tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/national-resistance-movement-44466/articlesNational Resistance Movement – The Conversation2022-05-22T12:35:12Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1818632022-05-22T12:35:12Z2022-05-22T12:35:12ZMuseveni’s first son Muhoozi: clear signals of a succession plan in Uganda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461233/original/file-20220504-13-flt98h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muhoozi Kainerugaba, commander of Uganda's land forces and President Yoweri Museveni's son.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Busomoke/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On 8 March 2022, Ugandan politics was sent into a spin by 49 words tweeted by President Yoweri Museveni’s only son, Lt Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba.</p>
<p>The tweet announced Muhoozi’s retirement from the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), which he had formally served in since 1999. Since his most recent promotion in June 2021, he has served as the commander of the land forces. The position made him the third-highest ranking officer in the defence forces.</p>
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<p>Muhoozi’s resignation would clear his legal path to formally enter electoral politics. Serving members of the armed forces are banned from political activity under Uganda’s constitution. </p>
<p>The tweet seemed to catch everyone by surprise, including senior security officials. They later <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-clears-the-air-on-muhoozi-status-3745690">put out a statement</a> saying Muhoozi had not resigned. </p>
<p>While Muhoozi clarified hours later that his retirement would not come for eight years, the post fits a recent pattern that has fuelled growing public perception that he is declaring his political intentions. </p>
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<p>The most stark example of this occurred weeks after the tweet. This was in the form of a nationwide series of public events to mark <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/muhoozi-s-birthday-launch-of-the-project--3800066">Muhoozi’s 48th birthday</a>. </p>
<p>These included sports tournaments, public rallies, a party for supporters, and a state dinner. Public roads were shut for the events, and state-owned broadcasters aired some of them live. Rwandan President Paul Kagame attended the State Dinner. </p>
<p>At one of the birthday rallies held in the south-western town of Masaka on <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/the-curious-case-of-muhoozi-national-event-3791614">April 20,</a> supporters wore T-shirts with slogans such as ‘Muhoozi K is our next president’ and ‘MK Project. Team Chairman. Secure Your Tomorrow.’ </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-will-take-power-says-muhoozi-3801732">subsequent tweets</a> in early May, Muhoozi dropped any remaining reticence. </p>
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<p>He later added:</p>
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<p>At the state dinner, Museveni, who has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/i-am-not-grooming-my-son-for-presidency-says-museveni-3544172">always denied</a> grooming his son to succeed him, <a href="https://www.observer.ug/news/headlines/73599-why-colonels-generals-support-gen-muhoozi">made comments </a> implying that Muhoozi would soon be in charge. </p>
<p>Whether or not Muhoozi makes it to State House – and a great deal still stands in the way of this happening – it is undoubtedly clear that the possibility of replacing Museveni with his son has dramatically shifted from rumour to reality in recent months.</p>
<h2>Heir apparent, apparently</h2>
<p>Muhoozi was 11 years old when his father’s National Resistance Army took Uganda’s capital Kampala in 1986. In 1999, he formally joined the Ugandan defence forces while a student at the city’s Makerere University. </p>
<p>He has been subsequently trained at elite military academies in the UK and US, and <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/muhoozi-kainerugaba-uganda-s-cagey-heir-apparent-3726692">continually promoted</a> ahead of more experienced peers.</p>
<p>After Muhoozi’s most recent promotion to commander of the land forces, he has featured in a number of Uganda’s military deployments. These include those in the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/updf-sends-more-troops-armoured-vehicles-into-dr-congo-in-anti-adf-rebel-operation--3639838">Democratic Republic of Congo,</a> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/the-rise-of-gen-muhoozi-kainerugaba-3742016">Somalia</a> where Uganda is part of the African Union peacekeeping force, and the <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/we-re-coming-with-hell-muhoozi-tells-rustlers-3757124">Karamoja region</a> in Uganda’s northeast. </p>
<p>Muhoozi’s fast-tracked rise into a position of power within the military has long produced <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/probe-assasination-claims-says-tinyefuza-1542336">accusations</a> that he is being groomed by Museveni for succession. Yet, despite this ‘heir apparent’ accusation, Muhoozi’s public profile had previously remained relatively small. He is still perceived as something of ‘an unknown quantity’ among broad swathes of the Ugandan public. </p>
<p>He has rarely given interviews to traditional media outlets. For most of his adult life, the average citizen would probably not have known very much about him. </p>
<p>The reasons for this relatively subdued profile were related to the inner workings of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2016.1279853">National Resistance Movement</a> (NRM) regime that Museveni has led since 1986. </p>
<h2>Museveni’s play book</h2>
<p>At every point in his now 36 years at the helm, the president has maintained a posture of impending retirement. Museveni consistently suggests that the next election will be his last and that he dreams of <a href="https://chimpreports.com/museveni-i-am-ready-to-retire-as-soon-as-we-get-east-africa-federation/">the simple life</a> of cattle keeping. </p>
<p>Being constantly about to step down in this way has allowed Museveni to play off the factions of the NRM against each other. He has dangled the possibility of succession before them. </p>
<p>In Uganda, this ploy has been referred to as the succession <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/what-really-happened-to-the-succession-queue--1586740">‘queue’</a> within the ruling party.</p>
<p>In recent years, however, this act has worn thin. </p>
<p>This is mainly because Museveni has successfully marginalised several powerful National Resistance Movement figures who had developed partially autonomous political bases. They include former Vice President Gilbert Bukenya, former Parliamentary Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, former Inspector General of Police Kale Kayihura, and most spectacularly former Prime Minister and Party Secretary General Amama Mbabazi. </p>
<p>The decline of these figures – all rumoured to be in the metaphorical ‘queue’ for the top job – has made even the most naive party elites incredulous to the idea that Museveni will ever hand over power to one of them. </p>
<h2>Enter Muhoozi</h2>
<p>This change has coincided with the political emergence of Muhoozi in recent years. </p>
<p>His public profile has been growing both domestically and internationally. As a presidential advisor on special operations, a post he was appointed to in 2017 alongside his military roles, Muhoozi has <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/is-former-ldu-muhoozi-eyeing-seat-of-commander-in-chief--3800078">held summits</a> with the leaders of Egypt, Kenya and Somalia. </p>
<p>He has also held regional engagements with Rwanda’s Kagame, whom he refers to as his ‘uncle’. Following a meeting between the two men in Kigali in January, Rwanda finally agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-has-reopened-the-border-with-uganda-but-distrust-could-close-it-again-176861">reopen its border</a> with Uganda. It had been closed for three years following Kigali’s accusations that Uganda had been harbouring members of the opposition Rwandan National Congress. </p>
<p>The perception that Muhoozi’s intervention has been key in mending the frosty relationship between the two countries was reinforced by a further meeting, again in Kigali, in <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202203150194.html">March</a>. After this, Muhoozi and Kagame announced a broader bi-lateral agreement to stop supporting dissidents in each other’s countries. </p>
<p>Shortly afterwards, Rwandan opposition blogger, and former journalist, <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-deports-top-rwandan-rebel-robert-mukombozi-3771012">Robert Mukombozi</a>, who had been living in Kampala, was pictured boarding a plane at Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport. </p>
