tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/radicalisation-of-muslims-3877/articlesRadicalisation of Muslims – The Conversation2015-10-30T00:46:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/494922015-10-30T00:46:49Z2015-10-30T00:46:49ZAustralia’s response to youth radicalisation can benefit from a look to overseas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/99412/original/image-20151023-27580-1ikfjq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malcolm Turnbull has signalled a willingness to work with Australia’s Muslim community to prevent radicalisation.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia has <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-05/pm-approach-to-extremism-praised/6827420">started to acknowledge</a> that a hardline approach alone is not the answer to tackling youth radicalisation. This is because it responds to the symptoms rather than the underlying causes.</p>
<p>Focusing on harsher penalties for those inclined to engage in terrorist activities driven by Islamic extremism, in Australia or overseas, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/narrow-focus-on-radicalisation-wont-stop-terrorists-48962">unlikely to deter</a> young, disenfranchised people on their newly discovered pathway to social status, meaning and perceived heroism.</p>
<p>The answer should instead be sought in preventative measures that offer education, social and cultural integration, <a href="https://theconversation.com/australian-muslim-role-models-could-be-the-missing-link-in-countering-radicalisation-48984">positive role models</a> and a sense of belonging.</p>
<p>In implementing such programs, Australia should be looking at international best practice for early intervention strategies that target young people at risk of joining violent gangs and right-wing extremist groups. What can we learn from these?</p>
<h2>Preventing youths from joining gangs</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/crimeprevention/shareddocs/pubs/crime-prev-series1-youth-gangs.pdf">Canada</a> and the <a href="https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/239234.pdf">US</a> have long been working on tackling the problem of youths joining violent and often racially motivated gangs. These approaches may have some merit when trying to understand and prevent Islamic radicalisation of young Australians. </p>
<p>Young people susceptible to Islamic radicalisation are often <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/encounter/tackling-the-root-causes-of-radicalisation/5829980">described as disenfranchised</a>. </p>
<p>Being disenfranchised – in a social, cultural or religious sense – seems to be what makes young people susceptible to the voice and instruction of extremists who promise social or religious status and a sense of integration and belonging. The same is true for young people at risk of joining violent youth gangs.</p>
<p>Disengagement from family, community and education – along with social and cultural marginalisation – are <a href="http://youth.gov/feature-article/gang-prevention-overview-research-and-programs">frequently quoted reasons</a> why youths join gangs. The gang offers social status and a sense of belonging through joint anti-social actions and achievements. </p>
<p>Preventative strategies in the US and Canada have therefore been tailored around approaches that address the issue on an individual, family, educational and community level. The recent cases of young Australian Muslims joining terrorist networks and agendas suggest that they are not necessarily disengaged from education or socioeconomically marginalised. Rather, they seem to be disenfranchised by a social, cultural and family environment that is perceived as <a href="http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2014-10-20/muslim-australians-talk-about-tackling-radicalisation/1380343">unsupportive and misunderstanding</a> of its young Muslim population. </p>
<p>Drawing on components from an approach similar to the ones targeting young people at risk of joining gangs in North America therefore seems useful.</p>
<h2>Preventing youths from joining right-wing extremist groups</h2>
<p>Right-wing extremist groups and organisations have been a long-standing social problem in a number of Western European countries. Social marginalisation and the framing of foreign cultures and foreign religions as a threat to personal safety and well-being are often the key draw factors. </p>
<p>Young people who join right-wing extremist groups <a href="http://www.socwork.net/sws/article/view/386/727">often lack</a> social status and a sense of belonging. This is often as a result of being educationally or vocationally disengaged. </p>
<p>Right-wing extremist groups promote an “us against them” mentality. By joining such a group, young people find a sense of belonging and a way of achieving social status in its hierarchical ranks. </p>
<p>Based on this knowledge, <a href="http://www.european-network-of-deradicalisation.eu/profiles/2-violence-prevention-network">Western European countries</a> affected by right-wing extremism have developed a strong focus on early intervention strategies. </p>
<p>Similar to those targeting youths at risk of joining gangs, these approaches focus on addressing the underlying causes at multiple levels. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Given the <a href="http://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/radicalization-why-do-western-youth-join-extremist-groups">similarities in underlying causes</a> associated with young people joining violent gangs and other forms of racially and religiously motivated extremist groups, Australia’s response to Islamic youth radicalisation can benefit from knowledge on international best practice in engaging with socially and culturally disenfranchised young people.</p>
<p>The issue to be targeted is not religion. Religion may be the angle extremists are using to capture the attention of young Australian Muslims. But, the underlying problems are social and individual risk factors that make young people susceptible to joining violent, extremist organisations that promise social status and a sense of belonging.</p>
<p>The response therefore needs to be an approach, informed by best practice, that engages young Muslims in an educational, social, communal and religious context.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-05/pm-approach-to-extremism-praised/6827420">signalled willingness</a> to work together with Australia’s Muslim community and young leaders offers a chance for Australia to prevent radicalisation by re-engaging its socially and religiously disenfranchised young Muslims.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Silke Meyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia should be looking at international best practice for early intervention programs targeting young people at risk of joining violent gangs and right-wing extremist groups.Silke Meyer, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Institute for Social Science Research, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/489802015-10-15T19:17:41Z2015-10-15T19:17:41ZMissing the mark: we don’t need more anti-terror summits or pressure on Muslim community leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98481/original/image-20151015-19374-7q5t4q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malcolm Turnbull (right) has made considerable ground in mending some of the fractured relationships with Australia's Muslim community groups.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull on Thursday convened another high-level meeting with senior intelligence, police and education officials on countering the homegrown extremist threat. </p>
<p>In his <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-34535450">opening remarks</a>, Turnbull said that recent attacks – in <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/parramatta-shooting-gunman-a-15yearold-boy-police-sources-say-20151002-gk0flb.html">Parramatta</a> and elsewhere – prove that radicalisation is spreading among the very young. He also stressed that sharing information between security agencies and frontline workers – such as teachers – will be important to address the problem.</p>
<p>Many Australians are probably comforted by Turnbull’s determination to tackle violent extremism head-on. Another reassessment of security and police arrangements certainly appears crucial.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Australian governments have done such reviews regularly since 9/11 – yet the threat of violent extremism continues to increase. Therefore, rather than another security summit, we should ask: what has changed within society that fosters such hatred among young people? Where are we failing children, and how can we adjust direction to care for them rather than incarcerate them?</p>
<p>These questions are becoming more urgent. We must refrain from making matters worse by placing vulnerable children closer to the criminal justice system without truly understanding the future consequences of such action.</p>
<h2>Mending bridges with the Muslim community</h2>
<p>Since becoming prime minister in September, Turnbull has made considerable positive ground in mending some of the fractured relationships created by the previous Abbott government. He <a href="https://newmatilda.com/2015/10/12/malcolm-turnbull-benches-team-australia-but-will-the-narrative-on-terrorism-change/">recently said</a>, for example, that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We must not vilify or blame the entire Muslim community with the actions of what is, in truth, a very, very small percentage of violent extremist individuals.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To date, Turnbull’s comments have been inclusive. He has focused on mutual respect, rather than the Abbott government’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/playing-the-muslim-card-abbotts-loose-lips-threaten-to-sink-unity-38153">sometimes divisive posture</a>. This so-called <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/muslim-leaders-hopeful-of-new-direction/story-fn3dxiwe-1227527983935">“new direction”</a> could not have come soon enough.</p>
<p>Relationships between some Muslim community groups and various government agencies were at a significant low point. These were severely damaged, and in some cases severed, following the Abbott government’s clumsy and divisive rhetoric, its potentially counter-productive terrorism legislation and an overly securitised posture on terrorism and national security more broadly.</p>
<p>Rightly or wrongly, much of the government’s direction has placed unnecessary attention on Muslim community leaders, who are already under pressure and struggling for solutions to the many other issues causing young people to become alienated.</p>
<p>Surprisingly (to some), many of the social issues that make some Muslim youth vulnerable to radicalisation are common to many other young people from all religions and ethnicities. But we do not call on those community leaders to solve equally concerning problems such as homicide, domestic violence and drug addiction.</p>
<p>Relying on Muslim community leaders to assist or solve the radicalisation problem is also partly where Australia’s strategies to counter violent extremism may be faltering.</p>
<p>In many cases, Muslim community leaders <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/06/01/Muslim-radicalisation-Why-Australias-strategy-is-failing-and-how-to-fix-it.aspx">do not have the expertise</a> to develop intervention initiatives to counter radicalisation. Nor are they necessarily connected to the Muslim youth searching for identity or who are feeling isolated or marginalised from friends, families and communities.</p>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/fighting-fire-with-fire-target-audience-responses-to-online-anti-violence-campaigns/Fight_fire_long_paper_web.pdf">important problem</a> with the government’s strategy is that it may be targeting the wrong constituents. The focus has been too much on highly educated and socially connected youth, rather than on the most vulnerable – the poorly educated and those who “only have contact with the small socioreligious groups to which they’ve withdrawn”. </p>
<p>This has limited the government’s capacity to target and assist communities working with those most at risk.</p>
<h2>Reaching and protecting those at risk</h2>
<p>Children <a href="http://www.9news.com.au/national/2015/10/15/03/34/afp-monitoring-12-year-old-gun-for-police-shooting-sought-in-march">as young as 12</a> – and even younger in cases overseas – are now on the “radar” of security agencies. </p>
<p>Terrorist groups exploiting children is not new. But groups like Islamic State are increasingly using children to carry out their activities. This has allowed them to attract the more vulnerable and groom them as loyal followers.</p>
<p>Because of their vulnerability, children are easier to indoctrinate; they are less likely to question or resist. They do not yet fully understand their own mortality or the consequences of the acts they are asked to perform.</p>
<p>Identifying the root causes of children wanting to carry out violence is difficult, and the causes can be multifaceted. Today’s young people are readily exposed to violence in the home, at school, in the community and online. Children who are exposed to violence undergo lasting physical, mental and emotional harm and are more likely to engage in violence themselves.</p>
<p>In many cases, children are being shaped and moulded by adults in the world around them. Most would not have developed a genuine belief in any ideology.</p>
<p>The criminalisation of children within the criminal justice system in Australia may therefore have dangerous consequences. In <a href="http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/there-is-no-such-thing-as-a-child-terrorist/17233">failing to distinguish</a> between the actions of a child and those of an adult, we fail to appreciate the peculiar dynamics at play in young people’s lives. Worse, it shows that adult society is now less willing to take responsibility for young people and their mistakes.</p>
<p>Violent extremism, particularly when it involves young children, cannot be tackled in isolation from other social issues. While police and security agencies are important for community protection and national security, they will not have the solutions or the capacity to fix societal ills.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clarke Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What has changed within society that fosters radicalisation among young people? Where are we failing children, and how can we adjust direction to care for them rather than incarcerate them?Clarke Jones, Research Fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/489622015-10-13T19:29:26Z2015-10-13T19:29:26ZNarrow focus on radicalisation won’t stop terrorists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/98041/original/image-20151012-17843-h5ynf9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Malcolm Turnbull is convening a summit this week to discuss Australia’s approach to countering violent extremism.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Dan Himbrechts</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-09/malcolm-turnbull-plea-for-mutual-respect-after-parramatta-murder/6841892">recently made</a> a strong contribution to restoring a sense of dignity to Australia’s counter-radicalisation policies when he emphasised that “mutual respect” should be its key foundation.</p>
<p>This was a breath of fresh air after the divisive tones of his predecessor, Tony Abbott. It will help allow Australians to feel a sense of pride in the country’s undoubted counter-terrorism successes. <a href="http://www.cdpp.gov.au/case-reports/operation-pendennis/">Operation Pendennis</a> in 2005 was the best of these.</p>
<p>But, as Turnbull <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-10-09/commonwealth-state-and-territory-countering-violent-extremism-meeting-15-october">prepares</a> for a meeting this week of federal, state and territory agencies to discuss Australia’s approach to countering violent extremism, one would hope that he also promotes a fresh look at the best available research on what works and what doesn’t.</p>
<h2>Radicalisation and terrorism are two separate beasts</h2>
<p>Will Turnbull act on the findings of an <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15614263.2015.1015126#.VhshfLSqpBc">Australian study</a> published in 2015 that reports, in passing, disaffection in the Muslim community with the government use of the terms “radical” and “extremism”?</p>
<p>What will Turnbull make of the 2014 book, <a href="http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/academic/policing/procedure/9780199674633.do#.UiV7ZJK9Lng">Traces of Terror</a>, that found key communities perceive Australian counter-terrorism policies as tinged with racism?</p>
<p>Leading studies by international organisations such as the Club of Madrid do not give the same emphasis to counter-radicalisation as the Australian government does. That organisation has sponsored many reports on countering violent extremism. One of the most thorough and best deliberated may be a 2005 study, <a href="http://www.clubmadrid.org/img/secciones/Club_de_Madrid_Volume_I_The_Causes_of_Terrorism.pdf">Addressing the Causes of Terrorism</a>. The word radicalisation, or variations on it, appears only seven times in 50 pages, and even fewer times in each of two follow-on volumes.</p>
<p>Radicalisation and terrorism are two different phenomena – legally, politically, psychologically and morally. While a terrorist is by definition radicalised, the mere fact of being radicalised does not explain the transition to terrorism – a choice for violence.</p>
<p>In most scenarios, there are many “radicals” in any cause for each person who becomes a terrorist. A policy that screens radicals for terrorists is not workable or reliable, nor scientifically defensible. It will always record significant failures.</p>
<h2>What Australia needs to do</h2>
<p>Herein lies a policy implication for Australia. Why is it staking so much on counter-radicalisation? Even Turnbull said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Preventing someone from becoming radicalised in the first place is the most effective defence against terrorism.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Counter-radicalisation is only one part of nearly 20 very distinct areas of policy to combat terrorism. It is probably not the most effective by a long shot. Other areas of policy that need appropriate public recognition and debate include intelligence, research, legislation, legal system (judges and prosecutors), law enforcement (police) and combating terrorist financing.</p>
<p>Turnbull’s statement that counter-radicalisation work is the best defence against terrorism begs the question of what policies – apart from that one – can be effective. The list is long. The government has invested heavily in some of them – especially intelligence – but not in most of them, such as the training of police investigators and court prosecutors for counter-terrorism cases.</p>
<p>In April 2015, an <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Australia-2015.pdf">independent international evaluation</a> of Australian policy on terrorist financing found a number of shortcomings. Not least of these was the lack of engagement by police forces with nationally available data to launch investigations of terrorist financing.</p>
<p>In the equally important area of legislation, the government’s approach has been consistently criticised by a range of professional associations, community leaders, experts, ethicists and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. The monitor’s <a href="http://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/INSLM_Annual_Report_20140328.pdf">2014 annual report</a> is a scathing indictment of a government that has all too often simply refused to address the security watchdog’s important concerns, or those of a well-meaning legal fraternity.</p>
<p>Has the government ever evaluated the success of its counter-radicalisation program (at a cost of around <a href="http://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2015/05/25/stronger-counter-terrorism-arrangements">A$40 million</a>) relative to other counter-terrorism measures? In February 2015, the Parliamentary Library <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1415/Quick_Guides/Extremism">reported</a> that a promised evaluation of Australia’s programs in this area in 2012 did not appear to have been completed.</p>
<p>As an alternative narrative, the Australian government may want to consider an assessment that goes like this. The best way of preventing terrorism by new recruits is to capture and convict known terrorists. Failure to “capture and convict”, whether in Australia or overseas, is a gift to terrorist recruiters.</p>
<p>Until Australian security agencies can demonstrate more success in capturing and convicting terrorists, new recruits to terrorism in Australia will increase in number. Australia needs a powerful and sustained public campaign around its counter-terrorism successes more than it needs morally troubling and unscientific public discourse about youth radicalisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48962/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Austin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Counter-radicalisation is only one part of nearly 20 very distinct areas of policy to combat terrorism. It is probably not the most effective by a long shot.Greg Austin, Visiting Professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/486642015-10-08T19:23:48Z2015-10-08T19:23:48ZHow are Western youth conditioned to commit terrorist acts?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/97718/original/image-20151008-9664-15w5h9f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Narratives of grievance are foundational to Islamic radicalisation. It may have helped motivate 15-year-old Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar's actions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Questions <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/parramatta-shooting-farhad-jabar-was-recruited-by-western-sydney-extremists-20151007-gk3i76.html">continue to be raised</a> as to how a 15-year-old Sydney boy, <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/parramatta-shooting-gunman-a-15yearold-boy-police-sources-say-20151002-gk0flb.html">Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar</a>, was radicalised to the point that he shot dead a NSW police employee in Parramatta last week.</p>
<p>Each individual case of radicalisation has its own characteristics. But the research I have conducted which focuses on Islamic radicalisation – has highlighted some patterns that may help to explain this dark, murky world that is drawing in some Australian youth. </p>
