tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/sharia-3203/articlesSharia – The Conversation2023-04-25T13:10:57Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043912023-04-25T13:10:57Z2023-04-25T13:10:57ZOmar al-Bashir brutalised Sudan – how his 30-year legacy is playing out today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522631/original/file-20230424-1289-n7envf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese in Khartoum protest the 2021 military coup that blocked a transition to civilian rule.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since independence in 1956 the Sudanese have lived through <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/26044/sudan-coup-timeline/">35 coups, attempted coups and coup plots</a> – more than any other African country. When the 2019 uprising against long-time dictator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">Omar al-Bashir</a> created a military-civilian transitional government, the Sudanese hoped that their country would <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-can-avoid-past-mistakes-by-drawing-lessons-from-its-history-115470">transition to democratic rule</a>. </p>
<p>But their hopes were dashed in October 2021 when Abdel Fattah al-Burhan <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-coup-years-of-instability-have-made-the-army-key-power-brokers-170676">led a coup</a> against his civilian counterparts in the transitional government. </p>
<p>In the latest round of conflict that began on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/15/sudan-unrest-live-news-explosions-shooting-rock-khartoum">15 April 2023</a>, civil war looms as the security actors who benefited from Bashir’s downfall battle for supremacy.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.ncl.ac.uk/hca/people/profile/willowberridge.html">studied Sudanese politics</a> for 15 years, and this latest round of conflict is the worst in the country’s recent history. And the legacy of Bashir’s rule is central to this calamity.</p>
<p>Bashir <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2021.1882385">bent government institutions</a> to serve his regime. He chose conflict over compromise in dealing with politically marginalised groups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/26/20-years-since-war-began-in-sudans-darfur-suffering-continues">Darfur</a>, in Sudan’s west, and in the south. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/">used force</a> to hold on to power. This fuelled <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Bashir-repression-in-Sudan/4552902-5158960-eifsgw/index.html">his support</a> of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was used to check regional rebels and the army. </p>
<p>Bashir’s legacy has continued to play out today. His former allies have mobilised to block the transition to civilian rule. This had been promised to the Sudanese people under a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/return-civilian-rule-sudan#:%7E:text=The%20Sudanese%20military%20and%20a,in%20an%20October%202021%20coup.">framework agreement</a> signed in December 2022 by the military and a coalition of civilian actors.</p>
<p>In my view, Burhan’s fear of civilian attempts to rein in military privileges led him to preserve key elements of the Bashir system. This is playing a divisive role in the current conflict.</p>
<h2>The ideology of Islamism</h2>
<p>Part of Bashir’s legacy has to do with Islamist politics. It’s this legacy that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Hemedti</a> and who heads the paramilitary force, sought to exploit to his favour when he labelled Burhan a “<a href="https://twitter.com/GeneralDagllo/status/1647887773011959809">radical Islamist</a>”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1647887773011959809"}"></div></p>
<p>This characterisation was designed to <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-turmoil-why-hemeti-taking-aim-radical-islamists">appeal to Western powers</a>. But it’s inaccurate. To understand why, one has to understand the ideological trajectory of the Bashir regime.</p>
<p>When Bashir staged the coup in 1989, he was acting as a representative of a cell in a military carefully cultivated by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-National-Front">National Islamic Front</a>. The political party co-ordinated the coup with Bashir. </p>
<p>The National Islamic Front was led by <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hasan-al-Turabi-Islamist-Politics-Democracy/dp/1107180996">Hasan al-Turabi</a>, who had run Sudan’s Islamic Movement since the 1960s. He had grown frustrated at his failure to introduce his version of Muslim law (Sharia), through parliamentary means. </p>
<p>Soon after the coup, Bashir and Turabi initiated a process of <em>tamkeen</em> (empowerment). This policy, the legacy of which still remains, enabled them to give <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7062-sudans-popular-uprising-and-the-demise-of-islamism">adherents of Islamism</a> and security bosses willing to ally with them control over almost every part of public life in Sudan.</p>
<p>Formally, Bashir installed an independent, technocratic government. In practice, however, power lay with a military-Islamist coalition that ran the country behind the scenes. </p>
<p>Throughout the 1990s, Bashir set about ruthlessly purging Sudan’s independent civil society organisations and political parties. By the end of the decade, he’d fallen out with Turabi. </p>
<p>He ejected Turabi from the government in 1999 and co-opted selected representatives of the opposition into his regime in the decades that followed. Bashir maintained the military-Islamist coalition as the basis of his National Congress Party. This kept the edifice built through tamkeen in place.</p>
<h2>Making amends</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, the Sudanese government hosted <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hasan-al-Turabi-Islamist-Politics-Democracy/dp/1107180996">radical Islamists</a> who sought to export revolution abroad and topple neighbouring regimes deemed to be Western proxies. However, after the split with Turabi in 1999, the Bashir regime attempted to <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-is-sudans-genocidal-regime-a-cia-favorite">repair its international image</a> by distancing itself from such militant groups. It also began to cooperate with Western intelligence agencies. </p>
<p>In the later Bashir period, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-sudan-idUSKCN0SC0E120151018">Sudanese government supported</a> the Saudi-Emirati coalition against the militant Islamist Houthis in Yemen. <a href="https://www.sudanakhbar.com/488615">Burhan oversaw this deployment</a>. </p>
<p>When he emerged as the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190413-veteran-soldier-burhan-becomes-sudans-new-ruler">transitional military leader</a> in 2019, Burhan benefited from the perception that he was a professional soldier more than an Islamist. </p>
<p>His principal interests are aligned with the military’s core interests: maintaining its privileged social and political status, as well as its numerous business enterprises. Burhan made the <a href="https://3ayin.com/en/ncp-returns/">political calculation</a> in 2021 that National Congress Party-era security bosses and bureaucrats were his best allies in the battle to both prevent civilians challenging the military’s grip on the economy, and Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces emerging as an alternative power centre. After taking over power, he co-opted these former security bosses into government.</p>
<p>The Islamism of the Bashir-era stooges Burhan has been returning to government is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/sudans-unfinished-democracy/">defined by</a> three elements. These are socially conservative authoritarian politics, including the <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/outrage-in-sudan-as-new-force-reminiscent-of-public-order-police-is-installed">return of morality policing</a>; a hostility to the Sudanese left; and corruption.</p>
<p>While these leaders are mostly not the “radical Islamists” the West fears, for many Sudanese, their ongoing commitment to a narrowly defined Arab-Islamic identity is divisive.</p>
<h2>A difficult dismantling</h2>
<p>After he seized power in 1989, Bashir insisted that his coup was a conventional military movement designed to return order to public life. Bashir, who has been in jail since April 2019, still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-bashir-admits-role-1989-coup-during-trial-2022-12-20/">maintains</a> that line. The military that overthrew him has been reading the same script.</p>
<p>Four months after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/">the military</a> had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/20/sudans-military-removes-al-bashir-all-the-latest-updates#:%7E:text=Sudan's%20President%20Omar%20al,a%20maximum%20of%20two%20years.">removed Bashir</a>, it signed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/4/what-does-sudans-constitutional-declaration-say">constitutional declaration</a> with the main civilian coalition, the Forces of Freedom and Change.</p>
<p>This led to the formation of a joint military-civilian transitional government. The government established an Empowerment Removal Committee to <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-anti-corruption-team-continues-purging-remnants-of-old-regime">dismantle the network</a> of parastatal charities, media enterprises and banks that had enabled Bashir and his allies to maintain their grip on Sudan. </p>
<p>But Burhan’s October 2021 coup disrupted this. The committee was pushed aside and most of its prominent members <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/lawyers-question-legal-grounds-of-erc-arrests">arrested</a>.</p>
<p>But even before this coup, dismantling Bashir’s regime was an enormous challenge. </p>
<p>The media is a case in point. In the Bashir period, the media was controlled by nominally independent proprietors. In practice, they were National Congress Party cronies, thriving off the party’s domination of the Sudanese economy. </p>
<p>The notorious al-Intibaha newspaper, for instance, is known for its hostile rhetoric towards the South Sudanese. It continued to act as a platform for Bashir’s warmongering uncle, al-Tayyib Mustafa, even after Mustafa was <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2315281/bashir%E2%80%99s-uncle-arrested-over-threat-violence-topple-transitional-govt">arrested</a> for posing a threat to the transitional government.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.sudaress.com/kushnews/286365">Mustafa’s death in 2021</a>, the paper retained his style. A <a href="https://alintibaha.net/online/162998/">piece</a> published shortly before the April 2023 outbreak of conflict characterised the civilians in the 2019-2021 transitional government as dual nationals serving foreign interests. It attacked efforts to curtail the security services’ powers.</p>
<p>Bashir may have fallen in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of his regime’s infrastructure. The remnants of this continue to undermine democratic transition in Sudan, with ultimately disastrous consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>My research on Islamist politics in Sudan (for my book on Hasan al-Turabi) was funded by a British academy small grant. I have also recently been a fellow at the World Peace Foundation (2020-2022).</span></em></p>Omar al-Bashir fell in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of the authoritarian infrastructure of his regime.Willow Berridge, Lecturer in History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1913662022-10-11T14:02:01Z2022-10-11T14:02:01ZWhat drives Al-Shabaab in Somalia: foreign forces out, Sharia law in and overthrow the government<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486829/original/file-20220927-24-32z7kt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu where a 30-hour Al-Shabaab siege left 21 people dead in August 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hassan Elmi/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In response to external – and at times internal – pressure, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia has evolved over time. </p>
<p>Before 2008, Al-Shabaab was a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986">small player</a> within the larger Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The Union was an umbrella entity that emerged around 2003 to provide justice and security in Mogadishu in the absence of a formal state.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17531050701452382">Ethiopia</a> – in support of the transitional Somali government – militarily defeated the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. Over the next two years, Al-Shabaab broke away from the Union and rose to prominence in Somalia.</p>
<p>It transformed from a terrorist organisation, fighting Ethiopian occupation, to something of a de-facto state. It gained territory, eventually controlling most of southern Somalia. </p>
<p>Between 2010 and 2013, the group survived <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21520844.2019.1658986">military and territorial losses</a>, as well as a significant <a href="https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140221_Bryden_ReinventionOfAlShabaab_Web.pdf">leadership crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab adapted and honed its ability to conduct attacks. It also established systems to tax businesses and the public, both inside and outside of the territory it controlled. The group began to provide an alternative justice structure based on a <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299149628?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strict and harsh interpretation</a> of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-sharia-intersection-islam-and-law">Sharia</a> (Islamic law) – though its understanding of Sharia was highly debatable even among <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafi circles</a>. </p>
<p>Today, Al-Shabaab remains the most <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/expanding-us-counterterrorism-somalia-necessary-insufficient">formidable challenge</a> to the Somali government, and its regional and international partners. </p>
<p>Despite the shifts it has experienced over 15 years, some things have remained crucial to Al-Shabaab’s mission in Somalia. Scholars have noted <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter/299149628">three goals</a> that have been continually reasserted:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>ridding the country of foreign troops</p></li>
<li><p>implementing Sharia </p></li>
<li><p>defeating the Somali federal government </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fully understanding these motivations, however, can be a challenge. This is because the organisation’s goals can change with time and the views of the leadership can be different from those of recruits. </p>
<p>Yet, examining these motivations offers important and actionable insights into the factors that perpetuate the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-55795025">conflict in Somalia</a> or block efforts to resolve it.</p>
<h2>Hostility to foreign troops</h2>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s nationalist stance against foreign troops in Somalia has been a theme throughout its evolution.</p>
<p>Following the US backing of a warlord coalition during the Islamic Courts Union era and Ethiopia’s military intervention, Al-Shabaab began to <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-courts-union#text_block_19602">spread a message</a> in opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Somalia. </p>
<p>There were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099">“maximalist and violent pan-Islamist members”</a> within the group’s leadership ranks at the time. However, Al-Shabaab’s outspokenness against foreign forces resonated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2020.1863099">deep-rooted Somali hostility</a> against Ethiopia and broader nationalist narratives that existed, separate from Salafi and extremist trends. Ultimately, this served as an incredible recruitment tool.</p>
<p>After Ethiopia withdrew forces in 2009, Al-Shabaab shifted its focus to the expulsion of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The mission’s role included <a href="https://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/">protecting federal institutions</a>. AMISOM has since been replaced by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-is-still-fragile-what-the-new-african-union-mission-can-do-to-help-stabilise-it-180430">African Union Transition Mission in Somalia</a>, which Al-Shaaab continues to oppose. </p>
<p>The group also wants to <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">get rid of the US</a>. This is due to the country’s airstrikes and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-61631439">special operations forces in Somalia</a>. </p>
<p>Turkey is another <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaabs-expanding-anti-turkish-campaign-in-somalia/">unwelcome foreign power</a> because it supports the Somali federal government. It also advises and trains the military. </p>
<p>Al-Shabaab additionally opposes the <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">United Arab Emirates’ economic interests</a> in Somali ports and military bases.</p>
<h2>Implementing Sharia</h2>
<p>Implementing its own version of Sharia (Islamic law) has remained a pillar of Al-Shabaab’s agenda throughout its existence. </p>
<p>The group embraces a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/15/islamism-salafism-and-jihadism-a-primer/">Salafist interpretation</a> of Sharia. This includes the imposition of harsh punishments for infractions and the rejection of Sufi traditions that many Somalis follow. However, this goal has, as researchers have pointed out, taken “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/35091/chapter-abstract/299149628?redirectedFrom=fulltext">different forms according to the situation and the strength of the organisation</a>”. </p>
<p>For instance, in 2006, Al-Shabaab didn’t antagonise Sufi orders in the way it did between 2008 and 2009 because it wasn’t as powerful. As the group began to experience military pressure and territorial losses in the period after 2011-2012, the implementation of Sharia varied across Somalia, with some Al-Shabaab provincial (<em>wilayat</em>) governors operating more reasonably than others.</p>
<p>More recently, in 2019, Ahmed Diriye – Al-Shabaab’s current leader – expressed a tougher stance. He declared that Sharia ought to be implemented without “<a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf">concession or compromise</a>”. </p>
<h2>Desire to govern</h2>
<p>Defeating the Somali federal government and federal member states is another important agenda item for Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>The group sees itself as an alternative to the Somali government. This is evident in its efforts to govern territory. It also provides security, justice and other services that the government <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/inside-minds-somalia%E2%80%99s-ascendant-insurgents">has failed</a> to effectively provide. </p>
<p>The organisation’s influence in the sphere of governance is notable in three areas: justice, taxation and dispute mediation. </p>
<p>First, Al-Shabaab’s shadow court system has offered pathways to justice for Somalis. It addresses the problems of the population it controls, including divorce, inheritance and land disputes. It then provides rulings it can actually enforce. </p>
<p>The government’s court and justice system are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-gov-t-seeks-to-crack-down-on-al-shabab-shadow-courts-/6705224.html">reportedly</a> less consistent. Its rulings aren’t always enforced and it faces issues of corruption.</p>
<p>Al-Shabaab’s courts <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-gov-t-seeks-to-crack-down-on-al-shabab-shadow-courts-/6705224.html">attract residents</a> from areas outside the organisation’s immediate territorial control. This is because the courts help solve practical problems. </p>
<p>Second, the group maintains a taxation system that has spread beyond government-controlled territories. This <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Al-Shabaab-IMEP_Bacon_March-2022.pdf">likely surpasses</a> the Somali government’s own taxation abilities. </p>
<p>Through its taxation of businesses, transportation, ports and other sectors, Al-Shabaab provides <a href="https://hiraalinstitute.org/a-losing-game-countering-al-shababs-financial-system/">some services</a>, such as regulating the production of certain export products. However, the main benefit of “taxation” is protection from the group. </p>
<p>The organisation also collects <em>zakat</em>, a charitable contribution required for Muslims. However, it uses much of this collection to bolster its own coffers rather than redistributing it to the community. </p>
<p>Third, Al-Shabaab has presented itself as capable of successfully intervening in clan disputes. In an <a href="https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/in-hearts-and-minds-effort-shabaab-boasts-of-settling-dispute-between-conflicting-tribes-in-southern-somalia.html">October 2020 press release</a>, the organisation claimed it’s “keen to solve the problems and differences that arise between the tribes, and it has shown remarkable success in settling decades-long disputes among them”. </p>
<p>Mediating clan disputes is central to Al-Shabaab’s ambitions to establish a unified Islamic state. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>After 15 years of conflict, Al-Shabaab remains a significant threat to stability in Somalia and its neighbours, <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-why-militants-are-targeting-kenyas-lamu-county-176519">like Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>Understanding its motives to expel foreign troops, implement its version of Sharia and defeat the government raises questions on how to end their insurgency. </p>
<p>With the <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-election-raises-more-questions-than-answers-183833">recent election</a> of Somali president Hassan Mohamud, there appears to be renewed government focus on not just weakening Al-Shabaab, but eliminating it. As part of this effort, the government has “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ma-awisley-militias-in-central-somalia-mobilizing-against-al-shabab-/6776048.html">hailed</a>” mobilisation efforts by local militia (called Ma'awisley) against the group. </p>
<p>The new administration has called for the expansion of these resistance efforts. It has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/ma-awisley-militias-in-central-somalia-mobilizing-against-al-shabab-/6776048.html">sent government troops</a> to join local militia in an offensive against Al-Shabaab. Time will tell if this new strategy will strategically alter the course in the fight against the group. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/309-considering-political-engagement-al-shabaab-somalia">Political engagement</a> with Al-Shabaab is another potential avenue that could complement military operations. </p>
<p>However, prospects for negotiation are poor. This is because of Al-Shabaab’s reluctance to engage in negotiations, its uncompromising position on foreign troop withdrawal and the government’s commitment to eliminating the group.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daisy Muibu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Al-Shabaab’s evolution over nearly two decades has been centred around three major goals.Daisy Muibu, Assistant Professor, University of AlabamaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1685112021-10-11T08:45:53Z2021-10-11T08:45:53ZFostering girls’ education will be challenging under a Taliban regime, but Afghanistan can learn a lot from Indonesia<p>Since the return of the Taliban to power, concern has been growing over the “Islamisation” of Afghan society – including the education sector.</p>
<p>Many fear that either schools will be shut down or girls will be excluded. This could reverse <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-taliban-returns-20-years-of-progress-for-women-looks-set-to-disappear-overnight-165012">20 years of progress</a> in narrowing the gender gap in school enrolment.</p>
<p>There have been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58537081">reports</a>, for instance, about Taliban plans to enforce gender segregation, restrict women’s activities outside their homes, impose hijab norms, and replace schools with traditional <em>madrasas</em> (Islamic education institutions).</p>
<p>However, around the world, millions of girls have been schooled under similar conditions, often inspired by strict interpretations of Shariah law. </p>
<p>A case in point is Indonesia, where the government along with non-state religious organisations run the world’s largest network of <a href="https://theconversation.com/poor-indonesian-families-are-more-likely-to-send-their-daughters-to-cheap-islamic-schools-131310"><em>madrasas</em></a>. They have made important social contributions to educational development in remote and underdeveloped communities.</p>
<p>Despite the many challenges, therefore, Indonesia can serve as an important model for the Taliban of how Muslim nations and faith-based organisations can play a big role in expanding girls’ education.</p>
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Baca juga:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-taliban-returns-20-years-of-progress-for-women-looks-set-to-disappear-overnight-165012">As the Taliban returns, 20 years of progress for women looks set to disappear overnight</a>
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<h2>Islamic law and girls’ schooling are not in conflict</h2>
<p>Just like Afghanistan, Indonesia has allowed <em>madrasas</em> to co-exist side by side with secular schools.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0738059317302341">Indonesian <em>madrasas</em></a> have responded to societal needs by offering girls’ education long before other Muslim countries like <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/17/i-wont-be-doctor-and-one-day-youll-be-sick/girls-access-education-afghanistan">Afghanistan</a>, where most <em>madrasas</em> are still either single-sex, or boys only.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, hand in hand with the country’s two leading Muslim organisations – the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-worlds-biggest-islamic-organization-drives-religious-reform-in-indonesia-and-seeks-to-influence-the-muslim-world-165064">reformist Sunni organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</a>, and the education and social charity Muhammadiyah – have created a nationwide <a href="https://www.press.uillinois.edu/books/?id=p073175">network of <em>madrasa</em>-educated women</a>. Setting aside ideological differences, both have historically welcomed female students to <em>madrasas</em>. </p>
<p>Although there has been <a href="https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/unraveling-the-myth-of-madrasah-formal-education-quality-in-indo/19188764">debate</a> over their quality, Indonesian <em>madrasas</em> have achieved gender parity in school enrolment. There are also more girls than boys at the upper secondary level. Even enrolment in informal or <a href="https://theconversation.com/poor-indonesian-families-are-more-likely-to-send-their-daughters-to-cheap-islamic-schools-131310">traditional Islamic boarding schools (“<em>pesantrens</em>”)</a> is gender-balanced.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425615/original/file-20211011-25-1soxsd8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425615/original/file-20211011-25-1soxsd8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/425615/original/file-20211011-25-1soxsd8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425615/original/file-20211011-25-1soxsd8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425615/original/file-20211011-25-1soxsd8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425615/original/file-20211011-25-1soxsd8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425615/original/file-20211011-25-1soxsd8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/425615/original/file-20211011-25-1soxsd8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=578&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Regardless of the type of Islamic school, female presence has been steady across recent years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://emispendis.kemenag.go.id/dashboard/?content=data-statistik">(Data from the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs.)</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For Afghanistan, following in Indonesia’s footsteps can play a role in plugging the country’s supply gap of schools, particularly in remote regions.</p>
<p>Many parts of Afghanistan remain <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/156881533220723730/pdf/129161-WP-P157288-Afghanistan-to-2030-PUBLIC.pdf">isolated</a>. Poor digital infrastructure and the lack of state schools mean community-based <em>madrasas</em> remain the only viable option to expand girls’ schooling.</p>
<p>Even after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/8/16/the-us-spent-2-trillion-in-afghanistan-and-for-what">trillions of dollars</a> invested during the US administration, around <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12354">two-thirds</a> of secondary school-aged girls in Afghanistan have been left out of school. In other words, even in the absence of Taliban rule, progress in bringing girls to school has been less than satisfactory. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s model can be a low-cost solution for state authorities to create educational opportunities for girls.</p>
<p>Another Muslim country, Bangladesh, for instance, has followed the Indonesian model of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/09645290903142593">partnership with <em>madrasas</em></a>. Today, girls <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220380902935824">outnumber boys</a> in secondary education in Bangladesh. </p>
<p>What’s more, even before the Taliban’s recent demands on veiling and <em>purdah</em> (female segregation), the Indonesian government had similarly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/node/378167/printable/print">imposed</a> restrictive dress codes on school girls back in 2014.</p>
<p>So an important lesson for Afghanistan from Indonesia – as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country – is that even a preference for Shariah law is not in conflict with the global agenda to educate girls in school.</p>
<h2>Educate to fight another day</h2>
<p>Partnership with <em>madrasas</em> does in some ways <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2017.1414190">undermine</a> the full transformative power of education. However, Muslim communities should be left alone to negotiate civic rights with their ruling elites.</p>
<p>Bringing girls to school is the main priority right now – educated women are the best force for future social change.</p>
<p>In Indonesia, a number of <a href="https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/suffra-jets-protests-indonesian-flight-attendants-ordered-don-hijab">women</a> and <a href="https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/suffra-jets-protests-indonesian-flight-attendants-ordered-don-hijab">parents</a> recently spoke out against an earlier government decision to impose hijab norms. These isolated acts of protest are a byproduct of past investments that Indonesia has made in mass schooling <a href="http://globaldev.blog/blog/building-schools-boosts-long-term-and-intergenerational-outcomes">since the 1970s</a>. This has resulted in increasing citizen activism, voice, and a sense of empowerment among Indonesian girls and women.</p>
<p>This shows that, over time, a larger and critical mass of educated women can mobilise on common interests and use their literacy to negotiate better rights with state authorities. </p>
<p>Continuous acts of small protests in Indonesia, for instance, eventually led to a <a href="https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/indonesia-s-mandatory-hijab-ban-is-a-triumph-for-women">landmark decision</a> earlier this year when the Indonesian government banned schools across the country from forcing girls to wear the hijab.</p>
<p>The diversity in the way that Indonesia has expanded educational opportunities for girls – despite intense <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/rise-islamist-groups-malaysia-and-indonesia">conservative religious campaigns</a> at the grassroots level – once again reminds us Islamic traditions alone are no barrier to women’s development.</p>
<p>Therefore, in Afghanistan, a country devastated by war and at an early stage of economic development, the world community should demand that the Taliban bring all girls to school.</p>
<p>In fact, the debate should not be about gender segregation and whether or not to mix religion with schooling. Education should be a priority, regardless of the form and type.</p>
<p>Afghanistan today has many more vocal female leaders than before, thanks to their appointment to various <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/18/1029014825/afghan-women-politicians-taliban-resistance">leadership positions</a> in the past 20 years. The Taliban acknowledges this change, which is reflected in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/20/world/asia/afghan-girls-schools-taliban.html">regime’s recognition</a> of the importance of girls’ schooling including access to higher education.</p>
<p>If past trends are sustained, schooling will empower Afghan women and help them mobilise further to negotiate more inclusive schooling in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>M Niaz Asadullah is affiliated with the Global Labor Organization (GLO) and a co-founder of the Initiative on Education, Gender and Growth in Asia (Integgra).</span></em></p>Indonesia can serve as an important model for the Taliban of how Muslim nations and faith-based organisations can play a big role in expanding girls’ education.M Niaz Asadullah, Professor of Development Economics, University of MalayaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1650642021-09-23T12:30:23Z2021-09-23T12:30:23ZHow the world’s biggest Islamic organization drives religious reform in Indonesia – and seeks to influence the Muslim world<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422463/original/file-20210921-5916-rj44er.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C4881%2C3266&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A gathering during the 73rd anniversary of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/participants-are-seen-at-the-bung-karno-stadium-during-a-news-photo/1090184470?adppopup=true">Eko Siswono Toyudho/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After its return to power in Afghanistan, the Taliban are again imposing their <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/08/taliban-perpetuate-muslim-worlds-failed-governance-paradigm/">religious ideology</a>, with restrictions on <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-afghanistan-womens-rights-kabul-taliban-eee5a8c73dd5d58acfda008582ef77bb">women’s rights</a> and other repressive measures. They are presenting to the world an image of Islam that is intolerant and at odds with social changes. </p>