<p>Muhoozi confirmed on Twitter that Mukombozi had been expelled, describing him as an “enemy of Rwanda and Uganda”. It was not clear where Mukombozi was going, although it was <a href="https://taarifa.rw/robert-mukombozi-rncs-boss-in-australia-deported-to-rwanda/">possibly to Australia</a>, with which he has ties. </p>
<p>No longer a quiet figure in the background, the First Son has recently become vocal on social media about many aspects of Ugandan politics and its foreign affairs. </p>
<p>In many cases, his stances appear to have <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/72924-disregard-muhoozi-s-tweet-backing-russia-on-ukraine-minister-oryem">contradicted</a> some of the official positions of the Ugandan government. These include his tweets in support of Tigrayan rebels in Ethiopia’s civil war, and Russian President Vladimir Putin in his invasion of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Alarming to many is not just the positions Muhoozi has taken, but the <a href="https://observer.ug/viewpoint/72907-what-s-beneath-muhoozi-s-ridiculous-and-outrageous-tweets">bombastic and egotistic tone</a> of his discourse. </p>
<p>He frequently states that he will destroy Uganda’s enemies, and likens himself to military and revolutionary figures throughout history. These are discursive traits that have long been components of his father’s rhetoric.</p>
<p>Yet, across the country and online, multiple ‘Team MK’ or ‘MK 2026’ <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/71516-muhoozi-army-campaigns-for-his-2026-presidential-bid">groups</a> are popping up to support his future presidential run.</p>
<h2>What’s coming?</h2>
<p>The most likely explanation for Muhoozi’s recent emergence is that his once low profile is being raised to position him to succeed his father. If this is indeed the regime’s wish, it would be unwise to bet against it. </p>
<p>However, the pathway for Muhoozi to reach State House is far from guaranteed. The Ugandan public would expect him to win an election to legitimise his leadership, and in so doing he would potentially face 2021 candidate <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/120/481/629/6406415">Bobi Wine</a> in fierce competition for the nation’s increasingly young electorate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181863/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Wilkins has received funding from the British Institute in Eastern Africa</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Vokes has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Royal Society of New Zealand, the European Union, the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), the British Institute in Eastern Africa, the British Library, and the Australia-Africa Universities Network.</span></em></p>The plan to replace Museveni with his son has dramatically shifted from rumour to reality in recent months.Sam Wilkins, Lecturer, RMIT UniversityRichard Vokes, Professor of Anthropology and International Development, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1804472022-04-10T07:54:05Z2022-04-10T07:54:05ZHow the Ugandan state outsources the use of violence to stay in power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/456092/original/file-20220404-22-c9tr4i.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police officers cordon off a crime scene in Kampala, Uganda, in 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hajarah Nalwadda/Xinhua via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>How do authoritarian rulers survive in the context of democratic institutions? This is a <a href="https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/new-perspectives-modern-authoritarianism">long-standing puzzle</a> that has become more pressing with the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029">rise</a> of authoritarianism in the 21st century.</p>
<p>In theory, democratic institutions should allow citizens to vote out elected officials who don’t pursue the public interest, or hold them accountable via other measures, like an independent judiciary.</p>
<p>Yet, most of today’s authoritarian regimes hold regular elections, have a formal separation of powers and a relatively independent press. Scholars have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428375?seq=1">called</a> these hybrid or electoral authoritarian regimes.</p>
<p>I set out to <a href="https://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/9780198856474.pdf">research</a> this puzzle of authoritarian rule. I focused on Uganda because it provides a clear case of an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14662043.2019.1576277?casa_token=KwJAV-kp4nUAAAAA%3A8FJpORb_XzZChQahLmL074YF3Bs6MC_ATIQOgYMjR-_kZZo0TLscX_Sco12cglNfsZK3DrRLHKeBQg">electoral authoritarian regime</a>. President Yoweri Museveni has held power since 1986 under the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement. The state is seen as <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/ugandas-fraudulent-election/">increasingly repressive</a>. However, it holds regular elections and meets some other basic criteria of a democracy. This includes a nominally independent judiciary, inclusive suffrage and a fairly free press.</p>
<p>In studying Uganda, I identified a type of governance that uses unpredictability to combine democratic institutions with authoritarian power. I call this ‘institutionalised arbitrariness’.</p>
<p>Uganda is unique in many ways. Nevertheless, my research offers some insights for contemporary practices of authoritarianism worldwide. It also offers insights into the workings of post-liberation African states like Ethiopia, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p>I carried out fieldwork in Uganda, studying local violent actors. I held more than 300 interviews with local security actors. These included vigilantes and community police, community members and government representatives.</p>
<p>I attended public events like community meetings, and collected village-level bylaws and other documentation that helped triangulate what people told me. </p>
<p>I studied the interactions between state authorities and informal security actors to understand who can use violence and how, and the implications for state authority. For instance, I looked at how vigilante groups were formed in different communities and what they did. This included how they enforced local order and when they were seen to overstep their mandate. </p>
<p>I also studied <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198856474.001.0001/oso-9780198856474-chapter-6">Uganda’s Crime Preventer programme</a>. My aim was to understand who joined it, what activities crime preventers were asked to do, and how the programme joined national-level politics to the grassroots.</p>
<h2>Key findings</h2>
<p>Uganda has limited capacity to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23040638?seq=1">fully monopolise violence in its territory</a> or <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uganda/overview#1">provide basic services</a> to its citizens. It relies on repression, but its limited capacity means that it cannot silence dissent systematically and reliably. </p>
<p>My research analysed the interactions between state authorities and informal violent actors. What I found was surprising. First, state actors encouraged the formation of these groups and gave them the job of using violence to police their communities. This was an active outsourcing of violence to non-state actors. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-roots-of-pre-election-carnage-by-uganda-security-forces-152774">The roots of pre-election carnage by Uganda security forces</a>
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<p>I also found that local violent actors tried to consolidate their authority – as might be expected. They imposed bylaws and extracted resources in the form of fees and taxes. They also provided varying degrees of security and justice. </p>
<p>But the groups didn’t consolidate. Instead, they remained fluid and poorly defined. This was in part because their membership often got into trouble with state authorities for using excessive violence, or intervening in matters that were later determined beyond their remit. As a result, they were unable to succeed to a level that would meaningfully threaten state control. </p>
<p>The failure of violent local actors to consolidate was not for lack of trying. Across my cases, vigilantes and other local security actors tried to formalise control over a specific jurisdiction, usually their village.</p>
<p>They also emulated established authorities. For example, they printed ID cards and adopted titles like president, secretary, and even in one case, a ‘whip master’ who was tasked with caning wrongdoers. </p>
<p>But their efforts to consolidate power were largely unsuccessful because state actors continually changed their remit. At times they burdened local actors with tasks they were not equipped to handle. At other times, they reclaimed control without warning. </p>
