tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/togo-29291/articlesTogo – The Conversation2024-01-16T14:14:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204982024-01-16T14:14:16Z2024-01-16T14:14:16ZDangerous chemicals found in recycled plastics, making them unsafe for use – experts explain the hazards<p>Plastic pollution is a menace worldwide. Plastics are now <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abg5433">found</a> in every <a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.1c04158">environment</a> on the planet, from the deepest seas to the atmosphere and human bodies. </p>
<p>Scientific evidence <a href="https://doi.org/10.5334/aogh.4056">describing harm</a> to the environment and humans is growing. Hence, the United Nations has <a href="https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/39812/OEWG_PP_1_INF_1_UNEA%20resolution.pdf">resolved</a> to <a href="https://enb.iisd.org/negotiations/international-legally-binding-instrument-plastics-pollution-including-marine#:%7E:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Environment%20Assembly,pollution%2C%20including%20in%20the%20marine">negotiate</a> a legally binding instrument to end plastic pollution. </p>
<p>Strategies to achieve this goal include provisions throughout the plastics lifespan: production, use, waste management and remediation. </p>
<p>In designing rules for managing plastic, it’s important to understand that plastic materials and waste streams are complex. Not all plastics are the same. And recycled plastics are not necessarily “better” – less harmful – than virgin plastics. If they contained harmful chemicals to begin with, recycling doesn’t make them less harmful. And sometimes they are contaminated by other substances.</p>
<p>We conducted a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352340923008090?via%3Dihub">study</a> identifying and measuring the concentration of contaminants in recycled pellets from 28 small-scale recycling facilities in the global south. Plastic waste is often exported from high income countries to less developed countries, with few to no requirements for reporting their makeup.</p>
<p>Our investigation covered facilities in Cameroon, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania and Togo in Africa as well others in Asia, Europe and South America. </p>
<p>We found 191 pesticides, 107 pharmaceuticals and 81 industrial compounds among many others in the recycled plastic pellets. Many of these chemicals could be hazardous and make the plastics unsuitable for reuse.</p>
<p>This finding can inform regulations for recycled plastics. The chemical composition of the plastic should be checked before it is recycled. </p>
<h2>Chemicals used in production of plastics</h2>
<p>More than <a href="https://www.unep.org/resources/report/chemicals-plastics-technical-report">13,000 chemicals</a> are currently used in the production of plastic materials and products. They can include thousands of plastics additives – but also substances that are added unintentionally. Some unwanted chemicals form during the production or life of plastics. Thousands of these chemicals have dangerous properties. The health risks of some others are unknown. </p>
<p>Throughout the plastics value chain, during production, use, waste and recycling, other chemicals can contaminate the material too. The result may be recycled materials whose chemical composition is unknown. </p>
<p>Previous studies have reported the presence of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhazmat.2017.10.014">plastics additives</a> in recycled materials. Among them were chemicals that are <a href="https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/chemicals-waste/what-we-do/emerging-issues/endocrine-disrupting-chemicals">known</a> to have <a href="https://www.epa.gov/endocrine-disruption/overview-endocrine-disruption">negative effects on health</a>. Examples include <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0055387">phthalates</a> (plastic softeners), bisphenols like <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0303720706002292">BPA</a>, and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969721044478?via%3Dihub">UV-stabilisers</a> used to protect plastics from sun damage and yellowing.</p>
<p>In our work, we established the presence of chemicals in recycled plastic that can cause harm to humans or other organisms. They include pesticides, pharmaceuticals and fragrances. Others are chemicals that result from burning natural materials, man-made organic chemicals used for industrial applications like paint, and ultraviolet filters.</p>
<p>We quantified a total of 491 different chemical substances. Some had specific uses and others formed from the breakdown of products.</p>
<p>Some national and regional policies <a href="https://www.basel.int/Implementation/Plasticwaste/Globalgovernance/tabid/8335/Default.aspx">regulate</a> the allowable concentration of hazardous chemicals in specific plastic products. But only 1% of plastics chemicals are subject to international regulation in existing multilateral environmental agreements. Policies don’t adequately address the issue of transparent reporting of chemicals in plastics across their value chain. Also, there are no laws to govern monitoring of chemicals in recycled materials. This is a <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adk9846">serious gap</a> in oversight. Stronger and more globally coordinated measures are necessary. </p>
<p>Our findings emphasise the importance of regulating mechanical recycling, as many of the substances measured were contaminants and not plastic additives. Many of the chemicals we identified may have contaminated the materials during use. For example, a jug used for storing pesticides will absorb some of the pesticides and will contaminate the recycling waste stream. Plastics in the environment are also known to absorb <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0025326X11005960">organic pollutants</a>. </p>
<p>To assess the quality of recycled plastics, it’s crucial to know which chemicals are present and in what concentrations. This information can guide regulations about how recycled plastics may be used. It will also be valuable for plastics producers, waste management workers (including recyclers), consumers, and the scientific community.</p>
<h2>A path towards safer reuse of plastics</h2>
<p>To recycle more materials safely, several changes are necessary. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>increased transparency regarding the use of chemicals and their risks </p></li>
<li><p>chemical simplification of the plastics market, so that fewer and less toxic chemicals are permitted for use</p></li>
<li><p>improved waste management infrastructure with separated waste streams </p></li>
<li><p>improved recycling methods, including monitoring of hazardous chemicals.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Chemical simplification of plastic additives will promote sustainability, safety and regulatory compliance. It will help manufacturers to minimise the environmental impact and adverse health effects of complex chemical formulations. Simpler chemical structures also improve the recycling potential of plastics and make recycling more efficient and cost-effective.</p>
<p><a href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.est.1c04903">Chemical simplification</a> can also reduce potential health risks in the disposal of plastic materials. </p>
<p>From a regulatory perspective, chemical simplification supports clearer and more enforceable safety guidelines.</p>
<p>It’s is a crucial step towards the sustainable production and use of plastics, as countries work towards a legal instrument to end pollution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bethanie Carney Almroth receives funding from the Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development
FORMAS (grant number 2021-00913) and The Carl Tryggers Foundation (grant number 21:1234).
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Carmona Martinez received funding from Carl Trygger Foundation. </span></em></p>Recycled plastics are not safe if the chemicals used in creating them in the first place are harmful.Bethanie Carney Almroth, Associate Professor, Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences, University of GothenburgEric Carmona Martinez, Scientist, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research-UFZLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166742023-12-06T13:43:37Z2023-12-06T13:43:37ZGhana’s media treats terrorism as a threat from outside – it overlooks violence at home<p>In 2022, 43% of all <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2023-key-findings-in-5-charts/">global terrorism deaths</a> occurred in the Sahel – the region south of the Sahara Desert and stretching east-west across the African continent. West Africa had recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">1,800 terrorism attacks</a> as of June 2023, resulting in nearly 4,600 deaths.</p>
<p>The region has also seen a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a>, making countries more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Coastal west African countries worry about terrorism in the Sahel spilling over into their territories. It is against this backdrop that discussions and commentary about terrorism are taking place in Ghana.</p>
<p>I have researched and analysed security and militancy in Africa for a decade. My most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2023.2250142">recent research</a> examined how terrorism is viewed in Ghana in light of insecurity across the Sahel and the country’s reputation as an oasis of peace in the sub-region.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526130921/9781526130921.xml">criticism</a> of the way terrorism is spoken of globally, due to its potential to be divisive and serve as justification for violence by security agencies and the abuse of citizens’ rights.</p>
<p>For this reason, my aim was to assess whether these global perceptions influenced views in Ghana. I also aimed to understand the security implications of the nature of the terrorism discourse.</p>
<p>I found the discourse to be contradictory, dangerous and simplistic. It lacked a coherent theme, except for repeating problematic narratives and platitudes.</p>
<p>One of these narratives was the mistaken idea that terrorism was foreign to Ghana, and now entering the country. Secondly, the discussion equated terrorism with violence involving jihadist groups. While jihadist forms of violence are present in the region, there are <a href="https://prezi.com/j5cptnaaxcsf/the-four-waves-of-terrorism-by-david-c-rapoport-2004/">other types of terrorism</a> too – including <a href="https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/state-terrorism-even-worse-than-the-sub-state-variety/">terrorism by states</a> and their agents.</p>
<h2>Analysing news articles</h2>
<p>I brought a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x">sceptical attitude</a> to the discussion of terrorism in Ghana by critically analysing the titles of 60 online news articles published between 2015 and 2022. </p>
<p>The titles were sampled from a Ghanaweb.com dossier captioned “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=661">Terror attack on Ghana</a>” and accessed between July and September 2022. Ghanaweb.com is the most widely used online news source in Ghana and has existed since the late 1990s.</p>
<p>The titles were selected using two criteria. The first was the use of threat and risk language. Here, I looked for titles that communicated space or place (for example, Sahel, Togo, Burkina Faso), vulnerability (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Porous-borders-fuelling-insecurity-as-Immigration-grapples-with-serious-logistical-constraints-627387">porous borders</a>”), pre-emption (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Terrorist-threat-Be-vigilant-don-t-be-scared-Christian-Council-1549604">be vigilant</a>”), othering (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Citizens-cautioned-against-hosting-strangers-1545251">strangers</a>”) and assurance (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Don-t-panic-over-ISIS-infiltration-Irbard-Ibrahim-617645?gallery=1">don’t panic</a>”). </p>
<p>The other criterion was the assumed authority of the source. I selected titles that cited security officials, analysts with significant media presence, politicians and religious leaders.</p>
<p>The analysis revealed that the character of the discourse was lopsided and gave an incomplete picture of the state of security in Ghana. </p>
<h2>Ghana’s overlooked culture of violence</h2>
<p>The discourse overlooked Ghana’s endemic culture of violence, including acts by militia groups, political assassinations and police brutality.</p>
<p>Recently, several militia groups have been involved in violent events in Ghana, including election violence in 2019 that led to two fatalities and 18 injuries. A security analyst has named <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/security-analyst-names-24-violent-groups-in-ghana/">24 violent groups</a> in the country, with names like Kandahar Boys, Aluta Boys, Al Qaeda, Invincible Forces and Delta Forces.</p>
<p>On 16 January 2019, an investigative journalist was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47002878">shot dead</a> in front of his home in an alleged act of political assassination. </p>
<p>In 2020, a sitting MP and government minister fired gunshots during a voter registration exercise – an act <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/hawa-koomson-minister-fires-gun-at-registration-centre-4-arrested.html">she explained</a> was for her protection. In the same year, another MP threatened to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXJ0uzTZkEY">burn down</a> the house of a former president of Ghana.</p>
<p>There are many cases of violence by security agents, including the police <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/seven-shot-dead-by-police-not-armed-robbers.html">killing</a> of seven Muslim youths mistaken for armed robbers. </p>
<p>Ghana’s 2020 elections – its eighth since 1992 – recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/9/five-killed-in-ghana-election-violence-as-accusations-continue">five deaths</a> and scores of injuries. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford-Gyampo/publication/331152559_Proportional_Representation_as_Solution_to_Winner-Takes-All_Politics/links/5c6815eb92851c1c9de5ab39/Proportional-Representation-as-Solution-to-Winner-Takes-All-Politics.pdf">scholars</a> argue that extra-legal uses of force and violence in Ghana are due to a culture of impunity resulting from a “systemic decapitation of the police by the political elite”.</p>
<h2>Blaming the Sahel</h2>
<p>Despite the above terrorising acts of violence, the terrorism discourse in Ghana creates the predominant impression that terrorism and political violence are now heading towards Ghana from the Sahel.</p>
<p>The fear of the coming terrorists has united “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Everybody-needs-to-be-involved-in-the-fight-against-terrorism-Security-analyst-751355">everybody</a>” in Ghana to protect the country. The list includes community vigilantes, civil society organisations, political parties, business organisations, churches and traditional leaders. The measures to safeguard Ghana include <a href="https://ghanaguardian.com/brief-mps-anti-terrorism-drill-ablakwa">counter-terrorism drills</a>, vigilance, border security, prophecies and prayers.</p>
<p>This collective national effort presents political violence from other countries in the region as if terror events do not exist within Ghana. Commentators say that terrorism is now heading towards Ghana, causing Ghanaians to panic and grow apprehensive. </p>
<p>Three examples show how the terrorism discourse is contradictory and simplistic – hence deceptive.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Accra-safe-but-Ghana-not-out-of-the-woods-ACP-Eklu-753641">Accra safe but Ghana not out of the woods – ACP Eklu</a>” and “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-ready-for-terrorist-attack-National-Security-ministry-661540">Government ready for terrorist attack – National Security ministry</a>”. These claims are contradictory. They mean Accra and Ghana are safe and unsafe simultaneously. </p></li>
