tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/privacy-invasion-15345/articlesPrivacy invasion – The Conversation2020-07-29T04:49:41Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1433542020-07-29T04:49:41Z2020-07-29T04:49:41ZThe privacy paradox: we claim we care about our data, so why don’t our actions match?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350056/original/file-20200729-19-1tke6d9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=127%2C22%2C4865%2C3502&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Imagine how you’d feel if you discovered footage from your private home security camera had been broadcast over the internet. This is exactly what happened to <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-24/security-cameras-hacked-streamed-on-russian-website/12380606">several unsuspecting Australians</a> last month, when the website Insecam streamed their personal lives online. </p>
<p>According to an <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-24/security-cameras-hacked-streamed-on-russian-website/12380606">ABC report</a>, Insecam broadcasts live streams of dozens of Australian businesses and homes at any given time. Some cameras can be accessed because owners don’t secure them. Some may be hacked into despite being “secured”.</p>
<p>When asked if they care about their personal information being shared online, most people say they do. <a href="https://www.oaic.gov.au/updates/videos/australian-community-attitudes-to-privacy-survey-2017">A 2017 survey</a> found 69% of Australians were more concerned about their online privacy than in 2012. </p>
<p>However, a much smaller percentage of people actually take the necessary actions to preserve their privacy. This is referred to as the “privacy paradox”, a concept <a href="https://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2001/HPL-2001-49.pdf">first studied</a> about two decades ago.</p>
<p>To investigate this phenomenon further, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404820301711">we conducted a research project</a> and found that, despite being concerned about privacy, participants were willing to sacrifice some of it in exchange for the convenience afforded by an internet-connected device. </p>
<h2>Unpacking the privacy paradox</h2>
<p>Any “smart” device connected to the internet is called an <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/what-is-the-internet-of-things-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-iot-right-now/">Internet of Things</a> (IoT) device. These can be remotely monitored and controlled by the owners.</p>
<p>The projected growth of IoT devices is staggering. By 2025, they’re expected to <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iot-number-of-connected-devices-worldwide/">reach 75.44 billion</a> – an increase of 146% from 2020.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350059/original/file-20200729-27-17hifh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350059/original/file-20200729-27-17hifh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350059/original/file-20200729-27-17hifh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350059/original/file-20200729-27-17hifh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350059/original/file-20200729-27-17hifh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350059/original/file-20200729-27-17hifh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350059/original/file-20200729-27-17hifh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350059/original/file-20200729-27-17hifh4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The global IoT network is a collection of all the interconnected devices that can communicate online. This includes smart devices, appliances and wearable tech.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Are device owners <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316866340_Yes_I_know_this_IoT_Device_Might_Invade_my_Privacy_but_I_Love_it_Anyway_A_Study_of_Saudi_Arabian_Perceptions">genuinely concerned about their privacy</a>? Recent worldwide anxiety about personal information shared through <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/06/27/covid-19-phone-tracking-apps-this-is-what-youre-not-being-told/#43f6bb502970">COVID-19 tracing apps</a> seems to suggest so. </p>
<p>But as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/05/privacy-paradox-why-do-people-keep-using-tech-firms-data-facebook-scandal">privacy paradox</a> highlights, users expressing privacy concerns often fail to act in accordance with them. They freely divulge personal information in exchange for services and convenience.</p>
<p>Explanations for the privacy paradox abound. Some suggest:</p>
<ul>
<li>people find it difficult to associate a specific value to their privacy and therefore, the value of protecting it</li>
<li>people do not consider their <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-dont-own-data-like-we-own-a-car-which-is-why-we-find-data-harder-to-protect-98469">personal information to be their own</a> and thus might not appreciate the need to secure it</li>
<li>people completely lack awareness of <a href="https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/commission-general/privacy">their right to privacy</a> or <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1979742.1979887">privacy issues</a> and believe their <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/2556288.2557421?casa_token=O5o_MevKSSEAAAAA:z9ZBt5DQL0jK0rYulPCO8BGJMi9IqTjKNccYXFx0SGBLlMdwSaByjgVGVDdH7O_9Cg41hspZFq0noBQ">desired goals</a> (such as a personalised experience) outweigh the potential risks (such as big tech companies using their data for profiling).</li>
</ul>
<p>The likely explanation for the privacy paradox is a mix of all these factors.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-facebook-uses-the-privacy-paradox-to-keep-users-sharing-94779">How Facebook uses the ‘privacy paradox’ to keep users sharing</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>What if we <em>proved</em> your device harvests data?</h2>
<p>To understand whether and how the privacy paradox applies to IoT devices, we conducted an experiment involving 46 Saudi Arabian participants. This is because in Saudi Arabia the use of IoT is <a href="https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/590331">exploding</a> and the country <a href="https://www.financierworldwide.com/cyber-security-and-data-privacy-law-in-saudi-arabia#.XyC-LfgzbVo">does not have</a> strong privacy regulations. </p>
<p>We gave participants a smart plug that let them switch a table lamp on or off using an app on their smartphone. We then showed them the device’s privacy policy and measured participants’ privacy concerns and trust in the device. </p>
<p>None of the participants read the privacy policy. They simply agreed to commence with the study.</p>
<p>After two hours, we presented evidence of how much of their data the IoT-connected plug was harvesting, then remeasured their privacy concerns and trust. </p>
<p>After the participants saw evidence of privacy violation, their privacy concerns increased and trust in the device decreased. However their behaviour did not align with their concern, as shown by the fact that:</p>
<ul>
<li>15 participants continued to use the device regardless</li>
<li>13 continued to use it with their personal information removed</li>
<li>only three opted to block all outbound traffic to unusual IP addresses.</li>
</ul>
<p>The rest preferred “light-touch” responses, such as complaining on social media, complaining to the device’s manufacturer or falsifying their shared information.</p>
<p>After one month, we measured participants’ attitudes a third time and discovered their privacy concerns and trust in the device had reverted to pre-experiment levels.</p>
<h2>How to prevent complacency</h2>
<p>Two decades since the first privacy paradox studies were conducted and despite a great deal of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ejsp.2049">research</a>, there is still a mismatch between people’s stated privacy concerns and their protective behaviours. How can we improve this? </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350061/original/file-20200729-27-tmgoj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350061/original/file-20200729-27-tmgoj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350061/original/file-20200729-27-tmgoj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350061/original/file-20200729-27-tmgoj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350061/original/file-20200729-27-tmgoj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350061/original/file-20200729-27-tmgoj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350061/original/file-20200729-27-tmgoj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/350061/original/file-20200729-27-tmgoj7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Every time you connect a new device to the internet, or opt-in to a new service, ask yourself: ‘do I really need this?’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The first step is to simply be aware our judgement of IoT device risks and benefits may not be accurate. With that in mind, we should always take time to read the privacy policies of our devices.</p>
<p>Besides informing us of the risks, reading privacy policies can help us <em>stop</em> and <em>think</em> before connecting a new device to the internet. Ask yourself: “is this really going to benefit me?” </p>
<p>As citizen surveillance increases, it’s not wise to mindlessly scroll through privacy policies, tick a box and move on.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-accc-is-suing-google-for-misleading-millions-but-calling-it-out-is-easier-than-fixing-it-143447">The ACCC is suing Google for misleading millions. But calling it out is easier than fixing it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Second, we should not assume our personal information is trivial and would not interest anyone. <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-alleges-google-misled-consumers-about-expanded-use-of-personal-data">Time after time</a> we have witnessed how <a href="https://techfruit.com/2018/03/30/the-internet-is-a-privacy-nightmare-be-careful-with-your-personal-data/">our digital traces</a> can be valuable to malicious individuals or large corporations. </p>
<p>And finally, always change the default password on any new IoT device to a <a href="https://www.cnet.com/how-to/strong-passwords-9-rules-to-help-you-make-and-remember-your-login-credentials/">stronger one</a>. Write down this password and secure it, perhaps with other physical valuables, so you don’t have to worry about forgetting it.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1205284700945649666"}"></div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For decades experts have puzzled over why most people claim to have privacy concerns, but few actually do enough about it.Ivano Bongiovanni, Lecturer in Information Security, Governance and Leadership / Design Thinking, The University of QueenslandKaren Renaud, Visiting Professor, Rhodes UniversityNoura Aleisa, Assistant professor of Computer Science, Saudi Electronic University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1421572020-07-07T19:54:21Z2020-07-07T19:54:21ZChina could be using TikTok to spy on Australians, but banning it isn’t a simple fix<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/345991/original/file-20200707-194396-1ealmrs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C71%2C5955%2C3296&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In an age of isolation, video sharing platform TikTok has emerged as a bonding force for many. But recent headlines allege the service, owned by Beijing-based company ByteDance, is feeding users’ data to the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p>Earlier this week, the <a href="https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/calls-for-tiktok-app-to-be-banned-in-australia/news-story/5b8b294b0cc2679b76221de89e4e7202">Herald Sun reported</a> an unnamed federal MP was pushing for the app to be banned.</p>
<p>Following suit, Liberal senator Jim Molan <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jul/06/tiktok-may-be-data-collection-service-disguised-as-social-media-liberal-senator-says">said</a> TikTok was being “used and abused” by the Chinese government, while Labor senator Jenny McAllister <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com.au/tiktok-australia-data-privacy-china-concerns-2020-7">called on</a> TikTok’s representatives to face the Select Committee on Foreign Interference Through Social Media. </p>