<p>This enabled the state to outsource much of the day-to-day responsibilities associated with providing security and justice, while remaining authoritative.</p>
<p>So how does this link back to the paradox of electoral authoritarianism? </p>
<h2>The link to democracy</h2>
<p>My research shows that the presence of multiple kinds of authorities, each with poorly defined mandates, creates endemic unpredictability. This means that in everyday life, citizens do not know which actor can decisively solve a complaint. </p>
<p>For instance, if seeking accountability for a violent crime, citizens might go to the police. But they could also seek out local authorities, district officials, clan authorities and NGOs, among others. Each of these authorities may help to some extent, while partially deferring to – or overruling – other actors. The result is an environment in which no single actor can reliably claim authority over any area. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/arbitrary-detention-and-torture-in-uganda-the-government-ignores-the-law-157607">Arbitrary detention and torture in Uganda: the government ignores the law</a>
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<p>The state can allow certain autonomous or semi-autonomous spaces for opposition. This is because the unpredictable political environment makes these spaces so fragmented and fragile that citizens using them cannot gain traction to hold authorities accountable.</p>
<p>This creates an obstacle to the emergence of political accountability – sometimes called the compact between the state and society. The result is an approach to governance that is based more on fragmenting and weakening opposition than on extending unquestioned or unchallenged control. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>The implications for Uganda are wide ranging. The first and most apparent one is that it’s difficult to mobilise political opposition in this context. It isn’t that there are no spaces for political action. Rather, these spaces are fragile and threatened by the possibility of unaccountable state violence. </p>
<p>This helps understand why Ugandans use political protests or the legal system to check the executive. Yet, it’s very difficult to translate these activities into sustained and effective political organisation and action. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rising-vigilantism-south-africa-is-reaping-the-fruits-of-misrule-179891">Rising vigilantism: South Africa is reaping the fruits of misrule</a>
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<p>It also helps explain why citizens take up alternative approaches – such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698249.2020.1680018">naked protests</a> – to raise their political voices. </p>
<p>My research additionally underscores why it’s not possible to understand Ugandan politics without understanding the role of the security sector and armed forces.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180447/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This research received funding from the Centre for Public Authority and International Development (ES/P008038/1).</span></em></p>Uganda uses unpredictability to combine democratic institutions with authoritarian power.Rebecca Tapscott, Research Fellow, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1677252022-01-12T14:42:43Z2022-01-12T14:42:43ZFrom mercenaries to citizens: how the Nubians gained acceptance in Uganda<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/440414/original/file-20220112-15-e7l747.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ugandan strongman General Idi Amin raised the national profile of Uganda Nubians -- but they were persecuted soon after his overthrow in 1979.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Keystone/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been well over a century since the Nubian people arrived in Uganda from what was then Sudan, as the armed enforcers of the British colonial government. Over time, the new arrivals assimilated individuals from different ethnic backgrounds within Uganda while remaining a distinct group. Now officially recognised as Ugandans, the history of Ugandan Nubians – sometimes referred to simply as the “Nubi” – makes a case study of how social identity is formed and changed.</p>
<p>The Uganda Nubian origins were in what is now South Sudan. There, in the 1820s, some members of the Shilluk, Dinka, Bari, Lotuko, Madi, Lugbara and Alur ethnic groups coalesced into a community of people known as “Sudanese-Nubians”. They <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/722844">practised</a> Islamic culture and spoke a creolised form of Arabic. </p>
<p>The Sudanese Nubians developed as a distinct group as a result of Egypt’s military expansion south into Sudan in the first half of the nineteenth century. Among Sudanese Nubians were professional mercenaries who were used by both Africans and Europeans to capture slaves, ivory and minerals from Gondokoro (southern Sudan) during the 19th century. In the process, Africans adapted to the Arabic culture.</p>
<p>This is the group from which the British military administrator in Uganda <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-Lugard">Lord Frederick Lugard</a> recruited a band of mercenaries to keep law and order. </p>
<p>The Sudanese mercenaries under their leader Selim Bey were recruited at Kavali, an area in the southwestern corner of Lake Albert in Uganda. The band of about 8,200 Nubian men, women and children set off by canoe on Lake Albert via Bunyoro, a kingdom in western Uganda.</p>
<p>The Nubians later assimilated with those around them with whom they socially identified. This included the Kuku, Lugbara, Acholi, Kakwa, Bganda and Batoro. They became the Nubi-Muganda, Nubi-Kuku, Nubi-Toro, Nubi-Lugbara, Nubi-Acholi and Nubi-Kakwa, among others. </p>
<p>Most of Uganda’s ethnic groups are associated with specific ancestral territories. For instance the Baganda of central Uganda, Bagishu of eastern Uganda and Banyankole of western Uganda. However, Uganda Nubians have had no territorial claim because they settled in the different places they were deployed.</p>
<p>For decades Ugandan Nubians were treated as foreigners or “Abagwira” and discriminated against. But the country’s 1995 <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2017.pdf?lang=en">constitution</a> recognised the Nubians as a Ugandan indigenous ethnic community and as citizens. This was a significant step because their identity was now officially recognised with similar rights as other Ugandans. </p>
<p>In my <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/AJHC/article-full-text-pdf/3410C7860468">PhD research</a> I studied the formation and shifts of the Nubian ethnic identity, and the strategies Uganda Nubians have used to define and sustain themselves as a distinct ethnic group in Uganda. Understanding identity shifts over time allows for an appreciation of the fluidity and the construction of identities. </p>
<p>I drew the conclusion that there is more to ethnic identity than ancestral location or settlement pattern. It goes beyond language or family history too. Understanding this can lead to lessening of ethnic conflicts worsened by the colonially constructed ethnic territorial boundaries.</p>
<h2>Shifting identity</h2>
<p>Like most historical studies, my research relied mainly on oral history and written archival records. Oral interviews were conducted in Bombo and Kampala (both in central Uganda), Kabarole district (western Uganda) and Arua Adjuman and Pakwach (west Nile districts of Uganda). </p>
<p>Based on the oral narratives and archival documents, my study found that over the years, the Uganda Nubians came to take on different identities. But they retained a distinct group identity bound together by Islam and other aspects of culture, including language, food, dress and crafts. </p>
<p>In the early colonial period (1890s-1930s), the Nubians were identified by the British as “Sudanese mercenaries”. This was because they had worked as Sudanese-Egyptian mercenaries during the Anglo-Egyptian imperial campaign in Sudan during the 19th century. </p>
<p>This is why they were hired by Lugard for the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Kenya/The-British-East-Africa-Company">Imperial British East African Company</a>. But their mercenary identity changed when the British recruited them formally into the British army (Uganda Rifles and later East African Rifles) with the intention to boost the colonial army in order to “pacify” East Africa. </p>
<p>Throughout the colonial period to independence (1894-1962), the Uganda Nubians had settled wherever they were deployed by the British. By the mid-20th century, many Nubian soldiers were retired from service and integrated with other ethnic communities because they could not go back to Sudan. The Sudanese government did not consider the Uganda Nubians as their own since many decades had passed since they had left Sudan. </p>