<li><p>The “terrorists are in our communities, they are our neighbours, they are our siblings, they are our fathers, they are our mothers”, claims an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/adibsaani1/">analyst</a>. This claim is dangerous as it could create unnecessary social and communal tension.</p></li>
<li><p>Ghana is the only country bordering Burkina Faso that has not <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-risk-of-violent-extremism-and-terrorism-in-the-coastal-states-of-west-africa/">experienced a terrorist attack</a>. This claim is simplistic and it is only true if terrorism is defined to mean “jihadist” political violence.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>My conclusion is that any future acts of terrorism and political violence in Ghana will not be anything new. Shooting to kill during elections and firing a warning shot at a polling station are acts of terrorism. Police brutality, election violence and assassinations are also acts of political violence. </p>
<h2>Implications of the discourse</h2>
<p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the so-called global war on terror shape how we think about security, even when those views create dire consequences such as <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_15">Islamophobia and more violence</a>.</p>
<p>These lopsided narratives can alienate some communities and threaten social cohesion. Worse, they undermine Ghana’s responsibility to address insecurity within the country. </p>
<p>To avoid such problems, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.988452">some</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.976011">scholars</a> have argued that terrorism should be defined to suit specific contexts. I have made a <a href="https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.321567836600468">similar argument</a> elsewhere that terrorism is a process rather than an event. </p>
<p>This avoids the <a href="https://ombuds.umich.edu/article/danger-single-story">dangers of a single story</a> about terrorism and political violence in general. In particular, it creates a conducive environment for solutions that sustainably secure Ghana and its citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Dan Suleiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the war on terror continue to shape thinking about security.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Research associate, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2078642023-06-20T12:23:53Z2023-06-20T12:23:53ZTextile queen Maman Creppy has died: the last of West Africa’s legendary wax cloth traders has left her mark<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532901/original/file-20230620-18-mzmx1q.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Courtesy Yvette Sivomey</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Dédé Rose Gamélé Creppy, who <a href="https://nouvelangle.tg/index.php/2023/06/07/togo-disparition-de-maman-creppy-la-doyenne-des-nana-benz/">has died</a> aged 89, was one of west Africa’s most influential wax cloth traders. She was the youngest, and the last living, “Nana Benz” – the legendary first generation of women cloth traders from Togo. </p>
<p>Wax cloth was a European adaptation of a classic Indonesian batik hand printing technique which created designs using hot wax. Areas of design were blocked out by applying hot wax over them to resist dye. The cloth was introduced to west Africa by Dutch and English textile manufacturers in the <a href="https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2018/08/cloth-copyright-and-cultural-exchange.pdf">late 19th century</a>. Women traders – who became experts at predicting what the market wanted – started feeding design and colour suggestions back to the manufacturers. They were integral to the cloth’s success. The Nana Benzes were particularly skilled at this. </p>
<p>Wax cloth became popular because its colours stood out, it could be easily tailored into stylish outfits for both men and women, the colours are fast – they wouldn’t fade when washed. Its patterns also had messages and broadcast images, from power and politics to beauty and wealth. They could speak to joyful or complex relations between men and women.</p>
<p>The Nana Benzes, a group of about 15 Togolese women, started trading in the wax print. The word “Nana” is a diminutive form of “mother” or “grandmother” and “Benz” is for the Mercedes-Benz cars some of them liked to drive – and which they were able to buy due to their big success. </p>
<p>As an anthropologist, I encountered Maman Creppy – as she was affectionately known – several times during research for my <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo25126083.html">book</a> Patterns in Circulation: Cloth, Gender, and Materiality in West Africa.</p>
<p>Rose Creppy’s story is an incredible one. She was one of Togo’s original Nana Benzes, who created a powerful empire founded on a monopoly over patterns – manufacturers distributed specific patterns only to specific women. A successful Nana could be the unique wholesaler for over 60 patterns, sold to traders from all over the continent.</p>
<p>These design ownership rights, combined with her entrepreneurial savvy and a deep knowledge of regional tastes and style, made Maman Creppy, like other Nana Benzes, a legend throughout west Africa. </p>
<p>Their craft however is sadly in decline. Since the early 2000s production of the cloth has shifted to Chinese factories. Today, no wax comes near the process.</p>
<h2>From beads to cloth</h2>
<p>Born in the southern town of Aneho on 22 December 1934, Maman Creppy was determined to become a successful entrepreneur. She started her career trading beads imported from Ghana. But, as she recalled in one of our many conversations, “this was hard manual work”. So, once she had acquired a small trading stock, she switched to cloth. </p>
<p>Maman Creppy initially traded in European-produced fancy-prints. These were less onerous to produce and hence cheaper. Africa’s fancy-print textile industry started in the early 1960s and many newly independent countries were using the textile industry to bolster their economies. </p>
<p>As Maman Creppy accumulated more capital, she switched to English wax-prints from Arnold Brunnschweiler & Company (ABC) and later to Dutch wax cloth from <a href="https://www.vlisco.com">Vlisco</a>.</p>
<p>Maman Creppy became a Nana Benz – one of the super-wholesalers of wax cloth. They originally collected the wax cloth from Ghana’s capital, Accra, in the 1940s but, by the late 1950s, shifted the centre of trade to the Lomé market in Togo’s capital. They transformed the Lomé market into a site of economic power and national prestige. </p>
<h2>Nana Benzes boom</h2>
<p>The heyday of the Nana Benzes was from the 1960s to the early 1980s. Traders flocked to the Lomé market, not only from Abidjan, Accra, Kumasi, Cotonou, Porto-Novo, Onitsha and Lagos, but also from Kinshasa and Libreville.</p>
<p>They benefited from a unique trading position. Trade rules in some post-independence African countries made it hard to trade in the cloth. For instance in Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah’s nationalist-protectionist policies placed high tariffs on imports. This made wax-print imports unprofitable. In Togo, low tariffs made the cloth cheaper. Nana Benzes therefore became a key part of the wax print trade and enabled the Dutch to penetrate other African markets. </p>
<p>The Nana Benzes also had a monopoly over patterns – many of them unique. For instance, they intercepted Yoruba trading networks that operated along the coastal corridor between Lagos and Accra, selling so-called Yoruba and Igbo patterns in specific colourways in Lomé. It was their effective monopoly over pattern rights that garnered the Nana Benzes unparalleled wealth.</p>
<p>The Nana Benzes soon established distribution rights for these classic designs from colonial firms, such as Unilever’s United Africa Company (UAC). In the process, they strengthened ties with European firms. This allowed them to exercise control over an emergent urban cultural economy of taste.</p>
<p>The Nana Benzes had cleverly inserted themselves into the restrictive retailing systems of European trading companies with whom they negotiated exclusive pattern rights to cloth distribution. </p>
<p>Amid changing political regimes, the women consolidated their power and economic interests by creating their own professional organisation in 1965, L’Association Professionelle des Revendeuses de Tissu, a body that negotiated trading policies directly with the state. They agreed on a low-tariff regime that made their Dutch and English cloth imports relatively cheap in comparison to others in the region. In return, they lent their branding power to the state, providing it with a felicitously modern entrepreneurial façade. </p>
<h2>The downfall</h2>
<p>The end of the Cold War and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/161005">democracy movement</a> that liberalised political and economic spaces had serious consequences for the cloth trade. And for Rose Creppy. </p>
<p>A devaluation of the <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fabric/backgrnd.htm#:%7E:text=To%20address%20this%20situation%2C%20they,francs%20to%201%20French%20franc.">CFA franc (by 50%) in 1994</a> turned an everyday consumer good, wax cloth, into a near luxury almost overnight. Until then, wax cloth was available to most. When the price doubled, wax cloth became a luxury good. Many turned to cheaper alternatives, including counterfeits from China.</p>
<p>The liberalisation of the economy in post-Cold War Togo further derailed the Nana Benzes’ trade. The main distributor of wax cloth – Unilever’s United Africa Company – pulled out of the market and the Dutch manufacturer, Vlisco, took over its west African distribution points. This dismantled the system of exclusive retail rights that made the women’s trade profitable. </p>
<p>To add to the demise of the Nana Benzes, Chinese counterfeits entered the market in the early 2000s. </p>
<h2>Maman Creppy’s legacy</h2>
<p>Until her passing, Maman Creppy remained intimately connected to the market through her daughter, Yvette Sivomey, whom she initiated into the cloth trade in the early 2000s.</p>
<p>Like many of her older peers, Maman Creppy was married but lived independently with her children, whom she would later send to study in France; she owned a property in Lyon. In addition to her entrepreneurial activities, she held a ministerial position at the Lolan royal palace of her native Aneho. </p>
<p>Today a highly successful cloth entrepreneur herself, Sivomey works closely with Vlisco to rediscover and revive old patterns in new colour combinations. </p>
<p>The legacy of Dédé Rose Gamélé Creppy is preserved in her daughter’s work. It is alive and well, woven into the classic wax cloth patterns she co-designed and traded as one of the remarkable Nana Benzes, the women merchants of Togo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207864/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nina Sylvanus does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Maman Creppy was one of Togo’s original Nana Benzes who had created a powerful wax cloth empire.Nina Sylvanus, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Northeastern UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2049242023-05-31T13:26:44Z2023-05-31T13:26:44ZFree secondary education in African countries is on the rise - but is it the best policy? What the evidence says<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525851/original/file-20230512-29-k330gh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Africa's secondary school enrolment rates still lag far behind those of other world regions'.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Dorey/Contributor/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When President Salva Kiir <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/14/south-sudan-expands-access-free-education">announced the abolition of secondary school fees</a> in South Sudan in February 2023, he was following several fellow African leaders. </p>
<p><a href="https://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/news-style2/364-president-akufo-addo-launches-free-shs-policy">Ghana</a>, <a href="https://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Gratuite-des-inscriptions-dans-les-etablissements-scolaires-publics.html">Madagascar</a>, <a href="https://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-abolishessecondary-school-tuition-fees-full-free-education-by-jan-2019/">Malawi</a>, <a href="https://statehouse.gov.sl/president-bio-launches-free-education-calls-on-parents-andteachers-to-support-the-initiative/">Sierra Leone</a>, <a href="https://togobreakingnews.info/togo-gratuite-frais-de-scolarite-secondaire/">Togo</a>, and <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202202030616.html">Zambia</a> have all announced free secondary education policies in the last five years. Rwanda, Kenya and South Africa were early trendsetters in this regard.</p>
<p>Despite its popularity with policymakers, parents and other stakeholders, the abolition of secondary school fees in resource-constrained contexts is still a subject of debate. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://southafrica.un.org/en/191051-african-leaders-launch-education-plus-initiative#:%7E:text=Education%20Plus%20calls%20for%20free,to%2Dwork%20transitions%2C%20and%20economic">African Union</a>, global NGOs like <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/31/millions-children-denied-free-secondary-education">Human Rights Watch</a> and various United Nations agencies are in favour. </p>
<p>Others are sceptical. They highlight financial sustainability and equity implications, especially at the upper secondary level. A report by the Malala Fund, a global education NGO, <a href="https://r4d.org/resources/financing-upper-secondary-education-unlocking-12-years-education/">argued</a> that free upper secondary education “would be regressive in nature” and might not be affordable for low-income countries. </p>
<p>We conducted a <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/8fa2c.html">systematic review</a> to take stock of the evidence. We conclude that free secondary education can be costly and inequitable in the short run, especially if it diverts resources from primary education. Based on these findings, we recommend a policy of “progressive universalism”: free education should be introduced gradually, starting with the lowest levels. </p>
<h2>Setting the scene</h2>
<p>Many African countries abolished primary school fees in the 1990s and early 2000s. This led to a <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/a55bc38c-5d2b-5932-83e4-debc56e30da9">major rise in enrolment</a>. But secondary school enrolment rates still lag far behind those in other world regions. <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS?locations=ZG">Less than half</a> of children in sub-Saharan Africa complete lower secondary education, compared to around 80% in South Asia and Latin America. High fees and related costs are a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a5b40f0b6497400056a/School-fees-2012-Morgan-report.pdf">major impediment</a>, particularly for children from low-income backgrounds.</p>
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<img alt="A map of Africa, marked with various shades of red to indicate which countries have free secondary education" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/525850/original/file-20230512-17-9ip8wm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=630&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Free secondary education policies in sub-Saharan Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors supplied</span></span>
