tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/syrian-war-24928/articlesSyrian war – The Conversation2023-09-04T14:06:53Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116272023-09-04T14:06:53Z2023-09-04T14:06:53Z‘My home city was destroyed by war but I will not lose hope’ – how modern warfare turns neighbourhoods into battlefields<p>It has been almost 12 years since I left my city. And I have never been able to return. Homs, the place I was born and grew up, has been destroyed and I, like many others, have been left in exile: left to remember how beautiful it once was. What can a person do when their home – that place within them that carries so much meaning – has effectively been murdered?</p>
<p>I have spent my academic career studying the impact of war on architecture and cities and researching acts of deliberate destruction of home, termed by scholars as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Domicide.html?id=6t_KSirfEnsC&redir_esc=y">domicide</a>. <em>Domus</em> is the Latin word for home and domicide refers to the deliberate destruction of home – the killing of it. I have investigated how architecture, both at the time of war and peace, has been weaponised; wilfully targeted, bombed, burnt and contested. It has led me to publishing my first book, <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/domicide-9781350248106/">Domicide: Architecture, War, and the Destruction of Home in Syria</a>.</p>
<p>From the burning of housing, land and property ownership documents, to the destruction of homes and cultural heritage sites, the brutal destruction in Homs, and other cities in Syria, has not only erased our material culture but also forcibly displaced millions.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/syria-situation#:%7E:text=Over%2012%20million%20Syrians%20remained,from%205.7%20million%20in%202021.">over 12 million people</a> have been displaced from their homes within Syria, and beyond in countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Germany and Egypt. This destruction has been “justified” by the Syrian government and its allies, who claim these ordinary neighbourhoods are in fact “battlefields” in what they call a “war on terror and on terrorists”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Aerial photo showing a city devastated by bombing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544590/original/file-20230824-17-ns1kk0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An aerial photo shows the devastation caused in Homs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/city-homs-syria-1057305518">Shutterstock/FlyandDive</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In March 2011, peaceful protests against the government <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35806229">began to grow</a>. The protests evolved into a violent insurgency when the government responded with force. Syrians were protesting over issues like oppression and a lack of political freedom.</p>
<p>Amid the brutal crackdown, there were soldiers from the Syrian army who switched sides and formed the breakaway Free Syrian Army to support the revolution. Throughout the years, more armed and rebel groups emerged. But powerful allies also came to the government aid, such as Russia and Iran. This has <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2023/07/13/syria-between-civil-and-proxy-war-the-question-of-terminology/">led the country into war</a>. To date, more than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-war-factbox-idUSKCN1GR2VT">half million</a> people have been killed.</p>
<p>The government destroyed and bombed rebel held areas as well as issuing new urban planning laws to carry out further devastation without the need for a military justification. The new planning <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/syria-new-property-law-punishes-the-displaced-and-could-obstruct-investigation-of-war-crimes/">decrees</a> led to the erasure of entire neighbourhoods which were largely populated by people who opposed the government. These sites were labelled as “illegal” or “built without permission”. These wanton acts of destruction were carried out to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2016.1158527">punish opponents of the government</a>.</p>
<h2>My home</h2>
<p>I sometimes wish there were cameras that could livestream the streets of Homs in Syria. I wonder, how is my city getting on? How are the people? Can I see their faces again, and can I, even through a camera, see every corner of the streets of Homs. </p>
<p>I search for every new video published on the city, looking at the new shops that opened, and the many that have remained in ruins. I look in these videos at the people. What is happening in their minds? Who have they lost? Is their home still intact? They have endured so much pain. I wonder how they are after 12 years of suffering that left over half of the neighbourhoods in ruins.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong><em>This article is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>It feels like a dream now when I see Homs. Even after being so privileged to visit so many cities around the world (from New York and Berlin, to Rome, Istanbul and Athens). Every city reminds me of the city of my birth.</p>
<p>When my well-meaning friends tell me to forget about Homs, forget about the past – “Syria is no longer for us”, I refuse to forget, even when the world seems to do exactly that. I don’t want to live in a landscape of forgetting.</p>
<p>Now, when walking the streets of my newly adopted home city of Oxford, Homs remains in my mind. I remember the day I left on November 17, 2011. The departure day was filled with tears to leave as tanks were positioned across different parts of the city and Homs was being divided and shelled. I feel a deep sense of grief for the people who have been killed since the start of the revolution - and for those who remain, for those who are forcibly displaced: for us. Grief was aching my heart for my friend who was killed while marching in a peaceful demonstration. His name was Taher Al Sebai. He was killed on October 16, 2011, a month before my departure from Homs to Manchester.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Homs City Centre before the war." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543461/original/file-20230818-15-8pdupj.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newly built clock tower in Homs city centre in 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Protests in Homs were spreading across neighbourhoods, with men, women and children calling for a new future inspired by the waves of protests sweeping countries as part of the wider movements of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2011.632900">Arab Spring</a>. “Death but not indignity”, people in Homs chanted, “One. One. One. The Syrian People Are One”, they called in the streets, and “Freedom Forever”. The protests were brutally attacked.</p>
<p>When protests were targeted and oppressed, people chanted from their own homes; from their balconies. I watched this from my own bedroom. I remember women in the neighbouring buildings breaking the silence of the dark nights; “where is everyone”, a woman cried to encourage our neighbours to start chanting.</p>
<p>This became a daily practice in the early days of the revolution when the streets became no-go zones because bullets were being shot randomly from cars to spread fear and prevent protest. There were times I sheltered in the corridors of my home with all the lights off, away from the windows, for fear of being hit by a stray bullet.</p>
<p>Despite the constant threat and fear of death, the people stood up. Walls of fear and silence were knocked down as thousands of Homsis gave the streets new purpose, turning them into sites of resistance and protest. 2011 will forever be engraved in my mind because it was a historical moment of discovery built on the hopes of everyday people who dared to imagine and construct a new way of life based on the simplest of things: freedom. Homs, often known for its jolly people and their sense of humour, took a new name, “The Capital of the Revolution”.</p>
<p>When a peaceful demonstration marched in my street on October 16, it was targeted. I remember the screams and the shouting in the street. Soon I was told that Taher was killed. A martyr, everyone wrote on social media. How did I, at the age of 23, come to have a martyr as a friend?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543464/original/file-20230818-17-yxmgtx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women protesting in Homs on October 31, 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Given to the author with a request of anonymity.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And not only Taher, two other young children were killed too. I knew Taher from the Department of Architecture, as we both studied there. I remember his smile; his face radiated with kindness, tranquillity and goodness. His name in Arabic means “pure” or “virtuous” and everyone who knew him described him like that.</p>
<p>Even when writing this piece on a rainy and cloudy summer day in Oxford, the images of Taher return as if it all was just yesterday. Can someone tell me how to live after death? Is there a life after destruction?</p>
<h2>From Ukraine to Syria: civilians as the frontline</h2>
<p>This is surely a question which occupies the minds of the many millions of ordinary people caught up in today’s wars - wars which have transformed streets, towns and neighbourhoods into battlefields.</p>
<p>On February 20, 2022, I contacted <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/c2e418d0zxqt">Lyse Doucet</a>, the BBC’s chief international correspondent to invite her to write the foreword to my book. She replied from the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. Throughout her career, Doucet has covered several conflicts around the world, including Afghanistan and Syria, by taking the audiences globally to the intimate stories and lives of those civilians who suffer the horrors of war.</p>
<p>At the time of her response, the emerging videos and photos from Ukraine, reminded me of the trauma that the Syrian people have suffered through. “All the images were trembling into our lives again”, Doucet wrote in her foreword, adding:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Moscow’s cruise missiles smashing into high-rise residential blocks, exposing wrecked homes within: tidy rooms turned topsy-turvy; crockery shattered; children’s torn toys strewn across the floor. Heartbreaking images of petite suburban bungalows with pocket gardens swallowed up by flames. Stomach-churning images of bodies sprawled out along the streets.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/MG8waU7Evpo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Cities have become the battlefields making the everyday urban life the site of contestation, division, siege and destruction. And we have all seen this destruction, which has been wiping out peoples’ intimate and cherished places causing a deep sense of grief and rupture. This is Domicide. As Doucet adds:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Wars of our time, sometimes fought in our name, are not in the trenches; they’re fought street-to-street, house to house, one home after another. Why does a hospital, a kindergarten, always seem to be hit in every outbreak or hostilities? After nearly four decades of reporting on conflict, I now often say: civilians are not close to the front lines; they are the frontline.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is what we have seen in Ukraine, and before that in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and many other countries. Civilians are the frontline. In my city, some people have been displaced multiple times within the last 12 years. </p>
<p>As a London-based citizen from Homs, who I interviewed in 2019 told me: “We left Homs in 2012. We lived in rural Damascus for a year and a half. During that time, we rented another house, we furnished it, and we wanted to start over, but then again, we had to leave, and we went back to Homs. It was bombed again. So I think my mother lost two houses. After that, she decided she does not want to furnish any house, she doesn’t want to buy any luxurious things because she was afraid it might be destroyed again.”</p>
<h2>Architecture at the time of war</h2>
<p>When I tell people that I am researching the impact of war on architecture and cities, they often get surprised, even some of those within the field of architecture. For some, architecture is about shiny buildings, luxurious design and skyscrapers.</p>
<p>But then I start explaining that architectural questions are central at the time of war. Questions like: How do we rebuild cities after war? What should we remember and what should we forget? Who decides the shape of the future of cities? How do you protect endangered heritage? And how can you engage with local communities in the process of reconstruction so that their voices are heard?</p>
<p>Once I unpack these questions, the people I meet start reflecting on these themes by telling me of an example they are aware of, such as the preservation of the remains of the Berlin Wall after its fall, or the reconstruction of Coventry after World War II, or Beirut after the civil war, or struggles to decide how to rebuild Mosul, or the destruction of peoples’ ways of living in Gaza.</p>
<p>Architecture is a fundamental part of the process of making and unmaking a home, an essential debate to be discussed and researched in our times as many cities remain in ruins around the world.</p>
<p>These questions and more have been <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/14696053221073992">researched</a> by architects and academics writing about their own cities and countries, either from within or from <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/05/15/syria-s-reconstruction-between-discriminatory-implementation-and-circumscribed-resistance-pub-81803">exile</a>. Bringing this personal attachment to the research is, in my opinion, fundamental when it comes to explaining the impact of destruction on people who cherish their own architecture and cultural heritage. As Doucet added:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In many realms, from journalism to academe to literature and art, there is now a deepening appreciation that whoever asks the questions and seeks the answers can have a decisive impact on how much, and what kind of knowledge we gain. A new generation of scholars, researchers and writers bring to their work a fluency in relevant languages and a more visceral understanding of their own cultures and societies, including its deepest pain and greatest joys. This is lived experience.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In Ukraine, Ievgeniia Gubkina wrote about the destruction and reconstruction of cities. In her book, <a href="https://dom-publishers.com/products/being-a-ukrainian-architect-during-wartime">Being a Ukrainian Architect During Wartime: Essays, Articles, Interviews, and Manifestos</a>, Gubkina included a letter titled Unseen Realities: Let History Be Told by the Victims.</p>
<p>In the letter, she emphasised the need to bring trauma to the surface, instead of hiding it. By doing so, Gubkina centralised the concept that architecture is not just about stones and buildings, it is about people and their pain and hopes. This is the reality that Gubkina lived at the time of war:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>My reality is thousands of missiles that have been fired at civil infrastructure and all-day shelling aimed at residential areas. My reality is thousands of people and hundreds of children that have been killed. My reality is millions of people that have been forced to leave their homes. My reality is my substantially destroyed home city of Kharkiv … My world, my reality, is being destroyed, bombed, exterminated, erased, exploded, demolished, deconstructed and killed.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Bombed out school viewed from the play ground." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544595/original/file-20230824-29-8l0xbg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Kharkiv school destroyed by Russian bombs in June 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/kharkiv-ukraine-1006-russianukraine-war-destroyed-2166429019">Shutterstock/MagicGeorge</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And through this new history, written by the victims, we are able to enter the worlds and the realities of others. Through these entries, we are able to create spaces of solidarity and understanding and construct narratives that are often kept hidden, silenced and unspoken. </p>
<p>Gubkina adds: “The pain that, when people see Saltivka, a residential district in Kharkiv, is felt not just in the rest of Ukraine but in Paris and London too and can bring tears to eyes from Palmyra to New York. This is the pain of loss, loss of what we all, regardless of nationality, social status, and place of residence, understand as life, way of living, and memory of lives. These are tears of shared despair at our inability to stop these lives being destroyed.”</p>
<p>In the case of Syria, there are several architects who lived there and are writing about cities and war, such as the work of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ve6pC8Vfm34">Nasser Rabbat</a>, <a href="https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/informal-settlements-in-syria-what-approach-after-the-conflict/">Sawsan Abou Zainedin, Hani Fakhani, Ahmad Sukkar,</a> and <a href="https://thamesandhudson.com/the-battle-for-home-the-memoir-of-a-syrian-architect-9780500292938">Marwa al-Sabouni</a>.</p>
<p>On Iraq, Sana Murrani, has researched questions of memory, belonging and refuge through interviews with Iraqis from different parts of the country, and through deep-mapping and storytelling methods. Murrani left Iraq in June 2003 shortly after the US-led invasion. She has never been able to return. Now two decades later, she has written a <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/Events/2023/04/20220403vATR/Ruptured-Domesticity">book</a> on her beloved country which will be published in 2024; Rupturing architecture: spatial practices of refuge in response to war and violence in Iraq.</p>
<p>I have been privileged to talk to some of these architects, including Abou Zainedin, Rabbat, Murrani and Gubkina. Today, as we live in a world of ruins, it is vital that we have conversations and exchange ideas, to support each other and learn – perhaps, to write a new history together.</p>
<h2>Deconstructing reconstruction</h2>
<p>As wars continue to destroy many cities around the world, reconstruction has become an important word of our times. From Syria to Ukraine, this word has been debated and discussed.</p>
<p>Syria was a fashionable conflict site, covered widely in the media and studied in academia – unlike other conflicts, such as Yemen and Libya. Conversations and debates about reconstruction have already been discussed both inside and outside the country. </p>
<p>Today, however, 12 years into the conflict, no reconstruction project has been implemented. In Homs, some partially damaged buildings have been rehabilitated but most of the heavily damaged buildings remain in ruins. The continuation of the war, the collapsed economy and the financial sanctions, have all contributed to a country in ruins.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/every-day-is-war-a-decade-of-slow-suffering-and-destruction-in-syria-154595">'Every day is war' – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It feels like the world moved on from Syria. All the eyes have now turned to a new conflict site: Ukraine. It has attracted significant attention in the media and academia. The <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/school-of-public-policy/The-ukraine-Reconstruction-Forum">reconstruction question</a> has become highly debated in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/ukraine-recovery-conference-2023">conferences</a> and architecture <a href="https://www.reconstruct.in.ua/">symposiums</a> both inside and outside of Ukraine.</p>
<p>One of these conversations that has fuelled big debates and discussions is “a <a href="https://unece.org/media/press/367310">vision for the Master Plan for the city of Kharkiv</a>”. <a href="https://unece.org/housing/un4kharkiv-rehabilitation#:%7E:text=1.,2.">The Master Plan</a>, according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), “is being developed under the leadership of and with substantial expert contribution from the Norman Foster Foundation on a pro bono basis”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2st3hQoZTx4">In his presentation at MIT</a> in January 2023, the British architect and designer, Sir Norman Foster, explained that thinking about reconstruction does not start after the end of the war, but at the time of war. He referenced the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/davehillblog/2014/mar/22/london-county-plan-abercrombie-forshaw">Greater London Plan of 1944</a> which was developed by Patrick Abercrombie.</p>
<p>But as he referenced the case of London, Foster did not note that the architect at the time was British, not Iraqi, Polish or Ukrainian. In other words, would the UK have let a foreign star architect lead its master plans for the destroyed cities of Coventry, Manchester and London? Would they hire someone who knows nothing about the history and culture of these cities?</p>
<p>If this seems like harsh criticism, it is not, as Foster himself admitted in the presentation that: “I knew nothing about the city other than I might find out from a Google search.”</p>
<p>Responses to Foster’s involvement have varied between those who say that star architects bring money and attention to those who fear that the voices of local architects will be marginalised. Oleg Drozdov, the founder of the Kharkiv School of Architecture, said in a webinar earlier in 2023 that Ukraine’s leaders should be wary of <a href="https://architecturetoday.co.uk/kharkiv-must-be-rebuilt-by-architects-with-experience-in-ukraine/">“intellectual colonisation”</a>, and the deputy vice chancellor of the school, Iryna Matsevko, <a href="https://architecturetoday.co.uk/kharkiv-must-be-rebuilt-by-architects-with-experience-in-ukraine/">emphasised the need</a> for “architects who have deep knowledge of the local context to avoid a ‘copy paste’ rebuilding programme”.</p>
<p>Foster explained that the work they have been doing on the city included a questionnaire where over 16,000 people responded. In one of his slides, he showed two pie charts with questions that read: “Are you satisfied with the quality of the house you live in?” and “Are you satisfied with the neighbourhood you live in?”</p>
<p>Imagine your city is being bombed, that your world is collapsing, that you are escaping in a search of a shelter and thousands of homes are being destroyed. Next, imagine you are being asked about your “satisfaction”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/2st3hQoZTx4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Oleksii Pedosenko, an urban planning specialist, has <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/progressingplanning/2023/06/19/planning-in-ukraines-kharkiv-when-radical-hope-meets-starchitecture-is-there-a-place-for-local-voices/">written</a> an excellent reflection on the questions of reconstruction in Ukraine. He raises ethical points about the transparency of the work being done on Kharkiv’s master planning. Pedosenko writes that even though the project continues to engage with Kharkiv architects and local government officials, it only reports limited information to the public. He has also asked for the written report of the plan, but the foundation never responded to him. </p>
<p>Pedosenko asks: “How can solidarity be created if the very process of plan development is left to be constantly hidden from the very people who will live with the outcomes of the master plan long into the future? Also is it reasonable and practical for international actors to work remote from the local context if a truly collaborative process is the goal?”</p>
<p>These are important questions to think about at the time of reconstruction, and I have come across the same dilemmas when researching the reconstruction in Syria. Who has the right to write history? How could architects engage with local communities? And whose voice is heard? These questions matter, and they matter the most, when people have lost so much including their choices to shape their own future.</p>
<p>Star architects can bring with them power, money, fame, prestige and attention. But there are times where none of these are needed. Who knows what it means to lose home but the victim?</p>
<p>Good intentions are important. Global solidarity is important. But sometimes good intentions are not enough. As Pedosenko writes, there needs to be a more critical approach towards reconstruction.</p>
<h2>Reconstructing hope</h2>
<p>Despite everything we have lost, we should not lose hope. And despite the destruction of war, we must not let the war defeat us on the inside. It is hard to believe what has happened, it is hard to believe how death and destruction have shaped our lives in Syria. But at moments of despair and hopelessness, I return to the words of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, who wrote in 1970:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Hopelessness is a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it. The dehumanisation resulting from an unjust order is not a cause for despair but for hope, leading to the incessant pursuit of the humanity denied by injustice. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In moments of despair, I also return to the words of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/world/middleeast/fadwa-suleiman-actress-and-voice-of-syrian-opposition-dies-at-47.html">Fadwa Souleimane</a>, a Syrian artist who became an icon of the revolution. In the early days of the revolution she led protests in Homs and was one of the few women who spoke publicly about the situation in Homs – from within Homs. I still remember when she was asked live by the news reporter if she was aware that her face was visible on the screen, or whether she thought it was a phone call only. She replied confidently that she was aware of being visible.</p>
<p>Her belonging to the revolution put her life under threat. She fled to Paris and continued her struggle from exile until she died from cancer at the age of 47. During her time in Paris, she advocated for peaceful tools and devices to face war. She remembered the art, culture, dance and music of the people who protested in the streets. Until her last moments, she remembered hope, and reconstructed it, reminding people to not live in a landscape of despair. In 2016, she said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Even if they erase everything, we should not let them erase our dream. If there is only one Syrian left, I am sure he [or she] will build the Syria that we love. Syria is not a country, a geography. It’s an idea. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>And as time passes, as the years move with new degrees of pain, let us remember this hope. Let us think and work towards the rebuilding of Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Palestine. Let’s fight the bulldozers that destroy our memories and presence. Let’s remember.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>For you: more from our <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insights series</a>:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/loneliness-loss-and-regret-what-getting-old-really-feels-like-new-study-157731?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Loneliness, loss and regret: what getting old really feels like – new study
</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/gp-crisis-how-did-things-go-so-wrong-and-what-needs-to-change-208197?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">GP crisis: how did things go so wrong, and what needs to change?