<p>After Uganda’s independence in 1962, the Uganda Nubians came to be seen as “Sudanese foreigners” or “Sudanese mercenaries”. Even after living in Uganda for many decades, they were still perceived as “Abasudani Abagwira”. This is the local phrase for “Sudanese immigrants”. Thus the Uganda Nubians were left out of national programmes like education, health and poverty eradication. </p>
<p>Perceptions of the Uganda Nubians were to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/722844">change</a> again during Idi Amin’s regime (1971-1979). Some people labelled them as “Amin’s men”. Amin came from the Kakwa ethnic group, a Sudanic speaking Nilotic group in the West Nile part of Uganda. He identified himself as a Nubi-Kakwa and elevated the Uganda Nubians to crucial positions in the army, police, business, and other fields in his military government.</p>
<p>With the fall of Amin’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">notoriously brutal</a> regime in 1979, many Uganda Nubians were targeted as having been his accomplices. Nubian settlements were destroyed, bank accounts were frozen and shops belonging to Nubians were looted. Some Nubians fled into exile in neighbouring Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania. </p>
<p>Those who remained in Uganda suffered from marginalisation and discrimination. Some of them changed their names and those of their children to disguise themselves as other ethnic groups to get access to government services. </p>
<h2>End of marginalisation</h2>
<p>The Uganda Nubians were able to return to Uganda and resettle after President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement took over in 1986. The framers of the 1995 constitution recognised them as Ugandans since they had settled in Uganda before 1926 (the deciding date for the country’s boundaries and citizenship). They became known as the Nubi.</p>
<p>As citizens of Uganda, the Nubi were at last able to obtain national identification cards and passports. They now also enjoy voting rights. They became accepted by other ethnic communities, for example through intermarriage. This has eased ethnic tension and conflict in areas where the Nubi settled. </p>
<p>The 2014 <a href="https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/03_20182014_National_Census_Main_Report.pdf">statistical report</a> puts the Uganda Nubian population at 28,772 out of about 34 million Ugandans. </p>
<p>The history of the Nubi is an example of how ethnicities change and are not limited to geographical boundaries. They are socially created by the power centres of the time.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abudul Mahajubu receives funding from Gerda-Hankel Stiftung. </span></em></p>There is more to ethnic identity than ancestral location or settlement pattern, language or family history.Abudul Mahajubu, Researcher, Makerere UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1540812021-01-28T14:11:19Z2021-01-28T14:11:19ZMuseveni has failed to win over young, urban Ugandans: why he’s running out of options<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380827/original/file-20210127-21-1ha6vo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Campaign posters of President Yoweri Museveni hang on a cable a day after the election commission said he won a sixth term in office.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">YASUYOSHI CHIBA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Yoweri Museveni <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55689665">has claimed</a> victory in Uganda’s recent elections, potentially extending his presidential rule to 41 years. The elections were marred by <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/oped/columnists/daniel-kalinaki/in-five-years-will-our-destination-be-talks-on-the-left-or-junta-on-the-right--3264364">widespread claims of rigging, malpractice and intimidation</a>. At the receiving end of this was his thoroughly <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/bobi-wine-robert-kyagulanyi-uganda-opposition-yoweri-musaveni-torture-police-medical-treatment-a8519916.html">brutalised</a> opponent, the pop star-turned politician Robert Kyagulanyi, also known as Bobi Wine. </p>
<p>The question is, what’s next? </p>
<p>Museveni’s political party – the National Resistance Movement – has been the ruling party in Uganda since 1986. But its popularity has now hit rock bottom in the country’s urban areas, particularly among young people. </p>
<p>Kampala, like most of Uganda’s urban areas, has <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/dpr.12068">long been an opposition stronghold</a> and the urban challenge to Museveni was clear even before Bobi Wine arrived on the political scene in 2017.</p>
<p>It’s difficult for anyone to know exactly how much support Wine and his National Unity Platform command across the country. But what’s clear is that Museveni has been rejected in the capital. Wine’s party won <a href="https://dailyexpress.co.ug/2021/01/18/list-59-nup-elected-mps-for-the-11th-parliament/">nine of the 10 parliamentary seats</a> in Kampala, with the 10th being retained by its incumbent, an independent MP. Museveni’s party also won just <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/landslide-victory-for-lord-mayor-erias-lukwago/">8% of the mayoral votes</a> cast in Kampala. </p>
<p>Of the many challenges facing the president, the mobilisation of young people living in urban areas is one that clearly will not dissipate. Uganda has <a href="https://population.un.org/wup/Download/">one of the</a> youngest populations in the world, with a median age of 17. Moreover, between 2015 and 2020 its urban growth rate was <a href="https://population.un.org/wup/Download/">higher than any other country globally</a>. Given that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/20/why-are-ugandan-youth-so-angry-these-4-takeaways-illuminate-the-recent-protests/">disaffected urban youth</a> are so central to National Unity Platform’s support base, urban opposition is likely to fester and grow after this disputed election.</p>
<p>On the one hand, Uganda finds itself in uncharted territory. The beaten opposition candidate is from the growing demographic of dissatisfied urbanites, and his party has swept the board in Kampala and surrounding districts like no other opposition party before.</p>
<p>On the other hand, there is a sense of déjà vu. Museveni’s party didn’t win any seats in Kampala <a href="https://www.ec.or.ug/sites/default/files/docs/Gazette%20List%20Elected%20MPs%202016.pdf">in 2016 </a> either. </p>
<p>So what did Museveni do to try to regain political dominance in urban areas after previous elections? And what does this mean for the future?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/esid_wp_146_muwanga_mukwaya_goodfellow.pdf">Our research</a> explores this. It focuses on the National Resistance Movement’s attempt to dominate Kampala over the last two decades, and especially since 2010. </p>
<p>It shows the breadth of strategies and tactics used against urban opposition. Wads of cash, institutional restructuring, waiving taxes and regulations, militarisation and open terror on the streets were among them. But they’ve all failed to stop Kampala’s residents from voting against him. </p>
<p>Uganda is at a crossroads. It is clear that Museveni is <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/landslide-victory-for-lord-mayor-erias-lukwago/">running out of tactics</a>, and business as usual is no longer going to be enough. Either the country’s young, urbanising population needs to be taken much more seriously by the regime, or Museveni takes the country down the road of all-out military dictatorship.</p>
<h2>Two decades of shifting strategies</h2>
<p>Most media attention has understandably been focused on the brutal repression of opposition. Nevertheless, we can see that Museveni’s long campaign to claw back support in Kampala was multifaceted. It included efforts to manipulate institutions and co-opt urban youth, as well as to coerce.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, Museveni has made efforts to win over Kampala’s huge numbers of <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/understanding-the-informal-economy-in-african-cities-recent-evidence-from-greater-kampala">informal workers</a>. He built support among the city’s market vendors, carpenters, salon operators, restaurant owners and transport workers by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026427511200039X?casa_token=ziNpxYRcymcAAAAA:oLv7ZveR2LuL6_stBMAk5c5tvko2z3JkI7LU3Uqc-opRiB-LSDyFwA2pF34sCYDue0SPTHhuMQ">constantly intervening</a> to prevent the city council from implementing taxes and regulations. He also showered workers’ associations with micro finance schemes and other sporadic favours. This may have even yielded some results with an uptick in support in <a href="https://www.ec.or.ug/sites/Elec_results/2011_Direct_MPs.pdf">2011’s election.</a>.</p>
