tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/sahrawi-arab-democratic-republic-36202/articlesSahrawi Arab Democratic Republic – The Conversation2023-01-13T13:04:15Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1926542023-01-13T13:04:15Z2023-01-13T13:04:15ZWestern Sahara: the six-decade struggle to liberate Africa’s last colony<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/490301/original/file-20221018-20-3hpnkt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sahrawi protesters demand an end to hostilities by Morocco in the occupied territory of Western Sahara at the Square of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland in 2021.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Photo by Carlos Gil Andreu/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Western Sahara is the territory in north-west Africa bordered by Morocco in the north, Algeria and Mauritania in the east and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. A former Spanish colony, it’s <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt">listed</a> by the United Nations as one of only 17 territories that remain without self-government. </p>
<p>Since becoming independent from France in 1956, Morocco has been claiming sovereignty over Western Sahara. In the late 1970s, the kingdom formally annexed around 80% of Western Sahara, over which it exercises de facto control. This followed the so-called <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4325817">“Green March”</a> of 6 November 1975 in which between 100,000 and 350,000 Moroccans resettled in Western Sahara to </p>
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<p>regain the southern provinces of a Greater Morocco. </p>
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<p>This annexation flew in the face of the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf#page=60">advisory opinion</a> of the International Court of Justice made on 15 October 1975. The court concluded that evidence presented before it did</p>
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<p>not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity.</p>
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<p>The court also <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf#page=60">found</a> that there were no legal obstacles to the decolonisation of Western Sahara. This includes the right to self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the people of the territory. </p>
<p>The UN Security Council <a href="https://minurso.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unsg_report_19_april_1991.pdf">established</a> the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara in April 1991. The plan provided for a cease-fire, followed by a referendum on self-determination in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between two options: integration with Morocco or plain and simple independence. Because of <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr166.pdf">disputes</a> over who can vote in the referendum, it has yet to be organised. </p>
<p>I have been studying the conflict in Western Sahara as part of <a href="https://law.exeter.ac.uk/newsandevents/news/articles/title_728122_en.php">my PhD research</a> for the past four years. It is my finding that the Western Sahara stalemate stems from weaknesses in the UN mission mandate. This is mainly because the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara has no mandate to monitor human rights abuses in Western Sahara. </p>
<p>The absence of a dedicated mechanism has affected and continues to affect the visibility of events on the ground. For example, protesters in the occupied territory of Western Sahara are repeatedly subjected to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/morocco/western-sahara">human rights violations</a> during demonstrations. This increases the possibility of more violations that impair the search for justice and accountability. </p>
<p>Adding a human rights monitoring mechanism to the mandate of the UN’s Western Sahara mission would not automatically resolve the conflict. There are other dynamics, including the fact that the case of Western Sahara has been dealt with in a distinct way from the start. But my findings underline the fact that a mechanism would be beneficial to conflict management, if not conflict resolution.</p>
<h2>Absence of human rights mandate</h2>
<p>There are four current peacekeeping deployments of the United Nations that have no human rights monitoring mandate. The first, in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unficyp">Northern Cyprus</a>, was set up by the Security Council in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The second, in <a href="https://unifil.unmissions.org/">Lebanon</a>, is the only peacekeeping force at sea. The third is a <a href="https://undof.unmissions.org/">disengagement observer force</a> in the Israeli-Syrian sector, while the fourth is the Western Sahara UN mission.</p>
<p>The Western Sahara mission also stands out as not having attained its purpose through the organisation of a referendum. Previous UN missions charged with this task did organise referendums in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untag.htm">Namibia</a> and in <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmit/background.shtml">East Timor</a>. The two successful missions had some sort of human rights oversight mechanism stemming from their mandates. </p>
