tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/smallholder-farming-35531/articlesSmallholder farming – The Conversation2023-11-16T14:47:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2156312023-11-16T14:47:59Z2023-11-16T14:47:59ZClimate change and farming: economists warn more needs to be done to adapt in sub-Saharan Africa<p>Sub-Saharan African countries strongly rely on the agricultural and forestry sectors. Agriculture contributes up to <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=ZG">60%</a> of some countries’ gross domestic product. But the sector is highly vulnerable to climate change because it relies heavily on climatic factors. This vulnerability is particularly marked in the region because of its slow rate of technological advancement.</p>
<p>As agricultural economists we carried out a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652623016451">review</a> of the literature on the climate change challenge for agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. We explored the distribution of various climatic factors (like rainfall, temperature and extreme weather events) across the region, and their impact on agriculture. We also investigated what rural farmers were doing to respond to climate change. </p>
<p>We found that the implications of climate change for agricultural and economic development are diverse across the region. It is difficult to predict exactly how climate change will affect agriculture and economic development. </p>
<p>But is is clear that sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria, South Africa, Botswana, and Kenya are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652623016451">extremely vulnerable</a> to <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/cop25/climate-change-africa">climate change</a>. </p>
<p>Farmers are not using effective adaptation strategies. These include planting drought tolerant crop varieties, and conserving water and soil. Limited resources and infrastructure have held them back. Mitigation programmes such as carbon pricing, water management, recycling, afforestation and reforestation have had limited impact. Poor climate change awareness, unstable government policies and political instability have hindered the programmes.</p>
<p>The impact of climate change on vulnerable households will be extreme if adequate measures are not taken in time. Research suggests that countries such as Togo, Nigeria, Congo and Mali will record more agricultural <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf#page=13">losses</a> without adaptation. Governments, international organisations, local communities and other stakeholders need to develop strategies to address the diverse needs of rural farmers in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<h2>What our review found</h2>
<p>The studies we reviewed indicated that patterns of rainfall, temperature and extreme weather events have changed significantly in the region. This trend is not expected to change in future decades.</p>
<p>Sub-Saharan Africa experiences <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652623016451">diverse rainfall patterns</a>. Annual rainfall can be as low as 100 millimetres in arid areas in the Sahel and parts of east Africa and over 500 millimetres in tropical areas in central and western Africa. </p>
<p>Temperatures can often exceed 40°C (104°F) during the hottest months. Over the last century, the mean temperature has <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405880722000292">increased</a> by about 0.74°C. </p>
<p>The region <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405880722000292">experiences</a> various extreme weather events, including droughts, floods and heatwaves. Coastal areas, especially in the eastern and southern regions, experience <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/cyclones-more-frequent-storms-threaten-africa/">cyclones or tropical storms</a>.</p>
<p>Many studies show that these conditions affect agricultural production and society in a number of ways:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Yield reduction: Climate change reduces crop yield. Higher temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, droughts and floods affect harvests. For instance, farmers in Nigeria have seen lower yields caused by new pests, disease outbreaks and the drying up of rivers. </p></li>
<li><p>Food insecurity: Poor agricultural productivity often leads to food insecurity, which affects both rural and urban populations. Lower crop yields can cause prices to rise. Reduced access to food can worsen malnutrition and hunger.</p></li>
<li><p>Income loss and poverty: Lower agricultural output affects the income of smallholder farmers. This can increase poverty levels and economic vulnerability. We found a decline in cereal production over the last decade in Ghana, Congo and South Africa. </p></li>
<li><p>Decreased livestock productivity: Higher temperatures, changes in forage availability, and water scarcity are a challenge for livestock farmers. These make livestock prone to diseases and death. Farmers incur high costs to immunise and treat animals.</p></li>
<li><p>Vulnerability of smallholder farmers: These farmers don’t always have the resources and capacity to adapt to the impact of climate change.</p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Recommendation and policy implications</h2>
<p>The review of studies showed that sub-Saharan Africa could develop economically if rural farmers took more effective measures against climate change.</p>
<p>We made the following recommendations to protect farmers from the impact of climate change:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Strengthen institutions for policy development and implementation. Coordinating climate change adaptation efforts and sustainable agricultural practices improves farm productivity. </p></li>
<li><p>Improve rural infrastructure. This would promote economic growth, reduce poverty and make rural communities more resilient. </p></li>
<li><p>Initiate public welfare programmes. Improved access to finance, markets, education and climate information would enhance social protection.</p></li>
<li><p>Establish more forest plantations and maintain existing ones. They would help absorb the impact of climate change on agriculture and promote economic development.</p></li>
<li><p>Afforestation and reforestation can also help absorb carbon and conserve biodiversity.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abeeb Babatunde Omotoso. Researcher at Oyo State College of Agriculture and Technology, Igboora, Nigeria </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abiodun Olusola Omotayo receives funding from The Climap Africa programme,German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD-Grant Ref: 91838393), Germany and the National Research Foundation’s (NRF), Incentive Funding for Rated Researchers (Grant number: 151680), South Africa. </span></em></p>Smallholder farmers are bearing the brunt of climate change in sub-Saharan Africa. Deliberate steps are required to support them and boost agricultural output,Abeeb Babatunde Omotoso, Postdoctoral research associate, North-West UniversityAbiodun Olusola Omotayo, Senior lecturer/researcher, North-West UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2112182023-09-19T13:24:27Z2023-09-19T13:24:27ZSouth Africa’s smallholder vegetable farmers aren’t getting the finance they need: this is what it should look like<p>Fresh efforts are being made to increase the share of black ownership in South Africa’s agricultural sector. This follows decades of missteps and badly designed interventions that have failed to significantly change the ownership patterns in the sector.</p>
<p>The latest plan – known as the <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/220607Agriculture_and_Agro-processing_Master_Plan_Signed.pdf">agriculture and agro-processing master plan</a> – aims to provide, among others, comprehensive farmer assistance, development finance, agricultural research and development and extension services. </p>
<p>It also aims to increase the share of black ownership and the contribution of small-scale producers in the country by 2030.</p>
<p>The master plan has been signed by government and representatives from various businesses and civil society organisations within the agricultural sector. It is the first multi-stakeholder strategic plan in the country. Its aim is to promote transformation in agriculture and agro-processing sectors affected by apartheid. </p>
<p>However, farming is a capital and resource intensive business, which requires access to sufficient finance. In a <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/650189832232f1281216cb5b/1694599558497/Vegetables+Working+Paper_OXFAM_13092023%5B12%5D.pdf">recent study</a> we looked at the funding challenges facing smallholder farmers in the vegetables value chain. A smallholder farmer is someone engaged in agricultural activities on a small scale, generally farming less than 10 hectares of land, selling part of their crop and farming for subsistence. </p>
<p>The study provides valuable insights that could help inform the implementation of the masterplan. For example, one of the main findings is that there is an urgent need for government to provide “patient” finance – such as longer repayment periods – to allow farmers to build capabilities, accumulate returns and be profitable. The current problem with government funding is that it’s limited in both scale and scope and provided on a piecemeal basis.</p>
<p>This is not to suggest that there is no financing available for farmers. What’s in contention is whether what’s available helps farmers enter, expand and grow.</p>
<h2>How financing is offered affects who gets to farm</h2>
<p>Farming needs substantial investment in on-farm infrastructure and equipment. This includes fencing, farming tools, tractors, boreholes and pumps, irrigation systems, shade nets and greenhouse tunnels. </p>
<p>Research by <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/650189832232f1281216cb5b/1694599558497/Vegetables+Working+Paper_OXFAM_13092023%5B12%5D.pdf">the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development</a> found that it can cost a farmer between R2.5 million and R3 million (around US$159,000) to install an irrigation system and greenhouse tunnels on a 5-hectare farm. These are substantial investments for smallholder farmers. </p>
<p>Short repayment periods mean that farmers are required to pay back their loans sometimes before they have even become profitable. </p>
<p>The issue of financing is particularly concerning given that smallholder farmers are self-financed or have limited access to debt finance.</p>
<p>As one farmer put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The problem why farmers are collapsing and exiting the vegetable farming business is because farmers get a loan to start farming and they make losses in the first years which means that they can’t re-pay the loan, so they start selling farm assets to repay the loan.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is counterproductive. If a farm goes under, all the funding and non-financial support previously provided to get the enterprise started is lost.</p>
<p>Patient funding is the answer. Patient financing in agriculture is financing and support that’s made on a longer-term basis and that recognises the extended time frames and risks associated with agricultural cycles and the time it takes for the farmer to become profitable. </p>
<p>The lack of patient financing also stands in the way of farmers being able to access reliable and consistent markets, such as supermarkets. Supermarkets have stringent requirements which often entail farmers needing to invest further in their farms. The investment required can be in the form of infrastructure such as packhouses, pack sheds, cold rooms, proper financial statements, and refrigerated trucks to deliver to the stores. </p>
<p>Government support does not cover weather and climate change related risks. These are increasingly affecting smallholder farmers who still practise open field farming. </p>
<p>Many farmers also complained of complicated application forms and bureaucratic application processes to obtain finance. Often small farmers don’t have all the requirements stipulated on the forms, such as bookkeeping. This limits their chances of getting access to finance. There is also a lack of assistance from the department on how applicants can fill out the forms when they encounter difficulties. </p>
<p>As one farmer suggested: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The challenge with government support is that it comes and helps in piecemeal and they don’t go all the way. Also, government does not come to visit the farm to check and evaluate or monitor progress.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>What needs to done</h2>
<p>Government needs to provide patient finance to allow farmers to build capabilities, accumulate returns and be profitable. </p>
<p>This will safeguard the participation of smallholder farmers by allowing them to access more reliable and consistent markets. It will also benefit consumers through better quality produce and avoid potential food shortages in the wake of high inflation and the energy crisis in South Africa. </p>
<p>Having the agriculture and agro-processing master plan in place is helpful. But it needs to be put into practice properly. If smallholder farmers are its focus, then more emphasis needs to be placed on providing them with access to finance, to equip them with the tools to achieve better production.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211218/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karissa Moothoo Padayachie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Financing is available to farmers. What’s in contention is whether what’s available helps farmers enter the industry, expand and grow.Karissa Moothoo Padayachie, Researcher for the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1987962023-02-17T11:59:30Z2023-02-17T11:59:30ZAfrica’s agribusiness sector should drive the continent’s economic development: Five reasons why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508061/original/file-20230203-24-k9czvf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Agriculture is still largely manual in a several parts of the continent.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Patrick Sheperd/CIFOR</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa’s agriculture sector <a href="https://www.fao.org/3/bo092e/bo092e.pdf">accounts</a> for about 35% of the continent’s gross domestic product, and provides the <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16624/769900WP0SDS0A00Box374393B00PUBLIC0.pdf">livelihood of more than 50%</a> of the continent’s population. These shares are more than double those of the world average and much higher than those of any other emerging region. </p>
<p>Dependence on agriculture has declined in other emerging regions. For example in Southeast Asia, <a href="https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Books/2022/English/SAPTRG.ashx">agriculture’s share of GDP</a> dropped from 30-35% in 1970 to 10-15% in 2019. In Africa it has remained unchanged for decades, according to <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS">World Bank data</a>.
At the same time, Africa’s agriculture sector is the world’s least developed, with the lowest levels of labour and land productivity. Value added per worker in agriculture is about a quarter of the world’s average and less than a fifth of China’s. </p>
<p>The sector is dominated by smallholders, producing mainly for their own consumption. They operate well below minimum efficient scale and scope. <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.36.1.33">Average farm size</a> in Sub-Saharan Africa is 1.3 hectares, compared with 22 hectares in Central America, 51 hectares in South America and 186 hectares in North America, according to International Fund for Agricultural Development <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.36.1.33">data</a>. </p>
<p>Average farm machinery use in Africa is the <a href="https://www.fao.org/3/i0219e/i0219e00.pdf">lowest in the world</a> and has increased only very slightly since the 1960s.</p>
<p>Against this backdrop, the development of the agribusiness sector holds enormous potential to foster Africa’s economic development. For this to happen, the productivity of Africa’s agribusiness must rise. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/science-has-the-power-to-boost-farming-in-africa-but-a-lot-has-to-change-78489">Science has the power to boost farming in Africa. But a lot has to change</a>
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<p>My <a href="https://rdcu.be/c07eD">research</a> on Africa’s economic prospects has led me to believe that agribusiness offers African countries the most promising path for development and a shift towards higher value-added activities. This is the first step towards economic development. </p>
<p>There are five reasons why agribusiness should drive Africa’s economic development. </p>
<h2>Why agriculture should be the focus</h2>
<p>Firstly, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Africa">Africa</a> has abundant land. Agribusiness might be its foremost source of comparative advantage. Africa’s <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/africa-dwarfs-china-europe-and-the-u-s/">land size</a> is larger than China, India, the US and most of Europe combined. More than half is arable land, suitable for crop growing. The weather in different parts of Africa provides perfect conditions for the growth of various crops. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-youth-and-abundant-arable-land-are-a-potential-winning-combination-48855">Africa's youth and abundant arable land are a potential winning combination</a>
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<p>Secondly, agriculture has huge potential for adding value, and Africa has comparative advantages in this sector. Also, most African countries export commodities and raw materials and import finished goods. Ghana, for example, exports cocoa and imports high value-added chocolate; Kenya exports tea leaves and imports expensive branded tea. Nigeria and Angola have some of the world’s largest oil resources, but lack refining capacity and depend on imports for their energy consumption. </p>
<p>Africa’s dependence on imports for its consumption is the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/09/26/africa-food-prices-are-soaring-amid-high-import-reliance">highest in the world</a> as a share of its GDP. The development of agribusiness is fundamental for Africa’s ability to ensure food security. </p>
<p>Upgrading to activities that add more value in agriculture often requires less advanced technology than in manufacturing industries. Compare the technology of producing spare parts for the automobile industry with that needed to produce tea bags. </p>
<p>Thirdly, agribusiness is attractive because there are ready markets for its output. Africa has vast local markets for food. Agribusiness producers can sell much of their output in local markets. This enables local farming operations to grow and become more sophisticated in a less competitive environment before expanding internationally. Regional integration via the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/agreement-establishing-african-continental-free-trade-area">African Continental Free Trade Agreement</a> greatly increases these opportunities.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-and-south-africa-are-working-to-address-trade-barriers-where-to-start-194310">Kenya and South Africa are working to address trade barriers: where to start</a>
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<p>In export markets, Africa’s agribusiness products are likely to benefit from the continent’s reputation for high-quality natural resources. Ghana’s cocoa is considered as some of the world’s best, as are Kenya’s tea and coffee. </p>
<p>Fourth, African countries need to develop their agricultural sector also because they are unlikely to follow the traditional development paths. Many other emerging markets developed through industrialisation and export-driven manufacturing. Growth led by manufacturing needs infrastructure; Africa’s infrastructure is poor. This growth model is also threatened by automation and robotics that replace labour, and by growing protectionism in the world’s major markets. </p>
<p>With a few exceptions, such as Ethiopia and Morocco, most African countries have failed to establish a significant manufacturing sector, despite political efforts. A <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07900627.2020.1739512">study</a> showed that most African people who leave agriculture turn to low-skill, low-productivity services rather than to manufacturing. In 2022, manufacturing employment accounted for slightly over 10% of sub-Saharan Africa employment, the smallest share of any emerging region according to <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.IND.EMPL.ZS">World Bank data</a>. Nor did the flow of low-wage manufacturing jobs out of China trigger the development of Africa’s manufacturing sector. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-imports-could-undermine-ethiopian-manufacturing-leaving-women-workers-worst-off-195730">Chinese imports could undermine Ethiopian manufacturing - leaving women workers worst off</a>
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<p>Yet another reason to pay more attention to Africa’s agribusiness is that it is at the forefront of environmental challenges and global warming. Drastic changes in rainfall and weather patterns change what can grow where, and increase the importance of efficiency of land use. It is important to understand the consequences of these changes so that they can be managed effectively. </p>
<p>Africa’s agribusiness must develop in order for the continent to develop economically. Its strengths and weaknesses make agribusiness the most significant sector to drive its overall economic development. Policy makers, educators and researchers should take note. Done right, the economic gains of developing Africa’s agribusiness will be enormous.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198796/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lilac Nachum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Average farm machinery use in Africa is among the lowest in the world.Lilac Nachum, Visiting Professor at Strathmore Business School ;Professor of International Business, City University New York, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1959332022-12-10T05:52:03Z2022-12-10T05:52:03ZClimate crisis in Africa exposes real cause of hunger – colonial food systems that leave people more vulnerable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499297/original/file-20221206-8597-1i0jaw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zawadi Msafiri is seen in a withered maize crop field in Kilifi County, Kenya. The drought situation started in 2021.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Dong Jianghui/Xinhua via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the waning hours of the year’s biggest climate change conference – COP27 – we learned of a deal to create a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/countries-agree-loss-damage-fund-final-cop27-deal-elusive-2022-11-20/">loss and damage fund</a>. This is essentially a source of finance to compensate poor countries for the pain they are incurring because of climate change. An often-cited example of such suffering is the ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa region, which has put some <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/november-2022/horn-africa-extreme-drought-deepens-hunger-region-facing-conflict">22 million people</a> at risk of severe hunger. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.undp.org/press-releases/statement-un-development-programme-administrator-achim-steiner-outcome-cop27-climate-negotiations">some</a> have heralded this agreement as long overdue <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/at-cop-27-joy-over-loss-and-damage-fund-is-tempered-by-reality-104497">climate reparations</a>, <a href="https://www.wri.org/news/statement-breakthrough-cop27-establishes-fund-aid-vulnerable-countries-facing-severe-climate?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=worldresources&utm_term=91a1d58e-bf89-4ceb-b8d4-863c6a3e917d&utm_content=&utm_campaign=cop27">others</a> point out that the loss and damage fund does nothing to address the root causes of climate change - fossil fuel emissions. </p>
<p>Here I seek to raise a different concern: this approach glosses over the fact that the types of food production systems that the global community has fostered in Africa leave the poorest more exposed and vulnerable to climatic variability and economic shocks. These food production systems refer to the ways people produce, store, process and distribute food, as well as the inputs into the system along the way.</p>
<p>Historically smallholder and women farmers have produced the lion’s share of food crops on the African continent. Over the past 60 years, global decision makers, big philanthropy, business interests and large swaths of the scientific community have focused on increased food production, trade, and energy intensive farming methods as the best way to address global and African hunger. </p>
<p>This approach to addressing hunger has failed to address food insecurity on the continent. Moderate to severe food insecurity affects nearly <a href="https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc0640en">60% of Africans today</a>. It’s also resulted in food systems that are now more vulnerable to climate change. </p>
<p>The idea that the solution is to produce more dates back to the colonial period. It’s bad for the global environment, highly vulnerable to climate and energy shocks, and does not feed the poorest of the poor.</p>
<p>I approach this topic as a nature-society geographer who has spent his career studying agricultural development approaches and food systems in west and southern Africa. Through this work, I have come to see agroecology as more accessible to the poorest.</p>
<h2>Vulnerable food systems</h2>
<p>Each time there has been a global food crisis, variations on the formula of increased agricultural production, trade and energy intensive farming methods have been the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2020.1823838">favoured solution</a>. These include the first Green Revolution of the 1960s-1970s, commodity production and trade in the 1980s-1990s, the New Green Revolution for Africa and public-private partnerships in the 2000s-2010s.</p>
<p>Many scholars now understand that food security has <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919221001445">six dimensions</a>, of which only one is addressed by food production. </p>
<p>Looking at all six dimensions reveals the complex drivers of hunger. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>food availability - local production and net imports </p></li>
<li><p>access - the ability of households to acquire food that is available</p></li>
<li><p>utilisation - the cooking, water and sanitation facilities needed to prepare healthy food</p></li>
<li><p>stability of food prices and supplies over time</p></li>
<li><p>sustainability - the ability to produce food without undermining the resource base</p></li>
<li><p>agency – people’s ability to control their food systems, from production to consumption. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Decolonising African agriculture</h2>
<p>So, how did we get here?</p>
<p>Certain countries and businesses profit from productionist approaches to addressing hunger. These include, for example, Monsanto, which developed the herbicide <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jennifer-Clapp/publication/365767722_The_rise_of_big_food_and_agriculture_corporate_influence_in_the_food_system/links/63822891c2cb154d292d030b/The-rise-of-big-food-and-agriculture-corporate-influence-in-the-food-system.pdf">Round-Up</a>. Or the four companies (Archer-Daniels-Midland, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) that control <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/aug/23/record-profits-grain-firms-food-crisis-calls-windfall-tax">70%-90% of the global grain trade</a>. </p>
<p>The productionist focus is also engrained in the agricultural sciences. Tropical agronomy, now known as “development agronomy”, was central to the colonial enterprise in Africa. The <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429351105-3/political-agronomy-101-william-moseley">main objective for colonial powers</a> was to transform local food systems. This pushed many African households away from subsistence farming and the production of food for local markets. Instead, they moved towards the cultivation of commodity crops needed to fuel European economic expansion, such as cotton in Mali, coffee in Kenya, and cacao in Côte d'Ivoire.</p>
<p>While forced labour was employed in some instances, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/geography/geography-general-interest/peasant-cotton-revolution-west-africa-cote-divoire-18801995?format=PB&isbn=9780521788830">head taxes</a> became the preferred strategy in many cases for facilitating commodity crop production. Forced to pay such taxes in cash or face jail time, African farmers begrudgingly started to produce cash crops, or went to work on nearby plantations.</p>
<h2>Loss of risk management practices</h2>
<p>Accompanying the transition to commodity crop production was a gradual loss of risk management practices like storage of surplus grain. Many farmers and herders in Africa have had to deal with highly variable rainfall patterns for centuries. This makes them some of the foremost experts on climate change adaptation. Farmers would also plant a diverse range of crops with different rainfall requirements. Herders moved across large areas in search of the best pastures. </p>
<p>In the name of progress, colonial regimes often <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41145912.pdf">encouraged herders to be less mobile throughout East Africa</a>. They also pushed farmers via taxation policies to store less grain in order to maximise commodity crop production. This opened up farmers to the full, deadly force of extended droughts, a <a href="https://ugapress.org/book/9780820344454/silent-violence/">situation that is well documented in northern Nigeria</a>.</p>
<p>Many problematic approaches have continued in the post-colonial period. </p>
<p>Various <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.0905717107">international and national policies</a> and programmes have encouraged African farmers to produce more crops, <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/brownjwa23&id=479&collection=journals&index=">using</a> imported seeds, pesticides and fertilisers in the name of development or hunger alleviation. </p>
<p>Even though African farmers may be producing more, they are left exposed to the ravages of variable climatic conditions. </p>