<p>But it became apparent between 2011 and 2016 that his push to transform the city through the new <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1468-2427.12012?casa_token=QmOTslgiYaMAAAAA%3ACyca9NmN68ZpMYm7s5lvVuaHdGnhd-AyS4WtwLu_qjGwBgb9lZIPsw_69J7E76KWr6c0mWclSX5Uebc">Kampala Capital City Authority</a> also made him unpopular with informal workers. Many found themselves at the sharp end of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2017.1378448?casa_token=8Tc1Ci1VrHAAAAAA%3AuBKKRIswQpBGOetZXRlQnqrw04g9Af6yRjrgG7tynTdMPeDkblvJFXqOwTHVpx0nrgFHODQgMZLt">“clean up” operations</a> on the city’s streets. </p>
<p>In the run-up to the 2016 election – by which time Bobi Wine’s politically-charged music was already rattling the president – Museveni even <a href="https://matsutas.wordpress.com/2015/11/16/we-are-with-you-musicians-and-the-2016-general-elections-in-uganda-by-nanna-schneidermann/">co-opted a dozen of Uganda’s other leading pop stars</a> into his own <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4JhrmVpL68">campaign</a> song.</p>
<p>This failed to prevent his very <a href="https://www.ec.or.ug/ecresults/02-Final%20Presidential%20Results%20by%20District.pdf">low vote share</a> in Kampala in 2016. He then went into overdrive to buy influence among urban youth and opposition figures. He established an informal <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-s-fight-for-soul-of-the-ghetto-1857056">“ghetto fund” and “brown envelopes”</a>, allegedly diverting money from official government projects, and <a href="https://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/esid_wp_146_muwanga_mukwaya_goodfellow.pdf">sent “socialites” and “philanthropists”</a> into city slums to distribute cash and consumer goods.</p>
<p>Wine’s home neighbourhood of Kamwokya was a particular target for Museveni. His State House acolytes wrote <a href="https://observer.ug/images/Museveni-handing-over-a-Shs-100m-dummy-cheque-to-Mulago-car-washers.jpg">gigantic</a> cheques to youth organisations - handouts that took place largely outside official channels.</p>
<p>In this respect, Museveni’s attempt to gain support in urban areas in the 2021 elections was not only about repression. But it still failed.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>What, then, will Museveni do next? </p>
<p>Fierce urban opposition didn’t prevent him from claiming a “large margin” of victory. After all, over <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=UG">three quarters</a> of Uganda’s population still live in rural areas, and Museveni has always dominated rural Uganda.</p>
<p>Given this, it is possible that he could just abandon efforts to win urban support, instead adopting a strategy of containment towards Bobi Wine and his urban followers.</p>
<p>There are, however, at least two good reasons to think this unlikely.</p>
<p>The first is Uganda’s extreme <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=UG">urbanisation trajectory</a>. The problem of urban opposition, if ignored, will only grow. The balance of voters is shifting away from Museveni, and he knows it.</p>
<p>The second is that abandoning cities to the opposition will mean maintaining very high levels of urban militarisation and repression, especially since Bobi Wine (now <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/61347/uganda-high-court-orders-military-to-release-bobi-wine-from-house-arrest/">released</a>) will surely try to continue mobilising his base. </p>
<p>This level of ongoing brutality is unlikely to be what the regime wants. Museveni likes to <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/12/953580506/ugandas-ruler-museveni-defends-violent-crackdown-in-bid-for-6th-term?t=1611765023363">show people who is boss in public</a>, viciously and periodically; but not continuously. His relationship with Western donors is still valued, and full-blown military rule is not a good option.</p>
<p>He might try to offer something new to offer city dwellers – such as major transport and housing projects or industrial jobs. </p>
<p>But for reasons relating to land tenure, corruption and the city’s politics, Kampala is a <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/the-fall-of-jennifer-musisi/">notoriously difficult context</a> in which to deliver these kinds of projects. That’s why the regime has always fallen back on informal favours and populist gestures. Evidently these are no longer sufficient to stop urban opposition mounting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154081/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Goodfellow receives funding from the Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre, Economic and Social Research Council and Global Challenges Research Fund.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Isolo Mukwaya receives funding from Effective States & Inclusive Development Centre, Economic and Social Research Council and Global Challenges Research Fund. </span></em></p>Museveni’s attempt to gain support in urban areas in the 2021 elections was not only about repression. But it still failed.Tom Goodfellow, Lecturer in Urban Studies and Planning, University of SheffieldPaul Isolo Mukwaya, Senior Lecturer, Makerere UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1532052021-01-13T14:02:54Z2021-01-13T14:02:54ZBobi Wine has shaken up Ugandan politics: four things worth knowing about him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/378503/original/file-20210113-13-dmiay0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, also known as Bobi Wine, addresses supporters in Uganda's capital Kampala. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Regardless of how Ugandans decide to vote in the January 14 presidential elections, the incumbent Yoweri Museveni will most likely be declared the winner. Museveni has ruled the country for five consecutive terms. He has historically been able to <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/05/16/uganda-cost-of-fake-democracy/">manipulate</a> elections in his favour, because he controls Uganda’s military, judiciary, and Electoral Commission with an iron fist.</p>
<p>Throughout this electoral campaign, however, the long-standing Ugandan president has been upstaged by a formidable young challenger: popular musician-turned-parliamentarian Robert Kyagulanyi, aka Bobi Wine. Since being elected as a Member of Parliament in 2017, the 38-year-old leader of the National Unity Platform has become the new face of Uganda’s opposition.</p>
<p>There are four things worth knowing about Bobi Wine and Uganda’s politics.</p>
<h2>Building a movement, defying expectations</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine has repeatedly been underestimated by government supporters and critics since he first ran for parliament. He was forced to run as an independent after the two major opposition parties, the Forum for Democratic Change and the Democratic Party, turned him away.</p>
<p>He nevertheless easily won the by-election in the Kyandondo East constituency within Kampala with <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/53602-kyadondo-east-bobi-wine-headed-for-landslide-victory">78%</a> of the vote. Since then, he has proved himself to be a skilled politician who has successfully built a strong political movement – from scratch.</p>
<p>Within his first two years in office, he forged a reputation as a principled and fearless opponent of Museveni’s policies. He was a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLDMrbk5VIU">leading voice</a> against the president’s ultimately successful effort to remove <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/us-turns-blind-eye-ugandas-assault-democracy/">presidential age limits</a> from the constitution. He also led protests against the government’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44798627">proposed tax on social media</a> in July 2018.</p>
<p>Over the course of that same year, he endorsed opposition candidates who went on to <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/bobi-wine-beats-besigye-in-bugiri/">win</a> four consecutive parliamentary by-elections. </p>
<p>By 2018, he had created a political pressure group called <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/can-bobi-wine-unite-uganda-and-bring-down-a-dictator/">People Power, Our Power</a>. When the government blocked its registration as a formal political party, Bobi Wine outmanoeuvred the Electoral Commission by aligning himself with a smaller, pre-existing one, which he <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/how-bobi-wine-nup-deal-was-negotiated-1908714">re-christened</a> as the National Unity Platform. Almost immediately more than 20 MPs left more established opposition parties to <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/21-mps-join-bobi-wine-1921682">join</a> his party.</p>
<h2>A target of unprecedented state repression</h2>
<p>Bobi Wine has been a regular target of state <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/besigye-lauds-opposition-presidential-candidates-for-bracing-security-brutality-3254412">repression</a>. </p>