<p>My research sought to understand the extent to which the absence of human rights monitoring components is an anomaly in today’s peacekeeping practice. I also sought to investigate the connection between human rights and peacekeeping in the Western Sahara conflict. Of note is the fact that Morocco opposes a human rights mandate on the grounds that it is not the core objective of the mission and it could jeopardise the negotiation process. </p>
<p>My project has two dimensions. Firstly, it aims to establish why the Western Sahara UN mission is an outlier case in terms of human rights provisions in peacekeeping practice. I conclude that the monitoring of human rights by the mission need not be understood as antagonistic to the primary aim of UN intervention, which is to resolve the conflict through a negotiated political solution that will provide for self-determination.</p>
<p>Secondly, it explores ways through which this absence of explicit language in the mandate is – or can be – remedied in practice based on legal doctrine and methodology. By establishing the emergence in customary international law of a norm of human rights monitoring for peacekeeping operations, I am able to strengthen the assumption of a highly irregular nature of the UN’s Western Sahara mission. </p>
<h2>Hope after impasse</h2>
<p>Several factors have signalled a renewed interest in this protracted conflict. The African Union in 2014 <a href="https://au.int/es/node/34987">appointed a special envoy</a> for Western Sahara. More recently, major events have begun to challenge the status quo. </p>
<p>The war <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/14/world/middleeast/western-sahara-morocco-polisario.html">resumed</a> on 13 November 2020 following almost 30 years of ceasefire. For the first time, a UN member state – the US – <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-recognizing-sovereignty-kingdom-morocco-western-sahara/">recognised</a> Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over the territory. Former US president Donald Trump’s declaration of 10 December 2020 has not been renounced by the current Biden administration. It secured Morocco’s support for Israel as per the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf">Abrahamic Accords</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, in September 2021, the General Court of the European Union issued <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-09/cp210166en.pdf">decisions invalidating</a> fisheries and trade agreements between Morocco and the EU insofar as they extended to Western Sahara, rejecting Morocco’s sovereignty.</p>
<p>It must be emphasised that the people of Western Sahara reserve to right to self-determination. The last colony in Africa remains largely under occupation and the UN mission in place is still deprived of any kind of human rights monitoring. This situation must end – with freedom, and sovereignty finally won by Western Sahara.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192654/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meriem Naili is affiliated with OUISO, the International Academic Observatory on Western Sahara. </span></em></p>Western Sahara remains largely under occupation and without any kind of international human rights monitoring.Meriem Naili, PhD candidate, College of Social Sciences and International Studies, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1143732019-03-27T12:07:08Z2019-03-27T12:07:08ZWhy Western Sahara remains one of Africa’s most divisive political issues<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266067/original/file-20190327-139341-wwtfut.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Sahrawi refugee carries a flag of the Democratic Arab Republic of Sahara.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">MOHAMED MESSARA/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>South Africa and Namibia hosted a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sadc-declares-solidarity-with-western-sahara-20088963">“solidarity conference with Western Sahara”</a>, convened by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 25 and 26 March 2019 in Pretoria. The summit opened with a call for unity in “ensuring the right to freedom and self-determination of the people of the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-solidarity-conference-saharawi-kicks-pretoria-south-africa/">Western Sahara”</a>. Politics and society editor Thabo Leshilo asked Frank Mattheis for some perspective.</em></p>
<p><strong>What is the issue? Why does Western Sahara require a solidarity conference?</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/countries/western-sahara">Western Sahara</a> is a disputed territory in Northwest Africa. It is sparsely populated and consists mainly of desert. Two parties claim sovereignty of the territory. One is the Moroccan government, which considers it a province with certain autonomous rights. The other is the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Polisario-Front">Polisario Front</a>, a political and military organisation that has proclaimed the area as the <a href="http://www.spsrasd.info/news/en">Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic</a>.