<h2>Agroecology and the way forward</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.fao.org/3/ca5602en/ca5602en.pdf">Agroecologists</a> can offer a different way forward. They seek to understand the ecological interactions between different crops, crops and the soil and atmosphere, and crops and insect communities. They seek to maintain soil fertility, minimise predation from pests and grow more crops without using chemical inputs. </p>
<p>Agroecologists often collaborate with and learn from farmers who have developed such practices over time and are in tune with local ecologies. This combination of experiential knowledge and formal science training makes agroecology a more decolonial science. It is also more accessible to the poor because there’s no need to buy expensive inputs or risk becoming indebted when crops fail.</p>
<p>The fact that agroecological farming is <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/food-health/corporate-take-over-african-food-security">less expensive</a> has not been lost on the business community. They would lose out substantially if conventional farming approaches were no longer associated with hunger alleviation. </p>
<p>Furthermore, those in the agricultural sciences who have supported productionist approaches to hunger alleviation also see agroecology as a threat as it could lead to a decline of prestige and research funding.</p>
<p>There are signs that the global community may be on the <a href="https://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/insights/news-insights/news-detail/Is-the-global-food-system-on-the-cusp-of-a-major-shift-/en">cusp of a major shift in thinking</a> with regard to food systems, climate change and hunger. </p>
<p>A global food crisis has led some to question why previous solutions have not worked. We also now have an emerging, more decolonial science of agroecology that is increasingly accepted within the <a href="https://ijsaf.org/index.php/ijsaf/article/view/27">United Nations system</a>. It’s backed by a powerful social movement that refused to back down when corporate agricultural interests tried to hijack the 2021 <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10806-022-09882-7">UN Food Systems Summit</a>. </p>
<p>In some cases, there are also large institutional <a href="https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/global-food-nutrition-security/topic/agroecology_en">donors</a> experimenting with agroecological approaches, something almost unheard of a decade ago. </p>
<p>Lastly, there is a new set of <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10460-021-10247-5">leaders</a> within some African governments who understand what agroecology offers.</p>
<p>The ravages of climate change and hunger do not occur in isolation, but are part of the system we have built. That means we can build something different. The current crisis lays bare this problem and the right combination of new ideas, resources and political will can solve it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195933/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William G. Moseley receives funding from the US National Science Foundation.</span></em></p>The ravages of climate change and hunger do not occur in isolation, but are part of the system we have built.William G. Moseley, DeWitt Wallace Professor of Geography, Director of Food, Agriculture & Society Program, Macalester CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1904522022-10-17T14:57:17Z2022-10-17T14:57:17ZLand reform in South Africa is failing. Ignoring the realities of rural life plays a part<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489772/original/file-20221014-896-pmyzrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by OJ Koloti/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is widespread agreement that land reform in South Africa has failed to deliver the changes <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Land-Matters-Africas-Failed-Reforms/dp/1776095960">many hoped it would</a>. Racially based dislocation and land dispossession were central features of colonial conquest and apartheid rule. To redress this, in 1994, the newly elected African National Congress (ANC) set a target of redistributing 30% of the country’s white-owned agricultural land to black people <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_Report_land/Diagnostic_Report_on_Land_Reform_in_South_Africa.pdf">within the first five years of government</a>. Persistently failing to come close to this goal, the government now hopes to reach it <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/land-reform">by 2030</a>. </p>
<p>Agriculture continues to be <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2016.1259223?needAccess=true">dominated by large-scale agri-business</a>, and small farmers <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2015-10-15-farmers-rights-must-be-defended/">frequently lack the support they need</a> after land has been transferred. There are many debates about why <a href="https://www.tut.ac.za/news-and-press/article?NID=579">land reform is not working</a>. </p>
<p>My co-researcher <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/donna-hornby-420077">Donna Hornby</a> and I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2022.2101098?src=">investigated the socio-cultural influences on farming</a>. We reviewed findings from across the social science literature. We also drew on our own research on <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X14000485">small farmers belonging to an irrigation scheme</a> and land reform beneficiaries operating as part of <a href="https://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/4199">communal land-holding organisations</a>.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2022.2101098?src=">findings</a> show that South Africa’s land reform programme is misguided. It is designed for a socio-economic context that doesn’t exist. It ignores three important factors: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>land has multiple uses other than production </p></li>
<li><p>small rural farmers aren’t purely economic actors who are self-reliant </p></li>
<li><p>family and community obligations create financial pressures that can force small rural farmers to stop production and fall into poverty. Social obligations may at other times consolidate social networks that keep farmers afloat. </p></li>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/land-reform-in-south-africa-what-the-real-debate-should-be-about-182277">Land reform in South Africa: what the real debate should be about</a>
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<p>Finding ways to support people to produce more food is critical for tackling rising hunger. But the economic viability of land reform programmes depends on their flexibility to accommodate the multiple ways that farmers and residents use and circulate resources, including land, labour and money. A narrow focus on productivity misses a wider picture about people’s diverse needs. </p>
<h2>Land reform programmes</h2>
<p>A strong thread in land reform policy is the aspiration to <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201907/panelreportlandreform_1.pdf#page=26">create “self-reliance” among small farmers</a>. Therefore, “commercial viability” <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150903498739">underpins entitlement to redistributed land</a>. </p>
<p>This way of allocating land overlooks its multiple uses aside from cultivation. Land is valued in ways that do not always lead to increasing yields.</p>
<p>Land reform programmes also assume that farmers are individual economic actors, self-reliant and autonomous. But this is at odds with the realities of life in rural South Africa. People rely on social networks of distribution to make a living. For example, farmers may not necessarily reinvest funds in productive enterprise if the social demands on these resources are more pressing.</p>
<p>Households need a ceremonial fund to pay for life-cycle events such as weddings and funerals. They may also be supporting non-farm activities of other family members, such as job-seeking. </p>
<p>Money circulates in ways that render ideas of “self-reliance” spurious. Interdependence is integral to livelihoods in rural South Africa. Economic life is embedded within social practices. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2022.2101098?src=">research</a> shows that successful small farming depends on diversified income sources and secure distributional networks. “Self-reliance” is associated with farmers dropping out of production, often into extreme poverty. </p>
<h2>Three social dynamics affecting farming viability</h2>
<p>Three key issues emerged.</p>
<p>First, families do not usually live under a single roof. They are split between country, town and city. Food and resources travel through networks in ways that development policy and planning often ignores. Yet the implications for farming prospects are huge. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2016.1265336">Unemployed youth do not necessarily take up farming</a>, although there is evidence of this happening more during the COVID crisis. Instead, they travel to and from cities in search of work. However, those with salaried income in towns often have more likelihood of success in farming. They are <a href="https://theconversation.com/obstacles-facing-a-young-black-farmer-in-south-africa-a-personal-story-94037">more likely to access loans</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the expectations and roles of women and men, young and old, is changing in South African homes. Contradictory trends are emerging. On the one hand, customary land rights – whereby chiefs control access to land – in many regions have extended to women. This allows women <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/10.10520/EJC148468">access to land without being married</a>. On the other hand, pressure on women’s land rights may be increasing in recent times, as migrants return from urban to rural homes following COVID job losses. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/black-farmers-in-south-africa-need-support-how-it-could-be-done-182605">Black farmers in South Africa need support: how it could be done</a>
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<p>Marriage rates have declined <a href="http://www.cls.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/downloads/Women_and_Land.pdf">in the post-apartheid period</a>, in part because of the cost of <em>ilobolo</em> (bridewealth) in the context of <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Love-Time-AIDS-Inequality-Gender/dp/0253222397">high unemployment</a>. One implication for farming is that unmarried adults may be less willing to contribute unpaid labour to household production than if they had married and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260805165_The_Social_Dynamics_of_Labor_Shortage_in_South_African_Small-Scale_Agriculture">built their own homes</a>. </p>
<p>The third issue has to do with the economic significance of customary practices centred on ceremonies such as weddings and funerals. These life-cycle events are a central feature of rural life, and are important for maintaining connection to <em>amadlozi</em> (ancestors). </p>
<p>The ceremonial fund households require to maintain this social obligation can put a strain on farming. Not everyone has four or five cattle and goats to carry out mourning, celebration and marriage feasts or the cash to buy food, goods and services for these ceremonies. </p>
<p>In some communally held land projects acquired through land reform, wealth inequalities emerged quickly due in part to the strain caused by <a href="https://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/4199">ceremonial expenses for some families</a>. In some cases, this led to irresolvable conflict.</p>
<h2>Implications for land reform</h2>
<p>If it doesn’t recognise the social dynamics that impinge on farming decisions, land reform will continue to be poorly suited to rural economic life. Post-transfer support must take seriously the social demands on land and finances that shape collective life, and that sit outside the production-oriented logic of mainstream agricultural policies.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/small-and-medium-growers-and-innovation-are-key-to-south-africas-citrus-export-growth-142112">Small and medium growers and innovation are key to South Africa's citrus export growth</a>
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<p>Social demands may occur through trans-local networks and through ceremonial obligations, drawing resources away from farming. Obligations based on age, gender or marital status shape farming decisions and its viability. Without tailoring support more closely to these local realities, the prospect of land reform genuinely meeting the social and economic needs of marginalised communities is remote.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190452/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>My co-researcher Donna Hornby received funding from EU/Capacity Building Programme for Employment Promotion (CBPEP) to conduct an earlier version of this study.</span></em></p>South Africa’s land reform programme is designed for a socio-economic context that doesn’t exist.Elizabeth Hull, Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1909272022-10-11T13:58:42Z2022-10-11T13:58:42ZSouth Africa’s small-scale farmers still can’t find a place in the food value chain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487724/original/file-20221003-24-l1d9q2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Workers at a fig processing operation</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Klaus Vedfelt / Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Value addition is a central theme in agriculture. The concept involves adding value at every step, from production to delivery of a product. This creates opportunities for farmers and companies to find competitive advantages. It also has the potential to improve food security and create employment.</p>
<p>In South Africa, the government has used value addition as a policy to try to correct some of the historical imbalances in the agriculture sector.</p>
<p>Large-scale commercial enterprises have dominated the sector since the first part of the 20th century. They compare favourably with those anywhere in the world. But they are in stark contrast with the small scale farming sector in terms of productivity and value addition. And the divide has a racial dimension. About <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201802/landauditreport13feb2018.pdf#page=4">72% of farm land</a> is held by white people, and only 4% by black people. </p>
<p>Large commercial enterprises are run mostly by white farmers. In the case of grain, oilseed and meat these enterprises account for about <a href="https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Oilseeds%20and%20Products%20Annual_Pretoria_South%20Africa%20-%20Republic%20of_SF2022-0009.pdf">three quarters</a> of the country’s production. For their part, small scale farmers – about 2 million of them – farm on a limited scale, rearing animals or cultivating crops. Their farming activities are characterised by, among others, low yields, a lack of mechanisation, and lack of financing solutions.</p>
<p>It is therefore difficult for small scale enterprises to commercialise and add value. </p>
<p>The South African government has taken some <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00307270221091839">steps</a> to help these farmers boost their productivity and become better integrated into the country’s agricultural economy. Its policies and plans include the <a href="https://agbiz.co.za/content/open/agricultural-policy-action-plan-apap">Agricultural Policy Action Plan</a> 2015-2019. The more recent efforts have focused on value addition as a strategy.</p>
<p>We conducted <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75556-0_5">a study</a> to analyse whether these initiatives had worked. We looked at the contribution of small-scale farmers to food value addition. </p>
<p>We found that their participation in agro-processing was limited. And we concluded that government’s funding policy for the sector should give priority to improving farmers’ access to information, technology, skills and markets.</p>
<h2>The vision for value addition</h2>
<p>Value addition in the food industry is applied at every link of the chain to increase production. For example, sophisticated techniques can process maize into different products such as corn meal, corn syrup, corn starch and corn oil which can find their way to markets around the world. Maize processing by traditional methods, in contrast, limits the variety of products and is only sufficient for home consumption. </p>
<p>South Africa’s government has recognised the potential that value addition has to improve small-scale agriculture and, in turn, national food security. In 2021, for example, about R1.2 billion was allocated to the agriculture and food sector budget to support smallholder farmers through various initiatives related to value addition.</p>
<p>The Department of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2018/ene/Vote%2024%20Agriculture%20Forestry%20and%20Fisheries.pdf">budgeted</a> about R5.6 billion between 2018 and 2021 to support 145,000 black commercial, subsistence and smallholder producers. The support included production inputs and farm infrastructure.</p>
<p>Also, a scheme called the <a href="https://www.dalrrd.gov.za/Branches/Administration/Development-Finance">Micro Agricultural Financial Institutions of South Africa</a> has existed since 2004 to address the financial services needs of smallholder farmers and agribusinesses. It lends money at lower than market rates. </p>
<p>The idea was that these interventions would yield returns in the production of high-value crops such as macadamia nuts, fruit production, poultry production, red meat production schemes or initiatives to improve animal production in rural areas.</p>
<h2>From policy to practice</h2>
<p>Our study reviewed documents about food value chains and agro-processing in South Africa. We wanted to know how food value-addition policies encouraged food value addition in the small-scale agricultural sector, and what challenges were inhibiting the sector.</p>
<p>The findings show that policies are not contributing much to food value chain addition at the national level. The overall contribution of agro-processing to GDP was a paltry <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoXEMXjh16k">5.7%</a>. About <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s40066-022-00370-9">3%</a> of farmers are trained in food processing. And the small-scale agricultural and aquaculture sectors are not well established. Land reform remains an issue.</p>
<p>The constraints to value addition operate mainly at the primary production level. They limit both quality and quantity of output, which has practical implications for agro-processing participation. For example, an <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2018.1509417">analysis</a> of African leafy vegetable value chains in Limpopo province shows smallholder producers experience considerable post-harvest losses because of their more frequent use of informal market channels and low capitalisation. </p>
<p>The key constraints we identified in the literature were:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>a lack of access to finance and rising input costs</p></li>
<li><p>government budget cuts in vital support functions such as extension services and research and development</p></li>
<li><p>a lack of appropriate technology</p></li>
<li><p>a dearth of technical and entrepreneurial skills</p></li>
<li><p>a lack of knowledge and skills in agro-processing and food quality standards required by markets </p></li>
<li><p>a lack of access to information about technology and markets</p></li>
<li><p>bottlenecks in the supply of raw materials like oil and grain</p></li>
<li><p>food trade policy misalignment with partner countries </p></li>
<li><p>dumping of food products by trading partners, effectively destroying the domestic food value chain. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>The contribution of the small scale agricultural sector to the South African food value addition agenda is restricted on many frontiers which require government intervention. </p>
<p>Firstly, the South African government needs to rethink its funding policy for agriculture and agro-processing. </p>
<p>It should prioritise programmes that enhance farmers’ access to information about technology and markets. Such programmes should also aim to improve farmers’ knowledge and skills around agro-processing – and help them to understand and comply with food quality standards in line with customer preferences. </p>
<p>Finally, food trade policy should be aligned with partner countries in various blocs to protect the food industry from dumping. This has ripple effects on markets and employment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Small-scale farmers find it difficult to commercialise and add value to the food chain.Adrino Mazenda, Senior Researcher, Associate Professor, University of PretoriaTyanai Masiya, Senior Lecturer, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1891172022-08-25T15:30:40Z2022-08-25T15:30:40ZStoring cattle feed can improve milk and meat yields: why African farmers aren’t doing it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480337/original/file-20220822-53919-176vis.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman feeding Zebu cows in a village in Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Brittak / Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Africa’s cattle feed production is a boom-and-bust cycle. Most of the continent’s grazing lands are lush and green in the rainy season, only to wither into dry scrublands in the dry season. </p>
<p>For instance, while Burkina Faso produces an excess of <a href="https://acsess.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/agj2.20955">six million tons</a> of forage a year, its Sahel livestock producing regions have a deficit of two million tons annually. </p>
<p>The quantity of food for cattle isn’t the only issue: another is its quality. Studies have shown that in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14735903.2018.1440474">Tanzania</a> the quality of forage from pasturelands declines by a fifth during the dry season. In <a href="https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/939/93924497008.pdf">Ethiopia</a> it declines by 28%. The result is a 40% decrease in milk yield. </p>
<p>Across many other countries in Africa, for example <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Awad-Abusuwar/publication/236002510_AGRICULTURE_AND_BIOLOGY_JOURNAL_OF_NORTH_AMERICA_Seasonal_variability_in_nutritive_value_of_ruminant_diets_under_open_grazing_system_in_the_semi-arid_rangeland_of_Sudan_South_Darfur_State/links/004635157d1194ed4e000000/AGRICULTURE-AND-BIOLOGY-JOURNAL-OF-NORTH-AMERICA-Seasonal-variability-in-nutritive-value-of-ruminant-diets-under-open-grazing-system-in-the-semi-arid-rangeland-of-Sudan-South-Darfur-State.pdf">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.lrrd.cipav.org.co/lrrd27/3/mayo27042.html">Algeria</a>, and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2989/10220119.2015.1029972">South Africa</a>, studies have shown that quality livestock feed swings from excess during rainy seasons to abrupt declines, with subsequent reduction in meat and milk and even mass death of cattle. </p>
<p>This cycle poses the question of why African herders are not preserving forage for dry season use. </p>
<p>To find an answer, <a href="https://acsess.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/agj2.20954">we reviewed</a> studies and sought expert opinion about livestock feed preservation across sub-Saharan Africa. Fifteen experts representing all regions in sub-Saharan Africa participated and reviewed a total of 161 studies. </p>
<p>Our findings indicate that smallholder farmers rarely adopt forage preservation or practise it adequately. Most farmers <a href="https://agra.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/AASR-2021-A-Decade-of-Action-_Building-Sustainable-and-Resilient-Food-Systems-in-Africa.pdf#page=47">on the continent are</a> smallholder farmers.</p>
<p>Excess forage for cattle is often poorly stored, leading to waste. And forage production is lacking in the dry season.</p>
<p>There are a number of reasons for this. They include limited resources, knowledge, skills, labour, land and suitable forage. </p>
<p>Improving the diets of livestock would improve nutrition for people too. Using forage resources more efficiently could also help prevent problems like desertification and human conflict.</p>
<p>We make a number of recommendations. Firstly, that there should be major investments to increase awareness of the benefits of growing and conserving better forage, and how to do it. Secondly, that livestock production should shift from keeping large numbers of unproductive animals to smaller numbers of well-fed and highly productive animals. And lastly that better markets for feeds, animals and livestock products would create an environment for better livestock feeding practices.</p>
<h2>Hay, silage and crop residue</h2>
<p>Hay made from fresh grass is the most common type of preserved forage across Africa. Yet many technical and management problems result in low quality. Grass is often harvested after maturity instead of at the recommended time before the grass blooms. Harvesting too late greatly reduces the quality of hay. </p>
<p>Storing hay the wrong way causes the loss of nutrients and can also be physically wasteful. For example, a study in Ethiopia found that <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0140196308003601?via%3Dihub">up to 70% of the protein content of grass was lost</a> through poor outdoor storage. This can be improved using raised platforms, for example, and mixing grass with legumes. </p>
<p>Silage is a useful way to store cattle feed. It’s made by chopping grass or other plants and storing it in airtight containers to enable fermentation and preservation. Additives such as molasses enhance quality and fermentability. But this practice is rare among African farmers. The silage made tends to be low quality and prone to spoilage and moulding. </p>
<p>Most <a href="https://www.britannica.com/animal/ruminant">ruminant livestock</a> (cattle, sheep and goats) in Africa are <a href="https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/CA1718EN/">mainly fed crop residues</a> (stalks and leaves, for example), which are of very low quality. Various treatments – physical (chopping, densification, pelleting), chemical (urea treatment) and biological (micro-organism cultures) – can improve the quality and digestibility of crop residues. These techniques are critical in improving meat and milk output. Yet the additives are often expensive and techniques too complex for smallholders.</p>
<h2>Techniques to improve cattle feed</h2>
<p>African farmers rarely use the techniques that can improve their cattle feed. </p>
<p>Studies in Kenya indicate that even with concerted efforts by government and donor agencies, only <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gideon-Munga/amp">0.5%</a> to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Donald-Njarui/publication/291778832_Feeding_management_for_dairy_cattle_in_smallholder_farming_systems_of_semi-arid_tropical_Kenya/links/606dc1bba6fdcc5f778a9f08/Feeding-management-for-dairy-cattle-in-smallholder-farming-systems-of-semi-arid-tropical-Kenya.pdf">5.1%</a> of farmers have ever practised silage making. </p>
<p>We identified several reasons.</p>
<p>The first was a lack of awareness about how well-preserved forages could increase livestock productivity and profit. Smallholder farmers also lacked the knowledge and skills to grow the forages. </p>
<p>Studies from <a href="https://www.ijbcnet.com/2-7/IJBC-13-2309.pdf">Kenya</a>, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2989/10220119.2016.1234509">Zimbabwe</a> and <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/AJAR/article-full-text-pdf/688356F65258">Uganda</a> showed that farmers did not conserve forage because they did not know how to do it effectively. In turn, that was because of isolated and often ineffective livestock extension services across many African countries. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-grass-native-to-africa-could-transform-the-continents-dairy-yields-heres-how-168392">A grass native to Africa could transform the continent's dairy yields. Here's how</a>
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<p>Secondly, efforts to find solutions were hampered where farmers were not involved in research and development. For example, a forage chopper introduced in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0743016718304340?via%3Dihub">Tanzania</a> created more labour for women and the community rejected it until it was revised to account for their needs. Systemic limitations such as finances, lack of land tenure security and lack of markets hinder investment by smallholders in various technologies. </p>
<p>Thirdly, forage cultivation is uncommon. Most forage is sourced from vast areas of pasture and rangelands, with low to moderate quality, that are directly grazed by cattle. </p>
<h2>Improving farming practices</h2>
<p>To address these problems, there is a need to increase awareness, knowledge and skills of forage cultivation, processing and preservation, and of crop residue management. New smallholder-friendly inputs could include silage additives, chemical and biological crop residue treatments, affordable and effective silos, forage harvesters, choppers and compacters. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/subsidies-for-african-farmers-weve-designed-a-tool-to-guide-spending-decisions-186809">Subsidies for African farmers: we've designed a tool to guide spending decisions</a>
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<p>A general shift in livestock production in Africa is warranted, from herding of too many poorly fed cattle towards smaller numbers of well-fed cattle. This approach is climate smart as livestock fed poorer quality diets emit relatively <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJCCSM-09-2019-0060/full/html">more greenhouse gases</a> than those fed higher quality diets. </p>
<p>With such improvements to their feed, livestock in Africa could play a greater role in reducing hunger across the continent. </p>