<p>There is still much more work to be done in understanding this complex phenomenon, but here’s what we know.</p>
<h2>Embedded grievances</h2>
<p>Narratives of grievance are foundational to Islamic radicalisation. These narratives cannot be separated from international and domestic events, which are continually changing. </p>
<p>During the early stages of my research, grievances were primarily directed against the US military’s <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4392519.stm">mistreatment</a> of prisoners and detainees in Afghanistan and then Iraq. The focus then shifted to Syria and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/failure-to-intervene-shows-syria-is-heading-in-the-wrong-direction-13226">inaction of Western governments</a>. Most recently, grievances have centred on government actions to <a href="https://theconversation.com/bill-targets-foreign-fighters-before-departure-and-after-return-30095">cancel passports</a>. Coupled with this is the Australian government’s recent decision to <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-sends-its-warplanes-into-syria-but-what-comes-next-46682">extend airstrikes</a> into Syria. </p>
<p>These <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/another-pupil-arrested-at-school-of-teen-killer-farhad-jabar/story-e6frg6n6-1227558495568&memtype=anonymous">grievances</a> are framed to create an emotional response and a belief that oppression of Muslims is continuing to take place, as part of a long historical narrative of grievance. Key radical clerics have framed this grievance as an oppression of Muslims and a bid to prevent them from achieving their God-given destiny.</p>
<p>But grievance in isolation is insufficient to create radicalisation to commit acts of terrorism. Essentially, radicalisation is developed by embedding grievance within an ideological and propaganda framework. This framework calls for action in the form of jihad and ultimately martyrdom. Such actions are presented not merely as an option but as a divine obligation. </p>
<p>Building on the emotional connection created through grievance, a cognitive framework based on ideology and propaganda is developed that can direct action and legitimise violence.</p>
<h2>Reframing morality</h2>
<p>Terrorism in general has often been conceptualised as using forms of moral disengagement. </p>
<p>But my research, specifically focusing on Islamic terrorism, found that rather than disengaging from morality, morality was reframed to create a new mental framework that outlined morality as an adherence to Islamic fundamentalism and a willingness to adopt the ideology and – more importantly – its associated obligations. </p>
<p>As strange as it sounds, those who murder in Allah’s name believe they are doing a holy act, for which they will be rewarded in the afterlife.</p>
<h2>How do online recruiters achieve this?</h2>
<p>There are number of strategies. First is “anchoring”, or connection with an individual based on grievances. Disaffected young people with a personal sense of grievance are often easier to target as they can easily internalise this broader sense of grievance.</p>
<p>“Future pacing” is a common technique employed. Here, imagery is used to try essentially to mentally transport a recruit into the future and enable them to see that they have not only accepted the ideology but also acted on it. This is not done once but many times, using social media, videos and images.</p>
<p>In order to understand what happens to young people online, we can conceptualise the online social media environment as a type of virtual <a href="http://www.security-informatics.com/content/2/1/6">institution</a> in which feelings and thought patterns are normalised to be in line with ideological frameworks. </p>
<p>Institutions also have an important sense of isolation from outside influences. Most important for radicalisation is the isolation from moderate Islamic voices. </p>
<p>A networked approach is often used where a potential recruit is connected with a large number of other radicals or sympathisers who help convey and reinforce the ideology. Key connections are made with individuals who can take a recruit further along the stages of radicalisation. </p>
<p>These recruiters essentially become guardians of a young person, demonstrating an albeit false “ethic of care” built through friendships that may even replace that of their <a href="http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-05/parents-must-steer-youth-from-radicalisation-nsw-police-chief/6828366">parents</a>.</p>
<p>Many of these skilled recruiters are from <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3260712/Radicalised-15-year-old-Parramatta-shooter-Farhad-Jabar-Khalil-Mohammad-talking-online-British-extremist-linked-Islamic-State.html">the UK</a>, <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/terror-shooting-teen-killer-turned-at-parramatta-mosque/story-fnpdbcmu-1227556913764?sv=bbe664c15d27e3b389ebba7c8b4f2952">Australia</a> and the Middle East. And as shown in recent cases, they can be young people.</p>
<p>Recruiters also look at targeting more than one person in a given friendship group. Online interactions and mentoring can flow over to offline connections, <a href="http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/parramatta-terror-attack-police-are-gunning-for-the-ringleaders/story-fni0cx12-1227561175937">extremist networks</a> and groups within a local community to reinforce the online mentoring process.</p>
<p>Isolating an individual within this online institution, which may also extend to a small group, enables a faster and more efficient form of transformation. </p>
<p>Notwithstanding this process, there are some important caveats:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Individuals who enter the virtual institution do so willingly and of their own choosing. </p></li>
<li><p>Transformation is a difficult process to achieve but even if it is only successful in a small number of cases, the effects are still horrific.</p></li>
<li><p>The best place for intervention is as early as possible. The more isolated an individual becomes, the more they connect to these extreme ideologies and the fewer their opportunities to be exposed to more moderate voices.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robyn Torok does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Each individual case of radicalisation has its own characteristics. But the research has highlighted some patterns that may help to explain the dark world that is drawing in some Australian youth.Robyn Torok, PhD Candidate, Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/376702015-02-17T17:44:08Z2015-02-17T17:44:08ZMemorial in Copenhagen draws 40,000 for show of unity<p>A <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/11416754/Copenhagen-shooting-Denmark-holds-mass-memorial-and-rally-to-honour-victims.html">memorial service</a> has been held in Copenhagen for the victims of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/copenhagen-shootings">shootings</a> that killed two and injured five in the city on February 14. A crowd of up to 40,000 people gathered just around the corner from the scene of the first shootings, at which documentary film director <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/15/copenhagen-shooting-the-victims-finn-norgaard-dan-uzan-denmark">Finn Nørgaard</a> was killed. He had been attending a debate meeting on art, blasphemy and freedom of speech featuring the controversial Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks, who had once depicted the Prophet Muhammad as a dog. </p>
<p>Copenhageners paid a unforgettable tribute to the two victims at the memorial service. The programme included a number of guest speakers, including prime minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt, and the French ambassador, François Zimeray, who survived the first attack at the debate meeting.</p>
<p>The memorial was being organised on behalf of all the political parties represented at Copenhagen Municipality, who announced they are standing together across political boundaries to protect freedom of expression, democracy and free speech in the wake of the attacks.</p>
<p>There has been concern that the suspected perpetrator, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein, a 22-year-old man born and raised in Denmark, may have been inspired by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/charlie-hebdo-attack">Islamist attacks in Paris</a> a month ago, and decided to carry out similar murders at the debate and at a synagogue. He was known to the police and national intelligence agencies. He has been involved in weapons violations and violence and had ties to gangs in Copenhagen. He was released from prison just a few weeks ago.</p>
<p>When young Muslim men, born and raised in Western cultures, turn to radical interpretations of Islam and lash out at the society in which they live, talk quickly turns to the spectre of the “home-grown terrorist”. Questions are asked about what part that society, their community or their parents played in their being drawn to extremism.</p>
<p>Prime minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt has described the shootings in Copenhagen as a “cynical act of terror” but added: “We are not in a fight between Islam and the West. This is not a conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. This is a conflict between the core values of our society and violent extremists.”</p>
<p>And in fact, surprisingly few politicians have used the attack as an opportunity to articulate resentment toward Islam and the Muslim population in Denmark. The prime minister’s interpretation of the event as a “politically motivated attack” has been widely accepted with only a few exceptions. </p>
<p>Denmark is considered an open, free and peaceful democracy. According to political leaders from the government and the opposition, this will not change as a result of these incidents. Debate about freedom of speech is inevitable – especially when it comes to Islam and blasphemy – and there will now probably be more debate about the freedom of assembly too after the attack on a open and free debate meeting. But these debates are not new and were heated long before this attack. </p>
<p>But there is another issue that will need to be addressed after this tragedy. El-Hussein grew up in the social housing complex of Mjølnerparken in Copenhagen. His social background is comparable to the three men who carried out the attacks in Paris in January. Following the horrors of Paris, many asked if the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-jihadism-appeals-to-religiously-illiterate-loners-36106">homegrown amateur terrorist</a> is the new face of extremism and the events in Copenhagen over the weekend would appear to confirm that development.</p>
<p>However, given that it is extremely difficult to predict who will carry out a lone-wolf attack or track everyone who has been in contact with the security agencies, a broader approach is needed. We need better anti-radicalisation programmes in public institutions, including prisons, and more focused integration projects in the social housing complexes in which radicalisation can breed. We also, of course, need better gun control laws.</p>
<p>The ability of home-grown terrorists to attain meaningful goals through individual attacks is limited, but as an agent for division, the significance of such events should not be underestimated. They have the potential to destabilise social unity and compound radicalisation.</p>
<p>The former does not appear to have happened in Denmark as a result of this attack. The memorial service showed a city resisting division. The question for the Danish authorities now though, is how to integrate disaffected young people like El-Hussein so that radicalisation no longer appeals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37670/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Arly Jacobsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A memorial service has been held in Copenhagen for the victims of the shootings that killed two and injured five in the city on February 14. A crowd of up to 40,000 people gathered just around the corner…Brian Arly Jacobsen, Assistant professor, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of CopenhagenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/368512015-02-05T13:57:15Z2015-02-05T13:57:15ZWhy do women in West turn to Islamic State? For the same reasons as men<p>What makes someone want to travel to some of the most dangerous places on earth to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-fight-against-islamic-state-is-a-battle-for-young-minds-31710">fight alongside terrorists</a>? It’s a question we’ve been asking about young people for more than a decade. But the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq has seen the onset of a particular phenomenon – more and more young women are now leaving the West to support the group in its controlled territories. </p>
<p>Since the Islamic State’s campaign began, it is estimated that 3,000 people have migrated from the West to <a href="http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.PDF">join the cause</a> – 550 of them women.</p>
<p>On the face of it, IS and its “caliphate” seems to be a male-dominated environment. Until now, it has not been clear how IS makes room for female activists. But <a href="http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/women-of-the-islamic-state3.pdf">a document obtained</a> by anti-extremist think tank the Quillam Foundation, which purports to be a guide for jihadist brides, has shed light on the role of women under IS. It states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The role of women is inherently ‘sedentary’, and that her responsibilities lie first and foremost in the house, except in a handful of narrowly defined circumstances. This role begins at the point of marriage which, it is declared, can be as young as nine years old. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>So why do Western women choose this restricted life? A <a href="http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.PDF">recent report</a> from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue has examined the role of female migrants in IS for the first time. This examination of these clandestine activists provides insight into the possible threat migrating female activists may pose to the West – and why they go in the first place. </p>
<h2>The will of Allah</h2>
<p>It appears that religious revivalist tendencies inspire female activists, who ultimately seek to embrace “a new vision for society”. In most cases, female migrants felt their identity and purpose had been empowered by preserving the notion of “true Islam”. The challenging process of turning away from their previous lives is mitigated by their strong idealistic world-view. Thus, as one female activist indicates, joining IS was the practical manifestation of “the will of Allah”. </p>
<p>These women often hold disturbing opinions that justify violence against the West. The women espouse a radical worldview drawn from Islamist ideology. In particular, the notion of “<em>Al-wala wal-bara</em>” (loyalty and disavowal) has been firmly directed and applied to the non-believer and encourages absolute disassociation with the disbeliever. This ideal gives rise to a worldview that allows the activist to de-humanise all non-Muslims. This de-humanising process provides the ideological pathway for extreme acts of violence. </p>
<p>Online recruitment is a particular problem. Female activists are turning to social media to post glorifying tales of life under IS authority. This could act as a lightning rod for disaffected young Muslims across the western world. </p>
<p>All this comes before <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-syrian-conflict-is-putting-british-terrorism-law-to-the-test-22912">the threat posed by dormant returnees</a>. Those who have returned home often exemplify a deeper hatred of the West, especially after those who have experienced the death of a husband in the wake of drone attacks. This fragmented state of being can trigger potential terror threats within the host country, and thus the report strongly recommends the need to track and monitor those who seek to return home. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70966/original/image-20150203-25524-phllrs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70966/original/image-20150203-25524-phllrs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/70966/original/image-20150203-25524-phllrs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70966/original/image-20150203-25524-phllrs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70966/original/image-20150203-25524-phllrs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70966/original/image-20150203-25524-phllrs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70966/original/image-20150203-25524-phllrs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/70966/original/image-20150203-25524-phllrs.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Syrian Civil War and the Iraqi insurgency.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Life under IS</h2>
<p>The report also systematically documents the practical acts currently performed by female migrants. Unmarried women stay in a group hostel provided by IS, and married women who travel with their husbands are given a home.</p>
<p>Women do not fight for Islamic State, performing instead a range of domestic duties once they have settled in controlled regions. One migrant posted a picture of a cheesecake she had made with a friend to Twitter. The report states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The scene in this picture, however, is not a typical household situation, as there is a grenade positioned next to the cake. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Target the recruiters</h2>
<p>Many of the reasons given by female migrants to IS territories are the same as those espoused by their male peers. As <a href="http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409463719">part of my research</a>, I am currently interviewing young male Islamists who are looking to travel to IS controlled territories. These are principally young, second-generation Muslims, who feel alienated from British society. </p>
<p>They tell me their ideological motivation is two-fold: to live under the banner of “true Islam” and to participate in the global jihad. These young men have been radicalised by a selective ideology, which draws upon an alarmist worldview (for example that Islam and Muslims are under threat). This promotes a rapid response, as the threat posed is perceived as immediate. Salafi-jihadist groups in the UK have been extremely effective at turning this rhetoric into a significant operation. </p>
<p>Authorities must target these Islamist groups acting as a recruitment base for both men and women migrating to IS territories. A counter-narrative should be conveyed to those young Muslims who feel disassociated with British society. In the case of young women, the report identifies families as playing a key role in persuading would-be migrants to stay in the West, or using practical measures such as withholding money or passports to prevent their daughters from leaving. </p>
<p>At the organisational level, the individuals who radicalise young people should be targeted. This can be done using banning and control orders for known radicals. The fight must also be taken to social media, which is acting as a new frontier for the Islamic State’s campaign of terror.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36851/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Farhaan Wali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What makes someone want to travel to some of the most dangerous places on earth to fight alongside terrorists? It’s a question we’ve been asking about young people for more than a decade. But the rise…Farhaan Wali, Lecturer in Religious Studies, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/360912015-01-10T04:08:41Z2015-01-10T04:08:41ZPrisons, Muslim memory and the making of a terrorist<p>The media spotlight on Cherif Kouachi’s life rekindles questions about prisons and radicalization. As an alleged participant of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30722038">Charlie Hebdo</a> attacks, Kouachi has seemingly led many lives. In one incarnation, he was a marijuana-smoking rapper. Later, he would turn jihadi and find himself jailed, awaiting conviction for jihadist crimes. </p>
<p>Over a decade of research on Islam in prison, I have concentrated on religious conversion and prisoner radicalization – this offers unique insight to Kouachi’s story.</p>
<p>One urgent question is whether jail had anything to do with the attack. Paradoxically, the answer is no – and yes.</p>
<h2>Muslim prisoners overrepresented in French jails</h2>
<p>For France, Kouachi’s case calls for a close look at its prisons. With a prison population that is, reportedly, <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/04/28/ST2008042802857.html">60% Muslim</a>, it is worthwhile to examine what exactly jail had to do with his radicalization.</p>
<p>First, Kouachi’s case suggests imprisonment was the key to explaining what leads an individual to extremism. In his case, however, time spent in jail was the effect of extreme behavior, not the cause of it; for him, jail was merely a pit stop on a journey that started long before. </p>
<p>Others, in contrast, might not participate in extremist activities until well after their release. In such cases, the prison’s impact is nominal. This reality cautions against characterizing an extremist as a case of “prisoner radicalization” just because he spent time in jail.</p>
<h2>American misperceptions of radicalization</h2>
<p>Such misunderstandings haunt debates in America. For years, top lawmakers have politicized the issue. <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/spearit/radical-islam-prison_b_880733.html">Representative Peter King</a> has been known to label cases as “prisoner radicalization” with merely proof of incarceration. </p>
<p>In similar fashion, one scholarly book, <a href="http://nyupress.org/books/9780814725443/">The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat</a>, characterizes Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Adolf Hitler as radicalized prisoners. However, as one <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488262">critique</a> notes, all three were first-order radicals before imprisonment.</p>
