tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/stormont-22286/articlesStormont – The Conversation2024-02-06T12:06:12Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227852024-02-06T12:06:12Z2024-02-06T12:06:12ZHow Sinn Féin reinvented itself from IRA associations to realistic leftwing alternative<p>Addressing the newly restored Northern Ireland Assembly, Sinn Féin First Minister Michelle O’Neill assured everyone that she would be working equally for “<a href="https://www.derryjournal.com/news/people/this-historic-day-represents-a-new-dawn-northern-ireland-first-minister-michelle-oneills-speech-in-full-4504168">Catholics, Protestants and dissenters</a>”.</p>
<p>This iconic quote from the founder of Irish Republicanism, <a href="https://research.tees.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/16053350/Democracy_religion_and_the_Political_Thought_of_Theobald_Wolfe_Tone_submitted.pdf">Theobald Wolfe Tone</a>, needs no contextualisation in Ireland. It was not just meant to reassure those among unionists who might have misgivings about a Sinn Féin-led government. O’Neill was also addressing her own rank and file. She was guaranteeing that while the party will do its utmost to make Northern Ireland work, it has not lost sight of the ultimate prize – Irish unity.</p>
<p>In a carefully crafted speech full of optimistic prophecies, O’Neill announced a “new dawn” and the start of a “decade of opportunity” for Northern Ireland. She wasted little time in clarifying that she believes there will be a referendum on Irish unity within the next decade. Sinn Féin party president <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2023/03/26/referendum-on-irish-unity-within-a-decade-mary-lou-mcdonald-says/">Mary Lou McDonald</a> echoed the same sentiments almost immediately in Dublin.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Michelle O'Neill’s first speech as first minister.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The Good Friday Agreement provided that the governance of Northern Ireland is predicated on a power-sharing system. While this theoretically made it possible for the party most opposed to the very existence of Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin, to lead its government, it was an unimaginable scenario at the turn of the century. Unionism remained solid and politically dominant in a system <a href="https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/partition-of-ireland-explained-477342/">designed to make it so</a>. Sinn Féin equally still had a number of obstacles to overcome on its road to respectability and power – not least shedding its controversial image of a party <a href="https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526154569/">closely linked to the IRA.</a></p>
<p>Throughout the peace process, Sinn Féin developed a carefully crafted, two-pronged strategy. It would keep the party strongly rooted in its traditional message while developing a socio-economic programme that could win over the electorate from both constituencies. This has now started to pay off. Sinn Féin surged to win the popular vote in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/10/sinn-fein-declares-victory-irish-general-election">2020 general election in Ireland</a>, even though other parties went on to form the government.</p>
<p>The trend was confirmed in the 2022 Northern Ireland assembly election, when it became the biggest party for the first time, giving O'Neill the right to claim the position of first minister. But the Democratic Unionist Party made their participation in the executive conditional on the renegotiation of the 2021 Brexit deal. A more recent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-53724381">deal</a> brokered by prime minister Rishi Sunak and the EU broke the deadlock, with the DUP agreeing to participate in a Sinn Féin-led government.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in the Republic, under the leadership of Mary Lou MacDonald, and a team of high-profile spokespeople on issues such as housing (Eoin Ó Broin having made a name for himself as an expert in the field) and finance (Pierce Doherty’s alternative 2024 budget was described <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2023/10/04/sinn-feins-alternative-budget-is-carefully-calculated-not-to-scare-off-the-middle-ground/">by Irish Times</a> political editor Pat Leahy as “comprehensive and painstakingly costed”), the party reinvented itself. It succeeded in providing a credible, leftwing alternative to the two-party system that had seen Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael dominate Irish politics since independence.</p>
<h2>In government and opposition</h2>
<p>As the only political party organised throughout the island (with the exception of People Before Profit, which holds four seats in the Republic and one in Northern Ireland), much of Sinn Féin’s work on one side of the border is scrutinised on the other.</p>
<p>Being in government on one side and in opposition on the other, all at the same time, will therefore be a delicate balance to sustain. In the Republic, Sinn Féin has kept the two main parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, on their toes. But while it has retained its lead over its two rivals, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/ireland/">opinion polls</a> show that the gap is slowly narrowing. Sinn Féin dropped from an all-time high of 33% in September 2023 to 27% in January 2024 – though it is still ahead of the other parties by a comfortable margin. Sinn Féin’s capacity to prove that it can govern consensually and efficiently in an environment as politically divisive as Northern Ireland will be a useful test ahead of the next general election in the Republic.</p>
<p>In the North, the work of the newly nominated executive will be focused on bread-and-butter issues, such as addressing the crisis in the <a href="https://www.channel4.com/news/inside-a-northern-ireland-health-and-social-care-system-in-crisis">NHS</a>, which is reaching breaking point. The political vacuum created by the Democratic Unionist Party’s boycott of the institutions has compounded the problems faced by an ailing economy which <a href="http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/comparing-living-standards-north-and-south/">lags behind the Republic</a> in terms of salaries and living standards. The British government has offered a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-67968994">£3.3bn funding package</a> as part of the deal to restore power sharing in Northern Ireland and this will undoubtedly help to address the more immediate questions of public sector pay, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-150-000-public-sector-workers-in-northern-ireland-have-been-on-strike-221455">stagnated</a> since the start of the decade and is the lowest in the UK.</p>
<p>Now that it holds the key ministries of finance, economy and infrastructure, Sinn Féin will have the opportunity (or face the challenge) to demonstrate its ability to make a difference. During their visit to Belfast to mark the restoration of the power-sharing executive, on February 5, Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Leo Varadkar and his British counterpart Sunak played down the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2024/02/05/real-work-starts-now-rishi-sunak-tells-stormont-leaders/">prospects of a united Ireland</a> and insisted on the importance of day-to-day matters. </p>
<p>Indeed, only the secretary of state for Northern Ireland can decide on holding of a referendum on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. But Sinn Féin is determined to make this happen. O'Neill has pledged that she will not ask anyone in Northern Ireland to surrender their identity. However,‘ we can expect her and her colleagues to continue to put Irish unity at the top of the agenda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222785/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Agnès Maillot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>O'Neill has pledged to represent ‘Catholics, Protestants and dissenters’ but has made plain that she sees that as compatible with a referendum on Irish unity within a decade.Agnès Maillot, Associate Professor, School of Applied Languages and Intercultural Studies, Dublin City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214552024-01-19T18:07:25Z2024-01-19T18:07:25ZWhy 150,000 public sector workers in Northern Ireland have been on strike<p>An estimated 150,000 public sector workers in Northern Ireland went on strike on January 16 as part of a long-running dispute over pay and conditions. The strike, which involved workers from 16 trade unions, was the largest in more than 50 years. </p>
<p><a href="https://datavis.nisra.gov.uk/economy-and-labour-market/Employee-earnings-NI-2023.html">Official figures show</a> that between April 2022 and April 2023, real pay (adjusted for inflation) in Northern Ireland’s public sector fell by 7.2%. That decline came on the heels of real pay falling by more than 4% between April 2021 and April 2022, and two decades of no growth in public sector real pay.</p>
<p>While there is much talk about an “Irish Sea border” because of post-Brexit trade arrangements, a sea border of sorts already exists when it comes to public sector earnings. Differences in <a href="https://www.nipsa730.org.uk/wp/2023/09/07/september-2023-update/">public sector pay</a> between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK are long-running grievances for workers.</p>
<p>Newly qualified teachers in Great Britain make about £30,000, while in Northern Ireland they <a href="https://neu.org.uk/about/nations/neu-northern-ireland/teachers-pay-campaign-northern-ireland">start on £24,000</a>. A newly qualified doctor in Northern Ireland earns a base salary of <a href="https://www.bma.org.uk/bma-media-centre/junior-doctors-in-northern-ireland-to-be-balloted-for-industrial-action">£26,000 per year</a>. In England the starting rate is over £32,000, and in Scotland it is £31,000. </p>
<h2>Deteriorating public services</h2>
<p>One cannot detach the demand for higher pay from the broader economic and political malaise in which Northern Ireland finds itself.</p>
<p>Conservative-led austerity at the UK level <a href="https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/542586/UUEPC-Public-and-private-sector-pay-270220-FINAL.pdf">introduced 1% pay caps</a> on public sector pay increases from 2010 to 2019. And austerity budgets led to increasingly dilapidated public services. Similar to much of the rest of the UK, schools across Northern Ireland <a href="https://www.stran.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/The-Consequences-of-the-Cuts-to-Education-for-Children-and-Young-People-in-Northern-Ireland-Final.pdf">now strain to cover bills and maintain services</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13211/pdf/">NHS figures from 2023</a> show that about 122,000 patients are awaiting surgery and a further 378,400 people are waiting to see a consultant for the first time. GP surgeries are closing in many places and there are real risks to some hospitals. Unions representing healthcare workers, the British Medical Association and Royal College of Nursing NI, have <a href="https://www.bma.org.uk/bma-media-centre/bma-ni-and-royal-college-of-nursing-ni-raise-concerns-about-staff-exhaustion">raised the alarm</a> about the impact of underfunded services on doctor and nurse fatigue. </p>
<p>Making work strain and stretched resources worse still is the fact that <a href="https://www.rcn.org.uk/northernireland/Get-Involved/Northern-Ireland-fair-pay-and-safe-staffing-campaign">recruitment</a> has become a real problem, especially in education and health. </p>
<p>While these problems prevail across the UK, they have particularly hit Northern Ireland where public sector workers make up a <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/the-good-friday-agreement-at-25-has-there-been-a-peace-dividend">greater proportion</a> of the workforce than in the rest of the UK. The recent effects of higher inflation and rising interest rates have added to the pain. </p>
<h2>Political issues</h2>
<p>The strike comes amid an ongoing political crisis in the region, as the devolved administration, the Northern Ireland executive, collapsed in February 2022 and remains in a stalemate. </p>
<p>The unique power-sharing feature of the Stormont government means either of the two major power blocs of nationalists and unionists can prevent a functioning executive by refusing to participate. In this case, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) pulled out over post-Brexit trade agreements, and has refused to return until its concerns, both economic and ideological, are met.</p>
<p>The lack of an executive affects industrial relations, because public sector pay is a devolved matter, within the constraints of Treasury funding. If the executive was in place, ministers would receive direction from pay review bodies and set a pay policy for negotiation with the unions. In the absence of the executive, that cannot happen.</p>
<p>An even bigger problem, however, is the region’s public finances, itself a consequence of the inadequacies of the “Barnett Formula”, the mechanism by which the UK Treasury allocates funding to support public spending across the devolved regions. The formula, which is Treasury policy, has been assessed by the unions, among others, to be <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/123832/pdf">wholly inadequate</a> in meeting Northern Ireland’s public expenditure needs.</p>
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<img alt="Northern Ireland secretary Chris Heaton-Harris outside of Number 10 Downing Street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570351/original/file-20240119-15-qfy3sa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570351/original/file-20240119-15-qfy3sa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570351/original/file-20240119-15-qfy3sa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570351/original/file-20240119-15-qfy3sa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570351/original/file-20240119-15-qfy3sa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570351/original/file-20240119-15-qfy3sa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570351/original/file-20240119-15-qfy3sa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Northern Ireland secretary Chris Heaton-Harris.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-united-kingdom-november-22-2022-2285215571">I T S/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Due to the collapse of the executive, the UK’s Northern Ireland secretary, Chris Heaton-Harris, set Northern Ireland’s budget for 2023-24, to ensure public services could continue. But perception in Northern Ireland is that Heaton-Harris set a “punishment budget” to coerce the DUP back into government. The budget requires budget overspends from past years to be paid back to the Treasury. Combined with inflation, this has meant, in real terms, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-65404988">funding cuts</a> in the latest budget for education, health care, justice and economy from the previous year.</p>
<p>The consequences of this led the Northern Ireland department of finance – the body allocating the public sector pay pot – to claim that pay deals equivalent to those in Britain were <a href="https://www.finance-ni.gov.uk/news/public-sector-pay-policy-guidance-2023-2024-published">not affordable for 2023-24</a>. </p>
<p>Heaton-Harris has since indicated a willingness to remedy this should the executive return, by <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/41c27034-de3a-4f2b-8d1c-f809ceb5ad8c">dangling the carrot</a> of £3.3 billion in funds, including public sector pay awards. The money is there, and unions have called on Heaton-Harris to <a href="https://www.unitetheunion.org/news-events/news/2024/january/heaton-harris-must-release-public-sector-funds-or-face-further-escalation-of-strikes">release it</a> despite the lack of a functioning government at Stormont. But the hurdle remains the DUP’s unwillingness to reenter government until their concerns are addressed. </p>
<p>Even if such money is made available, it would be little more than a short-term sticking plaster for the region, given the ongoing economic and political issues.</p>