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://minurso.unmissions.org/chronology-events">referendum to choose between the two options</a> was proposed as far back as 1991. But it’s never happened. This is mainly because of disputes over who would be eligible to vote. Negotiations between Morocco’s government and the Polisaro Front have resulted in little progress since. The two parties officially ceased their military operations in 1991, but the situation remains fragile despite a United Nations <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minurso">peacekeeping mission</a> being deployed to the Western Sahara since that same year.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sadc-declares-solidarity-with-western-sahara-20088963">solidarity conference</a> hosted by SADC can be seen as a reaction to the gradual shift of power towards Morocco. In 2017, Morocco <a href="https://theconversation.com/moroccos-membership-of-the-au-has-unity-finally-been-achieved-72893">joined the African Union (AU)</a> after a 33-year absence. It chose to stay away because the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was already an AU member (it remains so today). </p>
<p>Since Morocco joined, the AU has <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/au-limits-its-role-in-western-sahara-crisis">held back</a> from playing a further role in the conflict. Previously its Peace and Security Council had tried to intervene on the issue. This shows that most African countries prefer to circumvent the thorny issue of self-determination for Western Sahara; instead, these countries are pursuing closer ties with Morocco. </p>
<p>The SADC region, however, is home to countries like Zimbabwe and South Africa. They are among the Polisario Front’s <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-solidarity-conference-saharawi-kicks-pretoria-south-africa/">most faithful allies</a>. They have sided with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic because of how Morocco has handled the Western Sahara’s status, which reminds them of their own legacy of settler colonialism.</p>
<p><strong>How long has the problem been brewing?</strong></p>
<p>Since the late 19th century, when the territory was colonised by Spain. <a href="https://minurso.unmissions.org/chronology-events">When Spain withdrew in 1975</a> a war broke out between Morocco, Mauritania and the Polisario Front over control of the Western Sahara. </p>
<p>Mauritania retreated after four years. But fights between Morocco and the Polisario Front (which was supported by Algeria) continued <a href="https://minurso.unmissions.org/chronology-events">all the way until 1991</a>. Back then, the United Nations established the <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minurso">Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</a> to oversee a truce. No solution has been implemented since. The current <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/profiles/horst-k%C3%B6hler">UN Personal Envoy for Western Sahara</a>, former German president Horst Köhler, has struggled to make notable progress. </p>
<p>The longer the conflict continues, the more the power balance tilts in Morocco’s favour. Economically and diplomatically the Kingdom of Morocco has been on the rise on the continent. This offers tangible gains to its allies and makes it ever more powerful.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Western Sahara’s inhabitants are suffering. Human rights violations are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/un-peacekeeping-force-in-western-sahara-and-refugee-camps-must-urgently-monitor-human-rights/">reportedly common</a>. Protest movements that support self-determination are restricted and oppressed. </p>
<p>The level of reported violence has diminished in recent years. That’s why the issue of Western Sahara has gradually disappeared from the international agenda.</p>
<p><strong>What’s the significance of a declaration from SADC?</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/declaration-sadc-solidarity-conference-western-sahara/">declaration</a> issued at the end of the conference confirms SADC’s long-standing <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/sadc-solidarity-conference-saharawi-kicks-pretoria-south-africa/">support for the Polisario Front</a>. </p>
<p>While other African countries have abandoned this position in favour of closer ties with the economically strong Morocco, SADC (and other countries such as Algeria) still follow a value-driven foreign policy in this regard. The declaration confirms that the AU remains split on the matter.</p>
<p>However, the impact of the declaration is limited to maintaining the issue on the agenda. It is unlikely to have a direct impact on the intended referendum, and the UN remains the main body that can resolve the impasse.</p>
<p>It’s also worth noting that Morocco hosted a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sadc-declares-solidarity-with-western-sahara-20088963">parallel conference on the Western Sahara</a> to undermine SADC’s efforts. This just highlights the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/mantashe-slams-morocco-over-parallel-western-sahara-conference-20190325">divisions</a>.</p>
<p><strong>What would success look like?</strong></p>
<p>Success from a SADC and Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic point of view would entail the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. But, it would still count as a notable success if the SADC declaration marks a reversal of the current trend that favours Morocco’s diplomacy in Africa.</p>