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<p>The number of sub-Saharan Africa countries with free secondary education policies in place has increased rapidly over the last two decades. Almost half of all African countries now offer fee-free education at the lower secondary level. Almost one in three does so at the upper secondary level. The aim of the recent wave of free secondary education policies is to raise overall education levels – and, ultimately, countries’ <a href="https://cocorioko.net/president-bio-launches-free-education-calls-on-parents-and-teachers-to-support-the-initiative/">broader prosperity and social conditions</a>. </p>
<p>Abolishing school fees is also <a href="https://www.ghgossip.com/ghana-election-2020-free-shs-alone-can-boost-500k-votes-to-npps-win-franklin-cudjoe/">popular with voters</a>. This may have been on the minds of politicians seeking to win or maintain power.</p>
<h2>The cost of free education</h2>
<p>There are two major problems with secondary school fee abolition in resource-constrained states. The first is that, in most African countries, the majority of children from poor households would be ineligible for free secondary education. In Somalia, Niger and Mozambique, less than one in five of the poorest children <a href="https://www.education-inequalities.org/indicators/comp_prim_v2#maxYear=2019&minYear=2014&ageGroup=%22comp_prim_v2%22&dimension=%7B%22id%22%3A%22wealth_quintile%22%2C%22filters%22%3A%5B%22Quintile+1%22%2C%22Quintile+5%22%5D%7D&countries=%5B%22BDI%22%2C%22BEN%22%2C%22BFA%22%2C%22CAF%22%2C%22CIV%22%2C%22CMR%22%2C%22COD%22%2C%22COG%22%2C%22COM%22%2C%22ETH%22%2C%22GAB%22%2C%22GHA%22%2C%22GIN%22%2C%22GMB%22%2C%22GNB%22%2C%22KEN%22%2C%22LBR%22%2C%22LSO%22%2C%22MDG%22%2C%22MLI%22%2C%22MOZ%22%2C%22MRT%22%2C%22MWI%22%2C%22NAM%22%2C%22NER%22%2C%22NGA%22%2C%22RWA%22%2C%22SEN%22%2C%22SLE%22%2C%22SOM%22%2C%22SSD%22%2C%22STP%22%2C%22SWZ%22%2C%22TCD%22%2C%22TGO%22%2C%22TZA%22%2C%22UGA%22%2C%22ZAF%22%2C%22ZMB%22%2C%22ZWE%22%5D">complete primary school</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/only-1-in-3-girls-makes-it-to-secondary-school-in-senegal-heres-why-and-how-to-fix-it-200294">Only 1 in 3 girls makes it to secondary school in Senegal: here's why and how to fix it</a>
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<p>Moreover, even those eligible for free secondary education are often unable to attend. School fees constitute <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/facing-forward-schooling-for-learning-in-africa">less than half</a> of households’ education spending in most African countries. Most free secondary education policies do not cover the cost of essential non-fee expenses such as textbooks, school uniforms, meals and transport. Nominally “free” secondary education can therefore be <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059311000101">unaffordable for low-income households</a>. This means the benefits of fee abolition would mainly accrue to children from relatively privileged households and not help those who needed it most.</p>
<p>The second problem is that enacting these policies is very expensive. Empirical evidence from <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0305764X.2020.1789066">Ghana</a>, The <a href="https://academic.oup.com/wber/article-abstract/33/1/185/2420643?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Gambia</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775721000467">Kenya</a> and other countries shows that free secondary education policies can substantially increase secondary school enrolment and completion rates in the short run. But they do so at a very high cost: the average expense per senior secondary student is <a href="https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/node/819#:%7E:text=2015-,Pricing%20the%20right%20to%20education%3A%20The%20cost,reaching%20new%20targets%20by%202030&text=This%20paper%20shows%20there%20is,and%20lower%20middle%20income%20countries">equivalent to that of five primary school pupils</a>. </p>
<p>Considering the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/277051/africa-sovereigns-left-exposed-to-looming-debt-crisis-afdb/">precarious financial position</a> of many African states, providing free secondary schooling to the entire population is likely to be fiscally unsustainable. </p>
<p>It may also divert scarce resources away from basic education, which is already chronically underfunded. In Malawi for example, which recently abolished secondary school fees, there are <a href="https://www.iiep.unesco.org/en/packed-classrooms-reality-educational-planners-malawi-13351">more than 70 students</a> per primary school teacher.</p>
<h2>What is to be done?</h2>
<p>Access to education is <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/human-rights/universal-declaration/translations/english">a human right</a>. In an ideal world, the global community would ensure that all children could enjoy a full cycle of free, high-quality education. </p>
<p>Most African countries are far removed from this scenario, however. Policymakers must balance the potential benefits of abolishing secondary school fees against the urgent need for investment in basic education. </p>
<p>In many cases, this would suggest a phased approach to introducing free education, which prioritises public spending on basic education in the short run, while asking wealthier households to contribute to the cost of higher levels of education. <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/662580">A good example</a> is South Africa’s fee-free schools policy, which was designed to increase enrolment in the poorest districts.</p>
<p><em>Mohammed Alhassan Abango and Leslie Casely-Hayford of Associates for Change, Ghana co-authored this article and the research it is based upon.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204924/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The research project on which this article is based was funded by the British Academy.</span></em></p>The introduction of free education should follow a gradual process, starting with the lowest levels.Rob Gruijters, Associate Professor in Education & International Development, University of CambridgeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2013012023-03-27T15:45:38Z2023-03-27T15:45:38ZLeprosy, scabies and yaws - Togo’s neglected tropical skin diseases need attention<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514904/original/file-20230313-28-faxr6h.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scabies and other skin diseases are still common in Togo.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/neglected-tropical-diseases#:%7E:text=NTDs%20include%3A%20Buruli%20ulcer%2C%20Chagas,chromoblastomycosis%20and%20other%20deep%20mycoses%2C">Neglected tropical diseases</a> are a group of 20 diseases found mostly in tropical regions that are strongly associated with poverty. Among them are skin diseases like scabies, leprosy and yaws. They are caused by some bacteria, viruses, mosquitoes or mites and, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), they <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240010352">affect</a> more than one billion people worldwide, mainly in lower-income settings. </p>
<p>These skin diseases are particularly common in most African countries. For example the estimated at-risk population on the continent requiring intervention for <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/lymphatic-filariasis">lymphatic filariasis</a> (an abnormal enlargement of body parts, causing pain, severe disability) was <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7290598/">341 million</a> in 2020. And <a href="https://www.lakeforest.edu/academics/student-honors-and-research/student-publications/eukaryon/is-it-possible-to-eliminate-onchocerciasis-(river-blindness)-in-africa">99 percent</a> cases of <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/onchocerciasis">onchoerciasis</a> also known as river blindness occur on the continent.</p>
<p>Children are usually more affected than adults, and risk factors include poverty, overcrowding, malnutrition, and humidity. </p>
<p>Neglected tropical diseases of the skin are stigmatised, and may affect an individual’s quality of life or psychological well-being. They can be difficult to diagnose and there are typically few, if any, dermatologists in areas where they are common. </p>
<p>Our team led a <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0010697">study</a> in Togo, in west Africa, to assess the burden of these diseases. We found a high prevalence of several skin infections and evidence of social impact experienced by the patients. We suggest that local and national health authorities, in Togo and more widely across Africa, consider an approach that integrates skin management along with general public educational programmes to encourage early reporting of cases to the health service.</p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>The study population was two schools in Lomé, the Togo capital city, and one rural community setting, the village of Ndjéi, Ndjéi has a population of about 3,000 and is 400km north-east of Lomé. </p>
<p>Mobile clinics were set up in the schools and community sites, between June and October 2021. Medicines were provided free of charge to participants. Where necessary, individuals were referred to the appropriate service in the healthcare system. The team looked to record the skin infections listed by the WHO, and as well as diagnoses of other fungal diseases. </p>
<p>Skin examinations were carried out on a total of 1,401 people. This included 954 in Ndjéi – 68.1% of the total. In the Lomé school setting, 447 children (31.9% of the total sample) were examined out of 782 regularly enrolled children. </p>
<p>Overall, we found a large number of skin infections. There were 105 observed cases of skin diseases classified as neglected tropical diseases (7.5% of all the people we examined had one of these diseases). And there were 333 cases of fungal disease (23.8% of all the people we examined had a fungal disease). Where data are available, these numbers are perhaps comparable with other studies though rates can vary greatly. For example, an <a href="https://jidc.org/index.php/journal/article/view/32614791">Ethiopian</a> study found fungal disease prevalence of 21%, similar to the 23.8% we found here. However, another study in <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0006584">Benin</a> reported a prevalence of 49%. </p>
<p>The 105 cases of skin neglected tropical disease included 20 in schools and 85 in the rural community setting. Neglected tropical diseases are often more common in <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/questions-and-answers/item/neglected-tropical-diseases#:%7E:text=Where%20are%20NTDs%20most%20prevalent,scarce%20%E2%80%93%20worsened%20by%20climate%20change.">rural</a> areas.</p>
<p>Across school and community data, there were 68 cases (6.7% of the total) of neglected tropical diseases in children, and 37 cases (9.7%) in adults. </p>
<p>The most prevalent of the skin diseases (other than fungal diseases) was <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/scabies">scabies</a>, observed in 86 patients (6.1%). Scabies is an unpleasant infection transmitted by mites that burrow underneath the skin and lay eggs. It can be incredibly itchy and lead to secondary consequences, including other skin infections and kidney disease. Treatment in Africa is <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/scabies">often</a> a skin lotion called benzyl benzoate, and the oral medicine ivermectin, both of which are very effective at killing the scabies mites. </p>
<p>The effectiveness of traditional remedies such as herbal cataplasm (a home-made healing paste of different herbs and plants) to treat skin infections in different parts of Africa is uncertain. Their use could promote a secondary bacterial infection or cause eczema around the skin wounds.</p>
<p>Among other diseases observed in our study, the team also found cases of leprosy, yaws and Buruli ulcer. </p>
<h2>A call to action</h2>
<p>Although it was not the main motivation behind the study, we also asked questions about stigma. In the school setting, five (6%) children with cutaneous neglected tropical diseases reported being stigmatised, and four of them had refused to go to school for one or more days. In Ndjei, 44 (4.6%) participants reported having experienced stigma and 41 (93.2% of those) missed at least one day of school or work. </p>
<p>Stigma and the problem of absenteeism associated with skin diseases should encourage the health authorities to make the treatment of these diseases free of charge, including consultation fees and drugs. Health promotion and education is important. This can help to persuade the population to seek medical care. An integrated management approach as well as mass drug administration programmes may be effective in controlling the diseases, and are recommended as part of the WHO neglected tropical diseases <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240010352">roadmap</a>. </p>
<p>This study has provided evidence around the numbers and types of skin neglected tropical disease and fungal infections found in school and rural communities in Togo. The data has been presented within Togo and to the relevant international groups such as the WHO.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201301/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Head has previously received funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the UK Department for International Development.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bayaki Saka and Palokinam Pitche do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Neglected tropical diseases of the skin are stigmatised, and may affect an individual’s quality of lifeMichael Head, Senior Research Fellow in Global Health, University of SouthamptonBayaki Saka, Professor of Dermatology, University of LomePalokinam Pitche, Professor of Dermatology , University of LomeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1987982023-02-02T06:48:39Z2023-02-02T06:48:39ZThe body choosing Kenya’s election commission is being overhauled – how this could strengthen democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/507316/original/file-20230131-4114-8kr9t0.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">William Ruto (right) takes over from Uhuru Kenyatta as Kenya's president in 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tony Karumba/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya has new rules for choosing the people who run its elections.</p>
<p>President William Ruto has signed into law the <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/index.php/iebc-amendment-bill-2022-assented-law">Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Amendment) Bill</a>. It changes the composition of the panel that selects people to serve on the country’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.iebc.or.ke/iebc/?mandate">commission</a> is a state institution that has the task of enhancing and supporting constitutional democracy in Kenya. It conducts elections, registers citizens as voters and maintains the voters’ roll. It also fixes the boundaries of electoral constituencies and wards. It settles electoral disputes, registers candidates for election and conducts voter education.</p>
<p>But since it was established in 2011, the commission has been at the centre of Kenya’s history of post-election violence. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/counties/article/2000203367/the-truth-lies-and-dangers-as-debate-on-iebc-rages-on">2013</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20171018-kenya-election-chief-doubt-free-fair-poll-kenyatta-odinga-demonstrations">2017</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/rigging-allegations-begin-kenyan-media-slow-tally-votes-tight-presidential-race-2022-08-12/">2022</a>, the losing political parties accused it of failing to administer elections fairly and lawfully. </p>
<p>In 2017, the Kenyan supreme court accused the commission of “<a href="https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/africa/kenyans-usher-in-year-of-political-reforms-i46ulluz">bungling</a>” the presidential election. In the 2022 elections, the then vice-chairperson of the commission, Juliana Cherera, <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/august-9/4-iebc-commissioners-disown-presidential-results-144903/">disowned the results</a> of the presidential poll before the official announcement. </p>