<p>Where next for the unions? At the time of writing, some remain on strike, others have promised further action, and some union officials have raised the prospect of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-67968999">civil disobedience</a>. The willingness of unions to sustain action, however, looks set to be determined by the political agenda which, in the short-term, is still uncertain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Niall Cullinane receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and previously the British Academy.</span></em></p>The record strike action comes amid an ongoing political crisis in Stormont.Niall Cullinane, Professor in organisation, work and leadership, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2032082023-04-06T09:53:05Z2023-04-06T09:53:05ZGood Friday Agreement: 25 years on, the British government is seeking to undo key terms of the peace deal<p>The Good Friday Agreement ended a conflict that claimed more than 3,500 lives between 1968 and 1998. It is estimated that one-third of the adult population in Northern Ireland has been directly affected by bereavement, physical injury or trauma.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.peaceagreements.org/">Peace agreements</a> often now include provisions (such as truth commissions) to deal with the legacy of past conflict. Addressing the rights and needs of victims, these mechanisms seek to balance competing demands for truth, justice, accountability and reconciliation. The Good Friday Agreement controversially provided for the release of all paramilitary prisoners who had served two years and agreed to the peace process. But broader legacy issues were deemed a bridge too far.</p>
<p>The “moment” of political agreement presents a unique opportunity to confront the horrors of past conflict and violence. As a lawyer interviewed in the course of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/jp/academic/subjects/law/human-rights/lawyers-conflict-and-transition">recent research</a> I carried out with colleagues on the South African transition noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The first five or ten years is a great window of opportunity in every way … [you have to] use that space because it all really closes down.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The rights and needs of victims were not central to the Good Friday Agreement negotiations. A 1998 <a href="https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/violence/victims.htm">report</a> by Northern Ireland victims commissioner Sir Kenneth Bloomfield proposed practical measures to deal with their pain and suffering – but, in many respects, the window of opportunity was lost. In the decades following the agreement there was <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201415/jtselect/jtrights/130/13005.htm">pressure from the European Court of Human Rights</a> to deal effectively with Troubles-related offences and deaths. In response, successive UK governments commissioned a series of initiatives to explore how everyone involved might holistically deal with legacy issues.</p>
<p>But it wasn’t until 2014, after multiple false starts, that the British and Irish governments and four of the five main political parties in Northern Ireland finally signed up to the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-agreement">Stormont House Agreement</a>. This proposed an independent historical investigations unit to look at outstanding cases relating to deaths during the Troubles and an information recovery body that would enable people to seek and privately receive (via interlocutors) information about the Troubles-related deaths of their relatives. The information provided to this body would not be admissible in legal proceedings. There was also provision for a major oral history archive and an implementation group to lead on broader reconciliation efforts.</p>
<h2>Backtracking on the GFA</h2>
<p>Following years of delay, the UK government finally committed to legislating for the Stormont House Agreement legacy mechanisms <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/856998/2020-01-08_a_new_decade__a_new_approach.pdf">in 2020</a>. But in a dramatic about-turn just weeks later, then prime minister Boris Johnson <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51487695">sacked</a> his secretary of state for Northern Ireland and scrapped the Stormont House Agreement, instead pushing for a sweeping amnesty for Troubles-related crimes. This was fuelled by a misleading narrative that there has been a “witch-hunt” against British army veterans who served in Northern Ireland (only one veteran has been successfully prosecuted since 1998).</p>
<p>For the past year, the UK government has been moving forward with the <a href="https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3160">Northern Ireland Troubles (legacy and reconciliation) bill</a>. This fundamentally undermines the Good Friday Agreement. The incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic Northern Irish law was a cornerstone of the GFA. This bill significantly limits the ability of people in Northern Ireland to challenge alleged breaches of the ECHR by closing access to the criminal, civil and coronial courts for Troubles-related cases.</p>
<p>The GFA also committed the UK government to “devolve policing and justice issues” to Northern Ireland, as indeed occurred in 2010. This bill now seeks to unravel key elements of the devolution of policing and justice. It proposes to grant people accused of serious Troubles-related crimes conditional immunity from prosecution, setting the conditional bar so low as to make that immunity practically guaranteed. Many regard this as a thinly veiled attempt to ensure that state actors are not held to account for their actions in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The bill is opposed by Northern Ireland’s victims, the Council of Europe, UN special rapporteurs, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the Irish government and all political parties in Northern Ireland. The government has suggested that the existing legal system is not delivering for victims. The legislation thus proposes setting up a commission to help victims recover information, but the proposed body lacks the legal powers to access the kind of information necessary to enable people to find out what happened during the Troubles.</p>
<p>All accept that successful prosecutions in Troubles-related cases will now be few and far between (and nobody can serve more than two years for Troubles-related offences). The key point is that legal investigations have been increasingly successful in recent years in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-56986784">delivering information to families</a> and exposing embarrassing details concerning <a href="https://www.policeombudsman.org/getmedia/2952cfb0-4403-4e31-a349-e0a2b632e089/Loughinisland-Report.pdf">state involvement</a> in past human rights violations.</p>
<h2>An anniversary and a time for action</h2>
<p>The implementation of the Good Friday Agreement has, in recent years, been significantly undermined by the government’s focus on matters English. There has been a notable determination that British army veterans should not be prosecuted, or indeed even properly investigated for conflict-era offences, and indifference about the implications of such a policy in Northern Ireland and its compatibility with international human rights law.</p>
<p>Ireland’s taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, has indicated that the Irish government <a href="https://www.rte.ie/news/politics/2023/0309/1361255-legacy-bill/">could not rule out taking an interstate case</a> to Strasbourg if the UK government makes its bill law as they believe it contravenes the European Convention on Human Rights.</p>
<p>In the meantime, victims are being retraumatised by the ongoing denial of their right to find out the truth about what happened to their loved ones and to see those responsible held to account.</p>
<p>The EU and the US administration played a crucial role in securing the peace agreement in 1998. The best efforts of Dublin, Brussels and the Biden administration are now required to prevent it unravelling.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203208/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anna Bryson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A law making its way through parliament that would grant widespread immunity from prosecution for people accused of crimes during the Troubles.Anna Bryson, Senior Lecturer in the School of Law and a Fellow at the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2021962023-04-04T12:15:00Z2023-04-04T12:15:00ZNew EU-UK trade deal has promise for Northern Ireland and US as well<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518029/original/file-20230328-518-tnu3a0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C0%2C7919%2C5306&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, left, and European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen announce their new trade agreement. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/britains-prime-minister-rishi-sunak-and-european-commission-news-photo/1247535827">Dan Kitwood/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A new trade agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom, which left the EU in 2020, could have finally found a way to safeguard peace in Northern Ireland after Brexit reignited old tensions.</p>
<p>The deal between the EU and the U.K., called the <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9736/">Windsor Framework</a>, lays out new rules about how trade will move between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the island that consists of Scotland, Wales and England, the other three provinces of the United Kingdom.</p>
<p>Among other changes, the Windsor Framework creates two categories of items being shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. Items intended to stay in Northern Ireland would have free passage, but those destined to cross the border into the Republic of Ireland – which is in the EU – would face stringent screening. </p>
<p>The agreement has been <a href="https://www.irishcentral.com/news/politics/windsor-framework-ratified">ratified by the U.K. Parliament and the European Union</a>. But it remains to be seen whether Northern Ireland’s unionist political parties will accept it and lift their boycott of the provincial government.</p>
<p>Since unionists’ refusal to join the power-sharing assembly began in 2022, elected representatives in Northern Ireland have not been able to tackle a growing backlog of critical issues, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/nov/19/northern-irish-healthcare-in-crisis-amid-political-deadlock">declining quality and availability of health care</a>, the shortage of housing, the <a href="https://viewdigital.org/crushed-by-the-cost-of-living-crisis/">rising cost of energy</a> and <a href="https://www.newsletter.co.uk/business/consumer/cost-of-living/northern-ireland-being-hit-harder-by-cost-of-living-crisis-than-other-parts-of-the-uk-as-more-forced-to-cut-back-on-essentials-which-research-shows-4020648">inflation</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=V4yncf0AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholars</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=6nkxNe8AAAAJ">of</a> Northern Irish politics, we see a newly approved trade deal as an opportunity to return Northern Ireland’s political attention to those crucial issues.</p>
<h2>A history of trouble</h2>
<p>In the late 1960s, a period of violence known as “The Troubles” began, pitting nationalists, who want Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland and are mostly Catholic, against unionists, who want it to remain part of the United Kingdom and are mostly Protestant. Over the following three decades, <a href="https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html">about 3,500 people were killed</a> and <a href="https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#05">another 47,000 were injured</a> in riots, assassinations and other violence. These events were largely in the six counties of Northern Ireland, which are part of the U.K., but also happened in the neighboring nation of Ireland and the remainder of the U.K., on the island of Great Britain. </p>
<p>A 1998 agreement between the U.K. and Irish governments and various political groups in Northern Ireland ended the violence. That deal, called the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-61968177">Good Friday Agreement by nationalists and the Belfast Agreement by unionists</a>, set up a power-sharing provincial government in Northern Ireland, close links between this new government and the Irish government, and various systems for cooperation and coordination between the U.K. and Irish governments. </p>
<p>The agreement also allowed people who lived in Northern Ireland to identify as Irish, British or both and carry passports from both places. These measures made it easier for people with different identities in Northern Ireland to coexist, and in some cases to express complex identities. Today, for example, <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/over-one-third-of-north-s-population-hold-irish-passport-1.4814375">more than one-third of Northern Ireland’s population</a> carry an Irish passport.</p>
<p>And the 1998 agreement says that the decision about whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the U.K. or unite with Ireland should be decided only by a majority vote of Northern Ireland’s people.</p>
<p>When the agreement was signed, both the U.K. and Ireland were part of the EU. The EU’s common market allows goods, people and business activities to flow freely between member nations, without customs or passport controls. </p>
<p>Within a few years of the 1998 agreement, trade and people were flowing seamlessly, rendering the border all but invisible – especially after the U.K. removed <a href="https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/border/border-violence.htm">military installations and the fortified barriers</a> at the land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large commercial truck stops at a gate with a booth and a person holding a piece of paper." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518030/original/file-20230328-5054-txd7na.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The port of Belfast is a crucial point in trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/freight-lorries-are-checked-after-disembarking-from-the-p-o-news-photo/1247533288">Paul Faith/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<h2>Brexit risks peace</h2>
<p>With the help of a strengthening EU, the peace was stable until 2016. That year, the people of the U.K. voted to leave the EU, though the majority of <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/brexit-northern-ireland-votes-to-remain-in-the-eu-1.2697132">voters in Northern Ireland wanted to remain</a> in the union. </p>
<p>The departure of the U.K. from the EU meant the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland mattered again. It would no longer be a technical, administrative boundary between EU member nations, but rather a point where goods and people would flow into and out of the EU and a non-EU country. </p>
<p>Tensions flared over where to put these checks and the possible new divisions they would create between either Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland or Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K.</p>
<p>In 2019 the U.K. and the EU agreed to a deal, called the Northern Ireland Protocol, that established a kind of border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the U.K. It involved burdensome and slow customs checks on all goods arriving at Northern Irish ports and prohibitions on some goods including sausages, medicines, plants and potatoes. </p>
<p>Those problems sparked stiff resistance from unionists, who said it had done what they feared: <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-46988529">separated them from their nation</a>.</p>
<p>In 2022, in protest against the Protocol, the Democratic Unionist Party, a key party in Northern Irish politics, <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/no-stormont-return-until-ni-protocol-is-replaced-dup-leader-says/42170991.html">withdrew from the provincial government</a>, effectively shutting it down. </p>
<p>Now, the Windsor Framework keeps key border protections around the EU but eases a lot of the restrictions created in the 2019 agreement.</p>
<h2>A key US role</h2>
<p>There is an element of U.S. foreign policy at work here, too. The U.S. was <a href="https://joewilson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/wilson-resolution-calls-for-full-implementation-of-belfastgood-friday">key to negotiating the 1998 agreement</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jun/10/why-joe-biden-is-so-invested-in-defending-good-friday-agreement">successive administrations</a> have championed it as the only way to a sustainable peace. </p>
<p>When the U.K. voted to withdraw from the EU, the departure meant the U.K. needed to negotiate a new trade agreement with the U.S. But the U.S. decided to force the U.K. to work out its departure from the EU – in ways consistent with the 1998 agreement – before U.S.-U.K. trade talks could truly begin.</p>