<p>On a global level, success for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic people could also mean forging stronger alliances with other countries, such as the <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/cp160146en.pdf">European Union</a>, for their self-declared republic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114373/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The solidarity conference by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can be seen as a reaction to the gradual shift of power towards Morocco.Frank Mattheis, Senior research fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/881852017-12-04T12:06:22Z2017-12-04T12:06:22ZThe EU-Africa summit is now the AU-EU summit. Why the upgrade matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197543/original/file-20171204-4062-c4kuwu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of the AU Alpha Conde, European Council President Donald Tusk (L) and President of the EU Jean-Claude Juncker.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Luc Gnago</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>African and European heads of government gathered last week in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, for their <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/11/29-30/#">5th summit</a> since 2000. For the first time, the African Union (AU) rather than “Africa”, officially appears as the European Union’s partner. While plenty has been discussed about <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2017/11/29-30/#">youth, migration, security and governance</a> less is being said about the shift from an EU-Africa to an AU-EU summit. </p>
<p>Is this just a case of semantics? After all, the AU has been the key organiser of these triennial summits since they started in 2000. Or are there larger implications? We think there are. </p>
<p>The AU-EU summit coincided with the January 2017 report on the reform of the African Union prepared by Rwandan President Paul Kagame. The report recommends rationalising “Africa’s” many international <a href="https://au.int/en/continent-and-country-partnerships">partnerships</a> by having the continental body <a href="https://au.int/en/au-reform">take the lead</a>. This means that the previous, current and future AU chairpersons, plus the AU Commission chairperson and the chairperson of the Regional Economic Communities, would represent the AU, rather than all its member states.</p>
<p>Despite some <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-07-17-iss-today-with-au-reforms-a-new-african-renaissance-is-possible/#.WiDS5lWWYdU">misgivings</a> at the July 2017 AU Summit in Addis Ababa, Kagame’s proposed reforms were well received. The AU and its member states have committed to a <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/33272-doc-au_reform_implementation_report_july_2017_final_v2.pdf">timetable of reform implementation</a>, heralding a potential new era for the AU.</p>
<p>The transformation of the EU-Africa summit series into the EU-AU summit in Abidjan is more than just a change of name. It reflects the increasing recognition of the AU as an international actor that is becoming difficult to circumvent when engaging Africa. But there’s still a risk that the recognition remains confined to ceremonial purposes, as long as key challenges such as funding and mandate are not resolved.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>The first summit in Cairo in 2000 was intended as a meeting of the EU and the AU’s forbearer, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). But, the EU insisted on the inclusion of Morocco – the only African country not a member of the OAU and the exclusion of the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a full member of the OAU.</p>
<p>Only after last minute shuttle diplomacy was the cancellation of the summit averted. The compromise solution was to call the event the <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-00-901_en.htm">“Africa-Europe Summit Under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU”</a>. </p>
<p>The idea of “Africa” as the EU’s interlocutor was set.</p>
<p>This way of seeing Africa had repercussions for the relationship. Although the EU had targeted the AU as its <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/communication-commission-european-parliament-and-council-cairo-lisbon-eu-africa-strategic_en">principle partner</a> by 2007, the AU’s organisational growing pains and less clear jurisdiction in external relations meant that it was exposed to the whims of its member states. </p>
<p>This was the case before the 2nd summit in Lisbon in 2007, when after months of AU-driven negotiation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, several AU member states voiced strong misgivings about it. Their objections on issues such as the restitution of stolen cultural artefacts, while crucial, were outside of the EU’s jurisdiction and threatened to scuttle the AU’s own good work.</p>
<p>The 2010 summit in Tripoli was overshadowed by the outsized personality of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who stole headlines insisting that the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11139345">EU pay him</a> to limit migration to Europe. Lost was the fact that the AU was endeavouring to upturn decades of EU driven agenda setting in the EU-ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific Group of States) relationship.</p>
<h2>The upgrade</h2>
<p>In theory the AU’s new status in EU-Africa summits has the potential to substantially contribute to the AU’s cohesion, recognition and identity. But whether this upgrade will actually materialise or whether the summit only offers a ceremonial appearance of the AU’s standing will depend on four crucial factors. </p>