<p>Islam, however, has multiple interpretations. A humanitarian interpretation, focusing on “rahmah,” loosely translated as love and compassion, has been emphasized by a group <a href="https://siapabilang.com/buku-islam-otoritarianisme-dan-ketertinggalan/photo/">I have studied</a> – Nahdlatul Ulama, which literally means “Reawakening of the Islamic Scholars.”</p>
<p>Nahdlatul Ulama, or NU, was founded in <a href="https://www.baytarrahmah.org/media/2021/Yahya-Cholil-Staquf_Transcript_Regent-University_9-11_Commemoration-Speech.pdf">1926 in reaction</a> to the Saudi conquest of Mecca and Medina with their rigid understanding of Islam. It follows <a href="https://brill.com/view/book/9789004435544/BP000016.xml">mainstream Sunni Islam</a>, while embracing Islamic spirituality and accepting Indonesia’s cultural traditions.</p>
<p>Functioning in Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population, Nahdlatul Ulama is the world’s biggest Islamic organization with about <a href="https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/publication/indonesia-religious-freedom-landscape-report">90 million members and followers</a>. In terms of membership, the organization hugely outstrips that of the Taliban – yet this face of Islam has not been sufficiently recognized on the international stage.</p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/27/world/asia/indonesia-islam-nahdlatul-ulama.html">NU responded</a> to the rise of the Islamic State group and its radical ideology by initiating an <a href="http://sr.sgpp.ac.id/post/humanitarian-islam-fostering-shared-civilizational-values-to-revitalize-a-rules-based-international-order">Islamic reform</a>. Since then, it has elaborated on this reform that it calls “<a href="https://baytarrahmah.org/humanitarian-islam/">Humanitarian Islam</a>.”</p>
<h2>Humanitarian Islam</h2>
<p>During the past seven years, NU’s general secretary, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-make-the-islamic-world-less-radical-11610665933">Yahya Cholil Staquf</a>, has organized several meetings of the organization’s Islamic scholars with a reformist agenda. They made public declarations for reforming Islamic thought on controversial issues, including political leadership, equal citizenship and relations with non-Muslims.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.baytarrahmah.org/media/2021/God-Needs-No-Defense_Reimagining-Muslim-Christain-Relations-in-the-21st-Century.pdf">The Nahdlatul Ulama declarations include crucial decisions</a> that differentiate “Humanitarian Islam” from other interpretations. First of all, they reject the notion of a global caliphate, or a political leadership that would unite all Muslims. The concept of a caliphate has been accepted by both <a href="http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com">mainstream Islamic scholars</a>, such as those in <a href="https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-islam-and-the-foundations-of-political-power.html">Al-Azhar</a> – Egypt’s world-renowned Islamic institution – and radical groups, such as the Islamic State group and al-Qaeda.</p>
<p>Moreover, the NU declarations emphasize the legitimacy of modern states’ constitutional and legal systems, and thus reject the idea that it is a religious obligation to establish a state based on Islamic law.</p>
<p>Additionally, these declarations stress the importance of equal citizenship by refusing to make a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as legal categories.</p>
<p>They call for a deeper cooperation among Muslims, Christians and followers of other religions to promote world peace.</p>
<p>Nahdlatul Ulama has taken practical steps for realizing these aims. For example, it has established a working relationship <a href="https://worldea.org/news/thomas-k-johnson-on-humanitarian-islam-and-the-ethics-of-religious-freedom-podcast/">with the World Evangelical Alliance</a>, which claims to represent 600 million Protestants, to promote intercultural solidarity and respect.</p>
<p>These NU declarations may sound insufficient from a Western liberal point of view, since they do not touch upon some issues such as LGBTQ rights. To better understand the importance of NU’s perspective and its limits requires an examination of the Indonesian context.</p>
<h2>Indonesia’s tolerant Islam</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Yahya Staquf, secretary general of Indonesia's Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422462/original/file-20210921-15-i1g5b7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yahya Cholil Staquf, general secretary of Nahdlatul Ulama.</span>
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</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">My research</a> on 50 Muslim-majority countries finds that Indonesia is notable because it is one of the few democracies among them.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s foundational credo, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pancasila">Pancasila</a>, means “five principles” and basically refers to the belief in God, humanitarianism, Indonesia’s national unity, democracy and social justice. </p>
<p>About 88% of Indonesia’s population of 270 million are Muslim. Both Nahdlatul Ulama and <a href="https://maarifinstitute.org">Muhammadiyah</a>, the country’s second-biggest Islamic organization, have been respectful of these principles. Like NU, Muhammadiyah also has tens of millions of followers, and these two organizations often <a href="https://libforall.org/ini-iis-book/">cooperate against radical Islamist groups</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/robert-hefner/">Robert Hefner</a>, a leading expert on Indonesia, documents in <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691050478/civil-islam">his 2000 book “Civil Islam”</a> how NU and Muhammadiyah made important contributions to the country’s democratization in the late 1990s. During this process, the leader of NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, became Indonesia’s first democratically elected president in 1999. </p>
<p>Wahid, who died in 2009, left a religious legacy, too. During my conversations, senior <a href="https://baytarrahmah.org/c-holland-taylor-biography/">NU members</a> repeatedly referred to Wahid’s reformist ideas as the main source of inspiration for Humanitarian Islam.</p>
<h2>Indonesia’s intolerant Islam</h2>
<p>Not all Islamic theories and practices in Indonesia are tolerant toward diversity. The country’s Aceh province has enforced certain rules of Islamic criminal law, including the punishment of caning for those who sell or drink alcohol.</p>
<p>Another example of religious and political intolerance is the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">blasphemy law</a>, which resulted in the 20-month imprisonment of the capital city Jakarta’s Chinese Christian governor, <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/12/6/415/htm">Basuki Purnama</a> in 2017-2018, for a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/asia/indonesia-governor-ahok-basuki-tjahaja-purnama-blasphemy-islam.html">statement about a verse</a> in the Quran.</p>
<p>In January 2021, the story of a Christian female student being pressured by the school principal to wear a Muslim headscarf went <a href="https://www.facebook.com/elianu.hia/videos/3444961562268596">viral on Facebook</a>. In two weeks, the Indonesian government responded with a decree that banned <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/world/asia/indonesia-schools-head-scarves.html">public schools from making any religious attire compulsory</a>.</p>
<p>In short, there is a tug-of-war between tolerant and intolerant interpretations of Islam in Indonesia. Even within NU, there exist disagreements between conservatives and reformists.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, Nahdlatul Ulama reformists are becoming more influential. One example is the current minister of religious affairs, <a href="https://en.qantara.de/content/future-proofing-islam-indonesia-g20-presidency-to-focus-on-the-soul-of-islam">Yaqut Cholil Qoumas</a>, a leading NU member and the younger brother of NU’s reformist general secretary. He was one of the <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/16679-indonesian-government-forbids-state-schools-from-requiring-muslim-headscarves">three ministers who signed </a> the joint decree banning the imposition of headscarves on students in February.</p>
<p>NU’s Humanitarian Islam movement might be crucial to promote tolerance among Indonesia’s Islamic majority. But can it have an effect beyond Indonesia?</p>
<p>[<em>Explore the intersection of faith, politics, arts and culture.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-explore">Sign up for This Week in Religion.</a>]</p>
<h2>Influencing the Middle East</h2>
<p>This reform movement’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/world/asia/indonesia-islam.html">reception in the Middle East</a>, the historical center of Islam, is important if it is to have a global impact. Humanitarian Islam has been mostly ignored by scholars and governments of Middle Eastern countries, who generally see it as <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/16463-the-battle-for-the-soul-of-islam">a competitor of their own attempts to influence the Muslim world</a>. As a nongovernmental initiative, Humanitarian Islam is different from Middle Eastern efforts to shape the Muslim world, which are mostly government-led schemes.</p>
<p>With its reformist emphasis, Humanitarian Islam may appeal to some young <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48703377">Middle Eastern Muslims</a> who are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43981745">discontent</a> with their countries’ <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-secular-shift-new-survey-reveals-huge-changes-in-religious-beliefs-145253">political and conservative</a> interpretations of Islam.</p>
<p>In order to reach a Middle Eastern audience, the Humanitarian Islam movement is launching <a href="https://arabic.baytarrahmah.org">an Arabic-language version</a> of its English website. Whether this Indonesian initiative can have an impact in the Middle East and become a truly global movement for Islamic reform remains to be seen.</p>
<p></p><hr><p></p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418525/original/file-20210830-33-yznmc8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Want to learn about Islam and Muslims in America? Read our series of six articles on Understanding Islam on <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/understanding-islam-108919">TheConversation.com</a>. Or we can deliver them to your inbox over a week if you <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/understanding-islam-79">sign up for our email newsletter course</a></em></p>
<p></p><hr><p></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165064/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nahdlatul Ulama is the world’s biggest Islamic organization, initiating a reform movement, which it is calling ‘Humanitarian Islam.’Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1663232021-08-25T12:28:45Z2021-08-25T12:28:45ZTaliban’s religious ideology – Deobandi Islam – has roots in colonial India<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417455/original/file-20210823-26-gu7pjr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Students on the campus of Darul Uloom, the Deoband school of Islam located in a small town, Deoband, in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-picture-taken-on-september-7-2011-muslim-students-news-photo/128403818?adppopup=true">Sajjad Hussain/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Following the Taliban’s rapid taking of power in what it describes as a reestablished “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan</a>,” fears of a certain kind of Islamist ideology being brought back <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/talibans-rapid-advance-across-afghanistan-2021-08-10/">have led a large number of Afghans to flee, or fear for their lives</a>. </p>
<p>The Taliban were known for their oppressive rule. They ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, at which point they were <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/afghanistan-war">pushed out of power by U.S. and British troops</a>. Under the Taliban rule, religious minorities and other Muslims who did not share their fundamentalist understanding of Islam were not tolerated. The Taliban also <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/taliban-rules-for-women-during-last-afghanistan-takeover-2021-8">severely restricted</a> the rights of women and girls.</p>
<p>As scholars who <a href="https://polisci.indiana.edu/about/faculty/ganguly-sumit.html">research ethno-religious conflicts</a> in South Asia, we have studied the origins of the Taliban’s religious beliefs. The roots of this ideology – Deobandi Islam – can be traced to 19th century colonial India. </p>
<h2>Colonialism and Islam</h2>
<p>Deobandi Islam <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520298002/revival-from-below">emerged in India in 1867</a>, 10 years after a major Indian nationalist uprising against the rule of the British East India Company.</p>
<p>Two Muslims clerics, Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Maulana Rashid Muhammad Gangohi, <a href="https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A2715157/view">were behind the setting up of the Deobandi school</a>. Their aim was to indoctrinate Muslim youth with an austere, rigid and pristine vision of Islam. At its heart, Deobandi Islam was an anti-colonial movement designed to revitalize Islam. </p>
<p>This school of Islamic thought had a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/1089201x-2006-049">very particular understanding of the faith</a>. The Deobandi brand of Islam adheres to orthodox Islamism insisting that the adherence to Sunni Islamic law, or sharia, is the path of salvation. It <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-deobandi.htm">insists on the revival of Islamic practices</a> that go back to the seventh century – the time of the Prophet Muhammad. It upholds the notion of global jihad as a sacred duty to protect Muslims across the world, and is opposed to any non-Islamic ideas. </p>
<p>The first <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-madrasa-schools-and-what-skills-do-they-impart-99497">madrassa</a> – or Islamic school – to educate Muslim youth in the Deobandi tradition was set up in the north Indian state of present-day Uttar Pradesh toward the end of the 19th century.</p>
<p>The Deobandi school system spread over the next several decades and attracted Muslim youth in different parts of the Indian subcontinent. For instance, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186307007778">Deobandi tradition became the most popular school of Islamic thought</a> among the Pashtuns, an ethnic group living in an area on either side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. </p>
<p>Pashtun leaders played an instrumental role in establishing and <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/durand-line/">expanding the Deobandi curriculum</a> and tradition in the Pashtun belt across the <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/durand-line">Durand line</a>, the colonial border separating British India from Afghanistan. </p>
<h2>Funding and enrollments</h2>
<p>After British India was partitioned in 1947 between India and Pakistan, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/deoband-school-and-the-demand-for-pakistan/oclc/592479?tab=details">many prominent Deobandi scholars migrated to Pakistan</a>, setting up a large number of madrassas. </p>
<p>With the independence of India and Pakistan, the school placed its full attention on training the students <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-deobandi.htm">within this fundamentalist Islamic tradition</a>.</p>
<p>In the years and decades after the independence of Pakistan, Deobandi madrassas spread across Pakistan, and one of their principal causes of political activism became <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d67513f2.html">India’s treatment of Muslims</a> in the Indian-controlled portion of Jammu and Kashmir. </p>
<p>According to one estimate, by 1967 there were as many as <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-past-and-future-of-deobandi-islam/">8,000 Deobandi schools worldwide</a> and thousands of Deobandi graduates mainly in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Malaysia. </p>
<p>At first, the Deobandi madrassas tended to be poorly funded. One event that greatly boosted the growth of enrollment in Deobandi madrassas was the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/">Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979</a>. </p>
<p>The CIA’s covert involvement in the war fueled Islamic militancy and inadvertently helped <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Ghost_Wars.html?id=ToYxFL5wmBIC">organize and orchestrate a resistance</a> movement mostly composed of ardent religious fighters. A substantial number of these Afghan fighters were drawn from the Deobandi madrassas, especially the Pashtuns, who played a leading role in the resistance. </p>
<p>During that time, the Deobandi madrassas also <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023">gained financial assistance</a>. This assistance, as scholar <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=8khoUBcAAAAJ&hl=en">Thomas Hegghammer</a> writes, came mainly through American aid dollars meant for Pakistan and money from Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Saudi leaders, in fact, used the <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/Religion_and_Politics_in_Saudi_Arabia_Wahhabism_and_the_State">influence of their money to push their own interpretation of Islam – Wahhabism – at the Deobandi madrassas</a>. Wahhabism is a deeply conservative form of Islam that believes in a literal interpretation of the Quran. At this point, <a href="https://theprint.in/india/were-indians-first-taliban-view-of-islam-not-ours-say-deoband-islamic-scholars-locals/720283/">the Deobandi madrassas moved far away from their religious roots</a>. </p>
<h2>Ties of kinship</h2>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Afghans refugees line up for food disbursement at a camp in Pakistan in 2001." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/417659/original/file-20210824-19623-4n9fr5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Afghans have fled upheaval in their country for more than 40 years, often landing in refugee camps in Pakistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-refugees-line-up-for-cooking-oil-during-a-food-news-photo/1171969?adppopup=true">Chris Hondros/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Following the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, <a href="https://media.nationalgeographic.org/assets/file/afghan_MIG.pdf">millions of Afghan refugees, in several waves</a>, took shelter in Pakistan, especially in its Pashtun belt. </p>
<p>Keen on obtaining a strategic toehold in Afghanistan, Pakistan <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/pw_175-afghanistan_pakistan_ties_and_future_stability_in_afghanistan.pdf">actively recruited young men in refugee camps</a>, imbuing them further with religious zeal to <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300163681/taliban">fight the Soviets</a>. </p>
<p>Driven out of their homes in Afghanistan, the dispossessed young Afghans thrived in the refugee camps, in part due to ties of ethnicity as Pashtuns. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316226803.010">Drawn to a religiously based offensive against what they deemed to be an infidel</a>, or foreign occupier, they became ready recruits to the anti-Soviet cause.</p>
<p>Many of the Taliban’s key leaders and fighters, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230106581_6">Mullah Omar, the founder of the organization</a>, had studied in the Deobandi seminaries in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. </p>
<h2>After the civil war</h2>
<p>After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the fighters <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm">continued to enjoy the support of Pakistan’s security establishment</a> and private actors for financial assistance.</p>
<p>When Afghanistan plunged into a civil war in 1992, various factions of the anti-Soviet resistance vied for power. Among them was the Northern Alliance, a group that India and Russia had backed and was under the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2968/057006004">leadership of an ethnic Tajik, Ahmed Shah Massoud</a>, who resisted the Taliban and acquired an almost mythic status.</p>
<p>However, as scholar <a href="https://www.carlisle.army.mil/kmn/curriculumVitae/287993_CurriculumVitae.pdf">Larry P. Goodson</a> writes, with the crucial and substantial assistance of Pakistan’s security establishment, <a href="https://uwapress.uw.edu/book/9780295980508/afghanistans-endless-war/">the Taliban emerged victorious and seized power in 1996</a>. </p>
<p>Once in power, they imposed their distinctive brand of Islam on the country – far removed from its religious roots in colonial India. </p>
<p>[<em>3 media outlets, 1 religion newsletter.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-3-in-1">Get stories from The Conversation, AP and RNS.</a>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166323/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Deobandi Islam, the religious school that the Taliban draw their ideology from, was set up in 19th century India to educate Muslim youth.Sohel Rana, PhD Student, Indiana UniversitySumit Ganguly, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1661312021-08-15T15:03:10Z2021-08-15T15:03:10ZAfghan government collapses, Taliban seize control: 5 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416187/original/file-20210815-6755-osweke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4932%2C3329&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Personnel were evacuated from the U.S. embassy in Kabul on Aug. 15, 2021, as Taliban insurgents broke through the capital city's defensive line.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Afghanistan/519e42dfe6464de3ad1ca95e8861dc22/photo?Query=Afghanistan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=72958&currentItemNo=40">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Panic and turmoil grip Afghanistan after Taliban insurgents <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/12/world/asia/kandahar-afghanistan-taliban.html">captured the capital city of Kabul</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">the president fled on Aug. 15, 2021</a>.</p>
<p>There would be “no transitional government in Afghanistan,” <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taliban-officials-there-will-be-no-transitional-government-afghanistan-2021-08-15/">Taliban officials told Reuters</a> news service. The insurgent group “expects a complete handover of power” – though <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/countries-should-not-recognise-taliban-afghan-government-says-uks-johnson-2021-08-15/">many nations may not recognize</a> a Taliban government that took power through armed struggle rather than by continuing the now-failed internationally mediated peace negotiations.</p>
<p>Fearful citizens aiming to escape the rule of radical Islamic fighters were “lining up at cash machines to withdraw their life savings,” <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">according to the Associated Press</a>, and overrunning the Kabul airport’s tarmac as U.S. military evacuation flights tried to take off.</p>
<p>The fall of Afghanistan came just three months after the U.S. began to withdraw its troops from the country following a 20-year war that <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-08-14/costs-of-the-afghanistan-war-in-lives-and-dollars">killed 2,448 U.S. service members, 3,846 U.S. military contractors and some 66,000 Afghan national military and police</a>. </p>
<p>For Afghans and international observers of a certain age, history is repeating itself in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The Taliban – which means “the students” in Pashto – seized control of Afghanistan in 1996 after capturing Kabul in the Afghan civil war. They established a government based on their extreme interpretation of Islamic Sharia law and ruled for five years. The Taliban regime was then toppled in 2001 by the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Six armed men in head coverings with beards stand by a road with mountains in background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416109/original/file-20210813-15-s510z3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Taliban fighters at a roadside checkpoint in Afghanistan in 1995.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/taliban-fighters-at-checkpoint-on-road-leading-to-radical-islamic-picture-id50437124">Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Here, Afghanistan experts offer insight into the Taliban – then and now – and explain the United States’ role in Afghanistan’s collapse. </p>
<h2>1. The Taliban regime</h2>
<p>Have the Taliban changed since 2001? </p>
<p>That’s the question <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/international-studies-and-programs/about-us/directory/sherjan-ahmadzai.php">Sher Jan Ahmadzai</a>, director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, set out to answer in his <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-the-taliban-speak-more-moderately-but-their-extremist-rule-hasnt-evolved-in-20-years-164221">July 2021 story on the Taliban</a>. </p>
<p>Ahmadzai, who is from Afghanistan, explained that, “During the Taliban’s five-year rule, women were prohibited from working, attending school or leaving home without a male relative. Men had to grow beards and wear a cap or turban.” </p>
<p>Anyone not abiding by this code could be lashed, beaten or humiliated. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A street hairdresser in Kabul cuts a man's beard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Getting a trim in Kabul after the Taliban’s ouster, November 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/119720452">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The rhetoric of the Taliban has moderated since 2001, Ahmadzai wrote, but their extremist beliefs have not changed.</p>
<p>“All evidence suggests the Taliban still believe in restoring their old system of emirate, in which an unelected religious leader, or emir, was the ultimate decision-maker,” given authority from God.</p>
<p>Already, in Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan, Ahmadzai wrote, Taliban have rulers “have asked families to marry off one girl per family to their fighters; said women should not leave home without a male relative; and ordered men to pray in mosques and grow beards.” </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-after-the-us-withdrawal-the-taliban-speak-more-moderately-but-their-extremist-rule-hasnt-evolved-in-20-years-164221">Afghanistan after the US withdrawal: The Taliban speak more moderately but their extremist rule hasn't evolved in 20 years</a>
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<h2>2. Women under ‘fundamentalist’ rule</h2>
<p>Afghan women may have the most to fear from the Taliban’s victory.</p>
<p>Scholars <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/homa-hoodfar-449678">Homa Hoodfar</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pRDRavYAAAAJ&hl=en">Mona Tajali</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-has-not-changed-say-women-facing-subjugation-in-areas-of-afghanistan-under-its-extremist-rule-164760">interviewed 15 Afghan women activists, community leaders and politicians</a> over the past year. Few of them felt the Taliban believed in gender equality.</p>
<p>“Reform of the Taliban is not really possible. Their core ideology is fundamentalist, particularly towards women,” one 40-year-old women’s rights activist from Kabul told Hoodfar and Tajali. </p>
<p>In international meetings and on social media, Taliban leaders suggest only that women have rights “according to Islam.” </p>
<p>A schoolteacher in northern Afghanistan told the researchers, “In the beginning, when we saw the Taliban interviews on TV, we hoped for peace, as if the Taliban had changed. But when I saw the Taliban up close, they have not changed at all.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Women in purple burqas walk amid a ruined city street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416108/original/file-20210813-6624-kgy7py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Women in traditional burqas in wartorn Kabul, in 1996, as the Taliban fought to take control of Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/women-wear-traditional-burqas-october-21-1996-in-kabul-afghanistan-picture-id744218">Roger Lemoyne/Liaison/Getty Images</a></span>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taliban-has-not-changed-say-women-facing-subjugation-in-areas-of-afghanistan-under-its-extremist-rule-164760">Taliban 'has not changed,' say women facing subjugation in areas of Afghanistan under its extremist rule</a>
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<h2>3. A ‘moral tragedy’</h2>
<p>The United States <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-wont-be-able-to-shirk-moral-responsibility-in-leaving-afghanistan-164474">cannot shirk moral responsibility</a> for the human rights abuses and violence that Afghans will likely face under Taliban rule, according to University of Washington philosopher <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Mm14TeMAAAAJ&hl=en">Michael Blake</a>.</p>
<p>“This ought to trouble the politicians who defend the withdrawal, and those voters who gave power to those politicians,” he says.</p>
<p>Calling the collapse of Afghanistan “morally tragic,” Blake says the U.S. may have an obligation to provide refuge to Afghans who bear particular risks because they were part of the United States war effort. That includes Afghan translators, who have been targeted by the Taliban for their work with the U.S. military.</p>
<p>The Biden administration in July 2021 authorized a US$100 million “urgent” expansion of the special visa program that could get <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/02/biden-visa-program-afghan-interpreters-502085">up to 20,000 Afghans affiliated with the U.S. war effort out of Afghanistan</a> and resettled abroad. </p>
<p>But it is difficult if not impossible now for those people to flee a country under Taliban rule. And translators are far from the only Afghans at risk of retaliation by the Taliban.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Crowds of Afghans trying to take money out of the bank in Kabul." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416198/original/file-20210815-13-1elgnxi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Afghans wait for hours to try to withdraw money from Kabul Bank, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Sunday, Aug. 15, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Afghanistan/639280f1107448f0981a1e1c397c55c9?Query=kabul&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=31447&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/Rahmat Gul</a></span>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-wont-be-able-to-shirk-moral-responsibility-in-leaving-afghanistan-164474">Why the US won't be able to shirk moral responsibility in leaving Afghanistan</a>
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<h2>4. Global terror threat</h2>
<p>The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan is also a victory for the terrorist organization al-Qaida, <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-the-taliban-surges-across-afghanistan-al-qaeda-is-poised-for-a-swift-return-164314">according to Greg Barton, chair in global Islamic politics at Deakin University in Australia</a>.</p>
<p>“Afghanistan was the birthplace of al-Qaida in 1988. The group gave rise to terrorist networks around the world, including…al-Qaida in Iraq, which morphed into the Islamic State,” writes Barton.</p>
<p>The U.S. originally invaded Afghanistan to hunt down and destroy al-Qaida after the group attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001. Afghanistan had become a haven for terrorists under Taliban rule. </p>
<p>With the Taliban’s return to power, international terrorist organizations could – sooner than anticipated – begin openly operating out of the country again, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/afghanistan-taliban-us-troops-intl-08-15-21/index.html">said Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley on Aug. 15, 2021</a>.</p>
<h2>5. Could US forces return to Afghanistan?</h2>
<p>When former President Donald Trump made a deal with the Taliban to end the U.S. war in Aghanistan, acceding to a longstanding Taliban demand, public opinion polls indicated widespread support for the decision. </p>
<p>That gave President Joe Biden license to follow through on Trump’s decision, says <a href="https://as.vanderbilt.edu/history/bio/thomas-schwartz">Thomas Alan Schwartz</a>, a history professor at Vanderbilt University.</p>
<p>But a “rapid takeover of the country by the Taliban, with the subsequent persecution of women and domestic opponents of the regime, may well produce a backlash among millions of Americans,” Schwartz <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-afghanistan-the-us-again-gets-to-choose-how-it-stops-fighting-165058">wrote on Aug. 13, 2021</a>.</p>
<p>Schwarz notes that “the brutality of Islamic State executions led U.S. forces back into Iraq” after President George W. Bush had declared victory there. Similarly, the “repression and carnage involved in a Taliban triumph” could make Biden rethink a full U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan that would “cast a profound and damaging shadow over the entire Biden presidency.”</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-afghanistan-the-us-again-gets-to-choose-how-it-stops-fighting-165058">In Afghanistan, the US again gets to choose how it stops fighting</a>
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</em>
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<p><em>This story has been updated.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The Taliban ‘expect a complete handover of power.’ Experts explain who the Taliban are, what life is like under their rule and how the US may bear responsibility for Afghanistan’s collapse.Catesby Holmes, International Editor | Politics Editor, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1642212021-07-22T12:07:18Z2021-07-22T12:07:18ZAfghanistan after the US withdrawal: The Taliban speak more moderately but their extremist rule hasn’t evolved in 20 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411284/original/file-20210714-13-1i7h63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C1911%2C1279&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In early 2021, some Taliban fighters surrendered their weapons to support peace talks with the Afghan government. Today the Islamic extremist group is battling government forces to control the country. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/photos/taliban-fighters?agreements=pa%253A91269&family=editorial&page=2&phrase=Taliban%2520fighters&sort=newest">Xinhua/Emran Waak via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Taliban are rapidly gaining territory in Afghanistan as the United States withdraws its forces from the war-torn country. The militant group now <a href="https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/06/taliban-takes-control-of-30-districts-in-past-six-weeks.php">holds at least one-third of Afghanistan’s 364 districts</a>. </p>