<p>TikTok has <a href="https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/2020/07/07/tiktoks-australia-future/">denied</a> the accusations and rebuffed suggestions it should be banned in Australia. </p>
<p>But why is the federal government <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/technology/tiktok-on-thin-ice-as-parliament-prepares-to-pore-over-app-20200706-p559d9.html">examining this app so closely</a>? And could it really be a tool used by the Chinese government to spy on us?</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1161600933974794240"}"></div></p>
<h2>A growing following</h2>
<p>With a reported <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/29/21241788/tiktok-app-download-numbers-update-2-billion-users">two billion downloads</a> worldwide, TikTok’s <a href="http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/8289-launch-of-tiktok-in-australia-december-2019-202002240606">Australian market</a> is also significant. It has an estimated 1.6 million Aussie users, mostly aged 16-24 but with a growing number of <a href="https://slate.com/technology/2018/09/tiktok-app-musically-guide.html">older users too</a>.</p>
<p>Simply, users generate short videos that are shared in the app, with many celebrities also <a href="https://socialblade.com/tiktok/top/50/most-followers">signing up</a>. But although TikTok seems to offer carefree entertainment, is there a darker side?</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/1WB4fG3OmqA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Australian television presenter Andrew Probyn had an unexpected TikTok moment.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What information is collected?</h2>
<p>When installed, TikTok <a href="https://www.proofpoint.com/us/corporate-blog/post/understanding-information-tiktok-gathers-and-stores">asks users to grant</a> several permissions, including the use of the camera, microphone and contact list. However, it may also collect location data, along with information from other apps on the device.</p>
<p>Last year, a proposed class action <a href="https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Tiktok.pdf">lawsuit</a> <a href="https://www.cnet.com/news/tiktok-accused-of-secretly-gathering-user-data-and-sending-it-to-china/">filed against</a> TikTok in California claimed the company gathered users’ data, including phone numbers, emails, location, IP addresses, and social network contacts. </p>
<p>The lawsuit also stated TikTok concealed the transfer of data (including biometric data), and continued to harvest it even after the app was closed. This would mean when a user shoots a video and clicks the “next” button, the video could be automatically transferred to servers – without the user’s knowledge. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/tiktok-the-worlds-most-valuable-startup-that-youve-never-heard-of-109302">TikTok: the world’s most valuable startup that you've never heard of</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<h2>Where is the data stored?</h2>
<p>While TikTok’s headquarters are in Beijing, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/technology/tiktok-on-thin-ice-as-parliament-prepares-to-pore-over-app-20200706-p559d9.html">Australian general manager</a> Lee Hunter recently claimed Australian users’ data was stored in Singapore.</p>
<p>A major challenge in sorting the truth from fiction lies in how we define “data”. While TikTok users’ details and videos may be stored in Singapore, there’s still potential for data to be extracted from this video content and the device and sent to China’s servers (although this hasn’t been proven to have happened).</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/huaweis-window-of-opportunity-closes-how-geopolitics-triumphed-over-technology-142158">Huawei's window of opportunity closes: how geopolitics triumphed over technology</a>
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<p>Hypothetically, it would then be possible for Chinese authorities to use <a href="https://theconversation.com/fingerprint-and-face-scanners-arent-as-secure-as-we-think-they-are-112414">biometric data</a> to identify people using facial recognition. It would also be possible to map rooms and locations by using “<a href="https://deepai.org/machine-learning-glossary-and-terms/feature-extraction#:%7E:text=Feature%20extraction%20is%20a%20process,of%20computing%20resources%20to%20process.">feature extraction</a>” (a machine learning method) on videos. </p>
<p>This could then aid the creation of new, advanced <a href="https://theconversation.com/detecting-deepfake-videos-in-the-blink-of-an-eye-101072">deepfake videos</a> potentially targeting specific people. </p>
<p>While this may seem far-fetched, there have already been preemptive TikTok bans within major organisations to ensure sensitive information isn’t leaked. </p>
<p>For instance, the app has been banned from devices used by the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2020-01-16/defence-ban-tiktok-china-security-fears/11869512">Australian Defence Department</a>, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/tiktok-pentagon-military-ban.html">US Department of Defence</a>, and even entire countries – with the <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/29/india-bans-tiktok-dozens-of-other-chinese-apps/">Indian government</a> announcing a nationwide ban last month.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1280372829494501376"}"></div></p>
<h2>Privacy issues</h2>
<p>ByteDance <a href="https://datacenterfrontier.com/growth-of-tiktok-boosts-data-center-appetite-for-bytedance/#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CWe%20store%20all%20TikTok%20US,to%20serve%20the%20Chinese%20market.//">claims</a> its data is stored in servers in the US and Singapore:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our data centers are located entirely outside of China, and none of our data is subject to Chinese law. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>TikTok’s privacy policy is ambiguous. As of January, <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en">it states</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>You should understand that no data storage system or transmission of data over the Internet or any other public network can be guaranteed to be 100% secure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From a user privacy perspective, TikTok has access to a device’s location and a user’s personal information. Although TikTok’s servers may be located outside China, it’s very difficult (if not impossible) to confirm where this data could end up, or what it could be used for. </p>
<p>While the location of servers can be important, possession of data is more relevant. Once data is obtained, it can be used. If data is stored on a server in Australia, for instance, Australian jurisdiction applies. But once it is sent to another country, that country’s laws take precedent. </p>
<p>And if a TikTok user decides to delete their content from their device, or if there is a government-imposed ban, data can’t be retrospectively erased. Once information is transferred, it’s impossible to retract without the cooperation of the organisation or agency concerned (in this case, TikTok).</p>
<h2>Can the government actually ban TikTok?</h2>
<p>The fact is, enforcing an Australia-wide ban on TikTok isn’t a simple prospect. While the federal government <em>could</em> request the app’s removal from the Apple App Store and Google Play Store, it could only do this for Australian regions and marketplaces. </p>
<p>Users in Australia would still be able to download TikTok from another region’s store, or via a third-party source. Also, banning the app <a href="https://www.indiatvnews.com/technology/apps-chinese-apps-banned-will-they-vanish-from-phones-what-happens-next-tells-cyber-expert-630322">won’t automatically remove it</a> from devices on which it is already installed.</p>
<p>Blocking access to TikTok’s servers would be done in conjunction with internet service providers (such as Telstra and Optus), as they can block access to apps and websites. But users could still use proxies or <a href="https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-privacy-what-is-a-vpn.html">Virtual Private Networks</a> (VPNs) to circumvent these controls.</p>
<p>And even if TikTok was banned, citizen data already handed over would remain stored, and could be accessed for the foreseeable future.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/restricting-underage-access-to-porn-and-gambling-sites-a-good-idea-but-technically-tricky-133153">Restricting underage access to porn and gambling sites: a good idea, but technically tricky</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142157/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US is also ‘looking at’ banning the Chinese social media app.Paul Haskell-Dowland, Associate Dean (Computing and Security), Edith Cowan UniversityJames Jin Kang, Lecturer, Computing and Security, Edith Cowan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1370672020-04-24T05:56:26Z2020-04-24T05:56:26ZANU will invigilate exams using remote software, and many students are unhappy<p>The Australian National University (ANU) is facing a backlash from students over the proposed use of a digital platform to invigilate exams remotely. The university <a href="https://www.anu.edu.au/covid-19-advice/learning-remotely/remote-examinations">recently announced plans</a> to use the Proctorio platform to ensure the legitimacy of exams conducted away from campus during the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1252478905069387776"}"></div></p>
<p>Students aren’t happy. A <a href="https://www.facebook.com/No-Proctorio-at-ANU-112247750446698/">Facebook page</a> and a <a href="https://www.change.org/p/australian-national-university-tell-anu-students-say-no-to-proctorio">Change.org petition</a> with more than 3,700 signatures have gained significant media attention. </p>
<p>But the use of technology to solve COVID-19 related challenges has been widespread. So what’s different now?</p>
<h2>What is Proctorio?</h2>
<p>In essence, <a href="https://proctorio.com/">Proctorio</a> is the digital equivalent of the invigilators walking up and down the aisles during student examinations. The software is already used by various institutions around the world, including <a href="https://canvas.harvard.edu/courses/11544/files/2420382/download?verifier=J84eQ3dJ92MuPd5EINg3Sy0rThJ63NmfySF0lO5F&wrap=1">Harvard University</a> and other <a href="https://www.kent.edu/sites/default/files/file/Proctorio_StudentFAQ_Final.pdf">US universities</a>. The University of Queensland has also <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/uq-students-raise-privacy-concerns-over-third-party-exam-platform-20200419-p54l77.html">announced plans</a> to use a similar platform, ProctorU.</p>
<p>To use the Proctorio software, the student taking the exam has to install it on their computer and allow the program to access their camera and microphone. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329991/original/file-20200423-47841-zh66r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329991/original/file-20200423-47841-zh66r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329991/original/file-20200423-47841-zh66r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329991/original/file-20200423-47841-zh66r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329991/original/file-20200423-47841-zh66r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=631&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329991/original/file-20200423-47841-zh66r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=631&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329991/original/file-20200423-47841-zh66r0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=631&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A range of permissions are required by the Proctorio browser extension.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The software is a <a href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/proctorio/fpmapakogndmenjcfoajifaaonnkpkei">browser extension</a> for Google Chrome. Along with camera access, Proctorio requires permission to:</p>
