tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/tanking-3526/articlesTanking – The Conversation2019-03-22T10:43:56Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1130942019-03-22T10:43:56Z2019-03-22T10:43:56ZBaseball’s biggest problem isn’t pace of play – it’s teams tanking<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265124/original/file-20190321-93051-1smhe8l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Miami Marlins fans have little to look forward to this season.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Phillies-Marlins-Baseball/62cb806fcf784ba98c84f9c590047847/33/0">AP Photo/Brynn Anderson</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Major League Baseball is in trouble. But for all of Commissioner Rob Manfred’s <a href="https://www.mlb.com/news/commissioner-rob-manfred-talks-pace-of-play-c266818890">concerns about pace of play</a>, he’s looking in the wrong direction.</p>
<p>The game is healthy. The league isn’t.</p>
<p>Tanking – or intentionally losing – is endemic. Consider the Miami Marlins.</p>
<p>Since former Yankees great Derek Jeter’s ownership group took over the Marlins at the conclusion of the 2017 season, they’ve:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Traded away the <a href="https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/s/stantmi03.shtml">2017 Most Valuable Player</a></p></li>
<li><p>Gotten rid of <a href="https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/y/yelicch01.shtml">the eventual 2018 MVP, too</a></p></li>
<li><p>And flipped a <a href="https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/o/ozunama01.shtml">two-time All-Star</a> as well as the <a href="https://blogs.fangraphs.com/the-argument-for-j-t-realmuto-as-baseballs-best-catcher/">game’s best catcher</a>.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The 2018 Marlins went 63-98, 14 wins worse than 2017. Projections for 2019 have them somewhere between “<a href="https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/projected-2019-mlb-standings-yankees-dodgers-looking-like-favorites-as-baseball-waits-on-harper-and-machado/">just as lousy</a>” and “<a href="https://www.fangraphs.com/depthcharts.aspx?position=Standings">even worse</a>.”</p>
<p>It’s so dire that Jeter <a href="https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/derek-jeter-wants-marlins-fans-to-remember-ballpark-experience-not-the-scoreboard-in-2019/">said</a> fans might not remember the score of this season’s games, but at least they’ll remember the ballpark experience. Not exactly a ringing endorsement for Marlins baseball.</p>
<p>For the Marlins, though, it’s all part of a bigger plan: lose now, save money, accumulate young talent and – hopefully – win later.</p>
<p>The Marlins are just one of many teams following this strategy, and there’s a logic to their approach: There’s no prize for mediocrity, and if a team, at its best, will probably miss the playoffs, why bother trying? Why not shed payroll and collect the higher draft picks that come from having a terrible record?</p>
<p><a href="https://batten.virginia.edu/school/people/adam-felder">As a data analyst</a>, I wanted to study the underlying factors fueling this trend. It seems that the league’s inequitable pay structure plays a big role.</p>
<h2>The best get paid … less?</h2>
<p>Let’s begin by looking at who’s been getting the bulk of the playing time in MLB since 1995. For the sake of space, we’ll focus only on batters, using plate appearances – the number of times that player batted during the season – as the metric.</p>
<p><iframe id="LLkFl" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/LLkFl/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>There’s no trend here. For the last quarter century, players in their mid-to-late 20s have played the most. Once they turn 30, they have fewer opportunities.</p>
<p>Does this reflect their productivity?</p>
<p>Determining the best players is a bit difficult since players are good at different things. But “<a href="https://www.baseball-reference.com/about/war_explained.shtml">wins above replacement</a>” is an all-encompassing metric that takes into account a number of discrete skill sets, from defense to baserunning to hitting.</p>
<p>Looking at wins above replacement, players tend to hit peak productivity in their mid-20s, before experiencing a downturn around age 30. As they approach their mid-30s, they’re a fraction of the player they once were.</p>
<p>So it makes sense that players younger than 30 get most of the playing time: They’re the most productive. </p>
<p>They must make the most money, then, right?</p>
<p>Wrong. Toggle between the tabs on the graph below and you’ll see that players in their mid-to-late 20s are the most productive but that their counterparts over 30 draw the biggest salaries.</p>
<p><iframe id="Prlqn" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Prlqn/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>A labor agreement that handicaps players</h2>
<p>This discrepancy between value and salary is due, in part, to <a href="http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450407.pdf">the current labor agreement</a> between players and ownership. Last negotiated in <a href="https://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Collective_bargaining_agreement">2016</a>, it has long resulted in a compensation structure that disproportionately favors established veterans.</p>
