tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/pkk-10386/articlesPKK – The Conversation2023-10-26T12:31:38Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2151342023-10-26T12:31:38Z2023-10-26T12:31:38ZTurkey faces competing pressures from Russia and the West to end its ‘middleman strategy’ and pick a side on the war in Ukraine<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/555704/original/file-20231025-15-e5fh9c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5494%2C4119&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, walks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-shakes-hands-with-turkish-news-photo/1645160088?adppopup=true">Photo by Contributor/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>From the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Turkey has performed a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/06/turkey-elections-russia-erdogan-putin-nato/">delicate balancing act</a>, portraying itself as an ally to the warring sides while reaping economic and political benefits from its relationship with both. </p>
<p>Turkey has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-rejects-russias-annexation-ukrainian-territory-2022-10-01/">condemned Russia’s invasion</a> and extended diplomatic and material assistance to Ukraine’s war efforts. At the same time, the country’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1427365">pointedly opted not to join</a> the Western-led sanctions against Russia or cut ties with Moscow.</p>
<p>But Turkey’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/28/turkish-neutrality-how-erdogan-manages-ties-with-russia-ukraine-amid-war">neutrality in the Ukraine conflict</a> is seemingly meeting with growing impatience in Washington and Moscow, and may be difficult to sustain amid a shifting geopolitical landscape.</p>
<p>In September 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-sanction-five-turkey-based-firms-broad-russia-action-2023-09-14/">sanctions on Turkish companies</a> and a businessman accused of helping Russia to circumvent U.S. sanctions. Meanwhile, Erdoğan has <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/09/04/russias-putin-meets-for-talks-with-turkish-leader-erdogan-to-revive-ukraine-grain-deal">failed to revive a deal</a> with Russian President Vladimir Putin that allowed the export of Ukrainian grain shipments via Turkey’s Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits and eased global food prices.</p>
<p>The developments suggest that both Washington and Moscow are seeking to pressure Turkey into taking a decisive stand. Already there are signs of Erdoğan bending. On Oct. 25, 2023, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/23/turkey-submits-bill-to-ratify-sweden-nato-membership">signed Sweden’s NATO accession protocol</a> and sent it to the Parliament for ratification, having earlier refused to endorse the move – much to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html">annoyance of Turkey’s NATO allies</a>.</p>
<p>The move may be interpreted as a sign that Turkey’s balancing strategy is reaching its limits. But it may also be another tactical move in Erdoğan’s geopolitical chess game, which has expanded as he seeks to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-says-turkey-will-ramp-up-diplomacy-calm-israeli-palestinian-conflict-2023-10-08/">position Turkey as a diplomatic force</a> amid escalating violence in the Middle East. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/person/ozgur-ozkan#:%7E:text=Biography,D.">expert on Turkish politics and international affairs</a>, I have watched as Erdoğan walks a fine line between the country’s commitments as a longtime NATO member and its <a href="https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/709-turkey-will-not-give-up-on-its-lucrative-trade-with-russia.html">reliance on Russia for trade</a>, economic resources and energy imports. But this balancing act is becoming increasingly difficult the longer the war goes on.</p>
<h2>The middleman strategy</h2>
<p>Erdogan’s approach aligns with Turkey’s historical foreign policy trajectory. Turkey has maintained a balance between Western European powers and Russia since the latter <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=OmKJDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=russian+ottoman+relations&ots=f8tmkyssUN&sig=gJ7mZVVUaCBMU8sFS49vTx1Mk1I#v=onepage&q=russian%20ottoman%20relations&f=false">emerged</a> as an ambitious regional player along Turkey’s northern border in the early 18th century.</p>
<p>The balancing act <a href="https://besacenter.org/turkey-foreign-policy-balancing/">allowed the Ottoman Empire</a>, Turkey’s predecessor, to survive the 19th century largely intact despite mounting pressures from the Russian Empire and European powers. Failure to utilize a balancing strategy in the First World War facilitated the empire’s demise. <a href="https://nes.princeton.edu/publications/ottoman-road-war-1914-ottoman-empire-and-first-world-war">Joining forces with</a> the losing Central Powers, Turkey had to share a catastrophic fate. In contrast, in World War II, a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/history/twentieth-century-regional-history/turkish-foreign-policy-during-second-world-war-active-neutrality?format=PB&isbn=9780521523295">strategy of neutrality</a> helped Turkey to weather the war unscathed. </p>
<p>Against a mounting Soviet threat during the Cold War, Turkey took refuge under Western security guarantees, <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-nato-together-for-peace-and-security-since60-years.en.mfa#:%7E:text=In%20the%20aftermath%20of%20the,Turkey's%20defense%20and%20security%20policy.">joining NATO in 1952</a>.</p>
<p>Relieved of the Soviet threat in the 1990s, Ankara sought greater foreign policy autonomy. However, it lacked the necessary economic and military resources and domestic political will to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357694">fully realize this ambition</a>, leading to alignment with U.S. policies in the Middle East and Balkans until the early 2010s.</p>
<h2>Splintered support</h2>
<p>But U.S. support to Kurds in northern Syria, aligned to the militant separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/15/turkeys-failed-coup-attempt-explainer">2016 coup attempt</a> against Erdoğan marked the beginning of a more confrontational relationship between Washington and Ankara.</p>
<p>Blaming the U.S. and its Persian Gulf allies for complicity in the coup, Erdogan began to court Putin, who <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2019-07-17/ty-article/.premium/putin-s-400-how-failed-coup-erdogan-turkey-nato-biggest-headache-trump-no-f-35/0000017f-db3c-d856-a37f-fffc38200000">openly stood behind him</a> during and after the attempted coup. Ankara’s acquisition of Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missiles led to its <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1908351/us-begins-process-of-unwinding-turkey-from-f-35-program-dod-officials-say/">removal from the U.S.’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program</a> and a set of <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-turkey-under-caatsa-231/#:%7E:text=Today%2C%20the%20United%20States%20is,main%20arms%20export%20entity%2C%20by">U.S. sanctions</a> on Turkey’s defense industry. Coupled with its repeated military interventions in Syria, Turkey’s closeness with Russia has, critics say, reduced it to a status of “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/turkey-unreliable-partner-fight-against-isis">unreliable partner</a>” in the North Atlantic alliance. </p>
<p>But it didn’t take long for Ankara’s flirtation with Moscow to reach a deadlock. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-toll/at-least-34-turkish-soldiers-killed-in-air-strikes-in-syrias-idlib-syrian-observatory-idUSKCN20L32S">death of 34 Turkish soldiers</a> in a Russian bombardment in northern Syria in February 2020 prompted a renewed effort to seek reconciliation with the U.S. However, the Biden administration <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-us/ignored-biden-erdogan-desperate-get-his-attention-business-insider">hesitated to reset relations</a> due to concerns over Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.</p>
<h2>The balancing act and Ukraine</h2>
<p>War in Ukraine offered a new boost to Erdoğan’s balancing act. Turkey’s <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/02/turkey-closes-the-dardanelles-and-bosphorus-to-warships/">control of two major straits</a> and established ties with Ukraine and other states along the Black Sea provided significant leverage for a multifaceted and neutral approach. Erdoğan seemingly hoped that maintaining trade relations with Russia and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/amirhusain/2022/12/20/ukraine-war-thrusts-iran-and-turkey-into-the-role-of-arms-suppliers/?sh=6c32a16e4b1f">arms sales to Ukraine</a> would bolster the struggling Turkish economy and rehabilitate his image in the West. </p>
<p>But Erdoğan’s early blocking of Sweden’s and Finland’s entry into NATO <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html">stirred resentment in Washington and Brussels</a>. </p>
<p>As the Ukraine conflict continued and Erdoğan’s domestic popularity <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-lags-election-rival-closely-watched-poll-2023-05-11/#:%7E:text=The%20survey%20by%20pollster%20Konda,%2D7%2C%20before%20Ince's%20announcement.">dipped in the lead-up</a> to the May 2023 elections, the sustainability of Turkey’s balancing act seemed uncertain again. </p>
<p>In need of financial and political support, Erdoğan has turned to the West and Persian Gulf countries. He approved Finland’s NATO accession and forged economic deals with West-friendly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/03/08/saudi-crown-prince-sees-a-new-axis-of-evil-in-the-middle-east/">Saudi Arabia</a> and the <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/12/27/dubais-deputy-security-chief-claims-turkey-is-evil-wants-to-harm-uae-with-qatar">United Arab Emirates</a> – Turkey’s two bitter rivals in the Middle East.</p>
<p>In summer 2023, Erdoğan announced a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/03/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-announces-new-cabinet">new cabinet</a> that projected a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/turkey/recep-erdogan-post-western-turkey">pro-Western outlook</a>. He mended <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-turkey-normalization-cairos-perspective/">ties with Egypt</a>, another traditional regional rival, aligning with the new balance of power that the U.S. and its regional allies were shaping in the Middle East. And then, at the July 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, Erdoğan announced the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-press-turkey-finland-sweden-hope-nato-breakthrough-2022-06-28/">withdrawal of his veto</a> against Sweden’s accession to NATO.</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s pro-Western moves have prompted a cautiously optimistic approach by Western leaders, using both incentives and punitive measures: extending a US$35 billion <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/world-bank-increase-exposure-turkey-35-bln-within-three-years-anadolu-2023-09-07/">World Bank credit</a> to aid Turkey’s economy, while penalizing Turkish entities for violating <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/14/us-turkey-sanctions-russia-ukraine-shipping-nato/">U.S. sanctions</a>. The latter has been taken as a not-so-veiled message to Ankara to take a definitive stance in its foreign affairs.</p>
<p>Erdoğan has received a similar message from Putin. Disappointed in part by Turkey’s reconciliation with the West, Putin chose <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/17/1188048725/ukraine-russia-grain-deal-putin">not to renew</a> the Ukrainian grain deal despite Erdoğan’s earlier successful brokerage. It was a considerable blow for Erdoğan, who sought to position himself as a crucial power broker in the Ukraine-Russia conflict.</p>
<p>Although Erdoğan faces pushback from the U.S. and Russia, this does not necessarily signal the demise of his middleman strategy. Turkey’s location on the Europe-Asia boundary and historical ties to neighboring regions provide Erdoğan opportunities to sustain and even expand a strategy of neutrality among regional and global actors. </p>
<p>Developments in the South Caucasus and the escalating conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip are two recent examples. They add a new layer of complexity for Erdogan’s balancing act, but also more room for him to maneuver. Turkey has been a <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/09/turkeys-erdogan-backs-azerbaijans-offensive-nagorno-karabakh-us-russia-urge">key backer</a> of Azerbaijan’s military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh – something that has exposed Russia’s waning influence in the region and created a major geopolitical setback for Iran. Meanwhile, Erdoğan’s ties with both <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/20/erdogan-turkey-hamas-ties-israel-war-normalization/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Editors%20Picks%20-%2010232023&utm_term=editors_picks">Hamas</a> and <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4228775-what-turkey-israel-reconciliation-means-for-the-region-and-the-world/">the Israeli government</a> provide an opportunity for him to play a <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/10/eying-gaza-mediator-role-turkey-cools-hamas-ties-erdogan-restrains-rhetoric">mediator role</a> there.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215134/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ozgur Ozkan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey walks a fine line between NATO commitments and Western alliances and its dependence on Russia for financial resources and trade.Ozgur Ozkan, Visiting Professor at the Fletcher School's Russia and Eurasia Program, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1477042020-11-02T10:58:03Z2020-11-02T10:58:03ZIn Turkey, life for Syrian refugees and Kurds is becoming increasingly violent<p>A spate of attacks in Turkey on Syrian refugees and Kurdish internal migrants and displaced people in recent months have put both communities on edge. In July, a Syrian teenager working as a market seller in Bursa, northwestern Turkey, died <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/refugees/voice-voiceless-refugees-voice-hamza-ajan">after he was attacked</a> by a group of men. </p>
<p>Another Syrian teenager who worked in a bakery in Samsun, another northern province, was <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/homicide/sixteen-year-old-syrian-refugee-murdered-northern-turkey">killed during a fight</a> in a street in September. His brother, who witnessed it, <a href="https://bianet.org/english/migration/230838-syrian-child-killed-in-samsun-province">said it was a racist attack</a>.</p>
<p>The same weekend, a young <a href="http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/230803-armed-attack-on-kurdish-workers-claims-one-life-wounds-two-others">Kurdish man</a> from Van working in construction in western Turkey was shot dead and two of his friends were wounded. A week earlier, members of a Kurdish family from Mardin employed as seasonal agricultural workers in Sakarya, a Turkish province where Kurds are <a href="http://bianet.org/english/male-violence/230419-the-moment-when-they-attacked-us-still-haunts-me">frequently targeted</a>, told reporters they had been verbally <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LA3KjN4Mqog&ab_channel=MezopotamyaAjans%C4%B1">humiliated and physically attacked</a> by a group of local Turkish men. </p>
<p>These recent attacks against both Syrian refugees and Kurds reveal how the nationalist policies of Turkey’s authoritarian and aggressive regime are influencing perceptions and attitudes towards non-Turkish minorities – with devastating consequences.</p>
<h2>Syrians remain stuck</h2>
<p>It’s been nine years since Syrians started taking refuge in Turkey, and there are now <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113">3.6 million</a> Syrian refugees registered as “foreigners under temporary protection” in the country. As the conflict in Syria has turned into a protracted one, hopes that their stay would be temporary have been replaced with anxiety of a more <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/09/SB2019-TR-04092020.pdf">permanent situation</a>. </p>
<p>The ongoing civil war and instability in Syria, as well as <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/">a 2016 EU-Turkey deal</a> which largely stopped people crossing the Aegean from Turkey to Greece, have made it almost impossible for refugees to consider moving anywhere else. The deal recognises Turkey as a safe country for Syrian refugees. Yet Syrian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-syria-refugees-idUSKCN1U40X8">refugees</a> and their <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/20200304-racism-syrian-turkey-violence-soldier-die-syria">property</a> are often attacked by Turkish citizens.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1234400569382424577"}"></div></p>
<h2>Kurds displaced</h2>
<p>Kurds make up around <a href="https://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/the-kurdish-population-1232551004">20%-25%</a> of Turkey’s population of 82 million. Over the past century, millions of Kurds have become internally displaced in Turkey due to the conflicts in southeast Turkey (northern Kurdistan) between the Turkish state forces and Kurdish armed groups. Northern Kurdistan – “Bakur” in Kurdish – is a reference used by the <a href="https://hezenparastin.info/eng/">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a>(PKK) and other Kurdish political parties for the Kurdish-populated region in east and southeast Turkey.</p>
<p>A first wave of displacement happened in the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14718800108405092">1920s and 1930s</a> followed by another in the <a href="http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/bcelik/files/2015/06/Bradley-book-chapter.pdf">1990s</a>. The most recent wave of forced migration happened after <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer">conflict</a> erupted in July 2015 between Turkish security forces and the PKK in southeast Turkey, particularly in the provinces of Diyarbakır, Mardin, Şırnak and Hakkâri. </p>
<p>Some Kurds built up optimistic expectations that they would be able to safely return to their homeland during the 40-year conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK, including in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/turkey/Turkey1002.pdf">1990s</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/turkish/reports/turkey0305/turkey0305trweb.pdf">2000s</a>. But the majority of displaced Kurds did not want to return due to protracted conflict and socioeconomic instability in their home regions. Government policies focusing on economic growth, rather than <a href="http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/bcelik/files/2015/06/Bradley-book-chapter.pdf">reconciliation and compensation</a> for people who had been displaced, also played an important role in their hesitancy.</p>
<p>Aggressive and anti-democratic policies introduced since 2016 targeting Kurdish politicians and Kurdish political and cultural <a href="https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/12%20Trustee%20report%202019.pdf">organisations</a> have worsened <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/kurds-in-turkey-increasingly-subject-to-violent-hate-crimes/a-50940046">anti-Kurdish sentiments</a> in the country. So has Turkey’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2019.1642662">deepening authoritarianism</a>.</p>
<p>Syrian refugees and displaced Kurds have both been victims of <a href="http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3433%28199008%2927%3A3%3C291%3ACV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6">post-conflict violence</a>. This has included direct violence, as well as marginalisation, discrimination and cultural violence against their identity and heritage. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/231364-280-racist-attacks-in-turkey-in-10-years?bia_source=rss">report</a> by the Human Rights Association, a Turkish-Kurdish group which monitors human rights in the country, shows how racist and hate crime against minorities, including Syrians and Kurds, have left dozens of people dead and hundreds wounded in the past decade. Four key factors appear to have led to this violence: nationalist policies, othering, polarisation and impunity.</p>
<h2>Identity politics</h2>
<p>Since the beginning of the 20th century, nationalist identity politics have played a critical role in systematic violence against minorities in Turkey, particularly Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks and Kurds. This violent, assimilationist approach is borne out of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2018.1514494">Turkification policies</a> which promote a Sunni-Turkish identity while denying minority rights.</p>
<p>Political and armed resistance by minorities such as the Kurds against Turkification have resulted in <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/43701">violence</a> and widespread discrimination from Turkey against those who don’t want to assimilate. The current Justice and Development Party (AKP) of the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, emphasises a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1497755">“one state, one nation, one flag, one language”</a> agenda. By ignoring diversity, this is exacerbating the existing anti-minority sentiments even further.</p>
<p>A process of othering, dividing people into “us” and “them”, characterised by mistrust, group-based inequality and marginalisation, is also rife in Turkey. It leads to stereotypes, discrimination and social exclusion of particular ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Like the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1250382">Kurds</a> before them, Syrians have become <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-from-guests-to-enemies/29536558EBF6E27022769A7B858F29E7/core-reader#">the new “others”</a> in Turkey due to the public and political debate and <a href="https://bianet.org/english/media/231141-media-in-turkey-5-thousand-515-instances-of-hate-speech-in-a-year">mass media representations of Syrians</a> as <a href="http://suriyelilersuriyeye.com/">a threat to security and economy</a>. </p>
<h2>Polarisation and impunity</h2>
<p>Polarisation along ethnic and ideological lines also contribute to the violence, particularly when violence by both Turkish citizens and the state is not <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2018.1451035">properly investigated</a>. This encourages those who conduct attacks against refugees and displaced people, because they can easily <a href="http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/230448-detained-over-attack-on-kurdish-workers-two-people-released">avoid prosecution</a>. </p>
<p>Both the government policies and people’s perceptions and attitudes towards Syrian refugees and displaced Kurds feed public hostility. The coalition government formed in February 2018 by the AKP and the <a href="https://www.mhp.org.tr/mhp_dil.php?dil=en">Nationalist Movement Party</a> – which has a remarkable ability to foment domestic, regional and international enemies – is increasingly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17448689.2019.1668627">oppressing</a> civil society organisations and opposition parties. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/04/10/lawyers-trial/abusive-prosecutions-and-erosion-fair-trial-rights-turkey">abusive prosecutions and the erosion of fair trials</a>, particularly since a <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-coup-erdogans-tightening-grip-will-test-relations-with-the-west-62706">failed coup</a> attempt against the Erdoğan government in July 2016, are trying to silence journalists, human rights defenders and opposition politicians. There is little chance the violence will be remedied soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147704/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yasin Duman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What are the drivers behind violent attacks against minorities in Turkey?Yasin Duman, PhD Candidate, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251952019-10-22T11:39:17Z2019-10-22T11:39:17ZDeportation to Syria could mean death for women, children and LGBTQ refugees in Turkey<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297977/original/file-20191021-56203-159jer0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3960%2C2855&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees awaiting municipal bread distribution in Akcakale, Turkey, Oct. 20, 2019. Three-quarters of the Syrian refugees in Turkey are women and children. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Syria/b35a047850364daa9a335f7cfb7695e9/4/0">AP Photo/Mehmet Guzel</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan isn’t limiting his assault on neighboring Syria to attacking Kurdish troops that run the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-attack-on-syria-endangers-a-remarkable-democratic-experiment-by-the-kurds-125105">country’s northern region</a>. He says the 3.6 million Syrians <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-europe/turkeys-erdogan-threatens-to-send-syrian-refugees-to-europe-idUSKBN1WP1ED">now living as war refugees in Turkey may also be returned</a> “to their own homes” once northern Syria is wrenched from Kurdish control. </p>
<p>This could be an empty threat. After eight years of welcoming people fleeing Syria’s civil war, the Turkish public is <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/why-turkey-pushing-refugees-return-syria">beginning to turn against Syrian refugees</a>. Erdogan may see anti-refugee rhetoric as a way to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-politics-akparty/erdogans-ak-party-membership-seen-sliding-further-as-dissent-grows-idUSKBN1WC1CR">boost his popularity</a>, which is slumping due to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html">recession in Turkey and years of controversial power grabs</a>.</p>
<p>But if the Turkish president does deport Syrian refugees, he won’t be sending them to a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50064546">safe zone</a>,” as promised. These extremely vulnerable people would be deported into the lines of combat in this <a href="https://www.apnews.com/a66bf441fdfb43ca80d200dcbfb5d09d">contested, oil-rich zone</a>.</p>
<h2>The forgotten half: Women Syrian refugees</h2>
<p>In my experience <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601151?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">researching minorities at risk in the Middle East</a>, governments dealing with mass migration often overlook the particular challenges facing the most vulnerable refugees: women, children and LGBTQ people. </p>
<p>The Syrian refugees in Turkey are majorly Sunni Muslim – the same faith that predominates in both Turkey and <a href="https://cpa.ca/docs/File/Cultural/EN%20Syrian%20Population%20Profile.pdf">Syria</a>. However, Syrians are <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/">ethnically and linguistically different</a> than Turks.</p>
<p>Syrian refugees differ from the broader Turkish and Syrian public in another way, too: <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/thinking-outside-camp-syrian-refugees-istanbul">75% of them are women and children</a>, according to the global nonprofit Migration Policy Institute. Between 2011 and 2017, more than 224,000 babies were <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/thinking-outside-camp-syrian-refugees-istanbul">born in Turkey to Syrian refugee families</a>. Those children are now stateless, granted neither Turkish nor Syrian citizenship at birth. </p>