<p><em>This article was prepared in collaboration with Jim W. Harper, communications manager, University of Florida, and Adegbola Adesogan, director, Feed the Future Innovation Lab for Livestock Systems, University of Florida.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189117/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mulubrhan Gebremikael runs a project funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in collaboration with USAID.</span></em></p>Improving the diets of livestock in Africa provides a rapid pathway to increasing nutrition for people.Mulubrhan Gebremikael, Researcher, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796812022-05-30T14:15:11Z2022-05-30T14:15:11ZCannabis policy changes in Africa are welcome. But small producers are the losers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/462493/original/file-20220511-26-a9sr7d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A farm worker picks medical cannabis flowers in Kasese, Uganda, in 2020.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Luke Dray/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cannabis is a drug crop with a <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/Assets/PubMaterials/978-1-4780-0394-6_601.pdf">long history</a> in Africa. Alongside coca and opium poppy, it has been subjected to <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-6-a&chapter=6&clang=_en">international control</a> for nearly a century. The International Opium Convention of 1925 institutionalised the international control system and extended the scope of control to cannabis.</p>
<p>In 1961 a new international <a href="https://www.incb.org/documents/Narcotic-Drugs/1961-Convention/convention_1961_en.pdf">convention</a> was adopted to replace the existing multilateral treaties for control of narcotic drugs. The prohibitionist framework it provided for control of cannabis was adopted by post-colonial African states. These official efforts succeeded in driving cannabis production underground and limiting its contribution to citizens’ livelihoods. But they <a href="https://www.unodc.org/res/wdr2021/field/WDR21_Booklet_3.pdf">failed</a> to eradicate the crop. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, many African states that persecuted citizens for cannabis related offences for years are now promoting legal cannabis production. Over the past five years 10 countries have passed laws to legalise production for medical and scientific purposes. These include <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/05/27/morocco-joins-growing-list-of-african-countries-to-legalize-cannabis/">Lesotho, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Uganda, Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, Eswatini, Rwanda and Morocco</a>. </p>
<p>South Africa has also legalised the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-top-court-legalises-the-private-use-of-marijuana-why-its-a-good-thing-103537">private growing</a> of cannabis plants by adults for their own personal consumption. </p>
<p>The cannabis policy liberalisation in Africa has been brought about by two main factors. One is the lobbying by local activists. Cannabis use is still criminalised in most African countries. But even in the most conservative ones there are emerging debates ultimately aimed at spurring cannabis policy reforms. </p>
<p>The other factor is the emergence of the global legal cannabis industry <a href="https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/industry-reports/cannabis-marijuana-market-100219">projected to grow to nearly US$200 billion by 2028</a>. For state authorities, policy changes are aimed at opening avenues for scarce foreign exchange revenue critically needed to boost stagnating economies.</p>
<p>But there are still policy and practical concerns requiring attention if the cannabis sector reforms are to have a positive impact on the economy and citizens’ livelihoods. These include the need to ensure participation of ordinary producers in the legal cannabis sector. This is because the emerging regulation frameworks seem to <a href="https://transformdrugs.org/blog/preventing-corporate-capture-of-emerging-cannabis-markets">favour</a> corporate businesses over smallholder farmers.</p>
<h2>Winds of change</h2>
<p>The liberalisation of the cannabis policy in Africa is primarily for production for medical and scientific purposes. Production, trade and consumption of cannabis outside of these purposes remain criminalised. The production by many smallholder farmers, who historically were custodians of the cannabis plant and knowledge, is not covered by the new regulations. It means their cannabis related livelihoods are still in contravention of the laws.</p>
<p>Among other conditions, producers must acquire a license from state authorities. There are various types of licenses and fees for cannabis manufacture, distribution and research. These can range from US$5,000 to US$50,000 in <a href="https://cannavigia.com/cannabis-country-report-zimbabwe-how-to-get-a-license">Zimbabwe</a>. In South Africa the <a href="https://gazettes.africa/gazettes/za-government-gazette-regulation-gazette-dated-2020-12-22-no-44026">gazetted fees</a> range from R9 200 (US$579.27) for an export permit to R25 200 (US$1,586.69) for the manufacture permit.</p>
<p>The highest licence fees have been reported in <a href="https://cannavigia.com/cannabis-country-report-lesotho-how-to-get-a-license-how-to-export-products-abroad">Lesotho</a> and <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202001280583.html">Uganda</a>. Here, they range from hundreds of thousands of dollars to a couple of million dollars.</p>
<p>The average farmer in these countries can’t afford these kinds of fees.</p>
<p>Additional requirements include tax clearance certificates, bank guarantees, compliance with cultivation guidelines and security guarantees. For authorities, these preconditions are designed to secure an end-product that could be easily “abused” if not properly regulated. They seem to be aimed also at ensuring that governments do not lose on tax revenues from the emerging industry. </p>
<p>However, the limited scope of legal production, the high license fees and business set-up costs and other conditions are likely to limit participation of many smallholder producers who lack resources to set up legal cannabis businesses.</p>
<h2>The emerging picture</h2>
<p>We are involved in a pan-African <a href="https://cannabisafricana.blogs.bristol.ac.uk/">research project</a> which aims to develop a deeper understanding of cannabis in Africa. We focus not only on its “traditional” uses, but on its contemporary growth as an economic cash crop, and source of livelihoods in a global context where drug policy is in flux. </p>
<p>Run jointly by the universities of Bristol and Cape Town, the project is gathering new empirical data in Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This will be used to examine the historical and contemporary place of cannabis in African rural and urban settings. </p>
<p>Our research also involves capturing the experiences of ordinary citizens, beyond the official narrative of medical and scientific production.</p>
<p>Our initial observations show that the risk of corporate capture of the legal cannabis industry, and exclusion of smallholder producers, is serious. Because the license fees are high, many smallholder producers cannot afford them. This leaves corporate businesses as the main holders of licences. </p>
<p>In Uganda, for instance, only one company is <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202001280583.html">currently licensed</a> by the government to produce medical cannabis. The strict regulations include a minimum capital of US$5 million and a bank guarantee. This is clearly a deterrent to most aspiring producers. </p>
<p>In Zimbabwe, the government <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-05/zimbabwe-licenses-57-cannabis-producers-as-it-eyes-export-market">licensed</a> dozens of new investors for cultivation and processing of medical cannabis in 2021. The beneficiaries are established agribusinesses and large-scale commercial farmers. </p>
<p>Similar concerns in Malawi and South Africa led small farmers to protest against the licensing process in November 2020 and April 2021. Jacob Nyirongo, the chief executive officer for the Farmers Union of Malawi, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_malawi-farmers-protest-cannabis-license-fees/6198855.html">argued</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The question is, if you buy a license at $10,000 what kind of market price for cannabis (must) a farmer (get) to make a profit? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Other conditions attached to licenses are also obstacles for smallholder producers. For South Africa, applicants need to comply with <a href="http://webapps.daff.gov.za/AmisAdmin/upload/Final%20Draft%20from%20Communication%20-%2026-05-16.pdf">certification</a>, be registered, and provide police clearance, among other conditions. Police clearance, in particular, may affect those with past criminal records for the illegal production, possession or consumption of cannabis. </p>
<h2>Towards an inclusive cannabis future</h2>
<p>Early insights from our research show an emerging legal cannabis industry with a limited role for smallholder producers. This limits the industry’s ability to contribute to livelihoods of the poor and the majority more widely.</p>
<p>Further, the limiting of legal cannabis production to medical and scientific purposes excludes production activities of many existing smallholder producers. This perpetuates their criminalisation. It also creates a dual model where established businesses benefit from the reforms while small producers’ activities remain outlawed and suppressed.</p>
<p>Legalising cannabis production for medical purposes is all very well. But ensuring the participation of ordinary citizens and producers in the industry is the big challenge facing African states. The risk of corporate capture of the industry is a real possibility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179681/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Clemence Rusenga is a researcher on the Cannabis Africana: Drugs and Development in Africa project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Neil Carrier receives funding from the United Kingdom's Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gernot Klantschnig and Simon Howell do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ensuring the participation of ordinary citizens and producers in the industry is the big challenge facing African states.Clemence Rusenga, Research Associate, University of BristolGernot Klantschnig, Associate Professor in International Criminology, University of BristolNeil Carrier, Associate Professor in Social Anthropology, Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of BristolSimon Howell, Research Fellow, Global Risk Governance Programme, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1809922022-05-05T16:39:58Z2022-05-05T16:39:58ZHow COVID controls hit farmers in 7 low-income countries, most in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457774/original/file-20220412-55721-jlveyt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Strict COVID measures led to 50% income reduction among smallholders. Billy Mutai/SOPA Images/LightRocket via </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mr-brian-kiplangat-harvesting-maize-in-his-family-farm-in-news-photo/1227669999?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since its emergence more than two years ago, COVID-19 has reached nearly every corner of the globe. It has infected hundreds of millions of people, and overwhelmed health systems worldwide. But its impact goes beyond its direct health consequences.</p>
<p>Measures to contain its spread – such as travel restrictions and lockdowns – have also had severe consequences for <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">economies</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_policy_brief_on_covid_impact_on_food_security.pdf">food systems</a> worldwide.</p>
<p>Despite the global impact, the consequences of pandemic-related restrictions vary widely among individuals. In the West, massive stimulus spending has helped ease the economic burden of the lockdowns. In low and middle-income countries, steep <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abe0997">drops</a> in employment and income have rivalled or exceeded those in richer nations. </p>
<p>But most people in poor countries have received no financial support and have few or no savings to fall back on. </p>
<p>Research shows that a <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01096-7">disproportionate burden</a> of pandemic-related restrictions has fallen on the world’s poorest. This has raised the question of how to best adapt the mitigation efforts to different types of economies.</p>
<p>My colleagues and I sought to shed light on this issue. Our <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308521X22000038?via%3Dihub#bb0220">research</a> examined the impact of pandemic restrictions on smallholder farmers in low and middle-income countries. </p>
<p>In line with existing <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abe0997">research</a> on the negative impacts of pandemic restrictions, farmers in low and middle income countries reported that COVID-19 measures negatively affected food purchase, income generation and access to inputs.</p>
<h2>Food security</h2>
<p>The focus on smallholder farmers is pertinent. This group <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(17)30007-4/fulltext">contributes</a> most of the food production in many countries. They are also <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919217309016?via%3Dihub">vulnerable</a> to food insecurity and poverty.</p>
<p>We conducted more than 9,000 interviews with smallholder farmers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia. The seven countries reflect the diversity of COVID-19 containment measures, and all rely heavily on smallholders for food supply.</p>
<p>The containment measures ranged from no restrictions in Burundi and Tanzania, to closures of public spaces, mandatory quarantines, and travel restrictions in Rwanda and Vietnam. This diversity allowed us to assess how the severity of COVID-19 restrictions affected smallholder farmers’ livelihoods and food security.</p>
<p>Our findings also indicate that the severity of these impacts was directly related to the stringency of the measures.</p>
<p>For countries with the strictest control, up to 80% of smallholder households reported major disruptions, largely in their ability to purchase food due to high prices and closed markets.</p>
<p>Under stringent regulations, most smallholders also reported income reductions averaging 50%. The drop was due to few work opportunities, low prices for agricultural goods, and difficulty in accessing markets. This affected households with off-farm and on-farm incomes alike.</p>
<p>In contrast, negative economic and food security outcomes were less frequent and less severe in locations with relaxed measures. Only around 20% of smallholders reported negative outcomes in Burundi and Tanzania. This supports the growing connection between stringent restrictions and rising poverty and food insecurity in vulnerable areas.</p>
<h2>Government support</h2>
<p>Reports of lost income and difficulty in purchasing food are not unique to smallholder farmers in low and middle-income countries. People around the world have either lost jobs or seen empty grocery store shelves when the pandemic first hit. </p>
<p>What separates the experience of smallholder farmers of poor countries from their counterparts in the West is government aid, and the resulting coping tactics.</p>
<p>The overwhelming majority of farmers we interviewed said they had received no official aid. Unable to turn to their government for support, up to 80% of smallholder farmers in areas under stringent control were forced to reduce their food consumption. Other coping methods included the sale of livestock, unplanned crop sale, drawing down of savings and taking risky loans.</p>
<p>These findings have profound implications because coping methods reduce the buffering capacity of smallholder households and make them vulnerable to future shocks. In many poor smallholder households, coping ways likely forced them into deprivation.</p>
<p>Overall, our results draw further attention to the policy choice between lives and livelihoods. It reveals an almost impossible trade-off between saving lives from the pandemic and losing lives due to deprivation. </p>
<p>Our findings are supported by recent <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X22000092">economic analyses</a> showing that the cost-benefit ratio of COVID-19 measures can differ significantly by country. The optimal lockdown is likely to be less stringent in low and middle-income countries seeking to prevent deprivation.</p>
<p>Researchers are not the only ones catching on to this. A recent <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912421000791">media analysis</a> of how the pandemic was discussed in five African countries shows that popular media recognised the food insecurity impacts long before many of the scientific studies had been published. Popular narratives framed the situation as a balance between virus containment and food security. This eventually influenced governments to adapt official policy responses and loosen restrictions.</p>
<p>In other words, the world is slowly coming to the realisation that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the COVID-19 pandemic. <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/8/e006653">Research</a> shows that stringent measures can successfully prevent excess deaths. But if these measures are introduced in poor countries without the requisite financial assistance, they can undermine the health of the very people they intended to protect. </p>
<h2>What works for poor countries</h2>
<p>Therefore, the suitability of any crisis mitigation depends on the needs of local populations as well as the capacity of local government to support them.</p>
<p>Crisis mitigation must guard against the exhaustion of buffering capacity in vulnerable households. Potential policy measures to ensure this include tiered mobility restrictions that allow travel for economic reasons, short-term price guarantees to stabilise the food system, and direct aid to rural households.</p>
<p>As governments fight this pandemic and prepare for future crises, they can no longer shy away from thinking through the trade-offs between restrictions and well-being. When COVID-19 struck, we were not prepared to make informed decisions about the trade-offs. The world’s poorest have borne the brunt of the consequences.</p>
<p>Our latest study is part of a growing body of research that provide tools we need to confront these trade-offs. By considering costs and benefits to local populations, policymakers can craft measures that save lives and protect livelihoods of the most vulnerable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180992/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Stricter measures had major impacts on farmers’ livelihoods and food security.James Hammond, Researcher, farming systems analyst, International Livestock Research Institute Dan Milner, Economist, spatial statistics expert, International Livestock Research Institute Mark van Wijk, Researcher, modeling and futures expert, International Livestock Research Institute Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1760172022-02-13T07:14:55Z2022-02-13T07:14:55ZKenya’s dairy sector is failing to meet domestic demand. How it can raise its game<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443382/original/file-20220131-19-zr8ug8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A consumer shops for milk products in a Nairobi supermarket. Simon Maina/ AFP via</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/consumer-shops-for-brookside-dairy-milk-products-in-a-news-photo/452832836?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s dairy sector is estimated at <a href="https://climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/brief_3_-_enhancing_investment_attractiveness_of_kenya_dairy_sector.pdf">14% of Kenya’s agricultural GDP</a>. Milk is primarily produced by smallholder dairy farmers who account for 56% of total output. It is estimated that the sector has 1.8 million smallholder farmers (about 80% of producers). The remaining 44% of milk output comes from large commercial farmers. </p>
<p>Kenya has three main production systems. Intensive production where animals are fully housed (zero-grazed); open grazing where animals roam fields; and semi-intensive systems where animals are partly zero-grazed and taken to fields.</p>
<p>Dairy cattle in Kenya consist of indigenous and exotic breeds; as well as crosses between the two varieties. There are more than <a href="https://globalresearchalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2020-09-02_Livestock-sub-sector-NDC-report_FINAL.pdf">five million dairy cattle</a> producing an estimated <a href="https://www.knbs.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Economic-Survey-2021.pdf">four billion litres</a> of milk annually. Milk production is projected to grow by <a href="https://www.ilri.org/news/kenyan-livestock-sector-grow-%E2%80%98exponentially%E2%80%99%E2%80%94kenya-national-bureau-statistics">about 150% by 2050</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya has the highest per capita <a href="https://climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/brief_3_-_enhancing_investment_attractiveness_of_kenya_dairy_sector.pdf">milk consumption</a> in sub-Saharan Africa, at 110 litres. The demand, currently at 8 billion litres, is also expected to grow with the population increase. </p>
<p>The government has therefore prioritised the industry in national strategy and plans, such as the Agricultural Sector Transformation and Growth Strategy (2019-2029) and the president’s <a href="https://big4.delivery.go.ke/">Big Four Agenda</a>. There’s also a <a href="https://kilimo.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/DMP-VOL-ll-STRATEGIES-AND-ACTION-PLANS.pdf">dairy master plan</a> to guide the development of the industry up to 2030. </p>
<p>But the sector faces significant challenges that affect the realisation of its full potential. As a result, Kenya has to <a href="https://infotradekenya.go.ke/procedure/830?l=en">import</a> from neighbouring countries to meet demand.</p>
<p>One of the reasons is the low average annual <a href="https://www.kdb.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Cost-of-milk-production-report..pdf">dairy productivity</a> which ranges between six to eight litres per cow per day. It is important to highlight that productivity varies with production systems. The highest productivity is attained under intensive production systems. A low level of productivity increases the cost of production and affects the competitiveness of the industry.</p>
<h2>Choice of breeds</h2>
<p>Based on our <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Timothy-Njagi-2">studies</a> at the Egerton University’s <a href="https://www.tegemeo.org/working-papers">Tegemeo Institute</a>, the dairy industry in Kenya is yet to reach its potential. To make it competitive, all players must work together to improve productivity at farm and improve efficiency of dairy markets.</p>
<p>Firstly, a dairy animal’s milk yield is determined by its genetic composition. Exotic cows produce much higher volumes compared to indigenous breeds. But indigenous breeds are hardier and are able to withstand harsh conditions.</p>
<p>The choice of breed is informed by production system, ability, experience or expertise of the farmer, and environmental factors such as climate. Artificial Insemination is the most preferred method to improve animal breeds. The artificial insemination was previously offered by the government but the service was privatised in the late 1980s as part of Kenya’s <a href="https://aercafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/RP124.pdf">Structural Adjustment Programs</a>. This was meant to improve the reach to farmers by private service providers. </p>
<p>The government supports the AI service providers by subsidising prices. The number of service providers has significantly improved, cost of the service has dropped and the access distance reduced. However, the quality of services still varies across regions. </p>
<p>Improving regulation and supervision of insemination, and enhancing the supply of supporting infrastructure such as semen storage, will improve the genetic composition of dairy animals. </p>
<h2>Feed quality and cost</h2>
<p>Secondly, feeds are essential to dairy productivity. Dairy farmers grapple with low quality and high cost of feeds. <a href="https://www.hindawi.com/journals/vmi/2020/3262370/">Studies</a> show that improving the quality of fodder significantly improves milk productivity. </p>
<p>Fodder varies in quality based on nutrients. <a href="https://www.kalro.org/sites/default/files/Proceeding-Climate-Smart-Brachiaria-Grasses-Dec2016.pdf">High quality fodder</a> are grown. Fodder yield depends on seed quality and farm level agronomic practices. Furthermore, a farmer must have know-how on mixing different types of fodder to attain the nutrition level required by the animal. Therefore, improving farmers’ knowledge is critical. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.kdb.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Cost-of-milk-production-report..pdf">cost</a> of feed and fodder varies by the production system. In intensive production systems, feed and fodder account for 55% of the cost of producing a litre of milk, while it’s 44% in open grazing systems and 37% in semi-intensive systems. For producers under intensive systems, the high costs erode profitability despite productivity being highest.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/business/article/2001422908/high-cost-of-feeds-drives-farmers-out-of-dairy-and-poultry-business">Rising costs of commercial feeds</a> drive the cost of production up. <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/data-hub/farmers-anguish-as-feed-costs-go-through-the-roof-3696476">Feed prices have continued to rise</a> even after government <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001431676/government-allows-importation-of-duty-free-livestock-raw-feeds">waived</a> the duty on imported raw materials.</p>
<p>There’s also policies such as the ban on genetically modified products which <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/markets/market-news/imports-of-yellow-maize-for-feeds-stall-on-gmo-free-rule-3672406">prevent feed manufacturers from accessing cheaper raw materials</a>.</p>
<h2>Extension services</h2>
<p>Animal husbandry plays a critical factor in improving productivity. This is directly affected by farmers’ access to extension services. Farmers in high potential dairy production areas have formed cooperatives. These provide extension services in some areas following the collapse of government services. </p>
<p>However, this strategy primarily benefits farmers in high dairy production areas, mainly under extensive systems and partly in semi-extensive systems. Development partners and civil society organisations have further strengthened the role of cooperatives in delivering knowledge and technologies to farmers.</p>
<p>Cooperatives have suffered from governance problems, causing exit of members. The Ministry of agriculture in December 2021, reviewed the Cooperative Act in a bid to tighten the policy framework. But a stricter supervision and punishment for those abusing position of trust, can improve appeal of the societies.</p>
<h2>Animal health</h2>
<p>Animal health affects both productivity of milking heads and the quality of milk. Responsibility for animal health is shared between the national and county governments. Both have been working to enhance disease monitoring and surveillance by launching vaccination campaigns, especially in the open grazing areas. Regulation of veterinary service providers remains critical, especially as it pertains to safety.</p>
<p>Issues such as <a href="https://www.aasciences.africa/news/antimicrobial-status-human-animal-interface-kenya">microbial</a> resistance in both humans and animals has been linked to misuse of medicines. The government has a <a href="https://www.health.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Kenya-AMR-Containment-Policy-_Final_April.pdf">policy</a> to address this. However, stringent implementation of measures on animal health and food safety is required. </p>
<h2>Marketing</h2>
<p>The marketing of milk and dairy products remains a key talking point for the industry. The informal market dominates the raw milk segment. This is because there are a large number of smallholder producers who are not organised in groups or cooperatives. </p>
<p>The informal market, however, offers a higher return to producers. A key criticism is that the milk is unsafe due to poor handling or adulteration. Defining and enforcing food safety standards for milk value chain can improve safety. </p>
<p>The standards should define how milk is handled, transported and packaged. Awareness among actors and consumers in the informal market could have greater results in ensuring the safety of milk to consumers. </p>
<p>Government policy encourages value addition and processing by cooperatives, but progress has been slow because of market concentration at processing. The largest processor controls more than a <a href="https://www.tegemeo.org/images/_tegemeo_institute/downloads/publications/policy_briefs/policy%20brief_%20no.%2024%20-%20dairy.pdf">third of the market</a>, and two processors control two-thirds of the market. The regulator should regularly monitor changes in market structure to ensure farmers receive competitive prices. </p>
<p>To support cooperatives in value addition, both the national and county governments have distributed milk coolers to cooperatives. However, most of these remain collection centres for processors, and few have engaged in processing. Besides, milk imports and dairy products from neighbouring countries such as Uganda, are favoured by consumers because of lower prices.</p>
<h2>Capital</h2>
<p>Other key challenges affecting the sector include access to capital for both farmers and value chain actors. This prevents critical investments in the industry. Furthermore, supply of public goods such as improved rural roads adversely affects the collection and delivery of milk, especially during the rainy seasons. </p>
<p>To revitalise the dairy industry, improving coordination across the government and stakeholders in the industry is a first step. Next, the government must address the policy incoherence in the industry.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176017/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Njagi Njeru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The industry is in the hands of smallholder farmers who struggle to raise capital and practise good farming.Timothy Njagi Njeru, Research Fellow, Tegemeo Institute, Egerton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1733322022-02-06T08:34:07Z2022-02-06T08:34:07ZNo perfect solution: Africa’s smallholder farmers must use both traditional and new practices<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/441079/original/file-20220117-21-1bkl67u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Farmers test new practices to cope with climate impacts in Kenya. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Cecilia Schubert/Climate Smart Kenya/CCAFS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As an agricultural and environmental scientist, I’ve worked <a href="https://profiles.uonbi.ac.ke/ratemomichieka/content/biography-5">for decades</a> exploring the practical challenges that smallholder farmers encounter in East Africa. These include controlling weeds that can choke their crops and looking for new ways to deal with pests or diseases that threaten their harvests.</p>