</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/its-like-being-in-a-warzone-aande-nurses-open-up-about-the-emotional-cost-of-working-on-the-nhs-frontline-194197?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">‘It’s like being in a warzone’ – A&E nurses open up about the emotional cost of working on the NHS frontline</a></em></p></li>
</ul>
<p><em>To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK"><strong>Subscribe to our newsletter</strong></a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211627/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz receives funding from British Academy for his research at the University of Oxford. </span></em></p>Wars are no longer fought in the trenches, they’re fought in the streets and civilians are on the frontline.Ammar Azzouz, Research Fellow, School of Geography and the Environment, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1982692023-02-16T13:25:10Z2023-02-16T13:25:10ZCOVID-19 restrictions unexpectedly reduced Islamic State violence – political science experts explain why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510108/original/file-20230214-24-ab590n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman walks in Raqa, the former Syrian capital of the Islamic State, in December 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1230242180/photo/topshot-syria-conflict-daily-life-raqa.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=i-FdQOqRBmciGD8TCY0hyKF8kvbZ5ixLz7y_77mY_7E=">Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>World leaders and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus">policy experts </a>at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://time.com/5828630/isis-coronavirus/">feared that</a> the health crisis might make the world more dangerous. They worried specifically that terrorist organizations like the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/isil.html">Islamic State group</a> would <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/69508/how-terrorist-groups-will-try-to-capitalize-on-the-coronavirus-crisis/">capitalize on the pandemic</a> to increase attacks on civilians and recruit new sympathizers. </p>
<p>In some ways, the pandemic presented an opportunity to groups like the Islamic State group, known by the initials IS, because the sudden increase in health spending <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35298/From-Double-Shock-to-Double-Recovery-Implications-and-Options-for-Health-Financing-in-The-Time-of-COVID-19.pdf?sequence=8&isAllowed=y">strained many countries’ budgets</a> and diverted attention <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/28/preventing-violent-extremism-during-and-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/">away from extremism</a>. Governments’ COVID-19 responses also called on police and armies to deliver health care services <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7870912/">in some cases</a>. </p>
<p>But the feared increase in IS violence <a href="https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2021/06/28/has-isis-made-gains-as-a-result-of-the-pandemic/">largely did not materialize</a>.</p>
<p>We are <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=C2IitzkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholars who study</a> the causes of violence within countries, often between armed groups and governments, and what works to prevent it. Along with our colleague <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/qutaiba-idlbi/">Qutaiba Idlbi</a>, a senior fellow at the <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/">Atlantic Council</a> think tank, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=1dHeQGgAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">we wanted to understand</a> how COVID-19 lockdowns affected the ability of groups like IS to operate. </p>
<p>As our new <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/locking-down-violence-the-covid19-pandemics-impact-on-nonstate-actor-violence/19073EF1BC0873E1D614A34F6BD1365C">research</a> shows, 2020 COVID-19 lockdown measures such as curfews and travel bans – which governments have mostly <a href="https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-lockdowns/">since lifted</a> – made it difficult for IS to operate and, as an indirect result, helped reduce violence in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A soldier in camouflage steps into a destroyed vehicle that appears charred from the inside." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510111/original/file-20230214-2150-zdys90.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iraqi fighter inspects the site of an Islamic State group attack north of Baghdad in May 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1211657465/photo/topshot-iraq-conflict-is.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=s34V40b5F3hAhyP1ZlD-BjZRPY6MdKZxgDoUmPzBCL0=">Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Understanding the Islamic State group</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/08/12/middleeast/here-is-how-isis-began/index.html">Islamic State group</a> – also known as IS, ISIS and ISIL – emerged as an offshoot of the Islamic <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">militant terrorist group</a> al-Qaida in Iraq around 2004. </p>
<p>In its rise, Islamic State group used unusually brutal and sadistic <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61016908">tactics</a> against government officials, as well as civilians, including intense <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/syria-isis-tortured-kobani-child-hostages">torture</a> and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/death-steven-sotloff">beheadings</a>. </p>
<p>But IS still cultivated genuine support from some locals in Iraq and Syria by exploiting <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/17/not-by-counterterrorism-alone-root-causes-and-the-defeat-of-the-islamic-state-group/">their grievances</a> over weak, corrupt governance – while sometimes providing better <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html">public services</a>, like routine street cleanings and power line repairs, than the government did in the areas it controlled. </p>
<p>Omar, a local journalist and civil society activist from Deir Ezzor, Syria, recalled in 2022 to our co-author Qutaiba how for many in his province, “When ISIS took over Deir Ezzor province, the poor and those unable to flee were glad that the province did not fall back to the Assad regime. For them, ISIS was the better devil.” </p>
<p>Throughout 2013 and 2014, the <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state">Islamic State group began</a> to take over territory in Syria and Iraq. At the time, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229">engaged in a civil war</a>, which began in 2011 when Assad attempted to quash a popular uprising against his family’s 40-year-long rule. </p>
<p>The Assad regime shot at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/22/syria-protests-forces-shoot">peaceful demonstrators</a>, detained and tortured activists, and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coisyria/2022-06-28/Policy-paper-CoH-27-June.pdf">retaliated against communities</a> that challenged his authority. In 2013, the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/09/18/united-nations-releases-report-use-chemical-weapons-syria">Assad regime attacked its own</a> people with sarin gas, killing more than 1,400 people – many of them children – in Eastern Ghouta. </p>
<p>Political instability was not limited to Syria at the time. </p>
<p>In Iraq, for example, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki responded to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests/thousands-rally-in-iraqs-day-of-rage-protests-idUSTRE71O1RN20110225">2011 protests</a> against corruption with violence, kidnapping, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/02/02/133440159/group-claims-iraq-secret-prison-in-operation">torture and</a> <a href="https://www.jpost.com/opinion/who-are-the-people-killed-by-nouri-al-maliki-and-why-482227">assassinations of activists</a> and protesters. </p>
<p>The Islamic State group grew during the civil conflicts and public uprisings, and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whos-who-syrias-civil-war">tried to establish</a> control over territory in parts of Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>At its height in 2014, IS <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157">controlled</a> 34,000 square miles – or 88,000 square kilometers – across Syria and Iraq, home to about <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034">10 million people</a>. The group also changed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277">its name from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham to the Islamic State</a>, reflecting its plans to expand control over more territory. </p>
<p>The U.S. launched an <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-us-policy-isis">international military intervention</a> to defeat the Islamic State group in 2014. </p>
<p>This military coalition <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">brought IS to its knees</a> by the beginning of 2018 and ended its control over the large territory it once controlled in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troop-withdrawal.html">announced it would pull out its troops</a> from Syria in 2018 and declared victory over IS. The Islamic State group lost control over its last <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157">bit of</a> territory in Syria in 2019. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of men, one with crutches and an amputated leg, walk, followed by some men with cameras photographing them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510133/original/file-20230214-16-mmzz9y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Men suspected of having collaborated with the Islamic State group are released from a Syrian prison in October 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/id/1229085930/photo/topshot-syria-conflict-kurds-prisoners.jpg?s=1024x1024&w=gi&k=20&c=mGP42EEK4ZWsKARtSrKaK5OxLHxJxpKX8gWJAF_MWQw=">Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Islamic State group under lockdown</h2>
<p>But despite the group’s setbacks – including <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/gen-raymond-thomas-socom-60000-to-70000-isis-fighters-killed-2017-7">tens of thousands</a> of fighters killed since its rise – IS <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/02/kurdish-leader-isis-conflict-iraq-iran/606502/">remained active in early 2020</a>.</p>
<p>In March 2020, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-covid-19-response-2020-fact-sheet">Syrian government enforced</a> a two-month lockdown that closed most businesses and imposed a partial curfew. <a href="https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2020/03/iraq-nationwide-lockdown-implemented-march-22-update-15">Iraq</a> <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/coronavirus/2020/06/23/Coronavirus-Egypt-to-reopen-restaurants-cafes-sports-clubs-from-July-27">and Egypt</a> also implemented widespread closures and curfews to prevent COVID-19 from spreading. </p>
<p>We analyzed data on more than 1,500 attacks initiated by IS over an 18-month period in these places during 2019 and 2020. Our <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422001423">research, published in January 2023</a>, shows that travel bans and curfews helped reduce IS attacks substantially. </p>
<p>These findings highlight that COVID-19 lockdown measures affected the Islamic State’s ability to operate. The curfews made it difficult for IS to generate revenue and hide its movements by closing public and private institutions and restricting travel between provinces.</p>
<p>Our analysis showed that while in effect, curfews and travel bans helped to significantly reduce IS violence, especially in highly populated areas. </p>
<p>In Iraq, violence declined around 30% because of lockdowns. In Syria, there was an approximate 15% overall reduction in violence during this period.</p>
<p>But in Egypt, the government had already instituted curfews <a href="https://egyptindependent.com/curfew-announced-in-some-north-sinai-areas/">in some areas because of the Islamic State group’s presence</a> and violence there. This made it difficult to analyze COVID-specific lockdowns.</p>
<p>Unlike many other militant groups, IS had large <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/isis-caliphate-money-territory/584911/">financial reserves</a> to sustain itself during the lockdown. It also operates in largely <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria">rural areas</a> and, therefore, was not especially vulnerable to the effects of lockdown measures in urban areas. </p>
<h2>Broader implications</h2>
<p>Our research comes at a critical time as policymakers and <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA900/RRA958-1/RAND_RBA958-1.pdf">counterterrorism experts debate</a> a long-term strategy to eliminate the Islamic State group. </p>
<p>In 2022, the U.S. and <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/01/19/who-are-the-syrian-democratic-forces">local military forces in</a> Syria <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/iraqi-security-forces">and Iraq</a> conducted 313 operations in Iraq and Syria, killing 700 IS fighters. </p>
<p>The U.S. and its partners in the region have also killed several prominent <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3266973/us-partners-find-success-in-mission-to-defeat-isis/">IS leaders</a> over the past few years, including Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2922796/leader-of-isis-dead-following-us-raid-in-syria/">who died</a> in February 2022. </p>
<p>But we think the United States’ <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/09/the-us-played-down-turkeys-concerns-about-syrian-kurdish-forces-that-couldnt-last/">current strategy</a>, which focuses heavily on military alliances with local partners, is not sustainable – in part because it does not pay heed to the reasons some people in Syria and Iraq still support IS.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198269/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While some world leaders and foreign policy experts expected IS to increase its attacks during COVID-19’s early days, travel bans and curfews helped slow violence.Jóhanna Kristín Birnir, Professor Comparative Politics, University of MarylandDawn Brancati, Senior Lecturer, Political Science Department, Yale UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1993292023-02-07T13:18:46Z2023-02-07T13:18:46ZTurkey-Syria earthquake: how disaster diplomacy can bring warring countries together to save lives<p>The death toll of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/64533954">massive earthquakes</a> that have rocked the Turkey-Syria border region has now exceeded 5,000 people and the World Health Organization has suggested it could rise as high as <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/turkey-syria-earthquake-death-toll-increase_uk_63e20fdae4b04d4d18eec4a5#">20,000</a>. The catastrophe has led to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-quake-international-support-offers-aid-2023-02-06/">an international outpouring of support</a>. Numerous international rescue, medical, and other teams are arriving and on their way.</p>
<p>As ever, local emergency services were first on the front line to pull survivors from the collapsed buildings. We know from <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002398">researching previous earthquake responses</a> that most survivors are pulled out of the rubble by local residents and workers in the immediate aftermath.</p>
<p>But rescue attempts are ongoing and reports are continuing to emerge of people being found alive under the rubble, despite freezing temperatures at night and poor weather in many earthquake-affected areas.</p>
<p>Having <a href="https://www.disasterdiplomacy.org">researched disasters in conflict zones</a> for more than 20 years, I’m acutely aware of how difficult the task will be in Turkey and Syria. This border region is riven with conflict which not only impedes the response to the disaster, but also often prevents or inhibits work to reduce the risk of earthquake impacts. Yet effective diplomacy and a willingness for countries to work together despite their tensions can make a huge difference.</p>
<p>The area over which shocks continue to be felt has suffered long-term violent conflict. Kurds in the region have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2021.1909285">fighting for a homeland for years</a> in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Syria has been <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/destroying-a-nation-9781784537975/">shattered by civil war</a> since 2011, so the area around Turkey’s border with Syria is packed with refugees from the fighting and is a crossing point for terrorists.</p>
<p>Reports <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/07/syria-earthquake-aftermath-aid-politics">are emerging</a> that Damascus is demanding control of aid crossing into Syria and is allowing relief supplies to enter the region through only one border crossing. There have been calls for more crossing points to be opened to allow aid to get to disaster-affected people in Turkish areas affected by the quakes but so far there is no confirmation that Syria will allow this.</p>
<p>However, past experience tells us that if countries who are seemingly at loggerheads can pull together after a catastrophe such as this, it can sometimes yield dividends. </p>
<p>Turkey itself provides an instructive example. For several decades, Turkey has had a fraught relationship with its neighbour Greece, including over Cyprus since Turkish forces <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_invasion_of_Cyprus">invaded the north</a> in 1974 in response to a coup supported by the Greek military government of the time.</p>
<p>And yet two earthquakes in 1999 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570008400339">challenged this picture</a> of mutual enmity and distrust. On August 17, more than 17,000 people died in an earthquake in north-west Turkey. Greece offered extensive assistance and Turkey accepted.</p>
<p>Then on September 7, Turkey’s main search-and-rescue team phoned the Greek ambassador to Turkey to explain that they had heard that Athens had been rocked by a tremor and to offer assistance. The quake killed over 140 people. A Turkish team pulled at least one trapped person from the rubble.</p>
<p>Since then, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.03.004">collaboration between Greece and Turkey</a> on preventing disasters – involving wildfires, earthquakes and other hazards – has endured despite the shifting status of their diplomatic relationship.</p>
<p>Now, less than two months after <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-mevlut-cavusoglu-threat-war-greece-territorial-sea-dispute/">threats of war</a> over disputed territory in the Aegean Sea, Greece is once again <a href="https://greekreporter.com/2023/02/06/turkey-earthquake-greece-sends-help/">offering disaster aid</a> to help Turkey in the wake of the latest earthquakes.</p>
<h2>Stopping earthquake disasters</h2>
<p>However, measures to help prevent disasters are always more useful than international post-disaster aid, which is notoriously inefficient. It usually takes <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002398">at least 24 hours</a> for an international search-and-rescue team to be on site and active.</p>
<p>It’s expensive, too. As part of our research, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002398">we calculated</a> that the approximate cost per post-earthquake life saved by international search-and-rescue teams is US$1 million (£830,000).</p>
<p>Research has shown that “<a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/soc13010008">informal disaster diplomacy</a>” aimed at preventing or mitigating disaster impacts, such as those seen in these earthquakes, tends to be more successful than cooperation after the event. Long-term pre-earthquake actions are certainly far more effective for saving lives and helping people than waiting until the ground has shaken and infrastructure has collapsed.</p>
<p>From the <a href="https://mitigate.be.uw.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/37/2014/11/The-Impact-of-Project-Impact-on-the-Nisqually-Earthquake.pdf">US</a> to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.11.025">Japan</a>, many lives have been saved by building codes and planning regulations – not to mention a population that knows what to do before and during an earthquake. It’s eminently possible these days to build structures that can <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/Why+Do+Buildings+Collapse+in+Earthquakes%3F+Building+for+Safety+in+Seismic+Areas-p-9781119619420">withstand seismic shaking</a>.</p>
<p>Because of our ability to mitigate the effects of hazards such as earthquakes, researchers <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/disaster-by-choice-9780198841357">avoid the phrase “natural disaster”</a>. Earthquakes will always happen as the earth’s tectonic plates can and do shift. But it doesn’t follow that this must always mean a disaster. And we can make ourselves less vulnerable to tremors by working together – even with our political enemies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199329/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilan Kelman receives funding from research councils in the UK and Norway, as well as from the Wellcome Trust and internal UCL funding. He is also Professor II at the University of Agder in Norway and co-directs the non-profit organisation Risk RED (Risk Reduction Education for Disasters).</span></em></p>Disasters such as the earthquake affecting Turkey and Syria are always worse when there is bad blood between the countries involved.Ilan Kelman, Professor of Disasters and Health, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1869872022-08-15T15:51:45Z2022-08-15T15:51:45ZHow displaced Syrians effectively navigated ‘border frictions’ in Lebanon and Turkey<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478384/original/file-20220809-20-bmbvqp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C25%2C5760%2C3802&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Syrian refugee boy jumps from a swing as he plays under cloudy skies at the public beach of Ramlet al Bayda in Beirut, Lebanon, in 2015. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Hassan Ammar)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/4/14/syrias-war-explained-from-the-beginning">The Syrian conflict began in early March 2011 on the heels of the Arab Spring</a> as pro-democracy uprisings in Syria demanded regime change and political reform.</p>
<p>The conflict transformed into a war. More than <a href="https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts">13 million people</a> have either escaped the country or are displaced within its borders.</p>
<p>Displaced Syrians who have made the journey to the borderlands of Lebanon and Turkey encountered and had to respond to problems at the borders, forcing them to engage intermediaries — or smugglers — to assist them, and to use transnational networks during their perilous treks.</p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743817000642">our ethnographic</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420943593">qualitative research</a> into their journeys, we interviewed displaced Syrians who travelled from Syria to Lebanon and Turkey from 2012 to 2017 during the Syrian war. Some now reside in Canada.</p>
<h2>‘Border frictions’</h2>
<p>Over the past several decades, there has been an increase in the proliferation of border controls, forcing displaced people to respond.</p>
<p>These controls are called “border frictions,” and they include internal border and military checks, sieges, walls, deportations, immigration policies and other initiatives aimed at controlling population movements. </p>
<p>Their effects can <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.02.002">generate fear and violence</a>, contain and detain people on the move and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1762485">differentiate based on race, class</a>, economic need and other social distinctions. </p>
<p>But some displaced Syrians responded to these border frictions by passing through permeable borders and borderlands, using alternative routes and relying upon the use of smugglers and social networks during their treks. </p>
<p>These types of strategies, known as migrant politics, were at play in the borderlands of Lebanon and Turkey. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two boys play soccer with a black and yellow soccer ball with tents and brown hills in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478380/original/file-20220809-15346-l14g5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C8640%2C5755&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478380/original/file-20220809-15346-l14g5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478380/original/file-20220809-15346-l14g5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478380/original/file-20220809-15346-l14g5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478380/original/file-20220809-15346-l14g5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478380/original/file-20220809-15346-l14g5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478380/original/file-20220809-15346-l14g5d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian children play soccer near their tented homes at a refugee camp in the town of Bar Elias in Lebanon in July 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Borderland of Lebanon</h2>
<p>For decades, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-lebanon-syria-visas-20150105-story.html">Syrians didn’t require visas to enter Lebanon</a>, permitting many to establish transnational social, cultural and economic networks.</p>
<p>During the Syrian war, many Syrian participants travelled to Lebanon in search of safety and protection. They told us about their irregular crossings into Lebanon, the bribes they paid to border officials at checkpoints and their reliance on smugglers during their journeys.</p>
<p>For example, through the assistance of an intermediary, one displaced Syrian man, Hassan, was able to hide from border snipers along the Syrian-Lebanese border, wait in mountainous areas, circumvent border security personnel and travel safely to Beirut. </p>
<p>Intermediaries often provide crucial services that are demand-driven, fuelled by restrictive border controls and the war. Many other Syrians who travelled to Lebanon were reunited with family members and received assistance from their social and economic networks to find work and housing, while some others decided to hide from security forces to avoid detection and legal repercussions. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People toting their belongings walk through grassy hills." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478383/original/file-20220809-14-n8c4vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478383/original/file-20220809-14-n8c4vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478383/original/file-20220809-14-n8c4vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478383/original/file-20220809-14-n8c4vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=378&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478383/original/file-20220809-14-n8c4vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478383/original/file-20220809-14-n8c4vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478383/original/file-20220809-14-n8c4vc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=475&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this May 2011 photo, Syrians cross the border into Lebanon as they flee the violence in the Syrian village of Talkalakh.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This engagement in migrant politics was necessitated in part by a new visa requirement introduced in 2013 that meant Syrians had to provide documentation and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/20581831.2016.1226533">limit their stay in Lebanon</a> to a maximum of one month.</p>
<p>The Lebanese government also closed its territorial border with Syria in 2015 and instructed the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2020.1762485">United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to stop refugee registration</a>.</p>
<h2>Borderland of Turkey</h2>
<p>Drawing on the <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/blogs/babylon-beyond/story/2009-09-17/turkey-syria-nations-sign-historic-accord-end-visa-requirements">2009 cancellation of entry visa requirements between Syria and Turkey</a>, the Turkish open-border policy enabled Syrians to enter the country legally in the early days of the Syrian war.</p>
<p>Many families arrived in multiple stages and self-settled in border areas with the expectation of returning to Syria. The cross-border movements of displaced Syrians were multi-directional until <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/23/turkey-syrians-pushed-back-border">Turkey closed its southern borders in 2015</a>. </p>
<p>For example, a displaced Syrian woman, Laila, initially entered Turkey in 2012 by air via Beirut, returned to Syria after some months to check on her family and business, relocated to Turkey’s border province Hatay in 2013 and then travelled once again to Syria in 2015 to arrange for her newborn daughter’s passport. </p>
<p>Many others came and left illegally even during the days of open-border policy, either because they fled without a passport or were travelling from areas controlled by groups not officially recognized by Syria or Turkey.</p>
<p>Once resettled along the Turkish border, Syrians mobilized their pre-conflict networks of kinship, trade and religion with Turkish citizens to navigate unpredictable legal procedures and access limited resources in their everyday lives. How, when and for whom the borders remained porous varied, nonetheless. </p>
<p>As an open-border policy that yielded to a temporary protection regime, <a href="https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020C01/">arbitrary deportations</a> and Turkey’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2020.1841642">construction of a wall</a> along its southern border, Syrians found alternate ways to engage in migrant politics, including migrant smuggling and other clandestine movements.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two women in head scarves smile. One holds a baby while another flashes a V for victory sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478381/original/file-20220809-15894-ilv3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478381/original/file-20220809-15894-ilv3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478381/original/file-20220809-15894-ilv3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478381/original/file-20220809-15894-ilv3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=447&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478381/original/file-20220809-15894-ilv3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478381/original/file-20220809-15894-ilv3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478381/original/file-20220809-15894-ilv3ej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=562&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian refugee women react as they wait with their children outside a makeshift hospital in a refugee camp in the Turkish town of Yayladagi in June 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Burhan Ozbilici)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Porous borders</h2>
<p>Our research on Syrian migrant journeys shows how border regimes restrict human rights and discriminate against displaced people.</p>
<p>They encourage rather than eliminate irregular border crossings. And, ultimately, they fail. </p>
<p>Despite all the walls and exceptional measures that are placed before them, many Syrians have found ways around borders and established new lives in the borderlands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Suzan Ilcan receives funding from SSHRC.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Secil Dagtas receives funding from SSHRC</span></em></p>Many displaced Syrians responded to harsh border controls by passing through permeable borders, using alternative routes and relying upon the use of smugglers and social networks.SUZAN ILCAN, Professor & University Research Chair, Sociology and Legal Studies, University of WaterlooSeçil Daǧtaș, Associate Professor, Political Anthropology, University of WaterlooLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1860222022-07-20T15:00:13Z2022-07-20T15:00:13Z‘Summer with the Enemy’ by Syrian novelist Shahla Ujayli is a searing summer read<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473698/original/file-20220712-30704-mom4xw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C67%2C869%2C527&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The protagonist at the centre of 'Summer with the Enemy' rides horses along the Euphrates and dreams of an equestrian future, but faces uncertainty in a society under seige. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arabian_Horse_%2838083704%29.jpeg">(Ahmed Matrix/Wikimedia)</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Wherever you spend your summer, allow yourself to be transported to Syria and immerse yourself in the world of Shahla Ujayli’s sweeping historical novel <a href="https://www.interlinkbooks.com/product/summer-with-the-enemy/"><em>Summer with the Enemy</em></a>. </p>
<p>The ongoing devastation of the war that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229">began in 2011</a> has brought Syria to the world’s attention. Reading a Syrian novel is a way to experience its deep and rich culture, history and literature beyond the headlines. </p>
<p><em>Summer with the Enemy</em> was a finalist for the prestigious the <a href="https://www.arabicfiction.org/en/node/1400">International Prize for Arab Fiction</a>, sometimes known <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arabs-gulf/arab-booker-winner-defends-arab-gulf-arts-drive-idINTRE52M2GT20090323">as the “Arab Booker Prize.”</a> It was written in Arabic by Ujayli, one of the country’s most prominent women writers; I translated it into English one year later.</p>
<h2>City of Raqqa</h2>
<p>Ujayli’s evocative storytelling conjures up the city of Raqqa, from its past as a dusty provincial town beginning in the 1920s, through the 20th century, and its subsequent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-isis-caliphate">occupation and 2017</a> siege <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/raqqa-reuild-isis-syrian-civil-war-1.5966299">by Islamic State militants (ISIS)</a>. In <em>Summer with the Enemy</em>, the main characters eventually must leave Raqqa behind for a new life in Germany.</p>
<p>A detailed and intricate portrait of three generations of one family in this northern Syrian town, <em>Summer with the Enemy</em> combines historical fiction with a romance and a coming-of-age story complete with an tale of first love. The characters challenge western stereotypes about Arab Muslim women — <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674088269">that they need to be “saved” from oppressive realities</a> — through depictions of their active, diverse and complex lives. </p>
<p>The town of Raqqa is so important to the story that <a href="https://syriauntold.com/2020/08/16/raqqa-at-the-center-of-the-universe/">one critic</a> claims it is actually a character in the novel. </p>
<h2>Family drama, first love</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473462/original/file-20220711-18-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A sunset is seen against a building in a village" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473462/original/file-20220711-18-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473462/original/file-20220711-18-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473462/original/file-20220711-18-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473462/original/file-20220711-18-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473462/original/file-20220711-18-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473462/original/file-20220711-18-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473462/original/file-20220711-18-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Summer with the Enemy,’ by Shahla Ujayli, translated by Michelle Hartman.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Interlink Publishing)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It’s hard not to feel compelled by the Raqqa of the past, with its tightly knit, multi-ethnic community, full of local conflicts and family drama. </p>
<p>Each story the grandmother tells has the younger generations on the edge of their seats, waiting to hear about a scandal, an illicit affair, a failed love match or an exotic trip abroad. She always leaves her audience wanting more when she rises mid-sentence to stir the coffee on the stove, tension building.</p>
<p>During the summer of the title, some time in the ‘80s, the protagonist, Lamees, rides horses <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-does-future-euphrates-spell-middle-east-180967224/">along the Euphrates</a>, an expansive desert surrounding her, and dreams of an equestrian future. </p>
<p>Horses means she can avoid her mother. Their relationship had become tense, after Lamees’s father left Syria, never to return. Lamees resents her mother’s incipient love affair with a visiting German professor, Nicolas, the enemy of the book’s title. The daughter acts as a local guide to Nicolas, who leaves when his research is done. The women call upon Nicolas later to find passage to Germany after the fall of their beloved city.</p>
<h2>Revisiting memories of Raqqa</h2>
<p>About 10 years after the fictional Lamees was living in Raqqa, experiencing the Assad government’s belt-tightening policies, I embarked upon the long trip there from Damascus with a university friend. In summer 1995, my visit revealed a Raqqa much like the one Lamees showed to her German enemy. </p>