<p>The Museveni regime responded to his early successes by repeatedly <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/62237-police-cancels-another-bobi-wine-concert">blocking</a> him from holding concerts and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/30/uganda-bans-red-beret-bobi-wines-signature-headgear">banning</a> the public from wearing People Power’s trademark red berets.</p>
<p>Since being elected, Bobi Wine has been <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-presidential-candidate-bobi-wine-arrested-reports-3243652">arrested</a> countless times. He has never been convicted on any of the charges. Some of his movement’s members and supporters have been <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/63683-one-shot-dead-as-police-battles-bobi-wine-supporters-in-nansana">killed</a>, sometimes in <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/ziggy-wyne-death-bobi-wine-speaks-out-1841472">suspicious</a> <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/police-accused-of-killing-people-power-movement-supporter-1876952">circumstances</a>. </p>
<p>Many have been arrested. Perhaps most notoriously, in August 2018, as he campaigned for a fellow independent candidate in a by-election in Arua in northwestern Uganda, Bobi Wine and at least 35 of his political associates were <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/uganda-bobi-wine-arrested/568549/">arrested</a> following dubious <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/can-bobi-wine-unite-uganda-and-bring-down-a-dictator/">reports</a> that Museveni’s motorcade had been stoned. That same night the opposition leader’s driver, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/uganda-investigate-death-of-opposition-politicians-driver/">Yasin Kawuma</a>, was murdered with a bullet that Bobi Wine <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/opinion/uganda-museveni-repression.html">believes</a> was intended for him.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of these arrests, the Kyadondo East MP was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/uganda-museveni-critic-bobi-wine-charged-in-military-trial/a-45082938">charged with treason</a> and possession of illegal firearms. Over his next ten days in custody, he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/04/bobi-wine-ugandan-pop-star-politician-describes-torture-by-soldiers">beaten so brutally</a> by government security forces that he could not stand, sit or walk. He eventually sought <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/1/bobi-wine-arrives-in-us-for-medical-treatment">treatment for his injuries</a> in the US.</p>
<p>International <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/chris-martin-and-damon-albarn-join-campaign-to-free-uganda-star-bobi-wine">outrage</a> at this incident has not stopped the Museveni regime from escalating its tactics of repression during this election cycle.</p>
<p>The arrests have continued unabated throughout the current campaign. In addition, campaign rallies have been restricted and the government has met opposition supporters with deadly force on multiple occasions. Most tragically, following Bobi Wine’s arrest in mid-November, nationwide protests erupted during which state security forces killed <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/uganda-stop-killings-and-human-rights-violations-ahead-of-election-day/">at least 54 people</a>.</p>
<p>In response to these abuses, in early January, Bobi Wine and two other co-claimants filed a 47-page complaint to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/world/africa/uganda-election-bobi-wine-icc.html">International Criminal Court</a> against Museveni and nine of his regime’s security officials, accusing them of gross human rights violations dating back to 2018.</p>
<h2>Generational dimension</h2>
<p>Uganda’s changing demographics have a great deal to do with Bobi Wine’s electoral appeal. The East African country of 46.5 million people has one of the world’s youngest populations, with a median age of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uganda-population/">16.7</a>. Just over one in five Ugandans are between the ages of 15 and 24 and 77% of the country’s population is <a href="https://www.issuelab.org/resources/4998/4998.pdf">under the age of 30</a>.</p>
<p>Although these young people have benefited from reforms to public education introduced by the Museveni regime, they see little hope for the future. By some estimates, youth unemployment in Uganda is as <a href="https://theconversation.com/insights-into-why-ugandas-strategy-to-create-jobs-for-young-people-hasnt-fully-worked-149576">high</a> as 70%. Frustrated young people can, therefore, easily identify with Bobi Wine, who grew up in the Kampala ghetto of Kamwokya. Like him, they have only known life under Museveni. He was not even four when Museveni first came to power in 1986.</p>
<p>Bobi Wine has skilfully appealed to this demographic. He frames his political movement in generational terms: the “Facebook generation”, which he represents against the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/uganda-if-we-do-not-take-risks-we-risk-everything/">“entrenched interests of the ‘Facelift generation’”</a> of the Museveni regime. He has been able to speak to – and articulate – the deep sense of anger and grievance that young Ugandans feel towards the Museveni regime. In so doing, Uganda’s “Ghetto President” has come to be the face and voice of young people’s collective desire for generational political change.</p>
<h2>Populism</h2>
<p>In the final weeks of the campaign, Museveni derided Bobi Wine as a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/some-countries-have-voted-for-change-out-of-excitement-museveni--3250376">populist</a> politician. While this adjective was intended to dismiss his young adversary, there is some truth to this label. In my <a href="https://www.academia.edu/44894954/_Politics_Unusual_Generational_Populism_and_the_Making_of_People_Power_in_Uganda">research</a>, I argue that Bobi Wine’s inclusionary brand of populism has also been a key to his political success.</p>
<p>His use of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569317.2020.1844372">populist rhetoric</a> has effectively forged a new collective sense of identity among his mostly youthful supporters around the nodal point of “the people” and in antagonistic opposition to the country’s political elite .</p>
<p>But Bobi Wine’s brand of populism is novel because his conception of “the people” is defined not in ethno-nationalist terms (as with right-wing politicians in the US or Western Europe). Rather it’s defined largely in generational ones. This has helped him to build a burgeoning political coalition across ethno-regional lines.</p>
<p>If Bobi Wine’s brand of generational populism proves successful, its repercussions could be felt across Africa. It could serve as a model for opposition politicians who are operating in countries with similar demographic characteristics and facing many of the same political obstacles.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luke Melchiorre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition presidential candidate Robert Kyangulanyi has repeatedly been underestimated by government supporters and critics since he first ran for parliament.Luke Melchiorre, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Universidad de los Andes Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1142022019-03-25T13:58:59Z2019-03-25T13:58:59ZEast Africa should intervene to defuse Rwanda-Uganda war of words<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265541/original/file-20190325-36270-kd865o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Presidents Paul Kagame (right) and Yoweri Museveni observe a minute of silence during a genocide memorial.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Ricky Gare</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The verbal exchanges between presidents Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, between their ministers and between their media have been escalating. In the aftermath, borders remain closed and trade and movement of people has been disrupted. </p>
<p>Historically the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda – and their countries – have been close allies. Kagame was among the “originals” of the National Resistance Movement that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/30/world/rebel-sworn-in-as-uganda-president.html">started a rebellion</a> in 1981 . He and many other Rwandan fighters contributed significantly to Museveni’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1166507?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">seizure of power</a> in 1986. In return, Uganda gave crucial support to the Rwandan Patriotic Front <a href="https://observer.ug/features-sp-2084439083/96-special-series/35981--museveni-how-i-supported-rpf-in-rwandas-1994-liberation-war">during the civil war in Rwanda</a>. Without it, Kagame would probably not have taken power in 1994. </p>