<p>I focus on smallholder agriculture because most of the food in the region is <a href="https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/Factsheet_SMALLHOLDERS.pdf">generated by farms</a> that are only a few acres or hectares in size. And, while African economies are diversifying, <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=ZG">most Africans</a> still depend on crops and livestock production for income.</p>
<p>Across the region there is <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/09/16/agricultural-innovation-technology-hold-key-to-poverty-reduction-in-developing-countries-says-world-bank-report">a strong link</a> between fighting hunger, poverty and improving productivity and incomes on smallholder farms. But we must be careful to avoid pursuing solutions that damage the broader ecosystem.</p>
<p>In my research, I have explored how <a href="https://profiles.uonbi.ac.ke/ratemomichieka/publications/farmer-innoviations-and-indigenous-knowledge-which-promote-agrobiodivers">farmer innovations and local knowledge</a> can contribute to maintaining crop varieties, livestock, pollinators, soil micro-organisms and other variables essential for a sustainable agriculture system. What scientists call agriculture biodiversity or agrobiodiversity.</p>
<p>My work puts me firmly on the side of people who today advocate for an approach to food production that’s called “<a href="http://www.fao.org/agroecology/home/en/">agroecology</a>” or “environmental conservation.” This means a focus on farming methods that protect natural resources and vulnerable ecosystems while respecting local knowledge and customs. </p>
<p>At the same time, however, in certain contexts I do support approaches that are viewed as “<a href="https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/distributing-seeds-fertilizer-pesticides-poor-farmers-agroecology/">wrong</a>” to many contemporary advocates of agroecology. These include the use of certified, commercial seeds for improved crop varieties, fertilisers, and genetically modified crops. </p>
<p>Opposition by agroecologists is rooted in a mix of concerns. With certified seeds, there is wariness about the cost to farmers and the impact on the common practice of saving seeds from one season to the next. For fertilisers, the focus is on run-off caused by their excessive use in places like North America and Europe. Opposition to genetically modified crops involves unease with using genes from unrelated species to improve crops. In addition to this is the potentially higher price of modified varieties.</p>
<p>While this may seem contradictory to some, I know that agroecology and advanced farming practices can co-exist in Africa. Indeed, to ensure African farmers and food markets can thrive while protecting local ecosystems – especially as climate change presents a host of new food-related challenges —- they must co-exist.</p>
<p>In my view, supporters of agroecology who strongly oppose new inventions are sincere in their beliefs that they are advocating for the interests of Africa’s farmers and the preservation of vulnerable ecosystems. Unfortunately, if successful, such hardline positions will narrow the options available in ways that will be harmful to both.</p>
<h2>Weighing up the options</h2>
<p>The three issues that appear to be most contentious for certain advocates of agroecology: fertilisers, commercially produce improved seeds and genetically modified crops.</p>
<p>Let’s start with synthetic fertilisers. The main concerns with fertilisers are related to their misguided and excessive application. In some places, this has <a href="https://news.jrn.msu.edu/2021/01/midwest-fertilizer-runoff-adds-to-low-oxygen-zone-in-gulf-of-mexico/">contributed to the degradation</a> of freshwater and saltwater ecosystems. However, rather than an absolute ban on using them, I prefer strategies that consider their safe and, modest use. </p>
<p>There are many situations on African farms today where modest amounts of synthetic fertilisers – <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-319-69626-3_71-1">applied in combination</a> with other sustainable soil management strategies, such as crop rotation and intercropping – will do more to restore degraded landscapes than cow or sheep manure alone.</p>
<p>For the farmers I’ve worked with, the manure from their livestock may be enough to fertilise the small garden outside their kitchen, but it won’t be nearly enough to fertilise entire farms. Particularly if they hope to grow enough food to sell.</p>
<h2>Seed debates</h2>
<p>Some agroecology advocates also firmly oppose commercial seeds in favour of those saved by farmers from season to season. There are concerns about the cost of new seeds to farmers and also that crop diversity will narrow as varieties, that farmers have planted for generations, will be lost.</p>
<p>Again, I look for evidence of outcomes, as do most farmers I encounter. Overall, the farmers I’ve worked with in Africa are radically practical and carefully evaluate their options. They will purchase a commercial seed if they see clear evidence that it is worth the investment. For instance, that it provides superior yields, or other qualities, while retaining the flavour and texture they and their customers prefer. If not, they will use seeds saved from previous years.</p>
<p>Expanding their options with commercial seeds can empower farmers. It helps them make choices that can help to improve both household income and sustainably boost production to meet consumer demands. These outcomes align with agroecological principles.</p>
<h2>Genetically modified crops</h2>
<p>When it comes to genetically modified crops, I focus on the traits they contain and the agroecological conditions where they are to be used. Again, context is critical. There are clearly contexts where genetically modified seeds —- once thoroughly tested to prove they are safe —- can be compatible with agroecology.</p>
<p>For example, varieties of <a href="https://www.cimmyt.org/projects/tela-maize-project/">maize</a>, <a href="https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2020/08/bt-cotton-in-africa-role-models-and-lessons-learned/">cotton</a> and <a href="https://www.iita.org/news-item/major-breakthrough-for-farmers-and-scientists-as-nigerian-biotech-body-approves-commercial-release-of-genetically-modified-cowpea/">cowpea</a> are now being developed for, and increasingly cultivated by, African farmers. The genetically modified traits are used to help address pests and other stresses, including drought. These crops undergo <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpls.2021.605937/full">extensive trials and national regulatory reviews</a> to assess their safety and consider their release to farmers for use.</p>
<p>New varieties of genetically modified maize and cowpea that can fight off destructive crop pests are especially attractive. They contain traits acquired from a safe, naturally occurring soil bacteria called Bacillus thuringiensis or Bt. It has also been <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK559445/">used for decades</a> as an organic crop protection spray. Incorporating Bt traits directly into the crop itself reduces the need to treat fields with expensive and, in some instances, potentially toxic pesticides that may result in huge problems for people and the environment from inappropriate use. In this context, the genetically modified seeds —- if affordable – could be the optimal choice from an agroecological perspective.</p>
<p>Bt cowpea was recently <a href="https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Agricultural%20Biotechnology%20Annual_Lagos_Nigeria_10-20-2020">approved in Nigeria</a> and Bt maize is being <a href="https://www.cimmyt.org/news/announcing-cimmyt-derived-fall-armyworm-tolerant-elite-maize-hybrids-for-eastern-and-southern-africa/">evaluated as an option</a> for fighting destruction caused by the recent arrival of fall armyworm pests on the continent. Bt cotton is already grown in several countries in Africa where it offers higher yields and reduces the need for pesticides. </p>
<p>However, farmers in Burkina Faso are <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-power-shaped-the-success-story-of-genetically-modified-cotton-in-burkina-faso-144959">no longer growing</a> Bt cotton due to concerns about the quality of the fibres produced by the variety available to them, though not its pest-fighting properties. These quality concerns point to the need to support local breeding efforts, <a href="https://sciafmag.com/2019/10/04/this-is-how-nigeria-plans-to-avoid-burkina-fasos-gm-cotton-curse/">as Nigeria is now doing</a> with its Bt cotton varieties, as opposed to rejecting the technology itself.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-power-shaped-the-success-story-of-genetically-modified-cotton-in-burkina-faso-144959">How power shaped the 'success story' of genetically modified cotton in Burkina Faso</a>
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<h2>No perfect solution</h2>
<p>The difficult issues around Bt cotton production in Burkina Faso are evidence that there are no perfect solutions. </p>
<p>But we know the results of a lack of choices – where African farmers plant only the seeds from varieties they have been cultivating for decades and have limited options for maintain soil health and dealing with crop pests. It has contributed to a situation where crop yields have stagnated, lands are degraded of basic nutrients, consumers’ demands must be met with costly food imports. Those who depend on agriculture suffer high rates of poverty and hunger. </p>
<p>We also know from the experience of farmers in other countries about the pitfalls of an over-reliance on a small range of commercially produced crop varieties and unchecked use of fertilisers and pesticides.</p>
<p>But we will not overcome these challenges by narrowing the options for addressing them. Instead, we should be open to a wider range of practices and innovations. </p>
<p>For me that means embracing the core focus of agroecology – supporting environmentally sustainable food production that benefits local farmers, consumers and ecosystems – while avoiding the wholesale rejection of certain technologies that, in the right context, can be instrumental to achieving this critical goal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173332/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ratemo Michieka does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Hardline positions could narrow the options available to farmers and conservation practitioners in a way that can be harmful to both.Ratemo Michieka, Professor, University of NairobiLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1718772021-12-01T13:32:19Z2021-12-01T13:32:19ZAre small farms the solution to food insecurity? Uganda study shows policies can get it wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434419/original/file-20211129-21-1vsf5sb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A vegetable farmer with her produce.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> boezie/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around the developing world, agriculture remains a critical source of livelihood. In many <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=ZG">low-income countries</a>, the sector accounts for around 30% of gross domestic product, and 60% of employment. At the same time, most of the world’s <a href="https://worldpoverty.io/headline">extreme poor</a> live in rural areas, mainly practising small-scale farming. </p>
<p>Despite its importance, agricultural productivity (measured as value added per unit of land or worker) is low in poor and developing countries. Consequently, growth in agricultural productivity is at the heart of global efforts to reduce <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2021-MPI">poverty</a>, and boost <a href="https://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/2021/en/">food</a> security. </p>
<p>In trying to understand how to improve the sector, much of the academic research has focused on relationship between productivity and farm size. Specifically, it has long appeared that bigger farms have lower output per unit of land, or yields, than smaller farms. </p>
<p>This was first noted by the economist Alexander Chayanov in the 1920s Soviet Union. It was later documented by Amartya Sen, in the 1960s, for India. The observation was subsequently <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275353">replicated</a> around the world. </p>
<p>The interpretation given to this inverse relationship between farm size and yields, is that <a href="https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/134558">policies</a> that favour small land holdings, such as land redistribution and ceilings on the amount of land a farmer can hold, should boost agricultural output and reduce rural poverty. For example, the Africa Union <a href="https://au.int/en/documents/20210709/land-governance-strategy">expressly</a> recognises the “strategic role of smallholder farmers in achieving food security, poverty reduction and economic growth”.</p>
<h2>New finding</h2>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919221001482?via%3Dihub">research</a>, however, challenges the interpretation that small farms are more productive. This is because yields are not only determined by farm productivity but also by other features of the economic environment. </p>
<p>We show evidence that suggests that functioning land markets, backed by strong property rights, would be more effective at improving agricultural productivity than some other popular land reform policies.</p>
<p>Our findings come from four waves of survey data on more than 4,000 farming households in Uganda. The data covers the period between 2009 and 2014. We found that larger farms were, on average, more productive than smaller ones, even if their yields were lower. </p>
<h2>Detailed data</h2>
<p>To understand why this can happen, we distinguish between two measures of productivity. The first measure is what we call “farm productivity” or total factor productivity, namely how good a farmer is at producing with a given set of inputs like land, labour or tools.</p>
<p>The second measure, commonly used in the literature, is “yields”, or production per unit area of cultivated land. Yield is a partial measure of productivity. It can increase if the farmer becomes better at producing. But it can also change if the farmer adds more inputs to a plot of land. </p>
<p>The rich data for household farms in Uganda allowed us to measure agricultural output. We also had details on all the inputs used in production, including the area of land cultivated, and the number of person-days used on the farm. In addition, we took into account agricultural practices such as use of fertilisers, inter-cropping, soil characteristics, temperature and water. </p>
<p>Using all this information, we were able to estimate both total factor productivity and yields at the farm level. We found that yields were indeed higher for smaller farms, as in previous studies. However, farm productivity was higher for larger farms. </p>
<h2>Market access</h2>
<p>How can we explain this finding? If small farm owners have less access to land markets, due to say, more insecure property rights, this may affect their input choices. For instance, farmers could resort to using relatively more labour in production. In addition, the farming technology is such that an increase in all inputs leads to a less than proportional increase in output. </p>
<p>These features of small-scale farming imply that two farmers may be equally good at running a farm, but the smaller farms may end up with higher yields.</p>
<p>Our research provides evidence that both channels explain the divergence between farm size and both measures of productivity. For example, we found that the positive relationship between size and total farm productivity is strong for households that own their farms and weak for those relying on customary land rights.</p>
<p>Furthermore, our study shows that both measures of productivity vary significantly between farms that use similar amounts of land. This implies that farm size cannot be an effective instrument for policies aiming to address low agricultural productivity. </p>
<h2>Effective policy</h2>
<p>Our results suggest that policies targeting farm size are misplaced, and can be counterproductive. There is no silver bullet for improving food security and reducing rural poverty. An effective policy should seek to facilitate resources allocation towards more productive farmers. </p>
<p>Yet, the problem for the policymaker is that productivity is difficult to observe. For that reason, we propose that policy should focus on fostering and improving markets. In particular, markets for land need to be developed further. Policies on land ownership and user rights may be an important step toward strengthening markets. </p>
<p>A fair distribution of land property rights, which may satisfy cultural and political objectives, can coexist with functioning rental markets. That would make it possible to separate between ownership and use of land, thus facilitating a better allocation of productive resources. </p>
<p>Disconnecting land use from land rights can also have substantial effects on other economic choices of farmers. Decisions like migration, sector of occupation, mechanisation or technology adoption may further contribute to overall productivity growth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171877/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Juan Pablo Rud receives funding from The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), United Kigndom. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diego Restuccia receives funding from the Canada Research Chair program and the Bank of Canada Fellowship program. The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Bank of Canada and are the author's alone. Diego Restuccia is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in Cambridge MA, USA.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fernando Aragon Sanchez receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada</span></em></p>A new study faults a well-established concept that informs land-use policies in developing countries.Juan Pablo Rud, Reader in Economics, Royal Holloway University of LondonDiego Restuccia, Professor of Economics and Canada Research Chair in Macroeconomics and Productivity, University of TorontoFernando Aragon Sanchez, Associate Professor, Development economics, natural resources and political economy, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1679242021-09-26T08:35:43Z2021-09-26T08:35:43ZGhana’s rice farmers need finance for new technologies, but banks don’t trust them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422165/original/file-20210920-15-1t72s3t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Farmers harvesting rice </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/farmers-busy-harvesting-rice-dakhla-oasis-western-sahara-news-photo/640236621?adppopup=true">DeAgostini/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>New farming technologies have the potential to improve livelihoods and food security in Sub-Saharan Africa. Better seed varieties, soil fertility practices and pest management can all increase productivity. A United Nations Development Programme <a href="https://sdgfinance.undp.org/products-and-country-experiences/knowledge-sharing-report-%E2%80%9Cadvancing-regional-agro-food-value-chains">report</a> says growth in the region’s agriculture is more effective than other economic sectors when it comes to ending hunger and reducing poverty.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19376812.2014.1003308">Steps</a> have been taken over decades to enhance farmers’ access to improved seeds and technologies that are essential to stimulate agricultural transformation on the continent. The efforts were at both <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19376812.2014.929971">local</a>, national and regional levels by government and donors. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2021.665297/abstract">studies</a> continue to show that the adoption rate of modern technologies is low among the region’s farmers. This situation has resulted in poor agricultural productivity, high-levels of food insecurity and rural poverty. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-020-00073-0">Over 65%</a> of the households in Sub-Saharan Africa are mainly smallholder farmers, many are poor and vulnerable.</p>
<p>Smallholder farmers in the region have a common problem. They tend to <a href="https://thejournalofbusiness.org/index.php/site/article/view/22/21">lack access to the finance</a> they need to adopt modern technologies. Finance could be in the form of loans or credit.</p>
<p>Using the case of rice farming in Ghana, we conducted a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03736245.2021.1962395">study</a> to understand the challenges smallholder farmers face in accessing loans. We wanted to find out if this was preventing them from adopting modern technologies, and whether these technologies would improve their productivity and incomes. </p>
<p>We found that banks and financial institutions don’t trust smallholder farmers. They relay their mistrust by, for example, requesting outrageous collateral, a high sum of savings capital, and a high-interest rate for agriculture loans. There are also usually long delays in accessing any funds.</p>
<p>We suggest mechanisms to improve access to finance that would help farmers produce more rice. </p>
<h2>Our research</h2>
<p>We interviewed 100 smallholder rice farmers in the Shia-Osuduku district in the Greater Accra region of Ghana. In focus group discussions and interviews, we asked about access to credit and loans, and how this influenced their use of modern production technologies. </p>
<p>We focused on rice farmers because rice is the second most important food crop in Africa. Rice is also a significant <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-020-00073-0">source of income</a> for rural farmers. In Ghana, rice is the <a href="http://riceforafrica.net/downloads/CARD%20DOCS/Ghana_Mapping_report_Final_version.pdf">second most important cereal</a> and is fast becoming a cash crop for many farmers. Rice demand in Ghana is <a href="https://journalajaees.com/index.php/AJAEES/article/view/28074">projected</a> to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 11.8%. </p>
<p>At the moment, most rice farmers are planting old rice variety seeds using broadcast seeding. These <a href="https://www.scidev.net/sub-saharan-africa/news/new-tech-increase-production/">give</a> poor yields compared to those using modern technologies. Such technologies include new rice varieties, a high-capacity thresher for rice, a mobile application called RiceAdvice that provides tips on rice farming, mechanical weeders that could reduce labour in rice production, and localised farmer advice for nutrient management. </p>
<p>These farmers are optimistic that if they can access these technologies, they will obtain better yields and improve livelihoods but said during a focus group discussion:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are poor farmers and cannot afford these technologies unless we get some financial support from government or we get loans from banks to invest in these technologies. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another farmer said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you are lucky and you get money from the bank on time, and you invest it in modern technologies, you are sure of a good yield. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Our study revealed that the greatest obstacle to access loans from banks and village savings companies by farmers is the inability of smallholder farmers to pay back loans when the harvest fails or they suffer post-harvest crop losses. A situation that is likely to be reduced to near zero when farmers adopt modern rice technologies that have been proven to be climate-smart as well. </p>
<p>These financial institutions, usually village savings and loan group, microfinance companies or rural banks don’t trust that farmers will be able to repay loans. So they use certain tactics to avoid granting loans. For example they are unwilling to share information about innovative financial products. Or they insist on farmers having huge amount of saving capital before borrowing. Some financial institutions demand outrageous collateral and multiple guarantors for credit. Others impose high interest rates <a href="https://www.businessworldghana.com/agriculture-average-interest-rate-hits-31-0-percent-september-bog-report/">beyond</a> the 31% average interest rate set by the Bank of Ghana in 2017. </p>
<p>Some institutions erect unnecessary bureaucratic delays to process loans for smallholder farmers. </p>
<p>Microfinance companies and rural banks are more willing to approve credit facilities and loans to non-agricultural sectors than to smallholder farmers. Nevertheless, our study shows that farmers who invest in modern technologies such as improved seeds and fertiliser see an increase in yields and household income, and are able to pay back their loan on time. </p>
<p>Overall, 88% of the rice farmers interviewed said their inability to adopt modern technologies to improve productivity and achieve household economic well-being was connected to their lack of access to loans to invest in these technologies. </p>
<h2>What we recommend</h2>
<p>To improve smallholder farmers’ access to loans, government must provide support for the sector. It can introduce agriculture insurance policy systems to reduce the risk of non-payment of loans if harvests fail. This is essential to addressing mistrust by financial institutions of smallholder farmers. </p>
<p>Smallholder farmers should also develop a saving culture and join farmer group associations for collective bargaining for loans from financial institutions. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-affecting-agrarian-migrant-livelihoods-in-ghana-this-is-how-156212">Climate change is affecting agrarian migrant livelihoods in Ghana. This is how</a>
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<p>Innovative solutions such as a warehouse receipt financing system that allows farmers to deposit their harvest in a certified warehouse and then be issued with a document called warehouse receipt that they can use to access loans from financial institutions, would address two barriers: lack of savings and lack of collateral and guarantors.</p>
<p>The banks and other financial institutions must employ innovative ways to reduce the bureaucracy in processing loan facilities. They should make more effort to educate farmers about their processes and requirements to acquire loans before the onset of the rainy season. This is critical to enable smallholders to prepare adequately before applying for credit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Tetteh Quarshie receives funding from the Canada First Research Excellence Fund, and the Department of Geography, Environment and Geomatics, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada. He is also affiliated with the Guelph Institute of Development Studies, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evan Fraser receives funding from both Canadian and Provincial governments and the Arrell Family Foundation. He is affiliated with the Canadian Food Policy Advisory Council, the Maple Leaf Centre for Action on Food Security and the European Commissions High Level Expert Group on Food Systems Science. </span></em></p>Smallholder rice farmers in Ghana should be supported by the government to access finance needed to adopt modern technologies for greater productivity.Philip Tetteh Quarshie, PhD Candidate/Graduate Teaching/Research Assistant, University of GuelphEvan Fraser, Director of the Arrell Food Institute and Professor in the Dept. of Geography, Environment and Geomatics, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1592402021-04-29T14:58:46Z2021-04-29T14:58:46ZSomalia is facing another food crisis: here’s why – and what can be done to stop the cycle<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/395840/original/file-20210419-23-1n4c8mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier looking over a maize field where Somali farmers are tending a crop in Dollow, northern Somalia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">TONY KARUMBA/AFP/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, which led to a prolonged period of civil unrest, Somalia has been in a <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/665345/pdf">near-constant state</a> of food insecurity. It also suffered two famines – in 1992 and 2011. </p>
<p>Every year, between April and May (when crop is planted), aid agencies make <a href="https://www.savethechildren.net/news/disaster-somali-families-income-livestock-sales-expected-halve-coming-months">dire predictions</a> about the impending doom of the upcoming growing season and to appeal for funds to support increased food aid. </p>
<p>This year, Save the Children <a href="https://www.savethechildren.net/news/disaster-somali-families-income-livestock-sales-expected-halve-coming-months">announced</a> that millions of Somalis won’t have enough food to eat as crop and vegetable production is expected to drop by 75%-80%. And the UN’s 2021 <a href="https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/document/somalia-humanitarian-response-plan-humanitarian-programme-cycle-2021-issued-february-2021">Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan</a> seeks US$1.09 billion to provide “life-saving assistance” across Somalia. </p>
<p>As agricultural experts working in Somalia for the last 35 years we have done extensive research into food production. We have been involved in developing agricultural policies aimed at finding solutions to the country’s stagnant cereal production with an eye on reducing food insecurity in the country.</p>
<p>As part of our work we <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajfand/article/view/190736">investigated</a> historic trends over the last 60 years in domestic cereal production, cereal imports, and food aid in Somalia. We <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajfand/article/view/190736">found</a> that there’s been a precipitous decrease in the production of key cereals – maize and sorghum – over time, falling from a high of 91 kg per capita in 1972 to just 30 kg per capita in 2012. This is due to a combination of stagnant crop production and a rapidly increasing population. Conflict, corruption and bad governance have made matters worse. </p>
<p>Once almost <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4191966">cereal independent</a>, the production decline has created a dependence on food aid and imports – over 50% <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajfand/article/view/190736">cereal consumed is</a> imported. This is hugely problematic: a majority of Somalis live below the <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/data-development-poverty-and-policy-somalia">poverty level</a> and cannot afford to pay for food and <a href="http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/129187">relying on imports</a> leaves them vulnerable to markets.</p>