<ul>
<li>access web page content to allow the extension to function correctly</li>
<li>capture the screen to facilitate screen recording</li>
<li>manage other extensions to monitor other tools being used in the browser</li>
<li>display notifications</li>
<li>modify clipboard data to prevent copy-and-paste capability</li>
<li>identify storage devices to allows the extension to “see” system resources and</li>
<li>change privacy settings to allow an external technical support function.</li>
</ul>
<p>While the provider gives <a href="https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/proctorio/fpmapakogndmenjcfoajifaaonnkpkei">reassurance in each category</a> (and there’s no evidence any of it’s untrue), it’s understandable some students are daunted by the extent of permissions requested.</p>
<p>The second part of the system is in the cloud. Data collected on a user’s computer is transmitted to the company’s servers to be analysed. This could include video and audio recordings, as well as images captured of a user’s screen.</p>
<p>In a statement to The Conversation, an ANU spokesperson said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Data will be stored in a secure location in Australia. Only ANU staff who are trained in privacy and the use of Proctorio will have access to this data. These staff members are also responsible to the University’s privacy policy. Data will be deleted once exams are over and course results are finalised.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Facial detection (but not recognition)</h2>
<p>Proctorio claims to use <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-machine-learning-76759">machine learning</a> and <a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/face-detection-for-beginners-e58e8f21aad9">facial detection</a> to identify the likelihood a student is cheating. It’s important to distinguish facial detection from the more controversial technology of facial recognition.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/facial-recognition-is-spreading-faster-than-you-realise-132047">Facial recognition is spreading faster than you realise</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>By <a href="https://proctorio.com/platform/exam-monitoring">observing a student</a> throughout the exam, Proctorio’s system may be able to detect if the student:</p>
<ul>
<li>is looking at a second screen or reading from another source</li>
<li>is copying content</li>
<li>is being prompted by another person</li>
<li>has been replaced with someone else.</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/apr/20/concerns-raised-australian-universities-plan-use-proctorio-proctoru-exam-monitoring-software">Concerns have been raised</a> that the system will monitor keystrokes (typing), potentially compromising students’ personal information.</p>
<p>But an ANU spokeperson told The Conversation that “Proctorio does not monitor what keys are typed – just that keys have been typed”.</p>
<h2>What are the issues being flagged?</h2>
<p>Students may nevertheless feel Proctorio is “spying” on them. Any tool that overtly monitors a user’s behaviour, particularly when downloaded on a personal laptop, merits thorough examination.</p>
<p>ANU has released a <a href="https://www.anu.edu.au/files/guidance/ANU-CyberAdvisory-Proctorio-Guidance_updated.pdf">cyber security advisory statement</a> and <a href="https://www.anu.edu.au/files/guidance/Proctorio_PIA_0.pdf">privacy assessment</a> that aim to address concerns. The key points are:</p>
<ul>
<li>all data is encrypted in transit and storage, and is only available to designated ANU staff. Proctorio has no access to the student data</li>
<li>students may have to show their room to the camera (presumably to verify they are alone)</li>
<li>the system doesn’t record keystrokes or mouse movements</li>
<li>camera, microphone and browser are used to monitor the user. However, the document does make reference to a rather nondescript “other means” of monitoring.</li>
</ul>
<p>In a YouTube video statement, ANU’s Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) Grady Venville reassured students the university’s IT security team had undertaken a thorough assessment of the software, and were “very satisfied” it met ANU’s “rigorous cybersecurity standards”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/hGqklmHhqok?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">ANU Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic) on the use of Proctorio.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is perhaps not entirely reassuring, given the university’s own cyber advisory recognised its “recent security challenges”.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/19-years-of-personal-data-was-stolen-from-anu-it-could-show-up-on-the-dark-web-118265">19 years of personal data was stolen from ANU. It could show up on the dark web</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Can ANU force students to use Proctorio?</h2>
<p>ANU, like any university, is entitled to implement assessment strategies it deems appropriate. Given the current situation, finding alternatives to traditional examinations is essential to adhere to social-distancing measures.</p>
<p>The university is somewhat vague with regards to the specific use of Proctorio. In its <a href="https://www.anu.edu.au/covid-19-advice/learning-remotely/remote-examinations/proctorio-faqs">FAQ</a> it states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Course conveners will determine if your course requires the use of Proctorio for the assessment for your course.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>ANU has confirmed to The Conversation that students have the option to defer the exam instead of using the software. Those without a suitable device can also use a university computer on campus, or enquire about alternative assessments with their convener. An ANU spokesperson also said course conveners “can use a range of other assessment methods” if appropriate.</p>
<p>Some students have asked to be notified before May 8 (the deadline to withdraw from units) if they will be forced to use Proctorio. </p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The legal situation is currently unclear. While ANU may be allowed to force the use of Proctorio for exams conducted on university-owned devices, mandating its use on privately owned devices is less certain.</p>
<p>If students do use Proctorio on their personal devices, they may want reassurance their device will be safe from surveillance when not being used for exams.</p>
<p>Also, while ANU offers the option to defer exams, students may feel pressure to unwillingly use the system simply to avoid a delayed graduation.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australians-accept-government-surveillance-for-now-110789">Australians accept government surveillance, for now</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Haskell-Dowland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Australian National University is turning to digital proctoring to replace the role of a walking invigilator. But who watches the proctor, what are the risks, and what data will be collected?Paul Haskell-Dowland, Associate Dean (Computing and Security), Edith Cowan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1351512020-04-09T12:07:52Z2020-04-09T12:07:52ZDigital surveillance can help bring the coronavirus pandemic under control – but also threatens privacy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326653/original/file-20200408-165795-1w7rhof.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C7951%2C5273&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Digital footprints.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/map-pin-flat-in-new-york-city-scape-and-network-royalty-free-image/1067370998">Prasit photo/Moment via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Apple and Google are <a href="https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/10/21216675/apple-google-covid-coronavirus-contact-tracing-app">collaborating on new technology</a> that will alert smartphone users who have come in sustained contact with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19. Users will need to opt-in to the contract tracing system, which will use Bluetooth technology in both iPhone and Android phones in ways designed to protect privacy. </p>
<p>The plan puts the weight of the two tech giants behind the numerous efforts of universities, public health authorities and nonprofits to develop apps that warn people of potential exposure without building new databases or relying on government collection of location data, as is being done by a number of countries around the world.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1504888">technology, law and security scholar</a> at American University Washington College of Law, I study questions of privacy and surveillance. The pandemic is confronting Americans with important questions about how much and what kinds of surveillance and tracking to accept in support of better health, as well as a revitalized economy.</p>
<h2>Privacy in the balance</h2>
<p>Israel’s top spy agency has been using <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html">secretly collected cellphone data</a> to retrace the movements of those who tested positive for the coronavirus.</p>
<p>The Polish government launched the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/poland-app-coronavirus-patients-mandaotory-selfie-2020-3">“Home Quarantine” app</a> so that people in quarantine can upload geo-located photos proving they’re at home.</p>
<p>The South Korean government is using a combination of mobile phone data, credit card information and facial recognition software <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00740-y">to track the movements of people who test positive</a> for COVID-19. The government posts the details publicly to alert people who might have come in contact with the infected person.</p>
<p>Deaths in the U.S. from the coronavirus are projected to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/us/politics/coronavirus-trump.html">reach six digits</a>, which adds urgency to decisions that have long-term consequences. Should location data be used to identify and warn those in the U.S. who have been exposed to the virus? Data be used to enforce quarantines? Can digital information be used to serve compelling health needs without boosting the reach of the surveillance state?</p>
<p>Already, cellphones, apps and digitally connected devices provide a range of data that can be used to track movements and associations with varying degrees of specificity. Though some of this digital surveillance requires users to opt-in to data collection, a lot is already in the hands of companies that are now using it to predict trends.</p>
<p>A smart thermometer company, for example, is using <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/90479800/this-map-uses-smart-thermometers-to-detect-potential-surges-in-covid-19-cases">real-time temperature data</a> to forecast the next COVID-19 hot spots, something it’s done successfully to predict the seasonal flu. Google already has been compiling data from Google Maps and elsewhere to chart shifts in people’s movement over time in order to help officials determine how well the population is <a href="https://www.blog.google/technology/health/covid-19-community-mobility-reports">engaging in social distancing</a>. Both are examples of population-level analysis, using aggregated data to assess trends in ways that, if designed and implemented properly, can provide important health information while also protecting personal privacy. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326617/original/file-20200408-150164-1579p2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326617/original/file-20200408-150164-1579p2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326617/original/file-20200408-150164-1579p2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326617/original/file-20200408-150164-1579p2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326617/original/file-20200408-150164-1579p2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326617/original/file-20200408-150164-1579p2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326617/original/file-20200408-150164-1579p2l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Data collected by smart thermometer companies can give public health authorities warnings of potential disease outbreaks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flickr.com/photos/bfishadow/13979021167/">Julien G./Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Tracking individuals</h2>