<p><a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/-raila-calls-for-constitutional-changes-and-iebc-reforms--4001430">Raila Odinga</a>, who lost that poll, called for reforms that would make the electoral commission a much fairer referee of the country’s elections. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/raila-odinga-should-be-thanked-his-election-losses-helped-deepen-kenyas-democracy-190044">Raila Odinga should be thanked - his election losses helped deepen Kenya's democracy</a>
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<p>The new law seeks to <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2022-11/Independent%20Electoral%20and%20Boundaries%20Commission%20%28Amendment%29%20Bill%2C%202022.pdf">streamline the process</a> of appointing members to the electoral commission, making the selection process more participatory and reflective of the country’s diversity.</p>
<p>And it comes at a critical moment. Seven commissioner positions are currently vacant.</p>
<p>A weak electoral agency poses four major threats to Kenya’s democracy: it will fail to deliver fair, free and credible elections; it will disrupt improvements in the country’s transition to democracy; it will prolong the culture of post-election violence; and it will divide the nation’s diverse ethnocultural groups.</p>
<p>It is, therefore, vital that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission be a strong and fully functioning organisation staffed by Kenyans who are dedicated to democratic governance. </p>
<h2>What’s changing under the new law</h2>
<p>Selecting electoral commissioners is a complex job. </p>
<p>The new law brings more independent commissioners and associations into the selection process. Previously, only three agencies nominated the seven commissioners: the <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/psc/the-commission">Parliamentary Service Commission</a>, the <a href="https://interreligiouscouncil.or.ke/history/">Inter-Religious Council of Kenya</a> and the <a href="https://twitter.com/lawsocietykenya?lang=en">Law Society of Kenya</a>. Now there are five. The newcomers are the <a href="https://orpp.or.ke/index.php/services/political-parties-liaison-committees-pplc">Political Parties Liaison Committee</a> and the <a href="https://www.publicservice.go.ke/index.php/about-us/mandate">Public Service Commission</a>. They open the door for political parties and the public service to participate in this critical process.</p>
<p>It’s important that the selection panel includes state and non-state organisations that promote election integrity. Only individuals who are citizens of Kenya and meet the integrity requirements in <a href="http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010#KE/CON/Const2010/chap_6">Chapter 6</a> of the constitution can serve on the selection panel. These individuals must hold a degree from a university recognised in Kenya.</p>
<h2>The vacancies</h2>
<p>Three of the current vacancies in the commission were expected: these commissioners’ terms had expired. But four other commissioners quit under a cloud of suspicion. </p>
<p>Cherera, Justus Nyang'aya and Francis Wanderi resigned after being <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2022-12-06-cherera-four-should-be-probed-even-after-resigning-mp-kiarie/">suspended for their conduct</a> during the 2022 election. They had alleged that commission chairperson Wafula Chebukati had <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/national/article/2001462824/cherera-nyangaya-wanderi-and-masit-to-be-investigated-individually-muchelule-says">altered poll results</a> in favour of Ruto. Another commissioner, Irene Masit, was also suspended. She now has <a href="https://www.citizen.digital/news/irene-masit-breaks-silence-after-skipping-hearings-by-tribunal-probing-cherera-4-n311525">charges pending</a> against her before a tribunal investigating the matter.</p>
<h2>Why elections matter</h2>
<p>Elections are <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/10/30/threats-to-democracy-in-africa-the-rise-of-the-constitutional-coup/">a cornerstone of any democracy</a>. They help a nation build and sustain democratic and development-enhancing institutions. </p>
<p>They are a check on government. Elections put the power in ordinary people’s hands to change their government and choose more effective leaders for public service. They also give historically marginalised groups a voice.</p>
<p>To perform these functions, elections must meet certain minimum standards. They must be regular, fair, free, competitive, inclusive, transparent and credible. They must be conducted in strict conformity with the constitution. </p>
<p>That’s why a strong, independent and functioning electoral agency is so vital. </p>
<h2>Risks of dysfunction</h2>
<p>In Kenya, a weak and dysfunctional electoral commission would have dire consequences.</p>
<p>First, the failure to conduct elections that are considered by the majority of Kenyans as free, fair and credible could lead to the type of violence that the country experienced after the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/3/3/kenya-what-went-wrong-in-2007">2007 presidential election</a>. More than 1,000 people died. </p>
<p>Second, a weak commission can derail improvements in Kenya’s electoral system. A strong commission sets codes of conduct for candidates and political parties. This helps guard against various forms of political opportunism, including corruption. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fears-of-election-rigging-may-fuel-further-abuses-in-kenya-democracy-could-be-the-loser-176113">Fears of election rigging may fuel further abuses in Kenya: democracy could be the loser</a>
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<p>Third, a dysfunctional electoral commission can be manipulated by politicians and their supporters to monopolise political spaces. This situation has played out in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-07-23-voa7-66781532/565192.html">Cameroon</a>, where the ruling party has marginalised the opposition to remain in power since 1990. Similarly, in <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20200224-togo-incumbent-re-elected-fourth-term-opposition-alleges-fraud">Togo</a>, President Faure Gnassingbé has monopolised political spaces since 2005. </p>
<p>Fourth, in Kenya, the electoral commission is responsible for creating electoral boundaries. Any weakness in the commission can be exploited to create boundaries that benefit certain politicians and their supporters. This would undermine democracy and create distrust in the country’s democratic institutions.</p>
<p>The new law <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/senators-split-on-proposal-to-change-law-on-iebc-selection-4090866">doesn’t meet the expectations</a> of all of Kenya’s political constituencies – some individuals and groups believe that their voice in the selection panel has been diluted. However, it’s important for all Kenyans to recognise these reforms as an effort in the right direction – towards a stronger and more inclusive commission.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198798/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Mukum Mbaku does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Kenya’s electoral agency is tasked with enhancing and supporting constitutional democracy – any dysfunctions would have dire consequences.John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1985432023-01-26T13:34:59Z2023-01-26T13:34:59ZEliminating neglected diseases in Africa: there are good reasons for hope<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506411/original/file-20230125-16-drokh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Head nurse Luke Kanyang'areng' with a visceral leishmaniasis patient at the Kacheliba Sub-County Hospital in Kenya.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rowan Pybus-DNDi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Togo had reason to celebrate in 2022 when it became the first country in the world <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/aug/25/togo-achieves-major-feat-of-eradicating-four-neglected-tropical-diseases">to eliminate four neglected tropical diseases</a>. The west African nation stamped out <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/guineaworm/index.html">Guinea worm disease</a> in 2011, <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/lymphaticfilariasis/index.html">lymphatic filariasis</a> in 2017, <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/sleepingsickness/">sleeping sickness</a> in 2020, and <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/hygiene/disease/trachoma.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fhealthywater%2Fhygiene%2Fdisease%2Ftrachoma.html">trachoma</a> last year. </p>
<p>These diseases are transmitted in various ways. Guinea worm disease, for instance, is water-borne while sleeping sickness is transmitted by the tsetse fly. </p>
<p>They are just a few among a host of neglected tropical diseases, which mostly affect impoverished communities and that are exacerbated by instability, climate change, and poor living conditions. Every year, <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/16-07-2020-neglected-tropical-diseases-treating-more-than-one-billion-people-for-the-fifth-consecutive-year">1.7 billion</a> people are affected by these diseases. They cause immense suffering, stigma, disability – and sometimes death. </p>
<p>Togo achieved its milestone through a combination of measures. These included door-to-door mass drug administration, training of healthcare staff, sustained financing, and strong political support. </p>
<p>Other African countries also made significant progress in tackling neglected tropical diseases in 2022. Benin, Rwanda and Uganda managed to <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/24-05-2022-benin--uganda-and-rwanda-eliminate-human-african-trypanosomiasis-as-a-public-health-problem">eliminate sleeping sickness</a>. Malawi <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/21-09-2022-malawi-eliminates-trachoma-as-a-public-health-problem">eliminated trachoma</a> and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/15-12-2022-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-certified-free-of-dracunculiasis-transmission-by-who">eliminated Guinea worm disease</a>. </p>
<p>On another continent, in India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi applauded his country’s success in eliminating smallpox, polio and Guinea worm disease, while expressing confidence it could “<a href="https://www.freepressjournal.in/india/mann-ki-baat-pm-modi-talks-about-eradicating-kala-azar-what-is-it-what-are-its-symptoms">soon</a>” eliminate another neglected tropical disease, visceral leishmaniasis.</p>
<p>All of this means there’s plenty of reason to celebrate. But the global health community cannot rest on its laurels. These diseases are still present in some areas. </p>
<p>The insects that transmit many of these diseases don’t respect borders – so no one is safe until everyone is. The COVID-19 pandemic gravely disrupted control programmes, <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(22)00360-6/fulltext">delaying the achievement of elimination goals by years</a> for some diseases. Some countries are also struggling to tackle neglected tropical diseases because of instability and conflicts that hinder control efforts, or because they have large remote regions that are difficult to reach.</p>
<p>Adequate funding is needed to support drug distribution, training of healthcare staff, and raising awareness. Funding for research and development is crucial, too, so that the promising innovations emerging from African laboratories and clinical trial sites can reach doctors and patients.</p>
<h2>Improved treatments</h2>
<p>One of the challenges in tackling many neglected tropical diseases is the absence of adequate treatments. Existing medicines are often not effective enough or are difficult to administer, such as regular injections that require hospitalisation. Some treatments are very painful. Others are downright toxic. For some diseases, such as a fungal infection called <a href="https://dndi.org/diseases/mycetoma/facts/">mycetoma</a>, which is endemic in Sudan, there are no effective treatments at all – amputation is often the only option.</p>
<p>Because these diseases affect the poorest communities and there is little profit to be made from developing new drugs, they have been historically ignored by traditional pharmaceutical research.</p>
<p>But the abundance of good news last year has given me hope. 2022 was an incredible year for visceral leishmaniasis, which is endemic in eastern Africa and is <a href="https://theconversation.com/innovation-and-research-are-key-to-killing-off-neglected-tropical-diseases-in-africa-153914">my field of expertise</a> as a physician and specialist in infectious diseases and tropical medicine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/innovation-and-research-are-key-to-killing-off-neglected-tropical-diseases-in-africa-153914">Innovation -- and research -- are key to killing off neglected tropical diseases in Africa</a>
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<p>The disease is fatal if left untreated. It’s the deadliest <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/global-health-disease-idAFL3N2O9075">parasitic killer</a> after malaria. Those infected with visceral leishmaniasis suffer from fever, weight loss and intense fatigue. Many are unable to work, which means a loss of income for their families.</p>
<p>But in September 2022, a <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d44148-022-00138-0">shorter, more effective new treatment</a> was announced. Developed with several partners, including Médecins Sans Frontières, this treatment partially removes the need for daily injections. </p>
<p>In June, the World Health Organization also <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2022/07/07/1110146123/a-nasty-disease-is-even-nastier-for-patietnts-with-hiv-now-theres-encouraging-ne?ft=nprml&f=">recommended</a> an improved treatment specifically for people who are co-infected with HIV and visceral leishmaniasis. This gives hope for the thousands of patients – often young seasonal migrant workers – who respond poorly to standard treatment.</p>
<p>Promising results for a new, one-dose drug for sleeping sickness were also <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(22)00660-0/fulltext">announced</a> last year following clinical studies conducted in the DRC and Guinea by Congolese and Guinean researchers. This new medicine would be a significant improvement over existing drugs and could open the door to sustainably eliminating the disease. This is a remarkable achievement. I still remember when the only drug available to my fellow doctors in the DRC was an arsenic derivative so toxic it <a href="https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/fire-veins-still-injecting-arsenic-derivatives-treat-african-sleeping-sickness">killed 5%</a> of their patients.</p>
<h2>Collaboration and partnerships</h2>
<p>However, research and development efforts alone are not enough. Collaboration and partnerships are key. These are not just buzzwords: past successes in tackling neglected tropical diseases have been rooted in close-knit partnerships between national health authorities, international donors, medical research institutes, universities and industry.</p>
<p>The new treatments I mentioned above were all developed thanks to such coalitions. I am the director of the Eastern Africa office of a global non-profit medical research organisation called <a href="https://dndi.org/">Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative</a>, which took an active role in all these research and development collaborations.</p>
<p>The good news is that new partnerships keep being formed. In 2022, we established LeishAccess, a regional collaboration in Eastern Africa working to <a href="https://news.scienceafrica.co.ke/new-program-to-scale-up-access-to-leishmaniasis-treatments-launched/">promote access to visceral leishmaniasis treatments</a> and remove the obstacles that still prevent half of patients from accessing the life-saving drugs they need.</p>