<p>Improving domestic cereal production in Somalia should be part of any future food security strategy for the country. The implementation of simple agricultural best management practices – such as fertiliser application and timely planting and weeding – can increase cereal production in the country. </p>
<p>In practical terms this means many farmers could increase production, if there was increased incentive to do so. Currently, food aid and imports can stifle domestic production because farmers have little incentive to put in the extra effort to produce more than that which they consume. </p>
<h2>Cereal crops</h2>
<p>Sorghum and maize are the predominant cereal crops grown in Somalia and historically, these two crops have provided a <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home">sizeable</a> portion of total caloric intake of the Somali diet. <a href="https://www.fsnau.org/analytical-approach/methodology/livestock">Livestock</a> is also a key local consumption commodity for household food security.</p>
<p>Sorghum production is mainly done by smallholder farmers and is carried out in dryland areas. Sorghum is more drought tolerant than maize and is grown predominantly in the <a href="https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnabc182.pdf">Bay Region</a>, south-central Somalia between the Juba and Shebelle rivers, Somalia’s largest rivers.</p>
<p>Maize is typically grown on irrigated land, often by small- and medium-sized farmers. These landholders often employ family labour to manage their land. The major maize growing areas <a href="http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/Lower-Shabelle-Baseline-Report-November-2013.pdf">are along</a> the Shebelle and Juba rivers.</p>
<p>Somali cereal <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home">production</a> levels <a href="https://www.ajfand.net/Volume19/No3/Gavin18025.pdf">have not increased</a> in the last 60 years. In fact, from 1972 to 2012 cereal production per capita <a href="https://www.ajfand.net/Volume19/No3/Gavin18025.pdf">decreased by</a> 66%.</p>
<p>There are a few factors that have contributed to this.</p>
<p>The first is poor yields. Average yield of both <a href="https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnabc182.pdf">sorghum (300 to 500 kg/ha)</a> and <a href="https://land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/somalia/rural-development-4/937-subsistence-farming-in-lowe-shabelle-riverine-zone/file">maize (900 to 1200 kg/ha)</a> is low compared with most, about 20% of the <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data">average yield in developed countries</a>.</p>
<p>Average yields are low because farmers typically don’t have access to the necessary agricultural inputs, for example, quality seeds and fertiliser. They also lack access to farm machinery, such as planters, fertiliser applicators, sprayers and harvesting equipment. In addition, there are no research and extension services in the country to help farmers make an informed decision.</p>
<p>Food shortages can also be due to the weather, such as flooding or drought. <a href="http://41.89.240.73/handle/embuni/3705">Higher frequencies and severity of drought events</a> observed in recent years could make things worse. </p>
<p>Limited rainfall can negatively impact sorghum production. In recent years drought frequency is <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0012825218303519?casa_token=nEEdk53HXxwAAAAA:JOJhrlpwb01kUpntYKbkLckPKDjZD_8Y5OhEbLJym5xEXgeMfIMsS2mSo_t3f1ed5jWRVp3Q">once every three</a> years. Flooding can negatively impact irrigated maize production. Though localised, the country is experiencing <a href="http://41.89.240.73/handle/embuni/3705">flooding</a> every two to three years. </p>
<p>Because the Shebelle and Juba rivers originate in high rainfall areas of Ethiopia, rains there can cause subsequent flooding in Somalia while drought conditions exist during the same growing season. </p>
<h2>Conflict and poor governance</h2>
<p>Another major reason for food insecurity in the country remains conflict, corruption and bad governance.</p>
<p>Civil unrest, since the early 1990s, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalia-conflict-and-famine-the-causes-are-bad-governance-not-climate-change-84166">directly related</a> to a deterioration of irrigation infrastructure. It has reduced the access that farmers may have to markets and the country lacks an agricultural regulatory framework, affecting food production and marketing.</p>
<p>The unrest has also resulted in the displacement of many farmers – there are about to 2.6 million <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/cccm_somalia">internally displaced people in Somalia</a>. This reduces the harvest of both crops. </p>
<p>In addition, illegal taxation on agricultural produce while it’s being transported to market is commonplace, both by government officials and rebel groups. This acts as a disincentive to farmers to produce crops.</p>
<h2>Food insecurity</h2>
<p>The fact that Somalia has not improved crop production has led to food insecurity. There are a few things that can be done to change this.</p>
<p>First, Somalia should improve the way in which production data are reported. Somalia has <a href="https://land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/somalia/rural-development-4/937-subsistence-farming-in-lowe-shabelle-riverine-zone/file">two growing seasons</a> each year: the <em>Gu</em> from April through May and the shorter <em>Deyr</em> from October into November. However, data is reported annually. This gives an incomplete view of how drastically different the seasons can be and causes confusion on production area data.</p>
<p>It’s also imperative that production and reliability increases. This can be done by adopting relatively simple agricultural management techniques that have been well-researched and recognised as important yield factors in sub-Saharan Africa. </p>
<p>For example, the country could:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Introduce proper land and irrigation management techniques.</p></li>
<li><p>Improved transportation infrastructure and market development.</p></li>
<li><p>Work on canal restoration and land levelling for improved irrigation efficiency.</p></li>
<li><p>Introduce organic and mineral fertilisers, train farmers on their importance and develop policies on fertiliser importation.</p></li>
<li><p>Instigate land ownership laws, giving farmers an incentive to improving agricultural infrastructure.</p></li>
<li><p>Encourage timely weeding and optimum planting population for increased yields.</p></li>
<li><p>Better monitor food aid distribution and encourage more aid to be domestically produced. This would enhance agricultural capabilities within Somalia.</p></li>
<li><p>Enhance security in agricultural areas. This would free up donor funds that currently go to providing security of humanitarian efforts.</p></li>
<li><p>Encourage cropping and intercropping with legumes such as cowpea and mungbean. While this will not enhance yield of the cereal crop, it spreads risk and adds to diversity in the diet.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In terms of political instability, unfortunately <a href="https://theconversation.com/somalias-toxic-political-and-security-order-the-death-knell-of-democracy-159549">current tensions</a> prevent policymakers from focusing on issues of food security. This is a big hurdle that needs to be overcome. </p>
<p>But there are steps policymakers can still take to move Somalia from emergency or humanitarian aid towards development aid. This would provide much-needed jobs, particularly for the youth (<a href="https://www.unido.org/news/skills-training-gives-somalian-youth-chance">almost 70%</a> of the population) – and strengthen the agricultural sector to help enable Somalia to be more food secure. </p>
<p>In 1991, Hossein Farzin published an article titled <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4191966">“Food Aid: Positive or Negative Economic Effects in Somalis?”</a>. It would seem now – 30 years later – we should have a better answer to that question.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159240/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Drs. Hussein Haji and Paul Porter helped create the Somali Agricultural Technology Group (SATG) in 2001. SATG is a Somalia-based NGO (<a href="http://www.satg.org">www.satg.org</a>) that has received grants from a number of aid agencies (including USAID, FAO, DFID, ICRC and the EU) to implement agricultural development projects throughout Somalia. SATG is apolitical, but does work with Federal and State agencies on agricultural-related policy development and training. In 2016, they started Filsan, a private commercial seed company with headquarters in Mogadishu. Dr. Haji is the executive director of SATG and president of Filsan. Dr. Porter is a SATG board member and professor emeritus in agronomy at the University of Minnesota. Ryan Gavin is a graduate student at the University of Minnesota.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hussein Haji, Ph.D., has served for over ten years with the Ministry of Agriculture in Somalia. He worked as a Senior Researcher and a lecturer of Genetics and Plant Breeding at the Somali National University. He has also served as the coordinator of the national sorghum improvement program and a director of the Central Agriculture Research Station (CARS) based in Afgoi. He traveled to Canada in 1990 where he obtained his M.Sc. and Ph.D. in Genetics and Plant Breeding at the University of Guelph. Soon after his graduation, he joined Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, where he served for 10 years as a lead scientist in the tobacco breeding and biotechnology department. During his service, he developed both open-pollinated as well as hybrid varieties using state-of-the-art technologies. While working with Agriculture Canada, Dr. Haji joined other agriculture professionals in founding the Somali Agricultural Technical Group (SATG) with the mission to bring peace and prosperity through sustainable agriculture development (<a href="http://www.satg.org">www.satg.org</a>).
Dr. Haji is also the founder of Filsan Inc (<a href="http://www.filsansomalia.org">www.filsansomalia.org</a>). which is a private company engaged in introducing new innovative agriculture technologies with the vision to translate science into action.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryan Gavin has consulted with SATG in the past, but at the time of this writing, has no active commitments or engagements with the organization.</span></em></p>For decades Somalia has been in a near-constant state of food insecurity. This is due to a combination of stagnant crop production, a rapidly increasing population and political unrest.Paul Porter, Professor Emeritus, Cropping Systems Agronomist, University of MinnesotaHussein Haji, Executive Director of the Somali Agriculture Technical Group and Lecturer, City University of MogadishuLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1567782021-03-17T19:04:41Z2021-03-17T19:04:41ZWhat the drive for open science data can learn from the evolving history of open government data<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388530/original/file-20210309-19-91fsap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C53%2C6000%2C3934&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.pexels.com/photo/open-signage-hanging-on-glass-door-of-vicinity-331990/">Kaique/Pexels</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nineteen years ago, a group of international researchers met in Budapest to discuss a persistent problem. While experts published an enormous amount of scientific and scholarly material, few of these works were accessible. New research remained locked behind paywalls run by academic journals. The result was researchers struggled to learn from one another. They could not build on one another’s findings to achieve new insights. In response to these problems, the group developed the <a href="https://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/">Budapest Open Access Initiative</a>, a declaration calling for free and unrestricted access to scholarly journal literature in all academic fields.</p>
<p>In the years since, open access has become a priority for a growing number of <a href="https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/why-uc-split-publishing-giant-elsevier">universities</a>, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-innovation/strategy/goals-research-and-innovation-policy/open-science_en">governments</a>, and <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2021/01/science-journals-offer-select-authors-open-access-publishing-free">journals</a>. But while access to scientific <em>literature</em> has increased, access to the scientific <em>data</em> underlying this research remains extremely limited. Researchers can increasingly see what their colleagues are doing but, in an era defined by the <a href="https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/27/17761466/psychology-replication-crisis-nature-social-science">replication crisis</a>, they cannot access the data to reproduce the findings or analyze it to produce new findings. In some cases there are good reasons to keep access to the data limited – such as confidentiality or sensitivity concerns – yet in many other cases data hoarding still reigns.</p>
<p>To make scientific research data open to citizens and scientists alike, open science data advocates can learn from open data efforts in other domains. By looking at the evolving history of the open government data movement, scientists can see both limitations to current approaches and identify ways to move forward from them.</p>
<h2>The three waves of open government data</h2>
<p>The term open data did not <a href="http://www.paristechreview.com/2013/03/29/brief-history-open-data/">appear</a> until 1995, but the movement to open government data has a longer history. With roots in mid-century freedom of information legislation, open data emerged first as an attempt to push the boundaries of transparency and accessibility. This approach, part of the “first wave of open data” centered on removing secrecy in response to specific inquiries. While it had value it was also limited. It primarily benefited journalists, lawyers, and activists – those with the time, resources, and expertise needed to regularly query the government with specific requests.</p>
<p>As the Internet moved into the <a href="https://www.oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html">Web 2.0 era</a> of the 2000s, new approaches began to emerge. Open government data came to be seen not just as a way to ensure accountability but a way to improve the processes of government itself. This second wave of open data prioritized problem solving.</p>
<p>It was, as former deputy chief technology officer for open government Beth Noveck once <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/beth_noveck_demand_a_more_open_source_government/transcript">noted</a>, “not about transparent government. Simply throwing data over the transom doesn’t change how government works. It doesn’t get anybody to do anything with that data to change lives, to solve problems, and it doesn’t change government. […] It’s not even producing accountability as well as it might if we took the next step of combining participation and collaboration with transparency to transform how we work.”</p>
<p>This conception allowed open government data to benefit a broader cohort, one that included civic technologists, governments, corporations, and start-ups. New York activists, for instance, <a href="https://iquantny.tumblr.com/post/144197004989/the-nypd-was-systematically-ticketing-legally">used</a> open government datasets to reveal improper ticketing practices by the New York Police Department. In Brazil, open datasets <a href="http://odimpact.org/case-brazils-open-budget-transparency-portal.html">supported</a> critical anti-corruption work. In Ghana, open data <a href="http://odimpact.org/case-ghanas-esoko.html">helped</a> smallholder farmers sell their crops at better prices.</p>
<p>Yet, this approach too had its limitations. Data could be released without a clear sense of how others would use it, leading to a large number of datasets about issues unimportant to the public. Meanwhile, the desire to release datasets often led to a focus on assets that already existed, which benefited large institutions (often national governments) over smaller ones with less resources (such as local governments).</p>
<p>Recognizing these limitations, <a href="https://opendatapolicylab.org/images/odpl/third-wave-of-opendata.pdf">a third wave of open data</a> has begun to emerge. This wave involves data holders across sectors and regions adopting a purpose-driven approach to making data accessible to the benefit of community-based organizations, NGOs, academics, and small businesses. It seeks not just to open data for the sake of opening but to use collaborations to re-use assets that will be impactful. By paying as much attention to the demand for data as the supply, it concerns itself with the broader context within which data is produced and consumed. What’s more, it asks how data held by businesses and other stakeholders can supplement those assets held by governments through data collaboratives..</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388522/original/file-20210309-23-1e1fjc5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388522/original/file-20210309-23-1e1fjc5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388522/original/file-20210309-23-1e1fjc5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388522/original/file-20210309-23-1e1fjc5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=601&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388522/original/file-20210309-23-1e1fjc5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=755&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388522/original/file-20210309-23-1e1fjc5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=755&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388522/original/file-20210309-23-1e1fjc5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=755&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Third Wave of open data will include a wider spectrum of openness and data types, including private-sector data. Among the main distinguishing features of this wave will be a greater effort to match supply and demand, and to target which datasets are released so to achieve maximum social impact.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://opendatapolicylab.org/images/odpl/third-wave-of-opendata.pdf">The GovLab</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This approach to data is still emerging but can be seen in many of the responses to Covid-19, which have relied heavily on collaborative methods. Efforts such as the NYC Recovery Data Partnership have combined public and private data assets on a local level to address public needs.</p>
<p>Much as the open government data movement has come to accept demand-driven, collaborative methods, so too can the movement to open science data. By recognizing the value of responding to more than just the “usual suspects,” advocates can open the possibility of new and innovative research on pressing issues in their fields. They can allow professionals in other fields and domains the chance to build on their research.</p>
<h2>Where to start</h2>
<p>Advocates of open research data can learn from the open government data movement. As the last three decades show, opening data requires credible action on behalf of researchers, data providers, and intermediaries to foster a data ecosystem that sustains and nurtures collaboration. It requires organizations to make real commitments to openness.</p>
<p>While these efforts will not be easy, our research at The GovLab points to several actions that organizations can take to foster an ecosystem that encourages openness. As we argue in our recent report, <a href="https://opendatapolicylab.org/images/odpl/third-wave-of-opendata.pdf"><em>The Third Wave of Open Data</em></a>, open data can flourish if organizations focus collectively on:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Fostering and Distributing Institutional Data Capacity</strong>: In the public sector, data science capacity has often been relegated to small teams within organizations. This tendency has meant that attempts to use data are often ad hoc and isolated, with work siloed according to the field or skills. Much like those government organizations that have embraced the third wave, open research data advocates can try to build a culture of learning in their institutions, encouraging professional development and training programs that help low-ranking and senior researchers alike (re)use data in their daily operations.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Articulating Value and Building an Impact Evidence Base</strong>: In earlier waves of the open government data movement, advocates often started and ended their calls for open data by emphasizing the norms of transparency or accountability. While not wrong, these arguments tended to be less compelling to officials and members of the public who wanted to understand the tangible ways open data would improve their lives. Learning from this experience, open science data advocates can compile clear and specific uses for open science data to demonstrate the ways it strengthens existing research methods.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Creating New Data Intermediaries</strong>: Collaborating with outside organizations can be costly in terms of time, resources, and labor. Organizations like <a href="https://opennorth.ca/">Open North</a>, <a href="https://brighthive.io/">BrightHive</a>, and StatsNZ’s <a href="https://dataventures.nz/">Data Ventures</a> have emerged to address these costs. These organizations help public-facing organizations engage with possible collaborators by ensuring data is interoperable, providing mechanisms to securely share assets, and building trust between parties. Similar organizations could prove useful for sharing open science data.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Establishing Governance Frameworks and Seeking Regulatory Clarity</strong>: A recent MIT survey <a href="https://mittrinsights.s3.amazonaws.com/AIagenda2020/GlobalAIagenda.pdf">found</a> that 64% of business executives in the United States are reluctant to embrace open data because of regulatory uncertainty. This statistic is telling Though a lack of regulation is often seen as offering organizations flexibility, the decades-long failure to develop policies around data reuse has instead disincentivized sharing. Just as organizations like the European Union have recently tried to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-strategy-data">develop</a> strategies to organize the reuse of public and private data stores, open science data advocates might develop similar policies, plans, and procedures laying out expectations concerning the data they use.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Creating Technical Infrastructure for Reuse</strong>: In many countries, open government datasets are facilitated by open data portals. Sites like <a href="https://www.data.gov/">data.gov</a> commingle various institutional datasets and allow users to browse, filter, search, and download data to their machines. While this approach can be used for open science data, additional technical infrastructure is likely for data users and suppliers to improve institutional capacity. As John Wilbanks of Sage Bionetworks <a href="https://medium.com/open-data-policy-lab/summer-of-open-data-panel-9-incentives-for-data-reuse-frameworks-for-collaboration-and-f020b0f87d71">has argued</a>, institutions might explore ways to subsidize computing capacity among target users and demographics, especially in fields where the datasets in question are prohibitively large and complex.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Fostering Public Data Competence</strong>: Open government data advocates in places like Taiwan have <a href="https://medium.com/open-data-policy-lab/summer-of-open-data-keynote-conversation-with-taiwans-audrey-tang-b6c1921e10bf">sought to encourage</a> data competence among the public. These leaders argue that anyone should be able to participate fully in data projects, not just as consumers but producers of data-driven solutions that can improve their lives. To encourage public involvement in scientific research and foster new and innovative applications of data, open science data advocates might seek out ways to engage with the public, such as through research challenges and <a href="https://the100questions.org/">participatory agenda-setting</a>.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Tracking, Monitoring, and Clarifying Decision and Data Provenance</strong>: Decision provenance <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.05741">entails</a> identifying decision points impacting data’s collection, processing, sharing, analysis, and (re)use to determine which parties influence it. As third wave advocates have come to understand, awareness of these decision points is crucial in proactively identifying gaps and biases, both of which can undermine project goals. As such, open science data practitioners might create processes that allow others to understand the context from which data emerged and the harms that might result from inadvertent use.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Creating and Empowering Data Stewards</strong>:Finally, a core aspect of open government data work amid the third wave has been acknowledgement that data sharing and collaboration needs leaders who can champion it. These data stewards – responsible data leaders empowered by organizations to identify opportunities for data sharing and seek new ways of creating public value – already <a href="https://opendatapolicylab.org/third-wave-of-open-data/">exist</a> in a number of public sector institutions, civil society organizations, and companies. To encourage the creation of similar leaders in research spaces, open science data advocates might create <a href="https://course.opendatapolicylab.org/">training courses</a> and <a href="http://datastewards.net/">professional networks</a> that encourage data stewardship skills.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Almost two decades since the Budapest Open Access Initiative, our understanding of science data has changed profoundly. As we enter a new decade, these changes can continue so long as they are shepharded by advocates committed to expanding access.</p>
<p>We at The GovLab encourage researchers, institutions, and others to look toward the example provided by the open data movement in government to transform the way they work. By learning from others and adopting their practices, open research data can be a possibility for any field.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/328409/original/file-20200416-192725-wmbl1n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/328409/original/file-20200416-192725-wmbl1n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/328409/original/file-20200416-192725-wmbl1n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/328409/original/file-20200416-192725-wmbl1n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/328409/original/file-20200416-192725-wmbl1n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/328409/original/file-20200416-192725-wmbl1n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/328409/original/file-20200416-192725-wmbl1n.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=609&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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</figcaption>
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<p><em>This article is part of the series “Great Stories of Open Science” published with the support of the French Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation. To learn more, visit <a href="https://www.ouvrirlascience.fr/">Ouvrirlascience.fr</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156778/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefaan G. Verhulst has conducted research on open data that has been funded by Luminate, Omidyar Network, Rockefeller Foundation, MacArthur Foundation and Microsoft.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew J. Zahuranec works for The GovLab. It receives funding from Luminate, The Omidyar Group, the Rockefeller Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and Microsoft for its open data work </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Young works for The GovLab. It receives funding from Luminate, The Omidyar Group, the Rockefeller Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and Microsoft for its open data work</span></em></p>By looking at the evolving history of the open government data movement, scientists can see both limitations to current approaches and identify ways to move forward from them.Stefaan G. Verhulst, Co-Founder and Chief Research and Development Officer of the Governance Laboratory (GovLab), New York UniversityAndrew J. Zahuranec, Research Fellow, The GovLabAndrew Young, Knowledge director, the Governance Lab, New York UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1534622021-02-23T14:56:04Z2021-02-23T14:56:04ZWhy efforts to clean up charcoal production in sub-Saharan Africa aren’t working<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385503/original/file-20210222-13-17a4syk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Charcoal is an essential fuel for most parts of sub-Saharan Africa</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Charcoal_before_pick-up.jpg">AnandievanZyl/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Charcoal is an essential source of domestic fuel in many sub-Saharan African countries. Overall, the region produces 65% of the world’s charcoal, with Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana being the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19376812.2020.1846133">top three producers</a>. The charcoal sector employs about 40 million people in the region. Smallholders are responsible for most charcoal production, and it’s an important safety net for most producers.</p>
<p>The average person in sub-Saharan Africa consumes 0.69 cubic metres of charcoal per year. That’s 2.5 times more than the amount of wood fuel an average person consumes globally. </p>
<p>Producing charcoal involves burning wood under anaerobic conditions – when too much oxygen is supplied, the wood turns to ash. Typically, the production technique – earth kilns, used by smallholders – cannot properly regulate the oxygen supply, leading to inefficiencies. Simply put, they use more wood to produce little charcoal and emit more emissions compared to emerging carbonisation techniques. </p>