<p>Things get more complicated, however, with the move from aggregated analysis to individual-level tracking. There are, broadly speaking, three key forms of individual tracking being pushed, each raising unique policy and legal considerations. </p>
<p>The first, contact tracing, is used to map the movements of sick individuals in order to warn unsuspecting contacts so they can take appropriate steps to protect themselves and others. The second uses location- and time-stamped photos to monitor compliance with quarantine orders and travel restrictions. The third identifies and tracks those who have tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. This type of tracking – being contemplated in <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/germany-antibodies-tests-general-public-immunity-certificates-1494934">Germany</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/apr/02/no-10-seeks-to-end-covid-19-lockdown-with-immunity-passports">England</a> – could be used to provide immunity passes to allow people who are no longer at risk to return to work or otherwise engage socially. </p>
<p>Several universities, companies, nonprofit organizations and governments are <a href="https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Privacy-Pandemics-The-Role-of-Mobile-Apps.pdf">developing contact tracing apps</a> that identify when someone has been in contact with other people who have tested positive for the disease. Stanford University-based <a href="https://www.covid-watch.org/">COVID Watch</a>, for example, is developing an app that uses Bluetooth technology to map where and when people cross paths, which can then be used to anonymously notify those who have had contact with sick people who have a compatible app. This is an open source, decentralized system, without the need for any government data collection. Singapore’s <a href="https://www.mobihealthnews.com/news/asia-pacific/singapore-government-launches-new-app-contact-tracing-combat-spread-covid-19">TraceTogether app</a> is also an open source system that relies on Bluetooth technology to map associations and issue warnings.</p>
<p>These kinds of decentralized tracking systems are designed to better protect privacy than government-collected or other centrally maintained datasets. But these apps are opt-in, meaning people have to actively choose to use them. As a result, they will only be as effective as they are widespread, something that depends in part on whether users trust the security and other privacy protections built into the system design.</p>
<h2>Check-ins and blood tests</h2>
<p>Other forms of tracking raise both privacy-related and other civil liberties considerations. Quarantine monitoring systems like Poland’s Home Quarantine app or Singapore’s quarantine requirements, coupled with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/03/inside-two-week-quarantine-singapore/?arc404=true">twice daily digital check-ins</a>, raise the specter of Big Brother, achieved via digital monitoring. </p>
<p>In the United States, this kind of monitoring runs up against the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable search and seizure. But the Fourth Amendment is not an absolute. Digital monitoring could be court-ordered in response to someone’s demonstrated failure to abide by criminally enforceable quarantine orders, many of which are now in place. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326611/original/file-20200408-118674-uyosd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326611/original/file-20200408-118674-uyosd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326611/original/file-20200408-118674-uyosd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326611/original/file-20200408-118674-uyosd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326611/original/file-20200408-118674-uyosd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326611/original/file-20200408-118674-uyosd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/326611/original/file-20200408-118674-uyosd3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some people might choose to use their mobile phones to prove they’re abiding by quarantine orders rather than have police officers check up on them.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/78170556@N08/7096860201">28704869/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, the police could be employed to knock on doors and check compliance with quarantine orders – even in the absence of a demonstrated failure to abide by the orders. Individuals could, as a result, presumably consent to digital monitoring as an alternative to daily check-ins by police. Depending on the design, digital check-ins might also be deemed valid under the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment. In such cases, the central question is the validity of the quarantine orders rather than the means of enforcement.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, even the seemingly innocuous tracking of those who test positive for antibodies may not be as innocuous as it seems. If and when such testing becomes reliable and available, it could provide critical, albeit imperfect, assurances on both the individual and community level. But whereas aggregate-level analysis can help determine when it’s appropriate to lift restrictions, individual tracking risks dividing communities into groups of “clean” and “dirty,” with privileges doled out according to status. </p>
<h2>Principles for protecting privacy</h2>
<p>As society works through these difficult issues, a few key principles should guide decision-making.</p>
<p>First, design matters. Tracking systems should, to the extent possible, be open source, decentralized and designed in a way to share the key health data without gathering or revealing the movements and contacts of those involved. The best contract tracing apps do just that, incorporating key principles of <a href="https://iapp.org/resources/article/privacy-by-design-the-7-foundational-principles/">privacy by design</a> and back-end limitations on things like who can access the data and to whom it can be disseminated. Importantly, data should not be retained any longer than it is needed. </p>
<p>Second, whatever system is put in place, whether privately developed or government-mandated, it should be carefully tailored to serve a specified and compelling health need. </p>
<p>Third, any claims that governments need new authority should be examined carefully and warily, particularly given the trove of data already available. If adopted, any new authority should be explicitly time limited, with clear and constrained criteria for extending the time limits.</p>
<p>When the last massive pandemic hit a century ago, the population did not walk around with tracking devices. Now we all do. This is data that can both protect people and confine them. It should be used to save lives but in ways that also protect core freedoms.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of an article originally published on April 9, 2020.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Daskal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cellphone data can show who coronavirus patients interacted with, which can help isolate infected people before they feel ill. But how digital contact tracing is implemented matters.Jennifer Daskal, Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Technology, Law & Security Program, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1221372019-08-21T13:47:19Z2019-08-21T13:47:19ZFacial recognition: ten reasons you should be worried about the technology<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288912/original/file-20190821-170922-16dr2bh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-portrait-attractive-african-woman-facial-1160287945?src=j2YHKqXCPj1yiGwR-nCHbw-1-44">Karelnoppe/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Facial recognition technology is spreading fast. Already <a href="https://fortune.com/2018/10/28/in-china-facial-recognition-tech-is-watching-you/">widespread in China</a>, software that identifies people by comparing images of their faces against a database of records is now being adopted across much of the rest of the world. It’s common among <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-facial-recognition-became-routine-policing-tool-america-n1004251">police forces</a> but has also been used at <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/when-your-face-is-your-boarding-pass-you-are-holidaying-with-big-brother-1.3949353">airports</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49357759">railway stations</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-49369772">shopping centres</a>.</p>
<p>The rapid growth of this technology has triggered a much-needed debate. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/may/21/office-worker-launches-uks-first-police-facial-recognition-legal-action">Activists</a>, <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/19/20812032/bernie-sanders-facial-recognition-police-ban-surveillance-reform">politicians</a>, <a href="https://www.essex.ac.uk/news/2019/07/03/met-police-live-facial-recognition-trial-concerns">academics</a> and even <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/17/police-halt-trials-face-recognition-systems-surveillance-technology">police forces</a> are expressing serious concerns over the impact facial recognition could have on a political culture based on rights and democracy. </p>
<h2>Human rights concerns</h2>
<p>As someone who researches the future of human rights, I share these concerns. Here are ten reasons why we should worry about the use of facial recognition technology in public spaces.</p>
<p><strong>1) It puts us on a path towards automated blanket surveillance</strong></p>
<p>CCTV is already widespread around the world, but for governments to use footage against you they have to find specific clips of you doing something they can claim as evidence. Facial recognition technology brings monitoring to new levels. It enables the automated and indiscriminate live surveillance of people as they go about their daily business, giving authorities the chance to track your every move.</p>
<p><strong>2) It operates without a clear legal or regulatory framework</strong></p>
<p>Most countries have no specific legislation that regulates the use of facial recognition technology, although <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/science-and-technology-committee/news-parliament-2017/biometrics-strategy-report-publication-17-19">some lawmakers</a> are <a href="https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/8/9/20799022/facial-recognition-law">trying to change</a> this. This legal limbo opens the door to abuse, such as obtaining our images without our <a href="https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/news/press-releases-and-statements/liberty-client-takes-police-ground-breaking-facial-recognition">knowledge or consent</a> and using them in ways we would not approve of.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288915/original/file-20190821-170906-fc2pe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288915/original/file-20190821-170906-fc2pe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288915/original/file-20190821-170906-fc2pe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288915/original/file-20190821-170906-fc2pe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288915/original/file-20190821-170906-fc2pe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288915/original/file-20190821-170906-fc2pe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288915/original/file-20190821-170906-fc2pe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Authorities don’t need to capture everyone’s image to ensure law and order.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/young-woman-picked-out-by-face-1437798524?src=6fixjEhTOV1qTepLhvHttA-1-11">Axel Buerckert/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>3) It violates the principles of necessity and proportionality</strong></p>