<p>But when I was in Raqqa in the '90s, I had no idea that more than 20 years later I would be video-chatting with a famous Syrian author from the town. Ujayli was giving me a sort of interview before I translated her novel. Among other questions, she asked me: “Have you ever been to Raqqa?”</p>
<p>I was pleased to be able to answer yes — I had visited long before most people outside of Syria had ever heard of Raqqa. I prepared to translate this novel by revisiting that journey through talking to Ujayli and by looking back over old photographs, revisiting memories of the place. </p>
<h2>Translating Arabic into English</h2>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473476/original/file-20220711-18-qiraph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Book cover showing women sitting at a table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473476/original/file-20220711-18-qiraph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473476/original/file-20220711-18-qiraph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473476/original/file-20220711-18-qiraph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473476/original/file-20220711-18-qiraph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473476/original/file-20220711-18-qiraph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473476/original/file-20220711-18-qiraph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473476/original/file-20220711-18-qiraph.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Summer with the Enemy,’ by Shahla Ujayli.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Difaf Publishing and Al-Ikhtilef/International Prize for Arab Fiction)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In an interview about my translation process, an interviewer <a href="https://arablit.org/2021/06/17/from-the-archives-shahla-ujayli-on-getting-raqqa-back-through-writing/">asked me the same question</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://oxfordre.com/literature/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190201098.001.0001/acrefore-9780190201098-e-1209">Translating Arab women</a> writers from Arabic into English has a difficult history: Many translations have been so changed as to be unrecognizable. </p>
<p>As scholars have shown, the entire thrust of a book can change with translations creating <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Going-Global-The-Transnational-Reception-of-Third-World-Women-Writers/Amireh-Majaj/p/book/9780815336068">new titles</a>, sections edited and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3175385">censored</a>, narrative voices <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/1570064x-12341305">voices altered</a> and entire <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/1570064x-12341401">characterizations changed</a>. </p>
<p>I worked with Ujayli to convey the details of the text accurately, while also finding words to give the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Translation-Changes-Everything-Theory-and-Practice/Venuti/p/book/9780415696296">new English text</a> <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/A+Companion+to+Creative+Writing-p-9780470656938">as much life</a> as the Arabic original. </p>
<p>In the summer of 2019, I translated the novel in a Lebanese mountain village. Just across the border, Syria was visible on a clear day. That summer we could hear the echoes of bombs being dropped across the valley. </p>
<p>Focused on conveying the details and complexities of of the book, I felt the tension between the book’s beautiful depiction of the past and Ujayli’s searing depiction <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2018/5/10/coming_of_age_in_the_syrian">of life</a> under ISIS occupation, <a href="https://www.truthdig.com/articles/burning-raqqa-inside-the-u-s-war-against-civilians-in-syria/">fierce battles</a> in Raqqa and Lamees’s subsequent escape to <a href="https://hir.harvard.edu/integrating-refugee-women-into-germany/">Germany</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473478/original/file-20220711-12-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Blocks of bombed out and damaged buildings." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473478/original/file-20220711-12-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473478/original/file-20220711-12-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473478/original/file-20220711-12-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473478/original/file-20220711-12-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473478/original/file-20220711-12-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473478/original/file-20220711-12-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473478/original/file-20220711-12-papg1r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An image made from drone video shows damaged buildings in Raqqa, Syria, in October 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Gabriel Chaim)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Lessons in empathy</h2>
<p>The utter destruction of Raqqa between 2013 and 2017 and any semblance of the previous lives lived there felt so real. </p>
<p>Lebanon is a country still bearing the scars of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/4/13/lebanon-marks-civil-war-anniversary-2">its own long civil war (1975-90)</a>. The reverberations of the bombs we heard that summer in Lebanon had an unmistakable impact on the translation. The words a translator chooses to translate are always impacted by their surroundings. </p>
<p>Ujayli’s novels offer “<a href="https://en.qantara.de/content/portrait-of-the-syrian-writer-shahla-ujayli-lessons-in-empathy">lessons in empathy</a>,” as noted by Marcia Lynx Qualey, <a href="https://hoopoefiction.com/2020/03/25/a-quarantine-interview-with-marcia-lynx-qualey-about-arabic-fiction/">founding editor of the website ArabLit</a>.</p>
<p>Packed with humour, drama, romance and 100 years of history, <em>Summer with the Enemy</em> puts women centre stage, will take readers to the heart of one woman’s coming of age in Syria — and offer insights into its past and present.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Hartman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Three generations in a Syrian town: The English-to-Arabic translator of the novel that was a finalist for the prestigious International Prize for Arab Fiction discusses the sweeping historical novel.Michelle Hartman, Professor and Director, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1832772022-05-17T19:41:37Z2022-05-17T19:41:37ZWhy Turkey isn’t on board with Finland, Sweden joining NATO – and why that matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463686/original/file-20220517-25-ezc7ni.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5472%2C3604&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Room for any more at NATO? Not according to Turkey's president.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkeys-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-attends-the-nato-news-photo/1233447431?adppopup=true">Kenzo Tribouillard/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After decades of neutrality, the two Nordic states that have to date remained out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have reacted to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/17/world/europe/sweden-finland-nato.html">declaring an intention to join</a> the American-led alliance. But there is a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-stockholm-sweden-finland-f7328801f699fbb2f28826c0f14d4ef6">major obstacle in their way</a>: Turkey.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/16/how-erdogans-anti-democratic-government-made-turkey-ripe-for-unrest/">increasingly autocratic and anti-democratic</a> president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has said he will not agree to the entry of these two countries. And as a member of NATO, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm">Turkey’s approval is needed</a> for Finland and Sweden to join.</p>
<p>Erdogan is alone among NATO leaders in publicly stating that he is against the two countries’ joining the alliance.</p>
<h2>Harboring terrorists or grudges?</h2>
<p>The Turkish president’s opposition is based on his view that Finland and Sweden support “terrorists.” What Erdogan means is that both countries have given protection and residence to members of the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/turkey_domestic_terrorism.html">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a>, or PKK – the major armed group mounting resistance to Turkey’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/turkey">harsh treatment</a> of its millions of Kurdish citizens. The plight of the country’s Kurds, part of a large but stateless ethnic group in the region, has long been a bone of contention between Turkey and parts of the international community.</p>
<p>Despite the PKK’s being <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">listed by the U.S.</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2021:043:FULL&from=en">and EU</a> as a terrorist group, Finland and Sweden have been <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/sweden-finland-reject-turkeys-request-to-extradite-terrorists">reluctant to extradite</a> members of the group to Turkey over human rights concerns. Erdogan <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/16/sweden-announces-nato-membership-bid-one-day-after-finland#:%7E:text=In%20a%20news%20conference%20on,terrorist%20organisations%2C%E2%80%9D%20Erdogan%20said.">has responded</a> by calling Sweden a “hatchery” for terrorism and claiming neither country has “a clear, open attitude” toward terrorist organizations, adding: “How can we trust them?”</p>
<p>Erdoğan’s ire with Finland and Sweden has also been exacerbated by the country hosting followers of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/from-ally-to-scapegoat-fethullah-gulen-the-man-behind-the-myth/a-37055485">Turkish scholar and cleric Fethullah Gulen</a>. These followers are part of an educational and political movement with which Erdogan had been allied, but with which he broke as it grew more powerful. The Turkish president accuses the Gulenists of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61472021">staging a failed coup</a> against his government in 2016.</p>
<h2>All international politics is local</h2>
<p>As if that were not enough, the neutral <a href="https://buffalonews.com/news/national/govt-and-politics/explainer-why-is-turkey-wary-of-nordic-states-nato-bid/article_d0650bc8-7def-556e-bc3d-2d17643094fa.html">northern Europeans condemned Turkey’s 2019 incursion</a> into Syria. In that operation, the Turks targeted Rojava – a <a href="https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-democracy/rojava-democracy/">socialist, feminist autonomous Kurdish enclave</a> near the Turkish border. Complicating the matter, the Syrians of Rojava were – despite their links to the PKK – allies of the American forces. The Kurds of Rojava played a crucial role beating back the Islamic State group in Syria but were later <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440">abandoned by the Trump administration</a>, which pulled U.S. troops back from the Turkish border, <a href="https://www.firstpost.com/world/turkey-remains-defiant-to-international-pressure-on-offensive-against-syrian-kurdish-forces-as-us-demands-ceasefire-7511331.html">allowing its NATO ally to launch a military operation</a> against the Kurds.</p>
<p>Foreign policy is almost always intimately tied to domestic concerns. In the case of Turkey’s government, a major fear is the threat to its grip on power posed by the Kurds – and international pressure over Turkey’s record of repressing the group.</p>
<p>Turkey’s Kurdish populations are <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/turkeys-local-elections-were-not-free-or-fair/">not allowed free elections</a> in the eastern Anatolian region, <a href="http://countrystudies.us/turkey/28.htm">where they are the majority</a>. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/in-turkey-repression-of-the-kurdish-language-is-back-with-no-end-in-sight/">education and cultural institutions in the Kurdish language</a> face a de facto ban.</p>
<h2>The path ahead for NATO</h2>
<p>Finland and Sweden are neutral countries not beholden to the strategic compromises that the United States and NATO are forced to make to hold the alliance together. Both countries have to date been free to take a moral position on Turkey’s position on Kurdish rights and have officially protested the repressions of dissidents, academics, journalists and minority groups.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, NATO countries have equivocated before their fellow member, agreeing to label the <a href="https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/">PKK a terrorist organization</a>.</p>
<p>So where does this all leave Finland and Sweden’s application for NATO membership?</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm">rules for entry into the strategic alliance</a> require unanimity of the current NATO members.</p>
<p>As such, Turkey can effectively veto the entry of Finland and Sweden.</p>
<p>The standoff highlights an underlying problem the alliance is facing. NATO is supposed to be an alliance of democratic countries. Yet several of its members – <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/05/strongmen-die-but-authoritarianism-is-forever/">notably Turkey and Hungary</a> – have moved steadily away from liberal democracy toward ethnonational populist authoritarianism.</p>
<p>Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, fulfill the parameters of NATO membership more clearly than several of the alliance’s current members. As the United States proclaims that the war in Ukraine is a struggle between democracy and autocracy, Turkey’s opposition to the Nordics who have protested its drift to illiberalism are testing the unity and the ideological coherence of NATO.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183277/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is against allowing two Nordic countries to join NATO over what he deems their support of ‘terrorists.’ His opposition will test the alliance’s unity.Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1797812022-03-23T13:03:43Z2022-03-23T13:03:43ZUkraine: aid workers were forced out of Syria – the same thing could happen in this war<p>In the midst of brutal war, healthcare and humanitarian aid workers represent hope. They travel to areas riven by conflict and ease the suffering of the most vulnerable through moving displays of humanity. Coming from a range of international organisations, they administer healthcare, distribute donations and support and manage emergency response. Humanitarian workers are committed to neutrality, impartiality and independence, helping anyone who needs it in a conflict area. In theory, they are protected from attack by <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/10-things-rules-of-war-Geneva-Conventions">international humanitarian law</a>. But in practice they are frequently targeted, bombed and shot at <a href="http://insecurityinsight.org/projects/aid-in-danger#:%7E:text=The%20Aid%20in%20Danger%20project,on%20access%20for%20aid%20agencies">by warring parties</a>.</p>
<p>Russia’s conduct of the war in Ukraine is hauntingly familiar of its intervention in the Syrian civil war, which began in 2015. I have worked in Syria as an aid worker, and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Armed-Groups-and-International-Legitimacy-Child-Soldiers-in-Intra-State/Plowright/p/book/9780367649319">conducted research</a> in areas while they were under Russian bombardment. I am familiar with the difficulties of trying to deliver humanitarian assistance in situations of extreme insecurity.</p>
<p>Russian authorities have claimed that in the “special operation” in Ukraine, Russia has only engaged in the targeting of military infrastructure. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-embassy-kyiv-without-citing-evidence-says-russian-forces-shot-dead-10-people-2022-03-16/">They have denied</a> killing civilians or hitting civilian infrastructure, despite a wealth of <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/21/politics/zelensky-ceasefire-talks-ukraine-war-analysis/index.html">evidence to the contrary</a>.</p>
<p>The most glaring example is the attack on the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2022/03/europe/mariupol-maternity-hospital-attack/index.html">Mariupol maternity hospital</a>, which killed five, injured 17 and destroyed 90% of the hospital’s building. The number of people killed in the attack will be exceeded by the unnecessary deaths and illness from a lack of healthcare – women who will no longer have a safe place to give birth and newborn children who won’t receive necessary postnatal care.</p>
<p>This attack is far from unique. By March 22, the World Heath Organization <a href="https://extranet.who.int/ssa/LeftMenu/PublicReportList.aspx?start=2022-02-24&end=2022-03-18&countryList=229&typeList=0">listed</a> a shocking 59 attacks on healthcare in Ukraine, more than one per day since the start of the invasion.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russian-denial-of-civilian-casualties-follows-tactics-used-in-syria-179583">Ukraine war: how Russian denial of civilian casualties follows tactics used in Syria</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Russia has accused the west of <a href="https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2022/03/15/fact-check-russian-attack-mariupol-hospital-not-staged/7041649001/">staging the attack</a>, a piece of disinformation that is disturbingly reminiscent of its obfuscation of another war crime – the use of chemical weapons in Syria. One of the most famous of these attacks was in the opposition-held Damascus neighbourhood of Ghouta, where hundreds of <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s13031-018-0150-4">civilians were killed</a> and many more injured. Despite ample evidence suggesting the contrary, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43747922">Russian authorities also claimed</a> that the well-documented chemical attacks were staged.</p>
<h2>Aid workers targeted in Syria</h2>
<p>There are other parallels between the Russian invasion in Ukraine and its past intervention in Syria – including attacks on civilians, denial of humanitarian access and the spread of disinformation. Lessons from history would suggest that the true crisis in Ukraine may have only just begun.</p>
<p>Russia’s intervention to help its beleaguered ally Bashar al-Assad came in the form of air and missile strikes. During the next 12 months there was a dramatic spike in attacks on humanitarian aid workers, and healthcare infrastructure was systematically targeted by both Russian and Syrian militaries. <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(17)30741-9/fulltext">Hundreds of facilities</a> were destroyed, and hundreds of aid workers were killed.</p>
<p>When faced with such attacks, humanitarians often respond by sharing their GPS locations with both sides of an armed conflict. This strategy operates on the logic that if aid workers and hospitals are clear about where they are located, belligerents will avoid attacking them. Syria showed this to be a false assumption, as the Russian and Syrian militaries <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russian-denial-of-civilian-casualties-follows-tactics-used-in-syria-179583">bombed hospitals with impunity</a>, endangering healthcare and humanitarian workers instead of protecting them.</p>
<p>Aid workers are not armed – they cannot defend themselves, and there is nothing they can do to protect themselves from an airstrike or artillery barrage once it has been launched. When they are systematically targeted, as in Syria, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/everybodys-war-9780197514641?cc=gb&lang=en&#">their only choice is to leave</a>. </p>
<h2>The worst may be yet to come</h2>
<p>Perhaps the most concerning thing about Russia’s strategy in Syria is that it worked. Under the weight of the Russian intervention, the opposition was crushed, millions of people were displaced, and hundreds of thousands were killed. Putin’s Syrian ally remained in power, and Russia’s strategic aims were met.</p>
<p>The Russian military has a long history of <a href="https://theconversation.com/humanitarian-corridors-could-help-civilians-safely-leave-ukraine-but-russia-has-a-history-of-not-respecting-these-pathways-178840">ignoring humanitarian corridors</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russian-denial-of-civilian-casualties-follows-tactics-used-in-syria-179583">killing civilians</a> and <a href="https://snhr.org/blog/2019/12/23/54561/">attacking aid workers</a>. If the similarities between Syria and Ukraine continue, the scale of the crisis is likely to increase.</p>
<p>Civilians on the ground suffer the most when aid workers are targeted. So far, the attacks in Ukraine have been against local healthcare workers and facilities, and not international humanitarian staff. There are several reasons for this, part of which is the strength of the pre-conflict Ukrainian healthcare system, which reduces the need for international aid workers. As the number of attacks on healthcare continues to increase, so will the need for international aid. But if targeted by one or both sides of the conflict, humanitarian aid workers will be forced to withdraw, just as they did in Syria.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Plowright does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the invasion continues, humanitarian workers could become a target of the Russian army.William Plowright, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1795832022-03-21T14:47:50Z2022-03-21T14:47:50ZUkraine war: how Russian denial of civilian casualties follows tactics used in Syria<p>US president Joe Biden <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/17/unforgivable-russia-decries-putin-war-criminal-allegation">has labelled</a> Russian president Vladimir Putin a “war criminal” for the way the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/17/explainer-who-is-a-war-criminal">war in Ukraine</a> is being carried out.</p>
<p>Experts collating the numbers of casualties in Ukraine report that Russia is failing to acknowledge it has killed civilians in its military action, just as it did in Syria, where Russia began its military engagement in support of the Assad government in 2015 with intense airstrikes and artillery actions.</p>
<p>Russian officials and <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2022-03-18/russia-denies-targetting-civilians-in-ukraine-after-school-and-theatre-hit">state media claim</a> they are only attacking military sites. To date, Russia has not publicly accepted responsibility for a single civilian death in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Biden’s comment came after Russian forces <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/08/europe/russian-general-killed-ukraine-kharkiv-intl/index.html">had bombed</a> a maternity and children’s hospital in southern <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/08/politics/poland-jets-ukraine-russia/index.html">Ukraine</a>, injuring at least 17 people in the attack.</p>
<p>At least 13 people were killed in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/7/ukraines-civilian-death-toll-surges-with-13-killed-in-makariv">Russian attack on an industrial bakery</a> in Makariv, west of Kyiv, and it was estimated by the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) that two weeks into the Russian invasion at least 549 Ukrainian civilians <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/10/russia-invasion-killed-549-civilians-in-ukraine-united-nations-says.html">had been killed</a>, 41 of them children, rising to 780 killed (722 adults and 58 children) by <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/03/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-17-march-2022">March 17</a>.</p>
<p>According to Kharkiv regional police, between February 24, when the invasion began, and March 7, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/18/ukraine-deadly-attacks-kill-injure-civilians-destroy-homes">133 civilians were killed</a>, five of them children. An attack documented by Human Rights Watch included the case of a man who was killed as he waited in line outside a supermarket. </p>
<p>But the OHCHR believes that the overall figures of civilian deaths are <a href="https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Ukraine%20-%20civilian%20casualty%20update%20as%20of%2024.00%209%20March%202022%20ENG.pdf">considerably higher</a> than local estimates. This is because individual civilian reports from locations where intense hostilities have been going on has been delayed and many reports are still awaiting corroboration. </p>
<p>The office of the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, claims 1,500 residential buildings, 202 schools and 34 hospitals <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-civilian-cost-of-the-conflict-with-russia-and-the-stories-behind-the-hospitals-and-schools-targeted-12562199">have been shelled</a> across the country.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s defence ministry has said that <a href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=333275575513104&set=a.291577646349564&type=3">Russia has lost 14,200 military personnel</a>, while Ukrainian forces destroyed 450 Russian tanks, 1,448 armoured vehicles, 93 planes, 112 helicopters and 12 drones. Russia’s defence ministry reported the death toll only once, on March 2, saying that <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/17/un-says-more-than-700-civilians-killed-ukraine-liveblog">498 Russian servicemen had been killed</a> in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Comparisons with Syria</h2>
<p>Russian military action caused civilian deaths or injuries in 4,615 incidents in Syria, according to Airwars, a collaborative, not-for-profit transparency organisation. It has been tracking military actions and related civilian harm claims in conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria and Libya since 2014, drawing on media, social media and NGO reports. </p>
<p>This brings Airwars’ total estimate since 2015 to a minimum of <a href="https://airwars.org/news-and-investigations/after-six-years-of-russian-airstrikes-in-syria-still-no-accountability-for-civilian-deaths/">14,216 civilians killed</a>. Overall, Russia <a href="https://airwars.org/news-and-investigations/after-six-years-of-russian-airstrikes-in-syria-still-no-accountability-for-civilian-deaths/">has been linked</a> by other sources to as many as 23,400 civilian deaths and 41,000 injuries in Syria.</p>
<p>But the Russian military’s own estimate of civilian deaths and injuries in Syria <a href="https://airwars.org/conflict/russian-military-in-syria/">stands at zero</a>. Russian actions in Syria suggest its military does little to to try to avoid harming civilians, and this appears to also be the case in Ukraine. In a report dated February 18, 2022, Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/18/ukraine-shelling-residential-areas-puts-civilians-risk">raised concerns</a> about the shelling of residential areas in Ukraine by Russian-backed groups, a tactic Russia has been repeatedly accused of pursuing in Syria.</p>
<p>At the same time Russian state television <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/01/russian-talkshows-media-fake-reports-military-ukraine">is describing videos</a> of missiles striking Ukrainian cities and reports of Russian soldiers killed in action as “fakes”, as the country’s media try to account for information emerging from Ukraine that contradict official reports of the invasion.</p>
<p>While claims surrounding military deaths support narratives of winning or losing a war, with each side maintaining their enemy is suffering greater losses, combatant deaths are less problematic than civilian ones, because combatants are legitimate targets, whereas non-combatants are “protected persons”, according to <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-what-the-rules-of-war-tell-us-about-the-deliberate-targeting-of-civilians-178691">international law</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-what-the-rules-of-war-tell-us-about-the-deliberate-targeting-of-civilians-178691">Ukraine: what the rules of war tell us about the deliberate targeting of civilians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Collateral damage?</h2>
<p>Russia is not the first country to be accused of under-reporting civilian casualties. It was a feature of “the war on terror”. In 2002 General Tommy Franks made a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/02/world/nation-war-casualties-us-military-has-no-count-iraqi-dead-fighting.html">statement</a> that the US “don’t do body counts”, admitting to the significant undercounting of civilian deaths by the US-led coalition in the campaign against ISIS since 2014. In the west, civilian deaths <a href="https://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/the-price-of-loss/">are often referred to as</a> “collateral damage” and are always “regrettable”.</p>
<p>In May 2019, the US Department of Defense <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002126767/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-CIVILIAN-CASUALTIES-IN-CONNECTION-WITH-US-MILITARY-OPERATIONS.PDF">released a report</a> to account for civilian casualties of US military activities in 2018: 120 deaths and 65 injuries in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. It also acknowledged 793 civilian deaths in Iraq and Syria as a result of US and coalition military activities in 2017. While certainly an undercount – Iraq Body Count, an organisation which has been tallying deaths form the conflict in Iraq, and Airwars <a href="https://airwars.org/news-and-investigations/tens-of-thousands-of-civilians-likely-killed-by-us-in-forever-wars/">estimate these numbers</a> to be in the tens of thousands – there is at least some attempt to accept responsibility for harms inflicted.</p>
<p>Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-ukraine-invasion-war-lavrov-b2027544.html">recently declared</a> that Russia did not “invent collateral damage” with Ukraine: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’m not justifying any actions that lead to deaths of civilians, but it wasn’t us who invented this collateral damage. This was invented by our western partners from their adventures in Iraq, in Libya and so on. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It may be the closest Russia ever comes to admitting some degree of civilian harm in the wars it fights.</p>
<p>But, denials, explanations and justifications aside, the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/children-killed-ukraine-war-b2031914.html">deaths of children</a> like Alisa (7) Polina (10) and her brother Semyon (5) killed in bombings and shootings show that when a state invades, no one is safe.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lily Hamourtziadou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia denies targeting civilians. But it was the same with its bombing campaign in Syria.Lily Hamourtziadou, Senior Lecturer in Security Studies, Birmingham City UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1788362022-03-15T12:16:05Z2022-03-15T12:16:05ZPutin puts international justice on trial – betting that the age of impunity will continue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451997/original/file-20220314-101106-1r6jxz0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C67%2C4985%2C3255&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A pregnant woman is carried away from a shelled maternity hospital. She later died.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarMaternityHospital/0c824c429f0f4bfbb1c5cea372219a22/photo?Query=maternity%20ukraine&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=136&currentItemNo=5">AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Images of pregnant women <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-europe-2bed71c00916d44ea951c5809b446db3">fleeing a bombed maternity ward</a> in Mariupol, Ukraine, raised again the question of how far the Russian military will be willing to go to conquer the country – and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/3/10/is-russia-committing-war-crimes-by-bombing-hospitals-in-ukraine">whether war crimes are being committed</a>.</p>
<p>In just over two weeks of the invasion, <a href="https://extranet.who.int/ssa/LeftMenu/Index.aspx?utm_source=Stopping%20attacks%20on%20health%20care%20QandA&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=Link_who">the World Health Organization has verified</a> 39 attacks by Russians on health care facilities. Ukraine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/11/first-thing-russian-forces-have-killed-more-civilians-than-soldiers?utm_term=622b4edc7d657dbab80fe20b1e5cd689&utm_campaign=GuardianTodayUS&utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&CMP=GTUS_email">claims more civilians</a> than Ukrainian soldiers have already been killed. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf">International humanitarian law</a>, constituting agreements between countries on the laws of conduct in war, requires militaries to avoid the deliberate targeting of civilians and the use of weapons like cluster munitions that are indiscriminate – in other words, have a high chance of affecting civilians. </p>
<p>It also calls on warring nations to prevent extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, such as schools, residential buildings and hospitals. Simply stated, under these criteria, <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-icc-is-investigating-war-crimes-in-ukraine-could-putin-be-indicted-178005">war crimes</a> take place when there is excessive destruction, suffering and civilian casualties. Rape, torture, forced displacement and other actions may also constitute war crimes.</p>
<p>There are other international crimes, including genocide and crimes against humanity. The latter consists of similar acts like rape and murder <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml">undertaken as part of widespread or systematic attack</a> directed against a civilian population.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/hrc/inglis-shelley.php">scholar of human rights and the law</a>, I believe there is clear evidence that Russia has already engaged in violations of international law, including war crimes. Although the potential for holding Russian commanders, and even President Vladimir Putin, accountable and punishing them for international crimes is more likely than in the past, the path is likely long and difficult. Moreover, it is unknown what effect, if any, the specter of prosecution will have on the course of the war.</p>
<p>That’s because international justice has been unable to either prevent or prosecute many perpetrators of war crimes in the past decade.</p>
<h2>History repeating</h2>
<p>International law experts point to <a href="https://theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1010764/putins-brutal-record-in-chechnya-and-syria-is-ominous-for-ukraine">the earlier ravages of Russian military actions in both Chechnya and Syria</a> as an indicator of the tactics Putin is willing to use in the invasion of Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia fought two wars against the breakaway republic of Chechnya in the years following the fall of the Soviet Union. The second – in which Putin cut his teeth as a wartime leader – was seen as particularly brutal.</p>
<p>During that 1999-2000 conflict, advocacy group <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/2000/04/chech0421.htm">Human Rights Watch collected evidence</a> that Russia <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west#">carpet-bombed the capital Grozny and other towns</a>, causing heavy civilian casualties – estimates run into <a href="https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/5415049">the tens of thousands killed</a> – and leaving much of the capital destroyed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman dragging a cart walks away from the edifice of buildings destroyed by missiles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=422&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452002/original/file-20220314-26-kj93iu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=530&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The city of Grozny was destroyed by Russian shells.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/this-combination-of-photos-created-on-july-29-shows-a-news-photo/1158372463?adppopup=true">Alexander Nemenov/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There is also compelling evidence that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed during Russia’s occupation of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=20220310-prosecutor-statement-georgia">South Ossetia in Georgia in 2008</a> and in relation to its annexation of <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201211-otp-statement-ukraine">Crimea and engagement in eastern Donbas region</a> in Ukraine in 2014.</p>
<p>In 2015, Russia participated in Syria’s civil war on the side of President Bashar al-Assad by providing Russian air support to Syria’s army. According to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/russia/syria-war-crimes-month-bombing-aleppo">Human Rights Watch</a>, the aerial bombardment of Aleppo supported by the Russians in 2016 was “recklessly indiscriminate, deliberately targeted at least one medical facility, and included the use of indiscriminate weapons such as cluster munitions and incendiary weapons.” </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/russia-committed-war-crimes-in-syria-finds-un-report">United Nations concluded</a> that the Russian air force was <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=25638&LangID=E">responsible for war crimes in the Syrian province of Idlib in 2019</a>, having bombed indiscriminately a major marketplace and a displaced persons camp, killing and injuring scores of men, women and children. Russian denied any culpability. And no charges against Putin or Russian military commanders have ever been formally pursued internationally for alleged crimes in Chechnya or Syria. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/11/politics/joe-biden-warning-chemical-weapons/index.html">United States recently raised</a> the prospect of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity">Russia’s deploying prohibited chemical weapons</a> in Ukraine. If it does so, it will be following the lead of Putin ally Assad, whose government <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity">is known for its use of prohibited chemical weapons</a> against civilians in Syria.</p>