<p>As a result charcoal production is one of the main drivers of savannah and forest degradation in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, demand for charcoal is rising. This has led to governments attempting to formalise the sector. One such step has involved enabling investments from large-scale companies. For example, in Ghana, the government leases out forest reserves to private companies to produce wood on plantations for conversion to charcoal. Another step involves introducing punitive policies. For example, in Malawi, the state forbids smallholders from producing charcoal without permits, with noncompliance leading to fines and up to ten years imprisonment. </p>
<p>I conducted <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19376812.2020.1846133">a review</a> of charcoal production and recent developments in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>It’s not clear that formalisation tackles challenges at the grassroots. For the charcoal sector to transition towards sustainability, I argue for the adoption of integrated approaches that pay attention to the social needs of actors while tackling environmental concerns. This should preferably be done under the banner of ‘carbon-neutral charcoal’.</p>
<h2>Efforts to formalise the sector</h2>
<p>In recent years, many countries, including Ghana and Malawi, have tried to formalise the charcoal sector.</p>
<p>Their reasons for doing so have varied, and have included the desire to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>increase revenue from charcoal to state governments through taxes, and </p></li>
<li><p>reduce the perceived environmental impacts of charcoal production. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The consequences of these endeavours are contested.</p>
<p>For example, in Ghana, in a bid to promote sustainable charcoal production, the government enabled foreign investors to acquire large tracts of fertile land for wood production.</p>
<p>The effect was that many smallholders have been displaced from their lands and means of production. </p>
<p>The idea behind introducing taxes is also unclear. For example, in Ghana the government <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/831002/the-woes-of-the-forest-of-northern-ghana-a-nation.html">imposed taxes</a> on smallholder charcoal producers with no clear plan on how these taxes would lead to sanitising the charcoal sector or support the countryside’s development. </p>
<p>Malawi has imposed outright bans on charcoal production without permits. This has removed a crucial safety net for smallholders, forcing them into poverty. </p>
<p>In addition to the fact that many interventions have failed to work, it’s also become clear that smallholders employ several strategies to subvert sanctions instituted by the state government. These include using illegal means to transport charcoal and paying bribes to law enforcement agencies. <a href="http://www.kenyaforestservice.org/documents/redd/Charcoal%20Value%20Chain%20Analysis.pdf">Kenya</a> is one country where this happens.</p>
<p>There is also ample evidence that prohibitions such as banning the production and transport of charcoal don’t work in many countries in the region because of weak institutions. </p>
<p>Given that the current path towards formalisation is failing, what alternatives can governments adopt?</p>
<h2>Cleaning the charcoal sector</h2>
<p>Making the charcoal sector less carbon intensive is desirable. But the current pathways chosen by various governments aren’t sustainable because they deprive many poor farmers of the means of their survival. </p>
<p>I identify a number of steps that could be taken.</p>
<p>First, national governments need to recognise and improve traditional leaders’ current role in allocating trees for charcoal production in the countryside. This approach has been in place for decades in countries, including Ghana.</p>
<p>It has its flaws. For example, there is no proper accountability for how traditional leaders apply revenues raised from allocating wood resources. But it has nevertheless helped sustain the population of valuable tree species in the savannah, including the shea tree (<em>Vitellaria paradoxa</em>) and the African locust bean tree (<em>Parkia biglobosa</em>) in Ghana. </p>
<p>Second, governments need to invest in the countryside, creating awareness and facilitating green charcoal businesses and associations. This way smallholders could produce charcoal from sustainable woodlots that are harvested in rotation. </p>
<p>Efforts also need to be made to address some of the structural challenges along the charcoal commodity chain, including the skewed distribution of profits to traders and merchants. The creation of cooperatives could help by strengthening the bargaining position of smallholder charcoal producers. </p>
<p>Finally, improving charcoal production at the grassroots level will allow governments in the region to tap into the growing global demand for sustainable charcoal in international markets, while contributing to climate change mitigation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153462/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Kumeh Mensah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to formalise charcoal production have been largely unsuccessful.Eric Kumeh Mensah, Doctoral Researcher, University of HohenheimLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1486652020-10-26T15:17:54Z2020-10-26T15:17:54ZProblematic assumptions raise questions about South Africa’s new land reform plan<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/365238/original/file-20201023-16-1fzjk95.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Small-scale farming creates more jobs in South Africa.This one is in Soweto, Johannesburg.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sharon Seretlo/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The South African government recently announced a plan to allocate 700,000 hectares of state land to black farmers. Exactly how many farms and beneficiaries this will involve is unclear. </p>
<p>But there’s a huge amount wrong with the idea.</p>
<p>First, it reproduces the core weaknesses of post-apartheid land and agricultural policies, which do little to reduce unemployment or enhance rural livelihoods.</p>
<p>Public response has been mostly <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-10-01-hefty-push-to-redistribute-land-to-black-farmers/">positive in character</a>. But land researchers on the left of the political spectrum are asking searching questions about the origins of this land. Also about the status of its current occupiers, and whether the procedures announced provide sufficient safeguards against the process being <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/700-000-ha-of-state-land-redistributed/">captured by elites</a>.</p>
<p>From the right, the Institute of Race Relations think-tank asked why property rights on the allocated farms will continue to take the form of leases, rather than private title. It also asked how beneficiaries will <a href="https://irr.org.za/media/government2019s-new-land-plan-needs-to-do-better-iol">secure bank loans without collateral</a>.</p>
<p>The policy announcement does have some positive aspects. If achieved, the redistribution of 700,000ha in one year would indeed represent an acceleration of <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/land-reform">land reform</a>. The minister also acknowledged that the administration of state land had been deficient to date, and admitted that corruption was a problem. This is refreshingly frank talk from a department that has mostly been in denial about these problems.</p>
<p>But below the radar of public debate are other aspects of this initiative which are highly problematic. These include crippling assumptions in relation to farming systems and scale. </p>
<p>I argue that these reproduce the core weaknesses of post-apartheid state land and agricultural policy, which have done little to reduce unemployment or enhance the livelihoods of the rural poor.</p>
<h2>Key features</h2>
<p>The state will allocate farmland to successful applicants who must <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2020-10-01-hefty-push-to-redistribute-land-to-black-farmers/">show evidence of farming experience</a> or a willingness to learn. Allocations will be biased in favour of women, young people and the disabled. A compulsory training programme will focus on “entry level” knowledge, record keeping and financial management.</p>
<p>Rent will be paid to the state at rates aligned with local land values, and an option to purchase will be offered after 30 years. Beneficiaries must maintain state-owned infrastructure on farms, and regular inspections will take place. Investments in infrastructure must be recorded, valued and reported.</p>
<p>Given that some (unspecified) proportion of these farms is already occupied and used, a land enquiry process will investigate how such occupation came about. It will also look at whether the land is being used “in accordance with the agricultural practices of the area”, and whether occupiers can become beneficiaries.</p>
<h2>Worrying silences</h2>
<p>There’s a lot of detail that’s worryingly missing. For example, official statements neglect to specify how and when this land came to be acquired by the state, and how it has been managed to date. </p>
<p>Secondly, it is positive that weaknesses in land administration are acknowledged, but no details have been offered. It is also not at all clear that the root causes of the failures of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/impllandacquisition0.pdf">Pro-Active Land Acquisition policy</a> to date are being addressed. These include the absence of area-based planning, inadequate and poorly targeted financial support and a lack of effective extension advice. And the allocation procedures seem similar to those adopted during the presidency of Jacob Zuma, when corruption was rife and <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/farai-mtero-elite-capture-in-land-redistribution-winners-and-losers/">elites were favoured</a>.</p>
<p>Nor are the criteria to be used in assessing the performance and productivity of beneficiaries specified, mirroring the lack of clarity on exactly how the suitability of applicants will be assessed.</p>
<p>The lack of clarity speaks to a much deeper problem – the adherence to a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03066150903498739">particular paradigm of agriculture</a> that I don’t believe is suited to what’s needed in South Africa in the 21st century. </p>
<h2>The wrong model</h2>
<p>The model of “farming” that underlies government’s policies for land and agricultural reform is one of modern, high-tech, large-scale commercial production of agricultural commodities by skilled business managers, in which economies of scale are paramount.</p>
<p>This largely unexamined choice has consequences. From within the paradigm, it is “common sense” that land reform beneficiaries should be “business-oriented”, with the potential to succeed in a highly competitive South African agricultural sector. Lip service is paid to the need to provide land to smallholder and “semi-commercial” farmers. But, in practice, the hegemonic model sidelines farmers operating small-scale farming systems, often successfully, despite inadequate support in a hostile economic environment.</p>
<p>Small-scale farming systems in South Africa tend to be labour rather than capital intensive, and have potential to create jobs <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-land-redistribution-can-create-new-jobs-in-agriculture-in-south-africa-139333">on a significant scale</a>. </p>
<p>They tend to focus on high-value horticultural crops, such as fresh vegetables, rather than mechanised dryland cropping systems in which economies of scale are pervasive. They also focus on extensive livestock production, including small stock such as sheep and goats. </p>
<p>Land reform’s current focus on promoting black, “emerging” commercial farmers means that relatively few people – likely to be either middle class already or aspiring entrepreneurs – gain access to a <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/farai-mtero-elite-capture-in-land-redistribution-winners-and-losers/">small number of medium-scale farms</a>. Problems with this include high rates of failure, partly due to over-gearing of the new farm enterprises and crippling debt. This is partly due to lack of appropriate planning and support.</p>
<p>These issues need to be understood in the context of a changing agrarian structure. A 2017 <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-11-02-01/Report-11-02-012017.pdf">census</a> of commercial farming revealed that 67% of income in South African agriculture is earned by only 2,610 farms, 6.5% of the total. They have annual turnover of over R22.5 million (about US$1.3 million) and employ 51% of all workers. Farms earning around R1 million annually or below number 25,000, or 62% of the total, but earn only 2% of total income.</p>
<p>It would seem that black land reform beneficiaries on under-capitalised medium-scale farms are being set up to join the ranks of these marginal commercial producers. Why?</p>
<p>Aspirant black commercial farmers should benefit from land redistribution. But a narrow focus on only this category of beneficiary is likely to end in tears. And the potential of redistribution to create a large number of new jobs is being missed. In the context of massive and <a href="https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/1.-Spaull-et-al.-NIDS-CRAM-Wave-2-Synthesis-Findings..pdf">growing unemployment</a>, a middle class land reform agenda is an affront to the transformative promise of post-apartheid democracy.</p>
<p>Detailed recommendations on an alternative approach are available. A recent study for the Treasury Department provided detailed empirical evidence of the potential for employment growth through land redistribution aimed primarily at smallholders and <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-land-redistribution-can-create-new-jobs-in-agriculture-in-south-africa-139333">small-scale commercial black farmers</a>. It has received little attention from policymakers, including those managing the development of government’s draft <a href="http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Agri-parks/Cammisa/BOJANALA-Agri-Park-MBP-April2016.pdf">Agricultural Master Plan</a>.</p>
<h2>Urgent need to rethink land redistribution</h2>
<p>The social and economic crisis that has followed the COVID-19 pandemic is already shaking the foundations of South Africa’s democracy. Questions of unequal land ownership, always profoundly political, are unlikely to fade away. </p>
<p>Unless addressed, they will contribute to further dissatisfaction with the status quo, creating fertile ground for authoritarian forms of populism.</p>
<p>It is urgent that land policies provide real opportunities to create jobs, increase the incomes of the poor and enhance livelihoods. A focus on small-scale farmers is the most practical way to do so. But once again, the Agriculture Minister and her department appear to have their heads in the sand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Cousins has received funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa, and from the European Union</span></em></p>The new initiative reproduces the core weaknesses of post-apartheid state land and agricultural policy. These have done little to improve the livelihoods of the poor.Ben Cousins, Emeritus Professor, Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1432882020-07-31T13:16:55Z2020-07-31T13:16:55ZSouth Africa needs better food price controls to shield poor people from COVID-19 fallout<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349386/original/file-20200724-15-1rm3w5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman walks past a market stall in Kliptown, Soweto.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>COVID-19 has wrought havoc on poor households in countries across the world. In South Africa, more and more people are facing hunger resulting from <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/cover-story/2020-07-15-the-jobs-reckoning-is-here/">mass job losses</a> and small, poorly implemented supplementary cash grants. </p>
<p>On top of this the pandemic has put in stark relief the country’s poorly understood food system, in which powerful firms operate with little oversight while vulnerable actors in the informal food sector face over-regulation. </p>
<p>When the country went into lockdown on 26 March 2020, <a href="http://www.dti.gov.za/news2020/FAQs-EssentialServices.pdf">government placed</a> the formal food sector at the centre of continued food supply. Informal food vendors were restricted. Yet these vendors provide an important source of food and livelihoods for the majority of South Africa’s population. </p>
<p>The South African constitution recognises the right to food. But the government’s failure to enact specific legislation on food rights has resulted in incoherent food security policies. Even the smallest increases in prices of products in the basic food basket can have a significant impact on poor households and in local markets. Therefore, access to affordable and nutritious food through formal and informal food markets is critical for ensuring people’s right to food. </p>
<p>In this article, we highlight indicators of a distressing rise in the prices of essential food products that is contributing to South Africa’s hunger crisis. We call for the urgent expansion of price controls to items in the basic household food basket, as well as an inquiry into the price-setting of major retailers. </p>
<h2>Have food prices increased?</h2>
<p>StatsSA recently <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0141/P0141April2020.pdf">published</a> the headline urban consumer price index (CPI) as having <em>decreased</em> by 0.5% month-on-month in April 2020. But the statistics body <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0141/P0141April2020.pdf">explicitly cautioned</a> that its new price collection strategy had been severely limited by the lockdown regulations. The headline number potentially reflects very different pricing behaviour of major retailers that have an online presence. Moreover, smaller retailers are excluded from this methodology – despite comprising half of poor household food spending based on data from the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0100/P01002011.pdf">Income and Expenditure Survey</a> of 2011.</p>
<p>Evidence of large price increases on essential food items is recorded by the NGO Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice and Dignity’s <a href="https://pmbejd.org.za/index.php/household-affordability-index/">price surveys</a>. They find an 8.2% increase in the price of a household food basket for the three-month period from 2 March to 3 June 2020. This includes large increases in the prices of essential food items at the local level over the period, such as an 18% increase for sugar beans and a 14% increase for brown bread. </p>
<p>Table 1: Month-on-month price increases for essential food items, March to April 2020 </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349102/original/file-20200723-21-1boiwi4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349102/original/file-20200723-21-1boiwi4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349102/original/file-20200723-21-1boiwi4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349102/original/file-20200723-21-1boiwi4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349102/original/file-20200723-21-1boiwi4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349102/original/file-20200723-21-1boiwi4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349102/original/file-20200723-21-1boiwi4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Source: StatsSA detailed weekly price data for April and PMBEJD weekly price data for April. Items have been matched by authors for comparability.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Comparisons of the StatsSA and Pietermaritzburg surveys are limited by timing and availability of item specific data. But both sources show that prices of brown bread, eggs, potatoes, salt, and soup increased in March and April. These are essential food items not necessarily monitored under current COVID-19 regulations. </p>
<h2>Why is this not a Competition Commission case?</h2>
<p>The price hikes have drawn the attention of the country’s Competition Commission. In a recent food price monitoring <a href="http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Essential-Food-Pricing-Monitoring-Report.pdf">report</a> it pointed out significant inflation in the prices of various food items. It commented that, in some cases, the increases and high margins were not justified by the changes in the operating costs of the suppliers. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202004/43205rg43205gon448.pdf">Regulations</a> introduced in March after the government declared a state of disaster to manage the COVID-19 pandemic empowered competition agencies to investigate firms believed to be charging excessive prices for certain essential healthcare and food items. But not a lot has happened. Although 38% of the 320 complaints received by the competition commission by the end of June related to food prices, only one has so far led to an administrative penalty for a firm. This was the Food Lover’s Market case relating to the price of raw <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2020-07-14-food-lovers-store-admits-to-charging-excessive-price-for-raw-ginger/">ginger</a>. </p>
<p>Cases of excessive pricing of goods and services are among the most difficult to prosecute. This is because of the complexities of determining the extent to which prices are high; relevant cost parameters that have to be considered; the reliability of benchmarks; and the availability of data. </p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>During the most severe part of the lockdown in the country, the government addressed the issue of higher food prices by concluding an agreement with major retailers to limit price increases on key items. But this lapsed immediately after the first easing of the lockdown on 4 May. Since then retailers have <a href="http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Essential-Food-Pricing-Monitoring-Report.pdf">increased prices</a> of certain food items in response to higher input prices. We believe a renewed list of price limits should be put in place.</p>
<p>Along with capping price increases for key food items, we propose that the list of items subject to the price monitoring regime be broadened. The Competition Commission’s assessment – and our own – indicate that there has been some positive effect of the food price increase restrictions for food items already included in this list, such as maize meal and frozen chicken. But the published <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/383217/new-regulations-bring-coronavirus-price-controls-for-certain-high-demand-products-heres-what-is-on-the-list/">list</a> of 22 critical products and categories, including 11 basic food items that are price-monitored, does not go far enough. The list of 11 food items leaves out brown bread and dried foods such as legumes, for example, which are staple foods for the poor and a major source of nutrition. The inclusion of frozen vegetables, on the other hand, points to poor targeting and a limited understanding of what constitutes the food basket of low-income households. Frozen vegetables are staples among middle-income households. </p>
<p>Table 2: Comparison of essential food baskets </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349109/original/file-20200723-29-105x169.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349109/original/file-20200723-29-105x169.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349109/original/file-20200723-29-105x169.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349109/original/file-20200723-29-105x169.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349109/original/file-20200723-29-105x169.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349109/original/file-20200723-29-105x169.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349109/original/file-20200723-29-105x169.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=607&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Notes: Food poverty line basket compiled by the StatsSA. VAT zero-rated basic foodstuffs are defined by National Treasury/SARS. Price monitored goods are published by the National Consumer Commission list in Reg. 350 of Government Gazette No. 11057 of 19 March. PMBEJD household food basket is compiled in consultation with women living on low incomes in Pietermaritzburg.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We recommend the urgent expansion of the list to include brown bread, fresh vegetables, eggs and sugar beans, among other products. A failure to do this may well reverse any positive impact of increasing the rand values of social grants. At its core, the right to food is about protecting people’s right to feed themselves. </p>
<p>While the expansion of social protection measures does in part contribute to access to food for poor and vulnerable households, government should play a role in monitoring and regulating the food sector to ensure a more equitable and sustainable food system for consumers and actors in informal food markets. Price limits should be complemented by an inquiry into the price-setting of major retailers. The weaknesses in the StatsSA pricing data highlighted above indicate the need for more comprehensive data to inform ongoing monitoring of food prices.</p>
<p>The effects of COVID-19 will endure for some time to come, including large-scale job losses, and so it is certainly not too late to intervene. Poorer South African households cannot continue to endure both a crisis of joblessness and food price increases.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ihsaan Bassier is affiliated with the C19-People's Coalition and the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Refiloe Joala is affiliated with the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies at the University of the Western Cape. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thando Vilakazi writes in his own capacity. He is affiliated with the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development (CCRED) at the University of Johannesburg, and the Competition Tribunal. CCRED has received external funding from the DTIC and other government departments. </span></em></p>We highlight the distressing rise in the prices of essential food products. We call for the urgent expansion of price controls, as well as an inquiry into the price-setting of major retailers.Ihsaan Bassier, Phd candidate in Economics, UMass AmherstRefiloe Joala, Researcher and PhD candidate at PLAAS, University of the Western CapeThando Vilakazi, Executive Director of the Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1348042020-04-13T07:41:15Z2020-04-13T07:41:15ZWhy Ghana’s smallholders aren’t excited by the latest ‘Green Revolution’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/325723/original/file-20200406-74220-fb7sv2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Ghanaian vegetable farmer sits on his land</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ghanaian_Vegetable_Farmer.jpg">Vrinda Khushu/Wikimedia Commons</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Green Revolution – the introduction of new higher yielding seed varieties, increased use of fertiliser, irrigation and other mechanisation introduced since the 1960s – brought about a great <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/300/5620/758">increase in crop yields</a> in some countries in the Global South. Hybridised seeds produced more grains per plant and were more responsive to fertiliser and irrigation.</p>
<p>But the effects of this “<a href="https://www.routledge.com/Africas-Green-Revolution-Critical-Perspectives-on-New-Agricultural-Technologies/Moseley-Schnurr-Bezner-Kerr/p/book/9781138185951">revolution</a>” were famously uneven, both between and within countries. The farming environment in sub-Saharan Africa wasn’t as well suited to the technologies as Asia and Latin America. </p>
<p>In the past 20 years, a newer model of the Green Revolution has emerged predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa. Domestic and international agribusinesses have a much more prominent place. The Green Revolution of the past was more heavily supported by public and quasi-public institutions. Now the private sector is encouraged to take the lead role in distributing agricultural inputs and getting outputs to market. The idea is to commercialise production and integrate farmers into global markets. </p>
<p>The contemporary version of the Green Revolution is promoted largely by the <a href="https://agra.org/">Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa</a>, the G7/G8’s <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/535010/EXPO_STU(2015)535010_EN.pdf">New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa</a>, the World Bank, USAID, the African Union among others. These donors generally take the view that African agriculture must be transformed to use land more efficiently and catch up with the productivity levels of other regions.</p>
<p>But there are many questions about whether this newer Green Revolution can increase production in a way that will reduce poverty and food insecurity. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/11287462.2014.1002294">previous research</a> analysed whether this approach is likely to succeed. We looked at the assumptions it’s based on and the possible consequences, particularly for smallholder farmers. Focusing on northern Ghana, we then completed a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504509.2020.1733702">case study</a> of how the strategy is playing out. </p>
<p>We found that the vast majority of smallholder farmers were reluctantly adopting the new varieties of seed, chemical fertilisers, agrochemicals and farm contracts promoted as part of the Green Revolution. Farmers adopted these inputs and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2018.1552076">business arrangements</a> to address the immediate challenges of erratic rainfall, shortened growing seasons, drier soils with diminished fertility and increasing land competition. But many described this decision as a short-term trade-off to maintain the yields required to survive. They did not have the hope of increasing yields.</p>
<p>They also identified serious negative consequences of these newer farming practices. </p>
<h2>Reluctant adoption</h2>
<p>In our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504509.2020.1733702">case study</a> we found that many farmers expressed deep concern about the long-term consequences of the Green Revolution prescriptions. These included damage to soils from herbicides and fertilisers, the narrowing of crop varieties planted and foods consumed, rising levels of indebtedness, and heightened risks of land dispossession, particularly for women. </p>
<p>Most smallholders used new varieties of seed when planting soy, rice, maize and groundnuts. These matured and could be harvested in a shorter time than “non-improved” varieties. This helped in a shortened growing season associated with a changing climate. </p>
<p>But some farmers insisted that the new seed does not actually increase yields. </p>