<p>Even the book’s cornerstone study of prisoner radicalization falls prey to this generalization. In this plot, <a href="http://www.fbi.gov/losangeles/press-releases/2009/la030609ausa.htm">Keven Lamar James</a> planned attacks against Jewish and military targets from his prison cell. Yet James was no stranger to extremes: he carried guns, was in and out of detention facilities, was active in a criminal gang, and convicted of robbery. In his life, prison appears as only incidental to a life of extreme behavior.</p>
<p>Kouachi parallels James in the way he adopted extremism before his own jailing; it is different, however, since animosity toward imprisonment did factor into his radicalization. As one <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/08/europe/paris-charlie-hebdo-shooting-suspects/">report</a> notes, Kouachi’s path to terrorism took a serious turn after he saw pictures and read accounts of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq. If true, his reaction to the abuse shows that prisons can indeed radicalize, even absent personal experience.</p>
<p>This case presents a different shade of prison radical. As Kouachi was not radicalized in jail, he demonstrates the importance of pre-prison experiences. The fact that his life took a sinister turn because of the mistreatment of prisoners elsewhere cannot be overlooked. His story keeps us vigilant of a prison’s power to exacerbate, rather than alleviate, extremism. </p>
<h2>The Muslim experience in France</h2>
<p>Moving forward, French officials must avoid the mistakes of their American counterparts. American politicians have been quick to <a href="http://www.theislamicmonthly.com/the-waning-pulse-of-islamic-radicalization-in-america/">blame foreigners</a> for fomenting prisoner radicalization. This view, however, ignores what <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2387928">Muslims themselves</a> see as the problem: racial and religious discrimination, unfairness in criminal justice, and anti-Muslim foreign policy. </p>
<p>Rather than successful preaching by al-Qaeda, domestic problems are the main catalyst of prisoner radicalization. Americans need no help from abroad – there is plenty of fuel for radicalization at home. </p>
<p>For France and its disproportionately Muslim prison population, the point is worth pondering. With prisons playing such a huge role in the life of Muslims, it is likely to be a locus of conflict for years to come. </p>
<p>The French government’s ability to manage its situation will depend on its grasp of the problem. Understanding prisoner radicalization is always a function of two parties: the watched and the watchers. Any honest assessment of the problem must involve both, lest we ignore what prisons like Abu Ghraib mean to Muslim memory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36091/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>SpearIt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The media spotlight on Cherif Kouachi’s life rekindles questions about prisons and radicalization. As an alleged participant of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Kouachi has seemingly led many lives. In one incarnation…SpearIt, Associate Professor of Law, Texas Southern UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/360842015-01-09T20:57:42Z2015-01-09T20:57:42ZCharlie Hebdo attackers killed, now France seeks answers<p>The hunt for the two killers who attacked the offices of Charlie Hebdo <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30752239">is over</a>, after a three-day chase and a standoff at a warehouse outside Paris. The two suspects were killed, and the hostage they took was freed.</p>
<p>At the same time as the warehouse was stormed, the police also moved to end a hostage situation at a Kosher supermarket at Porte de Vincennes in Paris. That operation ended with conflicting reports of casualties, but the hostage-taker was killed.</p>
<p>French security services and political leaders have been keen to stress the country remains in a state of high alert and the hunt for other potential accomplices goes on. However, it does appear a phase in this extraordinary and deadly terror attack is over. Now, anti-terror experts and police will begin to pore over images and video of the events and try to figure out exactly what happened.</p>
<p>The images captured from the attack at the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris, of two masked gunmen on the attack gave the impression of disciplined killers, clad in black and showing no mercy.</p>
<p>In reality, the attackers first went to the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30708237">wrong building</a> and, when they found right one, had to force someone to let them in with an entry code. They escaped, but with no safe house established, and they appeared to be without a plan as to what to do next. They were identified at a service station the following day, still driving the same car they stole in the immediate wake of the Paris attack.</p>
<p>Despite these amateurish slip-ups, it is still not clear if the events in Paris this week were entirely homegrown attacks or if these attackers were trained abroad. US and French intelligence services <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-french-believe-one-gunman-received-training-in-yemen-1420759112">suspect one of the brothers</a> of having trained with al-Qaeda in Yemen, though their proximity to the organisation is not yet known. Al-Qaeda has, from there, made threats against Europe.</p>
<p>Al-Qaeda was established to provide support to a network of more than 20 organisations operating in the Islamic world. These were united by common experience in the war against the USSR in Afghanistan and by a desire to return to a more fundamental version of Islam. At present it consists of a number of affiliated regional groups and indirectly affiliated organisations.</p>
<p>One of the key components is <a href="http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717">al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</a>, which attacked in Mali and against which French troops were deployed. Others include al-Qaeda in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, which the Paris attackers claimed to be representing; al-Qaeda in Syria – which is a different organisation to Islamic state – and al-Qaeda in the Indian sub-continent.</p>
<h2>Past precedent</h2>
<p>This downward spiral into ultra-violence has been seen before. It is not confined to Islamic extremism. During the 1970s, anarchists, Maoists and Trotskyists committed acts of terror in Europe.</p>
<p>There was a generational change in what began as an urban guerrilla movement and turned into full-blown terrorism. And that change can teach us about our very modern problem.</p>
<p>The first generation was led by relatively experienced individuals, with a long background in political activity. They began by using violence against symbolic targets and differentiated between the “enemy” and the public as a whole. Symbolic buildings were their main targets.</p>
<p>The second generation saw violence against politicians, policemen and soldiers as acceptable. The third hoisted high the banner of “if you are not part of the solution you are part of the problem”, a slogan which justified civilian casualties. Finally a fourth generation emerged which concentrated on attacking “soft” civilian targets.</p>
<p>At the time this was considered a logical progression. As the older leadership was arrested or killed, leadership passed to individuals with fewer scruples and no real interest in building up public support.</p>
<p>Provoking the authorities into overreaction became a strategy. As potential targets were hardened and made more risky to attack, militants turned to softer targets. There were even training programmes in Palestine and other post-colonial countries.</p>
<p>We may be able to learn more from a re-examination of what happened to revolutionary groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s as we try to understand and stop the generation of extremists that appear to be responsible for the shocking events in France.</p>
<p>Back then, there was a bewildering array of ideologies and groups. Anarchism, Maoism, several kinds of Trotskyism and orthodox communism existed on the revolutionary Left. We had different strategies and tactics and organisational splits because of them. We had broader campaigns within which all of these groups operated in different ways.</p>
<p>Now, below the leadership of al-Qaeda and Islamic State is a much looser set of associations, following individual local charismatic leaders, who will go their own way when it suits them. History tells us that extremist groups can and do splinter.</p>
<p>The whole network is more fragile than it looks, particularly in these dark times. Unforeseen events could rapidly produce internal conflicts over personalities, the tactic of indiscriminate violence, or even the teachings of Islam, leading to disillusionment on the part of existing and potential recruits from Europe. Investigators in France will now call upon intelligence regarding the details of and differences between such groups as they seek to understand what has taken place in France – and to stop it happening again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36084/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bill Tupman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The hunt for the two killers who attacked the offices of Charlie Hebdo is over, after a three-day chase and a standoff at a warehouse outside Paris. The two suspects were killed, and the hostage they took…Bill Tupman, Honorary Research Fellow, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/346852014-12-01T05:48:44Z2014-12-01T05:48:44ZBrainwashing and radicalisation don’t explain why young people join violent causes<p>On the morning of September 24 2014, 15-year-old Yusra Hussien left for school near her home in Easton, Bristol. She then disappeared. News reports surfaced a few days later that Yusra and a 17-year-old friend from London had reached Istanbul, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2774562/Police-fear-radicalised-British-schoolgirl-15-flew-Turkey-going-missing-family-home-planning-fight-jihadis-Syria.html">fueling speculation</a> that the two young women were heading for Syria to join Islamic State. </p>
<p>Terms such as “brainwashing” and “radicalisation” were repeatedly and casually invoked to explain Yusra and her friend’s actions. Understandable enough; how else to explain the uncharacteristic folly of a model student who was described by her teachers as “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/03/yusra-hussein-teenager-uk-missing-bristol-syria">calm and collected</a>”?</p>
<p>The problem is, it’s just not that simple. </p>
<h2>Weasel words</h2>
<p>Suggestions of brainwashing or radicalisation imply that the object of such efforts has been profoundly diverted from their usual, reasonable way of thinking. The instigators of this mental trickery are implicitly credited with considerable psychological skill, while the target is simultaneously assumed to have some mental insufficiency or vulnerability. </p>
<p>This may be a lack of <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-you-could-really-brainwash-young-muslims-isis-would-have-a-lot-more-british-recruits-28423">agency</a>, an inadequate understanding of the issues at stake, or just “weakness of mind”.</p>
<p>The young are commonly deemed to be easy prey for those seeking to enlist them for a “radical” cause. Indeed, children and young people’s engagement in oppositional politics has often been explained away by reference to their supposed psychological immaturity. Outside of state-sanctioned exceptions (such as allowing 16 and 17-year-olds to vote in the Scottish referendum), political engagement by minors is liable to be dismissed as the product of mental or physical coercion, the incapacity associated with immaturity, or a combination of both.</p>
<p>The response from police, educators and political figures to protests by school students at the planned invasion of Iraq in 2003 illustrates the assumption of immaturity. Rallies held in various cities around the UK and in Parliament Square were uniformly depicted as the acts of “truants” who lacked “<a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=V1QTX2P6eO8C&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75&dq=Firstly,+I+am+concerned+about+truancy,+whatever+the+motivation+for+truancy,+because+I+see+a+slippery+path+towards+anarchy+and+kids+being+in+school+at+all.&source=bl&ots=lBKqWV-Gnf&sig=KJqnas3Q4_p6sVHte0L8Z7dA_Do&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DL9zVOCMI4fsaN--gpAL&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Firstly%2C%20I%20am%20concerned%20about%20truancy%2C%20whatever%20the%20motivation%20for%20truancy%2C%20because%20I%20see%20a%20slippery%20path%20towards%20anarchy%20and%20kids%20being%20in%20school%20at%20all.&f=false">the experience to really understand the full ramifications</a> of what they are talking about.” But the same truants’ <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/15/iraq-war-mass-protest">reflections</a> ten years on suggest these rallies were profoundly meaningful events for them, offering a real expansion of their political outlook and experience.</p>
<p>Similar, equally lazy assumptions still inform much of the debate around <a href="https://www.academia.edu/7504205/The_Politics_of_Child_Soldiers_">child soldiers</a>, which has been raging since the late 1990s. </p>
<p>The push to end the recruitment of under-18s for military action has spawned academic studies, human rights reports, advocacy campaigns and measures adopted by the United Nations, including an <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPACCRC.aspx">Optional Protocol</a> added to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that raised the minimum age of involvement in combat from 15 to 18. And yet, these initiatives have rarely paid serious attention to the reasons why the young might engage in military action. The underlying assumption, as usual, is that this is generally the result of some kind of coercion.</p>
<p>While horrific cases of kidnapping and intimidation undeniably continue to occur, detailed investigation of specific settings and even accounts from former underage soldiers reveal a more complex reality. Around the world, young people join military groups or engage in less organised political violence with diverse motives; they act out of self-defense, a sense of justice and revenge, or support for “community” - construed at local, national or transnational level.</p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>This unwillingness to seriously consider why children might engage in armed hostilities is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is also liable to come into play more particularly when the minors concerned fight for causes we deem objectionable. </p>
<p>A century ago, the estimated <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zcvdhyc">250,000 boys</a> who volunteered to fight for the British Army were hailed by newspaper editors and political leaders as heroes and patriots, not dupes or truants. The role of <a href="https://libcom.org/history/1976-the-soweto-riots">black South African schoolchildren in the struggle against Apartheid</a> was scarcely pathologised or belittled.</p>
<p>The fact is that in a great many societies, teenagers under the age of 18 are still considered capable of reasoned choice about enlistment and involvement in political violence. But elsewhere, the assumption of incapacity offers former combatants deemed “children” a shield from the punishment meted out to their “adult” comrades and seniors. Arguing instead that a 15 or 16-year-old is able to make a reasoned choice about engagement in hostilities risks exposing that young person to the full force of the law. </p>
<p>On the other hand, using loose, inadequate concepts such as brainwashing and radicalisation to explain young people’s engagement in political violence carries its own risks. It severely limits our ability to understand why young people are mobilised in support of a group such as Islamic State, and hinders intelligent debate about the wider changes needed to prevent them doing so. Moreover our efforts to reintegrate them once they come back are likely to prove desperately inadequate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34685/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jason Hart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>On the morning of September 24 2014, 15-year-old Yusra Hussien left for school near her home in Easton, Bristol. She then disappeared. News reports surfaced a few days later that Yusra and a 17-year-old…Jason Hart, Senior Lecturer in International Development, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/338622014-11-06T06:08:21Z2014-11-06T06:08:21ZWhy there is no such thing as the Muslim ‘community’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/63784/original/mj49c4tm-1415212296.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One size doesn't fit all.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/matthewblack/6097952226/in/photolist-ahRAKm-dwinbD-cTreWU-cTr4Uy-cTrjy9-cTqZCW-cTrqPC-cTr913-e1TJ8u-e1N6jv-e1TJmd-mUNaM-mp3f3H-5mqgaL-6MKsYJ-avWFL4-7BA79-nUMa44-5mkXpr-9HMLs3-9HJWxe-9HJXJv-e6NiTG-bNkSfM-4p4LwR-5mm3Ye-eDQH7r-7TdxQS-5mnoKp-5mrBDC-dVKZMH-hBVp58-5F3jny-dSZiDd-dSTHge-dVRB1y-dVRAPL-dVRAn5-dVKZsF-dVKZXX-dr73gC-e153it-9UtsjF-4t3e6P-8TSmVq-9xL1mL-9xL19Q-kyz9J8-oPy5Up-5mqNf3">Matthew Black</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cases of extremist violence and sexual exploitation have caused significant anxiety in the UK in recent years and politicians are continually looking for ways to identify how these things happen and how they can be prevented.</p>
<p>A strange consensus seems to be building as a result – the key to solving these social problems is the Muslim “community” or, at least Muslim “communities”.</p>
<p>But the reality is that there is no such thing as a Muslim community. Followers of the faith come from cultures and countries all over the world, live in different parts of the the UK and subscribe to a wide spectrum of doctrines. Yet we seem to expect them to all know each other. Just as every person who has ever picked up a scarf pattern is not a member of the knitting community, nor is everyone who has read the Koran a member of the Muslim community.</p>
<p>When the UK government produced its strategy for <a href="http://www.tedcantle.co.uk/publications/021%20Preventing%20violent%20extremism%20%20winning%20hearts%20and%20minds,%20.pdf">preventing violent extremism</a> in 2007, it was Muslim communities who were to provide local solutions to a national problem. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf">latest version</a> of this strategy – published in 2013 – also pushes the idea of building community capacity and integrating Muslim communities into British society as integral to tackling radicalisation.</p>
<p>Similarly Nazir Afzal, the Crown Prosecution Service’s lead on child sexual abuse and a laudable champion of women’s rights, has stated in the wake of the Rotherham child abuse scandal that the problems of street-grooming <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/31/muslim-community-street-grooming-nazir-afzal">can be addressed effectively within Muslim communities</a>. </p>
<p>And even though female genital mutilation is largely unheard of among South Asian Muslims in the UK and was recently condemned as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/23/female-genital-mutilation-muslim-council-britain-unislamic-condemn">un-Islamic</a> by the Muslim Council of Britain, <a href="http://www.thecommentator.com/article/5070/female_genital_mutilation_uk_institutions_not_to_blame">some</a> continue to frame it as a specifically Muslim problem that demands a community response.</p>
<h2>Many faces</h2>
<p>It is very easy to imagine multicultural Britain existing as a patchwork of groups, especially when thinking about minorities. It is tempting to readily accept the warm notion that Muslims collectively behave like characters in Eastenders, buzzing around Asian Albert Squares across the country, their families constantly interacting at the local mosque – their version of the Queen Vic. We would never accept similar notions of Christian communities or white communities – but when applied to minorities, the idea sounds authentic and credible.</p>
<p>Even Muslims can be quick to succumb to the romantic rhetoric. Within Islamic theology the concept of <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/1061854">“ummah”</a> is an idealised, unified global Muslim community made up of all the various ethnic, racial and cultural constituencies that follow the Islamic faith.</p>
<p>Look closer though, and the Muslim community is far more elusive. Until the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/rushdie-fatwa">Salman Rushdie fatwa affair</a>, Muslims in the UK were not conceptualised by religious identity. Ethnic groups such as Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians were the more legitimate conceptions of migrant communities. Even today, in most British towns and cities with Muslim populations, different ethnic groups will have their own mosques and religious institutions, and in some instances membership of those establishments remains exclusive to those specific ethnic groups.</p>
<p>Look closer still and other divisions emerge: Indian Muslims who came directly to the UK and Indians who arrived via African colonies are often divided by class and have been known to fall out. Many Pakistanis from urban centres such as Karachi and Islamabad are quick to distinguish themselves from the usually poorer, supposedly “less educated” Mirpuri populations from Pakistan’s Kashmir region. Bangladeshis from the capital Dhaka and those from rural Sylhet have similarly failed to co-operate at times because of class and caste-based distinctions.</p>
<p>These distinctions can be made without even touching on the theological differences within Sunni Islam alone. Deobandis, Barelvis and Salafis all have their own take on religious doctrine.</p>
<p>All these layers mean that no representative organisation and no individual or group of clerics can claim to represent British Muslims. Muslims are no clearer about what their neighbours and co-religionists are up to than anyone else.</p>
<h2>See no evil, believe no evil</h2>
<p>As a researcher of Muslim issues I have lost count of the number of times Muslim interviewees have told me that radicalisation or sexual exploitation doesn’t exist within their “community”. It’s not a Muslim problem they might suggest, but a problem with “other” Muslim groups: “a Pakistani problem”, a “Mirpuri problem”, a “Salafi issue”.</p>
<p>While this dissociation at first seems like denial, it is usually voiced because the individuals in question have simply never met any fellow Muslims who might become radicalised, or who they suspect of sexual offences. They don’t see evidence of such problems in their neighbourhood and don’t realise that they are defined themselves as part of a “community” with which they may have no contact. It’s little wonder they often feel unduly stigmatised by the debate and react defensively.</p>
