tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/tehran-38953/articles
Tehran – The Conversation
2022-03-31T18:59:14Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/179089
2022-03-31T18:59:14Z
2022-03-31T18:59:14Z
Kylie Moore-Gilbert’s 804 days in an Iranian prison were a travesty - but the West is in no position to lecture
<p>The brutal 804-day incarceration of Kylie Moore-Gilbert in Iran on fictitious charges was an appalling travesty. It remains inexplicable. </p>
<p>Moore-Gilbert is an Australian-British academic who was conducting field research on Bahranian exiles in Iran when she was <a href="https://theconversation.com/scholars-growing-insecurity-puts-academic-freedom-at-risk-128680">suddenly detained</a> by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, at the airport gate in Tehran. It seems her arrest was opportunistic. Unsubstantiated charges were made that she spied for MI6, along with unproven allegations that her husband was linked to Israel’s Mossad.</p>
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<p><em>Review: The Uncaged Sky – Kylie Moore-Gilbert (Ultimo)</em></p>
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<p>Subsequent attempts to lure her Russian-Israeli husband to Iran and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-56339817">turn Moore-Gilbert into a spy</a> for the state were so amateurish and preposterous, one is left with the impression that her captors were soon as perplexed by her arrest as she was. Were they just religious zealots driven by an irrational hatred and suspicion of all things Western? </p>
<p>They must have known in advance that, according to their own metrics, she was a low value target. It is absurd to think MI6 or any spy service would send someone to Iran who didn’t speak Farsi. It also appears that they had not developed any plans about what to do with her once she was under their control. </p>
<p>This uncertainty and their inability to provide Moore-Gilbert with plausible answers to her questions significantly contributed to her suffering, initially in solitary confinement in 2A at Evin prison, later at the remote desert prison Qarchak.</p>
<h2>A political prisoner, despite lack of evidence</h2>
<p>She became a political prisoner convicted of espionage, despite the fact that her crimes could not be substantiated with incriminatory documents or recordings. In what was a de facto admission of this (which <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-bernard-collaerys-case-is-one-of-the-gravest-threats-to-freedom-of-expression-122463">Bernard Collaery and Witness K in Australia</a> would more recently come to understand), the judge at her trial invoked “national security” to conceal the lack of evidence against her.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455158/original/file-20220330-25-85rgem.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455158/original/file-20220330-25-85rgem.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455158/original/file-20220330-25-85rgem.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455158/original/file-20220330-25-85rgem.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455158/original/file-20220330-25-85rgem.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455158/original/file-20220330-25-85rgem.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455158/original/file-20220330-25-85rgem.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>Ultimately, Tehran <a href="https://theconversation.com/kylie-moore-gilbert-has-been-released-but-will-a-prisoner-swap-with-australia-encourage-more-hostage-taking-by-iran-150942">exchanged Moore-Gilbert</a> for three Iranians held in Thailand, after protracted negotiations with Canberra. But it is not clear that hostage diplomacy was the initial motivation for her arrest, and it only became an option when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps concluded that Moore-Gilbert had nothing else to offer them. By that time, the growing public awareness of her plight through international media had left a deepening stain on Iran’s image around the world. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/i-kept-silent-to-protect-my-colleague-and-friend-kylie-moore-gilbert-but-australias-quiet-diplomatic-approach-is-not-working-143597">I kept silent to protect my colleague and friend, Kylie Moore-Gilbert. But Australia's quiet diplomatic approach is not working</a>
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<p>Strained relations between Tehran and Canberra delayed her freedom. Only a few short years ago, during Julie Bishop’s tenure as Australia’s foreign minister, relations between the two countries were <a href="https://theconversation.com/ms-bishop-goes-to-tehran-a-story-of-good-news-and-bad-news-40463">significantly improving</a>. </p>
<p>Regrettably, like so many of Australia’s bilateral relations, taking cues from Washington has become the default setting: leverage and influence have been traded for little or no gain. Quiet diplomacy made no progress until Moore-Gilbert’s case <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-australian-government-needs-to-step-up-its-fight-to-free-kylie-moore-gilbert-from-prison-in-iran-130591">became a cause célèbre</a> among her academic colleagues in Australia and later in media circles – a shift in strategy that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra <a href="https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/for-australians-in-foreign-jails-any-publicity-can-be-good-publicity-20210312-p57a24">strongly opposed</a>.</p>
<h2>Inside the prison cells</h2>
<p>Her memoir of this terrible experience is detailed, beautifully written and heartbreaking. She takes us inside her prison cells as she battles daily indignities and atrocious conditions, the petty hostility of her guards, repetitive and pointless interrogations, hunger strikes and planted informants. </p>
<p>The only happiness she found was with transient fellow prisoners who were often whisked away without warning. Infrequent phone calls to Australia and occasional acts of defiance and resistance, such as climbing onto the prison roof before guards could stop her, also kept her morale from hitting rock bottom.</p>
<p>Teaching herself Farsi and maintaining an analytical view of politics, religion and human nature helped to maintain her mental equilibrium when despair was the more tempting reaction to her situation. Readers can only speculate how they would have fared in similar circumstances, wondering if they could have endured the prospect of a ten-year prison sentence for bogus crimes with such strength, composure and dignity.</p>
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<img alt="A cluster of prison buildings on a remote hill." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455194/original/file-20220330-5217-l4a4u8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/455194/original/file-20220330-5217-l4a4u8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455194/original/file-20220330-5217-l4a4u8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455194/original/file-20220330-5217-l4a4u8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=285&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455194/original/file-20220330-5217-l4a4u8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455194/original/file-20220330-5217-l4a4u8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/455194/original/file-20220330-5217-l4a4u8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=358&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Evin Prison, Iran (north of Tehran) is noted for its political prisoners’ wing, where prisoners have been held both before and after the Iranian Revolution.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/yaadaavar/">Yaadaavar/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>The most impressive aspect of her story is that, unlike her heart, Moore-Gilbert’s mind did not break. Despite her captors’ sadistic game-playing, led by an infatuated case officer who seemed to want to marry his prisoner, her isolation from friends and family, and a private betrayal, she maintained hope when precious little was apparent. </p>