<p>With the Windsor Framework agreed upon, the U.S. will <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/13/politics/biden-northern-ireland-visit/index.html">likely send President Joe Biden</a> to visit both Ireland and Northern Ireland, potentially as soon as April, to mark the 25th anniversary of the 1998 agreement. The new U.S. special envoy to Northern Ireland for economic affairs, Joe Kennedy III, a former Democratic congressman from Massachusetts, is also <a href="https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2023/01/19/news/us_envoy_promises_to_champion_northern_ireland_s_compelling_potential_-3005755/">expected to travel to Northern Ireland soon</a>, with U.S. investors eager to take advantage of <a href="https://www.newsletter.co.uk/business/us-president-joe-bidens-special-envoy-to-northern-ireland-joe-kennedy-hears-call-from-ni-business-for-new-economic-good-friday-agreement-4064604">Northern Ireland’s unique connections</a> with both the EU and the U.K. markets.</p>
<p>All eyes are now on the Democratic Unionist Party. Its members voted against the Windsor Framework in the U.K. Parliament in late March, but the people of Northern Ireland, including many unionists and the business community, want a functioning government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kimberly Cowell-Meyers is affiliated with the Ad-hoc Committee to Protect the Good Friday Agreement but does not represent the group and the views expressed here are her own. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carolyn Gallaher is affiliated with the Ad-hoc Committee for the Protection of the Good Friday Agreement. This is an ad-hoc, bi-partisna voluntary group. It is not a lobby and there are no membership fees or responsibilities for members. It also does not have 501c3 status. However, we are not representing this group. The views expressed here are our own. </span></em></p>A newly approved trade deal could be an opportunity to return Northern Ireland’s political attention to pressing issues of health care, housing, energy costs and inflation.Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, American University School of Public AffairsCarolyn Gallaher, Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1826522022-05-07T19:30:21Z2022-05-07T19:30:21ZNorthern Ireland election: despite Sinn Féin’s historic win over unionists, things may not be as they seem<iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/northern-ireland-election-despite-sinn-feins-historic-win-over-unionists-things-may-not-be-as-they-seem-182652&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p><em>You can listen to more articles from The Conversation, narrated by Noa, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/audio-narrated-99682">here</a>.</em></p>
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<p>It is clear that Sinn Féin has achieved a <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/utv/2022-05-07/sinn-fein-confirmed-as-northern-irelands-biggest-stormont-party-for-first-time">historic result</a> in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Stormont">Stormont</a> election. For the first time in Northern Ireland’s history, a nationalist party is set to claim the most seats in a political system that was <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/irish-partition-was-a-deliberate-process-on-the-part-of-the-british-1.4557195?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fculture%2Fheritage%2Firish-partition-was-a-deliberate-process-on-the-part-of-the-british-1.4557195">originally designed</a> to guarantee a unionist majority.</p>
<p>Yet this does not reflect any surge in support for Sinn Féin. The party secured only a marginal increase in its vote since the last Stormont election in 2017. The party’s steady progress is made more spectacular by the collapse of the Democratic Unionist party (DUP) and the broader divisions within unionism.</p>
<p>Indeed, by combining all their votes, the unionist parties can still claim a fractional advantage over their nationalist rivals. However, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-northern-ireland-protocol-unionists-b1798025.html">demographic trends</a> continue to favour the latter. Sinn Féin’s achievement has long been predicted, and unionists must realise that there will be no return to their past dominance.</p>
<p>The other notable trend is the considerable growth of the cross-community <a href="https://www.allianceparty.org/?locale=en">Alliance party</a>. Its vote is up by a third since 2017, and its seats have doubled. However, suggestions that this shows a significant growth in the moderate middle ground are somewhat misleading. The Alliance party’s gains come at the expense of other cross-community alignments like the Greens, who have lost all their representation at Stormont.</p>
<p>The Alliance has also taken votes from moderate nationalist and unionist parties. The <a href="https://www.uup.org/">Ulster Unionist Party</a> (UUP) leader, Doug Beattie, is clearly trying to steer the party in a more progressive direction, but <a href="https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/politics/election-2022-doug-beattie-in-scrap-with-alliance-to-retain-his-upper-bann-seat-3684656">very nearly lost his seat</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the moderate nationalist <a href="https://www.sdlp.ie/">Social Democratic & Labour party</a> (SDLP) has had a harrowing election. Despite producing an array of young and able leaders, it seems that liberal nationalist voters have either defected to the Alliance or decided to punish unionists for their political intransigence by voting Sinn Féin.</p>
<p>The DUP has clearly tested the patience of many nationalists – resisting legislation that would support Irish language speakers, backing Brexit, then <a href="https://theconversation.com/sinn-fein-could-become-the-biggest-party-in-northern-ireland-on-may-5-heres-what-it-means-for-power-sharing-181674">rejecting the deal that was negotiated</a> – and the SDLP is a casualty of this.</p>
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<h2>Problems ahead</h2>
<p>Analysts who see great political progress in the Alliance party’s advance may be misreading the overall results of the election. There is certainly political flux and changing of alignments across the moderate middle ground, but as yet no hugely significant erosion in the overall support for more traditional parties.</p>
<p>Turnout was slightly down on the last Stormont election, with more than a third of all registered voters exercising their democratic right to stay at home. They are likely the citizens most disillusioned with the political status quo in Northern Ireland, but without their engagement things remains the same.</p>
<p>And this applies to the prospects for power-sharing at Stormont. Despite Sinn Féin success, without DUP agreement, a government cannot be formed. There are questions as to whether it is willing to serve in an administration where Sinn Féin would hold the first minister role.</p>
<p>Although the deputy first minster has equal powers, even the idea of subservience to Sinn Féin is difficult to swallow for the DUP. More problematic still, the party insists it will <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/donaldson-eyes-executive-return-but-warns-on-ni-protocol-1.4867702?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Fassembly-election-2022%2Fdonaldson-eyes-executive-return-but-warns-on-ni-protocol-1.4867702">not return to government</a> until changes are made to the so-called <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-53724381">Northern Ireland protocol</a> in the Brexit deal.</p>
<p>The protocol requires checks on goods coming into Northern Ireland from Great Britain, which the DUP argues separates the region from the rest of the UK and weakens the union. However, it is clear that the protocol is not a priority even for many unionist voters.</p>
<p>Sinn Féin’s emphasis on more practical concerns like the rising cost of living has clearly served it better than the DUP’s continued obsession with Brexit arrangements. The fact that the DUP has no clear alternative to the protocol also does not help its case.</p>
<p>The continuation of the protocol in some form seems inevitable, and this exacerbates unionist fears for the political future of Northern Ireland. With polls suggesting Sinn Féin will soon <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/republic-of-ireland/sinn-fein-remains-most-popular-party-in-ireland-according-to-new-poll-41389621.html">hold power in Dublin too</a>, this makes it more difficult for the DUP to aid its rival into government in Belfast, creating a situation where republicans could claim to be overseeing the alignment of the two parts of Ireland to advance reunification.</p>
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<h2>Fresh thinking required</h2>
<p>Though traumatic for unionists, the best that might come of this situation is a more fundamental realignment of politics within this community. Nationalism is uniting around the Sinn Féin agenda, north and south. Unionism also needs to coalesce behind a forward-thinking strategy rather than one that simply seeks to turn the clock back.</p>
<p>A much more progressive case could be made for the union, and even the protocol. Unionists could argue that Northern Ireland now enjoys unique advantages. Unlike the rest of the UK, it still enjoys unfettered access to EU markets. <a href="https://www.euro.who.int/en/countries/ireland/news2/news/2020/7/new-who-study-shows-how-ireland-can-reduce-health-related-financial-hardship-and-unmet-need-by-delivering-universal-access-to-health-care">Unlike the Republic of Ireland</a>, it has universal health care. Why, unionists could ask, would voters want to forego either by removing the protocol or uniting with the south?</p>
<p>It remains to be seen whether unionism has a leader able to persuasively articulate such an approach. This seems to be what Doug Beattie of the UUP was edging towards, yet look at his <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/doug-beattie-i-want-to-promote-a-progressive-and-inclusive-unionism-with-a-welcoming-approach-1.4579236?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fopinion%2Fdoug-beattie-i-want-to-promote-a-progressive-and-inclusive-unionism-with-a-welcoming-approach-1.4579236">difficulties</a>. Perhaps the shift has to be more radical, with unionism effectively being led by a party that refuses to call itself unionist: the Alliance.</p>
<p>Only time will tell, and the process would likely be slow and painful. Meantime, without agreement between Sinn Féin and the DUP, political stalemate in Northern Ireland will continue, and the future will have to wait.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182652/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin has received funding in the past from the AHRC, Leverhulme, the Irish Research Council, and Fulbright. He is a member of Greenpeace.</span></em></p>Sinn Fein’s win does not reflect a surge in support but rather other factors including the divisions in unionism.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1745102022-01-07T10:01:47Z2022-01-07T10:01:47ZState of Stormont: can Northern Ireland trust in Truss?<p>The new year in Northern Ireland has opened much the same as the last, with DUP First Minister Paul Givan warning that Stormont’s collapse is “inevitable” unless changes are made to post-Brexit regulations <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2022/01/03/stormont-collapse-inevitable-unless-northern-ireland-protocol/">for the region</a>. When the Northern Ireland protocol came into force in January 2021, it created new checks on goods arriving from Great Britain. This <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-vaccines-and-brexit-borders-what-is-happening-in-northern-ireland-154503">triggered protests</a> from unionists, who felt the arrangements separated them from the rest of the UK, and undermined the union. The resulting turmoil led to three unionist party leaders <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-ireland-paul-givan-takes-over-as-first-minister-but-his-party-is-in-crisis-162728">resigning in 2021</a>. </p>
<p>Jeffrey Donaldson emerged from this chaos as the latest DUP leader, and sought to establish order and his authority by, ironically, threatening more disorder. He vowed to withdraw from Stormont unless swift progress was made in ongoing EU-UK talks over the protocol. Many commentators read this as Donaldson simply “talking tough” to win back voters that polls showed were deserting the DUP over its flawed handling of the Brexit process. Speaking in September, Donaldson implied that he would act on his threat within a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/sep/09/northern-ireland-dup-may-walk-out-of-stormont-power-sharing-over-brexit-protocol">matter of weeks</a>. Many weeks have since passed, and so Givan’s more recent comments appear to be political posturing – providing a substitute for risky action. </p>
<p>Meanwhile in UK-EU talks, Brussels has offered significant compromise on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/oct/13/eu-offers-to-scrap-80-of-ni-food-checks-but-prepares-for-johnson-to-reject-deal">operation of the protocol</a>, but with no reciprocal shift from London. Indeed, the government’s lead negotiator, Lord Frost, actually escalated British demands by insisting that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) no longer have any oversight in Northern Ireland. This was a red line issue for the EU in terms of assuring the integrity of any agreement. </p>
<p>Before Christmas, there were signs that London was backing away from its <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/britain-drops-demand-for-removal-of-ecj-role-from-ni-protocol-1.4752375?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fnews%2Fworld%2Fuk%2Fbritain-drops-demand-for-removal-of-ecj-role-from-ni-protocol-1.4752375">demands on the ECJ</a>, followed by Frost’s unexpected resignation. He cited wider concerns about the direction of government policy, including over COVID, as the cause of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/dec/18/brexit-minister-lord-frost-resigns-over-covid-plan-b-measures">his departure</a>, but it seemed that Frost was simply unwilling to sully his reputation as “Mr Brexit” by overseeing any retreat on the protocol. </p>
<p>Boris Johnson then made a possibly shrewd move by passing Frost’s portfolio over to Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, a prospective rival for the leadership of the Tory party. By making Truss carry the can for an eventual compromise with Brussels, Johnson could now concentrate on restoring his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/dec/10/the-guardian-view-on-boris-johnson-odds-shorten-on-a-vote-of-no-confidence">battered authority</a>. However, Truss may decide to follow Johnson’s past example, playing hardball on Brexit to win the Tory right and the keys to No. 10. This probably explains the DUP’s recent return to sabre-rattling on the protocol, as it tries to influence the path that Truss takes.</p>
<h2>Elections ahead</h2>
<p>The DUP is also positioning itself with a view to the May elections at Stormont. Recent <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/dup-lag-behind-sinn-fein-as-nis-biggest-party-in-latest-poll-41021442.html">polls suggest</a> that Sinn Féin will win the most seats -– a hammer blow to unionists. The sense that Brexit is edging Northern Ireland out of the union and towards a united Ireland would be greatly enhanced by Sinn Féin becoming the leading party in Northern Ireland. Polls in the Republic of Ireland suggest that Sinn Féin is on course to win the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/irish-times-ipsos-mrbi-opinion-poll-support-for-sinn-f%C3%A9in-reaches-new-record-1.4751548?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Firish-times-ipsos-mrbi-opinion-poll-support-for-sinn-f%25C3%25A9in-reaches-new-record-1.4751548">next election</a> there, too.</p>
<p>This explains why the DUP is so desperate to rally despondent unionist voters, showing that it is standing firm on the protocol, and can influence the outcome of UK-EU talks. The party’s fate, therefore, is in Truss’s hands. If she refuses to compromise with Brussels, she will undoubtedly win support on the Tory right. But Truss may also have noted the limited appetite among the wider electorate for continual <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/dec/16/uk-public-dont-want-perennial-fights-of-a-permanent-brexit-with-eu-report">wrangling with the EU</a>. </p>
<p>Truss’s reputation has suffered damage from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jan/04/leak-casts-doubt-on-explanation-for-liz-trusss-3000-lunch-says-labour">recent revelations</a> of fine dining at the taxpayers’ expense in a private members club. However, she might try to spin this to her advantage. Truss’s expensive lunch was a work event, and as then Trade secretary, she would stress that she was hosting officials from the UK’s largest trading partner, the US. </p>
<p>Despite supporting the Remain campaign, Truss has become the Brexiteers’ latest darling by negotiating a series of new trade deals. But a US-UK trade arrangement is the prize that Brexiteers most desire, and here difficulties with Northern Ireland have not helped. President Biden, a proud Irish-American, has consistently <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-58648729">made clear</a> his concern that ongoing disputes over the protocol threaten the Good Friday Agreement. </p>