<p>There are of course Muslim community groups but that doesn’t mean such a thing as the Muslim community exists – at least in the sense that we perceive. Organisations that are run by Muslims function in much the same way as any community group. They service people in a particular geographical locations, whether it’s providing young people with after-school activities, or providing spaces of prayer for worshippers in mosques. Yet they may be oblivious to events beyond their remit, and out of touch with the lives of those beyond their immediate congregation.</p>
<p>To tackle extremism, misogyny and abuse we often need to tap into the specialist knowledge that Muslim organisations can offer. But “communities” also have their limits. Muslim communities cannot and should not be seen as primarily responsible for fixing a vast array of social ills that arise from an complex array of social problems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arshad Isakjee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cases of extremist violence and sexual exploitation have caused significant anxiety in the UK in recent years and politicians are continually looking for ways to identify how these things happen and how…Arshad Isakjee, Researcher in Identity and Belonging, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/330372014-10-16T05:26:21Z2014-10-16T05:26:21ZTony Blair is wrong: teaching children to respect religion isn’t the answer to radicalisation<p>At a time of increasing concern about <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-fight-against-islamic-state-is-a-battle-for-young-minds-31710">religious radicalisation</a>, Tony Blair has issued a call for school children to be <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29553001">taught to respect religion</a>. But he’s got it wrong on all counts: it’s literacy about religion that our children need, not blanket respect for it. </p>
<p>Respect per se cannot provide children with the skills they need to navigate their relationships with each other, or in the wider world outside of the school gates. And in any case, not all ideas are worthy of respect. </p>
<p>There are many different religious beliefs practiced in the UK alone, let alone globally; even interfaith organisations which include more than just the Abrahamic religions (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), or the “top five” religions (adding Hinduism and Buddhism) still exclude some religious groups <a href="http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/faith/article3617192.ece">such as the Druids</a>. If we’re to teach our children to respect religions, we first need to figure out who decides which religions to “respect” with our attention – and which we can afford to overlook. </p>
<p>This isn’t a simple problem to solve, as the UK’s Supreme Court showed in 2013 when it <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25331754">reversed an earlier decision</a> that Scientology chapels were not religious places of worship. Given the level of animosity directed towards Scientologists, we can imagine that the decision to teach their beliefs and the need to respect them in schools would hardly be met with universal approval.</p>
<p>The point is that, seen from the outside, many religious ideas seem strange (so do many political ideas, but no-one is suggesting we should teach children to respect them). And at a time when even the beliefs and values of established religious organisations such as the Roman Catholic Church <a href="http://faithdebates.org.uk/blog/surveys-reveal-widening-gulf-catholics-church-teaching/">seem out of touch with even their own believers</a>, we should also ask how we decide what specific beliefs are worthy of respect and which aren’t. </p>
<h2>Solving the wrong problem</h2>
<p>In his piece, Blair argues that the reason we have to teach children to respect religion is to help tackle the problem of religious, specifically Islamic, extremism. But this starts with a religiously illiterate assumption – that religion is the problem. </p>
<p>Religion is already all around us; people, institutions and cultures are stuffed full of religiously informed values, histories and beliefs. While membership of most religious institutions in the UK has dropped in recent years, this can be seen as a measure of religious change, and <a href="http://kenanmalik.wordpress.com/2013/08/15/religion-is-not-what-it-used-to-be/">not necessarily as a decline</a>. </p>
<p>In most cases those values and beliefs are not a problem; they don’t threaten the fabric of our society, and they are in many cases simply invisible to the major news stories and issues of the day.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/Giv_XmOTr0w?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Linda Woodhead explains why most religious people are, in fact, normal.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But thanks to the well-established secular assumption that religion is an irrational problem which has no place in public debate, we still struggle to seeing it as anything other than <a href="http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/mems/newsrecords/2014/Gutkowski-book.aspx">a risk</a>. This is compounded when people erroneously assume that religious belief is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/radical-ideology-isnt-what-makes-extremists-turn-violent-27006">primary recruitment engine</a> for groups like Islamic State, something <a href="http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/projects/ideology-and-uncertainty/">my own research</a> challenges. </p>
<p>By pushing the need to tackle extremism as the main imperative for engaging with religion in schools, Blair is reinforcing the problem: children won’t learn to respect religion, they’ll simply fear it.</p>
<h2>Literacy, not respect</h2>
<p>Clearly, we do need to teach children more about religion. But rather than a divisive and unproductive conversation about which beliefs and religions are worthy of respect, and instead of assuming that this is an exercise in threat-reduction, we should be helping our children to be more religiously literate. </p>
<p>To be absolutely clear, I’m not suggesting we should teach children to be religious. (Indeed, a <a href="http://nsrn.net/">growing body of excellent research</a> suggests we need to be more literate about non-religious identities too.) Religious literacy means learning about other religions and engaging with other faith communities – areas in which the <a href="http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/">Tony Blair Faith Foundation</a> has undertaken some good work – but it also teaches children to be critically engaged with ideologies and ideas, not just aware of their contours. </p>
<p>This gives children the tools to interrogate the value and validity of all kinds of beliefs, including conspiracy theories or violent ideologies, and critical thinking skills have much broader application than just religions. Respect for ideas, where due, may follow but are not assumed. </p>
<p>This approach has a proven track record in the higher education sector with the <a href="http://religiousliteracyhe.org/">Religious Literacy Leadership Programme</a> (which I managed for a while). It has also been <a href="http://www.religiousliteracy.org/">used to aid</a> some of the sensitive discussions which bodies like the Equality and Human Rights Commission are involved in. </p>
<p>We certainly need to improve education about religion in our schools, and we should be thankful to Tony Blair for raising this issue. But religious literacy is a more productive approach than his counterproductive and reactionary suggestion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Francis receives funding from the RCUK Partnership for Conflict, Crime and Security Research.</span></em></p>At a time of increasing concern about religious radicalisation, Tony Blair has issued a call for school children to be taught to respect religion. But he’s got it wrong on all counts: it’s literacy about…Matthew Francis, Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/324872014-10-05T19:07:46Z2014-10-05T19:07:46ZIs it fair to blame the West for trouble in the Middle East?<p>For at least a decade, attempts to understand why some young Muslims living in Western countries turn to violence in the name of religion have raised questions about Western foreign policy in the Middle East. Many blame the United States’ foreign policy. The Islamic State uses anger and grievance against Western intervention as a powerful recruiting tool. </p>
<p>But is it really fair to blame Western foreign policy for the state of affairs in the Middle East?</p>
<p>There is some truth to the argument that anger at foreign policy and the West’s engagement with the Arab world is at the heart of Muslim anger, as well as a driver of radicalisation among Muslim youth. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60732/original/qg7rpcby-1412314875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60732/original/qg7rpcby-1412314875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60732/original/qg7rpcby-1412314875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60732/original/qg7rpcby-1412314875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60732/original/qg7rpcby-1412314875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60732/original/qg7rpcby-1412314875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60732/original/qg7rpcby-1412314875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60732/original/qg7rpcby-1412314875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US President George W. Bush and his senior staff in the Oval Office, working on the speech he delivered on the night of the September 11 attacks, 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The U.S. National Archives/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The “war on terror” – a phrase first used by US President George W. Bush just after the September 11 attacks in 2001 – was arguably a dismal failure.</p>
<p>American and British intelligence agencies have both reported that the US-led invasion of Iraq has actually increased the number of Islamist terrorists. The belief that the war on terror was a thinly disguised attempt to attack Islam was no longer limited to conspiracy theorists and 9/11 “truth seekers”. Instead, it became popularised among Muslims around the world.</p>
<p>However, to <em>solely</em> lay blame for the rise of a global and increasingly violent Jihadi movement on Western intervention ignores other crucial factors that allow extremism to take root and spread. </p>
<h2>The origins of extremism</h2>
<p>In his book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Fundamental-Fear-Eurocentrism-Emergence-Islamism/dp/1842771973">A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism</a>, <a href="http://www.sociology.leeds.ac.uk/people/staff/sayyid">Dr S. Sayyid</a> describes five arguments that explain the spread of what is commonly called Islamic fundamentalism, Islamism or militant Islamism.</p>
<ul>
<li>Islamism is a response to the failure of Arab leaders to deliver meaningful outcomes to their people. </li>
<li>Lacking opportunities for political participation, Arab citizens turned to mosques as public spaces for political discussion. As a result religion became the language of politics and of political change.</li>
<li>Post-colonialism also failed the Arab middle class, as the ruling elite continued to hold power and wealth. </li>
<li>Rapid economic growth in the emerging Gulf States increased the influence of conservative Muslim governments. At the same time, the expansion of the oil-based Gulf economy brought about uneven economic development, the response to which was growing support for Islamism as a mode of expression for internal grievances.</li>
<li>Finally, the spread of Islamism has also been due to the effects of cultural erosion and globalisation contributing to a Muslim identity crisis.</li>
</ul>
<p>So the current state of affairs in the Middle East is not simply an outcome of Western intervention and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. </p>
<p>Western foreign policy in the region has no doubt influenced the current situation. But the conditions for the spread of militant Islamism have come from attempts to deal with the crisis within: a crisis that is as much political in nature as it is religious.</p>
<h2>Filling a power vacuum</h2>
<p>In terms of politics, the traditional seats of power in the Arab world have been toppled, creating a void and opening opportunities for other Arab nations to vie for power. </p>
<p>With the decline of Egyptian power and ongoing chaos in Syria and Iraq, the Gulf states have emerged as the most economically and politically stable influences in the region. </p>
<p>Gulf state competition, particularly between Abu Dhabi and Doha, has become one of the defining features of the Middle East. While Doha supports the Syrian revolution as well as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, Abu Dhabi stands guarded against a foreign policy approach that strengthens Islamists.</p>
<p>Qatar, on the other hand, has been known to provide significant <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/qatar/11110931/How-Qatar-is-funding-the-rise-of-Islamist-extremists.html">financial assistance to violent Islamist groups</a>, including groups linked to Al Qaeda. It has also failed to act on wealthy citizens accused of financing terrorist organisations to the tune of millions of dollars.</p>
<p>Angered by its support for extremist groups, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia all <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/30/the_case_against_qatar_funding_extremists_salafi_syria_uae_jihad_muslim_brotherhood_taliban">withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar</a> in March this year.</p>
<p>The political struggle for power has also played out as a struggle for religious space in the Arab world. Here, the declining role of Saudi Arabia as the traditional seat of religious authority and knowledge has contributed, as Saudi Arabia also struggles to contain extremist Islamist elements within its own brand of Islam. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/saudi-arabia-deny-link-extremism-wahhabism.html">Links have been made</a> between Wahhabi Islam that originated in Saudi Arabia and the ideological frame of the jihadist movement. Such accusations have prompted Saudi Arabia to examine the Wahhabi Jihadist connection, leading to a review of religious programs and school curricular in the kingdom.</p>
<h2>Seeing beyond a ‘clash of civilisations’</h2>
<p>The Middle East is a complex mix of culture, religion, politics and history. To continue to engage with the Arab world on the basis of flawed assumptions that neatly divide it into the camp of moderate Islam and the camp of extreme Islam feeds into an equally flawed analysis of the conflict as a clash of civilisations.</p>
<p>It may be tempting to oversimplify the conflict as a battle of the West against Islam, just as it is tempting to overstate its origins in the history of Western intervention and foreign policy.</p>
<p>However, more nuanced analyses should also take into account the various internal factors that created the conditions for the spread of extremist Islamist ideologies in the first place. Such analyses are necessary to developing understanding of how to address the ongoing threat of non-state terrorism to national and international security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32487/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anne Aly is a board member of the Council for Australian Arab Relations, and the Founding Chair of People against Violent Extremism (PaVE).</span></em></p>For at least a decade, attempts to understand why some young Muslims living in Western countries turn to violence in the name of religion have raised questions about Western foreign policy in the Middle…Anne Aly, Associate Professor, Department of Social Science and International Studies, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/318722014-09-24T16:31:02Z2014-09-24T16:31:02ZEuropean governments play their part in driving young Muslims to extremism<p>Governments in Europe have been horrified to see their young nationals turning to extremist groups and committing terrible acts in their name, but few have stopped to think about how their own policies have contributed to the problem.</p>
<p>For decades, European countries have made it difficult for young people to be pious Muslims and feel European at the same time. But that hasn’t stopped them, it has simply taught them that their new-found faith may not be compatible with their European life. That in turn makes them all the more vulnerable to people <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-very-french-jihad-hundreds-head-to-syria-and-paris-fears-their-return-26077">recruiting for extremist groups</a>.</p>
<p>Islam is now a significant part of the young, racially-mixed urban culture that exists all over Europe and, to some extent, North America. Thousands of Europeans convert to Islam and many ethnic Muslims who did not grow up in religious homes find Islam through friends.</p>
<h2>Making new friends</h2>
<p>Converted or born-again newcomers to Islam who find religion on their own often don’t fully understand that there are many different interpretations of Islam. They try to learn about the faith either on the internet or through neighbourhood mosques.</p>
<p>Many of them often end up in puritan <a href="http://www.theweek.co.uk/politics/6073/what-salafism-and-should-we-be-worried">Salafi mosques</a>, which promote the idea of leaving all Western traditions behind and strictly emulating the life of Prophet Muhammad. Salafism is at heart a particularly conservative branch of Sunni Islam.</p>
<p>Salafis in Europe reach out to young people and converts more than other branches of Islam. Most Sunni mosques in Western Europe often have ties to countries such as Turkey or Morocco, where national mosque communities are less welcoming of converts, which makes them less approachable to Europeans. Mosques in the west that depend on financial support and other resources from these countries tend to function in the language of the immigrant community and are not welcoming to third or fourth-generation Muslims who do not speak these languages. </p>
<p>Salafi mosques operate quite differently in European cities. They are among the few Islamic centres to use the local European language as their main mode of communication rather than Arabic and their communities tend to reflect the national and racial diversity of their surrounding neighbourhoods. Most Salafi communities across Europe are not jihadist, and even stay away from political engagement. Most converts or born-again Muslims, especially those with a criminal, find their lives are significantly improved by joining Salafi communities. They finish school, get married, establish businesses, and start a new life.</p>
<p>The problem can be that the isolationist nature of Salafi communities also provides a context for jihadists to recruit young and impressionable new Muslims. Because Salafi communities prize leading a lifestyle cut off from non-Muslims and other branches of Islam, newcomers to religion often turn their back on their families and friends and are more easily impressed by the new people they meet, even when they promote radical ideas. </p>
<p>European Muslim converts are an excellent opportunity for jihadists, as they come with valuable resources such as money, mobility, linguistic ability and access to technology.</p>
<h2>No direction</h2>
<p>For decades, many European governments have made life difficult for European Muslims. They have treated individuals or groups that promoted Islam among, say, French or German nationals, with suspicion. They have instead supported mosques that centre around one or another distinct national group. Rather than making it possible for people to receive Islamic education in their local context and local language, governments have enabled Imams who do not speak the local language and know nothing of local culture or issues to carry on as they were, rather than adapting.</p>
<p>These policies have ensured that most mosques do not speak to the realities of young people in their areas. Despite their isolation from other branches of Islam and Western culture, Salafi mosques have stood apart in this respect. They reject the Western way of life but are keen to recruit more people away from it at the same time. They are streets ahead of national mosques in tuning into European culture and life and are an appealing option as a result.</p>
<h2>Changing times</h2>
<p>European conversion to Islam is part and parcel of the immigration process. As Muslims become more European, more Europeans will become Muslims and children of non-religious Muslim immigrants will become more involved in Islam independently of their families. </p>
<p>The solution to the integration of Muslims is also an answer to radicalisation. European governments should trust and support individuals and organisations who promote being both Europeans and pious Muslims. They should encourage Islamic education in the local language and stop treating converts as threats to the nation.</p>
<p>Being European and a pious Muslim should not feel like a devious act that can be practised only away from mainstream society. That will only reinforce the equation of being a European Muslim with being radical. It will make it easier for jihadists to appeal to young Muslim converts and born-again Muslims.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Esra Özyürek received funding from German Academic Exchange Program, Fulbright Foundation, and Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to do research on this issue.</span></em></p>Governments in Europe have been horrified to see their young nationals turning to extremist groups and committing terrible acts in their name, but few have stopped to think about how their own policies…Esra Özyürek, Associate Professor in Contemporary Turkish Studies, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/318422014-09-19T05:01:24Z2014-09-19T05:01:24ZTerrorists can be defeated by fighting fear with co-operation<p>From <a href="http://www.loc.gov/rr/news/topics/anarchy.html">anarchists in the 1920s</a> and <a href="http://factsanddetails.com/world/cat58/sub385/item2372.html">radical leftists in the 1960s</a>, to fringe, extreme-right <a href="http://www.salon.com/2013/08/03/the_10_worst_examples_of_christian_or_far_right_terrorism_partner/">Christian bombers or gunmen</a> in the United States in recent decades, or radical Islamists such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/islamic-state">Islamic State</a> today, terrorist groups have one thing in common. They seek to shock, while simultaneously portraying themselves as victims. While their beliefs can vary wildly, what they all share is the “propaganda of the deed” in their extreme violent activities. </p>