<p>With trust in such rare supply during her confinement, and the mounting physical, emotional and mental toll of her incarceration, Moore-Gilbert’s resilience was astonishingly impressive. At the end of her account, even she seems surprised by her inner strength and capacity to maintain a spirit of hope under such dispiriting conditions.</p>
<h2>Why the West is culpable, too</h2>
<p>It is tempting to conclude that Moore-Gilbert’s appalling treatment was simply the product of a brutal, authoritarian government that is not committed to the human rights of either its own citizens or those of foreigners. Tehran’s record in this area is little short of barbaric, especially its treatment of women, its theocratic intolerances and its liberal use of the death penalty.</p>
<p>But as we know from the United States penal colony at <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-things-to-know-about-guantanamo-bay-on-its-115th-birthday-108301">Guantanamo Bay</a>, post-9-11 renditions, and the torture of enemy combatants in <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib">Abu Ghraib</a> prison during the Iraq war, liberal democracies are are no less reluctant to use the same techniques of incarceration on their enemies. They also lock up journalists and publishers such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-arbitrary-detention-of-julian-assange-54342">Julian Assange</a>, for simply exposing their crimes. The West is in no position to lecture others about good international citizenship.</p>
<p>Nor does the Western world shy away from forming close friendships with other countries in the Persian Gulf with horrific legal systems, such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-repressive-saudi-arabia-remains-a-us-ally-156281">Saudi Arabia</a>, which make Iran look like a liberal paradise. Human depravity is neither politically, nationally nor culturally specific. </p>
<p>The Iranian political elite and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are paranoid, but with some justification. </p>
<p>They remember how in 1953, the CIA and MI6 <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days">overthrew</a> the democratically elected leader of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh, because he nationalised Anglo-Iranian oil. They recall US support for the tyrannical and brutal Shah, whom they restored to power in the country after removing his secular nationalist predecessor.</p>
<p>They know that since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran has paid a heavy price for successfully defying the United States. Economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, obsessive calls for regime change within the US and Israel, cyber-attacks like <a href="https://theconversation.com/stuxnet-is-scary-but-human-safety-should-come-first-18576">Stuxnet</a>, regular Mossad assassinations of its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-fakhrizadeh-assassination-israel.html">nuclear scientists</a> and senior military leaders like <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israeli-intel-chief-takes-responsibility-for-assassination-of-iran-s-soleimani-1.10481220">Qasem Soleimani</a> by the US, reinforce their suspicions. Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement Tehran signed with the Obama Administration (the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance">Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</a>) also contributed to a deep and pathological distrust of the West.</p>
<p>This does not justify the treatment Moore-Gilbert received. There is no defence for incarcerating innocent people on trumped up charges for 804 days. It is simply the context for the collapse of relations between Iran and the Western world, where routine proclamations of “Iranian terrorism” only serve to absolve the West of its share of responsibility for the collapse of goodwill between the parties.</p>
<p>At the end of her account, it is still not clear why Kylie Moore-Gilbert was arrested and prosecuted. It is the one central question that remains unanswered from a vivid and inspiring account of survival against injustice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179089/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Burchill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The story of Kylie Moore-Gilbert’s 804 days as a political prisoner is about more than Iran’s human rights abuses, writes Scott Burchill – the West is no model of international citizenship either.
Scott Burchill, Honorary Fellow, Deakin University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/130432
2020-01-23T19:24:38Z
2020-01-23T19:24:38Z
Despite shows of unity, Iran is more divided than ever after Soleimani killing
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311670/original/file-20200123-162246-3xmom.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=73%2C34%2C1037%2C582&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters hold flowers during protests at Amir Kabir University in Tehran, in tribute to the victims of the crash of Flight PS752. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The two major events that have shaken Iran in recent weeks have also had major internal repercussions. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://apnews.com/5597ff0f046a67805cc233d5933a53ed">assassination of Qassem Soleimani by an American</a> drone lit the fuse, sending shock waves around the world and increasing the risk of an escalation of armed conflict between Iran and the United States. Following this assassination, Iran was the scene of massive demonstrations to commemorate the Iranian general and denounce the Americans. </p>
<p>A few days later, as Iran launched a retaliatory raid on U.S. bases in Iraq, <a href="https://theconversation.com/flight-ps752-a-deadly-combination-of-irans-recklessness-and-incompetence-129749">a Ukrainian civilian plane crashed near Tehran airport, killing 176 people, including 57 Canadians</a>. This tragedy provoked anti-regime demonstrations this time. Thousands of Iranians took to the streets, angry at their government <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51073621">when it admitted responsibility for the crash</a> after three days of denial. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310971/original/file-20200120-69539-1kdz6uw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Debris from the plane crash near Tehran airport.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Canadian Press/AP-Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
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<p>Thus, in the space of 10 days, Iran was the scene of pro- and anti-regime demonstrations. </p>
<p>During the pro-government demonstrations, some commentators claimed that <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/reza-marashi-interview-iran-soleimani-assassination-934852/">Iranians were rallying around the regime after the assassination of Soleimani</a>. Was this really the case? Did the assassination of the general really change Iranians’ perceptions of the regime? </p>