<p>The improved varieties were also “open pollinating” – the plants produce seeds for the next season. But only a limited number of crops have been improved and could grow within shorter time periods (such as 90 days for maize). This was reducing the diversity of crops planted and the variety of foods consumed. Crops that required longer growing periods, such as millet and sorghum (120-150 days), were once common but are grown by fewer farmers. This could have shifted diets to maize instead of more nutritious staples such as sorghum or millet.</p>
<p>Many smallholders said they were more frequently turning to herbicides to deal with weeds – a growing problem which they blamed on soil degradation. They said chemical fertilisers were becoming necessary just to maintain production levels, and this put them further into debt. Their increasing dependence on pesticides and chemical fertilisers was becoming a vicious dependency spiral. </p>
<p>Community members pointed out that farming was becoming polarised between those who could afford to finance the promoted package of inputs and those who couldn’t. </p>
<p>Another major concern for many smallholders was the growing presence of newcomers to their communities who have access to finance to farm, including direct payments from development projects. Their presence stoked competition for land. One smallholder described his sense of the newcomers: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Big people, MPs and the educated who are all into farming. I think it is a way of investment. That is why more of such people are rushing into it.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Land was regularly described as being in short supply, as more people moved into farming in response to new incentives and environmental changes. Some were trying to increase their acreage planted to compensate for lower yields stemming from drying conditions. </p>
<p>The majority of farmers felt they had to continuously cultivate all of their fields. Many knew this contributed to soil degradation and reliance on chemical inputs but they are trying to minimise the risk of dispossession. As one smallholder put it: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We know of the benefit of fallowing, but the moment you even leave it, somebody is hungry for land, he will even come and say, ‘you are satisfied and left some’, so he will be begging to farm on it. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Our case study shows that even though many smallholders have adhered to the newer Green Revolution model, they are worried about its long-term implications. It is also clear that wealth and gender disparities affect the ability of farmers to access and benefit from new technologies and markets. Female farmers are especially disadvantaged and at risk of dispossession. </p>
<p>In developing more sustainable agriculture, the first step should be to listen to what smallholder farmers say about their particular environments and constraints. And not funding technologies and business arrangements that exacerbate environmental changes and socioeconomic inequalities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siera Vercillo has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the International Development Research Centre and Western University in Ontario, Canada.</span></em></p>And why development funders should listen to smallholder farmersSiera Vercillo, Postdoctoral Fellow, School of Environment, Enterprise and Development, University of WaterlooLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1299092020-03-09T13:28:11Z2020-03-09T13:28:11ZNot just farmers: understanding rural aspirations is key to Kenya’s future<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/318548/original/file-20200304-66074-ryeli8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Most households didn't want their future generations to become farmers</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">DIVatUSAID/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>About <a href="http://www.kilimo.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ASTGS-Full-Version.pdf">8.3 million</a> people living in <a href="http://www.kilimo.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ASTGS-Full-Version-1.pdf">Kenya’s rural areas farm</a> to feed themselves. They typically have just a few acres of land and depend on rain to grow their crops. This makes them extremely vulnerable to changes in the weather. Many already struggle. </p>
<p>As with <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/accelerating-poverty-reduction-in-africa-in-five-charts">other countries in sub-Saharan Africa</a>, rural communities in Kenya are <a href="http://theconversation.com/whats-driving-persistent-poverty-in-rural-kenya-99765">characterised</a> by higher rates of poverty, illiteracy and child mortality. They also have poor access to basic services, such as electricity and sanitation. </p>
<p>As a result, governments and development organisations <a href="https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/caadp.shtml">consider</a> improving farmers’ agricultural performance a priority to solve poverty and hunger.</p>
<p>Yet, after decades of agriculture-centred rural development approaches, progress has been <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252271-en">limited</a>. Food insecurity is still widespread and crop yields in farmer fields remain much lower than their potential. Many agricultural technologies – such as improved crop varieties or the use of fertiliser – <a href="https://doi.org/10.5367/oa.2016.0235">fail to scale</a> beyond pilot phase.</p>
<p>One overlooked reason why these technologies aren’t being used at scale could be people’s relative interest in farming and their aspirations beyond farming. There’s evidence in this given that rural incomes are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0306-9192(01)00014-8">increasingly diversifying</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0030727018766940">We argue in our paper</a> that a better understanding of households’ aspirations is key to design successful technologies that will be adopted more widely.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2018.1446909">our research</a>, we interviewed 624 households to explore the aspirations of people living in Kenya’s rural areas. We asked them about their current income sources, investment plans and what they would like their children to do in the future.</p>
<p>We found that only a few households specialised in farming and yet, many self-identified as farmers and said they aspired to increase their agricultural income. This was surprising as the majority of their income often came from sources other than farming. We also found that few aspired for their children to become farmers. </p>
<p>Our findings show that rural Kenyan households can’t just be classified as farmers: there are many different income portfolios and aspirations. And it’s important to listen to people we call “farmers” so policies can be developed that offer innovations that meet their realities, such as training and financial services adapted to a more diversified livelihood portfolio.</p>
<p>Avoiding the trap of calling all households with farm activity “farmers”, and assuming they have no other interests, may also increase the match between demands and technology adoption.</p>
<h2>Not only farmers</h2>
<p>The rural economy is not only about agriculture. While many rural Kenyan families have their shamba (plot) and have a strong attachment to the land, not all households are farmers in the traditional understanding. </p>
<p>Our results showed that only a quarter of the families in rural Kenya are full-time farmers. The majority (60%) of farm labourers and households derived most of their income from activities outside farming.</p>
<p>Yet, they still identified as farmers. </p>
<p>When asked about their future, two-thirds aspired to increasing their farm incomes through irrigation access, small livestock or high-value crops like fruits and vegetables. Just a third looked outside the farming sector with suggestions of transport, hair salons, shops or other rural business ventures. But this doesn’t mean these other diverse activities aren’t important – and likely becoming more so all the time.</p>
<p>Income diversification isn’t surprising. Several agriculture experts <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0030727019888513">question the potential</a> of rain-fed smallholder farming, as practised by millions of rural families in sub-Saharan Africa, as a pathway out of poverty. </p>
<p>Even though much of sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12308">changes</a> in farm size distribution, the share of small farms under under five hectares is still <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.041">dominant</a> – as it is in Kenya. Although adopting new technologies generally has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2013.09.005">positive</a> economic returns per hectare
and could improve the resilience of these farmers, the small size of most farms limits smallholders’ agricultural earning potential. This means that escaping poverty purely based on farming is not possible.</p>
<p>A well thought out rural investment strategy should provide a more diverse portfolio to the rural population.</p>
<h2>Future generations</h2>
<p>More questions were raised when we looked at household aspirations for future generations. </p>
<p>Very few parents hope for a future in farming for their children. This is in stark contrast to their personal aspirations and investment plans, which mostly involve expansion or intensification of farming. </p>
<p>This finding raises several pertinent questions that should be explored in future research. For example, what is the implication for agricultural innovations now and in the future? If most households foresee their children stepping out, does this mean that they are focused on short-term investments with quick wins? </p>
<p>Though all poor households are probably looking for quick wins, this may mean that even wealthier households might not have the long-term horizons needed to consider investments in practices with delayed benefits such as agroforestry or soil fertility management.</p>
<p>There are also implications for changes in land use patterns, currently characterised by high levels of land fragmentation in densely populated areas. </p>
<p>If households increasingly step out of farming, would this reverse the trend and enable consolidation of land for the next generation, for example, through people selling or renting out their land? Or is land still perceived as a necessary insurance or for retirement? </p>
<p>These are all important questions for the country’s future that require data and evidence for policymakers to base decisions on. </p>
<p>Capturing what drives the decision-making and aspirations of rural households will help design more effective policies and development initiatives that trigger positive, lasting change within the community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129909/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kai Mausch received funding from multiple organisations that fund international agricultural research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Harris has received funding from various public institutions that support international agricultural research . </span></em></p>Understanding rural household aspirations and taking them seriously in development planning could offer great potential in shaping the future of rural spaces.Kai Mausch, Senior Economist, Center for International Forestry Research – World Agroforestry (CIFOR-ICRAF)David Harris, Honorary Lecturer, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1319172020-02-25T13:49:33Z2020-02-25T13:49:33ZHow changes in weather patterns could lead to more insect invasions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/315948/original/file-20200218-11044-3te04q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A man runs through a desert locust swarm in Kitui County, Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">DAI KUROKAWA/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Outbreaks of insect pests and insect invasions are <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-11857-0_4">on the rise</a> on the <a href="https://www.nature.com/news/polopoly_fs/1.21527!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/nature.2017.21527.pdf?origin=ppub">African continent</a>.</p>
<p>Currently, several African countries – including Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia – are dealing with the one of the most <a href="https://apnews.com/3062a16869436a7eeb2b5596c7d04278">devastating</a> outbreaks of desert locusts. This comes after recent <a href="https://www.invasive-species.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/02/FAW-Evidence-Note-October-2018.pdf">fall armyworm</a> invasions which affected more than 44 African countries. Countries also grapple with more localised pest invasions of insects like the <a href="https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/sabinet/ento/2014/00000022/00000002/art00021">South American tomato moth</a> and <a href="https://cipotato.org/riskatlasforafrica/busseola-fusca/">maize stem borers</a>. </p>
<p>Many countries suffer from a lack of food because the insects can consume, or destroy, huge amounts of crops. Just five invasive insect pests are estimated to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912416301092">cost the</a> African continent US$1.1billion every year. </p>
<p>Insect-pest related crop losses and pest invasions are <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-92798-5_2">projected to increase</a> as the climate changes. Projected changes include changes in temperature – with many regions <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/global-warming-severe-consequences-africa">becoming warmer</a> – and the amount of precipitation. Insects <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-warm-to-swarm-why-insect-activity-increases-in-summer-69637">thrive</a> in warmer temperatures. </p>
<p>Studies show that <a href="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6405/916">insect-pest related yield losses</a> for maize, rice and wheat are expected to increase by between 10% and 25% for each degree Celsius of warming. The impact will be huge. These crops are the three most important crops in the world, <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/">accounting for</a> 42% of calories eaten. </p>
<p>Broadly, there are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232066653_Consequences_of_Climate_Warming_and_Altered_Precipitation_Patterns_for_Plant-Insect_and_Multitrophic_Interactions">two explanations</a> for why there’ll be more insect invasions: because the changing weather modifies insect traits and because the changing weather is having an impact on their food, natural enemies and predators.</p>
<h2>Insect traits</h2>
<p>A changing climate causes changes in temperature. This has a <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1046/j.1365-2486.2002.00451.x">huge impact</a> on insects because they are cold-blooded animals. This means that their growth, development and life-cycles are regulated by temperature. Consequently, when temperatures are warmer or colder than the norm, this directly affects their development, growth, reproduction, and ultimately population numbers and distribution.</p>
<p>As temperatures rise, the insect’s metabolism speeds up. Because they are <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rspb.2009.1910">burning more energy</a>, they consume more, develop faster and larger, suffer less mortality, reproduce faster and lay more eggs. The end result is an increase in populations, and consequently, more crop damage.</p>
<p>A changing climate will also affect rainfall patterns. We are already seeing this with more incidents of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0012825218303519#bb0450">droughts</a> and <a href="https://rmets.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/joc.4358">floods</a>. These changes affect the interactions between insect pests, plants and their natural enemies. </p>
<p>For example, there is substantial <a href="https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=barkbeetles">evidence</a> showing that <a href="https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=barkbeetles">drought stress</a> increases the number of crop plant eating insects. There’s a bit of contention as to why this is the case, but the <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/brv.12571">plant stress hypothesis</a> suggests that insect performance increases with plant stress because the plant’s level of investment in its chemical defences decreases. </p>
<p>Changes in the weather can also affect the territory that insects live in. </p>
<p>There’s <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/110/6/2193">compelling evidence</a> that insect distributional ranges are changing. As warming happens, insects are moving into <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1990">new territories</a> and exploring new habitats. They do this to find food and to escape competition and natural enemies.</p>
<p>Extreme conditions – like drought and floods – also alter the nutritional value of plants. Faced with the problem of a less nutritious plant, insects <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1570-7458.1969.tb02560.x">consume more</a> plant tissues to get the amount of nutrients they need. </p>
<h2>Natural enemies</h2>
<p>Climate change may also alter the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Linda_Thomson3/publication/223746909_Predicting_the_effects_of_climate_change_on_natural_enemies_of_agricultural_pests/links/5a14f7010f7e9b925cd52552/Predicting-the-effects-of-climate-change-on-natural-enemies-of-agricultural-pests.pdf">interaction</a> of insect pests and their enemies. These may be <a href="http://ipm.ucanr.edu/PMG/PESTNOTES/pn74140.html">natural predators</a> such as ladybird beetles, which eat aphids. They can also be introduced to control pests; <em>Cotesia flavipes</em>, for example, is an insect that <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/agricultural-and-biological-sciences/cotesia-flavipes">has been introduced</a> in various countries to control stem borers. </p>
<p>In a perfect world, natural enemies should be abundant when crop plants are under pressure from insect pests. But the ability of natural enemies to find the insect pests depends on their ability to tolerate changing weather conditions and how well they can move. </p>
<p>And when they find the insect pests, other factors – like the size of the insect host – are important. For instance, parasitoids (insects whose larvae live as parasites which eventually kill their hosts) develop inside the host. If the host insect is too small, there won’t be enough food for the larvae to grow and hatch. This may determine whether they stay to protect plants from the pests.</p>
<p>These are some of the key findings about the impact of climate change on insects. There is still a lot to be discovered, though. </p>
<p>More research needs to be done to develop a clear understanding of how climate change directly and indirectly affects insects, to help us predict what invasions could happen, and where.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/131917/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Esther Ndumi Ngumbi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Changing weather modifies insect traits and can have an impact on their food, natural enemies and predators.Esther Ndumi Ngumbi, Assistant Professor, Department of Entomology; African-American Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1266922019-12-11T12:57:38Z2019-12-11T12:57:38ZCan African smallholders farm themselves out of poverty?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/305851/original/file-20191209-90592-1aq4i79.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hard work and poor prospects for smallholder farming households in Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/swathi-icrisat-esa/12201688784/">Swathi Sridharan (formerly ICRISAT, Bulawayo)</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A great deal of research on agriculture in Africa is organised around the premise that intensification can take smallholder farmers out of poverty. The emphasis in programming often focuses on technologies that increase farm productivity and management practices that go along with them. </p>
<p>Yet the returns of such technologies are not often evaluated within a whole-farm context. And – critically – the returns for smallholders with very little available land have not received sufficient attention. </p>
<p>To support smallholders in their efforts to escape poverty by adopting modern crop varieties, inputs and management practices, it’s necessary to know if their current resources – particularly their farms – are large enough to generate the requisite value. </p>
<p>Two questions can frame this. How big do farms need to be to enable farmers to escape poverty by farming alone? And what alternative avenues can lead them to sustainable development?</p>
<p>These issues were explored in a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/experimental-agriculture/article/intensification-benefit-index-how-much-can-rural-households-benefit-from-agricultural-intensification/7580F3F01DEEC06482D5D64DD8CC9EE5">paper</a> in which we examined how much rural households can benefit from agricultural intensification. In particular we, together with colleagues, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308521X13001236">looked at the size of smallholder farms</a> and their potential profitability and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0030727019888513">alternative strategies for support</a>. In sub-Saharan Africa smallholder farms are, on average, smaller than two hectares.</p>
<p>It’s difficult to be precise about the potential profitability of farms in developing countries. But it’s likely that the upper limit for most farms optimistically lies between $1,000 and $2,000 per hectare per year. In fact the actual values currently achieved by farmers in sub-Saharan Africa are much less. </p>
<p>The large profitability gap between current and potential performance per hectare of smallholder farms could, in theory, be narrowed if farmers adopted improved agricultural methods. These could include better crop varieties and animal breeds; more, as well as more efficient, use of fertilisers; and better protection from losses due to pests and diseases. </p>
<p>But are smallholder farms big enough so that closing the profitability gap will make much difference to their poverty status? </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/experimental-agriculture/article/intensification-benefit-index-how-much-can-rural-households-benefit-from-agricultural-intensification/7580F3F01DEEC06482D5D64DD8CC9EE5">research</a> suggests that they are not. Even if they were able to achieve high levels of profitability, the actual value that could be generated on a small farm translated into only a small gain in income per capita. From this we conclude that many, if not most, smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely to farm themselves out of poverty – defined as living on less than $1.90 per person per day. This would be the case even if they were to make substantial improvements in the productivity and profitability of their farms. </p>
<p>That’s not to say that smallholder farmers shouldn’t be supported. The issue, rather, is what kind of support best suits their circumstances. </p>
<h2>Productivity and profitability</h2>
<p>In theory, it should be quite simple to calculate how big farms need to be to enable farmers to escape poverty by farming alone. </p>
<p>To begin with, it’s necessary to know how productive and profitable per unit area a farm can be. Productivity and profitability – the value of outputs minus the value of inputs – are functions of farmers’ skills and investment capacities. </p>
<p>They are also dependent on geographical contexts. This includes soils, rainfall and temperature, which determine the potential for crop and livestock productivity. Other factors that play a part include remoteness, which affects farm-gate prices of inputs and outputs, and how many people a farm needs to support. </p>
<p>The figure below summarises the relation between farm size, profitability and income of rural households. We used a net income of $1.90 per person per day (the blue curve) as our working definition of poverty. A more ambitious target of $4 per person per day (the orange curve) represents a modest measure of prosperity beyond the poverty line.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304224/original/file-20191128-178094-zcbm4y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304224/original/file-20191128-178094-zcbm4y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304224/original/file-20191128-178094-zcbm4y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304224/original/file-20191128-178094-zcbm4y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304224/original/file-20191128-178094-zcbm4y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304224/original/file-20191128-178094-zcbm4y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304224/original/file-20191128-178094-zcbm4y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304224/original/file-20191128-178094-zcbm4y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Combinations of land per capita and net whole-farm profitability that would generate 1.90 (blue) and 4 (orange) dollars per person per day. The median land per capita values of rural households from all 46 sites in 15 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa were below the horizontal dashed line (0.60 hectares per person).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>So, how do these values compare with the situation in sub-Saharan Africa? </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.041">It has been estimated</a> that about 80% of farms across nine sub-Saharan countries are smaller than two hectares. These sites would need to generate at least $1,250 per hectare per year just to reach the poverty line. Sites at the lower end of the range cannot escape poverty even if they could generate $3,000 per hectare per year.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, there is limited information about whole-farm net profitability in developing countries. But in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi, for example, the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2013.09.005">mean values</a> of only $78, $83 and $424 per hectare per year, respectively, imply that even $1,250 appears to be far out of reach for most small farms. </p>
<p>It’s difficult to interpret information from <a href="http://www.farmbusinesssurvey.co.uk/">developed countries</a> in developing country contexts. Nevertheless, gross margin values for even the most efficient mixed farms seldom exceed around $1,400 per hectare per year. </p>
<p>These values are similar to gross margins using best practices for perennial cropping systems reported in a recent literature survey of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2013.09.005">tropical crop profitability</a>. The study drew on data from nine household surveys in seven African countries. It found that profit from crop production alone (excluding data on livestock) ranged from only $86 per hectare per year in Burkina Faso to $1,184 in Ethiopia. The survey mean was $535 per hectare per year.</p>
<p>From this overview we must conclude that, even with very modest goals, most smallholder farms in sub-Saharan Africa are not “viable” when benchmarked against the poverty line. And it’s unlikely that agricultural intensification alone can take many households across the poverty line.</p>
<h2>What is the takeaway?</h2>
<p>We certainly do not suggest that continued public and private investments in agricultural technologies are unmerited. In fact, there is evidence that <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/ejdr.2015.40">returns to agricultural research and development</a> at national level are very high in developing countries. And there is <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jid.3455">evidence</a> that agricultural growth is the most important impetus for broader patterns of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2018.1430774">structural transformation and economic growth in rural Africa</a>. But realistic assessments of the scope for very small farmers to farm themselves out of poverty are necessary. </p>
<p>Farmers are embedded in complex economic webs and increasingly depend on more than farm production for their livelihoods. More integrated lenses for evaluating public investment in the food systems of the developing world will likely be more helpful in the short term.</p>
<p>Integrated investments that affect both on- and off-farm livelihood choices and outcomes will produce better welfare than a narrow focus on production technologies in smallholder dominated systems. Production technology research for development will remain important. But to reach the smallest of Africa’s smallholders will require focus on what’s happening off the farm.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126692/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Harris receives funding from the CGIAR.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jordan Chamberlin receives funding from the CGIAR, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and IFAD. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kai Mausch received funding from multiple organisations that fund international agricultural research. </span></em></p>Smallholder farming might not be able to generate enough value on its own, but farmers still need support.David Harris, Honorary Lecturer, Bangor UniversityJordan Chamberlin, Spatial Economist, International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT)Kai Mausch, Senior Economist, Center for International Forestry Research – World Agroforestry (CIFOR-ICRAF)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1229562019-09-04T12:49:27Z2019-09-04T12:49:27ZPasha 34: How digital technologies can help farmers in Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290888/original/file-20190904-175700-8475do.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Digitisation could change the game for Africa’s smallholder farmers. Technologies like drones, satellites and apps all have the ability to make farming much easier and simpler. Of course, technology is not a panacea to all the challenges smallholder farmers face – but as it gets cheaper and easier to access, it can make their work much easier.</p>
<p>In today’s episode of Pasha PhD students Abdul-Rahim Abdulai and Emily Duncan from the University of Guelph take us through what some of these technologies are and how people are using them. They also discuss the gaps in these initiatives. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-digital-technologies-can-help-africas-smallholder-farmers-119952">How digital technologies can help Africa's smallholder farmers</a>
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<p><strong>Photo:</strong>
Photo by Arrowsmith2.
