tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/south-sudan-3008/articlesSouth Sudan – The Conversation2024-03-05T12:12:14Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244092024-03-05T12:12:14Z2024-03-05T12:12:14ZCrisis in Abyei: South Sudan must act and stop violence between Dinka groups<p>Abyei – a territory roughly the size of Jamaica – is being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/26/oil-rich-and-extremely-poor-inside-the-forgotten-abyei-box-a-photo-essay">contested</a> by two countries, Sudan and South Sudan. Abyei, which covers just over 10,000km², is under <a href="https://unmis.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/UNMIS/Fact%20Sheets/FS-abyeiprotocol.pdf#page=1">special administrative status</a> following the terms of a 2005 peace agreement between the two countries.</p>
<p>The disagreement has led to increasingly violent inter-communal tensions. Although the roots of these stretch back decades, they present a complex challenge, particularly in a context where the state lacks the capacity to enforce the rule of law impartially. But, in my view, the South Sudanese national government has the tools to help alleviate these tensions in the near term.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://pureportal.coventry.ac.uk/en/persons/jan-pospisil/publications/">researched</a> the political and security situation in Sudan and South Sudan for more than two decades and, as representatives from all sides confirm, the heart of the current conflict lies in overlapping territorial claims. </p>
<h2>Important region</h2>
<p>Abyei is both geographically and culturally significant.</p>
<p>It’s strategically positioned in a resource-rich and fertile area between Sudan and South Sudan that is also important for its transport links. Abyei is a bustling regional trading hub. Although there is only one producing oilfield in Abyei and <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2010/1102/Oil-rich-Abyei-Time-to-update-the-shorthand-for-Sudan-s-flashpoint-border-town">production is declining</a>, the region is thought to have vast untapped resources. </p>
<p>Abyei is deeply embedded in the history of the Ngok Dinka community, who are among the northernmost Dinka populations. The Dinka represent the predominant ethnolinguistic group in South Sudan, a country that emerged as the world’s newest nation in 2011. </p>
<p>Abyei’s ownership is also contested by the Arabic Misseriya from the north, indigenous to the current Sudanese territory.</p>
<p>These contestations have resulted in the region being plagued by <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/clashes-in-disputed-african-region-of-abyei/7460780.html">recurrent conflicts</a>, marking a history of turmoil in Abyei dating back more than a century. </p>
<h2>Efforts at resolution</h2>
<p>In an effort to resolve the dispute over <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_040526_Protocol%20between%20GoS%20and%20SPLM%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20Abyei%20Conflict.pdf">Abyei’s sovereignty</a>, negotiations held between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement that began in 2002 proposed a referendum to decide if Abyei should become part of Sudan or South Sudan. Such a referendum would have been held in parallel with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927">South Sudanese independence referendum in 2011</a>. </p>
<p>The referendum on Abyei, however, has yet to happen. This is largely due to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-referendum-in-abyei-is-an-ongoing-challenge-for-the-african-union">disagreements</a> over voter eligibility. The nomadic lifestyle of the Misseriya groups has also complicated matters.</p>
<p>To address recurrent tensions, the <a href="https://unisfa.unmissions.org/mandate">United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</a> was established in 2011. It was tasked with maintaining peace in the contested region. Over a decade later, however, little has changed.</p>
<p>Since <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/response-people-impacted-violence-agok-and-aneet-situation-report-no-1-22-april">2022</a>, contestations over Abyei have been complicated by <a href="https://acleddata.com/2024/02/09/acled-brief-violence-rises-across-south-sudans-disputed-abyei-state/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=acled-brief-violence-rises-across-south-sudans-disputed-abyei-state">renewed clashes</a> between the Ngok and another Dinka sub-group, the Twic Dinka, from the south. </p>
<p><strong>Map of Abyei</strong></p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-UD8WK" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/UD8WK/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>The Ngok Dinka assert their rights to the whole territory of what is known as the “Abyei Box”. This is the current internationally recognised form of Abyei, which was established based on the findings of the <a href="https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/boundary-demarcation-sudan-comprehensive-peace-agreement">Abyei Boundary Commission</a>. The commission was formed from the North-South peace talks of the mid-2000s. </p>
<p>Conversely, the Twic Dinka argue that their ancestral lands extend further north to the River Kiir, suggesting a natural demarcation line between their territory and that of the Ngok Dinka. The Twic contend that the Ngok Dinka’s presence south of the river had been a result of displacement caused by historic hostilities with the Misseriya during <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05430.6?seq=1">Sudan’s civil war in the 1980s and 1990s</a>.</p>
<h2>The drivers of conflict</h2>
<p>Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/12/south-sudan-president-signs-peace-deal-with-rebel-leader">conclusion of the South Sudanese civil war in 2018</a> and the formation of a power-sharing government, tensions escalated in the Abyei region. This was partly due to grievances from Twic politicians who felt overlooked for significant roles in the national government and also in the state government of Warrap, where Twic county falls. Income from the bustling Aneek market in south Abyei was seen as a potential remedy for these grievances. </p>
<p>However, when the Abyei administration began land demarcation efforts in February 2022, conflict erupted. This resulted in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/response-people-impacted-violence-agok-and-aneet-situation-report-no-1-22-april">several deaths and the destruction of Aneek market</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the area has remained tense, with outbreaks of violence involving organised assaults or clashes between armed youth factions.</p>
<p>This situation has been further exacerbated by the involvement of Bul Nuer militias. </p>
<p>One faction of militias was displaced from their native Mayom county in Unity State, in South Sudan’s north, by intense flooding. They eventually settled in Twic county, in Warrap state, in areas close to the Abyei border. </p>
<p>Concurrently, political disputes between other factions of Bul Nuer militias with the local government of Mayom county escalated to violent clashes. This forced the militias to flee Unity State. They, too, settled in Twic county.</p>
<p>This complicated an <a href="https://www.sudanspost.com/gai-machiek-i-am-not-a-rebel-and-not-involved-in-abyei-attacks/#google_vignette">already tense situation</a>.</p>
<p>To address the escalating violence in Twic county and Abyei, South Sudan President Salva Kiir <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-orders-expulsion-of-nuer-spiritual-leader-from-warrap">ordered the expulsion</a> of Bul Nuer militia members from Warrap state, and their resettlement in other states outside Warrap and Abyei. However, the implementation of this decree has faced significant challenges. </p>
<p>Since settling in Twic county in 2022, many Bul Nuer families have formed marital alliances with Twic families, integrating them into the community. This integration led to widespread protests from the Twic against Kiir’s decree. As a result, the Bul Nuer militias have remained in the area. </p>
<p>The presence of these militias has fuelled distrust among the Ngok community. </p>
<p>This tension boiled over in early February 2024 when minor altercations involving Ngok, Twic and Bul Nuer youths escalated into a larger conflict, resulting in the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1146007">loss of more than 50 lives</a>.</p>
<p>Addressing these deep-seated inter-communal tensions, with roots stretching back decades, presents a complex challenge particularly in a context where the state lacks capacity to enforce laws impartially. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>Despite these difficulties, the South Sudandese national government has the tools to help alleviate these tensions in the near term. </p>
<p>One significant area of ambiguity that has contributed to ongoing disputes is the undefined border status between Twic and Abyei. </p>
<p>The government’s strategy has been to avoid making definitive statements regarding this border. This is in an effort to prevent alienating any community and to curb conflict escalation. </p>
<p>However, considering the intensification of tensions over the past two years, it may be prudent to reconsider this approach and seek a more definitive resolution to the border issue. Clarifying the border between Twic county and Abyei could significantly undermine the influence of political myths and propaganda used to raise ethnic distrust.</p>
<p>Initiating political dialogue that involves both Ngok and Twic leaders, as well as engaging with the youth who have been both instigators and casualties of the conflict, could facilitate this process of demystification. </p>
<p>While achieving a long-term resolution to the conflict around Abyei amid <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/oct/26/oil-rich-and-extremely-poor-inside-the-forgotten-abyei-box-a-photo-essay">socio-economic challenges</a> remains an elusive goal, adopting pragmatic approaches to manage the current conflict is essential for maintaining peace in the region. Such efforts would help lay the groundwork for long-term stability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224409/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Pospisil receives funding from the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform, a programme funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. He is Associate Professor at Coventry University's Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations.</span></em></p>Overlapping territorial claims continue to fuel conflict in Abyei, which is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan.Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor, Research, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2225192024-02-20T13:12:43Z2024-02-20T13:12:43ZSouth Sudan: some spoilers want peace to fail, putting 2024 elections at risk<p>South Sudan is expected to hold its first general election in <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-south-sudan-meet-its-election-deadline-this-time">December 2024</a>. It became an independent state in <a href="https://www.usip.org/programs/independence-south-sudan">2011</a>. </p>
<p>The long overdue election is one of the pillars of a <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">peace agreement</a> signed in 2018. It helped end the 2013-2018 civil war that killed <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IN10975.pdf#page=1">nearly 400,000 people and displaced millions</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, the country has progressed in relative peace, with fewer incidences of conflict reported between 2018 and 2023. However, UN experts have <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144822">voiced concerns</a> about the likelihood of elections being held within agreed timelines. </p>
<p>The election has been slated for December 2024, provided a number of <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/s-sudan-risks-delayed-2024-elections-due-to-the-stuck-deal-4472812">issues</a> listed in the peace agreement are addressed. These include the making of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">permanent constitution</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/peace-in-south-sudan-hinges-on-forging-a-unified-military-force-but-its-proving-hard-181547">unifying command of the military</a>.</p>
<p>But there have been major hurdles in the way of implementing the agreement. One of them is the <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">presence of spoilers</a> within the South Sudanese political landscape. </p>
<p>Spoilers, as I define them, are detractors who attempt to undermine the successful implementation of peace agreements. </p>
<p>I have researched <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">South Sudan’s peace process</a> for eight years. I have studied the evolution of the country’s conflict since 2013, and the <a href="https://erepo.usiu.ac.ke/handle/11732/6971">various hurdles</a> that warring parties face in their quest for peace.</p>
<p>In my view, spoilers comprise leaders and parties who view peace as a major threat to their interests and power. They willingly risk using any means, including violence, to derail peace agreements due to feelings of exclusion or betrayal. </p>
<p>South Sudan’s elections were initially planned for <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/counting-down-to-south-sudans-elections">2022, and then pushed to 2023 and now 2024</a>. These delays have been as a result of the lack of real peace. Instead, there’s negative peace: a peace deal exists but there are simmering tensions between warring factions and those left out of negotiations. </p>
<p>This exclusion has led to the proliferation of spoilers. As I warn in <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">my research</a>, in this context, a more inclusive process needs to be prioritised to save the country’s fragile peace and get the elections on track.</p>
<h2>What happened to negotiate peace in South Sudan</h2>
<p>A protracted <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan#:%7E:text=In%20December%202013%2C%20following%20a,ethnic%20groups%20in%20South%20Sudan.">political power struggle</a> between South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir, and his deputy, Riek Machar, to lead the main political party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, sparked a civil war in 2013.</p>
<p>Violence first broke out after a <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/interview-kiir-has-deliberately-destroyed-splm-and-is-not-interested-in-bringing-genuine-peace-pagan-amum">volatile meeting</a> in July 2013 to decide who – between Kiir, Machar and Pagan Amum, then the secretary-general of the party – would be its flagbearer in elections scheduled for 2015. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week">December 2013</a>, fighting between military forces loyal to either Kiir or Machar – who are from the country’s two largest ethnic groups – escalated. </p>
<p>The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement splintered into two factions in 2014. One is led by Kiir, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Government; the other by Machar, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.usip.org/south-sudan-peace-process-key-facts#:%7E:text=The%20South%20Sudan%20peace%20process,a%20post%2Dconflict%20political%20transition.">International and regional interventions</a> led to a long peace process that resulted in the signing of several peace agreements. Between 2013 and 2018, six main agreements and five addenda were signed to help resolve the South Sudan conflict. </p>
<p>The key sticking points in these deals were around how power would be shared between the warring parties, military integration of armed forces, addressing the root causes of the conflict, and healing the nation through a truth, justice and reconciliation process. </p>
<p>The last peace agreement was <a href="https://horninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/No.-17.-The-Revitalized-Agreement-for-Resolution-of-Conflict-in-South-Sudan-R-ARCSS-1.pdf#page=1">signed</a> in September 2018 by five key actors and a group of smaller opposition parties, signalling an end to the five-year conflict. </p>
<p>Elections were originally slated for <a href="https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/counting-down-to-south-sudans-elections">December 2022</a>. They were later postponed due to delays in implementing the peace agreement. </p>
<h2>Who are the spoilers?</h2>
<p>Spoilers can destroy peace agreements. There are two main types of spoilers: <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/jolte/article/view/248083">insiders and outsiders</a>. </p>
<p>Insider spoilers participate in the peace process, sign the peace agreement and even signal support for its implementation. However, they fail to follow through. Their motives for this include the need to achieve their goals by maintaining the guise of supporting the peace process. They are especially sensitive to decisions that would weaken them militarily. </p>
<p>In South Sudan, insider spoilers include <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kiir-puts-south-sudan-on-edge-4154634">the two breakaway parties</a> of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. They are the main signatories of the 2018 peace agreement. Their spoiling role has been exhibited by a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/is-south-sudan-s-peace-deal-holding-/7004434.html">lack of political goodwill</a> in upholding the spirit and letter of the agreement on various issues. A good example of this is a recent <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/30/s-sudan-president-appoints-defence-minister-breaching-peace-deal">breach</a> when Kiir unilaterally appointed a defence minister from his own faction in total disregard of the peace agreement. </p>
<p>Outsider spoilers exclude themselves from the peace process because they feel their demands won’t be addressed. They openly declare their hostility to the process. They eventually use any means, including open violence, to disrupt and upset the process.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/south-sudan-s-holdout-rebel-groups-resume-talks/7016828.html">New negotiations</a> were held in 2023 to include outsider spoilers like <a href="https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/gen-cirillo-we-were-right-not-to-sign-the-peace-agreement">General Thomas Swaka</a> of the National Salvation Front and <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/q-a-nss-gen-akol-koor-cannot-convince-me-to-return-to-juba-gen-paul-malong">General Paul Malong</a>, a leader of the South Sudan United Front. These two parties are new entrants into the South Sudan political space and generally accommodate former Kiir allies. The negotiations didn’t bear fruit.</p>
<p>In my view, insider spoilers are more likely to disrupt the South Sudan peace process. They span both the political and military landscape and are very influential. Insider spoilers tend to have a large support base within the population. </p>
<h2>What happens now?</h2>
<p>New threats continue to emerge in the South Sudanese landscape, particularly as December 2024 draws closer. There have been <a href="https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/jonglei-two-spla-io-generals-defect-in-major-blow-to-machar">major defections</a> of influential generals from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition. They have expressed dissatisfaction with the progress of reforms and implementation of the current peace agreement. </p>
<p>This strains the delicate balance of power that has existed between the warring factions since 2018. These generals have a substantive following among the public and pose a serious risk to the South Sudan peace agenda. Failure to accommodate these generals could result in insecurity in the regions where they have influence, affecting the chances of holding peaceful elections.</p>
<p>South Sudan needs to reassess its commitment to peace. It can do this by including all aggrieved parties in the political peace process. This will help ensure that the country returns to normalcy under a government that’s legitimately in power after credible polls.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edgar Githua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A major hurdle in South Sudan is the presence of detractors who could undermine the successful implementation of peace agreements.Edgar Githua, Lecturer in International Studies, Strathmore UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2113552023-08-15T14:08:27Z2023-08-15T14:08:27ZSouth Sudan is gearing up for its first election – 3 things it must get right<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/542338/original/file-20230811-21-9migfb.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudan President Salva Kiir (left) and Vice President Riek Machar.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Louis/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The people of South Sudan have not exercised the right to choose their leaders since the referendum that secured <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/new-nation-born">independence from Sudan in 2011</a>. Instead, they have suffered through cycles of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/south-sudans-12-years-of-independence-triumphs-and-challenges/a-66151967">violent conflict</a> that have prevented the democratic transfer of power. </p>
<p>South Sudan descended into violent conflict less than three years after independence. It signed its first <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Resolution%20of%20the%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf">peace agreement in 2015</a>. This collapsed in less than a year and was followed by another wave of violence. The 2015 peace agreement was resuscitated in <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018</a> with hope it would lead to a newly elected government in February 2023. </p>
<p>After failing to fully implement the 2018 revitalised peace agreement, the signatories <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15219.doc.htm">extended its term for 24 months</a> to allow for better preparation for elections in December 2024. The elections, however, may be extended again. </p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Luka-Kuol-2">studied</a> constitution-making, security governance and post-conflict transitions. I also served as a minister in the Government of Southern Sudan and the Sudan National Government of Unity in 2005. In my view, postponing polls has become a currency in South Sudan, making a democratic transition through elections an elusive quest. However, it’s possible to hold elections if there is political will. </p>
<p>A recent public opinion survey showed that the majority of South Sudanese <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/South-Sudan-Policy-Report-Elections.pdf#page=11">are opposed to any further delays</a> to elections. Church leaders and civil society organisations have also <a href="https://cityreviewss.com/no-more-extension-the-church-adds-voice-in-call-for-general-election/">called</a> for elections. These sentiments indicate that the South Sudanese are tired of a status quo where the ruling elite clings to political power through endless power-sharing arrangements rather than through the ballot. </p>
<p>Three key things are needed for a credible poll: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>electoral laws to guide the process</p></li>
<li><p>voter registration and constituency boundaries</p></li>
<li><p>a safe environment to vote in.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Providing what’s needed</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf">major political and logistical challenges</a> in the way of an election in South Sudan. Resolving them will require hard choices and difficult trade-offs. </p>
<p><strong>Electoral laws:</strong> one of the big issues in the political reforms process is whether the elections will be conducted under a permanent constitution – which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-constitution-making-process-is-on-shaky-ground-how-to-firm-it-up-177107">still being drafted</a> – or the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011">current constitution</a>. A permanent constitution is one of the prerequisites for the conduct of election under the 2018 peace deal. However, tying a permanent constitution to the conduct of elections was unrealistic. Permanent constitution-making takes time. It requires the effective participation of citizens, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their home areas. </p>
<p>Also, the permanent constitution should be ratified by an elected parliament. Not the current handpicked 650 members of the national legislature who are part of South Sudan’s elite power-sharing arrangements. </p>
<p>The amended <a href="https://www.fd.uc.pt/g7+/pdfs/South_Sudan.pdf">2011 transitional constitution</a>, the <a href="https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/SS/south-sudan-the-national-elections-act-no.-39-of/view">2012 elections Act</a> and the <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">2018 revitalised peace agreement</a> can provide the basis for laws to guide the 2024 elections. </p>
<p><strong>Voter registration:</strong> another necessary condition for the conduct of elections is a population census. This is important for voter registration and the drawing of constituency boundaries. However, it would be ideal to conduct such a census when there is relative stability, and displaced persons and refugees can return to their homelands. </p>
<p>A population census will take time, though. So how can South Sudan register voters and draw boundaries without one? Political elites need to make the <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf">strategic decision</a> to either use the 2010 constituency boundaries, population estimates or voter registration data. Given rapid demographic shifts – <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/record-36-million-africans-forcibly-displaced-is-44-percent-of-global-total-refugees-asylum/">40%</a> of the country’s population has been forcefully displaced – projections based on the <a href="http://ssnbs.microdatahub.com/index.php/catalog/6/study-description">2008 census</a> could be used to reflect these changes. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ssnbss.org/">National Bureau of Statistics</a> and other research centres, such as the public policy think-tank <a href="https://www.suddinstitute.org/">Sudd Institute</a>, could objectively make population projections. Combined, these data sets can provide reasonable estimates for voter registration and drawing boundaries for constituencies.</p>
<p><strong>Security, and political and civic space:</strong> violent conflict still plagues South Sudan. Should elections be held when there is greater security? Or be organised under the current conditions in the hope that they will produce a legitimate government that promotes peace? A <a href="https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/South-Sudan-Policy-Report-Elections.pdf">public perceptions survey</a> found that despite the fear of violence, the majority of South Sudanese want elections. Creating a minimum safe and secure environment, which includes political and civic space for elections, is within the reach of political elites. Especially with the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/south-sudan-begins-unifying-ex-rebels-and-army-3932544#:%7E:text=South%20Sudan's%20unity%20government%20has,to%20transition%20to%20professional%20soldiers.">unification and deployment of security forces</a>. </p>
<h2>What’s going right</h2>
<p>South Sudan has put in motion two major laws that could help conduct elections.</p>
<p>The first is the progressive <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/elections-act-2012-amendment-bill-tabled-before-parliament">National Elections Bill</a>. It proposes a mixed system that allows geographical representation, as well as special <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf#page=14">parliamentary quota seats</a> for political parties and marginalised groups, such as women, persons with disabilities and the youth. This is aimed at ensuring inclusivity. It also reduces the risk of a single party holding a monopoly of power.</p>
<p>The elections bill has the potential to achieve political stability that rests on the distribution of power and resources to constituencies, as in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-illustrates-both-the-promise-as-well-as-the-pitfalls-of-devolution-96729">case of Kenya</a>. </p>
<p>The second law is the newly amended <a href="https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/parliament-passes-political-parties-act-2012-amendment-bill-2022">Political Parties Act</a>. Elections are only as credible as the parties that contest them. The amended law provides mechanisms for regulating political parties. It aims to ensure internal democratic governance and accountability in party constitutions. However, its implementation remains a challenge. For instance, the Political Parties Council hasn’t been formed, affecting the registration of political parties. </p>
<p>Most of South Sudan’s political parties are at the embryonic stage with limited or no political experience and resources. Investing in building their institutional capacities and governance will be as urgent as funding the elections. </p>
<h2>What next?</h2>
<p>South Sudan is at a crossroad. Its ruling elites have to decide between continuing on the <a href="https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-3/2022/12/13/elite-capture-and-popular-participation-in-south-sudans-constitution-making">endless power-sharing path</a> or heed to the demands of the people and embrace elections for state legitimacy and democratic transition.</p>
<p>The latter provides citizens with hope of a better South Sudan governed by elected leaders. Yet, political elites are <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/suedsudan/20294.pdf#page=23">becoming increasingly calculating and transactional</a> in meeting the minimum conditions for holding elections. </p>
<p>Providing funding for the elections, and related institutions and activities will test political commitment to the poll. The <a href="https://mofp.gov.ss/doc/MinisterofFinancandPlanning-BudgetSpeechFY2023_2024.pdf">2023-2024 budget</a> – expected to be an elections budget – failed to allocate resources for the poll. </p>
<p>The challenges facing the 2024 elections can be surmounted by collective political will. This is currently in short supply.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luka Kuol is affiliated with the Abyei Community Action for Development and the Rift Vally Institute.</span></em></p>The political elite have held on to power through power-sharing arrangements rather than the ballot. How will that change?Luka Kuol, Adjunct Professor, University of JubaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2102932023-08-01T14:46:56Z2023-08-01T14:46:56ZSudan needs to accept its cultural diversity: urban planning can help rebuild the country and prevent future conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539757/original/file-20230727-17-efhzbn.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Smoke rises above buildings in Sudan's capital Khartoum in June 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sudan is rich in cultural, ethnic and racial diversity. The country’s <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/SD">48 million people</a> come from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698280500423908">56 ethnic groups, with over 595 sub-ethnic groups, speaking more than 115 languages</a>. </p>
<p>This plurality has shaped urban development patterns and the country’s socio-political landscape. </p>
<p>Take, for instance, <a href="https://theconversation.com/khartoum-the-creation-and-the-destruction-of-a-modern-african-city-205705">Khartoum</a>. The Sudanese capital <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2005-4-page-302.htm">historically</a> drew traders from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Each placed a <a href="https://jur.journals.ekb.eg/article_88400.html">distinctive stamp</a> on the cityscape. </p>
<p>These range from Ottoman-style Islamic architecture to the narrow alleys, small windows and colourful clothes peculiar to African ethnic groups. The city symbolises Sudan’s cultural mosaic in architecture and urban planning.</p>
<p>However, Khartoum is also a domain of <a href="https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2020/12/02/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8E%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%8A/">ethnic and cultural division</a>.</p>