<p>All these advances give me hope. These extraordinary efforts will eventually pay off. I am convinced that, in a not-so-distant future, people will stop dying from leishmaniasis, and will be safely cured thanks to simple oral drugs.</p>
<p>Many gaps remain, with millions of people still suffering from diseases that could be cured. And neglected tropical diseases that are slowly disappearing can suddenly come back with a vengeance, fuelled by conflicts, economic crises, increased poverty, or climate change.</p>
<p>But if sustained investment is coupled with African political leadership and scientific excellence, there’s good reason to hope for the elimination of neglected tropical diseases on the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Monique Wasunna is the director of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative Africa Regional Office.</span></em></p>Every year, 1.7 billion people, most in the world’s poorest areas, are affected by NTDs. The diseases cause suffering, stigma, disability and sometimes death.Monique Wasunna, Researcher, Kenya Medical Research InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1938662022-11-10T13:45:39Z2022-11-10T13:45:39ZTogo’s new climate policies reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve air quality – here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493601/original/file-20221104-15-2bzzaq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=46%2C23%2C5194%2C3374&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Using unsafe fuels for domestic cooking is a major contributor to carbon emissions in Togo. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-cooking-at-sokode-market-togo-news-photo/1095396160?phrase=cooking%20in%20togo&adppopup=true">gettyimages.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Like many African cities, Lomé, the capital of Togo, has a pollution problem. </p>
<p>Its ambient (outdoor) air pollution levels exceed World Health Organization (WHO) <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/what-are-the-who-air-quality-guidelines">guidelines</a> for human health protection. Air pollution is the world’s largest environmental health risk. In Togo, a country of <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/togo-population/">8 million</a> people, it contributes to 6,700 premature <a href="https://vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/">deaths</a> per year.</p>
<p>Air pollutant emissions and emissions that contribute to climate change come largely from the same sources. They include fuel combustion in households, transport, industry, and burning of agricultural and municipal waste. Some pollutants, like black carbon and methane, contribute to both climate warming and air pollution. </p>
<p>So it makes sense to tackle the two issues together. The question is, how?</p>
<p>To do so, the government of Togo has developed a climate change plan, called its <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/CDN%20Revis%C3%A9es_Togo_Document%20int%C3%A9rimaire_rv_11%2010%2021.pdf">Nationally Determined Contribution</a>, which describes its climate change commitment. It has also developed a National Action Plan to Reduce Air Pollutants, which outlines actions to <a href="https://www.ccacoalition.org/en/resources/plan-national-de-r%C3%A9duction-des-polluants-atmosph%C3%A9riques-et-climatiques-de-courte-dur%C3%A9e-de">reduce air pollution</a>. </p>
<p>To inform the development of these plans, we <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969722042048">evaluated</a> the impact that implementing ten mitigation measures in Togo would have on reducing air pollutants and climate pollutants simultaneously.</p>
<p>Togo is not the only West African country using climate change plans as public health improvement strategies. Before the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow in 2021, Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire submitted climate change plans. </p>
<p>If fully implemented, these plans could reduce thousands of premature deaths every year by improving air quality. </p>
<p>Showing how climate change plans can improve human health locally provides additional motivation to carry out the plans. </p>
<p>If all countries followed climate change plans like these, the global health benefit would be substantial. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-06885-9">Over one million</a> premature deaths could be avoided annually by 2050 because of air quality improvements. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/air-pollution-in-fast-growing-african-cities-presents-a-risk-of-premature-death-183944">Air pollution in fast-growing African cities presents a risk of premature death</a>
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<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>We quantified the emissions for Togo and Grand Lomé from all major source sectors for the years between 2010 and 2018. Togo emitted an estimated 21 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions in 2018, predominantly from the energy, agriculture, forestry and other land use sectors. These emissions are projected to increase 42% to 30 million tonnes in 2030 if nothing is done. Without intervention air pollution is also expected to worsen, with emissions estimated to increase by between 16% and 60% across different air pollutants. </p>
<p>We found a large overlap in the major emission sources of gases and particles contributing to both climate change and degraded air quality in Togo. The overlap provides a substantial opportunity to design integrated strategies that simultaneously improve air quality and mitigate climate change.</p>
<p>Our assessment modelled how implementing ten mitigation measures in these overlapping sources would affect emissions. </p>
<p>We showed that fully implementing Togo’s two plans would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% in 2030 compared to a baseline scenario, and lead to a reduction of between 25% and 78% in emissions of various health-damaging air pollutants. </p>
<p>Our paper provides a clear pathway for Togo to reduce its already small contribution to climate change while simultaneously achieving local benefits for air quality and human health. </p>
<p>The 10 mitigation measures we assessed, which are now included in Togo’s air pollution and climate change plans, included the following:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>expanding renewable electricity generation </p></li>
<li><p>increasing use of more efficient vehicles and electric vehicles</p></li>
<li><p>increasing use of cleaner fuels and more efficient stoves for cooking</p></li>
<li><p>increasing efficiency of charcoal production</p></li>
<li><p>reducing energy intensity of livestock and crop production</p></li>
<li><p>decreasing the rate of deforestation</p></li>
<li><p>capturing the use of methane from landfills and reducing open waste burning.</p></li>
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<p>Reducing the rate of deforestation was the mitigation action that would make the largest difference to Togo’s contribution to climate change. Switching to cleaner fuels for cooking in Togo would achieve the largest reduction in air pollutant emissions. </p>
<p>These measures are closely linked. Currently, wood and charcoal are the fuels most commonly used for cooking in Togo. They contribute to poor air quality and to deforestation. Therefore, switching to <a href="https://theconversation.com/renewable-energy-could-get-togo-to-its-goals-experts-identify-whats-in-the-way-186754">cleaner fuels</a>, or more efficient biomass stoves, is not only the most effective action to reduce air pollution in Togo, but also simultaneously helps achieve the largest climate change benefit through reduced deforestation. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493604/original/file-20221104-10296-gvhly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Man walking among trees." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493604/original/file-20221104-10296-gvhly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493604/original/file-20221104-10296-gvhly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493604/original/file-20221104-10296-gvhly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493604/original/file-20221104-10296-gvhly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493604/original/file-20221104-10296-gvhly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493604/original/file-20221104-10296-gvhly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493604/original/file-20221104-10296-gvhly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Togo must work to restore its forest cover to mitigate the impact of climate change. Photo by Matteo Fraschini Koffi/AFP via Getty Images.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sebastien-balouki-executive-director-of-reboisons-vite-le-news-photo/1242294605?phrase=deforestation+Togo&adppopup=true">from www.gettyimages.com</a></span>
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<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>This first assessment provides the basis for future routine updates of integrated air pollution and climate change mitigation. It can be used to monitor how Togo’s plans and strategies are being put into practice. And it can be adjusted as the situation changes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/renewable-energy-could-get-togo-to-its-goals-experts-identify-whats-in-the-way-186754">Renewable energy could get Togo to its goals: experts identify what's in the way</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193866/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Malley receives funding from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Climate Promise, the United Kingdom Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition Supporting National Action & Planning initiative. </span></em></p>Togo can take bold actions to reduce climate change emissions and also improve the health of its citizens.Chris Malley, Research Fellow, The Stockholm Environment York centre, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1882342022-08-14T08:07:49Z2022-08-14T08:07:49ZYes, Africa’s informal sector has problems, but the answer isn’t to marginalise it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478087/original/file-20220808-1331-vy8036.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Informal workers are a key part of African economies</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>African leaders are increasingly aspiring to <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12132-016-9294-8">“modernise”</a> their cities. That is to make them “globally competitive” and “smart”. The hope is to strategically position cities in Africa to drive the continent’s much-needed socio-economic transformation.</p>
<p>But these aspirations tend to marginalise and antagonise the informal sector. The sector encompasses the suite of economic activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered (or insufficiently covered) by formal arrangements.</p>
<p>We are a team of international scholars researching sustainable cities in Africa. In our <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X21003971">latest paper</a>, we explore the dual role played by the informal sector in Africa’s urban economy. On the one hand, it plays a positive role. It provides employment, securing household income and savings, provides household basic needs and boosts civic engagement. </p>
<p>But the sector also plays a negative role. It contributes to social and gender inequality, insecurity, congestion and pollution. </p>
<p>Overall, we found that the informal sector has a lot to offer the future of African cities. We therefore recommend that public policy focuses more on regularising the sector, instead of displacing it. This is often done to make way for <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12132-016-9294-8">elitist big capital projects</a>. </p>
<p>Also, we warn that ignoring or marginalising the millions of people whose livelihoods depend on the sector could spell a social bloodbath on the continent.</p>
<h2>The ‘smart cities’ craze in Africa</h2>
<p>There has been a resurgent interest in building so-called “smart”, “modern”, “globally competitive” <a href="https://theconversation.com/building-new-cities-to-meet-africas-rapid-urbanisation-is-a-risky-bet-126099">cities in Africa</a>. Some are seeking to build entirely new cities. But, for the most part, most governments want to put cities on the “map” through large-scale redevelopment or by “modernising” existing city districts.</p>
<p>African cities have long been blamed for not serving as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X20302886">engines of growth and structural transformation</a> as their counterparts did during Europe’s Industrial Revolution. This makes it refreshing that leaders on the continent are seeking to turn things around. </p>
<p>The problem, however, is that these visions of city modernisation tend to heavily marginalise and antagonise the informal sector in their design and execution. Some even have a strong focus on displacing informal workers and activities – particularly hawkers and hawking, slum dwellers and slum settlements – from the central business districts of the cities.</p>
<p>For instance, early this year, the authorities in Nigeria sent a combined team of police, military and other law enforcement officials to <a href="https://dailytrust.com/anguish-tears-as-rivers-government-demolishes-port-harcourt-slum">destroy a Port Harcourt </a>informal settlement that housed some 15,000 families.</p>
<p>Their counterparts in Ghana are currently conducting <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1170595/squatters-clash-with-police-during-demolition-exer.html">similar exercises</a>.</p>
<p>These decisions are often justified on the grounds that informal workers and their activities generate <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0169796X1102700406">“congestion”, “crime”, “filth/grime”, and “disorderliness”</a>. </p>
<p>In other words, they impede sustainable city-making, and hence, must be eradicated. </p>
<p>But is this premise backed by the evidence? This is the question our team <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X21003971">recently interrogated</a>.</p>
<p>We conclude that the informal sector is rather the goose laying Africa’s golden eggs.</p>
<h2>Unpacking the data</h2>
<p>We argue in our paper that African leaders must re-think the informal sector as a potential site for innovation and solutions. </p>
<p>Consider its employment creation potential for instance. In 2018, a study by the <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_626831/lang--en/index.htm">International Labour Organization (ILO)</a> found that the informal sector employs some 89.2% of the total labour force in sub-Saharan Africa if agriculture is included.</p>
<p>Even without agriculture, the share of informal employment is still significant: 76.8%. In central Africa, without agriculture, the sector’s share of employment hovered at 78.8% and 91% with agriculture. In east Africa, the contributions stood at 76.6% without agriculture and 91.6% with agriculture. The figures for southern and western Africa hovered around 36.1% and 87% without agriculture and 40.2% and 92.4% <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_626831/lang--en/index.htm">when agriculture is included</a>.</p>
<p>The informal sector also makes other important contributions to Africa’s economy. In 2000, the gross value additions of Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Togo’s informal sector (including agriculture) hovered around 71.6%, 55.8%, 51.5%, and 72.5% of the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/097380101200600202">countries’ total GDPs</a>. </p>
<p>The sector’s contribution to housing too is <a href="https://researchrepository.rmit.edu.au/discovery/delivery/61RMIT_INST:ResearchRepository/9921864078801341#13248372790001341">substantial</a>. The most notable form of informal housing, popularly called “slums”, provide accommodation to millions of urban dwellers on the continent. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331176027_Habitat-III-Regional-Report-Africa_2017">United Nations’ data</a> suggest that Nigeria’s share of urban population that are accommodated in slums as of 2015 stood at 50.2%. That of Ethiopia was 73.9%; Uganda’s 53.6%; Tanzania’s 50.7%. Ghana and Rwanda’s hovered around 37.9% and 53.2%, respectively. </p>