<p>Syrian women refugees suffer more discrimination and racism in Turkey than their male counterparts, <a href="https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Turkey/The-fragility-of-Syrian-refugee-women-in-Turkey-191805">research shows</a>. </p>
<p>This is partially due to a big gap in Turkish language acquisition: 20% of Syrian refugee women complained that lack of language causes exclusion and discrimination, <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/54518">U.N. survey data from 2016 shows</a>, compared to 13% of men.</p>
<p>Even so, 73% of Syrian refugee women told the U.N. that they feel safe in Turkey. That may be related to their resettlement in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unhcr-turkey-fact-sheet-july-2019">cities and towns</a> across Turkey, <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/thinking-outside-camp-syrian-refugees-istanbul">primarily in Istanbul</a>, where they usually live in poor neighborhoods. </p>
<p>Those areas surely feel secure compared to war-torn Syria. They are safer, too, than refugee camps along the Turkish-Syrian border, where <a href="https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Turkey/The-fragility-of-Syrian-refugee-women-in-Turkey-191805">rape, human trafficking, prostitution and child marriages have all been reported</a>, according to OBC Transeuropa, a think tank.</p>
<p>Half of all Syrian female refugees were <a href="https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Turkey/The-fragility-of-Syrian-refugee-women-in-Turkey-191805">under the age of 18</a> when they were displaced by war to the Turkish border area. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children in al-Bab, northern Syria, which was seized from the Islamic State by Turkey and Syrian opposition fighters last year, May 29, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Syria-Turkey/f225f44b72194f7abb8aa7f251e49c00/57/0">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>LGBTQ Syrian refugees: An untold story</h2>
<p>Turkey’s Syrian refugee community includes other marginalized groups that would face unique dangers back home, including <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/lgbtq-syrian-refugees-forced-chose-between-their-families-identity-n1062446">gay, lesbian and trans people</a>. </p>
<p>The exact number of LGBTQ Syrian refugees displaced across the region is unknown, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/lgbtq-syrian-refugees-forced-chose-between-their-families-identity-n1062446">human rights groups say</a>. But Syria – like much of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/16/audacity-adversity/lgbt-activism-middle-east-and-north-africa">the Middle East and North Africa region</a> – is a dangerous place to be gay.</p>
<p>Homosexuality <a href="http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/syria-lgbti-resources">is illegal in Syria</a>, and both the government and terror groups like the Islamic State <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/it-cant-get-any-worse-than-being-gay-in-syria-today-20151001-gjze4o.html">persecute sexual minorities</a>. Being gay is culturally unacceptable <a href="https://www.hrc.org/resources/stances-of-faiths-on-lgbt-issues-islam">according to traditional Islamic mores</a>.</p>
<p>Though Turkey does not criminalize homosexuality, it is not always safe for LGBTQ Syrian refugees, either. Gay Syrians have suffered <a href="https://journo.com.tr/syrian-lgbti-refugees-struggle-in-turkey">physical and verbal attacks</a>, often with little response from law enforcement or the government.</p>
<p>In August 2016, Muhammed Wisam Sankari was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/04/body-missing-gay-syrian-refugee-muhammed-wisam-sankari-found-beheaded-istanbul">found mutilated and killed</a> in Istanbul, two days after he went missing. Sankari had told police he feared for his life after having previously been abducted, tortured and raped by unknown attackers, according to reports. </p>
<p>Recent crackdowns by the Turkish police in Syrian refugee communities, have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/23/its-not-legal-un-stands-by-as-turkey-deports-vulnerable-syrians">detaining and deporting thousands of Syrian refugees, including LGBTQ people</a>. </p>
<p>The Turkish government <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-08-06/turkey-denies-deporting-refugees-syria-activists-say-they-ve-sent-back-thousands">denies</a> that it is forcibly returning refugees to a war zone, which would be <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html">illegal</a> under Turkish and international law.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fighting continues in northeast Syria near the Turkish border despite a U.S.-brokered ceasefire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Syria/40fdde21f6f24994bb9d2523b7dd9024/108/0">AP Photo/Emrah Gurel</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For LGBTQ Syrians, going home may be a death sentence.</p>
<p>In August 2019 a transgender Syrian woman named Ward <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/23/its-not-legal-un-stands-by-as-turkey-deports-vulnerable-syrians">told The Guardian newspaper</a> that she feared being deported to the Turkey-Syria border because the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-nusra-front-al-qaedas-affiliate-syria">al-Nusra terrorist group</a>, a branch of al-Qaida with 5,000 to 10,000 fighters in western Syria, would kill her. </p>
<p>Ward was deported days later. She was last seen in late August being forced into the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/23/its-not-legal-un-stands-by-as-turkey-deports-vulnerable-syrians">trunk of a car by militants in Syria</a>, according to the Guardian report.</p>
<h2>Collateral damage</h2>
<p>Erdogan’s stated purpose in invading Syria is to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkey-claim-syrian-kurds-terrorists-not-isis-ypg-pkk-sdf/">rid its northern region of the Kurdish Worker’s Party</a> – an armed militia and political party known as the PKK – and create a “buffer zone” between the two countries. </p>
<p>The PKK has been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-kurdish-conflict-in-turkey-is-so-intractable-125101">thorn in Turkey’s side</a> for the past 41 years.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.mar.umd.edu">With Syrian government support</a>, PKK leader Abdallah Ocallan has been threatening the Turkish government with a Kurdish separatist insurgency long before Erdogan’s presidency. </p>
<p>The United States, like Turkey, considers the PKK to be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-foreign-terrorist-designation-is-more-punishment-than-threat-detector-116049">terrorist organization</a>. </p>
<p>But in Syria the U.S. had, until its recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">military withdrawal</a>, allied itself with other secular and progressive Syrian groups, namely the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/who-are-the-syrian-kurds-the-us-has-abandoned/2019/10/17/24759880-f0f8-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story.html">Syrian Democratic Forces</a>.</p>
<p>The Kurdish minority in northern Syria, as in nearby Iraq, has long been stuck between Ocallan’s armed militia, the Turkish government and their own authoritarian leaders – used and abused, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601151?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">my research finds</a>, by politicians seeking to further their own regional agenda in the Mideast. </p>
<p>Returning Syrian refugees to this battleground would make them the “buffer” between these warring forces, turning more vulnerable people into collateral damage of a greater geopolitical war. </p>
<p>[ <em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125195/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deina Abdelkader does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey is threatening to send 3.6 million refugees back to the Syrian territory it just invaded. Deporting these vulnerable people would make them the collateral damage of a chaotic, many-sided war.Deina Abdelkader, Associate Professor of Political Science, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251012019-10-18T09:12:00Z2019-10-18T09:12:00ZWhy the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is so intractable<p>The ramifications of Donald Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-donald-trumps-decision-to-abandon-kurdish-fighters-in-syria-means-for-the-kurds-assad-and-russia-124815">decision to withdraw US troops</a> from the Turkish-Syrian border continues to have a seismic effect on the situation in northern Syria. </p>
<p>Faced with the Turkish invasion of northern Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who controlled the area were forced to make compromises. On October 13, they <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50039106">announced a deal with the Syrian army</a>, which began moving troops towards the Turkish border. A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-ceasefire/turkey-u-s-agree-ceasefire-in-northeast-syria-pence-idUSKBN1WW2KL">five-day ceasefire</a> was brokered by the US on October 18, during which Turkey agreed to pause its offensive to allow Kurdish forces to withdraw. </p>
<p>For many, the SDF proved itself to be the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/military-leaders-warn-trump-abandoning-ally-grave-mistake-2019-10?r=US&IR=T">most effective</a> force in the fight against Islamic State (IS). Turkey, however, considers the SDF as an extension of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-49963649">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a> (PKK), which it, the US and EU label as a terrorist organisation.</p>
<p>But behind this lies a long history of Turkey denying the very existence of the Kurdish conflict, and the political and cultural rights of its Kurdish population. Understanding this history helps explain why the conflict is so intractable, and the impact it continues to have on Turkey’s foreign policy choices.</p>
<h2>No room in the nation state</h2>
<p>The Kurdish conflict cannot be understood without considering the question of power and exclusion. Its origins go back to the mid-19th century when the Ottomans attempted to end the 300-year-old autonomy of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19436149.2016.1218162?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=ccri20%5D(https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19436149.2016.1218162?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=ccri20">the Kurdish principalities in Kurdistan</a>. This struggle for <a href="https://www.sunypress.edu/p-3887-kurdish-notables-and-the-ottoma.aspx">autonomy</a> wasn’t resolved during the rule of the Ottoman era, and when it collapsed, all of the new nation states that eventually emerged – Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran – inherited their own Kurdish conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nationbuilding-in-turkey-and-morocco/8647BB17BC02282D5E370376AA436F87">Turks and the Kurds</a> fought a successful war of <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191835278.001.0001/acref-9780191835278-e-299">independence</a> together in 1919 against the Allied forces. Nevertheless, when the new Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, Turkish identity was presented as its unifying force, at the expense of the society’s political, social and cultural differences.</p>
<p>Not only was political power further centralised in Ankara, but the domination of the ethnic, Turkish and Sunni majority became the norm. The decision to create <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/a-modern-history-of-the-kurds-9780857714824/">a centralised and homogeneous nation state</a> was implemented in a top-down and violent fashion. The seeds of the long-term problems that Turkish and Kurdish communities confront today were created by this decision. </p>
<p>Various Kurdish groups challenged this new social and political order with different <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/871c10c2-e9c3-11e9-85f4-d00e5018f061">revolts, uprisings, and resistance</a>, but these were violently suppressed. <a href="http://www.markuswiener.com/books/the-kurds-a-modern-history/">Repressive policies of assimilation</a> were later implemented to transform the Kurds into <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nationbuilding-in-turkey-and-morocco/8647BB17BC02282D5E370376AA436F87">civilised and secular Turks</a>.</p>
<h2>A conflict buried</h2>
<p>The Kurdish conflict laid buried for many years. Then, the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329023">most serious challenge</a> to Turkey’s nation state project was initiated by the PKK in 1984, which embraced a political agenda called <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030005382">democratic autonomy</a>. The violent struggle between Ankara and the PKK has resulted in a huge <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/09/29/economic-cost-pkk-conflict-turkey/">economic</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-death-toll">human cost</a>. </p>
<p>Peace talks which began in 2013 with the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan were widely considered to be the best chance for ending the conflict, but these collapsed in 2015. This led to <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-opens-up-old-wounds-with-a-new-campaign-against-the-pkk-45397">increasing violence</a> in the form of a destructive armed conflict in southeastern Turkey and a wave of bombings, including in <a href="https://theconversation.com/bombing-in-ankara-who-is-fighting-who-in-turkey-56223">Ankara</a> and Istanbul.</p>
<p>The resolution of intractable conflicts is only possible when conflicted parties can confront their past and learn from it. In 2015, amid attempts by Turkish opposition parties to reopen peace negotiations with the Kurds, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-seeks-strong-restart-for-peace-process-85385">insisted</a>: “There is no Kurdish conflict”. Such positioning, which continues today, keeps the political dimension of the conflict in the background. </p>
<p>The state carefully controls what can and cannot be said about the conflict. Typically, words such as “terror” and “traitor” are used to criminalise those who criticise government policy towards the Kurds. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/11/erdogan-turkey-academics-terrorism-violence-kurdish-people">A group of academics</a> who signed a petition in 2016 calling for the resumption of peace talks were charged with making “terrorism propaganda”. The non-violent wing of the Kurdish movement – activists, politicians, political parties – has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/turkey-arrests-pro-kurdish-party-leaders-mps">also been criminalised</a>.</p>
<h2>Blame game</h2>
<p>Instead of confronting their failure to bring about peace, Turkish political elites have tried to apportion <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Transformation_of_Turkey.html?id=hPUUbI_uoGsC&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">blame</a> elsewhere. Erdoğan, for example, repeatedly refers to an invisible “<a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/10/26/erdogan-there-is-a-superior-mind-in-pyds-kobani-plots">mastermind</a>” who orchestrates the PKK. Such rhetoric is deployed to play on the collective fear and anxiety about national security felt by parts of Turkish society. </p>
<p>Some have called this the “Sèvres syndrome” – referring to the 1920 <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100457377">Treaty of Sèvres</a> that marked the end of the Ottoman empire and proposed to divide it <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp092.pdf">into small states and occupation zones</a>. The treaty was never implemented, and superseded by the 1923 <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100054128">Lausanne Treaty</a> which recognised the Republic of Turkey.</p>
<p>This syndrome – also referred to as “Sèvres <a href="https://www.persee.fr/docAsPDF/cemot_0764-9878_2003_num_36_1_1702.pdf">Paranoia</a>” – in essence reflects the collective fear that the Treaty of Sèvres <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp092.pdf">will be revived</a> and that the Turkish state is encircled by enemies who want to <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Oil_and_Water.html?id=ZF5uAAAAMAAJ&source=kp_cover&redir_esc=y">divide</a> and weaken the country. </p>
<p>Today, this line of thinking is an integral part of Turkish political life and continues to influence public <a href="https://www.bookdepository.com/Transformation-Turkey-Fatma-Muge-Gocek/9781780764863">perception</a> towards the external world. In a 2006 public opinion survey, for example, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Transformation_of_Turkey.html?id=hPUUbI_uoGsC&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">78% of participants</a> agreed that “the West wants to divide and break up Turkey like they broke up the Ottoman Empire”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Driving Turkey’s choices.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">By kmlmtz66/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this way, the Kurdish conflict has been used to mobilise Turkish society to act against its own collective interest: a peaceful and just society. Policies aimed at managing the conflict have been implemented mostly within a state of emergency, in ways that continue to undermine <a href="https://stockholmcf.org/turkey-ranks-110th-among-160-countries-in-the-economists-democracy-index/">Turkish democracy</a>. Not only has the tremendous economic and human cost of the conflict become a “normal” part of Turkish life, but the state has also been successful in actively keeping the political dimension of the conflict at bay.</p>
<p>For a long time, Turkey refrained from talking about the Kurdish issue by assuming that it would eventually fade away. But it didn’t and instead, the conflict has become more deeply entrenched. Time will tell whether the Turkish state will ultimately gain or lose by its latest military intervention in Syria. However, what’s clear is that the Kurdish conflict will get more complicated with this latest move, and both the Turkish state and Turkish society will no longer be able to ignore it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Recep Onursal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By burying the Kurdish conflict, Turkey has made it that much more difficult to resolve.Recep Onursal, Assistant Lecturer and PhD candidate in International Conflict Analysis, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251052019-10-10T22:55:45Z2019-10-10T22:55:45ZTurkish attack on Syria endangers a remarkable democratic experiment by the Kurds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296566/original/file-20191010-188792-l4zhjx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C8%2C5955%2C3979&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kurdish fighters in Syria say the U.S. is abandoning its allies and potentially empowering the Islamic State by withdrawing from northeastern Syria and allowing a Turkish assault, Oct. 7, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Syria/01b7c48ed1bc400e99cac09047706a55/13/0">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkey’s attack on Kurdish-run territory in northern Syria will likely snuff out a radical experiment in self-government that is unlike anything I have seen in more than <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-new-middle-east-what-everyone-needs-to-know-9780190653989?cc=us&lang=en&">30 years studying the Middle East</a>.</p>
<p>In a surprise Oct. 6 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-85/">statement</a>, President Donald Trump announced the U.S. would withdraw <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-pull-troops-from-northern-syria-as-turkey-readies-offensive/2019/10/07/a965e466-e8b3-11e9-bafb-da248f8d5734_story.html">its troops from northern Syria</a>. </p>
<p>Approximately 1,000 American soldiers had been stationed in that region as a buffer separating Kurdish forces – who had been working with the Americans in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/07/brief-history-syrian-democratic-forces-kurdish-led-alliance-that-helped-us-defeat-islamic-state/">fight against the Islamic State</a> – from Turkish troops. Turkey feared that the Syrian Kurds would link up with Turkey’s Kurdish minority who have <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10102610/why-turkey-attacking-syria-border-map-background-tension-explained/">demanded autonomy or independence</a>. </p>
<p>On Oct. 9, the Turkish military <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/09/politics/syria-turkey-invasion-intl-hnk/index.html">began its assault</a>, pummeling Kurdish-held territory with artillery and airstrikes. Kurds are rapidly evacuating the region and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/syria-turkey-military-offensive-dle-intl/index.html">at least 24 people</a> have been killed in northern Syria. Retaliatory strikes from Syria have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/the-latest-finland-condemns-turkeys-offensive-into-syria/2019/10/10/8f29cd60-eb42-11e9-a329-7378fbfa1b63_story.html">killed civilians</a> in southern Turkey.</p>
<p>According to Turkish president Recep Erdogan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/09/turkey-plans-syrian-safe-zone-advocates-fear-death-trap/">Turkey’s goal</a> is to create a buffer zone separating Syria’s Kurds from the Turkish border. </p>
<p>But his country’s attack will do much more than that. If successful, it will destroy the most full-fledged democracy the Middle East has yet to see.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296563/original/file-20191010-188835-ujglip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C7%2C5065%2C3407&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296563/original/file-20191010-188835-ujglip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296563/original/file-20191010-188835-ujglip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296563/original/file-20191010-188835-ujglip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296563/original/file-20191010-188835-ujglip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296563/original/file-20191010-188835-ujglip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296563/original/file-20191010-188835-ujglip.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turks look toward northern Syria, which has been under attack by Turkey since Oct. 9.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-US-Syria/58f92d9fae874674973ce05e73000364/16/0">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A different way to govern</h2>
<p>The Kurds call their autonomous region in Syria “Rojava,” meaning “the land where the sun sets.” </p>
<p>Kurdish-led forces took possession of this <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/05/23/the-kurds-are-creating-a-state-of-their-own-in-northern-syria">swath of territory in northern and eastern Syria</a> from <a href="https://rojavainformationcenter.com/background/rojava-timeline/">direct Syrian government control in 2012</a>. Then they successfully defended it against the Islamic State.</p>
<p>Kurdish Syria is a small portion of a territory, known as Kurdistan, that includes parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Kurdistan is home to approximately <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2019/01/independence-iraqi-kurds-190122043558455.html">25-35 million Kurds</a>, a cultural and ethnic minority in the Middle East.</p>
<p>The key to understanding the Rojava project, as those involved often refer to it, is the notion of “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/50102294-77fd-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7">confederalism</a>.” In this form of government, local units – in this case, Kurdistan’s “autonomous regions” – come together in a federation yet retain a great deal of autonomy. </p>
<p>Because sovereign power belongs to the local units and not to a central government, Kurdish confederalism differs from an American-style federal system.</p>
<p>The Kurds are so serious about devolving power to the local level that <a href="https://www.kurdishinstitute.be/en/charter-of-the-social-contract/">Rojava’s charter</a> requires each of its three regions to have its own flag. And within each region, local elected councils are in charge. They organize garbage collection, adjudicate disputes and manage public health and safety.</p>
<p>Confederalism sets the Kurds apart from almost every other government in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Across the region, power is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/11/22/want-to-stabilize-the-middle-east-start-with-governance/">concentrated at the top</a>. Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, is an authoritarian leader who has ruthlessly crushed his opponents in the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-syrian-uprising-began-and-why-it-matters-112801">eight-year civil war</a>. Egypt has a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html">military government</a>. Saudi Arabia has a king. </p>
<p>But Rojava would be an exceptional society almost anywhere.</p>
<p>Rojava’s charter guarantees freedom of expression and assembly and equality of all religious communities and languages. It mandates direct democracy, term limits and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurds-targeted-by-turkish-attack-include-25000-female-fighters-whove-battled-islamic-state-125100">gender equality</a>. Men and women share every position in government. Kurdish women have <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/15/syrias-kurds-are-not-the-pkk-erdogan-pyd-ypg/">fought the Islamic State in Syria as soldiers</a> in an all-female militia.</p>
<p>In a region where religion and politics are often intertwined, the Kurdish state is secular. Religious leaders cannot serve in politics. Rojava’s charter even affirms the right of all citizens to a healthy environment.</p>
<p>Surrounding countries, <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-forgotten-pluralism-and-why-it-matters-today-76206">including Syria</a>, also have constitutions with eloquent endorsements of political and human rights. </p>
<p>In Rojava, however, the constitution is <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-10-14/rojava-model">actually in effect</a>. Syrian Kurds have realized the dream of the 2010-2011 pro-democracy uprisings across the Arab world.</p>
<h2>Rojava’s downsides</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/d49f0ab9-1c99-4a85-89e2-7953ab6d31a4">Internal cleavages</a> in Syria’s Kurdish community undermine the Rojava project – namely, the perpetual jockeying for power between rival Kurdish clans and the struggle for preeminence among Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi Kurds. </p>
<p>The Kurds also have a troubled relationship with Syria’s Arabs and other groups. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/11/26/group-denial/repression-kurdish-political-and-cultural-rights-syria">Beginning in the 1960s</a>, the Syrian government began moving other populations to Kurdish territory to challenge Kurdish dominance there, sparking Kurdish resentment. </p>
<p>The devastation wrought by the Islamic State – such as the mass murder of the Yazidis, a religious minority within the Kurdish community, and sexual enslavement of their women – further fueled this resentment.</p>