<p>This dates back to the period of the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/mahdist-state-mahdiyya">Mahdist state (Mahdiyya)</a>, which ruled Sudan from 1881 to 1898 and challenged the colonial ambitions of Britain and Egypt. The Mahdist state made <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Omdurman">Omdurman (Umm Durman)</a> its new capital on the western side of the River Nile, and developed the city around the <a href="https://archive.org/details/isbn_9781782821151">ethnic structure of its army</a>. </p>
<p>A colonial plan for <a href="https://repozytorium.biblos.pk.edu.pl/redo/resources/28522/file/suwFiles/HassanS_UrbanPlanning.pdf#page=3">Khartoum followed in 1910</a>, triggered by the governor-general of Sudan, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Horatio-Herbert-Kitchener-1st-Earl-Kitchener">Horatio Kitchener</a>. It had <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268280184_alywm_alalmy_ltkhtyt_almdn_althdyat_w_almalat_fy_almdn_alswdanyt">three segregated zones</a> to accommodate Europeans, elites and ordinary locals. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/khartoum-the-creation-and-the-destruction-of-a-modern-african-city-205705">Khartoum: the creation and the destruction of a modern African city</a>
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<p>These decades of interplay between diversity and urban planning in Sudan fostered vibrant cityscapes. But spatial segregation has continued, creating <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">socio-cultural divisions and uneven urban growth</a>. </p>
<p>Drawing on my experiences as an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ibrahim-Bahreldin">educator, researcher and practitioner in urbanism in Sudan</a>, I argue that failure to use urban planning to manage diversity has worsened ethnic and racial divisions. It has fanned <a href="https://theconversation.com/darfur-how-historical-patterns-of-conflict-are-haunting-current-violence-144423">conflict and discontent</a> in Sudanese society.</p>
<h2>Embracing diversity</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268280184_alywm_alalmy_ltkhtyt_almdn_althdyat_w_almalat_fy_almdn_alswdanyt">Urban planning</a> is supposed to improve residents’ quality of life. It strategically organises physical spaces and land use. It optimises resources and livelihoods, and promotes social equity. </p>
<p>It holds immense potential to manage diversity and reconstruct a resilient and prosperous Sudan. </p>
<p>This isn’t to say urban planning can single-handedly resolve <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">Sudan’s conflict</a>. Peace requires a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-peace-talks-successful-the-4-factors-that-matter-206299">shared commitment</a> to silence the guns and build political stability and security. </p>
<p>Yet the way diversity is managed makes it either a virtue or a <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">curse</a>. </p>
<p>In my view, there are three avenues through which urban planning can positively manage diversity to help prevent conflict: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>by celebrating multiculturalism.</p></li>
<li><p>by boosting regional integration and resource management.</p></li>
<li><p>by ensuring effective governance and public participation in urban spaces.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What Sudan got wrong</h2>
<p>Colonial and post-independence planning practices in Sudan attempted to forge a <a href="https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/AHRLJ/2013/17.html">national identity</a>. However, this was done by <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">suppressing ethnic diversity</a>, and disintegrating cultural values and their spatial footprints. </p>
<p>After independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956, Sudan’s ruling elites rejected the demand from southern Sudan for <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/federalism">a federal system</a>. This would have created a united Sudan but allowed different regions to maintain their integrity, culture and traditions. The ruling elite instead adopted an “Arab Islamic” identity to create a <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">homogeneous society</a>. </p>
<p>This was among the reasons for the eruption of the <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/sudanese-civil-wars">first civil war in southern Sudan in 1955</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/darfur-tracing-the-origins-of-the-regions-strife-and-suffering-131931">Darfur: tracing the origins of the region's strife and suffering</a>
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<p>And in Darfur, infringements of communal land ownership rights <a href="https://metropolitics.org/Land-Insecurity-in-Khartoum-When-Land-Titles-Fail-to-Protect-Against-Public.html">fuelled violent conflict</a>. This extended to <a href="https://docs.southsudanngoforum.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/Luka-Biong-Deng-Kuol-When-Ethnic-Diversity-Becomes-a-Curse-in-Africa-The-Tale-of-Two-Sudans.pdf">southern Sudan</a> and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287221183_Urban_agriculture_facing_land_pressure_in_Greater_Khartoum_The_case_of_new_real_estate_projects_in_Tuti_and_Abu_Se'id">Khartoum</a>. </p>
<p>The Khartoum <a href="https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Sudan_Khartoum1998.pdf">Public Order Act</a> of 1996 (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50596805">repealed in 2019</a>) was another misjudgement. It <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/12/5194">discriminated against citizens</a> based on their cultural and gender identities. The public order rules were <a href="https://redress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/report-Final.pdf#page=5">vague and open-ended</a>, leaving them open to exploitation for social control.</p>
<h2>Rebuilding a post-war Sudan</h2>
<p>Urban planning should follow the principles of economic, social and physical integration. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Economic integration ensures equal access to employment, education and resources. </p></li>
<li><p>Social integration provides affordable housing, diverse neighbourhoods and accessible social infrastructure. </p></li>
<li><p>Physical integration encourages social interaction and breaks down barriers. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These principles help create vibrant, harmonious cities that cater to the needs of diverse populations and future generations. They can be put into practice through three avenues.</p>
<p><strong>1. Celebrating multiculturalism and diversity</strong> </p>
<p>This requires <a href="https://www.cgscholar.com/bookstore/works/the-power-of-diversity?category_id=cgrn&path=cgrn%2F209%2F215">rethinking urban spaces to embrace inclusivity</a>, particularly where ethnocultural ties transcend national boundaries. Inclusive neighbourhoods, mixed-use developments and accessible public spaces promote interaction and foster belonging. Such developments help build understanding, empathy and trust among different communities, preventing community fracturing that <a href="https://theconversation.com/darfur-tracing-the-origins-of-the-regions-strife-and-suffering-131931">leads to unrest</a>. </p>
<p><strong>2. Regional integration and resource management</strong></p>
<p>Sudan has experienced <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269336771_Khartoum_2030_Towards_An_Environmentally-Sensitive_Vision_for_the_Development_of_Greater_Khartoum_Sudan">unequal urban growth and the depopulation of rural areas</a>. To address this, the country’s long-term development visions and plans should aim for equitable development. These plans should take into account marginalised regions which may have ethnic populations that extend beyond national borders. A planning vision that transcends the scope of a single nation and seeks a regional approach is indispensable. Regional integration can restructure urban spaces, mobility systems and production patterns. This would foster self-sufficiency and integration. </p>
<p>Urban planning can also address resource management concerns – such as land ownership and economic opportunities – that trigger tension and conflict. Transparent mechanisms for resource allocation can help mitigate conflict arising from scarce resources. In Sudan, this would have helped improve regional employment prospects, reducing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-created-a-paramilitary-force-to-destroy-government-threats-but-it-became-a-major-threat-itself-203974">reliance on paramilitary activities</a> for income.</p>
<p><strong>3. Effective governance and public participation</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261996322_A_Critical_Evaluation_of_Public_Participation_in_the_Sudanese_Planning_Mandates">Participatory urban planning</a> improves governance. It empowers historically marginalised groups like young people, women, rural communities, informal settlers and minorities through public engagement. This enables them to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262008475_Evaluation_of_Two_Types_of_Community_Participation_In_Development_Projects_A_Case_Study_of_The_Sudanese_Neighbourhood_of_Al-Shigla">address their grievances and secure opportunities for meaningful dialogue</a>. The process generates enthusiasm for shaping, financing and managing urban spaces. </p>
<p>Public engagement harnesses local knowledge and culture. It advocates for policy transformation to address systematic inequalities and safeguard rights. Transparent and accountable governance complements these arrangements, promoting equality and preventing tension.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210293/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ibrahim Bahreldin is a member of the Sudanese Institute of Architects and the City Planning Institute of Japan, and is registered as a professional architect and urban planner with the Sudanese Engineering Council and the Saudi Council of Engineers. He is also affiliated with the University of Khartoum in Sudan. Ibrahim does not work for, consult, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article.</span></em></p>The interplay between diversity and urban planning in Sudan has created vibrant cityscapes, but also led to segregation and division.Ibrahim Z. Bahreldin, Associate Professor of Urban & Environmental Design, King Abdulaziz University Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069902023-06-08T14:08:37Z2023-06-08T14:08:37ZKenya’s opposition wants to split up the country – but secession calls seldom succeed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530907/original/file-20230608-22-hj7i1j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s opposition politicians recently called for <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">secession</a> – which is the withdrawal of territory and sovereignty from part of an existing state to create a new state. Led by Raila Odinga, who received <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62554210">48.8%</a> of the presidential vote in Kenya’s 2022 election, the politicians want the country split into two republics to create a new state for Kenyans unhappy with President William Ruto’s leadership.</p>
<p>Calls for secession are not a new political phenomenon in Kenya. </p>
<p>Even before the territory gained independence from Britain in 1963, some Kenyan Somalis had <a href="https://medium.com/@muturi/kenya-that-was-never-kenyan-the-shifta-war-the-north-eastern-kenya-e7fc3dd31865">sought to secede</a> and join neighbouring Somalia. And the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenyas-mombasa-republican-council-liberators-or-nascent-radical-fanatics">Mombasa Republican Council</a>, established in the 1990s, has called for an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/06/kenya-ocean-coast-secessionist-party">independent state</a> for the coastal people, citing their marginalisation.</p>
<p>Opposition groups also made <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/112/446/48/10197">secession calls</a> after Kenya’s 2007-08 <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/smart-global-health/background-post-election-crisis-kenya">post-election violence</a>. These calls were repeated in the run-up to the elections in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-kenya-coast-mrc-idUKBRE86M0H820120723">2013</a>. Then in 2017, a bill tabled in parliament proposed creating a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/mp-peter-kaluma-drafts-bill-for-secession-of-40-counties-476322?view=htmlamp">People’s Republic of Kenya</a> from 40 of the country’s current 47 counties. Geographically, this new republic would retain nearly 87% of Kenya’s population and 97% of the land mass, leaving behind a nation that would not be economically viable. </p>
<p>Secessionist movements around the world usually result from the belief by some groups within a region or state that they aren’t able to exercise their right to <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2013/gashc4085.doc.htm">self-determination</a>. This is their right to determine “<a href="https://press.un.org/en/2013/gashc4085.doc.htm">their own future, political status and independence</a>”, according to the UN. </p>
<p>Self-determination can be <a href="https://pesd.princeton.edu/node/511#:%7E:text=External%20self%2Ddetermination%20is%20the,an%20exercise%20of%20self%2Ddetermination.">external or internal</a>: full independence from other states, or access to political and social rights within a state. The two kinds are related. When governments fail to guarantee internal self-determination, affected groups may seek secession, or external self-determination. </p>
<p>The politicians calling for secession in Kenya argue that some Kenyans have been <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">systematically deprived</a> of the right to participate in the country’s government and economy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-muslims-a-divided-community-with-little-political-clout-184436">Kenya's Muslims: a divided community with little political clout</a>
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<p>Aggrieved groups may seek to form their own independent sovereign state, like the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093">Biafrans of Nigeria</a> did between 1967 and 1970. Or they may seek to join another independent state, as the <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/oped/comment/what-can-kenya-s-budding-secessionist-movement-learn-from-elsewhere--1378732">Somalis of Kenya</a> did in the 1960s. </p>
<p>In my view as a legal scholar and economist who has studied the political economy in Africa for close to two decades, any group in Kenya that unilaterally declares independence is unlikely to find support on the continent. Additionally, Kenyan politicians have yet to prove that aggrieved groups have been systematically denied the right to participate in the government and the economy in meaningful ways. </p>
<h2>Colonial borders</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-totally-rejects-the-so-called-declaration-of-independence-by-a-rebel-group-in-northern-mali">African Union</a> has been against secession since it was first established as the Organisation of African Unity in <a href="https://au.int/en/overview">1963</a>. </p>
<p>The organisation refused to intervene in the Nigerian civil war sparked by the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51094093">Biafran secession of 1967</a>, calling it an internal affair. And in Mali, in response to the declaration of the independent state of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-mali-20120406-idAFJOE83500820120406">Azawad</a> by northern Tuaregs in 2012, the union rejected this, terming it “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-mali-20120406-idAFJOE83500820120406">null and of no value whatsoever</a>”. </p>
<p>The union’s chairperson at the time, <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-comm-mali-2-06-04-2012.docx-eng.pdf">Jean Ping</a>, emphasised the </p>
<blockquote>
<p>fundamental principle of the intangibility of borders inherited by African countries at their accession to independence.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This echoes <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=8">Article 4(b)</a> of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. It states that the continental organisation shall respect the borders that existed at independence. The act also calls on the union to defend the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf#page=7">territorial integrity</a> of its member states. This presents it with a dilemma when it comes to addressing secessionist movements. </p>
<p>The answer to this dilemma is for the African Union to establish a legal mechanism for recognising legitimate struggles for secession. These include struggles that offer a <a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=114130#:%7E:text=Van%20Der%20Driest%20defines%20remedial,or%20domestic%20constitutional%20authorization%2C%20yet">remedy</a> for grave and systematic injustices.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-breakdown-of-biafra-separatism-and-where-kanu-fits-into-the-picture-166235">A breakdown of Biafra separatism, and where Kanu fits into the picture</a>
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<p>This was seen in South Sudan in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082">2011</a>. The South Sudanese people based their push to secede on the argument that since independence in <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/0721/South-Sudan-5-key-questions-answered/Why-did-the-Republic-of-South-Sudan-secede-from-the-North#:%7E:text=The%20decision%20to%20secede%20can,Sudan%20became%20independent%20in%201956.">1956</a>, Khartoum had systematically marginalised them and denied them the right to pursue their political, economic and social development within a united Sudan. </p>
<p>At the end of a brutal civil war (<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2nd-civil-war-darfur/">1985 to 2005</a>), the warring parties signed a peace agreement. It granted southerners the option to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12317927">pursue self-determination</a>. Sudan <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20100628-sudan-agrees-commission-southern-referendum">approved</a> of South Sudan’s independence push.</p>
<p>National governments can also establish constitutional processes that allow aggrieved groups to peacefully and constitutionally petition for separation. This has been done in the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9104/">UK</a> and <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-31.8/page-1.html">Canada</a>. Such constitutional mechanisms <a href="https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/secession">can encourage</a> aggrieved groups to seek internal instead of external self-determination.</p>
<p>While secession can involve the use of force – as it did in Biafra and South Sudan – it can also be achieved through peaceful means. Scotland’s ongoing bid to become independent of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-16/nicola-sturgeon-resigned-what-s-next-for-scottish-independence#xj4y7vzkg">Britain</a> is a case in point. </p>
<h2>Kenya’s obstacles</h2>
<p>Secession by Kenya’s aggrieved groups or peoples is unlikely to succeed as it faces four major obstacles.</p>
<p>First, as is clear from the African Union’s <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a>, any move to interfere with Kenya’s territorial integrity is unlikely to be supported by the organisation. </p>
<p>Second, it’s not likely that the post-secession state will gain the approval of the UN Security Council and then that of two-thirds of the UN General Assembly to be admitted to the UN. This is largely because the secessionists have not yet made a credible case for splitting Kenya into two states. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-secessionist-conflict-has-its-genesis-in-colonialism-its-time-to-reflect-158953">Ghana's secessionist conflict has its genesis in colonialism: it's time to reflect</a>
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<p>Third, secession as <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/azimio-to-push-for-secession-in-battle-with-ruto-as-talks-stall--4248456">envisioned</a> by Kenya’s opposition will create two states, one of which is not likely to be economically viable. This could lead to a civil war. </p>
<p>Fourth, the <a href="http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=3979#:%7E:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya%2C%202010,specified%20in%20the%20First%20Schedule.">2010 constitution</a> <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/brief/kenyas-devolution">devolved power</a> from the central government in Nairobi in favour of local communities in 47 regions. This significantly improved the ability of various groups to govern themselves and participate in their own economic, social and cultural development. </p>
<p>Politicians and aggrieved groups need to exercise the right to self-determination through this decentralised governance process. Through it, they can help create a participatory, inclusive and development-oriented government and economy in a united Kenya.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Calls to secede have been heard from time to time in Kenya – most often around elections.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2067422023-06-07T12:24:51Z2023-06-07T12:24:51ZThis course studies NGOs aiming to help countries recover from mass atrocities and to prevent future violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530156/original/file-20230605-23-e0xtco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C293%2C3856%2C2311&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A witness cries while giving testimony in a trial against former Guatemalan dictator Gen. José Efraín Ríos Montt in 2013. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ana-de-leon-cries-while-giving-testimony-as-witness-in-the-news-photo/165201899">Johan Ordonez/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Text saying: Uncommon Courses, from The Conversation" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/499014/original/file-20221205-17-kcwec8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=471&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/topics/uncommon-courses-130908">Uncommon Courses</a> is an occasional series from The Conversation U.S. highlighting unconventional approaches to teaching.</em></p>
<h2>Title of course:</h2>
<p>“Introduction to Nongovernmental Organizations”</p>
<h2>What prompted the idea for the course?</h2>
<p>I’ve long studied mass atrocities perpetrated against people based on their religion, ethnic background, political views or simply some aspect of their identity. Over the past decade, I came to realize that what I’d learned from history classes and news media about the Nazi Holocaust, the Cambodian killing fields, the genocide of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda, and the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s taught me what happened and why. I didn’t know, and wanted to learn, what could have been done to prevent that violence and what happened afterward to prevent it from happening again. </p>
<p>I learned that nonprofits play a critical role in preventing mass atrocities and helping communities recover from them. I developed this course to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2023.2201806">teach students about the nongovernmental organizations</a>, as these groups are called outside the United States, that do this work.</p>
<h2>What does the course explore?</h2>
<p>It focuses on five countries with a history of mass atrocities – or the risk of experiencing them in the future – and the often difficult <a href="https://monitor.civicus.org/">work NGOs do</a> in those places. Students learn about the history of conflicts and the potential for future identity-based violence in nations like Myanmar, Colombia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland and South Africa.</p>
<p>In addition, students regularly meet with staff from NGOs in each of those countries to learn what they do to address past violence and prevent it in the future. </p>
<p>Two examples are <a href="https://www.cbmitrovica.org/">Community Building Mitrovica</a> in Kosovo, and the <a href="https://www.districtsix.co.za/">District Six Museum</a> in South Africa. Community Building Mitrovica operates in a city with a population that’s evenly divided between Albanians and Serbs. It delivers programs that increase understanding and enhances the capacity of the two ethnic groups to live together peacefully.</p>
<p>Cape Town’s District Six Museum tells the story of the displacement of residents and the destruction of the District Six neighborhood under apartheid while also working to rebuild that community in post-apartheid South Africa. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C55%2C4575%2C2900&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman walks past displays outside a museum." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C55%2C4575%2C2900&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530144/original/file-20230605-27-kvgg5y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The District Six Museum commemorates a Capetown neighborhood South Africa’s Apartheid government demolished in 1966.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photograph-taken-in-the-city-centre-of-cape-town-on-news-photo/1199755969?adppopup=true">Rodger Bosch/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Why is this course relevant now?</h2>
<p>Systematic identity-based violence is more common than you might think. Mayans in <a href="https://theconversation.com/guatemalas-history-of-genocide-hurts-mayan-communities-to-this-day-97796">Guatemala</a> were victims of genocide in the 1970s and 1980s, as were Indigenous women in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-canada-committed-genocide-against-indigenous-peoples-explained-by-the-lawyer-central-to-the-determination-162582">Canada</a> over the past 100 years. Repressive governments in <a href="https://theconversation.com/operation-condor-why-victims-of-the-oppression-that-swept-1970s-south-america-are-still-fighting-for-justice-186789">Argentina, Chile and Uruguay</a> assassinated political opponents in the 20th century. <a href="https://theconversation.com/ugandas-anti-homosexuality-law-is-a-patriarchal-backlash-against-progress-206681">Uganda in May 2023 enacted a law that criminalized homosexuality</a>, making <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/mar/14/lgbtq-crackdowns-uganda-environment-hostile">LGBTQ people fear they too could become victims of identity-based violence</a>.</p>
<h2>What’s a critical lesson from the course?</h2>
<p>Threats of violence against groups due to their identity persist in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-republican-transgender-laws-pile-up-setting-2024-battle-lines-2023-05-18/">the United States</a> and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/trans-rights-lgbt-latin-america-brazil-bolsonaro/">globally</a>. Recent political attacks on transgender and other LGBTQ people reflect this threat. NGOs are using their knowledge and skills to stave off the threat of violence against them. </p>
<h2>What materials does the course feature?</h2>
<p>“<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CT50KiRsTbA&ab_channel=PBSNewsHour">PBS NewsHour</a>”: A segment on the trial of former Guatemalan President José Efraín Ríos Montt for genocide, and the role of NGOs in bringing him to trial.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/research/program-for-the-advancement-research-on-conflict-collaboration/e-parcc/cases-simulations-syllabi/cases/kifaya-enough-dangerous-speech-for-south-sudanese">#KIFAYA</a>: A case study of young South Sudanese activists from different ethnic groups who created a music video sung in several local languages to call for an end to interethnic violence and hate speech.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.iheart.com/podcast/1119-the-missionary-61230211/">The Missionary</a>”: A podcast that tells the story of the harm people from wealthy nations can do when they lack the skills and local knowledge to do NGO work outside their home countries. This podcast focuses on a U.S. woman accused of providing medical care in Uganda without any training. </p>
<h2>What will the course prepare students to do?</h2>
<p>Students ideally acquire a deeper appreciation of the hard work required to address the underlying causes of mass atrocities and identity-based violence. They learn about people who have dedicated their professional lives to reducing the threat of violence – and their successes and failures. I hope it motivates some of them to work in this field, either through volunteering or their professional careers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206742/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Institute for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention at Binghamton University, which sponsored the development of this course, receives funding from an alumnus to underwrite the cost of the stipends the course provides to participating NGOs.</span></em></p>College students learn about people who have dedicated their professional lives to reducing the threat of violence – and their successes and failures.David Campbell, Professor of Public Administration, Binghamton University, State University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2065172023-06-06T14:41:44Z2023-06-06T14:41:44ZWar in Sudan puts South Sudan in danger too: the world’s youngest nation needs a stable neighbour<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/529295/original/file-20230531-21-ikzgfl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anton Petrus/ Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Twelve years after independence, South Sudan remains extremely poor and underdeveloped. A <a href="https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/arcss-2015/agreement-summary/130-summary-of-the-revitalized-agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-the-republic-of-south-sudan-r-arcss-12-september-2018/file">peace deal</a> brokered in 2018 has failed to end conflict. And the government has failed to engage the people in state reconstruction, leaving the country without genuine and effective institutions of self-government.</p>
<p>The country remains trapped in extreme poverty, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100932">high levels of corruption</a>, bloody power struggles between <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15278.doc.htm">ethnic-based militias</a>, and total dependence on oil exports for public revenues.</p>
<p>The outbreak of conflict in the Republic of Sudan will hamper South Sudan’s efforts to get on its feet. This is so for two main reasons. </p>
<p>First, South Sudan’s economy is highly dependent on oil. But the oil has to pass through Sudan to get to export markets. The conflict in Sudan could halt this. Also, the deal struck with Khartoum on oil exports could be at risk if the war continues and the government in Khartoum collapses. </p>
<p>The second reason South Sudan’s efforts at statehood are threatened is that a peaceful Khartoum is critical for the peace process and development in South Sudan. Instability in Sudan could derail South Sudan’s peace process. It could relegate the country to persistent instability, economic deterioration, pervasive corruption and self-dealing by civil servants and political elites.</p>
<p>I have for 12 years followed key aspects of South Sudan’s progress to statehood, including its <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/27/south-sudan-seeking-the-right-formula-for-peaceful-coexistence-and-sustainable-development/">development effort</a> and <a href="https://www.africaportal.org/publications/one-year-after-south-sudans-independence-opportunities-and-obstacles-for-africas-newest-country/">obstacles to its growth</a> in the context of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315186092-13/ethnicity-constitutionalism-governance-africa-africa-john-mukum-mbaku">governance in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>The country has enormous amounts of natural resources: the Nile River, petroleum, aluminium, iron ore, marble and gold. But even after more than 10 years of independence, a significant proportion of the citizens depend on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/06/15/world-bank-report-with-peace-and-accountability-oil-and-agriculture-can-support-early-recovery-in-south-sudan#:%7E:text=Oil%20and%20agriculture%20are%20the,than%20four%20in%20five%20households.">humanitarian aid</a> to meet their basic needs. In 2023, South Sudan had the highest <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/poverty-rate-by-country">poverty rate</a> in the world. It is <a href="https://list25.com/25-most-unstable-countries-in-the-world/">among</a> the world’s most politically and economically unstable countries. </p>