<p>Here’s the gist of how it works: For the first six years of a player’s career – starting when he’s first promoted to the major leagues – the team that drafted him has exclusive negotiating rights. That player makes the league minimum in his first three years. During seasons four, five and six, he makes 40 percent, 60 percent and 80 percent, respectively, of what he would make on the open market – a number determined by an <a href="https://library.fangraphs.com/business/mlb-salary-arbitration-rules/">arbitration panel</a> if the player and front office can’t agree.</p>
<p>Only after a full six years of service in the majors can he become a free agent – at which point he can negotiate with all 30 teams. This competition should drive his salary up and explains why players over 30 years old tend to make the most money.</p>
<p>But the pay differential between a player who can negotiate with other teams and a player who cannot is so enormous that teams are incentivized to do everything in their power to keep a player from accruing a full six years of service time until it’s absolutely necessary. </p>
<p>Just a few weeks spent in the minors can prevent a player from hitting a full year of service time, so it’s become common practice for teams to either leave a player in the minors at the start of the season or to “yo-yo” a player between the minors and majors <a href="https://www.theringer.com/mlb/2019/3/7/18254501/service-time-manipulation-vladimir-guerrero-jr-fernando-tatis-jr-peter-alonso">just long enough to squeeze out a seventh year</a>. Teams have <a href="https://www.foxsports.com/mlb/just-a-bit-outside/story/houston-astros-jon-singleton-contract-prospects-jose-altuve-george-springer-dominguez-031915">also started</a> to offer long-term, below-market contract extensions to players well before free agency – <a href="https://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2019/03/white-sox-nearing-extension-with-eloy-jimenez.html">sometimes before they even play a major league game</a> – using the <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/baseball-broshuis-minor-league-wage-income/">sub-poverty wages</a> of minor league baseball to all but coerce a player into signing away his most marketable years.</p>
<h2>The gap between winners and losers grows</h2>
<p>Because teams have become well aware that most players’ skills decline once they hit free agency, they’ve been less and less likely to offer free agents lucrative contracts. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/biggest-mlb-contracts-in-history-where-mike-trout-bryce-harper-manny-machado-deals-rank/">Superstars</a> like Manny Machado, Bryce Harper and Mike Trout still make money. But a far greater number of less productive veterans lose out; their best years, after all, are behind them.</p>
<p>The veterans that manage to find work end up doing so on shorter contracts for lower annual value than they might’ve seen even a few seasons prior. Other players are absolutely good enough to crack an MLB roster but now go unsigned entirely.</p>
<p>The problem is so bad that a general manager could have put together a <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2019/01/19/mlb-free-agents-manny-machado-bryce-harper/2617212002/">competitive team</a> with the free agents on the market before the beginning of this year’s spring training, while All-Stars like <a href="https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/k/keuchda01.shtml">Dallas Keuchel</a> and <a href="https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/k/kimbrcr01.shtml">Craig Kimbrel</a> remained unsigned as of March 20.</p>
<p>That’s the point, though: A competitive team isn’t the goal. Either a team wins, or it doesn’t, and the chance to receive higher draft picks incentivizes not winning.</p>
<p>Essentially, most teams look at more sophisticated versions of the previous graphs to determine a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/sports/baseball/spring-training-major-league-teams.html">competitive window</a>” in which they can lump all their young talent onto the field simultaneously.</p>
<p>The age of a typical free agent – and the length and cost of a typical free agent contract – make signing him a losing proposition for most teams. If a team does decide to wade into free agency, it’ll only be when that team believes a few players are the difference between making or missing the playoffs.</p>
<p>The result? MLB is sorting itself into haves and have-nots. There are more super teams trying to win by beating up growing numbers of teams trying to tank. One could credibly point to roughly one-third of teams in the league on Opening Day and claim they’re not trying to win in 2019.</p>
<p>The graph below looks at how varied the records of teams have been over time, a sort of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient">Gini coefficient</a> – a measure used to determine income inequality – for baseball. </p>
<p>A low value in any given season suggests that there were relatively few teams that stood out from the pack – good or bad. A high value in any given season suggests that there were relatively few mediocre teams and instead a great number of exceptionally good or exceptionally bad ones.</p>