<p>For two decades the Afghan government has relied heavily on American military power to defend against the bloody insurgency of the Taliban, a radical Islamic organization that seized control of the country in 1996. </p>
<p>During the Taliban’s five-year rule – which was almost universally shunned by other governments but supported <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm">militarily and politically by Pakistan</a> – women were prohibited from working, attending school or leaving home without a male relative. Men were forced to grow beards and wear a cap or turban. Music and other entertainment was banned. </p>
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<img alt="A street hairdresser in Kabul cuts a man's beard in November 2001." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411287/original/file-20210714-19-1hrkv77.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Getting a trim in Kabul, November 2001.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/119720452">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Anyone not abiding by this code risked being publicly lashed, beaten or humiliated. Women who disobeyed these rules were <a href="http://rawa.org/beating.htm">sometimes killed</a>.</p>
<p>Twenty years have passed since the 2001 United States invasion that quickly toppled the Taliban regime. Most Taliban fighters today are under 30. Some weren’t even born in 2001. </p>
<p>What does the group stand for today?</p>
<h2>The Taliban then and now</h2>
<p>The 2001 Taliban defeat was celebrated by Afghans inside and outside of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Children started to fly kites and to play games – both previously banned. Couples played music at their weddings, and women left their homes for work without fear of being beaten by Taliban enforcers. Many men shaved their beards. Afghanistan opened to the world. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ac3UA_48Va0?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Kite-flying resurged in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Neither the Taliban nor violence disappeared as the climate of fear dispersed, but Afghans resumed some semblance of normal life. </p>
<p>Today, younger members of the Taliban, a group once known for eschewing technology, have adopted social media, TV and radios to promote their extremist version of Islamic law. The rhetoric of their older leaders has changed since 2001, too – at least on the international stage. </p>
<p>During peace negotiations and on visits abroad, the Taliban’s leadership has expressed both a belief that women have <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/taliban-say-islamic-system-only-way-to-afghan-peace-womens-rights/ar-AALet6z">rights under Islamic laws</a> and a desire to reduce violence in Afghanistan. The group has also pledged to protect <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/afghan-taliban-offers-protect-infrastructure-projects-142805475.html">such public infrastructure as government buildings, roads and schools</a>, which it has often attacked. </p>
<p>In very few areas of Afghanistan that the Taliban have controlled for many years, local members of the group have allowed girls to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/why-the-taliban-agreed-to-let-more-girls-in-afghanistan-go-to-school/ar-BB1cwf4I">go to school after community leaders negotiated with local Taliban leaders</a>.</p>
<h2>A new emirate</h2>
<p>But in newly captured areas their policies are more hard line. </p>
<p>According to various reports by the Afghan stations Radio Liberty and Radio Salam Watandar, Taliban rulers in Afghanistan’s North and Northeast have asked families to <a href="https://swn.af/taliban-in-takhar-every-family-brings-a-girl-to-our-marriage/">marry off one girl per family to their fighters</a>; said women should not <a href="https://da.azadiradio.com/a/31350025.html">leave home without a male relative</a>; and ordered men to pray in mosques and grow beards. </p>
<p>The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, an Afghan government agency, says <a href="https://bakhtarnews.af/taliban-destroyed-public-infrastructures-in-116-districts-nadery/">public infrastructure has been destroyed</a> and social services halted in many Taliban-controlled areas, leaving 13 million people without public services. </p>
<p>All evidence suggests the <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/have-the-taliban-changed/">Taliban still believe</a> in restoring their old system of emirate, in which an unelected religious leader, or emir, was the ultimate decision-maker. No one could challenge his verdicts because he was believed to have a divine authority from God.</p>
<p>“What has changed? Absolutely nothing,” Ahmad Rashid, a Pakistani journalist who <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ahmed-rashid-afghanistan-chaos-will-suck-in-neighboring-countries/a-58163020?maca=en-Twitter-sharing">has covered Afghanistan for 20 years</a>, told Germany’s Deutsche Welle newspaper in July 2021. “The Taliban don’t believe in democracy. They just want the collapse of the government so they can reconquer Afghanistan and reimpose their system.”</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bearded men in white robes and head coverings walk closely together in a hotel-like setting" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411286/original/file-20210714-19-2ga69l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Taliban co-founder Abdul Ghani Baradar, center, after signing the Taliban’s accord with the U.S. in Qatar in February 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/1204139101">Giuseppe Cacace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>A dubious negotiating partner</h2>
<p>The U.S. troop withdrawal follows a controversial February 2020 U.S.-Taliban accord initiated by former President Donald Trump. </p>
<p>In the deal, the U.S. agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan – fulfilling a long-standing Taliban goal – if the Taliban ceased violence against American forces, severed ties with al-Qaida and other terror groups and entered <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-peace-talks-begin-but-will-the-taliban-hold-up-their-end-of-the-deal-146081">peace talks with the Afghan government</a>. </p>
<p>U.S. President Joe Biden has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/08/1014178656/as-u-s-troops-leave-afghanistan-biden-is-set-to-explain-what-happens-now">defended his decision to leave Afghanistan</a>, but there is good reason to doubt the Taliban’s commitment to peace. </p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://unama.unmissions.org/surge-civilian-casualties-following-afghanistan-peace-negotiations-start-un-report">recent United Nations report</a>, 5,459 Afghans have been killed since the 2020 U.S.-Taliban deal was signed, and the Taliban were responsible for 62% of those deaths. </p>
<p>In my decades of first working for the Afghan government and then <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/international-studies-and-programs/about-us/directory/sherjan-ahmadzai.php">studying Afghanistan as an academic</a>, I have found no reliable historical evidence of the group’s abiding by any domestic agreement it signed with any party in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>It has <a href="http://www.hazara.net/mazari/mazari.html">killed opponents</a> at meetings allegedly called to discuss a truce and denied schooling to girls after committing to educate them. </p>
<p>The Taliban have so far kept their promise to the U.S. not to attack withdrawing American forces. But ongoing talks with the Afghan government have not resulted in a cease-fire or power-sharing agreement for Afghanistan.</p>
<p>“Why were the Taliban going to compromise once the [U.S. troop] exit date was given?” asked Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan at a July 2021 conference on <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1635387">security in Central and South Asia</a> I attended. </p>
<p>“Why would they listen to us when they are sensing victory?”</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A dozen or more men with large weapons stand in front of a home with arched windows" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411289/original/file-20210714-21-f829i8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Armed men gather in Herat to support Afghanistan security forces fighting the Taliban on July 9, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/afghan-militia-gather-with-their-weapons-to-support-afghanistan-picture-id1233885751">Hoshang Hashimi / AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<h2>Terror connections</h2>
<p>Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan hosted many terrorists who perpetrated attacks on American interests worldwide. </p>
<p>The terrorists included al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden, who planned <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/afghan-taliban#text_block_16833">the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania</a> and the Sept. 11, 2001, World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in his home <a href="https://www.npr.org/series/135908383/osama-bin-laden-dead">in Pakistan in 2011</a>, but al-Qaida cells <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-al-qaida-is-still-strong-17-years-after-9-11-102966">continue to operate in Southwest Asia and beyond</a>. </p>
<p>And the Taliban <a href="https://theprint.in/defence/why-us-pullout-from-afghanistan-has-indian-security-forces-worried-about-kashmir/696519/">still associate with the group</a> – a violation of their 2020 accord with the U.S. According to a May 2021 U.S. government report, the Taliban <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/18/2002654296/-1/-1/1/LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20FREEDOM'S%20SENTINEL.PDF">“maintain close ties” with al-Qaida</a>. </p>
<p>Recent reports from <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/paks-terror-groups-join-taliban-war-india-wary-101625942135382.html">Indian security agencies</a> say Pakistan-based terrorist groups are partnering with the Taliban to fight Afghan forces inside Afghanistan, too.</p>
<p>Journalist Ahmad Rashid says with the U.S. gone, the Taliban won’t likely strike a deal as long as the Pakistani military continues to give <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ahmed-rashid-afghanistan-chaos-will-suck-in-neighboring-countries/a-58163020?maca=en-Twitter-sharing">their leaders and their families refuge in Pakistan</a>. The Taliban top brass is safe, while young Taliban fighters wage their insurgency in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>[<em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sher Jan Ahmadzai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two decades have passed since the US invasion of Afghanistan toppled the Taliban’s Islamic extremist regime. Despite efforts to update its image, the group still holds hard-line views.Sher Jan Ahmadzai, Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1583712021-05-18T12:23:03Z2021-05-18T12:23:03ZMuslim women are using Sharia to push for gender equality<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396649/original/file-20210422-18-17aoklz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C17%2C2973%2C1926&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslim women in India protesting against the use of Sharia as a tool for oppression.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-muslim-womens-hold-placards-and-take-part-in-a-news-photo/928329674?adppopup=true">anjay Purkait/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sharia is often portrayed as barbaric and particularly regressive in terms of women’s rights. Citing Sharia, lawmakers in some Muslim-majority countries have punished theft with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50179741">amputation</a>, and sex outside of marriage with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/05/28/in-pakistan-honor-killings-claim-1000-womens-lives-annually-why-is-this-still-happening/">stoning</a>. Women have been also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/nyregion/muslim-abuse-womens-shelter.html">forced to stay in abusive marriages</a> and flogged for defying Sharia because they were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/12/01/sudan-has-repealed-its-repressive-public-order-law-that-had-let-police-flog-women-wearing-pants/">wearing trousers</a>.</p>
<p>Commonly translated as Islamic law, Sharia is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-sharia-means-5-questions-answered-79325">broad set of ethical principles</a> found in the Quran, Islam’s holy book, and in the teachings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. It is not a strict legal code, leaving it open to <a href="https://theconversation.com/dont-blame-sharia-for-islamic-extremism-blame-colonialism-109918">varying interpretations</a> by governments and religious leaders. </p>
<p>Public outcry over Sharia has led to more than 200 <a href="https://belonging.berkeley.edu/global-justice/islamophobia">anti-Sharia bills</a> being introduced across the United States. The European Court of Human Rights has twice ruled Sharia <a href="https://www.justiceinitiative.org/voices/case-watch-europes-broad-view-acceptable-limits-free-speech">incompatible</a> with <a href="https://www.icnl.org/resources/research/ijnl/refah-partisi-the-welfare-party-and-others-v-turkey">human rights</a>. Conservative analysts have called Sharia <a href="https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2020/03/11/beware-the-other-pandemic-sharia-supremacism/">the world’s “other pandemic,”</a> a comparison to COVID-19. </p>
<p>However, many Muslim women do not regard Sharia as being incompatible with their rights. My <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108965989">research</a> shows how women – typically small activist groups in many countries – are using Sharia to fight against oppressive practices. </p>
<h2>Sharia and women’s rights</h2>
<p>I interviewed nearly 150 women’s rights activists, religious leaders, officials and aid workers over the past decade in Somalia and Somaliland, where <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-international-religious-freedom/somalia/">more than 99%</a> of the population is Muslim.</p>
<p>The region has suffered cycles of <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/famine-somalia">famine and drought</a>, as well as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12251">brutal dictatorship and civil war</a> that led to the collapse of Somalia’s government 30 years ago and the split between Somalia and Somaliland. </p>
<p>I wanted to learn why women were demanding Sharia and whether Sharia could help rebuild societies after war. My book, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108965989">“Shari‘a, Inshallah: Finding God in Somali Legal Politics,”</a> tells the story of peace builders and peacemakers oriented toward, rather than away from, Sharia. </p>
<p>Because Sharia <a href="https://theconversation.com/harsh-punishments-under-sharia-are-modern-interpretations-of-an-ancient-tradition-115211">encourages a diversity of interpretations</a>, there is no right or wrong way to interpret it.</p>
<p>Women activists I met saw an inherent feminism in Sharia. Muslims “can find support for almost everything” in Sharia, a Somali activist reminded me. It’s just that women “have to know their rights in the Quran,” she added.</p>
<p>These activists help their local communities understand women’s rights in Islam. For example, one activist fighting for girls’ education explained to local parents how Sharia demands that both “boys and girls have the right to education.” Billboards put up by human rights groups referred to the Islamic teaching that to educate a girl is to educate a nation. They emphasized that Prophet Muhammad himself <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780312213510#aboutBook">taught women and men</a> and encouraged his followers to do the same.</p>
<p>Another activist I talked with invoked Sharia to explain that girls should be allowed to play sports. She explained to parents that not allowing their daughters to play <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/JPESM/article-full-text-pdf/7772CB356230">goes against Sharia</a>, which “gives rights to human beings.”</p>
<p>Yet another called the Quran – one of the sources of Sharia – her guide to persuade women to <a href="http://exhibitions.globalfundforwomen.org/exhibitions/women-power-and-politics/elections/quran">run for public office</a>. Allowing women to stand for election, she publicly insisted, “is Islamic.” </p>
<h2>Patriarchy and interpretations</h2>
<p>Part of the problem with the often brutal interpretation of Sharia has been that men have been aligning it with their political views. “The custodians of law are men,” an aid worker told me.</p>
<p>Indeed, some religious leaders insist that Sharia allows <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/sep/03/a-race-against-time-the-new-law-putting-somalias-children-at-risk-of-marriage">child marriage</a> and <a href="https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnado630.pdf">female genital mutilation</a> to preserve women’s premarital virginity and prevent women from experiencing sexual pleasure.</p>
<p>Activists I met tried to put an end to these harmful practices by sharing harrowing stories in workshops with religious leaders. One activist told me that in one such workshop she had related the tragic story of a young girl whose pelvis shattered during childbirth. Another shared the story of a child who drank bleach to avoid a forced marriage. </p>
<p>These women wanted religious leaders to share these stories with others. They argued that Sharia could not be used to permit child marriage and female genital mutilation. <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Encountering-the-Transnational-Women-Islam-and-the-Politics-of-Interpretation/Sharify-Funk/p/book/9780367605667">Protecting women</a> “is so clearly written in the Quran,” said one activist who added that “Islam always promotes the person, health, and dignity.” </p>
<p>[<em>This Week in Religion, a global roundup email newsletter each Thursday.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/this-week-in-religion-76/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=religion-global-roundup">Sign up.</a>]</p>
<h2>Reclaiming women’s power</h2>
<p>Religious leaders in these countries have, however, been reluctant to speak publicly on these issues. But many of the Somali women I met were reviving a centuries-old tradition – of women <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/156920803322765155">teaching and interpreting Sharia</a>. In the seventh century, Aisha, the Prophet Muhammad’s surviving spouse, was among the first Muslim authorities to render decisions on sacred law <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/494271">that men had to follow</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A Muslim woman leads prayers inside the Qal'bu Maryam women's mosque in Berkeley, California." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/401075/original/file-20210517-17-1h3okc0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Qal'bu Maryam women’s mosque in Berkeley, California.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/soraya-deen-leads-prayers-as-part-of-a-grand-opening-news-photo/1213336107?adppopup=true">Kristopher Skinner/MediaNews Group/East Bay Times via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Not just in Somalia and Somaliland, but in many parts of the world, Muslim women <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/islam-gender-and-social-change-9780195113570?cc=us&lang=en&#">are reclaiming</a> their rights by studying and sharing Quranic verses and prophetic teachings. In <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/888E17F4ACC3739CE1AA443FD07C9BA8/9781108423946AR.pdf/Constituting_Religion.pdf">Malaysia</a>, for example, groups like <a href="https://rpl.hds.harvard.edu/religion-context/case-studies/gender/malaysias-sisters-islam">Sisters in Islam</a> and <a href="https://www.musawah.org/">Musawah</a> have been publicly putting forward feminist interpretations of Quranic verses to teach women about gender equality and inheritance rights. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/mwjhr-2016-0022">Egypt</a>, women have invoked Sharia to expand access to divorce.</p>
<p>In my research in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139199247">Sudan</a>, I saw women lawyers teach women displaced by civil war that their rights come from God. On the Day of Judgment, these women said to one another, God will judge those who tried to take away women’s God-given rights. </p>
<p>And in Los Angeles, California, a <a href="https://www.womensmosque.com/">women’s mosque</a> offers women-led sermons, classes and events.</p>
<p>By interpreting theological and legal texts in less patriarchal ways, these women, as I found, are shattering age-old sexist interpretations of Sharia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158371/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Fathi Massoud has held fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Andrew Mellon Foundation, Fulbright-Hays, and the University of California. Any views expressed here are the author's responsibility.</span></em></p>Sharia is often portrayed as being brutal and barbaric. However, in many parts of the world, women are using Sharia to stop oppressive practices.Mark Fathi Massoud, Professor of Politics and Legal Studies, University of California, Santa CruzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1541492021-03-05T21:04:02Z2021-03-05T21:04:02ZWomen in Afghanistan worry peace accord with Taliban extremists could cost them hard-won rights<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387893/original/file-20210304-15-1sypk8u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C19%2C4274%2C2796&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Audience members listen to Afghan parliamentarian Fawzia Koofi speak in 2014. Women's access to politics increased greatly after the Taliban's 2001 ouster.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-women-listen-to-a-speaker-address-a-political-news-photo/181903098">Sha Marai/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Three Afghan women who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/02/world/asia/afghanistan-women-journalists-killed.html">worked at a media company were gunned down in Jalalabad in early March</a>. In January, unidentified gunmen killed <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack-judges/gunmen-kill-two-female-supreme-court-judges-in-afghanistan-police-idUSKBN29M076">two female Supreme Court judges in Kabul</a>.</p>
<p>These are the latest victims on a long list of assassinations and attempted assassinations of female politicians and women’s rights activists. Such attacks have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taliban-attacks-in-afghanistan-surge-after-us-peace-deal-inflicting-heavy-casualties/2020/04/30/1362fb40-88c0-11ea-80df-d24b35a568ae_story.html">intensified since the government began peace negotiations</a> with the Taliban militant group in September 2020. In the past year, 17 <a href="https://twitter.com/HRD_Memorial/status/1359814612921778179">human rights defenders</a> have been killed in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>The Taliban’s rule of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 was the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-fate-of-womens-rights-in-afghanistan/">darkest time for Afghan women</a>. Assuming an austere interpretation of Islamic Sharia and Pashtun tribal practices, the group limited women’s access to education, employment and health services. Women were required to be fully veiled and have <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/6185.htm">male escorts in public</a>. </p>
<p>We are <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C11&q=H+Hoodfar&btnG=">scholars</a> of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=pRDRavYAAAAJ">women’s rights in Muslim majority countries</a>, including in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1554477X.2013.820115">Afghanistan</a>. We have been following Afghanistan’s peace talks with an eye on gender, seeking to understand how Afghan women view the prospect of their government striking a power-sharing agreement with the group that oppressed them.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387899/original/file-20210304-22-fcm9w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Sunny, blue-painted classroom full of smiling Afghan boys and girls" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387899/original/file-20210304-22-fcm9w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387899/original/file-20210304-22-fcm9w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387899/original/file-20210304-22-fcm9w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387899/original/file-20210304-22-fcm9w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387899/original/file-20210304-22-fcm9w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387899/original/file-20210304-22-fcm9w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387899/original/file-20210304-22-fcm9w0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A coed private school classroom in Kabul, September 2019. Girls’ education is still restricted in Taliban-controlled areas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/afghan-boys-and-girls-attend-mixed-classes-at-the-ariana-news-photo/1183342347">Scott Peterson/Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Seat at the table</h2>
<p>Women are a pale presence in the on-again, off-again, U.S.-brokered Afghanistan peace process underway in Doha, Qatar. The Taliban, which still controls roughly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-rule-territory/">30% of Afghanistan’s territory</a>, has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/05/opinions/women-should-be-at-the-center-of-afghan-peace-talks-bigio-cleaveland/index.html">no women on its negotiating team</a>. Only four of the Afghan government’s 21 negotiators are women – even though several women play prominent roles within the national government. </p>
<p>The past six months of talks have demonstrated the contradictions between each side’s stance on women’s equality and other central issues. </p>
<p>The government intends to preserve Afghanistan’s democratic institutions and constitution, which guarantees <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004.pdf?lang=en">the rights of women and minorities</a> as equal citizens of an Islamic republic. </p>
<p>The Taliban, on the other hand, is pushing for an Islamic emirate controlled by a nonelected council of religious leaders who rule based on their conservative interpretation of Islam, according to unpublished analysis by the nonprofit <a href="http://www.wluml.org">Women Living Under Muslim Laws</a>, where we are board members. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387895/original/file-20210304-17-75uw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Men, some in suits and other in traditional Pashtun clothing, stand in a hotel conference room at a distance from each other, wearing face masks" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387895/original/file-20210304-17-75uw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387895/original/file-20210304-17-75uw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387895/original/file-20210304-17-75uw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387895/original/file-20210304-17-75uw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387895/original/file-20210304-17-75uw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387895/original/file-20210304-17-75uw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387895/original/file-20210304-17-75uw2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other U.S. officials meet with senior Taliban leaders in Doha, Qatar, November 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-state-mike-pompeo-meets-with-taliban-co-news-photo/1229709572">Patrick Semansky/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/10/afghan-women-should-be-the-centerpiece-of-the-peace-process/">Roya Rahmani</a>, the Afghan ambassador to the United States, says <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/11/first-lady-rula-ghani-afghan-womens-consensus">having women on its team</a> gives the Afghan government more leverage to negotiate on women’s rights. That’s important because our research indicates that the Taliban maintain their extremist stance on women. </p>
<p>“The Taliban live in their 1990s universe and they refuse to see the reality of Afghanistan and in particular the young generations today who see themselves entitled to human rights, education, and an open public sphere,” Palwasha Hassan, an Afghan women’s rights activist, told us in an interview in December 2020.</p>
<p>The Taliban claims its views on women have evolved. But in some Taliban-controlled regions of Afghanistan <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/06/30/you-have-no-right-complain/education-social-restrictions-and-justice-taliban-held#_ftn1">girls are barred from getting an education</a> after puberty – in violation of the Afghan constitution. And while women are elected and appointed to high-level posts nationally, their political participation is restricted in Taliban-controlled regions.</p>
<p>There is a “gap between official Taliban statements on rights and the restrictive positions adopted by Taliban officials on the ground,” according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/06/30/you-have-no-right-complain/education-social-restrictions-and-justice-taliban-held">the international nonprofit Human Rights Watch</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387898/original/file-20210304-24-8g7fpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Veiled women and some children stand on the street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387898/original/file-20210304-24-8g7fpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387898/original/file-20210304-24-8g7fpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387898/original/file-20210304-24-8g7fpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387898/original/file-20210304-24-8g7fpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387898/original/file-20210304-24-8g7fpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387898/original/file-20210304-24-8g7fpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387898/original/file-20210304-24-8g7fpg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women were required to be fully veiled in public when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan. Kabul, 1996.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/veiled-women-stand-in-the-street-october-11-1996-in-kabul-news-photo/744044">Roger Lemoyne/Liaison</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Women and war</h2>
<p>Armed conflicts may be primarily fought by men, who are killed or injured, but women are <a href="https://socwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fact_fall2006-impact-of-war.pdf">war victims in a different way</a> – and therefore have different needs when it ends. Many lose their husbands and children, and thus their income, and are disproportionately displaced by violence. <a href="https://theconversation.com/rape-as-a-weapon-of-war-what-the-law-can-do-10038">Rape is one weapon of war</a>, and in some places women may be sexually assaulted en masse. </p>
<p>In 2000, the United Nations <a href="https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/">adopted a resolution</a> emphasizing that women should be included in all post-conflict reconstruction efforts.</p>
<p>Colombia was the <a href="https://apolitical.co/en/solution_article/colombias-peace-agreement-worlds-first-gender-core">first country to ensure gender equity in its peace process</a>. In its landmark 2016 accord with the FARC insurgents, which was mediated by Sweden, women were on <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2017/2/gender-and-the-role-of-women-in-colombias-peace-process">both the insurgent and government negotiating teams</a>, and the final accord included a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/feminist-peace-colombia">chapter outlining what assistance women in conflict zones</a> would need to start businesses, participate in politics, thrive in rural areas and the like.</p>
<p>Afghanistan, the first big globally brokered peace deal to follow Colombia’s, does not follow this model. </p>
<p>In interviews with more than 15 Afghan women’s rights leaders, we heard frustration over women’s exclusion from the peace talks given that women are the main victims of Afghanistan’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghan-War">40-year conflict</a>.</p>
<p>These women support the effort at national reconciliation. But they cited the targeted killings of women over the past year as reason for concern that the Taliban’s disregard for human rights jeopardizes the longevity of any peace deal.</p>
<p>As one interview subject put it, “Taliban’s win is a win for ISIS, Boko Haram and other extremist groups.” </p>
<h2>Targeting women</h2>
<p>Outspoken critics of the Taliban’s undemocratic vision of peace have been threatened or killed. </p>
<p>In August 2020, Fawzia Koofi, an Afghan government negotiator and long-time Afghan parliamentarian, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/16/female-afghan-peace-negotiator-wounded-in-assassination-bid">shot in the arm</a> in an attempted assassination. The attack is an instance of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/misogyny-in-the-capitol-among-the-insurrectionists-a-lot-of-angry-men-who-dont-like-women-153068">gendered violence</a> that women often face as a way to deter them from participating in politics. </p>
<p>Koofi <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/28/why-was-i-targetted-asks-afghan-activist-after-gun-attack">refused to be silenced</a>. Just days after her injury, she flew to Doha to attend the peace talks. </p>
<p>The Afghan government has made recent missteps on women’s rights, too.</p>