<p>The key to resolving South Sudan’s economic problems is wealth creation and robust economic growth. This can only happen if all of the country’s ethno-cultural groups live together in peace. Peace and security in South Sudan depend, to a great extent, on a fully functioning, peaceful and democratic government in Khartoum. </p>
<h2>Economic lifeline</h2>
<p>South Sudan’s present economic prospects are tied directly to the production and export of oil. It accounts for <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/06/15/world-bank-report-with-peace-and-accountability-oil-and-agriculture-can-support-early-recovery-in-south-sudan#:%7E:text=Oil%20and%20agriculture%20are%20the,than%20four%20in%20five%20households.">90%</a> of public revenue. </p>
<p>South Sudan currently produces about <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/the-promise-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-sudan-81521">150,000 to 170,000 barrels of oil per day</a>. But Juba receives income from only <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/the-promise-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-sudan-81521">45,000 barrels</a> after an account is made of “the share owed to international companies and <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/the-promise-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-sudan-81521">fees paid to Sudan</a>”, based on the terms of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Sudan/The-2005-Comprehensive-Peace-Agreement">the 2005 peace agreement</a>. According to the International Crisis Group, the government’s opaque approach to accounting for oil sales “<a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/305-oil-or-nothing-dealing-south-sudans-bleeding-finances">shields substantial revenues from oversight</a>” and creates conditions that enhance corruption and mismanagement of public funds. </p>
<p>Some oil revenues are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudans-oil-sector-needs-become-more-transparent">siphoned off</a> by elites in Juba for their personal benefit. According to <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/the-promise-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-sudan-81521">US government sources</a>, some of those funds are used to “fund the purchase of weapons and other materials that undermine the [country’s] peace, security, <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/the-promise-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-sudan-81521">and stability</a>.” In 2012, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-corruption/south-sudan-officials-have-stolen-4-billion-president-idUSBRE8530QI20120604">President Salva Kiir</a> claimed that his own government officials had “stolen” US$4 billion of the public’s money and that they needed to return it so that it could be used to lift the people out of poverty.</p>
<p>South Sudan’s oil travels through the <a href="https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?Country=Sudan&articleid=1221930106&oid=1421858326&pid=1421858_8">Greater Nile Oil Pipeline</a> via Khartoum to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Continued fighting between the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/6/rival-sudan-factions-meet-in-saudi-arabia-as-pressure-mounts">rival factions</a> in Sudan could lead to sabotage or disruption of oil exports. </p>
<p>Continued fighting could also weaken Khartoum so much that it is no longer able to facilitate any export trade or oversee the arrangement for sharing oil revenues with Juba.</p>
<h2>The peace process at risk</h2>
<p>On <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-unrest/south-sudans-president-rebel-leader-sign-peace-deal-idUSKCN1LS2PW">12 September 2018</a>, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir and Vice-President Riek Machar signed a peace agreement. The civil war had killed more than 50,000 people, forced more than two million from their homes, and derailed progress towards development and peaceful coexistence. </p>
<p>Sudan and Uganda are guarantors of the 2018 <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article274026/">agreement</a> to end conflict in South Sudan. Sudan also chairs the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the group that worked to bring an end to the conflict. </p>
<p>The warring parties in South Sudan had a transitional period to make reforms, restore the rule of law and open up political spaces. But the country made no significant progress in that period. Insecurity and violence against civilians continued.</p>
<p>On 4 August 2022, the opposition and the government agreed to extend the peace agreement for an extra 24 months, starting in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/18/south-sudan-use-peace-deal-extension-reforms">February 2023</a>. Kiir <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/18/south-sudan-use-peace-deal-extension-reforms">stated</a> that the extra time would allow preparation for elections. </p>
<p>Critics of the government have argued that instead of implementing the peace agreement, Kiir has inserted himself into the Sudan conflict, serving as the <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article273059/">coordinator of efforts</a> to secure a permanent peace deal between the feuding factions. </p>
<p>A spokesperson for South Sudan’s government has argued, however, that the peace process continues, pointing to <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article274026/">meetings</a> between Machar and Kiir.</p>
<p>A peaceful Khartoum is critical for the peace process and development in South Sudan. Continued instability in Sudan, then, could worsen the political crisis in South Sudan and cause further deterioration in economic and social conditions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206517/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Peace and security in South Sudan depend on a fully functioning, peaceful and democratic government in KhartoumJohn Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049242023-05-31T13:26:44Z2023-05-31T13:26:44ZFree secondary education in African countries is on the rise - but is it the best policy? What the evidence says<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525851/original/file-20230512-29-k330gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa's secondary school enrolment rates still lag far behind those of other world regions'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Dorey/Contributor/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When President Salva Kiir <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/14/south-sudan-expands-access-free-education">announced the abolition of secondary school fees</a> in South Sudan in February 2023, he was following several fellow African leaders. </p>
<p><a href="https://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/news-style2/364-president-akufo-addo-launches-free-shs-policy">Ghana</a>, <a href="https://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Gratuite-des-inscriptions-dans-les-etablissements-scolaires-publics.html">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-abolishessecondary-school-tuition-fees-full-free-education-by-jan-2019/">Malawi</a>, <a href="https://statehouse.gov.sl/president-bio-launches-free-education-calls-on-parents-andteachers-to-support-the-initiative/">Sierra Leone</a>, <a href="https://togobreakingnews.info/togo-gratuite-frais-de-scolarite-secondaire/">Togo</a>, and <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202202030616.html">Zambia</a> have all announced free secondary education policies in the last five years. Rwanda, Kenya and South Africa were early trendsetters in this regard.</p>
<p>Despite its popularity with policymakers, parents and other stakeholders, the abolition of secondary school fees in resource-constrained contexts is still a subject of debate. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://southafrica.un.org/en/191051-african-leaders-launch-education-plus-initiative#:%7E:text=Education%20Plus%20calls%20for%20free,to%2Dwork%20transitions%2C%20and%20economic">African Union</a>, global NGOs like <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/31/millions-children-denied-free-secondary-education">Human Rights Watch</a> and various United Nations agencies are in favour. </p>
<p>Others are sceptical. They highlight financial sustainability and equity implications, especially at the upper secondary level. A report by the Malala Fund, a global education NGO, <a href="https://r4d.org/resources/financing-upper-secondary-education-unlocking-12-years-education/">argued</a> that free upper secondary education “would be regressive in nature” and might not be affordable for low-income countries. </p>
<p>We conducted a <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/8fa2c.html">systematic review</a> to take stock of the evidence. We conclude that free secondary education can be costly and inequitable in the short run, especially if it diverts resources from primary education. Based on these findings, we recommend a policy of “progressive universalism”: free education should be introduced gradually, starting with the lowest levels. </p>
<h2>Setting the scene</h2>
<p>Many African countries abolished primary school fees in the 1990s and early 2000s. This led to a <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/a55bc38c-5d2b-5932-83e4-debc56e30da9">major rise in enrolment</a>. But secondary school enrolment rates still lag far behind those in other world regions. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS?locations=ZG">Less than half</a> of children in sub-Saharan Africa complete lower secondary education, compared to around 80% in South Asia and Latin America. High fees and related costs are a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a5b40f0b6497400056a/School-fees-2012-Morgan-report.pdf">major impediment</a>, particularly for children from low-income backgrounds.</p>
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<img alt="A map of Africa, marked with various shades of red to indicate which countries have free secondary education" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Free secondary education policies in sub-Saharan Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors supplied</span></span>
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<p>The number of sub-Saharan Africa countries with free secondary education policies in place has increased rapidly over the last two decades. Almost half of all African countries now offer fee-free education at the lower secondary level. Almost one in three does so at the upper secondary level. The aim of the recent wave of free secondary education policies is to raise overall education levels – and, ultimately, countries’ <a href="https://cocorioko.net/president-bio-launches-free-education-calls-on-parents-and-teachers-to-support-the-initiative/">broader prosperity and social conditions</a>. </p>
<p>Abolishing school fees is also <a href="https://www.ghgossip.com/ghana-election-2020-free-shs-alone-can-boost-500k-votes-to-npps-win-franklin-cudjoe/">popular with voters</a>. This may have been on the minds of politicians seeking to win or maintain power.</p>
<h2>The cost of free education</h2>
<p>There are two major problems with secondary school fee abolition in resource-constrained states. The first is that, in most African countries, the majority of children from poor households would be ineligible for free secondary education. In Somalia, Niger and Mozambique, less than one in five of the poorest children <a href="https://www.education-inequalities.org/indicators/comp_prim_v2#maxYear=2019&minYear=2014&ageGroup=%22comp_prim_v2%22&dimension=%7B%22id%22%3A%22wealth_quintile%22%2C%22filters%22%3A%5B%22Quintile+1%22%2C%22Quintile+5%22%5D%7D&countries=%5B%22BDI%22%2C%22BEN%22%2C%22BFA%22%2C%22CAF%22%2C%22CIV%22%2C%22CMR%22%2C%22COD%22%2C%22COG%22%2C%22COM%22%2C%22ETH%22%2C%22GAB%22%2C%22GHA%22%2C%22GIN%22%2C%22GMB%22%2C%22GNB%22%2C%22KEN%22%2C%22LBR%22%2C%22LSO%22%2C%22MDG%22%2C%22MLI%22%2C%22MOZ%22%2C%22MRT%22%2C%22MWI%22%2C%22NAM%22%2C%22NER%22%2C%22NGA%22%2C%22RWA%22%2C%22SEN%22%2C%22SLE%22%2C%22SOM%22%2C%22SSD%22%2C%22STP%22%2C%22SWZ%22%2C%22TCD%22%2C%22TGO%22%2C%22TZA%22%2C%22UGA%22%2C%22ZAF%22%2C%22ZMB%22%2C%22ZWE%22%5D">complete primary school</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/only-1-in-3-girls-makes-it-to-secondary-school-in-senegal-heres-why-and-how-to-fix-it-200294">Only 1 in 3 girls makes it to secondary school in Senegal: here's why and how to fix it</a>
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<p>Moreover, even those eligible for free secondary education are often unable to attend. School fees constitute <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/facing-forward-schooling-for-learning-in-africa">less than half</a> of households’ education spending in most African countries. Most free secondary education policies do not cover the cost of essential non-fee expenses such as textbooks, school uniforms, meals and transport. Nominally “free” secondary education can therefore be <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059311000101">unaffordable for low-income households</a>. This means the benefits of fee abolition would mainly accrue to children from relatively privileged households and not help those who needed it most.</p>
<p>The second problem is that enacting these policies is very expensive. Empirical evidence from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305764X.2020.1789066">Ghana</a>, The <a href="https://academic.oup.com/wber/article-abstract/33/1/185/2420643?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Gambia</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775721000467">Kenya</a> and other countries shows that free secondary education policies can substantially increase secondary school enrolment and completion rates in the short run. But they do so at a very high cost: the average expense per senior secondary student is <a href="https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/node/819#:%7E:text=2015-,Pricing%20the%20right%20to%20education%3A%20The%20cost,reaching%20new%20targets%20by%202030&text=This%20paper%20shows%20there%20is,and%20lower%20middle%20income%20countries">equivalent to that of five primary school pupils</a>. </p>
<p>Considering the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/277051/africa-sovereigns-left-exposed-to-looming-debt-crisis-afdb/">precarious financial position</a> of many African states, providing free secondary schooling to the entire population is likely to be fiscally unsustainable. </p>
<p>It may also divert scarce resources away from basic education, which is already chronically underfunded. In Malawi for example, which recently abolished secondary school fees, there are <a href="https://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/packed-classrooms-reality-educational-planners-malawi-13351">more than 70 students</a> per primary school teacher.</p>
<h2>What is to be done?</h2>
<p>Access to education is <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/human-rights/universal-declaration/translations/english">a human right</a>. In an ideal world, the global community would ensure that all children could enjoy a full cycle of free, high-quality education. </p>
<p>Most African countries are far removed from this scenario, however. Policymakers must balance the potential benefits of abolishing secondary school fees against the urgent need for investment in basic education. </p>
<p>In many cases, this would suggest a phased approach to introducing free education, which prioritises public spending on basic education in the short run, while asking wealthier households to contribute to the cost of higher levels of education. <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/662580">A good example</a> is South Africa’s fee-free schools policy, which was designed to increase enrolment in the poorest districts.</p>
<p><em>Mohammed Alhassan Abango and Leslie Casely-Hayford of Associates for Change, Ghana co-authored this article and the research it is based upon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research project on which this article is based was funded by the British Academy.</span></em></p>The introduction of free education should follow a gradual process, starting with the lowest levels.Rob Gruijters, Associate Professor in Education & International Development, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2008612023-05-14T06:11:57Z2023-05-14T06:11:57ZMost east African refugees are hosted close to borders – it’s a deliberate war strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523812/original/file-20230502-20-ymiyh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Burundian flag flies at the head of a convoy of buses moving refugees back home from Tanzania in 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tchandrou Nitanga/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There are close to <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/">4 million</a> people living in refugee camps across Africa. Of the more than 300 camps, nearly 70% are situated within 30km-50km of an international border. They include some of the largest camps in the continent, such as Kakuma in northern Kenya, Nyarugusu in western Tanzania and Bidibidi in north-western Uganda. </p>
<p>The closer the camp is to an international border, the easier it is for people on both sides of the border to interact. </p>
<p>What this means is that healthy refugees in Kakuma, for example, can walk across the Kenyan border and get to Uganda or South Sudan within a day or two. It also means that rebel groups operating in any of these countries can access the refugee camp. This easy access to refugees benefits rebel groups across the border. And asylum countries like Tanzania and Kenya may choose refugee policies that help rebel groups in this fashion. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/99.397.601">Exploitation by armed groups</a> is one of the many threats refugees in border camps face. Often refugees are not allowed to <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/472896f50.pdf">leave camps to seek work</a>, making them dependent on aid. Young refugees, particularly men, are vulnerable to armed rebel groups that recruit people to their causes. These groups also informally tax refugees by taking a share of the aid they receive or demanding contributions. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt7z6bx">Researchers</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-anatomy-phantom-state">aid groups</a> have suggested that rebel groups take advantage of refugees because host countries <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501700392/dangerous-sanctuaries">cannot or will not stop them</a>. This logic focuses on the lack of will or capacity of such host countries as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-sudan-displaced/chad-failing-to-protect-civilians-refugee-group-idUSL1269730520070712">Chad</a> or the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-anatomy-phantom-state">Central African Republic</a>. But this ignores their strategy. </p>
<p>Even governments of <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/205014/why-nations-fail-by-daron-acemoglu-and-james-a-robinson/">poor countries choose where to allocate resources</a>. For example, rather than being inept or incapable of protection, <a href="https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2008/02/12/chad-demands-removal-sudanese-refugees/23619034007/">Chad’s approach to refugees has been consistent</a> with a broader approach to its <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2008/02/making-sense-of-chad/">relations with Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>I set out on my <a href="https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/kara_ross_camarena/files/krc_camplocation.pdf">research</a> project in east Africa to develop an <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691001296/analytic-narratives">analytic narrative</a> of refugee policy selection in the region. Using in-depth case studies and formal theory, I expected to find that foreign policy informed refugee policy in some ways, including interactions with humanitarian aid and donor countries. I sought to investigate the extent to which these tempered the domestic drivers of refugee policy. </p>
<p>What I found is that countries’ policies for hosting refugees are more strategic than expected. Host countries choose their refugee policy to influence the war from which the refugees fled. When <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.10520/EJC111780">Tanzania</a> and Kenya chose the <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/fmr-3/crisp-jacobsen">location</a> of camps and the restrictions on work and movement, influencing war informed their policies. Camp location and restrictions, along with maintaining dense refugee settlements, give rebel groups valuable access to refugee camps for exploitation.</p>
<p>My study demonstrates that east African host countries can follow a foreign policy logic for setting refugees up to be exploited. Domestic considerations can matter as well. </p>
<p>My research can help aid organisations identify whether domestic or foreign policy interests drive border camps in east Africa and elsewhere. When domestic rather than foreign policy considerations drive border camp location, humanitarian agencies can negotiate alternatives that make camps less crowded, move refugees further from the border or provide options for integrating elsewhere. </p>
<p>Each of these make refugee camps safer for refugees but less valuable to a rebel group. However, aid agencies will be less successful in negotiating alternatives when foreign policy drives the border camps because the alternatives undermine the goal of helping the rebel group.</p>
<h2>Proxy intervention aims</h2>
<p>Tanzania’s refugee policy in the 1990s is a good example of how geopolitics can inform refugee policy. <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/united-republic-tanzania/tanzania-refugee-situation-report">Tanzania hosted hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees</a>. They began arriving in 1993 because of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/30/tribal-massacres-ravage-burundi/2ce12135-2139-4b78-a89b-f9bcf19b0992/">political violence</a> and then a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/burundian-refugees-tanzania-key-factor-burundi-peace-process">civil war</a>. Densely populated camps were set up for arriving Burundian refugees as close as 15km to the common border. </p>
<p>The location, dense population and movement restrictions ensured that aid groups could serve the refugees. But the refugees were also ideal targets for recruitment and taxation, unable to work and with aid that could be taken away as efficiently as it was distributed. </p>
<p>Tanzania need not have established crowded camps on the border but this favoured its goals. Tanzania’s aim was to create pressure to return Burundi to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x15000324">a government consistent with the 1993 constitution</a>. Tanzania hoped that by Burundi holding multiparty elections and selecting a government backed by the majority of its citizens, Burundi would gain some stability. </p>
<p>At the same time, Tanzania sought to avoid a domestic backlash from the host population in the north-west who were <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/21.1_and_2.12">growing weary</a> of hosting refugees. </p>
<p>For Burundian rebel groups, the policy created a constant flow of resources and people from the camps to the front lines, which put the rebel groups in a better position to fight. Tanzania, which also hosted the peace accords, used a variety of tools of statecraft to end the war, and refugee policy was one of them. The better position to fight gave the rebel group more bargaining power. Since the rebel group also supported the 1993 constitution, a negotiated settlement where the rebel group had a pathway to elections would achieve this goal. </p>
<p>East Africa offers another example of the foreign policy logic. Following the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6b414.html">fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime</a> in Ethiopia in 1990, refugees from southern Sudan left Ethiopia for Kenya. Kenya established camps for the Sudanese at Kakuma near the border with Sudan. This was in line with Kenya’s support for the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army’s fight for autonomy. Like Tanzania, Kenya used multiple tools to sway the civil war outcome in their northern neighbour. Its combined efforts were instrumental in securing a pathway to independence for South Sudan. </p>
<h2>Non-intervention as a policy goal</h2>
<p>Tanzania and Kenya also offer a lesson in advancing foreign policy aims by not intervening. </p>
<p>At roughly the same time as Burundian refugees were being placed into crowded camps, Tanzania was also <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/research/evalreports/3ae6bcf90/evaluation-unhcrs-repatriation-operation-mozambique.html">hosting</a> between 70,000 and 300,000 Mozambicans. Many of them fled or could not return home because of civil war in Mozambique.</p>
<p>The Tanzanian and Mozambican governments have a long <a href="https://www.mz.tzembassy.go.tz/resources/view/mozambique-tanzania-relations">history of cooperation</a>. Tanzania was also strongly opposed to the apartheid-backed rebel group, Mozambican National Resistance, or Renamo, which was battling the government. </p>
<p>Unlike refugees from Burundi, Mozambican arrivals were not housed in camps. Most Mozambicans <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/research/evalreports/3ae6bcf90/evaluation-unhcrs-repatriation-operation-mozambique.html">were allowed to settle across the southern regions of Tanzania</a>, where they integrated with their co-ethnics in rural villages. Their shared way of life made the experience more like the regular cross-border migration that has occurred for generations.</p>
<p>By dispersing refugees throughout the countryside, refusing aid and allowing Mozambicans to integrate, Tanzania’s strategy followed a logic of non-intervention. This ensured that the migrant population was not easily targeted by Renamo in keeping with its political backing of the Mozambique administration.</p>
<p>In Kenya’s case with Somalia, the tide turned from indifference to non-intervention within a span of six years. </p>
<p>After the United Nations pulled out of Somalia in <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/">1995</a>, Kenya shifted the policy for Somalis away from intervention while building a relationship with what would became the transitional government in Somalia. Kenya <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/12.1.54">consolidated existing refugee camps</a> and eliminated camps that were close to the border with Somalia and along the coast. Somali refugees were subsequently moved <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/12.1.54">across the country</a> to Kakuma in the north. Settlements in Nairobi were allowed to expand, which reinforced an informal pathway to make Dadaab – the remaining camp near the Somali border – less attractive for recruiting.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Most wars end in negotiated settlements. Rebel groups need to extract sufficient assurances to negotiate. If not, <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/24/1/127/11637/Designing-Transitions-from-Civil-War">they are unwilling to take the risk of giving up the fight</a>. Providing a rebel group with a stronger bargaining position could help along negotiations and bring about a peace agreement. </p>
<p>Giving a rebel group bargaining power by helping it fight a war can inform refugee policy. Alternatively, host countries might avoid camps specifically to prevent helping a rebel group.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200861/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kara Ross Camarena received funding from the Harvard University Committee on African Studies and
the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs for this project. She is also a faculty affiliate of the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts. </span></em></p>Tanzania’s refugee policy in the 1990s is a good example of how geopolitics affects ordinary refugees.Kara Ross Camarena, Assistant Professor, Loyola University ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2052172023-05-11T09:19:32Z2023-05-11T09:19:32ZSudan refugee crisis: aid agencies face huge challenges as hundreds of thousands flee violence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525604/original/file-20230511-25-7g00wd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees who crossed from Sudan to Ethiopia wait in line to register at the International Organization for Migration at Metema on May 4, 2023. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by AMANUEL SILESHI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Sudan stands on the brink of yet another civil war <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-created-a-paramilitary-force-to-destroy-government-threats-but-it-became-a-major-threat-itself-203974">sparked by</a> a confrontation between two generals: the head of Sudan’s Armed Forces, General Abdelfatah El-Burhan, and the head of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.</em></p>
<p><em>The conflict, currently unfolding in the capital, Khartoum, has created a widespread humanitarian crisis. Thousands of people, trying to escape the violence, are crossing into neighbouring countries. International law and refugee <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Asylum-Seeker-and-Refugee-Protection-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-The-Peregrination/dOrsi/p/book/9781138025424">expert</a> Cristiano d'Orsi tells us what his biggest concerns about the situation are, and what needs to be done to address them.</em></p>
<h2>What are your biggest concerns with the refugee situation?</h2>
<p>In Sudan, the situation is particularly worrying because of the huge number of refugees that will be moving. People are leaving from many parts of the country. Though the conflict’s epicentre is in Khartoum, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/18/what-is-happening-in-sudan-a-simple-guide">it has spread</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1082722">At least</a> 100,000 people have already arrived in neighbouring countries, <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15265.doc.htm">including</a> Chad, Egypt and South Sudan. Contingency plans are being put in place <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-sudan-refugee-response-will-need-445-million-rising-numbers-fleeing-sudan">for about</a> 860,000 refugees. As an <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Asylum-Seeker-and-Refugee-Protection-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-The-Peregrination/dOrsi/p/book/9781138025424">expert on</a> the legal protection of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants, I’m interested in seeing how these vulnerable groups will fare.</p>
<p>The numbers are high partly because Sudan hosted <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/countries/sudan">1.1 million</a> refugees, one of the largest refugee populations in Africa. South Sudanese represented more than 70% (800,000) of the refugees in Sudan, followed by 126,000 Eritrean refugees (11%). Most of these refugees, about 60%, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-country-refugee-response-plan-crp-january-december-2023">lived outside</a> camps – in towns, villages and areas just outside Khartoum.</p>
<p>The refugees hosted by Sudan are now fleeing violence in Sudan. Neighbouring countries will have to treat them as asylum-seekers or refugees because <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/6450e5814.html#page=3">they cannot</a> be returned to a situation of conflict. Some will also face the difficult decision of returning to their home countries. For instance, there are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/07/eritrea-accused-of-forcibly-repatriating-civilians-caught-up-in-sudan-fighting">reports</a> that Eritrean men who escaped military service and fled to Sudan are already being detained upon their return.</p>
<p>Another big concern I have is the challenges facing aid efforts. </p>
<p>With Khartoum under attack, aid efforts – to support both refugees and the wider public – will require a new operational hub. Port Sudan – a city and port on the Red Sea in eastern Sudan – has become a hub for evacuations, and looks set to become an operating base for the UN and aid groups. </p>