<p>To better understand the current context in Iran, it should be noted that Soleimani was assassinated a month and a half after <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/11/iran-anti-government-protests-us-support/">the largest anti-regime demonstrations</a>, which took place last November. These protests were so threatening to the regime that Supreme Leader Khamenei led the deadliest crackdown since 1979, saying: “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR">The Islamic Republic is in danger. Everything necessary must be done. This is an order</a>.” </p>
<p>As many as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/06/dont-believe-iranian-propaganda-about-mourning-soleimani/">1,500 protesters were reportedly killed</a> in November. The repression was so severe that the security forces even prevented mourning ceremonies for <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/12/26/an-iranian-couple-wanted-mourn-son-killed-protests-now-they-are-jail/">some victims</a>.</p>
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À lire aussi :
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-crackdown-against-iraq-protests-exposes-fallacy-of-the-countrys-democracy-124830">Violent crackdown against Iraq protests exposes fallacy of the country's democracy</a>
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<h2>Why did so many mourn Soleimani?</h2>
<p>How did the regime manage to bring so many people to the streets for Soleimani in a climate of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/iran-shot-down-hopes-its-people/605158/">public discontent against both the reformist and conservative factions of the regime</a>? There are several factors that explain how Tehran managed to give <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/09/politics/donald-trump-iran-congress/index.html">this illusion of unity by using Soleimani’s funeral</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310975/original/file-20200120-69531-1jn0rta.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A demonstration near Tehran’s Great Mosque in honor of General Ghassem Soleimani. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini said in his sermon that U.S. President Donald Trump was a ‘clown.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</span></span>
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<p>First of all, Soleimani was very popular among both the reformist and conservative factions of the regime. His funeral received <a href="https://twitter.com/AlinejadMasih/status/1215310781853642752">enormous media coverage</a> in Iran. This contrasted with the non-existent coverage surrounding the November anti-regime protests <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28376/after-protests-iran-may-be-locked-into-a-future-of-more-social-unrest">targeting both reformers and conservatives</a>. The authorities blocked internet access for more than seven days while they massacred protesters in the streets, according to a <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/20191224-iran-hidden-slaughter-video-investigation-protest">reporting by France 24</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the state deployed enormous resources to increase the number of participants in the pro-Soleimani demonstrations. <a href="https://twitter.com/AlinejadMasih/status/1213682218033266688">Students, civil servants and shopkeepers were forced to go attend.</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51021854">Persian BBC journalist</a> so aptly said about the regime’s ability to orchestrate their own demonstrations: </p>
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<p>“The organizers are now experts in their work. From declaring national holidays to gathering university students to requiring military and civil servants to go out with their families, every means has been used to gather the crowds. Buses, trains and trucks are provided to transport people from villages and towns across Iran to the rallies that are constantly announced on state television.”</p>
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<p>That said, there are also citizens who are truly fascinated by Soleimani.</p>
<p>For several years now, there has been a certain craze for the general, who is very present on state television, in the sermons of the mosques and even with some celebrities. Soleimani is viewed in Iran as a hero who saved the Middle East from the influence of the Islamic State (ISIS). Because of his role in the fight against the terrorist organization, Soleimani embodies for some Iranians the image of a benevolent commander who is above the internal politics of the country. The presence of these admirers was also marked in these pro-Soleimani demonstrations.</p>
<h2>Demonstrations after the crash</h2>
<p>But the apparent unanimity that followed Soleimani’s assassination, <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/01/06/sea-endless-people-mourns-soleimani-across-iran-vowing-trump-will-be-held">commented on by many as a rally around the flag</a> and against the Americans, quickly collapsed in the face of popular demands and general discontent.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310972/original/file-20200120-69551-p888jj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A demonstrator prepares to throw a tear gas cannister at police outside Amir Kabir University in Tehran during a demonstration in memory of the victims of Flight PS752. The apparent unanimity that followed the assassination of Soleimani quickly collapsed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As soon as the Iranian leaders announced, in the face of international pressure, that the Ukraine Airlines passenger jet had been shot down by an Iranian missile – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/21/iran-admits-it-fired-two-missiles-at-ukrainian-passenger-jet">it is now known that it was two missiles</a> – anti-regime demonstrations broke out in major cities such as Tehran, Mashhad, Esfahan and Racht, as well as in several other regions.</p>
<p>Protesters chanted many of the same anti-regime slogans as they did in November: “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/12/iran-braces-for-protests-after-admitting-plane-shootdown.html">We were told that the enemy is the United States. Yet our enemy is here</a>.” The demonstrators were dispersed by force, which is the usual <em>modus operandi</em> of the Iranian republic.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310978/original/file-20200120-69531-ub6gcm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police take a stand as demonstrators gather in front of Amir Kabir University in Tehran to mourn the victims of Flight PS752. Police fired both live ammunition and tear gas to disperse the protesters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In short, Soleimani’s death didn’t weld the country together. It is still grappling with structural problems that cannot be solved overnight without a real willingness to change. The gap between the regime and the people will only grow if current trends persist. Among these trends is an expected increase in anti-regime demonstrations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130432/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vahid Yücesoy ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>
Despite apparent unity after the killing of an Iranian general by the U.S., deep divisions still mark the Middle Eastern country.