<p><iframe id="mJLqE" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/mJLqE/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Last season marked the highest gap between haves and have-nots in the last quarter century.</p>
<p>That behavior makes sense for individual teams, but it’s bad news for the league. A great way to lose fans is to lose for seasons on end. <a href="https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=mathfac">Several</a> <a href="http://web.mst.edu/%7Edavismc/attendance%20var.pdf">analyses</a> <a href="http://thesportjournal.org/article/attendance-still-matters-in-mlb-the-relationship-with-winning-percentage/">have shown</a> that a team’s ability to win is highly correlated with a team’s attendance. This shouldn’t shock anyone: It’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_League_(film)#Plot">literally the plot</a> of the classic movie “Major League.”</p>
<p>While each team is acting in its own self-interest, the collective trend is problematic. Whether through alienating fans or forcing a labor dispute, there’s reason to believe the league is headed for trouble.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113094/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Felder does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Roughly one-third of the league won’t be trying to win this season. What’s fueling this trend?Adam Felder, Director of Data Analytics, Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of VirginiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/885742017-12-25T20:34:43Z2017-12-25T20:34:43ZHow and why economics is taking over sports<p><em>In this series we’re looking at how the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/economics-of-sport-47162">economics of sports</a> is doing away with hunches and intuition. Using data and research to evaluate players, strategies and even leagues.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>If you look closely at your favourite sport nowadays, it’s hard to miss the influence of economics. It’s evident from <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2650398">the way players are drafted</a> or <a href="https://www.econ.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/li_harrison.pdf">how much they are paid</a>, through to individual coaching decisions, and even <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1527002514560578">strategic shifts across entire leagues</a>. </p>
<p>This has been particularly driven by the <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/21527025">rise of game theory</a> in economics. Game theory uses mathematical models to figure out optimal strategies, <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w15347">such as</a> what pitches a baseball pitcher should throw, or whether American Football teams should pass more. </p>
<p>Sport lends itself to economics and game theory because players, coaches and agents act similar to the hypothetical rational decision-makers in economic models.</p>
<h2>The economics of professional sport</h2>
<p>If you’ve seen or read <a href="https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/moneyball/">Moneyball</a> you’ll understand how economics can be used to put together a team. This is the true story of Billy Beane, the former general manager of the Oakland Athletics baseball team. Beane became famous for using economic ideas to identify undervalued players. </p>
<p>Baseball scouts and agents often focused too much on unimportant factors like how hard someone could hit a ball. Using <a href="http://sabr.org/sabermetrics">advanced statistics</a> Billy Beane could identify players who were undervalued by his competitors, and play them in ways that made best use of their strengths.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/shorter-or-longer-tennis-matches-whats-the-right-balance-70998">Shorter or longer tennis matches: what's the right balance?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In basketball, <a href="http://economics.clemson.edu/robert-d-tollison">Robert D. Tollison</a> is largely behind the <a href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/basketballs-other-3-point-revolution/">explosion of three point shooting</a> in the National Basketball Association. Tollison’s <a href="http://angusgrier.oucreate.com/arbitragebb.pdf">research</a> identified that even though three pointers are less accurate than other shots, over the course of a game and season it makes sense to take more three pointers. </p>
<p>In some cases economists have been hired to solve specific problems. For instance the AFL was worried about clubs “tanking” (purposefully losing) to get favourable draft picks (not mentioning any names, <a href="http://www.heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/how-melbourne-tanked-in-2009/news-story/5b0efacdf9da532f8daea1c1313d461c">Melbourne</a>). </p>
<p>So the AFL asked Melbourne University Economics Professor Jeff Borland to come up with an <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2775924">objective measure of club performance</a> (based on team performance, win-loss ratios, previous finals appearances and injuries). </p>
<h2>Why are academics getting into sports?</h2>
<p>For teams and leagues, the incentive to implement economic ideas is financial. American Football’s Superbowl attracts <a href="https://www.google.com.au/search?q=superbowl%2C+ratings&oq=superbowl%2C+ratings&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60l2j69i61l3.1619j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">111 million viewers</a> each year in the USA alone. </p>