<p>Given the current insecurity, getting relief to people in need will be a massive hurdle. Depending on how the conflict unfolds, aid may need to move across front lines or across national borders. </p>
<p>In addition, last year the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that Sudan’s aid groups, including those looking after refugees, only received <a href="https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1068/summary">around half</a> of the nearly US$2 billion they requested from donors – a shortfall that other relief missions are also facing. </p>
<p>The crisis places huge, new demands on the international community to increase funding. UNHCR alone will need <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-sudan-refugee-response-will-need-445-million-rising-numbers-fleeing-sudan?mc_cid=14b70653fa&mc_eid=4aad996b35">at least US$445 million</a> to support the displaced until October 2023.</p>
<p>How long it will take for donor funding to materialise remains to be seen. In the meantime, frontline communities and mutual aid networks <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65344673">are acting</a> as first responders, from hosting displaced families to coordinating relief in Khartoum and beyond. </p>
<h2>What’s the international response been like?</h2>
<p>There has been some international action. From what I’ve seen, for now, it’s mostly been the United Nations, European Union and a handful of individual countries. </p>
<p>The African Union has <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230502/african-union-condemns-violence-sudan-calls-humanitarian-ceasefire-and-urges">condemned the violence and called</a> for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. It has also pledged to coordinate international action on Sudan. </p>
<p>A regional refugee emergency response, led by UNHCR, is underway. And the International Medical Corps <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-conflict-situation-report-2-april-27-2023">has launched</a> a regional response to meet the needs of internally displaced persons and refugees. </p>
<p>The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">has provided</a> critical water, sanitation and hygiene support to hospitals in Khartoum and Darfur. UN Women <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">is providing</a> financial and technical support to young Sudanese women who are using app technology to keep themselves safe. They’re able to find food, medicine and safe routes away from the fighting. The UN is <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136292">also</a> tracking cases and allegations of gender-based violence and taking measures to support victims. </p>
<p>The European Union has <a href="https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/sudan_en">allocated</a> €200,000 (about US$220,000) for immediate relief and first aid assistance to those injured or exposed to high risk. This will support the Sudanese Red Crescent Society with first aid, evacuation services, and psychosocial support.</p>
<p>The Arab League <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/05/07/arab-league-begins-negotiations-between-sudans-warring-sides">has been holding</a> emergency meetings to find a real solution to the clashes and stop the bloodshed.</p>
<h2>What more needs to be done?</h2>
<p>The root causes of refugee flows need to be addressed. The most obvious solution to end Sudan’s refugee crisis is to make efforts to reach a peace agreement.</p>
<p>While attempts to mediate the conflict are underway, for instance by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-pin-their-hopes-talks-saudi-arabia-2023-05-08/">Arab League</a>, there are several factors that must be respected. </p>
<p>First, the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and returnees must be respected and protected. All of Sudan’s neighbours have a duty under law to do this. Five of Sudan’s neighbours are party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, so they’re obliged to protect refugees on their territory. </p>
<p>Even though Libya and Eritrea aren’t party to the convention, the principle of non-refoulement – whereby people aren’t allowed to be returned to situations of harm – has today become <a href="https://harvardilj.org/2022/12/the-obligation-of-non-refoulement-and-its-erga-omnes-partes-character/">a principle of customary</a> international law. This means they can’t force people to return to Sudan, while it’s still volatile. The UN, the AU and UNHCR typically supervise this. </p>
<p>UNHCR <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/6450e5814.html#page=3">has called on</a> states to suspend the forcible return of nationals and stateless people residing in Sudan. </p>
<p>In addition, countries that people are fleeing to must suspend issuance of negative decisions on applications for international protection, until the situation in Sudan has stabilised.</p>
<p>Finally, all countries <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/unhcr-urges-states-keep-borders-open-sudanese-suspend-negative-asylum-decisions?mc_cid=14b70653fa&mc_eid=4aad996b35">must allow</a> civilians of all nationalities fleeing Sudan non-discriminatory access to their territories. These include those who do not have documentation or passports. </p>
<p>Next, Sudan will need stronger aid infrastructure. This <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/04/26/aid-agencies-sudan-war">includes</a> improved security analysis and better coordination mechanisms between civilian and military actors. </p>
<p>Finally, <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2023/04/26/aid-agencies-sudan-war">funding</a> for relief efforts will also need to increase substantially. Key to this is <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/four-key-areas-improve-aid-effectiveness">accountability</a>. Donors are more likely to base their own policies on recipient priorities if donors act together.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205217/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristiano d'Orsi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The number of refugees leaving Sudan is particularly high because Sudan was itself host to a million refugees.Cristiano d'Orsi, Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law (SARCIL), University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2044532023-04-28T12:46:12Z2023-04-28T12:46:12ZSudan’s plunge into chaos has geopolitical implications near and far – including for US strategic goals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523311/original/file-20230427-26-r895dy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=20%2C68%2C3473%2C2258&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Jordanians being evacuated from Sudan amid fighting between two factions.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UnitedStatesSudanEvacuationExplainer/f1ecc7c128e3456eaeb70f9f90762d1a/photo?Query=Sudan%20evacuations&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=292&currentItemNo=22">AP Photo/Raad Adayleh</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The sight of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-evacuations-united-states-diplomats-khartoum-eb48df9d2d6334f9de36ffe92b9bede1">diplomats fleeing Sudan</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/26/sudan-fighting-evacuation-americans-british/">amid chaotic scenes</a> reflects the gravity of the situation, but also the extent of international interest in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">strife-torn nation</a>.</p>
<p>Days into fighting that has left <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-death-toll-rises-413-world-health-organization-says-2023-04-21/#:%7E:text=GENEVA%2C%20April%2021%20(Reuters),out%20there%20six%20days%20ago.">at least 400 people dead</a>, governments from <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2023/04/26/what-middle-east-nations-have-done-to-evacuate-citizens-from-sudan/">across the Middle East</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-65380753">Europe</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3218178/china-evacuates-citizens-sudan-violence-continues">Asia</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3371442/us-forces-evacuate-americans-from-khartoum-embassy/">and the Americas</a> evacuated nationals – teachers, students and workers, as well as embassy staff – from the capital, Khartoum.</p>
<p>Of course, expat employees are to be found in all countries. But as a <a href="https://history.washington.edu/people/christopher-tounsel">scholar of Sudanese history</a>, it is difficult to ignore the fact that, in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/22/world/africa/sudan-war-international-relations.html">words of one analyst</a>, everyone wants “a chunk of Sudan.” While a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47852496">2019 coup</a> ended the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/11/omar-al-bashir-sudan-ousted-regime-president">brutal dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir</a>, the years since have not given way to democracy. Rather, it has led to a period in which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/22/world/africa/sudan-war-international-relations.html">various overseas governments have sought to capitalize</a> on the transition of power and Sudan’s strategic importance and mineral wealth.</p>
<p>And while a descent into all-out civil war would be devastating for Sudan, it would also create ripples that would be felt throughout the geopolitical world. </p>
<h2>Where things stand</h2>
<p>The evacuation of foreign nations followed the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-crisis-explained-whats-behind-the-latest-fighting-and-how-it-fits-nations-troubled-past-203985">eruption of violence</a> between the Sudanese military, led by the country’s leader, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, led by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, generally known by the name Hemedti.</p>
<p>The two men jointly ran the government but now find themselves deadlocked in a power struggle. On April 25, 2023, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. brokered a three-day ceasefire. Despite sporadic fighting, that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65414838">ceasefire was later extended</a>.</p>
<p>Efforts of international governments to broker peace may hint not only at a desire to halt the bloodshed, but also a desire to limit the fallout that the situation will have for world politics. </p>
<h2>Sudan’s regional, economic and strategic importance</h2>
<p>Sudan is located at a <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sudan/overview">critical nexus, geographically</a>. It borders Egypt and Libya in North Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, the East African nation of South Sudan, and Central Africa’s Chad and the Central African Republic.</p>
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<p>Sudan is the site where the White and Blue Nile Rivers merge to form the main Nile and is home to <a href="https://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/sudan">more than 60% of the Nile River Basin</a>. Safe <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14576.doc.htm">management of the Nile’s water</a> is crucial for stability of the region. Northern neighbor Egypt is <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/basic-page/egypt-34124">90% dependent on the river</a> for its water supply, while Ethiopia to the east is looking to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/20/ethiopia-electricity-production-gerd-blue-nile-mega-dam">double the country’s electricity generation</a> through the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. </p>
<p>The project has been a source of contention, though – Ethiopia began filling the dam in 2020-2021 <a href="https://www.pesmaastricht.com/post/geopolitical-tensions-surrounding-the-nile-river-what-should-europe-do">without an agreement with Egypt</a>, and last year Egypt protested Ethiopia’s planned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/12/ethiopia-says-completes-third-filling-of-mega-dam-reservoir">third filling of the dam to the U.N. Security Council</a>. The United Nations has called on the three nations to <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14576.doc.htm">negotiate a “mutually beneficial” agreement</a> over the Nile’s management – something that will be difficult should Sudan fall into a prolonged period of instability.</p>
<p>Sudan also has a <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/countries-concerns-interests-sudan-latest-conflict-explained-8571913/">strategic location on the Red Sea</a>, a body of water that <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-complicated-nature-of-red-sea-geopolitics/">approximately 10% of global trade passes through</a>, with the Suez Canal <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/china-middle-east-are-spending-on-sudan-but-us-policy-is-confused.html">connecting Asian and European markets</a>. </p>
<p>And then there are Sudan’s immense mineral resources. The nation is Africa’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">third-largest producer of gold</a>, has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/china-middle-east-are-spending-on-sudan-but-us-policy-is-confused.html">major oil reserves</a> and produces over <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/sudan-agricultural-sectors">80% of the world’s gum arabic</a> – a component of food additives, paint and cosmetics.</p>
<h2>Sudanese gold, Russia’s war</h2>
<p>As a result of this strategic and economic importance, Sudan has attracted willing international partners. Gulf oil states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for example, saw Bashir’s ouster as a chance to stabilize the region and invest in everything <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/21/why-the-conflict-in-sudan-is-worrying-its-neighbours">from agricultural projects to Red Sea ports</a>.</p>
<p>Sudan’s leaders have seemingly been none too picky about who they partner with. While much of the international community shunned and sanctioned Russia after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Sudan provided Moscow with an <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">economic lifeline through its gold reserves</a>.</p>
<p>Russia’s interest in Sudan’s gold dates back to 2017, when after a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-president-visits-russia-asks-for-protection-from-us/4131704.html">meeting between Bashir and Russian President Vladimir Putin</a>, the two countries <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/documents-reveal-wagners-golden-ties-to-sudanese-military-companies">established the Meroe Gold corporation</a> – a subsidiary of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner Group network of mercenaries</a>. </p>
<p>Since the 2019 coup, Moscow has increasingly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/26/africa/sudan-generals-west-democratic-transition-intl/index.html">aligned itself with Hemedti</a>, as the RSF leader sought to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65284948">control more and more of the country’s richest gold mines</a>. In July 2022, Sudanese sources told CNN that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">at least 16 Russian gold smuggling flights</a> had embarked from Sudan over the previous year and a half.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in Sudanese gold extraction and its role in supplying fighters in Ukraine have prompted many observers to suggest that <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/04/27/why-is-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-and-what-does-it-have-to-do-with-the-war-in-ukraine#:%7E:text=According%20to%20a%20number%20of,of%20the%20mineral%20in%20Africa.">Sudanese gold is being used to finance Moscow’s war</a>.</p>
<p>In return, Russia has provided <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/29/africa/sudan-russia-gold-investigation-cmd-intl/index.html">political and military assistance to Sudan’s paramilitary leadership</a>. According <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/23/world/africa/sudan-russia-wagner-group.html">to U.S. officials</a>, the Wagner Group has offered weaponry, including surface-to-air missiles, to the RSF. </p>
<p>Hemedti is not alone in currying Russian support. Theodore Murphy, Africa director at the European Council of Foreign Relations, has suggested that the RSF leader’s now-rival, Burhan, would also be <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-cold-shoulder-for-un-warm-embrace-for-russia/a-61526111">open to working with Moscow</a>.</p>
<h2>China a winner in Sudan scramble</h2>
<p>China also has considerable interests in Sudan as part of its “Belt and Road” global infrastructure initiative. From 2011 to 2018, Beijing granted Sudan an <a href="https://www.diis.dk/en/research/whats-stake-china-in-sudan">estimated US$143 million in loans</a> and has <a href="https://www.aninews.in/news/world/others/oil-rich-sudan-begins-to-sense-exploitation-meted-out-to-them-by-chinese20210810040556/">invested in projects</a> such as the construction of Sudanese oil pipelines, Nile bridges, textile mills and railway lines. </p>
<p>Indeed, China was <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/china-middle-east-are-spending-on-sudan-but-us-policy-is-confused.html">one of the main investors to Sudan</a> during the rule of Bashir and one of the few countries to <a href="https://besacenter.org/china-and-sudan-coup/">supply the regime with weapons</a>.</p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30990268">relies on Africa’s mineral resources</a> to meet its own expanding industrial needs. China-Sudan mining cooperation dates back to the 1970s, and over 20 Chinese enterprises have operated in Sudanese mining with a <a href="http://sd.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/dshd/202010/t20201016_6689197.htm">total investment of over $100 million</a>.</p>
<p>However, this relationship is not entirely one-way. Sudan exported $780 million worth of products to China in 2021 and in the previous quarter-century <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/sdn">increased its exports to China at an annual rate of 10.6%</a>. Indeed, China is Sudan’s <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/SUD">second-largest trading partner</a> after the UAE, and the African nation’s biggest supplier of goods.</p>
<p>Although the U.S. <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-sudan/">revoked long-standing sanctions against Sudan in 2017</a>, allowing for American companies to pursue business interests in Sudan, Washington is still playing catch-up with China. </p>
<h2>Concerns of contagion</h2>
<p>The United States’ strategic interest in the Sudanese crisis can be considered through the lens of its opposition to Russia’s war in Ukraine and concern over regional contagion – that is, the spread of instability.</p>
<p>Sudan’s potential to prop up Moscow’s war effort would make Western leaders wary of the RSF gaining an upper hand in the current fighting; the paramilitary group could reward Russia’s friendship with Sudanese gold. But with an <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-cold-shoulder-for-un-warm-embrace-for-russia/a-61526111">apparent willingness of both sides</a> of the current fighting to exploit the country’s gold mines in return for Moscow’s military assistance, a better outcome for the West – and indeed the Sudanese people – would be a transition away from military rule altogether.</p>
<p>Of perhaps more concern to Washington is the impact of an unstable Sudan on the region. In recent years, the U.S. has benefited from a warming relationship with Sudan’s leaders, especially through <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-priorities-sudan-stability-or-democracy">counterterrorism cooperation</a>. The Biden administration will surely be fearful of Sudan’s instability providing the kind of conditions in which terrorist groups, such as al-Shabaab, may thrive. or that the situation could trigger a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/24/world/africa/sudan-war-civilians.html">refugee crisis on Sudan’s borders</a>, especially in Ethiopia and South Sudan – countries that are already struggling to keep fragile peace deals in place.</p>
<p>While the people of Sudan have the most to lose should the current fighting descend into civil war, the geopolitical significance of the country means millions in the surrounding regions – and indeed around the world – also stand to be impacted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204453/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Tounsel has previously received funding from the Council of American Overseas Research Centers, the Institute for Citizens & Scholars, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Social Science Research Council, the Doris G. Quinn Foundation, the University of Michigan, the Pennsylvania State University, Macalester College, and the University of Washington. </span></em></p>Sudan’s location and natural resources have attracted international partners keen to benefit either geopolitically or economically.Christopher Tounsel, Associate Professor of History, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2040362023-04-27T12:06:03Z2023-04-27T12:06:03ZPeace in the DRC: East Africa has deployed troops to combat M23 rebels – who’s who in the regional force<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522646/original/file-20230424-14-adtvfi.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Sudanese soldiers prepare for deployment to the Democratic Republic of Congo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Samir Bol/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The East Africa Community (EAC) has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/eacrf-troops-now-fully-deployed-in-drc-4191138">completed the deployment</a> of its regional force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to oversee the withdrawal of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">rebel group, M23,</a> from the eastern part of the country. </p>
<p>The last contingent was of <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/04/fully-deployed-regional-force-starting-to-impact-eastern-drc/">South Sudanese soldiers</a> who joined troops from Kenya, Burundi and Uganda.</p>
<p>Formed in 2012 as a splinter group of the armed militia <a href="https://www.c-r.org/accord/cross-border-peacebuilding/congo-rwanda-and-national-congress-defence-people">National Congress for the Defence of the People</a>, the M23 briefly occupied the city of Goma the same year. It was quickly routed by forces operating as part of the UN peacekeeping mission, Monusco.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-m23s-on-and-off-insurgency-tells-us-about-drcs-precarious-search-for-peace-182520">M23 re-emerged</a> in 2022, prompting the east African region to send in troops.</p>
<p>While eastern DRC contains over 100 armed groups, the M23 has drawn the region’s attention. This is not only because the conflict could spill across borders, but also because the M23 is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/eu-urges-rwanda-to-stop-supporting-m23-rebels-in-dr-congo-/6899260.html">widely seen</a> as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/4/rwanda-backing-m23-rebels-in-drc-un-experts">backed by Rwanda</a> (<a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/dr-congo-accuses-rwanda-of-backing-militia-violence-3828930">a claim Rwanda denies</a>). Thus, a rise in tension could <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">reignite fighting</a> between Rwanda and DRC, and draw in the broader region.</p>
<p>The EAC’s forces could be important in bringing the threat posed by the M23 under control, given the regional dimensions to this conflict. But their involvement is complicated.</p>
<p>On the one hand, neighbouring countries often have a better understanding of local political and security contexts than international actors. They also have more direct interest in the outcome of conflict, potentially leading to more sustained engagement.</p>
<p>On the other hand, neighbouring countries have their own interests, which means their actions may not always be in the best interests of the country they’re meant to help. Such risks are especially pronounced in the DRC. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">Conflict in the DRC: 5 articles that explain what's gone wrong</a>
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<p>The country’s history has been <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">rife with meddling</a> by its neighbours, including some members of the EAC regional force. The two Congo wars – <a href="https://www.easterncongo.org/about-drc/history-of-the-conflict/">in 1996-1997 and 1998-2003</a> – brought numerous foreign forces to Congolese soil. </p>
<p>While some neighbouring countries came to support the DRC government, others backed the rebels during the two wars, and actors from multiple sides <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2009/10/report-exploitation-resources-democratic-republic-congo-challenged-security">have pillaged DRC’s natural resources</a>. <a href="https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/version-anglaise-sondage-gec-ebuteli-deuxieme-note-thematique-force-regionale.pdf#page=4">Public distrust</a> in the regional force is, therefore, high.</p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1992272">lessons learned</a> from previous interventions in the DRC, it’s not clear whether the EAC regional force will help the DRC find peace this time around or contribute, deliberately or otherwise, to its instability.</p>
<p>Here is a short overview of the players in the regional force and their connections to the DRC.</p>
<h2>Kenya</h2>
<p>Kenya has <a href="https://www.eac.int/eac-partner-states/kenya">relatively more economic resources</a> than some other EAC members and a less complicated history with the DRC. While Kenya has had troops in the country <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/monuc/facts.shtml">since 1999</a> as part of the UN peacekeeping operation, it has been less tangled in previous conflicts in the DRC. </p>
<p>Kenya deployed its troops as part of the regional force in November 2022 after the the M23 enlarged its territorial hold in Congo’s eastern region. </p>
<p>Kenyan president <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/11/02/kenya-sends-troops-to-dr-congo-to-fight-rebels//">William Ruto has stated</a> that defeating the M23 is important for the region. Stability in the DRC is also in <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/kenya-why-we-deployed-our-troops-in-drc-4017620">Kenya’s economic interests</a>. It accelerated investments into the DRC after the latter <a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-is-set-to-become-7th-member-of-the-east-africa-trading-bloc-whats-in-it-for-everyone-179320">joined the regional bloc in 2022</a>. </p>
<h2>Burundi</h2>
<p>Burundi has a <a href="https://theconversation.com/burundis-gatumba-massacre-offers-a-window-into-the-past-and-future-of-the-drc-conflict-191351">tangled history with the DRC</a>. It was involved in the two Congo wars and has been <a href="https://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/DRC%20v%20Burundi,%20Rwanda%20and%20Uganda.pdf#page=1">accused by the DRC</a> of occupying its border provinces and violating human rights and international law during these conflicts.</p>
<p>Burundi formally deployed troops to Goma in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/22/burundi-sends-troops-to-drc-for-regional-peacekeeping-force">August 2022</a>. A <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/more-burundi-troops-arrive-in-goma-4161608">second battalion</a> was deployed seven months later. But a Burundian rights group has <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/burundi-secretly-sent-troops-to-dr-congo-rights-group-3894150">claimed that Burundi</a> has been conducting secret operations against Burundian opposition groups within DRC for some time. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/22/burundi-sends-troops-to-drc-for-regional-peacekeeping-force">The group also expressed concern</a> that Burundi may use its membership of the regional force to continue operations against its opponents. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-africas-peace-mission-in-the-drc-why-its-in-burundis-interest-to-help-203486">East Africa’s peace mission in the DRC: why it’s in Burundi’s interest to help</a>
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<h2>Uganda</h2>
<p>Uganda <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/uganda-troops-join-eac-force-in-drc-4180430">deployed troops</a> to the force in March 2023. Before this, it conducted <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/1/after-air-raids-uganda-sends-troops-into-drc-to-hunt-adf">joint operations</a> with Congolese national forces against the rebel Allied Democratic Forces, a Uganda-based, Islamic State-allied group that has been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230309-more-than-40-killed-in-suspected-eastern-dr-congo-rebel-attacks">particularly violent towards civilians</a>. </p>
<p>Despite their common foe, Uganda and DRC have a history of tension. Uganda’s military intervention in the DRC in the 1990s was found by the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/116">International Court of Justice</a> to be “of such magnitude and duration” that it was considered “a grave violation” of the prohibition on the use of force in terms of the UN Charter. The court ordered Uganda to pay US$325 million for its illegal occupation. Uganda made its first payment of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/12/uganda-pays-first-installment-of-325m-war-reparations-to-drc#:%7E:text=Uganda%20has%20paid%20%2465m,Ugandan%20troops%20occupied%20Congolese%20territory.">US$65 million</a> in September 2022. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">How conflicts intertwined over time and destabilised the DRC – and the region</a>
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<p>Ugandan troops have found some early success in their deployment. This includes the area of Bunagana, where they were able to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/congo-drc-rwanda-m23-rebels-uganda-bunagana-58787acda1f5ebc0ee2b3de2cbb12491">regain control</a> of the town that had been held for months by the M23. Nevertheless, Uganda’s involvement in the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2001/sc7057.doc.htm">illegal exploitation of DRC’s natural resources</a> in the 1990s and early 2000s raises concerns about its presence among the local population. </p>
<h2>South Sudan</h2>
<p>South Sudan is the most recent EAC member state to deploy troops to the DRC after some <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/277626/east-africa-force-in-drc-kenyas-on-the-ground-so-where-are-the-others/">initial logistical delays</a>. South Sudan’s history with the DRC is less contentious than Uganda’s and Burundi’s. However, its national forces have a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/un-experts-tell-human-rights-council-violence-against-civilians-persists#:%7E:text=Based%20on%20investigations%20undertaken%20in,and%20State%2Dsponsored%20extrajudicial%20killings.">history of human rights abuses</a> against their own population. </p>
<p>Despite South Sudan president Salva Kiir’s instruction that his troops not “<a href="https://jubaecho.com/president-kiir-flags-off-720-troops-headed-for-drc/">go and rape women and girls</a>”, their presence within the <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/the-role-progress-and-challenges-of-the-eac-regional-force-in-the-eastern-drc/">crowded theatre could increase the risk</a> of human rights abuses. </p>
<h2>Risky, but necessary?</h2>
<p>Despite these risks, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">EAC regional force</a> may be the DRC’s best chance of defeating the M23. Monusco <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-against-un-in-eastern-congo-highlight-peace-missions-crisis-of-legitimacy-187932">has struggled</a> to mitigate the M23 or the numerous other rebel groups operating in the eastern region. </p>
<p>One advantage for the EAC is that it’s leading both the political and military responses to the M23, which were previously led by different actors. The M23 threat requires both a political and military response, and ensuring these two prongs remain closely integrated is essential. </p>
<p>So far, though, the M23 has not respected the timelines for withdrawal set as part of the political process, including the most recent <a href="https://ntrtv.com.tr/no-retreat-by-m23-rebels-from-eastern-drc-on-deadline/">30 March 2022 deadline</a>. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/east-african-troops-hope-to-bring-peace-in-the-drc-but-there-may-be-stumbling-blocks-195937">East African troops hope to bring peace in the DRC but there may be stumbling blocks</a>