<p>There have been numerous reports of Kurdish soldiers taking violent revenge against captured Islamic State members, alleged collaborators and even entire villages suspected of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/syria-us-allys-razing-of-villages-amounts-to-war-crimes/">aiding the Islamic State enemy</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296558/original/file-20191010-188807-9mubsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296558/original/file-20191010-188807-9mubsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/296558/original/file-20191010-188807-9mubsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296558/original/file-20191010-188807-9mubsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296558/original/file-20191010-188807-9mubsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296558/original/file-20191010-188807-9mubsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296558/original/file-20191010-188807-9mubsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/296558/original/file-20191010-188807-9mubsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=512&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People in Akcakale, Turkey, run for cover after mortars were fired from northern Syria in retaliation for Turkey’s military attack, Oct. 10, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Turkey-US-Syria/62d861712a3a414c9e0ac86795157758/3/0">Ismail Coskun/HA via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Kurdish region of Syria also has some politically problematic origins. </p>
<p>The Syrian-Kurdish Democratic Union Party – Rojava’s leading political party – played an outsized role in the creation of Rojava. The party is <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-ypg-pkk-connection/">affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a>, or PKK, a far-left militant group that has fought against the Turkish government, first for the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/its-time-acknowledge-pkks-evolution-42482">independence of Kurds from Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s</a>, then – in the early 2000s – for their autonomy within Turkish borders. </p>
<p>Many Kurds in Rojava consider <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/10/syria-kurds/">PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan</a> a national hero. It was Ocalan who came up with the idea of confederalism in the first place, back in 2005. </p>
<p>But both Turkey and the United States consider the PKK to be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-foreign-terrorist-designation-is-more-punishment-than-threat-detector-116049">terrorist organization</a>. The PKK is currently conducting an insurgency against the Turkish government.</p>
<h2>Danger ahead</h2>
<p>The Rojava project is now in imminent peril. </p>
<p>Even if Turkey hadn’t launched its military offensive, Rojava would probably still have a tenuous future.</p>
<p>The Syrian-Kurdish Democratic Union Party has refused to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds-explainer/where-do-the-kurds-fit-into-syrias-war-idUSKCN1OX16L">take sides in the Syrian civil war</a>. Its vision, now realized, lay elsewhere. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Syrian regime will reward Kurds for their relative impartiality during the civil war. Nor is it likely that the regime will reward them for limiting their goal to autonomy instead of independence. </p>
<p>The reason: Rojava <a href="https://www.bakerinstitute.org/files/13492/">sits atop Syria’s largest oil fields</a>.</p>
<p>[ <em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since defending northern Syria from the Islamic State, Kurdish people have established an egalitarian society where women are equal, democracy is direct and religious freedom is guaranteed.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1076462019-01-02T23:55:05Z2019-01-02T23:55:05ZThe elusive quest for peace between the Turks and the Kurds<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252026/original/file-20181227-47298-gqxlv3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this December 2009 file photo, a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, trains on a weapon at their camp in the Qandil mountains near the Turkish border with northern Iraq. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Yahya Ahmed)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Donald Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria is likely to help ISIS adopt a new strategy and expand its territorial control while at the same time continuing its execution of unarmed civilians. The move also means Trump has stabbed in the back his most successful military partner, the Kurds.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, all is not lost for the Kurds — they have already emerged as prominent actors who are capable of developing serious diplomatic and political ties.</p>
<p>A decade ago, the AKP government in Turkey launched a set of reforms called <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/fruitless-attempts-the-kurdish-initiative-and-containment-of-the-kurdish-movement-in-turkey/A1FB3871767CCB2DB107877EBE50F348">the Kurdish Opening</a> and started official conversations with the leaders of the Kurdistan Workers Party, known as the PKK. This was not the first time that the Turkish state was in contact with the PKK, but it was the first period for launching a multi-layered process which made the negotiations legitimate. </p>
<p>Yet Turkey’s 40-year internal conflict did not end and, in the summer of 2015, the dialogue between both sides gave way to aggravated state repression.</p>
<p>Less than two years after the collapse of the Turkish-Kurdish negotiations, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights announced that half a million Kurdish people left their homes due to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/world/europe/un-turkey-kurds-human-rights-abuses.html">ongoing military operations by the Turkish army from July 2015 to December 2016.</a> </p>
<p>Turkish troops entered the <a href="https://www.merip.org/mer/mer287/sur">peripheral, politicized neighbourhoods of Kurdish cities after the PKK declared democratic autonomy</a>, and kept those districts <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/03/turkish-police-kurd-actvists-clash-diyarbakir-curfew">under curfew, sometimes for up to 90 days</a>. </p>
<p>These developments beg the question: Why did the dialogue between the Turkish state and the PKK, aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict and bringing about peace, fail in Turkey? </p>
<p>Here’s why. </p>
<h2>Maintaining a control regime</h2>
<p>Even though the Turkish-Kurdish negotiations were highly publicized, the Turkish state’s reliance on violence has been underestimated. </p>
<p>Nation-states are expected to maintain control over certain territories that are under their jurisdiction. But what happens when a specific state enforces territorial control and violence over minority-populated areas in its attempts at democratization and dialogue during a negotiated peace process?</p>
<p>And how does the existing territorial agenda of the Turkish state affect its desire to resolve the protracted conflict with Kurds? </p>
<p>There is substantial research offering rich insights into territory, state and authority in parts of the world ranging from <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/096262989500003S">Israel and Palestine</a> to <a href="http://www.crossborder.ie/pubs/odowd_coakley.pdf">Ireland</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1026546030554">the Balkans</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/lines-of-inconvenience-sovereignty-and-bordermaking-in-postcolonial-south-asia-19471965/F73D9923936444B81C02B6DD310BAF33">Asia</a> and <a href="http://people.unica.it/biancamariacarcangiu/files/2016/05/5.Korf-Raeymaeker-2013-Violence-on-the-Margins-Chs-1-2.pdf">Africa</a>. </p>
<p>But the relevance of the territorial aspects of conflicts has been largely neglected when it’s come to examining the Kurdish-populated borderlands of Turkey. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2015/06/local-peacebuilding-turkeys-kurdish-borderlands/">research I conducted</a> in Turkey’s Kurdish borderlands between 2013 and 2014 shows the territorial agenda of the Turkish state can be best seen when conducting ethnographic field work in those regions.</p>
<p>Kurdish borderlands are war-torn areas with their own dynamics. Opposing sides are more likely to confront and interact with each other here. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250733/original/file-20181214-185237-1bz1igc.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Borderlands between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. Summer 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In these volatile conditions, people became more willing to share their stories once I got to know them better. My interviews revealed that the policies introduced by the Turkish state to bring about peace failed because the state pursued what I call a “dual strategy” during the same process of democratic reforms. </p>
<p>That is, the state’s territorial agenda coexisted with its emphasis on negotiating the Kurdish-Turkish conflict through democratic channels.</p>
<h2>How Kurds regarded reforms</h2>
<p>Drawing on the 12 months of field work, my study’s focus on territorial control involved two aggregate factors, each of which also have various components.</p>
<p>At the state level, I examined democratic reforms and showed the mechanisms of territorial control. </p>
<p>At the Kurdish level, I looked at the responses of Kurdish political actors and Kurdish people to understand how the Kurds regarded the reform process. I presented the stories of Kurds from the 1990s and 2000s to show their experiences living under territorial control on the borderlands. </p>
<p>Both of these aggregate factors are the two main components of the typology of territorial control. </p>
<p>At the macro level, the state enacts policies and Kurdish political actors respond.</p>
<p>At the micro level, the state employs various mechanisms, including securitization, expulsion, demographic and administrative control, nationalizing the landscape and control of movement across borders. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Kurds speak of these processes — displacement and loss of property; militarization; disruption of minority culture; disenfranchisement; and denial and loss of minority cultural heritage — from their own perspective. </p>
<p>By focusing on territorial control, my research explains the limitations of democratic reforms that only focus on cultural rights but exclude territorial rights. </p>
<p>The processes of ethnic control continued to operate <a href="http://www.publicseminar.org/2018/04/vicious-infrastructure/">in certain Kurdish-populated sites, such as Hakkari, Sirnak, Van,</a> more than others during the Turkish-Kurdish peace process. These control tactics negated the impact of the so-called Kurdish Opening.</p>
<p>Why did the Turkish state continue to maintain territorial control in certain areas more than others? Because these are border zones in rough terrains that are more likely to foster insurgency.</p>
<h2>More control over certain border zones</h2>
<p>Border zones do not only cover the lines between Turkey, Iraq and Iran, which were not even properly fenced, but also some villages and towns in the hinterland/interior territories, which I also call ‘the zone of conflict’.</p>
<p>Control mechanisms used by the Turkish state seemed to be on hold in certain destinations, while they were strikingly visible in some other locations during my 12 months in the region. In these interior territories, displacement and loss of property became the primary tool of control while militarization and demographic control was more pervasive in towns right on the borders.</p>
<p>The Turkish state does not manage every border in the same way. Despite the common narratives of loss and displacement, there were some strategic locations where the state preferred to have civilians around rather than keeping the area vacated. </p>
<p>One of the villagers who also served as a village guard for more than a decade told me how they were compelled to stay in the village and became shields between the soldiers and guerrillas.</p>
<p>The majority of people, regardless of their political ideology, agree that everyone from these areas lost a property at least once. On top of that, most of them also complained about the lack of sufficient and fair compensation. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252187/original/file-20181231-47316-1w2k3sw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">One of the houses that was demolished in the 1990s. The owners still have no access to this area.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another common narrative, independent of political ideology, was that those who received some amount of compensation complained about the corrupt system because, according to these participants, the legal system created certain beneficiary groups who have been taking advantage of the Kurdish villagers’ fragile conditions. </p>
<h2>Ideology important</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, party affiliation and political ideology still matter.</p>
<p>Those who were openly associated with the People’s Democracy Party (HDP), a pro-minority party that has MPs in the Turkish parliament, were more critical about the processes of control and violence as well as their durability, partly because the HDP voters have witnessed and experienced the deep, dark side of these control practices — but also because every aspect of their lives was politicized.</p>
<p>In accordance with their political stance, the majority of the participants from the Kurdish-populated borderlands were sceptical but also optimistic about <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB111.pdf">the peace process</a>, because, for them, the process could be manipulated but the idea must have been appreciated because it was proposed by the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.</p>
<p>Surprisingly, most of these people also had to serve as <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/kurds-who-became-village-guards-and-fought-pkk-rebels-in-turkey-to-be-disbanded-but-they-fear-a-9131095.html">village guards</a>, paramilitary groups armed and paid by the state in their war against the PKK. </p>
<p>The stories of village guards show the complexities and contradictions of this protracted conflict.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://dealingwiththepast.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Disa-Paramilitary.pdf">village guard system</a> has become a primary component of the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/mechanisms-co-optation-palestinian-territories-neutralizing-independent-civil-society">co-optation</a> and dependency measures taken by the state to neutralize independent actors and maintain <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227663216_Understanding_processes_of_ethnic_control_Segmentation_dependency_and_co-optation_in_post-communist_Estonia">territorial control</a> in these highly militarized areas adjacent to Iraq and Iran.</p>
<p>Democratization is a long path requiring courage, fairness and commitment. At the heart of democratization lies the elusive Turkish-Kurdish negotiations. </p>
<p>Understanding the Turkish-Kurdish negotiations and its limitations requires understanding the mechanisms and experiences of territorial control. Omitting territorial rights from the bundle of policies designed for minority accommodation in such divided settings means that a Turkish-Kurdish peace accord is a long way off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dilan Okcuoglu received funding from MITACS CANADA and IDRC during her research.
She is currently affiliated with the Canada Research Chair in Quebec and Canadian Studies (CREQC), UQAM as well as the Centre for the Study of Democracy and Diversity, Queen's University. </span></em></p>Why did negotiations between the Turkish state and the Kurds, aimed at mitigating ethnic conflict and bringing about peace, fail in Turkey?Dilan Okcuoglu, PhD Candidate and Teaching Fellow in Political Studies, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/764252017-05-05T15:50:17Z2017-05-05T15:50:17ZKurds brace for an uncertain future in post-referendum Turkey<p>Turkey is still taking stock of its <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-declares-victory-in-his-pursuit-of-one-man-rule-76032">referendum</a> on sweeping constitutional reforms, which delivered a crucial victory for the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – albeit under highly contested circumstances. </p>
<p>The anti-Erdoğan “No” camp, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Kurdish-led, left-leaning People’s Democracy Party (HDP), <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/chp-blasts-election-board-referendum-result-170417034950684.html">claim</a> that about 1.5m ballots in favour of “Yes” were counted despite having no official stamp, which should have rendered them invalid. But their complaints have failed to overturn the result, and the new political reality is taking shape. Turkey’s parliamentary system will be restructured, greatly enhancing Erdoğan’s power.</p>
<p>The new “super-presidency” system is the ultimate realisation of the “New Turkey” rhetoric <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/turkey-erdogan-new-turkey-religious-conservatives.html">long propagated</a> by Erdoğan’s right-wing populist (in a “conservative democrat” discourse) ruling party, Justice and Development (AKP). Whatever the coming years hold, they will be full of surprises. No one, including Erdoğan and the AKP, seems quite sure what to expect – but the implications of this new order are especially unclear for the Kurds. </p>
<p>In the absence of a clear prognosis, the future of the so-called “Kurdish right problem” is the subject of intense debate on all sides. Is New Turkey a renewed Ottoman <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0231.xml">millet system</a> of religious politics, an Islamist project in the style of the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170217-turkeys-erdogan-muslim-brotherhood-is-ideological-not-terrorist-organisation/">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, or a chance to realise the long-held dream of Kurdish self-governance?</p>
<p>The Kurds briefly seemed to have a strong political voice in the form of the HDP. The party is noticeably different to the pro-Kurdish political parties of yore, espousing a leftist populist discourse of equality and liberty for all against the AKP’s growing conservative authoritarianism and neoliberal elitism. It’s also relatively popular among Kurdish movements: its efforts to mobilise the passion stirred up by the 2013 Gezi Park protests seemed to pay off at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">June 2015 election</a>, where it cleared the 10% national vote threshold to win seats in parliament, netting 80 MPs. </p>
<p>The result was a beacon of hope for many in Turkey and beyond, but it faded fast. At a second election later in 2015, Erdoğan <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-election-erdogan-and-the-akp-get-majority-back-amid-climate-of-violence-and-fear-49963">won an outright majority</a> and formed a government, while the HDP lost 20 of its hard-won seats. Erdoğan’s approach to the Kurdish issue has since then been more hardline than ever. </p>
<h2>A more muscular approach</h2>
<p>The president accuses previous governments of being “weak” in the face of the militarised Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). He blames their failure on treacherous cadres within the police, military, and intelligence services – the same malign infiltrators he accuses of masterminding the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-struggles-to-make-sense-of-a-surreal-failed-coup-detat-62596">failed coup attempt</a> in July 2016. Expunging these factions, he says, will allow him to take a more muscular, highly militarised approach.</p>
<p>When the so-called Kurdish peace process ultimately <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/turkey-kurdish-peace-process-150729074358423.html">broke down</a> in 2015, the AKP government duly turned away from a peaceful path to a military one, <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/09/29/extension-of-state-of-emergency-to-benefit-people-president-erdogan-says">vowing</a> to vanquish the PKK altogether – all this with the zealous support of Turkish ultra-nationalists.</p>
<p>Violence soon returned to south-eastern Turkey. The HDP’s “human security” agenda was overwhelmed by a new armed conflict between security forces and the PKK’s youth branch, the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/turkey-kurdish-rebels-new-youth-wing-or-deep-pkk.html">Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement</a>, who are using heavy weapons, digging trenches and erecting barricades down the side streets of cities and towns.</p>
<p>To listen to Erdoğan, you might think none of this was happening. In his post-referendum victory speech, he claimed his support had substantially grown in the east and south-east, even though those regions voted “No” by large margins. The HDP counter-claims that what advances Erdoğan made can be chalked up to fraud, unfairness, and outright coercion. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in 2016, almost all the elected pro-Kurdish municipal authorities were <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/28-mayors-replaced-with-trustees-by-turkish-government.aspx?pageID=238&nID=103784&NewsCatID=341.0">replaced</a> by state-appointed “trustees” and elected mayors <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-kurds-idUSKCN11H065">arrested</a>, while the tough state of emergency law has securitised the region as never before.</p>
<p>Erdoğan seems to be looking for a new political representative for the Kurdish movement, one that will be more likely to toe his line. But as long as he oppresses the HDP, Kurdish politics will have no single mainstream political voice. The non-PKK, secular, socialist or Kurdistani (pro-Kurdish autonomy) political parties have yet to mobilise efficiently enough to carry much weight. The ensuing vacuum might be filled by a new actor – and not necessarily a secular, peaceful one.</p>
<p>One faction vying for the lead role is <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21590595-islamist-party-turkeys-kurds-huda-pars-emergence">Hüda-Par</a>, a radical Islamist party with links to the Hizbullah paramilitary group. But the majority of Kurds still associate Hizbullah with brutal violence, and secular pro-Kurdish factions are still popular, particularly since their <a href="http://aranews.net/2017/01/syrian-kurds-celebrate-second-anniversary-kobane-liberation/">victory against the so-called Islamic State</a> just across the Syrian border.</p>
<p>So long as the Kurds lack a unified political voice, the newly empowered Erdoğan will continue to deal with them violently rather than peacefully – and their future in Turkey will remain out of their control.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Omer Tekdemir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With President Erdoğan increasingly empowered, the ‘Kurdish question’ is at the forefront once again.Omer Tekdemir, Research Associate, School of History, Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/644482016-08-25T12:54:19Z2016-08-25T12:54:19ZTurkey playing Russian roulette in Syria<p>Turkey has finally <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37171995">directly entered the Syrian conflict</a>. With support of Turkish tanks, artillery and fighter jets, some 1,500 fighters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) have moved in to take over the strategic city of Jarablus, meeting with little resistance from militants of the so-called Islamic State (IS).</p>
<p>But the main target of the Turkish intervention is neither the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which Turkey has for the past five years done everything it could to undermine, nor IS, which it stood accused of tacitly supporting until recently. The real target of Turkey’s risky intervention in Syria <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33690060">are its long-time foe, the Kurds</a> who it is desperately trying to prevent from achieving statehood since that would embolden its own Kurdish population in their quest for political and cultural recognition and endanger the unitary nature of its nation-state.</p>
<p>Turkey’s apparent volte-face of re-aligning its Syria policy with those of Iran and the Assad regime seems dramatic even by Middle Eastern standards of geopolitical flux. Strategically dazzled by the spectacle of the fall of one Arab ruler after another during the height of the Arab Spring, Turkey under president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initially wagered on the rapid collapse of Assad’s Ba'ath regime and threw its political, diplomatic, military and logistical weight <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/nishaat-ismail/turkey%E2%80%99s-quagmire-since-arab-spring">behind the Syrian opposition</a>.</p>
<p>But the fall of Assad became an ever-elusive mirage. His regime has been propped up by Iran, Russia and the Lebanese Hezbollah – and has indirectly benefited from the rise of IS, which has been targeting other opposition groups more than Assad’s army. Assad has arguably weathered the worst storms of the civil war and Turkey now seems to accept him as part of the solution to the conflict, something it was never prepared to countenance before.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, exploiting the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of Assad’s forces from Kurdistan due to the Syrian army’s overstretch elsewhere, Syrian Kurds <a href="http://www.warscapes.com/reportage/syrias-kurds-quietly-consolidating">quickly have emerged as a coherent political-military force</a>. They have advanced an ambitious bottom-up, secular system of self-governance based on the constitutional recognition of the ethno-religious diversity of the region. </p>
<p>And the more the Syrian Kurds’ project of “<a href="http://www.kurdishquestion.com/oldsite/index.php/kurdistan/west-kurdistan/democratic-confederalism-the-short-and-long-of-it/352-democratic-confederalism-the-short-and-long-of-it.html">democratic confederalism</a>” has been consolidated and expanded, the more Turkey has moved its strategic objective away from toppling Assad and towards containment of the Kurds.</p>
<h2>Turkey’s u-turn on Syria</h2>
<p>The overhaul of Turkey’s Syria policy was massively accelerated by three main events. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-downing-of-russian-jet-over-turkey-really-lead-to-a-wider-war-51207">shooting down of the Russian bomber last winter</a> and the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3321901c-4fbf-11e4-908e-00144feab7de">Russo-Turkish military-diplomatic stand-off</a> that ensued hugely limited Turkey’s ability to project military power inside Syria – either in support of opposition groups or against the Kurds. Moreover, deprived of Turkey’s hugely lucrative trade with Russia, Erdoğan risked the erosion of support domestically. </p>
<p>US support for the Syrian Kurds in their highly effective war against IS troubled Turkey even more. Washington has repeatedly declared its understanding of Turkish sensitivities regarding the Kurds. But it has also <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-35882201">refused to toe Erdogan’s line</a> in identifying the YPG, the Syrian Kurds’ military arm, with the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which has been locked in conflict with the Turkish state for more than 30 years and is considered a terrorist organisation by both countries.</p>
<p>The last straw seems to have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-isnt-a-failed-state-but-maybe-it-should-act-like-one-64181">last month’s failed coup</a>. Deeply disappointed by its Western allies’ lukewarm support during and in the aftermath of the botched coup, Turkey made a sharp eastward turn, <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/09/world/turkey-russia-erdogan-putin-meeting/">restoring relations with Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2016/07/11/140959/turkey-iran-relations/">strengthening its anti-Kurdish cooperation with Iran</a>.</p>