<p>Either way, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/09/russian-ukraine-war-will-get-worse-before-it-gets-better-army-secretary-christine-wormuth-says.html">military experts</a> expect Russia’s tactics in Ukraine to only intensify in its brutality and disregard for the laws of war.</p>
<h2>In search of accountability</h2>
<p><a href="https://opiniojuris.org/2022/02/25/more-than-rhetoric-international-criminal-justice-crime-semantics-and-the-role-of-the-icc-in-the-ukraine-conflict/">Many scholars</a> pin their hopes for accountability on <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/">the International Criminal Court</a>, which was established under the Rome Statute in 1998 with 123 states parties. <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-international-criminal-court">The aim of the court</a> is to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. </p>
<p>Although neither Russia nor Ukraine is a party to the Rome Statute, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/7/is-putin-likely-to-face-the-icc-over-russias-actions-in-ukraine">ICC has initiated an investigation</a> into alleged crimes based on <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1146">a special declaration by Ukraine</a>. This gives the ICC legal authority to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes committed in Ukraine since 2014. </p>
<p>But while this early action means that evidence might be collected in real time and speed up the usually slow process of international justice, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/icc-faces-myriad-challenges-prosecute-war-crimes-ukraine-2022-03-04/">there are still substantial problems in prosecuting these alleged crimes</a>. </p>
<p>The standards set for proving massive and complex international crimes are more daunting than for domestic crimes. It is even harder to <a href="https://theconversation.com/civilians-are-being-killed-in-ukraine-so-why-is-investigating-war-crimes-so-difficult-178155">prove command responsibility by a head of state</a>, such as Putin, particularly when there is no cooperation between the ICC and the country of the accused. <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/prosecuting-heads-of-state/F6143E3825D0C7EACA922A0E9BF1C9A5">Successful cases are few</a> and have taken place only after a leader’s fall from power and only if the court has cooperation with the country. That’s how Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia was prosecuted by the <a href="https://www.icty.org/">International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</a>. Similarly, former President Charles Taylor of Liberia was prosecuted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. </p>
<p>Other options for criminal trials <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/03/russia-war-crimes-putin-prosecute.html">exist outside the ICC but also face major obstacles</a>. Advocates have harnessed <a href="https://lieber.westpoint.edu/water-finds-way-universal-jurisdiction-justice-syria/">the concept of universal jurisdiction</a> – inspired by <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/chile98/index.htm">the efforts of Spain to bring former dictator Augusto Pinochet of Chile</a> to justice – to bring perpetrators of war crimes in Syria to trial in European courts. </p>
<p><a href="http://opiniojuris.org/2022/03/08/de-bunking-the-role-of-international-law-in-the-ukrainian-conflict/">Legal experts are also</a> looking at the prosecution of Putin and Russian leadership directly for <a href="https://crimeofaggression.info/role-of-the-icc/definition-of-the-crime-of-aggression/">the crime of aggression</a> in regards to Ukraine. </p>
<p>For this crime, the ICC does not have legal authority to prosecute Putin without a U.N. Security Council referral. Given that Russia has a seat on the Security Council, where it wields a veto, that won’t happen. Options include establishing a special tribunal by Ukraine <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80395/united-nations-response-options-to-russias-aggression-opportunities-and-rabbit-holes/">with U.N. General Assembly endorsement</a> or other international support. </p>
<p>But the ICC and special courts are “made from scratch” institutions, with limited capacity and without a police force. Practically, getting Putin or other Russian leaders into any court is an issue. For example, the ICC still struggles <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir">to capture former Sudan President Omar al-Bashir, accused of genocide and other crimes in Darfur</a>, despite issuing arrest warrants for him in 2009 and 2010. </p>
<h2>Age of impunity</h2>
<p>Advocates point out <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-05-13/age-impunity">that impunity</a> – the ability to escape responsibility for violations of international law – has been on the rise for many years, along with authoritarianism.</p>
<p>That means the initiation of criminal investigations might have little impact on the calculations of Putin, senior Russian leadership or commanders and soldiers on the ground in Ukraine. Some <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Simmons_Paper.pdf">international law experts argue</a> that even where actual prosecution and punishment might not be immediate, actors who care about their legitimacy domestically or internationally are more likely to be deterred from committing more crimes by potential prosecutions. However, there are no <a href="https://internationallaw.blog/2017/04/06/the-approach-to-deterrence-in-the-practice-of-the-international-criminal-court/">firm conclusions</a> about the preventive or deterrent effect of international justice. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The actions of Russia in Ukraine <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/14/vladimir-putin-war-crimes-icc-sajid-javid-hague">might spur investigations at an unprecedented</a> pace. And the ICC can issue <a href="https://iccforum.com/rome-statute#Article58">arrest warrants in order to prevent the further commission of crimes</a>. Such warrants would affect the accused’s ability to travel and officially represent the country.</p>
<p>When, or if, the formal label of accused “war criminal” gets attached to specific Russian names, it is possible that the prospect of accountability will become a more significant factor in the decision-making of those responsible for the ruthless war in Ukraine. But it will still be too late for the many victims already being identified.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178836/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shelley Inglis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin has a history of flattening cities in time of conflict. But alleged war crimes in Chechnya and Syria never resulted in charges, let alone prosecutions. Will Ukraine be any different?Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1641522021-12-14T18:23:39Z2021-12-14T18:23:39ZPandemic, war and environmental disaster push scientists to deliver quick answers – here’s what it takes to do good science under pressure<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435919/original/file-20211206-140267-1cr6m9q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=881%2C0%2C4230%2C2690&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic lends urgency to scientific research, putting researchers under pressure to produce.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/laboratory-team-working-on-coronavirus-vaccine-royalty-free-image/1251892829">janiecbros/E+ via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>How can you know that science done quickly during a crisis is good science? </p>
<p>This question has taken on new relevance with the COVID-19 vaccine rollout. Researchers developed vaccines in <a href="https://connect.uclahealth.org/2020/12/10/the-fastest-vaccine-in-history/">under a year</a> – <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03626-1">easily breaking the previous record of four years</a>. But that pace of development <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/29/us/vaccine-skepticism-beliefs.html">may be part of the reason</a> about 1 in 7 unvaccinated adults in the U.S. <a href="https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/poll-finding/kff-covid-19-vaccine-monitor-november-2021/">say they will never get the COVID-19 shot</a>. This is in spite of continued <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fauci-receives-vaccine-extremely-confident-effective/story?id=74859728">assurances from infectious disease experts</a> that <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-vaccines-were-developed-in-record-time-but-are-these-game-changers-safe-150249">the vaccines are safe</a>.</p>
<p>Scientists are called on to come up with answers under pressure whenever there is a crisis, from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/02/us/challenger-columbia-and-the-nature-of-calamity.html">Challenger space shuttle explosion</a> to the <a href="https://research.ucdavis.edu/how-researchers-are-responding-to-mitigate-californias-wildfire-crisis/">2020 California wildfires</a>. As they shift from “regular” to “crisis” research, they must maintain rigorous standards despite long hours, mentally demanding tasks and persistent outside scrutiny. Thankfully, science produced under urgent conditions <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aax5052">can be just as robust and safe</a> as results produced under normal conditions. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=QuvnahQAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">We are two social</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=nj8nAbIAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scientists interested</a> in understanding how researchers can best work on urgent problems and deliver useful findings.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.15195/v8.a22">In a recent study</a>, we focused on “conflict archaeologists,” an interdisciplinary group tasked with rapid assessments of archaeological destruction in Syria during the war between 2014 and 2017. Observers feared that one particular form of destruction, artifact looting, was a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/opinion/isis-antiquities-sideline.html">major source of revenue</a> for terrorist groups, including the Islamic State. <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/231992.htm">Prominent policymakers</a>, security officials and a worried public wanted clear answers, quickly. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412204/original/file-20210720-21-17ywyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="John Kerry giving speech at lectern in front of Syrian artifacts." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412204/original/file-20210720-21-17ywyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412204/original/file-20210720-21-17ywyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412204/original/file-20210720-21-17ywyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412204/original/file-20210720-21-17ywyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412204/original/file-20210720-21-17ywyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412204/original/file-20210720-21-17ywyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/412204/original/file-20210720-21-17ywyd2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Then-Secretary of State John Kerry praised the work of crisis archaeologists as ‘the gold standard’ in a 2014 speech about the looting of cultural artifacts.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://sy.usembassy.gov/education-culture/cultural-events/">U.S. Department of State</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By any measure, conflict archaeologists succeeded. <a href="https://theconversation.com/were-just-beginning-to-grasp-the-toll-of-the-islamic-states-archaeological-looting-in-syria-116645">They produced findings</a> that improved <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0188589">scientific knowledge</a>. Their research led to a <a href="https://uscbs.org/news/president-signs-engel-bill-stop-isis-looting-antiquities/">landmark bipartisan bill</a> signed by President Obama. Perhaps most importantly, they raised public awareness of the problems associated with looting and smuggling archaeological materials.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.15195/v8.a22">Our latest research aimed to understand</a> how work cultures played a role in these achievements – and what lessons can be applied in crisis science across disciplines.</p>
<h2>What worked for conflict archaeologists</h2>
<p>To investigate, we interviewed 35 conflict archaeologists and other scientists who worked with them. We also observed work in satellite labs and team meetings, and talked to people who used the data and analysis created by conflict archaeologists.</p>
<p>Those we interviewed worked in different physical locations and across multiple disciplines. If they met, they would do so remotely. And yet they were generally aware of what others in this research area were doing. Collaboration is central to doing good urgent science, and we found three key factors behind successfully working together during a crisis.</p>
<p>First, the percentage and distribution of effort matters. We call this “temporal control.” We found that full-time devotion to crisis science was not necessarily the only way to produce good work. In fact, researchers involved on a part-time basis expressed higher confidence in the quality of other collaborators’ work. We think part-timers were able to maintain a more comprehensive perspective on the collaboration overall.</p>
<p>And keeping a hand in their usual scientific practices seemed to help researchers stay sharp. It meant that when they turned to urgent science tasks, they could do so with fresh eyes and renewed attention to methodological precision.</p>
<p>Second, sharing responsibility for outcomes motivated researchers to generate rapid findings for policy and public-interest needs. We call this “responsibility control.” Effective conflict archaeologists distributed credit among collaborators. They translated their objectives and priorities for policymakers and set boundaries and expectations for understanding and using their findings. As a result, they could do their work with the knowledge that they stood with a team – producing accurate findings that could be used to combat artifact looting and trafficking was not any one individual’s sole responsibility.</p>
<p>[<em>Too busy to read another daily email?</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-toobusy">Get one of The Conversation’s curated weekly newsletters</a>.]</p>
<p>Finally, it was important to have limits around the extent of an individual’s personal involvement. This is “scope control,” a work environment that helped scientists set boundaries between the research and their personal lives. “It was exhausting,” one respondent told us. “I tried not to take the work home with me, but I know it was starting to affect my family life.”</p>
<p>Scientists who were able to control the scope of their work, and to speak openly about their challenges, were more likely to stick with the project and express confidence in the strength of the research. We hypothesize that those who are able to set borders around what and how much work they took on were in a better position to assess the strength of both their own research and that of others – and thus feel confident in it.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435921/original/file-20211206-25-svpv87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="soldiers with guns ride in pickup trucks through ancient city of Palmyra" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435921/original/file-20211206-25-svpv87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/435921/original/file-20211206-25-svpv87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435921/original/file-20211206-25-svpv87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435921/original/file-20211206-25-svpv87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435921/original/file-20211206-25-svpv87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435921/original/file-20211206-25-svpv87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/435921/original/file-20211206-25-svpv87.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Crisis science can be triggered by any number of external challenging conditions.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-taken-on-march-3-2017-shows-syrian-government-news-photo/647612170">Stringer/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Creating the conditions for good crisis science</h2>
<p>Generating high-quality, safe and reliable scientific research under pressure is not a matter of having a heroic personality or superhuman stamina. It is a matter of thoughtful, deliberate work environments and being part of professional fields that support their members even as they hold them to high standards of rigor and ethics.</p>
<p>To be sure, no two crises are identical. At the same time, <a href="https://www.amacad.org/publication/science-during-crisis/section/1">crisis science best practices</a> can be adapted to fit the specific circumstances of the project. Global pandemics or imminent environmental catastrophe may require short, intensive, full-time bursts of work. Some research projects are lab- or equipment-sensitive and require specific personnel. As our findings show, science conducted with a supportive infrastructure, with rigor and ethics built into the process, can produce reliable results under pressure.</p>
<p>Like COVID-19 researchers, conflict archaeologists worked with tight deadlines under intense scrutiny. Both groups also emphasized the need for researchers to continue to employ <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331507/WHO-RFH-20.1-eng.pdf">high ethical standards</a> in the research process.</p>
<p>And understanding <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phaa017">how scientists maintain their ethics </a> and rigor while working under difficult conditions is essential for maintaining the <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/trend/archive/winter-2021/why-we-must-rebuild-trust-in-science">public’s trust in science</a>. </p>
<p>This much is certain: Crises aren’t going away. As long as society is relying on scientists for solutions, it’s important to create conditions conducive to effective research.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164152/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fiona Greenland receives funding from the National Science Foundation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle D. Fabiani receives funding from the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>Scientists can be asked to help find solutions during disasters. A study of how archaeologists worked on the problem of looting during the Syrian war offers lessons for science done during crisis.Fiona Greenland, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of VirginiaMichelle D. Fabiani, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of New HavenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721972021-11-23T11:51:16Z2021-11-23T11:51:16ZCollateral damage: crushing the myths of accuracy and accountability in modern warfare<p>The US military is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/14/us-confirms-2019-airstrike-hit-crowd-of-syrian-women-and-children">facing allegations</a> it covered up civilian casualty cases in the US-led coalition war against Islamic State (IS). It’s an issue that has drawn attention to one of the most worrying aspects of US and coalition involvement in the Middle East: the large numbers of civilian casualties or what has come to be known as “collateral damage”. </p>
<p>On November 13 2021, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/us/us-airstrikes-civilian-deaths.html">the New York Times</a> revealed that over 70 people had been killed in an F-15 airstrike on the Syrian town of Baghuz in 2019. Legal officers flagged the incident as a possible war crime at the time and requested an investigation. </p>
<p>But this investigation never took place. Instead, information on the strike was buried, inconvenient questions were ignored, reports were “deleted, sanitised and classified”, and defence analyst Gene Tate, the whistleblower in question, was fired. Only after he finally turned to the media, the Pentagon acknowledged that there had been 80 deaths. That these casualties were civilians was not acknowledged - and nor was the potential for this to have been a war crime. The Pentagon maintained that the civilian identity of the people killed was impossible to determine because women and children in IS sometimes took up arms.</p>
<p>The Baghuz airstrike is not an isolated event. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211038801">Recent research</a> on a Dutch-led coalition airstrike on an IS weapons factory in the Iraqi town of Hawija in 2015 that killed over 70 civilians shows that neither the shocking civilian death toll nor its denial and cover-up are unique. Dutch politicians initially denied responsibility for any civilian casualties – then attempted to keep civilian casualty numbers classified in the name of “operational security”. </p>
<p>When journalists irrefutably demonstrated that the Hawija attack had been carried out by the Netherlands, here too officials claimed nobody could know if the people killed were civilians or IS fighters.</p>
<p>This denying that casualties take place and questioning their civilian identity is a systematic feature of the remote war waged against IS. Respected monitoring agency Airwars <a href="https://airwars.org/conflict/coalition-in-iraq-and-syria/">estimates</a> that between 8,150 and 13,174 civilians have been killed in the wake of the 35,000 airstrikes that were conducted since the war began in 2014 (and which destroyed over 70% of cities such as Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria). Yet the coalition as a whole acknowledges just over 10% of these (1,417).</p>
<h2>‘Precision warfare’</h2>
<p>The US-led coalition war against IS is a good example of how advanced militaries are turning to remote warfare. <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010618777890">Remote warfare</a> is characterised by a shift away from “boots on the ground”. It involves drone and airstrikes and special-operation teams training local forces to do the actual <a href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ORG_RemoteControl_SecCoop.pdf">fighting and dying</a>. This “zero-risk warfare” is appealing to western democratic leaders: with fewer returning body bags, they no longer fear public outcry and electoral losses.</p>
<p>Remote war is sold to the public by emphasising things like the “precision” of the missiles and the “care” taken to avoid civilian casualties. The US coalition commander, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/15/reports-of-civilian-casualties-from-coalition-strikes-on-isis-are-vastly-inflated-lt-gen-townsend-cjtf-oir/">Stephen J Townsend,</a> for instance, challenged anyone to find a more “precise air campaign in the history of warfare … The coalition’s goal is always for zero human casualties.” </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-warfare-precision-missiles-will-not-stop-civilian-deaths-heres-why-171905">Modern warfare: 'precision' missiles will not stop civilian deaths – here's why</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>For coalition strategists, this new sort of “<a href="https://intimacies-of-remote-warfare.nl/publications/perfect-war-and-its-contestations/">perfect warfare</a>”, based on “smart technologies” and “proportionality principles” allows them – in principle at least – to save the lives of not just western military personnel, but also friendly civilians.</p>
<h2>Denial, secrecy and the impossibility of knowing</h2>
<p>So, incidents that involve mass civilian casualties have the potential to undercut the legitimacy of not just a particular operation, but the new nature of warfare more broadly. This is why in situations such as the two outlined above, <a href="https://airwars.org/news-and-investigations/pentagon-revelations-increase-pressure-on-european-militaries-to-acknowledge-killing-civilians/">western governments are secretive</a> about the civilian harm their remote attacks cause and go to great lengths to keep these quiet. </p>
<p>To uphold the myth of a “clean war”, officials turn to routine strategies of denial (“civilians didn’t die”) and secrecy (“we cannot disclose whether civilians died because of operational security”). If, however, civilian casualties can no longer be kept under wraps, officials resort to emphasising the sheer impossibility of knowing the identity of those targeted. With this, they ironically undermine their own precision discourse: exactly because strikes take place far away and there are no boots on the ground, it apparently is impossible to determine who died. </p>
<p>Regarding Hawija, the Dutch Ministry of Defence <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211038801">initially claimed</a> that only Centcom – the American central command that led the war against IS – had the authority and the capacity to establish the occurrence of civilian casualties in Hawija. </p>
<p>But when Centcom subsequently acknowledged the 70 casualties were part of its official civilian body count, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211038801">the Dutch defence minister Ank Bijleveld argued</a> that even Centcom could never know the true civilian nature of the casualties, because of “the difficulty of distinguishing retrospectively between IS fighters and civilians”. In many ways, the US responses to Baghuz echo this logic, by stating that the civilian identity of the 80 people killed was inherently impossible to determine.</p>
<h2>Remote warfare and accountability</h2>
<p>This systematic and strategic refusal to “know about” the harm done to civilians undermines transparency, recognition and accountability for human suffering in remote wars. It also undermines the ability of western citizens and parliaments to exert democratic control over the wars waged in their name. This will make western advanced militaries more – not less – war prone, and allows for the continued unaccountable killing of civilians. </p>
<p>Monitoring organisations, journalists, academics and military whistleblowers are doing their best to uncover and make visible the asymmetrical death and suffering that occurs in remote wars. It is now up to people in the west and their governments to care and question the logic of this type of violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Western militaries all too often try to hide the fact of civilian casualties as they spoil the popular narrative of a “clean” war.Lauren Gould, Assistant Professor, Conflict Studies, Utrecht UniversityJolle Demmers, Professor in Conflict Studies, Utrecht UniversityNora Stel, Assistant Professor in Conflict Studies, Radboud UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1719052021-11-19T16:08:32Z2021-11-19T16:08:32ZModern warfare: ‘precision’ missiles will not stop civilian deaths – here’s why<p>Modern guided missiles and bombs are capable of incredible, almost science-fiction-like precision. To research my book, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Reaper-Force-Inside-Britains-Drone/dp/1789460786/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr=">Reaper Force</a>, about the lives of drone operators, I was allowed to watch RAF MQ-9 Reaper drones in real-time action in Syria. </p>
<p>I sat with a three-person crew at a ground-control station in <a href="https://www.creech.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/449127/history-of-creech-air-force-base/">Creech Air Force Base</a> in Nevada as they killed an Islamic State fighter with a <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/03/22/agm-114-hellfire-missile/">Hellfire precision-guided missile</a>. The Reaper drone being piloted was flying 20,000 feet above its target. He was on a moving motorcycle when the missile hit him. </p>
<p>Missile accuracy is judged by how close it gets to its aiming point. Precision refers to the <a href="https://geographicalimaginations.com/tag/hellfire-missile/">size and predictability</a> of the explosive blast. The strike I watched was accurate and precise and no civilians were hurt. </p>
<h2>Degrees of precision</h2>
<p>Air-launched missile technology continues to advance rapidly. The 100-pound Hellfire missile was developed to destroy armoured tanks, and its laser targeting is the most accurate system in regular use. It included <a href="https://man.fas.org/dod-101/sys/land/wsh2011/128.pdf">20 pounds</a> of explosive charge, though recent versions use less explosives to reduce the risk of collateral damage and civilian deaths. </p>
<p>Having said that, precision can only take you so far: governments do not publish lethal blast-radius information, but a video released by the UK’s Ministry of Defence shows a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-LvWMZKusEs">Hellfire blast</a> radius of several metres. Blast is also affected by the angle at which a missile hits a target, the local topography and any nearby structures which might absorb some of the explosion. Also, even <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2018/11/06/how-do-military-pilots-aim-guided-weapons-through-clouds/">light clouds</a> can disrupt the laser beams that laser-guided missiles like the Hellfire rely on to hit their targets accurately.</p>
<p>This is still much more accurate than more traditional bombs, though these are being improved for accuracy too. Traditional unguided 500-pound, 1,000-pound and 2,000-pound “dumb” bombs are being converted into “smart” Guided Bomb Units (GBU) by attaching a <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104572/joint-direct-attack-munition-gbu-313238/">Joint Direct Attack Munition</a> (JDAM) guidance tail kit. </p>
<p>The JDAM contains <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/inertial-navigation-system">inertial navigation</a> – an internal computer and gyroscopes to ensure it flies straight – as well as global positioning-system guidance capabilities. They can only hit coordinates and can’t “see” or avoid civilians, though unlike the Hellfire missiles, they are not affected by cloud cover. The 2,000-pound version can be lethal up to <a href="https://aoav.org.uk/2016/large-destructive-radius-air-dropped-bombs-the-mark-80-series-and-paveway-attachments/">several hundred metres</a> away but the guidance kit enables them to strike between [10 and 30 metres] of their targets. </p>
<h2>Danger to civilians</h2>
<p>The development of more precise missiles and guided bombs does not automatically mean a reduction in civilian deaths. For one thing, “precision” is not about protecting civilians so much as making these weapons “<a href="https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1232889/block-5-mq-9-debuts-in-combat/">more lethal</a>”.</p>
<p>A whole range of factors affect the civilian risk during a “precision” attack. These include the size and explosive yield of the missile or bomb; the training and experience of the aircrew involved; the quality of the military intelligence; and the operational environment in which the attack is made. </p>
<p>Political implications for the countries involved are also a factor. The British government, for example, has faced <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/david-cameron-justifies-drone-strikes-in-syria-against-britons-fighting-for-isis">public scrutiny</a> for civilian deaths in air strikes in a way that, say, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has not.</p>
<p>Much also depends on the <a href="https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/OLH_2015_Ch5.pdf">rules of engagement</a> – or legal guidance, because they will set out how many civilians a government is prepared, or not, to allow its air force to kill in pursuit of its military campaign objectives.</p>
<h2>Law of war</h2>
<p>The law of war – which includes the Geneva Conventions – requires civilians to <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E">be protected</a> in war and not attacked. But – and this is not commonly understood – the law allows civilians to be legally killed in some circumstances: where the number of deaths is judged by the attacker not to be “excessive in relation to the concrete and <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E">[direct military advantage]</a> anticipated”. So if a target is judged to be valuable enough, and the military advantage important enough, civilians can and will be killed.</p>
<p>On August 29 2021, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/sep/17/us-military-strike-afghanistan-civilians-islamic-state-pentagon">ten Afghan civilians</a> were killed by a Hellfire missile from a US Reaper drone. The precision of the missile did not save them. The crew responsible made the mistake through a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2831896/air-force-official-briefs-media-on-deadly-drone-strike-in-kabul/">combination of</a> human error, miscommunication and the fact that the family’s Toyota Corolla had been wrongly identified as the car of an important ISIS target. </p>
<p>Lieutenant General Sami Said, the US air force inspector general, described it as “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2832634/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-and-air-force-lt-gen-sami-d-said-hold-a-p/">an honest mistake</a>”. His enquiry also found that the crew had not broken the law of war. </p>
<h2>Sometimes harming civilians is the point</h2>
<p>Sometimes air power is also used to directly target or coerce civilian populations. For example, in 2016 Amnesty International reported air attacks by Russian forces on Syrian hospitals. Six hospitals or medical facilities <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/03/syrian-and-russian-forces-targeting-hospitals-as-a-strategy-of-war/">were bombed</a> in three months in areas controlled by forces opposed to the Syrian government. Dozens of civilians were killed or injured. This, despite hospitals being <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/380-600022?OpenDocument">explicitly protected</a> under international humanitarian law. </p>
<p>Direct hits on all of those hospitals indicate the operational effectiveness of the aircraft and weapons involved. Russia was open about its use of <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/home/2015/10/18/russia-shows-early-success-new-capabilities-in-syria/">“precision” weapons</a> by its air force in Syria at the time. Putin spoke of Russia acting in Syria in support of its government within “the <a href="http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548">norms of international law</a>”. When he referred to Russian strike aircraft producing “<a href="http://en.special.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548">positive results</a>"m, it was about keeping Syria’s government in power, not protecting civilians.</p>
<h2>What does the future hold?</h2>
<p>As aerial firepower has become more sophisticated, the risks of civilian deaths also rise for other reasons. For example, IS has repeatedly demonstrated effective methods of reducing its enemy’s aerial advantage, such as resorting to urban warfare and creating a network of tunnels under cities such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-idUSKCN12J1OX">Mosul</a> and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqi-troops-face-booby-traps-tunnels-packed-with-explosives-as-they-advance-on-fallujah/2016/06/11/97dd7314-2f19-11e6-b9d5-3c3063f8332c_story.html?utm_term=.efbe7f089551&itid=lk_inline_manual_5">Fallujah</a> in Iraq.</p>
<p>In urban warfare it is impossible to avoid all civilian deaths. A camera in the sky cannot tell if there are civilians out of sight behind walls, in buildings, under trees or in tunnels. Choosing not to shoot is the only sure protection for civilians in unclear circumstances.</p>
<p>For all these reasons, no degree of missile precision will stop the tragedy of civilian deaths in war. And wars show no sign of ending. Perhaps it is time for a more honest dialogue about the limits of technology and the human costs involved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The technical and political issues at play in launching air attacks that may harm civilians.Peter Lee, Professor of Applied Ethics and Director, Security and Risk Research, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1718482021-11-15T15:22:43Z2021-11-15T15:22:43ZDeaths from landmines are on the rise – and clearing them all will take decades<p>Nearly quarter of a century after most of the world <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/anti-personnel-landmines-convention/">signed a convention outlawing</a> the use of antipersonnel landmines, the number of people being killed or maimed by these insidious and lethal weapons remains high – and rising. The <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/landmine-monitor-2021.aspx">Landmine Monitor for 2021</a>, released on November 10, reported 7,073 casualties in 2020, including 2,492 people killed and 4,561 wounded. </p>
<p>This is a significant increase on the 5,554 people killed and wounded in 2019. Syria was the worst affected country, reporting 2,729 casualties. The report says that the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by insurgents, many of which were deliberately aimed against the civilian population. Other countries with more than 100 recorded casualties in 2020 were Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen, </p>