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<p>This lack of progress has led Angolan president João Lourenço – who is <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/221187/rwanda-and-drc-start-peace-talks-mediated-by-angola/">mediating peace talks</a> between the DRC and Rwanda – to announce the deployment of 500 Angolan troops to the volatile east. Kinshasa said the Angolan troops would be there “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/angola-deploy-troops-congos-rebel-hit-east-2023-03-17/#:%7E:text=LUANDA%2C%20March%2017%20(Reuters),approved%20the%20deployment%20on%20Friday.">not to attack but to help maintain peace</a>”. Sadly, there is not yet much peace to be maintained.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jenna Russo is the Director of Research for the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Head of IPI's Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations. </span></em></p>The region’s forces are seen as important in addressing the long-running conflict in the DRC – but their involvement is complicated.Jenna Russo, Researcher and lecturer, City University of New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2043912023-04-25T13:10:57Z2023-04-25T13:10:57ZOmar al-Bashir brutalised Sudan – how his 30-year legacy is playing out today<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522631/original/file-20230424-1289-n7envf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudanese in Khartoum protest the 2021 military coup that blocked a transition to civilian rule.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since independence in 1956 the Sudanese have lived through <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/26044/sudan-coup-timeline/">35 coups, attempted coups and coup plots</a> – more than any other African country. When the 2019 uprising against long-time dictator <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">Omar al-Bashir</a> created a military-civilian transitional government, the Sudanese hoped that their country would <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-can-avoid-past-mistakes-by-drawing-lessons-from-its-history-115470">transition to democratic rule</a>. </p>
<p>But their hopes were dashed in October 2021 when Abdel Fattah al-Burhan <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-coup-years-of-instability-have-made-the-army-key-power-brokers-170676">led a coup</a> against his civilian counterparts in the transitional government. </p>
<p>In the latest round of conflict that began on <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/15/sudan-unrest-live-news-explosions-shooting-rock-khartoum">15 April 2023</a>, civil war looms as the security actors who benefited from Bashir’s downfall battle for supremacy.</p>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.ncl.ac.uk/hca/people/profile/willowberridge.html">studied Sudanese politics</a> for 15 years, and this latest round of conflict is the worst in the country’s recent history. And the legacy of Bashir’s rule is central to this calamity.</p>
<p>Bashir <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2021.1882385">bent government institutions</a> to serve his regime. He chose conflict over compromise in dealing with politically marginalised groups in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/26/20-years-since-war-began-in-sudans-darfur-suffering-continues">Darfur</a>, in Sudan’s west, and in the south. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/">used force</a> to hold on to power. This fuelled <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Bashir-repression-in-Sudan/4552902-5158960-eifsgw/index.html">his support</a> of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was used to check regional rebels and the army. </p>
<p>Bashir’s legacy has continued to play out today. His former allies have mobilised to block the transition to civilian rule. This had been promised to the Sudanese people under a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/return-civilian-rule-sudan#:%7E:text=The%20Sudanese%20military%20and%20a,in%20an%20October%202021%20coup.">framework agreement</a> signed in December 2022 by the military and a coalition of civilian actors.</p>
<p>In my view, Burhan’s fear of civilian attempts to rein in military privileges led him to preserve key elements of the Bashir system. This is playing a divisive role in the current conflict.</p>
<h2>The ideology of Islamism</h2>
<p>Part of Bashir’s legacy has to do with Islamist politics. It’s this legacy that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">Hemedti</a> and who heads the paramilitary force, sought to exploit to his favour when he labelled Burhan a “<a href="https://twitter.com/GeneralDagllo/status/1647887773011959809">radical Islamist</a>”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1647887773011959809"}"></div></p>
<p>This characterisation was designed to <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/sudan-turmoil-why-hemeti-taking-aim-radical-islamists">appeal to Western powers</a>. But it’s inaccurate. To understand why, one has to understand the ideological trajectory of the Bashir regime.</p>
<p>When Bashir staged the coup in 1989, he was acting as a representative of a cell in a military carefully cultivated by the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-National-Front">National Islamic Front</a>. The political party co-ordinated the coup with Bashir. </p>
<p>The National Islamic Front was led by <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hasan-al-Turabi-Islamist-Politics-Democracy/dp/1107180996">Hasan al-Turabi</a>, who had run Sudan’s Islamic Movement since the 1960s. He had grown frustrated at his failure to introduce his version of Muslim law (Sharia), through parliamentary means. </p>
<p>Soon after the coup, Bashir and Turabi initiated a process of <em>tamkeen</em> (empowerment). This policy, the legacy of which still remains, enabled them to give <a href="https://www.cmi.no/publications/7062-sudans-popular-uprising-and-the-demise-of-islamism">adherents of Islamism</a> and security bosses willing to ally with them control over almost every part of public life in Sudan.</p>
<p>Formally, Bashir installed an independent, technocratic government. In practice, however, power lay with a military-Islamist coalition that ran the country behind the scenes. </p>
<p>Throughout the 1990s, Bashir set about ruthlessly purging Sudan’s independent civil society organisations and political parties. By the end of the decade, he’d fallen out with Turabi. </p>
<p>He ejected Turabi from the government in 1999 and co-opted selected representatives of the opposition into his regime in the decades that followed. Bashir maintained the military-Islamist coalition as the basis of his National Congress Party. This kept the edifice built through tamkeen in place.</p>
<h2>Making amends</h2>
<p>In the 1990s, the Sudanese government hosted <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hasan-al-Turabi-Islamist-Politics-Democracy/dp/1107180996">radical Islamists</a> who sought to export revolution abroad and topple neighbouring regimes deemed to be Western proxies. However, after the split with Turabi in 1999, the Bashir regime attempted to <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/why-is-sudans-genocidal-regime-a-cia-favorite">repair its international image</a> by distancing itself from such militant groups. It also began to cooperate with Western intelligence agencies. </p>
<p>In the later Bashir period, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-sudan-idUSKCN0SC0E120151018">Sudanese government supported</a> the Saudi-Emirati coalition against the militant Islamist Houthis in Yemen. <a href="https://www.sudanakhbar.com/488615">Burhan oversaw this deployment</a>. </p>
<p>When he emerged as the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190413-veteran-soldier-burhan-becomes-sudans-new-ruler">transitional military leader</a> in 2019, Burhan benefited from the perception that he was a professional soldier more than an Islamist. </p>
<p>His principal interests are aligned with the military’s core interests: maintaining its privileged social and political status, as well as its numerous business enterprises. Burhan made the <a href="https://3ayin.com/en/ncp-returns/">political calculation</a> in 2021 that National Congress Party-era security bosses and bureaucrats were his best allies in the battle to both prevent civilians challenging the military’s grip on the economy, and Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces emerging as an alternative power centre. After taking over power, he co-opted these former security bosses into government.</p>
<p>The Islamism of the Bashir-era stooges Burhan has been returning to government is <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/sudans-unfinished-democracy/">defined by</a> three elements. These are socially conservative authoritarian politics, including the <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/outrage-in-sudan-as-new-force-reminiscent-of-public-order-police-is-installed">return of morality policing</a>; a hostility to the Sudanese left; and corruption.</p>
<p>While these leaders are mostly not the “radical Islamists” the West fears, for many Sudanese, their ongoing commitment to a narrowly defined Arab-Islamic identity is divisive.</p>
<h2>A difficult dismantling</h2>
<p>After he seized power in 1989, Bashir insisted that his coup was a conventional military movement designed to return order to public life. Bashir, who has been in jail since April 2019, still <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-bashir-admits-role-1989-coup-during-trial-2022-12-20/">maintains</a> that line. The military that overthrew him has been reading the same script.</p>
<p>Four months after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-bashir-fall/">the military</a> had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/20/sudans-military-removes-al-bashir-all-the-latest-updates#:%7E:text=Sudan's%20President%20Omar%20al,a%20maximum%20of%20two%20years.">removed Bashir</a>, it signed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/4/what-does-sudans-constitutional-declaration-say">constitutional declaration</a> with the main civilian coalition, the Forces of Freedom and Change.</p>
<p>This led to the formation of a joint military-civilian transitional government. The government established an Empowerment Removal Committee to <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-anti-corruption-team-continues-purging-remnants-of-old-regime">dismantle the network</a> of parastatal charities, media enterprises and banks that had enabled Bashir and his allies to maintain their grip on Sudan. </p>
<p>But Burhan’s October 2021 coup disrupted this. The committee was pushed aside and most of its prominent members <a href="https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/lawyers-question-legal-grounds-of-erc-arrests">arrested</a>.</p>
<p>But even before this coup, dismantling Bashir’s regime was an enormous challenge. </p>
<p>The media is a case in point. In the Bashir period, the media was controlled by nominally independent proprietors. In practice, they were National Congress Party cronies, thriving off the party’s domination of the Sudanese economy. </p>
<p>The notorious al-Intibaha newspaper, for instance, is known for its hostile rhetoric towards the South Sudanese. It continued to act as a platform for Bashir’s warmongering uncle, al-Tayyib Mustafa, even after Mustafa was <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2315281/bashir%E2%80%99s-uncle-arrested-over-threat-violence-topple-transitional-govt">arrested</a> for posing a threat to the transitional government.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.sudaress.com/kushnews/286365">Mustafa’s death in 2021</a>, the paper retained his style. A <a href="https://alintibaha.net/online/162998/">piece</a> published shortly before the April 2023 outbreak of conflict characterised the civilians in the 2019-2021 transitional government as dual nationals serving foreign interests. It attacked efforts to curtail the security services’ powers.</p>
<p>Bashir may have fallen in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of his regime’s infrastructure. The remnants of this continue to undermine democratic transition in Sudan, with ultimately disastrous consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204391/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>My research on Islamist politics in Sudan (for my book on Hasan al-Turabi) was funded by a British academy small grant. I have also recently been a fellow at the World Peace Foundation (2020-2022).</span></em></p>Omar al-Bashir fell in 2019, but his military successors have preserved much of the authoritarian infrastructure of his regime.Willow Berridge, Lecturer in History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2039852023-04-17T21:52:35Z2023-04-17T21:52:35ZSudan crisis explained: What’s behind the latest fighting and how it fits nation’s troubled past<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521406/original/file-20230417-14-9k84wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C170%2C4166%2C2628&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sudan army soldiers are fighting a rival paramilitary group.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sudanese-greet-army-soldiers-loyal-to-army-chief-abdel-news-photo/1251884288?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Days of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/17/sudan-fighting-live-news-nearly-100-killed-as-clashes-spread">violence in Sudan</a> have resulted in the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-fighting-military-rsf-eafa3246b1e3004a1a9f2b9af9561362">deaths of at least 180 people</a>, with many more left wounded.</em></p>
<p><em>The fighting represents the latest crisis in the North African nation, which has contended with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-59057559">numerous coups and periods of civil strife</a> since becoming independent in 1956.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked <a href="https://history.washington.edu/people/christopher-tounsel">Christopher Tounsel</a>, a Sudan specialist and interim director of the University of Washington’s African Studies Program, to explain the reasons behind the violence and what it means for the chances of democracy being restored in Sudan.</em></p>
<h2>What is going on in Sudan?</h2>
<p>It all revolves around infighting between two rival groups: the Sudanese army and a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/sudan-unrest-what-is-the-rapid-support-forces">paramilitary group known as the RSF</a>, or Rapid Support Forces.</p>
<p>Since a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/25/africa/sudan-coup-explained-intl-cmd/index.html">coup in the country in 2021</a>, which ended a transitional government put in place after the fall of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16010445">longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir</a> two years earlier, Sudan has been run by the army, with coup leader General Abdel-Fattah Burhan as de facto ruler.</p>
<p><iframe id="nO9q2" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/nO9q2/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The RSF, led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo – who is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-conflict-hemedti-the-warlord-who-built-a-paramilitary-force-more-powerful-than-the-state-203949">generally known by the name Hemedti</a> – has worked alongside the Sudanese army to help keep the military in power.</p>
<p>Following Bashir’s ouster, the political transition was supposed to result in elections <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/25/sudan-coup-fears-amid-claims-military-have-arrested-senior-government-officials">by the end of 2023</a>, with Burhan <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59855246">promising a transition to civilian rule</a>. But it appears that neither Burhan nor Dagalo has any intention of relinquishing power. Moreover, they are locked in a power struggle that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/4/15/sudan-unrest-live-news-explosions-shooting-rock-khartoum">turned violent on April 15</a>, 2023.</p>
<p>Since then, members of the RSF and the Sudanese army have engaged in gunfights in the capital, Khartoum, as well as elsewhere in the country. Over the course of three days, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sudan-fighting-military-rsf-eafa3246b1e3004a1a9f2b9af9561362">violence has spiraled</a>.</p>
<p>The recent background to the violence was a disagreement over how RSF paramilitaries <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-s-military-warns-of-conflict-after-rival-force-deploys-/7050034.html">should be incorporated</a> into the Sudanese army. Tensions boiled over after the RSF started deploying members around the country and in Khartoum without the expressed permission of the army.</p>
<p>But in reality, the violence has been brewing for a while in Sudan, with concern over the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48987901">RSF seeking to control more of the country’s economic assets</a>, notably its gold mines.</p>
<p>The developments in Sudan over the last few days are not good for the stability of the nation or its prospects for any <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/03/1134137">transition to democratic rule</a>.</p>
<h2>Who are the two men at the center of the dispute?</h2>
<p>Dagalo rose to power within the RSF beginning in the early 2000s when he was at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-tracing-the-history-of-sudans-janjaweed-militia-118926">head of the militia known as Janjaweed</a> – a group responsible for human right atrocities in the Darfur region.</p>
<p>While then-Sudanese President Bashir was the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">face of the violence</a> against people in Darfur – and was later <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CaseInformationSheets/AlBashirEng.pdf">indicted on crimes against humanity</a> by the International Criminal Court – the Janjaweed is <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur">also held responsible</a> by the ICC for alleged acts of genocide. While they were doing so, Dagalo was rising up the ranks.</p>
<p>As head of the RSF, Dagalo has faced accusations of overseeing the bloody crackdown of pro-democracy activists, including <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/11/18/they-were-shouting-kill-them/sudans-violent-crackdown-protesters-khartoum">the massacre of 120 protesters</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>The actions of Burhan, similarly, have seen the military leader <a href="https://www.hrw.org/africa/sudan">heavily criticized by human rights groups</a>. As the head of the army in power and the country’s de facto head of government for the last two years, he <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/pro-democracy-protests-set-to-mark-sudan-coup-anniversary-despite-crackdown-01666672508">oversaw a crackdown of pro-democracy activists</a>.</p>
<p>One can certainly interpret both men to be obstacles to any chance of Sudan transitioning to civilian democracy. But this is first and foremost a personal power struggle.</p>
<p>To use an African proverb, “When the elephants fight, it is the grass that gets trampled.”</p>
<h2>So this is about power rather than ideology?</h2>
<p>In my opinion, very much so.</p>
<p>We are not talking about two men, or factions, with ideological differences over the future direction of the country. This cannot be framed as a left-wing versus right-wing thing, or about warring political parties. Nor is this a geo-religious conflict – pitting a majority <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-south-sudan-turns-10-questions-over-the-role-of-the-church-emerge-amid-anti-clerical-violence-164018">Muslim North against a Christian South</a>. And it isn’t racialized violence in the same way that the Darfur conflict was, with the self-identified Arab Janajaweed killing Black people.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-burhan-hemeti-tensions-escalate-framework-dea">observers are interpreting</a> what is happening in Sudan – correctly, in my opinion – as a battle between two men who are desperate not to be ejected from the corridors of power by means of a transition to an elected government.</p>
<h2>How does the violence fit Sudan’s troubled past?</h2>
<p>One thing that is concerning about the longer dynamics at play in Sudan is the violence now forms part of a history that fits the trope of the “failed African nation.”</p>
<p>Sudan has, to my knowledge, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-coup-years-of-instability-have-made-the-army-key-power-brokers-170676">had more coups</a> than any other African nation. Since gaining independence from the U.K. in 1956, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-59057559">there have been coups</a> in 1958, 1969, 1985, 1989, 2019 and 2021.</p>
<p>The coup in 1989 <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-bashir-admits-role-1989-coup-during-trial-2022-12-20/">brought Bashir to power</a> for a three-decade run as dictator during which the Sudanese people suffered from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/11/quran-and-ak-47-the-30-year-rule-of-sudans-omar-al-bashir">typical excesses of autocratic rule</a> – secret police, repressions of opposition, corruption. </p>
<p>When Bashir was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/4/11/omar-al-bashir-deposed-how-the-world-reacted">deposed in 2019</a>, it was shocking to many observers – myself included – who assumed he would die in power, or that his rule would end only by assassination.</p>
<p>But any hopes that the end of Bashir would mean democratic rule were short-lived. Two years after his ouster – when elections were due to be held – the army decided to take power for itself, claiming it was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/26/sudans-army-chief-defends-militarys-seizure-of-power">stepping in to avert a civil war</a>.</p>
<p>As striking as the recent violence is now, in many ways what is playing out is not unusual in the context of Sudan’s history.</p>
<p>The army has long been at the center of political transitions in Sudan. And resistance to civilian rule has been more than less the norm since <a href="https://countrystudies.us/sudan/20.htm">independence in 1956</a>.</p>
<h2>Is there a danger the violence will escalate?</h2>
<p>A coalition of civilian groups in the country has called for an immediate halt to the violence – as has the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-secretary-state-blinken-calls-immediate-end-violence-sudan-2023-04-15/">U.S. and other international observers</a>. But with both factions dug in, that seems unlikely. Similarly, the prospect of free and fair elections in Sudan seems some ways off.</p>
<p>There doesn’t appears to be an easy route to a short-term solution, and what makes it tougher is that you have two powerful men, both with a military at their disposal, fighting each other for power that neither seem prepared to relinquish.</p>
<p>The concern is that the fighting might escalate and destabilize the region, jeopardizing Sudan’s relations with its neighbors. Chad, which borders Sudan to the west, has already <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230416-chad-closes-borders-with-sudan-amid-armed-clashes/">closed its border</a> with Sudan. Meanwhile, a couple of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/16/egyptian-soldiers-captured-in-sudan-to-be-returned-says-rsf">Egyptian soldiers were captured</a> in northern Sudan while violence was happening in Khartoum. Ethiopia, Sudan’s neighbor to the east, is still reeling from a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia">two-year war in the Tigray region</a>. And the spread of unrest in Sudan will be a concern to those watching an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/why-has-peace-eluded-south-sudan-2023-02-03/">uneasy peace deal</a> in South Sudan – which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/africa/10sudan.html">gained independence from Sudan in 2011</a> and has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">beset by ethnic fighting ever since</a>.</p>
<p>As such, the stakes in the current unrest could go beyond the immediate future of Burhan, Dagalo and even the Sudanese nation. The stability of the region could also be out at risk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Tounsel has previously received funding from the Council of American Overseas Research Centers, the Institute for Citizens & Scholars, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Social Science Research Council, the Doris G. Quinn Foundation, the University of Michigan, the Pennsylvania State University, Macalester College, and the University of Washington. </span></em></p>Violence in Sudan threatens to throw the troubled nation into chaos. A scholar of the region explains what is going on and what’s at stake.Christopher Tounsel, Associate Professor of History, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1996562023-02-16T14:35:57Z2023-02-16T14:35:57ZIlemi Triangle spat: how resources fuel East Africa’s border conflicts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/509768/original/file-20230213-19-nq08wu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kenyan fishermen demand a say in the country's border conflict with Somalia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kenyan-coastal-fishermen-carry-placards-during-a-news-photo/1231734423?phrase=Geographical%20Border%20east%20africa&adppopup=true">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Peacebuilding</p>
<p>For decades, African states have grappled with numerous interstate <a href="https://theconversation.com/drafts/44264/edit">border disputes</a>, especially in resource-rich regions. In east Africa, most of these conflicts are as old as independence. The disputes flare up every so often despite interventions by agencies of the African Union and the United Nations. A <a href="https://nation.africa/africa/news/kenya-south-sudan-locked-in-border-dispute-4117296">fresh war of words</a> has erupted between Kenya and South Sudan over the water- and oil-rich Ilemi Triangle border, which was first drawn up in 1914. We asked Al Chukwuma Okoli, a defence strategy scholar, four key questions._</p>
<h2>Why do boundaries matter for nation states?</h2>
<p>The term “boundary” refers to a cartographic (mapped out) line that marks and defines the confines of a state, distinguishing its <a href="https://study.com/academy/lesson/international-internal-boundaries-definition-function.html">sovereign territory from that of others</a>. It is mutually agreed upon and jointly owned by the countries involved. </p>
<p>Boundaries matter because they determine the area that a country rules. They also assign national identity. </p>
<p>Boundaries are both a bridge and a barrier to international peace and stability. As a bridge, international boundaries have a role in legitimate activities, especially in trade and migration. But as a barrier, they can be a site for criminality and violence. More importantly, boundaries provide a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/boundary-dispute">“fault-line” for international conflicts</a>.</p>
<h2>Which are some of east Africa’s boundary conflicts?</h2>
<p>I took part in a <a href="https://cejiss.org/borderlines-natural-resources-and-conflicts-towards-a-territorial-materialism-of-boundary-disputes-in-east-africa">recent study</a> of several instances of boundary conflicts in east Africa. These include the conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia (ongoing since 1960); Kenya and South Sudan (ongoing since 1963); and Kenya and Somalia (1963-1981). Others are Ethiopia and Sudan (from 1966 to 2002), Tanzania and Malawi (ongoing since 1967) and Uganda-Tanzania (1974–1979). </p>
<p>The various boundary conflicts in the region originated and evolved in different historical and political contexts. But they have been complicated by the changing dictates of international politics. </p>
<p>Some of these conflicts have been protracted and intractable. A case in point is the Kenya–South Sudan conflict, which seems to have become more complicated in recent years. It began in 1963 when Kenya claimed the Ilemi Triangle. Ilemi is a region rich in oil and water, lying to the north of a straight border that was drawn in 1914. Kenya’s claim, and de facto control, extends beyond the limit marked in 1938. </p>
<p>Several bilateral and multilateral measures have been taken over the years to resolve the conflict. These include continental initiatives anchored by the African Union. In 2019 Kenya and South Sudan agreed to talks. They have demonstrated commitment to finding a solution by creating a joint boundary commission. But flare-ups and skirmishes still erupt on the disputed borderlines.</p>
<h2>What generally fuels Africa’s boundary disputes?</h2>
<p>A dominant view by scholars holds that boundary disputes are inevitable creations of colonialism. Via the <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-0467">Berlin Conference diplomacy</a> of 1884 to 1885, European imperial powers took control of African territories and carved them up. European maps defined African state boundaries. </p>
<p>This perspective suggests that the imperialist scramble for Africa was a sort of crude territorial grabbing, leading to arbitrary and artificial partitioning of Africa into slices of colonial spheres of interest. By slicing up similar cultural groups and lumping together culturally divergent groups, colonialism created long-lasting disputes.</p>
<p>Other scholars have questioned this view. They say colonial interference cannot fully explain the nature and dynamics of the current boundary conflicts in Africa. These “realist” scholars believe that states fight for <a href="https://cejiss.org/borderlines-natural-resources-and-conflicts-towards-a-territorial-materialism-of-boundary-disputes-in-east-africa">territory for material advantage</a>. The fight is largely about the ownership, access or control of natural resources like oil and water. This implies that the motive behind most present-day boundary conflicts is states’ pursuit of material advantages along their common territorial frontiers. </p>
<p>My view is that what is crucially at issue in most current border-related disputes in Africa is the quest for resources.</p>
<p>Apart from the Ilemi Triangle spat, South Sudan is currently feuding with Sudan over the oil-rich Abiyei region. Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are locked in a dispute over the ownership of parts of Lake Albert. The disputed spot has potential for crude oil alongside minerals like diamonds, gold and coltan.</p>
<p>Similarly, Tanzania and Malawi are at loggerheads over the oil-rich area around Lake Malawi (Nyasaland), while Kenya and Uganda have been quarrelling over the waters, fish and possible crude oil of Lake Victoria’s Migingo Island.</p>
<h2>How can these border conflicts be resolved?</h2>
<p>Modern boundary disputes in east Africa have often been largely driven by declared or disguised claims, stakes, motives and interests that are material or economic in essence. Understanding boundary disputes in Africa should go beyond the idea of “colonial causation” and come to terms with strategic and material interests.</p>
<p>Solutions to such conflicts depend on a diplomatic approach that recognises the colonially inherited boundary system and also mediates the interests of affected states.</p>
<p>It is necessary to evolve a regional border management mechanism that can proactively and multilaterally address border-related issues to find an enduring resolution. The joint border commission between Kenya and South Sudan is a step in the right direction.</p>
<p>The spate of boundary conflicts in east Africa poses a huge challenge to regional politics and diplomacy. Apart from creating diplomatic tension among states, the situation has resulted in a loss of lives and livelihoods. It has also destabilised the region – a setback to regional integration. A lasting solution is needed to sustain peace and stability of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199656/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Al Chukwuma Okoli teaches Political Science at Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria. He has consulted for the UN-Women, African Union, Centre for Democracy and Development, and Open University of Nigeria. He has received funding from the Tertiary Education Trust Fund, Nigeria. He is a Member of Amnesty international and CORN West Africa. </span></em></p>The joint border commission between Kenya and South Sudan is a step in the right direction.Al Chukwuma Okoli, Reader (Associate Professor), Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria, Federal University LafiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1977252023-02-12T08:36:15Z2023-02-12T08:36:15ZSouth Sudan’s oil and water give it bargaining power – but will it benefit the people?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507896/original/file-20230202-9745-760nn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/oil-field-with-rigs-and-pumps-at-sunset-world-oil-royalty-free-image/1427900101?phrase=Anton%20Petrus&adppopup=true">Anton Petrus/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Sudan has long been one of east Africa’s most unstable states. But surging external interest in its resources and the diplomatic agility of its rulers are again underlining how pivotal the country remains to regional energy and water politics. </p>