<p>In Australia the broadcast rights for the <a href="http://www.afl.com.au/news/2016-10-27/fewer-games-on-freetoair-tv-in-2017">AFL</a> and <a href="http://www.nrl.com/nrl-broadcast-rights-deal-announced/tabid/10874/newsid/91023/default.aspx">NRL</a> are each around A$2 billion. And this doesn’t even count the merchandise that can be sold to fans. </p>
<p>But the academic economists are often driven by something else - analysing sports can shed light on fundamental economic questions, particularly about the impact of incentives, labour market discrimination on race and gender lines, and competition.</p>
<p>For instance, discrimination against non-white athletes like Hank Aaron in Major League Baseball led to a lot of <a href="http://repository.brynmawr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=econ_pubs">interesting research</a> about the economics of discrimination in the workplace. </p>
<p>Similarly, the rapidly increasing player salaries in the English Premier League has led to a lot of <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00423.x/abstract?userIsAuthenticated=false&deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=">analysis of winner-take-all markets</a>. It has also led <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/152700250200300201">other sports leagues</a> to implement salary caps and restrictions on the draft.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/big-data-can-give-athletes-the-winning-edge-21922">Big data can give athletes the winning edge</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But the economics of sports aren’t just for academics, teams and leagues. The last few years have seen a few popular books that explain how fans can also get in on this movement.</p>
<p>For example, there’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6617185-soccernomics">Soccernomics</a> by Simon Kuper and Stefan Syzmanski. This book applies statistics, economics, psychology and game theory to popular questions about game. What country likes soccer the most? Norway. What country has performed better at the World Cup than they should have? England (despite their reputation).</p>
<p>There’s also Franklin Foer’s <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/10395.How_Soccer_Explains_the_World">How Soccer Explains the World</a>, which uses soccer to explain topics as diverse as globalisation, oligarchy and antisemitism. </p>
<p>Lawrence Ritter, an eminent economist, is arguably more famous for his book <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/461749.The_Glory_of_Their_Times">The Glory of Their Times</a> about the early days of American’s Major League baseball. There has probably been no better book on the sociology of business and the labour market of the United States in the 1920s.</p>
<p>The growth in sports economics is likely to continue, as the data gets better and teams compete for a strategic edge. In economic terms, the global sports industry really is more than a game.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88574/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Harcourt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why are NBA players taking more three pointers, baseball pitchers throwing slower, and soccer player salaries skyrocketing? It all comes down to the economics of sport.Tim Harcourt, J.W. Nevile Fellow in Economics, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/123922013-02-25T02:21:52Z2013-02-25T02:21:52ZPlaying to win: how the AFL can prevent tanking<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/20516/original/28kk4j9j-1361496066.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is a way to ensure poor performing teams such as Greater Western Sydney and Melbourne play to win.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Lukas Coch</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The AFL’s <a href="http://www.afl.com.au/news/2013-02-19/afl-full-statement-melbourne-tanking-penalties">recent decision</a> on whether the Melbourne Football Club “tanked” to secure draft picks in 2009 has left many confused. </p>
<p>While ruling that the Demons “did not set out to deliberately lose in any matches” in 2009, the AFL still fined the club $500,000 and has suspended then coach Dean Bailey and football operations manager Chris Connolly.</p>
<p>The system that led to the Demons’ suspected tanking, which awarded teams that won fewer than four games a priority pick in the subsequent draft, has since been <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-02-21/afl-punts-priority-pick/3842838">abandoned by the AFL</a>.</p>
<p>But the temptation to tank persists in the current draft system. Put simply, the team that finishes at the bottom of the ladder gets the highest draft picks. In the final few weeks of the season, then, there remains an incentive for poor performing teams to lose to ensure they attain (or maintain) the earliest possible selections in the draft.</p>
<p>There has to be a better way to ensure fans of poor performing teams can guarantee they can watch their team at least try to win at the end of the season. In that spirit, I’ve come up with the following proposal to discourage tanking.</p>
<h2>How it works</h2>