<p>Perhaps Truss will articulate her own version of “Getting Brexit done” –- finally reaching an accommodation with the EU that resolves the issue of the protocol and other outstanding matters. This could be sold to Brexiteers on the basis that it allows the UK to move on to greater things, not least negotiating a US trade deal, with the Biden administration assured that there is no longer a threat to peace in Northern Ireland. Or will Truss decide that what worked for Johnson will work for her, and that the support of Tory backbenchers is all that matters in terms of advancing a leadership bid?</p>
<p>Whatever choice Truss makes, it will certainly have particular repercussions for Northern Ireland, and especially the DUP. However, what is also clear is that running Northern Ireland according to the whims of the DUP or Tory right, does not lead to political stability or longevity of leadership.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/174510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin has received funding in the past from the AHRC, Leverhulme, the Irish Research Council, and Fulbright. He is a member of Greenpeace.</span></em></p>After Lord Frost’s departure, the future of Brexit negotiations – and the Northern Ireland protocol – are in Liz Truss’s hands.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1627282021-06-18T11:59:18Z2021-06-18T11:59:18ZNorthern Ireland: Paul Givan takes over as first minister, but his party is in crisis<p>Northern Ireland has a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/17/sinn-fein-designates-deputy-first-minister-to-avert-stormont-crisis">new first minister</a> – its youngest ever. But as a mark of the strife and confusion which so often characterises Stormont politics, within hours of the confirmation of the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) Paul Givan, 39, in the top job, the party had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/17/edwin-poots-resigns-as-dup-leader-after-21-days">to deal with the resignation</a> of its shortest serving leader, Edwin Poots, who lasted just 21 days. Outsiders may already be confused, as the two roles are currently separate. But the confirmation of the former triggered the departure of the latter.</p>
<p>More confusing still, Givan is a close ally of Poots. He had been widely tipped as the former DUP leader’s nomination for the first minister role. Poots had <a href="https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/sunday-life/news/edwin-poots-doesnt-want-to-be-northern-ireland-first-minister-he-plans-to-split-dup-posts-and-concentrate-on-party-40377786.html">made a promise</a> as part of his campaign for the DUP leadership that he would not be head of the Stormont executive.</p>
<p>This was to show his commitment to reforming the DUP, suggesting that he would forgo the limelight to concentrate on this and involve other party members in the overall leadership operation. The aim was to suggest a greater team effort, and more accountability in the DUP. </p>
<p>It was also an implicit rebuke of Arlene Foster’s leadership, presented as being more top down, and may have helped Poots narrowly defeat the rival candidate, Jeffery Donaldson, seen as representing the more “Fosterite” wing of the DUP.</p>
<p>But Poots’ marginal victory immediately prompted open dissent within the party – and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-57283002">even resignations</a>. Donaldson’s backers questioned whether Poots, reflecting a <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/edwin-poots-profile-new-dup-leader-is-a-traditionalist-and-paisleyite-1.4565581">more conservative outlook and religious ethos</a>, could win back the votes the party seems to be losing among younger and more liberal unionists.</p>
<p>Despite the divisions within the DUP, an even greater obstacle to Poots’ agenda emerged when Sinn Féin <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/stormont-faces-crisis-as-sinn-f%C3%A9in-accuses-dup-of-bad-faith-on-irish-language-1.4592339">threatened to veto</a> the nomination of any successor to Foster, who stepped down as first minister on June 15 following her ousting as DUP leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/arlene-foster-where-it-all-went-wrong-for-northern-irelands-first-minister-159966">in April</a>. So far, so confusing – right?</p>
<h2>Power sharing</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/articles/northern-ireland-executive">rules of power-sharing</a> at Stormont effectively allow either Sinn Féin or the DUP to veto the first and deputy first minister nominations, and so gridlock the assembly. The rules also gave the two parties seven days after Foster’s resignation to find agreement on the matter. But Sinn Féin was insisting that it would not proceed without gaining a firm commitment by the DUP to support legislation to protect and promote the Irish language.</p>
<p>This had been agreed as part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-irelands-government-is-back-up-and-running-heres-how-it-happened-and-why-129831">last deal</a> made to restore power-sharing in Northern Ireland in January 2020 – and indeed on many previous occasions. Under Poots, the DUP continued to say it would legislate on the Irish language, but refused to confirm a date for this. Sinn Féin clearly ran out of patience on the issue, hence a standoff which most commentators felt would run at least till the June 21 deadline for agreement on a new Stormont leadership team.</p>
<p>But a surprising solution arrived well ahead of that, with Sinn Féin saying <em>go raibh maith agat</em> (thank you) to the British government after it <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-57507176">promised legislation</a> on the Irish language at Westminster if the DUP failed to do so. Some were surprised that republicans were accepting the word of the Johnson administration on the matter. It is not seen as the most trustworthy on many issues – but particularly Northern Ireland. This is especially the case given its refusal to honour parts of the Brexit deal relating to the region.</p>
<p>But it was Poots that was taking the greater risk, pressing ahead with the nomination of Givan as first minister even after a rebellion within the DUP. Reports suggest that a party meeting held on the morning of June 17 saw <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-57507176">only four</a> of the DUP’s 28 representatives in the Belfast Assembly support the move. However, along with Sinn Féin, Poots proceeded to nominate the new first and deputy first minister team, despite the opposition of most of his DUP colleagues. Following this, a further DUP meeting took place in the evening, after which Poots <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-57521158">announced his resignation</a>. </p>
<h2>Crisis for unionism</h2>
<p>This is Northern Ireland’s centenary year, but what should have been a celebration for unionists has turned into an unprecedented crisis. Indeed, Foster was forced to resign just days before the official birthdate of the state on May 3. There was further shock when the leader of the smaller UUP quit just days later – and now a third unionist leader has been forced out in as many months.</p>
<p>It is hard not to trace the ultimate cause of this instability to Brexit, with the terms of Johnson’s deal establishing customs checks on the movement of goods between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Unionists feel this further <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-vaccines-and-brexit-borders-what-is-happening-in-northern-ireland-154503">separates them</a> from the rest of the UK, while effectively remaining under EU jurisdiction aligns the region towards integration with the Republic of Ireland. </p>
<p>This, the now constant discussion of a border poll, and republicans’ continued momentum – with <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/irish-times-poll-sinn-f%C3%A9in-s-move-to-the-mainstream-seems-inexorable-1.4595221?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fnews%2Fpolitics%2Firish-times-poll-sinn-f%25C3%25A9in-s-move-to-the-mainstream-seems-inexorable-1.4595221">polling trends</a> suggesting that Sinn Féin will soon hold power in Dublin as well as Belfast – is unnerving for unionists. Moves towards Irish language legislation just add to their anxieties. Again, the sense is that this will further undermine the “Britishness” of Northern Ireland, preparing the way for Irish reunification.</p>
<p>It is surprising that Poots, seen as a more traditional unionist, thought that he could act as if the deal between Sinn Féin and the British government was unconnected to his move to make Givan first minister. Clearly, most DUP members felt that they would be seen to have facilitated the progress of Irish language legislation – just as the party is seen to have aided Johnson’s Brexit deal, despite voting against it.</p>
<p>This is the dilemma for any new unionist leader. Even if Donaldson is now crowned, what room will he now have for manoeuvre? How can anyone lead unionism when it is clearly paralysed by fear?</p>
<p>Foster is obviously glad to be done with the role. Gently mocking yesterday’s developments at Stormont, she tweeted that she had just enjoyed lunch at one of Belfast’s top restaurants, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-57507176">wished everyone</a> a “great day on this lovely sunny afternoon”. But it is hard not to think that the sunshine was just a prelude to an uncomfortably hot summer in Northern Ireland, with the marching season about to begin.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162728/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin has received funding in the past from the AHRC, Leverhulme, the Irish Research Council, and Fulbright. He is a member of Greenpeace.</span></em></p>With the resignation of shortlived DUP leader Edwin Poots, unionism in Northern Ireland is in turmoil.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1298312020-01-13T16:31:17Z2020-01-13T16:31:17ZNorthern Ireland’s government is back up and running – here’s how it happened and why<p>The Northern Ireland government is back up and running after the British and Irish governments jointly announced a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51047216">draft deal</a> to resolve the continued political stalemate in the region, exactly three years to the day since power-sharing broke down. A few days later, the deal has now been formally agreed.</p>
<p>It has been widely suggested that the Westminster elections, and losses suffered by both the DUP and Sinn Féin, were the main reason they suddenly agreed to return to sharing power. The threat of a fresh assembly election for Northern Ireland, which could see their dominance further eroded, may well have influenced their thinking. Recent gains by moderate parties, arguably reflecting the frustration of voters at the inability of Sinn Féin and the DUP to compromise, surely focused minds.</p>
<p>One of the key sticking points had been Sinn Féin’s insistence on legislation to help promote and protect the Irish language in Northern Ireland. Many unionists were staunchly opposed, seeing this as part of a broader project by Sinn Féin to gradually undermine the “Britishness” of Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The new deal allows compromise on this issue. It promises to appoint an Irish language commissioner, and standards that public bodies will have to meet to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51063140">provide services in Irish</a>. However, balancing things out, Sinn Féin did not get the stand-alone Irish language act which it had demanded. </p>
<p>Indeed, the new deal makes similar commitments for Ulster-Scots, which is spoken by some unionists. It also states that the first minister and deputy first minister – posts long held by the DUP and Sinn Féin – must both agree on any new language proposals. That effectively gives the first minister, currently the DUP’s Arlene Foster, an effective veto over moves to give Irish greater prominence, such as by introducing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51063140">bilingual road signs, for example</a>.</p>
<p>On the subject of vetoes, the new deal also promises to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-51047216">reform the petition of concern mechanism</a>, which gives members of the Northern Ireland assembly the ability to raise opposition to legislative proposals. It is this mechanism which effectively gave the DUP and Sinn Féin a veto over each other’s proposals, allowing them to gridlock and eventually collapse power-sharing in the first place. </p>
<p>Reform of the mechanism to minimise its use may help, but the DUP and Sinn Féin will also need to try harder to find compromise if things are to work. They both need to rebuild damaged relations and trust. In short, they must genuinely share power if they are to exercise any.</p>
<h2>UK and Ireland step in</h2>
<p>What really forced the deal between Sinn Féin and the DUP, however, was intervention from the British and Irish governments. Their decisiveness, and boldly pre-emptive announcement of a deal, resulted from the recent changes at Westminster. </p>
<p>Thus, it was not just the losses suffered by the DUP and Sinn Féin in the UK election which mattered. The Conservative victory can be said to have, in a way, “resolved” Brexit – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/13/brexit-irish-border-uk-northern-ireland">at least for now</a>. This allowed London and Dublin to finally focus on and cooperate in their efforts to restore power-sharing in Northern Ireland. The fact that the election decisively removed the Tories’ reliance on DUP support at Westminster also eased this path toward progress.</p>
<p>Economic pressures were just as important. London promised significant financial support to help address the multiple healthcare crises in Northern Ireland, and Dublin offered money for large infrastructure projects in the region. However, these commitments were conditional upon the local parties accepting the deal. With nurses and other workers in the region currently engaging in strike action, this put huge pressure on Sinn Féin and the DUP.</p>
<p>This approach triggered <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/the-northern-capacity-to-focus-on-the-negative-can-be-breathtaking-1.4135922">claims of blackmail</a>, and exasperation by others that it took “outsiders” to force Northern Ireland’s squabbling parties to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/10/the-guardian-view-on-the-northern-ireland-deal-take-it-move-on">face up to their responsibilities</a>. But there has always been an element of blackmail – or, more positively, “incentivisation” – in the way the British and Irish governments have <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781315638065/chapters/10.4324/9781315638065-15">dealt with Northern Ireland</a> – justifiably so in that it has largely worked to deliver a more stable and peaceful society.</p>
<p>As for suggestions that this shows a lack of political maturity in Northern Ireland, well again, yes. Northern Ireland has only had regional democracy since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Thus, of course the practice of democracy in the region is underdeveloped. It has also been hindered by the legacy of 30 years of bloody conflict, and many more decades of discrimination and exclusion, leaving deep divisions.</p>
<p>It was the failure of Britain and Ireland to resolve their own relationships which created this problem, resulting in partition and the birth of Northern Ireland exactly 100 years ago. For decades thereafter, London and Dublin largely ignored the problem, and it was only from the 1980s that they began to properly re-engage in a way that allowed for the subsequent peace process. Unfortunately, however, Brexit once again complicated relations between the two governments – <a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-a-reason-why-northern-ireland-has-been-without-a-government-for-more-than-500-days-brexit-102297">undoubtedly reinforcing</a> the stalemate in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The re-engagement of London and Dublin with the region is to be commended, and their continued commitment will be required to face the fresh challenges that Brexit throws up. The draft document they announced last week was entitled “New Decade, New Approach”. One hundred years on from the birth of Northern Ireland, it might even have promised a “New Century, New Approach”. The British and Irish governments, and certainly the local parties, will all need to continue to work hard together to ensure that this new century undoes the divisions and distrust of the last.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129831/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter John McLoughlin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new deal has been signed that seeks to encourage Sinn Fein and the DUP to work together.Peter John McLoughlin, Lecturer in Politics, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215232019-08-08T10:20:00Z2019-08-08T10:20:00ZNorthern Ireland is stuck – fresh thinking is needed if the peace process is to outlive Brexit<p>The British and Irish governments were to be found clapping each other on the back for a job well done in 2011. The visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Ireland in May of that year was presented as a new cordial phase in relations between the two nations. </p>