<p>A commonly stated human rights principle, recognised by organisations <a href="https://www.article19.org/resources/un-resolution-affirms-surveillance-that-is-not-necessary-or-proportionate-is-against-the-right-to-privacy/">from the UN</a> to the <a href="http://www.policingethicspanel.london/uploads/4/4/0/7/44076193/lfr_final_report_-_may_2019.pdf">London Policing Ethics Panel</a>, is that surveillance should be necessary and proportionate. This means surveillance should be restricted to the pursuit of serious crime instead of enabling the unjustified interference into our liberty and fundamental rights. Facial recognition technology is at odds with these principles. It is a technology of control that is symptomatic of the state’s mistrust of its citizens.</p>
<p><strong>4) It violates our right to privacy</strong></p>
<p>The right to privacy matters, even in public spaces. It protects the expression of our identity without uncalled-for intrusion from the state or from private companies. Facial recognition technology’s indiscriminate and large-scale recording, storing and analysing of our images <a href="https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/08/statement-live-facial-recognition-technology-in-kings-cross">undermines this right</a> because it means we can no longer do anything in public without the state knowing about it.</p>
<p><strong>5) It has a chilling effect on our democratic political culture</strong></p>
<p>Blanket surveillance can deter individuals from attending public events. It can stifle participation in political protests and campaigns for change. And it can discourage nonconformist behaviour. This chilling effect is a serious infringement on the right to freedom of assembly, association, and expression.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/surveillance-cameras-will-soon-be-unrecognisable-time-for-an-urgent-public-conversation-118931">Surveillance cameras will soon be unrecognisable – time for an urgent public conversation</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p><strong>6) It denies citizens the opportunity for consent</strong></p>
<p>There is a lack of detailed and specific information as to how facial recognition is actually used. This means that we are not given the opportunity <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/federal-court-sounds-alarm-privacy-harms-face">to consent</a> to the recording, analysing and storing of our images in databases. By denying us the opportunity to <a href="https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/why-is-consent-important/">consent</a>, we are denied choice and control over the use of our own images.</p>
<p><strong>7) It is often inaccurate</strong></p>
<p>Facial recognition technology promises accurate identification. But <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28">numerous studies</a> have highlighted how the algorithms trained on racially biased data sets misidentify people of colour, especially women of colour. Such <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-recognize-black-faces-equally/">algorithmic bias</a> is particularly worrying if it results in unlawful arrests, or if it leads public agencies and private companies to discriminate against women and people from minority ethnic backgrounds.</p>
<p><strong>8) It can lead to automation bias</strong></p>
<p>If the people using facial recognition software mistakenly believe that the technology is infallible, it can lead to <a href="https://theconversation.com/automation-can-leave-us-complacent-and-that-can-have-dangerous-consequences-62429">bad decisions</a>. This “<a href="https://thewire.in/tech/india-is-falling-down-the-facial-recognition-rabbit-hole">automation bias</a>” must be avoided. Machine-generated outcomes should not determine how state agencies or private corporations treat individuals. Trained human operators must exercise meaningful control and take decisions based in law.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288919/original/file-20190821-170914-kl4m2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288919/original/file-20190821-170914-kl4m2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288919/original/file-20190821-170914-kl4m2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288919/original/file-20190821-170914-kl4m2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288919/original/file-20190821-170914-kl4m2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288919/original/file-20190821-170914-kl4m2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288919/original/file-20190821-170914-kl4m2i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Human operators can rely too much on machines.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/security-control-room-officer-monitors-multiple-771480619?src=-1-0">Gorodenkoff</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>9) It implies there are secret government watchlists</strong></p>
<p>The databases that contain our facial images should ring alarm bells. They imply that private companies and law enforcement agencies are sharing our images to build watchlists of potential suspects without our knowledge or consent. This is a serious threat to our individual rights and civil liberties. The security of these databases, and their vulnerability to the actions of hackers, is also cause for concern.</p>
<p><strong>10) It can be used to target already vulnerable groups</strong></p>
<p>Facial recognition technology can be used for blanket surveillance. But it can also be deployed selectively, for example to identify migrants and refugees. The <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7x59z9/the-facial-recognition-system-amazon-sells-to-cops-can-now-detect-fear">sale of facial recognition software</a> to agencies such as the controversial US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which has been <a href="https://psmag.com/social-justice/abolish-ice">heavily criticised</a> for its tactics in dealing with migrants, should worry anyone who cares for human rights. And the use of handheld mobile devices with a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-49261763">facial recognition app</a> by police forces raises the spectre of enhanced <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/face-recognition-tech/2016/10/17/986929ea-41f0-44a2-b2b9-90b495230dce_story.html">racial profiling</a> at the street level.</p>
<h2>Debate sorely needed</h2>
<p>With so many concerns about facial recognition technology, we desperately need a more prominent conversation on its impact on our rights and civil liberties. Without proper regulation of these systems, we risk creating dystopian police states in what were once free, democratic countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122137/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Birgit Schippers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Surveillance software that identifies people from CCTV is eroding human rights and democracy.Birgit Schippers, Visiting Research Fellow, Senator George J Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/836052017-09-07T14:43:16Z2017-09-07T14:43:16ZLeaked emails: Ramaphosa’s hypocrisy on spying by the South African state<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185057/original/file-20170907-8341-1gjep07.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa claims the country's security agencies hacked his emails.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the run up to the election of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/content/54th-national-conference">next president</a> of South Africa’s governing ANC in December, unknown entities are clearly working hard to discredit candidates who have spoken out against <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-runs-deeper-than-state-capture-78784">state capture</a>.</p>
<p>The latest dirty tricks have targeted Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, who recently <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ramaphosa-launches-campaign-with-attack-on-zuma-guptas-20170423">condemned</a> the capture of the South African state, allegedly by <a href="http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">business interests linked to</a> President Jacob Zuma. Someone has <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/news/ramaphosa-in-womanising-e-mail-shock-11056138">leaked</a> Ramaphosa’s emails from his private Gmail accounts, suggesting that he was having multiple affairs, despite being married.</p>
<p>Ramaphosa has claimed that the fingerprints of the state intelligence services are all over the leaks. He has also <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017-09-02-intelligence-resources-hacked-my-email-ramaphosa/">located</a> the smear attempt within</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…a broader campaign that has targeted several political leaders‚ trade unionists‚ journalists and civil society activists.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>How much credibility do his claims have? Those responsible could be private actors with no links to the spy agencies. But, no one should be surprised if his allegations of state spying turn out to be correct. </p>
<p>After all, in 2005, state spy agencies were <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08baae5274a31e0000cc8/ReviewComm.Sept08.pdf">abused</a> in the bruising succession battle between then President Thabo Mbeki and his rival for the ANC presidency, Jacob Zuma. That behaviour seems to have been sustained.</p>
<p>There are systemic weaknesses in how the state intelligence services are regulated that predispose them to abuse. As a senior member of government, Ramaphosa must take political responsibility for keeping silent about these problems until now.</p>
<h2>Eavesdropping in South Africa</h2>
<p>It’s quite possible that Ramaphosa’s Gmail accounts were hacked. An intrusive piece of hacking software like <a href="http://www.zdnet.com/article/adelaides-accumulus-launches-b-one-hub-smart-home-play/">Finfisher</a> could do the trick. Finfisher is a weapons grade intrusion tool sold exclusively to governments. It is particularly useful for monitoring security conscious and mobile targets who make extensive use of encryption.</p>
<p>The tool allows its operator to take control of a target’s computer as soon as it is connected to the internet. Once the operator does so, it can turn on web cameras and microphones for surveillance purposes, and exfiltrate -withdraw- data from the target’s computer, such as emails.</p>
<p>By 2014, South Africa was the <a href="https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles4/customers.html">third largest named user</a> of Finfisher, after Slovakia and Estonia. </p>
<p>In 2015, the University of Toronto’s <a href="https://www.citizenlab.co/">Citizenlab</a> detected a Finfisher command-and-control server in South Africa. The discovery strongly suggested that the South African government continued to be a Finfisher user.</p>
<p>Leaked <a href="https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/">emails</a> from Finfisher’s competitor, the Italian-based Hacking Team, also provided evidence that South African government departments were in the market for hacking tools. And South Africa has a <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/mail-guardian/20151218/281625304257040">reputation</a> in international intelligence circles for targeting individuals (like journalists, activists and academics) through hacking, rather than engaging in <a href="https://probonomatters.co.za/online-privacy-guide-for-journalists-2017/">mass surveillance</a> of the kind practised by the US and the UK. Tools like Finfisher come in handy.</p>
<h2>Safeguards against abuse</h2>
<p>In spite of their invasiveness, hacking tools are under regulated in South Africa.</p>
<p>There are two communication interception centres in the State Security Agency that the general public knows about. The first is the <a href="http://www.oic.gov.za/">Office for Interception Centres</a>, which handles targeted interceptions approved by a special judge. It is inwardly focused, and provides services to national crime fighting agencies.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185069/original/file-20170907-10812-16j7d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/185069/original/file-20170907-10812-16j7d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185069/original/file-20170907-10812-16j7d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185069/original/file-20170907-10812-16j7d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185069/original/file-20170907-10812-16j7d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185069/original/file-20170907-10812-16j7d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/185069/original/file-20170907-10812-16j7d4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock</span></span>