<p>Much of Africa has spent 2022 facing <a href="https://oecd-development-matters.org/2022/04/28/collateral-damage-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-and-energy-transitions-in-least-developed-countries/">sharp increases in the costs of energy and food</a> driven by the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the <a href="https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/research/currency-volatility-dollar-strength">strengthening of the US dollar</a>. </p>
<p>For states that have the potential to expand energy and food production – like South Sudan – global shortages and price hikes might offer an <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/africa-and-russia-ukraine-conflict-seizing-opportunity-crisis">opportunity</a>. The country is repositioning itself as a destination for capital flows to boost energy and food supply. </p>
<p>The country’s elites see South Sudan’s energy and water potential as leverage instruments in the region, which is likely to result in the exploitation of these resources in ways that might not benefit most citizens</p>
<p>The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which has governed since 2011, aims to reconnect with the high hopes that accompanied the country’s independence but that disappeared when civil war erupted in 2013. A <a href="https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/arcss-2015/agreement-summary/130-summary-of-the-revitalized-agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-the-republic-of-south-sudan-r-arcss-12-september-2018/file">peace deal</a> signed in 2018 is still holding, despite challenges such as its <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129702">slow implementation</a> and <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-violence-in-upper-nile-and-jonglei-states-south-sudan/">continued fighting in the Upper Nile and Jonglei regions</a>. </p>
<p>Relative national stability and global economic tailwinds have fanned speculation about renewed investment. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/savannah-energy-follows-chad-deal-with-south-sudan-acquisition-2022-12-12/">British firm Savannah Energy’s decision</a> in December 2022 to buy oil fields from Malaysia’s Petronas is the latest example of surging interest in South Sudan’s resources. </p>
<p>Likewise, investors are eagerly awaiting the 2023 <a href="https://energycapitalpower.com/the-energy-minute-south-sudan-oil-power-2023/">South Sudan oil and power conference</a> to see what sort of incentives are on offer. South Sudan has been using the platform to promote investments that help stabilise the national budget. Oil accounts for up to 90% of government revenues. </p>
<p>New investment could affirm South Sudan’s status as east Africa’s largest oil producer. The country is a member of OPEC+, a grouping of oil exporting countries. It currently <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/305-oil-or-nothing-dealing-south-sudans-bleeding-finances">pumps an estimated 150,000 to 170,000 barrels a day</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://sudantribune.com/article267465/">Regular squabbles with Khartoum</a> over diversions of South Sudanese oil and transit fees still occur. But Juba adroitly manages relations with its northern neighbour. It depends on Sudan for transporting its crude to global markets. <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/the-promise-of-oil-and-gas-in-south-sudan-81521">Petrodollars are forecast to accelerate GDP growth</a> to more than 6% in 2023.</p>
<p>Beyond oil, the country also has huge scope for increased production of food and <a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/sr418-south-sudans-renewable-energy-potential-a-building-block-for-peace.pdf">renewable energy</a> like solar, wind and hydro. It has considerable potential to use the Nile for irrigation and electricity production. </p>
<p>Such projects could, <a href="https://www.academia.edu/840831/Black_Gold_for_Blue_Gold_Sudans_Oil_Ethiopias_Water_and_Regional_Integration">under specific conditions</a>, help remedy deepening regional water and electricity shortages. But plans for reviving canal dredging or dams can also <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/resistance-from-communities-on-dredging-jonglei-3985552">stoke tensions</a> in a region that already has plenty of them.</p>
<h2>Regional diplomacy</h2>
<p>Despite their preoccupation with internal conflicts, South Sudanese elites are far from passive regional actors. They have long considered the country’s resource potential an invaluable diplomatic instrument. </p>
<p>East Africa is at a critical moment. In addition to global pressures on food and energy prices, there are also intractable regional disputes. The most complex dossier remains that of Nile politics, with Ethiopia completing the <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/08/third-filling-nile-dam-heightens-ethiopia-egypt-crisis">third filling</a> of the <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/150/4/159/107371/The-Grand-Ethiopian-Renaissance-Dam-Africa-s-Water">Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam</a> last August. </p>
<p>Egypt and Sudan oppose what they see as the Ethiopian government’s unilateral construction and filling of the dam with Nile water. But the dam’s location makes it cheaper to export power to South Sudan than it is to transport it over the Ethiopian highlands to Addis Ababa. In this context, South Sudan’s diplomatic commitments around energy and water are much sought after.</p>
<p>This gives Juba leverage. The country has been exploiting regional rivalries and fluctuations in global commodity prices. We’ve argued in a <a href="https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/energy-and-water-sovereignty-south-sudan-s-regional-diplomacy-and-geopolitics-nile-basin/">recent paper</a> that the government’s energy diplomacy has allowed the ruling party to tighten its grip on power. It has also bolstered South Sudan’s ability to shape regional developments. </p>
<p>For instance, since independence President Salva Kiir has endorsed the Ethiopian dam and signalled his desire to import electricity from Ethiopia. His cabinet has repeatedly indicated its intention to ratify the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02508060.2013.744273">Cooperation Framework Agreement</a>, which Ethiopian officials see as key to the equitable and stable management of the Nile Basin. </p>
<p>But South Sudan has, at the same time, deepened relations with Ethiopia’s great rival, Egypt. Juba has solidified security ties with Cairo and solicited its assistance for infrastructure projects on the Nile and its tributaries. Such balancing is crucial to Kiir’s ability to extract support from Ethiopia, Egypt and other regional players. But his unwillingness to make hard, durable commitments leaves these powerful neighbours of South Sudan often deeply frustrated. </p>
<h2>Ignoring developmental needs</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, diplomatic agility does little to benefit the people over whom the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement governs. For all South Sudan’s trumpeted potential in water, energy and food, more than 50% of the population <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1155997/?iso3=SSD">is facing acute food insecurity</a> and barely <a href="https://www.iea.org/countries/south-sudan">1% has access to electricity</a>. A <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-needs-overview-2022-february-2022">2022 assessment</a> estimates that only 39% of the population has enough water to meet household needs. </p>
<p>Recent initiatives announced by government officials might well make existing problems worse. Resuming construction of the Jonglei canal <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/egypt-secret-nile-deal-divides-juba-3863834">is widely considered detrimental</a> to regional ecosystems, and to local livelihoods already battered by conflict and climate-related uncertainties. Similarly, a project in which <a href="https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/105395/Egypt-signs-protocol-for-construction-of-Wau-Dam-in-South">Egypt is to build a dam</a> on a branch of the Jur river has been met with scepticism over how it could contribute to South Sudanese water or food security. </p>
<p>South Sudan is receiving <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/11/21/pr22403-imf-pr-south-sudan-imf-reaches-sla-3rd-rev-smp-rcf-food-shock-window-prgrm-monitor-brd-inv">International Monetary Fund emergency financing</a> to restore some fiscal discipline while it deals with food price shocks. But the notion that such programmes constrain the government and encourage it to prioritise food (or energy) insecurity seems fanciful. </p>
<p>The track record since independence in 2011 is bleak: cereal production in 2021 was barely higher than in 2012, and the same proportion of the population was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.BASW.ZS?locations=SS">excluded from access to basic drinking water services</a> as a decade ago (59%). South Sudan remains, by most estimates, the least electrified country on the planet. </p>
<p>Indeed, despite all the buzz about hydro-infrastructure or new oil investments, it is improbable that millions of citizens will get even part of their needs met. If the past is any guide, speculation about foreign investments will likely give the country’s elites the power to once again ignore the population.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197725/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Sudan’s diplomatic support around energy and water is much sought after in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan.Harry Verhoeven, Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia UniversityFrancois Sennesael, DPhil Candidate, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1992652023-02-08T19:51:12Z2023-02-08T19:51:12ZCorruption and war: two scourges that feed off each other<p>In the world championship of corruption, the competition is fierce. The NGO Transparency International has just published its list of countries according to the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb">level of perceived corruption</a>.</p>
<p>The gold medal in the competition for the most corrupt country has just been awarded to Somalia, followed by South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, Libya, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, and North Korea.</p>
<h2>How do you measure corruption in a country?</h2>
<p>Since its inception in 1995, the <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/how-cpi-scores-are-calculated">Corruption Perceptions Index</a> (CPI) has become the world’s leading indicator of public sector corruption.</p>
<p>It ranks 180 countries and territories as more or less corrupt, using data from 13 external sources, including the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, private consulting and risk management firms, think tanks and others.</p>
<p>The scores given – on a scale ranging from zero (0 = high corruption) to one hundred (100 = no corruption), depending on the degree of perceived corruption in the public sector – reflect the opinions of experts and business figures.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=274&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/508417/original/file-20230206-17-1ssapj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=345&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2022 shows perceived levels of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<h2>When corruption eats away at the state…</h2>
<p>Holding the unenviable title of the most corrupt country on the planet since 2007, Somalia has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14747730701695729">something in common</a> with its “challengers” that explain their high level of corruption. What are the reasons for the link between increased corruption and the multiplication of conflicts?</p>
<p>The first is that highly corrupt societies are characterised by a great weakness of the state. As the most corrupt country, Somalia has almost no state. Over the past 30 years, it has experienced catastrophic famines, failed international interventions, refugee flows, deaths by the hundreds of thousands, and endless corruption, leading to a continued lack of even rudimentary state services and institutions.</p>
<p>Thus Somali law enforcement forces serve only to terrorise the population and enrich themselves and serve their warlord. Somalis live in an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056240500329379">environment of pervasive predation, threats and deprivation</a>. Another example is <a href="http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.522">Syria</a>, in which corruption and the civil war have challenged the functioning of the judicial system, a jungle where those who corrupt the judges win the most.</p>
<h2>Decaying public institutions</h2>
<p>Second, corruption leads to a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9730-2">loss of trust in public institutions</a>, which leads to near-permanent violence. Corruption deteriorates the democratic system in an endless cycle: impoverished citizens receive money to vote for the tyrant in power; electoral commissions are bought and become masquerades to proclaim plebiscites for despots hated by their people; and independent candidates in power are threatened and even sometimes murdered…</p>
<p>For example, South Sudan is a democratic nightmare with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-sudan">permanent violations of human rights</a> – arbitrary arrests, illegal detention, torture and murder. Venezuela, one of the five most corrupt countries in the world, such crimes have infiltrated all levels of the state and corruption has effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-corruption-kill-democracy-110637">killed the country’s democracy</a>.</p>
<p>Another reason is that corruption fuels war is the lack of press freedom. A tyrannical political system nourished by corruption further reinforces its authoritarianism by destroying press freedom. For example, without any media capable of thwarting his power, Vladimir Putin strengthened his hold on Russia and made it impossible to challenge his country’s territorial ambitions such as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2019.1625279">2014 annexation of Crimea</a> and the <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD281.pdf#page=2">2022 attack on Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>As for Yemen, a particularly corrupt territory with very little press freedom, the NGO Reporters Without Borders <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/yemen">says</a>: “The Yemeni media are polarised by the war’s different protagonists and, to avoid reprisals, have no choice but to toe the line of whoever controls the area where they are located”. As a result, Yemen has been ravaged by war since 2014, fuelled by corruption and an authoritarian press.</p>
<p>The final reason for the link between corruption and war is the importance of <a href="http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I4-P240.pdf">economic inequalities and the weakness of economic development</a>.</p>
<h2>Rising inequality</h2>
<p>In a country where corruption reigns, a small minority monopolises national wealth, especially since <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1056492615579081">corruption is the use of its personal power for private interests against the collective interest</a>. When social injustice reigns, tensions develop and civil wars can break out. South Sudan has been portrayed as a kleptocracy, a governmental system in which the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/113/452/347/78186">ruling class appropriates public resources for its own benefit</a> at the expense of public welfare.</p>
<p>In the end, the vicious circle has set in: corruption leads to permanent tensions, and then violent conflicts, and then crimes and wars. As the latest Transparency International report shows, highly corrupt countries are all economically, politically and socially unstable territories that are gradually being destroyed by incessant wars. Over the course of the conflicts, all the institutions of governance have been destroyed.</p>
<p>Insecurity encourages the people to engage in trafficking. In the absence of national watchdog agencies, a feeling of total impunity sets in and corruption becomes systemic. The spread of corruption then makes it a social norm, leading populations of the most affected countries to eventually regard it as the only way to survive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199265/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bertrand Venard ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>A review of Transparency International’s recently released global corruption ranking confirms that corruption fuels war, and vice versa.Bertrand Venard, Professeur / Professor, AudenciaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1973752023-02-01T06:12:04Z2023-02-01T06:12:04ZPope prepares for South Sudan peace mission – but many people there aren’t ready to forgive<p>Pope Francis, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland plan to visit South Sudan in February 2023 to try and move <a href="http://www.christianunity.va/content/unitacristiani/en/news/2022/2022-12-01-ecumenical-pilgrimage-for-peace.html">the nation towards peace</a>. </p>
<p>The three church leaders will meet church and civil groups. The visit follows a retreat held at the Vatican in 2019, when South Sudanese political leaders were urged to end a civil war that has cost more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pope-southsudan-idUSKCN1RN27G">400,000 lives</a>. </p>
<p>Churches are powerful <a href="https://www.baylorpress.com/9781481308229/christianity-and-catastrophe-in-south-sudan/">authorities in South Sudan</a>, where many people are <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/621868/summary">Christian</a> (estimates of <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/south-sudan/">60%-80%</a> are highly contested). When South Sudanese political leaders visited the Vatican in 2019, the pope surprised people by <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47903916">kissing the feet</a> of President Salva Kiir and opposition leader (and former vice president) Riek Machar, as the pontiff urged them <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pope-southsudan-idUSKCN1RN27G">towards peace</a>.</p>
<p>Religious leaders can provide <a href="https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol19/iss1/4/">an alternative diplomatic route</a> when others have failed to reconcile. For example, churches in Columbia have been active in <a href="https://www.usip.org/blog/2022/11/latest-usip-resurgent-efforts-colombias-peace-process">promoting peaceful relations</a>. </p>
<p>I have spent a decade carrying out research on peace and conflict in South Sudan, and research suggests that the two big challenges these religious leaders face are understanding both why people are not ready to forgive and why local institutions face difficulties helping resolve the violence. </p>
<p>Religious leaders have previously called on people to forgive each other as part of a move towards peace. <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847013385/spiritual-contestations-the-violence-of-peace-in-south-sudan/">In my forthcoming book</a> I highlight how, for many South Sudanese, forgiveness is seen as undesirable when the violence of the perpetrator is ongoing, and doesn’t provide accountability. </p>
<p>People also feel this ignores people’s obligations to those who were killed during war. Among the communities where I have researched, people want compensation in order to provide for the family of the dead, to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/dead-are-just-to-drink-from-recycling-ideas-of-revenge-among-the-western-dinka-south-sudan/425A11D0B27561FDCA5979AD4A431B41">keep their memory alive</a> and to allow full reconciliation. </p>
<p>Christian churches have sensibly sought to work with existing peacemaking institutions and <a href="https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10454/17138/Martin%27s%20PhD%20Thesis%20%28Post-viva%20final%20submission%20%20May%201%2C%202018%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">not only with political leaders</a>. Local peacemaking is also subject to ongoing, high-level political interference including through the remaking of <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847013385/spiritual-contestations-the-violence-of-peace-in-south-sudan/">the meanings of peace rituals</a>. </p>
<p>In areas where I conducted research, decades of governments’ legal reforms, shifting economies and the lack of compensation in peacemaking had undermined local institutions’ <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/dead-are-just-to-drink-from-recycling-ideas-of-revenge-among-the-western-dinka-south-sudan/425A11D0B27561FDCA5979AD4A431B41">ability to end violence</a>. </p>
<p>Decades of armed conflicts have had political, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/dead-are-just-to-drink-from-recycling-ideas-of-revenge-among-the-western-dinka-south-sudan/425A11D0B27561FDCA5979AD4A431B41">social and spiritual consequences</a>. Local beliefs have long suggested that killers and their communities become subject to “<a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847013385/spiritual-contestations-the-violence-of-peace-in-south-sudan">spritual pollution</a>” that can have deadly physical manifestations, such as sickness, and that can only be resolved through rituals and reconciliation. </p>
<p>Armed combatants have tried to remake rituals to protect themselves from <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847013385/spiritual-contestations-the-violence-of-peace-in-south-sudan/">this “pollution”</a>, but the scale of killing, the use of guns and the patterns of violence all leave fears that situation is unresolved.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The pope offered help to South Sudanese leaders at a previous meeting at the Vatican.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Religious authorities, including those largely invisible to the international community such as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/182485#metadata_info_tab_contents">Nuer prophets</a> and Dinka spear masters, have a powerful role in setting the <a href="https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/amet.12138">moral limits of lethal violence</a>, and deciding <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2021.1918126">how war should be fought</a> and resolved.</p>
<h2>Understanding the past</h2>
<p>Wars for a separate South Sudan state started soon after Sudan’s independence from Britain in 1956. Peacemaking by Christian churches in what is now South Sudan also has a long history. </p>
<p>It has also often involved collaboration between different churches including Catholics, Anglicans and Presbyterians. In 1972, the World Council of Churches hosted peace negotiations that ended the war between the Sudan government and the Anyanya rebels who were <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/root-causes-of-sudans-civil-wars/addis-ababa-agreement-the-regional-governments-197283/A9E8251ED9C9F823FF26CB78F8883A49">fighting for southern independence</a>. </p>
<p>From 1983 until the 2005 peace agreement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) fought against the Sudan government. To gain international support and local recruits, from the 1990s the SPLA framed <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5325/jafrireli.4.2.0129.pdf">the conflict in religious terms</a>.</p>
<p>These terms pitted the pro-Christian SPLA in what is now South Sudan against the Islamic Sudan government. However, much of the fighting in the 1990s and 2000s was between South Sudanese groups. </p>
<p>The SPLA v Sudan government wars ended with the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_060000_The%20Comprehensive%20Peace%20Agreement.pdf">2005 peace agreement</a> that made the SPLA the official army of the south and promised a referendum on southern independence. In 2006, the SPLA absorbed large numbers of anti-SPLA troops from elsewhere in the South in order to reduce divisions between groups. South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011. </p>
<p>Armed conflict escalated again in South Sudan in December 2013 when the army divided along the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/113/451/300/135552">historic pro- and anti-SPLA lines</a>. This fighting
included <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/south-sudan-ethnic-targeting-widespread-killings">the targeting of civilians</a> and led to regional <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14678802.2020.1820161">rebellions</a> and the rapid rise of armed opposition. </p>
<p>Within five years, these wars had resulted in <a href="https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/research/centres/health-humanitarian-crises-centre">400,000 deaths</a>. <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/south-sudan-emergency.html">Millions were displaced</a>, and <a href="https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/108930/1/CRP_chiefs_courts_hunger_and_improving_humanitarian_programming.pdf">hundreds of thousands experienced famine</a>. </p>
<p>In 2018, <a href="https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/02/South-Sudan-Peace-Agreement-September-2018.pdf">a peace agreement</a> was signed by the South Sudan government and the largest armed opposition group. However, fighting continued between the government and groups who did not sign the agreement.</p>
<p>In early 2022, armed conflict resulted in the government gaining territory from opposition parties who had signed the peace agreement. At the end of 2022, violence broke out between political factions in Upper Nile state, and offensives were carried out in Jonglei state by groups historically aligned to the opposition.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kiir-and-machar-insights-into-south-sudans-strongmen-182522">Kiir and Machar: insights into South Sudan's strongmen</a>
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<h2>What’s been tried before?</h2>
<p>In the late 1990s, international and local church leaders engaged with <a href="https://www.cmi.no/file/3278-We-Have-Lived-Too-Long-to-Be-Deceived---RVI-2014-Juba-Lecture-Series-2015.pdf">South Sudanese chiefs and other local religious leaders</a> to try to end violent divisions. A meeting in the <a href="https://riftvalley.net/news/what-happened-wunlit-reliving-south-sudans-most-successful-peace-conference">village of Wunlit</a> was considered a success both because communities resumed peaceful relationships, but also because their political leaders were apparently forced to reconcile. This prompted churches to support dozens of similar processes <a href="https://riftvalley.net/publication/local-peace-processes-sudan">over the subsequent decades</a>. </p>
<p>From 2014, South Sudanese church leaders were official observers at the internationally brokered peace meetings. Church leaders have also publicly criticised <a href="https://www.catholicregister.org/home/international/item/25554-south-sudan-churches-decry-warring-factions-for-ignoring-people-s-needs">the warring parties</a> when they have not supported peace.</p>
<p>One part of <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847013385/spiritual-contestations-the-violence-of-peace-in-south-sudan/">my upcoming research</a> describes how South Sudanese, over the last century, have often understood governments and warring parties as “god-like” because they claim to be able to arbitrarily show favour or destruction, without accountability. In such a context, religious authorities have a particularly important role in holding governments and warring parties to account. </p>
<p>To end these wars, church leaders need to take seriously the politics and potential violence of peace and forgiveness.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197375/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Naomi Ruth Pendle receives funding from the UK's Arts and Humanities Research Council, Economic and Social Research Council and the British Academy. </span></em></p>Pope Francis will be part of a peace mission to South Sudan, where thousands have been killed in ongoing violence.Naomi Ruth Pendle, Lecturer in International Development, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1976332023-01-16T13:45:14Z2023-01-16T13:45:14ZPope Francis’ visit to Africa comes at a defining moment for the Catholic church<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504210/original/file-20230112-53024-f2g4xr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pope Francis in Nairobi, Kenya, during his first papal visit to the African continent in 2015. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nichole Sobecki/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During his <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202212020298.html">planned visit</a> to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan in February 2023, Pope Francis intends to be in dialogue with African Catholics – but also to listen to political leaders and young Africans. </p>
<p>This visit comes at a defining moment in what is regarded as a fairly progressive papacy.</p>
<p>Pope Francis has convened a worldwide consultation on the future of the Catholic church. This consultation, called a <a href="https://www.synod.va/en/what-is-the-synod-21-24/about.html">synodal process</a>, began in 2021 and will conclude in 2024. </p>
<p>It is the most ambitious dialogue ever undertaken on bringing changes in Catholic beliefs and practices since the Second Vatican Council’s reforms in <a href="https://www.npr.org/2012/10/10/162573716/why-is-vatican-ii-so-important#:%7E:text=AP-,Pope%20Paul%20VI%20hands%20Orthodox%20Metropolitan%20Meliton%20of%20Heliopolis%20a,Orthodox%20churches%20nine%20centuries%20before">1965</a>. It is exciting for reform-minded Catholics, but distressing for conservative Catholics. </p>
<p>The ongoing synodal process has exposed the fault lines in modern Catholicism on the issues of women, celibacy, sexuality, marriage, clericalism and hierarchism. How Pope Francis – who marks a decade of his papacy this year – manages these increasingly divisive issues will, in my judgement, largely define his legacy. </p>
<p><a href="https://works.bepress.com/stanchuilo/">My research</a> has focused on how African Catholics can bring about a <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/as-pope-francis-visits-af_b_8633590">consensus approach</a> in managing these contested issues.</p>
<p>The big questions for me are how another papal visit to Africa at this point will address the challenges and opportunities that Africans are identifying through the synodal process – and how this plays into the state of Catholicism in Africa.</p>
<h2>The influence of African Catholicism</h2>
<p>The Catholic church is witnessing its fastest growth in Africa (recent statistics show <a href="https://dornsife.usc.edu/iacs/global-christianity/#:%7E:text=April%2030%2C%202022&text=Following%20recent%20trends%2C%20the%20Catholic,growth%20in%20Europe%20(0.3%25)">2.1%</a> growth between 2019 and 2020). Out of a global population of <a href="https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/250362/number-of-catholics-in-asia-and-africa-continues-to-rise">1.36 billion Catholics</a>, 236 million are African (20% of the total).</p>
<p>African Catholics are not simply growing in number. They are reinventing and reinterpreting Christianity. They are infusing it with new language and spiritual vibrancy through unique ways of worshipping God. </p>
<p>Given its expansion, the Catholic church in Africa is well placed to be a central driver of social, political and spiritual life. In many settings, the church provides a community of hope where the fabric of society is weak because of war, humanitarian disasters and disease. </p>