<p>Both of these moves are driven by the geopolitical and diplomatic requirements of a decisive intervention against the Syrian Kurds – an intervention that assumed an unprecedented urgency following the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/06/us-backed-syrian-fighters-take-town-of-manbij-from-isis">expulsion of IS from the strategic town of Manbij</a> by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). SDF’s announcement of an <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syrian-rebel-forces-preparing-attack-isis-controlled-town-jarablus-along-turkey-border-1577294">imminent assault on the IS-held town of Jarablus</a> further north on the Turkish border, to which the encircled IS fighters in Manbij had retreated, seems to have decided the timing of Turkey’s intervention to pre-empt Jarablus’s capture by SDF. </p>
<h2>Complex politics</h2>
<p>Wars tend to be easy to start but difficult to end. In the short term, Turkey might achieve some specific military objectives, but in the long run the extent to which Turkey’s interests coincide with those of the other major players in the Syrian civil war are likely to be unstable.</p>
<p>The long-term <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-has-russia-been-flying-airstrikes-over-syria-from-an-iranian-airbase-64273">interests of Russia and Iran in Syria</a> and the new (pro)active role in the Middle East to which they seem to aspire, partially depends on a restored but relatively weak – and hence dependent – Assad regime. They are therefore likely to refrain from a full-frontal assault on the Kurds, but instead will work to undermine Kurdish attempts at creating a territorially contiguous political entity. This also serves to counter-balance Turkey. </p>
<p>Syria is unlikely to remain content with the large-scale and long-term occupation of its territory by Turkish forces. In fact, <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-condemnation-idUSKCN10Z18J?il=0">Syria has formally condemned the Turkish incursion</a>. Russia on the other hand might be interested in seeing Turkey stuck in the Syrian quagmire after last year’s <a href="http://natoassociation.ca/turkey-and-ukraine-teaming-up-how-the-new-alliance-is-combatting-the-russian-aggression/">military cooperation plan</a> signed with Ukraine. Indeed, prolonged Turkish involvement in Syria might deprive NATO of the full capacities of its second largest army in its potential confrontation with Russia over Ukraine. </p>
<p>Moreover, the abiding power of Arab nationalism might push at least some of Syria’s Arab opposition forces to reconsider their relations with Turkey whose softening position towards Assad is not to their liking. </p>
<h2>War on many fronts</h2>
<p>Hardened by several years of relentless and successful war against IS, Kurdish forces are also likely to pose a much more formidable resistance to the invading Turkish forces than Ankara might be expecting. They might also seek to forge tactical alliance with those anti-Assad forces that choose to oppose Turkey’s occupation of Syrian soil. </p>
<p>If Turkey’s intervention goes beyond a limited incursion, something <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkeys-syria-incursion-reflects-foreign-policy-reset-1472068752">statements by some Turkish military officials</a> seem to confirm, it will also have potentially very dangerous domestic implications. The PKK might intensify its military operations and expand them to major cities in Turkey’s heartland. IS might also exploit its wide terror network inside Turkey to retaliate against Turkish intervention against its forces inside Syria. And the challenge of the deeply entrenched Gulen movement, which Erdogan <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36855846">sees as behind the recent failed coup</a>, also remains very much alive. </p>
<p>And finally, following the post-coup purges in the Turkish military, intelligence agencies and various other state institutions, Turkey is arguably ill-prepared for a war on so many fronts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64448/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kamran Matin is a member of the Labour Party</span></em></p>Ankara’s real target in Syria is the Kurds, but is Turkey getting bogged down on too many fronts?Kamran Matin, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/641812016-08-22T13:29:32Z2016-08-22T13:29:32ZTurkey isn’t a failed state, but maybe it should act like one<p>As Turkey recovers from an attempted coup, it has an opportunity to move in a new direction. And while it is neither a failed state nor emerging from a civil war, it might be useful to see itself as such in the transformation process. The state needs to be rebuilt as though part of a post-conflict reconstruction effort. </p>
<p>Turkey is not Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia. On the contrary, it is one of the strongest countries in its region in terms of its economy, military power and governance. However, the attempted coup against the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on July 15 exposed a number of significant problems on all three fronts. They are of such a scale and depth that Turkey could, and in fact should, learn from how other countries rebuild after conflict – imperative if it is to avoid future coup attempts and even a possible civil war.</p>
<h2>Cleaning up the government</h2>
<p>Had the coup been successful we would, today, have been witnessing the “Syrianisation” of Turkey. The pro and anti-coup elements in the military, and the coup organisers and the police, would have probably ended up waging a <a href="http://setadc.org/coup-attempt-successful/">civil war</a> against each other. The way in which the public went out into the streets to stand against the coup also indicated that a successful coup regime would have been fighting <a href="http://scroll.in/article/813417/what-if-the-attempted-coup-in-turkey-had-succeeded">opposition from the public</a> too. In short, society would be divided along numerous political, ethnic and sectarian fronts and a bloody civil war might even have ensued.</p>
<p>Consider the huge international security ramifications that the crisis in Syria has already caused. It has turned the country into a centre of global jihadism and driven millions out, sparking a continent-wide <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/migrant-crisis-16372">refugee crisis</a>. A civil war in Turkey – a much more significant country internationally – could have meant even greater upheaval. The failure of the coup was therefore a narrow escape, not only for Turkey, but also for Europe and the world beyond.</p>
<p>As it is, since July 15, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/02/world/europe/turkey-purge-erdogan-scale.html">tens of thousands</a> of staff in the military, judiciary, police, intelligence service, academia, schools and various ministries and national authorities have been dismissed or suspended. Nearly <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/1992119/turkey-fires-25000-teachers-professors-and-others-huge-purge-coup">25,000 people</a> have been detained or arrested and these numbers increase on a daily basis.</p>
<p>This is aimed at weeding out supporters of <a href="https://theconversation.com/fethullah-gulen-public-intellectual-or-public-enemy-62887">Fethullah Gülen</a>, who is accused of masterminding the coup attempt. President <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/recep-tayyip-erdogan-5905">Erdoğan claims</a> that a “parallel state” system had been established by Gulenists who had infiltrated the Turkish government, private sector, media and education system. </p>
<p>However, if these people had been able to infiltrate the state to such a dangerous degree, how they were able to do it? <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/real-and-imagined-threats-the-shared-past-of-akp-and-the-g%C3%BClen-movement/a-19429199">Revelations</a> over the past few weeks point to nepotism, corruption and short-termist political manoeuvring. It is <a href="http://www.meforum.org/2045/fethullah-gulens-grand-ambition">claimed</a> that the Gulenists placed their supporters in key public sectors using various tactics, including stealing questions at national exams for civil servants and blocking promotions for their rivals.</p>
<p>It would follow from Erdoğan’s argument, then, that the Turkish state has been failing to implement the number one rule of good governance: employing public workers on their merits. This should be the most important factor to bear in mind during the post-coup statebuilding process. In replacing thousands of public workers the only criteria that will really matter should be applicants CVs, otherwise many other religious brotherhoods might now see an opportunity to infiltrate the state system.</p>
<p>If the government fails to establish a transparent, accountable and merit-based recruitment and promotion system as the norm in public life, Turkey may not be so lucky in repelling a next coup attempt, be it civilian or military.</p>
<h2>Democratic values</h2>
<p>Turkey also needs to rebuild itself as a state in which legislative, executive and judicial powers are clearly and effectively separated. Otherwise it will continue to be plagued by security threats, including those that target its very existence as a country. </p>
<p>The concentration of power in Erdoğan’s presidency was one of the most controversial issues before the failed coup attempt. If nothing else, Turkey must have now learned that democratic checks and balances and rule of law are a must for the survival of the state. </p>
<p>The accumulation of power in a single office is a sure recipe for societal polarisation. It breeds damaging levels of mistrust between society and the state. There is now an opportunity for Turkey to restructure itself as an accountable and transparent state for all of its citizens. </p>
<p>The failed coup also underlined the importance of secularism for Turkey and why Turkey’s founder, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/ataturk_kemal.shtml">Mustafa Kemal Atatürk</a>, made it the main cornerstone of the Turkish Republic. There should now be no ifs and buts with these principles. The country needs to re-establish, protect and maintain this.</p>
<p>Turkey must become a country where freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity are clearly ensured and protected. This is the only way to deal with wider peace and security problems, from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/kurdistan-12557">Kurdish insurgency</a> to other terrorism risks. In other words, Turkey needs to stop thinking about security through guns and weapons, and come to the realisation that, as Gandhi once said, “peace is the only way”.</p>
<p>After its collapse in 2015, the peace process in Turkey needs to be re-initiated. The Kurdish PKK is killing indiscriminately and the resolution of the Kurdish issue can no longer be postponed, particularly when the country is facing a major security risk posed by Islamic State. </p>
<p>To help with all this, Turkey should use some of the well-known tools for post-conflict statebuilding, such as truth and reconciliation commissions. It might not be possible to identify the full scale of any Gülenist infiltration through purely punitive means. A commission in which everyone is open and honest might be a most effective long-term approach. Similarly, the state needs to investigate itself and its role in the creation of possible security threats. </p>
<p>The way the public and all political parties reacted to the failed coup should be considered a great opportunity to initiate such a reconciliation process. The Kurdish political party, HDP (which expressed clear opposition to the coup attempt), should be brought into the fold in the rebuilding of a new Turkey.</p>
<p>After the IS <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/injured-blast-hits-wedding-hall-gaziantep-160820204150494.html">suicide attack on August 20</a> at a wedding in Gaziantep, Selahattin Demirtas, the leader of HDP, called all political parties to mourn for the dead side-by-side. Such opportunities to make peace and reconcile are rare, and therefore, should be seized upon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64181/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey is recovering from a failed coup, not a war, but it could learn from the practice of post-conflict reconstruction.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/618362016-06-29T18:43:47Z2016-06-29T18:43:47ZTurkish airport massacre will further imperil a nation on the verge of crisis<p>Another heinous terrorist attack has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jun/29/istanbul-ataturk-turkey-airport-attack-explosions-rolling-report-updates">horrified Turkey and shocked the rest of the world</a>. The target this time was Istanbul’s busy Ataturk Airport and it is believed to have been the work of Islamic State gunmen who are thought to have entered the country before the beginning of Ramadan. The death toll is believed to be at least 41 people with many hundreds more reported injured.</p>
<p>Turkey has experienced a number of <a href="https://www.rt.com/viral/348785-turkey-timeline-terrorist-attacks/">similar deadly attacks</a> over the past six months by both Islamic State and TAK – an offshoot of Kurdish terrorist group PKK with which Turkey has been fighting an increasingly vicious war for many years. Attacks have targeted Istanbul, the Turkey’s cultural and financial centre, and its political capital, Ankara. But Ataturk Airport is a particularly significant target, as it is the third busiest airport in Europe and hugely important for the Turkish economy.</p>
<p>The attack focused on the international arrivals zone in the airport, which is doubly significant because Turkey’s tourism sector has suffered a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36549880">serious downturn in recent months</a> as a result of the various attacks. There had been hopes that a campaign of diplomatic rapprochement with Israel and Russia would help boost weak tourist numbers, but this is a devastating setback.</p>
<p>Ironically, on the day the attack took place, Turkey announced that it had <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/26/israel-and-turkey-end-six-year-stand-off-with-deal-on-gaza-floti/">reached an agreement with Israel</a> over the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29934002">attack on the Mavi Marmara in 2010</a> which left nine Turkish activists dead after Israeli commandos raided a flotilla bound for Gaza. Israel had agreed to pay compensation to families of the dead activists and allow Turkey to build a hospital in Gaza. The <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/26/israel-and-turkey-end-six-year-stand-off-with-deal-on-gaza-floti/">agreement will restore full diplomatic relations</a> and will likely pave the way for a large natural gas deal between the two countries.</p>
<p>Turkey is also in the process of normalising its relationship with Russia following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-downing-of-russian-jet-over-turkey-really-lead-to-a-wider-war-51207">shooting down of a Russian warplane in November 2015</a>. Vladimir Putin offered his sympathies during a phone call shortly after news of the attack broke. He is understood to have instructed his government to begin the process of lifting the sanctions against Turkey that had been in place since the military clash. It has been suggested that the <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/isis-istanbul-airport-attack-2016-6">airport attack by Islamic State</a> might even be a reaction to these positive recent developments.</p>
<p>Tensions have been high across Turkey since the <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/9f06f0cc-1b85-11e6-b286-cddde55ca122">breakdown in the Kurdish peace process last year</a>. The <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/12058691/The-return-of-war-Turkeys-south-east-region-plunged-into-worst-violence-in-years.html">armed violence in south-eastern Turkey</a> has since risen to unprecedented levels. </p>
<p>Domestically, Turkey went through two <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/world/europe/turkey-elections-erdogan.html">highly divisive general elections in June and November 2015</a> which were followed by the sudden removal from power in May 2016 of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/05/ahmet-davutoglus-future-turkish-prime-minister-balance">prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu,</a> by Erdogan. Many saw this as a further step in the president’s ambition to change Turkey’s governance model to allow him to become an executive president.</p>
<h2>No good news</h2>
<p>Against such a backdrop of regional and political instability, Turkey continues to host nearly 3m Syrian refugees – and the conflict in Syria and Iraq, both of which share a border with Turkey, pose a wide range of constant regional security threats. The presence of Syrian refugees is increasingly becoming a destabilising factor in the country.</p>
<p>Turkey has always been a challenging geopolitical environment with its borders extending from the Balkans to the Caucasus and the Middle East. But the situation is now as volatile as at any time since the end of World War II. With the emergence of non-state armed actors such as Islamic State and disintegration of international borders drawn up in the aftermath of World War I, Turkey certainly is now in a demanding, divisive and dangerous place. </p>
<p>Looking west, the question of Turkey’s EU membership continues to fester without much direction or vision. The recent deal on the resettlement of Syrian refugees, which was expected to lead to a visa-free regime for Turkish citizens within the EU, was expected to begin in July. But it has already been postponed over concerns about Turkey’s anti-terror legislation. It is thought that the possible failure of this deal will mean that membership talks will once again be placed on the back burner.</p>
<p>And with all of these grim developments as a backdrop, it is thought likely that <a href="https://next.ft.com/content/42de5688-f730-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132">Erdogan will continue to further push his presidential agenda</a> – at the cost of exacerbating the already deep socio-political divisions throughout the country. </p>
<p>Today, Turkey is a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-turkey/">country with serious deficiencies</a> in democracy, governance, the judicial system, human rights, the rule of law and – more importantly – security. Some commentators have even warned of the possibility of a <a href="http://www.worldtribune.com/international-media-silent-as-turkey-teeters-on-the-brink-of-civil-war/">full-blown civil war</a>. More terror attacks such as this massacre at Ataturk airport can only serve to hasten the country down this dark path.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61836/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politically unstable and bordering the world’s most violent and volatile region, Turkey is at risk of descending into civil war.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/562232016-03-14T17:11:24Z2016-03-14T17:11:24ZBombing in Ankara: who is fighting who in Turkey?<p>Hours after Ankara was rocked by the second bomb attack in less than three weeks, killing <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/deaths-reported-explosion-turkey-ankara-160313172932404.html">at least 37 people and injuring 70 others</a>, Turkish jets <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/turkey-ankara-attack-one-bombers-was-pkk-member-officials-say">bombed PKK bases</a> in the Qandil mountains deep inside the Kurdish region of Iraq. </p>
<p>Turkish security officials told reporters that two suspects in the bombing had <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/turkey-ankara-attack-one-bombers-was-pkk-member-officials-say">ties to the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK)</a> – although it is not yet clear whether one of the attackers whose body is said to have been found at the scene is either of these people.</p>
<p>But the fact that responsibility for the bomb attack in the Turkish capital on February 17 was claimed by <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-blast-kurds-idUSKCN0VS245">the militant group TAK</a> (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons) has clearly increased government suspicion that the same Kurdish group is behind this attack.</p>
<p>The official line in Turkey is that the TAK is <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/after-ankara-bomning-questions-over-pkk-tak-ties-resurface-1097219220">an affiliate of the PKK</a> – and so eventual responsibility lies with them. The PKK has always denied its affiliation with TAK – but, in any case, Turkey considers the group to be the main Kurdish threat and the Kurdish question to be the biggest problem for state security.</p>
<p>Despite this, it’s worth exploring the identities and motivations of the different players in what is clearly a complex and increasingly violent security situation in Turkey.</p>
<h2>PKK: long-term struggle</h2>
<p>The PKK’s origin dates back to the early 1970s student radicalism in Ankara but it was <a href="formally%20established%20in%20Diyarbakir%20in%201978">formally established in Diyarbakir in 1978</a>. It defined itself as a national liberation movement and fought a guerrilla campaign in the rural areas of the Kurdish regions of Turkey between 1984 and 1999. The conflict has cost the lives of 45,000 people and caused <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-opens-up-old-wounds-with-a-new-campaign-against-the-pkk-45397">huge socio-economic devastation</a> in the region.</p>
<p>The PKK has been the dominant Kurdish organisation in Turkey since the early 1980s. Its founding leader Abdullah Öcalan has been serving a life sentence in a Turkish prison since 1999, but he remains the main figure in the movement and, as such, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31998336">was involved in a peace dialogue with the Turkish government</a>. In his absence, the group is spearheaded by a <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/pkk-leader-bayik-says-turkey-and-kurds-in-civil-war">collective leadership</a> based in its headquarters in the Qandil mountains. </p>
<p>Currently, the PKK advocates the recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey and autonomy and language rights for the Kurds. </p>
<p>There was a significant reduction in PKK violence after Öcalan’s 1999 arrest brought about a <a href="http://researchturkey.org/radicalising-democracy-power-politics-people-and-the-pkk/">significant ideological transformation</a>. But it continues to have a 5,000-strong guerrilla force in the field and has carried out many attacks against state security forces in the past decade, including roadside bombs and ambushes. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115017/original/image-20160314-11302-dwojtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115017/original/image-20160314-11302-dwojtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/115017/original/image-20160314-11302-dwojtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115017/original/image-20160314-11302-dwojtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115017/original/image-20160314-11302-dwojtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115017/original/image-20160314-11302-dwojtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115017/original/image-20160314-11302-dwojtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/115017/original/image-20160314-11302-dwojtc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map showing population spread of Kurdish population.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">CIA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There have also been extended periods in the conflict in which the PKK ceased violence – including nearly two-and-a-half years between January 2013 and June 2015 during which there was a moratorium against guerrilla activities in an attempt to help peace negotiations. </p>
<p>The PKK says it is committed to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict and will end its violent campaign permanently only if there is significant progress made in peace negotiations.</p>
<h2>TAK: violent offshoot</h2>
<p>There is very little knowledge available publicly about the TAK’s organisational structure and membership but it has carried out attacks in various parts of western Turkey in the past decade, mainly targeting the security forces and Turkey’s tourism industry. Its first attack took place in July 2005 in the <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/02/turkey-outlawed-tak-will-not-deviate-line-of-ocalan.html#">holiday resort of Kusadasi on Turkey’s Aegean Coast</a>, killing five people. TAK has carried out a number of other attacks that have also resulted in civilian casualties, including the roadside bomb blast in Istanbul <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=four-soldiers-teen-killed-in-a-bomb-attack-in-istanbul-2010-06-22">that killed four soldiers</a> in 2010 and the February 17 Ankara bombing. </p>
<p>The state claims the TAK <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/12/26/pkk-affiliated-terrorist-group-claims-responsibility-for-istanbul-airport-attack">to be affiliated to the PKK</a>. In turn, the PKK denies the association, claiming TAK is comprised of former PKK militants who left the movement because they advocated the use of more violent force against the state. </p>
<p>Whether it was TAK or PKK behind the March 13 bomb in Ankara, it suggests that Kurdish militants are responding to the state’s military operations in Kurdistan by targeting Turkey’s urban centres. This is likely to escalate the struggle into an increasingly violent armed conflict. </p>
<h2>Heavy-handed military</h2>
<p>Ground operations by the Turkish military, in urban Kurdish majority areas in the south-east of Turkey, ostensibly to target militants, appear to have been the trigger for the TAK’s attack in Ankara in February. These have been ongoing in the past six months and have caused great destruction as well as anxiety in the Kurdish community. </p>
<p>Army operations in the past three months have focused on <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/army-279-pkk-militants-killed-in-sur-operation.aspx?pageID=238&nID=96306&NewsCatID=341">the Sur district of Diyarbakir</a>, where authorities reported 279 militants had been killed, and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/02/turkey-kurdish-people-cizre-return-to-ruins">in Cizre</a> – where the town was devastated with the loss of hundreds of lives and the displacement of much of the population. This attack on Cizre was cited by TAK as the main reason for its attack last month. </p>
<p>The state’s heavy-handed approach, which has inevitably included the deaths of many civilians has given rise to accusations of targeting non-combatants – and has caused significant disillusionment among the Kurds. It certainly hasn’t helped the peace process and is likely to further radicalise a significant section of the Kurdish society.</p>
<h2>Deteriorating security situation</h2>
<p>Things started to spiral downhill when Kurdish enclaves <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-opens-up-old-wounds-with-a-new-campaign-against-the-pkk-45397">came under attack from Turkish military</a>, ostensibly as part of the war against the Islamic State. It seems likely that things will continue to deteriorate. On March 13, the army announced its plan to carry out military operations in the south-eastern towns of Yüksekova, Nusaybin and Sirnak, declaring curfews and moving in troops and materiel. </p>
<p>Of course, the continuing conflict in Syria and international confusion over who is fighting who is fanning the flames of this tension. It seems unlikely that Turkish central government will be either willing – or able – to seek a lasting solution to this bloody and long-running conflict.</p>