Vahid Yücesoy, PhD Candidate in political science, Université de Montréal
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/100431
2018-08-01T10:39:16Z
2018-08-01T10:39:16Z
New sanctions on Russia and Iran are unlikely to work. Here’s why
<p>Sanctions are much in demand these days as a tool of American foreign policy. </p>
<p>Members of Congress want <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-sanctions-idUSKBN1AC1U8">tough new sanctions</a> against Russia for its interference in American elections. Sanctions will <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea">remain in place</a> against North Korea, the White House says, until Pyongyang shows progress toward denuclearization. After <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-donald-trumps-nuclear-deal-withdrawal-will-hurt-irans-dissenters-and-activists-96364">tearing up the Iran nuclear accord</a>, the Trump administration <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/us/politics/iran-sanctions-trump.html">restored sanctions</a> against Tehran in an effort to get a better deal on restricting its weapons and a change in its behavior. And even NATO ally Turkey <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-02/turkey-s-markets-plunge-into-the-unknown-after-u-s-sanctions">faces sanctions</a> for imprisoning several U.S. citizens and employees of its diplomatic mission.</p>
<p><a href="http://abc7news.com/politics/sec-of-state-tillerson-says-north-korea-sanctions-working-at-stanford-lecture/2960149/">Policymakers claim</a> that sanctions are an effective means of achieving policy goals, but is that true? Are new measures against Moscow and Tehran likely to be successful?</p>
<p>Research on sanctions by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/david-cortright-522739">myself</a> and others has shown that they can sometimes be effective. But there are three key elements: allies, a willingness to enforce them and incentives to bargain. The absence of all three means they probably won’t work with Russia and Iran.</p>
<h2>Unilateral sanctions rarely work</h2>
<p>Allies supporting and reinforcing sanctions are usually pivotal to making them stick. </p>
<p>Unilateral sanctions such as the proposed measures against Russia and Iran are seldom successful. Although the <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/">European Union has placed sanctions</a> on Russia because of its actions in Ukraine, the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia/new-u-s-russia-sanctions-push-slows-in-congress-before-recess-idUSKBN1KE32X">latest legislative measures</a> proposed in Congress would be unilateral.</p>
<p>In an increasingly globalized world, unilateral sanctions face huge obstacles – even when imposed by the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/022415/worlds-top-10-economies.asp">largest economy</a>. A landmark study published in the 1990s by the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that unilateral U.S. sanctions achieved their foreign policy goals <a href="https://piie.com/commentary/testimonies/evidence-costs-and-benefits-economic-sanctions">only 13 percent of the time</a>. </p>
<p>The rare instances when unilateral sanctions work involve countries that have extensive trade relations with the U.S., clearly not the case with <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/usa/rus/show/2016/">Russia</a> or <a href="https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/usa/irn/show/2016/">Iran</a>. <a href="http://fortune.com/2014/03/18/u-s-russian-trade-relationship-there-really-isnt-one/">Russia</a> is low on the list of <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/toppartners.html">U.S. trading partners</a>, and Iran has had virtually no economic or commercial relations with the U.S. Neither country is dependent on U.S. trade or likely to submit to American economic pressure. </p>
<p>In addition, when a country faces sanctions, it can often seek commercial ties elsewhere. This was the case with Cuba. When the U.S. <a href="http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Embargoes-and-Sanctions-Cold-war-sanctions.html">imposed sanctions</a> on its former trading partner after Fidel Castro came to power, Havana turned to Moscow for help and became a part of the communist bloc.</p>
<p>Iran, for its part, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/08/fresh-u-s-sanctions-not-likely-to-strangle-irans-oil-market/">has diversified its economy</a> in the face of sanctions from the U.S. and other Western countries, shifting trade to the East and increasingly selling oil and buying goods in China, India and other Asian countries.</p>
<p>Washington is responding to Tehran’s circumvention strategy by <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-iran-sanctions-affect-countries-and-businesses-1525824925">threatening</a> to impose secondary sanctions against foreign companies that trade with Iran, barring them from doing business in the U.S. Extraterritorial sanctions such as these are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions">opposed by other countries as a violation of international law</a>. </p>
<p>European nations especially disagree with this approach and have <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/world-powers-back-iran-oil-exports-despite-us-sanctions-threat/">vowed to maintain trading relations</a> with Iran despite secondary sanctions. Russia and China <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/25/moscow-and-beijing-have-tehrans-back/link">also oppose</a> the new U.S. policy. </p>
<h2>Willingness to follow through</h2>
<p>This raises a second factor that influences whether sanctions work: Is the country issuing the sanctions willing and able to assure compliance with those measures? </p>
<p>The prospect of losing Iran’s 2 million barrels of oil a day is already <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-what-sanctions-on-iran-could-do-to-global-oil-supply-and-prices-2018-05-04">roiling global markets</a>. To calm investors, the U.S. State Department <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/middleeast/us-iran-oil-imports-sanctions-.html">quietly announced in early July</a> that Washington would allow countries like China, India and Turkey to reduce oil imports from Iran “on a case-by-case” basis, signaling the U.S. will allow some states to maintain imports, thus limiting the impact of the sanctions. </p>
<p>In other words, the desire to mitigate the potential impact of new sanctions on global financial markets may outweigh the goals of imposing them in the first place.</p>
<p>A similar problem of weak compliance is affecting continued U.N. sanctions against North Korea. In the wake of the Trump-Kim summit and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/07/02/president-trumps-exaggerated-claims-about-the-north-korea-deal/">president’s claim</a> that Pyongyang is no longer a nuclear threat, China and Russia have shown reluctance to continue enforcing sanctions. They recently <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/un-diplomats-russia-puts-hold-on-us-requests-over-nkorea/2018/07/19/49d6875e-8b7f-11e8-9d59-dccc2c0cabcf_story.html?utm_term=.3f11861c9400">blocked an effort within the U.N. Security Council</a> to condemn North Korean oil smuggling.</p>