<p>One of the worst things about this is that many of these people will have died or been maimed by a mine that was laid years, perhaps even decades, previously, but which have not yet been detected and neutralised.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rspa.2019.0791">research at the University of Sheffield</a> has, for the past decade, been looking at quantifying how the soil around landmines changes how deadly they are. According to the Landmine Monitor report, about 5,000 square kilometers are known to need clearing of mines. By my calculation, at the current rate of clearance this will take about 34 years and cost around £14 billion.</p>
<h2>Indiscriminate war crimes</h2>
<p>Historically, military forces deployed anti-personnel mines (those designed to explode in the presence, proximity or contact of a person) to create defensive barriers or to deny access to specific regions or facilities. Military use requires regions to be marked as minefields – not marking out mine-infested regions is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.40_CCW%20P-II%20as%20amended.pdf">regarded as a war crime</a> under the Geneva Convention. Once conflicts are over, these mines are left behind, which has a devastating effect on the local population for decades to come.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/two-decades-after-they-were-banned-its-time-to-make-landmines-war-crimes-88054">Two decades after they were banned, it's time to make landmines war crimes</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Landmines are indiscriminate in their destructive power, being triggered by soldiers and children alike (more than half the casualties in the 2021 report were children). This, combined with the fact that they can lie unexploded for decades before then killing or maiming innocent people, led to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, known informally as the <a href="https://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/text_status/Ottawa_Convention_English.pdf">Ottawa Convention</a>. </p>
<p>While 164 states have signed up to the treaty – including the UK – many of the world’s major military powers still have not, notably Russia, China, and, thanks to the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-51332541">Trump administration’s U-turn</a>, the USA. Other non-signatories include many of those countries with active mine fields, including Syria, Egypt and Myanmar.</p>
<p>The difficulties in rehabilitating mined areas are not to be underestimated, taking both time and money to complete – which is why many mine-strewn areas take such a long time to clear. A common misconception is that if the production of anti-personnel mines ceased and stockpiles destroyed that the problem would start to diminish. </p>
<h2>IEDs – the next generation</h2>
<p>Sadly, in areas such as Afghanistan, where the highest number of casualties <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/landmine-monitor-2021/major-findings.aspx">have been recorded</a> over the past 20 years, the threat is not from standard landmines but from homemade buried IEDs. Unmarked, with a range of different triggering techniques from pressure plates to triggers placed under innocuous objects such as rocks, it is easy to see why children are disproportionately injured and killed due to their inquisitive nature. </p>
<p>Improvised mines are used by anti-government elements as a <a href="https://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-June21/statements/7-afghanistan.pdf">“weapon of choice”</a>. The flexibility in deployment and triggering mechanisms of these improvised mines make the clearance of areas even more dangerous, especially in areas that are still in a state of political unrest – where the demining personnel can themselves become the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-57410265">target of attacks</a>.</p>
<p>One often-overlooked aspect is the lasting effect on local communities. In areas such as Syria, occupying forces in retreat actively target both the local facilities and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-sinai-booby-traps-homes-islamic-state">homes of those</a> displaced. This has the effect of prolonging the trauma of the conflict for populations returning after the supposed end of a conflict. </p>
<p>The type of homemade device is also always evolving, making it more difficult – and dangerous – to train demining staff. While mines were once used purely as a military tactic to deny hostile military forces access to a strategically important area, now they are often used to impose the values of retreating forces. Islamic State is one terrorist group that uses mines to target community education facilities like <a href="https://icct.nl/publication/the-threat-of-the-islamic-states-extensive-use-of-improvised-explosives/">schools and swimming pools</a>, adding to the oppression of local people.</p>
<h2>Making a difference</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.undp.org/blog/how-landmines-hinder-development">United Nations Development Programme</a> with the help of charities such as the <a href="https://www.halotrust.org/">Halo Trust</a> work with local volunteers to clear these areas once the occupying forces have left. It’s a process which requires specialist equipment, training and time. A key part of the process is learning to live around active minefields. </p>
<p>Governments and charities <a href="https://www.halotrust.org/what-we-do/our-work/teaching-people-to-stay-safe/">provide training</a> to local children on how to keep themselves safe while the minefields are awaiting clearance. This can greatly reduce the casualties in post-conflict areas.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/landmine-monitor-2021/major-findings.aspx">Landmine Monitor report</a> doesn’t just focus on minefields and casualties, but also on the work of charities and governments in clearing afflicted areas. In 2020, 146km² of land was cleared of mines, with more than 135,000 antipersonnel mines destroyed. That’s potentially 135,000 lives protected. </p>
<p>So while the timescales involved seem long, the impact for those living and working in mined areas cannot be underestimated. Hopefully, we will be able to see a mine-free world within our lifetimes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171848/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Clarke receives funding from Dstl and EPSRC.</span></em></p>The number of casualties from landmines remains high, with the most people killed and wounded in Syria.Sam Clarke, Senior Lecturer in Geotechnical Engineering, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1582572021-06-14T15:39:14Z2021-06-14T15:39:14ZComics and graphic novels are examining refugee border-crossing experiences<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405681/original/file-20210610-14-1cukhod.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1%2C2%2C897%2C607&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">'An Olympic Dream: The Story of Samia Yusuf Omar' recounts how the Somali Olympic runner drowned while trying to reach Italy in 2012. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(From Reinhard Kleist's 'An Olympic Dream: The Story of Samia Yusuf Omar/SelfMadeHero)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Comics about refugee experiences are not new. After all, even the superhero created by Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster, <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/superman-refugees-success-story">Superman, is a refugee</a> who landed on Earth after his flight from Krypton. </p>
<p>However, recently there has been renewed interest in comics representing migrant experience — namely, that of refugees and asylum-seekers. Since 2011, in particular, and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868">start of the civil war in Syria</a>, comics and graphic novels have become an important forum for examining global forced migration. </p>
<p>These so-called “refugee comics” range from newspaper comic strips to webcomics and graphic novels that combine eyewitness reportage or journalistic collaboration with comic-book storytelling. These stories are written with the aim of incorporating the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37998-8_16">points of views of refugees, artists, volunteers</a> or journalists working on-the-ground in displaced communities, war zones and along the migrant journey. They sometimes emerge <a href="https://positivenegatives.org/">in collaboration with human rights organizations</a>. </p>
<p>In light of their subject matter, these comic artists contend with complex and distressing themes that are otherwise difficult to represent. </p>
<p>They draw on <a href="http://www.imageandnarrative.be/inarchive/house_text_museum/lefevre.htm">the traditional comics format, including the medium’s sequential nature, the use of panel walls and a combination of text and image</a> to <a href="https://theconversation.com/refugee-comics-personal-stories-of-forced-migration-illustrated-in-a-powerful-new-way-106832">foster empathy and compassion for the migration journey</a>. In so doing, they aim to give voice to asylum-seekers and refugees, part of <a href="https://www.unhcr.ca/in-canada/refugee-statistics/">80 million individuals and families forcibly displaced worldwide</a>, whose anonymous images often appear in western media.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1402972209954672651"}"></div></p>
<h2>Complex issues, narrator’s perspective</h2>
<p>These comics are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/08989575.2017.1339468">typically drawn by western cartoonists, based on direct testimonies by migrants and refugees or those who have worked with them</a> or encountered them. They are typically not by refugees but about refugees. Scholar Candida Rifkind, who studies alternative comics and graphic narratives, explores how comics about migrant experience often emerge when witnesses to migrant stories grapple with feelings of “shame, guilt and responsibility” to make western society at large more aware of and responsive to refugee realities. </p>
<p>These narratives prompt <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/08989575.2020.1738081">ethical questions about what it means to tell a story and who has the right or responsibility</a> to do so. While questions about the power relations embedded in how these texts are produced remain, comics on global forced migration are still an important avenue for interrogating the representation of migrants and the socio-political circumstances surrounding their journeys.</p>
<p>These comics also challenge what may otherwise be relayed in mainstream media as the story of a global migrant crisis that has no human face, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2020.1802499">with perilous effects for migrants who face xenophobia and hate</a>. In Rifkind’s words, they are a kind of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/08989575.2017.1339468">intervention into “the photographic regime of the migrant as Other</a> that has emerged as the dominant visual record” of contemporary globalization. </p>
<p>In comics about forced migrant experiences, people experiencing life as refugees become centred as the subjects of their own stories. But <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37998-8_17">cartooning can allow storytellers to represent individuals anonymously</a>, <a href="https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/community/2018/06/26/why-comics-are-so-effective-at-telling-refugees-stories">making it easier for people “to give testimony fully and candidly</a>,” while affording them the specificity of their humanity. </p>
<p>There can be consequences for refugees who testify about their circumstances and the oppression and violence they encounter. Photographic evidence of unlawful or undocumented residence in migrant encampments or someone’s journey to seek asylum could in fact jeopardize a person’s safety and end goal. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Cartoon panel showing smoke floating outside the panel and a bullet cutting through the edge." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405791/original/file-20210610-16-1n0r6je.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405791/original/file-20210610-16-1n0r6je.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=673&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405791/original/file-20210610-16-1n0r6je.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=673&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405791/original/file-20210610-16-1n0r6je.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=673&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405791/original/file-20210610-16-1n0r6je.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405791/original/file-20210610-16-1n0r6je.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405791/original/file-20210610-16-1n0r6je.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=846&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The violence encountered by the refugees depicted in ‘The Unwanted: Stories of the Syrian Refugees,’ by Don Brown is the only graphic element that breaks through the panel frame.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(HMH Books)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>New visual strategies</h2>
<p>Notably, comics on forced migration are also inventing new visual strategies to recount refugee experiences. Artists use panel borders to add a layer of storytelling that typically vacillates between the creators’ ability to represent a specific experience, emotion or event and the very inability to portray some forms of trauma and lived experience.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.hmhbooks.com/shop/books/The-Unwanted/9781328810151">In <em>The Unwanted: Stories of the Syrian Refugees</em></a> (2018), American author and illustrator Don Brown depicts moments of hardships and hope in the lives of the refugees that Brown met in three Greek refugee camps in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/14/sunday-review/greece-refugee-king-gilbertson.html">Ritsona</a>, in Thessaloniki and on <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/21/leros-new-migrant-detention-centre-brings-back-old-ugly-memories">Leros</a>.</p>
<p>The violence encountered by the refugees of Brown’s graphic novel is the only graphic element that breaks through panels. Bullets fracture the panel edges, bombs explode out of the picture planes and toxic smoke rises through the frames. </p>
<p>Brown draws on the convention of exceeding and playing with borders in comics to demonstrate a relationship between violence and transgressing borders. Not only did violence in Syria force many of its citizens to journey in search of safety and freedom; fleeing Syrians also also faced <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016679590">violence and hostility beyond the borders of their homeland on their journeys and where they landed</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Cartoon panels that are bordered with white lace" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405989/original/file-20210611-13-lt8q58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405989/original/file-20210611-13-lt8q58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=257&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405989/original/file-20210611-13-lt8q58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=257&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405989/original/file-20210611-13-lt8q58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=257&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405989/original/file-20210611-13-lt8q58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405989/original/file-20210611-13-lt8q58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405989/original/file-20210611-13-lt8q58.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=323&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Detail of a page shows how lace is used as a panel border in ‘Threads,’ by Kate Evans.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Verso)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The panel borders in <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/2458-threads"><em>Threads: From the Refugee Crisis</em></a> (2016) by British cartoonist, non-fiction author and graphic novelist Kate Evans are comprised of clippings of delicate lace. <em>Threads</em> is a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/ink.2021.0004">socio-political</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.16995/cg.215">cultural critique</a> rooted in the author’s <a href="https://vancouversun.com/entertainment/local-arts/cartoonist-draws-on-experiences-as-a-refugee-camp-volunteer-for-graphic-novel-threads">experience volunteering</a> in the largest though <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-37750368">unofficial refugee encampment in Calais, France</a>, which operated from January 2015 to October 2016. </p>
<p>My research has examined how this lace integrated into the comic is more than simply an analogy for the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/ink.2021.0004">intertwining factors and complex relationships that emerged in Calais</a>. The lacework is a fundamental structuring principle in Evans’ text that engages with the region’s history of lacemaking, Calais’ most essential industry and refugee experience simultaneously.</p>
<h2>Frames within stories</h2>
<p>The aesthetics of the smartphone have also begun to play a role in the representation of refugee experiences in comics. Smartphone screens and social media platforms function as frames within some stories. </p>
<p>German graphic designer and cartoonist <a href="https://www.selfmadehero.com/books/an-olympic-dream-the-story-of-samia-yusuf-omar">Reinhard Kleist</a> embeds social media into the comics grid in <em>An Olympic Dream: The Story of Samia Yusuf Omar</em> (2016). The story <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-07-17/samia-yusuf-omar-earned-fame-runner-died-refugee-new-comic-honors-her">recounts how Omar</a>, the Somali Olympic runner, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19323535">died by drowning en route to Italy in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Some of the story is <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-07-17/samia-yusuf-omar-earned-fame-runner-died-refugee-new-comic-honors-her">narrated through Facebook posts</a> based on interviews conducted on that platform with Omar’s sister and a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/sports/2012/8/27/grieving-for-somali-olympian-samia-omar">journalist who had interviewed and known Omar</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Illustrated borderless panel, in which Omar is packing for journey to Italy. A t-shirt, towel, scarf, pair of pants, toothbrush and a cell phone are spread across the floor. A Facebook post in the top left corner reads: I'm packing for my trip. Miriam told me what to bring. Only God knows how long it will take." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405963/original/file-20210611-17-2amma0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405963/original/file-20210611-17-2amma0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405963/original/file-20210611-17-2amma0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405963/original/file-20210611-17-2amma0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=555&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405963/original/file-20210611-17-2amma0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405963/original/file-20210611-17-2amma0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405963/original/file-20210611-17-2amma0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Panel from ‘An Olympic Dream: The Story of Samia Yusuf Omar,’ by Richard Kleist.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(SelfMadeHero)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Somalian athletes lifted up Omar’s story to draw attention to the Olympics as a venue to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/03/the-story-of-samia-omar-the-olympic-runner-who-drowned-in-the-med">promote awareness about global conflict and peace</a>. In Kleist’s introduction, he writes that too often, “abstract numbers represent human lives.”</p>
<p>This comic and others joins several examples of new media, such as <a href="https://youtu.be/m1BLsySgsHM">viral videos</a>, <a href="https://burymemylove.arte.tv/">mobile games</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/film/2019/sep/24/midnight-traveler-refugee-documentary-afghanistan">documentary film</a> that are highlighting the role mobile devices can play during the migration journey.</p>
<p>Through their personal stories, comics on forced migration <a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/es/content/ali-fitzgerald-drawn-to-berlin-refugees-interview/">humanize refugee experience</a>. This category of graphic narrative also offers opportunities for articulating the complexity of refugee experience through the narrative techniques and visual strategies of comic art.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158257/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Biz Nijdam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Comics about migrant experiences seek to expose personal perspectives about the global crisis of 80 million individuals and families forcibly displaced worldwide.Biz Nijdam, Lecturer, Department of Central, Eastern, and Northern European Studies, University of British Columbia, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597812021-06-07T12:35:03Z2021-06-07T12:35:03ZWhat the Ottoman Empire can teach us about the consequences of climate change – and how drought can uproot peoples and fuel warfare<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402263/original/file-20210524-19-1594uiw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C926%2C763&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Drought's effects on the population slowed the Ottoman Empire's expansion in the 16th century.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ottoman_army_at_Tiflis_in_1578_(Nusretname_miniature).jpg">Lessing Archives</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the late 16th century, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511844058">hundreds of bandits on horseback</a> stormed through the countryside of Ottoman Anatolia raiding villages, inciting violence and destabilizing the sultan’s grip on power.</p>
<p>Four hundred years later and a few hundred miles away in the former Ottoman territory of Syria, widespread protests escalated into a <a href="https://theconversation.com/every-day-is-war-a-decade-of-slow-suffering-and-destruction-in-syria-154595">bloody civil war</a> in 2011 that persists to this day.</p>
<p>These dark episodes in Mediterranean history share key features that offer a warning for the future: Both forced waves of people from their homes. Both were rooted in politics and had dramatic political consequences. And both were fueled by extreme weather associated with climate change.</p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/aw49/">environmental historian</a>, I have researched and written extensively about conflict and environmental pressures in the Eastern Mediterranean region. While severe droughts, hurricanes, rising oceans and climate migration can seem new and unique to our time, past crises like these <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-fueled-the-rise-and-demise-of-the-neo-assyrian-empire-superpower-of-the-ancient-world-126661">and</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-fueled-the-rise-and-demise-of-the-neo-assyrian-empire-superpower-of-the-ancient-world-126661">others</a> carry important lessons about how changing climates can destabilize human societies. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three men and two boys stand on a dry landscape" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402719/original/file-20210525-13-probum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402719/original/file-20210525-13-probum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402719/original/file-20210525-13-probum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402719/original/file-20210525-13-probum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402719/original/file-20210525-13-probum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402719/original/file-20210525-13-probum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402719/original/file-20210525-13-probum.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The poorest and most vulnerable people are often hit hardest by drought. In 1962 near Erzurum, Turkey, an impoverished family stared at a barren plain left dry and unproductive by drought that resulted in famine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TURKEYDROUGHTFAMINE/3723123764e5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo">Associated Press</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Drought in the heartland of an empire</h2>
<p>We live in an era of global warming largely due to unsustainable human practices. Generally known as the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/415023a">Anthropocene</a>, this era is widely considered to have emerged in the 19th century on the heels of another period of major global climate change called the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.518">Little Ice Age</a>.</p>
<p>The Little Ice Age brought cooler-than-average temperatures and extreme weather to many parts of the globe. Unlike current anthropogenic warming, it likely was triggered by natural factors such as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1029/2011GL050168">volcanic activity</a>, and it affected <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300208634/global-crisis">different regions</a> at different times, to different degrees and in vastly different ways. </p>
<p>Its onset in the late 16th century was <a href="https://doi.org/10.3098/ah.2020.094.2.176">particularly noticeable in Anatolia</a>, a largely rural region that once formed the heartland of the Ottoman Empire and is roughly coterminous with modern-day Turkey. Much of the land traditionally was used for <a href="https://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu/university-of-nebraska-press/9780803290976/">cultivating grain or herding sheep and goats</a>. It provided a critical food source for the rural population as well as residents of the bustling Ottoman capital, Istanbul (Constantinople). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402214/original/file-20210523-23-c46rhz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402214/original/file-20210523-23-c46rhz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402214/original/file-20210523-23-c46rhz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402214/original/file-20210523-23-c46rhz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402214/original/file-20210523-23-c46rhz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=628&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402214/original/file-20210523-23-c46rhz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=628&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402214/original/file-20210523-23-c46rhz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=628&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lands of the Ottoman Empire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/19/Ottoman_empire.svg/2458px-Ottoman_empire.svg.png">André Koehne/The Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd, 1923</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The two decades surrounding 1600 were especially tough. Anatolia experienced some of its coldest and driest years in history, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00382-005-0016-5">tree rings and other paleoclimatological data</a> suggest. This period also had frequent <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/climate-of-rebellion-in-the-early-modern-ottoman-empire/C022031EDC39F862EA87DBC88D66B888">droughts, frosts and floods</a>. At the same time, the region’s inhabitants reeled under an animal plague and oppressive state policies, including the requisitioning of grain and meat for a costly war in Hungary. </p>
<p>Prolonged poor harvests, war and hardship exposed major shortcomings in the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nature-and-empire-in-ottoman-egypt/B05D2208CB9B404D6CA768A62DBAC969#fndtn-information">Ottoman provisioning system</a>. While inclement weather stalled state efforts to distribute limited food supplies, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/climate-of-rebellion-in-the-early-modern-ottoman-empire/C022031EDC39F862EA87DBC88D66B888">famine spread across the countryside</a> to Istanbul, accompanied by a deadly epidemic.</p>
<p>By 1596, a series of uprisings collectively known as the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Anatolian-rebellion-1000-1020-Islamkundliche-Untersuchungen/dp/3922968341">Celali Rebellion</a> had erupted, becoming the longest-lasting internal challenge to state power in the Ottoman Empire’s six centuries of existence. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402218/original/file-20210523-15-xnwij8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An old illustration of men fighting on horseback" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402218/original/file-20210523-15-xnwij8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402218/original/file-20210523-15-xnwij8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402218/original/file-20210523-15-xnwij8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402218/original/file-20210523-15-xnwij8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1115&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402218/original/file-20210523-15-xnwij8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1401&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402218/original/file-20210523-15-xnwij8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402218/original/file-20210523-15-xnwij8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1401&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An image from Tacü’t Tevarih, published in the 16th century, of the Celali rebellion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Osmanl%C4%B1-%C4%B0ran_Sava%C5%9Flar%C4%B13.jpg">Republic of Turkey, Topkapı Palace Museum-Istanbul</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Peasants, semi-nomadic groups and provincial leaders alike contributed to this movement through a rash of <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801484193/bandits-and-bureaucrats/#bookTabs=1">violence, banditry and instability</a> that lasted well into the 17th century. As drought, disease and bloodshed persisted, people <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/climate-of-rebellion-in-the-early-modern-ottoman-empire/C022031EDC39F862EA87DBC88D66B888">abandoned farms and villages</a>, fleeing Anatolia in search of more stable areas, while famine killed many who lacked the resources to leave.</p>
<h2>Weakening of the Ottoman Empire</h2>
<p>Before this point, the Ottoman Empire had been <a href="https://www.macmillanihe.com/page/detail/the-ottoman-empire-13001650/?k=9781352004137&loc=us&priceCode=us">one of the most powerful regimes in the early modern world</a>. It included large swaths of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East and controlled the holiest sites of Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Over the previous century, Ottoman troops had pushed into Central Asia, annexed most of Hungary, and advanced across the Hapsburg Empire to threaten Vienna in 1529.</p>
<p>The Celali Rebellion had major <a href="https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/197805/whither.the.weather.htm">political consequences</a>. </p>
<p>The Ottoman government succeeded in reestablishing relative calm in rural Anatolia by 1611, but at a cost. The sultan’s control over the provinces was irreversibly weakened, and this internal check on Ottoman authority helped curb the trend of Ottoman expansion. </p>
<p>The Celali Rebellion closed the door on the Ottoman “Golden Age,” sending this monumental empire into a spiral of <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/caroline-finkel/osmans-dream/9780465023974/">decentralization, military setbacks and administrative weakness</a> that would trouble the Ottoman state for its remaining three centuries of existence.</p>
<h2>Climate change as a threat multiplier</h2>
<p>Four hundred years later, <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-not-conflict-drove-many-syrian-refugees-to-lebanon-127681">environmental stress</a> coincided with social unrest to launch Syria into an enduring and devastating civil war. </p>
<p>This conflict emerged in the context of political oppression and the Arab Spring movement, and on the tail end of one of Syria’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1421533112">worst droughts in modern history</a>. </p>
<p>The magnitude of the environment’s role in the Syrian civil war is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.007">difficult to gauge</a> because, as in the Celali Rebellion, its impact was indelibly linked to social and political pressures. But the brutal combination of these forces can’t be ignored. It’s why <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/climate-change-as-a-threat-multiplier/">military experts</a> today talk about climate change as a “threat multiplier.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Dry, empty landscape with a tractor" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402720/original/file-20210525-13-1y4ruop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/402720/original/file-20210525-13-1y4ruop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402720/original/file-20210525-13-1y4ruop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402720/original/file-20210525-13-1y4ruop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402720/original/file-20210525-13-1y4ruop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402720/original/file-20210525-13-1y4ruop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/402720/original/file-20210525-13-1y4ruop.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Farmers ride in a tractor in the drought-hit region of Hasaka, Syria, in 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/farmers-ride-in-their-tractor-in-the-drought-hit-region-of-news-photo/102301134">Louai Beshara/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Now entering its second decade, the Syrian war has driven over <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html">13 million Syrians</a> from their homes. About half are internally displaced, while the rest have sought refuge in surrounding states, Europe and beyond, greatly intensifying the global refugee crisis. </p>
<p>[<em>Get our best science, health and technology stories.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-best">Sign up for The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p>
<h2>Lessons for today and the future</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://books.openedition.org/irdeditions/23727?lang=en">Mediterranean region</a> may be particularly prone to the negative effects of global warming, but these two stories are far from isolated cases. </p>
<p>As Earth’s temperatures rise, the climate will increasingly hamper human affairs, exacerbating conflict and driving migration. In recent years, low-lying countries such as <a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/147057/intense-flooding-in-bangladesh">Bangladesh</a> have been devastated by flooding, while drought has upended lives in the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/disaster/dr-2015-000134-som">Horn of Africa</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-climate-change-is-driving-emigration-from-central-america-121525">Central America</a>, sending large numbers of migrants into other countries.</p>
<p>Mediterranean history offers three important lessons for addressing current global environmental issues:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>First, negative effects of climate change fall disproportionately on poor and marginalized individuals, those least able to respond and adapt. </p></li>
<li><p>Second, environmental challenges tend to hit hardest when combined with social forces, and the two are often indistinguishably connected. </p></li>
<li><p>Third, climate change has the potential to prompt migration and resettlement, spur violence, unseat regimes and dramatically transform human societies throughout the world.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Climate change ultimately will affect everyone – in dramatic, distressing and unforeseen ways. As we contemplate this future, there is much we can learn from our past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159781/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Duffy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Drought has been a threat multiplier for centuries, fueling conflict and migration from the time of the Ottoman Empire to Syria today.Andrea Duffy, Director of International Studies, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1617042021-05-28T11:47:58Z2021-05-28T11:47:58ZSyrian election: Bashar al-Assad wins with 95% of votes as world watches in disbelief<p>The least surprising news of the week from Syria is that Bashar al-Assad has won another <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-president-bashar-al-assad-wins-fourth-term-office-with-951-votes-live-2021-05-27/">seven-year term</a> with 95% of the votes – an increase on the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/bashar-al-assad-winds-reelection-in-landslide-victory">89% he won in 2014</a>.</p>
<p>Officials said 78.6% of <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/syria-election-results-bashar-assad-wins-4th-term/a-57695135">eligible voters</a>, or more than 13.5 million people, cast their ballots in the election on May 26. But western critics have pointed out this is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/syria-elections-polls-open-as-western-countries-slam-illegitimate-vote/a-57663592">highly unlikely</a>, given that so much of the electorate lives in areas under the control of rebels or Kurdish-led troops, where the vote wasn’t held. </p>