<p>Typically, political violence in the most extreme form – terrorism – usually will see groups <a href="http://m.theage.com.au/comment/seeking-calm-amid-violence-fear-and-outrage-20140918-10iwud.html">fracture in to smaller sub-groups</a>. Once violence is legitimated, it then becomes a way to settle internal disagreements as well. </p>
<p>Given that we have seen a number of terrorist groups come and go over the decades, it bears scrutiny how these various groups were successfully stopped, as well as where governments failed. Buying in to media hype actually helps terrorist organisations to create public suspicion, division among groups and eventual social disorder where terrorism can thrive. </p>
<p>Whether it is in Iraq, Australia, Britain, or Canada, radical groups will try to draw legitimate political authorities into a violent confrontation of some kind.</p>
<p>Public and government reprisals against any defined group is <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-wants-australians-to-attack-muslims-terror-expert-31845">precisely what terrorists want</a>. It legitimates their standing as victims rising up against their oppressors through the use of violence, ever more extreme. </p>
<p>This is at least one reason why launching military raids against Islamic State is so risky. It is also why large-scale invasions of homes – although sometimes necessary – must be managed carefully to avoid creating deeper community divisions, which can inadvertently play into the terrorists’ hands.</p>
<p>And there are lessons from overseas – including from Canada, Northern Ireland, Indonesia and Malaysia – on how we might manage today’s terrorists threats.</p>
<h2>Canada’s handling of violent separatists</h2>
<p>In the 1960s and 1970s, Canada faced its own “homegrown terror cell”: French-Canadian nationalists <a href="http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/front-de-liberation-du-quebec/">the Front de libération du Québec</a> (or FLQ). The FLQ had a history of deadly armed robbery and more than 200 bombings. In October 1970, they kidnapped a British diplomat and demanded the release of 23 prisoners in return for releasing him.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=830&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=830&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=830&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1043&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1043&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59517/original/jdk68zjn-1411101706.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1043&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A post box in Montreal graffitied with “FLQ oui” (FLQ yes) in support of the violent extremist group, photographed in 1971.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Harryzilber/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s response to what became known as <a href="http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/october-crisis/">the October crisis</a> was criticised by some at the time. But it is widely seen now as a political masterstroke. </p>
<p>Showing the force of legislative powers by invoking <a href="http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/war-measures-act/">the War Measures Act</a>, Trudeau sent tanks and soldiers in full battle gear into the streets of Montreal to show that the state was mobilised and ready. However, Trudeau avoided wholesale raids on homes (although some were indeed raided). </p>
<p>At the same time, a clear, sympathetic message was delivered by the government that Quebec’s French-speaking locals were right to be disgruntled about feeling like second-class citizens. Trudeau <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-crisis-civil-liberties-suspended/flq-backgrounder.html">reinforced linguistic and cultural recognition</a> of the minority that the FLQ terrorists were trying to appeal to, so the government undermined their legitimacy.</p>
<h2>From the Troubles to Toronto</h2>
<p>Crackdowns on communities rarely work without serious consequences. A good example of the failure of a heavy-handed approach can be seen in how successive British governments tried to “solve” <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/histories/troubles">Northern Ireland’s violent 30-year conflict</a> with military crackdowns, without addressing underlying community concerns. </p>
<p>Ultimately it was patient political negotiation through the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement">Good Friday Agreement</a> that ended decades of bloodshed.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/mfn93qqvA8E?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Hustontv looks back on the Good Friday Agreement.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More recently in 2006, Canada faced a terrorist plot similar to what has been alleged here in Australia this week. A group of 18 young men – commonly referred to as the “Toronto 18” – were arrested over ambitious though amateurish plans to carry out a series of armed assaults and truck bombings (using a tonne of ammonium nitrate purchased on one perpetrator’s credit card). There were even discussions about beheading Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and driving a ute up the steps of the parliament in Ottawa. </p>
<p>The local and federal police forces succeeded in tracking and infiltrating the group, partly thanks to cooperation from the local Islamic community. While some of the men got off with only light sentences (and two of the accused are believed to have <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5044560.stm">died fighting in Syria</a>), Canada has since reviewed its terrorism sentencing and brought in <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/03/05/the-defining-case-for-trying-terrorists/">life sentences</a> as a much stronger deterrent.</p>
<h2>Community leadership</h2>
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<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Queensland Police Commissioner Ian Stewart at a Logan Mosque open day on Friday September 19, held to bring Muslim and non-Muslim Australians together after this week’s terrorism raids.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">@KathLanders/Twitter</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
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<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Queensland Police Commissioner Ian Stewart on Twitter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Crucially, in many of the recent cases of radicalised young men both in Canada and in Australia, members of the Islamic community have often helped to identify the radicals amongst themselves. While many did not agree with the sometimes heavy-handed approach of investigations, they certainly did not want the violence brought to their own communities.</p>
<p>Since the Toronto 18 case, further plots have occurred in Canada but have <a href="http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/04/22/suspects_in_toronto_terror_plot_arrested_sources.html">been quietly thwarted</a>. Last year, two Canadian men were arrested for plotting to derail a passenger train travelling between Toronto and New York – and <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/news-video/video-via-train-plot-tip-came-from-religious-leader/article11493030/?from=11492749">it was a tip-off from a prominent Toronto imam</a> (Muslim community leader) concerned about the one of the suspect’s behaviour that sparked the investigation. As local man <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/news-video/video-via-train-plot-tip-came-from-religious-leader/article11493030/?from=11492749">Hussan Hamdani explains in this news video</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This was a tip that came from the Muslim community because they had good relations with [the Canadian police], because they had this long-standing bridge-building long before this incident ever took place. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Community cooperation in the UK and Australia has also been vital, as both the former head of international counter-terrorism at New Scotland Yard, <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-wants-australians-to-attack-muslims-terror-expert-31845">Nick O'Brien</a>, and the Global Terrorism Research Centre international director, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-raising-australias-terrorism-alert-to-high-would-mean-for-you-31510">Greg Barton</a>, have said this week. For example, the 2005 arrests of men in Melbourne and Sydney under <a href="http://www.cdpp.gov.au/case-reports/operation-pendennis/">Operation Pendennis</a> followed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mosques-muslims-and-myths-overcoming-fear-in-our-suburbs-31822">tip-off from Melbourne’s Muslim community</a>.</p>
<h2>Tracking a radical minority</h2>
<p>Terrorism is not a new problem. If history teaches us anything, it’s that close connections with any self-defined community – especially one that is having a series of internal problems associated with violence – is a key to effective policing. </p>
<p>In Indonesia and Malaysia, counter-terror measures include cataloguing how radical Islamists are speaking in public and what actions they suggest their followers take. </p>
<p>The authorities know where the threat lies, and allowing the preaching to go on takes away the argument that radical Islam is being stifled. In the meantime, Indonesia proceeds along a path of democratisation. That’s certainly not without problems – but for a nation of 250 million people, <a href="https://theconversation.com/indonesias-democratic-masses-brought-victory-to-jokowi-29569">its democratic progress in less than two decades</a> has been extraordinary.</p>
<h2>The good news</h2>
<p>If there any upside to this week’s raids and terrorism allegations, it’s that the plotters in Australia don’t seem to show anywhere near the same levels of organisational competence as other terror cells in war zones such as Iraq and Syria. If the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-18/authorities-thwart-beheading-plot-in-australias-biggest-raid/5754276">police allegation</a> that an order to attack a random Australian citizen was given over the phone is true, that’s hardly a sophisticated way of avoiding detection.</p>
<p>At present, radical Islamic terrorists do not appear to have the capacity to develop well-organised cells in places like Australia or Canada, and will most likely dissipate as previous anarchists and ultra-Marxists did decades ago. </p>
<p>The next big question in all of this is how to de-radicalise. What has worked and what has failed in terms of de-radicalisation efforts by various governments? Hopefully, the government is engaged in a careful consideration of this, and has thought about how other countries have handled the problem of domestic terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31842/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Imre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From anarchists in the 1920s and radical leftists in the 1960s, to fringe, extreme-right Christian bombers or gunmen in the United States in recent decades, or radical Islamists such as Islamic State today…Robert Imre, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of NewcastleLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/318222014-09-18T20:26:41Z2014-09-18T20:26:41ZMosques, Muslims and myths: overcoming fear in our suburbs<p>Since Australians woke to the news of yesterday morning’s counter-terrorism raids in Sydney, Brisbane and Logan, talkback radio and the TV news have filled with talk of “home-grown terrorism” and “enemies within”. </p>
<p>There have been claims that Australia’s <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2071.0main+features902012-2013">half a million Muslims</a> have particular difficulty “fitting in” and that their presence is a threat to social cohesion. </p>
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<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Many people took to social media in response to yesterday’s counter-terrorism raids – including Liberal Senator Cory Bernardi and Monash University’s Susan Carland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Twitter</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That’s not unique to Australia. For instance, in the United Kingdom, it is sometimes claimed that Muslim Britons live alongside – but not with – their non-Muslim fellow citizens. </p>
<p>So what is the evidence that anything other than a tiny minority of Muslim Australians don’t want to live decent, ordinary lives, like the thousands who gathered for a <a href="https://au.news.yahoo.com/nsw/a/24989096/father-of-australian-islamic-state-fighter-warns-parents-to-be-vigilant-about-extremist-behaviour/">Muslims Love Australia</a> community barbecue in Sydney’s south-west on Sunday?</p>
<p>And given the fierce anti-Islamic protests in some areas – as seen on the Gold Coast in the past week, where a councillor reported <a href="http://www.skynews.com.au/news/national/2014/09/12/rape--death-threats-over-qld-mosque-plan.html">rape and death threats from anonymous anti-mosque protesters</a> – what’s the evidence that we should be afraid of mosques in our midst?</p>
<h2>Are mosques the problem or part of the solution?</h2>
<p>Only hours after yesterday’s raids, I was involved with the launch of the <a href="http://uws.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/754140/IS0001_ISRA_NSW_Msq_Rprt.pdf">Mosques of Sydney and NSW Research Report 2014</a> at the New South Wales Parliament. The research was done by one of my PhD students, Husnia Underabi, in conjunction with the Islamic Sciences and Research Academy and the Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation at Charles Sturt University.</p>
<p>The report surveyed 50 of New South Wales’ 167 Islamic places of worship to provide a picture of the formal religious experiences of the state’s 170,000 Muslims.</p>
<p>Mosques and other religious centres are too easily characterised as incubators of separation and radicalisation. Yet Underabi’s Mosque Report shows that as well as being places of prayer and communion, mosques have increasingly become places of social work. This includes weekend schools, language classes, women’s group meetings and marriage guidance, as well as child and youth activities. </p>
<p>Underabi’s report demonstrates how most mosques are hubs for engagement, civic participation and charitable work. They are places that encourage greater national identification and belonging. <a href="http://uws.edu.au/newscentre/news_centre/more_news_stories/study_details_changing_face_of_mosques_in_nsw">She found</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Most NSW mosques are involved in either interfaith dialogue or open days to invite non-Muslims to the mosque, indicating that mosques are involved with the wider society and are willing to communicate and exchange ideas. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Her research also found that:</p>
<ul>
<li>the majority of mosque leaders feel Australian Muslims should participate in Australia’s civic institutions;</li>
<li>more than half (56%) of the mosques indicated having female representation in the mosque committee;</li>
<li>whereas mosques in the past served only one ethnic group, almost all mosques in NSW now serve people of many ethnic backgrounds.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Are Muslim and Western values incompatible?</h2>
<p>Over the last decade there has been a rapid expansion of scholarship on the supposed difficulties of Muslims living in Western countries. One branch of this research is based on the common angst about Muslim incompatibility with “Western values”. Some of this angst focuses on the threat from radicalisation, if not terrorism. </p>
<p>A good deal of government-funded research in Australia on Muslims since 2007 has come from funding schemes with a de-radicalisation mission. In Australia this included the <a href="http://www.crc.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/19729/2012_National_Action_Plan_Final_Evaluation.pdf">National Action Plan To Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security</a>.</p>
<p>The catalyst for this funding and the resulting research projects was the London bombings of July 7, 2005. Much of this research was therefore focused on the threat of home-grown terrorism, specifically the vulnerability of young Australian Muslims to radicalisation. </p>
<p>But an unfortunate effect of this mission was that it reinforced many of the <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9663.00158/abstract">core stereotypes of Islam in the West</a>: of militancy, fanaticism, intolerance, fundamentalism, misogyny and of alien-ness.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59434/original/vd6cgjfc-1411039569.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59434/original/vd6cgjfc-1411039569.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/59434/original/vd6cgjfc-1411039569.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59434/original/vd6cgjfc-1411039569.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59434/original/vd6cgjfc-1411039569.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=602&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59434/original/vd6cgjfc-1411039569.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59434/original/vd6cgjfc-1411039569.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/59434/original/vd6cgjfc-1411039569.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=756&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australians’ religious affiliations, as reported in the 2011 Census. The Australian population is now estimated to be more than 23.6 million, so if the proportion of Australians identifying as Muslim has remained the same, there would be about 520,000 Muslims now.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2071.0main+features902012-2013">Australian Bureau of Statistics</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Australian Muslims have faced ongoing frustrations in getting <a href="http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/gold-coast-mosque-rejection-common-sense-20140916-10ho4l.html">places of worship</a>, <a href="http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/developers-of-islamic-school-at-camden-retreat-as-real-estate-agents-put-site-up-for-sale-again/story-e6freuzi-1226296361476">schools</a> and renovations approved by local councils. This has happened in other Western nations too. Unfortunately, Islamaphobia continues to feed opposition to new mosques. </p>
<p>Of course, this is but one manifestation of the negative effects of Islamaphobia. There are also the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-05/vandals-graffiti-cairns-mosque/5070180">attacks on existing mosques</a>, verbal attacks, <a href="http://www.heraldsun.com.au/leader/east/thugs-bash-muslim-schoolgirl-wearing-hijab-in-wantirna-south/story-fngnvlxu-1226773375213">physical assaults</a> and prejudice. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.uws.edu.au/ssap/ssap/research/challenging_racism">Challenging Racism Project</a> data reveal that over 60% of Australian Muslims have experienced racism in the workplace or when seeking employment.</p>
<h2>Community safety starts with all of us</h2>
<p>As the former head of International Counter Terrorism in Special Branch at New Scotland Yard, <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-wants-australians-to-attack-muslims-terror-expert-31845">Nick O'Brien, wrote in The Conversation</a> last night:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s in the interests of Islamic State for Muslims in Australia to be attacked or for their mosques to be attacked, because doing so would help divide the Australian community … it’s only a tiny minority of the Muslim community that are ever involved in any kind of extreme action. The vast majority are decent, ordinary people.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, the international director of Monash University’s Global Terrorism Research Centre <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-raising-australias-terrorism-alert-to-high-would-mean-for-you-31510">Greg Barton has warned</a> that a knee-jerk, anti-Muslim reaction is a threat to our national security.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Trust between different ethnic and religious groups across Australia and with our security authorities is the bedrock of our security … In many cases where passports have been withheld in Australia, the tip-offs have come through the community.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For example, in 2005 a terrorism plot involving guns, ammunition and bomb-making equipment was thwarted after a <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2014/s4090094.htm?site=melbourne">tip-off from Melbourne’s Muslim community</a>. After a long investigation, police arrested men in Melbourne and Sydney under <a href="http://www.cdpp.gov.au/case-reports/operation-pendennis/">Operation Pendennis</a>.</p>
<p>Muslim parents, friends and community leaders are vital for helping authorities know about the tiny minority of young Australians who may be sufficiently disenchanted to be radicalised.</p>
<h2>Low-key but effective policing</h2>
<p>Over the last four years we have analysed the work of the Community Engagement Unit within the Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command of the NSW Police Force. </p>
<p>Beyond the spectacular raids, such as those that occurred yesterday, there is the day-to-day counter-terrorism work that is done in our cities. That everyday effort includes police undertaking mundane intelligence gathering and liaison work, and building good relationships with communities. </p>
<p>Indeed, a large part of the counter-terrorism work – the primary interventions against radicalisation – is done by and through the communities. This mode of policing is called “community policing” and involves co-operation with communities. </p>