<p>If the U.S. and major allies are unable or unwilling to pay the price of sanctions enforcement, effectiveness diminishes. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229136/original/file-20180724-194134-jsuxnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229136/original/file-20180724-194134-jsuxnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229136/original/file-20180724-194134-jsuxnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229136/original/file-20180724-194134-jsuxnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229136/original/file-20180724-194134-jsuxnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229136/original/file-20180724-194134-jsuxnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/229136/original/file-20180724-194134-jsuxnq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called the sanctions the administration plans to place on Iran the ‘strongest sanctions in history.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Pompeo-Australia-Meeting/c53f1da1457c4ad988ed495cbc5550bd/7/0">AP Photo/Jeff Chiu</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Coercion and compliance</h2>
<p>A third factor affecting success is the need to combine sanctions with diplomatic bargaining. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://sanctionsandsecurity.nd.edu/news/the-sanctions-decade-assessing-un-strategies-in-the-1990s/">research with George Lopez</a>, a <a href="https://politicalscience.nd.edu/faculty/faculty-list/george-lopez/">professor emeritus of peace studies</a>, shows that sanctions work best within a bargaining framework in which the imposition of coercive measures is combined with incentives for compliance. </p>
<p>The offer to lift sanctions can be an effective bargaining chip for persuading the targeted regime to accept compromise and alter its policies. This was the case in the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Dayton-Accords">1995 Dayton Peace Agreement</a>, when the offer to lift sanctions served as an inducement for Serbia to end its aggressive policies and accept a political settlement.</p>
<p>The irony in the case of Iran is that precisely this form of sanctions-based diplomacy was successful in achieving the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/iran-nuclear-deal-15757">2015 nuclear deal</a>. Rigorous U.S., U.N. and European Union sanctions were combined with an offer to lift them if Iran complied with demands to restrict its nuclear program and accept intrusive inspections. The International Atomic Energy Commission <a href="http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/421491/IAEA-reaffirms-Iran-s-compliance-to-nuclear-deal-for-10th-time">verified</a> on 10 separate occasions from 2016 through the early part of 2018 that Iran kept its side of the bargain, and sanctions were removed. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230011/original/file-20180731-136646-w9ii1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230011/original/file-20180731-136646-w9ii1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230011/original/file-20180731-136646-w9ii1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230011/original/file-20180731-136646-w9ii1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230011/original/file-20180731-136646-w9ii1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230011/original/file-20180731-136646-w9ii1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230011/original/file-20180731-136646-w9ii1d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The offer to end sanctions against Serbia is what led former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to sign the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/David Longstreath</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The lonely road</h2>
<p>For all these reasons, I believe the new U.S. policy of reimposing unilateral sanctions abandons a multilateral approach that was working in favor of a unilateral policy that has little chance of success. </p>
<p>The U.S. and EU sanctions on Russia for its policies in Ukraine may have some continuing effect, but the new measures under consideration in Congress are unlikely to have a major impact. </p>
<p>Policymakers may talk tough about threatening sanctions, but their policies are weak if they are unilateral and costly to implement. Sanctions work best when they are part of a multilateral diplomatic effort – like the Obama administration took on Iran – in which the offer to lift sanctions is used as an incentive to achieve a negotiated settlement.</p>
<p>The Trump administration may think that it can go it alone in foreign policy, but on sanctions, as on nonproliferation and other policies, multilateral cooperation is often the key to success. </p>
<p><em>This article was updated to include new information about sanctions against Iran.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100431/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I have raised funds from the US State Department for the Kroc Institute project monitoring the Colombia peace agreement. I am active with the NGO Win Without War, which conducts policy advocacy on progressive foreign policy issues.
</span></em></p>
American policymakers and lawmakers are floating unilateral sanctions against Russia, Iran and even Turkey in an effort to change behavior. But research shows sanctions only work in narrow circumstances.
David Cortright, Director of Policy Studies, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/99155
2018-07-03T15:11:16Z
2018-07-03T15:11:16Z
Iran’s Grand Bazaar: once a hotbed of revolution, now a conservative power base
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225699/original/file-20180702-116143-1ic135n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tehran's Grand Bazaar: a city within a city. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ninara/41906451204/sizes/l">Ninara/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Too often, news about Iran is tainted by the politics of the day, particularly in the US. Recent protests by the bazaar merchants of Tehran were a case in point. <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-26/thousands-protest-in-iran-over-failing-economy/9909184">Major news outlets</a> in the US and elsewhere were quick to imply that Iran may be on a verge of another major rupture. </p>
<p>The bazaar is typically cited as a barometer for the socio-economic and political situation in Iran. When the bazaar merchants strike, as they repeatedly did in the build up to the revolution of 1979, there must be another revolution around the corner. </p>
<p>Yet, such one-sided historical analogies are flawed. In contemporary Tehran, the bazaar has ceased to play the central business and political role that it assumed in the build up to the 1979 revolution which overthrew the regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran. </p>
<h2>The revolutionary bazaar</h2>
<p>The bazaar played a major symbolic role in the revolution because it was a hub for the opposition, whose power base was the traditional lower-middle class. Back then, it played a major role in the day-to-day affairs of Tehran’s population. The bazaar was a city within the city, home to a population brimming with political and socio-economic grievances against the Shah. Under the beautifully arched ceilings first erected in the 17th century, a civil society infrastructure emerged geared to the revolutionary momentum that delivered the Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. </p>
<p>In the labyrintine matrix that makes the Grand Bazaar of Tehran such a fascinating urban space, the revolutionaries were able to keep their organisational autonomy in the face of intrusions by the Shah’s security forces. At the height of the revolution, the bazaaris gave out free drinks and food to the demonstrators and helped them hide from the monarch’s dreaded secret service. </p>