African Farmer stand in the green farm holding tablet - Image. <a href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/african-farmer-stand-green-farm-holding-1440177119?src=-1-1">Shutterstock</a></p>
<p><strong>Music</strong>
“Happy African Village” by John Bartmann found on <a href="http://freemusicarchive.org/music/John_Bartmann/Public_Domain_Soundtrack_Music_Album_One/happy-african-village">FreeMusicArchive.org</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/">CC0 1</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Over the past two decades digitisation has steadily transformed African farming.Ozayr Patel, Digital EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1203362019-07-19T12:10:28Z2019-07-19T12:10:28ZUnderstanding the political economy of maize in Kenya<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284730/original/file-20190718-116543-14luaa8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Kenyan women removes maize from husks.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stephen Morrison</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Maize is the cheapest source of calories among the cereal grains, making up about <a href="http://www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/conferences/RCT_Conference/Diversity%20in%20Maize%20Production%20Environments%20and%20Practices.pdf">65% of total food calories</a> consumed by households in Kenya. To meet this demand, maize is produced on 40% of the total crop area – mainly by smallholders.</p>
<p>Kenya’s annual production target has been 40 million bags or approximately 3.6 million tons. However, over the past decade, the average production has been well <a href="http://www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/breakfast_forums/COP%202018_Food%20Assessment_2018.pdf">below 40 million bags</a>, with the exception of 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2018. Last year saw the highest <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201809120141.html">production of 46 million bags</a>. </p>
<p>At the same time, demand is growing driven by population growth and stands at above <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/16/c_138063905.htm">50 million bags in 2019</a>. It has been projected to reach 60 million bags by 2025.</p>
<p>The gap between demand and domestic production has placed maize at the centre of the food security debate. </p>
<p>This year’s projected production is unlikely to hit the 40 million target. Given this, there is an on-going debate on whether to <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/How-to-avert-a-maize-shortage-crisis/440808-5145318-2x6udm/index.html">import maize from outside the East African Community region</a> to plug the gap. </p>
<p>Importing from within East African Community is the first logical step in view of a 50% common external tariff designed to protect local producers. However, countries can seek exemption and import duty free from elsewhere when a pressing need arises. Kenya also has a total ban on GMO products meaning that it can only import from GMO free countries.</p>
<p>The import debate has increasingly taken a political tone with politicians from maize producing regions in Kenya totally <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/news/MPs-want-Kiunjuri-sacked-maize-cartels/1056-5192132-uewadi/index.html">against any imports</a>. They argue that imports would likely depress producer prices in the middle of the main season for harvesting. Farmers usually sell immediately after harvest.</p>
<p>But government’s response is that there’s a need to import given the expected shortfall.</p>
<p>It is my position that a key sticking point is contested data, with different stakeholders providing different numbers that support their arguments. The Ministry of Agriculture is the institution mandated to generate data on food security. But it has capacity gaps and doesn’t do this well. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tegemeo.org/">Tegemeo Institute</a>, where I work as a research fellow, is recognised as a credible source of data in agriculture. However, the Ministry of Agriculture can decide whether or not to use the data, which it does on and off. </p>
<p>The current debate is stirred by interests among the political class, elite business people. The use of evidence is not in their interest. </p>
<h2>The production landscape</h2>
<p>Policies on maize have always been contested in a market characterised by <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018-10-29-millers-threaten-to-raise-unga-price-to-sh100/">lobbying from farmers, millers, and consumers</a>.</p>
<p>Ideally, farmers and millers will make a reasonable profit and consumers will get affordable prices. But the Kenyan case is far from ideal. Farmers have perennially <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001302504/farmers-to-wait-longer-for-better-maize-prices">agitated</a> for higher prices due to high production costs. In response, government has intervened by setting maize prices, usually above market rates, for the strategic food reserve. The <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/LegalNotices/2015/LN15_2015.pdf">strategic food reserve</a> was set up to stabilise food supply and food prices. </p>
<p>On the other hand, consumers want to <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2001299576/millers-to-govt-we-can-t-sell-unga-at-sh75">buy cheap maize flour</a>, squeezing the government between producer and consumer demands.</p>
<h2>Challenges galore</h2>
<p>Despite the importance of maize, productivity has stagnated and is now about <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC">only 1.6 tons/ha</a>, leaving Kenya trailing behind other maize producers on the continent. Ethiopia, for example, is <a href="http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC">twice as productive</a>, with a productivity of 3.7 tons/ha. Ethiopia managed to attain <a href="http://www.ifpri.org/publication/agricultural-growth-ethiopia-2004-2014-evidence-and-drivers">high productivity</a> through improving access to extension services, use of modern inputs and improving rural infrastructure. </p>
<p>The productivity of Kenyan maize farmers has stagnated because farm sizes have <a href="https://www.canr.msu.edu/fsg/publications/presentations-pdfs/Muyanga_Jayne_Tegemeo_12-05-2017.pdf">declined to uneconomical sizes</a>. This has mainly been caused by population increase and urbanisation, which have led to increased land subdivisions in rural areas. In addition, Kenya’s <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/business/seedsofgold/How-to-correct-acidic-soils-for-better-maize--production/2301238-4128484-848iluz/index.html">soil quality is declining</a> while smallholder farmers often plant unsuitable varieties, have low use of complementary inputs, and sub-optimal use of <a href="http://www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/conferences/RCT_Conference/Tim_maize%20bundles.pdf">inorganic fertilizers</a>. </p>
<p>Added to all these are the effects of unpredictable and unfavourable <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/No-rain-this-season--weatherman-says/539546-5073986-3ykge3/index.html">weather patterns</a> compounded by limited access to water <a href="https://waterfund.go.ke/watersource/Downloads/001.%20Irrigation%20Potential%20and%20Achievements.pdf">for irrigation</a>, and increased pest and diseases prevalence such as the <a href="http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-detail/en/c/179179/">Maize Lethal Necrotic Disease</a> and <a href="http://www.kilimo.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Armyworm-Ad-Artwork.pdf">Fall Army Worm</a>.</p>
<p>Most farmers <a href="https://www.tegemeo.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&layout=edit&id=673">rely on public sector extension systems</a>. Without access to proper extension services, Kenyan farmers have no access to information on how to improve productivity. </p>
<p>There are also market failures, exemplified by the poor distribution between deficit and surplus regions. This means that the market is unable to signal or provide incentives for traders to address supply issues. This implies that the government must intervene to correct the market failure.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-kenyans-are-going-hungry-months-after-a-bumper-maize-crop-113929">Why Kenyans are going hungry months after a bumper maize crop</a>
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<p>Yet there is little to show for government attempts at resolving these issues over the years. Key interventions in the past included a fertiliser subsidy, food subsidy, and producer price support. A <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/counties/Kiunjuri-Mandago-to-lead-taskforce-on-maize/1107872-4815070-65odur/index.html">task force</a> appointed last year to find solutions to the challenges has yet to present its report.</p>
<h2>Is there a deficit?</h2>
<p>In the latest controversy, millers have accused <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Release-maize-or-it-will-be-imported/539546-5111424-109tkb4/index.html">farmers of hoarding</a> maize to drive prices higher, a claim which <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001321298/farmers-caution-on-maize-imports">farmers reject</a>. <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/rift-valley/2019-04-18-maize-price-shoots-to-sh3200-farmers-warn-against-cheap-imports/">Farmers</a> and <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/marketnews/Millers-doubt-Kenya-has-21m-bags/3815534-5071226-wdr63bz/index.html">millers</a> disagree on what is the level of maize held in storage. </p>
<p>More alarming are the <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001333542/rift-in-government-over-maize-imports">different positions taken</a> over the available maize stocks by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Strategic Food Reserves board, two institutions key to maintaining food security in the country.</p>
<p>Recent projections by <a href="http://www.tegemeo.org/images/downloads/PressReleases/press%20release_17-04-19.pdf">Tegemeo Institute</a> show that the country has enough stocks to get to the start of the harvest period in 2019, even under the most pessimistic scenario. The harvest is now expected to be in August rather than July because of delayed rains. </p>
<p>The outlook suggests a deficit for the full season. Government recently estimated the deficit at 12.5 million bags while clarifying that it <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-07-11-government-yet-to-authorise-maize-imports-says-ps/">has not authorised any importation</a>. The ministry is doing the <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/Delay-maize-imports-spells-doom/440808-5187948-1189engz/index.html">right thing in terms of preparedness</a> based on <a href="https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/How-to-avert-a-maize-shortage-crisis/440808-5145318-2x6udm/index.html">recent history</a>. However, this pronouncement was met with scepticism especially by political leaders from the maize producing regions who have insisted the data is inaccurate.</p>
<p>The size of the deficit matters because it determines whether maize can be imported from outside the East African Community. Like Kenya, other East Africa Community countries also experienced bad weather. Their production is expected to be below normal production. However, early indications are that <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/markets/marketnews/Tanzania-Kenya-maize-import-window/3815534-5188016-20i3ckz/index.html">Tanzania has sufficient stocks</a> to fill the deficit that Kenya faces. Moreover, additional stocks could come from Uganda. </p>
<h2>When to import</h2>
<p>It is only after factoring in the inflows from the region that a decision can be made whether imports from outside the region are needed. And such a decision should be guided by three principles. First is verifiable data on the deficit, second is the timing of the importation which should not coincide with the harvesting season in Kenya and, third, is to ensure decisions to import should not be delayed until the stock in the country is depleted. </p>
<p>Finally, all these decisions and processes should be transparent. This would include making public the importers and volumes permitted for importation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120336/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy Njagi Njeru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Understanding the political economy around maize production puts into context debates on key interventions in the value chain.Timothy Njagi Njeru, Research Fellow, Tegemeo Institute, Egerton UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1199522019-07-11T14:56:02Z2019-07-11T14:56:02ZHow digital technologies can help Africa’s smallholder farmers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283044/original/file-20190708-51253-1ml5ikz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Digitisation includes the delivery of agronomic advice and information via text messaging and interactive voice response.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.cta.int/</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Digitisation could change the game for agriculture in Africa. That’s a key message in <a href="https://www.cta.int/en/digitalisation/all/issue/the-digitalisation-of-african-agriculture-report-2018-2019-sid0d88610e2-d24e-4d6a-8257-455b43cf5ed6">a report </a> recently released by an international institution that enhances smallholder farming in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. </p>
<p>The Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) <a href="https://www.cta.int/en/about-cta">focuses</a> on poverty reduction through modernising smallholder farming by fostering innovation and knowledge sharing. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cta.int/en/digitalisation/all/issue/the-digitalisation-of-african-agriculture-report-2018-2019-sid0d88610e2-d24e-4d6a-8257-455b43cf5ed6">Digitisation</a> refers to everything from delivering farming advice via text messaging to interactive voice response. It also includes smart phone applications that link farmers to multimedia advisory content, farm inputs, and buyers. And it covers the use of drones and satellite systems to inform farmer activities, such as crops and times to plant; and types and amounts of inputs to use.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282968/original/file-20190707-51292-9zwh7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/282968/original/file-20190707-51292-9zwh7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282968/original/file-20190707-51292-9zwh7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282968/original/file-20190707-51292-9zwh7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282968/original/file-20190707-51292-9zwh7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282968/original/file-20190707-51292-9zwh7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/282968/original/file-20190707-51292-9zwh7b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Ziongate Geospatial and Research Services staff preparing to survey farmlands with drones, Ghana.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ziongate Geospatial and Research Services</span></span>
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<p>Other global organisations have echoed this message. These range from NGOs like <a href="https://www.solidaridadnetwork.org/news/what-role-can-technology-play-in-smallholder-farms">Solidaridad Network</a> – a civil society organisation that accelerates sustainable and inclusive development – to <a href="http://www.fao.org/3/a-at453e.pdf">the World Bank</a>. These organisations believe that digital technologies can create employment for young people in the agricultural sector, promote economic activity, and enhance food security.</p>
<p>For the past two decades, digitisation has steadily transformed African farming. In Ghana, for instance, online platforms such as <a href="https://esoko.com/">Esoko</a>, <a href="https://farmerline.co/">Farmerline</a>, and <a href="https://www.trotrotractor.com/">Trotro Tractor</a> have provided farmers with accessible services. These have included <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s40066-016-0088-y">voice messages and SMS extension advice</a>. This helps farmers obtain information about how to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12300">access markets and extension services.</a>. </p>
<p>Elsewhere on the continent, international organisations help <a href="https://www.unenvironment.org/pt-br/node/24047">provide precision advice to farmers</a>. An example is the CTA’s <a href="https://www.cta.int/en/projects/eyes-in-the-sky">‘Transforming Africa’s agriculture: Eyes in the sky, smart techs on the ground"</a> project that supports the use of drones for agriculture.</p>
<p>The continent’s digital agriculture industry is growing. The number of farmers subscribed to digital services has grown by <a href="https://www.cta.int/en/digitalisation/all/issue/the-digitalisation-of-african-agriculture-report-2018-2019-sid0d88610e2-d24e-4d6a-8257-455b43cf5ed6">between 40% and 45% per year</a> in the last three years. </p>
<p>Annual revenues from digitally supported farming are estimated at about <a href="https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/file/89982/download?token=LfhgAcCc">$140 million</a>. Services are provided by a small but growing number of providers — some of which are estimated to generate <a href="https://www.cta.int/en/digitalisation/all/issue/the-digitalisation-of-african-agriculture-report-2018-2019-sid0d88610e2-d24e-4d6a-8257-455b43cf5ed6">€90 of revenue per farmer annually</a>, partly through service charges. This trend looks set to continue. </p>
<p>But the success of digitisation in agriculture shouldn’t just be evaluated by its economic value. Its benefits must be enjoyed by smallholder farmers and rural populations. Smallholder farmers, <a href="http://cdm15738.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/37971/filename/37972.cpd">most of whom have access to less than two acres of land</a>, <a href="http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/Factsheet_SMALLHOLDERS.pdf">produce more than 80%</a> of the food in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>African smallholder farmers will ultimately determine the continent’s digital farming story. Only through collaborations with them, and among sectors, will the digital transformation become a success in Africa. </p>
<h2>Challenges of smallholder farming</h2>
<p>Smallholder farmers face daunting political, economic, social, cultural, and institutional barriers. They have limited access to information, markets, capital, land tenure, and even basic inputs like fertilisers and seeds. </p>
<p><a href="https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620837/bp-west-africa-inequality-crisis-090719-en.pdf">Government policies</a>, and the influx of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03066150.2017.1415887?needAccess=true">foreign land grabbers</a> in <a href="http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GC104Oct16Wise.pdf">many African countries</a>, only worsen the situation. Ethiopia, Ghana, and South Sudan are among the hot beds for <a href="https://landmatrix.org/documents/47/Analytical_Report_II_LMI_English_2016.pdf">foreign land deals</a>. </p>
<p>Added to these are environmental issues like <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2FBF02394737.pdf">soil erosion</a> and a <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/10568/66472">changing climate</a>. In recent years, droughts, rising temperatures, and El-Niño events <a href="https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/mb-climate-crisis-east-africa-drought-270417-en.pdf">left nearly thirteen million</a> people from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia needing humanitarian assistance. </p>
<p>This makes traditional farming hard for smallholders across the continent, and can undermine their capacity to fully benefit from the digital revolution. </p>
<p>Also, connectivity tends to be limited in rural areas. And, even if farmers can connect, they may not have enough money to access the services.</p>
<p>These concerns limit the production and profits of farmers and undermine rural development. This is where digitisation comes in. It has potential to increase access to information and resources to provide solutions. </p>
<p>Elsewhere, digital technologies are already showing promise for rural farmers. The <a href="https://www.realclearscience.com/articles/2018/06/30/china_is_spearheading_the_future_of_agriculture.html">Chinese government</a> partners with private actors like <a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180606006487/en/Alibaba-Cloud-Launches-Agricultural-Brain-Shanghai-Computing">Alibaba</a> to digitise agriculture. From web-portals to Mobile Internet Based Services, rural farmers benefit from access extension advice and capital. This <a href="https://www.scitepress.org/papers/2015/55115/55115.pdf">leads to increased productivity and incomes</a>. </p>
<h2>Inclusion in digitisation</h2>
<p>There have been positive strides in ensuring smallholders become involved in digital agriculture. An estimated <a href="https://www.cta.int/en/digitalisation/all/issue/the-digitalisation-of-african-agriculture-report-2018-2019-sid0d88610e2-d24e-4d6a-8257-455b43cf5ed6">33 million people</a> – about 13% of all sub-Saharan African smallholders and pastoralists – are already registered for services such as weather updates and market linkages. </p>
<p>Ethiopia’s “80-28” hotline - a farmer advisory service - <a href="https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/101498/CTA-Digitalisation-report.pdf">has about 4 million users</a>, the highest on the continent. Beyond being a free service, its success is partly due to the delivery of services in local languages. Aligning services to local circumstances encourages farmers to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/sep/19/ethiopia-agriculture-hotline-opportunities-farmers">subscribe willingly</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya <a href="https://www.cta.int/en/digitalisation/all/issue/the-digitalisation-of-african-agriculture-report-2018-2019-sid0d88610e2-d24e-4d6a-8257-455b43cf5ed6">leads the way</a> in digitisation in Africa. Collaborations between agriculture and telecommunication has been instrumental in their success so far.</p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>These examples show what is necessary to help smallholders become connected to digital services.</p>
<p>One additional strategy is to blur the boundaries between different sectors. Digitisation is not just an agricultural issue, or a technological one. It involves many parts of the economy. Hence, digitisation must be situated within a broader development and poverty reduction agenda. For instance, education is critical to farmers’ ability to use and benefit from digital technologies.</p>
<p>It is also crucial to place smallholders front and centre when designing policies and specific digital products meant to help them. In this way, digital transformation will reflect the users’ needs.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/119952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abdul-Rahim Abdulai receives funding from the Arrell Food Institute at the University of Guelph. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Duncan receives funding from the Canada First Research Excellence Fund and the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evan Fraser receives funding from the Canada First Research Excellence Fund, the Canada Research Chairs program, SSHRC and NSERC, the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, and George Weston Ltd. He is the vice-chair of the Maple Leaf Centre for Action on Food Security, and is a member of the scientific advisory panel for the Weston Seeding Food Innovation Fund.
</span></em></p>There have been some positive strides made in getting smallholders involved in digital agriculture in AfricaAbdul-Rahim Abdulai, PHD Student, @Feeding9Blilion Research Lab, Department of Geography, Environment and Geomatics/Arrell Food Institute, University of GuelphEmily Duncan, Ph.D. Student, University of GuelphEvan Fraser, Professor, Director of the Arrell Food Institute and Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in Global Food Security, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.