<p>The mutual praise was repeated when Irish president Michael D. Higgins returned the visit in 2014. The UK and Ireland both felt they could <a href="https://www.thejournal.ie/in-full-the-speech-of-queen-elizabeth-at-the-state-dinner-139301-May2011">“bow to the past, but not be bound by it”</a>.</p>
<p>It was a far cry from the 1970s and early 1980s when the relationship between the two countries soured to the extent that they were “<a href="http://historyhub.ie/the-evolution-of-anglo-irish-relations">brawling publicly</a>”.</p>
<p>But these grand bilateral gestures in recent years have masked the fragility of the peace process in Northern Ireland, which has been struggling for at least 15 years, if not more. The northern six counties have always been the linchpin of the relationship between the two countries, even before it was the political entity of Northern Ireland. It should therefore come as no surprise that the lack of focus on the North over the past 20 years has now come back to bite both governments. </p>
<h2>Iconic agreement</h2>
<p>The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998 brought, if not the end, then certainly a reduction, of violence that had mired Northern Ireland for 30 years, resulting in over 3,700 deaths. It was lauded globally as an example of an iconic peace process that other divided societies should emulate.</p>
<p>Not since James Joyce’s Ulysses have so many claimed to have read, or not read, a document. Irish government officials regularly berate their British counterparts for not reading it, not understanding it, and being a threat to it. Now, both Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) accuse the other of being in breach of the agreement over Brexit. This demonstrates a deliberate dismissal of responsibility by both the British and Irish governments for the lack of progress there. </p>
<p>Now, 20 years on, the Northern Ireland Assembly has been suspended as often as it has been operating. The Northern Ireland Executive is not working. The Consultative Civic Forum (which comprised 60 representatives from the business, trade union and voluntary sectors and was to act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues) has not met since 2002.</p>
<p>The North-South Ministerial Council (which comprises ministers from the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish government) has not met since 2016. The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which aims to bring together the British and Irish governments to promote bilateral cooperation, has held two meetings in 12 years.</p>
<p>American diplomat Richard Haass, who was tasked with finding a way forward on the intractable issue of dealing with the past, warned in 2013 that Northern Ireland could no longer be held up as a model of conflict resolution. Despite some movement in terms of residential segregation and shared schooling for Catholic and Protestant communities, he said, the fundamental divisions remained unchanged. More than 93% of children are educated separately from each other, interface walls still divide communities and sectarian riots are accepted as routine annual events.</p>
<p>It is not denied that both the Good Friday Agreement and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-st-andrews-agreement-october-2006">St Andrews Agreement</a> (2006) have prevented the return of large-scale violence. However, the model on offer from the top is peace without reconciliation. It is not just intractable issues of flags, parades and dealing with the past that are hampering progress – there is also a failure to tackle bread-and-butter issues such as health, welfare and education.</p>
<p>The area ranks among the slowest recovery from recession on record for the UK as a whole. There has been little change in poverty rates over the past decade. Welfare reforms, which are currently being rolled out by a Tory government as part of a decade-long austerity drive, will have a negative impact on the most vulnerable households.</p>
<p>Despite a £1 billion investment from Westminster in exchange for DUP votes, without a functioning government – and ministerial sign off – big budget education or health reform cannot happen.</p>
<p>These problems pre-date Brexit, and have nothing to do with debate over <a href="https://tribunemag.co.uk/2019/01/northern-irelands-deeper-crisis">the backstop</a>.</p>
<h2>Unlocking Stormont</h2>
<p>Pulling the Good Friday Agreement out of cold storage to beat the British government with is disingenuous. Boris Johnson and the Conservative Party are no better. The confidence-and-supply arrangement between the DUP and the Tories has called into question the neutrality of the British government in the ongoing attempts to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland. Britain cannot claim to be a non-partisan broker between the two main parties in Northern Ireland, when one (the DUP) props it up in Westminster. </p>
<p>But the British government was never a neutral player in the North. Recent <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/2955941.stm">investigations</a> have found that British security forces colluded with loyalist paramilitary groups in killing unarmed civilians in Northern Ireland.</p>
<p>The EU, which has had a “soft” role through financial contributions to peace funds, has now taken on the role, willingly or not, of being the unofficial third party (after the British and Irish governments) in the peace process. This will undoubtedly present its own problems for the future of Stormont.</p>
<p>While Brexit is not to blame for the lack of progress in the North, it has placed additional strains on the relationship between the DUP and Sinn Féin. It obfuscates and relegates key issues like equality, health and housing. But the Good Friday Agreement, as it has been implemented in the past two decades, is not capable of advancing these issues either.</p>
<p>The agreement does not necessarily need throwing out altogether, but there needs to be imagination and commitment to breathing new life into the peace process, Brexit or not, and neither Leo Varadkar nor Johnson are demonstrating that they have either.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121523/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Campbell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Some of Northern Ireland’s biggest problems have nothing to do with leaving the EU, but all anyone talks about now is the backstop.Sarah Campbell, Lecturer in British/Irish History, Newcastle UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/946102018-04-09T12:33:09Z2018-04-09T12:33:09ZThe Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland at 20 – The Anthill podcast<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/213604/original/file-20180406-125177-1dzvoo3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/belfast-northern-ireland-may-21-2011-169080716?src=W6lsDs9ThZBs4kizx79Mng-1-0">LunaseeStudios/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been 20 years since the Belfast Agreement paved the way for a relatively peaceful end to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The deal was made on Good Friday that year, April 10, 1998, and has become known since as the Good Friday Agreement.</p>
<p>To mark the 20th anniversary, this episode of The Anthill is all about the Good Friday Agreement.</p>
<p>While this anniversary is an opportunity to remember the achievements of 1998, it is also throwing up some difficult questions about the present. The UK is leaving the European Union and will need to come up <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-eus-brexit-backstop-option-for-northern-ireland-doesnt-threaten-the-uks-constitutional-integrity-92869">with a plan</a> for the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. But the very absence of a border has been an integral element of life after the Good Friday Agreement. What’s more, Northern Ireland hasn’t had a devolved government for over year as a result of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-reasons-to-be-optimistic-about-northern-ireland-politics-91957">dispute between</a> the unionists and republicans running the administration, making the celebrations a little hollow.</p>
<p>We hear from Feargal Cochrane, professor of international conflict analysis at the University of Kent and panellists David Mitchell, assistant professor of conflict resolution and reconciliation at Trinity College Dublin, and Katy Hayward, reader in sociology at Queen’s University Belfast. (<em>Starts at 5:30)</em> </p>
<p>We find out more about what it’s like to grow up in Northern Ireland today, a place where education is still heavily segregated by faith. We hear from Tony Gallagher and Joanne Hughes from the School of Education at Queen’s University, Belfast, about their research to unite Protestant and Catholic schools through a programme that sees children from both communities coming together for lessons. Then we speak to Laura Taylor a psychologist who’s also based at Queen’s who explains why the role of the family can be so important in helping to keep the peace in divided communities. And we also discover how other countries such as Macedonia and Israel, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-for-israel-on-how-shared-education-can-bridge-divided-communities-35005">learning from Northern Ireland’s approaches</a> to breaking down borders through education. (<em>Starts at 29:25</em>)</p>
<p>And finally, we talked to four academics for an in depth look at what motivated the key political figures involved to get to an agreement in April 1998. From unionist leaders such as David Trimble, to Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams and the big hitting trio of Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern. Four academics – Margaret O'Callaghan from Queen’s University Belfast, Liam Kennedy from University College Dublin, John Morrison from the University of East London, and Connal Parr from Northumbria University – tell their stories. (<em>Starts at 40:18</em>)</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The Anthill theme music is by <a href="https://www.melodyloops.com/search/How+to+Steal+a+Million+Dollars/">Alex Grey for Melody Loops</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Thank you to City, University of London’s Department of Journalism for letting us use their studios to record The Anthill.</em></p>
<p><em>Click here to listen to more episodes of The Anthill, on themes including <a href="https://theconversation.com/anthill-23-bursting-the-bitcoin-bubble-93337">Bitcoin</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/anthill-21-growing-up-90247">Growing Up</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/anthill-20-myths-89107">Myths</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/anthill-19-pain-87538">Pain</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94610/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
To mark the 20th anniversary of the agreement that brought peace to Northern Ireland, this episode of the podcast looks at its history, its legacy and the impact of Brexit on its future.Will de Freitas, Environment + Energy Editor, UK editionLaura Hood, Senior Politics Editor, Assistant Editor, The Conversation (UK edition)Annabel Bligh, Business & Economy Editor and Podcast Producer, The Conversation UKGemma Ware, Head of AudioHolly Squire, Special Projects Editor, The Conversation UKLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/886092017-12-06T11:53:24Z2017-12-06T11:53:24ZBrexit: never underestimate the political potency of symbolism in Northern Ireland<p>In Northern Ireland, political uncertainties are par for the course. Since the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement">Good Friday Agreement</a> was signed in 1998, devolution at the Stormont Assembly has been, at times, a fraught exercise. But up until the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-northern-irelands-government-went-from-mutual-suspicion-to-collapse-71418">recent collapse</a> of the devolved power-sharing executive, the assembly had been fully functioning for a remarkable ten years. </p>
<p>It is Brexit – a crisis that transcends the confines of Stormont – that is creating new uncertainties, and this time across Ireland as a whole. </p>
<p>While the overall majority of the population of Northern Ireland voted to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-36614443">remain</a> part of the European Union in the June 2016 referendum, the region is now embroiled in the turmoil following the UK’s collective decision to leave. </p>
<p>In Northern Ireland, voting along ethno-national lines has become a feature of the post-Good Friday Agreement landscape. Research by John Garry, an expert in political behaviour, showed that the <a href="https://www.qub.ac.uk/brexit/Brexitfilestore/Filetoupload,728121,en.pdf">way people voted in the referendum</a> was “very strongly predicted by their core ethno-national characteristics”. Protestant unionists tended to vote Leave, whereas catholic nationalists voted to Remain.</p>
<p>Even when the question at hand is beyond the everyday governance of Northern Ireland, identity politics and ethno-national tribalism continue to rear their unhelpful heads. </p>
<h2>Symbolism and politics</h2>
<p>The intersection between politics and symbolism in Northern Ireland has always been clear. For example, reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) – a major feature of the 1998 agreement – required more than merely a commitment to ensure greater representation from the catholic community within the force. Symbols and trappings attached to the old RUC were rendered obsolete. A new “inclusive” logo and significant rebrand of the <a href="https://www.psni.police.uk/inside-psni/our-history/a-history-of-policing-in-ireland/">name</a> to the Police Service of Northern Ireland attempted to generate a symbolically resonant and palatable institution that was acceptable across both sections of the community. </p>
<p>Rituals specific to certain communities, including commemorative and “cultural” events, continue to reinforce old tribal lines. They have become the new battlegrounds upon which political differences are publicly displayed.</p>
<p>When identities are perceived to be “under threat”, violent responses can erupt and undermine the great progress that has been made since the onset of peace. In 2012, Belfast experienced a <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northernireland/9731510/Belfast-riots-police-injured-as-loyalists-clash-with-officers-during-flag-protests.html">serious escalation</a> in civil disobedience following a democratic decision by Belfast City Council to restrict the flying of the Union flag over government buildings to only designated days. Ironically, this brought Northern Ireland in line with the rest of the UK but angered Loyalists who viewed such a move as an attack on their British identity. </p>
<p>A few years later, in 2015, a stand-off between the Loyalist Orange Order and members of the Nationalist Ardoyne community in North Belfast over disputed “historical” parading routes in the city, also led to the erection of a permanent protest camp, which was only recently dismantled. This move cost the police in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/09/cost-of-securing-belfast-protest-camp-to-exceed-21m-says-police-chief-george-hamilton">excess of £21m</a>. </p>
<p>At a time when cool heads are needed to navigate uncertain waters, the paucity of leaders attuned to the power of symbolism in the north is more evident than ever. Few currently in positions of power were <a href="https://theconversation.com/martin-mcguinness-and-the-power-of-political-symbolism-74947">as adept</a> as the late Martin McGuinness, the Sinn Féin politician and former deputy first minister of Northern Ireland, in stage managing the power of symbolism and reaching beyond the tribal divide.</p>
<h2>Beyond the Brexit economics</h2>
<p>So when it comes to Brexit, in the already polarised political climate of the north, there is more than just economic prosperity to consider. Practically speaking, in accepting that the <a href="http://www.assemblyresearchmatters.org/2017/06/14/goods-northern-ireland-export-much-worth-go/">majority of exports</a> from Northern Ireland are to the Republic of Ireland, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has already indicated its preference to avoid a “hard border”. </p>