<p>In 2020, the Afghan <a href="https://www.khaama.com/govt-dissolves-state-ministry-for-human-rights-affairs-6565444/">government dissolved the State Ministry of Human Affairs</a>, led by Dr. Sima Samar, a key advocate for women’s rights with nearly two decades of experience at the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387896/original/file-20210304-23-4cj5ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Woman in hijab sits at a table with microphones between two men in sits, with international flags behind them" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387896/original/file-20210304-23-4cj5ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387896/original/file-20210304-23-4cj5ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387896/original/file-20210304-23-4cj5ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387896/original/file-20210304-23-4cj5ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387896/original/file-20210304-23-4cj5ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387896/original/file-20210304-23-4cj5ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387896/original/file-20210304-23-4cj5ak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Afghan women’s rights advocate Sima Samar, center, at a United Nations event on domestic violence in Afghanistan in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chairperson-of-the-afghan-independent-human-rigths-news-photo/470337312">Parwiz Sabawoon/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This ministry, as the main body documenting and reporting on Afghanistan’s human rights status, could have played an instrumental role in the negotiations. </p>
<p>After the fall of the Taliban in the 2001 U.S. invasion, women eagerly embraced every opportunity to advance professionally in diverse sectors, from politics to social services. Today women compose around <a href="https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=10&year=2020">27% of the Afghan Parliament</a>, one of the highest rates of women’s political representation in the region.</p>
<p>“There is no going back,” Zarqa Yaftali, a women’s rights activist told us. “Women intend to guide their country towards peace and stability.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154149/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mona Tajali is affiliated with Women Living Under Muslim Laws, a transnational feminist research network. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Homa Hoodfar is affiliated with the organization Women Living Under Muslim Laws, a transnational Feminist Research Network</span></em></p>Afghan women interviewed about current talks between the government and the Taliban say, ‘There is no going back.’ Taliban fundamentalist rule in the 1990s forced women into poverty and subservience.Mona Tajali, Assistant Professor in IR and WGSS, Agnes Scott CollegeHoma Hoodfar, Professor of Anthropology, Emerita, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1093812019-07-15T13:46:52Z2019-07-15T13:46:52ZAfghanistan: how to widen access to justice<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277017/original/file-20190529-192361-6f40gi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tribal members in a jirga, or circle – one traditional avenue for justice in Afghanistan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/gardez-august-26-afghan-tribal-members-53486098?src=PbINJgfUTDbXz80Cd0_mgA-1-1">Lizette Potgieter/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Getting justice in Afghanistan is a complicated business. Two main justice systems – state laws based on the civil law tradition and Islamic jurisprudence – combine with non-state institutions, such as traditional village <em>jirgas</em> (circles) or <em>shuras</em> (councils), to resolve local disputes and deal with offences. </p>
<p>Since the collapse of the Taliban regime, the US alone has <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-68-AR.pdf">spent well over a billion dollars</a> rebuilding and reforming Afghanistan’s state justice sector, influenced by the Western system of retributive justice. But the failure to engage with the Afghanistan’s own tradition of <a href="http://www.cscsb.org/restorative_justice/retribution_vs_restoration.html">restorative justice</a> and to understand its multiplicity of justice providers has undermined true reform. </p>
<p>It has instead resulted in a justice system that doesn’t have the full capacity to address the complex needs of all the Afghan people. And it has allowed others, including the Taliban judiciary – who have a select and narrow interpretation of Sharia – to step into the vacuum. This can lead to situations where people’s rights – especially women – are unprotected or infringed.</p>
<p>A “hybrid model” that instead forges links between state and non-state providers could provide justice that is more accessible, affordable and inclusive – and one with better oversight of those involved, and which would reduce human rights violations.</p>
<p>In 2007, <a href="http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/library/human_development/Af-HDR2007.html">out of research and a report</a> for the UN Development Programme (UNDP), I developed such a model. The idea was to create complementary links between the existing state justice system, various non-state justice providers, and women’s/human rights units, each acting as a check and balance on the others. </p>
<p>Although vested interest of powerful Afghan politicians delayed the translation of this hybrid model into practice, it has now partially resulted in a draft law – the Law on Conciliatory Jirga’s in Civil Disputes – which is currently waiting to be approved by the new Afghan parliament. </p>
<h2>Women’s rights</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-metajuridica/afghanistans-justice-system-vs-2016.10.04.pdf">Research has shown</a> that non-state justice providers (especially <em>jirgas</em> and <em>shuras</em>) are perceived as more accessible, trusted, less corrupt and speedier in resolving disputes than the state courts. But these male-only institutions exclude women, are sometimes influenced by warlords, and their decisions are not officially recorded. Most of these non-state justice institutions also variously violate human rights, for example in their use of <em>baad</em>, a centuries-old practice in which an offender’s female relative is given in marriage to a male family member of a victim.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277019/original/file-20190529-192416-k7chf6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277019/original/file-20190529-192416-k7chf6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277019/original/file-20190529-192416-k7chf6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277019/original/file-20190529-192416-k7chf6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277019/original/file-20190529-192416-k7chf6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277019/original/file-20190529-192416-k7chf6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/277019/original/file-20190529-192416-k7chf6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Justice that protects women too.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/afghan-women-on-street-13492072?src=fkn9UjnjZbbHwr1ONtRgsQ-1-4">Lizette Potgieter/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A hybrid framework not only creates a collaborative dialogue between various state and non-state justice providers, but also empowers women through raising awareness of their rights and supporting spaces for contestation. Human rights units can provide disputants with help and advice in selecting the right institution for their case and can also check justice decisions are consistent with women’s and human rights principles. These units can also be empowered to examine issues relating to domestic violence, past human rights abuses and war crimes.</p>
<p>Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) units would handle minor criminal offences and any civil cases. Their decisions would be checked by the closest state justice institution to ensure that decisions didn’t violate Afghanistan’s law and/or the fundamental principles of Islamic Sharia. Decisions that failed to be endorsed on either human rights grounds or by a concerned state court, would be revised or referred to the state justice system for adjudication. But all serious criminal cases would fall exclusively under the remit of the state justice system. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252506/original/file-20190104-32124-imiscw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252506/original/file-20190104-32124-imiscw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252506/original/file-20190104-32124-imiscw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252506/original/file-20190104-32124-imiscw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252506/original/file-20190104-32124-imiscw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252506/original/file-20190104-32124-imiscw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252506/original/file-20190104-32124-imiscw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252506/original/file-20190104-32124-imiscw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=616&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A different design for the justice system in Afghanistan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A challenging time</h2>
<p>It took more than a decade to get the idea of a hybrid model of justice accepted in Afghanistan. Senior judges saw it as a threat to their exclusive authority over all cases and disputes within the state judicial system. They also saw the 2007 UNDP report recommendations as a possible diversion of international aid to non-state justice providers. The report was initially banned by Afghanistan’s Supreme Court. </p>
<p>But strong support from international organisations including the US Institute of Peace, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and some national and international institutions in Afghanistan led to the implementation of programmes that trained traditional local mediators, promoted legal awareness and women’s rights and resulted in more coordination between non-state actors and the state justice system. </p>
<p>Success of these programmes induced Afghanistan’s Ministry of Justice to revisit the hybrid model and these programmes may be the reason behind the <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181203006003/en/Asia-Foundation-Releases-2018-Survey-Afghan-People">increasing rejection of the practise of <em>baad</em></a> in Afghanistan. The UNDP report suggested that 28% of people saw <em>baad</em> was “always” or “sometimes” an outcome of <em>jirga</em>/<em>shura</em> decision making in 2007, <a href="http://openasia.org/en/g/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Research-Draft-21-Oct-2014-3-1.pdf">recent research</a> reveals that this practice now <a href="https://www.pajhwok.com/en/2018/04/10/ghani-praises-%E2%80%98no-more-baad-marriages%E2%80%99-khost">rarely happens</a>.</p>
<p>I have now also been working with Conciliation Resources, an international peace organisation, to see how the hybrid model can be used to engage traditional and religious institutions using their established practical experience of resolving local conflict <a href="https://www.c-r.org/accord/afghanistan/institutionalising-inclusive-and-sustainable-justice-afghanistan-hybrid">to contribute</a> to peacemaking in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>The Palestine connection</h2>
<p>The hybrid model could also work in other places where multiple state and non-state justice institutions exist. Hebron University’s Mutaz Qafisheh and I <a href="https://www.elevenjournals.com/tijdschrift/IJRJ/2019/1/IJRJ_2589-0891_2019_002_001_006">recently found</a> that the state alone cannot provide effective justice for all Palestinian children. As in Afghanistan, many people see the justice provided by key non-state providers as more speedy and accessible. </p>
<p>But, as we also found in Afghanistan, these are also often male-dominated providers that prioritise community over individual rights. For example, it is <em>makhateer</em> (traditional male mediators/community leaders) and <em>mosleheen</em> (male conciliators) who often decide what is good for the community, and whose judgments sometimes violate the rights of young offenders or victims, and especially girls. </p>
<p>As a result of this work, Swiss children’s charity <a href="https://www.tdh.ch/en">Terre des hommes</a> – which provides professional support to the Palestinian state juvenile justice system and legal/social support for children in conflict with law – is now using our idea of a hybrid model in its juvenile justice policy in the Palestinian Territories.</p>
<p>Justice is especially complex in countries where multiple providers exist – and whether official or unofficial, many of these are here to stay. Rather than impose one top-down retributive system, it is prudent to harness the many positive aspects of local traditional, religious and other existing non-state justice providers and link them to the state justice system in meaningful ways. This form of hybridity helps to prevent human rights violation, and promises to provide more accessible, affordable, effective and restorative justice for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109381/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Along with Kate Williams and Palash Kamaruzzaman, I recently received £300,000 from the British Academy to conduct field research on the Rohingyas in Bangladesh and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan. </span></em></p>In countries where people access different justice providers, a hybrid model could pull them together and ensure better oversight and human rights.Ali Wardak, Professor of Criminology, University of South WalesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1152112019-05-08T10:13:21Z2019-05-08T10:13:21ZHarsh punishments under Sharia are modern interpretations of an ancient tradition<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272565/original/file-20190503-103082-15qu5ta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddien Mosque, one of the landmarks in Brunei. Brunei recently announced punishing gay sex by stoning offenders to death.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Brunei-Sharia-Law/b31b0762904e4cc8ae84f741a2335dda/2/0">AP Photo/Vincent Thian</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After Brunei introduced death by stoning for homosexuals under its Islamic law, or Sharia, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/asia/brunei-stoning-gay-sex.html">condemnation</a> from human rights organizations and others was swift. Recently, the country backed down under mounting international pressure, saying it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/asia/brunei-gays-stoning-execution.html">would not carry out executions</a> under the new law. The sultan of Brunei, Hassanal Bolkiah, said,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“As evident for more than two decades, we have practiced a de facto moratorium on the execution of death penalty for cases under the common law.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And this, he added would also be applied to cases under the Sharia penal code.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, homosexuals in Brunei are still subject to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/05/asia/brunei-lgbt-death-penalty-intl/index.html">penalties</a> such as whipping and amputation. </p>
<p>Is Brunei’s law an accurate reflection of Sharia?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/cf/faculty-and-staff/faculty.cfm?pid=1057944">scholar</a> of law and religion, I would argue that Sharia is not one thing: It is a complex tradition with multiple interpretations – one that accommodates the celebration of same-sex attraction alongside rulings condemning homosexual intercourse. </p>
<h2>Different views</h2>
<p>Starting in the early medieval period, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=3YvEt3PxmAcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=hallaq+sharia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJy7W0jfvhAhUjMX0KHW6TDZMQ6AEINjAC#v=onepage&q=hallaq%20sharia&f=false">Sharia</a> developed as a sprawling corpus of texts and sources of authority that were often quite independent of the state.</p>
<p>Over the centuries, jurists of Islamic law have reached different decisions about what the tradition mandates in a particular case. Within Sunni Islam, four different <a href="https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/madhhab-SIM_8798?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=madhhab">schools</a> have agreed to disagree about everything from criminal law to ritual observance. Shia Muslims have their own school of Islamic law. </p>
<p>Take, for instance, Muslim jurists’ approach to <a href="https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/liwat-SIM_4677?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=liwat">anal intercourse</a> between two men. The Quran offers only a general condemnation, with no specific legal consequences. There are some sources in the Hadith – the vast corpus of sayings and actions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad and collected centuries after his death – that are more specific, including condemning those convicted of anal intercourse to death.</p>
<p>Some schools of Islamic law – such as the Shafii school, which is predominant in Brunei – classify sodomy as a type of <a href="https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/zina-or-zina-SIM_8168?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=zina">fornication</a>, which requires the death penalty. </p>
<p>But others, such as the Hanafi school, which was the official school of the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=9cTHyUQoTyUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=hanafi+law+ottoman+empire&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjyrvmNkvvhAhXSLH0KHfvrDqgQ6AEIXzAJ#v=onepage&q=hanafi%20law%20ottoman%20empire&f=false">Ottoman Empire</a>, prescribe far lighter penalties for this act. The Hanafi school is still one of the most widespread in the Islamic world, including in Turkey, the Balkans, South Asia and Central Asia.</p>
<p>And even in those schools of Islamic law that prescribe the death penalty for anal intercourse, jurists have made the standard of proof so high as to be nearly impossible to meet. </p>
<p>To condemn someone for sodomy requires four male, Muslim witnesses to have had such an intimate view of the act that they could see the genitals of the offenders. All schools of law require this type of evidence to condemn someone for fornication. Needless to say, such proof was exceedingly hard to come by. </p>
<h2>Celebrating same-sex attraction</h2>
<p>Moreover, as scholar <a href="https://nelc.fas.harvard.edu/people/khaled-el-rouayheb">Khaled El-Rouayheb</a> has <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=undbSDztxVMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=khaled+el-rouayheb+homosexuality&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiLnbDYjvvhAhVFlFQKHRmXBMkQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=khaled%20el-rouayheb%20homosexuality&f=false">argued</a>, while jurists might have condemned sodomy, they also celebrated homoeroticism, that is, erotic love between members of the same sex.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272568/original/file-20190503-103082-1ie3ijg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272568/original/file-20190503-103082-1ie3ijg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272568/original/file-20190503-103082-1ie3ijg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272568/original/file-20190503-103082-1ie3ijg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272568/original/file-20190503-103082-1ie3ijg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272568/original/file-20190503-103082-1ie3ijg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272568/original/file-20190503-103082-1ie3ijg.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cairo’s Al Azhar Mosque and University.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cairo_-_Islamic_district_-_Al_Azhar_Mosque_and_University_front.JPG">Daniel Mayer</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the 18th century, Abdallah al-Shabrawi, the rector of al-Azhar in Cairo – then, as now, one of the Islamic world’s most prestigious centers of religious learning – was known both as a scholar and a poet. Al-Shabrawi dedicated a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=undbSDztxVMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=khaled+el-rouayheb+homosexuality&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj36aj34__hAhXo0FQKHXx7DQoQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=khaled%20el-rouayheb%20homosexuality&f=false">love poem</a> to his male student, and wrote many others celebrating young men.</p>
<p>As scholars of Ottoman history and literature <a href="http://faculty.washington.edu/walter/">Walter Andrews</a> and <a href="http://mehmetkalpakli.com/">Mehmet Kalpaklı</a> have shown, Ottoman sexuality was in many ways like that of ancient Greece and Rome. Far from stigmatizing men who sexually desired other men, young boys were often considered <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jID6Z1l0IfEC&printsec=frontcover&dq=andrews+kalpakli+age+of+beloveds&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwidlNrh5v_hAhVLs1QKHT9jA04Q6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=andrews%20kalpakli%20age%20of%20beloveds&f=false">more perfect objects of desire and love</a> than women.</p>
<p>Celebrations of same-sex love did not flout Islamic law. Rather, love for another man was considered widely acceptable even by jurists, as long as one avoided the sin of sodomy.</p>
<h2>Islamism and Sharia</h2>
<p>The interpretation of Sharia that originally guided the recent laws in Brunei is not a straightforward revival of an ancient tradition. </p>
<p>On the contrary, this interpretation is related to a particularly modern approach to Islamic law, one that is typical of <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2hxmm2N6jOgC&printsec=frontcover&dq=introduction+to+islamism&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj1osCHkPvhAhUcJzQIHez0CBkQ6AEIPDAD#v=onepage&q=introduction%20to%20islamism&f=false">Islamism</a>. Islamism is an approach to Islam and the Sharia that arose in the 20th century across the Muslim world. Among its best-known example is the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ltVtj3Kh7IIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Richard+P.+Mitchell,+The+Society+of+the+Muslim+Brothers&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj18-rI5ofiAhUHsFQKHeB3AjAQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=Richard%20P.%20Mitchell%2C%20The%20Society%20of%20the%20Muslim%20Brothers&f=false">Muslim Brotherhood</a>, which originated in Egypt and argued, for instance, that Sharia was indispensable to a vibrant Muslim community.</p>
<p>Today, many Islamist political parties point to a revival of the Sharia as a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=CE_sgHj4k0EC&printsec=frontcover&dq=noah+feldman+the+fall+and+rise+of+the+islamic+state&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwivtajQ5__hAhWmwFQKHZ7BDBoQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=noah%20feldman%20the%20fall%20and%20rise%20of%20the%20islamic%20state&f=false">political solution</a> to the problems plaguing Muslim-majority societies, including corruption and inequality. </p>
<p>However, there are many different viewpoints even among those linked with Islamism. For example, the Egyptian Islamist group al-Gama'ah al-Islamiyah <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ieflBQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=jackson,+S.+A.+(2015).+Initiative+to+Stop+the+Violence:+Sadat%27s+Assassins+and+the+Renunciation+of+Political+Violence&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiwpq6M5IfiAhXIr1QKHbDnDPgQ6AEINDAC#v=onepage&q&f=false">renounces violence</a>. On the other end of the spectrum is the Islamic State, which has taken up perhaps the most extreme version of a violent interpretation of Islamism. </p>
<p>In spite of these differences, many Islamists share the belief that Sharia is a way to harken back to an authentic Islam free of the corruption that is perceived to come from the West. </p>
<h2>Pre-colonial Sharia</h2>
<p>In fact, Sharia was not usually the primary source of <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=7EAsmttzXjcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=criminal+law+islamic+world&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiDr96ukPvhAhXNIzQIHbkcAqwQ6AEIMDAB#v=onepage&q=criminal%20law%20islamic%20world&f=false">criminal law</a> in the pre-modern period.</p>
<p>Rather, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=3YvEt3PxmAcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=hallaq+sharia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjJy7W0jfvhAhUjMX0KHW6TDZMQ6AEINjAC#v=onepage&q=hallaq%20sharia&f=false">Sharia courts</a> focused more on regulating issues such as contracts, debts, marriage, divorce, mortgages and other everyday matters of civil law. This was in part because the Sharia required such high standards of proof for crimes as to make conviction nearly impossible.</p>
<p>My own <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=WqIqDQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=marglin+across+legal+lines&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjuqqGuj_vhAhXLwlQKHUIUBmMQ6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=marglin%20across%20legal%20lines&f=false">research</a> on law in pre-colonial Morocco shows that everyone – Muslims and Jews alike – used Sharia courts, which were mostly concerned with making sure that debtors paid their debts.</p>
<h2>Sharia stereotypes</h2>
<p>The way in which Sharia is codified and enforced by the state in a place like Brunei bears little resemblance to the way it functioned when al-Shabrawi was rector of al-Azhar.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272570/original/file-20190503-103057-142gr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272570/original/file-20190503-103057-142gr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272570/original/file-20190503-103057-142gr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272570/original/file-20190503-103057-142gr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272570/original/file-20190503-103057-142gr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272570/original/file-20190503-103057-142gr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272570/original/file-20190503-103057-142gr37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some countries use a harsh interpretation of Sharia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Indonesia-Aceh-Islamic-Law/59b08543977f4195b246cd0048ee9f65/2/0">AP Photo/Heri Juanda, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To many Americans, Sharia has become synonymous with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-sharia/2016/06/24/7e3efb7a-31ef-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.962edfb45af4">harsh punishments</a> and intolerance. This is a misunderstanding of Islamic law, both as it functioned historically and as it informs the daily lives of millions of Muslims today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115211/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Marglin is affiliated with the Democratic party. </span></em></p>Some Islamic nations, including Brunei, have harsh punishments under Sharia. In pre-modern times, Sharia was rarely used as criminal law, and standard of proof for any prosecution was very high.Jessica Marglin, Associate Professor of Religion, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1153522019-04-16T10:45:52Z2019-04-16T10:45:52ZBrunei wants to punish gay sex with death by stoning – can boycotts stop it?<p>The sultan of Brunei has been on the throne for 52 years, making him the second-longest reigning monarch in the world, after Queen Elizabeth II. </p>
<p>In Brunei – a rather traditional, deeply Muslim Southeast Asian country – the sultan is known for leading a decadent life. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/07/prince-jefri-201107">Vanity Fair</a> once dubbed Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and his brother, Prince Jefri Bolkiah, “constant companions in hedonism.” They spend lavishly on luxury cars, yachts and real estate, and according to the magazine, “allegedly sent emissaries to comb the globe for the sexiest women they could find in order to create a harem the likes of which the world had never known.” </p>
<p>Now, Brunei’s sultan appears to have found religion. </p>
<p>He has implemented a harsh interpretation of Sharia – Islamic law – in his country, taking aim at LGBT people, women and even children with some of the world’s harshest penalties for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/asia/brunei-stoning-gay-sex.html?module=inline">homosexual conduct</a>. </p>
<p>Under Brunei’s new laws, gay sex and adultery can result in death by stoning, and having an abortion is punishable by public flogging. Dressing in clothing associated with a different sex may <a href="http://www.agc.gov.bn/AGC%20Images/LAWS/Gazette_PDF/2013/EN/S069.pdf">incur</a> a fine and imprisonment up to three months. Younger children can be <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/03/brunei-new-penal-code-imposes-maiming-stoning">whipped</a> for these offenses.</p>
<h2>Diversion from economic woes</h2>
<p>These laws represent serious breaches of international human rights law, my <a href="https://paulagerber.com/">field of academic expertise</a>. </p>
<p>Thirty-six countries – including the United States, United Kingdom, Argentina and Australia – recently <a href="https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/2019-04-13-erc-cde.aspx?lang=eng">issued a joint statement</a> expressing “profound dismay” at Brunei’s penal code, which the United Nations has deemed “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47906070">cruel and unusual</a>.”</p>
<p>Why is Brunei’s sultan suddenly so keen to enforce Sharia across this island nation of 430,000?</p>
<p>One of the main reasons may be plunging global oil prices. For the first time, the oil-rich nation of Brunei is <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d8e074fe-80e6-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff">grappling with economic crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Other countries have similarly <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/21/gambia-life-sentence-aggravated-homosexuality">whipped up hatred against LGBT people</a> to distract the public’s attention from economic crisis or corruption allegations. </p>
<p>The sultan may also be seeking to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/09/asia/brunei-sultan-intl/index.html">rehabilitate his reputation</a> as a “party boy.” </p>
<p>“This is obviously not coming from a place of religious devotion, since the sultan himself is in violation of every single rule of Sharia you could possibly imagine,” religious scholar Reza Aslan <a href="https://nypost.com/2014/05/10/inside-the-wacky-sex-obsessed-world-of-brunei/">told the New York Post</a> in 2014, when the sultan first flagged his intention to impose strict Islamic law in Brunei.</p>
<p>Perhaps the Sultan thinks that implementing Sharia will enable him to leave a religious legacy that outweighs his decades of very public excess and indulgence.</p>
<h2>Do boycotts work?</h2>
<p>As a way of trying to get the Sultan to change his mind about imposing these harsh penalties within Brunei, many <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/video/george-clooney-leads-celebrity-boycott-of-brunei-linked-hotels-over-anti-lgbtq-laws/">celebrities</a> and gay rights advocates are calling for boycotts of the sultan’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/asia/brunei-hotel-boycotts.html">international hotels</a> and of <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/breaking-news/global-travel-firm-boycotts-royal-brunei/news-story/ab92e4f28a66c1254f8fd077eee57143">Royal Brunei Airlines</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1113177461276082177"}"></div></p>
<p>But evidence suggests that boycotts are <a href="https://i-d.vice.com/en_au/article/kzdmvv/brunei-sultan-lgbt-boycott">not the most effective way to influence foreign governments</a>. </p>
<p>For one, they can cause the offending government to harden its position to show it will not give in to foreign pressure. That can make it harder to work collaboratively with leaders of that country to actually improve the situation.</p>
<p>That’s what happened in Uganda in 2014, when President Yoweri Museveni introduced some of the word’s toughest <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/24/uganda-president-signs-anti-gay-laws">anti-gay laws</a>.</p>
<p>“I advise friends from the West not to make this an issue, because if they make it an issue the more they will lose,” he said. “Outsiders cannot dictate to us. This is our country.”</p>
<p>This risk is compounded by the evident double standard of an international boycott of Brunei and the sultan’s businesses. Other countries that impose the <a href="https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2019.pdf">death penalty</a> for same-sex sexual conduct – including Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia – are not subjected to similar global condemnation.</p>
<h2>Who can stop the sultan?</h2>
<p>The United Nations may stand a better chance of curbing Brunei’s behavior. </p>
<p>Brunei’s human rights record will be reviewed by the U.N.’s Human Rights Council next month, as part of a regular assessment called the Universal Periodic Review – a relatively new process <a href="https://www.ibanet.org/Human_Rights_Institute/HRI_Publications/SOGIESC-at-UPR.aspx">described by the International Bar Association</a> as “the most progressive arena for the protection of the LGBTI community internationally.” </p>
<p>Though the Universal Periodic Review has no power to enforce its recommendations, it has <a href="http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/45.1-Saunders.pdf">shown some success</a> in advancing human rights in U.N. member countries. Its method is to foster dialogue with and between governments and civil society, create a plan for improving rights and closely monitoring progress.</p>
<p>Brunei’s allies and neighbors are also well placed to put pressure on the sultan. </p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-016-9264-x">Research</a> has found that if a state is criticized by one of its strategic partners, it is more likely to accept that criticism than if it comes from a state with which it has fewer ties. </p>
<p>Brunei is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, a voluntary association of 53 sovereign states, most of them former British colonies. <a href="http://thecommonwealth.org/chogm">Its biannual Heads of Government Meeting</a>, set to take place in Rwanda next year, is a potential forum for meaningful dialogue about the state of LGBTQ rights across the Commonwealth of Nations, since Brunei is one of 35 Commonwealth countries that <a href="https://antigaylaws.org/commonwealth/">still criminalize consensual same-sex sexual conduct</a>. </p>
<p>If negotiations with Brunei are unsuccessful, the Commonwealth of Nations can take the powerful step of <a href="http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth/commonwealth-membership/withdrawals-and-suspension/">suspending</a> its membership. That would prevent Brunei from participating in group meetings and events – including the popular <a href="https://thecgf.com/">Commonwealth Games</a>, which have been described as “sport with a social conscience.” </p>