<p>After the revolution, the Grand Bazaar became a major institutional focal point in the chain of “Islamic” sites that galvanised the power of the newly formed Islamic Republic. Ironically, as the Middle East scholar, Arang Keshavarzian, rightly argued in his excellent <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Bazaar_and_State_in_Iran.html?id=_NKL8-6B9OYC&redir_esc=y">book on the topic</a>, this alliance with the state transformed the bazaar into an economic unit, with waning political centrality. Whereas in 1979, the bazaar was a hub for revolutionary agitation, today it is complementary to the state.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/f3RP_01rjsw?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>Today, Tehran is a modern, decentralised, megalopolis with 15m inhabitants. The bazaar, with its traditional trades, is flanked by sparkling shopping malls where affluent Tehranis spend their time in chic, air-conditioned boutiques offering a wide range of consumer goods and designer items. </p>
<h2>A conservative power base</h2>
<p>The bazaar continues to be seen as one of the many pillars of the Iranian state. But now, despite its history of opposition to the state, it is seen as an institutional hub for conservative politics in Iran. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225697/original/file-20180702-116120-1y1455o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/225697/original/file-20180702-116120-1y1455o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225697/original/file-20180702-116120-1y1455o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225697/original/file-20180702-116120-1y1455o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225697/original/file-20180702-116120-1y1455o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225697/original/file-20180702-116120-1y1455o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/225697/original/file-20180702-116120-1y1455o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shops shut in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar during a protest on June 25.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">STR/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In light of this, the recent discontent within the bazaar can be explained by two factors, both of them largely driven by the economic situation in Iran.</p>
<p>In the last six months, exacerbated by the economic warfare that the Trump administration is waging against Iran, the Rial, the national currency, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/iran-stop-downward-spiral-currency-180628063235075.html">has lost</a> almost half of its value vis-a-vis the US dollar. As a result, inflation is rampant, imports are costly and the exchange rate remains volatile. The one-day strike of the bazaaris on June 25 was about these <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/strike-tehran-grand-bazaar-rial-devaluation-180625180010879.html">very specific and legitimate economic</a> concerns. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-us-withdrawal-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal-will-affect-irans-economy-96476">How the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal will affect Iran's economy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>At the same time, there is increasing frustration with the economic performance of the administration of President Hassan Rouhani. He has been targeted by part of a similar conservative groundswell that delivered the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 by deposing the reformist camp around his predecessor, Mohammed Khatami.</p>
<p>Iran’s pragmatists and reformists have born the brunt of antagonistic US foreign policies which empowered the more conservative forces in Iranian politics. This was evident in the 2002 “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000004021075/the-axis-of-evil-speech.html">axis of evil</a>” speech by President George W. Bush which paired Iran with US enemies such as North Korea and Iraq even at a time when Khatami had made several overtures to the US. This speech, and the subsequent introduction of ever more draconian sanctions against Iran, had a similar effect as the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-donald-trumps-nuclear-deal-withdrawal-will-hurt-irans-dissenters-and-activists-96364">breach of the Iran nuclear agreement</a> by the Trump administration. It caused the conservatives to both gain in popularity and allowed them to move against reformist elements.</p>
<p>In a similar way, the recent strike of the bazaaris can be seen as a jibe against Rouhani, and an act of support for a conservative, future president. </p>
<p>Once again, Iranians are articulating very specific demands related to the economy. But this is a part of the reform process in the country and not a revolutionary movement. The strike of the bazaaris is the latest manifestation of the political prowess of an immensely potent civil society in Iran. And it is exactly because of this ability to organise and articulate their specific demands that Iranians have repeatedly managed to garner concessions from successive governments in their country – in many ways against all odds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arshin Adib-Moghaddam does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Recent protests in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar are part of a long reform movement, not a new revolution.
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Professor in Global Thought and Comparative Philosophies, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/73221
2017-05-26T06:38:37Z
2017-05-26T06:38:37Z
In razing its modernist buildings, Iran is erasing its past Western influence
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/170802/original/file-20170524-31373-qk4cke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A view of Tehran, with its mix of traditional and modern design.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jorneriksson/7602832814/">Jørn Eriksson/Flick</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Hassan Rouhani’s re-election <a href="https://theconversation.com/hassan-rouhanis-economic-legacy-may-be-his-key-to-winning-a-second-term-77408">as Iran’s president</a> has rekindled <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-iranian-women-want-rights-jobs-and-a-seat-at-the-table-77633">hope</a> for liberals in the country. During his first term, Iran began edging closer to the West, and his positions on both international and domestic affairs indicate further openness to its influence. </p>
<p>Current battleground issues in Iran include not just <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-do-iranians-want-better-salaries-more-jobs-and-safe-working-conditions-76872">social and economic policy</a> but also cultural concerns. Specifically, say architects and historians, Iran must take action to protect its modern architectural heritage before it’s too late. </p>
<p>Iran is known for its magnificent Persian design but, in the late 19th and 20th century, its capital Tehran saw renowned Western architects, including prominent <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38336761">modernists</a> such as Frank Lloyd Wright (1867-1959), build some of the city’s iconic structures. </p>
<p>Today, some have been razed and many more are in danger of demolition or collapse. Without protection, these buildings, which bear testament to Iran’s historic openness to the West, will be reduced to dust, beams and concrete blocks.</p>
<h2>A disappearing modern heritage</h2>