<p>Firstly, the AU still needs to be based on a <a href="http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/BN98-Apiko-Aggad-November-2017.pdf">sustainable financial mechanism</a>. So far, it depends heavily on development aid for its activities. </p>
<p>Secondly, member states need to provide the AU with an authoritative mandate to negotiate on their behalf. While it is becoming a stronger institution, it still heavily depends on compromises between heads of states.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the AU has to compete for the EU’s attention with other existing partnerships with Africa. Plans are already underway for the it to play a more prominent role in the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/acp-eu-partnership-after-2020_en">ACP</a>. This would underline the central role of the AU for all interregional arrangements. </p>
<p>Fourthly, other international partners such as China will need to recognise AU’s central role in their <a href="http://www.focac.org/eng/">summits with Africa</a>. So far, China is focusing on bilateral relations and there are few signs of the direct relationship China-AU receiving a substantial upgrade.</p>
<p>The transformation of the EU-Africa summit series into the EU-AU summit in Abidjan is more than just a change of name. It reflects the increasing recognition of the AU as an international actor that is becoming difficult to circumvent when engaging Africa. Yet, there is a risk that the recognition is confined to ceremonial purposes, as long as key challenges such as funding and mandate are not resolved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88185/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis receives funding from the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet activities. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Kotsopoulos receives funding from the Erasmus+ programme's Jean Monnet Activities.</span></em></p>The transformation of the EU-Africa summit series into the EU-AU summit is more than just a change of name. It reflects the increasing recognition of the AU as an international actor.Frank Mattheis, Senior Researcher in Global Studies, University of PretoriaJohn Kotsopoulos, Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/750702017-03-29T14:41:09Z2017-03-29T14:41:09ZMorocco reaps rewards of major changes in its diplomatic strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162657/original/image-20170327-3283-uzgiyq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Mohammed VI of Morocco, (L) walks with Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Tiksa Negeri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At a time when the European Union is bemoaning the loss of the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887">United Kingdom</a>, Morocco has rejoined the African Union, ensuring that every African country is <a href="https://theconversation.com/moroccos-membership-of-the-au-has-unity-finally-been-achieved-72893">again a member</a>.</p>
<p>Morocco has also served formal notice that it will apply to join the Economic Community of West African States <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/25/c_136083651.htm">(Ecowas)</a>. At a time when there’s a growing northern backlash against <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/upshot/donald-trump-trashes-nafta-but-unwinding-it-would-come-at-a-huge-cost.html?_r=1">free trade areas</a>.Morocco has been actively negotiating with more than one of these in Africa.</p>
<p>What is going on? Morocco is now outflanking and outvoting Algeria, South Africa and their allies.</p>
<p>The main reason is that Morocco has been on a massive diplomatic drive, using both its political and economic muscle. Since his coronation in 1999, the king has led over <a href="http://moroccoonthemove.com/2017/01/31/moroccos-king-mohammed-vi-african-union-home-last/#sthash.Xneocccr.dpbs">40 visits</a> to African countries south of the Sahara. And 85% of Moroccan <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00044894.html">foreign direct investment</a> is in other African countries. </p>
<p>Morocco is today the second largest foreign investor, after South Africa, in other AU countries. It’s also now in a position to grant foreign aid that swings AU votes in its favour.</p>
<h2>Role of history</h2>
<p>When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/organisation-african-unity-formed-and-africa-day-declared">founded in 1963</a>, one of its founding principles was to recognise all borders as they existed on the day of independence. Morocco and Somalia <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=izoACwAAQBAJ&pg=PA80&lpg=PA80&dq=OAU,+borders,+Morocco+and+Somalia+object&source=bl&ots=TZtsD9wBer&sig=DyCE_Jbn3Nc_5-Nq4o0mWT9FpQE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjG1vXtk-zSAhWlAsAKHT0cDWcQ6AEIIDAB#v=onepage&q=OAU%2C%20borders%2C%20Morocco%20and%20Somalia%20object&f=false">lodged objections</a> – a premonition of wars to come. Both considered their precolonial territory, included neighbouring colonies, not yet independent.</p>
<p>When Spain withdrew from <a href="http://www.stampworldhistory.com/country-profiles-2/africa/spanish-sahara/">Spanish Sahara</a> in 1975, Polisario, which waged an insurgency against Spanish colonialists and subsequently Morocco, proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic <a href="http://statehoodandfreedom.org/en/the-saharawi-stuggle/the-saharawi-arab-democratic-republic-sadr">(SADR)</a> in 1976.</p>