<p>This step was previously taken in response to grave human rights violations committed by <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/the-suspended-commonwealth-member-fiji">Fiji</a>, Nigeria, Pakistan and Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Over 100 LGBTQ and human rights groups from Southeast Asia have also <a href="https://www.queerlapis.com/statement-of-asean-civil-society-organizations-on-the-full-enforcement-of-sharia-law-in-brunei-darussalam/?fbclid=IwAR0gYog-OUYkrZStCzkd0BuAL6Iuxonqtbyl9PcYEULJqc_EkSfWb4z4dV0">called on</a> the Association of South East Asian Nations – ASEAN, a regional intergovernmental organization – to take a hard line against member state Brunei, saying its new laws “legitimize violence.” </p>
<p>But ASEAN’s <a href="https://asean.org/asean-human-rights-declaration/">non-binding 2012 declaration of human rights</a> – which does not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity and contains <a href="https://theconversation.com/asean-human-rights-declaration-a-step-forward-or-a-slide-backwards-10895">imprecise language</a> that significantly dilutes its power – seems unlikely to demand an institutional response. </p>
<h2>Does the sultan mean it?</h2>
<p>There is concern that Brunei’s imposition of hard-line Sharia will embolden its Muslim majority neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/08/asia/brunei-indonesia-malaysia-islam-intl/index.html">follow suit</a>. </p>
<p>Malaysia already applies Islamic law in some states. Last September, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/03/women-caned-in-malaysia-for-attempting-to-have-lesbian-sex">two women found guilty of attempting to have sex</a> were sentenced to be, and were, caned. </p>
<p>In nearby Indonesia, gay sex is legal in all but one province, but homophobia and transphobia are <a href="https://www.gaystarnews.com/article/anti-lgbt-hysteria-in-indonesia-delays-sexual-violence-bill/#gs.4gflb9">rising nationwide</a>, and recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-lgbt-insight/criminal-code-revamp-plan-sends-chill-through-indonesias-lgbt-community-idUSKBN1FT2IO">talk of criminalizing gay sex</a> has LGBTQ Indonesians worried. </p>
<p>Brunei, it’s important to note, has not actually used the death penalty since 1957. </p>
<p>An optimist could conclude that the new laws are mostly symbolic – designed to beef up the sultan’s Islamic credentials and garner favor with other Muslim countries to boost trade and tourism. </p>
<p>That interpretation, however, is unlikely to diminish the fear of the vulnerable minorities targeted by Brunei’s Sharia laws.</p>
<p><em>This article is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-boycotts-against-bruneis-new-anti-gay-laws-wont-be-effective-but-regional-pressure-might-115067">article</a> originally published on April 11, 2019 in The Conversation Australia.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Gerber is a Director of Kaleidoscope Human Rights Foundation, a not-for-profit organization working to advance the human rights of LGBTI people in the Asia Pacific region.</span></em></p>Brunei’s new anti-gay Sharia laws are the harshest in the world. Yet few countries have publicly condemned them, and an international boycott could backfire.Paula Gerber, Professor of Human Rights Law, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1099182019-04-08T10:43:28Z2019-04-08T10:43:28ZDon’t blame Sharia for Islamic extremism – blame colonialism<p>Warning that Islamic extremists want to <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-travel-ban-is-just-one-of-many-us-policies-that-legalize-discrimination-against-muslims-89334">impose</a> fundamentalist religious rule in American communities, right-wing lawmakers in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/30/anti-sharia-laws-trump-muslims">dozens of U.S. states</a> have tried <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/10/trump-might-not-have-gotten-his-muslim-ban-he-sure-got-his-extreme-vetting/?utm_term=.642b85b35b5b">banning</a> Sharia, an Arabic term often understood to mean Islamic law. </p>
<p>These political debates – which cite <a href="https://theconversation.com/libya-and-isis-what-happened-37801">terrorism</a> and <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/arab-spring">political violence in the Middle East</a> to argue that Islam is incompatible with modern society – reinforce stereotypes that the Muslim world is uncivilized. </p>
<p>They also reflect ignorance of <a href="http://theconversation.com/what-sharia-law-means-five-questions-answered-79325">Sharia</a>, which is not a strict legal code. Sharia means “path” or “way”: It is a broad set of values and ethical principles drawn from the Quran – Islam’s holy book – and the life of the Prophet Muhammad. As such, different people and governments may interpret Sharia differently. </p>
<p>Still, this is not the first time that the world has tried to figure out where Sharia fits into the global order. </p>
<p>In the 1950s and 1960s, when Great Britain, France and other European powers <a href="https://nationalhistorycenter.org/decolonization-resource-collection-north-africa-middle-east/">relinquished their colonies in the Middle East, Africa and Asia</a>, leaders of newly sovereign Muslim-majority countries faced a decision of enormous consequence: Should they build their governments on Islamic religious values or embrace the European laws inherited from colonial rule?</p>
<h2>The big debate</h2>
<p>Invariably, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article/66/3/579/5098494">my historical research</a> shows,
political leaders of these young countries chose to keep their colonial justice systems rather than impose religious law. </p>
<p>Newly independent Sudan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia, among other places, all <a href="http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230495.001.0001/acprof-9780199230495">confined</a> the application of Sharia to marital and inheritance disputes within Muslim families, just as their colonial administrators had done. The remainder of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-law">their legal systems would continue to be based on European law</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267846/original/file-20190405-180047-199gflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267846/original/file-20190405-180047-199gflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267846/original/file-20190405-180047-199gflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267846/original/file-20190405-180047-199gflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267846/original/file-20190405-180047-199gflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=312&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267846/original/file-20190405-180047-199gflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267846/original/file-20190405-180047-199gflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267846/original/file-20190405-180047-199gflw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">France, Italy and the United Kingdom imposed their legal systems onto Muslim-majority territories they colonized.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://farm4.staticflickr.com/3102/2710789398_85b9ecd518_b.jpg">CIA Norman B. Leventhal Map Center</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To understand why they chose this course, I researched the decision-making process in Sudan, the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from the British, in 1956.</p>
<p>In the national archives and libraries of the Sudanese capital Khartoum, and in interviews with Sudanese lawyers and officials, I discovered that leading judges, politicians and intellectuals actually pushed for Sudan to become a democratic Islamic state. </p>
<p>They envisioned a <a href="https://merip.org/1997/12/what-is-political-islam/">progressive legal system consistent with Islamic faith</a> principles, one where all citizens – irrespective of religion, race or ethnicity – could practice their religious beliefs freely and openly.</p>
<p>“The People are equal like the teeth of a comb,” wrote Sudan’s soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice Hassan Muddathir in 1956, quoting the Prophet Muhammad, in an official memorandum I found archived in Khartoum’s Sudan Library. “An Arab is no better than a Persian, and the White is no better than the Black.” </p>
<p>Sudan’s post-colonial leadership, however, rejected those calls. They chose to keep the English common law tradition as the law of the land.</p>
<h2>Why keep the laws of the oppressor?</h2>
<p><a href="https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article/66/3/579/5098494">My research</a> identifies three reasons why early Sudan sidelined Sharia: politics, pragmatism and demography.</p>
<p>Rivalries between political parties in <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/fragilestate">post-colonial Sudan</a> led to parliamentary stalemate, which made it difficult to pass meaningful legislation. So Sudan simply maintained the colonial laws already on the books. </p>
<p>There were practical reasons for maintaining English common law, too. </p>
<p>Sudanese judges had been trained by British colonial officials. So they <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/fates-of-political-liberalism-in-the-british-postcolony/lawyers-and-the-disintegration-of-the-legal-complex-in-sudan/0BB57144852B58355E1F17A19EB5916E">continued to apply</a> English common law principles to the disputes they heard in their courtrooms. </p>
<p>Sudan’s founding fathers faced <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Sudan-1898-1989-Unstable-Peter-Woodward/dp/1870915089">urgent challenges</a>, such as creating the economy, establishing foreign trade and ending civil war. They felt it was simply not sensible to overhaul the rather smooth-running governance system in Khartoum.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267857/original/file-20190405-180036-123d8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267857/original/file-20190405-180036-123d8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267857/original/file-20190405-180036-123d8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267857/original/file-20190405-180036-123d8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267857/original/file-20190405-180036-123d8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267857/original/file-20190405-180036-123d8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267857/original/file-20190405-180036-123d8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/267857/original/file-20190405-180036-123d8rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=569&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sudanese city of Suakim in 1884 or 1885, just prior to British colonial rule.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://flic.kr/p/7MSERF">The National Archives UK</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The continued use of colonial law after independence also reflected Sudan’s ethnic, linguistic and religious <a href="http://sd.one.un.org/content/unct/sudan/en/home/about.html">diversity</a>.</p>
<p>Then, as now, Sudanese citizens spoke many languages and belonged to dozens of ethnic groups. At the time of Sudan’s independence, people practicing Sunni and Sufi traditions of Islam lived largely in northern Sudan. Christianity was an important faith in southern Sudan. </p>
<p>Sudan’s diversity of faith communities meant that maintaining a foreign legal system – English common law – was less controversial than choosing whose version of Sharia to adopt. </p>
<h2>Why extremists triumphed</h2>
<p><a href="https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article/66/3/579/5098494">My research</a> uncovers how today’s instability across the Middle East and North Africa is, in part, a consequence of these post-colonial decisions to reject Sharia. </p>
<p>In maintaining colonial legal systems, Sudan and other Muslim-majority countries that followed a similar path appeased Western world powers, which were <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/africa-since-1940/4A6AADCAEA3125B9100D016B00A33644#fndtn-information">pushing their former colonies toward secularism</a>. </p>
<p>But they avoided resolving tough questions about religious identity and the law. That created a disconnect between the people and their governments.</p>
<p>In the long run, that disconnect helped fuel unrest among some citizens of deep faith, leading to sectarian calls to <a href="https://uwpress.wisc.edu/books/2435.htm">unite religion and the state once and for all</a>. In Iran, Saudi Arabia and parts of <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/everything-you-have-told-me-is-true/">Somalia</a> and <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520293786/shariah-on-trial">Nigeria</a>, these interpretations triumphed, imposing extremist versions of Sharia over millions of people.</p>
<p>In other words, Muslim-majority countries stunted the democratic potential of Sharia by rejecting it as a mainstream legal concept in the 1950s and 1960s, leaving Sharia in the hands of extremists.</p>
<p>But there is no inherent tension between Sharia, human rights and the rule of law. Like any use of religion in politics, Sharia’s application depends on who is using it – and why.</p>
<p>Leaders of places like <a href="https://centerforinquiry.org/blog/islam-and-womens-rights/">Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/world/asia/who-is-sultan-brunei.html">Brunei</a> have chosen to restrict <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-women-are-going-to-college-running-for-office-and-changing-the-conservative-country-109938">women’s freedom</a> and minority rights. But many scholars of Islam and grassroots organizations interpret Sharia as a <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/shariah-9780199325061?cc=us&lang=en&">flexible</a>, <a href="https://www.cair.com/guides-to-muslim-religious-practices">rights-oriented</a> and <a href="http://www.mpvusa.org">equality-minded</a> ethical order.</p>
<h2>Religion and the law worldwide</h2>
<p>Religion is woven into the legal fabric of many post-colonial nations, with varying consequences for democracy and stability.</p>
<p>After its 1948 founding, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article-abstract/35/1/185/2582958">Israel</a> debated the role of Jewish law in Israeli society. Ultimately, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and his allies opted for a mixed legal system that combined Jewish law with English common law. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2603&context=lawreview">Latin America</a>, the Catholicism imposed by Spanish conquistadors underpins laws restricting <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-latin-america-is-there-a-link-between-abortion-rights-and-democracy-85444">abortion</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/married-priests-and-female-deacons-what-the-popes-politics-look-like-from-latin-america-75272">divorce</a> and <a href="https://www.worldreligionnews.com/religion-news/lgbt-rights-rise-catholic-latin-america">gay rights</a>.</p>
<p>And throughout the 19th century, judges in the U.S. regularly invoked the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/744320">legal maxim</a> that “Christianity is part of the common law.” Legislators still <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/27/gop-lawmaker-prays-jesus-forgiveness-before-states-first-muslim-woman-swears/">routinely invoke</a> their Christian faith when supporting or opposing a given law. </p>
<p>Political extremism and human rights abuses that occur in those places are rarely understood as inherent flaws of these religions. </p>
<p>When it comes to Muslim-majority countries, however, Sharia takes the blame for regressive laws – not the people who pass those policies in the name of religion.</p>
<p>Fundamentalism and violence, in other words, are a post-colonial problem – not a religious inevitability. </p>
<p>For the Muslim world, finding a system of government that reflects Islamic values while promoting democracy will not be easy after more than 50 years of failed secular rule. But building peace may demand it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109918/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Fathi Massoud has received fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Andrew Mellon Foundation, Fulbright-Hays, and the University of California. Any views expressed here are the author's responsibility.</span></em></p>There is no inherent tension between Islam and democratic values. Like any use of religion in politics, the application of Sharia as law depends on who is using it – and why.Mark Fathi Massoud, Associate Professor, University of California, Santa CruzLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1104062019-01-29T11:44:32Z2019-01-29T11:44:32ZWhat are Muslim prayer rugs?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255439/original/file-20190124-196228-1sikc3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslims can pray anywhere in the world using the prayer carpet.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Muslims-in-Hollywood/a7d6715d97494b5eb17fe03347a25bb9/212/0">AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1086252588088082432?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fd-1599397641671435474.ampproject.net%2F1901081935550%2Fframe.html">recent tweet</a>, President Trump stated that ranchers have been finding prayer rugs scattered along the U.S.-Mexico border. Late last year, <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1054351078328885248">he tweeted</a> that “criminals and unknown Middle Easterners” were mixed in with the caravan heading to the U.S.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=FvTDlCsAAAAJ&hl=en">My research</a> indicates that Islamophobia often targets visible signs of Muslimness, such as modest clothing like headscarves, as well as prayer rituals and mosques. This time it is the prayer rug.</p>
<p>These fearmongering tweets bear an uncanny resemblance to a 2018 action film, <a href="http://www.philly.com/philly/entertainment/movies/sicario-day-of-the-soldado-movie-review-20180627.html">“Sicario: Day of the Soldado</a>.” Its trailer shows a scene of a Muslim man praying and a row of prayer rugs at the border. In the movie, U.S. officials who find the rugs use them as “evidence” that Muslims are entering the U.S. illegally in order to expand the jurisdiction of the war on terror.</p>
<p>Other than these recent mentions, carpets found fame through Disney’s “Aladdin,” where they were imagined to have the power to fly. However, prayer carpets actually have a much more mundane daily use among Muslims. </p>
<h2>Much more than a plain carpet</h2>
<p>Ritual purity is extremely important for Muslim prayers practices. As Islamic studies scholar <a href="https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/marion-h-katz.html">Marion Katz</a> explains, prayer carpets <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=allSNvtTpZwC&lpg=PR9&ots=GBfhgR7H4P&dq=islamic%20prayer%20carpet&lr&pg=PA23#v=onepage&q=%20carpet&f=false">provide a protective layer</a> between the worshiper and the ground, protecting the clothing from anything on ground that is polluting.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A prayer niche in a mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/royluck/31897950555">Roy Luck</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://muslimheritage.com/article/muslim-carpet">Muslim carpets</a> have been traditionally produced for centuries in Muslim majority regions, sometimes known as “the rug belt,” spanning from Morocco to Central Asia and northern India. There is a wide variety of designs and materials. Islamic art historian <a href="https://www.umass.edu/arthistory/member/walter-denny">Walter B. Denny</a>, in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=D7vDBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PA5&ots=WFU05K0dne&dq=islamic%20prayer%20rug&lr&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q=islamic%20prayer%20rug&f=false">“How to Read Islamic Carpets,”</a> explains the different materials and symbolism in weaves used in these carpets. </p>
<p>For example, it is common to find symbols such as the prayer niche, a recess in the wall indicating the direction of Mecca; also a lamp, which is a reference to God; as well as flowers and trees that symbolize the abundance of nature in God’s paradise. </p>
<p>Prayer carpets that are used in homes are generally sized for one individual. Those used in mosques are much bigger, <a href="http://islamicart.museumwnf.org/database_item.php?id=object;ISL;tr;Mus01;17;en">often with a motif showing a row of arches</a> to indicate where each worshiper should stand in prayer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prayer carpets in mosques have a row of arches.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Muslim-Day-Oklahoma/539b10997667400897d9e9f7aaf5c65c/139/0">AP Photo/Sue Ogrocki</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Islamic carpets have been popular for centuries in Europe and beyond, often picking up symbolism, social meaning and ways of being used. Islamic carpets <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/isca/hd_isca.htm">were popular</a> among the wealthy of Europe, displayed proudly on the floor of their living rooms and on the walls. </p>
<p>Carpets designs have come down through generations. Some depict simple geometric patterns in rough wool, while other are <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/452553">produced by professional artisans</a> for the elite and show hunting scenes and elaborate scenes of paradise. </p>
<h2>Different costs and forms of practice</h2>
<p>Practices vary according to personal and sectarian preference among Muslims. </p>
<p>For everyday use, Muslims purchase simple prayer carpets, mass-produced in Turkey, throughout the Middle East and even China. For use outside, they often carry a thinner travel rug. There are also high-priced versions. An antique carpet was auctioned for <a href="https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/most-expensive-carpets-at-auction-slideshow">US$4.3 million in 2009</a> and an <a href="http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2015/carpets-textiles-n09323/lot.51.html">Ottoman-era prayer rug</a> sold for $30,000 in 2015. </p>
<p>Not all sects of Muslims use the prayer carpet. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=YF4BAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&pg=PR8#v=onepage&q&f=false">Shiite Muslims usually pray</a> on a clay disk called a “turba” in Arabic and “mohr” in Persian. This disk is often made from <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/articles/why-prostrate-karbalas-turba-yasin-t-al-jibouri">soil from Karbala</a>, the place of martyrdom of Hussein, Prophet Muhammad’s grandson in today’s Iraq, or another sacred site. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/utn94yJIAdU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Shiite Muslims use a clay disk.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They often place the disk on top of a prayer carpet. When Shiites prostrate their foreheads on the floor during prayer, they want their forehead to be in contact with an organic material rather than the synthetic fibers of a carpet. So, depending on circumstance, they might also place any natural material such as a small straw mat where they pray.</p>
<p>It is highly unlikely for Muslims to leave behind their prayer rugs or to even carry one on a perilous journey through the harsh desert.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110406/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rose S. Aslan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump recently tweeted about prayer rugs being left along the border. Many may not know the role and history of Muslim prayer rugs and why they are not likely to be left behind.Rose S. Aslan, Assistant Professor of Religion, California Lutheran UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1010822018-09-03T13:56:09Z2018-09-03T13:56:09ZIslamophobia is preventing the empowerment of Muslim women repressed by political agendas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234454/original/file-20180831-195328-nz51rk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/woman-desert-wearing-arabic-dress-666033169?src=KG4d9lao1ivgPcQUdikfzA-1-20">Facecontrol.it/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For many, Muslim veiling <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-truths-about-the-hijab-that-need-to-be-told-63892">represents the oppression</a> of women in Islam. The head and/or face veils are a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burqa-comments-like-boris-johnsons-are-pushing-muslims-to-reassert-their-identity-101362">frequent topic of debate</a>, which suggests that “saving” Muslim women from their oppressive religion is a moral duty of the West. </p>
<p>But focusing on the (in)visibility of women in Islam does not help the cause of empowering women in Muslim societies. Looking through the lens of Islamophobia, all Muslim societies are seen the same, where women are subjected to the same oppression. However, the contrasting examples of Saudi Arabia and Turkey show that this could not be further from truth. Muslim women are fighting for their rights, but are being held back by political moves.</p>
<h2>Saudi Arabia</h2>
<p>Saudi Arabia is one of the most religious countries in the Middle East and yet the denial of basic women’s rights is down to a unique combination of <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/wahhabism.html">Wahhabi culture</a> as well as Sharia (Islamic law). The women who live there are some of the most voracious Muslim campaigners, but it is the laws of the land that they fight, not their religion. </p>
<p>In August, a group of anonymous Saudi feminists <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/the-women-behind-saudi-arabias-anonymous-feminist-radio-station/10169198">launched a new internet radio station</a>, Nsawya FM (“Feminism FM”). Their main aims are to campaign for Saudi women’s rights, be “the voice of the silent majority” and to let the world <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-45181505">know they exist</a>. In recent years the internet has proven to be an important place to effect change. </p>
<p>Also notable has been the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13928215">Women2Drive campaign on social media</a>. Saudi Arabia was, until recently, the only country in the world where women were not allowed to drive – although this was more about Saudi culture, not explicitly against Islam and its doctrine. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-reason-saudi-arabia-lifted-its-ban-on-women-driving-economic-necessity-97267">eventual overturning of the ban</a> was seen as a victory for Saudi women, and yet several leading activists who challenged the ban <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/laurasilver/women-in-saudi-arabia-are-finally-able-to-drive?utm_term=.xsNy2q4d4#.bsdPq1LXL">were arrested</a> – some of whom <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/08/saudi-arabia-outrageous-ongoing-detention-of-women-rights-defenders-reaches-100-days/">are still in jail</a> without charge. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-decree-allowing-women-to-drive-cars-is-about-politics-not-religion-84809">driving ban was lifted</a> in June 2018 as part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-will-saudi-arabias-vision-2030-mean-for-its-citizens-58466">Vision 2030 programme</a> to modernise some aspects of Saudi society. Eight months prior, Saudi Arabia took a truly unique step by becoming the first country to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/saudi-arabia-robot-sophia-citizenship-android-riyadh-citizen-passport-future-a8021601.html">award citizenship to a robot named Sophia</a>. Clearly the Saudi authorities want to create a new international image, but many critics have raised concerns, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/saudi-arabia-criticized-giving-female-robot-citizenship-restricts/story?id=50741109">questioning why</a> the country would advance robot rights while still holding women back. They asked whether Sophia would have to follow the strict laws concerning Saudi women, and whether “she” would be required to cover her head.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, many conservative clerics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/saudi-arabias-once-powerful-conservatives-silenced-by-reforms-and-repression/2018/06/04/5332bdec-3dad-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story.html?utm_term=.25737a6b0567">disagreed with the Crown Prince’s social reforms</a> – as they erode cultural boundaries between men and women – and criticised the modernisation policies for being too close to Washington. And, despite the seemingly progressive moves, there has been an increasing crackdown on dissent. On August 22, Saudi Arabia’s public prosecutor <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/22/saudi-arabia-seeks-its-first-death-penalty-against-a-female-human-rights-activist">appealed for the death penalty</a> for the first time against a woman. Activist Israa al-Ghomgham is on trial because of her work <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/saudi-arabia-seeks-death-penalty-female-activist-180822111933881.html">documenting human rights-related demonstrations</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234453/original/file-20180831-195301-1fe6u4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/234453/original/file-20180831-195301-1fe6u4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234453/original/file-20180831-195301-1fe6u4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234453/original/file-20180831-195301-1fe6u4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234453/original/file-20180831-195301-1fe6u4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234453/original/file-20180831-195301-1fe6u4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/234453/original/file-20180831-195301-1fe6u4f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In the spotlight, but for the wrong reason.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/arab-woman-islamic-headscarf-back-light-27646588?src=KG4d9lao1ivgPcQUdikfzA-2-1">robert paul van beets/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Turkey</h2>
<p>Some 1,500 miles away, Turkey – once regarded the most progressive country for Muslim women’s rights – has been turning back the clock. When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey, as a secular democracy, had been a beacon of hope for many Muslim countries looking towards economic growth and modernisation, while retaining their religious identity. Under the rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, however, women’s rights have been regressing further every year. </p>
<p>In November 2017, the government passed a new law that allowed state-approved clerics (muftis) to conduct marriage ceremonies. This practice had previously been outlawed by Turkey’s Civil Code because they lacked the legal protections of secular marriages. The change <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-religion/turkey-to-allow-muftis-to-conduct-weddings-sparking-uproar-on-left-idUSKBN1CP226">paved the way</a> for any girl who has reached puberty to be able to marry.</p>
<p><a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/03/1004192">UN assessments</a> show that child marriage (under the age of 15 years) is one of the biggest obstacles to the education and empowerment of women. While child marriages are <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-43297085">declining worldwide</a>, <a href="http://www.tpfund.org/put-an-end-to-child-brides/">40% of Turkish women</a> between the ages of 15 and 49 were married before the age of 18. </p>
<p>Child brides are among the world’s most vulnerable individuals. Once girls are forced into marriage their basic rights of and claims to education, equality and opportunities are lost forever. Despite opposition and secular groups <a href="http://www.milliyet.com.tr/turkiye-de-181-bin-cocuk-gelin-var-pembenar-detay-aile-1629435/">calling for investigations</a>, the future of half of Turkish society continues to be impeded.</p>
<p>The oppression of women from Saudi Arabia and Turkey – though on different scales – show that it is not Islam and its faith that represses women. It is political agendas. </p>
<p>Islamophobia dehumanises Muslim women and denies their agency. By focusing on the role of religion, Western Islamophobic views ignore the patriarchal and political structures within which women are oppressed. Activists are silenced, and child brides are victimised. The way forward for empowering Muslim women requires looking beyond Islamophobia, and recognising the urgency of gender equality irrespective of any race, religion or culture. </p>
<p><em>This article has been edited to correct the figure on the rate of child marriages in Turkey. It originally stated that 40% of girls were forced into marriage in 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101082/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ayla Göl does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>From Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Muslim women are battling for their rights - but religion is not at fault.Ayla Göl, Visiting Senior Fellow, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/893342018-01-29T11:30:52Z2018-01-29T11:30:52ZTrump’s travel ban is just one of many US policies that legalize discrimination against Muslims<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203673/original/file-20180128-100929-ie8m1q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">At the funeral of Nabra Hassanen, a Muslim girl who was beaten to death.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Steve Helber</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Jan. 19, a year after President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban">first travel ban</a> was issued, the Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments against the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-enhancing-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry-united-states-terrorists-public-safety-threats/">latest third version</a> signed by Trump on Sept. 24, 2017. This version remains in full effect.</p>
<p>Under the ban, nationals from eight countries are subject to travel restrictions, varying in severity by country. Venezuela and North Korea are on the list, but the ban overwhelmingly targets Muslim-majority countries: Chad, Iran, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Yemen. Thus, what the <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/muslim-ban-what-just-happened">American Civil Liberties Union</a> has called a “Muslim ban” will have tremendous consequences on 150 million people, the majority of whom are Muslim.</p>
<p>This policy did not emerge in a vacuum. In fact, findings from our <a href="http://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/islamophobia">recently published research</a> expose 15 federal measures and 194 state bills that impact Muslims directly. Here’s a brief overview of some of the most critical yet overlooked measures. </p>
<h2>Anti-Muslim federal measures</h2>