<p>However, as the UK prime minister Theresa May found out to her dismay, the potential location of any customs checks, be they on the main Newry-to-Dublin dual carriageway or <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-post-brexit-border-in-the-irish-sea-was-never-really-on-the-table-but-a-political-solution-must-be-81767">in the Irish sea</a>, is highly significant. Despite guaranteeing the DUP a bumper financial package in return for support at Westminster, <a href="https://theconversation.com/never-mind-the-dup-theresa-may-needs-ireland-on-side-to-survive-this-shambles-88650">May proved</a> either oblivious or naive to the symbolically resonant issue of the border between the north and south of Ireland during the latest series of Brexit negotiations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197838/original/file-20171205-22996-qxi8uo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197838/original/file-20171205-22996-qxi8uo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197838/original/file-20171205-22996-qxi8uo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197838/original/file-20171205-22996-qxi8uo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197838/original/file-20171205-22996-qxi8uo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197838/original/file-20171205-22996-qxi8uo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/197838/original/file-20171205-22996-qxi8uo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=617&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">DUP: strongly against a different deal for Northern Ireland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Young/PA Wire</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Everyday issues will generate the greatest concern to the average citizen in the north. These include ease of movement across the border and access to Ireland as a longstanding trading partner. Yet, the very symbolism of a border on the island and how this is in turn sold across the community divide, is an issue that requires sensitive consideration. </p>
<p>While the creation of a hard border carries very serious economic and practical implications, the reemergence of any physical signs of division on the island could carry hugely problematic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/28/more-security-on-irish-border-could-mean-civil-disobedience-sinn-fein-says">symbolic importance</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the 20-year anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement approaching in 2018, identity politics in Northern Ireland continue to be as sharp as ever. Those negotiating Brexit and its impact on the island of Ireland have the unenviable task of appearing sensitive to the frustratingly intangible, destructive power of symbolism in Northern Ireland’s post-conflict era.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88609/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brendan Ciarán Browne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Brexit negotiations have revealed a clear lack of appreciation for the power of symbolism in Northern Irish politics.Brendan Ciarán Browne, Assistant Professor & Course Coordinator MPhil Conflict Resolution, Trinity College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/827092017-08-18T13:21:03Z2017-08-18T13:21:03ZSame-sex couples in Northern Ireland hamstrung in bid for marriage equality by Stormont stalemate<p>In another setback for marriage equality in Northern Ireland, two challenges to the country’s ban on same-sex marriage <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-40954619">were dismissed</a> by the High Court in Belfast on August 17. The ruling involved two separate cases brought by couples who argued that their human rights were being breached because there is no law allowing for same-sex marriage, or the recognition of same-sex marriages in Northern Ireland. It is the only jurisdiction in the UK which does not allow same-sex marriage. </p>
<p>The first case involved two men who were married in London in 2014 and who had moved to Northern Ireland and were attempting to have their marriage legally recognised there. Under the current law, their marriage is treated as a civil partnership. The second case involved the two couples in civil partnerships – the first two couples to enter into civil partnerships when Northern Ireland became the first UK jurisdiction to introduce these in 2005 – who argued that the marriage ban breaches their right to private and family life. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-GB/Judicial%20Decisions/SummaryJudgments/Documents/Summary%20of%20Judgment%20%E2%80%93%20Judge%20Dismisses%20Same%20Sex%20Marriage%20Petition/2017.08.17%20Press%20Summary.pdf">his judgment</a>, Justice O’Hara dismissed the applicants’ legal challenges concluding that international human rights law had not been violated and that the laws on marriage are a matter of social policy and therefore the responsibility of the executive and legislature. He stated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is not at all difficult to understand how gay men and lesbians who have suffered discrimination, rejection and exclusion feel so strongly about the maintenance in Northern Ireland of the barrier to same-sex marriage. However, the judgment which I have to reach is not based on social policy but on the law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>How social policy can currently be implemented in Northern Ireland, however, is a moot question. </p>
<h2>Stalemate in power-sharing</h2>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-northern-irelands-government-went-from-mutual-suspicion-to-collapse-71418">collapse</a> of the power-sharing assembly in January 2017 following a financial scandal, there has not been a functioning executive or legislature for eight months. Power-sharing between nationalist and unionist parties, including a joint office of first minister and deputy first minister, are a requirement of the institutional arrangements established following the Northern Ireland peace process. However, the largest unionist party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the largest nationalist party, Sinn Féin, remain at loggerheads. The issue of marriage equality remains one of the key points of contention.</p>
<p>Sinn Féin has <a href="http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2017/03/27/sinn-fein-makes-equal-marriage-a-key-issue-in-northern-ireland-power-sharing-talks/">argued</a> that progress on equal marriage is one of its key prerequisites for entering back into government, while the DUP has a <a href="http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2016/04/06/northern-irelands-dup-pledges-to-keep-blocking-same-sex-marriage/">long history</a> of opposing any such move. A previous attempt to legislate for same-sex marriage in 2015 won the backing of the majority of members of the Northern Ireland Assembly in Stormont, but <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-a-majority-vote-for-marriage-equality-in-northern-ireland-was-blocked-by-minority-veto-50130">was blocked</a> by the DUP who used a mechanism known as a “petition of concern”. </p>
<p>The triggering of a petition of concern – which requires the signature of 30 members of the assembly – means that any proposed legislation will only pass if supported by a majority of both unionists and nationalists. This mechanism was originally intended as a protective measure to stop any one community overriding the views of another on the basis of a straightforward parliamentary majority. There has been <a href="http://qpol.qub.ac.uk/the-problem-with-petitions-of-concern/">criticism</a> of the use of petitions of concern by both unionists and nationalists to veto legislation on the basis of party political interests such as same-sex marriage and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-32894371">welfare reform</a>. </p>
<h2>Public wants equality</h2>
<p>The legislature is out of touch with public opinion on this issue. <a href="http://www.ark.ac.uk/publications/updates/update106.pdf">Recent survey data</a> that I and colleagues have analysed shows that almost 60% of 1,210 respondents support the legal validation of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland. LGBT equality remains a touchstone issue in Northern Ireland and has gained increased political attention across the UK in light of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/conservatives-strike-deal-with-the-dup-experts-react-80101">confidence and supply political arrangement</a> between the DUP and the Conservative Party following the June 2017 general election. </p>
<p>Many commentators, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/10/tory-dup-deal-ruth-davidson-receives-assurances-from-pm-over-gay-rights">Ruth Davidson</a>, the leader of the Scottish Conservative Party, have been critical of the DUP position and have advocated for the extension of marriage equality legislation to Northern Ireland. </p>
<p>The clock is ticking for the re-establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly, a situation that must be resolved by the end of the summer. Failure to establish a government may lead to a return to direct rule by the UK government. This would mean the return of functions and powers of the Stormont assembly to Westminster, a move which would be highly controversial. Either way, pending the outcome of the political resolution, it is clear that the issue of marriage equality will have to be decided in either Stormont – or Westminster. </p>
<p>Either way, pending the outcome of the political resolution, it is clear that the issue of marriage equality will have to be decided in either Stormont or Westminster. While resolution of marriage equality under direct rule may be unlikely, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40462749">it remains a possibility</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/82709/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicola Carr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A judge in Belfast has dismissed a challenge to Northern Ireland’s ban on same-sex marriage citing it as a ‘social policy’ issue.Nicola Carr, Associate Professor in Criminology, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/792852017-06-14T08:11:43Z2017-06-14T08:11:43ZDebate over Irish language is central to power-sharing talks in Northern Ireland<p>Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) now <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-tory-dup-deal-could-bring-even-stormier-waters-to-northern-ireland-79235">finds itself kingmaker</a> at Westminster after Theresa May’s election gamble backfired. Back home in Belfast, talks are due to restart at Stormont to find a way through Northern Ireland’s political impasse caused by a <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/northern-ireland-power-sharing-latest-collapse-end-sinn-fein-refuse-stormont-dup-martin-mcguinness-a7529111.html">breakdown</a> in the devolved power-sharing government and <a href="https://theconversation.com/sinn-fein-gains-and-the-prospect-of-direct-rule-the-northern-ireland-election-fallout-explained-74035">subsequent election</a>. The deadline for an agreement is June 29. </p>
<p>One of the central sticking points of the talks is the Irish language – also known as Irish Gaelic – and whether there is a need for an Irish Language Act for Northern Ireland. In late May, <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/thousands-join-irish-language-act-march-in-belfast-may-2017-photos-35738356.html">thousands</a> marched in Belfast in support of an Irish Language Act. The issue, bound up with divisions in society over national identity, has divided political parties which draw their support from the nationalist and unionist communities. The two unionist parties, the DUP and the Ulster Unionist Party, have been reluctant to support an Act whereas the nationalist parties, Sinn Féin and the Social Democratic and Labour Party, have traditionally been in favour of legislation.</p>
<p>The decision to speak Irish in Northern Ireland <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/37952171">has been interpreted</a> as a cultural weapon used by nationalists to exacerbate sectarian division. It is also seen by <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p04t041k">some</a> as a pointless minority language: they think that speaking Irish is a hobby which may be pursued by individuals but which should place no undue compunction on the state.</p>
<p>For those who hold this view, the state provides ample support by means of its financial contribution to <a href="http://www.forasnagaeilge.ie/about/about-foras-na-gaeilge/?lang=en">Foras na Gaeilge</a>, the all-island body for the promotion of Irish, and through its commitment to the facilitation of <a href="http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/acts/1998-ni-education-order.pdf">Irish-medium education</a>. </p>
<p>But among those who speak Irish (approximately 185,000 people according to the <a href="https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ninis2.nisra.gov.uk%2FDownload%2FCensus%25202011_Excel%2F2011%2FQS216NI.xls">2011 census</a>) the lack of adequate support for the language’s preservation and transmission to new generations is seen as political. They believe that the language has been neglected by the Northern Ireland state and that this has been fed by a perception that the language is subversive and “belongs” only to nationalists.</p>
<h2>A shared history</h2>
<p>Taking a broader historical perspective, the facts are much more complicated. The connection between the Irish language and politics precedes the foundation of Northern Ireland in 1921. It has been spoken within both the Protestant and Catholic communities since the Plantation of Ulster in 1609, and the revival of the language in the 19th century is indebted to both Protestants and Catholics. </p>
<p>Elements of Irish-language culture (particularly <a href="http://www.placenamesni.org/">local place-names</a>) are cherished equally across the whole community in Northern Ireland, irrespective of religious and political differences, and constitute part of a shared heritage. This has been evident in a renewed interest in the language among members of the <a href="http://www.ebm.org.uk/turas/">Protestant community in Belfast</a>, in particular.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/148">European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages</a>, ratified by the UK in 2001, recognises “the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity”.</p>
<p>The British government, in the 2006 <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/53/introduction">St Andrews Agreement</a>, promised to introduce an Irish Language Act in Northern Ireland – yet the legislation which followed in 2007 that gave legal effect to the agreement made no mention of such an act. Language legislation was devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly at that point.</p>
<p>Provision was then made in the St Andrews Act for an amendment to the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/section/1">Northern Ireland Act 1998</a>, obliging the executive committee of the Northern Irish Assembly to “adopt a strategy setting out how it proposes to enhance and protect the development of the Irish language”. Since then, cross-party support which is required for an Irish Language Act has not been forthcoming, nor has the executive agreed a strategy. </p>
<p>The devolved Department for Communities has produced <a href="https://www.communities-ni.gov.uk/topics/languages">strategies</a> to “enhance and protect the development of the Irish Language”, and Ulster-Scots (a distinct language closely related to Scots and introduced into Ulster in the aftermath of the Plantation). But the minister in charge of the department is empowered to continue or discontinue elements of support in line with his or her political priorities. In late 2016, the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38594609">decision</a> by the communities minister, Paul Givan, of the DUP, to withdraw funding from the Líofa programme for learners of Irish, led to public outcry and contributed to the current political crisis in Stormont. The minister subsequently reviewed his decision and reinstated the funding. </p>
<p>In March 2017, a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-39157612">judicial review</a> by the High Court found the Northern Ireland Executive had failed to adopt a strategy for Irish. </p>
<h2>The case for an Act</h2>
<p>Legal protection of a language helps to remove it from the domain of confrontational party politics. The introduction of an Irish Language Act would mean that Northern Ireland would no longer be in breach of national and international agreements regarding language rights and the personal preferences of individual ministers would no longer dictate the level of support the language receives. An agreed legal framework for Irish would also mean that those who do not wish to engage with the language would be protected, irrespective of fluctuations in political governance and electoral politics. Irish could not be enforced in education or any other sphere to the point where it becomes an issue of compulsion or obligation on the citizen. </p>