<p>Syria’s minister of the interior, Mohammad Khaled al-Rahmoun, said before the election that more than 18 million people had been <a href="https://www.farsnews.ir/en/news/14000305000609/Syrians-Head-Plls-Elec-Presiden">eligible to vote</a>, including citizens living abroad. But it has been estimated that 13 million <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/millions-of-syrians-excluded-as-election-takes-place-under-assad-regime-47009">of those eligible</a> would have been unable to cast their ballots, as they were either living outside regime-controlled areas or were barred from voting because they had fled the country illegally and were unable to show an exit stamp on their passports.</p>
<p>Syria is presently divided into four areas of control. The Assad regime controls Damascus, Latakia, Homs, Hama, Tartous, Sweida, and parts of Deraa, Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Azzor and Hasaka, comprising 12.5 million people. About 3.5 million people live in areas under the control of the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the east. </p>
<p>A further 3.2 million people live in Idlib in the north, under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – formerly Jabhat al-Nusra (an al-Qaeda affiliated group). Finally, 1.3 million people are in the north-west of the country under the control of the Syrian National Army (SNA), a plethora of opposition groups and remnants of the Free Syrian Army.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Syria showing areas of control" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403224/original/file-20210527-15-19vyl2t.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=678&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syria: who controls what in 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Etana Syria</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Syria in 2021 is tired and divided after more than ten years of civil war. More than 13.3 million people have been forced from their homes, of whom 6.6 million are registered as refugees by <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html">UNHCR</a>. More than 12 million of Syria’s resident population of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population">just over 18 million</a> don’t have access to enough food, according to a <a href="https://www.wfp.org/countries/syrian-arab-republic#:%7E:text=WFP%20provides%20life%2Dsaving%20food,ownership%20of%20their%20food%20security.">report</a> from the World Food Programme.</p>
<p>Assad <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/23/civil-war-ruin-raging-poverty-but-assad-is-guaranteed-to-win-syrias-fake-election">was up against</a> two little-known challengers, Abdullah Salloum Abdullah, former state minister of parliamentary affairs, and Mahmoud Ahmad Marei, the head of the National Democratic Front, a small, state-endorsed opposition party. They were the only approved candidates of the 31 who applied for nomination. </p>
<h2>Contested legitimacy</h2>
<p>The election has been widely criticised, including by <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/syria-presidential-election-on-26-may-quint-statement">the “Quint”</a> – the group of governments comprising the UK, US, France, Germany and Italy. A statement from the Quint said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[We] wish to make clear that Syria’s May 26 presidential election will neither be free nor fair. We denounce the Assad regime’s decision to hold an election outside of the framework described in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and we support the voices of all Syrians, including civil society organisations and the Syrian opposition, who have condemned the electoral process as illegitimate.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The statement went on to “urge the international community to unequivocally reject this attempt by the Assad regime to regain legitimacy”. </p>
<p>But legitimacy has a questionable factor of every Syrian election since the 1963 coup, in which the Ba'ath Party <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18582755">first took power</a> and excluded all rivals. After a split among separate wings of the party in November 1970, Hafez al-Assad – the father of the incumbent president – orchestrated a coup that became known as the “Corrective Movement”. Rival politicians were condemned to death in absentia and, in 1973, the Syrian constitution was amended to enshrine power in the Ba'ath Party as “leader of the state and society”. </p>
<h2>Hereditary dictatorship</h2>
<p>Syria became to all intents and purposes a hereditary dictatorship. After the death of Hafez al-Assad in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hafiz-al-Assad">June 2000</a>, his son Bashar al-Assad <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/bashar-al-assad-a-profile-of-a-mass-murderer/">succeeded</a> him as party leader and head of state.</p>
<p>Aged 34, and educated as an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/18/bashar-al-assad-trained-as-a-doctor-how-did-he-become-a-mass-murderer">ophthalmologist</a> at Moorfields Hospital in London, Assad junior – whose <a href="https://www.economist.com/1843/2021/03/10/banker-princess-warlord-the-many-lives-of-asma-assad">wife Asma</a> was born and brought up in London – was initially presented as a break from the past. But a brief “Damascus Spring” was followed by a gradual tightening of the reins of power as the president and his oligarchical allies moved to restrict freedom of speech and other <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703912">political expression</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/every-day-is-war-a-decade-of-slow-suffering-and-destruction-in-syria-154595">'Every day is war' – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The ferocity of the regime’s response to Syria’s Arab Spring <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-syrian-uprising-began-and-why-it-matters-112801">protests</a> turned the initial calls for reform to a clamour for revolution. But Assad, with the backing of Russia and Iran, has held on to power and is now generally thought to be fairly secure once again. What is striking, though, is that the Assad regime has been called into question more for its use of violence and the perpetration of war crimes (including the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta/analysis-alleged-use-chemical-weapons-syria">use of chemical weapons</a>) rather than for its lack of democratic legitimacy.</p>
<p>This year’s elections <a href="https://npasyria.com/en/59023/">were held</a> according to Syria’s 2012 constitution, which stipulates that presidential candidates have to have been living in Syria for the past ten years, be Muslims and be endorsed by at least 35 of the 250 members of the parliament. At present 177 of the members are affiliated with the Ba'ath Party. This suggests that the prospect of anyone but the favoured Ba'athist candidate – on this case Assad himself – winning the election was always so remote as to be pretty much non-existent.</p>
<p>Assad chose to cast his vote in the Damascus suburb of Douma. The district had been a rebel stronghold before being recaptured in an offensive in 2018, that included an alleged <a href="https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2019/03/opcw-issues-fact-finding-mission-report-chemical-weapons-use-allegation">chemical weapons attack</a> which drew almost universal global revulsion at the time. He had a point to prove, as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-57252600">he told reporters while voting</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Syria is not what they were trying to market – one city against the other and sect against the other, or civil war. Today, we are proving from Douma that the Syrian people are one.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Of course, that all depends who is counting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/161704/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Aljasem is a PhD candidate at the Center for Conflict Studies at Utrecht University. </span></em></p>Assad claims to have won more than 95% of the vote, but that’s highly unlikely.Ali Aljasem, PhD researcher, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1589092021-04-14T12:32:24Z2021-04-14T12:32:24ZMyanmar: could defecting security forces bring down the military regime?<p>Just over ten years ago there were hopes that Myanmar might become a fully functioning democracy. Today there are concerns that the country may disintegrate into civil war. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/myanmar-memes-and-mantras-of-a-new-generation-of-democracy-protesters-155223">widespread opposition</a> to the military’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters also includes possibly as many as three-quarters of the soldiers in Myanmar’s army, according to an officer who has <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/myanmar-defector-says-most-soldiers-willing-to-oppose-regime-kqkzrqvp9">recently defected</a>. If this is accurate, there could be large-scale defections in the near future. </p>
<p>But what does this mean for the future of democracy in Myanmar? And is Myanmar on the precipice of civil war? </p>
<p>Myanmar’s <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myanmar-coup-will-test-loyalty-security-forces">security apparatus</a> is large, consisting of an army of about 350,000-400,000, most of whom are ethnic Bamar Buddhists, another 80,000 police (who have been relied on heavily to confront protesters), as well as state intelligence service members.</p>
<p>Defections from the military have happened from time to time, such as after <a href="https://www.npr.org/2013/08/08/209919791/as-myanmar-opens-up-a-look-back-on-a-1988-uprising">pro-democracy uprisings in 1988</a> and during the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43133778">Saffron revolution</a> in 2007. But over the past 60 years the military has remained a fairly cohesive unit, supported by a system of rewards and punishments and a rigorous indoctrination process.</p>
<iframe src="https://player.acast.com/60087127b9687759d637bade/episodes/myanmars-collective-fury?theme=default&cover=1&latest=1" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="110px" allow="autoplay"></iframe>
<p>Yet today’s military in Myanmar has had more exposure to the outside world since the country opened up in 2010. While it is still very brutal, it is not an organisation that is as blindly obedient as it was in the past.</p>
<p>Defections from the army or other elements of the security apparatus are important, because the success of any revolution is dependent on this – though this would need to be on a wide scale. The police and the military are the only organs of the state that can use tools of violence to enforce the will of an authoritarian regime. </p>
<h2>Why soldiers change sides</h2>
<p>There are several factors that are important for understanding what drives military defection. Not surprisingly, military cohesion is important to preventing revolution, as a cohesive military that stays firm in its support of the regime is near impossible to overcome. The worst-case scenario for Myanmar is if some of the military defects, but not enough to overturn the regime peacefully, which could lead to a protracted civil war, as in Syria. </p>
<p>Typically, militaries that consist of one ethnic or sectarian group are more cohesive but considered less legitimate in the eyes of the public, and are usually less professionalised as they are not recruited on the basis of merit. Militaries that are professionalised and not ethnically recruited tend to be more likely to <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Failed_States_and_Institutional_Decay/tozFAgAAQBAJ?q=natasha+ezrow&kptab=overview#f=false">side with their citizens</a> in the face of sizeable protests. </p>
<p>The role of the ethnic composition of the military is illustrated by the Arab Spring. Both Egypt and Tunisia did not have ethnically recruited militaries, and in both countries the military ended up siding with protesters – although in Egypt’s case this was ostensibly to oust the then president, Hosni Mubarak, and rule behind the scenes.</p>
<p>In contrast, both <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343313476529">Bahrain and Syria</a> had militaries where recruitment was based on sectarian ties to some extent. In the case of the former, foreigners were also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/17/bahrain-security-forces-sunni-foreign">widely recruited</a> to decrease the chances of members of the security apparatus siding with any public protests.</p>
<p>Other drivers of military defection are how the military is being treated (mostly financially) and the political influence and social status that it has acquired. The <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0095327X17708194">popularity and legitimacy</a> of the military are also important. </p>
<p>Connected to this point is how popular and widespread the protests are. Notably, the current protests in Myanmar are very different from the past – they are widely popular and involve different ethnicities, religions and occupations. Due to the large volume of people taking to the streets, important institutions – <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/banks-closed-myanmar-anti-coup-protests-financial-chaos-continue">including banks</a> – have been closed due to lack of staff, causing financial chaos. </p>
<p>Military personnel are also increasingly aware that the regime’s use of violent tactics to maintain power, such as shooting at everyone, including children, tarnishes any legitimacy it may have had. </p>
<p>This all affects the calculations of military defectors. There has also been a <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/police-breaking-ranks-amid-rising-unrest-in-myanmar/2165936">rise in defections</a> among police, which is usually under the military’s control. </p>
<h2>Chances of revolution or war?</h2>
<p>But is there much chance of a successful revolution? Revolutions are often hyped as a common way of ending authoritarian regimes. But in reality, they take place infrequently. In the 1960s and 1970s, <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/twq/v37i1/f_0030502_24672.pdf">fewer than 5%</a> of autocrats were ousted through public revolt, with more than half ousted through military coups. That number more than doubled in the 2010s, but revolution is no more likely to oust a dictatorship than a civil war.</p>
<p>Myanmar’s chances of war are amplified by the presence of various ethnic armed organisations. Technically Myanmar has faced <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/12/06/peace-and-war-in-myanmar/">continuous conflict</a> since the country gained independence in 1948, making it one of the longest ongoing insurgencies. A ceasefire took place in 2008, but calls for greater federalisation and increased autonomy of ethnic states have never dissipated. </p>
<p>Some of these ethnic groups are able to rule in de facto zones (through funds from drug trafficking) without much government interference. Though the military is well trained and experienced in combat, it does not have the capacity to fight simultaneously in the north, east, west and centre of the country.</p>
<p>In addition to being unpopular with its citizens, General Min Aung Hlaing’s regime has not gained much international support either. Though Russia and China are major arms suppliers to Myanmar’s military – the Tatmadaw – there are <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/can-myanmars-protesters-win/">serious international concerns</a> that the regime’s actions are causing too much instability. At a UN Security Council briefing, an <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-brink-state-failure">expert warned</a> that Myanmar was “on the brink of state failure”.</p>
<p>The crisis is taking place in a context of dire poverty, economic chaos, a raging pandemic, and where few political elites (including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy) are truly committed to democracy. Thus, even though the increase in military defections might seem promising to protesters, Myanmar appears more likely to collapse than to democratise.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158909/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>History tells us that the stability of a country’s security forces is key to the success or failure of a popular uprising.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1545952021-03-15T12:31:24Z2021-03-15T12:31:24Z‘Every day is war’ – a decade of slow suffering and destruction in Syria<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388068/original/file-20210305-17-1cy3igf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C1049%2C759&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The city of Homs has been ravaged by war, leaving millions of people homeless and displaced. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abduljalil Achraf</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Abduljalil sent me a photo of his ruined home in Homs, Syria. “It is the third floor”, he told me over WhatsApp. The building still stands but it looks like an empty skeleton. Most of its facade has been destroyed, while piles of debris surround it. Residents have not been able to return, as they fear it could collapse at any time.</p>
<p>For a decade now, conflict, violence and destruction have reshaped the lives of millions of Syrians since the start of the Syrian Revolution in March 2011. Abduljalil is just one of more than <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/syria-emergency.html">12 million</a> people who have had to flee their homes. While 5.6 million people have fled Syria to find refuge in countries such as Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan, 6.6 million people have been internally displaced.</p>
<p>Over the past five years, I have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/xT6AE8RNPymQ9PCNpge2/full?target=10.1080/13604813.2019.1575605">researching</a> the relationship between urban violence and the impact it has on cities. My research has been mainly focused on my home city of Homs where I conducted a series of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2020.1833536">interviews</a> with local people and examined the way Homs has been transformed in the past decade. The conflict has created a disorientating experience for many Homsis. People have lost some of their most cherished places, as well as many of their loved ones. </p>
<p>I want my research to help people understand how it feels to be forcibly uprooted. What does it mean to see your own country getting destroyed, to see your home – the place that gave you a sense of safety, security, belonging and identity – in ruins? </p>
<p>These questions are personal to me. I too was forced to leave my home in Homs when fighting broke out and tanks entered my city. I have not been able to return since 2011. From afar, I have seen my country crumble into ruins. I have watched the people I love struggle daily, losing their homes, their dreams, their friends and their future. I have lost people – people I coudn’t even say goodbye to.</p>
<p>As a displaced person, my life moves in parallels. Walking in London where I now live, the images of destroyed homes and shattered lives are always at the forefront of my mind. I left Syria, but Syria didn’t leave me. My life, like the lives of millions of us, has been terribly damaged – just like our cities. The past decade has been a story of loss and suffering, a landscape of grief and sorrow.</p>
<h2>Homs as it was</h2>
<p>Before the conflict started, Homs was known as a city of diversity where different communities from different religious and sectarian backgrounds lived together. It had a population of 800,000 people, but yet there was a strong sense of community – it felt as if everyone knew everyone else. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The busy city centre of Homs before the fighting began." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/389522/original/file-20210315-13-cxxd32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bustling Homs before the conflict started in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.city-analysis.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/8.-Homs-before-2011-Source-Ammar-Azzouz.jpg">Ammar Azzouz</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many neighbourhoods were divided along sectarian lines. Some were mostly inhabited by Alawites or Sunnis while others were mixed with Alawites, Sunnis and Christians living together. </p>
<p>It was a city of peace, quiet and simplicity. Its people famous for their sense of humour and generosity. The memory of this thriving and cosmopolitan city, makes the present reality even more difficult to swallow.</p>
<p>Abduljalil said the memories of old times haunt his former home like a ghost. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I remember the stars I put on the roof in my bedroom … but even the stars fell.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Abduljalil and his family had no choice but to flee their home in 2013 fearing, for their lives. Their neighbourhood, Jouret al-Shayah, at the heart of Homs, was <a href="https://unhabitat.org/city-profile-homs-multi-sector-assessment">heavily targeted</a>.</p>
<p>Other cities including Mosul, Beirut, Aleppo and Raqqa have suffered too. Cities have turned into battlefields. Wars are no longer fought outside densely populated areas, but in neighbourhoods. The urbanisation of the military has made <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0267303032000087766?journalCode=chos20">everyday life</a> a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5yEOdutixw&t=18s">target</a>. </p>
<p>Even cultural heritage sites have been targeted. The shelling of places such as the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyQdng7qsCI&t=37s">Khaled Ibn al Walid Mosque</a> in Homs, the destruction of monuments, cultural artefacts and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34036644">temples</a> in Palmyra and in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/38303230">Ancient City</a> of Aleppo shocked the world. </p>
<p>But this interest in the ancient monuments has overshadowed the loss people have endured to their way of living that has collapsed in the past decade – the slow suffering. Homes, bakeries, schools and hospitals have been destroyed too. But these “ordinary” spaces have rarely been brought into the conversation.</p>
<p>Everyday life is a battle for survival, even though the fighting in Homs has ended. For many families, food – including sugar and bread – are becoming hard to obtain. Some of the people I spoke to reported long hours waiting to get rice, while many struggle to afford food due to the country’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f3ccc3a7-c697-412a-9b99-18944de5c108">economic collapse</a>. The UN has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/02/1085722">reported</a> that around 60% of Syrians (12.4 million people) do not have regular access to safe and nutritious food.</p>
<p>One woman I spoke to, who asked not to be identified, lives in Mashta Al Hilu, a town between Homs and Tartus. After finishing her degree in architecture in Homs, she struggled to find a job. She told me how she felt when walking in the ruined streets. In Baba Amr she said she felt as if a “monster” had destroyed it.</p>
<p>Her dream is to improve her violin skills, but these dreams are on hold. She said she felt isolated, as many of her friends had left Syria or had been killed. She asked me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Is life after war more difficult than the life at the time of war? … Every day is war.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There were hopes for change in 2011. People imagined that the future would be different. Nobody expected that Homs would be destroyed, that entire neighbourhoods would be razed to the ground, that another day could mean yet another loss. </p>
<p>Abduljalil and his family couldn’t rebuild their home. No charity or organisation helped them. They eventually decided to sell the ruins and rent outside the heart of the city. Abduljalil still visits his past life, his lost home. He told me: “I feel as a flower uprooted from its roots and planted in another place”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Azzouz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>After ten years of conflict and destruction, what is left of Syria and what hope is there for its people?Ammar Azzouz, Short-term Research Associate, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1556952021-02-22T15:50:00Z2021-02-22T15:50:00ZBiden and the Iran nuclear deal: what to expect from the negotiations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385577/original/file-20210222-13-mhr4b2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5991%2C3979&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Regional powerplay: the nuclear deal has complex implications for the regin.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dilok Klaisataporn via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As Joe Biden was sworn in as the 46th president of the United States, speculation was rife that one of the first things his administration would do would be to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/middleeast/iran-biden-trump-nuclear-sanctions.html">seek re-entry to the Iran nuclear deal</a> that had been quit by his predecessor in the White House.</p>
<p>The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed between Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union in 2015, known as “<a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/iran-nuclear-deal-15757">the Iran nuclear deal</a>”, was considered a stunning diplomatic achievement. Iran agreed to limit or eliminate its enriched uranium sources in return for receiving financial and economic relief from the UN sanctions. </p>
<p>But in 2018, in a snub to the joint diplomatic venture, the then US president, Donald Trump, tweeted his country’s withdrawal, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/art-worst-deal-trump-blasts-iran-agreement-n809986">stating that</a>: “I think it was one of the most incompetently drawn deals I’ve ever seen…we got nothing.” He claimed that Iran had been using the financial relief, including the oil export money, to support terrorist organisations in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia was a cornerstone of Trump’s Middle East policy as the geopolitical counterweight against Iran. The country was instrumental in the negotiations of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/28/trumps-middle-east-peace-plan-key-points-at-a-glance">Middle East Peace Plan</a>, brokered by Jared Kushner. A <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/19/politics/jared-kushner-saudi-arms-deal-lockheed-martin/index.html">US$110 billion (£78.3 billion) defence deal with the Saudis</a> was signed by Trump in his first official visit to Riyadh in May 2017. </p>
<p>During the same visit, the Saudis <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-donald-trump.html">successfully convened</a> several Muslim state representatives for a speech by Trump that declared Iran as the main threat in the region. The killing of Iranian military commander <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/05/general-qassam-suleimani-obituary">Qassem Suleimani</a> by the USA in January 2020 took the main enemy of Saudi Arabia’s ruling crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), off the Middle East chessboard.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/N_gphbkZC6w?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Trump’s reluctance to take retaliatory steps following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45812399">murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi</a> in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul demonstrated his unswerving support to the crown prince, the de facto ruler of the kingdom. Trump showed the same reluctance regarding Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen">involvement in the Yemeni civil war</a> – another move by MBS, launched in March 2015, to rival the Iranian presence in Syria.</p>
<p>One of Biden’s first messages to Saudi Arabia has been that it should no longer rely on the USA’s unconditional support. White House press secretary Jen Psaki’s announcement of “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-16/biden-to-recalibrate-saudi-arabia-ties-away-from-crown-prince">recalibrating</a>” USA-Saudi relations between counterpart-to-counterpart on 16 February is a signal to the crown prince that his unrestrained behaviours will not be tolerated by the Biden administration.</p>
<h2>What to expect from negotiations</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Iran’s hand will be stronger in any prospective negotiations than in those before the deal was struck. During the first negotiations, the Syrian civil war had just started and Assad’s future was uncertain. The possibility of a new regime, especially one supported and financed by Saudi Arabia, would have meant for Tehran the loss of an important ally and would have disrupted Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.</p>
<p>The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Shia militias were fighting Islamic State (IS), while <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/11/20/17996024/the-us-and-iran-are-tacitly-cooperating-in-iraq">indirectly benefiting from the US airstrikes</a> in support of the Iraqi military. Following the deal’s announcement in July 2015, the nature of the war changed: Russia intervened in September 2015 on the side of the Assad regime and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34572756">the Revolutionary Guard involvement in the war accelerated</a> by training a further 100,000 Syrian fighters to join the Assad forces. The defeat of IS and Trump’s decision to withdraw the American forces from Syria in October 2019 presented opportunities for the Syrian regime to expand and consolidate its power – as well as Iran’s influence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-donald-trumps-decision-to-abandon-kurdish-fighters-in-syria-means-for-the-kurds-assad-and-russia-124815">What Donald Trump's decision to abandon Kurdish fighters in Syria means for the Kurds, Assad and Russia</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>What’s more, since the US withdrew from the deal, Iran has enriched nuclear fuel <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/us/politics/biden-iran-nuclear.html">beyond the limits agreed by the 2015 deal</a>. It has also stopped international inspections of the nuclear sites. On February 10, the International Atomic Agency <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-program-11610564572">informed its members</a> that “Iran had been producing uranium metal, a material vital for nuclear weapons.” In other words, because of the acceleration of its nuclear programme following Trump’s decision, Iran is closer to having atomic weapons.</p>
<p>Advances in nuclear capability and the more stable situation in Syria strengthen Iran’s hand at the negotiating table. And, <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/01/27/russia-opposed-to-widening-scope-of-iran-nuclear-deal-a72758">with Russia on its side</a>, Iran might resist the US desire to broaden the agreement to include clauses such as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/middleeast/iran-biden-trump-nuclear-sanctions.html">the halt of its military involvement</a> in Syria, Libya and Iraq.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An array of missiles with Iranian flags in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385587/original/file-20210222-21-qux72.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Aggressive stance: Iran’s military museum, Tehran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">saeediex via Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Another potential difficulty concerns domestic politics in Iran. Iranian foreign policy is made by agreement between the supreme leader, the president and the heads of the Supreme National Security Council and Assembly of Experts. While executive power lies with the president, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/20/prospects-for-change-in-iranian-foreign-policy-pub-75569">the supreme leader must approve the policy</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, the hardline supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a reluctant approval to the moderate president Hassan Rouhani’s policy on the deal. <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2015/02/where-does-irans-supreme-leader-really-stand-on-nuclear-negotiations/">Although it is impossible to know what was in Khamenei’s mind</a>, the Iranian economy, gravely damaged by the sanctions, and uncertain geopolitical context in the broader Middle East were likely reasons. But since then, the hardliners have been emboldened, partly because of the new UN sanctions introduced in September 2019 and the killing of Soleimani. </p>
<p>The Iranian presidential elections in June 2021 will be a battleground between the moderates and hardliners. One of the candidates, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/11/biden-policies-trumpism-iran-presidential-candidate-hossein-dehghan">Hossein Dehghan</a>, a military adviser to Khamenei has already criticised Rouhani’s moderate position. </p>
<p>The Iran nuclear deal is a joint effort by several countries. While Trump’s decision to withdraw did not kill the deal, it seriously wounded it. Like Trump, Biden would like the deal to be a key part of his administration’s vision in the Middle East – but this might be tougher than he anticipates.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Bilgic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US president is sending a message to Saudi Arabia. But it might also find that negotiations with Tehran are tougher.Ali Bilgic, Reader in International Relations and Security, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1505662020-11-24T15:07:05Z2020-11-24T15:07:05ZSyria, masculinity and how the Assad regime’s priorities have changed during pandemic<p>When I picture Syria, the first thing I see in my mind’s eye are the statues of the late Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad, in military attire – there’s one in almost every square. But it’s not just statues in the urban spaces, this muscular image of the nation permeates popular culture – Syria is symbolically depicted in songs and stories as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/20581831.2018.1554233">nation of warriors</a>. And, since the uprising in 2011, this link between Syrian masculinity and warrior status has, if anything, intensified.</p>
<p>But the coronavirus has hit all sides very hard. The impact of COVID-19, combined by new sanctions in the shape of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/19/the-caesar-act-and-a-pathway-out-of-conflict-in-syria/">US Caesar Act</a>, which targets overseas sources of income for the Assad regime and its enablers, has brought hostilities <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-war-torn-syria-the-coronavirus-pandemic-has-brought-its-people-to-the-brink-of-starvation-144794">to a halt</a> for the time being. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop of economic and political turmoil, the current president, Bashar al-Assad, has had to resort to adopting new strategies to prop up his regime’s finances. This has included chasing his cousin <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/can-syrias-assad-regime-survive-new-wave-threats">Rami Makhlouf</a> – a regime loyalist – for hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid back taxes. </p>
<p>Another revenue-raising exercise has been the recent <a href="https://nation.com.pk/09-Nov-2020/syraq-region-unprecedentedly-witnesses-new-election-military-service-laws">reform of the military service law</a>. This has set a new level of exemption fees – one category for Syrians living abroad and another for Syrians inside the country. So, for the first time, some male residents of Syria – including academics – can evade military service by paying a fee, without having to leave the country.</p>
<p>The new reform has also imposed a charge on people who, for medical reasons, were exempted from the military service – now they have to pay, despite being physically unable to bear arms (we have to say that ‘those who are assigned to service at offices’) This reinforces the link between being an able-bodied Syrian man and serving in the military, while at the same time bringing in more money for the regime’s coffers.</p>
<h2>Militarised manhood</h2>
<p>In the two Syrian constitutions <a href="https://syriauntold.com/2016/06/23/the-construction-of-a-patriarchal-militant-identity-in-the-syrian-constitutions-1973-2012/">(1973 and 2012)</a>, military service is mandatory for men. The sacred notion of fighting and dying for the nation has been part of the regime’s propaganda imposed on children through the compulsory conscription to Baʾath-affiliated organisations such as the Syrian National Organisation for Childhood (<em>talaʿeʾe</em>) during the primary stage and the Revolutionary Youth Union (<em>al-shabibah</em>) in high school.</p>
<p>In a <a href="http://mubasher.aljazeera.net/news/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%83%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%87">landmark speech</a> in July 2015, Assad emphasised the relationship between national “belonging” and military service, saying: “The fatherland is not for those who live in it or hold its nationality, but for those who defend and protect it.”</p>
<p>His wife Asma al-Assad reinforced this narrative of masculinity when she met a group of <a href="https://youtu.be/ZUNb2mhHJb8">voluntary female soldiers</a> on Mother’s Day in March 2018 and praised them in comparison with men who evaded conscription. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Your presence in the battlefield marks a new victory and a whole new age… When you are able to sacrifice your soul for the nation, this is the new age and this is the real equality between men and women… You have now proved to the whole world that you are a human being… a human being has strong determination that cannot be defeated.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Masculinity and post-war Syria</h2>