<p>The DRC, for instance, has the highest number of Catholic health facilities in Africa at <a href="https://books.google.co.ke/books?id=cZ51EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT649&lpg=PT649&dq=the+Democratic+Republic+of+Congo+(DRC)+has+the+highest+number+of+Catholic+health+facilities+in+Africa+at+2,185&source=bl&ots=c6A8EdULGF&sig=ACfU3U0WBNUa2VbKVLfl4xQMRkmVMeaH2g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwigo7Te88P8AhV1WqQEHchBCSEQ6AF6BAgqEAM#v=onepage&q=the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Congo%20(DRC)%20has%20the%20highest%20number%20of%20Catholic%20health%20facilities%20in%20Africa%20at%202%2C185&f=false">2,185</a>. It is followed by Kenya with 1,092 and Nigeria with 524 facilities. Additionally, bishops have mobilised peaceful protests against violence in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/4/dr-congo-thousands-of-churchgoers-protest-rebel-violence">DRC</a> and <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/africa/news/2020-03/nigeria-bishops-protest-march-against-extremism.html">Nigeria</a>. </p>
<p>Another major feature of Catholicism on the continent is that it is witnessing a “youth bulge”. Central to Pope Francis’ advocacy for Africa is his appeal that churches, religious groups and governments show solidarity with young people. He calls them “the church of now”. </p>
<p>The pope expressed this most recently in <a href="https://www.aciafrica.org/news/6990/engage-your-history-keep-your-roots-intact-pope-francis-to-african-catholic-students">November 2022</a> during a synodal consultation with African youth. He denounced the exploitation of Africa by external forces and its destruction by wars, ideologies of violence and policies that rob young people of their future. </p>
<h2>Why DRC and South Sudan?</h2>
<p>Pope Francis comes to Africa as part of the synodal consultation. He takes the message of a humble and merciful church to some of the most challenging parts of Africa: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">DRC</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-root-causes-of-ongoing-conflict-remain-untouched-133542">South Sudan</a>. </p>
<p>These two countries illustrate the impact of neo-liberal capitalism and the effects of slavery, colonialism and imperialism. Together, they have unleashed the most destructive economic, social and political upheaval in modern African history. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/conflict-in-the-drc-5-articles-that-explain-whats-gone-wrong-195332">Conflict in the DRC: 5 articles that explain what's gone wrong</a>
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<p>Pope Francis is coming to listen especially to the poor, to young people and to women who have been violated in conflicts. He also hopes to address the hidden wounds of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-catholic-church-sex-abuse-crisis-4-essential-reads-169442">clerical sexual abuse</a> in the church.</p>
<p>Pope Francis will see how war, dictatorship and ecological disasters have denied ordinary people access to land, labour and lodging. These are the “three Ls” he <a href="https://cjd.org/2015/09/08/sacred-rights-land-lodging-and-labor/">proposes</a> as vital in giving agency to the poor. </p>
<h2>Some opposition</h2>
<p>Pope Francis will no doubt receive a warm welcome during his visit. Most African Catholics embrace his message of a poor and merciful church because it speaks to their challenges. </p>
<p>But there are many African Catholics, particularly high-ranking church leaders, who are yet to embrace this reform agenda. The previous two popes encouraged a centralising tendency, which promoted unquestioning loyalty to Rome by African bishops. As a result, these bishops resisted attempts by African theologians to modernise and Africanise Catholic beliefs and practices to meet local needs and circumstances. </p>
<p>This has led to some African bishops being uncomfortable with Pope Francis’ <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html">progressive agenda</a> on liberation theology, openness to gay Catholics, condemnation of clerical privilege and power, and inclusion of women in mainstream leadership. </p>
<p>Rather than being a strong church that looks like Africa, some of the Catholic dioceses on the continent have embraced medieval traditions – like Roman rituals and Latin – that alienate ordinary African Catholics, especially young people. </p>
<h2>Africa’s future role</h2>
<p>Pope Francis has often <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/it/speeches/2022/november/documents/20221119-cuamm.html">spoken</a> of giving Africa a voice in the church and in the world. </p>
<p>Many African Catholics wonder how this will happen when, for the first time in more than 30 years, there is just one African holding an important executive function at the Vatican. This is Archbishop Protase Rugambwa of Tanzania, the secretary of the <a href="https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2022-06/dicastery-evangelization-vatican-praedicate-evangelium.html">Dicastery for the Evangelization of Peoples</a>, a department at the Vatican’s central offices. </p>
<p>Many African Catholics hope that Pope Francis will announce some African appointments to the Vatican during his February 2023 visit. </p>
<p>They also are hoping he will create a pontifical commission for Africa, similar to the <a href="http://www.americalatina.va/content/americalatina/es.html">Latin American commission</a> created in 1958. This will be a significant way of giving African Catholics a voice in the church of Rome. </p>
<p>Pope Francis hasn’t fully recovered from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/knee-problem-forces-pope-francis-cancel-july-africa-trip-2022-06-10/">health challenges</a> that led to the cancellation of the trip last July. But he is making this trip because <a href="https://www.lastampa.it/vatican-insider/en/2015/11/29/news/pope-opens-holy-door-today-bangui-is-the-spiritual-capital-of-the-world-1.35211106/">he believes</a> that Africa matters. </p>
<p>Through the sessions that the pope will conduct with Africans, especially young people, it’s hoped that the Catholic church in Africa can help address the causes of war and suffering in the DRC and South Sudan, and the obstacles to reforming the church in Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stan Chu Ilo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African Catholics are growing in number. They are also reinventing and reinterpreting Christianity.Stan Chu Ilo, Research Professor , World Christianity and African Studies, DePaul UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1952202022-11-28T12:27:46Z2022-11-28T12:27:46ZEast African Court of Justice – what it is and what its powers are<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/497004/original/file-20221123-14-81cjvc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Kenyan judicial nominee to the East African Court of Justice, Charles Nyachae, is sworn in before a summit of regional leaders in Kampala in 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kenya Presidential Communication Service</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Martha Karua, the running mate of Raila Odinga, the losing candidate in Kenya’s 2022 presidential election, continues to dispute William Ruto’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/5/kenyas-supreme-court-upholds-rutos-win-in-presidential-election">slim victory</a> over him. According to the <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/people/martha-karua-3813480">politician and lawyer</a>, the Kenyan electoral commission and the country’s supreme court </p>
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<p>failed Kenya’s democracy and infringed on the human rights of Kenyans when they ratified President William Ruto’s win. </p>
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<p>This is why she <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-11-04-details-of-karuas-petition-at-east-african-court-of-justice-over-ruto-win/">intends</a> to bring the matter before the East African Court of Justice. </p>
<p>As the judicial organ of the East African Community, the court was set up in 2001 to ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance with the treaty that binds the regional bloc of seven countries. These are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.</p>
<p>For everybody concerned with the progress of regional integration, challenging Kenyan presidential elections in the regional court is good news. It is not necessarily about what the court will say about the quality of the elections, but about the decision’s long-term implications. </p>
<p>Every decision sheds light on the regional bloc’s basic values. Case law shows countries how to live up to those values. And a high-profile case creates awareness of the court’s mandate and mission.</p>
<p>The regional court needs and deserves public attention. Unlike most of the regional institutions in Africa, it hasn’t been captured by political elites. It is a court of the people with a broad jurisdiction. </p>
<p>Initially, the regional court limited itself to <a href="https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Plaxeda-Rugumba-2010-8-judgment-2011.pdf">declarations of treaty violations</a>. With time, it moved to order <a href="https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2019/10/22/east-african-court-of-justice-a-midwife-of-the-political-federation-the-new-case-law-on-the-remedies-awarded-by-the-court">more robust remedies</a>, such as compensation for aggrieved parties. It also started instructing governments to take certain actions to remedy violations. </p>
<p>I have studied the development of the East African Court of Justice over the last few years. My view is that the court has been a keen promoter of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. It has also challenged the elitist legacy of regional integration in East Africa and shaken up the top-down decision-making processes in the East African Community. The court did so by engaging with civil society and national judiciaries, thus bringing the regional bloc closer to the people.</p>
<h2>A court of the people</h2>
<p>The East African Court of Justice is a very accessible court. Any person who is a resident of the bloc can file a petition – <a href="https://www.eacj.org/?page_id=33">the treaty</a> calls it individual reference (Article 30). Anybody can challenge treaty violations in the court directly without first engaging their national authorities or courts. There is no need to demonstrate any personal interest in the outcome of the case – it can be filed in the public interest. </p>
<p>The court has encouraged individuals to use it through a generous approach to the litigation costs. There are no filing fees and even a losing applicant does not have to pay any instruction fees to the state’s attorney general.</p>
<p>Moreover, the court has gone to great lengths to be physically closer to the people. Even though it is seated in Arusha, in northern Tanzania, there is no need to travel there to file a case. The court operates an electronic filing system and is establishing sub-registries in all capitals of the bloc. It’s also holding hearings in national judiciaries’ court stations across the region.</p>
<p>The court did not decide a single case in the first couple of years of its existence. As the cases finally started coming in the mid-2000s, the court experienced a backlash which limited its accessibility. In 2007, Kenyan politician <a href="https://www.eacj.org/?cases=application-no-01-no-02-of-2010-appellate-division">Anyang’ Nyong’o and 10 other applicants</a> brought a petition about flawed processes of election to the East African Legislative Assembly. The court agreed with the applicants. </p>
<p>It was apparently inconceivable to the national governments that the court they had created would dare to oppose them. Politicians rushed to put the court in its place. They introduced the time frame for individual references, making it harder to approach the court.</p>
<h2>What cases are most common?</h2>
<p>Cross-border trade disputes make up only a few of the court’s cases. In one <a href="https://africanlii.org/ea/judgment/east-african-court-justice/2018/71">case</a>, a private company won US$20,000 as compensation for Burundi custom authorities unlawfully seizing a truck carrying perishable goods.</p>
<p>Awarding of damages is, however, a new practice. The majority of cases concern violation of the bloc’s values, most notably the commitments to the rule of law and human rights. A <a href="https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/NO._1_OF_2007.pdf">groundbreaking judgement</a> was handed down in 2007 in the James Katabazi case. A group of treason co-accused in Uganda had been rearrested after being granted bail by their country’s court. The regional court denounced the rearrest as a violation of the rule of law.</p>
<p>Other cases followed. For example, the East African Court of Justice has <a href="https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Plaxeda-Rugumba-2010-8-judgment-2011.pdf">ruled</a> against secretive detention without trial of a Rwandan army officer accused of committing crimes against national security. And it <a href="https://www.eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Referene-No.2-of-2017.pdf">ruled</a> in favour of the Media Council of Tanzania against legislation which granted a government minister sweeping powers to </p>
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<p>prohibit or otherwise sanction a publication of any content that jeopardises national security or public safety.</p>
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<p>But what is interesting in the context of the upcoming petition from Kenya is an <a href="https://www.afronomicslaw.org/2020/11/30/eacj-first-instance-court-decides-martha-karua-v-republic-of-kenya-the-litmus-test-for-eacj-jurisdiction-and-supremacy">earlier judgement</a> – in 2020 – in favour of Martha Karua. After unsuccessfully contesting a gubernatorial seat in Kirinyaga, she filed an electoral petition with Kenyan courts. It was dismissed on procedural technicalities and she was never heard on the merits. According to the <a href="https://www.eacj.org/?cases=martha-wangari-karua-v-the-attorney-general-of-the-republic-of-kenya-2-others">East African Court of Justice ruling</a>, Kenya violated the right to access justice, and hence the principle of the rule of law. </p>
<h2>Only as strong as its partners</h2>
<p>The court holds great potential for justice in the region, but it is only as strong as its partner states allow it to be. The partner states are under treaty obligation (Article 38) to implement the court’s judgements without “undue delay”. If a state fails to do so, the applicant can go back to the court, since the failure to implement a judgement is in itself a rule of law violation, a violation of the treaty and contempt of court. </p>
<p>The enforcement of a judgement depends ultimately on the given state’s commitment to the rule of law. And <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHBZkMgWpQk">as stated</a> by the former Kenyan chief justice, David Maraga, it is herein that the greatness of any nation lies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195220/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tomasz Milej does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The East African Court of Justice has been a keen promoter of the rule of law, democracy and human rights.Tomasz Milej, Professor, Department of Public Law, Kenyatta UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1934662022-11-09T10:46:01Z2022-11-09T10:46:01ZKenya violence: 5 key drivers of the decades-long conflict in the north and what to do about them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493785/original/file-20221107-17-abds3d.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ivan Lieman/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Conflict and insecurity are prevalent in northern Kenya. In <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/11-including-eight-police-officers-killed-in-turkana-banditry-3960774">recent weeks</a>, cases of <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/turkana/armed-bandits-injure-two-pupils-in-raids-on-primary-schools-4005286">bandit attacks</a> in the region have left villages terrorised and led to several deaths. In October 2022, the government <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/news/police-recover-firearms-ammunitions-152470/">launched</a> a multi-agency security operation aimed at curbing further attacks. </p>
<p>Northern Kenya is characterised by a wide expanse of wilderness, harsh climate and low levels of development. The region borders Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. </p>
<iframe title="Kenya’s northern region" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-PI7YV" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/PI7YV/3/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>Instances of conflict and insecurity range from attacks by armed bandits and cattle rustlers to community disputes over resources and terrorism. The region covers about <a href="https://www.knbs.or.ke/?wpdmpro=2019-kenya-population-and-housing-census-volume-i-population-by-county-and-sub-county">60% of Kenya’s geographical territory</a>. It is occupied by about 18% of the country’s population. </p>
<p>Pastoralism is the <a href="https://pastoralismjournal.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13570-019-0144-x">main economic activity</a>. Others include irrigated agriculture, small-scale businesses and tourism-related activities. The region is largely <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/769351587711204889/pdf/Social-Economic-Blueprint-for-the-Frontier-Counties-Development-Council-2018-2030.pdf">isolated</a> from the rest of the country due to poor infrastructure, including roads. </p>
<p>According to National Police Service <a href="https://www.nationalpolice.go.ke/crime-statistics.html?download=95:annual-report-2021">crime statistics</a>, between January and December 2021, 73% of the country’s stock theft raids occurred in the northern region. Over the same period, 58% of the illegal arms recovered and surrendered to the government were from northern Kenya. </p>
<p>The government – <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/turkana/government-declares-total-war-on-bandits-in-north-rift-3819718">past</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHP-Q6Ygaxo">present</a> – has run numerous operations to address the violence in the region, which threatens Kenya’s overall security. But it hasn’t worked. </p>
<p>As a professor of political science who researches conflict, I’ve had the region on my radar for some time. In my assessment, violent conflict in northern Kenya is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056240600671324">driven</a> by five key factors that must be addressed by both state and non-state agencies.</p>
<h2>1. Regional inequality, exclusion and marginalisation</h2>
<p><a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15570/EIR%2036_Conflict_analysis_of_Northern_Kenya.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Inequality</a> between regions in Kenya is caused by decades of political, economic and social exclusion and marginalisation. This is a product of colonial and post-colonial state policies that have led to <a href="https://www.unicnairobi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Leave-no-one-behind-_Kenya-March-2022.pdf">historical injustices and human rights abuses</a>. </p>
<p>Colonial authorities <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137558305_4">neglected</a> Kenya’s arid and semi-arid regions by prioritising development in the country’s natural resource-endowed highlands. Successive post-independence governments continued to pursue <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137558305_4">policies</a> that further <a href="https://www.reinvent-kenya.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Study-to-Examine-the-Influence-of-Contemporary-Islamic-Ideologies-in-Kenya-Target-Counties-Mandera-Garissa-Marsabit-and-Isiolo.pdf">marginalised</a> the north. This has damaged trust in state institutions and produced communal grievances that hinder inter-group unity. </p>
<p>Post-colonial state security actors have also <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17539153.2018.1498190?src=recsys">disproportionately targeted</a> Somali inhabitants in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism measures in the north. The main terrorist threat comes from the <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785?rskey=cj1t0b&result=1">Somalia-based Al-Shabaab</a> group. </p>
<p>In 2010, Kenya <a href="https://countytoolkit.devolution.go.ke/basics-of-devolution">decentralised power</a> by allocating funds and responsibilities to its 47 county governments. This was aimed at improving service delivery at the regional level. While this has <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15570/EIR%2036_Conflict_analysis_of_Northern_Kenya.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">begun to address</a> northern Kenya’s marginalisation, repressive security operations continue to fan inter-group conflicts and radicalisation to violent extremism. The use of force in these operations disproportionately targets marginalised communities.</p>
<h2>2. Resource and environmental factors</h2>
<p>Disputes over land, access to pasture, and <a href="https://www.iri.org/resources/the-struggle-for-pluralism-and-peace-legitimacy-conflict-and-governance-in-two-kenyan-wards/">conflicts between herders and farmers</a> continue to drive violence in Kenya’s north. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.unicnairobi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Leave-no-one-behind-_Kenya-March-2022.pdf">Competition for scarce resources</a>, such as <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/drought-and-conflict-laikipia-kenya">pasture</a>, water and now <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17513488">oil</a>, has worsened these disputes.</p>
<p>Kenya announced it had discovered oil in Turkana County in 2012. Oil exploration has introduced new tensions between resident Turkana and Pokot ethnic groups, and within the Turkana community. Some members of the Turkana believe that the community has not substantially benefited from the resource exploitation. </p>
<p>A rise in crimes like <a href="https://www.unicnairobi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Leave-no-one-behind-_Kenya-March-2022.pdf">highway robberies</a> is attributed to these communal conflicts. </p>
<h2>3. Political power struggles</h2>
<p>Power struggles between politicians have fuelled conflict along ethnic lines in the north. </p>
<p>Elective political posts are perceived to provide access to economic resources. Devolving power to the counties along with <a href="https://www.unicnairobi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Leave-no-one-behind-_Kenya-March-2022.pdf">political alliances</a> have helped to decentralise political power and the provision of essential services. However, they have intensified local-level political competition. Politicians incite inter-clan rivalry, escalating tensions and undermining the benefits of devolution. </p>
<h2>4. Cultural practices</h2>
<p>Cultural practices contribute to violence in northern Kenya. These practices largely manifest through cattle rustling. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nationalpolice.go.ke/crime-statistics.html?download=95:annual-report-2021">Cattle rustling and stock theft</a> are partly driven by economic motives. These include a desire to restock herds depleted by a lack of pasture and water during droughts. Cattle rustling also provides an opportunity to make money from trading in stolen animals. </p>
<p>Cultural practices such as <a href="https://www.nrt-kenya.org/news-2/2018/6/20/stolen-cattle-returned-in-peaceful-handover-ceremony">marriage settlements</a> also drive cattle rustling. </p>
<p>This disrupts community livelihoods, and the use of automatic weapons in raids has led to a <a href="https://www.unicnairobi.org/news-and-events/leave-no-one-behind-peace-and-conflict-through-the-eyes-of-those-at-risk-of-being-left-behind-report/">high number of deaths</a>. State-led disarmament efforts have had little effect. </p>
<h2>5. Proliferation of small arms and weapons</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nationalpolice.go.ke/crime-statistics.html?download=95:annual-report-2021">proliferation of weapons</a> in the region is, to a large extent, caused by <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15570/EIR%2036_Conflict_analysis_of_Northern_Kenya.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">cross-border activities</a>. </p>
<p>Kenya’s borders with Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda are porous and have contributed to the increase in small arms, illicit trade in cattle, terrorism and other forms of organised crime. </p>
<p>Efforts by the state to manage domestic and cross-border conflicts through repressive disarmament operations have instead increased tensions between borderland communities and the state. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-should-disarm-civilians-the-evidence-shows-this-improves-security-190770">South Sudan should disarm civilians – the evidence shows this improves security</a>
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<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>State security agencies have the constitutional mandate to use force to deter and disrupt acts of violence that are a threat to national security. However, their methods are often formal and based on power. </p>
<p>Non-state actors, on the other hand, adopt informal methods that are widely accepted in local communities. They are based on mutual trust and are therefore seen as more legitimate. </p>
<p>Both state and non-state actors have the resources, technical expertise and experience to address the drivers of conflict in Kenya’s northern region. A flexible approach that involves various actors can broadly contribute to good governance, and reduce conflict and security incidences. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/training-local-leaders-in-mediation-can-reduce-violence-positive-results-in-nigeria-183746">Training local leaders in mediation can reduce violence: positive results in Nigeria</a>
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<p>This approach would entail all parties working together to promote dialogue, education and peacemaking. It also would include ensuring inclusive political representation in local-level traditional conflict management approaches.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Conflict is prevalent in the region characterised by harsh climate, vast wilderness and low levels of development.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of RwandaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1932412022-10-27T14:41:45Z2022-10-27T14:41:45ZDroughts don’t need to result in famine: Ethiopia and Somalia show what makes the difference<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491664/original/file-20221025-246-423c6v.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman at a camp for those displaced by drought in Baidoa, Somalia, in September 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ed Ram/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Horn of Africa is facing its worst drought in 40 years. Scientists <a href="https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/stubborn-la-ni%C3%B1a-persists">suspect</a> that a multi-year <a href="https://www.downtoearth.org.in/interviews/africa/east-africa-drought-climate-change-is-making-la-ni-a-impact-severe--83283#:%7E:text=The%20exceptional%20weather%20situation%20is,high%20temperatures%20in%20East%20Africa.">La Niña cycle</a> has been amplified by climate change to prolong dry and hot conditions. </p>
<p>After multiple failed harvests and amid high global food prices, the Horn is confronted with a severe food security crisis. Some <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1123812">37 million people</a> face acute hunger in the region, which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.</p>
<p>In Somalia alone, 40% of the population is facing <a href="https://www.wfp.org/publications/hunger-hotspots-fao-wfp-early-warnings-acute-food-insecurity-october-2022-january-2023">food insecurity</a>: about 6.7 million people. In neighbouring Ethiopia, the proportion is lower – 20% – but the absolute numbers are higher at 20.4 million. </p>
<p>It was not too long ago that drought led to highly divergent impacts between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 2010-2011, a <a href="https://news.un.org/audio/2013/05/579912">devastating drought</a> led to more than 260,000 deaths beyond normal levels of expected mortality in Somalia. Yet almost no one died in Ethiopia after a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/09/opinion/is-the-era-of-great-famines-over.html">severe drought in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>Why did so many people die in Somalia but so few in Ethiopia? I explore these and related questions in my recent book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/States-Nature-Effects-Climate-Security/dp/110895846X">States and Nature: The Effects of Climate Change on Security</a>. </p>
<p>Using the cases of the two countries, among others, the book shows why Somalia had a famine in the early 2010s while Ethiopia did not, despite both being exposed to severe droughts.</p>
<p>The biggest differences were that, compared with Somalia, Ethiopia enjoyed a state with more capacity and more political inclusion, and made good use of foreign aid. These are factors that I identify in the book as contributing to how climate change is affecting the security of states. I include famine as a form of insecurity.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/famine-should-not-exist-in-2022-yet-somalia-faces-its-worst-yet-wealthy-countries-pay-your-dues-191952">Famine should not exist in 2022, yet Somalia faces its worst yet. Wealthy countries, pay your dues</a>
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<p>Better outcomes are expected in states with high capacity to deliver services, high political inclusion where all social groups are represented in government, and where international assistance is welcomed and shared broadly. </p>
<h2>Two sets of conditions, two different outcomes</h2>
<p>So how did Somalia and Ethiopia stack up on the three factors that contribute to a bad situation being made worse?</p>
<p>In the lead-up to Somalia’s famine in 2011, the country faced persistent problems of a weak national government that was being challenged by Al-Shabaab, a violent Islamist militia that controlled significant territory in the south of the country. The Somali government had limited ability to deliver services in the areas it controlled, let alone areas under Al-Shabaab. </p>
<p>For its part, the Ethiopian government invested in <a href="https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/project_psnp_ethiopia">social safety net programmes</a> to feed people in the midst of the drought through cash transfers, employment programmes and food assistance. </p>
<p>The issue of sections of the society being excluded was also in greater evidence in Somalia than in Ethiopia. A number of marginalised groups, notably the Bantu Somalis and the Rahanweyn clan, were among the most affected by the drought. Better connected groups diverted aid that otherwise would have benefited these communities.</p>
<p>Finally, Somalia was in much worse shape when it came to aid. Al-Shabaab militants were blocking aid into the country, which led to a number of humanitarian groups withdrawing from Somalia. In addition, the US, through the Patriot Act, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/07/22/138596343/terrorists-u-s-policy-hinder-famine-aid-to-somalia">discouraged</a> NGOs from providing aid for fear it would end up in Al-Shabaab’s hands. Together, this meant that <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/famine-in-somalia/">little humanitarian assistance</a> came into Somalia precisely at the time when the country needed it most. Hundreds of thousands died. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-drives-al-shabaab-in-somalia-foreign-forces-out-sharia-law-in-and-overthrow-the-government-191366">What drives Al-Shabaab in Somalia: foreign forces out, Sharia law in and overthrow the government</a>
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<p>Ethiopia was a favourite of the international community for foreign assistance. It received funds that supported its social safety net programmes, which helped it prepare for the drought and administer emergency aid supplies. </p>
<p>The current food security crisis in the Horn of Africa, however, reveals persistent vulnerability in both countries. </p>