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<p>The second is the <a href="http://www.mediaanddemocracy.com/uploads/1/6/5/7/16577624/comms-surveillance-nia-swart_feb2016.pdf">National Communications Centres</a>, which monitors the electronic communication. This centre is externally focused. It collects foreign signals intelligence.</p>
<p>While the Office for Interception Centres is established in terms of the <a href="http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/num_act/roiocapocia2002943.pdf">Regulation of Interception of Communications</a> and Provision of Communication Related Information Act <a href="http://www.internet.org.za/ricpci.html">(Rica)</a>, the National Communications Centres has no explicit founding legislation, and no known rules that govern its activities. This is why the current <a href="http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2017-04-20-amab-challenges-snooping-law">court challenge</a> is significant.</p>
<p>In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights <a href="https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup16/Batch%201/WEBER%20AND%20SARAVIA%20v.%20GERMANY.pdf">identified</a> six safeguards for strategic intelligence gathering, to limit the potential for abuses. </p>
<p>It says the law needs to:</p>
<ul>
<li>Spell out the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order.</li>
<li>Provide a definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped.</li>
<li>Limit on the duration of tapping.</li>
<li>Set out the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained</li>
<li>List precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties. </li>
<li>Spell out the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed. </li>
</ul>
<p>South Africa’s laws fail these tests dismally.</p>
<p>There are also no known rules governing the State Security Agency’s use of selectors - the search terms used to process raw communications data - for analysing mass communication. This could lead to abuse. </p>
<h2>Spying on political dissent</h2>
<p>The problem of under regulation does not end with the National Communications Centre. As the country’s civilian intelligence agency, the State Security Agency is meant to develop high level strategic intelligence to inform the Cabinet in deciding on the nation’s most urgent national intelligence priorities.</p>
<p>But, a State Security Agency <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1672699-organogram-of-south-africa-state-security-agency.html">organogram</a> leaked to Al Jazeera points to the existence of an operational entity in the domestic intelligence section called the Special Operations Unit. Little is known about its exact mandate.</p>
<p>The Sunday newspaper, City Press has <a href="http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Sex-Sars-and-rogue-spies-20150429">linked</a> this unit to a number of dirty tricks. These include smearing top civil servants, and forming a rival trade union to the Association for Mineworkers and Construction Union in the platinum belt, as well as spying.</p>
<p>And, a recent <a href="https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/1031">investigation</a> by Privacy International exposed a revolving door between the intelligence agencies, the mining industry, and private security companies in the communications surveillance sector. In other words, not only are the state spy agencies underregulated; private sector ones are too.</p>
<p>So the available evidence points to the State Security Agency’s political and economic intelligence focus being used to legitimise government spying on perceived political critics, and protect the exploitative business practices of mining companies.</p>
<h2>Ramaphosa double standards</h2>
<p>In 2013, Parliament <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/15616/">narrowed</a> the definition of what constitutes a national security threat to exclude legitimate political activities. Be that as it may, it has not done enough to address the weaknesses that created space for the 2005 spying abuses to occur.</p>
<p>Complaints from <a href="http://www.r2k.org.za/2016/05/05/6594/">journalists</a> and <a href="http://bigbrother.r2k.org.za/">activists</a> about illegitimate spying by the state have been piling up for several years. As the Deputy President, Ramaphosa would have been aware of these complaints. Yet, as a shareholder and non-executive director of Lonmin, Ramaphosa would have benefited from the spy agencies’ interference in labour struggles in the platinum belt.</p>
<p>He has not spoken out about the under regulation of the spy agencies until now. Ramaphosa must take political responsibility for the utter mess that grips the state spy agencies.</p>
<p>Undoubtedly, spying on political elites threatens democracy, but it is self-serving of Ramaphosa to complain only when he himself becomes the target. Political leaders who are vying for the highest office in the land really need to be more principled.</p>
<p><em>The author is completing a book manuscript entitled ‘Stopping the spies: constructing and resisting the surveillance state in South Africa’ (forthcoming with Wits University Press in 2018)</em>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83605/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the Open Society Foundation for South Africa. She is a member of the secrecy and securitisation sub-committee of the Right 2 Know Campaign, and a project leader of the Media Policy and Democracy Project.</span></em></p>It would be no surprise if Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa’s claims of the state spying on him turn out to be true. After all, state spy agencies have been abused before in ANC factional battles.Jane Duncan, Professor in the Department of Journalism, Film and Television, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/765802017-04-26T01:59:40Z2017-04-26T01:59:40ZBackyard skinny-dippers lack effective laws to keep peeping drones at bay<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166713/original/file-20170425-13386-rss3v7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">New technologies make it easier than ever for peeping Toms – and the law isn't much help to stop them.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SFW_Depiction_of_Nude_Bathing.jpg">Gisele Porcaro/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent advances in technology mean we can no longer rely on fences or barriers around our homes to protect our privacy. This was certainly the case for Darwin resident Karli Hyatt, who on Tuesday explained to the ABC’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/regulating-eyes-in-the-sky/8466636">Law Report</a> how a drone invaded the security and privacy of her suburban backyard.</p>
<p>Hyatt had returned home last week from an evening gym session, undressed and jumped into her secluded backyard pool. She thought she was “skinny-dipping” in private. Within minutes, though, a small camera-mounted quadcopter drone was hovering close overhead. Hyatt is certain it was watching her, although there was no operator to be seen. </p>
<p>She describes the experience as initially shocking and has ongoing concerns about who might have been flying the drone and why. The result is an erosion of trust and cohesion in her neighbourhood and a feeling of insecurity in her own home. You can listen to the ABC interview <a href="https://radio.abc.net.au/programitem/pgW6zemDyG?play=true">here</a>.</p>
<h2>What laws might apply to this case?</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166717/original/file-20170425-13411-1u4p9dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166717/original/file-20170425-13411-1u4p9dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166717/original/file-20170425-13411-1u4p9dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166717/original/file-20170425-13411-1u4p9dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166717/original/file-20170425-13411-1u4p9dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166717/original/file-20170425-13411-1u4p9dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166717/original/file-20170425-13411-1u4p9dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166717/original/file-20170425-13411-1u4p9dz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A camera-mounted drone quadcopter can now be bought and flown without a licence in Australia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81:Spying_quadcopter.jpg">succo/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-relaxed-drone-regulations-will-help-the-industry-take-off-57201">relaxed rules on privately operated drones</a> last year, <a href="https://theconversation.com/got-a-drone-for-christmas-know-the-law-before-taking-to-the-skies-70341">although some restrictions remain</a>. However, flying a drone over private property isn’t illegal under CASA rules, nor is filming someone from it. Aircraft are generally permitted overflight of properties; otherwise they could fly only over public land. </p>
<p>In fact, most Australian states have barred home owners from suing aircraft operators for causing “nuisance” by overflight. </p>
<p>Although the Northern Territory is one of the few exceptions, the courts are still resistant to claims of nuisance against aircraft without proof of persistent and continuing interference with the property. One or two overflights (even on the same day) are unlikely to be enough to establish this.</p>
<p>Unlike its common-law cousins, <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-drone-rules-with-more-eyes-in-the-sky-expect-less-privacy-66202">Australia lacks a tort of privacy</a>. This is based on the conventional view that it would effectively prohibit people looking over each other’s fences. If you don’t like that happening – the old reasoning goes – you should build a higher fence. </p>
<p>Although most common-law countries have moved past this view, Australia hasn’t. This means Karli Hyatt couldn’t sue the drone operator (if she could find them) for a breach of privacy. </p>
<p>What all Australian jurisdictions have criminalised is harassment and stalking, however conducted. But these laws generally require a “pattern of behaviour”. </p>
<p>In the NT, for instance, it would have to be proved that the activity involved intentionally watching Hyatt “<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/num_act/dafva200734o2007300/s7.html">on at least two separate occasions</a>” with the “intention of causing harm” to her or causing her to “fear harm”. Given she doesn’t know who was flying the drone or why, this will be hard to prove. </p>
<p>That said, this case does appear to involve a breach of the relaxed CASA flight rules; the drone was being flown at night, within 30 metres of her and out of sight of the operator. But because she doesn’t know who was flying the drone she can’t identify someone to report to CASA.</p>
<p>If it happens again she can’t prove it is the same drone – as would be needed to apply nuisance, harassment and stalking laws – nor the intentions of the operator. </p>
<p>One of the reasons drone rules were relaxed is that CASA simply cannot monitor every privately operated drone. CASA also insists it cannot be responsible for <a href="https://www.casa.gov.au/aircraft/landing-page/flying-drones-australia">policing privacy breaches</a> by drones. But there isn’t another agency that can effectively do this. </p>
<p>With no regulatory agency, no tort of privacy, (nearly) no nuisance and inapplicable harassment and stalking laws, there isn’t much law when it comes to peeping Toms using drones around our homes and private spaces.</p>
<h2>Technology has left law behind</h2>
<p>Critics of increased protections against “privacy-invasive technologies” such as drones argue that we are already subject to surveillance by CCTV and satellites. They also point out that neighbouring properties often overlook modern dwellings.</p>