<p>Simultaneously, Morocco and Mauritania partitioned the SADR between them, with Morocco later <a href="http://www.sadr-emb-au.net/oauau-and-the-question-of-western-sahara/">occupying it all</a> on the grounds that it had been part of the <a href="http://www.sadr-emb-au.net/mapping-of-the-conflict-in-western-sahara/">Moroccan empire</a> two centuries earlier.</p>
<p>The SADR promptly applied for OAU membership. Diplomats resorted to their favourite tactic in cases of deadlock, to stall as long as possible. But after seven years this was no longer possible and the SADR was admitted in 1983 with Morocco withdrawing in <a href="http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/a_sndmsg/news_view.asp?I=131444&PG=288">1984</a>.</p>
<p>The Sahrawis waged a 16 year war, ending in a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-sahara-idUSKCN0WO2BK">ceasefire</a>. What’s often skated over is that the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_wi.html">Sahrawis</a> are outnumbered about sixty to one by <a href="https://www.google.co.za/?gws_rd=ssl#q=morocco+population+2016&*">Moroccans</a>. </p>
<h2>Diplomacy reaps rewards</h2>
<p>Morocco is still en route to a constitutional monarchy. Parliament has no say over foreign policy and military affairs, both of which remain controlled by the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/08/the-reform-of-the-king/">monarchy</a>.</p>
<p>We can infer though that a nationalist or irredentist policy towards the SADR probably enjoys wide popularity, and that a Moroccan withdrawal from the SADR would be met by some protests within Morocco.</p>
<p>When King Mohammed VI <a href="http://internationalrelations.org/mohammed-vi/">ascended the throne in 1999</a>, he took cognisance of the fact that 16 years of boycotting the OAU had failed because the SADR remained an AU member in good standing. The new king used Morocco’s strengths as both an Arabophone and Francophone country to lobby zealously. </p>
<p>His success can be measured by the fact that Morocco’s application to rejoin the now strengthened African Union was supported by <a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2017/01/31/ANC-regrets-Moroccos-readmission-to-the-African-Union">39 out of 54 votes</a>, with a majority of AU members, 28 out of 54, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-29/morocco-rejoining-african-union-seen-shaping-vote-for-new-leader">petitioning to suspend</a> the SADR as a member. The SADR was only saved by the two-thirds rule which applies to suspension.</p>
<p>During these two decades of Moroccan diplomacy, the kingdom had also joined the Community of Sahel-Saharan States <a href="http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-community-sahel-saharan-states">(CEN-SAD)</a>, until this became dormant after Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15390980">assassination in 2011</a>. It also negotiated, but didn’t sign, a free trade agreement with the francophone <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/west-african-economic-and-monetary-union-uemoa">UEMOA</a>, the west African economic and monetary union. </p>
<p>Morocco has now formally stated that it will apply to join the Economic Community of West African States <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/02/209398/morocco-seeks-join-economic-community-west-african-states/">(Ecowas)</a>, as “part of the royal vision for regional integration”. (This is also a tacit admission that the Arab Maghreb Union is moribund, and going nowhere.)</p>
<p>If this seems startling, we should note that regional definitions are as much political as geographic, and are dynamic, not static. Rwanda, for example, moved from the central African grouping to the <a href="http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-04-13/187793/">East African Community</a> in 2007. Egypt and Libya have joined the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa, <a href="https://www.google.co.za/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&rlz=1C1NHXL_enZA711ZA711&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Libya,+egypt+joing+Common+Market+of+Eastern+and+Southern+Africa,&*">Comesa</a>. </p>
<p>And the AU has urged other states to follow the Tripartite Free Trade Area precedent by <a href="http://www.trademarksa.org/news/au-minimum-integration-programme-action-plan-costing-report">amalgamating with Ecowas</a>.</p>
<h2>Economic success</h2>
<p>We now need to consider the economic dimension. Morocco now has the <a href="http://venturesafrica.com/the-5-largest-economies-in-africa/">fifth largest GDP in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, Morocco has an economy as diversified as Egypt’s and South Africa’s unlike Nigeria and Algeria which are brutally affected by slumps in oil and <a href="http://business.financialpost.com/news/energy/fragile-five-these-opec-producers-are-on-the-verge-of-collapse-if-oil-prices-dont-stabilize-soon">gas prices</a>.</p>
<p>In addition to tourism and food exports, Morocco has deftly used free trade area partnerships with the EU until it has, for example, built up over one hundred companies that are partners in <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46491:morocco-an-example-of-aerospace-manufacturing-innovation&catid=114:civil-aviation&Itemid=247">aerospace global supply chains</a>.</p>