<p>As Ethiopia’s case shows, progress can be undone. Rising political exclusion is leading to huge food security risks, particularly in the Tigray region where aid is currently <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/wfp-regional-director-says-virtually-no-aid-access-in-tigray-104069#:%7E:text=Following%20the%20resumption%20of%20fighting,at%20the%20World%20Food%20Programme.">largely blocked</a> amid the ongoing <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/a-call-to-action-averting-atrocities-in-ethiopia-s-tigray-war-3994170">violent conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Equally worrisome is Somalia’s situation, where both local and external actors have struggled to build state capacity or inclusion in the face of a long-running violent insurgency. </p>
<h2>What can work</h2>
<p>My book provides some hopeful insights, as well as caution. It shows that for countries like Ethiopia and Bangladesh, international assistance can help address weak state capacity. Donors worked with local officials to address specific climate hazards, like drought and cyclones.</p>
<p>Such international assistance helped compensate for weak state capacity through discrete investments in early warning systems, targeted social services, such as food assistance or cash transfers, and hazard-specific protective infrastructure, such as cyclone shelters. </p>
<p>Those examples suggest that climate adaptation can save lives and contribute to economic prosperity.</p>
<p>However, as the unfolding dynamic in Ethiopia shows, progress can be reversed. Moreover, it’s far more challenging for external actors to build inclusive political institutions if local actors are not so inclined. </p>
<p>With climate change intensifying extreme weather events around the world, it is incumbent upon policymakers to enhance the practice of environmental peacebuilding, both to resolve ongoing conflicts through better natural resource management and to prevent future emergencies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Busby received funding from the Minerva Initiative from the U.S. Department of Defense, the Skoll Foundation, and the University of Texas. </span></em></p>States with more capacity, more political inclusion and that make good use of foreign aid tend to see better outcomes.Joshua Busby, Professor, The University of Texas at AustinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915252022-10-08T05:00:57Z2022-10-08T05:00:57ZUganda’s fuel smugglers: are the Opec Boys (anti-)heroes of the marginalised?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/488040/original/file-20221004-17-1onk58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Boureima Hama/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Smuggling in the Ugandan border region of West Nile has a long and chequered history. It straddles the <a href="https://books.google.be/books?hl=en&lr=&id=FTJhFP1FK1wC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=abraham+and+van+schendel+2005&ots=hcL7cIKofK&sig=czwJFPyXuvAh0jtOHbYq5wNGyvY#v=onepage&q=abraham%20and%20van%20schendel%202005&f=false">fine line</a> between legitimacy and legality. Governance and conflict researcher Kristof Titeca has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2012.664703?scroll=top&needAccess=true">studied</a> smuggling in the border region <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">since 2003</a>. He explains the dynamics.</em> </p>
<h2>What’s the history of smuggling in Uganda’s West Nile region?</h2>
<p>The term smuggling often brings strongly negative connotations, and is often associated with criminality and violence. However, smugglers aren’t always associated with these negative connotations by the communities in which they are embedded.</p>
<p>The West Nile region in Uganda illustrates this dynamic. This area is located in northwestern Uganda, and borders the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.</p>
<p>When colonialists introduced the borders demarcating Uganda, Zaire/Congo and Sudan, this divided ethnic groups but <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp63.2-changing-cross-border-trade-dynamics.pdf">didn’t stop the interaction</a> between them. Continued untaxed trade – or smuggling – was <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/africa/article/abs/regulation-crossborder-trade-and-practical-norms-in-west-nile-northwestern-uganda/DF13D59E5184A27637447D169F4D7291">considered legitimate</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, smuggling – both then and now – is viewed as a survival mechanism. </p>
<p>For example, during successive wars and rebellions affecting the region, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346912534_A_Historical_Perspective_on_State_Engagement_in_Informal_Trade_on_the_Uganda-Congo_Border">many people fled across borders</a>. When former Ugandan president Idi Amin (a West Niler) was ousted from power in 1979, the residents of West Nile feared revenge and fled to eastern Congo and southern Sudan. Similarly, violence in southern Sudan in the early 1990s, and in more recent times, forced many (South) Sudanese to flee to northern Uganda. Smuggling constituted an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03056249008703848">important livelihood</a> for many during these times, and laid the basis for contemporary trading networks and practices.</p>
<p>Smuggling is also linked to people feeling marginalised or oppressed. And the West Nile region <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/refugee-law-project-working-paper-no-12-negotiating-peace-resolution-conflicts-ugandas">feels marginalised</a> by the Yoweri Museveni regime. </p>
<p>Smuggling in this border region has to be understood in this context: as a way of making ends meet despite of – and in opposition to – a regime perceived to marginalise them. Smuggling is regarded as legitimate employment. And an important form of social mobility, a rags-to-riches story present in the wider social imaginary of the population. </p>
<h2>How pervasive is smuggling in Uganda?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/borderland-policy-briefing-series-informal-cross-border-trade-along-drc-uganda-border">Data</a> from the Bank of Uganda and Uganda Bureau of Statistics shows that in 2018, Ugandan informal exports – or smuggled products – were worth US$546.6 million. For their part, smuggled imports were worth US$60 million. </p>
<p>But these numbers are an underestimation as they are based on data from official border posts, which excludes goods smuggled through <a href="https://westniletodaynews.com/122-illegal-entry-points-fuel-silent-gold-trade-along-uganda-drc-border-in-west-nile/">many unofficial smuggling routes</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, the <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/borderland-policy-briefing-series-informal-cross-border-trade-along-drc-uganda-border">data shows</a> that for the DRC – which in 2018 accounted for almost half of Uganda’s informal trade value – informal export and import figures are almost always higher than the formal ones.</p>
<h2>What does the story of the Opec Boys tell us?</h2>
<p>The Opec Boys – a term used to refer to fuel smugglers operating in the region – are a telling illustration of the dynamics of smuggling in the West Nile.</p>
<p>In my research, I have studied the Opec Boys at <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/journal-politique-africaine-2006-3-page-143.htm">different moments</a> in their <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17531055.2012.664703">history</a> over the last 20 years. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">Their roots</a> can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was when much of the population of north-western Uganda fled to neighbouring DRC and Sudan after the overthrow of the Amin regime. </p>
<p>During this time, a number of exiled young men made a living from smuggling fuel. They didn’t stop doing so upon their return to Uganda. They started an organisation that came to be known as the Opec Boys. Many other young men returning to their home areas, with no education or assets, were drawn into this fuel business. </p>
<p>They would sell smuggled fuel in jerrycans on street corners in the region’s major urban centres. There was a general shortage of petrol stations in the area, and their fuel was cheaper. The Opec Boys got their smuggled fuel in different ways: some smuggled it themselves from Congo, others used “transporters” who were mostly young(er) boys on bicycles, smuggling the fuel via back roads to avoid security officials. Others bought their fuel from truck drivers, who equally smuggled their fuel into Uganda. </p>
<p>The Opec Boys were the most important supplier of fuel in the area until the late 2000s. Around this time, the increased number of fuel stations, and the changing tax regime in DRC pushed many of them out of business. While they still exist, their activities are less prominent.</p>
<h2>What did they come to represent?</h2>
<p>The Opec Boys were considered an important social-economic and political force in two major ways. </p>
<p>First, they came to constitute an important manifestation of what sociologist Asef Bayat’s calls “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436599715055">un-civil society</a>”. This is an unconventional, uninstitutionalised form of civil society. It operates through ad hoc, direct and sporadic action through which it represents the interests of the urban informal sector. This definition applies to the Opec Boys. </p>
<p>Particularly during the 1990s and 2000s, they would – led by <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/kaku-arua-opec-boys-supremo-rabble-rouser-3942538">a charismatic leader</a> – come to the defence of actors within the urban informal sector, such as market vendors or motorcycle taxi riders. They, for example, <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003043645-11/smuggling-legitimate-activity-kristof-titeca">intervened</a> when urban authorities wanted to forcefully remove streetside kiosks by blocking roads and organising protests. </p>
<p>Second, in doing so, they are an illustration of historian Eric Hobsbawm’s “<a href="https://www.abebooks.com/Bandits-Revised-Edition-E.J-Hobsbawm-Pantheon/5603239895/bd">social bandits</a>”. This is through their links to the population and their composition – young, unemployed men, and (certainly in their early phase) often ex-rebels considered “<a href="https://www.abebooks.com/Bandits-Revised-Edition-E.J-Hobsbawm-Pantheon/5603239895/bd">natural material for banditry</a>”. </p>
<p>Their smuggling activities provide employment to, and absorb, a potentially dangerous group: low-skilled, landless young men. In a region with a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/refugee-law-project-working-paper-no-12-negotiating-peace-resolution-conflicts-ugandas">history of rebel groups</a>, this is seen as an important stabilising factor, allowing for the voicing of discontent through trading activities rather than illegality. </p>
<p>For these reasons, attempts to take formal action against smuggling in the West Nile region often lead to demonstrations and riots.</p>
<p>In February 2022, for instance, <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/one-shot-dead-ura-office-torched-in-clashes-with-boda-boda-cyclists-3727616">riots erupted</a> in Koboko town. These were directed against Uganda’s tax collecting agency – the Uganda Revenue Authority. </p>
<p>Protestors set the authority’s offices on fire after tax collectors allegedly hit and injured a suspected fuel smuggler (the authority <a href="https://twitter.com/URAuganda/status/1496886523933126656?s=20&t=PMBLUpWUtHgMH8uIcZ2wkQ">denied</a> this happened). The smuggler was reportedly carrying 320 litres of fuel in sixteen 20-litre jerrycans from the DRC. During the riots, one person was shot dead and several others wounded.</p>
<p>Months earlier, the shooting of a suspected smuggler also <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/one-shot-dead-as-ura-officers-impound-numberless-motorcycles-in-arua-3557294">led to violent demonstrations</a>. </p>
<p>However, this doesn’t mean all smuggling is romanticised. Smuggling in goods such as <a href="https://ugandaradionetwork.net/story/suspected-ugandan-drug-dealer-arrested-in-congo?districtId=553">drugs</a> or <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201008240002.html">weapons</a> is looked at very differently, and doesn’t have the same legitimacy and popular support. </p>
<p>In sum, smuggling is looked at as more than a strictly economic activity; it’s a social and political one. In local social imaginaries, it’s seen as an act of resistance, a way to fend for oneself in difficult circumstances.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191525/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Smuggling in Uganda’s West Nile region is seen as an act of defiance – a way to make ends meet in the face of perceived state neglect.Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1915062022-09-29T14:13:28Z2022-09-29T14:13:28Z5 steps to stop Ebola spreading in East Africa – a frontline expert advises<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487036/original/file-20220928-16-2bwv9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Staff from South Sudan's Health Ministry pose with protective suits during a drill for Ebola preparedness.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by PATRICK MEINHARDT/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The biggest Ebola outbreak in human history happened in <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html#:%7E:text=On%20March%2023%2C%202014%2C%20the,epidemic%2C%20the%20largest%20in%20history.">West Africa</a> from 2014 to 2015. I was on the front lines in Liberia serving as the head of case detection for the National Ebola Response team and administering critical aspects of Liberia’s Ebola response.</p>
<p>The outbreak affected Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia. It <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002508#:%7E:text=The%202014%E2%80%932015%20Ebola%20virus%20disease%20(EVD)%20outbreak%20across,in%204%2C809%20deaths%20%5B1%5D.">claimed 11,310</a> lives and took <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876034120304275">36 months</a> to contain. It made its way along major highways from Guinea into Liberia and Sierra Leone, which share a long border.</p>
<p>Uganda’s current <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/uganda-ebola-death-toll-3963084">Ebola virus outbreak</a> has a few similarities. The first case was found in Mubende district, located on a major highway to the capital city, Kampala, and neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo – putting both at high risk.</p>
<p>Ebola <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/symptoms/index.html">spreads through</a> body fluids and direct contact. The infectiousness of the virus increases as patients get sicker – when they vomit and have diarrhoea. At death the virus is at its most virulent and thus any communal burial increases the spread.</p>
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<p>In the 2014/2015 outbreak there was widespread disbelief in communities, due to ignorance, distrust and some traditional beliefs. People didn’t cooperate with response teams. Fear and disbelief <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">have also been</a> documented in Uganda as four contacts of the alert case ran away from response workers.</p>
<p>If people doubt they have Ebola – because symptoms of fever or vomiting are similar to other common illnesses like malaria and typhoid – they’ll seek healthcare from a range of places, including traditional healers and religious groups. And they could move to urban centres in search of better care. All of these behaviours increase the risk of a further spread of the virus and more deaths.</p>
<p>On the positive side, Uganda has the <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/how-previous-ebola-virus-disease-outbreaks-helped-uganda-respond-covid-19-outbreak">right basics</a> to mount an effective response: experienced medical staff, knowledge and good infrastructure. The country has responded to four previous Ebola outbreaks. Its health systems are also in better shape than they were in three of the West African countries during the 2014/2015 outbreak. Health systems are as effective as the response and support they can get from the community.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ebola-outbreak-in-uganda-the-health-system-has-never-been-better-prepared-191021">Ebola outbreak in Uganda: the health system has never been better prepared</a>
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<p>But the ability of Ebola to spread must not be underestimated. There’s a <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">knowledge gap</a> about the actual start of the outbreak and the index (or first identified) case. This means the actual first human case of this current outbreak, coupled with <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/gaps-in-ebola-response-stick-out-as-cases-grow-3960154">increasing</a> community <a href="https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/five-ugandan-doctors-catch-ebola-3966020">infections</a> and deaths, raises the risk of the outbreak spreading along the major highway to densely populated cities and neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>There’s no approved vaccine for this strain of Ebola – the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/uganda/ebola-disease-caused-sudan-virus">Sudan strain</a>. This is due to the focus on Ebola Zaire, the most deadly and infectious strain, which was responsible for the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa.</p>
<p>It’s therefore crucial that the region be prepared to work together to contain the spread of the virus. Drawing on my experience in the management of the 2014/2015 outbreak in West Africa, here are the five steps that might help East Africa curb the further spread of the virus.</p>
<h2>1. Set up a robust cross-border surveillance system</h2>
<p>To prevent a further spread, a cross-border surveillance system must be created that can quickly identify, test and isolate cases for treatment. This system must have direct, simple communication lines with minimal bureaucracy. For instance, teams should use mobile applications like WhatsApp.</p>
<p>One of the biggest weaknesses we faced during the 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak was that response workers in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea weren’t able to communicate easily with colleagues in other countries. This resulted in the use of intermediaries, like the World Health Organization (WHO) office, which caused delays. We lost the critical element of speed – every hour counts.</p>
<p>Communities along the borders must be part of the surveillance system. Ebola response workers in West Africa created a network along the borders that helped them move with speed. Cross border preparedness meetings and direct communication on the progress of the evolving outbreak in Uganda will be crucial for containment strategies.</p>
<h2>2. Create an army of community contact tracers</h2>
<p>To curb the Ebola outbreak in East Africa a portion of the response funding must be used to create an army of case finders and contact tracers. They must know people within their community well and report cases that families may be trying to hide. Fears, ignorance and cultural beliefs and practices tend to make contacts reluctant to report themselves; or they escape from treatment centres.</p>
<p>A crucial factor in containing the outbreak in Liberia was the payments of monthly stipends from the United Nations Development Fund and WHO to local pastors, imams, community leaders, teachers, university students and high school students. These ranged from US$80 to US$350 a month.</p>
<p>This is key because it can turn communities from being hostile to becoming champions of the effort. It also helps to create trust.</p>
<p>At the height of the Ebola outbreak in Liberia’s Montserrado County – where the capital is situated – we had 5,700 community leaders working with the response teams. They were able to visit 1.6 million households and identify thousands of sick people who were then either classified as suspect or probable cases by the more trained contact tracers.</p>
<p>These volunteers defeated Ebola because communities trusted them. Flying in foreigners at great cost <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/security-challenge-community-distrust-and-resistance">has been less effective</a> because communities don’t have the same level of trust in them.</p>
<h2>3. Recruit trusted messengers</h2>
<p>Misinformation, disinformation and rumours make response efforts difficult. It can create great hostility to response teams. The recruitment of messengers trusted by communities, and armed with the right message, is key.</p>
<p>During the 2014/2015 oubreak, we targeted influential people within a community. They included a former fighter during the Liberian civil war - people respected him because he was a part of group that protected them from armed robbers.</p>
<h2>4. Rapid field testing should be used</h2>
<p>Fast testing and short turnaround times are crucial to isolating cases and preventing further spread.</p>
<p>In the West Africa outbreak, our teams would ask a family to isolate a suspected case in a different room. They would then draw blood and send the sample to the field lab. Within three hours we had the results. If the person was positive we moved them to the isolation centre. If negative, we asked them to self-isolate for 48 hours so we could test them again. This allowed the families to call us as soon as they suspected that one of them had fever.</p>
<p>We also did oral swabs of all dead bodies in the communities. This helped us to pick up cases of silent super spreaders who had spread the virus <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/10/how-bloody-brawl-sparked-fears-new-ebola-outbreak-liberia-318442.html">but were misdiagnosed</a> in the community.</p>
<p>Both of these approaches helped us to restore confidence with the community and gave us much speed.</p>
<h2>5. Increase surveillance of all vehicles</h2>
<p>Since this outbreak is occurring at a major road leading to Kampala and DRC, the surveillance of all vehicles is critical.</p>
<p>In Liberia, we recruited and trained motorbike riders and transport vehicle riders. We gave them ledgers and notebooks and embedded them with our surveillance teams. They tracked all sick people and even took records of drivers who missed work. These were visited at home to see if they were sick.</p>
<p>Tracing – documenting the full address and host – was done on all recent passengers. This helped us to tightly monitor the movements of people from the epicentre.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191506/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mosoka Fallah works as the Program Manager for Saving Lives and Livelihoods at the Africa Center for Disease Control</span></em></p>When tackling an Ebola outbreak speed is a critical element - every hour counts.Mosoka Fallah, Part-time lecturer at the Global Health & Social Medicine, Harvard University, and Lecturer at the School of Public Health, College of Health Sciences, University of LiberiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1892582022-09-07T15:17:30Z2022-09-07T15:17:30ZKenya’s Lamu Port was meant to deliver great things. But, as the story of local fishermen shows, it hasn’t<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480808/original/file-20220824-16-gtivzu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A container ship docks at the Lamu Port in Kenya. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dihoff Mukoto/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For nearly two decades, successive Kenyan governments have <a href="https://vision2030.go.ke/">promoted</a> mega infrastructure projects as a pathway to development. The Lamu Port has been one of them. </p>
<p>In 2012, then president Mwai Kibaki – at the inauguration ceremony for a transport corridor that stretches from the Lamu Port to South Sudan and Ethiopia, and known as <a href="https://www.lapsset.go.ke/">Lapsset</a> – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17231889">stated</a>:</p>
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<p>I have no doubt that this day will go down in history as one of the defining moments – when we made a major stride to connect our people to the many socio-economic opportunities that lie ahead.</p>
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<p>However, as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24694452.2022.2062292">my research shows</a>, the reality of these mega projects is more complex than state officials acknowledge. </p>
<p>Instead of bringing development, a better society and a happier life, mega infrastructures result in hardship, especially for vulnerable, historically marginalised groups of people. This is vividly illustrated by Lamu’s fishermen. </p>
<p>The story of the fishermen provides a good lens through which to understand how vulnerable communities are affected by mega infrastructure projects. In Lamu, 70% of the local population depends on <a href="https://www.banktrack.org/download/the_lamu_county_biocultural_community_protocol/lamucountybcp2018.pdf">artisanal fishing</a>. This is characterised by small-scale, low-cost and low-technology fishing practices.</p>
<p>In my research, I conducted interviews with representatives of the Lapsset Corridor Development Authority, officials of the Kenya Ports Authority and local government, civil society groups and key local informants. I also held interviews and informal conversations with Lamu’s fishermen while I observed and participated in boat maintenance, fishing and social gatherings. </p>
<p>The fishermen’s experiences illustrate how communities can challenge the way big infrastructure projects are done. The <a href="https://www.savelamu.org/">Save Lamu</a> alliance, comprising civil society groups that focus on human rights, took the Kenyan government to court in 2014 over the port construction. </p>
<p>Through <a href="https://www.banktrack.org/download/the_lamu_county_biocultural_community_protocol/lamucountybcp2018.pdf">community-based research and mobilisation</a>, the alliance sought to demonstrate how historically vulnerable groups of people, such as artisanal fishermen, are deliberately excluded from state development plans. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenyas-mega-railway-project-leaves-society-more-unequal-than-before-170969">Kenya’s mega-railway project leaves society more unequal than before</a>
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<h2>Lamu’s fishermen</h2>
<p>The construction of the Lamu Port displaced fishermen from their traditional onshore fishing grounds in Manda Bay. This is located at the southern corner of the Lamu Archipelago on Kenya’s coast. It’s a deep and sheltered bay with a wide, navigable entrance channel.</p>
<p>The port’s construction began in 2012 and is expected to hold 32 berths. So far, <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/counties/coast/2022-06-21-phase-1-of-lamu-port-complete-as-second-third-berths-opened/">three berths</a> have been completed. They have claimed five square kilometres of Manda Bay. The first berth <a href="https://www.president.go.ke/2021/05/20/president-kenyatta-inaugurates-first-berth-of-new-32-berth-lamu-port/">began operating</a> in May 2021.</p>
<p>The port construction works – including reclaiming land from the sea, and digging and dredging – destroyed coral reefs and mangroves that are main fish breeding grounds. The works also polluted these breeding grounds by bringing up dirt and sand. This made the area <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24694452.2022.2062292">unsuitable for fishing</a>. </p>
<p>Fishing activities are entirely undertaken close to the shore in Manda Bay. There are fishing grounds further offshore, but local fishermen <a href="https://aquadocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/7347/ktf0290.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">lack appropriate fishing gear</a> to explore deep-sea areas. As a result, Lamu’s fishermen – estimated to be between 4,700 and 7,000 individuals – are witnessing a shrinking operational space for their livelihoods. </p>
<h2>Resistance to unsustainable corridor development</h2>
<p>These drastic effects on fishermen – and concerns about more negative impacts on the environment in the future – led to community mobilisation in Lamu. </p>
<p>In 2014, Save Lamu submitted a <a href="https://wagingnonviolence.org/2021/06/kenyans-lapsset-save-lamu/">court case</a> against the Lapsset Corridor Development Authority for not considering how the project was going to affect local people’s livelihoods. </p>
<p>Four years later, in an unprecedented ruling, Save Lamu won this legal battle against the national government. </p>
<p>A three-judge bench <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/kenya-court-declares-construction-of-lamu-port-violates-indigenous-communitys-right-to-information-healthy-environment-culture-orders-compensation/">ruled</a> that the construction of Lamu Port violated the rights to public participation, public information, a clean and healthy environment, and culture. </p>
<p>The court also found that the local county government of Lamu wasn’t involved in the planning and implementation of the port. </p>
<p>Regarding artisanal fishermen’s livelihoods, the judges ordered the government to recognise fishing rights as amounting to property, and pay US$170 million in compensation to 4,700 fishermen displaced by the port construction. </p>
<p>Kenya’s civil society celebrated the ruling as a historic win for human rights. But the national government immediately appealed it. </p>
<h2>Local versus national</h2>
<p>The port’s construction <a href="https://naturaljustice.org/one-year-after-landmark-judgment-on-lamu-port-violations-construction-continues-unabated/">continues unabated</a>. </p>
<p>The fishermen have <a href="https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/payment-sh1-7bn-for-lamu-fishermen-displaced-by-port-3413984">not been compensated</a> for lost livelihoods. This follows an ongoing disagreement between the national government, Lamu’s local government, Save Lamu and representatives of Lamu fishermen on how many individuals should receive this compensation, and how it should be spent. </p>
<p>The central government <a href="https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/lapsset-compensate-lamu-fishermen-capacity-building/">prefers state–controlled development</a> of the local fishing industry. This would include state-supervised acquisition of boats and fishing gear for deep-sea fishing. </p>
<p>The government has proposed development schemes that would provide the necessary equipment to clusters of 10 fishermen. This, it says, would address the long-existing problem of overfishing and enable fishermen to exploit deep-sea resources. This position is supported by Save Lamu, which advocates for long-term sustainability and fishing cooperatives. </p>
<p>Fishermen’s representatives, however, have rejected these proposals. They say fishermen lack access to the infrastructure to repair or maintain new equipment provided by the central government. Instead, they prefer to use boats that can be built and maintained locally. They also deeply mistrust the central government to provide any meaningful assistance. </p>
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<p>After years of dispute, in May 2022 the Lamu County commissioner Irungu Macharia <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TNrjLhQvLpc&feature=youtu.be">assured</a> Lamu fishermen of their compensation. It’s still not clear when this will begin. </p>
<h2>Lessons about infrastructure development</h2>
<p>The dynamics of infrastructure development in Lamu demonstrate how mega projects don’t result in the prosperity promised by the central government. Instead, they become implicated in national and local politics, and conflicts over different preferences for “development”. </p>
<p>In such contexts, the most vulnerable people whose livelihoods are directly affected by these developments suffer the most. </p>
<p>Even if civil society is successful in representing their interests, it doesn’t result in any meaningful changes. </p>
<p>These groups are not assisted to adapt to changing socio-economic circumstances brought by mega infrastructure. Big projects entrench existing inequalities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/189258/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gediminas Lesutis receives funding from Horizon 2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions Individual Fellowship (Project ID: 101023118).</span></em></p>Mega infrastructure projects entrench existing inequalities when they ignore the economic realities of vulnerable groups.Gediminas Lesutis, Marie Curie Fellow, University of AmsterdamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.