<p>After Sept. 11, immigration became a key national security issue. As a result, 15 federal programs and initiatives were implemented that target and discriminate against Muslim individuals and communities. These measures rely on a narrative that depicts Muslims as untrustworthy and in conflict with American values. This framing has justified the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/EB426F8A55795287366A05D58C05B0A8/S0748081416000333a.pdf/div-class-title-america-islam-and-constitutionalism-muslim-american-poverty-and-the-mounting-police-state-div.pdf">surveillance, racial profiling and violation</a> of citizens’ rights and protections enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203483/original/file-20180125-100915-eiwad7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203483/original/file-20180125-100915-eiwad7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/203483/original/file-20180125-100915-eiwad7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=320&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203483/original/file-20180125-100915-eiwad7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=320&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203483/original/file-20180125-100915-eiwad7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=320&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203483/original/file-20180125-100915-eiwad7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203483/original/file-20180125-100915-eiwad7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/203483/original/file-20180125-100915-eiwad7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Federal measures.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haas_institute_legalizing_othering_the_united_states_of_islamophobia.pdf">Authors</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are two important, often overlooked measures that have discriminated against Muslims and Arabs: the <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/dhs-announces-end-controversial-post-911-immigrant-registration-and-tracking-program">National Security Entry-Exit Registration System</a> and 2015 changes to the Visa Waiver Program.</p>
<p>The Entry-Exit Registration System, created by the Justice Department in 2002, fingerprinted, photographed and attempted to track all non-citizen males over 16 years of age from 25 countries. With the exception of North Korea, all 25 countries had Muslim-majority populations and more than 85,000 individuals were registered in the system. The <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/dhs-announces-end-controversial-post-911-immigrant-registration-and-tracking-program">surveillance program</a> was implemented as a counter-terrorism tool, but the program resulted in <a href="https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/homeland-security-suspends-ineffective-discriminatory-immigration-program">zero terrorism convictions</a>. Although all target countries in the program were removed in 2011, its <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/12/23/2016-30885/removal-of-regulations-relating-to-special-registration-process-for-certain-nonimmigrants">regulatory framework</a> remained in place for 14 years and could have been reinstituted at any time. </p>
<p>In December 2016, President Barack Obama officially <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/22/nseers-arab-muslim-tracking-system-dismantled-obama">dismantled the program</a>. Obama was motivated, in part, by preventing the incoming Trump administration from reviving the program. One of Trump’s campaign promises was to implement a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/11/20/donald-trump-says-hed-absolutely-require-muslims-to-register/?_r=0">Muslim registry</a>.</p>
<p>Additional anti-Muslim travel policies were introduced following the November <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/nov/14/paris-attacks-what-we-know-so-far">2015 Paris attacks</a> and the <a href="http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-san-bernardino-shooting-terror-investigation-htmlstory.html">2015 San Bernardino attack</a> in California. </p>
<p>The attacks spurred changes to the <a href="https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/visa-waiver-program/visa-waiver-program-improvement-and-terrorist-travel-prevention-act-faq">Visa Waiver Program</a>. The waiver allows citizens of specific countries to travel to the U.S. for up to 90 days without a visa. The 2015 changes exempted several Muslim-majority nations including Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Syria from these travel privileges.</p>
<p>Further updates were implemented in 2017 to target citizens of Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Yemen and visitors to those countries. </p>
<h2>Anti-Muslim state legislation</h2>
<p>In addition to federal measures, our <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1C3ylHBVHlHrJqJt6NVxusTGY3BShYzhF-lxyoRxdSRM/edit?ts=59b1cfab#gid=0">database</a> has documented 194 anti-Sharia bills introduced in 39 state legislatures across the U.S. from 2010 to 2016. The <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-the-anti-sharia-movement-is-america-at-its-worst_us_59383f42e4b00610547ea348">anti-Sharia movement</a> is responsible for the creation of these bills, sponsored by anti-Muslim organizations like <a href="http://www.actforamerica.org/">ACT for America</a>, and politicians who spread misunderstandings and fears around Sharia. This movement frames Sharia as a <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-the-anti-sharia-movement-is-america-at-its-worst_us_59383f42e4b00610547ea348">cruel and violent set of Islamic laws</a> that are infiltrating U.S. courts to undermine American values and freedoms.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-sharia-law-means-five-questions-answered-79325">Sharia</a> is a moral code founded on the teachings of the Quran and the Hadith – the teachings and actions of the Prophet Mohammed. Sharia is not the equivalent of Islamic law, but rather outlines how devout Muslims should <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/true-story-sharia-american-courts/">engage with the world</a>, from what they eat to how they conduct business and personal affairs.</p>
<p>Anti-Sharia bills, founded on the fear of <a href="https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2016/12/09/bill-filed-to-address-non-existent-problem-of-sharia-law-creeping-into-us">“creeping Sharia,”</a> identify Sharia as “<a href="https://www.cair.com/images/pdf/Pervasiveness-of-anti-Islam-legislation.pdf">foreign law</a>” and thus ban its use in courts. However, U.S. courts do regularly interpret and apply foreign law, like Sharia, <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/03/consequences-of-banning-sharia-law_n_6790436.html">so long as it does not violate the U.S. Constitution</a>.</p>
<p>In states that have banned the use of foreign law, judges are unable to enforce individual contracts that call for the application of Sharia. This restricts Muslims from upholding a range of <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/true-story-sharia-american-courts/">personal agreements</a> including marriage, estate distribution after death, or awarding of damages in commercial disputes or negligence matters. For example, the Kansas State Legislature enacted anti-Sharia <a href="http://kslegislature.org/li_2012/b2011_12/measures/SB79/">Senate Bill 79</a> in 2012. Later that year, a woman named Elham Soleimani, a Muslim immigrant from Iran, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/201321174724878286.html">filed for divorce</a> from her husband. Under the Islamic marriage contract she and her husband had signed, she was due US$677,000 in the event of divorce. The court refused to enforce the agreement, citing the enacted anti-Sharia law.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cair.com/press-center/press-releases/14104-cair-challenges-unconstitutional-anti-islam-bills-in-arkansas-montana-idaho-oregon.html">Anti-Sharia statutes</a> not only <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/march-against-sharia-anti-muslim-act-for-america_us_5939576ee4b0b13f2c67d50c">fuel public fear around Islam and Muslims</a>, but also prevent Muslims from using Sharia in rulings that call for cultural context.</p>
<p>Surveillance, travel restrictions, and anti-Sharia laws represent the ways in which U.S. policies discriminate against Muslims. As we anticipate the Supreme Court’s decision in June to either uphold or rescind Trump’s travel ban, the question remains: Will the Supreme Court continue to allow the legal discrimination against Muslims in the U.S.?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89334/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Before Trump said he wanted to create a Muslim registry, there were a number of Islamophobic policies in place.Basima Sisemore, Researcher, Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society, University of California, BerkeleyRhonda Itaoui, PhD Candidate and Research Fellow, Western Sydney UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/855042017-10-18T15:06:31Z2017-10-18T15:06:31ZWhy Islamist attack demands a careful response from Mozambique<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/190361/original/file-20171016-30979-10vz4fa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mozambique's military responded swiftly following deadly attacks by Islamist gunmen on three police stations recently.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Juda Ngwenya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the early hours of 5 October 2017 a group of <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/armed-men-attack-police-stations-in-mocimboa-da-praia-aim-report/">30 men attacked three police stations</a> in Mocimboa da Praia, a small <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moc%C3%ADmboa_da_Praia">town</a> of 30,000 inhabitants in Northern Mozambique. They killed two policemen, stole arms and ammunition, and occupied the town. </p>
<p>They told local people they would not hurt them, that their fight was with the state and the police. They explained that they rejected state health and education and refused to pay taxes. The local population calls these men <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/individuals-allegedly-linked-to-al-shabaab-attack-police-station-in-mocimboa-da-praia-mozambique/">“Al-Shabaabs”</a>.</p>
<p>Mozambique’s government’s response was swift. It fought back with forces from other districts and special forces from the provincial capital. The battle <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/life-returns-to-normal-in-mocimboa-da-praia/">lasted several hours and left 16 dead</a>, including two policemen and a community leader.</p>
<p>The attack came as a shock to a country already grappling with <a href="http://clubofmozambique.com/news/2017-war-hidden-debts-economic-stabilisation-carry-next-year-mozambique/">major economic and political problems</a>. The incident is the first confirmed Islamist armed attack in Mozambique.</p>
<p>Information is still sparse and confused. But for now, we can say with some degree of certainty that what happened on 5 October 2017 was not a Somali Al-Shabaab attack nor an externally driven <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201710060373.html">international Jihadi plot</a>. Nor was it a state <a href="https://www.facebook.com/unai.kambuma.matsangaisse/posts/522924458056358">conspiracy </a>as some had suggested. </p>
<p>Rather, the attack appears to have been carried out by a group of local young Muslims who formed a sect in 2014 in Mocimboa da Praia which is known as <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/46966-jovens-radicais-sonham-com-califado-em-mocimboa-da-praia.html">“Al-Shabaab”</a>. The group controls two mosques in the town and have told their followers to stop sending their children to secular institutions such as state schools and hospitals. It wants Sharia law applied in their area. </p>
<p>The fact that this first Islamist attack was carried out by Mozambicans makes the event no less shocking, particularly in a country proud of its sound and relaxed inter-religious relations. Until we get more information on the group and what triggered it to attack the state, it’s worth setting the incident within a historical context. </p>
<h2>Islam in Mozambique</h2>
<p>Islam has a very old presence in Mozambique, particularly on the coast and in the Northern parts of the country. Various Sultanates and Sheikdom existed before Portugal occupied the territory in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Mozambique/Colonial-Mozambique">late 19th Century</a> .</p>
<p>The Portuguese colonialists openly and officially favoured Catholicism, at a time <a href="http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/alpers.pdf">repressing Islam</a> and other religions. But Islam gained converts and nonetheless grew. By the time of <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/mozambique%E2%80%99s-40-years-independence-past-and-present-challenges">independence in 1975</a> Muslims officially accounted for 13% of the population. The 1997 census gave the figure of 17.8%. Both figures are contested by Muslims who believe them to be higher.</p>
<p>After independence the Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) adopted Marxist-Leninism. It attacked all faiths, but Islam was particularly affected. It was a faith most state leaders didn’t understand. This was evident in incidents such as President Samora Machel keeping his shoes when he walked into the main mosque in the country. <a href="https://www.academia.edu/723143/_Lislam_au_Mozambique_apr%C3%A8s_lind%C3%A9pendance_Histoire_dune_mont%C3%A9e_en_puissance_in_Christian_Coulon_ed._LAfrique_politique_2002_Islams_dAfrique_entre_le_local_et_le_global_Paris_Karthala_2002._p._123-146">Another example</a> was the government insisting on pigsties being built in Muslim areas in the name of “development”. Memories such as these are still raw and were raised yet again after the Mocimboa da Praia attack.</p>
<p>After Frelimo abandoned Marxism-Leninism and shifted to multiparty democracy, the party began courting all religions to gain electoral support. But tensions still arose from time to time. One involved the government taking steps to officially recognise Islamic holidays. This sparked a crisis in parliament in 1996 and the Frelimo governing party backtracked, adopting a more secular approach from then on. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5854764/_The_1996_Muslim_holiday_affair._Religious_competition_and_state_mediation_in_contemporary_Mozambique_Journal_of_Southern_African_Studies_26_3_2000_pp._409-27">incident</a> served to remind Muslims that they still felt marginalised.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/alpers.pdf">Islam is overwhelmingly Sufi in Mozambique</a>, with a majority of Muslims belonging to different Turuq (brotherhoods). <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-islam-so-different-in-different-countries-51804">Sufism</a> represents the more mystical side of Islam - opposed by scripturalist Muslims, such as the Wahhabi, who accuse them of deviating from the Koran.</p>
<p>The return of African graduates from Saudi Arabia in the 1970s gave political clout to the reformist and scripturalist movements in Mozambique. They gained control of some mosques and, in collaboration with the Portuguese, expanded their presence. </p>
<p>Today the main national organisation is the reformist <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Conselho-Islamico-de-Mocambique-CISLAMO-169928693058683/">Islamic Council</a> which was created after independence by Wahhabi elements and grew in the 1980s and 1990s in partnership with the authorities. </p>
<p>Splinter organisations appeared in the late 1990s and 2000s, particularly in Northern Mozambique. As reformism gained firmer ground in the north, tensions and conflict increased. Controversies emerged in relation to sufi practices, alcohol, education and dress code. There was, however, never any violence against the state.</p>
<h2>Powder keg</h2>
<p>Although no international terror group has been linked to Mocimba da Praia, the incident is very serious. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabo_Delgado_Province">Cabo Delgado</a> is a Muslim-majority province where discoveries of giant oil and gas reserves have brought international conglomerates and their private security, making the area a potential powder-keg.</p>
<p>On top of this, the area is desperately poor. Northern areas of Mozambique have gained little from the economic boom of the 2000s. Mocimboa da Praia is a case in point: little development has been seen even as expectations exploded following the discovery of massive gas and oil reserves in the province. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/mozambique-gas/mozambique-sees-30-bln-investment-for-2018-lng-exports-startup-idUSL5N0QR49C20140821">Billions of dollars</a> have been invested in offshore drilling, with little benefit to local communities.</p>
<p>The government must devise a careful and well-thought response to this new Islamist threat. Downplaying the affair as “banditry” and dealing only with the sect when it’s clear that there are broader religious and social dynamics at play risks seeing the problem reemerge elsewhere. </p>
<p>In turn, going for an all-out repression to eradicate the “Islamist threat” could radicalise other Muslims and root the problem deeper and more widely – think only of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Marc_Antoine_Montclos/publication/280592679_Boko_Haram_and_politics_from_insurgency_to_terrorism/links/56c47b8908aeeeffa9e5b663.pdf">Boko Haram in West Africa in 2009</a>. </p>
<p>So far state officials have been careful and moderate in their <a href="http://opais.sapo.mz/index.php/sociedade/45-sociedade/46980-vida-e-seguranca-voltam-a-normalidade-em-mocimboa-da-praia.html">statements</a>. But practice on the ground needs to follow the same line and some changes in social and religious policy will need to follow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/85504/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Morier-Genoud does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The first Islamist attack carried out by Mozambicans in the country is particularly surprising given the pride the country takes in its sound and relaxed inter-religious relations.Eric Morier-Genoud, Lecturer in African history, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/832872017-09-26T00:16:41Z2017-09-26T00:16:41ZWill outlawing ‘instant divorce’ advance justice for Muslim women in India?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187445/original/file-20170925-17421-hat5nv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Activists protesting against the recently banned triple divorce.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Altaf Qadri</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Supreme Court of India <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/asia/india-muslim-divorce-triple-talaq.html?mcubz=0&_r=0">recently struck down</a> a specific divorce practice among its minority Muslims. The age-old practice known as “triple talaq” allowed a Muslim man to dissolve his marriage by uttering the term divorce three times, all at once.</p>
<p>As a scholar who has <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/politicizing-islam-9780190225247?cc=us&lang=en&">conducted research among Muslim communities in India</a>, I have seen firsthand how the abuse of this practice resulted in devastating consequences for Muslim women in India. In recent years, some men, for example, were divorcing their wives over Skype or a phone app. Many women <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/10/india-muslim-women-fight-triple-talaq-law-instant-divorce">found themselves abandoned</a>, without any access to financial resources and in some cases custody of their children.</p>
<p>India came to this decision late after predominantly Muslim countries such as <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=-agODQAAQBAJ&pg=PA302&dq=pakistan+talaq+biddat&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj_gffIisHWAhXHJCYKHQz2BBIQ6AEIMTAC#v=onepage&q=talaq&f=false">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=tQIxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA32&dq=iran+talaq&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjEr9PHi8HWAhXCQiYKHfPlD-IQ6AEIKzAB#v=onepage&q=talaq&f=false">Iran</a>, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=gZU0jbXt5MkC&pg=PA205&dq=indonesia+talaq&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiUm9q1i8HWAhWILyYKHcuVC9AQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=indonesia%20talaq&f=false">Indonesia</a> and <a href="http://library.umac.mo/ebooks/b28020686.pdf">several Arab nations</a> had outlawed the practice in the 20th century. And controversially so. Even now, perhaps most fundamentally, the question remains – what difference will it actually make?</p>
<h2>Divorce in Islam</h2>
<p>Divorce in Islam is regulated by <a href="http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/34741/1/014_Understanding%20Islamic%20Law%20in%20India%20An%20Assessment%20of%20the%20Contribution%20of%20Justice%20V.R%20Krishna%20Lyer%20a%20Tribute%20%28307-332%29.pdf">a number of considerations and responsibilities</a>. According to the principles of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-sharia-law-means-five-questions-answered-79325">sharia</a>, or Islamic law, the recommended practices are to have two witnesses to the decision to end the marriage, hear both sides, allow time to reflect and reconcile, and carefully handle matters of property.</p>
<p>The process is not cut and dried, but is instead based on mediation, facilitated by an Islamic judge. These judges try to abide by principles of Islamic law and take into account the unique circumstances and life situations of all parties. For example, in some divorces women retain the “mehr,” which is the money the husband agrees to gift the bride at the time of marriage. In others, she is expected to return the gift upon divorce.</p>
<p>Still, the procedures differ significantly between men and women. Men have the right to declare “talaq” and thus end the marriage, although they are <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=PsB5LY2Now0C&source=gbs_book_other_versions">required to take three months</a> before finalizing their decision. </p>
<p>When a Muslim woman wants to <a href="http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Lemons_berkeley_0028E_10699.pdf">initiate a divorce based on Islamic law</a>, she generally must turn to an Islamic judge or imam (leader) to assist her if the husband refuses his consent. </p>
<p>There are many possible justifications under Islamic law: A woman might claim her husband prevents her from being pious or that he has abandoned or neglected her. It could also be that the husband is impotent, has other health issues or is in prison. I have also seen divorce granted on the <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/law/socio-legal-studies/muslim-womens-quest-justice-gender-law-and-activism-india?format=HB#dI2R6A1vD0zHIz0Y.97">grounds of cruelty</a>. Islamic judges can even annul the marriage on certain grounds.</p>
<p>In sum, women have ways to seek divorce under Islamic law. But unlike men, they cannot unilaterally make a binding decision to end the marriage. </p>
<p>In the debates that led up to the Indian Supreme Court ruling many Muslim activists and intellectuals argued that the practice of instant divorce by the husband <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/instant-triple-talaq-has-no-quran-sanction-muslim-women-board/articleshow/58651914.cms">did not exist in the Quran</a> and is therefore not a practice that should fall under religious freedom. The <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/supreme-court-strikes-down-triple-talaq-deems-it-against-tenets-of-islam/story-MG91Nll4c5KDOUkaFVsHEL.html">majority opinion</a> on the court accepted this argument that triple talaq, in which the word “talaq” is said all at once, is not a truly Islamic practice. </p>
<h2>Status of religious minorities</h2>
<p>So why did it take so long to rule against this practice in India? </p>
<p>While India is a secular country, the rights of minority communities such as Muslims and Christians to <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=21588">practice their religious laws</a> in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody and adoption are constitutionally protected.</p>
<p>In view of this protection, any attempt by the government to interfere in religious law and community matters is viewed as a violation of minority rights and a threat to freedom. For example, in 1985, when a Muslim woman, Shah Bano, filed a petition in court demanding the right to alimony from her divorced husband, the case became <a href="http://southasia.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/events/2008_Indian_Democracy/Agnes-FromShahbano2Kausar.pdf">highly political and controversial</a>. Muslim leaders demanded that the government <a href="https://feminisminindia.com/2017/04/21/revisiting-shah-bano-judgement/">not interfere in “personal” and religious matters</a>.</p>
<p>Today, Muslims have even more cause to worry about interference in their communities. Since the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in 2014, the <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/6652.html">Hindu nationalist movement</a> has become emboldened. Hindu nationalism promotes the political domination of “ancient” Hindu culture over all other cultures in India. For example, in the name of protecting the <a href="https://theconversation.com/hinduism-and-its-complicated-history-with-cows-and-people-who-eat-them-80586">sacredness of cows and Hindu tradition</a>, there have been many cow vigilante groups, who have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/27/india-cow-protection-spurs-vigilante-violence">attacked minority Muslims</a> for eating beef. </p>
<p>For this reason, even progressive legal changes like banning instant divorce were <a href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/owaisi-differs-on-triple-talaq-verdict-calls-it-contentious-slams-bjp-117082200839_1.html">viewed by some Muslim leaders</a> as one small step in a larger attack on religious minorities. </p>
<h2>Where are Muslim women’s voices?</h2>
<p>The other issue is who speaks on behalf of the Muslim community. Muslims constitute 14 percent of India’s population and are <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=MKIT9muBRuoC&pg=PT16&lpg=PT16&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false">enormously diverse.</a> However, it is the self-appointed Muslim leaders who have been the most vocal on the issue, saying that the government <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/aimplb-for-large-scale-community-reforms-to-discourage-instant-talaq/articleshow/60454787.cms">should not intervene</a> in Muslim family laws. </p>
<p>India does not demand official representatives of the Muslim community, as do some other countries, such as <a href="https://www.world-religion-watch.org/index.php/events-seminars-conferences-symposii/symp-state-of-belief/216-belief-public-policies-ff">France</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/knocking-on-europes-door-islam-in-italy/">Italy</a>. </p>
<p>Consequently, Muslim women’s groups have been struggling to be heard in these debates. </p>
<h2>Condition of Muslim women in India</h2>
<p>For many reasons, it is not clear how much the court ruling will improve women’s overall lives. </p>
<p><a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/understanding-context-of-sc-ruling-on-triple-talaq-divorce-rate-of-muslim-women-is-thrice-that-of-men-4810719/">Divorce appears to be lower among Muslim women</a> than among women of other religious communities. The <a href="http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/C-series/c-3.html">divorce rate</a> (based on the number of divorces per 1000 married women) is just over 5 percent for Muslim women, lower than the rate for Christian and Buddhist women. </p>
<p>Moreover, as women’s rights lawyer <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/flavia-agnes">Flavia Agnes</a> argued, there have already been <a href="http://www.epw.in/engage/article/triple-talaq-muslim-womens-rights-and-media-coverage">a number of legal cases</a> that effectively declared instant divorce invalid. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187441/original/file-20170925-17421-10cz036.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187441/original/file-20170925-17421-10cz036.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187441/original/file-20170925-17421-10cz036.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187441/original/file-20170925-17421-10cz036.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187441/original/file-20170925-17421-10cz036.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187441/original/file-20170925-17421-10cz036.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187441/original/file-20170925-17421-10cz036.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muslim women in India are dealing with a large number of challenges.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Tsering Topgyal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is also important to note that <a href="http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/sachar_comm.pdf">Muslim women are dealing with a large number of challenges.</a> These include widespread poverty, lack of access to education and an illiteracy rate of almost 40 percent in urban areas and over 50 percent in rural areas. (These percentages can vary widely across India.) Muslim women have the <a href="http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/sachar_comm.pdf">lowest rate of primary school completion</a> compared to other groups, at 71 percent in urban areas and 48 percent in rural areas. </p>
<p>Arbitrary divorce is therefore only one of the injustices Indian Muslim women face. </p>
<p>Furthermore, while many Muslim women may want and need internal reforms in their communities, they are uncomfortable in courts and also have reasons to <a href="http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/muslims-in-indian-cities/">distrust the state</a>. There are cases of <a href="http://twocircles.net/2017jul10/412735.html">police abuses</a> against Muslims, with <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Ggul4ceD4lEC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=Muslims%20india&f=false">rates of incarceration</a> being higher compared to other communities. </p>
<p>In my own research among <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/politicizing-islam-9780190225247?cc=us&lang=en&">low-income Muslim communities in the Indian city of Hyderabad</a>, people did not think government intervention would really improve their lives. They also feared it would undermine their religious autonomy. </p>
<p>Often, women look for local solutions before approaching civil courts. In one low-income neighborhood <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/politicizing-islam-9780190225247?cc=us&lang=en&">I studied</a>, a group of activists worked with Islamic judges to help women in situations of marital crisis or domestic violence secure a divorce or claim their financial rights in the aftermath of divorce. Activists told me that developing supportive relationships with these judges resulted in faster, easier and less costly resolution of family conflicts than going through civil courts. </p>
<p>While legal advancement is important and ensuring fairness in divorce is something to celebrate, it is but one small step toward a greater vision of gender justice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Z. Fareen Parvez received funding from the New Directions in the Study of Prayer at the Social Science Research Council; the National Science Foundation; the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation; and the University of California at Berkeley’s Center for Race and Gender, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and Institute of International Studies.</span></em></p>Muslim women in India struggle with a host of challenges, such as widespread poverty and lack of access to education. Arbitrary divorce was only one of many injustices.Z. Fareen Parvez, Assistant Professor of Sociology, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/785162017-05-31T06:41:50Z2017-05-31T06:41:50ZCaning of gay men in Aceh: not necessarily the exception to Indonesian rule<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171563/original/file-20170531-23660-r8ffi8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Contemporary Indonesia is heading down the path of conservative Sunni Islamism.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Beawiharta</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent events in Indonesia should dispel any doubt about the rising influence conservative Sunni Islamist sentiment is having on the country’s laws. </p>
<p>Just three weeks ago, Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, popularly known as Ahok, was <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-09/jakartas-outgoing-governor-ahok-found-guilty-in-blasphemy-trial/8509936">found guilty of insulting the Qur’an and sentenced to two years in prison</a>. Ahok decided not to appeal the verdict “<a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/ahok-refuses-to-appeal-for-good-of-indonesia/news-story/3509457d99d6f82b28bd0853d35a1969">for the good of the country</a>”, fearing that any attempt to overturn his conviction would divide the nation’s capital even further.</p>
<p>On 30 April and May 21, police raided gay sex parties in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/04/indonesia-gay-porn-arrests-threaten-privacy">Surabaya</a>, Indonesia’s second-largest city, and <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/22/asia/jakarta-sex-party-lgbt/">Jakarta</a>. Arrests were made in both instances for alleged violations of Indonesia’s anti-pornography law.</p>
<p>Homosexuality is not illegal in Indonesia – although it is in the autonomous province of Aceh. Police have said several of the men will be charged under the anti-pornography law.</p>
<p>On May 13, in Aceh’s capital Banda Aceh, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-23/gay-men-flogged-in-aceh-after-vigilantes-found-them-having-sex/8551188">two young gay men were caned 83 times</a> before more than 1,000 onlookers. They had been convicted of sodomy. </p>
<p>Distinct from Indonesia’s national criminal code, Aceh’s criminal code, which is known locally as the <em><a href="http://www.jdih.setjen.kemendagri.go.id/download.php?KPUU=30437">Qanun Jinayat</a></em>, prohibits sodomy. Vigilantism is also prohibited and has been denounced by senior public officials. Despite this, the conduct of the vigilante group that arrested the two young men after breaking into their rented room and assaulting them both has not been scrutinised.</p>
<h2>“Moral” crimes</h2>
<p>The caning temporarily shifted international focus from Ahok’s blasphemy conviction to issues of corporal punishment and the policing of “moral” crimes in Indonesia’s sole autonomous province. </p>
<p>While some may find comfort in the fact that Indonesia’s national criminal code is not as draconian and invasive as Aceh’s, the underlying ideological issue remains the same nationwide: contemporary Indonesia is heading down the path of conservative Sunni Islamism. </p>