<p>An Irish Language Act would also be key to enabling the transmission of Irish to younger generations by providing for the use of the language in as many domains as possible in public life, for example in dealings with public bodies and local government. </p>
<p>While there is a demand for an Irish Language Act, this demand should be met with an Act that endeavours to depoliticise the language and to garner the greatest possible agreement from across the community. An Act will function best in a context of consensus: good will and generosity must exist in order for it to achieve its goals.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79285/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deirdre A. Dunlevy is a research fellow on the Arts and Humanities Research Council funded project Multilingualism: Empowering Individuals, Transforming Societies (<a href="http://www.meits.org">www.meits.org</a>)</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Micheal O Mainnin receives funding from the AHRC as co-investigator on the Open World Research Initiative project 'Multilingualism: Empowering Individuals, Transforming Societies' (<a href="http://www.meits.org">www.meits.org</a>). </span></em></p>The issue of an Irish Language Act has been a sticking point at Stormont.Deirdre A Dunlevy, Research Fellow in Sociolinguistics, Queen's University BelfastMicheal O Mainnin, Chair professor, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/743212017-04-07T09:14:51Z2017-04-07T09:14:51ZHow Northern Ireland is battling the persistent threat of violence<p>In March 2017 the people of Northern Ireland returned to the polls for the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/ni2017/results">second Assembly election</a> in ten months. The 65% <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/ni2017/results">voter turnout</a>, a rise of 10% on the previous year, was the largest in a referendum or election since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. And for the first time in their history, the Northern Irish electorate decided that Unionist parties would not hold an overall majority of seats in Stormont. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is once again the largest overall party. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng-interactive/2017/mar/03/northern-ireland-assembly-election-latest-results">But they now only have one more seat than Sinn Féin</a>.</p>
<p>Northern Ireland’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/jan/28/northernireland1">political history</a> may be <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2016.1155927">violent and bloody</a>, but it was not the gun which determined this particular result. A <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-38382626">political scandal</a> relating to renewable energy brought down the last Assembly and the DUP was never able to escape its spectre during the campaign. The election was triggered by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/09/martin-mcguinness-to-resign-as-northern-ireland-deputy-first-minister">resignation</a> of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/martin-mcguinness-the-ira-commander-who-walked-down-a-political-path-74820">late Martin McGuinness</a> as deputy first minister. His resignation was a protest at the handling of the Renewable Heat Incentive by the DUP and the failure of the first minister, Arlene Foster, to resign. </p>
<p>The former Provisional IRA leader’s resignation was presented for political reasons. Yet, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/19/sinn-feins-martin-mcguinness-quits-frontline-politics-recover/">because of ill health</a>, it was his last act on the political stage. His departure, before his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/21/martin-mcguinness-northern-ireland-former-deputy-first-minister-dies">death at the age of 66</a>, was the most recent step in Sinn Féin’s gradual move away from its violent past</p>
<p>His replacement, Michelle O’Neill, is the first Sinn Féin leader with no history of direct paramilitary involvement. Even though she has significant <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/23/michelle-oneill-northern-ireland-new-sinn-fein-leader-republican-change-stormont-mcguinness">familial connections</a> with the IRA, she is widely seen as an energetic and effective politician who has embraced the political chance provided by peace. In the weeks that have passed since the election, the significant challenges facing politicians in this devolved power-sharing assembly have become a stark reality. An agreement to form a government is yet to be reached.</p>
<p>But while Sinn Féin and the wider republican and nationalist electorate have taken a further step towards political “normality”, there are those still hanging onto the violence of the past. In the weeks leading up to the election there were <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/dissident-bomb-attack-on-derry-police-officer-leaves-family-traumatised-35474525.html">near constant reminders</a> of those who still wish for Northern Ireland’s return to the dark days of the Troubles.</p>
<p>On January 13, a husband and wife from west Belfast, both in their 50s, were each <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jan/13/belfast-couple-shot-in-legs-while-protecting-son-paramilitaries">shot in the legs</a>. They were believed to be protecting their teenage son from the clutches of the paramilitaries.</p>
<p>On January 22, a Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) officer was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jan/22/belfast-police-officer-injured-in-terrorist-shooting">shot twice in the arm</a> at a petrol station in north Belfast. While he was only injured, it is believed that the intention was to kill.</p>
<p>On February 15 and 16 two teenagers were <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/utv/2017-02-17/psni-describe-shooting-of-teenage-boy-as-child-abuse/">shot in the legs</a> in separate punishment style attacks in west Belfast.</p>
<p>And on February 22 a pipe bomb, targeting a PSNI officer and his family was <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/derry-bomb-culmore-device-at-police-officers-home-more-intricate-than-a-basic-pipe-bomb-35472857.html">placed under their car</a> in Derry. No one was killed or injured, but the bomb exploded once the army robot touched it.</p>
<p>Even after the election, on the day of Martin McGuinness’s death the New IRA <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-39350435">attempted to kill</a> a police officer in Strabane. Again, no one was killed. But the intent was clear.</p>
<p>Each of these attacks was believed to have been perpetrated by <a href="http://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/the-origins-and-rise-of-dissident-irish-republicanism-9781623560096/">violent dissident republican (VDR) groups</a>. In all probability, either the New IRA or another dissident group known as Oglaigh na hEireann was responsible. This list represents only a fraction of the violence they have been linked with.</p>
<p>These small groups, with little support, reject the hard-fought peace of the Belfast and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/oct/17/northernireland.devolution1">St Andrews Agreements</a>. <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2016.1155941">They reject the legitimacy</a> of Sinn Féin to represent the republican population of Northern Ireland. In their eyes, by taking their seats and ministerial positions in the Stormont Assembly, and showing their support for the PSNI, Sinn Féin members are now “servants” of the British crown.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2016.1155940">Their violence is two-tiered</a>. Localised violent vigilantism, exemplified by punishment beatings and shootings, is designed to win and maintain control and support within republican communities. They depict themselves as protecting the people from drug dealers and petty criminals. Through their actions and statements they say that they are doing the job that the PSNI cannot, will not and should not do. They say that they are protecting the very communities that they portray Sinn Féin as having abandoned. </p>
<p>In parallel, their nationalised terrorist violence targets the political and security auspices of the state. Through their attacks on the police, prison officers and security services, they aim to highlight the continued “occupation” of Northern Ireland by the British “oppressor” and disrupt the normalisation of Northern Irish political life. In their eyes the PSNI is a repressive and unrepresentative British police force operating in Ireland – the frontline forces of their “enemy”. </p>
<h2>Persisting with peace</h2>
<p>The PSNI, in collaboration with colleagues in An Garda Siochana (the police force of the Republic of Ireland), have been responsible for the deterrence and <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/garda-psni-co-operation-has-saved-lives-minister-says-1.2809303">prevention of countless attacks</a>. Yet the threat remains. </p>
<p>The campaign of violence is nowhere near the level witnessed during the Troubles. And there is no indication that they have either the capability or intent to match it. However, just because the violence will not reach the levels of the past does not mean that it should be accepted or ignored.</p>
<p>These paramilitaries claim to be the true representatives of the republican people of Ireland, both north and south of the border. But this claim of legitimacy is frequently and loudly rejected by the very people they claim to represent. On March 2 2017 this was rejected in the most powerful way of all, at the ballot box.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74321/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Morrison has received funding from the Minerva Research Initiative.</span></em></p>Violent dissident republicanism is still making its presence felt.John Morrison, Director of Terrorism and Extremism Research Centre, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/714182017-01-17T13:46:45Z2017-01-17T13:46:45ZHow Northern Ireland’s government went from mutual suspicion to collapse<blockquote>
<p>As doctors say of a wasting disease, to start with it is easy to cure but difficult to diagnose; after a time, unless it has been diagnosed and treated at the outset, it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to cure. So it is in politics.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This quote in some ways explains the collapse of the Northern Ireland government. But it comes not from the lips of the former deputy first minister, Martin McGuinness, whose <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38561507">resignation</a> has effectively <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38644157">forced a forthcoming election</a> in March, but from Niccoló Machiavelli’s advice in The Prince, written in 1513. It gets to the heart of why the Northern Ireland Executive has collapsed barely eight months after the last election, which pitched Sinn Féin and the DUP into a two-party coalition government for the first time ever.</p>
<p>The relationship between the DUP and Sinn Féin had been souring for several years before this debacle, but it wasn’t always so. The former DUP leader and first minister, Ian Paisley, formed the unlikeliest of relationships with McGuinness when the two governed together. They got on so well that they were affectionately known as the <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/filming-to-begin-on-ian-paisley-and-martin-mcguinness-chuckle-brothers-comedy-drama-the-journey-31567404.html">Chuckle Brothers</a>. While working together, the two agreed to disagree about Northern Ireland’s final destination as part of the UK or a reunited Irish state.</p>
<h2>Declining relations</h2>
<p>A more humourless dynamic arrived when Peter Robinson succeeded Paisley in 2008. The relationship between the two parties began to unwind. This was partly because the DUP benefited electorally from a frosty public relationship with Sinn Féin. An assertive brand of unionism helped prevent votes from leaking to the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the DUP’s main unionist rival party.</p>
<p>Political space narrowed further when identity politics began to reassert itself over the disputed flags in December 2012. Unionists complained about Belfast City Council’s decision to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20651163">only fly the Union flag on designated days</a> (in line with the rest of Great Britain) rather than every day, as had been done before.</p>
<p>Agreements between the DUP and Sinn Féin began to disintegrate. The planned regeneration of the former Maze prison was, for example, abandoned: under pressure from unionist hardliners, the DUP decided the project risked turning the site into a “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22279360">shrine to terrorism</a>”.</p>
<p>From 2007 until the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/results">last assembly election</a> in May 2016, the relationship between the DUP and Sinn Féin has been mediated by the fact that they were the two dominant partners in a five-party coalition. Smaller partners the UUP and SDLP declined to take their seats in government and instead went into formal opposition. This left the DUP and Sinn Féin joined cantankerously at the hip in government.</p>
<h2>Referendum rancour</h2>
<p>Then came <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/eu-referendum-2016">Brexit</a>. The result of the June referendum provided a structural basis for the DUP and Sinn Féin to rationalise their adversarial behaviour. A programme for government, hammered out at great pains just a month previously, was significantly derailed by the fact that the DUP and Sinn Féin adopted opposing positions on Brexit.</p>
<p>The subsequent months have calcified their positions – and this looks likely to become more entrenched after Article 50 is triggered in March 2017. Disagreement over leaving the EU, and a post-Brexit deal, have re-energised an aspect of the NI conflict that many had hoped had been anaesthetised by the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement">Good Friday Agreement</a> in 1998.</p>
<p>Since then, the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland has become more of a porous membrane. Now the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/09/britain-to-push-post-brexit-uk-immigration-controls-back-to-irish-border">land border</a> may need to be more formally demarcated and policed, since one side will remain in the EU and the other will be leaving. </p>
<p>Leaving aside the economic impacts, a hard Brexit threatens to emphasise the Britishness and Irishness of the two jurisdictions, shining a harsh unforgiving light on the “constitutional question”.</p>
<h2>A rough campaign</h2>
<p>Following the collapse of the government, an election has been scheduled for March 2. And the campaign looks set to be nasty. Rather than defending their records in government, the DUP and Sinn Féin will call each other out.</p>
<p>Sinn Féin will focus on First Minister Arlene Foster’s personal responsibility for the <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/q-a-what-is-the-northern-ireland-cash-for-ash-scheme-1.2907866">Renewable Heating Initiative</a> scandal that cost taxpayers £490m. The party will also suggest that wider policy decisions, not least the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-38422550">withdrawal of public money</a> for the Irish language classes in the run up to Christmas, demonstrated the anti-nationalist mentality of the DUP. More broadly, the DUP will be accused of arrogance and contempt for the supposed partnership with Sinn Féin.</p>
<p>For its part, the DUP will criticise Sinn Féin for prompting the collapse of the government in the first place by deciding not to replace McGuinness after his resignation. It will say Sinn Féin is putting everyone through a needless election as a result, disguising narrow party interests as political principle.</p>
<p>An election suits Sinn Féin more than the DUP. Foster’s personal credibility has been badly damaged by the funding scandal and the DUP may suffer some electoral losses to the UUP. Sinn Féin also looks set to take votes from the SDLP as a result of changes to the electoral system. In the assembly election on March 2, the number of seats will be reduced from 108 to 90, meaning that smaller parties such as the SDLP are likely to be squeezed further in a system that benefits the larger parties. </p>