<p>So brace for further attacks on Turkey’s major centres of population. The tragedy is that the more regular these become, the more polarised civil society will become in the country. The prospect of communal violence against minority Kurdish populations in parts of Turkey is growing more likely and an end to the conflict seems further away than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56223/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A second bomb in the Turkish capital in three weeks raises the question of who are the main players in the violent struggle.Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490672015-10-14T11:57:28Z2015-10-14T11:57:28ZAnger over Ankara response is a product of Turkish government’s past record<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98257/original/image-20151013-31141-1v2ds22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters hold placards reading 'we know who the killer is'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Murad Sezer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkish voters will go to the polls on November 1, still reeling from the horrific bombings at a peace demonstration in Ankara on October 10. </p>
<p>The labour, peace and democracy rally in Ankara was planned as an intervention into the cycle of conflict that has engulfed the country since the parliamentary elections in June. Those who gathered did not get the chance to shout their calls for peace. A dual explosion went off, leaving <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/turkey-blames-ankara-bombings-on-islamic-state">at least 97 dead</a> and <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_isil-emerges-as-prime-suspect-in-ankara-blasts-as-court-orders-confidentiality-order_401339.html">more than 500 wounded</a>.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the attack, there have been <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/police-intervene-into-protest-against-ankara-bombing-in-istanbul-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=89830&NewsCatID=341">mass protests</a> against the government. The public anger, it seems, is being directed not at the perpetrators of the attack but at the people in charge of the country.</p>
<p>This is because the Ankara attack was not an isolated event. It is the latest link in a long chain of assaults against democratic forces in Turkey. Outrage is directed against the government precisely because the culprits of the previous attacks have not been held to account.</p>
<p>Turkish authorities are reportedly focusing on <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/turkey-blames-ankara-bombings-on-islamic-state">Islamic State</a> militants as the main suspects in the bombing. Prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has already <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2015/10/12/turkey-close-to-identifying-one-of-ankara-suicide-bombers-says-pm-davutoglu">stated</a>, though, that the government is also considering the “usual suspects”. That means the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C). </p>
<p>If these swift official statements were intended to reassure the public that the government is determined to identify the culprits and bring them to justice, they failed spectacularly.</p>
<p>Since the Ankara attack, dozens of protest meetings and rallies have <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ankara-explosions-mourners-chant-anti-government-slogans-as-death-toll-rises-to-128-a6689501.html">taken place</a> across the country. These have been aimed squarely at criticising the interim AKP (Justice and Development Party) government and president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.</p>
<p>At first glance, this collective burst of anger could be interpreted as a condemnation of the initial official response from the government. Interior minister Selami Altınok had angered many by initially <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/11/turkey-ankara-terror-bombings-80-killed">rejecting</a> any suggestion that there had been failures in security preparations for the rally on October 10 – a view <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/not-taking-safety-precautions-is-not-a-security-gap-deputy-pm.aspx?pageID=238&nID89739&NewsCatID=338">echoed</a> by deputy prime minister Tuğrul Türkeş. Eyewitnesses and amateur video footage provided a damning account of the security forces’ questionable but all-too-familiar response. It has even been <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_questions-raised-as-death-toll-reaches-97-in-turkeys-deadliest-terror-attack_401231.html">reported</a> that the police <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ankara-explosions-turkish-police-fire-tear-gas-at-mourners-laying-flowers-a6689726.html">fired tear gas</a> at people trying to lay flowers at the scene a few hours after the attack.</p>
<p>Yet this customary shirking of responsibility and the abuses of police power are not the main reasons that thousands are chanting <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/world/europe/thousands-in-turkey-rally-against-government-after-ankara-bombings.html?_r=0">“murderer Erdoğan!”</a> or carrying banners that <a href="ewn.co.za/2015/10/11/Protesters-gather-at-scene-of-Ankara-bombings">blame the state</a> for the deaths of those gathered in Ankara.</p>
<h2>A turbulent year</h2>
<p>It is important to contextualise the Ankara bombings within the cycle of violence that has gripped Turkey since the June election. This vote marked the end of an era. The AKP saw its vote share drop 10% and <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-votes-for-change-but-dont-expect-the-erdogan-power-drive-to-end-42950">lost its parliamentary majority</a> for the first time since 2002. The HDP won an impressive 13% of the vote, securing 80 seats in the national parliament.</p>
<p>This new parliamentary dynamic prevented the AKP from introducing a controversial presidential system designed to radically extend Erdoğan’s powers. Incapable of accepting this electoral mandate, the party blocked the formation of a coalition government and forced a new election.</p>
<p>Ever since, a climate of insecurity has pervaded. In July, 32 youth activists were killed in an Islamic State-linked attack in Suruç. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/turkey-syria-isis-bombings-need-new-security-concept.html#">Many people</a> believe <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_no-justice-in-sight-for-attacks-in-suruc-diyarbakir_401229.html">no serious investigation has been conducted</a> into the attack.</p>
<p>After an alleged PKK cell attacked police officers in the aftermath of Suruç the AKP duly shelved the peace process that has been underway since 2012. By joining the US-coordinated strikes against Islamic State, the government gained <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-08-03/turkeys-cover">a convenient pretext</a> to launch strikes against the PKK and unleashed an intense <a href="http://www.apple.com">crackdown</a> on Kurdish activists. This triggered further retaliatory PKK attacks against Turkish security forces.</p>
<p>As the conflict intensified, the AKP’s hostile rhetoric against the HDP and other opposition forces assumed a fully undemocratic character. <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/in-turkey-its-all-about-the-palace-erdogan-arrests-corruption-election/">Senior party figures</a> blamed the election results and the ensuing hung parliament for the country’s rapid descent into violence.</p>
<h2>A mandate in tatters</h2>
<p>As a result of all this, the public has little faith in the government’s willingness to conduct a transparent investigation into what has happened in Ankara. This suspicion is mirrored by an almost equally forceful assumption that the AKP is <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-turkish-deep-state-and-why-is-it-in-the-frame-for-the-ankara-bombings-49038">complicit</a> in the attacks against the Kurds, left-wing movements and other opposition forces. It has failed to prevent attacks against HDP offices all across the country and remained ineffective against Islamic State intrusions into Turkish territory.</p>
<p>This sentiment has been explicitly voiced by the HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş. He has <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-co-leader-slams-erdogan-govt-for-attack-that-claimed-86-lives.aspx?pageID=238&nID=89681&NewsCatID=341">openly wondered</a> why the state has been unable (or unwilling) to properly investigate previous attacks and blamed the government for turning a <a href="edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2015/10/12/turkey-intv-amanpour-pleitgen-selahattin-demirtas.cnn/video/playlists/intl-latest-world-videos/">blind eye</a> to the people behind them. If the government’s past record is any indication, it is no surprise that the public is not optimistic about the prospect of a comprehensive and transparent investigation. </p>
<p>The June election was the first stage of a wholesale rejection of the AKP regime which has been defined by a continual erosion of democracy and an intensified <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/cemal-burak-tansel/gezi-park-occupation-confronting-authoritarian-neoliberalism">authoritarian neoliberalism</a>.</p>
<p>For a party that has always highlighted its electoral victories as the proof of its own legitimacy, the AKP has shown a remarkable disregard for the popular will. It has endorsed a reckless politics of exclusion.</p>
<p>The public outrage at the Ankara bombings demonstrates that it is the same politics of exclusion and violence that will be the party’s undoing. Barring a highly unlikely AKP victory (i.e. parliamentary majority) in the upcoming elections, the AKP’s authoritarian ambitions will continue to confront both a growing grassroots mobilisation and a parliamentary opposition spearheaded by the HDP.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cemal Burak Tansel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Beleaguered president may about to receive an unequivical message from voters.Cemal Burak Tansel, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Politics, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490382015-10-13T10:47:43Z2015-10-13T10:47:43ZExplainer: what is the Turkish ‘deep state’ and why is it in the frame for the Ankara bombings?<p>Turkey is reeling from the worst terrorist attack in its history – the twin <a href="https://theconversation.com/ankara-bombing-kills-dozens-calling-for-peace-in-turkey-48942">bombings in Ankara</a> on October 10 that claimed the lives of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34505030">up to 128 people</a> attending a peace rally. Much rests on the investigation into who carried out what appears to have been a suicide attack.</p>
<p>While the government has named Islamic State as one of the main suspects, some activists have suggested that Turkey’s deep state could be involved. This has stirred up decades-old wounds. </p>
<p>The victims of the Ankara attack were largely supporters of the Kurdish oriented and liberal-left People’s Democratic Party (HDP). They had gathered in the capital to march for peace ahead of a national election on November 1.</p>
<p>Those who think IS sent two suicide bombers to the scene suggest the terrorist group was seeking to punish the Kurds for <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-battle-for-kobane-offers-a-glimpse-of-kurds-new-model-democracy-34027">fighting alongside</a> their brethren in Syria. Indeed, this would not be the first time IS has <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-bombing-risks-further-unrest-in-a-country-already-living-on-the-edge-45020">attacked the Kurds</a>.</p>
<p>But the HDP leader, Selahattin Dermirtas, has also <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/101020151">accused</a> the Turkish government of having blood on its hands after the Ankara bombings. He says the government did not properly investigate previous IS attacks on the HDP either.</p>
<p>Similar sentiments have been expressed on social media and by attendees at anti-government protests. Why, some people are asking, does the HDP get attacked and not the hundreds of other public rallies organised by other parties? Has there been state collusion in any of the attacks, or at best negligence on the part of the security and intelligence services?</p>
<h2>A secret network</h2>
<p>These questions have naturally led to discussions about Turkey’s so-called deep state – a term that may sound alien to western observers.</p>
<p>The deep state (in Turkish, <em>derin devlet</em>) is best understood as ultra-nationalist networks that consisted of the state’s military and security apparatus as well as members of civil society. These networks were supposedly formed during the Cold War to fight subversive communist agitators within Turkey. However, they were also thought to have been used against the Kurdish insurgency that gripped the south-east of Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s.</p>
<p>The secretive and clandestine nature of these deep state networks allowed the Turkish government to insist that it had no knowledge of them. It was able to deny involvement in some of the more violent episodes of the counter-insurgency campaign carried out against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as it <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17994865">fought for autonomy</a> in the 1980s and 1990s.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, it was believed that the networks were deploying special squads to assassinate leading Kurds. These squads were organised into cell-like structures and believed to be answerable to the military, which would recruit underworld figures from organised crime, the police or the security services who would launch operations in an apparently autonomous manner. No one would know who had carried out an attack or who ordered it.</p>
<p>Turks were given a glimpse of the inner workings of the deep state after a November 1996 car crash near the town of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/31/world/in-turkey-new-accusations-of-links-between-police-politicians-and-criminals.html">Susurluk</a>. Three of the four passengers inside the car were killed. What was strange about the incident was the group of people found inside the car. In the wreckage was found a senior police official, a former leader from the Grey Wolves ultra-nationalist paramilitary group (who was also a wanted murderer and drug trafficker) and his girlfriend, a former beauty-queen-turned-hit-woman.</p>
<p>The sole survivor of the crash was none other than a Kurdish warlord from a large state-supported anti-PKK village guard. The question on everyone’s lips was, no doubt: “What were these people doing together?” The incident became a public scandal. For many Turks this was evidence of the existence of a deep state. </p>
<p>The spectre of the deep state was raised again following the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/08/20138512358195978.html">Ergenekon</a> investigations from 2008 and the <a href="http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/331-the-balyoz-retrial-and-the-changing-politics-of-turkish-justice.html">Balyoz</a> trial in 2010. Alleging a military-led deep state coup against the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government for its Islamic sympathies, these cases saw hundreds of people accused of plotting bomb attacks and civil unrest to ease the passage for a military takeover – although the military denied any involvement in a plan to overthrow the government and convictions have since been overturned. </p>
<p>Despite these trials, it is actually more likely that Turkey’s deep state apparatus was either dissolved or became inactive after the Susurluk scandal. The Kurdish insurgency had, after all, come to a medium-term halt following the capture of PKK leader <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/feb99/ocalanturkey18.htm">Abdullah Ocalan</a> in 1999.</p>
<p>The scars from that period have not gone away though. There remains a lack of clarity about what the deep state was, how it operated and justice for its victims which has, in turn, lead to a general lack of public trust, not least from Turkey’s 12m-15m strong Kurdish minority.</p>
<p>A rapid and thorough investigation into the Ankara bombings would do much to alleviate such anxiety and any further allusions to the involvement of the Turkish deep state. It would also reassure the public that such conspiracies remain a thing of the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49038/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Waldman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>During the unrest of the 1990s, mysterious networks were said to have assassinated Kurdish fighters. Some believe they are still in operation.Simon Waldman, Lecturer in Middle East & Mediterranean Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/473892015-09-16T13:50:23Z2015-09-16T13:50:23ZHow Turkey began the slide towards civil war<p>The speed with which Turkey has became engulfed in violence since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-bombing-risks-further-unrest-in-a-country-already-living-on-the-edge-45020">Suruç massacre</a> on July 20 2015 is causing mass anxiety. </p>
<p>While public discussion has largely focused on questions of whose fault it is and why the country has suddenly descended into violence, one thing everyone agrees is that the country is passing through an extraordinary period in its history. While the current crisis has much deeper roots, the developments of the past year provide us sufficient clues about why the spiral of violence is likely to continue.</p>
<p>Since Turkey held its <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-turkeys-kurds-can-leverage-third-place-in-election-30273">first direct presidential election</a> on August 10 2014, the largely ceremonial presidency has become the focus of an intense debate, with the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) still pushing to get more executive power for the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. </p>
<p>The opposition parties won enough votes to deny the AKP the parliamentary majority and mandate it needs to introduce an executive presidential regime. But they have been unable to form an alliance to safeguard the country’s parliamentary democracy and secure badly needed democratic reforms. </p>
<p>With that failure they have handed the initiative back to Erdoğan, who has called fresh elections for November 1 2015 in hope that the AKP will regain its majority in the parliament. </p>
<p>In contrast to the June election, the November polls will be held amid deep uncertainty and escalating violence. It’s by no means certain whether the election can even be held in such a febrile atmosphere, or if it can genuinely reflect the will of the population.</p>
<h2>New wave of violence</h2>
<p>It’s hard to overstate how seriously the situation has deteriorated. The summer of 2015 witnessed the death of the Turkish-Kurdish ceasefire that all parties worked hard to maintain for two and a half years, and the spiral of violence continues to widen. </p>
<p>On August 6 2015 and August 8 2015, roadside bombs planted by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11847998/PKK-says-it-killed-15-Turkish-soldiers-in-a-major-attack-in-south-eastern-Hakkari-province.html">Hakkari</a> and <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/10-dead-pkk-attack-turkey-police-minibus-2038184206">Igdir</a> provinces killed nearly 30 soldiers and police officers. Together with other similar attacks, so far more than 110 security personnel have died. </p>
<p>It is more difficult to verify how many PKK guerrillas have been killed by the Turkish army’s operations and air strikes, which have been pummelling both south-eastern Turkey and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. State authorities say there have been <a href="https://beta.trtworld.com/turkey/turkish-air-strikes-hit-pkk-targets-in-northern-iraq-7651">more than 800 PKK casualties</a>, but the PKK has given much lower figures. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the state’s often indiscriminate repression of civilians in Kurdish majority areas has not received due attention. The Turkish government has long sought to clamp down on these areas by creating “<a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_number-of-special-security-zones-in-turkey-now-exceeds-100_396933.html">special security zones</a>” under military control –- the number of which has been rapidly increasing. The army’s heavy-handed response to the youth who dug ditches and built checkpoints in various districts has resulted in many civilian deaths. </p>
<p>That has been particularly true in Cizre, where more than 20 civilians were killed by the army and special police forces during the eight days the town remained under curfew and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34236013">cut off from the outside world</a>. The mayor of the town, Leyla Imret, who received the support of the 83% of the electorate, was removed from her position by the Interior Ministry on September 11 2015.</p>
<h2>The end of the peace narrative</h2>
<p>The ever-harsher measures against the PKK and the commitment to securing its demise have been sold to the wider population through the pro-government media. The funeral ceremonies of security personnel killed in the violence have been turned into public spectacles. </p>
<p>Turkey’s president and prime minster have continually stated the need to continue the operations against the PKK, and at the same time have popularised the idea that the <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">pro-Kurdish HDP opposition party</a> is also a culprit. </p>
<p>The current environment is a far cry from the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/07/turkey-election-preliminary-results-erdogan-akp-party">optimism and hope</a> that the HDP’s spectacular success in the June elections generated. In the government’s pronouncements, the HDP is bundled together with the PKK and blamed for the Turkish casualties.</p>
<p>Pro-government and nationalist mobs have attacked and looted HDP offices across the country. Several offices of the party, including its headquarters in Ankara, were <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34193733">set on fire</a>. Such attacks are likely to continue during the election campaign; their overall objective is to marginalise the HDP and keep it under the 10% election threshold in order to guarantee an AKP majority in the parliament. </p>
<p>Several Kurdish businesses were also targeted by mob attacks. A young Kurdish man was knifed to death by Turkish nationalists in Istanbul after being <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_kurdish-man-stabbed-to-death-in-alleged-racist-attack_398560.html">overheard speaking in Kurdish</a>.</p>
<h2>Unpredictable consequences</h2>
<p>The AKP has backing from the army and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in its attempts to defeat the PKK militarily, while at the same time intensifying its efforts to suppress the broader pro-Kurdish movement. However, both the scale and spread of violence may yet be far more than anything Turkey has seen in the past decade. </p>
<p>Whether the election dynamics will change in the AKP’s favour is not absolutely certain. Its nationalist rhetoric is certain to garner parliamentary votes from the MHP, but whether it will be enough to secure a big majority needed to introduce the presidential regime is highly unlikely.</p>
<p>What’s more, the AKP’s resort to a more aggressive Turkish nationalism will push Kurdish voters even further away from the political mainstream. As the mob attacks indicate, communal violence against the Kurds threatens to reach a shockingly high level, and will soon start doing irreparable damage to Turkish-Kurdish relations.</p>
<p>Throughout recent weeks, the HDP has been calling for the resumption of the <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_european-council-president-calls-on-turkey-to-revive-peace-process_398791.html">stalled peace process</a>. The PKK indicated that it is willing to end its violence if the government ends its military operations, but the government shows no sign it will compromise or soften its attitude. </p>
<p>In previous such stand-offs, the PKK took measures to de-escalate the conflict. But such moves were initiated by PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan, who has been barred from receiving any visitors since April 2015. </p>
<p>With no such intervention on the horizon, it’s difficult to see how a breakthrough can be achieved – and if there’s no breakthrough soon, Turkey’s slide towards civil conflict will only quicken.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/47389/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Things are going from bad to worse in Turkey. Why – and where will it end?Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/465672015-08-25T15:32:21Z2015-08-25T15:32:21ZTurkey: Erdoğan is forcing his people to take sides<p>Ever since the June 2015 elections, which thwarted the <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-erdogan-aims-to-expand-presidential-power/a-17885582">proposed presidential system</a> that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has long craved, Turkey has been hurtling into one of its most turbulent periods in decades. And with a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/21/turkey-to-form-interim-government-before-snap-election-on-november-1">snap election</a> called for November 2015, the country’s political factions are facing off in an ever more violent and bitter fashion.</p>
<p>Polarisation has been a problem for Turkey for a long time: right versus left, Kurd versus Turk, <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/turkey-alevi-sunni-clash-erdogan-secular-media.html">Alevi</a> versus Sunni, secular versus non-secular. But now, the division between supporters of the AKP – Erdoğan’s party – and their rivals has become one of the country’s biggest fissures.</p>
<h2>All against all</h2>
<p>As the country grapples with the threat of Islamic State <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33641315">just across the Syrian border</a>, Turkey’s low-intensity civil war has been <a href="http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi_basaran/pkk_hem_kendisini_hem_de_hdpyi_kapatiyor-1420432">ramped up again</a> with the Kurdish PKK <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-kurdish-workers-party-trade-blame-over-failed-peace-process/2931329.html">mounting attacks on security personnel</a> and the state responding with violence of its own. Recent fighting has <a href="http://www.rt.com/news/311332-turkey-attack-village-kurds/">claimed the lives</a> of more than 60 military personnel, 400 PKK fighters and a considerable number of civilians, who are treated as casualties of war. </p>
<p>The so-called peace process has entirely stalled, although it’s debatable whether it was really going anywhere in the first place. <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-pkk-emergency-rule-kurds-resent-security-measures.html">Restrictions on movement</a> in eight provinces have been introduced, raising fears that the state will enact “emergency laws” to allow a heavy crackdown. A district of Diyarbakir called Silvan was <a href="http://anfenglish.com/kurdistan/attacks-by-turkish-forces-leave-silvan-devastated">attacked</a> by the Turkish military in mid-August; it was seriously damaged, and many residents had to flee to survive. Kurdish people are forced to live in an environment of insecurity as if they are being punished for not voting for the AKP, which also meant Erdogan’s way to the presidential system. </p>
<p>On the Kurdish side, the leader of the pro-Kurdish HDP party, Selahattin Demirtaş, has <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-co-chair-demirtas-calls-on-pkk-to-halt-violence-without-ifs-or-buts-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=87365&NewsCatID=338">called on the PKK to end its violence</a>, but everyday funerals are being held for Turkish soldiers killed during clashes with the PKK. These funerals have become a way for Turkish voters to <a href="http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/349325/Ofke_AKP_ye_dondu.html">show their rage</a> not only at the PKK for its attacks, but also at the AKP and its MPs for putting their countrymen in harm’s way. </p>