<p>Clearly, the informal sector oils Africa’s urban economy in many important ways. This makes it highly unlikely that any visions of transforming lives on the continent can succeed without taking the sector into adequate account.</p>
<p>More importantly, the millions of working-class people whose lives depend on the sector have shown consistently that they won’t take their continuing marginalisation lying down. They frequently <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/097380101200600202">resist eviction orders</a>.</p>
<p>Perhaps, their most profound <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-covid-lockdown-why-it-triggered-a-toxic-mix-of-mass-defiance-and-police-violence-176062">moment of resistance</a> was witnessed at the height of the COVID pandemic. </p>
<p>Many African governments imposed lockdowns to limit community transmission of the virus. However, after subjecting informal workers to extensive brutalities, they still refused to comply, forcing many governments to suspend the lockdowns. The pandemic has shown that the continuing systematic marginalisation of informal workers in city-making heralds more trouble for the future.</p>
<h2>Informality at the heart of city-making</h2>
<p>The issue is not that city authorities must allow informal workers and activities to go unchecked. They clearly have a responsibility to deal with the problems in the sector to ensure the security and health of the public. This includes the informal workers themselves. </p>
<p>The problem with current approaches is that they largely dispossess the workers and displace them to make way for <a href="https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/tran.12105">big capital projects </a> which serve the needs of a privileged few.</p>
<p>African leaders must recognise the enormous potentials of the continent’s informal workers and begin to integrate them better into their city-building visions and strategies. </p>
<p>The recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/mar/27/waste-egypt-refuse-collectors-zabaleen-cairo">integration of informal waste collectors/recyclers</a> – popularly called <em>Zabbaleen</em> – in waste management in Cairo, Egypt’s capital, offers great lessons.</p>
<p>The <em>Zabbaleen</em> had long been neglected for so-called “formal” private companies which, however, continued to prove inefficient and structurally unable to navigate the narrow streets of several neighbourhoods of Cairo.</p>
<p>When Cairo authorities finally recognised that the <em>Zabbaleen</em> are better suited for the job, they changed course and brought them onboard. The <a href="https://rtd.rt.com/stories/zabbaleen-cairos--rubbish-collectors-21st-century-change/">emerging evidence</a> suggests that the change is paying some fruitful dividends in improved sanitation.</p>
<p>Cairo’s progressive example paints a powerful image of how the capabilities of informal workers could be seriously incorporated and integrated into building African cities. Hopefully, more of such interventions will be replicated in other sectors of the continent’s urban economy.</p>
<p><em>Dr Henry Mensah and Professor Imoro Braimah of KNUST’s Centre for Settlements Studies, and Department of Planning contributed to the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X21003971#bb0970">original article</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188234/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Informal workers are victims of the smart city drive in Africa.Gideon Abagna Azunre, PhD student, Concordia UniversityFestival Godwin Boateng, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Centre for Sustainable Urban Development, The Earth Institute, Columbia UniversityOwusu Amponsah, Senior Lecturer, Department of planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1833042022-05-21T07:59:53Z2022-05-21T07:59:53ZTogo looks like West Africa’s new frontier of violent extremism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/463982/original/file-20220518-15-9aajps.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A group of armed Islamists gathered in Gao, northern Mali in 2012. Now such groups are seeking foothold in Togo. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Issouf Sanogo/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/togo-looks-like-west-africas-new-frontier-of-violent-extremism-183304&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>The threat of violent extremism across West Africa has been <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-growing-threat-of-violent-extremism-in-coastal-west-africa/">on the rise</a> in recent times. </p>
<p>Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province have been active in the Lake Chad Basin region. <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin">Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin</a>, the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/sahel_mapping/isgs">Islamic State in the Greater Sahara</a> and <a href="https://institute.global/policy/what-ansarul-islam">Ansarul Islam in the Sahel</a>. The implications for the peace and security of the sub-region have never been more pronounced. </p>
<p>The activities of these groups have led to the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022">deaths of thousands</a> and <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14245.doc.htm">displaced</a> many others across parts of West Africa. The result is a worsening <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2020/4/5e99b5074/across-west-africa-dual-challenge-conflict-coronavirus-threatens-millions.html">humanitarian crisis</a>. </p>
<p>Togo, despite its proximity to countries affected by violent extremism, is one West African country that has experienced relative peace and security, until recently. On May 10 and 11 jihadists <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/203218/togo-suffers-its-first-deadly-jihadist-attack/">attacked</a> a Togolese military outpost and killed eight Togolese soldiers. </p>
<p>The incident was only a few kilometres away from neighbouring Burkina Faso, which struggles with <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220125-burkina-faso-a-history-of-destabilisation-by-jihadist-insurgencies">incessant attacks from violent extremist organisations</a>.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464460/original/file-20220520-11-n3ro3j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464460/original/file-20220520-11-n3ro3j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464460/original/file-20220520-11-n3ro3j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464460/original/file-20220520-11-n3ro3j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464460/original/file-20220520-11-n3ro3j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464460/original/file-20220520-11-n3ro3j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464460/original/file-20220520-11-n3ro3j.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>The African Union <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220512/auc-chairperson-statement-terrorist-attack-togo">condemned</a> the attack and called on neighbouring states to redouble their efforts against terrorism in the region. </p>
<p>No group has claimed responsibility yet for the latest attack, but the Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, one of the world’s largest databases of terrorists and terrorist groups, <a href="https://twitter.com/TracTerrorism/status/1524367211644829697?s=20&t=FcHWXj1IsE6DmNlJIvvmkg">points a finger</a> at Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin. The group is <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/306-mali-enabling-dialogue-jihadist-coalition-jnim">backed by al-Qaida and operates in the Sahel region</a>. </p>
<p>It is not the first time Togo has experienced an attack of this nature on security forces. The first was in November 2021, when a security post in a northern village was <a href="https://www.togofirst.com/fr/securite/1011-8904-togo-attaque-terroriste-signalee-pres-de-la-frontiere-avec-le-burkina">attacked</a>. </p>
<p>The question is why these attacks have begun and what they imply for peace and security in the region. </p>
<p>Having closely monitored the conflict and security dynamics of West Africa for over a decade, I am convinced the attacks have to do with the need of violent extremist organisations to establish a presence in Togo as part of a broader recruitment drive.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the underlying socio-economic conditions in Togo make it a prime target for extremist activities. Togo bears the hallmarks of a fragile state in which violent extremism could thrive. </p>
<h2>Breeding grounds for violent extremism</h2>
<p>Some of the warning signs for countries being vulnerable to violent extremism are high rates of poverty, inequality, illiteracy, unemployment, corruption, weak institutions and poor governance.</p>
<p>Togo has a population of just over <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/TG">8.5 million</a>. Its <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=TG">gross domestic product stood at US$7.5 billion in 2020</a>. That of its immediate neighbour, Ghana, with a population of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ghana-population">32 million</a>, was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=GH">US$72.3 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Over <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/togo/overview#1">50%</a> of Togo’s population live below the poverty line of US$1.25 per day. It is one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world as measured by the Human Development Index which is based indicators such as life expectancy, education and per capita income. In 2019, Togo’s index score was about <a href="https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/TGO.pdf">0.15, positioning it 167th out of 189 countries</a>. </p>
<p>In 2021, the life expectancy at birth in Togo was <a href="http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/tg">61.49</a> years and about <a href="http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/tg">40%</a> of its citizens are illiterate. These rates are similar to Burkina Faso, a country which struggles with violent extremism, where the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1036391/Burkina_economic_factsheet_2021.pdf">life expectancy at birth was 61.6% and illiteracy was 58.8%</a>. </p>
<p>Togo has the conditions for extremism to take root. </p>
<p>Poverty <a href="https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00WQ7X.pdf">contributes</a> to violent extremism as it can provide a way, for those that are desperate, out of economic hardship. Recruits are often provided with an income and protection.</p>
<p>When people are not educated, they’re more <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/global_20170322_violent-extremism.pdf">vulnerable</a> to exploitation and ideological manipulation. </p>
<p>Furthermore, low human capital development reinforces societal cleavages created as a result of years of neglect and poor governance, leading to marginalisation. This creates <a href="https://borgenproject.org/does-poverty-result-in-violent-extremism/">feelings of</a> abandonment and resentment, a potential driver of violent extremism once allowed to fester and left unchecked. </p>
<h2>Frustration</h2>
<p>Togo’s indicators tell us that it’s falling behind. This has also resulted in a heightened state of frustration among its citizens, most of which is directed at <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/08/anger-in-togo-after-government-accused-of-using-spyware-on-critics/">the state’s authoritarian rule</a>. </p>
<p>These grievances have been expressed through <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2018/12/togo-returns-streets-stop-unfair-legislative-elections/">street protests</a>.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.togofirst.com/fr/securite/1011-8904-togo-attaque-terroriste-signalee-pres-de-la-frontiere-avec-le-burkina">previous attempt</a> at infiltrating Togo in the same place as the latest attacks, could signal a coordinated effort by violent extremist organisations to exploit these local grievances. </p>
<h2>Extremism in West Africa</h2>
<p>Togo joins the ranks of other countries in the region that have experienced terrorism attacks by violent extremist organisations. These include Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210608-soldier-killed-in-ivory-coast-attack">Côte d’Ivoire</a> and Burkina Faso.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">Mapping the contours of Jihadist groups in the Sahel</a>
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<p>Peace and security across the region is further threatened by the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/malis-military-junta-pulls-out-regional-g5-sahel-force-2022-05-15/">recent decision</a> of the Malian junta to withdraw from the G5 Sahel force. The force, which is expected to contribute to peace, has suffered some operational hindrances owing to a lack of funds. Mali’s withdrawal could trigger other Sahelian states to opt out to suit their own strategic interests.</p>
<p>Though the affected states in West Africa have commenced a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-lifts-internet-suspension-day-after-violent-protest-2021-11-28/">regional response</a> to the threat of violent extremism, such as <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/west-african-coastal-terror-attacks-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg">Operation Koudanlgou 4 Zone 2</a>, its sustainability remains uncertain due to insufficient funding.</p>
<p>The same can be said of the <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-accra-initiative-prevent-terrorism-in-west-african-coastal-states">Accra Initiative</a>, which was launched in 2017 by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo in response to violent extremism and transnational organised crime.</p>
<p>Most of the countries in the region are poor. They have operational funding challenges and insufficiently equipped military forces. They lack smart technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions at the borderlands. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/enablers-of-political-extremism-a-checklist-for-west-african-countries-181110">Enablers of political extremism: a checklist for West African countries</a>
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<h2>What’s at stake</h2>
<p>By establishing a presence in Togo, extremist groups stand to gain by recruiting foot soldiers. Being in northern Togo also puts them close to Burkina Faso, enabling cross-border collaborations and attacks with other violent extremists operating in the area. </p>
<p>The more violent extremist organisations are able to demonstrate their viciousness, the more international attention they attract, that gives them a negotiating edge, as well as financial and logistical support from their parent organisation – in this case Al-Qaida.</p>
<p>West African states must act quickly and decisively to avert instability across the sub-region from violent extremism. Given the constraints highlighted above, they must prioritise efforts aimed at addressing the underlying socio-economic triggers of violent extremism, in addition to fundamentally improving relations between the state and society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183304/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent attacks on Togo show that West African states must act quickly and decisively to stop the spread of violent extremism.Folahanmi Aina, Doctoral Candidate in Leadership Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1763472022-03-16T16:34:27Z2022-03-16T16:34:27ZHow AI helped deliver cash aid to many of the poorest people in Togo<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451998/original/file-20220314-131648-9brlb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=198%2C68%2C4825%2C3015&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mobile devices are becoming ubiquitous in Africa.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mobile-phone-lome-togo-news-photo/170481943">Godong/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/research-brief-83231">Research Brief</a> is a short take about interesting academic work.</em></p>