<p>But whatever happens in the election, it is almost certain that the DUP and Sinn Féin will remain the two largest parties. After they finish negotiating following the election (which may take weeks, months or years) they will have to face each other once again in government. And all of the issues that have torn them apart will have become more difficult to resolve in the meantime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71418/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Feargal Cochrane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What was already an uneasy alliance first turned sour, and then utterly disintegrated. Where did it all go wrong?Feargal Cochrane, Professor of International Conflict Analysis, School of Politics and International Relations, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/588292016-05-04T14:47:06Z2016-05-04T14:47:06ZGender balance is back on the agenda but can women get elected in 2016?<p>UK voters are heading to the polls to vote in an unprecedented number of elections outside a general election year. Chief among these are the devolved elections in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London. And since the establishment of these regional bodies between 1998 and 2000, gender equality has been <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/women-representation-westminster-stirbu/">a key theme</a>.</p>
<p>The road towards a gender balanced House of Commons has been a long and slow one, but devolved parliaments were an opportunity for a fresh start for female representation in British politics. The <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP12-43.pdf">first London Assembly in 2000 comprised 48% women</a>, and in 2003 the Welsh Assembly became the first national elected body in the world to achieve <a href="http://www.clickonwales.org/2016/03/how-feminist-is-the-welsh-assembly/">gender parity among its members</a>. The Scottish Parliament also saw close to 40% women in Holyrood in 2003. </p>
<p>These early successes proved to be a high water mark, however, and since 2003 the number of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/mar/15/women-in-scottish-welsh-parliaments">women elected to the devolved bodies has either stalled or fallen</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121347/original/image-20160505-19858-zf6ljf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121347/original/image-20160505-19858-zf6ljf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121347/original/image-20160505-19858-zf6ljf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121347/original/image-20160505-19858-zf6ljf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=301&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121347/original/image-20160505-19858-zf6ljf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121347/original/image-20160505-19858-zf6ljf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121347/original/image-20160505-19858-zf6ljf.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fig.1: Proportion of female representatives over time.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl Cullinane</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, in 2016, as revealed by our research for the <a href="http://democraticdashboard.com/">LSE’s Democratic Dashboard</a>, the proportion of female candidates standing for election <a href="http://www.democraticaudit.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Gender-and-the-2016-Elections-Data-Briefing.pdf">has risen substantially</a> in all four jurisdictions, ranging from four percentage points in Wales to more than ten percentage points in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In the case of Wales and London, increases largely compensate for past falls, however the proportion of female candidates have reached all time highs in the Scottish Parliament and Northern Ireland Assembly elections.</p>
<p>In Northern Ireland, the number of women running has in fact doubled from 38 to 76 since 2011. This jump is particularly significant, as the proportion of female candidates running for Stormont has been both historically low in comparison to other elected bodies in the UK, and also stagnant, hovering between 17 and 19%. And the Northern Ireland Assembly <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/northern-ireland-assembly-urged-to-end-gender-imbalance-31053610.html">has been described</a> as “one of the most unequal legislatures in Western Europe”. </p>
<p>This year’s increase to over 27% marks a significant juncture for female political participation in the province. Research has identified the increasing <a href="http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/knowledge_exchange/briefing_papers/series5/matthews-briefing.pdf">centralisation of the candidate selection process</a> as a source of progress, as the previous dominance of the grassroots in candidate selection had traditionally disadvantaged women. While Sinn Féin remains the only party to employ formal gender balance mechanisms, more women are running in 2016 in parties across the political spectrum.</p>
<p>Likewise, Scotland has seen significant progress in terms of female candidate selection, with several major parties, most notably Labour and the SNP, employing all women shortlists, along with “zipping” tactics – where men and women are alternated on party lists – to balance the regional lists. Placement in party list is a crucial issue, and <a href="https://genderpoliticsatedinburgh.wordpress.com/gender-and-candidate-selection-2016/">Labour and the SNP have achieved balance</a> (or very close to it) in their top three candidates in each region.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121348/original/image-20160505-19851-1p3xlx4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121348/original/image-20160505-19851-1p3xlx4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121348/original/image-20160505-19851-1p3xlx4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121348/original/image-20160505-19851-1p3xlx4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=321&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121348/original/image-20160505-19851-1p3xlx4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121348/original/image-20160505-19851-1p3xlx4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121348/original/image-20160505-19851-1p3xlx4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fig. 2: Proportion of female candidates, 2011-2016 (London Assembly 2012-2016)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl Cullinane</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Translating into gains</h2>
<p>However, indications are that the increase in female candidates may not translate into equivalent increases in women elected. In London and Wales the number of women elected is likely to be either stagnant, or increase by a very small amount. In Wales, the Electoral Reform Society Cymru recently published an in-depth exploration of the picture for the Welsh Assembly, and found that while all women shortlists and zipping are used – in particular by the Labour Party – women are significantly more likely than men <a href="http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/publication/Women-in-the-National-Assembly-of-Wales.pdf">to be defending “marginal” seats</a>. Of the 11 battleground constituencies, ten are being defended by women.</p>
<p>This picture is to an extent repeated elsewhere. There are two main mechanisms where more female candidates may not translate into more seats. One is intra-party competition, where women are selected to contest seats, or are allocated list positions, that are less likely to result in victory. </p>
<p>The second is inter-party variation in the proportion of women selected. There are drastic differences in gender balance between parties, with Labour, the SNP, the Greens and the Lib Dems achieving significant advances towards parity in the jurisdictions where they field candidates, while the Conservatives, UKIP and the DUP lag substantially behind, due to a lack of willingness to adopt the often internally unpopular all women shortlists and other such policies. Much of the increase in female candidates in 2016 is being driven by smaller parties less likely to win seats, in particular the Greens, the Women’s Equality party, along with RISE and Solidarity in Scotland.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121349/original/image-20160505-19877-1cr94je.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121349/original/image-20160505-19877-1cr94je.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121349/original/image-20160505-19877-1cr94je.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121349/original/image-20160505-19877-1cr94je.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=362&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121349/original/image-20160505-19877-1cr94je.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121349/original/image-20160505-19877-1cr94je.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121349/original/image-20160505-19877-1cr94je.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=456&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fig. 3: Gender balance between parties in 2016 Scottish Parliamentary Election.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Carl Cullinane</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nonetheless, it is clear that gender balance is back on the agenda in these devolved elections. Northern Ireland stands on the cusp of change for female representation in Stormont, while Scotland could well bear out the <a href="http://www.democraticauditscotland.com/has-the-tide-turned-for-womens-representation-in-scotland/">prediction that the tide has turned for women</a> in politics there, led by women at the forefront of party leadership in Holyrood. Though the mixed electoral systems across the devolved nations make it very hard to predict, the prospects for women in Wales and London will likely to come down to fine margins. Regardless, this year is likely to see a step forward, even if a modest one, and, as the years since 2003 have shown, this isn’t something to take for granted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58829/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Carl Cullinane receives funding from LSE HEIF5 Innovation Fund, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, and Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust. This article does not reflect the views of the research councils or other public funders.</span></em></p>More candidates mean a change in politics, but it’s not as easy as creating policies such as all women shortlists.Carl Cullinane, Research Manager for Democratic Audit, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/501302015-11-05T11:12:42Z2015-11-05T11:12:42ZHow a majority vote for marriage equality in Northern Ireland was blocked by minority veto<p>Less than a week after civil marriage equality was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34675346">signed into law</a> in the Republic of Ireland, the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/02/northern-ireland-assembly-votes-to-legalise-same-sex-marriage">also voted in favour</a> – only to see the proposal vetoed by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).</p>
<p>The republic voted for equal civil marriage in a referendum in May, but north of the border – despite broad community support – the DUP was able to use a “petition of concern” to deny the will of the assembly.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf">parliamentary mechanism</a> was introduced under the Good Friday Agreement to ensure the rights of minorities in Northern Ireland. Amnesty International commented that it was ironic that a mechanism to ensure the rights of minorities had been used to deny a fundamental right to the LGBT minority in Northern Ireland.</p>
<h2>Crossing the line</h2>
<p>Since the first proposal to introduce equal civil marriage to the Northern Ireland statute books in 2012, the annual motion has been making a <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-irelands-same-sex-marriage-campaign-gets-a-boost-from-south-of-the-border-43438">relatively steady climb</a> towards a majority in favour. On November 2 the Northern Ireland Assembly reached that majority with <a href="http://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/plenary/details.aspx?tb=0&tbv=0&tbt=All%20Members&pt=0&ptv=0&ptt=All%20Items&mc=0&mcv=0&mct=All%20Categories&mt=0&mtv=0&mtt=All%20Types&sp=2&spv=18&spt=2015-2016&ss=marriage%20equality&tm=2&per=1&fd=&td=&tit=1&txt=1&pm=0&it=1&pid=1&sid=p&doc=242152&pn=0&ba=0&sd=0&se=">50.48% – or 53 of 105 members</a> voting in favour – the largest to vote on the topic to date.</p>
<p>The voting patterns largely followed the party lines with the nationalist parties, Sinn Fein and the SDLP, driving the surge. But it was a combined effort with the majority of Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs) from the Alliance Party, independents, Green Party and a few isolated unionists that tipped it over the line.</p>
<p>This is a historic and long-overdue success that came <a href="https://theconversation.com/northern-irelands-same-sex-marriage-campaign-gets-a-boost-from-south-of-the-border-43438">sooner than anticipated</a>. It is also one that was stopped in its tracks by the staunchly anti-equal civil marriage DUP, the largest unionist party.</p>
<p>Under the Good Friday Agreement 1998 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf">arrangements were to be made</a> to “ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis”. Consequently, the petition of concern was introduced and which allows for 30 or more MLAs to veto a proposed motion. Once vetoed, for the proposed legislation to pass it must be supported by a weighted majority (that is 60% of the voting members), including at least 40% of the nationalists and unionists voting. </p>
<p>Taking advantage of the lack of a weighted majority and its hold over the unionist vote, the DUP made use of this mechanism. This means that equal civil marriage cannot and, under the current status quo, will not pass by political vote, despite the overall majority of MLAs and <a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/gay-marriage-now-has-overwhelming-support-in-northern-ireland-poll-31355428.html">68% of those they represent</a> being in favour.</p>
<p>The petition of concern is one of a number of safeguards to “ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully” and that “all sections of the community are protected” under the Good Friday Agreement.</p>
<h2>Need for reform</h2>
<p>The use of the petition of concern has in the past <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-23247074">been criticised</a> and allegations have been made that this mechanism is being used by larger parties (such as the DUP) to promote their own interests, at the expense of the majority’s – an argument that seems to be on the mark in this instance. </p>
<p>It <a href="http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/Documents/Reports/Assem_Exec_Review/10170.pdf">has also been claimed</a> that the mechanism has been misused to block decisions that have nothing to do with vital interests specific to the nationalist or unionist communities. This rings true on the issue of equal civil marriage, which has to do with equality on the basis of sexuality, not political leanings.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"661476571275001856"}"></div></p>
<p>In March 2014 the Northern Ireland Assembly <a href="http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/committees/assembly-and-executive-review/reviews/review-of-petitions-of-concern/">set up a review committee</a> to consider the petition of concern. Three reforms were tabled for consideration – to introduce an alternative procedure (such as a weighted majority vote); to restrict the use of petitions of concern to key areas; or to adjust the current threshold of 30 signatures. The conclusions reached by the committee <a href="http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/Documents/Reports/Assem_Exec_Review/10170.pdf">were inconclusive</a> and no reforms were made on the basis of a lack of consent. </p>
<p>One thing that was clear from the comments of the MLAs and academics that responded is that there is a lot of discontent about the increasing use of the petition of concern and the way in which this mechanism is used.</p>
<p>A further issue is politicians playing both sides against the middle and engaging in petty mudslinging in the process – Mike Nesbitt, the leader of the Ulster Unionists, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-politics-34692546">blamed the DUP for his abstention</a> is one example. In such a close vote as this, an abstention is as good as a no vote and leaves the petition of concern open to abuse.</p>
<p>In the current climate, equal civil marriage is unlikely to be introduced by politics alone. However, this historic vote is not wasted – it provides persuasive evidence for the judicial review that is currently before the Northern Ireland High Court on the issue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/50130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hannah Russell received funding from the Department of Employment and Learning to complete her PhD. </span></em></p>A vote in favour of marriage equality in Northern Ireland was stymied by a mechanism designed to protect minorities.Hannah Russell, PhD in Human Rights Law, Queen's University BelfastLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.