<p>At the <a href="http://www.afp.com/en/news/turkish-soldier-slams-government-slain-brothers-funeral">funeral</a> for his brother, who was killed in a PKK attack, Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Alkan demanded: “Who is his murderer? Who is responsible for this? Why are those who were saying ‘peace process’ before now demanding ‘war till the end’ right now?”</p>
<p>Alkan was a lieutenant colonel in the Turkish army, and spent a good part of his life protecting Turkey’s territorial integrity against the PKK. His anger was directed at the government, and at its representatives at the funeral who were trying to make election propaganda of his brother’s death. </p>
<p>The cynicism around the civil war has reached the point where no side can even mourn its dead without being exploited for political ends.</p>
<p>Alkan soon found out the hard way what happens to those who speak out. Immediately after his tirade was reported, pro-AKP Twitter users began smearing him as a member of one or all of the groups designated as enemies of the Turkish state: the Alevists, the pro-Kurdish HDP, and the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13503361">Hizmet Movement</a> – a huge transnational Islamic movement some regard as a <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_conceptual-contradictions-when-it-comes-to-rhetoric-about-parallel-state-by-ahmet-erdi-ozturk-_337284.html">parallel state</a>.</p>
<h2>More chaos, more votes?</h2>
<p>This sorry state of affairs is not just an unfortunate collision of circumstances. It has been nourished by the current AKP government, which was put in a corner by the HDP’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">biggest-ever electoral haul</a> and entry into parliament. </p>
<p>It is now trying desperately to gather the nationalist and conservative votes it needs to win its longed-for parliamentary majority. The AKP’s calculation appears to be that <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-turkeys-president-profiting-from-escalating-violence-45921">more chaos will mean more votes</a>, with people turning to the devil they know in hope of stability. </p>
<p>On the face of it, the latest PKK-Turkish army clashes have driven many groups on both sides back into their traditional corners. But things are changing as well – and it is <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/23/turkeys-erdogan-fights-for-his-throne-by-battling-kurds/">clear</a> that many Turkish voters are anything but won over by this new strategy. And the public’s reaction to the deliberately contrived chaos has so far defied the AKP’s expectations. </p>
<p>People all over Turkey are now questioning what intentions lie behind the resurgent violence. Kurds have always been suspicious, but this is new to the Turkish population at large. While polarisation and unrest are in themselves hardly new to Turkey, the current division of Turkish political and social life is more intense than it has been for decades. </p>
<p>As HDP MP Gülten Kışanak recently <a href="http://t24.com.tr/haber/gultan-kisanak-kardesim-canimiz-korunmuyor-oluyoruz-oluyoruz,307243?utm_medium=social&utm_content=sharebutton">mentioned</a>, this is a very different era. In the 1990s political killings were executed in secret, and violence was covert; nowadays, they are carried out without any shame or pretence. </p>
<p>In this deeply polarised climate, the obvious reaction is to take sides. That’s exactly what the AKP wants Turks to do, and it’s highly dangerous. It not only harshens the tone of political discourse; it exacerbates all the deeper, long-existing divisions that undermine Turkish civil society. </p>
<p>The run-up to the snap election will be a very dangerous time not only for the HDP, but for all opposition groups, who must now mount election campaigns in a deliberately cultivated environment of violence and fear. To be sure, this began a long time ago – the HDP’s party buildings were <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/bombs-hit-two-hdp-buildings-in-southern-turkey-injuring-at-least-three.aspx?PageID=238&NID=82569&NewsCatID=509">constantly coming under attack</a> even before the June elections – but it is getting substantially worse.</p>
<p>As things stand, Turkey offers no promise of a better future to any of its warring groups. And with the campaign for the newly declared elections already sinking into a factional brawl, the signs are ominous indeed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/46567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey’s political factions, hardly friends at the best of times, are more divided and mutually suspicious than ever.Bahar Baser, Research Fellow, Coventry UniversityAhmet Erdi Öztürk, PhD Candidate/Research Asistant, University of LjubljanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/459212015-08-11T05:33:01Z2015-08-11T05:33:01ZIs Turkey’s president profiting from escalating violence?<p>Armed attacks on the US consulate and a police station are the latest in a wave of bloody violence in Turkey that has <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/10/europe/turkey-istanbul-violence">now reached Istanbul</a>. They are just two violent incidents to take place in the past few weeks, all of which appear to have been carried out by one armed non-state group or another. </p>
<p>Islamic State, Kurdish separatists <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-consulate-in-instanbul-targeted-in-terror-attacks-in-turkey-1439196354">the PKK</a>, and the radical left group the <a href="http://www.novinite.com/articles/170295/Turkish+Marxist+Group+DHKP-C+Says+Its+Member+Attacked+U.S.+Consulate">DHKP-C</a> are all suspected of carrying out attacks. But until now, most of the violence had taken place in the conflict-prone south-east region. The most recent incidents bring insecurity to Turkey’s commercial capital. </p>
<p>On average, up to three security personnel have been killed every day in Turkey since IS attacked the province of Suruç on July 22, killing 32 and wounding more than 100 people. </p>
<p>Before this point, a fragile peace process was making progress. Both the Turkish government and the Kurds appeared on the path to negotiating a settlement on the Kurdish issue.</p>
<p>That hope has been destroyed. Rather than achieving a resolution, Turkey is potentially heading towards a full-blown civil war. This could be avoided, but it may mean enabling Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to become the sole ruler of the country.</p>
<h2>Capitalising on fear</h2>
<p>Each of the groups taking on the Turkish government has different motives, but the recent attacks seem to have been orchestrated. From the massacre in Suruç to the US consulate, there seems to be a clear objective of creating an environment of insecurity, polarisation and fear.</p>
<p>This environment has brought Turkey into line with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-joining-islamic-state-offensive-so-why-is-it-targeting-the-kurds-45199">US-led coalition against IS</a>. Immediately after the Suruç attack, the İncirlik airbase was opened to US planes to ease their passage on bombing runs into Syria. Turkish forces are also taking part in aerial bombings – although it seems the main targets so far have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-opens-up-old-wounds-with-a-new-campaign-against-the-pkk-45397">PKK bases</a> rather than IS hotspots. </p>
<p>The violence also seems to be strongly linked to political uncertainty in Turkey too. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/turkish-election-2015">National elections</a> in June produced an uncertain result – a major blow for Erdoğan, who had planned to use a strong majority to vote in changes that would bolster his own position of power. He intended to amend the constitution to make himself the country’s executive president. Instead, his Justice and development Party (AK Party) failed to secure a big enough proportion of the votes and landed in coalition talks with the main opposition party the CHP.</p>
<p>But Erdoğan is increasingly <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/can-davutoglu-bypass-erdogan-to-form-a-coalition.aspx?PageID=238&NID=83731&NewsCatID=409">at odds</a> with his prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu over the formation of a coalition government and it now looks as though an early election is his only hope, if he wants to realise his dream of becoming the most powerful man in the country.</p>
<p>What is happening in Turkey today could be just what Erdoğan needs. If his AK Party can effectively handle the attacks, it could secure the extra 5-6% of the vote that might deliver an overall majority in parliament.</p>
<p>But while he is in some ways profiting from the current instability, Erdoğan might at least seek to get the peace talks with the PKK back on track if the AK Party achieves an overall majority in an early election. It was, after all, he who invested so much of his own political credibility in initiating the talks when he was prime minister.</p>
<p>If Erdoğan becomes the ruler of Turkey, he may well also suddenly become a beacon of peace by seeking to restart negotiations. This would save his tainted political image both domestically and internationally. It would also damage the political career of <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-the-political-party-that-could-change-turkeys-future-42057">Selahettin Demirtaş</a>, the co-chairman of the pro-Kurdish HDP party, who was the rising star of the last election. Faced with a galvanised Erdoğan, the latter could have to make tough choices to stay in the political game. The cherry on the cake for Erdoğan, in this scenario, would be if one of those choices was breaking ties with the PKK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45921/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Unrest has spread to Istanbul where the US consulate has been attacked.Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/454882015-08-03T01:28:34Z2015-08-03T01:28:34ZTurkey strikes back: the political ploy behind attacking both Kurdish and Islamic State forces<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90383/original/image-20150731-18709-134979i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The use of Incirlik airbase by Turkish warplanes launching attacks across the border and its re-opening to the US Airforce reflect the domestic and international goals of Turkey's campaign. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/5574429597/in/photolist-9uApH8-7kv283-gnehHS-gnex1a-9uCEFy-qdh4xo-gneVvi-h9Rojj-a2Gaha-a2K5Ad-a2K7mN-a2G9gM-a2K3Lf-a2GbE6-a2GebB-a2Gdqe-a2Gci6-9fHfqB-gnd8iH-odnnt1-odnFfc-h9SDfi-h9Rn2k-pejaGK-p81B5p-oNbhqm-p5pa6x-pei4Vi-peiVBw-peimkd-p8f8xJ-p5Cri7-gnd8GZ-a3ihMJ-9dRzfW-a3ihwm-q17YWE-psdJNV-q1fiPB-oDLU2M-oDLTZc-oWg4ng-oWg4ja-dPt3e6-8vM8va-cVcK59-6nuF2p-6nya65-6nuEqz-6nyG9f">FlickrUS Airforce</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Stemming from a presumed Islamic State (IS) <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33615239">suicide bombing</a> killing 32 leftist Kurdish university students in Suruc and the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/kurdish-group-claims-revenge-murder-turkish-police-150722132945249.html">killing of several Turkish policeman</a> claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey has begun <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-joining-islamic-state-offensive-so-why-is-it-targeting-the-kurds-45199">bombarding</a> both IS forces in Syria and PKK bases located in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq. </p>
<p>But what has provoked this punishing campaign? It’s a sharp reversal of policy given the considerable political capital that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has expended in: a) attempting to remain above the fray in Syria; and b) the peace process with the PKK, which angered many Turkish nationalists.</p>
<p>Although Turkey’s actions can be viewed on multiple levels, one could do worse than invoke Clausewitz’s maxim:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The most obvious answer is that this is a security issue. Both IS and the PKK have attacked Turkish citizens and members of the security services so it is unsurprising that the Turkish government has retaliated. Like all governments, its priority is to protect its citizens.</p>
<h2>Strong leadership as an election pitch</h2>
<p>However, a number of other considerations are at play. A more cynical interpretation would look to Turkey’s domestic politics. Since June’s elections, when the AKP <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2015/06/07/turkeys-ruling-akp-loses-majority">failed to win an outright majority</a> for the first time in 13 years, Turkish political parties have been unable to form a coalition government. This means the possibility of fresh elections in the near future is very real.</p>
<p>By embarking on a course of armed conflict, the AKP may be positioning itself with an eye to elections by invoking a garrison nationalism. The AKP will claim that now, more than ever, Turkey needs a strong majority government. Armed conflict is a tried and tested method to persuade nationalists and conservatives alike to “circle the wagons” and support the incumbent power.</p>
<p>At the last elections, the AKP also lost some of its traditional base, conservative Kurds, to the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). The HDP won 80 seats, a gain of 51, as the AKP was left 18 seats short of a majority. This was largely due to anger over the government’s inaction during the siege of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90537/original/image-20150803-17172-p3hdm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90537/original/image-20150803-17172-p3hdm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90537/original/image-20150803-17172-p3hdm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90537/original/image-20150803-17172-p3hdm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90537/original/image-20150803-17172-p3hdm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90537/original/image-20150803-17172-p3hdm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90537/original/image-20150803-17172-p3hdm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/90537/original/image-20150803-17172-p3hdm0.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many Kurds believe that the Turkish government is in cahoots with IS. Opposition figures have gone so far as to label government officials <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkey-syria-kobane-suruc-bombing-boomerang-hits-volunteers.html">“accomplices”</a> to the Suruc bombing. </p>
<p>The specific targeting of Kurdish university students planning a reconstruction trip to Kobane is noteworthy for several reasons. </p>
<p>First, this recalled both the siege of the town and the subsequent IS suicide mission there in June, which <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/kurdish-forces-have-besieged-isis-fighters-in-kobani-say-activists">massacred more than 150</a>.</p>
<p>Second, IS has <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/christian-foreign-fighters-deserting-kurdish-ypg-syria-because-theyre-damned-reds-1976493133">denounced</a> the PKK and its affiliates in Syria as “atheists”. This highlights the diametrically opposed visions that contending movements have for the future of the region.</p>
<p>Third, the bombing may have been intended to sow distrust and create a further rift between Turkish Kurds and the government. By responding strongly, the Turkish government is attempting to dispel the theory that it has been collaborating with IS, and thereby win back the conservative Kurd vote. The notionally progressive agenda of the newly elected HDP, for instance on LGBT rights, does not necessarily sit well with conservative Kurds.</p>
<p>The AKP similarly lost votes to the far right because Turkish nationalists were angry about the peace process with the PKK inaugurated by President Recep Erdogan in 2013. As such, the Turkish government’s attacks on the PKK can be viewed as a similar ploy to win back the nationalist vote.</p>
<p>The attacks will also wedge the pro-Kurdish HDP, which ran on a Turkey-wide agenda to win over the non-Kurdish progressive protest vote against Erdogan’s plans to centralise power with the presidency. In short, the HDP will be asked:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Are you pro-Turkey or pro-PKK?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a result, the HDP could lose non-Kurdish votes in particular and fall back below the 10% threshold required for representation in parliament. Should this happen, the AKP will be the main beneficiary under Turkey’s system of proportional representation as it is still by far the highest-polling party.</p>
<h2>Exploiting Kurdish divisions</h2>
<p>It is also worth noting that the PKK is not all that popular with many Kurds, especially conservatives. They see the PKK as rigid doctrinaire Marxists and atheists. </p>
<p>Turkish actions <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-opens-up-old-wounds-with-a-new-campaign-against-the-pkk-45397">against the PKK</a>, in addition, afford the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq a variety of opportunities. The turmoil allows the KRG to capitalise on the situation in its ongoing turf war with the PKK. </p>
<p>The KRG has accused the PKK of encroaching on its territory and there has been notable tension <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_tension-between-pkk-and-krg-escalates-due-to-strategic-value-of-sinjar_378588.html">over the city of Sinjar</a>. KRG president Masoud Barzani has also cleverly moved to <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/260720155">position himself</a> as peacemaker between Turkey and the PKK to enhance his prestige within both Turkey and the wider Kurdish national movement.</p>
<h2>Mending relations with the US and NATO</h2>
<p>Finally, Turkey has been welcomed <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-turkey-cooperation-on-isis-is-bad-news-for-kurds-45220">back into the US and NATO fold</a> following a year of tension arising from the Turkish government’s perceived inaction on IS. </p>
<p>The US-Turkish deal allowing the US to use the Turkish airbase at Incirlik not only cements Washington’s support of Ankara’s security concerns, but also fulfils Turkey’s long-held desire to create a buffer, or “safe”, zone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-us-turkey-plan-amounts-to-a-safe-zone-in-northwest-syria/2015/07/26/0a533345-ff2e-4b40-858a-c1b36541e156_story.html">in Syria</a>.</p>
<p>Extending west of the Euphrates to Aleppo province, such a zone will, in turn, prevent the cantons of Syrian Kurdistan from uniting. That is a scenario that the Turkish government views as a potential existential threat to the Turkish state. </p>
<p>Presumably establishing this safe zone will also help stem the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-urgently-needs-to-integrate-its-syrian-refugees-35984">flow of Syrian refugees to Turkey</a>, which already accommodates more than 1.5 million.</p>
<p>Blowback from both IS and the PKK is possible, but if and when this occurs such reprisals will be used to validate the Turkish government’s nationalist/security-orientated agenda. In purely political terms (as opposed to ethical considerations and potential death tolls), the Turkish government has deftly taken the tragedy at Suruc and translated it into both domestic and international political gains.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tristan Dunning does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What prompted Turkey’s punishing campaign against both Islamic State and Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria? The explanation for this sharp reversal of policy may lie in calculations for fresh elections.Tristan Dunning, Honorary Research Fellow, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/453972015-07-29T13:34:29Z2015-07-29T13:34:29ZTurkey opens up old wounds with a new campaign against the PKK<p>The recent surge of violence in Turkey following the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-bombing-risks-further-unrest-in-a-country-already-living-on-the-edge-45020">massacre of socialist activists in Suruc</a> has brought Turkey perilously close to an all-out conflict with the Kurds.</p>
<p>Turkey has begun regular air strikes targeting the bases of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas as part of its broader “war on terror”, which has also included action against Islamic State (IS) and the left-wing Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKPC). So far, <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20150727-turkey-1000-detained-militants-islamic-state-pkk-arrests">more than 1,000 people</a> have been detained in Turkey. That number includes many trade unionists – and there are growing fears that non-violent dissidents will be targeted.</p>
<p>Turkey’s effort to tie its campaign against the PKK to the international campaign against IS is widely seen as a ploy to make its actions against the Kurds more internationally legitimate. Turkey seems to have convinced the US of the need to create a de-facto <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33698659">safe zone</a> on the border with Syria, a long-held Turkish plan <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/27/syrian-safe-zone-us-relents-to-turkish-demands-border-crisis-kurd-uk-military">to prevent Kurdish autonomous regions from joining one to another</a>. The Kurds view that plan with deep suspicion, seeing it as a push to undermine their achievements in Syria.</p>
<p>While the trigger points of Turkey’s conflict with the PKK in the past year have all been connected to the developments in Syria, it’s worth remembering that the conflict has a much deeper history. </p>
<h2>Long road to peace</h2>
<p>Since the early 1980s, the PKK has been the main force in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. It began its insurgency against Turkey in 1984, mounting guerrilla attacks against the security forces between 1984 and 1999. Ever since the capture and imprisonment of PKK leader <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no1/fiasco-in-nairobi.html">Abdullah Öcalan</a> in 1999, Turkish governments have introduced some minor reforms to broaden Kurdish rights in Turkey. </p>
<p>The violence has simmered down, with the PKK abandoning armed conflict in favour of political struggle for long periods. That said, during the past decade, the PKK has resorted to violence on a number of occasions – but this has always been followed by periods of inactivity. </p>
<p>Overall, the PKK maintains its commitment to peaceful political resolution of the conflict, but retains its estimated 5,000 strong guerrilla force, some of which is positioned inside Turkey.</p>
<p>The total number of casualties in the conflict is thought to be <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=tYORNy901oYC&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=45,000+casualties+turkey+pkk&source=bl&ots=VLR48CsOAj&sig=tFMlKytVFym4MVetmoIf3V1cCRc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAWoVChMItv_78ZaAxwIVQsAUCh0pQQHh#v=onepage&q=45%2C000%20casualties%20turkey%20pkk&f=false">more than 45,000</a>. The state has carried out many large-scale operations against the PKK, but without much success. The PKK has proved to be an extremely resilient organisation able to exploit general regional developments to its advantage.</p>
<p>The dialogue between Ankara and the PKK has continued over the past two and a half years and has produced positive outcomes. A <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21874427">ceasefire</a> was declared on March 21 2013, and an agreement on the <a href="http://politics.bgnnews.com/pro-kurdish-party-co-chair-discloses-10-item-peace-negotiation-framework-haberi/3829">plan for future negotiations</a> was made public in February 2015.</p>
<p>The PKK’s capacity to use violence and its occasional attacks have been cited by the Turkish government as reasons why a military approach is needed. Ankara has set withdrawal of the PKK guerrillas from Turkey and the conclusion of the armed struggle against Turkey as the basic conditions for restarting the peace process.</p>
<h2>Kurds versus the AKP</h2>
<p>As things stand, Kurdish demands cannot be accommodated within Turkey. A form of self-rule for the Kurds – which can be achieved through decentralisation of state structure in Turkey and devolution of power to regional level, the recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights (such as Kurdish-language education) and reforms to strengthen democracy and pluralism – would go a long way in satisfying Kurdish demands.</p>
<p>The escalation came after the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) performed strongly in the recent elections winning sufficient support to send 80 MPs to Turkish parliament and <a href="https://theconversation.com/where-next-for-the-kurds-after-turkish-election-success-of-hdp-42979">raising hopes</a> that the peace process would finally take a step forward.</p>
<p>All round, the HDP has dented the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)‘s hopes of consolidating its hegemony, which has been challenged on a number of fronts since the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/29/gezi-park-year-after-protests-seeds-new-turkey">Gezi Park protests</a> broke out in May 2013. Most importantly, the HDP’s success kept the AKP from winning the parliamentary majority it needed to introduce the presidential form of government for which it had been campaigning. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Syria, Kurdish forces have managed to repel IS attacks and consolidate their three autonomous regions, collectively known as the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/evangelos-aretaios/rojava-revolution">Cantons of Rojava</a>. Their success reduces the likelihood of moulding post-conflict Syria into a state shaped by Turkey’s vision of the region.</p>
<p>The Rojava project is achieved under the guidance and leadership of the <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/impact-syrian-war-kurdish-politics-across-middle-east">Democratic Union Party</a>. This party has an ideological affiliation with the PKK but is a separate entity, and the international powers treat it as such – but Turkey <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-says-pyd-no-different-than-pkk-for-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=73172&NewsCatID=338">treats it as a terror organisation</a>, worried as it is that Rojava’s success will increase the PKK’s power as a regional actor and permanently change the game in the Kurds’ favour.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The recent developments in Turkey and Syria make the Kurds the main barrier to the goverment’s ambitions for both Turkey and the wider region. Present indications are that actions against the PKK will be extended to include the HDP and that pro-Kurdish representation in the parliament will be eliminated. The debate in Turkey’s mainstream media following the attacks against the PKK has already begun to marginalise the HDP and implicate them in the latest violence, and the Supreme Court has begun an investigation into the HDP that could result in its closure and the possible imprisonment of senior MPs.</p>
<p>In Syria, the Kurdish forces have complained that Turkey has <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33675760?post_id=10153405714147028_10153534257147028">attacked their defence positions</a> and it is possible that Turkey’s actions will be expanded to include the Rojava Cantons. </p>