<p>That work is done through community infrastructures, including local mosques and the Islamic associations. Mosques are not our problem; instead, they are a fundamental part of the solution to radicalisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31822/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Dunn receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Islamic Sciences and Research Academy and the NSW Police Force.</span></em></p>Since Australians woke to the news of yesterday morning’s counter-terrorism raids in Sydney, Brisbane and Logan, talkback radio and the TV news have filled with talk of “home-grown terrorism” and “enemies…Kevin Dunn, Dean of the School of Social Science and Psychology, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/317102014-09-18T11:01:51Z2014-09-18T11:01:51ZThe fight against Islamic State is a battle for young minds<p>Governments around the world are trying to come to terms with the fact that their nationals – and young people in particular – are leaving to join extremist groups such as Islamic State.</p>
<p>In response, ministers are threatening to <a href="https://theconversation.com/removing-citizenship-will-only-encourage-uk-jihadists-30754">remove their citizenship</a>. Britain is planning to join <a href="https://theconversation.com/boots-already-on-the-ground-as-us-mission-in-iraq-accelerates-31653">military action</a> in the areas controlled by IS but the battle against radicalisation is not one that can be won by military force or heavy-handed sanctions. In fact, that might make things worse.</p>
<p>The battleground against radicalisation is waged in the mind. It is here that persuasive arguments and passionate discussion appeal to the hero inside us to rise up and do something, be someone or make history. </p>
<p>Radicalisation begins like a seed and grows. It thrives best in the dark, best in isolation and best in soil that has been well manured. Foreign policy often provides a fertile bed of manure in which the seeds of radicalisation can grow. That’s not because foreign policy is manure but because it is easy to make it look as if it is. Negatively slanted, twisted and inaccurate accounts of any policy are difficult to challenge without lengthy investigation.</p>
<p>What is the UK’s foreign policy on Syria, for example? Those seeking to radicalise others will be able to summarise it in a <a href="http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/al-muhajiroun/">single sentence</a>. That sentence is likely to be accepted because it is difficult to find a simple counter argument. The more negative the policy is perceived to be, the less human the government or even British people are perceived to be. </p>
<p>This is important because radicalisation thrives when we start to see our enemy as less human than ourselves.</p>
<h2>Us and them</h2>
<p>The process of radicalisation involves getting us to focus on the negative experiences we have had and the negative experiences of those we love or should love. It asks us to provide an explanation for those things and when we can’t, it offers us one. These things happen to us because some enemy wants them to, chooses them to and allows them to. We then isolate ourselves from this enemy, focusing on the difference between us and them and emphasise the wrongs that they do. </p>
<p>And this in turn starts a process of dehumanisation in our minds. The apparently British IS fighter known as Jihadi John, for example, refers to David Cameron as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/terribly-effective-islamic-state-propaganda-draws-the-west-into-another-conflict-31801">“lapdog”</a> in the video showing the killing of hostage David Haines. He lays the blame for each of the killings squarely with British and American foreign policy. </p>
<p>Religion can also provide a simplistic, absolute framework behind which to hide from discussion, debate and accountability. It provides a foundation for difference. “Us” becomes people of the same religion and the “enemy” becomes anyone outside that group. The enemy is qualitatively different, not as human and maybe not even human at all – just a dog. This, for some, provides permission to use harm against others. </p>
<p>Years of peace talks in <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-ireland-has-come-far-since-1984-partition-plan-21763">Northern Ireland</a> have shown how important it is to undo narratives of difference to make progress. The sight of Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness sharing a joke like regular people in 2007 has, in the wake of the former’s death, been <a href="https://theconversation.com/ian-paisley-from-sectarian-provocateur-to-peacemaker-31655">cited as a symbol of change</a> in the country. The more human we can make the enemy, the less we will feel separated from them. Only when we stop seeing the opposition as completely different to us, can we start to be reconciled with them.</p>
<p>Rational arguments are one way to contradict the line peddled by radicals. The UK’s policy on Syria has many dimensions. The British public is deeply committed to humanitarian and charitable support, as was made clear when <a href="http://www.dec.org.uk/blog/uk-public-donate-%C2%A334m-syria-crisis-appeal">£3.4m</a> was donated to the cause in just 48 hours in March 2013. The government, on behalf of the taxpayer, donated £11.4bn in aid the same year, with £600m set aside for the Syrian crisis alone. These kinds of figures provide useful ammunition in the battle of the mind. The apparent enemy becomes less hostile and more human.</p>
<p>But reason alone will not win the battle for the mind. Some young people see no opportunity to get involved and make a difference other than by joining the jihad. It’s positive that young people are passionate about inequality, just not that they see violence as the only way to address it.</p>
<p>Perhaps this is where opportunity lies for the UK government. Shouting about the positive work it does internationally, offering young people the chance to make a positive contribution and acting transparently are all ways to counteract the messages being sent to young people by those who wish to indoctrinate them. An alternative needs to be offered on the other side, such as providing opportunities for young people to debate and engage in politics beyond casting a vote.</p>
<p>Military force is not the solution to this problem. At a recent sermon in my local church, we were told: “If, in order to defeat the beast, we become the beast; then the beast has won”. It’s not easy to rid people of firmly held prejudices but a consistent and reasonable argument is a better way to start than threats about removing passports or prison sentences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicola Bowes does not work for, consult with own shares in or receive funding from any organisation or individual who might benefit from this article and anticipates no conflicts of interest with submitting this perspective for The Conversation.</span></em></p>Governments around the world are trying to come to terms with the fact that their nationals – and young people in particular – are leaving to join extremist groups such as Islamic State. In response, ministers…Nicola Bowes, Forensic Psychologist and Senior Lecturer in Forensic Psychology, Cardiff Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/310282014-09-01T05:09:07Z2014-09-01T05:09:07ZShadow of extremism scandal lingers as Birmingham goes back to school<p>If a week is a long time in politics, then the school summer holidays must have seemed like a lifetime the for governors, teachers, pupils and staff at the <a href="http://theconversation.com/operation-trojan-horse-examining-the-islamic-takeover-of-birmingham-schools-25764">21 schools at the centre</a> of the Trojan Horse plot in Birmingham. </p>
<p>Allegations made in an anonymous letter – now widely <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/13/alleged-islamic-plot-birmingham-schools-possible-hoax">thought to be a hoax</a> – surfaced in March of a “plot” to overthrow existing teachers and governors in non-faith state schools as a means of replacing them with “Islam-friendly” individuals prepared to run the schools in accordance with conservative Islamic principles. In response, the 21 schools were subjected to what can only be described as unprecedented levels of public and <a href="http://theconversation.com/birmingham-has-most-to-lose-from-gove-may-extremism-row-27650">political scrutiny</a>.</p>
<p>While the summer holidays provided some respite – not least because the allegations have finally begun to disappear from the public gaze – the spectre of Trojan Horse will once more raise its ugly head as schools go back across Birmingham. The new academic year will see staff, pupils and parents beginning the process of dealing with the fallout from the allegations.</p>
<h2>Impact on parents and pupils</h2>
<p>In a handful of schools, <a href="https://theconversation.com/trojan-horse-snap-school-inspections-will-not-solve-wider-governance-issues-27824">Ofsted investigators</a> raised important concerns about certain aspects of school governance and five were <a href="http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/news/advice-note-provided-academies-and-maintained-schools-birmingham-secretary-of-state-for-education-rt">put into special measures</a>. But given that a number of governors involved have <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/jun/20/saltley-school-governors-resign-ofsted-trojan-horse">already resigned</a> or left their posts, addressing these very clear issues should be relatively unproblematic. </p>
<p>We should not overlook the fact that some of the schools concerned had been transformed from failing to <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/oldknow-academy-birmingham-schools-trojan-horse-ofsted">outstanding</a> under those same governors. Parents may be supportive of how the schools were being run, thereby raising the possibility of some being unhappy and even unwilling to support the changes required – especially if claims that <a href="http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/trojan-horse-involve-parents-future-7686181">new governors have failed to involve parents</a> are correct. Some might also point to reports that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-28878927">GCSE results at two of the schools have fallen</a> since the investigations and changes have been made. </p>
<p>There will also be concern among parents about the long-term impact on their children, some fearing that the allegations will detrimentally impact their future job and education opportunities. As the former <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/muslims-birmingham-schools-education-nicky-morgan">Birmingham councillor Salma Yaqoob</a> put it: “The impact of this stigma on a whole generation of the city’s Muslim students when applying to universities and jobs cannot be overstated.” </p>
<p>This fear of being seen to be guilty by association – of being an extremist or at least sympathetic to the goals and objectives of extremists – is a real and tangible one, something that will be as relevant to staff at the schools as the pupils.</p>
<h2>Solutions to extremism</h2>
<p>Over the space of a few months, the Trojan Horse allegations became conflated with the wider <a href="http://theconversation.com/birmingham-has-most-to-lose-from-gove-may-extremism-row-27650">issue of tackling extremism</a>. Former prime minister Tony Blair <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/10900955/Trojan-Horse-plot-driven-by-same-warped-Islamic-extremism-as-Boko-Harams-says-Tony-Blair.html">suggested</a> the allegations in Birmingham’s schools were directly linked to the kidnapping of <a href="https://theconversation.com/boko-haram-the-terror-group-that-kidnapped-200-schoolgirls-25931">200 girls by Boko Haram</a> militants in Nigeria. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/340526/HC_576_accessible_-.pdf">report</a> anti-terror chief Peter Clarke, brought in to investigate the allegations in Birmingham on behalf of the Department for Education, said: “I have neither specifically looked for nor found any evidence of terrorism, violent extremism or radicalisation in any of the schools we examined in detail.”</p>
<p>But that same perceived link has again raised its ugly head in relation to the <a href="http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9293762/the-british-beheaders/">growing number of British Muslims</a> going to fight in Syria and Iraq for Islamic State. </p>
<p>Focusing on the threat they might subsequently pose to Britain if and when they might decide to return, some commentators suggested that <a href="http://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/484061/The-Sunday-Express-on-British-children-traffic-wardens-and-Andy-Murray">extremism in British schools</a> is a causal factor in the decision-making of those choosing to fight in the Middle East. </p>
<p>The “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11052510/We-must-give-ourselves-all-the-legal-powers-we-need-to-prevail.html">solution</a>” being posited by politicians and commentators alike to this growing challenge is extremely similar to what has been suggested in relation to solving the “problem” in Birmingham’s schools: the need to place a greater emphasis on the teaching of <a href="https://theconversation.com/promoting-british-values-opens-up-a-can-of-worms-for-teachers-27846">“British values”</a> as part of the school curriculum.</p>
<h2>‘Clear message’ to British Muslims</h2>
<p>In spite of the lack of evidence of extremism in Birmingham’s schools, <a href="http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9780754651406">as my research has shown</a>, many in wider society believe that there is “no smoke without fire” when it comes to Muslims and Islam. So it is almost certain that many people in Britain will believe that a culture of extremism exists within Birmingham’s schools, even though there is little to substantiate such claims.</p>
<p>This has a potential impact on all Britain’s Muslims, and it will further add to the weariness that is already apparent in the Birmingham community. Many of the city’s Muslims are still reeling from the impact of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-13331161">now defunct Project Champion</a> – where more than 200 “spy” cameras were placed around two of the most densely populated Muslim areas in the city. <a href="http://etn.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/07/05/1468796813492488">Research I did with my colleague Arshad Isakjee</a> highlighted that the message from this is that Birmingham’s Muslims are a “suspect community”. </p>
<p>Trojan Horse will only reinforce this further and its shadow will be felt for some time yet. As children across the country return to school for the new academic year, many in Birmingham will be feeling just that little bit more anxious and fraught, increasingly isolated and marginalised. In doing so, the message that they do not belong – not even to the city in which they were born, grew up and continue to live – might just be the very message that the true extremists will want ordinary Muslims in Birmingham and elsewhere to hear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31028/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Allen is an independent member of the Coalition Government's Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group. He receives no remuneration for this.</span></em></p>If a week is a long time in politics, then the school summer holidays must have seemed like a lifetime the for governors, teachers, pupils and staff at the 21 schools at the centre of the Trojan Horse…Chris Allen, Lecturer in Social Policy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/285352014-07-03T05:02:03Z2014-07-03T05:02:03ZOur anti-terrorism laws aren’t equipped to handle Britons who fight jihad elsewhere<p>British support for opposition groups fighting against the Assad regime in Syria has waned considerably since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/commons-rejects-cameron-plea-for-syria-strikes-rewrites-special-relationship-17674">summer of 2013</a>, with the increasing prominence of more radicalised Islamic organisations such as ISIS in that conflict. With this conflict now spilling over to Iraq and the hundreds of UK citizens embroiled in the fighting, identifying who is actually a terrorist and a threat to the UK is becoming more difficult than ever. </p>
<p>The police and intelligence services have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27968963">warned</a> about the potential threat posed by individuals returning to the UK from these conflicts – but there is no easy way of identifying which returning combatants are “radicalised” and which ones are not.</p>
<h2>The enemy of my enemy</h2>
<p>Earlier this year, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/20/briton-convicted-terror-offence-syria-jihadist-training-camp">Mashudur Choudhury</a> became the first Briton convicted of terrorist offences related to the Syria conflict. Choudhury was never actually accused of being a threat to the UK, but this was not necessary; the British definition of terrorism covers not only acts of terrorism against the UK but also, as clarified by the Court of Appeal in an <a href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/243.html">earlier case</a>, against all governments – including those that are non-democratic or tyrannical. </p>
<p>But by taking this line, the UK is prosecuting individuals for fighting against a regime the British government itself <a href="https://theconversation.com/commons-rejects-cameron-plea-for-syria-strikes-rewrites-special-relationship-17674">sought to confront with military action</a> less than a year ago. Indeed, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/world/africa/10libya.html?pagewanted=all">the Libyan combatants that NATO assisted</a> in the 2011 military intervention against Gaddafi’s regime also potentially fitted the definition of terrorism to which Choudhury was held.</p>
<p>This contradiction will have to be directly addressed. Given the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10611286/700-Britons-fighting-in-Syria-terror-groups-warns-Hollande.html">sheer number</a> of UK citizens now apparently fighting in Syria, Choudhury will not remain an isolated case for long. </p>
<p>As things stand, the hundreds of UK citizens expected to return home from fighting in Syria and elsewhere could all expect to be prosecuted, since they are all potentially terrorists under UK law. British prosecutors, therefore, will soon be left on the front line .</p>
<h2>Leaving it to the lawyers</h2>
<p>In deciding whether to bring terrorist charges against an individual, prosecutors and police may very well be taking into account whether an individual does pose a risk to the UK, but this is not an explicit requirement of the legislation. While prosecutors should certainly consider whether bringing a case to court would be in the <a href="http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/codetest.html">public interest</a>, assessing whether an individual is or is not a terrorist is much more political than that. </p>
<p>Indeed, an argument could very well be made that it is in the public interest to deter others from travelling to armed conflicts around the world. Choudhury’s prosecution certainly suggests that the Crown Prosecution Service is taking this route.</p>
<p>Yet while many combatants may harbour no ill will towards the UK, a security crackdown that impacts adversely on one section of the community would be counter-productive. For a salutary warning, we need only look to the effects of <a href="http://www.museumoffreederry.org/history-internment01.html">internment in Northern Ireland</a> in the 1970s, which was used almost exclusively against the nationalist Catholic community, disenfranchising many and actually increasing support for the IRA. </p>
<p>But it is not clear that these are the sort of considerations lawyers should be agonising over. The <a href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2013/64.html">Supreme Court signalled</a> in 2013 that relying on prosecutorial discretion to hone the definition of terrorism is undesirable – even while shrinking the definition could be crucial to avoid conflict with international humanitarian law.</p>
<p>And even if it were proven effective in purely practical terms, relying on prosecutorial discretion to classify which returning fighters are terrorists means parliament has delegated what should be a legislative problem to the legal system – relieving the government of a highly sensitive and pressing responsibility.</p>
<h2>Urgent task</h2>
<p>Limiting the definition of terrorism solely to threats against the British government could be contra to international law and to the UK’s obligation to combat international terrorism. There is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism and the issue of whether or not to classify self-declared “freedom fighters” as terrorists is a major sticking point. The UK’s current legal definition of terrorism appears to make no distinction between terrorist and freedom fighter, even though the government clearly uses such distinctions to inform foreign policy and military action.</p>
<p>The decision of whether to prosecute specific individuals will of course largely hang on what credible evidence is available (if any). But the more political factors that will also affect the decision are a matter of serious concern. </p>
<p>Norms of due process and fair procedure arose precisely to save the justice system from show trials motivated by political considerations. For the system to function impartially as intended, it is crucial that prosecutors can work without being subject to any political imperative. But politicians have left it to lawyers to walk the tightrope between prosecuting purely in the public interest and making intensely political decisions of who exactly is a terrorist. </p>
<p>With both the Supreme Court and the <a href="https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/">Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation</a> signalling that the definition potentially needs reviewing, parliament will have to take up the task of reforming our counter-terrorism laws soon. If it fails to do so, the return of the hundreds of Britons fighting in the Middle East will be guaranteed to prove troublesome. </p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28535/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Greene does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>British support for opposition groups fighting against the Assad regime in Syria has waned considerably since the summer of 2013, with the increasing prominence of more radicalised Islamic organisations…Alan Greene, Lecturer in Law, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/284232014-06-30T04:54:23Z2014-06-30T04:54:23ZIf you could really ‘brainwash’ young Muslims, ISIS would have a lot more British recruits<p>Concern is again mounting about the radicalisation of young British Muslims, with the news that <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27968963">up to 500 may be fighting in Syria</a>.