<p>Again, during the first Congo war in 1997 the two were close allies in support of the rebellion that toppled Mobutu Sese Seko and brought Laurent Kabila <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3557264?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">to power in 1997</a>. </p>
<p>At the end of the 1990s things changed, and the unthinkable happened. The two friends clashed on several occasions <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/great-african-war/044430BB49F3381D4C9B2C1C330A40C0">during the second Congo war</a>. They fell out against the background of political differences on how to handle the war. But just as important was the competition between the countries over the <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/1999/08/19/old-friends-new-war">exploitation of Congolese natural resources</a>. </p>
<p>Hundreds of their soldiers were killed in 1999 and 2000. The entente cordiale never fully recovered.</p>
<p>A semblance of peace was restored in the early 2000s, but only after Clare Short, the then UK Secretary of State for International Cooperation, summoned the two to London in 2001 to avoid all-out war between Rwanda and Uganda. </p>
<p>A new round of hostilities erupted in 2017. These escalated considerably in early 2019. The Ugandan leadership <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Plot-to-topple-Museveni-claims-army-boss/4552908-4978284-yrcy61z/index.html">alleges that there are external efforts to topple the regime</a>. In response, the Rwandan Foreign Minister has <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/100-rwandans-held-uganda">claimed</a> that hundreds of Rwandans were illegally deported from Uganda and that many have been arrested and tortured. In early March, Ugandan nationals and vehicles were <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/60008-ugandan-nationals-vehicles-denied-entry-into-rwanda">denied entry</a> at Gatuna border post.</p>
<p>Although a military confrontation remains implausible, today’s situation is reminiscent of the worst days between the two neighbours. Leaders of the region need to do more to avert a violent scenario. </p>
<h2>Why relations went sour</h2>
<p>In February 2017 a Rwandan news agency, Rushyashya, which was considered to be close to the intelligence services, claimed that a <a href="https://theugandan.com.ug/rwanda-accuses-museveni-french-of-training-kayumba-nyamwasas-rebels-in-kibaale/">Uganda-backed rebel force was being set up</a> at a training camp to the west of Kampala. It was said to be put in place by the exiled opposition movement Rwanda National Congress with the support of a Rwandan businessman who fell out with Kagame and set up a large tobacco development investment in northern Uganda.</p>
<p>Things came to a head at the end of October, when nine people were arrested and charged in Uganda with conspiracy in the kidnap and illegal deportation to Rwanda of an exiled former military officer six years ago. Lieutenant Joël Mutabazi was sentenced to life imprisonment in Rwanda <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Ugandan-officers-charged-with-abducting-Rwanda-refugees/4552908-4927982-jxmljvz/index.html">on several counts related to subversion</a>.</p>
<p>Then in mid-December, the Ugandan intelligence <a href="http://www.inyenyerinews.org/justice-and-reconciliation/national-exclusive-cmi-detains-top-rwanda-patriotic-front-official/">detained</a> a high ranking Rwanda Patriotic Front official for “alleged espionage and activities which threaten national security”.</p>
<p>There <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2017/12/04/frenemies-for-life-has-the-love-gone-between-uganda-and-rwanda/">have also been other bones of contention</a>. These include air traffic rights, priorities on the construction of the new standard gauge railway, energy projects and French support for the training of Ugandan military units.</p>
<p>A number of incidents showed that relations continued to deteriorate throughout 2018. In early January, a former operative of Uganda’s intelligence agency <a href="https://www.thegrapevine.co.ug/i-was-paid-usd100000-to-kill-museveni/">wrote</a> to Museveni to claim that he had been offered US$100,000 by Rwandan agents to assassinate him. And Ugandan nationals <a href="https://chimpreports.com/more-ugandans-fired-from-rwandan-jobs/">claimed</a> they were being arbitrarily sacked in Rwandan media, schools and banks. </p>
<p>For its part, Kigali again <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-Uganda-tensions/2558-4341084-mldncsz/index.html">accused</a> Kampala of illegally detaining and torturing its citizens and of harbouring dissidents intent on destabilising Rwanda. Suspected Rwandan agents <a href="https://www.glpost.com/suspected-rwandan-agents-flee-kampala-as-military-intensifies-crackdown-at-ugandan-borders/">fled</a> Kampala because of a crackdown by Ugandan security forces.</p>
<h2>Distrust</h2>
<p>Museveni and Kagame know each other very well. Nevertheless, the distrust between them is considerable. They both seem to genuinely believe that the other is bent on destabilising their respective regimes. </p>
<p>Earlier this month Kagame <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/opinions/rwanda-everything-kneeling">lashed out</a>, claiming Uganda “had been undermining Rwanda since 1998”. He added that, faced with attempts to destabilise the country, “no one can bring me to my knees”. Museveni responded on the same day with a <a href="https://www.vanguardnews.ug/once-we-mobilize-you-cant-survive-museveni-responds-to-kagame/">pointed warning</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those who want to destabilise our country do not know our capacity. Once we mobilise, you can’t survive. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Rwandan government has <a href="https://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/rwanda-warns-citizens-against-travel-uganda">advised its citizens</a>) not to travel to Uganda for safety reasons, and a week later effectively <a href="https://www.256businessnews.com/uganda-accuses-rwanda-of-imposing-trade-embargo/">closed the border</a>. This left hundreds of trucks stranded. Even ordinary Rwandans who used to go to Uganda for purchases, schools or medical care were prevented from crossing into Uganda. And to prevent them from using unofficial crossings, the Rwandan army destroyed makeshift bridges and arrested those attempting to pass. </p>
<p><a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/60027-ugandan-drivers-locked-in-trucks-at-gatuna-chanika-borders">Unconfirmed reports mentioned</a> the deployment of Rwandan troops along the border. In mid-March, Ugandans started to <a href="https://command1post.com/index.php/2019/03/13/ugandans-shut-down-hotels-shops-in-kigali/">shut down their businesses</a> in Kigali because of a lack of supplies.</p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Where does this lead? </p>
<p>Both governments continue to trade accusations and take hostile unilateral actions. They aren’t even talking to one another directly to find solutions. In addition to impeding trade and the movement of people, the impasse is an obvious setback to cooperation and integration within the East African Community. Yet their neighbours Kenya and Tanzania remain silent. </p>
<p>Kenya’s president Uhuru Kenyatta met both Kagame and Museveni on the same day. But <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/60093-uhuru-kenyatta-meets-kagame-museveni">nothing concrete</a> seems to have come from the bilateral talks. There’s been no follow-up. And no roadmap has emerged. Yet Kenyatta and Tanzanian President John Magufuli, as leaders of countries that control access to landlocked Uganda and Rwanda, have a powerful lever in their hands. </p>
<p>And if leaders of the East African Community prove unable to tackle this potentially destructive issue, then perhaps the African Union – which was chaired by Kagame until January – should take the lead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114202/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filip Reyntjens does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A military confrontation between Uganda and Rwanda remains implausible. But the stand-off between the two countries is reminiscent of the worst days between them.Filip Reyntjens, Emeritus Professor of Law and Politics Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1023652018-08-31T07:02:36Z2018-08-31T07:02:36ZWhy Bobi Wine represents such a big threat to Museveni<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234277/original/file-20180830-195313-5v0hok.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The ground is shifting under the feet of Uganda's ruling party, the National Resistance Movement.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past fortnight, Uganda has been convulsed by the fallout from <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/uganda-bobi-wine-arrested/568549/">the arrest</a> of opposition MP Robert Kyagulanyi – better known as Afro-beat pop superstar Bobi Wine. His arrest, along with others opposed to the government, led to violent street protests in the capital Kampala and other urban centres.</p>