<p>Starting a large-scale campaign against the Kurds could have unpredictable consequences and further increase the instability in the region. For that reason Turkey will face domestic and international opposition. However, without a workable plan to put the peace process on track, the ongoing tensions will further escalate the conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45397/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Whatever the pretext, Turkey’s latest push against the Kurds will do nobody any favours.Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/452202015-07-28T19:50:47Z2015-07-28T19:50:47ZUS–Turkey cooperation on ISIS is bad news for Kurds<p>A deadly week in Turkey has pulled Ankara closer to the US in the fight against ISIS and led to an emergency meeting on Tuesday during which <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-meets-at-turkeys-request-to-discuss-crisis-in-syria-iraq-1438078682?cb=logged0.40403248788788915">NATO members</a> expressed support for bombing strikes carried out by the Turkish government.</p>
<p>But those strikes should raise concerns in the US about the Kurds who are also being targeted by Turkish attacks. </p>
<h2>A violent week</h2>
<p>The transformative week in Turkey began on July 20 when Sey Abdurrahman Alagoz, a 20-year-old Turkish suicide bomber, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33619043">attacked</a> a group of youth activists from the Federation of Socialist Youth Associations (SGDF), killing 32. </p>
<p>It was the first ISIS attack inside Turkey. </p>
<p>Before the strike, Turkey had been reluctant to engage in military strikes against ISIS or to <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0402/Is-Turkey-still-a-jihadist-highway-to-Syria-or-is-that-a-bum-rap-video">stem the flow</a> of potential fighters through its borders. But <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/24/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-islamicstate-idUSKCN0PY0AU20150724">late last week</a> it opened up air bases to the US and started its own bombing missions of ISIS targets. </p>
<p>However, ISIS is not Turkey’s <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/nato-emergency-meeting-turkey-pkk-kurdish-isil-150726182515557.html">only target</a>. Turkey’s main foes in the region are <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100">the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK</a>) and the affiliated People’s Protection Unit (YPG). The PKK is an armed Kurdish group labeled a terrorism organization by Turkey, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/11/us.turkey/">the US</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417888/Proscription-20150327.pdf">UK</a> – but which does not appear on the UN <a href="http://www.un.org/sc/committees/consolidated.pdf">sanctions list</a>. The PKK has been fighting for independence from Turkey for decades. </p>
<p>These attacks bring to an end a ceasefire that was declared two years ago. </p>
<p>My observations of events in Turkey during research visits this summer and last year indicate that the Turkish state’s response to the suicide attack will try to achieve <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100">a number of goals</a>. </p>
<p>Weakening ISIS may be at the bottom of that list.</p>
<p>Turkey is more interested, I would argue, in attacking <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-strikes-pkk-targets-in-northern-iraq-1437819823">PKK and YPG</a>, rounding up <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Turkey-stages-first-airstrikes-on-ISIS-while-rounding-up-Kurds-410081">YPG supporters</a>, establishing control over the Turkish–Syrian border and contributing to unseating of the Syrian <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18582755">Ba'ath regime</a>.</p>
<h2>Decades of conflict</h2>
<p>More than 20 million <a href="http://www.merip.org/mer/mer189/kurdish-experience">Kurds</a> live in Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq. All of these groups want autonomy and representation. </p>
<p>After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Kurds in northern Iraq established an autonomous region. </p>
<p>Kurds in Syria have pursued similar aspirations. They have achieved a degree of autonomy in Kobane, where they successfully fought against ISIS last year. </p>
<p>Kurds <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/iran-turkey-syria-kurds-iranian-kurds-rise-up.html">in Iran</a> are equally engaged in a struggle for autonomy.</p>
<p>Turkey has faced challenges from the separatist movement of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100">the PKK</a> since the early 1980s. Their relationship is defined by armed conflict and mutual mistrust. </p>
<p>The first full-scale PKK insurgency began in 1984 and lasted 15 years, until the PKK unilaterally adopted a ceasefire. A second insurgency started in 2004 and resulted in the loss of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/world/middleeast/turkey-attacks-kurdish-militant-camps-in-northern-iraq.html">40,000 lives</a>. However, in 2013, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/jiyar.gol/videos/10156100413840508/?pnref=story">a truce</a> was reached and a new era of peace negotiations and coexistence began.</p>
<p>Many Turks came to recognize the legitimate <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/kurdish-self-confidence-gets-a-boost-from-polls/a-17847911">grievances</a> of the PKK. They hoped <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/04/19/turkeys-kurdish-peace-process-parsing-the-polls/">peace negotiations</a> would end the sporadic attacks by the PKK aimed at the Turkish state. </p>
<p>In Turkey’s recent elections, this rising support for a peaceful resolution was demonstrated in the <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150723SyriaKurdsGunesLowe.pdf">electoral victory </a>of the pro-Kurdish <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-the-political-party-that-could-change-turkeys-future-42057">People’s Democratic Party</a>, or HDP. The HDP received 13.1% of the vote and secured 80 seats in the 550-seat parliament. </p>
<h2>A complex relationship with Syria</h2>
<p>The Syrian conflict has high stakes for Turkey. The two countries share a 500-mile border. Turkey hosts more than <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html">one million</a> Syrian refugees. </p>
<p>Since the uprising in Syria in 2011, the Turkish government has courted various rebel groups with the hope of removing the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18582755">Ba'athist regime</a> of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31327153">Bashar Assad</a>. </p>
<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan has long insisted that any attack against ISIS should also be extended against the Syrian regime as he viewed the latter as <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/world/middleeast/isis-syria-coalition-strikes.html">the real cause</a> for the rise of ISIS.</p>
<p>Turkey has not considered ISIS a primary threat and has thus maintained a lukewarm stance toward <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/272603951/Turkish-Embassy-in-DC-on-Turkey-s-operations-against-ISIS-PKK">US attacks on ISIS</a>. </p>
<p>Reports from as recently as last year indicate that Turkey has maintained <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/isis-and-turkey-cooperate-destroy-kurds-former-isis-member-reveals-turkish-282920">warm relations</a> with the group’s commanders and has allowed a flow of weapons to the group.</p>
<p>At the same time, the Syrian conflict also <a href="http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122068/why-are-we-supporting-kurdish-peoples-protection-forces">empowered the PKK</a> in Kobane, where <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150723SyriaKurdsGunesLowe.pdf">the PKK defeated ISIS</a> after 134 days of <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/10/17/pkk-s-rise-in-iraqikurdistan.html">fierce battle</a> in October 2014. </p>
<p>This success of the PKK was not welcomed by the Turkish government. Until the events of last week, Turkey was hesitant to join the US in attacking ISIS in Iraq and Syria. But now Erdogan is talking about threats to Turkey’s security. </p>
<p>The question is how exactly that threat is defined. What did President Obama and Erdogan <a href="http://ilhantanir.blogspot.com/2015/07/pentagon-exclusive-statement-on-incirlik.html">agree</a> to in exchange for the coordination of efforts against ISIS in the region? </p>
<h2>US and Turkey: different priorities</h2>
<p>For Erdogan and the Turkish state, the agreement may translate into having a free hand to target Kurds inside Syria as well as establish a partial <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/partial-no-fly-zone-included-in-us-turkey-consensus.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85850&NewsCatID=510">no-fly zone</a> in the border between Turkey and Syria where the Turkish military could <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-pm-pledge-further-counterterrorism-operations.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85881&NewsCatID=338">operate freely</a>.</p>
<p>Erdogan and his AKP government want to replace Assad’s regime with a regime that is Sunni and friendly toward the Gulf States. They also want to <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Turkey-rejects-independent-Kurdish-state-wants-Iraq-unity-government-361038">destroy the separatist</a> secular <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/27/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-kurds-idUSKBN0P70QB20150627">Kurdish forces</a> of PKK and YPG who are fighting for a Kurdish state.</p>
<p>What Turkey calls “terrorist” may not match the US’s definition. In the coming days and months, under the pretext of a war against terrorism, we may see a concerted effort not only against Kurdish fighters but <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/one-killed-over-290-detained-as-turkish-police-raid-suspected-isil-pkk-militants.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85854&NewsCatID=509">against secular Kurds in general.</a> </p>
<p>The Turkish state has already rounded up more than 5,000 “suspected terrorists” from 12 provinces. Evidence emerging <a href="https://www.facebook.com/10.posta/videos/270304016473706/?fref=nf">on social media</a> indicates that this number includes members of the Kurdish socialist youth group targeted by the suicide bombing.</p>
<h2>Not everyone in Turkey agrees</h2>
<p>Not all political forces inside Turkish state are behind Erdogan’s anti-Kurdish policy, however. </p>
<p>The Turkish military, which plays a central role in Turkish society, appears concerned about ISIS. They view the group as a serious <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkish-military-wary-erdogan-buffer-zone-syria-no-fly.html">potential threat</a> to Turkey’s security. Tensions between the Turkish military and Erdogan’s party have existed since the latter first won electoral victory <a href="http://www.cfr.org/turkey/weakening-turkeys-military/p21548">in 2002</a>. </p>
<p>Turkish citizens increasingly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkish-protests-show-depth-of-anger-against-erdogan/2013/06/04/f9b8af42-cd22-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html">oppose Erdogan</a>’s domestic policy, which they view as authoritarian. </p>
<p>The Turkish state seems to have committed itself to military attacks on the PKK for now. At the same time, it is taking preemptive action to secure Turkish borders by building a security <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-fly-surveillance-balloons-build-new-fence-and-moat-for-border-security.aspx?PageID=238&NID=85810&NewsCatID=510">barrier and a moat</a>. </p>
<p>The irony is that the only force in the region that has put up an effective fight against ISIS has been the secular Kurds in <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4a6e5b90-2460-11e4-be8e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3h7L8kljv">Kobane</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, in its initial reaction to Turkish attack against PKK, the US Ambassador Brett McGurk in a tweet expressed America’s support. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"625070882621390848"}"></div></p>
<p>If the US aims to reduce the threat of ISIS and its influence in the region, the current Turkish policy and the US compromise with Turkey could at best be counterproductive. At worst, it may strengthen ISIS.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angela Joya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A suicide bombing in Turkey last week has pulled Ankara closer to the US in the fight against ISIS. It has also raised concerns about Kurds who are also being targeted by Turkish bombing raids.Angela Joya, Assistant Professor, Department of International Studies , University of OregonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/451992015-07-27T15:02:02Z2015-07-27T15:02:02ZTurkey joining Islamic State offensive — so why is it targeting the Kurds?<p>Between 03.40 and 03.53 on July 24, three Turkish F-16 jets bombed three Islamic State targets in Syria. This was the first time the Turkish military has taken direct action against the terrorist group.</p>
<p>As the airstrikes began, Turkish police arrested a large number of suspected IS sympathisers across the state. The Turkish government has also opened the strategically important Incirlik airbase to Western allies engaged in the bombing campaign against IS. US officials have called this a “<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/world/europe/turkey-isis-us-airstrikes-syria.html?_r=0">game-changer</a>”. Turkey, a key Middle Eastern state and NATO ally, has formally joined the coalition against IS.</p>
<p>But the decision to get involved, after months of international pressure, has not been made entirely out of a sense of obligation. There is political manoeuvring, and a domestic agenda. Alongside the IS offensive, Turkey has also reportedly launched a crackdown on positions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) who are now claiming the attacks bring about the end <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33671436">of a two-year ceasefire</a> between the government and the Kurds. </p>
<h2>Show of force</h2>
<p>The use of Turkish bases will allow the anti-IS coalition to strike key targets more frequently, reducing the distance that jets will have to fly to Raqqa. The city is some some 2,000 miles from Gulf airbases but only 400 miles from the Incirlik base. It is reported that an <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/27/turkey-isis-free-zone-syrian-border-us">IS-free zone</a> is sought along the Turkey, Syria border.</p>
<p>The agreement comes after months of dialogue between Washington and Ankara, amid <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/us-deal-turkey-isis-incirlik-airbase-erdogan-obama">allegations</a> that Turkish security forces had been secretly supporting IS in an attempt to <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-bombing-risks-further-unrest-in-a-country-already-living-on-the-edge-45020">weaken the power</a> of Kurdish groups and the Assad regime.</p>
<p>For the many foreign fighters seeking to join IS, Turkey was a key transit route to cross into Syria and join the group, and Ankara’s reluctance to stop them caused <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/world/middleeast/isis-syria-coalition-strikes.html">much concern</a> amongst the anti-IS coalition.</p>
<p>It may be that Turkey felt compelled to take action after a recent wave of attacks within its own borders. A <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33641315">cross-border strike</a> recently killed a Turkish soldier and a <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/identity-of-suruc-bomber-confirmed-report--.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85760&NewsCatID=509">suicide bombing</a> on July 20 killed 32 people in the province of Suruc.</p>
<p>The attacks have highlighted Turkey’s proximity to the conflict in Syria, while also stressing the threat within Turkey. The suicide bomber was, after all, a Turkish student. Following a year of debate over how best to engage with IS, these recent attacks left Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with little option. </p>
<h2>Undermining the Kurds</h2>
<p>Complicating Turkey’s position in the region is how it engages with its large Kurdish population. This group has long struggled for greater rights in Turkey and across the region.</p>
<p>But Kurdish fighters have been a leading force in the fight against IS in the North of Syria. This left Turkey in a bind: it needed to appease NATO allies by helping fight IS but was reluctant to work alongside the Kurds – or do anything that would increase their autonomy or to bolster their calls for independence.</p>
<p>Prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu issued a <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkish-fighter-jets-target-syria-95521886#sthash.4ZLFfOmK.dpuf">statement</a> as the operations began stating that “the Turkish Republic is adamant on fighting all terrorism without distinction as it has always done, be it the terrorist organisation of Daesh [IS], the terrorist organisation of the PKK or any other international terrorist organisation”.</p>
<p>Of course, there is a national interest underpinning the decision to get involved in the fight against IS. The Kurds are gaining autonomy in Iraq and Syria and the world is becoming increasingly aware of their plight in Turkey. In striking against groups framed by Anakara as terrorist organisations – and by framing both IS and the PKK as such – the government is seeking to shift the public narrative away from sympathy to the Kurds and to reduce their influence in Turkey. </p>
<p>This bombing campaign is then, at least a part of a broader project, aimed at reducing the power of Kurdish groups both in Turkey and across the border as much as it is an attempt to keep Ankara in a position of influence across the Middle East and on the global stage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45199/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After months of pressure, the coalition against IS has a new team member. But what are its real motives?Simon Mabon, Lecturer in International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/340272014-11-11T05:52:40Z2014-11-11T05:52:40ZThe battle for Kobane offers a glimpse of Kurds’ new model democracy<p>As the battle against Islamic State fighters draws in viewers across the world, there has been some attention given to the men and women resisting them in northern Syria. The Syrian part of Kurdistan, or Rojava, as the Kurds would like to call it, has been fighting Islamists for well over two years now but only recently has the battle for the border town of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/kobane">Kobane</a> brought them to light.</p>
<p>And while it’s easy to portray the Kurdish people as pitted against this new terrorist threat, they are actually involved in something far more profound. Kobane is symbolic and the conflict there carries a universal significance. Not only are the Kurds battling the Islamists, but they are also attempting to create a model of democracy that might actually bring stability to a war-torn region. </p>
<p>The Kurdish political vision is not founded on any particular racial, ethnic, regional or religious belief but rather on an idea, or a set of ideas, that should resonate with people everywhere.</p>
<p>Fighters in Kobane <a href="http://rojavareport.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/interview-with-ypj-commander-in-kobane-kobane-will-not-fall/">claim</a> to be standing up for the freedom of everyone in the region, be they Kurds, Turks, Arabs or anyone else. The way the fighters in Kobane have <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/houzan-mahmoud/kurdish-female-fighters-_b_5944382.html">challenged</a> stereotypical gender roles is just one example.</p>
<p>As far as religious difference goes, Kobane disproves both Islamophobes who believe the Middle East to be incapable of progress and politically correct Islamophiles who push the patronising idea that religious identity is a top priority for Muslims the world over. In their readiness to defend the Yazidi minority against persecution from IS, the Kurds have essentially been promoting a radical secularism and a vision of tolerance in a region torn by religious strife.</p>
<p>What is novel about the Kurdish struggle for self-determination is its very definition of self-determination. The concept, when applied to nations, is generally taken to mean the right of nations to secede and form states of their own, but the Kurds see it differently. Many believe an experiment in <a href="http://www.freeocalan.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Ocalan-Democratic-Confederalism.pdf">democratic confederalism</a> is what the region really needs.</p>
<p>This is an idea espoused by PKK founder <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21314776">Abdullah Ocalan</a>, who is a central intellectual and moral figure for Kurds. The PKK, or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has been fighting Turkey for greater autonomy since 1978 and has also trained Kurdish fighters in Kobane. Ocalan’s writing, compiled from within the confines of a Turkish prison where he has languished for about 15 years, has provided a solid ideological plank for the Kurdish struggle. He believes nation states are inherently oppressive. While oppressed groups might have a legitimate desire to form states of their own, even such newly formed states only serve to replace one form of domination with another. For him, the nation state is linked to xenophobic nationalism, sexism and religious fundamentalism.</p>
<p>Democratic confederalism is a system of governance that would be based on greater collective consensus and voluntary participation. Ecology and feminism are seen as central pillars for local self-governance. It calls for an economic system that should be based neither on exploiting human labour nor the unsound use of natural resources.</p>
<p>Kobane has essentially implemented this theory in practice. The ideas might seem utopian and realists may, quite legitimately, question the sustainability of autonomous communes that do not have the political or military backing of a centralised state. But as Oscar Wilde said, progress is the realisation of Utopia. Maybe Kobane’s progress is just that.</p>
<p>The struggle for Kobane is an event of global significance on a par with the Declaration of Independence, the Storming of the Bastille, the Paris Commune, or the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu. Success for the Kurds would challenge established intellectual, ethical and political horizons.</p>
<p>At a time when right-wing parties are growing in Europe and elsewhere, and minority fundamentalism is growing in parallel, the Kurds are offering something different and it should not be ignored. In that sense, they are fighting for everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karthick Manoharan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the battle against Islamic State fighters draws in viewers across the world, there has been some attention given to the men and women resisting them in northern Syria. The Syrian part of Kurdistan…Karthick Manoharan, Phd Student and Graduate Teaching Assistant in Politics, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/337012014-11-03T06:00:27Z2014-11-03T06:00:27ZKobanê resists Islamic State – but Turkey still can’t get the Kurdish question right<p>The biggest new development in the ongoing conflict between the Kurds and Islamic State has been the growing co-operation between the Kurdish movements in Iraq and Syria – a phase change that forces to upend the whole question of Kurdish politics. </p>
<p>The link-up between Kurdish movements across borders has been a major security coup. It first paved the way for a US airdrop of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11173564/US-airdrops-arms-to-Kurds-in-Syrian-town-of-Kobane.html">weapons, ammunition and medical supplies</a> on October 20, resources which were sent to defend the town of Kobanê, which has been under siege from IS for seven weeks. We’ve also seen the deployment of Iraqi-Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, armed with heavy weapons such as <a href="http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0IH1SD20141028?irpc=932">artillery and anti-tank missiles</a>.</p>
<p>These events have run contrary to many analysts’ initial expectation that Kobanê’s fall to IS was a foregone conclusion – and the exemplary resistance of Kurdish forces has drawn the support of both the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-arab-partners-will-get-in-return-for-strikes-on-syria-32061">international coalition</a> and the <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/turkeys-u-turn-boosts-peshmerga-in-kobani">Peshmerga forces</a>.</p>
<p>But winning the support of the international coalition is a major development for the Kurds’ entire political cause, not just for their fight against IS.</p>
<p>Previously, the US authorities <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/19102014">rejected</a> the idea of working with the Kurds in Syria at all, on the grounds that the main Kurdish political party in Syria – Democratic Union Party (PYD) – has links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is on the US’s list of terrorist organisations. </p>
<p>But the Kurds’ response was astute and effective – and has forced the US’s hand. The Syrian Kurdish political parties met in Duhok, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, to establish a <a href="http://kurdishquestion.com/kurdistan/west-kurdistan/the-duhok-agreement-an-interview-with-aldar-xelil/358-the-duhok-agreement-an-interview-with-aldar-xelil.html">joint administration</a> for Syria’s Kurdish-controlled areas. The Kurds of Syria and Iraq knew that closer co-operation could make them an important force in the international fight against IS – which in turn is likely to increase their clout in regional politics in general. </p>
<p>But even with this new-found solidarity, any effort to properly integrate the Kurds into the existing regional power equation will have to clear significant hurdles.</p>
<h2>Heels dug in</h2>
<p>Better Kurdish co-operation in the fight against IS has not led to a significant change in Turkey’s attitude. Ankara still refuses to develop constructive and co-operative relations with the PYD, a strong indication that the same old ideas of what security entails still govern Turkey’s approach to its Kurdish question.</p>
<p>True, Turkey’s ongoing attempts to restart the peace process have at least gestured to the possibility of co-operative, mutualistic relations – but that still demands, not just an end to the recent rise of violence in Turkey, but a sea change in Turkey’s whole approach to the Kurdish conflict. Ankara needs to stop framing the Kurdish question as a security problem, and start taking measures to genuinely accommodate the Kurds’ demands. </p>
<p>Depressingly, statements made by Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, indicate a <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/erdogan-us-airdrops-kobane-wrong-929392597">hardening attitude</a>.</p>
<p>Previously, the PKK’s unilateral ceasefires and cessation of violence was interpreted by Turkey as the end of the Kurdish conflict, rather than an opportunity for major reforms that could meet the Kurds’ demands. The recent escalation of violence, and the ensuing war of words over whose fault it is and how to stop it, reveals how delicate the situation is – and exposes the lack of trust that still defines <a href="http://theconversation.com/turkey-is-paying-for-decades-of-divisive-politics-as-it-fights-to-end-its-civil-war-33197">Turkey’s approach to peace with the Kurds</a>.</p>
<h2>Open up</h2>
<p>Unfortunately for the Turkish government, the sympathy that the Kurdish forces continue to win as a result of their resistance in Kobanê is translating into growing popularity and a change of attitude internationally. </p>