<p>Indonesia’s Constitutional Court (<em>Mahkamah Konstitusi</em>) has declared that Islamic law is only <a href="http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan%20perkara%2016-PUU-VI-2008_15%20Agustus_telah%20baca.pdf">one source of law in Indonesia</a>, alongside traditional customary law (<em>adat</em>) and Western law, to name a few. But for many of the country’s Muslim-majority population and judiciary, conservative Sunni Islamic norms are becoming the preferred basis for law and jurisprudence.</p>
<p>Like Indonesia’s blasphemy laws, the Acehnese criminal code has received <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/01/qanun-jinayat-provokes-over-criminalization-of-lgbt-people-vunerable-groups-icjr.html">heavy criticism from human rights groups</a>. The most notable of “moral” offences prohibited under the code include adultery (<em>zina</em>), being in close proximity to a member of the opposite sex out of wedlock (<em>khalwat</em>), lesbian relations (<em>musahaqah</em>) and sodomy (<em>liwath</em>).</p>
<p>The code prescribes a maximum penalty for sodomy of 100 strokes of the cane. Human rights groups have decried the sanctioning and practice of caning in Aceh as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/19/indonesia-stop-public-flogging-gay-men">“medieval torture”</a>. </p>
<p>Caning does, in fact, violate multiple international human rights conventions. Among these are the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf">Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</a>, and the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a>. It also contravenes human rights guaranteed in <a href="http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_174556.pdf">Indonesia’s constitution</a>, including the right not to be tortured or subjected to degrading treatment.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/05/indonesia-revoke-the-caning-sentence-of-gay-men-in-aceh/">Amnesty International</a>, <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/db170523.doc.htm">UN Human Rights – Asia</a>, as well as countless local <a href="http://www.dw.com/id/pasangan-gay-aceh-dihukum-cambuk/a-38867321">pro-diversity civil society organisations</a> condemned the decision to cane the two men, aged 20 and 23. They also called on the Indonesian government to uphold its commitment to universal human rights standards.</p>
<p>But these calls will almost certainly go unheeded, because, from a legal perspective, Aceh’s criminal code is not necessarily unconstitutional. What’s more, international human rights guarantees may, in theory, be legally persuasive but enjoy no concrete legal standing in Indonesia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171565/original/file-20170531-23667-bl0aty.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women in Aceh were publicly caned for spending time with men who were not their husbands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Beawiharta</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Constitutionality of Aceh’s criminal code</h2>
<p>The authority for the statement that Aceh’s criminal code is not necessarily unconstitutional lies in a <a href="http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan%20PUU%20140_Senin%2019%20April%202010.pdf">2010 ruling of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court</a>. That court found that Indonesia’s blasphemy law, the same law under which Ahok was sentenced to two years’ prison, is constitutionally valid. </p>
<p>While the ruling received <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/05/22/un-urges-indonesia-free-jakarta-governor-jailed-blasphemy">broad criticism from human rights groups</a>, it remains the most definitive and recent authority on the status of individual human rights in Indonesia.</p>
<p>The court made <a href="http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan%20PUU%20140_Senin%2019%20April%202010.pdf">several salient points</a>, all of which help explain the implementation of corporal punishment in Aceh and the discriminatory treatment of homosexuals. These were strongly informed by the concept of religion and its exalted status in Indonesian society.</p>
<p>First, the court noted that Indonesia is neither an Islamic nor secular state. It is, rather, a religious state (<em>negara beragama</em>) based on the principle of One Almighty God (<em>Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa</em>). </p>
<p>The priority assigned to One Almighty God was born out of a constitutional compromise between the drafters of the 1945 constitution, some of whom hoped for a secular Indonesian state and others who envisaged an Islamic state. </p>
<p>As Indonesia is a religious state, the court found that “religious values” inform what makes a law good or bad. They also constitute a legitimate reason, the court said, to diminish individual human rights. </p>
<p>But what are “religious values” and who has the authority to define them?</p>
<p>The court’s interpretation of these values, as guaranteed in the 1945 constitution, may seem dubious to some. Rather than interpreting “religious values” as universal principles of brotherhood and humanity, for example, it read the term to mean the fundamental tenets of a state-recognised religion (<em>pokok-pokok agama</em>), as defined by Indonesia’s Ministry of Religion. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171566/original/file-20170531-23684-5mv7m8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Indonesia’s Constitutional Court argues the country is neither an Islamic nor secular state.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Darren Whiteside</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Shari'a-based values</h2>
<p>Aceh’s criminal code arguably reflects the broader view in Acehnese society that corporal punishment is necessary to uphold local shari‘a-based values. And to discourage contradictory “moral” offences, of which homosexuality is one. </p>
<p>Caning also enjoys historical legitimacy. It has featured throughout the Islamic tradition as a form of punishment for both <em>hudud</em> (crimes against Islamic law contained in the <em>Qur’an</em>) and <em>ta’zir</em> (discretionary punishments for crimes against Islamic law administered by the state) offences.</p>
<p>The second crucial point of the ruling was that while religion may be a private matter to some, the Constitutional Court endorsed a concept of religion forming the identity of a community or society. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520277229">critics have argued</a>, the court’s decision prioritised the rights of religious ideas over the rights of individual adherents. It also legitimised the idea that a person’s religious identity is akin to property and may not be infringed upon. </p>
<p>There are few parts of Indonesia, if any, where Islam is considered more a part of one’s identity than in Aceh.</p>
<p>The Constitutional Court also found that upholding “religious values” was necessary to ensure public order. Again, <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520277229">critics</a> have argued that the court conflated the need to maintain public order with the tendency to pander to general public discontent. </p>
<p>On this point, its stance partially explains why the criminal acts of certain vigilante groups continue to go unpunished where religion is concerned. Vigilantism in Aceh is commonly carried out in the name of the shari‘a.</p>
<p>Finally, the court stated that the Indonesian state had no obligation to ensure the domestic application of international human rights conventions. Rather, it held that Indonesia’s respect for various conventions and international law apparatuses, including human rights, must always be based on the philosophy and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. </p>
<p>In other words, Indonesian “religious values” trump international human rights norms.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/171567/original/file-20170531-23672-x2ua6j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There are few parts of Indonesia where Islam is considered more a part of one’s identity than in Aceh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Damir Sagolj</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The exception or the rule?</h2>
<p>Following something as controversial and divisive as the public caning of two citizens for having consensual sex in private, supporters of the LGBT community and opponents of corporal punishment may find it comforting to think of Aceh as the exception to the rule. </p>
<p>The province is, after all, the only one in Indonesia to legislate corporal punishment and to prohibit same-sex relations. But it is not the only one that’s home to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-indonesian-extremists-are-gaining-ground">radical, often violent, Islamist groups and vigilantes</a> who, at times, <a href="https://www.quora.com/Indonesia-What-are-the-real-reasons-why-the-Indonesian-government-doesnt-ban-the-Islamic-Defenders-Front-Front-Pembela-Islam-FPI">appear to enjoy impunity</a>.</p>
<p>Aceh may also not be the only province that prohibits same-sex relations and sex out of wedlock for much longer. In May 2016, a group calling itself the Family Love Alliance (AILA) petitioned the Constitutional Court to conduct a <a href="http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/first-blasphemy-now-homosexuality/">material review of the national criminal code</a>. </p>
<p>While the review is still under way, AILA’s primary argument is that the national criminal code is a relic of colonial rule and <a href="https://www.kiblat.net/2016/09/26/aila-ajak-masyarakat-dukung-uji-materi-pasal-kesusilaan-kuhp/">does not reflect Indonesia’s traditional “religious values”</a>. </p>
<p>If the court accedes to the petition, both sexual relations out of wedlock and homosexual relations as such may be outlawed across the archipelago. And this may provide sufficient justification for vigilante groups to carry out similar acts of violence across Indonesia.</p>
<p>So while it may be comforting to dismiss the caning as peculiar to Aceh, if Ahok’s blasphemy conviction tells us anything, it’s that it would be foolhardy to assume that other parts of the archipelago aren’t on a similar, albeit slower, trajectory.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/78516/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Peterson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent events in Indonesia should dispel any doubt about the rising influence conservative Sunni Islamist sentiment is having on the country’s laws.Daniel Peterson, PhD Candidate / Research Assistant, Institute for Religion, Politics and Society, Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/747402017-05-08T00:53:37Z2017-05-08T00:53:37ZHow the hijab has grown into a fashion industry<p>Nike, the well-known U.S. sportswear company, recently introduced a sports hijab. The reaction to this has been mixed: There are those who are <a href="http://www.refinery29.com/2017/03/144856/amna-al-haddad-nike-hijab-controversy">applauding Nike</a> for its inclusiveness of Muslim women who want to cover their hair, and there are those who <a href="http://www.ajc.com/news/local/muslim-women-support-nike-backlash-over-sports-hijab-sparks-boycottnike/sld2EbtjTXwVSghqUOvkNL/">accuse</a> it of abetting women’s subjugation. </p>
<p>Nike, in fact, is not the first corporate brand to champion the hijab. I am the author of <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/shirazi-brand-islam">“Brand Islam,”</a> and I have seen how it is commonly assumed, particularly in the West, that Muslim women are indifferent to fashion.</p>
<p>Nothing could be further from the truth: My research shows that <a href="http://journaldatabase.info/articles/review_influencing_factors_constructs.html">Islamic fashion</a> is a rapidly growing industry. </p>
<h2>History of sports hijab</h2>
<p>The use of an official sports hijab in competition dates back to <a href="http://www.arabianbusiness.com/fifa-overturns-hijab-ban-in-women-s-football-464914.html">July 2012</a> when the International Football Association Board (IFAB), custodians of the rules of soccer, overturned a 2007 ban which had argued that the hijab was “unsafe” for sports persons as it could “increase” the risk of neck injuries. </p>
<p>While overturning the ban, the IFAB noted that there was nothing in “the medical literature concerning injuries as a result of wearing a headscarf.” The sports hijab is secured in place with magnets. If it does get pulled off, another cap remains underneath, to cover the sports person’s hair without causing any injuries.</p>
<p>In 2012, Muslim athletes wearing the hijab received considerable media attention. Wearing the hijab set them apart from other Olympic athletes. Since then, several <a href="https://www.capsters.com/">lesser-known</a>, <a href="https://vimeo.com/15325211">sports hijab companies</a> – much before Nike’s pro hijab – have come to be <a href="https://www.dezeen.com/2011/06/07/sports-hijab-by-resporton/">in this business</a>.</p>
<h2>History of Islamic fashion</h2>
<p>The marketing of Islamic fashionable clothing, however, is older than the sports hijab. </p>
<p>In my research, I found that it started in the 1980s when ethnic grocery dealers in Western Europe and the United States began importing modest fashion clothing along with other items for the Muslim population. That proved to be a successful business. </p>
<p>Prior to that, <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520291461">most Muslim women</a> would put together <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254896167_Islamic_fashion_in_Europe_religious_conviction_aesthetic_style_and_creative_consumption">their own styles</a>.</p>
<p>These small endeavors ultimately morphed into a competitive and lucrative Muslim fashion industry. Islamic fashion in general is understood as women wearing modest clothing with long sleeves, descending to the ankle and having a high neckline. The outfits are nonhugging, with some form of head covering that could be draped in a variety of styles. Women who prefer to wear pants combine them with a long sleeved top that covers the buttocks and has a high neckline, along with a head covering. </p>
<p>Over time, national and international designers came to be involved in the sale of chic Islamic fashions. Today, Muslim fashion is a lucrative global industry with countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520291461">leading the way</a> outside the Western countries. In 2010 the Turkish newspaper Milliyet estimated the global Islamic clothing market to be worth <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/shirazi-brand-islam">around US$2.9 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The Global Islamic Economy report for 2014-2015 indicated Muslim consumer spending on clothing and footwear had <a href="http://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/export/sites/trade/files/news/342150121095027/342150121095027_1.pdf">increased to $266 billion</a> in 2013. This represents a growth of 11.9 percent of the global spending in a period of three years. The report predicted this market to reach $488 billion by 2019. </p>
<h2>The Islamic brand</h2>
<p>This growth has had its <a href="http://www.eastessence.com/islamic-clothing/women/">share of controversies</a>: Many designers <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/shirazi-brand-islam">use the term “Islamic”</a> for their clothing. Religious conservatives and Muslim scholars have raised questions about <a href="https://www.artizara.com/">what types of apparel</a> would fit <a href="http://zilzarlife.com/9-muslimah-fashion-brands-that-make-us-proud/">that category</a> and whether defining clothing as “Islamic” was even permitted or lawful by Islamic principles – a concept known as “halal.” </p>
<p>In particular, critics have objected to the fashion catwalk presentations, which actually draw the gaze and attention of spectators to the bodies of models, while the purpose of a hijab is to distract and move the gaze away from the body. In Iran, for example, Islamic fashion is viewed by the ulama (religious scholars) <a href="http://upf.com/book.asp?id=SHIRAS01">as another Western influence</a> and referred to as “Western Hijab.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168160/original/file-20170505-19124-8ze06e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/168160/original/file-20170505-19124-8ze06e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168160/original/file-20170505-19124-8ze06e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168160/original/file-20170505-19124-8ze06e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168160/original/file-20170505-19124-8ze06e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168160/original/file-20170505-19124-8ze06e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/168160/original/file-20170505-19124-8ze06e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Defining clothing as Islamic has been controversial.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/karmakazesal/302503123/in/photolist-ceaKaU-bWNnVg-ceaK7A-edEyvs-ceaKcJ-9yzZHZ-ceaK5Q-ceaK8C-ds84U5-8vxCRW-6o8hcU-47YhHi-bViypx-8oBK6z-dHYcMK-dHYaFH-dHYajR-DJ6WL-dHY9Vg-brTdXS-8nu9CD-Lyo9A2-Lyo9xM-Lyo9vx-Moqbka-mMxZtE-dJ4EtY-jvzLnt-5qT5Cb-qGos78-5aB9WY-dJ4EVo-dHYc1k-bmZtEH-dJ4CVw-eaeX7M-mTTWwF-sJpD6-p7S2RA-8UiPPK-sJpuj-8ecrab-4QXK8N-6ehPEL-k9echD-dPnPiH-AF1Jyg-pqXZ4d-dJ4DEY-dJ4Cgy">karmakazesal</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nonetheless, the Islamic fashion industry has managed to initiate <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/shirazi-brand-islam">marketing campaigns</a> that capitalize on the very core of Islamic precepts: Sharia, or the Islamic religious law. A Malaysian apparel company, Kivitz, for example, uses the phrase “Syar’i and Stylish.” In Malay, Syar'i is the same as Sharia.</p>
<p>In establishing a nominally Islamic brand, marketers make every effort to align their products with the core value of Islam. So, even when following the trendy fashionable seasonal colors and materials, clothing styles would include some sort of head covering.</p>
<h2>Who are the consumers?</h2>
<p>The question still remains: What led to such a rapid growth over a span of just three years? </p>
<p>My <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/shirazi-brand-islam">research has demonstrated</a> that Muslims are more brand-aware than the general population. However, in the past they were largely ignored by the fashion industry, perhaps, due to misconceptions that being a Muslim restricted people’s lifestyle. </p>
<p>And now, with a <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/06/why-muslims-are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group/">growing</a> <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/">Muslim population</a>, there is an increased demand for modest but also fashionable clothing for the <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1359183507078121">youth</a>, who have <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2008.00849.x/full">significant spending power</a>. At the same time, traditional elite and wealthy Middle Eastern consumers who used to shop for fashionable clothing from European nations <a href="http://www.salaamgateway.com/en/fashion-art-design/story/luxury_and_sophistication_overview_of_qatars_modest_fashion_market-salaam14062016073242/">now prefer to shop</a> from homegrown Muslim fashion designers. </p>
<p>Indeed, the halal logo on food and other products in addition to modesty in clothing has proved to be an effective strategy in creating a global Islamic identity. </p>
<p>As I have seen in my research, consumerism is changing what is means to be modern and Muslim today. As <a href="http://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2014/spring/vali-nasr-profile/a">Vali Nasr</a>, a Middle Eastern scholar, <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/shirazi-brand-islam">explains</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The great battle for the soul of the Muslim world will be fought not over religion but over market capitalism.”</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Faegheh Shirazi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic fashion is a rapidly growing industry: Muslim spending on fashion is expected to reach US$488 billion by 2019. What has led to this growth?Faegheh Shirazi, Professor, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, The University of Texas at AustinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/763882017-04-20T06:31:42Z2017-04-20T06:31:42ZJakarta governor election results in a victory for prejudice over pluralism<p>The long, divisive campaign for governorship of Indonesia’s capital city Jakarta is finally over, with unofficial results showing a <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/19/anies-beats-ahok-in-runoff-vote-quick-counts.html">decisive victory for the challenger Anies Baswedan</a> over the controversial incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly known as Ahok).</p>
<p>The election was the most politically significant regional election in Indonesia’s history because it wasn’t just about choosing the chief executive for the city’s 10 million citizens. </p>
<p>Rather, it became a referendum on the future of Indonesia’s ethno-religious diversity and tolerance after unwanted intervention by a number of radical Islamist groups, most notably the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).</p>
<h2>The blasphemy campaign against Ahok</h2>
<p>These groups accused Ahok, a Chinese Indonesian who is Christian, of <a href="http://www.catatansandk.net/2016/10/ini-isi-surat-al-maidah-ayat-51-yang.html">blaspheming last September by mocking a Qur’anic verse</a> that allegedly calls for Muslims to reject non-Muslims as their leaders. Ahok criticised unnamed religious clerics (<em>ulama</em>) for using verse 51 of the Surah Al-Maidah that advises Muslims to avoid aligning with Christian and Jews. </p>
<p>FPI and its allies managed to obtain a religious ruling (fatwa) from the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) declaring that Ahok was <a href="http://news.detik.com/berita/d-3318150/mui-nyatakan-sikap-soal-ucapan-ahok-terkait-al-maidah-51-ini-isinya">guilty of committing blasphemy against Islam</a>. They then sponsored a number of anti-Ahok rallies in Jakarta, the largest of which, held in November 2016, <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_id/article/anti-ahok-protests-shrink-as-election-nears-final-stretch">attracted approximately 2.5 million protesters</a>. </p>
<p>Under pressure from these groups, the Indonesian government opened an investigation against Ahok and tried him for blasphemy. <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-04-11/blasphemy-trial-of-jakarta-governor-ahok-delayed/8434290">The trial was adjourned</a> a week before the election.</p>
<p>Anies, a very astute politician, quickly capitalised on anti-Ahok accusations, by <a href="https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3385875/habib-rizieq-anies-sejalan-dengan-kita-yang-anti-reklamasi">seeking and receiving an endorsement</a> from Habib Rizieq Shihab, FPI’s supreme leader. He also started to portray himself as an “Islamic candidate” <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/world/asia/jakarta-governor-election.html">to win the support of Jakarta’s Muslims</a>, who comprise 85% of registered voters.</p>
<p>The strategy seems to have worked, as an Indo Barometer poll in February indicated <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/world/asia/jakarta-governor-election.html">more than half of Jakarta’s voters would not vote</a> for Ahok because they believed he had committed a blasphemous act against Islam.</p>
<p>They reached this conclusion despite a <a href="http://www.beraninews.com/2017/03/Saksi-Ahli-Agama-Dari-PBNU-Kyai-Masdar-F-Masudi-Keluarkan-Dalil-Pamungkas-Soal-Arti-Auliya.html">number of Islamic scholars saying</a> that the Qur’anic verse in question must be seen in the context of warfare between Muslims and non-Muslims during the early Islamic period. And that it had <a href="http://www.netralnews.com/news/megapolitan/read/64493/dipergunjingkan.karena.bela.ahok..ini.surat.terbuka.ahmad.ishomuddin">nothing to do with how Muslims should choose</a> their leader.</p>
<p>The race between the two contenders was very tight, as indicated by a reputable Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) poll, which showed <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/12/religious-sentiment-drives-anies-to-top-place-in-survey.html">Anies leading Ahok</a> with a margin of 1% (47.9% vs 46.9%), with up to 5.2% of voters still undecided. </p>
<p>The campaign took an ugly turn when an elderly woman, who had voted for Ahok during the first round and subsequently died, <a href="https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2017/03/13/078855407/kisruh-jenazah-nenek-hindun-lukman-saya-tak-bisa-menindak-takmir?fb_comment_id=1660600733956646_1662241843792535#f2535531e41e86c">was allegedly denied a Muslim burial</a>. And an Islamist activist <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/17/facebook-user-reported-after-claiming-gang-rape-of-ahok-voters-halal.html">made a Facebook post stating</a> it would be religiously permissible for any women voting for Ahok during the run-off election to be gang-raped. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/04/07/jakarta-officials-remove-provocative-banners-to-reduce-tension.html">Police had to tear down a number of banners</a> placed in mosques across Jakarta discouraging their members to vote for Ahok during the runoff.</p>
<h2>Implications of the election results</h2>
<p>The election has serious implications for the future of Indonesian politics. Anies’ victory means he is in a stronger position to mount a challenge against President Joko Widodo in 2019, as a candidate of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), or with another opposition party. </p>
<p>A young, telegenic politician who has widely touted his Islamic credentials, <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262">Anies is perceived by Jokowi as a more formidable opponent</a> than “old guard” elite figures, such as retired General Prabowo Subianto and former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who are both widely expected to be contenders during the 2019 presidential election.</p>
<p>But more importantly, Anies’ victory is another sign of the growing Islamisation of Indonesian politics, which has been on the rise since the country made its democratic transition in 1998. </p>
<p>This phenomena can be seen throughout Indonesian society, from the promotion of Islamist prayer groups (<em>pengajian</em>) and study circles (<em>halaqah</em>) in public university campuses throughout the country; the proliferation of Indonesian women wearing Islamic veils (hijab); and the rapid increase in local regulations restricting alcohol consumption and the rights of religious minorities.</p>
<p>There seems to be an <a href="http://www.newmandala.org/the-missing-middle/">ideological and political convergence</a> between Islamist groups such as FPI (an association of approximately 100,000 hardline Islamists with close ties to the Indonesian security apparatus) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. This latter is known for its advocacy for a global caliphate. </p>
<p>Members of both groups are developing a close relationship with the conservative elements of the Nahdlatul Ulama NU) and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organisations with generally moderate political leanings. They claim membership by 60 million and 30 million people respectively. </p>
<p>The MUI fatwa against Ahok was signed by Maaruf Amin, who, apart from being the council’s general chairman, is also NU’s supreme leader (<em>rais aam</em>). </p>
<p>The groups have also cooperated to demand the implementation of shari’a regulations (<em>perda shari’a</em>) by local governments throughout Indonesia. And there are now <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1206453?journalCode=ctwq20">442 such regulations in place in over 100 cities and districts</a>. </p>
<p>These regulations require women to wear hijab in public, prohibit the consumption of alcohol and prostitution, and declare a number of Islamic minority sects, such as Ahmadis and Shiites, to be illegal within their respective localities. The groups have <a href="https://ari.nus.edu.sg/publication/detail/1370">also encouraged acts of violence</a> against both minorities over the past decade or so. </p>
<p>Rising Islamism and the renewed prejudice against ethnic and religious minorities pose a danger to the pluralist outlook enshrined in Indonesia’s official founding principles, which are collectively known as <em>Pancasila</em>. Made from the Sanskrit word for “five”, <em>panca</em>, and the Javanese for “principles”, <em>sila</em>, <em>Pancasila</em> states: “The one God system (monotheism), just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy and social justice for all.”</p>
<p>These principles have underpinned equality for all Indonesia’s ethnic and religious groups since the country’s founding in 1945. Indonesian founding fathers who created <em>Pancasila</em> meant to give equal political and economic opportunities to all Indonesians irrespective of their ethnic and religious background. </p>
<p>Unlike Indonesia’s neighbour Malaysia, <em>Pancasila</em> grants no special status to Muslims and instead gives official religions status to a number of religions (Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism). It gives them equal legal recognition, and grants their members full religious freedom. Most significantly, adherents of all religions are free to run for and occupy any public office.</p>
<p>By creating these accusations against Ahok, the Islamists have refused to recognise the legal rights of Indonesia’s ethnic and religious minorities to run for public office. Ahok’s loss means that Indonesia’s ethno-religious diversity is the biggest casualty of this highly polarising election.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander R Arifianto does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The election was a referendum on the future of Indonesia’s ethno-religious diversity and pluralism.Alexander R Arifianto, Research Fellow, Indonesia Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/680232016-11-09T10:46:23Z2016-11-09T10:46:23ZA push to reform Islamic divorce could make Sharia councils redundant in Britain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145065/original/image-20161108-16724-kb5sas.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sharia councils deal mainly with issues over Islamic divorce. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zurijeta/shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Controversy over Sharia councils in Britain has resulted in an <a href="http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/sharia-councils/oral/42576.html">ongoing parliamentary enquiry</a> on their role and remit. Some of those giving evidence before MPs on the Home Affairs Select Committee suggest Sharia councils should be abolished altogether, while others are calling for reform or for a code of conduct to be introduced to regulate these institutions. A separate independent review is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36388560">also ongoing</a> about whether Sharia law is being used to discriminate against women. </p>
<p>As these debates continue, it is worth looking at the main use of Sharia councils in Britain: to carry out religious divorces by an “Islamic institution”. Yet I argue that an English court can clearly provide an “Islamically” valid divorce – but that conservative members of some Muslim communities are not doing enough to inform people about the options available to them. </p>
<p>Sharia councils emerged in Britain in the 1980s as informal, extra-legal bodies. They are not a replacement for English law, nor are they courts – though they are often mistakenly <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3886812/Top-sharia-court-protects-wife-beating-suspects-sabotaging-criminal-proceedings-against-women-s-rights-group-claims.html">called them</a> in the media. </p>
<p>Estimates of the number of Sharia councils in Britain vary <a href="https://www.reading.ac.uk/web/FILES/law/An_exploratory_study_of_Shariah_councils_in_England_with_respect_to_family_law_.pdf">between 30</a> and <a href="http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/18696/">over 80</a>. These range from councils with a single member to a formally constituted council with multiple members. Most of the councils are all-male, although there is one woman member, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36587665">Amra Bone</a>, in the Birmingham Sharia Council.</p>
<h2>Matrimonial matters</h2>
<p>Sharia councils were supposedly created to provide “Islamic” advice and assistance to Muslim communities, but have been primarily used for <a href="http://www.shariahcouncil.org/?page_id=365">issuing religious divorce</a> certificates to Muslim couples. In my <a href="http://www.jordanpublishing.co.uk/practice-areas/family/news_and_comment/Ali2013CFLQ113#.WCGrcNxNEU0">own research</a>, I have studied three of the largest Sharia councils operating in Britain today. Their websites acknowledge that the vast majority – as many as 95% – of cases before them deal with matrimonial matters. </p>
<p>Muslim women seeking divorce also constitute the largest group accessing Sharia councils, approaching them to terminate their marriages rather than using the English courts. This is usually the case when couples have entered into an unregistered Muslim marriage through a <em>nikah</em> ceremony which is not recognised by English law. </p>
<p>There are no reliable statistics on the percentage of all Muslim marriages which are only performed in this way, but anecdotal evidence from <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/law/comparative-law/modern-challenges-islamic-law?format=HB&isbn=9781107033382">my own research</a> suggests that it is quite high. This means that if a husband or wife wishes to dissolve their marriage, they must turn to a Sharia council. Muslim women also seek the assistance of Sharia councils to obtain a religious divorce if they have a civil divorce but also wish to make it religiously valid, a process that would allow them to remarry.</p>
<h2>Registered marriages provide protection</h2>
<p>Unregistered Muslim marriages place women at a disadvantage. If they want to seek a divorce they must approach a Sharia council which is unregulated and may apply the rules surrounding religious divorce in an inconsistent way. If a woman has been married using a <em>nikah</em> service she has no choice but to seek divorce through a Sharia council – but it means she is not afforded rights available to a wife under English law.</p>
<p>So I argue that Muslim women should have to register their marriage under English law. In Islam, <a href="https://wrcaselaw.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/divorce-khul-khurshid-bibi.pdf">marriage is a civil contract</a> that must be formalised before state and society in order to protect the wife and any children, and for the state to place responsibility of maintenance on the husband. </p>