<p>This niche surpasses both South African and Egyptian manufacturing. Morocco is also installing some of the largest solar power plants in Africa, monetising the <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/11/05/moroccan-solar-plant-africa/">Sahara sunlight</a>.</p>
<p>The future will tell us what further diplomatic successes Morocco will achieve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75070/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Gottschalk does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Morocco has been on a massive diplomatic drive, using both its political and economic muscle. Since his coronation in 1999, the king has led over 40 visits to African countries south of the Sahara.Keith Gottschalk, Political Scientist, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/728932017-02-26T16:59:36Z2017-02-26T16:59:36ZMorocco’s membership of the AU: has unity finally been achieved?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158091/original/image-20170223-24090-19d4wxb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Morocco's return to the African Union raises questions about the body's continued commitment to anti-colonialism and its pan-Africanism. </span> </figcaption></figure><p>The African Union (AU) has always considered Morocco <a href="https://www.au.int/web/en/AU_Member_States">the only country missing</a> from its fold. After a 33-year absence, it was <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/morocco-rejoins-african-union-33-years-170131084926023.html">recently admitted </a> to the continental body to become its 55th member. </p>
<p>With this last piece of the jigsaw now in place, does it mean that African unity has finally been achieved? Or is the current picture of the AU likely to be ephemeral?</p>
<p>The criteria to become a member of the African Union are simple. The organisation is open to all African states and accession requires approval by a <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">simple majority of the existing members</a>. Though being an African state seems a straightforward requisite, there is ample room for interpretation. </p>
<p>Take for example efforts by Haiti, a Caribbean state, to accede to the union. This would require the AU review its reading of pan-Africanism. Other possible new members are states that could be formed as result of secession as well as European overseas territories that are part of Africa but represent the last vestiges of imperialism. </p>
<h2>Beyond Africa</h2>
<p>The dominant view of the AU reduces Africa to its continental definition. Accordingly, the objective is the political union of the African landmass and the adjacent islands.</p>
<p>This view has been used in relation to Haiti. The country has sought membership <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0229/Long-distance-relationship-Haiti-s-bid-to-join-the-African-Union">since 2012</a> on the grounds that it was the first black republic in history. Though perceived by many as belonging to Africa culturally, the AU rejected the island’s application in 2016 on the grounds that it was <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/30342/haiti-will-not-be-admitted-african-union-member-state-next-summit-kigali-rwanda">not an African country</a>.</p>
<p>But there are other interpretations of pan-Africanism. One view, for example, is that the <a href="http://exhibitions.nypl.org/africanaage/essay-pan-africanism.html">African diaspora is an integral part of the continent</a>, another is that racial identity – in the sense of <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/negritude/">négritude</a> – or cultural identity makes people eligible for African citizenship.</p>
<h2>Breakaway states</h2>
<p>Even within the narrow continental vision of pan-Africanism, there is still room for new members. Somaliland is one potential future candidate. It broke away from Somalia in 1991 and has acquired <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/11/economist-explains">state-like functions</a>, such as the autonomous provision of public goods, and is a potential candidate for membership. But, for the time being all AU member states view it as a part of Somalia. None recognises it as a state. </p>
<p>Other secessionist movements, such as the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17546620">Barotseland kingdom</a> that transcends Zambia, could also gain independence from current nation states. New states based on the geographic imagination of <a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-border-disputes-are-set-to-rise-but-there-are-ways-to-stop-them-44264">pre-colonial borders</a> could form and eventually request accession to the AU.</p>
<p>There is a precedent for this: South Sudan broke away from Sudan in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082">2011</a>, to become an independent state, followed by <a href="http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00013730.html">accession to the AU the same year</a>. </p>
<h2>Africa’s “last colonies”</h2>
<p>The AU understands Africa as a sealed off geographic entity. Yet it remains remarkably quiet about the many bits that are geographically part of the continent but do not consider the AU their home. Take the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/octs_en">European overseas territories</a> which include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Spain’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14114627">Ceuta</a>, <a href="http://www.melilla.es/melillaPortal/index.jsp">Melilla</a> and the <a href="http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/europe/canary.htm">Canary Islands</a>, </p></li>