But despite the gravity of the issue, the public discussion of it is still clouded by lazy stereotypes.</p>
<p>On various occasions, the spectre of brainwashing has been raised by grief-stricken relatives of Britons who have travelled to fight abroad as they try to understand and explain their family members’ actions. For example, the mother of Reyaad Khan, a young British Muslim who travelled to Syria to fight and who recently appeared in a recruitment video for the jihadist organisation <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-isis-and-where-did-it-come-from-27944">ISIS</a>, said that her son was brainwashed into fighting in the conflict, and that the 20-year-old’s character had <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/isis-mother-reyaad-khad-video-plea-return">changed completely before he left for Syria</a>. </p>
<p>Similarly, the father of Ali Kalantar, also believed to be fighting in Syria, said that his son was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27989893">“brainwashed” into joining the conflict</a>. This is not unfamiliar territory: the parents of John Walker Lindh, dubbed the “American Taliban”, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1779455.stm">made a similar claim</a> when trying to explain how their son, an American citizen, came to fight against his countrymen in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>It is easy to understand how grief could lead to family seeking solace in the explanation of brainwashing – but the problem is that the concept of brainwashing doesn’t in itself explain anything. </p>
<p>It has been a widespread term in the media for years; it was popularised in several high-profile legal cases in the US in the 1970s, where it was argued that individuals could be brainwashed against their will. Its first prominent British outing was in 1981, when the Daily Mail (among others) accused the Unification Church – a new religious movement nicknamed the “Moonies” and often called a cult – of brainwashing its members. </p>
<p>These accusations stuck; the Mail repeated them, albeit somewhat less breathlessly, <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2197242/Sun-Myung-Moon-Self-proclaimed-messiah-dies-age-92.html">at the death of the leader of the Moonies in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Of course, many (if not most) social groups impose some kind of influence on their members; that’s the only reason we have moral norms that most people in our society can at least understand, if not necessarily conform to. But the concept of brainwashing, like radicalisation, implies a lack of agency on the part of the victim; it is almost exclusively used to decry the influence of a group deemed “bad”. </p>
<p>In fact, while we don’t hear quite as many commentators or experts using the term “brainwashing” as we once did, the term “radicalisation” is often used as a neat substitution, with “extremists” replacing “cults” as the source of concern.</p>
<p>This close relationship between the terms <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/shterin_2012_religion-2/">has been pointed out before</a>, and of course in the cases of new religious movements and Islamist groups there have been genuine causes for concern – the current violence in Syria and Iraq being a timely reminder. But if we are to use the term ‘radicalisation’ to help us understand how young people might be attracted to such violence we need to <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/sedgwick_2010_concept/">properly understand the context and what we mean by it</a>. As I have argued before, <a href="https://theconversation.com/radical-ideology-isnt-what-makes-extremists-turn-violent-27006">religion alone is not a cause</a> and while content on the internet is often seen as a prime source of inspiration, <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/radicalisation-in-the-digital-era-the-use-of-the-internet-in-15-cases-of-terrorism-and-extremism/">some research has questioned whether it alone is sufficient for motivating people to violent acts</a>.</p>
<h2>Multi-level recruitment</h2>
<p>This doesn’t mean we can’t understand why people have chosen to fight in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. In fact, <a href="http://radicalisationresearch.org">the project I currently work on</a> has highlighted plenty of good-quality research that’s already been done in this area. </p>
<p>Thomas Hegghammer, for instance, has <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/should-i-stay-or-should-i-go-explaining-variation-in-western-jihadists-choice-between-domestic-and-foreign-fighting/">shown</a> that Western jihadists prefer to fight overseas, and not in their home country. Most don’t bring violence home when they return – but those that do are certainly more efficient and effective because of their experiences. </p>
<p>Other research has looked at the tactics used by recruiters. This has found that the internet is not a particularly good place to recruit, but that <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/the-recruiters-dilemma-signalling-and-rebel-recruitment-tactics/">people who cry during prayer</a>, for example, might make good recruits. </p>
<p>Of course, there is a long history of foreign fighters that predates the current Islamist-dominated agenda by decades. Some research comparing fighters and their causes from a number of different conflicts has shown how these recruiters create a sense of an <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/foreign-fighters/">existential threat to a wider community</a> variously bound by ethnicity or ideology.</p>
<p>But as has been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/04/moonies-brainwash-dispel-myth">pointed out in the past</a> by those working on “brainwashing” by cults, the process (whatever we call it) is clearly very difficult. No perfect or foolproof method of radicalising unwitting victims exists. And if there did, the number of recruits from Cardiff, Coventry and across the UK would be far higher.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Francis edits RadicalisationResearch.org. He receives funding from the RCUK Global Uncertainties programme.</span></em></p>Concern is again mounting about the radicalisation of young British Muslims, with the news that up to 500 may be fighting in Syria. But despite the gravity of the issue, the public discussion of it is…Matthew Francis, Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/285742014-06-30T04:54:18Z2014-06-30T04:54:18ZCoverage of Britons fighting in the Middle East has moved on from Islamophobia of the past<p>For some time now, speculation has raged over the number of young British Muslims travelling to Syria and Iraq with the intention of fighting in the ongoing conflicts there.</p>
<p>At the high end, Birmingham-area MP Khalid Mahmood claimed that “<a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1287688/iraq-more-than-1500-british-jihad-recruits">more than 1,500</a>” British Muslims have gone to the Middle East to fight. Meanwhile, Peter Fahy, head of the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-the-uk-against-terrorism/supporting-pages/prevent">Prevent</a> counter-terrorism strategy for the Association of Chief Police Officers, offered a more tempered <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/21/isis-sir-peter-fahy-muslim-uk_n_5517465.html">figure of around 500</a>. But ultimately, as Fahy acknowledged, no-one really knows what the number is.</p>
<p>Further speculation followed the posting of a 13-minute recruitment video, the trenchantly titled <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-27974840">There is no Life without Jihad</a>, on account pages linked to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-isis-and-where-did-it-come-from-27944">ISIS</a> (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), posted highly explicit videos and photos online <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27875894">purporting to show mass executions</a>. </p>
<p>In this particular video, which urges British Muslims to join the fight in Iraq and Syria, three of the six fighters shown are British: Cardiff-based brothers Nasser and Aseel Muthana (aged 20 and 17 respectively) and another man from Aberdeen, Abdul Raquib Amin.</p>
<p>While the obvious short-term concern is that more British citizens and residents will indeed go and join them, in the longer term, we also have to consider the potential impact of radicalised fighters might have upon returning to the UK. </p>
<p>For Cressida Dick, the Metropolitan Police’s assistant commissioner and head of specialist operations, many of those returning will present Britain with <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-will-count-cost-of-islamic-extremism-for-many-years-says-cressida-dick">a very real terrorist threat</a>.</p>
<h2>Powerless families</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, alongside the endless column inches about the recruitment video was the story of three Coventry-based Muslims also believed to have gone to fight in Syria. </p>
<p>Much of the coverage focused on the plight of the families of two of the young men, Ali Kalantar and Khabir Amani (both 18). As <a href="http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/isis-iraq-syria-jihad-briton-teenager-fighter-father-begs-return-home-9559167.html">the father of Kalantar explained</a>, his family knew nothing about his son’s intentions. Having asked his parents for his passport, saying he needed it for university (he was planning to study at Coventry), he then borrowed £1,000 from one of his brothers telling him it was to buy a computer. Soon after, Kalanter and his two friends are believed to have flown from Birmingham to Turkey in order to travel to the Syrian border. </p>
<p>Fearing for his son’s life, Kalanter’s father <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27989893">described how he thought about his son</a> “every minute” and that his grief was “limitless”.</p>
<p>What was unusual about this reporting was that it presented the families of these boys as being entirely normal, experiencing the same emotions and anxieties that any family might experience in a similar situation. Irrespective of their being Muslim – in fact, the Muslim-ness of the families rarely featured - they were shown as powerless to stop what was going on.</p>
<p>The significance of that should not be understated. Throughout the post-9/11 era, this representation of Muslims has been extremely rare. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://issuu.com/drchrisallen/docs/commonground_report">a report I published in 2007</a> showed, the amount of coverage of Muslims and Islam in the British press had increased by around 270% over the preceding decade. Of that, more than 90% of the coverage was deemed negative, disproportionately focusing on threat, violence and conflict. </p>
<p>This is not to say all that coverage was Islamophobic, indeed far from it. But nonetheless, I argued that such intensely negative coverage was likely to <a href="http://issuu.com/drchrisallen/docs/media_vers2_-_chrisallen-evidence-o">provoke and increase feelings of insecurity, suspicion and anxiety</a> about Muslims amongst non-Muslims. The coverage was feeding into what I describe as the “white noise” that exists about Muslims and Islam. And of course, the revelations about British Muslims going to fight in the Middle East are likely to feed into this too.</p>
<h2>Us and them</h2>
<p>In the aftermath of 7/7, much of the media coverage (and speculation) focused on the fact that the perpetrators were British-born (or as rendered in political parlance, “<a href="http://www.politicsandreligionjournal.com/images/pdf_files/srpski/godina4_broj2/8%20chris%20allen%20vol.iv%20no.2.pdf">home-grown</a>”). The perceived threat therefore appeared much “closer to home”: the enemy was now within. </p>
<p>A clear “us” and “them” dichotomy emerged, tarring all Muslims as terrorists – or at least as potential ones. No longer were the threatening Muslims “over there”; they could be those you worked with or lived next door to. As such, all Muslims were seen to be against and indeed a threat to “our” culture, “our” values, “our” institutions and “our” way of life.</p>
<p>Of course, some British Muslims are in fact going to fight in Syria and Iraq; it is right that this is reported, and that rightful criticism and condemnation is neither withheld nor suppressed – just as when individual Muslim terrorists claim their atrocities were committed in the name of Islam. But this must be done with balance, and from an informed point of view. </p>
<p>As Fahy puts it, unfairly “<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/21/isis-sir-peter-fahy-muslim-uk_n_5517465.html">demonising the Muslim community</a>” is both offensive and deeply counter-productive. Britain’s Muslims are indispensable partners in the mission to stop any more of our citizens going to fight alongside ISIS – as well as in combating any longer-term problems.</p>
<p>Which is why the coverage of the Coventry Muslims going to fight in Syria is so important: it showed the families of those going to fight in Syria as entirely “normal”. For once, Muslims were seen as more like “us” than “them”.</p>
<p>As the impact of the crises in Syria and Iraq continues to be felt here in the UK, we can only hope this apparent improvement holds.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Next, read: <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-very-french-jihad-hundreds-head-to-syria-and-paris-fears-their-return-26077">A very French jihad: hundreds head to Syria and Paris fears their return</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/28574/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Allen is an independent member of the Coalition Government's Anti-Muslim Hatred Working Group. He receives no remuneration for this.</span></em></p>For some time now, speculation has raged over the number of young British Muslims travelling to Syria and Iraq with the intention of fighting in the ongoing conflicts there. At the high end, Birmingham-area…Chris Allen, Lecturer in Social Policy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/270062014-05-22T16:10:34Z2014-05-22T16:10:34ZRadical ideology isn’t what makes extremists turn violent<p>This week saw the convictions of two men at opposite ends of the process of radicalisation – one convicted for radicalising others, the other for being radicalised himself.</p>
<p>In the United States, a court in New York found <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/19/justice/new-york-terror-trial/">Abu Hamza al-Masri</a> guilty of involvement in several violent plots, the state’s attorney general arguing he was “not just a preacher of faith, but a trainer of terrorists.” Among other things, Hamza was accused of radicalising young Muslims to fight in conflicts around the world.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, a British court convicted <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27491066">Mashudur Choudhury</a>, a 31-year-old father of two from Portsmouth, who travelled to Syria intending to fight in the ongoing civil war. Choudhury was apparently radicalised into believing that his violent contribution to the war was ideologically necessary. Though there is no evidence that he actually fought there, he was found guilty of seeking to join the conflict for an ideological cause.</p>
<p>But even as both courts handed down decisive custodial sentences, there is still a good deal of confusion about how the process of violent radicalisation works, how it links men like Hamza to men like Choudhury – and exactly what role radical ideology, so central in both cases, actually plays in acts of radical violence.</p>
<h2>Bad religion?</h2>
<p>There is no consensus among researchers on exactly how radicalisation motivates people to commit violent actions. There are, however, some significant trends in the research, especially regarding the role of ideology, that can help us get to the real implications of these two very different cases.</p>
<p>In one camp are those who think that religion has everything to do with violent behaviour, and can reasonably be described as its <a href="http://www.hds.harvard.edu/news-events/harvard-divinity-bulletin/articles/does-religion-cause-violence">primary cause</a>. The existence of billions of non-violent religious believers hardly supports this point of view, but it nevertheless remains popular. More considered, and better researched, versions of this stance see religion playing a <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/ideologies/terror-in-mind-of-god-global-rise-relgious-violence/">specific but highly qualified</a> role in violence. </p>
<p>Other researchers, however, <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/myth-of-religious-violence/">have argued</a> convincingly that this approach defines religion so loosely that it can never explain religious radicals’ violent behaviour. </p>
<p>In my own work on this topic, I have suggested that rather than focusing on the role religion plays in driving people to violence, we should focus on the importance of non-negotiable beliefs in general, religious or otherwise – the things we hold to be sacred. This category can encompass the flags of our countries or our children as much as prophets or the ideas expressed in holy texts, and by using it, we can broaden our ideas about what makes some radicalised people violent.</p>
<h2>The in-crowd</h2>
<p>Many people in the field have already started doing this work. The anthropologist Scott Atran has written about the role <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/talking-to-enemy/">sacred ideas play in violence</a>. Having carried out research with people involved in fighting in several conflict zones around the world, he is clear that <a href="http://www.thisviewoflife.com/index.php/magazine/articles/here-he-goes-again-sam-harriss-falsehoods">people do not kill for an ideology</a>; instead, they take part in violent behaviour because of the influence of their peer groups. </p>
<p>And there are other common factors behind the slide into violence. Radicalised people who act violently have often previously felt that they are worse off than other people, and don’t feel that they have the means or opportunities to <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/radicalization-of-homegrown-jihadists/">improve their situation</a> (regardless of whether this is strictly true). It is these people’s engagement with a peer network which encourages violence, occasionally over the <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/bombing-alone/">internet</a> but more commonly in person. </p>
<p>Note that in Choudhury’s case, it was conversations with a friend already out in Syria which apparently encouraged him to go there; when he did, he went with a number of friends from his home town of Portsmouth. Given his history of lying and deceiving <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27491066">even his own family</a>, including by falsely claiming he had stomach cancer, he seems unlikely to have acted because of a long-standing and deepening commitment to a religious ideological cause. </p>
<p>Instead, the lack of clarity in Choudhury’s life chimes with studies that have shown how people struggling with personal uncertainty can become more extreme in their <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/compensatory-conviction-face-of-personal-uncertainty/">social attitudes</a> – and are also vulnerable to the appeal of groups which take a <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/subjective-uncertainty-reduction-through-self-categorization/">hard, judgemental line against non-members</a>.</p>
<p>It has been <a href="http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=416">argued</a> that we should not confuse radicalisation with the actual practice of terrorism. After all, a great many terrorists are not committed to a radical ideology, just as many radicals are not terrorists. And the policy ramifications of focusing too specifically on ideological radicalisation in itself are potentially <a href="http://www.demos.co.uk/blog/decouplingradicalisationandterrorism">very serious indeed</a>. </p>
<p>In short, we’re missing a trick by looking too closely at the ideological side of radicalisation, and we need to do more to find and understand the real <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/from-profiles-to-pathways-roots-to-routes/">pathways</a> that take people into terrorism – and indeed, the path back out again. </p>