<p>This system is based on the premise that all clubs commence the season with the aim of playing finals football and maintain that aim for so long as they are a mathematical chance of making the finals.</p>
<p>For the purpose of draft selection, clubs are ranked in the order that they are eliminated from finals contention, regardless of their position on the ladder at the end of the season.</p>
<p>A club is eliminated from finals contention when, at the end of a completed round, the number of games remaining for that club is fewer than the number of wins or draws required to secure the lowest position on the ladder designated for finals qualification.</p>
<p>Where two or more teams fall from finals contention at the end of the same round (irrespective of the number of games won), the team with the best record in head-to-head games played between the clubs throughout the entire home and away season will secure the higher position in the draft.</p>
<h2>Rationale</h2>
<p>Presuming the original premise holds true, clubs have the incentive to try to win matches while they are still in contention to make the finals.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=727&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20507/original/hth6pmkn-1361490744.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=914&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Number one draft pick in 2008, Jack Watts tackles Matthew Kreuzer, the number one pick from the year before.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Joe Castro</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And the disincentive to win matches (particularly late in the season) is removed even after clubs are eliminated from finals contention. In the situation where the club is the only one eliminated from finals contention at the end of a round, their subsequent win-loss record cannot alter their position in the draft. </p>
<p>The tie-breaking procedure will ensure that where two or more clubs are eliminated from finals contention in the same round, those clubs still have the incentive to win matches against each other in order to improve their head-to-head records while their results against all other teams will have no bearing on their ultimate position in the draft.</p>
<p>So clubs will have no incentive not to win matches in order to improve their draft position. More importantly, no club would ever be perceived to acquire any advantage by “tanking”.</p>
<h2>Applying the proposal to the 2012 Season</h2>
<p>So how would the last football season have played out under these rules for the bottom three teams?</p>
<p>At the end of round 15, Gold Cost was seven games behind eighth-placed St Kilda with eight games left to play, therefore mathematically still in finals contention.</p>
<p>By the end of round 16, Greater Western Sydney and Gold Coast were seven games behind eighth place with seven games to play. But both clubs were out of finals contention because ninth-placed North Melbourne had the same record as St.Kilda (eight wins to seven losses) and these two clubs were to meet later in the season. Either team winning that match (or even if they drew) would ensure Greater Western Sydney and Gold Coast could not make the final eight.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/20510/original/7mgdzfc4-1361491280.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/20510/original/7mgdzfc4-1361491280.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20510/original/7mgdzfc4-1361491280.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20510/original/7mgdzfc4-1361491280.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20510/original/7mgdzfc4-1361491280.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20510/original/7mgdzfc4-1361491280.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/20510/original/7mgdzfc4-1361491280.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Melbourne head coach and current Adelaide assistant Dean Bailey, received a 16 week coaching ban for his involvement in the Demons’ tanking scandal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Julian Smith</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Because the two teams were eliminated at the completion of the same round, they would then vie for picks one and two in the draft according to their head-to-head record. They had already met in round seven (Greater Western Sydney winning 94 to 67) and were due to meet again in Round 20, where Greater Western Sydney would take a 27-point advantage into the game. </p>
<p>So both teams would have had the incentive to win, but the Gold Coast would have had to win by 28 points or more to earn the superior draft selection.</p>
<p>At the end of Round 17, Melbourne were seven games behind eighth-placed North Melbourne with six games to play, so were eliminated from finals contention. At that point, Melbourne would secure pick three in the draft regardless of any other results before the end of the season.</p>
<p>The table below shows how the picks would have been distributed among the bottom ten teams under the proposed system, as compared to the current system.</p>