<li><p>France’s <a href="http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/re.htm">Réunion</a>, </p></li>
<li><p>Portugal’s <a href="http://www.madeira.gov.pt/">Madeira</a>, and </p></li>
<li><p>the UK’s <a href="http://www.sainthelena.gov.sh/">St Helena</a> and the <a href="http://www.chagos-trust.org/">Chagos Archipelago</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>And there’s one more: in 2011 France <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20150925-video-mayotte-revisited-island-indian-ocean-islandfrench-department-comoros">reintegrated</a> Mayotte as one of its territories. While the AU <a href="https://www.au.int/web/en/newsevents/25583/highlights-meetings-auc-chairperson-during-68th-unga">“hopes”</a> that Mayotte will return to the Comoros, it shies away from taking concrete action. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780511880223">“last colonies”</a> could in principle exercise self determination and join the AU after successful independence. Yet, that seems highly unlikely in the near future given the overwhelming sense of belonging to a European country. </p>
<h2>Quitters</h2>
<p>Inclusion is not the only issue facing the African Union. Some existing members could also withdraw. The union’s Constitutive Act makes provision for <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">cessation of membership</a> – a procedure that only requires a written request and a one year waiting period. </p>
<p>Countries seeking a binding federalist union, such as <a href="http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/African_Union.html#_edn27">Libya under Gaddafi</a>, unsuccessfully opposed this exit option, though in practice only Morocco ever left the organisation.</p>
<p>But others could consider doing so.</p>
<p>Take Cape Verde. In 2007 the European Union and the island nation off the coast of Senegal established a <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:r13018">special partnership</a> that prepares it to qualify for future accession talks with the EU. This would entail it exiting from the AU.</p>
<p>In the Comoros there have been movements to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0709comorospp.pdf">replicate the experience of Mayotte to join France</a>. Though these have been met with resistance by both the Comoros government – who fears secession – and France – who fears costs – an exit remains conceivable.</p>
<p>More perils for AU membership lurk where countries are part of competing regional organisations, such as the <a href="http://www.lasportal.org/Pages/Welcome.aspx">Arab League</a> or the <a href="https://www.cplp.org/">Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries</a>. These offer identities transcending the continent and should they become more binding members will have to choose between them and the AU. In particular the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en">European Neighbourhood Policy</a> is designed to increase the magnetic pull of the EU for North Africa.</p>
<h2>Expelling members</h2>
<p>The AU Constitutive Act makes no provision for expelling members. Only suspension is foreseen in cases when a government has come to power trough <a href="https://au.int/web/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">unconstitutional means</a>. However, with a two-thirds majority, AU members could vote to introduce a provision for expelling.</p>
<p>Should that happen, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic <a href="https://global.britannica.com/place/Saharan-Arab-Democratic-Republic">(SADR)</a> would be first on the list. In the past, most African states considered Moroccan occupation of the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/wi.html">Western Sahara</a> a form of colonisation. They legitimised the claim of the SADR to govern the Western Sahara, which triggered Morocco’s exit in 1984.</p>
<p>But the tide is turning.</p>
<p>The growing support within the AU for Morocco <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/morocco-the-aus-prodigal-son">despite its occupation of the Western Sahara</a> makes a dismissal of the SADR more likely. It also indicates that anti-colonialism has lost vigour, which reduces the likelihood of an assertive claim by the AU to the “last colonies”.</p>
<h2>Revisiting pan-Africanism</h2>
<p>The AU’s narrow geographic interpretation of Africa seems to have reached its zenith with the accession of Morocco. But important inconsistencies remain. The AU is likely to come under pressure in the future to review its reading of pan-Africanism, both from inside and outside the continent.</p>
<p>It took Morocco 33 years to rejoin. Over the coming 33 years, the AU’s shape is likely to continue changing. We have not seen the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/21/bring-back-ideology-fukuyama-end-history-25-years-on">end of history</a> yet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72893/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Frank Mattheis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union sees Africa as a sealed off geographic entity. Yet it remains remarkably quiet about the many bits of Africa that are geographically part of it but do not consider it their home.Frank Mattheis, Senior Researcher in Global Studies, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.