<p>The US and its allies are beginning to accept that Syria’s Kurds cannot be excluded from the campaign against IS, or from any eventual post-conflict settlement in Syria. This is in stark contrast to their refusal to engage with the Kurdish representatives in the built-up to the <a href="http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/features/kurds-in-syria-answer-geneva-ii-with-selfrule-and-coexistence_21450">Geneva II Conference on Syria</a> earlier this year, and it’s making Turkey’s hitherto intransigent position more and more uncomfortable.</p>
<p>At the heart of Turkey’s reaction to the Kobanê resistance is the fight over the Kurdish question in Turkey itself, as well in Syria. Turkish attempts to “outflank” the Kurds in Syria have so far not produced the desired outcome, and under severe pressure from the US, Ankara has reluctantly agreed to let Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces <a href="http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0IH1SD20141028?irpc=932">cross its territory to reach Kobanê</a>.</p>
<p>Given that many of the PKK’s guerrillas are now fighting IS in Iraq, it’s hard to imagine the PKK fully restarting its insurgency in Turkey in the short run. But as long as Turkey’s approach to the conflict is shaped by its own narrow security priorities, the escalation of violence is likely to continue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The biggest new development in the ongoing conflict between the Kurds and Islamic State has been the growing co-operation between the Kurdish movements in Iraq and Syria – a phase change that forces to…Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/331972014-10-21T15:51:15Z2014-10-21T15:51:15ZTurkey is paying for decades of divisive politics as it fights to end its civil war<p>When armed conflict becomes a fact of everyday life, and generations grow up knowing nothing else, imagining life in a state of peace is hard work. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-bombs-kurdish-forces-as-new-wave-of-violence-threatens-to-spill-across-borders-33035">fragile state</a> of Turkey’s negotiations with Kurdish insurgents is testament to that problem.</p>
<p>After decades of being torn apart by war, one might assume the people of Turkey would desperately want to break free from the politics of division and hatred. But that is not quite the case. </p>
<p>There is, of course, an urge to end Turkey’s painful 30-year armed conflict with the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20971100">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a> (PKK), one shared by Kurds, Turks, Sunnis, Christians and <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4834f8fc-134e-11e4-84b7-00144feabdc0.html">Alevis</a>. Everyone accepts that unless the struggle comes to a definitive and peaceful end it’s hard to imagine Turkey as a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21900310">fully democratic and developed country</a>. But exactly what such a settlement would look like and how it could be realised in day-to-day life remains to be seen. </p>
<p>This lack of vision is not accidental; it is the net result of years of calculated propaganda and deliberately divisive politics, which have left hideous marks on Turkish society.</p>
<h2>Neighbour against neighbour</h2>
<p>Having spent decades deliberately stoking people’s fears about each other to sustain the civil war, the parties to the conflict have a great deal to answer for; they have worked hard to maintain an environment of mistrust, and have succeeded. </p>
<p>While Turkey has not yet experienced the total societal disintegration seen in Bosnia, Iraq or Lebanon, its population is still riven by a remarkably high level of <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KepLD0MXbhYC&pg=PA44&lpg=PA44&dq=horizontal+trust&source=bl&ots=AWEo-lwotu&sig=4QjayMZ-2giGljIEqbOFTYHVT2k&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NqNDVObxKsbD7gbr_IDgBA&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAzgK#v=onepage&q=horizontal%20trust&f=false">mutual mistrust</a>. </p>
<p>According to opinion polls, the public does not seem keen on living in close proximity to anyone marked by difference. Large sections of the population for example, do not want their neighbours to be <a href="http://www.issp.org/page.php?pageId=4">from a different religion – or atheist, foreign or homosexual</a>. In other words, Turkey needs to accept that it is not a tolerant country – or at least not as tolerant a country as it might like to think it is. </p>
<p>A number of forces are at least partly to blame for this low ebb: rapid urbanisation, breakneck economic liberalisation and globalisation all set against a regional geography of instability and insecurity. But Turkish society has also been manipulated for decades by forces seeking to prolong the conflict, which is now <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement.aspx">all but intractable</a>. </p>
<p>Divide-and-rule tactics designed to whip up people’s fears of difference have defined Turkish politics for too long – and the state’s failure to act against it has made the situation exponentially worse. Indeed, the problems underpinning the conflict could have been tackled on many fronts. Wider democratisation and development, officially recognising different ethnic and religious identities, expanding local governance rights, protecting human rights, respecting the rule of law – all these could have made a substantial difference.</p>
<p>Instead of addressing these challenges in a timely manner, Turkey’s political elites have opted to press ahead with hostilities. And today’s sectarian misery and fragmented society are the result.</p>
<h2>Talking it out</h2>
<p>Right now, the Turkish government is struggling to reach a peace deal with the Kurdish insurgency, but given what is unfolding just across the border in Syria and Iraq – and now <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-bombs-kurdish-forces-as-new-wave-of-violence-threatens-to-spill-across-borders-33035">within Turkey itself</a> – the likelihood of any such settlement is rapidly fading. And even if a deal were reached, its chances of survival and sustainability would hardly look good given the environment of deep division, mistrust and fear. </p>
<p>This is why Turkey needs to immediately start tackling its mistrust problem as a core part of any peace agreement. As things stand, the current formal peacemaking effort is taking place at a table with all seats reserved for political leaders and no parties representing society at large. </p>
<p>This is not the only way it could be done. Think of the “<a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/erdogan-wise-people-commission-peace-process.html">Wise People Commission</a>” of 2013, which comprised 63 well-liked public figures: writers, academics, politicians and intellectuals and which ran a series of meetings to listen to the views and suggestions of the public throughout the country.</p>
<p>Turkey needs to return to that approach: civil society organisations need to be empowered to turn the spotlight on the deep mistrust that plagues people’s everyday lives and give these issues a meaningful public airing. </p>
<p>There are some signs that this process has begun organically at the neighbourhood level. The emergence of “<a href="http://www.academia.edu/5878404/Reclaiming_Istanbul_After_Gezi_Park_Protests_Public_Forums_As_A_New_Form_of_Participation">Public Forums</a>” in a number of Istanbul’s neighbourhoods after the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/29/gezi-park-year-after-protests-seeds-new-turkey">Gezi Park protests</a> is a good example of how ordinary people are starting to mobilise around the issues that really matter to them.</p>
<p>This must be encouraged as a matter of national urgency. The media, academia, unions, private sector and civil society organisations all need to recognise that a peace deal struck by politicians and commanders would only be the beginning of a <a href="http://www.transcend.org/files/Galtung_Book_unpub_Theories_of_Peace_-_A_Synthetic_Approach_to_Peace_Thinking_1967.pdf">negative peace</a> – merely an absence of violence, with Turkey’s societal issues unaddressed.</p>
<p>That would be welcome as far as it goes, but to turn that into a positive peace with meaningful consequences for everyday lives in Turkey, other types of violence: structural, social and cultural also need to be eradicated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When armed conflict becomes a fact of everyday life, and generations grow up knowing nothing else, imagining life in a state of peace is hard work. The fragile state of Turkey’s negotiations with Kurdish…Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/330352014-10-15T13:58:44Z2014-10-15T13:58:44ZTurkey bombs Kurdish forces as new wave of violence threatens to spill across borders<p>The ongoing humanitarian tragedy of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29617941">Kobanê</a> has raised serious questions about the future of the Kurds. The unstoppable advance of Islamic State (IS) over the last few months has already <a href="https://theconversation.com/everythings-at-stake-for-the-kurds-in-the-battle-for-kobane-32646">scrambled the power dynamics of the region</a>, while Western-led air strikes have so far <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-ups-pressure-on-allies-as-strategy-for-fighting-islamic-state-falls-apart-32789">failed to bring IS to its knees</a> – putting Kurdish movements in Syria and Iraq under tremendous pressure.</p>
<p>But the new Kurdish crisis is not confined to IS-controlled territory. On the other side of the border in Turkey, formal negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were supposed to start in October; instead, the PKK has been shelling Turkish outposts, while Turkey has now sent its jets to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/turkish-jets-bomb-pkk-targets-southeast-2014101492853176434.html">bomb PKK targets</a> in Northern Iraq. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/21/pkk-leader-ocalan-declares-ceasefire">ceasefire</a> struck between the two sides in March 2013 is fast becoming a distant memory. But of course, storm clouds had been brewing for a while.</p>
<h2>Lucrative hostilities</h2>
<p>Even by the end of 2013, the PKK’s top field commander, Cemil Bayik, had <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/22/uk-turkey-kurds-pkk-idUKBRE99L06920131022">issued a stern warning</a> to Ankara that its suspected backing of anti-Kurd Islamist rebels in Syria might force the PKK to relaunch its insurgency in Turkey. True to his word, the PKK has now <a href="http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Oct-11/273762-kurdish-pkk-fighters-called-back-to-turkey-after-protests.ashx">sent back</a> all its fighters who were pulled out of Turkey as part of the ceasefire process. </p>
<p>Bayik accuses Turkey of taking no action to save Kobanê from IS. That chimes with mounting domestic and international pressure on the Turkish government to start a fuller military intervention against IS, either by deploying ground forces or at least by allowing the transfer of military assistance to the Kurdish YPG (People’s Defence Units) fighters in Syria. </p>
<p>Turkey has so far done neither, and that has fuelled suspicions that this is a deliberate tactic. IS’s war against all Kurdish military forces has dealt severe damage to the Kurdish forces, and that could ultimately be considered a major favour to Turkey – strengthening Ankara’s position just before the formal peace negotiations with the PKK are due to begin.</p>
<p>However, there could be another way of interpreting these dangerous unfolding developments over the Turkish peace process from a different angle: and that might be to do with what the parties to the conflict in Turkey will lose out by making peace. </p>
<p>30 years of fighting in south-eastern Turkey has created a strong and profitable war economy on which various parties are deeply dependent, one that includes major <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/_pkk-runs-major-illegal-drug-trade-in-turkeys-southeast_293298.html">drug</a> and <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/_pkks-economy-of-crime-in-europe-by-recep-korkut-_263301.html">human</a> trafficking operations. In bald economic terms, continued war might just offer more stability than peace, since all these revenue streams would probably have to close down.</p>
<h2>The road not taken</h2>
<p>It did not have to be this way. The 2014 presidential election campaign offered a glimpse of a less sectarian, divisive and violent way forward for Turkey, in the form of Kurdish politician <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/turkeyelection/2011/05/201152612203685720.html">Selahattin Demirtaş</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61827/original/s4krqnvw-1413369186.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/61827/original/s4krqnvw-1413369186.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61827/original/s4krqnvw-1413369186.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61827/original/s4krqnvw-1413369186.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61827/original/s4krqnvw-1413369186.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61827/original/s4krqnvw-1413369186.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/61827/original/s4krqnvw-1413369186.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hope and change: Selahattin Demirtaş.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASelahattin_Demirta%C5%9F_(cropped).jpg">Voice of America via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A member of parliament since the age of 34, Demirtaş not only managed to increase his party’s votes in those elections; he also brought a much needed normalisation to the political landscape of Turkey, adopting a conciliatory approach and voice and trying to reach out to all peoples of the country. He talked about peace from the human security perspective, placing his emphasis on solidarity with all oppressed groups across the country. </p>
<p>In an <a href="http://www.kurdishquestion.com/interviews/exclusive-turkey-s-presidential-candidate-selahattin-demirtas-talks-to-kurdish-question/182-exclusive-turkey-s-presidential-candidate-selahattin-demirtas-talks-to-kurdish-question.html">interview</a> just before the elections, Demirtaş said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I know that Alevis trust in me, Kurds trust in me, Turkish progressives and democrats trust in me, women and youth trust in me, Armenians, Assyrians and Yazidis trust in me, ecologists and green movements trust in me. Now if all of these different groups have gathered around our principles and trust in us and are feeding and strengthening our hope, our job is to make sure we do not disregard or disappoint any of them and take this struggle to victory.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In other words, he showed that it is possible for a Kurdish politician to appeal to the entire country, positioning the HDP as a major threat to all mainstream parties in the country – or at least as a kingmaker, deciding who wins elections in such metropolises as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. </p>
<p>At the same time, Demirtaş has also shown Kurds that they could actually do without the PKK. He embodies the hope of a new way of doing Kurdish politics without fighting, agitation, division and separation, and instead, as part of a more democratic and prosperous Turkey.</p>
<p>But instead, the sun seems to be setting on the chances for a lasting peace. The main actors to the conflict on all sides do not seem to have any interest in the full demands of peace, and they clearly have no interest in giving up the things the continuing conflict allows them to control, manipulate, gain and exploit. </p>
<p>In the end, as in so many other frustrated peace processes, war still pays more dividends than peace. IS’s onslaught on Kobanê obviously serves its own jihadist ends, but by wrecking the Turkish peace process, it has given new life to other pernicious interests besides.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33035/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alpaslan Ozerdem does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ongoing humanitarian tragedy of Kobanê has raised serious questions about the future of the Kurds. The unstoppable advance of Islamic State (IS) over the last few months has already scrambled the power…Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chair in Peace-Building, Co-Director of Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/327892014-10-14T05:19:24Z2014-10-14T05:19:24ZUS ups pressure on allies as strategy for fighting Islamic State falls apart<p>Less than a month since Barack Obama went to the American public with his <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/isis-obama-speech/">strategy</a> for defeating the Islamic State (IS), expectations of a successful outcome are already being <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/08/air-strikes-isis-white-house-syrian-rebel-force">significantly lowered</a>.</p>
<p>This is worrying, since Obama likened IS to cancer; a harbinger of death requiring immediate surgery. IS’s malignance was so horrifically self-evident that the move to cut it out won near-total acceptance across the political spectrum; in a matter of weeks, the group’s brutality had rendered opposition to military inaction politically and morally untenable.</p>
<p>Military action has repeatedly been presented as a <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/10/07/general-david-richards_n_5944676.html">no-brainer</a>; opinion polls, which <a href="http://images.politico.com/global/2014/07/18/140718_politico_topline_july_2014_survey_t_142watermark.pdf">just three months</a> ago showed active resistance to military intervention in Syria and Iraq, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/27/isis-uk-attacks-support-protesters-warn-threat">more recently showed</a> that almost 70% of Americans and Britons were convinced of the need. </p>
<h2>Stop and think</h2>
<p>One theory of <a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3176265?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104311785601">how foreign policy is made</a> views it as a two-stage decision making process. In the first stage, leaders first discount all options that threaten them politically or fundamentally clash with their belief system; only in a subsequent phase of strategising do they actually use more analytical, cost-benefit strategies to figure out the best course of action.</p>
<p>This broadly seems to explain how the decision to attack IS was made. The first stage of decision-making was driven not by careful calculation, but by moral outrage at the brazen atrocities of a group <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10614037/Al-Qaeda-cuts-links-with-Syrian-group-too-extreme-even-for-them.html">more extreme than al-Qaeda</a>, in particular the beheading of Western hostages.</p>
<p>The result is that assessments of capabilities and threat, the traditional benchmarks for sensible foreign policy, were barely present at the conceptual stage. The strategy is instead the outgrowth of a moral, emotional logic. </p>
<p>And as Kobanê has showed, this emotional transition from inaction to military engagement was inadequately informed; it still lacks a clear understanding of how IS has come to rule 8m Iraqis and Syrians, sometimes secured millions of dollars of funding a day, and exploited all manner of regional security weaknesses.</p>
<p>But along with those strategic issues, one of the main obstacles to a coherent strategy is that the US and its allies have very different interests and capabilities in the two theatres where IS poses a threat.</p>
<h2>Last stand</h2>
<p>In Iraq, there are ground troops to work with and a central government with substantial international (if not domestic) legitimacy. The aims of perennially squabbling regional actors, so poorly aligned in Syria, are far more reconcilable in Iraq; all are willing to work with the central government, and several have significant influence there. True, the Kurds have taken advantage of the Iraqi army’s disastrous performances to advance their interests, but the long-trumpeted <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/14/western-intervention-isis-iraq-muslim">break-up of Iraq</a> remains an unlikely scenario.</p>
<p>Yet even though the US has more options in Iraq than it does in Syria, the <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/10/02/kurdish-peshmerga-defeat-islamic-state-in-rabia/16610563/">recapture of Rabia by Kurdish Peshmerga</a> showed how hard it will be to dislodge IS fighters. In a desperate last stand, a force of just 30 jihadists held out for 2 days against 1,500 Peshmerga fighters, who were supported by coalition air power. When the Peshmerga finally entered the town, they found that up to 20 of the ISIS rear-guard had managed to slip away. No sooner had they taken the town than IS killed scores of people with seven suicide vehicle attacks.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, IS fighters are fighting a largely successful campaign to consolidate their power in Iraq’s Anbar province. Last week they <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/isil-sunni-militias-battle-iraqi-town-201410281343980744.html">closed in on the city of Heet</a>, which hosts close to 100,000 internally displaced people. In a region that contains half a million such refugees, aid workers and medical staff warn of chronic shortages of food, medicine, hospital beds, shelter and clean water. </p>
<p>The government’s reliance on artillery and airstrikes to check IS’s advance in Anbar has reduced urban areas to rubble and killed many civilians. Without committed forces fighting on the ground, <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2014/10/youll-believe-population.html">airstrikes are not working</a>. The Sunnis of Anbar feel abandoned; the critical battle for hearts and minds in the Sunni heartlands is being lost. As a priority, a massive humanitarian mission is needed to avert an impending disaster in Anbar.</p>
<p>Persuading disillusioned Sunnis that the central government will protect them and give them a stake in the county is the only viable strategy for defeating IS in Iraq. Success will ultimately come down to whether the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/03/us-iraq-crisis-abadi-idUSKCN0HS1Q220141003">promising signs</a> that new prime minister Haider al-Abadi intends to build a more inclusive political process are fulfilled.</p>
<h2>Worse and worse</h2>
<p>The situation in Syria looks far more dire. The Obama administration <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29546714">insists</a> its bombing campaign was never expected to have much impact, with support from ground troops it <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/08/air-strikes-isis-white-house-syrian-rebel-force">freely admits</a> effectively do not exist. The upshot is that the strategic town of Kobanê, on the Turkish border, <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2014/10/kobani-syrian-murder.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook">could fall any day</a>.</p>
<p>Washington’s strategy appears to rest on persuading Turkey to provide the boots on the ground that could actually make a difference. The situation in Kobanê is further complicated by the politics of the Kurds fighting there, who do not share <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/world/middleeast/isis-syria-turkey-border-us.html?action=click&contentCollection=Middle%20East&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article">Turkey’s belief</a> that ousting President Assad is as important as defeating IS. To make things even more delicate, they are also allied to the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20971100">PKK</a>, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/everythings-at-stake-for-the-kurds-in-the-battle-for-kobane-32646">fought a long-running war</a> against the Turkish state. </p>
<p>Turkish president <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-erdogan-pledges-to-bring-vandals-to-account.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72872&NewsCatID=338">Recep Erdogan</a> is unwilling to rescue a force he believes has given up on removing Assad, and intends only to carve out an autonomous region that will exasperate Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. In this context, the back channel talks that have been happening between the US and the Syrian Kurds – which diplomats from both sides are <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/10/syria-feature-kobane-washingtons-back-channel-talks-syrian-kurds/">now admitting</a> have been ongoing for several years – will be watched warily in Ankara.</p>
<p>At a minimum, Erdogan will surely make any Turkish intervention contingent upon Washington directing its firepower against Assad’s forces. This is a deeply unattractive option. Unlike IS, Syria has an air force and air defence system that could feasibly shoot down US pilots. Strikes against Assad would plunge relations with Russia to an even further low, and the reaction in Iran would be hysterical, jeopardising the chance of a successful deal on the critical <a href="https://theconversation.com/frozen-out-of-anti-is-effort-iran-is-losing-patience-with-the-west-31864">nuclear issue</a>.</p>
<p>Erdogan may also insist that Washington police a “buffer zone” to be declared in the northern part of Syria – a demand the Obama administration has long resisted because of its cost and complications. </p>
<p>Given all this, and strong domestic opposition to a ground intervention, it seems unlikely that Turkish soldiers will take on IS on the ground – at least without increased US pressure.</p>
<h2>Getting it together</h2>
<p>But Washington is at last starting to put that pressure on. On October 12, secretary of state John Kerry deliberately <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/10/syria-daily-us-secretary-state-kerry-surrenders-kobane-islamic-state/">downplayed the chances of saving Kobanê</a> from IS as Washington positioned itself to blame Turkey for the town’s loss. Perhaps in response, Turkey has <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29591916">finally agreed</a> to allow US access to some of its military bases. The allies’ longer-term plan to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/26/us-mideast-crisis-usa-rebels-idUSKCN0HL24E20140926">train about 5,000 opposition fighters</a> will demand not only patience, but the further lowering of expectations; according to the Pentagon, it will take up to five months just to set up the facilities.</p>
<p>Washington’s belief that its Sunni allies are <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/biden-apologizes-to-turkeys-erdogan/2014/10/04/b3b5dc84-d97d-4381-ab7f-1754d495f84a_story.html">largely to blame for the rise of IS</a> in Syria has long influenced its strongly regionalist approach; only by cobbling together a “coalition of the willing” can Obama retain the distance he needs between this mission and the Iraq war he would like to be remembered for ending. </p>
<p>But America’s disgruntled allies are now complain that the main benefactor of US airstrikes is President Assad of Syria. They may be right: Syria has recently <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/world/middleeast/us-focus-on-isis-frees-syria-to-battle-rebels.html?smid=fb-share">stepped up its attacks</a> on rebellious parts of the country. </p>
<p>The obvious and depressing conclusion is that the strategy as it stands now is entirely dependent on the actions of actors who are clearly far beyond Washington’s capability to influence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Emery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Less than a month since Barack Obama went to the American public with his strategy for defeating the Islamic State (IS), expectations of a successful outcome are already being significantly lowered. This…Christian Emery, Lecturer in International Relations, University of PlymouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.