<p>Research <a href="http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/files/Untying%20the%20Knot.pdf">has shown</a> that Sharia councils often apply the most conservative and rigid interpretation of Islamic law, which regularly favours the husband. For instance, the abusive behaviour of a husband is a religiously valid cause for divorce and requires that he pays up the <em>mahr</em> or marriage gift to the wife. But women, even if they have been abused, are often reported to have been told that they must opt for <em>khul</em> , a type of divorce seen as the initiative of the wife and which means she gives up her marriage gift. As a result, Muslim women have had to bargain away some of their rights.</p>
<h2>Other options are available</h2>
<p>The reason this issue persists is that British Muslims have not been made aware of the variety of Islamically valid options of engaging with English law, including those relating to marriage and divorce. For instance, parties to a Muslim marriage contract <a href="http://www.shariahcouncil.org/?page_id=63">may enter</a> legally binding stipulations whereby the wife is given the right to divorce herself or a clause is included in the <em>nikah</em> to accept the civil court as the forum for divorce. Were this to be the case for every Muslim marriage in Britain, the role of the Sharia councils would in due course become redundant. </p>
<p>Another way forward would be for more mosques to be encouraged to obtain a licence to conduct marriages in accordance with civil law, in the same way that a Church is. This would mean that rather than having two marriages – a religious and a civil one – one ceremony would suffice. These suggestions are within the boundaries of Islamic law and are common in Muslim countries including Pakistan, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Indonesia. </p>
<p>I think there should be a robust and rigorous information campaign telling British Muslims how to proceed with marriage and divorce in ways that are Islamically valid. A simple handbook on Islamic family law for civil society organisations, activists, lawyers, legal aid workers and Muslim resource centres would be a useful starting point. And a code of conduct could be agreed for mosques and imams to follow for marriages and divorces. </p>
<p>At the heart of this debate are the rights of Muslim women as equal citizens of Britain and it is they who must be empowered and enabled to make informed choices. Yet at the moment, Sharia councils are mainly used by women who have no other recourse to end their marriages. </p>
<p>While Sharia councils should not be their only means to seek a divorce, it does not mean that these institutions should be banned outright, as prohibition will simply drive them underground. But if more couples are given information about marriage and divorce, then one of the main reasons why Sharia councils still exist in Britain could begin to fade away.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68023/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaheen Sardar Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A campaign to provide information for Muslim couples about English civil marriages could mean Sharia councils fade away.Shaheen Sardar Ali, Professor of Law, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/518042016-02-18T19:19:57Z2016-02-18T19:19:57ZWhy is Islam so different in different countries?<p><em>The rise of Islamic State has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of the jihadist group?</em></p>
<p><em>In the fourth article of our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>, Aaron Hughes explains the amazing regional variation in Islamic practice to illustrate why Islamic State appeared where it did.</em></p>
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<p>No religion is unified. How Catholicism, for example, is practised in rural Italy differs from the way this is done, say, in New York city. Language, culture, tradition, the political and social contexts, and even food is different in these two places. </p>
<p>Such geographic differences are certainly important in Islam. But also important are the numerous legal schools and their interpretations. Since Islam is a religion predicated on law (sharia), variations in the interpretation of that law have contributed to regional differences. </p>
<p>Also significant in the modern world is the existence of other religions. Malaysia, for example, has a relatively <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Malaysia">large percentage of religious minorities</a> (up to 40% of the population). Saudi Arabia <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Saudi_Arabia">has virtually none</a>. </p>
<p>This means Malaysia has had to develop a constitution that protects the rights of religious minorities, whereas Saudi Arabia has not. And it’s why Islam is so different in these two countries.</p>
<h2>Schools of thought</h2>
<p>There are historical reasons for this variation. Despite popular opinion, Islam didn’t appear fully formed at the time of Muhammad (570-632). There were huge debates over the nature of religious and political authority, for instance, and who was or was not a Muslim. </p>
<p>It’s similarly misguided to assume that a unified teaching simply spread throughout the Mediterranean region and beyond. </p>
<p>How Muhammad’s message developed into the religion of Islam — complete with legal and doctrinal content — took centuries to develop and cannot concern us here. </p>
<p>What <em>is</em> important to note, however, is that his message spread into various (unbordered) regions. Modern nation states would only arise much later. And each of these areas was already in possession of its own set of religious, legal and cultural traditions.</p>
<p>The result was that Islam had to be articulated in the light of local customs and understandings. This was done, in part, through the creation of legal courts, a class of jurists (ulema; mullas in Shi`ism), a legal code (sharia) and a system of interpretation of that code based on rulings (fatwas).</p>
<p>Many local customs arose based on trying to understand Muhammad’s message. And these customs and understandings gave rise to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_schools_and_branches">distinct legal schools</a>. </p>
<p>Although there were originally many such schools, they gradually reduced to four in Sunni Islam – Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi`i and Hanbali. While these four schools all regard one another as orthodox, they nevertheless have distinct interpretations of Islamic law. Some of their interpretations are more conservative than others. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>There are also a number of such schools in Shi`i Islam, as you can see from the image above. </p>
<p>The four Sunni schools are associated with distinct regions (as are the Shi`i schools). The Maliki school, for example, is prominent today in Egypt and North Africa. The Hanafi is in western Asia, the Shafi`i in Southeast Asia and the Hanbali (the most conservative) is found primarily in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. </p>
<h2>Fundamental differences</h2>
<p>All this legal and local variation has produced different interpretations of the religion. But despite such regional and legal diversity, many Muslims and non-Muslims insist on referring to Islam and sharia as if they were stable entities.</p>
<p>An example might be illustrative of the extent of the differences within Islam. Many non-Muslims are often surprised to learn of the cult of saints, namely the role Sufi saints (Sufism is Islamic mysticism) have played and continue to play in the daily life of Muslims. </p>
<p>A Sufi saint is someone who is considered holy and who has achieved nearness to God. Praying to these saints and making pilgrimages to their shrines is a way to, among other things, ask for intercession. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<p>Although these practices are not unlike the role and place of saints in Catholicism, in Islam they are much more localised. And this locally varied cult of saints played and continues to play an important role in Islamic religious life from Morocco in the West to Pakistan in the East. </p>
<p>Devotion to the saints is believed to cure the sick, make fertile the barren, bring rain, and so on. Needless to say, such devotion is often frowned upon by more fundamentalist interpretations. </p>
<p>While most legal schools are content – albeit somewhat bothered – by such practices, the conservative Hanbali school forbids cults like this. Its adherents have, among other things, destroyed tombs of saints in both the premodern and modern eras. They have also been responsible for the destruction of shrines associated with Muhammad’s family, such as the shrines and tombs of Muhammad’s wife. </p>
<p>The Hanbali school, backed by the wealth of the Saudi ruling family, has also tried to make inroads into other areas. Those associated with this legal school, for example, have built madrasas (religious seminaries) in regions traditionally influenced by other legal schools of thought. </p>
<p>Most fundamentalist movements in Islam, including Islamic State, have emanated from such ultra-conservative elements. The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, are influenced by the more conservative elements of Hanbali ideology, even though they exist in a predominantly Hanafi legal environment. </p>
<p>The goal of many of these groups, sometimes referred to as Wahhabis or Salafis, is to return to what they imagine to be the pure or pristine version of Islam as practised by Muhammad and his earliest followers. They often have strict interpretations of Islam, strict dress codes and separation of the sexes. </p>
<p>Today, there are more than one and a half billion Muslims worldwide, making Islam the second-largest religion on the planet after Christianity. But it is a rich and variegated religion. And this variation must be taken into account when dealing with it. </p>
<p>Most importantly, the variation cannot be papered over with simplistic slogans or stereotypes. That women are not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia but are in places like Malaysia tells you something about this variation.</p>
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<p><em>This article is the fourth in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron W. Hughes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since Islam is predicated on law, variations in the interpretation of that law – along with geography and distinct legal schools – have all contributed to differences in the religion.Aaron W. Hughes, Philip S. Bernstein Professor of Jewish Studies, University of RochesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/501132015-11-16T11:10:30Z2015-11-16T11:10:30ZHow Islamic law can take on ISIS<p>The media coverage of the terrorist atrocities of Friday November 13 in Paris would seem to promote an almost mythical image of the Islamic State (ISIS). What humanity needs, however, is to demystify ISIS as a criminal organization. And that need is particularly important in my community – the Muslim community. </p>
<p>The vast majority of Muslims almost certainly (<a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/10/how-to-measure-what-muslims-really-believe.html">we do not have exact figures)</a> feel moral revulsion and outrage about the violence perpetrated by ISIS. Indeed, Egypt’s top Sunni cleric, to name just one example, was quick to <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/166546/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-top-Muslim-cleric-denounces-hideous-Paris-a.aspx">denounce</a> the perpetrators of Friday’s “hideous and hateful” attacks. </p>
<p>However, the truth of the matter is that ISIS leaders and supporters can and do draw on a wealth of scriptural and historical sources to justify their actions. </p>
<p>Traditional interpretations of Sharia, or Islamic law, approved aggressive jihad to propagate Islam. They permitted the killing of captive enemy men. They allowed jihadis to enslave enemy women and children, as ISIS did with the <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2015/0814/ISIS-uses-theology-to-justify-rape-enslavement-of-Yazidi-women">Yazidi women in Syria</a>. </p>
<p>I am a Muslim scholar of Sharia. It is my contention that ISIS’ claim of Islamic legitimacy can be countered only by a viable alternative interpretation of Islamic law. </p>
<h2>Consensus leading to deadlock</h2>
<p>The key to understanding the role of Islam in politics is that there is no one authoritative entity that can establish or change Sharia doctrine for Muslims on any subject. </p>
<p>There is no equivalent of the Vatican and papal infallibility. How Sharia is interpreted by the many different communities of Muslims (from Sunni and Shia to Sufi and Salafi) is, at base, the product of an intergenerational consensus of the scholars and leaders of each community. </p>
<p>Islamic belief and practice is fundamentally individual and voluntary in its nature. A Muslim cannot be accountable for the views and actions of others. </p>
<p>One positive consequence of this absence of any one religious authority is the fact that it is possible to contest and reinterpret Sharia principles. </p>
<p>On the negative side, however, any Muslim can make any claim about Sharia if he or she can persuade a critical mass of Muslims to accept it. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=715&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=715&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=715&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101961/original/image-20151115-26096-15tlxe5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayatollah Khomeini.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Roollah-khomeini.jpg">www.irdc.ir</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One example of this is how Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used the doctrine of <a href="https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-2980815921/khomeini-s-concept-of-governance-of-the-jurisconsult">“wilayat al-faqih”</a> (or guardianship of the jurist) to claim the authority to launch the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. </p>
<p>This was controversial because in doing so, he went against the consensus that authority for such a decision resided in the person of the 12th and last “living” Shia Imam, who disappeared (but did not die) in 874 and, it is believed, will reappear at the end of time as <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/islam-in-iran-vii-the-concept-of-mahdi-in-twelver-shiism">al-Mahdi.</a> </p>
<p>A more recent example is the <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/who-exactly-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-leader-isis-368907">creation of ISIS</a> by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his self-appointment as Caliph or successor of the Prophet Muhammed, divinely charged with resurrecting a state that ended 1,400 years ago.</p>
<h2>Things changed in the 10th century</h2>
<p>For the first 300 years of its existence, Islamic thought can be characterized as dynamic and creative, with differing interpretations of the scriptures being discussed and debated among communities and generations. Ijtihad, or independent juridical reasoning, was explicitly endorsed by the Prophet Muhammed. </p>
<p>Some modern Muslims, like the <a href="http://www.sistersinislam.org.my">Sisters in Islam</a> organization in Malaysia, are exercising ijtihad today to promote the human rights of women from an Islamic perspective. To those, then, who accept the Sisters’ interpretation, women are accorded equal rights according to Sharia. </p>
<p>But the Sisters and others like them are in a minority. </p>
<p>By the 10th century, a highly sophisticated body of Sharia principles, methodologies and schools of thought had taken shape and put down roots among Muslim communities across the ancient world, from West Africa to Southeast Asia. This phenomenon came to be known as “closing the Gate of Ijtihad,” to indicate that there is no theological space for new creative juridical thinking. </p>
<p>There was, of course, no “Gate of Ijtihad” to be closed, and nobody had the authority to close the gate even if one had existed. The metaphor, however, highlighted the contrast between the cultivation of diversity in the first three centuries of Sharia and the stalemate and rigidity of the study of Islamic law since then. </p>
<p>The “silver lining” of ISIS is that it is forcing Muslims to confront the consequences of archaic interpretations of aggressive jihad. </p>
<h2>Moving from Mecca to Medina</h2>
<p>The Prophet Muhammad was born and raised in Mecca, a town in western Arabia, where he proclaimed Islam in AD 610. In AD 622 he had to move with a small group of his early followers to Medina, another town in Western Arabia, in order to escape persecution and threats to his life. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/101981/original/image-20151116-10435-11524cq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Medina is 210 miles from Mecca.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Medina,_Saudi_Arabia_locator_map.png">NormanEinstein</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This migration not only affected <em>where</em> the revelations were made to the prophet – a fact that is noted in the Quran. It also marked a shift in the <em>content</em> of the Quran.</p>
<p>ISIS’ harsh and regressive interpretation of Sharia draws on the Quran of Medina, which repeatedly instructed Muslims to support each other and to separate themselves from non-Muslims. </p>
<p>For example, in verse <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=3&verse=28">3:28</a> (and 4:144, 8:72-73, 9:23, 71 and 60:1M), Muslims are prohibited from taking unbelievers (pagan or polytheist) as friends and supporters. Instead, they are instructed to look to other Muslims for friendship and support. </p>
<p>The whole of Chapter 9 – which is among the last revelations – categorically sanctions and authorizes aggressive jihad against all non-Muslims, including People of the Book or Christians and Jews (verse <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=9&verse=29">9:29</a>).</p>
<p>Yes, the term jihad is used in the Quran to mean nonviolent efforts to propagate Islam (see verses <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=29&verse=8">29:8</a>, 31:15 and 47:31). But that does not change the fact that the same term was also used to mean aggressive war to propagate Islam. </p>
<p>This latter interpretation was, in fact, sanctioned by the actions and explicit instructions of <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Toward-Islamic-Reformation-International-Contemporary/dp/0815627068">the prophet himself</a>, and by his most senior followers, who subsequently became his first four successors and the rulers or Caliphs of Medina. </p>
<h2>Legitimate or illegitimate?</h2>
<p>A related difficulty in this whole discussion is that according to Sharia, jihad can only be launched by a legitimate state authority. </p>
<p>ISIS claims to have Islamic legitimacy, but what is the basis of that secretive claim? Who nominated them, and why and how should the Caliph of ISIS have authority over the global Muslim community? </p>
<p>Since this authority is based on an entirely open and free process of individual choice, ISIS’ claim may succeed to the extent it is supported by a critical mass of Muslims. </p>
<p>The danger is that passive acquiescence can be used by ISIS leaders as evidence of positive support. </p>
<p>After all, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/world/middleeast/as-us-escalates-air-war-on-isis-allies-slip-away.html?_r=0">only a handful of Muslim majority states </a> – and then only under Western leadership – have shown willingness to resist the military expansion of ISIS. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the masses of Muslims and their community leaders are not – tellingly – turning to Sharia to justify their opposition to ISIS claims. Many Muslims have condemned ISIS for moral or political reasons, but this, likely, is discredited among ISIS supporters as “Western” reasoning. </p>
<h2>An alternative view</h2>
<p>What then is needed is an alternative view of Sharia, one that argues that the scriptural sources that ISIS relies on must be seen in their wider historical context. </p>
<p>These principles, in other words, may have been relevant and applicable 1,400 years ago, when war – wherever it was being waged in the world – was much more harsh than it is now. Exclusive Muslim solidarity (wala’) then was essential for the survival of the community and success of their mission. </p>
<p>But today, the opposite is true. </p>
<p>Modern international law as stated in <a href="http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/principles.shtml">Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945</a> (a universally binding treaty) affirms equal sovereignty of all states regardless of religious belief, and prohibits the acquisition of territory through aggressive war. </p>
<p>While these principles have been violated by the major powers – recent examples include the US/UK invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Russian invasion of the Ukraine in 2014 – it is impossible for any state, including those with a Muslim majority, to accept being forced into a self-proclaimed Islamic state, as ISIS claims to have an Islamic mandate to do. </p>
<p>But for an alternative view of Sharia to emerge and take root through modern consensus, Muslims must first acknowledge and confront the problem of having acquiesced to a traditional interpretation of Sharia and ignored alternatives that would condemn ISIS as un-Islamic.</p>
<p>One place to start is with the writing of the Sudanese religious thinker <a href="http://www.alfikra.org/index_e.php">Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha</a>, who proposed repudiating the specific principles of Sharia authorizing aggressive jihad, slavery and subordination of women and non-Muslims by relying on the earlier revelations from Mecca. For example, verse <a href="http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=16&verse=125">16:125</a> says: “Propagate the path of your Lord in wisdom and peaceable advice, and argue with them in a kind manner” (see also verses 17:70,49:13 and 88:21-22).</p>
<p>As Taha explained in his book <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Second-Message-Contemporary-Issues-Middle/dp/081562705X">The Second Message of Islam</a>, the Sharia principles based on the Medina revelations came about in response to the historical conditions of seventh-century Arabia. </p>
<p>Taha argued that today it is the earlier message of Islam based on the Mecca revelations that is applicable because humanity is ready to live up to those standards.</p>
<p>Despite – or perhaps because of – the desperate need for alternatives to traditional Sharia interpretations, Taha was executed for apostasy in Sudan in 1985, and his books in Arabic continue to be banned in most Arab countries. </p>
<p>And ISIS continues to recruit. </p>
<p>The self-proclaimed Islamic State can survive only by fighting a permanent war. It is my contention that it will either implode or collapse in a total civil war because it has no viable political system for peaceful administration or transfer of power. </p>
<p>But whenever it collapses and for whatever cause, the world can only expect a new ISIS to emerge every time one disappears until we Muslims are able to discuss openly the deadlock in reforming Sharia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50113/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A Muslim scholar proposes the discussion of an alternative interpretation of Sharia that will challenge ISIS’ claims to Islamic legitimacy.Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law, Emory UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/354002015-03-06T11:04:37Z2015-03-06T11:04:37ZIslamic finance’s global surge remains a missed opportunity for banks in US and Canada<p>Islamic finance is surging across the globe, gobbling up an ever increasing share of the more than $220 trillion in international assets outstanding. It’s a trend that has accelerated since the 2008 crisis shook confidence in conventional banking, prompting most of the world’s financial capitals from London to Dubai to join the battle to dominate the industry. </p>
<p>That is, everywhere except in the US and Canada. How come? We can blame a combination of regulatory hurdles, a lack of proper rules and standards and general Islamophobia. But the result is that banks in the region risk missing out on a fast-growing and lucrative market and the patronage of wealthy foreign investors – not to mention the millions of Muslims living in North America eager for products and services that match their beliefs. </p>
<p>To be fair, most countries are struggling to craft rules and regulations that standardize Islamic finance and enable it to compete with its conventional counterpart. It’s just that North America is falling further and further behind. </p>
<p>To understand why – and see how the region’s banks could still grasp the industry’s reins – we must first explore the world of Islamic finance.</p>
<h2>What is Islamic finance?</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.islamic-banking.com/islamic_banking.aspx">Islamic finance</a> is much like traditional finance except that the services and products it creates conform to <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-sharia-law-and-does-it-fit-with-western-law-31972">Islamic teachings,</a> also known as sharia. The most well known of these is the prohibition against charging interest, known as riba in Arabic and a term whose explicit meaning is in dispute (more on that below). </p>
<p>Anyone who’s ever used a credit card knows you can’t borrow a dime without paying interest, but in Islamic finance, banks must find other ways to make money off their loans and other products. They usually do this by charging a service fee and/or engaging in profit-and-loss-sharing contracts. The most popular of such methods for home financing, for example, is called murabaha, which is similar to rent-to-own schemes. A bank purchases a house for a customer and then sells it back at an agreed-upon markup. </p>
<p>Islamic assets must also follow other ethical norms. Investments in high-risk ventures, gambling, non-halal foods, alcohol, pornography, and so on are all off limits. In addition, the rules generally require that risks be shared between the lender and borrower, and that all finance be directly backed by real assets – a far cry from some of Wall Street’s exotic creations that bear only a distant relation to an actual asset. </p>
<p>The industry is growing so quickly because its primary demographic comprises one-sixth of the world’s population, most of which is based in the Middle East and increasingly interested in parking its growing wealth outside the region. This is creating a pressing need for financial products and services that conform to Muslim beliefs. </p>
<h2>A fast-growing market</h2>
<p>The overall market in Islamic assets has grown at an average pace of <a href="http://www.ifsb.org/docs/2014-05-df">20% a year</a> since the financial crisis struck in 2008.</p>
<p>According to the Dubai-based Al Huda Centre of Islamic Banking and Economics, the industry is projected to boast more than <a href="http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/january/rise-of-islamic-finance-and-banking-to-reach-new-heights-in-2015/">$2.5 trillion in assets</a> this year. </p>
<p>Islamic bonds, or sukuk, are perhaps the most prominent segment, with companies and governments expected to sell about <a href="http://www.zawya.com/story/Global_Sukuk_issuance_to_reach_USD145bn_in_2015-GN_11022015_120243">$145 billion</a> of the debt in 2015. </p>
<p>Iran, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia <a href="http://www.gifr.net/publications/gifr2014/ifci.pd">currently dominate the industry</a>, but many Western countries are vying to become European and international hubs for Islamic finance. </p>
<p>The UK in particular has been pushing hard to get in the game. Last year, it became the <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7c89467e-fc4e-11e3-98b8-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Sb1DPaFD">first Western country</a> to issue an Islamic bond. The former lord mayor of London, <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-19/u-k-hub-pursuit-needs-corporate-sukuk-to-work-islamic-finance">Roger Gifford</a>, went so far as to say that Islamic finance should be as British as fish and chips. </p>
<p>Yet in a <a href="http://www.gifr.net/publications/gifr2014/ifci.pdf">2014 ranking of 42 countries</a> with some form of Islamic finance activity, the US placed 15th and Canada last – a puzzling reality given the importance of each country’s banks to the global financial system. </p>
<h2>Why did they fall behind?</h2>
<p>It’s not that Islamic finance is new to the New World. Mutual funds and mortgages that adhere to Islamic laws have been around <a href="http://www.cfr.org/economics/rise-islamic-finance/p32305">since the 1980s</a>. And in 1998, the US comptroller ruled that certain Islamic mortgages were equivalent to mainstream mortgages, as far as banks were concerned, encouraging Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to purchase millions of dollars worth of sharia-compliant housing loans. </p>
<p>But such activity was short-lived despite rising demand. </p>
<p>One key explanation why can be found in regulations and laws that discourage Islamic finance, even ones ostensibly designed to keep the overall financial system safe. Meanwhile, the overlapping regulatory layers between the states and federal government that make setting standards incredibly complex.</p>
<p>One example involves a Tennessee mosque that <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/02/16/islamic-teaching-on-usury-kills-property-tax-exemption-in-tennessee/">lost its property tax exemption</a> after it took out an Islam-compliant mortgage, which makes the bank the owner until the debt is paid off. Since the technical owner of the property was no longer a religious institution, the tax exemption (for the property) was lost. </p>
<p>Another is the requirement that US banks keep their risk ratios fairly low. In order to be compliant while also maximizing profit, banks usually invest in the huge supply of fixed-income securities such as Treasuries and conventional corporate bonds, which are prohibited by Islamic laws. </p>
<p>An entirely different reason also appears to be xenophobic fears of sharia spreading across the country. This even sparked an inquiry by the US senate in 2005 to look into whether Islamic finance supports terrorism. Experts at the hearing testified that there is <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg30837/html/CHRG-109shrg30837.htm">no evidence</a> suggesting Islamic finance is more prone to facilitate terrorism than its conventional counterpart. </p>
<h2>Lack of standards a global problem</h2>
<p>More broadly, the lack of standards in Islamic finance and costs and complexities involved in entering the market have made some mainstream financial institutions wary. For example, there continue to be disagreements over what actually makes an asset permissible under Islam and who is qualified to determine this in the first place. </p>
<p>In fact, even the most fundamental tenant of Islamic assets – the prohibition of interest – is under dispute. More orthodox schools of thoughts claim all forms of interest are forbidden, while modernists contend only its most excessive and exploitative forms (namely usury, the ninth-greatest sin) should be prohibited. </p>
<p>There are now increasing fears that this lack of standards will <a href="http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.PrintContent&action=Print&contentID=0000000072150">hurt the industry in the long run</a>. But rather than serving to put off banks in North America, this actually presents an opportunity to lead the way in crafting regulations that set standards globally and developing products at the cutting edge of the industry. </p>
<h2>A fresh opportunity</h2>
<p>Both the US and Canada are a natural fit as homes to the bustling and dynamic Islamic finance industry, despite the above challenges. </p>
<p>The region’s energy and natural resources, as well as its stability, are a strong draw for wealthy investors from the Middle East, while the presence of highly educated and high-income Muslim populations offers a sizable domestic customer base. </p>
<p>This is a segment that has been much neglected despite its desire for sharia-compliant financial products. A new survey of US Muslims by <a href="http://www.dinarstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Amercan_Muslim_Executive-Summary-2014_DinarStandard.pdf">Dinar Standard</a> shows that 65% of respondents want Islamic finance available at their local bank and 57% want to know such products are verified as sharia-compliant.</p>
<p>As they are unable to find avenues within institutional finance to invest in ways that conform to their beliefs many Muslims have fallen victim to ponzi schemes and other scams. High profile cases involving an <a href="http://www.chicagobusiness.com/realestate/20101117/CRED03/101119894/condo-developers-charged-with-defrauding-muslims-banks">alleged ponzi scheme</a> in Chicago and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/05/canada-islamic-bankruptcy-idUSL5E7MT3KY20111205">insolvency of a mortgage provider</a> in Toronto point to the vulnerability of the nascent industry.</p>
<h2>Regulators need to clear the way</h2>
<p>Fortunately, banks have been showing <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/10/11/shariah-compliant-islamic-financing-usa-europe/16828599/">increased interest</a> in recent years in adding Islamic finance to their offerings, and mainstream lenders are exploring how to tailor their contracts to meet sharia’s requirements. Goldman Sachs <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-22/goldman-sukuk-seen-too-risky-for-u-s-imitators-islamic-finance">issued its debut</a> sharia- compliant bond last year, becoming the fourth US-based issuer to do so. </p>
<p>And there is also much interest in fusing the similarly fast-growing halal food industry with Islamic finance. </p>
<p>But even if the banks are growing more interested, regulators must get involved to provide sufficient guidance to allow them to move ahead. The fundamentals of Islamic finance need to be strengthened and standardized if it is to emerge as a viable alternative. </p>
<p>At its heart, the purpose of Islamic finance is to promote the social good through financial markets, allowing companies and consumers to raise money while following the moral precepts enshrined in the Koran. But the way it is currently practiced is far away from realizing this goal. </p>
<p>North America has the potential to start afresh and create products that meet both the letter and spirit of Islamic law and lead the world in that effort. That requires creativity, innovation and a great deal of financial engineering –- something US banks in particular have proven to be especially adept at.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35400/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohammed Khan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Financial assets compliant with sharia are growing at a much faster pace than the conventional kind, yet North American banks are still stuck on the sidelines.Mohammed Khan, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, McMaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.