<p>On January 19 2017, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2017/jan/19/tehran-iran-plasco-tower-block-collapses-blaze-video">Plasco Tower, a 17-story high-rise, collapsed in the centre of Tehran</a> killing more than <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/19/middleeast/iran-tehran-building-fire-collapse/">20 firefighters</a> and injuring dozens. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/W1VL1Kj0_n8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Collapse of Plasco Tower.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The iconic building was designed by American architects – <a href="https://www.docomomo.com/events?sec=4&id=373">Benjamin Brown and Spero Daltas</a> – who set up shop in Tehran in 1957 during the rule of King Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979). The Shah had made it his mission to <a href="https://iranian.com/main/blog/darius-kadivar/new-deal-shah-explains-great-civilization-during-press-conference-1971-0.html">construct in Iran a “great civilisation”</a>. To do so, Tehran had to become a modern globalised city, with vast avenues and planned design.</p>
<p>Iran’s 20th-century <a href="https://www.witpress.com/Secure/ejournals/papers/HA010314f.pdf">modernisation process</a> coincided with that of many other <a href="http://www.meforum.org/290/the-middle-east-westernized-despite-itself">Middle Eastern countries</a>. Nations <a href="http://www.academia.edu/18057931/Nasser_and_the_modernization_of_Egypt">such as Egypt</a> <a href="http://polisci.berkeley.edu/course/modernization-turkey-and-iran">Turkey and Iran felt a need</a> to infuse their ancient civilisations with new ideas and influence, including Western infrastructure and educational models.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166873/original/file-20170426-2831-n8xjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166873/original/file-20170426-2831-n8xjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166873/original/file-20170426-2831-n8xjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166873/original/file-20170426-2831-n8xjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166873/original/file-20170426-2831-n8xjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166873/original/file-20170426-2831-n8xjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166873/original/file-20170426-2831-n8xjj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tehran’s American-designed master plan called for a series of residential and commercial areas linked by highways.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a2/Tehran_view_milad.jpg">Self/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>In Iran, the process was fuelled by <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/architecture-viii">increasing oil revenue</a>, which helped finance massive new developments that would turn its capital into a modern metropolis. For these ambitious plans, the government hired Western architects, urban planners and other experts to come work in Tehran. </p>
<p>The American planner <a href="http://rs5.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfmss/2001/ms001017.pdf">Victor Gruen</a> devised the city’s 1968 master plan, conceiving of an expansive Tehran with commercial centres and residential neighbourhoods connected by highways. </p>
<p>This golden age of urban development also saw wealthy parts of Tehran bloom with privately financed construction. </p>
<p>That all changed in 1979. After the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/iran-1979-revolution-shook-world-2014121134227652609.html">Iranian Revolution</a>, Tehran turned inward, closing its gates to the West. </p>
<h2>Tehran’s short memory</h2>
<p>Today, Iranian scholars, architects and intellectuals – including <a href="http://parshiaqaregozloo.com/Portfolio">Parshia Qaregozloo</a>, who curated Iran’s pavilion at the 2016 Venice biennial and Leila Araghian, architect of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/bridge-tehran-architect-iran-leila-araghian-tabiat-sanctions-iranian-designers">Tehran’s new high-tech Tabiat bridge</a> and Ali Mozaffari, founding co-editor of the Berghahn <a href="http://www.berghahnbooks.com/series/?pg=expl_heri">Explorations in Heritage Studies</a> book series – are raising concerns that the nation may have too short a cultural memory.</p>
<p>Many notable mid-century buildings have been neglected in the past decade, including the ornate <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/people-travel/21151/efforts-to-prevent-cultural-mansion-s-demolition">Sabet Pasal mansion</a> in Tehran, known as Iran’s Palace of Versailles, which narrowly avoided being demolished in 2015. And the 1966 <a href="http://franklloydwright.org/">Frank Lloyd Wright</a>-designed <a href="http://muftah.org/frank-lloyd-wrights-legacy-iran-withers-away/">Morvarid (Pearl) Palace, in the city of Karaj</a>, which once belonged to the Shah’s sister, Shams Pahlavi. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166656/original/file-20170425-22270-1dn4yz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166656/original/file-20170425-22270-1dn4yz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166656/original/file-20170425-22270-1dn4yz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166656/original/file-20170425-22270-1dn4yz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166656/original/file-20170425-22270-1dn4yz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166656/original/file-20170425-22270-1dn4yz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166656/original/file-20170425-22270-1dn4yz9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Pearl Palace in Karaj, Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ab/Pearl_Palace_-Kakh_e_Morvarid-_Karaj_Iran.jpg">Ararat-tehran/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/dec/13/iranian-architects-fight-to-save-gio-ponti-villa-from-bulldozers-villa-namazee-tehran">Important private residences</a> in Tehran are also at risk of destruction. In the affluent Zaferanieh neighbourhood, these include the former home of Queen Turan, the wife of Reza Shah (father or Iran’s last shah), and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/dec/13/iranian-architects-fight-to-save-gio-ponti-villa-from-bulldozers-villa-namazee-tehran">a villa frequented by Forough Farrokhzad</a>, an Iranian poetess and film director of the 1960s, as well as the <a href="http://www.caoi.ir/en/projects/item/319-panahi-house.html#">Panahi House</a>, which was designed by the French architect Roland Dubrulle.</p>
<h2>Villa Namazee</h2>
<p>Villa Namazee is probably the most iconic of all the endangered contemporary structures. <a href="http://living.corriere.it/tendenze/architettura/villa-nemazee-gio-ponti-teheran/">Designed</a> by Milan-based architect and industrial designer <a href="http://www.gioponti.org/it/biografia-e-ritratti/biografia">Giovanni Ponti</a> (1891-1979), one of the leading figures of Postwar Italian modernism (and the founder of <a href="http://www.domusweb.it/en/home.html">Domus magazine</a>), the villa has an open plan, a suspended roof and external openings protected by wide overhanging eaves.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166815/original/file-20170426-2831-1lm4yr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166815/original/file-20170426-2831-1lm4yr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=608&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166815/original/file-20170426-2831-1lm4yr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=608&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166815/original/file-20170426-2831-1lm4yr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=608&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166815/original/file-20170426-2831-1lm4yr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166815/original/file-20170426-2831-1lm4yr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166815/original/file-20170426-2831-1lm4yr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=764&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">View of the internal courtyard at Villa Namazee.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Gio Ponti Archive</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Ponti, who built <a href="http://www.gioponti.org/it/archivio/scheda-dell-opera/dd_161_6102/grattacielo-pirelli-in-piazza-duca-daosta">Italy’s first skyscraper</a>, was known for his value of classical order, integrity of building materials, new production techniques and sensitivity to designing around both human need and environmental conditions.</p>