<p>For some men, this this perpetuation of the warrior male stereotype has contributed to an identity crisis. In a recent roundtable discussion with about 50 men who had fled conscription and were living in the UK, many of the men expressed a sense of anguish for failing to defend the nation. </p>
<p>Some concluded that they were not worthy of being Syrian without the honour of carrying arms for their country, while others expressed their desire to go back to die on their home soil. One of them told me: “I feel I have failed my mother… Syria is our mother.”</p>
<p>But the latest reform to Syria’s military service law reflects the regime’s new priorities in fighting COVID-19, which takes money, rather than fighting the regime’s enemies, which takes soldiers.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that the reform targets Syrian men in diaspora and those living in Syria who can afford to pay rather than join up (accepting that some men had always corruptly paid bribes to avoid military service). It’s a shame that the male body is still regarded as either cannon fodder or a source of cash for the country – and it won’t stop men feeling that the constitution, which stipulates that military service is “sacred duty” and pledges to building “physically” as less masculine if they don’t join the armed forces and sign up to protect the nation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150566/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rahaf Aldoughli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Changes to the conscription law in Syria aim to raise money, while still dismissing those men who don’t bear arms as second-class citizens.Rahaf Aldoughli, Lecturer in Middle Eastern Politics, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1459102020-10-07T18:49:25Z2020-10-07T18:49:25ZSyrian refugees in Lebanon are misled on their chances of coming to Canada<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362039/original/file-20201006-18-dot2hu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C5030%2C3524&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Syrian refugee holds up a sign with a portrait of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, during a protest outside the headquarters of the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, demanding to be moved out of Lebanon, in September 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Hussein Malla)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>With <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-lights-go-out-on-lebanons-economy-as-financial-collapse-accelerates/2020/07/19/3acfc33e-bb97-11ea-97c1-6cf116ffe26c_story.html">an economic crisis</a>, COVID-19 lockdowns and the summer’s Beirut explosion, Syrian refugees living in Lebanon express increasing fears that <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/31/lebanon-is-sick-and-tired-of-syrian-refugees/">they will be scapegoated</a> or <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/02/syrians-deported-lebanon-arrested-home">forced to return</a> to Syria by authorities trying to explain away crippling levels of unemployment and overwhelmed social services. </p>
<p>Some refugees hope to find a new refuge in Canada. Canada is a <a href="https://www.unhcr.ca/news/global-displacement-grows-80-million-people-canada-world-leader-refugee-resettlement/">world leader</a> in refugee resettlement in large part because of its use of <a href="https://doi.org/10.7202/1064822ar">private sponsorship programs</a> to encourage citizens and charitable organizations to support the integration of refugees into their communities. </p>
<p>But Canadians looking to help through sponsorship will find that <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/application/application-forms-guides/guide-6000-convention-refugees-abroad-humanitarian-protected-persons-abroad.html">most of these programs require that — in big bold letters — applicants already have refugee status</a>. </p>
<p>Those without status can only submit a refugee claim through one part of Canada’s private sponsorship program. This is through <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/help-outside-canada/private-sponsorship-program/agreement-holders.html">Sponsorship Agreement Holders</a> (SAHs) — organizations that the government of Canada has agreed can help to sponsor refugees from abroad.</p>
<p>Like many living in countries that aren’t signatories to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Syrians in Lebanon are very rarely given official refugee status. </p>
<h2>At risk of harm</h2>
<p>They’re treated instead as something between displaced persons seeking international protection and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/guidelines-international-protection-no-11-prima-facie-recognition-refugee-status#:%7E:text=INTRODUCTION,country%20of%20former%20habitual%20residence"><em>prima facie</em> refugees</a> — recognized because conditions in their home country are known to put those who have fled at risk of harm. </p>
<p>In a country with <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/lb/at-a-glance">more refugees per capita</a> than any other, Lebanese authorities have few incentives to offer Syrians more. </p>
<p>Rather, they avoid integrating Syrians more permanently into Lebanese society in the hopes that Syrians, unlike the Palestinians who came before them, will only stay temporarily. </p>
<p>As an example, aid workers in Lebanon recently showed me where they had been prevented from raising refugee families’ tents out of muddy flood waters by using cement or gravel foundations. This would signal a permanence that authorities were unwilling to give. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men work to take down a concrete block wall." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362182/original/file-20201007-14-3d2yxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362182/original/file-20201007-14-3d2yxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362182/original/file-20201007-14-3d2yxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362182/original/file-20201007-14-3d2yxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362182/original/file-20201007-14-3d2yxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362182/original/file-20201007-14-3d2yxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362182/original/file-20201007-14-3d2yxr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this June 2019 photo, Syrian refugees demolish a concrete wall built inside their tent at a refugee camp in the eastern Lebanese border town of Arsal. Lebanese authorities ordered the demolition of anything in their squalid camps that could be a permanent home.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), meanwhile, has <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1371140">mostly adopted</a> Lebanese state language. Syrian “movement” or the Syrian “displaced” are often used in place of Syrian “refugee.” The UNHCR also avoids pushing for status determination for more than the most vulnerable Syrians, choosing not to ruffle too many feathers in order to protect its assistance in Lebanon. </p>
<h2>Syrians left out of debate</h2>
<p>Yet while scholars and practitioners debate the implications of this almost-a-refugee status on Syrian lives, often choosing pragmatism over advocacy, Syrians are regularly left out of the conversation. </p>
<p>Many do not know, and have not been told, that the registration papers they received from the UNHCR upon entering Lebanon are unlikely to move forward their claims for protected refugee status. Instead, refugees often said to me: “I’m on the list” for resettlement to Canada. </p>
<p>The first and most pressing concern is, therefore, that refugees are disempowered by an international refugee regime that is meant to support them. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Women hold up a protest sign reading 'We have the right to live in safety. Get us out of Lebanon.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362037/original/file-20201006-22-170sz7j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362037/original/file-20201006-22-170sz7j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362037/original/file-20201006-22-170sz7j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362037/original/file-20201006-22-170sz7j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362037/original/file-20201006-22-170sz7j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362037/original/file-20201006-22-170sz7j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362037/original/file-20201006-22-170sz7j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian refugees protest outside the headquarters of the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, demanding to be moved out of Lebanon, in Beirut, Lebanon. The country is home to more than a million Syrian refugees.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Hussein Malla)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Syrians, and refugees more broadly, are interested in protecting and advocating for themselves. But while the UNHCR is responsible for <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/4317223c9.pdf">informing Syrians of the process and outcomes of refugee status determination hearings</a>, when there are no hearings, it’s unclear that any such responsibility exists. </p>
<p>Refugees should be provided with the information they need to advocate for themselves.</p>
<p>Second, the complex legal status of many forcibly displaced people complicates potential third-country resettlement, in Canada and in countries <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/16902/private-sponsorship-refugee-resettlement-another-way">building new systems based on its model</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-canada-is-inspiring-scandinavian-countries-on-immigration-90911">How Canada is inspiring Scandinavian countries on immigration</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Millions in limbo</h2>
<p>Policy-makers should therefore do more to help refugees stuck in the grey areas, and more of them.</p>
<p>When someone does not have legal status as a refugee — even if they have a strong claim or come from a country where risk of harm is well known — their avenues are few. <a href="https://refugeeresearch.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/hyndman_feb%E2%80%9917.pdf">Previous loosening of restrictions by the Canadian government</a> for Syrians and sponsors are no longer in effect.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People stand near a green bus waving to its occupants." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362042/original/file-20201006-20-1hq9jb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/362042/original/file-20201006-20-1hq9jb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362042/original/file-20201006-20-1hq9jb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362042/original/file-20201006-20-1hq9jb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362042/original/file-20201006-20-1hq9jb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362042/original/file-20201006-20-1hq9jb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/362042/original/file-20201006-20-1hq9jb1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian refugees staying in Lebanon wave goodbye to their relatives in a bus that will take them home to Syria, in Beirut, Lebanon, in December 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Hussein Malla)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Depending on the government of the day, the political party in power and their appetite for accepting refugees in Canada, the number of spots allocated to SAHs varies. But no matter the party in power, SAH wait lists are long and under-resourced.</p>
<h2>Must know someone in Canada</h2>
<p>What’s more, because few Syrian asylum-seekers will be identified by the UNHCR in Lebanon for status determination and resettlement, only those with a foothold in Canada will have a chance at seeking refuge this way. They need to know someone able to bring their case to an SAH and raise the funds to cover the costs of a first year in Canada.</p>
<p>The need to have this kind of advocate can very quickly reproduce many of the blind spots and inequalities already built into the global refugee system.</p>
<p>As countries around the world develop their own private sponsorship systems or change their approaches to refugee resettlement, they should acknowledge how elusive refugee status can be. Policy-makers should proceed accordingly, increasing global capacities to resettle non-status refugees.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145910/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Emily K M Scott has received funding from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and is affiliated with the NGO Doctors Without Borders.</span></em></p>As countries around the world develop their own private sponsorship systems, they should acknowledge how elusive refugee status can be. Policy-makers should proceed accordingly.Emily K M Scott, Postdoctoral Researcher, International Relations and Comparative Politics, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1447942020-09-17T19:50:58Z2020-09-17T19:50:58ZIn war-torn Syria, the coronavirus pandemic has brought its people to the brink of starvation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358502/original/file-20200917-18-8ik4q4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C0%2C5543%2C3692&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/SANA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may have successfully warded off a nine-year <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/10338256?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cg41ylwvggnt/syrian-civil-war&link_location=live-reporting-story">rebellion</a> against his government, but he is being tested with economic turmoil and civilian protests amid the coronavirus pandemic and looming conflict in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.</p>
<p>The civil war in Syria has been overshadowed as the world grapples with the COVID-19 pandemic and its grim economic and social ramifications.</p>
<p>In March 2020, before the pandemic’s first wave reached its peak, the war was in full swing. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51667717">Turkey and Russia locked horns</a> over the northwestern Syrian city of Idlib, the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition. There were fears Turkey would actively fight the Syrian government.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-and-russia-lock-horns-in-syria-as-fear-of-outright-war-escalates-131830">predicted</a>, a last-minute deal was struck when Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-51760973">visited his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow</a> in March 2020.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51763926">The deal</a> established a security corridor 6 kilometres each side of Idlib’s M4 motorway. This is a key route linking Aleppo and Latakia, two major cities held by the Syrian government, which also retained its territorial gains during the crisis with Turkey. </p>
<h2>Civil war takes a break amid the pandemic</h2>
<p>Since March, there has not been any significant development in the Syrian conflict, which has been largely driven by the Syrian government’s offensive since it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/magazine/aleppo-after-the-fall.html">captured Aleppo</a> in 2016. Opposition has been largely eliminated, with those remaining in Idlib seemingly happy to be on the defensive rather than launch any offensive to the Russian-supplied Assad forces.</p>
<p>There are several reasons why the Assad government has just about halted its offensive. These include the coronavirus pandemic, the impact of the economic turmoil in Lebanon, and the economic and political crisis within Syria. Moreover, Turkey, a key player in Syria, has been busy in the eastern Mediterranean.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-and-russia-lock-horns-in-syria-as-fear-of-outright-war-escalates-131830">Turkey and Russia lock horns in Syria as fear of outright war escalates</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>On March 30, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-52100372?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cg41ylwvggnt/syrian-civil-war&link_location=live-reporting-story">first</a> coronavirus-related death was reported in Syria. There were fears the virus could spread rapidly through the highly vulnerable <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/syria-refugee-crisis-explained/#:%7E:text=More%20than%206.6%20million%20Syrians,remain%20trapped%20inside%20the%20country.">6.6 million people</a> displaced by the conflict, now living in overcrowded camps.</p>
<p>As the coronavirus spread deep into the country, the Syrian government introduced several <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020%2004%20Syria%20Country%20Brief.pdf">measures</a> to halt its progress. Borders were closed, travel between rural and urban areas was restricted, schools and restaurants were shut, and a nationwide curfew was implemented between 7.30pm and 6am. The effectiveness of these measures was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/coronavirus-syria-cases-assad/2020/07/18/732573ec-c14a-11ea-8908-68a2b9eae9e0_story.html">highly uncertain</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358504/original/file-20200917-18-odwrp0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Damascus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Russian Foreign Ministry Press Service</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Official reports suggest Syria is doing well, with <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/">160 deaths and 3,614 cases</a> at the time of writing. But, as with many <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2319714520928884">authoritarian countries</a>, these figures seem too low, given the conditions in the country.</p>
<p>In April, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/coronavirus-disaster-making-war-torn-syria-200413072258750.html">testing</a> was as low as 100 a day, with half of those in the capital, Damascus. By August, that had risen to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/24/medic-syria-covid-19-crisis-health-pandemic">300 a day</a> in only five testing centres. Of the reported cases, a mere 500 are from government-controlled regions. Syria as a whole has reported far fewer cases than any other Middle Eastern country.</p>
<p>It is almost certain the numbers of coronavirus cases are grossly under-reported. The deputy director for health in Damascus <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/24/medic-syria-covid-19-crisis-health-pandemic">estimates</a> the real number is 112,500 cases in Damascus alone. Poorly equipped hospitals are running out of supplies and, unfortunately, body bags. </p>
<h2>Economic meltdown and civil unrest</h2>
<p>There is a reason for the under-reporting of coronavirus cases in Syria: the economic turmoil that is facing the country and threatening the Assad government far more than the years of armed rebellion.</p>
<p>In late April, the government began lifting some coronavirus restrictions, but these measures caused panic-buying and sharp increases in food prices. This was compounded by a rapid fall in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53006408">value of the Syrian pound</a>, which traded at 3,000 to the US dollar on the black market (as opposed to 47 to the dollar before the civil war).</p>
<p>Inevitably, coronavirus measures have had a major economic impact on the war-torn country. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53006408">cost of living in Syria</a> has increased by more than 100% year on year.</p>
<p>The economic crisis was deepened by the increasing <a href="https://www.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/">US sanctions</a>. New sanctions introduced in June target any <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53006408">foreign person</a> who has knowingly provided significant financial, material, or technological support to the government of Syria.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358507/original/file-20200917-18-13dum3o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A large refugee camp on the Syrian side of the border with Turkey, in Idlib province.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Ghaith Alsayed</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Further, the worst economic meltdown in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/protesters-flood-on-to-the-streets-of-beirut-demanding-basic-rights">Lebanon</a> since the 1975-90 civil war caused a further slump in the Syrian economy. </p>
<p>The compounding effect of these forces culminated in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/protesters-flood-on-to-the-streets-of-beirut-demanding-basic-rights">rare civilian protests</a> in the Syrian capital. The protests began with economic demands but quickly turned into clashes, with supporters of Iran-backed Hezbollah <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/12/syrian-protesters-call-for-assads-downfall-as-economic-crisis-deepens">calling for the downfall</a> of the Assad government. </p>
<p>The government was not the only target of public anger. More than 80% of Syrians <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2019/3/5c88e57d4/united-nations-calls-sustained-support-syrians-region-ahead-brussels-conference.html#:%7E:text=An%20estimated%2083%20percent%20of,or%20lack%20of%20sustained%20livelihoods.">live below the poverty line</a>. The economic crisis hit the opposition-controlled city of Idlib, leading to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/12/syrian-protesters-call-for-assads-downfall-as-economic-crisis-deepens">demonstrations against the militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham</a>.</p>
<p>Many Syrians are in desperate circumstances. The pandemic has wiped out what meagre income they had, and they face <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53218788?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cg41ylwvggnt/syrian-civil-war&link_location=live-reporting-story">mass starvation</a>. The likely result is another mass exodus to Europe through Turkey.</p>
<h2>Repercussions of Syrian conflict in eastern Mediterranean</h2>
<p>The current crisis in the eastern Mediterranean is seemingly the result of <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-greece-conflict-in-eastern-mediterranean-is-less-about-gas-than-vaccuum-left-by-trump-144691">dispute</a> between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, over Turkey’s exploration of natural gas in waters claimed by Greece. There are three reasons why it has repercussions for the Syrian conflict.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-greece-conflict-in-eastern-mediterranean-is-less-about-gas-than-vaccuum-left-by-trump-144691">Turkey-Greece conflict in eastern Mediterranean is less about gas than vaccuum left by Trump</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>First, Turkey is drifting away from the western and European bloc over its <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">assertive Syria policy</a> (and Erdogan’s authoritarian tendencies within Turkey). Turkey was at odds with the US and European countries over its military operations and Syrian refugee policy, which allowed a flood of refugees to cross into Europe. In doing so, Turkey grew closer to Russia and, to some extent, Iran.</p>
<p>The second is the uncertainty of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/further-strikes-on-syria-unlikely-but-trump-is-always-the-wild-card-94814">US policy on Syria</a> and the US pulling out of Syria under the Trump administration. This resulted in Russia dominating the course of the Syrian civil war. Meanwhile, developments in the eastern Mediterranean forced European powers, particularly <a href="https://onu.delegfrance.org/Intervention-of-the-French-armed-forces-in-Syria">France</a>, to step in to fill the void.</p>
<p>The third is Greece’s attempt to bolster its own diplomatic and economic interests by leveraging against Turkey’s alienation from its western allies. This is aided by the conflict between Turkey and Egypt over Turkey’s <a href="https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/turkey-becomes-the-muslim-brotherhoods-base-to-take-over-the-world/">support of the Muslim Brotherhood</a>.</p>
<p>In early 2020, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-cyprus-israel-pipeline/greece-israel-cyprus-sign-eastmed-gas-pipeline-deal-idUSKBN1Z10R5">Greece signed</a> a major 1,900 kilometre undersea pipeline deal with Israel and Cyprus, followed by a bilateral <a href="https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/02/26/greece-to-sign-defence-deal-with-france/">defence deal with France</a>. Greece expanded its diplomatic push by signing an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-greece/egypt-and-greece-sign-agreement-on-exclusive-economic-zone-idUSKCN252216">agreement with Egypt</a> “designating an exclusive economic zone in the eastern Mediterranean between the two countries, an area containing promising oil and gas reserves”.</p>
<p>Unprepared, Turkey felt trapped, flexing its military muscles in <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/10/southern-eu-leaders-urge-turkey-to-end-unilateral-actions-in-mediterranean-sea-threaten-sa">unilateral moves</a> in the Mediterranean Sea. French President <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-calls-out-turkey-while-extending-dialogue-branch/">Emmanuel Macron responded</a> saying Turkey is “no longer a partner” in the region, further escalating tensions.</p>
<p>Russia has so far stayed quiet on the eastern Mediterranean crisis. But <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russia-in-the-mediterranean-strategies-and-aspirations">a dispute between Turkey, Greece and other NATO countries</a> will further alienate Turkey within NATO, resulting in a stronger position for Russia and its military and political base in Syria. </p>
<p>The coronavirus and its repercussions may have contributed to the slowing of civil war in Syria, but the humanitarian crisis facing its people may yet grow even worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144794/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and Research Academy of Australia. </span></em></p>After years of civil war, the Syrian people are now suffering from the coronavirus pandemic and a crashing economy. And there is no end in sight.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1148712020-06-18T08:02:59Z2020-06-18T08:02:59ZThis 3D printed ‘bone brick’ could transform how we treat bomb injuries – inside story<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319079/original/file-20200306-118923-1qkzhfy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For thousands of Syrian refugees who have suffered horrific blast injuries after being hit by barrel bombs and other devices of death in their war-torn homeland, the only option is amputation. When you see the damage a blast injury can do it’s a shock to the system and is so very sad and upsetting. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/circle-hell-barrel-bombs-aleppo-syria">Barrel bombs</a> have been dropped throughout the long conflict that has torn Syria apart and caused untold misery and pain to so many innocent civilians. At the start of 2018, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/circle-hell-barrel-bombs-aleppo-syria">Amnesty International reported</a> that barrel bombs had killed more than 11,000 civilians in Syria since 2012, injuring many more.</p>
<p>The barrel bomb is a type of improvised explosive device which – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/31/world/middleeast/syria-united-nations-investigation.html">according to the UN</a> – is used extensively by the Syrian Air Force. They are made from large oil barrels and are typically filled with TNT, oil and even chunks of steel. Due to the large amount of explosives that can be packed into a barrel, the resulting explosion can be devastating.</p>
<p>Even if a person survives such a blast, their limbs are at risk of suffering a large, often jagged break which, even in the best conditions, would be a major challenge to repair. In a fully equipped, state-of-the-art hospital such patients would be able to access expert orthopaedic surgery and a lot of expensive aftercare.</p>
<p>But in a refugee camp, far away from any sophisticated surgical intervention, these types of complex procedures with timely recovery and care implications are just not possible. So at the moment, amputation is unfortunately the most likely outcome in many of these cases.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong><em>This article is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em> </p>
<hr>
<p>Many of these bone shattering injuries are untreatable because of the constant risk of infection from procedures carried out in the field and the collapse of the healthcare system. A simpler and cheaper way to help these people needed to be invented and my colleagues and I believe we have done just that. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311604/original/file-20200123-162232-1cf2sg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311604/original/file-20200123-162232-1cf2sg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311604/original/file-20200123-162232-1cf2sg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311604/original/file-20200123-162232-1cf2sg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311604/original/file-20200123-162232-1cf2sg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311604/original/file-20200123-162232-1cf2sg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311604/original/file-20200123-162232-1cf2sg6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Andrew Weightman and Paulo Bartolo in the lab.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">JillJennings/The University of Manchester</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Our treatment uses a temporary, 3D printed “bone brick” to fill the gap. They are made up of polymer and ceramic materials and can be clicked together just like a Lego brick to fit perfectly into whatever gap has been created by the blast injury. The bricks are degradable and allow new tissue to grow around them. This structure will support the load like a normal bone, induce the formation of new bone and, during this process, the bricks will dissolve. The idea is that the surgeon can open a bag of bricks and piece them together to fit that particular defect and promote the bone growth.</p>
<p>The solution has been a long time coming and it was very much the plight of Syrian refugees that inspired it. It struck a very personal chord. I recognise that misery and pain and see my younger self on the faces of the children. I was born and grew up in Mozambique in South-East Africa in 1968. It was the middle of the war of independence and the country was in turmoil.</p>
<p>My family inevitably became caught up in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13890720">decade-long conflict</a> that involved the Portuguese community that was living and working in Mozambique and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Frelimo">Frelimo</a> (The Mozambique Liberation Front) resistance movement that were seeking independence and self-rule. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310503/original/file-20200116-181598-1skkubv.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310503/original/file-20200116-181598-1skkubv.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310503/original/file-20200116-181598-1skkubv.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310503/original/file-20200116-181598-1skkubv.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=598&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310503/original/file-20200116-181598-1skkubv.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310503/original/file-20200116-181598-1skkubv.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310503/original/file-20200116-181598-1skkubv.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=751&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Paulo Bartolo with his mother and younger brother Jose Manuel in 1973-4 at their home in Manhica, Mozambique.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paulo Bartolo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was 1973 and these were dangerous times. I was about five years old and it was a very frightening and disruptive period of my life. We moved up and down the country as my father’s job in civil administration changed and required us to move to the Niassa government base in Vila Cabral (now Lichinga). </p>
<p>One episode sticks out vividly. My one-year-old brother, Jose Manuel, and I were taken from our home in Maragra and moved to a refugee camp in an area of South Africa called Nelspruit, as we tried to escape the escalating violence. We were safe but I was always anxious and scared about the security of our family. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310511/original/file-20200116-181598-1ektu8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310511/original/file-20200116-181598-1ektu8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310511/original/file-20200116-181598-1ektu8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310511/original/file-20200116-181598-1ektu8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310511/original/file-20200116-181598-1ektu8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310511/original/file-20200116-181598-1ektu8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310511/original/file-20200116-181598-1ektu8z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The two brothers with their father outside the administrative office where he worked in Vila Cabral.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although we were only in the camp for around a month before we were transferred to start a new life in Portugal when I was six, that experience stayed with me for life. It gave me a strong sense of empathy for others who are being displaced by war. And it would eventually strengthen my commitment to use my bio-medical expertise to try and do something to help other refugees.</p>
<h2>Blast injuries and amputations</h2>
<p>The first time I was made fully aware of the impact of blast injuries in the Syrian conflict was when <a href="https://mft.nhs.uk/mri/consultants/mr-amer-shoaib/#targetText=Amer%20Shoaib%20is%20a%20Consultant,pain%20and%20Achilles%20tendon%20injuries.">Amer Shoaib</a> – a consultant orthopaedic surgeon at Manchester Royal infirmary – came to my university to discuss his experience and the problems he faced in treating these injuries in Syrian refugees. </p>
<p>Shoaib is a limb-injury expert with experience of working on the frontline of various conflicts and crisis zones as a humanitarian worker. He told us that in Syria the after effects of blast injuries were sometimes untreatable because of the constant risk of infection. The collapse of the healthcare system has also led to many treatments being done by people who are not, in fact, trained medics.</p>
<p>Shoaib was working in refugee camps in Turkey and I, along with my Manchester research colleagues Andy Weightman and Glenn Cooper, decided we needed to help and apply our expertise. We all wanted to make a difference and we continued our discussion late into the evening. This conversation developed into the idea of the “bone bricks”.</p>
<h2>A game-changer</h2>
<p>My own academic interests include biofabrication for tissue engineering. This involves fabricating bone, nerve, cartilage and skin through the use of 3D printing. 3D printing technology can now reproduce biocompatible and biodegradable materials that can be used in the human body. </p>
<p>Current grafting techniques have several limitations, including the risk of infection and disease transmission. They are also quite costly and present a high risk of further injury and serious bleeding. This work is centred on creating orthopaedic devices – or scaffolds – that can enable the regeneration of bone tissues to repair fractures.</p>
<p>I had been busy responding to the calls from clinicians to make these tools more agile, smaller in scale and responsive to more personalised healthcare. But the challenge set by the Syrian situation was a game-changer: we had to consider other new factors, such as making the scaffolds even more cost-effective and useable in demanding environments where it is very difficult to manage infection. </p>
<p>Part of our solution to these challenges was to use relatively low-cost 3D printing technology to create bone bricks with a degradable porous structure into which a special infection-fighting paste can be injected. The bone brick prosthesis and paste will prevent infection, promote bone regeneration and create a mechanically stable bone union during the healing period. </p>
<p>The challenge of creating this pioneering prosthesis led us on a journey to Turkey in 2016 where we met with academics, surgeons and medical companies. We were convinced that our proposed new technique could dramatically improve the medical response to life-changing limb injuries in the challenging conditions of these camps. It was clear that our project should be focused on patients within the Syrian refugee community in Turkey where they have found a safe haven from the horrors of war. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299448/original/file-20191030-17893-1m9chou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299448/original/file-20191030-17893-1m9chou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299448/original/file-20191030-17893-1m9chou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299448/original/file-20191030-17893-1m9chou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299448/original/file-20191030-17893-1m9chou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299448/original/file-20191030-17893-1m9chou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299448/original/file-20191030-17893-1m9chou.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Once we secured the backing of <a href="https://www.ukri.org/research/global-challenges-research-fund/">the Global Challenges Research Fund</a> (a £1.5 billion pot provided by the UK government to support cutting edge research that specifically addresses the challenges faced by developing countries) we began to put our project into motion. As a first step Weightman, Cooper and I visited <a href="https://www.sabanciuniv.edu/en">Sabanci University</a> in Istanbul to meet with our lead collaborator there, <a href="http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/bahattinkoc/">Bahattin Koç</a>, who introduced us to a group of clinicians who had been dealing with the refugees and their injuries firsthand and were able to share their knowledge. Their experiences gave us insight into the challenges of treating serious bone injuries in the field. </p>