<h2>The big idea</h2>
<p>Governments and humanitarian groups can use machine learning algorithms and mobile phone data to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04484-9">get aid to those who need it most</a> during a humanitarian crisis, we found in new research.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446801/original/file-20220216-24-1v07seb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of West Africa, highlighting Togo" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446801/original/file-20220216-24-1v07seb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446801/original/file-20220216-24-1v07seb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446801/original/file-20220216-24-1v07seb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446801/original/file-20220216-24-1v07seb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=556&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446801/original/file-20220216-24-1v07seb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=699&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446801/original/file-20220216-24-1v07seb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=699&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446801/original/file-20220216-24-1v07seb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=699&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Togo is a small West African nation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/world-data-locator-map-togo-news-photo/641462678">Encyclopaedia Britannica/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aac4420">simple idea</a> behind this approach, as we explained in the journal <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04484-9">Nature on March 16, 2022</a>, is that wealthy people use phones differently from poor people. Their phone calls and text messages follow different patterns, and they use different data plans, for example. Machine learning algorithms – which are fancy tools for pattern recognition – can be trained to recognize those differences and infer whether a given mobile subscriber is wealthy or poor.</p>
<p>As the COVID-19 pandemic spread in early 2020, <a href="https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/">our</a> <a href="https://www.poverty-action.org/">research</a> <a href="https://cega.berkeley.edu/">team</a> helped Togo’s <a href="https://numerique.gouv.tg/">Ministry of Digital Economy</a> and <a href="https://www.givedirectly.org/">GiveDirectly</a>, a nonprofit that sends cash to people living in poverty, turn this insight into a new type of aid program. </p>
<p>First, we collected recent, reliable and representative data. Working on the ground with partners in Togo, we conducted 15,000 phone surveys to collect information on the living conditions of each household. After matching the survey responses to data from the mobile phone companies, we trained the machine learning algorithms to recognize the patterns of phone use that were characteristics of people living on less than $1.25 per day.</p>
<p>The next challenge was figuring out whether a system based on machine learning and phone data would be effective at getting money to the poorest people in the country. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04484-9">Our evaluation</a> indicated that this new approach worked better than other options Togo’s government was considering.</p>
<p>For instance, focusing entirely on the poorest cantons – which are analagous to U.S. counties – would have delivered benefits to only 33% of the people living on less than US$1.25 a day. By contrast, the machine learning approach targeted 47% of that population.</p>
<p>We then partnered with Togo’s government, GiveDirectly and community leaders to design and pilot a cash transfer program based on this technology. In November 2020, the first beneficiaries were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/stories-56580833">enrolled and paid</a>. To date, the program has provided nearly $10 million to roughly 137,000 of the country’s poorest citizens. </p>
<h2>Why it matters</h2>
<p>Our work shows that data collected by mobile phone companies – when analyzed with machine learning technology – can help <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/02/15/966848542/the-pandemic-pushed-this-farmer-into-deep-poverty-then-something-amazing-happene">direct aid</a> to those with the greatest need.</p>
<p>Even before the pandemic, over half of the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=TG">West African nation’s</a> 8.6 million people lived below the international poverty line. As COVID-19 slowed economic activity further, our surveys indicated that 54% of all Togolese were forced to miss meals each week.</p>
<p>The situation in Togo was not unique. The downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-impact-covid-19-global-poverty-turning-corner-pandemic-2021">pushed millions of people into extreme poverty</a>. In response, governments and charities launched several thousand new aid programs, providing benefits to <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33635">over 1.5 billion people and families</a> around the world. </p>
<p>But in the middle of a humanitarian crisis, governments struggle to figure out who needs help most urgently. Under ideal circumstances, those decisions would be based on comprehensive household surveys. But there was no way to gather this information in the middle of a pandemic.</p>
<p>Our work helps demonstrate how new sources of big data – such as information gleaned from satellites and mobile phone networks – can make it possible to target aid amid crisis conditions when more traditional sources of data are unavailable. </p>
<h2>What’s next</h2>
<p>We’re conducting follow-up research to assess how cash transfers affected recipients. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw025">Previous</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.3386/w26600">findings</a> indicate that cash transfers can help increase food security and improve psychological well-being in normal times. We are assessing whether that aid has similar results during a crisis.</p>
<p>It’s also essential to find ways to enroll and pay people without phones. In Togo, roughly 85% of households had at least one phone, and <a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.00175">phones are frequently shared</a> within families and communities. However, it is not clear how many people who needed humanitarian assistance in Togo didn’t get it because of their lack of access to a mobile device.</p>
<p>In the future, systems that combine new methods that leverage machine learning and big data with traditional approaches based on surveys are bound to improve the targeting of humanitarian aid.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176347/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Aiken collaborated closely with the teams at GiveDirectly and the government of Togo described in the article. She consulted for GiveDirectly from June to August 2021. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Blumenstock receives funding from Google.org, data.org, the Center for Effective Global Action, the Jameel Poverty Action Lab, and the NSF under award IIS – 1942702.
</span></em></p>To date, the program has provided nearly $10 million to roughly 137,000 of the country’s poorest citizens.Emily Aiken, Doctoral Student of Information, University of California, BerkeleyJoshua Blumenstock, Associate Professor of Information; Co-Director of the Center for Effective Global Action, University of California, BerkeleyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1647332021-07-21T15:02:24Z2021-07-21T15:02:24ZVaccine hesitancy has risen in Ghana: a closer look at who’s worried<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411994/original/file-20210719-15-1c2rixg.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vaccine confidence is essential if the pandemic is to be brought under control</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/weekly-epidemiological-update-on-covid-19---13-july-2021">continues apace</a>, with high- and lower-income settings struggling to contain outbreaks. The vaccine rollout is relatively speedy in some countries such as the UK. However, vaccine demand is much greater than supply. This, combined with the hoarding of surplus doses from high-income countries, means that the continent of Africa is left with very few doses to protect its countries’ populations.</p>
<p>As of 13 July 2021, <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations">Our World in Data</a> report that only 2.95% of the African population had received one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. In <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/ghana">Ghana</a>, this figure is just 2.8%.</p>
<p>West Africa has handled the pandemic response <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/5/e004762">relatively well thus far</a>, with lessons learned from the 2014/15 Ebola outbreak. However, with the highly transmissible Delta variant <a href="https://twitter.com/DSD_GHS/status/1407472131022151685">now known to be present</a> in Ghana, the vaccine rollout is arguably more important than ever. The Ghanaian population has very little immunity to this novel coronavirus, and is thus almost entirely susceptible to infection. It is essential that people accept vaccines when doses arrive in the country. </p>
<p>As we know from existing <a href="https://www.who.int/polio-transition/documents-resources/best-practices-microplanning-entire-population.pdf?ua=1">international guidance</a>, vaccine acceptance requires time, laborious engagement, planning and monitoring to be successful. In 2019, before the pandemic, the World Health Organisation <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/spotlight/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019">described vaccine hesitancy</a> as one of the top ten greatest threats to global health. </p>
<p>Much of the existing literature and knowledge focuses on the richer countries, but the scenarios faced in Ghana may be very different. Previous research <a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.201199">has suggested</a> there are differences in types of misinformation across countries and continents.</p>
<p>Also, a false sense of confidence may emerge because Ghana has a long history of <a href="https://www.gavi.org/delivering/ghana">successful mass vaccination campaigns</a>, for example pneumococcal and rotavirus vaccines. COVID-19 is different in that it is driven by a novel emerging pathogen, and the knowledge base is rapidly evolving. The general public know the impact on quality of life of existing vaccine-preventable diseases like polio. But the strength of Ghana’s infrastructure and health workforce is up against widespread misinformation about this novel pathogen. </p>
<p>Our multi-disciplinary team from Ghana, Togo and the UK has conducted <a href="https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/Examining_drivers_of_COVID-19_vaccine_hesitancy_in_Ghana/14494851">surveys</a> in Ghana repeatedly over time. We focused on COVID-19 and assessed trends between August 2020 and June 2021, key drivers of willingness to vaccinate, and vaccine hesitancy. </p>
<h2>The key findings</h2>
<p>The first survey was conducted in August 2020 before any COVID-19 vaccines had been approved. The second round was in March 2021 at a time when the Oxford AstraZeneca vaccines had arrived in the country. Hesitancy significantly decreased between those two time points – from 36.8% to 17.2%. </p>
<p>Our new <a href="https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/Examining_drivers_of_COVID-19_vaccine_hesitancy_in_Ghana/14494851">report</a> includes findings from the latest survey, which took place in June 2021, and includes 1,295 Ghanaian respondents. We saw a significant decrease in willingness, and therefore an increase in hesitancy – from 17.2% to 28.5%. Within this 28.5% subgroup, 15.1% reported that they were undecided, and 13.4% indicated they would not accept the vaccine if offered. Both of these proportions had increased since the previous survey in March.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411886/original/file-20210719-23-1f9cp4p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411886/original/file-20210719-23-1f9cp4p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411886/original/file-20210719-23-1f9cp4p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=213&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411886/original/file-20210719-23-1f9cp4p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=213&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411886/original/file-20210719-23-1f9cp4p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=213&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411886/original/file-20210719-23-1f9cp4p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411886/original/file-20210719-23-1f9cp4p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411886/original/file-20210719-23-1f9cp4p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=268&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Percentage of Ghanaian willingness to receive vaccine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Around one-third of respondents had read stories (for example on <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/08/health/astrazeneca-covid-vaccine-blood-clots-explainer-cmd-gbr-intl/index.html">CNN</a>) about the indecision surrounding the Oxford AstraZeneca vaccine in Europe and North America on social media. Worryingly, a high proportion of respondents suggested that these stories made them feel concerned about accepting a COVID-19 vaccine in the future. COVID-19 will always be a global problem that requires international collaborations and solutions. Thus, the actions of a few countries can easily have an impact beyond their borders, and this may be what we are witnessing here with observed hesitancy in Ghana. </p>
<p>We found the groups more likely to be hesitant were women, Christians, opposition party supporters and people with higher education. </p>
<p>Research in higher-income settings often shows that <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-393X/9/6/593">more years of education</a> correlates with stronger vaccine confidence. But in other research covering African nations, there is a <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad432-covid-19_vaccine_hesitancy_high_trust_low_in_west_africa-afrobarometer-8march21.pdf">mixed set of findings</a> regarding education status. It may be that younger urban populations are more likely to be educated and also have access to the internet, and thus be exposed to a mixture of good and bad information about vaccines. There may also be different voting patterns in younger education groups that affect level of trust in government messaging. </p>
<p>In Togo, we <a href="https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Examining_determinants_of_COVID-19_vaccine_hesitancy_in_Togo/14805765">carried out</a> one survey in January 2021. Hesitancy was higher than in Ghana – at 32.3%. The two main reasons provided were that the vaccines were dangerous (stated by 90% of the hesitant respondents) and that they did not trust the current government (40% of the hesitant respondents). </p>
<p>Considering the results across Ghana and Togo, there is a clear need for strong health promotion ahead of any future arrivals of vaccine doses. It is difficult to push good public health messages through the noise of uncertainty, misinformation, and outright conspiracy theories. For maximum impact, the information must come from trusted sources, and this may differ depending upon the receiving demographic. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/low-trust-in-authorities-affects-vaccine-uptake-evidence-from-22-african-countries-161045">Low trust in authorities affects vaccine uptake: evidence from 22 African countries</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<hr>