<p>In 1957, he was commissioned by the wealthy Namazee family to design a <a href="http://www.gioponti.org/it/archivio/scheda-dell-opera/dd_161_6115/villa-nemazee">residence</a> in the affluent Niavaran district to the north of Tehran’s foothills, in collaboration with <a href="http://www.fondazionefaustomelotti.org/en/works/">Fausto Melotti</a> (1901-1986) and <a href="http://www.aisdesign.org/aisd/paolo-de-poli-artigiano-imprenditore-designer">Paolo De Poli</a> (1905-1996). The house has sliding doors and internal windows that offer full cross-views, and it demonstrates the same inventive <em>joie de vivre</em> style as Ponti’s projects in Caracas, Venezuela (the <a href="http://www.gioponti.org/en/archives/work-detail/dd_32990_6074/villa-planchart">Villa Planchart</a> and the <a href="http://www.gioponti.org/en/archives/work-detail/dd_32990_6087/villa-arreaza">Villa Arreaza</a>).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166818/original/file-20170426-2841-rehm9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166818/original/file-20170426-2841-rehm9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166818/original/file-20170426-2841-rehm9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166818/original/file-20170426-2841-rehm9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166818/original/file-20170426-2841-rehm9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166818/original/file-20170426-2841-rehm9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166818/original/file-20170426-2841-rehm9m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Facade of the Villa Namazee.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Gio Ponti Archive.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166973/original/file-20170427-15081-kxclwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166973/original/file-20170427-15081-kxclwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166973/original/file-20170427-15081-kxclwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166973/original/file-20170427-15081-kxclwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166973/original/file-20170427-15081-kxclwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166973/original/file-20170427-15081-kxclwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166973/original/file-20170427-15081-kxclwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Interior of the Villa Namazee.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Gio Ponti Archive.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2007, Villa Namazee was registered <a href="https://www.change.org/p/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-islamic-republic-of-iran-save-gio-ponti-s-villa-nemazee-a-unique-masterpiece-of-modern-architecture-in-tehran">as national heritage</a>, but it was acquired by a new owner four years ago and removed from the list, paving the way for the construction of <a href="https://news.artnet.com/art-world/gio-ponti-villa-iran-demoltion-plans-spark-protests-783233">a 20-storey luxury hotel</a>. </p>
<p>Porti’s other work in the Middle East was <a href="http://www.gioponti.org/it/archivio/scheda-dell-opera/dd_161_6114/palazzo-per-uffici-governativi">the office of the ministry of planning in Baghdad</a>, built in 1957. Its enormous outdoors portico and greyish blue ceramic tiles were partly destroyed in the Iraq war.</p>
<h2>Why do we need to save modern heritage?</h2>
<p>When the government removes historic structures such as the Villa Namazee from its national heritage list, it demonstrates a worrisome privileging of certain moments in its past over others that also have cultural value. </p>
<p>Many Iranians remain attached to these modernist symbols, and there have been significant efforts to save them in recent years. Some Iranian activists, calling themselves <a href="http://www.thhc.ir/#">the People’s Committee for Conservation of Historical Houses in Tehran</a>, have launched a website defending Tehran’s landmarks.</p>
<p>Public outcry against the plan to raze the Villa Namazee has been fierce. <a href="https://www.change.org/p/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-islamic-republic-of-iran-save-gio-ponti-s-villa-nemazee-a-unique-masterpiece-of-modern-architecture-in-tehran">Petitions</a> to save it were circulated globally and supported by UNESCO and the Germany-based <a href="http://icom.museum/the-committees/international-committees/international-committee/international-committee-for-documentation/">International Committee for Documentation,</a> and the <a href="http://en.unesco.org/partnerships/non-governmental-organizations/international-committee-documentation-and-conservation">Conservation of Buildings and Sites and Neighbourhoods of the Modern Movement</a>, among other international organisations. This well-publicised case may also help save other modern buildings in the future.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166879/original/file-20170426-2822-1hb9ky7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166879/original/file-20170426-2822-1hb9ky7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166879/original/file-20170426-2822-1hb9ky7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166879/original/file-20170426-2822-1hb9ky7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=327&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166879/original/file-20170426-2822-1hb9ky7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166879/original/file-20170426-2822-1hb9ky7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166879/original/file-20170426-2822-1hb9ky7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An anonymous group has started a conservation effort to protect historic homes in Tehran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.thhc.ir/#">THHC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The destruction of such structures erases all signs of contemporary Tehran’s modernist heritage. Mid-century residences and office buildings are not only physical links to a time when Iran opened its doors to the West, they are also memories of the aristocrats of the past regime, and of radical poets and writers and intellectuals, whose ways of life are much less visible in Iran today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Asma MEHAN is a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute (ADI) in Deakin University, Melbourne (Australia) and Ph.D. Candidate in Architecture- History- Project Doctoral Program in the Department of Architecture and Design (DAD), Politecnico di Torino, Torino (Italy). </span></em></p>
Without protection, Iran’s spectacular American- and Italian-designed mid-century structures will be reduced to dust, beams and concrete blocks.
Asma Mehan, Research Fellow at Deakin University and PhD Candidate at Politecnico di Torino, Politecnico di Torino
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.