<p>Both recently sentenced men provide us with glaring examples. In Choudhury’s case, what mattered was who he travelled with and why, not what he believed in. And when it comes to dealing with people like Abu Hamza, we must pay attention to the specific social networks they inspire and empower – not just anyone who might believe what they say. </p>
<p>And while we must pay attention to violent radical ideology itself, we must also acknowledge that it’s only one of the many forces that drive violent radicalisation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27006/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Francis edits the website RadicalisationResearch.org He receives funding through the RCUK Global Uncertainties programme, which is administered by the Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p>This week saw the convictions of two men at opposite ends of the process of radicalisation – one convicted for radicalising others, the other for being radicalised himself. In the United States, a court…Matthew Francis, Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/216642013-12-19T15:30:38Z2013-12-19T15:30:38ZMen who killed Lee Rigby in Woolwich are murderers, not ‘soldiers of Allah’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/38296/original/tcn8bjbf-1387461816.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guilty.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Elizabeth Cook/PA Wire</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The trial of Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale has concluded with the jury <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25450555">finding them guilty</a> of murdering soldier Lee Rigby. Their claims that they were, in the words of Adebolajo, “soldiers of Allah” and that the killing was an act of war rather than murder were dismissed by the jury in less than two hours.</p>
<p>The pair’s statements regarding their religious motivation has led to many headlines and a review of the government’s recent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf">Prevent</a> strategy. However, the prosecutor in the case was right to warn that Islam was not on trial (at least in the courtroom). As I have <a href="http://theconversation.com/terror-on-the-streets-of-london-but-dont-jump-to-conclusions-yet-13883">written before</a>, to describe Adebolajo and Adebowale’s actions as Islamic is wrong; indeed, that would be as erroneous as the argument that the West’s actions in Iraq and Afghanistan are Christian, although of course this falsehood is also <a href="http://pakistankakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/2010/04/12/glaring-evidence-of-crusades-against-muslims/">claimed in some places</a>.</p>
<p>Instead of focusing on whether Islam was at fault, it is more helpful to look at the specific ideology at play. As one of my colleagues Linda Woodhead has <a href="https://theconversation.com/flimsy-fundamentalism-infuses-the-third-wave-of-terror-14778">pointed out</a>, this is often very different to the idea of established religions as they are commonly conceived.</p>
<h2>Sacred grounds</h2>
<p>One way that <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/">my research</a> has focused on investigating violent religious and non-religious ideologies is through looking at what people hold sacred. We might understand this sacred as a set of non-negotiable beliefs. Adebolajo and Adebowale wholeheartedly believed they were part of a war – the world for them was divided inextricably between what they understood as believers of Islam, and the West. Their reaction to the invasion of Islamic countries was to extend the war to the streets of Woolwich, with horrific consequences. So committed were they to their cause that they actively sought martyrdom as a result of their actions – something the jury seemed to accept with the not guilty verdict to the charge of attempted murder of a police officer.</p>
<p>They believed their actions to have sacred legitimacy, that their actions were blessed by Allah and they interpreted His blessings through the success of their attack. This blessing and indeed their belief in Allah are further non-negotiable beliefs.</p>
<p>Of course, we all have non-negotiable beliefs and values. They define us and the groups we belong to. Whether they are state borders, flags, morals on sexual norms or commitments to freedom of speech, these sacred values can be found in secular and religious spheres of life. But for most of us our responses to threatened or actual transgressions of these values are contained within the rule of law and, even where they are not, they rarely take the extreme shape we witnessed in the murder of Lee Rigby.</p>
<p>These values are informed by many ideologies, differently interpreted by each of us, and it is difficult to establish the extent to which they contribute to violent action. Indeed, some researchers have questioned the causative role that ideology plays in violence. Writing about his Demos report <a href="http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/theedgeofviolencefullreport">The Edge of Violence</a>, Jamie Bartlett <a href="http://www.demos.co.uk/blog/decouplingradicalisationandterrorism">pointed out</a> that religion is often a justification, not a motivation, for acts of violence and, in the US, <a href="http://www.uml.edu/Research/CTSS/faculty/Horgan-John.aspx">John Horgan</a> <a href="http://sites.psu.edu/icst/2013/05/13/no-direction-home/">has argued</a> that radical beliefs do not necessarily lead to violent action.</p>
<p>With funding from the <a href="http://www.globaluncertainties.org.uk/">RCUK Global Uncertainties Programme</a>, <a href="http://wp.lancs.ac.uk/ideology-and-uncertainty/">Kim Knott</a> and I are exploring the links between ideology and violent action in more depth. We’ve been bringing together researchers and practitioners from across university disciplines, government departments and think tanks in order to understand it better. We know from <a href="http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/">past research</a> that factors such as past criminality and belonging to extremist networks – both of which can be seen in this case – can play a role in subsequent violent behaviour. </p>
<p>How much of a role it played in this case we don’t know, but from the evidence of Adebolaje, the murder of Lee Rigby does seem to have a clear ideological motivation. In their eyes they were soldiers of Allah, even if most Muslims and society as a whole dispute that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/21664/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Francis works for Lancaster University on a project which receives funding from the Research Councils UK Global Uncertainties programme. The website RadicalisationResearch.org is an output of this project. Matthew founded and edits RadicalisationResearch.org which is also funded by the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Programme.</span></em></p>The trial of Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale has concluded with the jury finding them guilty of murdering soldier Lee Rigby. Their claims that they were, in the words of Adebolajo, “soldiers of…Matthew Francis, Senior Research Associate, Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/146432013-05-24T13:06:01Z2013-05-24T13:06:01ZFrom convert to extremist: new Muslims and terrorism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24399/original/zshmv9v8-1369396739.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Police officers search the scene following the attack which left serving soldier Drummer Lee Rigby dead.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Gareth Fuller</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/may/23/woolwich-attack-suspect-michael-adebolajo">reported</a> that Michael Adebolajo, one of the two suspects in the case of the Woolwich murder of a British soldier on Wednesday, is a Muslim convert. </p>
<p>There are significant issues regarding the alleged involvement of converts in religiously motivated violence. Previous experience has shown converts play a disproportionate role in Islamist terrorism, yet we know very little about them.</p>
<p>Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has suggested Al Qaeda consider recruiting <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/09/200849143052675302.html">converts</a> in Western countries on the basis that they provide tactical and strategic advantages. This is not surprising given that counterterrorism officials seem to place more scrutiny on individuals from Muslim countries. </p>
<p>Of course, to broadly brand Muslim converts as a terrorist threat is inaccurate and misleading, as there are of course far more Muslim converts who don’t become terrorists than those who do.</p>
<p>Coincidentally, <a href="http://example.com/">The Economist</a> and <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/religion/2013/05/confessions-ex-muslim">The New Statesman</a> both ran stories earlier this week on the increasing number of Britons converting to Islam. These stories also briefly mentioned converts’ involvement with Islamic extremism and terrorism, including the recent case of Richard Dart from Dorset and the 7/7 bomber Germaine Lindsay.</p>
<p>There are no official statistics on religious conversion in the UK; best estimates suggest there are between <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12075931">60,000 and 100,000 Muslim converts</a>. On this count, converts represent between 2-3% of Britain’s 2.8 million Muslims. It is perhaps surprising, then, that our research shows converts have been involved in 31% of <a href="http://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/1278089320islamist_terrorism_preview.pdf">jihadist terrorism convictions</a> in the UK from 2001 to 2010.</p>
<p>The social sciences know very little about why Muslim converts appear more likely to radicalise than those people who are born Muslims; there are only four <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2012.656299#.UZ9XxTd2jZc">peer-reviewed academic articles</a> on the <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2012.656299#.UZ9Yi2TF2aM">topic</a>. </p>
<p>Yet there are hundreds of media articles on “Muslim convert terrorism”, the majority of which are speculative and only reinforce an inaccurate negative stereotype of converts. This lack of knowledge regarding convert radicalisation leaves policy makers and security agencies poorly prepared to understand converts and prevent their radicalisation. British counter-radicalisation programs currently tend to focus on “at risk” Muslim immigrant communities instead.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24400/original/xbpzktzr-1369396768.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24400/original/xbpzktzr-1369396768.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/24400/original/xbpzktzr-1369396768.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24400/original/xbpzktzr-1369396768.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24400/original/xbpzktzr-1369396768.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24400/original/xbpzktzr-1369396768.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24400/original/xbpzktzr-1369396768.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/24400/original/xbpzktzr-1369396768.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The front pages of Britain’s national newspapers carried shocking footage from the scene of the killing in Woolwich.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">PA/Yui Mok</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Our preliminary research shows that the radicalisation of Muslim converts is most frequently a two-step process. The first step involves conversion to a new faith. The second stage usually involves converts radicalising as a result of social interaction. It is less common for converts to self-radicalise in isolation, which contradicts the popular idea that terror suspects are radicalised solely from computers in their bedrooms. The process which often involves the convert developing a more extreme interpretation of their faith to legitimise or justify violence generally takes months or years.</p>
<p>How the mechanisms of conversion correlate and intersect with the mechanisms of radicalisation is not yet well understood. What we do know is that both religious conversion and radicalisation are similar in that they both involve significant changes in beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. However, radicalisation differs as a process in that the new beliefs, attitudes and behaviours that occurring as a result of conversion are heightened and polarised in preparation for engaging in some form of violence.</p>
<p>Psychological research on radicalisation indicates that a “transmission belt” from religious belief to terrorism does not exist. Therefore converting to Islam is not an indication that a person will radicalise. </p>
<p>Isolating the range of factors and processes that flow from conversion through to radicalisation is essential before claiming that converts are the new face of terrorism. Only on this basis one can we better determine what factors might turn ordinarily peaceful Muslim converts into extremists who use violence in the name of their religion.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/14643/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Flower receives funding from the Endeavour Awards program.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Kleinman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It has been reported that Michael Adebolajo, one of the two suspects in the case of the Woolwich murder of a British soldier on Wednesday, is a Muslim convert. There are significant issues regarding the…Scott Kleinman, Research Fellow at International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) and PhD Candidate, King's College LondonScott Flower, McKenzie Fellow, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/140132013-05-19T23:11:56Z2013-05-19T23:11:56ZInspire magazine and the rise of open-source jihad<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/23325/original/rx4z58fw-1367949622.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C5%2C798%2C561&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Inspire's writer, Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed in a US drone strike in November 2011</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">By Magharebi via Wikipedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The influence of globally available jihadist propaganda on the web is well established. But we know less about how and to what extent word-of-mouth and other more local channels of communication contribute to the creation of terrorists.</p>
<p>A vigorous “media jihad” has been central to the way al-Qaeda has changed in recent years from actually commissioning and directing terrorist operations to providing ideological and rhetorical support and guidance on practical measures for the aspiring jihadist.</p>
<p>The online English-language magazine <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/inside-the-al-qaeda-magazine">Inspire</a> was first published in 2010 by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to support this strategic shift to the strategy of “open-source jihad”. </p>
<p>Since its editor Samir Khan and leading ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki were <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/a/anwar_al_awlaki/index.html">killed in a drone attack</a> in September 2011, the magazine’s future has been uncertain, but there are many other online sources of similar “inspiration”. </p>
<p>There is very little in the way of political analysis in jihadist propaganda, and - perhaps surprisingly to those who see Islamist terrorism as deeply linked to Islam - there is often very little religious content, other than in the invocation of an imagined global Muslim community. </p>
<p>The appeal of this material to the consumer is typically based on a dramatic representation of victimhood, which aims to evoke righteous anger at the perpetrators of violence upon the victims and to mobilise that anger in a vengeful assault on the perpetrators.</p>
<h2>Parallels with crime reporting</h2>
<p>We are familiar with this sort of thing in other contexts. Popular response to violent crime, especially that involving children and old people, often follows a similar path, usually steered in the UK by a tabloid press and its depictions of “evil”. This not to see popular attitudes towards crime as entirely engineered by an outraged press, as some crimes really are worthy of the horror they provoke in the newspaper-reading public.</p>
<p>The dynamics of victimhood portrayed in jihadist propaganda differ from that type of crime reporting in several ways. First the victims are portrayed as Muslims everywhere. The perpetrators, meanwhile, are portrayed as all non-believers, i.e. everyone else, plus those Muslims who are in fact not true Muslims. So, unlike in the reporting of crime, in jihadist propaganda everyone is involved. The suffering and blame are everywhere, and the duty to take revenge cannot be avoided.</p>
<p>Second, the consumer of the propaganda is invited to identify totally with the victim. While a virulent anti-Americanism may sometimes take centre stage in the identification of the perpetrator, and the murder of children or the rape of women may be the narrative content of a propaganda piece, the victim is always the collective body of the Ummah, the global community of Islam, of which the viewer or reader is assumed to be a part.</p>
<p>Because the stakes are set so high, many who may encounter such material are not influenced by it, at least not in the sense of taking up its challenge, as it asks far too much. But for some of those with an acute sense of their own victimhood, it is a potentially seductive brew. It promises to replace shame at a feeling of impotence or worthlessness with the experience of triumph. It makes a direct appeal to a core feeling of humiliation and inserts into it a narrative of heroic resistance. </p>
<p>The feelings of humiliation which may render someone vulnerable to propaganda of this kind are not necessarily based in any social or political reality. They may have roots in early emotional development within a family - but, whatever their origin, they are a powerful internal reality. </p>
<h2>Emotion trumps reason</h2>
<p>There is very little cold reasoning involved in the propaganda. There is no foreseeable end to the jihad against the West, no instrumental rationale to persuade people to join it, and only occasional close examination of the actual consequences of terrorist attack (for example the calculations that September 11 and its various consequences would destroy the US economy). </p>
<p>The appeal is an entirely emotional one. Significantly, the jihadist role which it offers is, like the victim portrayed in jihadist propaganda, one of subjection. The humiliating subjection to a murderous foe (for example the US, the whole of the West or “kaffir” - non-Muslim - world) is replaced by a subjection to a God-given cause. </p>
<p>There is an increasing danger that this kind of appeal may hit its target. As internet use increases globally there will be more people seeking solutions to life’s problems online. Among these there will be individuals with a deep sense of inner humiliation and a need to try and find relief by taking action in the external world. </p>
<p>But, in absolute terms, the numbers moved by jihadist propaganda to engage in terror will remain small (though the threat they present could be great). Criminalising such material would probably create more problems by increasing the excitement attached to it and giving it an aura of transgressive power. And any attempt to clamp down on one online source may be like trying to dam a stream with a fork. </p>
<p>In any case, as with our attitudes towards crime, the media are not solely responsible for how people who read it feel. Far better to work on a civic environment, offline as much as online, in which individuals who might otherwise see violent jihadism as a solution to their lives can more easily find reasons to reject it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/14013/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Barry Richards has receved no funding for research in this area which might have influenced or compromised the content of this article in any way.</span></em></p>The influence of globally available jihadist propaganda on the web is well established. But we know less about how and to what extent word-of-mouth and other more local channels of communication contribute…Barry Richards, Professor of Public Communication, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.