<p>In those situations, however, the person being observed is put on reasonable notice or can easily identify the observer. We can build a higher fence, plant a hedge, or install a blind. If someone has filmed us from a neighbouring apartment, the footage will likely reveal who was doing it or from where. If we are accidentally recorded on Google Earth, there is a single company to negotiate with or put pressure on. </p>
<p>However, technologies like drones really do seem to change the privacy landscape. The sheer number of them, their mobile nature and the inability to identify who is operating them limit our ability to protect ourselves from prying eyes. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/1WqbICyAd60?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Off-the-shelf drones allow users to fly around neighbourhoods filming in high resolution.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As Karli Hyatt’s case shows, simply expecting home owners to build higher fences is no longer really applicable, so it might be time for the law to step in. </p>
<h2>What can be done to protect privacy?</h2>
<p>In 2014, a Commonwealth parliamentary committee delivered a report, <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House/Social_Policy_and_Legal_Affairs/Drones/Report">Eyes in the Sky</a>. It recommended reforming laws on harassment and stalking and introducing a tort of privacy for unreasonable interference into private spaces – as did the <a href="http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/serious-invasions-privacy-dp-80">Australian Law Reform Commission</a> the same year. Yet such rules depend on proving who was operating the drone in the first place. </p>
<p>Commercial operators must notify CASA of their intention to fly a drone. Untrained non-commercial operators do not, which means there is no record of who is flying drones and where. </p>
<p>Almost all off-the-shelf drones contain GPS and flight recorders. One technical/legal solution might be to require that they also be fitted with a mobile SIM card (just as your tablet can have a cloned SIM card from your mobile). Flight data would then be automatically uploaded to the cloud-based government database whenever the drone was within reach of a mobile network. </p>
<p>Tampering with the recorder would be illegal. This would allow CASA, the police or private citizens to establish who was flying a drone. </p>
<p>While there might be some technical or logistical obstacles, and some infrastructure costs for government, this proposal would not overwhelm CASA with the burden of directly regulating the increasing number of drones. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/OHyjtVvGekM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Drones have many positive uses, such as firefighting. (Note: this video is from before the relaxing of drone rules.)</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most drone owners act in good faith and respect others, but a few rogue ones misusing the technology may turn the public tide. Drones have many socially positive uses, but spying on people in their own homes is not one of them. The law needs to help residents protect themselves against such invasions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76580/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Gogarty does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A surprise intrusion by a drone on a Darwin woman skinny-dipping in her secluded backyard pool highlights the many weaknesses of current privacy and stalking laws.Brendan Gogarty, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/572232016-04-06T00:30:02Z2016-04-06T00:30:02ZBenefits of the census retaining names and addresses should outweigh privacy fears<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/117432/original/image-20160405-13542-1vlr6y1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The ABS has announced that it will retain the names and addresses collected in the 2016 Census.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Dean Lewins</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Former Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) head Bill McLennan renewed the debate over privacy, data linkage and the census when he recently <a href="http://www.afr.com/news/economy/abs-slammed-for-breach-of-trust-over-intrusive-2016-census-data-matching-plan-20160309-gnebci">spoke of</a> the major risks involved in retaining names and addresses from the 2016 Census.</p>
<p>McLennan, and the Australian Privacy Foundation, rightly raised privacy concerns about retaining names and addresses on census records for the purpose of linking future census data. However, they ignored the approach’s significant benefits. </p>
<h2>The debate’s missing context</h2>
<p>The ABS <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/D3310114.nsf/home/Retention+of+names+and+addresses+collected">announced</a> late last year that it will retain the names and addresses collected in the 2016 Census.</p>
<p>Australians don’t know what will happen to their stored information in the future. And any serious uncertainty among the public may reduce the quality of the information collected in the census.</p>
<p>These are both legitimate concerns. We should be very careful about changes to the census that will reduce the data quality. But those who profess to be concerned about this also have a responsibility to not disseminate misleading information. They must tell both sides of the story, including what the retention of names and addresses will help achieve.</p>
<p>The Australian Financial Review article in which McLennan was quoted compares the census’ collection of names and addresses with the 50% of Australians who voluntarily opt in to having their details kept with the National Archives for 100 years. This comparison is misleading, as that information will eventually be released to the public.</p>
<p>The names and addresses that are to be kept from the 2016 Census will not be stored with any other census information. The ABS has no intention and is legislatively forbidden from releasing name and address information publicly or to other areas of government. Arguments about what future governments might do is not helpful for current decisions. </p>
<p>Even if you wanted to, it is not possible to identify an individual from census data. That is how it should be.</p>
<p>There are far easier ways to find out information about someone than using the census. This fact is missing from the debate: the world has changed since the ABS last discussed retaining names and addresses more than a decade ago. There was no Facebook or Twitter. We didn’t all have loyalty cards in our wallets with names and addresses attached, as well as purchasing behaviour. </p>
<p>This doesn’t mean that we should be complacent about government data. However, attitudes change through time. The ABS has made it clear that it has taken that on board.</p>
<h2>Benefits of retaining information</h2>
<p>The discussion has also missed the considerable benefit of names and addresses being retained in a safe and secure way. By linking censuses through time or by combining other information with the census, many more important policy questions can be answered than if we used one dataset alone. </p>
<p>For example:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Linking census data to health or mortality data means it is possible to test whether migrants to Australia arrive with better or worse health than the native-born population, and whether this changes through time. This is vital to understanding the economic cost of Australia’s immigration policies.</p></li>
<li><p>Linking census data to social security data can better identify which individuals are likely to remain on welfare over the long term, as well as the intergenerational effect of welfare dependence. This is a large determinant of the social security system’s future cost.</p></li>
<li><p>Linking two or more censuses provides a longitudinal database on population groups that are not easily collectable in standard surveys. This also reduces the burden on these groups to provide the same set of information again and again. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Treading carefully</h2>
<p>These are but a few examples of how linked census data can support better policy design. </p>
<p>Some of these questions could be answered without using names and addresses for linking, or by keeping names and addresses for a short time. However, that data’s quality would be significantly impaired and the conclusions drawn from it much less certain.</p>
<p>All Australians need to be concerned about how their information is being used. Researchers and government statisticians need to be particularly careful. The onus is definitely on the ABS to argue methodically why the changes to the 2016 Census are necessary and of significant public benefit.</p>
<p>However, those who use the census’ sanctity as an argument against making changes also have an obligation to note the costs of throwing away information that, used with care, can significantly improve policymaking.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The authors’ disclosure statements have been updated since publication.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57223/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Biddle worked in the Methodology Division of the Australian Bureau of Statistics between 2001 and 2007. He has no ongoing employment or financial links with the Australian Bureau of Statistics, but is a user of publicly available ABS survey data.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Phillips was previously employed by the ABS but his role there was not related to the census.</span></em></p>By linking censuses through time or by combining other information with the census, many more important policy questions can be answered than if we used one dataset alone.Nicholas Biddle, Fellow, Australian National UniversityBen Phillips, Principal Research Fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/519062015-12-08T23:37:05Z2015-12-08T23:37:05ZAs Victoria opens sperm donor records, the key question is: do contact vetoes work?<p>Victoria’s parliament is on Wednesday debating the controversial <a href="http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/static/www.legislation.vic.gov.au-bills.html">Assisted Reproductive Treatment Amendment Bill</a>. The government <a href="http://hansard.parliament.vic.gov.au/search/?LDMS=Y&IW_FIELD_ADVANCE_PHRASE=be+now+read+a+second+time&IW_FIELD_IN_SpeechTitle=Assisted+Reproductive+Treatment+Amendment+Bill+2015&IW_FIELD_IN_HOUSENAME=ASSEMBLY&IW_FIELD_IN_ACTIVITYTYPE=Second+Reading&IW_FIELD_IN_SittingYear=2015&IW_DATABASE=*">intends</a> that its legislation, if passed, will retrospectively open Victoria’s sperm donor records so all donor-conceived people can obtain the name and date of birth of their donor, regardless of the donor’s consent. Victoria will become the first jurisdiction in the world to take such drastic action on such a large scale.</p>
<p>In recent weeks, donors have <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/wealthy-sperm-donor-fears-contact-from-more-than-two-dozen-offspring-20150903-gjefke.html">expressed anger</a> about the <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/good-weekend/when-spermdonor-children-come-calling-20150902-gjd76r.html">implications</a> of the legislation, arguing that it is an <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/andrews-to-overhaul-laws-guaranteeing-sperm-donor-anonymity-20151120-gl4h0l.html">invasion of their privacy</a>. </p>
<p>In response to such concerns, the bill includes the option of lodging a “contact preference”. This will enable a donor or donor-conceived person to veto contact or prescribe the type of contact with which they are comfortable. But do contact vetoes work?</p>
<h2>What will the new law do?</h2>
<p>The proposed law eliminates the existing requirement that someone who donated sperm prior to 1998, when anonymity was still permitted, must give his consent before his identifying information can be released. Any concerns about the privacy rights of donors created by the removal of consent are to be managed through the use of contact preferences.</p>
<p>A donor or donor-conceived person will have four months after an application is made to decide whether or not to lodge a contact preference. If a preference is lodged, the applicant will be required to sign an undertaking that they will comply with its conditions. If an applicant refuses to sign, information will not be provided. </p>