<figure><table><thead><tr><th>Pick</th><th>Current</th><th>Proposed</th><th>Round Secured</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>GWS</td><td>Gold Coast</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Gold Coast</td><td>GWS</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Melbourne</td><td>Melbourne</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>Western Bulldogs</td><td>Western Bulldogs</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>Port Adelaide</td><td>Port Adelaide</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>Brisbane</td><td>Brisbane</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>Richmond</td><td>Richmond</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>Essendon</td><td>Carlton</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>Carlton</td><td>Essendon</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>St.Kilda</td><td>St.Kilda</td><td>22</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>
<p>The finalists secure their order in the draft according to the order they are eliminated from the finals. Teams eliminated in the same week of the finals are ranked in order according to which of the two was ranked lower on the ladder at the end of the home and away season.</p>
<p>The bottom three teams collectively won five games in the final seven rounds without affecting their draft positions. Significantly, despite the fact the Gold Coast defeated Greater Western Sydney in round 20, this proposal would eliminate any suggestion that had Gold Coast lost the game, it might have done so to ensure they finish below GWS to secure an earlier draft pick.</p>
<p>In Round 21, Melbourne went into its game against Greater Western Sydney just one win ahead and, under the current system, may have had a disincentive to win to secure an earlier draft pick. Under this proposal, both clubs had already locked in their respective draft positions and the disincentive, perceived or otherwise, would be removed.</p>
<h2>Playing to win</h2>
<p>Some may argue tanking does not exist. Others looking at the 2012 example may point out that the final draft positions under the current system do not deviate significantly from that which would be derived from the proposal. But whether it actually occurred in 2012 or not, there is a public perception in some quarters that tanking does exist, and has occurred for a number of years.</p>
<p>My proposal definitively removes incentives, perceived or otherwise, to engage in tanking. It also preserves the integrity of the game. </p>
<p>But most importantly, it ensures that fans of Melbourne, the Gold Coast or Greater Western Sydney, can go to games knowing their teams have nothing to lose by winning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/12392/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noel Boys does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The AFL’s recent decision on whether the Melbourne Football Club “tanked” to secure draft picks in 2009 has left many confused. While ruling that the Demons “did not set out to deliberately lose in any…Noel Boys, Teaching Fellow / Lecturer in Financial Accounting, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/105192012-11-05T02:53:20Z2012-11-05T02:53:20ZThe Demons may have tanked, but did they break the rules?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/17241/original/n33x68fz-1352071956.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Melbourne ruckman Mark Jamar pounces on a loose ball. The Demons stand accused of deliberately losing games to gain high draft picks.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Julian Smith</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Melbourne Demons AFL team <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/afl/afl-news/tanking-affair-darkens-for-dees-20121029-28g2n.html">stand accused</a> of deliberately ensuring their team lost matches in order to secure talented players in the draft in a process known as “tanking”.</p>
<p>With the club facing a hearing at the AFL Commission into the allegations, a series of media reports quote officials and players from the club saying that the club had a deliberate strategy to ensure it did not win more than four games in season 2009 so it could secure a priority draft pick.</p>
<p>But was this behaviour actively in contravention of AFL rules? Are the laws of the game clear enough in prohibiting such tactics?</p>
<h2>The problem with ambiguity</h2>
<p>If I was the AFL administrator with responsibility for writing the rule that would prevent teams from deliberately playing games to lose, then I would be unambiguous. The rule would include phrases like “a team must try to win every game” or “no-one associated with a club should do anything that had the effect of reducing the chance of winning a game”.</p>
<p>The AFL Regulation 19 (A5) explains that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>A person, being a player, coach or assistant coach, must at all times perform on their merits and must not induce, or encourage, any player, coach or assistant coach not to perform on their merits in any match - or in relation to any aspect of that match, for any reason whatsoever.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is the problem with letting lawyers and administrators near rules. The rules become ambiguous. What exactly does “perform on their merits” mean?</p>
<p>To develop an answer to this question, it may be useful to give examples of what has been, in past matches, considered OK in terms of performing on merits.</p>
<h2>Precedent?</h2>