<p>Our collaborators in Turkey helped to ensure we shaped the design and specifications of the bone bricks so they aligned as closely as possible to the needs of the frontline clinicians. During our stay in Istanbul we were constantly reminded of the human cost of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39252307">Syrian civil war</a>. We would often witness groups of displaced families, including children, who had fled the conflict and were seeking refuge and the chance to rebuild their lives. What we had seen on TV about Syria, with helicopters dropping bombs, was brought home to us. Some of my colleagues have children the same age as those we want to help and it made us even more determined to do something. </p>
<h2>War in Syria</h2>
<p>The Syrian conflict has displaced around 3 million refugees into Turkey, accounting for around 4% of its population. Turkey provides free healthcare services to Syrians and, as such, the burden on the healthcare system <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/turkey-response-syria-crisis-november-30-2016">is significant</a>, with 940,000 patients treated, 780,000 operations and 20.2 million outpatient services taken up between 2011 and 2017 alone.</p>
<p>The Turkish government <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/07/middleeast/turkey-syrian-refugees-istanbul-intl/index.html">says</a> it has spent more than US$37 billion hosting Syrian refugees. We hope that our bone bricks innovation can make a contribution to this crisis, helping to mitigate Turkey’s healthcare costs and also significantly improve the human cost of this crisis.</p>
<p>Our project is focused on bone injuries that are often caused by blast explosions, which are powerful enough to throw a person many yards and shatter bodies. Shoaib once said to us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If you look at the way people were injured 100 years ago, 90% were the military and 10% were civilians. <a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-conflict-blurs-the-line-between-soldiers-and-civilians-28929">It’s now the other way around</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is certainly true for the Syrian crisis where thousands of people are suffering terrible injuries. Given that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/11/report-on-syria-conflict-finds-115-of-population-killed-or-injured">almost 2 million people</a> have been injured in the Syrian civil war, we estimate that 100,000 people have been affected by large bone loss and of those injured since 2013 there have been more than 30,000 amputations – equating to about 7,500 a year. Amputation has associated physical complications including heart attack, slow wound healing and the constant risk of infection.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-conflict-blurs-the-line-between-soldiers-and-civilians-28929">Modern conflict blurs the line between soldiers and civilians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311580/original/file-20200123-162210-1ipki6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311580/original/file-20200123-162210-1ipki6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311580/original/file-20200123-162210-1ipki6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311580/original/file-20200123-162210-1ipki6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311580/original/file-20200123-162210-1ipki6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311580/original/file-20200123-162210-1ipki6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311580/original/file-20200123-162210-1ipki6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bone brick under x750 magnification.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paulo Bartolo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Catastrophic limb amputation</h2>
<p>Current bone repair techniques are complex. They include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>The leg or arm being harnessed in a metal fixing device or cage which allows slow-growing bone tissue to reconnect. But this process frequently creates complications caused by metal wires transfixing and cutting through soft tissues as the frame is extended to lengthen the bone. It is a lengthy and meticulous. </p></li>
<li><p>Placing a pin or plate implant to stabilise the bone gap and enable the tissue to reconnect. This procedure requires complex surgery in specialist centres of excellence and can only be considered in extreme and selected cases.</p></li>
<li><p>Bone shortening procedures, where healing is stimulated by removing damaged bone tissue. Or there are forms of bone grafting techniques which use transplanted bone to repair and rebuild damaged bones. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>And it must be remembered, traumatic limb amputation is a catastrophic injury and an irreversible act that has a sudden and emotionally devastating impact on the patient. As a consequence, this not only impacts a person’s ability to earn a living but also brings very serious psychological issues for the patient because of the cultural stigma associated with limb loss.</p>
<p>External prosthetic limbs after amputation provide some with a solution but they are not suitable for all. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30782746">Studies show</a> that the long term healthcare costs of amputation are three times higher than those treated by limb salvage. Clearly, saving a limb offers a better quality of life and functional capacity than amputation and external prosthetics. </p>
<h2>Just like Lego</h2>
<p>With many blast injuries, the bone defects are totally impossible to heal. What we are doing is creating a temporary structure using bone bricks to fill the gap. Our treatment uses medical scaffolds, made up of polymer and ceramic materials, which can be clicked together like a Lego brick, creating a degradable structure which then allows new tissue to grow. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311657/original/file-20200123-162190-ql0zrz.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311657/original/file-20200123-162190-ql0zrz.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311657/original/file-20200123-162190-ql0zrz.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311657/original/file-20200123-162190-ql0zrz.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311657/original/file-20200123-162190-ql0zrz.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311657/original/file-20200123-162190-ql0zrz.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311657/original/file-20200123-162190-ql0zrz.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=594&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A prototype brick just off the 3D printer at the University of Manchester.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paulo Bartolo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We are also developing software to allow the clinician, based on the information on the bone defect, to select the exact number of bone bricks with the specific shape and size and information on how to assemble – just like Lego instructions. The connection between the bone brick design and the 3D printing system is completed. We’re now in the process of integrating with the software that will link the scanning of information from the wound area with the identification of the correct type of bone bricks and assembly mechanism.</p>
<p>An antibiotic ceramic paste is stored in a hollow in the middle of the brick and is a highly practical way to combat infection while the limb repairs and hugely improves the chances of success. </p>
<p>The bone brick solution is much more cost effective than current methods of treatment. We expect our limb-saving solution will be less than £200 for a typical 100mm fracture injury. This is far cheaper than current solutions, which can cost between £270 and £1,000 for an artificial limb depending on the type needed. </p>
<h2>When will they be used on humans?</h2>
<p>My team and I are entering the final stages of a three-year project. Our team consists of academics and clinicians from Manchester and Turkey, as well as a pool of ten bone injury patients drawn from the UK, Turkey and Syria. We have already evaluated the modular bone bricks system in a computer simulation, created prototypes of the modular bone bricks using 3D printing technologies in the lab, and conducted in-vitro (laboratory) testing of mechanical and biological characterisation of the bricks. This will be followed by in-vivo (animal) testing to prepare the device for regulatory approval and a pathway to implementation by clinicians. Once all these stages are complete the project we will be ready to trial on human patients. </p>
<p>The final stage will then be to translate the research into building a useable, medical device. This will be undertaken by a follow-on clinical trial on about 20 patients with large bone loss, some of which we expect will be drawn from the Syrian refugee community. The project will be subject to strict ethical scrutiny and approval.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311585/original/file-20200123-162221-mrh1t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311585/original/file-20200123-162221-mrh1t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311585/original/file-20200123-162221-mrh1t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311585/original/file-20200123-162221-mrh1t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311585/original/file-20200123-162221-mrh1t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311585/original/file-20200123-162221-mrh1t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/311585/original/file-20200123-162221-mrh1t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bone brick under Electron Microscopy scanning.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paolo Bartolo</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We hope this project will lead to further development of emergency healthcare in the developing world and could bring hope to a Syrian refugee community in dire need while their country rebuilds. Our long term hope is that bone bricks will be of use, not only in refugee crises, but also in many other healthcare situations, such as accidents and natural disasters – in both developing and developed nations. For example, in the UK around 2,000 patients a year receive treatment for severe fractures requiring surgical reconstruction for <a href="https://www.nice.org.uk/Media/Default/About/what-we-do/Into-practice/measuring-uptake/NICE-Impact-falls-and-fragility-fractures.pdf">bone loss</a>. </p>
<p>The burden to the health service relating to major traumatic injuries is <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27333868">estimated to be in excess of £0.5bn</a>. In addition, the estimated loss of contribution to the economy due to extended periods of rehabilitation is another <a href="https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/rehabilitation-comms-guid-16-17.pdf">£3.5 billion</a>.</p>
<p>We believe the bone brick project could help alleviate some of those economic burdens and drastically improve the patient experience. But it is the plight of the Syrian refugees that continues to inspire and inform this project. We hope that, perhaps in five years’ time, bone bricks will be used in the field on humans, finally giving medics and victims an alternative to catastrophic limb amputation.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>For you: more from our <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insights series</a>:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/they-put-a-few-coins-in-your-hands-to-drop-a-baby-in-you-265-stories-of-haitian-children-abandoned-by-un-fathers-114854?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">‘They put a few coins in your hands to drop a baby in you’ – 265 stories of Haitian children abandoned by UN fathers</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/the-end-of-the-world-a-history-of-how-a-silent-cosmos-led-humans-to-fear-the-worst-120193?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">The end of the world: a history of how a silent cosmos led humans to fear the worst</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/decades-neglecting-an-ancient-disease-has-triggered-a-health-emergency-around-the-world-121282?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Decades neglecting an ancient disease has triggered a health emergency around the world</a></em></p></li>
</ul>
<p><em>To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK"><strong>Subscribe to our newsletter</strong></a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114871/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article was written with the assistance of Shaden Jaradat from The University of Manchester. Bone bricks research credits go to Paulo Bartolo, Glen Cooper and Andrew Weightman from The University of Manchester, Bahattin Koc from Sabanci University in Turkey and Gordon Blunn from the University of Portsmouth, with clinical support from Amer Shoaib.
The research is funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
The research team is grateful for the excellent work conducted by a large number of post-doctoral research associates, PhD and MSc students.</span></em></p>A cutting edge new research project is developing Lego-like bricks made from biomaterials to replace bone fragments in shattered limbs.Paulo Bartolo, Chair Professor on Advanced Manufacturing, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1333302020-03-31T12:16:46Z2020-03-31T12:16:46Z2 reasons – and 1 disease – that make peace in Syria so difficult<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321766/original/file-20200319-22614-1x9uuh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=60%2C206%2C5691%2C3621&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Displaced Syrians learn about the danger of the coronavirus to them in their camps.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/displaced-syrian-some-wearing-protective-masks-listen-as-news-photo/1207608498">Mohammed Al-Rifai/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite many <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/30/syria-peace-talks-vienna-iran-saudi-arabia">attempts</a> <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39934868">at</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/world/middleeast/syria-peace-talks.html">negotiations</a>, the Syrian war – a conflict with a complicated and constantly changing cast of characters that has killed as many as <a href="http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=152189">585,000 people</a> and <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html">displaced</a> over half of Syria’s prewar population – has proved extremely difficult to resolve. </p>
<p>As the war grinds on, conditions are only getting worse. <a href="https://apnews.com/76cd635424dc016e04a04dc4f4609400">For months</a>, the Syrian regime and its Russian allies have been engaged in an assault on Idlib, the last rebel-held region in the country. That has sparked an <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-worst-humanitarian-crisis-of-the-21st-century-5-questions-on-syria-answered-132571">exodus of nearly a million people</a> toward the now-sealed Turkish border. Although the U.N. has tried to deliver badly needed relief, many Syrians are facing winter conditions without shelter and there are <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/world/middleeast/syria-idlib-refugees.html">reports of children freezing to death</a>.</p>
<p>On top of all this, Syrians are now facing the coronavirus outbreak, which poses a devastating threat to the displacement <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/world/middleeast/syria-coronavirus-idlib-tents.html">camps jammed with people</a> fleeing the conflict, who have no opportunity to practice social distancing – or even wash their hands.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=CQdE9nYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">I am currently working on a book</a> about the war in Syria. The Syrians I’ve spoken with in the course of my research point to many reasons for their country’s tragedy. For many of those I spoke with, those reasons include the Assad regime itself and, for at least some, the rebels as well.</p>
<p>But there are two factors that stand out in explaining why the war seems to be so intractable and peace so sadly elusive: First, everyone in Syria is fighting a slightly different war from everyone else. And second, the war involves lots of outside participants, all with their own goals. </p>
<p>With a fast-spreading dangerous disease on the doorstep, the situation in Syria looks grimmer than ever.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C37%2C4985%2C3285&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C37%2C4985%2C3285&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321763/original/file-20200319-22602-7jt8ai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women walk among airstrike-ruined buildings in Idlib, Syria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/APTOPIX-Syria-Idlib-on-the-Brink/aef79c4ef57e4369a529d3870f3e1dd2/53/0">AP Photo/Felipe Dana</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A complex mix of battles and wars</h2>
<p>The Syrian war involves a sometimes bewildering constellation of participants. </p>
<p>At a bare minimum, they include President Bashar al Assad’s regime; the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its associated armed wings (the YPG and YPJ); the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or IS; and the constantly shifting array of armed groups who make up “the opposition” (sometimes also referred to as “the rebels”), which have included everyone from former army officers, to foreign jihadists, to local warlords.</p>
<p>Each group has its own objectives. The rebels and the regime seek control of Syria itself. In contrast, the <a href="https://syriadirect.org/news/the-state-of-rojava-a-month-long-reporting-series-from-syria-direct/">Kurds</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/world/middleeast/isis-yazidi-women-rape-iraq-mosul-slavery.html">Islamic State group</a> were (and are) fighting to carve out entirely <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/world/middleeast/syria-kurds.html?searchResultPosition=5">new territories</a> with new boundaries and new forms of government. These conflicting objectives mean that what might appear from the outside as a single war is really a collection of semi-related subconflicts. </p>
<p>By 2012, the nonviolent uprising against the Assad regime the had begun in the spring of 2011 had morphed into a military conflict between the regime and a range of rebel groups. While all of the rebels were bent on removing Assad from power, they often had quite divergent visions of what or who might replace him (although in most cases, the answer was “themselves”). </p>
<p>Beginning in mid-2013, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/syria.html">fighting</a> erupted in the north between the Kurdish armed groups and the Islamic State group, a conflict that was largely disconnected from the war being waged elsewhere in the country. In 2018, Turkish-sponsored rebel groups <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/world/middleeast/afrin-turkey-syria.html">attacked Kurdish territory</a> in the north, while other rebel factions continued fighting the regime – and still others <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels-idUSKCN1OX1JF">fought amongst themselves</a>.</p>
<p>All this infighting and complexity means that even if a settlement is reached that satisfies some groups, it is unlikely to satisfy everyone. There will almost certainly be someone left with an incentive to keep fighting.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321767/original/file-20200319-22594-1b59dam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321767/original/file-20200319-22594-1b59dam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321767/original/file-20200319-22594-1b59dam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321767/original/file-20200319-22594-1b59dam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321767/original/file-20200319-22594-1b59dam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=420&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321767/original/file-20200319-22594-1b59dam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321767/original/file-20200319-22594-1b59dam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321767/original/file-20200319-22594-1b59dam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fighting continues in northwestern Syria.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/members-of-syrias-opposition-national-liberation-front-fire-news-photo/1205047412">Aaref Watad/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Major international forces are involved</h2>
<p>Nearly every one of these factions has support from foreign allies. The Assad regime is backed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/europe/russia-sides-firmly-with-assad-government-in-syria.html?searchResultPosition=25">by</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/europe/russian-forces-remain-heavily-involved-in-syria-despite-appearances.html?searchResultPosition=12">Russia</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/middleeast/irans-support-emboldens-assad-us-envoy-says.html?searchResultPosition=10">Iran</a> and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/world/middleeast/iran-and-hezbollahs-support-for-syria-complicates-us-strategy-on-peace-talks.html?searchResultPosition=9">Iran-backed</a> Lebanese armed group <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/world/middleeast/syrian-army-and-hezbollah-step-up-raids-on-rebels.html?searchResultPosition=2">Hezbollah</a>. </p>
<p>The various rebel factions each have their own backers, <a href="https://mepc.org/journal/eyes-bigger-stomachs-turkey-saudi-arabia-and-qatar-syria">including</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-idlib-idUSKCN1SV0FA">Turkey</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-saudi/saudi-arabia-and-qatar-funding-syrian-rebels-idUSBRE85M07820120623">Saudi Arabia, and Qatar</a>. </p>
<p>The Kurds have received U.S. military support in their campaign against the Islamic State group – which has the dubious distinction of being so unpleasant that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29074514">no nation</a> is willing to openly support it.</p>
<p>This outside support has enabled all the war’s participants to keep fighting for far longer than would have been possible without it. In particular, direct Russian intervention in 2015 probably <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/multimedia/100000004069392/assad-russias-support-changes-balance-on-the-ground.html?searchResultPosition=5">saved the Assad regime</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, all of these foreign parties are in Syria for their own interests. Russia hopes to preserve both its influence in the region and access to <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/09/27/naval-base-in-syria-anchors-russia-to-mediterranean/">its naval base</a> in the Syrian city of Tartus. </p>
<p>Turkey seeks to prevent the Syrian Kurds from establishing their own autonomous territory on its southern border, fearing this would work to the advantage of the PKK, the Kurdish armed group that has been embroiled in a conflict with the Turkish state since the 1980s. Aside from some early support for some parts of the opposition, the U.S. has mostly focused on <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-defeats-the-islamic-state-remains-unbroken-and-defiant-around-the-world-128971">containing the Islamic State group</a>.</p>
<p>All have engaged in military strikes that have cost Syrian lives, including Turkish <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/20/turkey-bombs-kurdish-controlled-city-of-afrin-in-northern-syria">attacks on Afrin</a>, the American <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-idUSKCN1BB17G">bombardment of Raqqa</a> and Russia’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/30/civilians-northern-syria-there-no-escape">assault</a> on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/18/syria-russia-attack-refuge-apparent-war-crime">civilian targets</a> <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russian-airstrike-kills-civilians-in-syrias-aleppo-province-attack/a-52322455">across Syria</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/321765/original/file-20200319-22622-dgjwom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Displacement camps in Syria’s Idlib province pack people closely together, with no running water.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/drone-image-taken-on-march-17-shows-a-displaced-camp-in-the-news-photo/1207507564">Omar Haj Kadour/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>From bad to worse?</h2>
<p>Recent developments suggest that, if anything, the situation in Syria is worsening. Most of the war’s participants, including (and recently, especially) Assad’s regime, have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/21/syrian-regime-targets-hospital-and-refugee-camp-killing-at-least-22">attacked</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/31/world/middleeast/syria-united-nations-investigation.html">medical facilities</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1058451">humanitarian aid</a> operations and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/21/syrian-regime-targets-hospital-and-refugee-camp-killing-at-least-22">refugee camps</a>.</p>
<p>One new factor stands to significantly complicate the situation in Syria: If there is an outbreak of the novel coronavirus and its associated disease, COVID-19, anywhere in Syria, the results will be <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/concern-mounts-catastrophic-coronavirus-outbreak-syria-200316003354976.html">catastrophic</a>. The Syrian regime has <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/world/syria-reports-first-coronavirus-death-as-fears-grow-of-major-outbreak/ar-BB11Tnrp?li=AAggFp5">acknowledged nine cases and one death</a> so far, though the number may well be higher. Given the poor state of the country’s health system, things will likely get much worse.</p>
<p>Displacement camps in Syria and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/stopping-coronavirus-spread-syrian-refugee-camps-mission-impossible-says-turkish-n1153606">refugee camps</a> outside of Syria provide ideal conditions for the spread of disease. With much of the country’s medical infrastructure and equipment damaged or destroyed, especially outside of Damascus, treatment will be extremely difficult.</p>
<p>The Assad regime may be close to winning a bitter victory. But the country’s future doesn’t look good. </p>
<p>For one thing, an end to the war doesn’t necessarily mean an immediate cessation of all violence; opposition forces may wage a low-grade insurgency for years to come, as has happened in Iraq.</p>
<p>Even if violence does end, rebuilding Syria will require an enormous amount of money and human effort – both of which are in short supply there. Many of the Syrians who fled in the war’s early years were <a href="https://time.com/4046618/syrian-migrants/">young and</a> <a href="https://www.voanews.com/world-news/middle-east-dont-use/un-many-syrian-refugees-educated-seeking-better-lives">educated</a> – exactly the people whose skills Syria will desperately need in order to recover. But they may not be willing to return, either out of fear of reprisals from the regime, or because they have nothing to return to.</p>
<p>The process of rebuilding Syria will be further hampered by the regime itself; the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/world/asia/01makhlouf.html">corruption</a> and repression that protesters objected to in 2011 remain very much a part of Assad’s government. Amnesty International has <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2445082016ENGLISH.PDF">documented the use of torture</a> against tens of thousands of Syrians, especially in the notorious Sadnaya Prison. </p>
<p>Probably unsurprisingly, few of the Syrians I have interviewed expressed much admiration for or confidence in any of the participants in the war – neither for the various nonstate armed groups involved, nor for the regime. As complex as ending the Syrian war has proved, building the Syrian peace may prove to be almost as difficult.</p>
<p>[<em>Get facts about coronavirus and the latest research.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=upper-coronavirus-facts">Sign up for our newsletter.</a>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/133330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ora Szekely does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Everyone in Syria is fighting a slightly different war from everyone else, there are outsiders with their own goals – and the coronavirus is about to make everything much worse.Ora Szekely, Associate Professor of Political Science, Clark UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1328382020-03-06T14:36:55Z2020-03-06T14:36:55ZWhy Turkey can’t expect military support from NATO over attacks in Syria<p>A <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51763926">ceasefire has begun</a> in the Syrian province of Idlib after an agreement was reached between Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow on March 5. </p>
<p>Conflict had escalated in the province after Syrian government forces, supported by Russian air power, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51667717">killed at least 34 Turkish troops</a> in late February. In response, Turkey, a NATO member, requested support from the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s main political decision-making body. </p>
<p>While <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_173927.htm">NATO publicly condemned</a> the air strikes by the Russia-backed Assad regime and urged both Russia and Syria to respect international law, Turkey should not expect the alliance to trigger Article 5 – its collective military response mechanism.</p>
<h2>NATO response</h2>
<p>Back in October 2019, when Turkey launched an offensive in northern Syria, both the EU and NATO <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169576.htm?selectedLocale=en">urged</a> Turkey to show restraint and avoid any unilateral action that might lead to further destabilisation of the region. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the alliance still <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_173931.htm">condemned</a> the late February attack on Turkish troops in Idlib after Turkey invoked <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm">Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty</a>. Article 4 is a practical demonstration of the alliance’s political dimension – any ally <a href="http://law.emory.edu/eilr/_documents/volumes/34/special/bumgardner.pdf">can voice an issue of concern</a> to the council whenever its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened.</p>
<p>In its history, NATO countries have used this strong political signalling tool only <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm">six times</a> and Turkey initiated five of them. One of these instances was in 2012, after Syrian forces <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18554246">shot down a Turkish fighter jet</a> and Syrian shells killed five Turkish civilians. NATO allies agreed to increase air defence systems to help Turkey protect its population and territory, and expressed strong political support for Ankara. Yet, they <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/turkey-syria-nato/24625900.html">didn’t discuss</a> the possible activation of Article 5 – under which an armed attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against them all. </p>
<p>NATO’s reaction to the recent attack was similar to 2012: as well as expressing a strong political support to Ankara, the allies agreed to increase Turkey’s air defence systems to help Turkey protect its population and territory. </p>
<p>This builds on support NATO has been giving Turkey <a href="https://shape.nato.int/nato-assurance-measures">since 2015</a> to improve air surveillance, enhance its maritime presence and increase information sharing among allies. In recent years, Turkey has also <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169574.htm?selectedLocale=en">received</a> more than US$5 billion (£3.8 billion) from NATO to improve its military facilities. </p>
<h2>What governs Article 5?</h2>
<p>NATO has activated Article 5 only once in its 71-year history – <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2006/06/01/invoking-article-5/index.html">in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks</a>. Any invocation of Article 5 requires consensus of all 29 nations. Its geographic application is <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm">limited by Article 6</a>, which sets out where an armed attack would need to take place to trigger Article 5. Among other areas, it defines Article 5’s ambit as including the territory of Turkey and the forces, vessels and aircraft of NATO members located in the Mediterranean Sea. But it crucially doesn’t cover attacks on Turkish forces on Syrian territory. </p>
<p>This means Turkey cannot invoke Article 5 on the basis of the escalation in Idlib. Only if Turkey were to be attacked on its territory from within Syria, or if Turkish forces were attacked in or over the Mediterranean Sea could Turkey invoke Article 5. </p>
<p>The right to self-defence under <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml">UN Charter Article 51</a> only exists where an unlawful armed attack takes place, not for the lawful exercise of self-defence through armed force by an opponent. As NATO’s Article 5 is based on this right, it doesn’t apply to all cases of loss of life in combat. Even if the geographical limit did not exist, if Turkish soldiers died as result of a lawful use of force in self-defence by the Syrian armed forces, Article 5 could not be used to request support.</p>
<h2>Turkey’s limited options</h2>
<p>In the past few years NATO’s cohesion has been weakened, partly because of a lack of trust between Turkey and the rest of the alliance and increasing strategic divergences among the allies. This has left NATO countries <a href="http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1422">unable to effectively the address escalations</a> in the Syrian conflict in a coherent way. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkeys-invasion-of-syria-a-stark-warning-of-how-irrelevant-nato-could-become-125451">Turkey's invasion of Syria a stark warning of how irrelevant NATO could become</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The strained relations between Turkey and the rest of the allies date back to a failed coup against Erdoğan’s government in 2016, since <a href="https://theconversation.com/erdogan-declares-victory-in-his-pursuit-of-one-man-rule-76032">when Turkey</a> has moved away from democratic values. </p>
<p>Turkey cannot hope for direct military support from the US either. Although Turkey has requested a no-fly zone in northern Syria, something also suggested by some <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/02/28/senator-calls-for-us-to-establish-no-fly-zone-over-syria-after-33-turkish-troops-killed-in-airstrike/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2003.02.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">US senators</a>, this is not being seriously discussed in the US or NATO circles, as it would risk confrontations with Russian air forces. </p>
<p>Washington is yet to formally respond to Turkey’s request for the US to deploy its Patriot missile batteries on Turkey’s southern borders, a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/28/turkey-patriot-missiles-pentagon-118256?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2003.02.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief">request backed</a> by the US special representative for Syria. </p>
<p>This kind of American military assistance would be quite paradoxical, since Turkey <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41237812">purchased</a> a Russian S-400 air defence system in 2017. The Russian system is <a href="https://www.military.com/defensetech/2017/07/17/us-to-turkey-russian-s-400s-arent-compatible-with-nato-tech">not only incompatible with NATO defence systems</a>, but is also a potential threat to the US-led, multinational fifth-generation fighter jet program, which Turkey <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/07/17/turkey-officially-kicked-out-of-f-35-program/">was forced to leave</a>. </p>
<p>The discussion surrounding Turkey’s involvement in Syria and its potential for escalation shows the challenges for NATO. While the current situation cannot trigger Article 5, despite these challenges NATO allies will continue to provide support to Turkey within the framework of Article 4. In fact, the possibility of such Article 4 consultations might allow for NATO to support Turkey without provoking escalation by triggering a collective military response – which would bolster the case for the continued relevance of the alliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132838/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey is a NATO member but that doesn’t mean its NATO allies will come to its support in Syria.Amelie Theussen, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern DenmarkDominika Kunertova, Postdoc, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern DenmarkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.