<p>The current upheavals began in mid-August when President Yoweri Museveni, Bobi Wine, and other opposition MPs descended on the north-western town of Arua to campaign in a by-election.</p>
<p>After several hours of raucous campaigning on all sides, the president’s motorcade was attacked with stones as it left the town, <a href="https://nilepost.co.ug/2018/08/15/president-museveni-blames-opposition-leaders-for-arua-chaos/">allegedly</a> by Bobi Wine’s supporters. Museveni reached his helicopter unharmed. But his security detail returned to Arua and <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFL5N1V64T7">unleashed a wave of violence</a> against the crowds still gathered there.</p>
<p>In the ensuing melee Bobi Wine, five other opposition MPs, two journalists and at least 28 other people were arrested. Bobi Wine’s driver – Yasiin Kawuma – <a href="https://observer.ug/news/headlines/58421-bobi-wine-driver-mugerwa-shot-dead.html">was shot dead</a>. Over the following days, <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Uganda-police-surround-Kizza-Besigye-s-home-in-Kampala/1066-4724976-ac3bapz/index.html">other opposition figures were also arrested</a>.</p>
<p>Almost immediately after news broke of the arrests and Kawuma’s death, street protests erupted in Kampala. These initially centred on the poor neighbourhood of Kamwokya (where Bobi Wine’s studio is located) and Kyadondo East (his constituency), but quickly spread. The unrest worsened as news emerged that Bobi Wine and the other arrested MPs had been badly mistreated in custody. When he finally appeared in court 10 days later he <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/story/2001293083/video-bobi-wine-struggles-to-walk-as-he-is-re-arrested">could barely walk</a>.</p>
<p>The growing protests drew a sharp response from the security services. The violence left dozens of people hospitalised, and at least two dead. Journalists writing about the affair <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Journalists-receive-threatening-calls-back-off-Bobi-Wine-stories/688334-4724030-vo1tgdz/index.html">have been threatened</a>.</p>
<p>The arrest and intimidation of opposition figures isn’t new in Museveni’s Uganda. Even so, the speed and severity of the security forces’ response was shocking. Their initial reaction was bad enough. But the subsequent escalation and the treason case against Bobi Wine suggests there’s more to the story than trigger happy soldiers.</p>
<p>And there is. Bobi Wine has been released on bail. This may draw a line under recent events — for now. But Museveni’s problems have only just begun, and run deep. He’s facing an increasingly agitated younger voter base, an erosion of the National Resistance Movement’s political model, and the growing prominence <a href="https://theconversation.com/bobi-wine-case-demonstrates-the-power-of-social-media-102179">of social media</a> in Uganda’s political life. All these factors will only grow over time. </p>
<h2>Changing voter profile</h2>
<p>In its first two decades of rule, the National Resistance Movement effectively operated as a single party under the “movement system”: all candidates were forced to stand as individuals rather than members of national political parties.</p>
<p>This legacy endures. The “individual” culture of local politics has continued since the National Resistance Movement became a political party in 2005. Its key constituents are rural voters who engage in politics mainly on local issues. They are also old enough to remember the <a href="https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4386/5071">horrific civil war</a> that preceded Museveni’s tenure. </p>
<p>To these voters removing the president from power is a perilous, even traumatic idea. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2016.1279853">Ethnographic research</a> we carried out in southern Uganda during the 2016 presidential election campaigns confirms this. It shows that most of Museveni’s voters aren’t simply coerced or bought off – they don’t want him replaced.</p>
<p>There is little reason to think that the old system is collapsing. Rather the problem for Museveni is that the number of those whose interests and identities it does <em>not</em> cater for is increasing.</p>
<p>This group includes younger voters. They have no memory of the war, have a relatively good education that has led them to want more than the agricultural livelihood of their parents, and stubbornly engage with politics on a national rather than local scale. </p>
<p>They’re not interested in replacing a local MP. They want a new president. </p>
<p>These voters have never been a key constituency for Museveni. Previously their political threat could be dismissed – there weren’t many of them, they were organisationally weak and concentrated in a few urban centres.</p>
<p>But the ground is shifting under the National Resistance Movement’s feet.</p>
<p>Young voters are now scattered across the country, including in the towns of Museveni’s rural southern heartland. The advent of social media makes it easier for them to network and communicate with each other. They can also get around more easily.</p>
<p>Most significantly, their numbers are rising fast. Uganda has one of the <a href="http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/uganda-population/">youngest populations</a> in the world. <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html">Just over</a> 48% of its population is 14 years and younger while one in five (21.16%) of the total population are aged between 15 and 24. Only 2% of the population is 65 years or older.</p>
<p>So the 36-year-old Bobi Wine is not a threat because he is saying something that no opposition leader has said before. It’s because he has, with considerable skill, positioned himself as a champion of this growing demographic.</p>
<h2>Building a movement</h2>
<p>Museveni likes to portray his opponents as either divisive <a href="http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Museveni-warns-tribalism/688334-4087530-x6dlg5z/index.html">tribalists</a> or young hooligans – <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/museveni-we-shall-not-allow-violence-in-elections/">and worse</a>. Bobi Wine is none of these, as proved by the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5fvBQMOC5Wc">erudite public letters</a> he traded with Museveni after his 2017 election. He has built a wide platform defined by youth more than ethnicity, class, region or religion.</p>
<p>And, critically, a string of recent by-elections across the country (including Arua) have shown that this brand transcends his local constituency. </p>
<p>It’s no coincidence that Bobi Wine’s most recent run-in with the law actually happened five weeks earlier during a protest in Kampala against Uganda’s controversial new “social media tax” (during which the authorities accused him of inciting a riot).</p>
<p>In the period leading up to the Arua by-election Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and WhatsApp all saw a marked uptick in posts about Bobi Wine and his emerging constituency.</p>
<p>Social media has also played a central role after Arua. Images of Bobi Wine and the other opposition MPs’ alleged mistreatment in custody were circulated widely, exacerbating the popular unrest. </p>
<p>News of the general tumult also spread via social media to the Ugandan diaspora, resulting in rallies being held in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GWJqrf-Mc1Q">Berlin</a>, London, <a href="https://watchdoguganda.com/videougandans-in-usa-washington-hold-peaceful-protest-over-bobi-wine/">Washington DC</a>, and elsewhere.</p>
<p>It was once possible to discuss opposition to Museveni in regional and ethnic terms. But, increasingly, opposition is a generational story. Whether the enduring face of this new politics is Bobi Wine or someone else, Ugandan politics is clearly changing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102365/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Vokes is at the University of Western Australia. He has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), Wenner Gren (USA), The Royal Society of New Zealand, the British Institute in Eastern Africa, the British Library and the Australian Research Council. He is President of the Australian Anthropological Society, and Editor of the Journal of Eastern African Studies.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Wilkins has received funding from the University of Oxford and the British Institute in Eastern Africa. He is affiliated with the University of Melbourne. </span></em></p>Whether the enduring face of this new politics is Bobi Wine or someone else, Ugandan politics is clearly changingRichard Vokes, Associate professor, The University of Western AustraliaSam Wilkins, PhD Student in Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.