<p>In round 21 of the 2010 AFL season, the Fremantle football side decided to rest seven players from a game against Hawthorn in Tasmania. The team needed to win one of their two remaining games to be assured of receiving a home game in the first week of the finals, and felt that they would have a better chance six days later against Carlton at their home ground, if these players were rested. The weakened Fremantle team <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/afl/afl-news/bmantle-blunder-or-daring-docker-design-20100823-13fb2.html#ixzz2B7G2bQN9">lost their game</a> against Hawthorn by 116 points. </p>
<p>This decision to rest players, apparently to maximise the opportunity for longer term success in finals is deemed to be playing on merits. It seems that teams playing off for finals are always “performing on merits”.</p>
<p>There are several other examples of teams playing on their merits, whilst not trying to maximise their chances of winning every game they played in. </p>
<p>Many teams, once it appeared unlikely that they would make finals, admitted to putting players in for mid-season medical procedures in order to have these players ready for the start of pre-season training for the following season.</p>
<p>Other teams have agreed to the early introduction of younger players to get them greater match experience for benefits that might occur in future seasons. Some coaches confessed that they had experimented with positions and rotations to learn more about their players, and other coaches agreed that they did not make moves to change the momentum of a game that they were losing, perhaps hoping that players could learn important lessons for the future about what they could do on the field to change the momentum of the match (I am being very generous here).</p>
<h2>What actual rule has been broken?</h2>
<p>So, if all of these decisions and contexts are acceptable, we are left with a very limited range of cases where teams do not play on their merits. And I think that this limited range of cases indicates why ambiguous phrasing was used in the rule on tanking. </p>
<p>Paraphrasing <a href="http://www.theage.com.au/afl/afl-news/mcguire-criticises-priority-pick-system-20121031-28jk4.html">Eddie McGuire</a>, supporters of the game accept and expect clubs to lose matches in certain cases where the long term benefits outweigh the short term costs of losing a game. We can debate whether this affects the culture of the club, or whether it is an effective strategy in the longer term, or whether certain clubs used better, or less obvious, methods than others, but it would be inconsistent to permit certain methods as strategy whilst labelling others as cheating.</p>
<p>It is, however, the ambiguous wording of the rule allows us to make these different assessments about practices that share common goals. Without this ambiguous wording, many more practices would need to be scrutinised by the AFL.</p>
<h2>Defining “merit”</h2>
<p>It appears from the existing and untested evidence that has come to the public’s attention over the past few weeks that Melbourne may not have maximised their chances of winning every game. Did they “at all times perform on their merits”? Yes. However, their understanding of what was meritorious for their club at the time was significantly different to what the AFL thought was meritorious. This is expected. </p>
<p>As <a href="http://what-when-how.com/social-sciences/merit-social-science/">Amartya Sen identifies</a>, there is a tension between an inclination to want a universal and fixed definition of merit and the ultimately instrumental character of what is deemed meritorious at a specific time, place and context. </p>
<p>At the time, place and context of the Melbourne decisions, they were viewed as meritorious by many within the practice community of football, including many not associated with the Melbourne Football Club.</p>
<p>It is likely that the AFL will find a way to punish Melbourne in order to protect its own image.</p>
<p>And what is certain is that the rules regarding “tanking” will be tightened dramatically to remove any ambiguity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/10519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Burke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Melbourne Demons AFL team stand accused of deliberately ensuring their team lost matches in order to secure talented players in the draft in a process known as “tanking”. With the club facing a hearing…Michael Burke, Senior Lecturer, School of Sport and Exercise Science, Victoria UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/86232012-08-04T00:50:16Z2012-08-04T00:50:16ZAFL and tanking: the cure might be worse than the disease<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/13848/original/bk5j4wss-1344040868.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Did the Melbourne Demons lose matches deliberately? Or are they simply just not very good at the game of Australian Rules football?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Julian Smith</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sometimes denial is understandable.</p>
<p>It’s no surprise that the Australian Football League maintained for so long the farcical position that “tanking’ (intentionally losing) by clubs was not a problem. It’s their standard response to any issue threatening the League.</p>