<p>Breaches of a contact preference will be a criminal offence. The penalty will be a a fine of up to 50 penalty units (about A$7583).</p>
<p>If a donor cannot be located within three months of an application being filed, the applicant will be given the donor’s identifying information. However, the applicant must sign an undertaking that if the donor is located, contact will not be made.</p>
<h2>Do contact vetoes work?</h2>
<p>Whether contact vetoes can protect the privacy rights of donors and donor-conceived people can be assessed by looking to the adoption context. Several Australian states and <a href="https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/adoption.pdf">overseas jurisdictions</a> have introduced laws over the past 20 years retrospectively opening adoption records. Many of those laws include the <a href="https://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Resources/Reports-and-Submissions/Reports-and-Submissions-Summary/?id=214">option of contact vetoes</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10926750802163188">Research</a> from Australia, the UK and the US on the use of contact vetoes in adoption law indicates that they are rarely breached. For example, a review of the first 12 months of the NSW adoption disclosure system found that compliance with contact vetoes was “remarkably high”, with <a href="http://www.lawreform.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/report_69.pdf">only one breach</a> reported. Concerns about parties breaching contact vetoes are thus largely unfounded.</p>
<p>While contact vetoes are typically respected, the NSW review indicated that breaches were not the only criterion by which participants judged the success of the system. The process of lodging the veto was also important.</p>
<p>For example, it was reported that department officials administering the veto system made some adoptees and birth parents feel uncomfortable about lodging a veto. Officials were described as critical of those who sought to put a veto in place. They were also accused of pressuring applicants to attach a message or photo to the veto.</p>
<p>Those who lodged vetoes also objected to having to do so in person. They felt this gave department officials an opportunity to pressure them to not lodge the veto. Others noted that ill-health or lack of mobility made it difficult to lodge a veto in person.</p>
<h2>How should the contact veto system work?</h2>
<p>While concerns that contact vetoes will be breached appear to be largely unfounded, the system must be administered neutrally if the privacy interests of donors and donor-conceived people are to be fully protected. This can be achieved in a number of ways.</p>
<p>First, the counselling that both donors and offspring have to attend if they are the subject of an application must be neutral on the question of contact vetoes. Counselling cannot be used as an opportunity to dissuade participants from lodging vetoes.</p>
<p>Second, those administering the system must refrain from discussing applicants’ decisions with them. Any suggestion that an applicant should change his or her mind or provide photos or other information should be understood as wholly inappropriate.</p>
<p>Finally, it should be possible to lodge a contact veto online or via mail, and the process should be free.</p>
<p>The privacy concerns of donors and donor-conceived people can likely be met by the Assisted Reproduction Treatment Amendment Bill provided the contact veto system is adequately managed. The process must be simple and free of coercion. </p>
<p>A system that lacks these attributes runs the risk of intruding on the privacy of donors and donor-conceived people who do not wish to participate in the new regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In a world first, Victoria plans to retrospectively open the records of formerly anonymous sperm donors to all donor-conceived people. A system of contact vetoes aims to manage the privacy concerns.Fiona Kelly, Associate Professor, Law School, La Trobe UniversityDeborah Dempsey, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Swinburne University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/383052015-03-10T02:01:02Z2015-03-10T02:01:02ZCCTV and security guards in schools: protective or invasive?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/74020/original/image-20150306-3295-mcpgn2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Do security cameras work to protect school kids?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/plashingvole/6116834369">Flickr/Plashing vole</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="http://www.news.com.au/national/schools-will-receive-funding-for-security-to-prevent-a-terror-attack/story-fncynjr2-1227244791856">Abbott government has announced</a> 54 schools around Australia will receive funding for security guards and CCTV cameras in an attempt to prevent possible terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>Recently, in his <a href="http://www.news.com.au/national/nsw-act/prime-minister-tony-abbotts-national-security-address-in-full/story-fnii5s3x-1227235192303">national security address</a>, Prime Minister Tony Abbott said his government would “never underestimate” the threat. He said his government would:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>make the difficult decisions that must be taken to keep you and your family safe. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The funding for this surveillance in schools was released in conjunction with a concerted anti-terrorism effort that included the cancellation of welfare payments and revoking the passports of citizens assessed to be a threat. </p>
<p>When Justice Minister Michael Keenan <a href="http://www.ministerjustice.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2015/Firstquarter2015/2-March-2015-Keeping-at-risk-schools-safe.aspx">made the announcement</a> that certain schools would have these measure put in place, he said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>All our children have the right to be educated in a safe and secure setting. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What are the consequences of having these cameras in schools?</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Surveillance-Schools-Discipline-Contemporary-Prevention/dp/1137308850">Research suggests</a> that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>surveillance in schools can undermine privacy, erode trust, have a chilling effect on creativity and interaction, criminalise students and, in the most extreme cases, facilitate a direct and expedited channel from the school to prison.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The use of CCTV cameras in the UK <a href="http://iospress.metapress.com/content/c3x4630112r47n0u/">is said to be for</a> crime prevention, monitoring and controlling pupil behaviour. CCTV can be used in situations where blame and punishment need to be mediated. The security in one school is <a href="http://iospress.metapress.com/content/c3x4630112r47n0u/">described as</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Having large internal windows [which] were used for senior teachers’ offices allowing them to overlook the corridors (or perhaps more importantly give the impression to pupils that they were potentially being observed in panopticon-esque fashion) […] There was also a ‘control office’ where the CCTV footage was recorded and could be viewed. The use of CCTV extended to the pupil’s toilets, the justification for which was to enable staff to ensure that groups of pupils were not hiding in the toilets, intimidating or bullying other pupils.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Surveillance-Schools-Discipline-Contemporary-Prevention/dp/1137308850">However, a study in the UK</a> documented the tactics students devised to protect their privacy. These included avoiding monitored areas, altering their position and appearance to restrict CCTV identification, and repositioning the cameras.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.lfbscholarly.com/product-detail/security-in-schools-its-effect-on-students">Research</a> into the impacts of surveillance suggests that cameras do not exacerbate levels of fear in a community, nor do students feel that having cameras in a school is evidence that the school is taking their security seriously. </p>
<p><a href="http://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ645207">Many American schools</a> had CCTV cameras in place before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. After the attacks additional surveillance policies were put in place to respond to the possibility that schools could be a terrorist target. </p>
<p>With recent attacks on schools in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-26/scores-dead-in-boko-haram-nigeran-school-attack/5284250">Nigeria</a> and <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-16/taliban-gunmen-attack-military-run-school-in-peshawar/5971484">Pakistan</a>, along with the recent events in <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-15/sydney-siege-hostages-cafe-martin-place-police-operation/5967232">Martin Place</a>, Sydney, it is important to consider measures to keep schools and young people safe.</p>
<p>It is also important to note that there is <a href="http://edr.sagepub.com/content/39/1/27.abstract">no evidence</a> that cameras keep schools safe. Some <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Surveillance-Schools-Discipline-Contemporary-Prevention/dp/1137308850">researchers in America</a> suggest that the costs and contracts surrounding this surveillance warrant further investigation.</p>
<h2>Protection versus privacy</h2>
<p>At the very least it should be made clear that the footage and other data collected will not be used to invade the privacy of young people. How the data will be stored, who has access to it and how it will be used need to be stipulated. </p>
<p>This is particularly important given the plan involves 17 Jewish and 15 Islamic schools, groups that have historically been targeted for surveillance based on profiling.</p>
<p>These measures have purportedly been put in place to protect these groups, which may be necessary due to recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-lets-the-anti-semitic-genie-out-of-its-australian-bottle-30307">rises</a> in <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/attacks-on-muslim-mothers-mount-20141009-113wdj.html">prejudice against</a> them.</p>
<p><a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1099-0860.2008.00173.x/abstract">Research</a> into collection of young people’s personal data tells us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Uninvited intrusion into their personal space or conflicting messages about their privacy rights are counterproductive […] They may yet have unintended consequences for children’s sense of personal integrity and for the kind of society that they will create in future.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="http://arrow.monash.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/monash:74421;jsessionid=147CE7435AE58EAE323427B8DFE85EBA?f0=sm_creator%3A%22Ruck%2C+M%22">International research</a> suggests young people in the current generation have a mistrust of the state, little belief in democracy and cynical views about a broad-based “common good”. </p>
<p>Certainly in Australia, <a href="http://monash.edu/mapping-population/social-cohesion-report.html">trust in government</a> has had a sharp decline. Participation in democracy has also fallen.</p>
<p>It is therefore even more important to consider the wishes and rights of young people regarding surveillance and data collection in their schools. This needs to be considered before any impingement upon freedoms and liberties of citizens, particularly those who are still too young to have a political voice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38305/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Catherine Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Abbott government has announced 54 schools will receive funding for security guards and CCTV cameras in an attempt to prevent possible terror attacks. But where is the line between protection and privacy invasion?Catherine Smith, PhD Student in Sociology of Education, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.