<p>That changed last Monday when Carlton midfielder Brock McLean suggested on TV that he left the Melbourne Demons because the club had not been entirely serious about winning games of football, with the implication it was doing so to get high draft picks.</p>
<p>Now faced with a public relations disaster, the League has promised severe punishment, called for people to speak out, and brazenly pronounced the issue must not be swept under the carpet. But the trouble is the AFL has built incentives to tank into the structure of their competition. And any systematic attempts to deal with the problem might do more harm than good.</p>
<p>For all its corporatisation Australian Rules football remains driven by the passions of fans: it depends on the dreams of barrackers, along with their absurd faith that the team they love is destined to one day win the premiership. At the centre of it all is hope – that the new players, coach or gameplan will bring the glory that has been promised. That eventual triumph is on its way.</p>
<p>The Australian Football League has been alive to this, borrowing "equalisation” measures from their North American counterparts, the NFL, since the 1980s. For the intended outcome of the draft and salary cap is to reinforce the belief that every team will be able to compete equally for the premiership cup.</p>
<p>And despite various obstacles, these equalisation strategies have been remarkably successful. Indeed, while the growth in audiences – and thus revenue – of the AFL has generally been credited to the national expansion of the League, the equalisation strategies have been a key factor. Only five different clubs won a premiership in the two decades before the AFL began to expand its competition in 1988. Since then all bar the two most recent teams have played finals, fourteen have been a game away from the grand final, and ten have won the flag.</p>
<p>Much of this has been due to the national draft which rewards the poorest teams by giving them the first pick of the most promising young footballers in the league. And although it takes place around two months after the season has ended, the national draft has become an increasingly vital occasion in footy’s liturgical calendar. Across the country, alone and in groups, huddled around TV’s, radios and the internet, barrackers hope for the recruitment of a saviour: for the player, or players, who will lead their club to a premiership flag. </p>
<p>History gives these fans due cause for optimism. Early draft picks such as Scott Pendelbury and Dale Thomas (Collingwood), Lance Franklin and Jarryd Roughead (Hawthorn), and Chris Judd (West Coast) have all played key roles in premiership victories during the last decade.</p>
<p>It often makes sense then, for those clubs who cannot make the finals to try and lose rather than do everything possible to win. It’s a disturbing side-effect of equalisation, and something the AFL clearly needs to counter. But how?</p>
<p>The AFL is currently taking the line that it can police tanking, but apart from the most extreme cases, this is unlikely to be effective. Clubs down the bottom of the ladder often send key players off for season-ending surgery when they would still be able to play at a high level if the club was still competing for that year’s premiership. How can this be policed? Is the AFL to insist that it vet every decision to operate on a player?</p>
<p>A more effective solution would be to modify the draft. The AFL has already made one change by lowering the value of the priority picks given to teams who perform horrendously for two years in a row. A further step would be to create a lottery for the picks as the NBA has done in the US whereby the teams who finish lowest have more chance, but no guarantee, of being awarded the first draft pick. Unfortunately the most recent NBA season showed that this could simply lead to multiple teams tanking in order to try and “win” the first pick.</p>
<p>Even more radical is the suggestion of moving to a two-league relegation system. This would make winning of the utmost importance for the bottom teams, and augment the race to the flag with compelling narratives of survival and despair. Nevertheless, a two-tier league would require a huge injection of funds to create the second-tier, the abandonment of the equalisation strategies – or at least the draft – and increase the need for new fans from a relatively small population.</p>
<p>The AFL often seems impregnable. Despite the scandals and angst it marches on. Membership figures, crowd numbers, and television audiences have all increased markedly over the past decade. A key reason for this is that even when supporters become disaffected by the game they still love their club and buy into the dreams of future glory. But these dreams of glory are fragile, and it is the AFL’s need to nurture the hopes of barrackers that explains its reluctance to move firmly against tanking.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/8623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Klugman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sometimes denial is understandable. It’s no surprise that the Australian Football League maintained for so long the farcical position that “tanking’ (intentionally losing) by clubs was not a problem. It’s…Matthew Klugman, Australian Research Council DECRA Fellow, Institute of Sport, Exercise and Active Living, Victoria UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.