<h2>Approaches to health messaging</h2>
<p>Our results show that, generally, the Ghana health service is a <a href="https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/Examining_drivers_of_COVID-19_vaccine_hesitancy_in_Ghana/14494851">highly trusted source</a>. Many respondents obtain their vaccine-related information directly or indirectly via social media – particularly Facebook. Therefore, Ghana health service messaging via electronic platforms such as Facebook and Whatsapp can potentially be effective, but the use of multiple methods and sources will be vital. </p>
<p>Our research required use of the internet and access to a device. Thus, there will be an additional need to assess vaccine confidence in rural and hard-to-reach areas where access to information will be different to urban areas. </p>
<p>Vaccine confidence is essential if the pandemic is to be brought under control. Vaccinating a population is the end point, and there must be proactive approaches to health promotion and community preparedness. The Ghana health service may be the best organisation to take the lead on this, but the government, opposition political parties and employers can all contribute positive messaging ahead of the next delivery of COVID-19 vaccines.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164733/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Head has received funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the UK Department for International Development. The project cited in this article was funded by the University of Southampton Strategic Development Fund. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Brackstone has received funding from the Impact Acceleration Account (IAA), University of Southampton.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laud Boateng has received funding from the UK Department for International Development.</span></em></p>Vaccinating a population requires a proactive approach to health promotion and community preparedness.Michael Head, Senior Research Fellow in Global Health, University of SouthamptonKen Brackstone, Research Fellow in Health Psychology, University of SouthamptonLaud Boateng, Post Doctoral Researcher, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1640102021-07-11T09:47:01Z2021-07-11T09:47:01ZAfricans want consensual democracy – why is that reality so hard to accept?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410288/original/file-20210708-15-yitatg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Mswati III of eSwatini, Africa's last absolute monarch, is facing growing demands for democracy and rule of law. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has become common to argue that most Africans are not that committed to democracy. Commentators often suggest that Africans care more about development than democracy, and that voters – especially those in <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/trouble-democracy-africa/">rural areas</a> – don’t really <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/western-style-democracy-in-africa-is-just-a-way-of-pushing-the-neoliberal-agenda/">understand democracy</a>. They would thus happily trade away their political rights for a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/11/africa-strongmen-angola-dos-santos-zimbabwe-mugabe-uganda-sudan">“strong man”</a> who can get things done.</p>
<p>This narrative has proved to be durable despite being wrong. </p>
<p>In our new <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/african-studies-keyword-democracy/31A98158F9749E17ADFA5DEC518CD757">journal article</a> for the <a href="https://africanstudies.org/annual-meetings-asa/2019-call-for-panelists/keywords-in-african-studies-african-studies-review-sponsored-panels/">Keywords</a> series of the <em>African Studies Review</em>, we investigated three issues. First, is there support for democracy in Africa? Second, what kind of democracy do people want? Third, why are the desires of African citizens so often silenced?</p>
<p>Drawing on survey data collected by the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a> between 2016 and 2018, we show that strong majorities think that democracy is the best political system for their country. </p>
<p>Contrary to claims that “Western style” democracy is “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0ec9dc4e-8976-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff7">unAfrican</a>”, we find widespread support for a form of consensual democracy, which combines a strong commitment to political accountability and civil liberties with a concern for unity and stability.</p>
<h2>Support for democracy remains strong</h2>
<p>Democracy in Africa has come under considerable pressure over the last decade. Satisfaction with the way that democracy is performing has fallen. This is in part due to a decline in public confidence in the <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp84-quality-elections-satisfaction-democracy-and-political-trust-africa">quality of elections</a> – how free, fair and credible they are. </p>
<p>We argue that this has only had a modest impact on support for the principle of democratic government, in part because African citizens continue to view authoritarian rule as a worse option. Of the 35 countries surveyed, the proportion of citizens who suggested that non-democratic political systems might be preferable only exceeded 20% in eSwatini and Malawi.</p>
<p>This figure is now likely to have declined in both countries. Malawians faith in democracy was revived by a <a href="https://oxfamapps.org/fp2p/how-does-change-happen-lessons-from-malawi/">peaceful transfer of power in 2020</a>. And the people of eSwatini have been protesting against a failing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/inside-story/2021/7/1/will-eswatinis-king-respond-to-calls-for-democracy">authoritarian regime</a>.</p>
<p>Even in states in which the reintroduction of multiparty politics has been associated with political controversy and conflict, such as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334391635_The_Root_Causes_of_the_Conflict_in_Ivory_Coast">Cote d’Ivoire</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tug-of-war-in-togo-over-term-limits-and-the-distribution-of-power-100731">Togo</a> and <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/11/how-museveni-mastered-violence-to-win-elections-in-uganda/">Uganda</a>, more than three quarters of citizens say that democracy is preferable.</p>
<h2>Consensual democracy</h2>
<p>It is, therefore, time to stop doubting that African citizens want democracy, and start asking what kind of democracy people want. We argue that there is widespread demand for a form of consensual democracy, in which a desire for elections and checks and balances on those in power goes hand in hand with a concern to maintain national unity.</p>
<p>Consensual democracy has four main features:</p>
<p><strong>Multiparty elections</strong></p>
<p>We show that the vast majority of Africans support selecting their government through multi-party elections. Three-quarters of those surveyed agreed that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Almost 65% also agreed that “many political parties are needed to make sure that (the people) have real choices in who governs them”. Most rejected the idea of one-party rule.</p>
<p><strong>Political accountability</strong></p>
<p>Our article also shows that most Africans want political accountability and the rule of law. Over three quarters of respondents agreed that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Only 34% agreed that the government getting things done was more important than being accountable to citizens.</p>
<p><strong>Civil liberties and political rights</strong></p>
<p>Respondents also wanted to be able to express their own opinions and engage in political activities. Over three quarters (76%) agreed that a citizen’s freedom to criticise the government was “important” or “essential” for a society to be called democratic.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410327/original/file-20210708-17-1cbhaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ugandans in Kenya demand freedom for opposition leader Bobi Wine in 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Daniel Irungu</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This extends to the right of association, with over 60% of individuals believing they “should be able to join any organisation, whether or not the government approves”. </p>
<p><strong>Consensual politics</strong></p>
<p>Strong support for rights, elections and accountability goes hand-in-hand with a concern to prevent “excessive” freedom and competition, lest they lead to disunity and instability. Many citizens worry about violence around elections; they want parties to put aside their differences and work for the common good.</p>
<p>Most respondents were therefore against the use of street protests to settle disputes, even though they often sympathised with protesters’ aims.</p>
<h2>The exceptions that prove the rule</h2>
<p>There are of course variations in how people feel about these issues, both across the continent and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/moral-economy-of-elections-in-africa/DDAE0D88636E296400383CFFFA2D13DF">within countries</a>. </p>
<p>Respondents in eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique were less committed to elections, but only in Lesotho did this drop below 50%. </p>
<p>Namibians and South Africans were more willing to trade accountability off against efficiency – perhaps because of majority support for the ruling party.</p>
<p>Yet, what is striking is the consistency of support for the four pillars of consensual democracy across the continent. What does this mean for African politics? Why is this reality not more accepted? </p>
<p>Our article outlines three key episodes in which support for democratic government has been silenced. We also identify vulnerabilities that authoritarian leaders could exploit. </p>
<p>Leaders who can persuade citizens that their country <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/118/473/603/5536927">faces a grave risk of violence and instability</a> may be able to legitimise backsliding on democracy – whether or not the risk actually exists. This is a cause for concern because supporters of democracy in Africa don’t always reject <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Working%20paper/AfropaperNo19.pdf">all authoritarian alternatives</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, as our <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/african-studies-keyword-democracy/31A98158F9749E17ADFA5DEC518CD757">study shows</a>, the overwhelming majority of Africans support consensual democracy.</p>
<h2>Lazy argument</h2>
<p>The argument that multi-party politics is incompatible with African ways of life stretches back to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/voting-nationhood-and-citizenship-in-latecolonial-africa/D6252CD6E0638A803F7086313BC703F1">racist colonial officials</a>. It was also used by nationalist leaders to justify creating one-party states after independence. But it is not true, and has become a lazy excuse for authoritarian regimes that are neither popular nor legitimate.</p>
<p>In a decade in which <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/10/23/book-review-africa-uprising-popular-protest-and-political-change-by-adam-branch-and-zachariah-mampilly/">activists have risked their lives</a> to advance democratic causes in Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, eSwatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, it is time to recognise that most Africans do not want authoritarian rule.</p>
<p>It is both misleading and patronising to suggest that democracy has somehow been imposed by the international community against the wishes of ordinary people. Instead, it has been demanded and fought for from below.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman is a member of the International Advisory Council of the Afrobarometer. This article is written in his individual capacity.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sishuwa Sishuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is more support for democracy among African people than is often recognised. Yet this can be undermined by election rigging and is lower in countries like Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamSishuwa Sishuwa, Postdoctoral Research Fellow; Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1597882021-05-02T08:42:39Z2021-05-02T08:42:39ZRestricting digital media is a gamble for African leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/398229/original/file-20210502-23-99qjxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>COVID-19 pushed much of the world into the digital realm for everything from schooling and work to religious worship and dating. At the same time, many governments were turning data connections off. Full or partial shutdowns of the internet and social media are increasingly common parts of the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism">“digital authoritarian”</a> toolkit. </p>
<p>Many leaders seem threatened by the way digital media make it possible to share information and organise. <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/">Research</a> shows that 2020 saw 156 full or partial shutdowns of the internet or social media like Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. South Asia accounts for almost three quarters of these shutdowns, with India leading the way. </p>
<p>Africa was the next most affected region, with 20 shutdowns affecting 12 countries. Disruptions lasted from as short as a day or less, in Burundi, Egypt, and Togo, to nearly 90 days in parts of Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/09/ethiopia-communications-shutdown-takes-heavy-toll">Oromia Region</a>. A recent blockage of social media in <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1582696/chad-has-blocked-whatsapp-facebook-twitter-for-a-year/">Chad</a> lasted for more than a year. </p>
<p>And 2021 has already seen shutdowns in <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/niger-election-internet-blackout/">Niger</a>, <a href="https://iafrikan.com/2021/03/08/senegal-social-media-and-internet-shutdown/">Senegal</a> and <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/social-media-and-messaging-platforms-restricted-in-uganda-ahead-of-general-election-XB7aaO87">Uganda</a>.</p>
<p>Governments have given varying justifications for these moves. These include: combating hate speech and fake news in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/4/chad-slows-down-internet-to-curb-hate-speech-on-social-media">Chad</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/africas-online-hate-speech-laws-sound-alarm-over-press-freedom/a-52488748">Ethiopia</a>, suppressing violence in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/13/end-mass-protests-sudan-has-cut-off-internet-access-nationwide-heres-why/">Sudan</a>, and preventing exam cheating in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/world/africa/algeria-exams-cheating-internet.html">Algeria</a> and <a href="https://smex.org/noexamshutdown-4-mena-countries-shut-down-the-internet-so-far-to-fight-cheating/">Sudan</a>. Disruptions in <a href="https://netblocks.org/reports/social-media-restricted-in-mali-amid-protests-against-president-QyKpdX8D">Mali</a> in 2020 coincided with anti-government protests, while shutdowns were timed around elections in <a href="https://cpj.org/2020/05/burundi-blocks-social-media-access-during-presiden/">Burundi</a>, <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/une-promesse-non-tenue-de-keepiton-la-guinee-coupe-lacces-a-internet-et-bloque-les-medias-sociaux-le-jour-du-referendum/">Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/tanzania-votes-government-forces-telcos-escalate-censorship/">Tanzania</a>, and <a href="https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1220118227126312960?s=20">Togo</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/shutting-down-the-internet-doesnt-work-but-governments-keep-doing-it-111642">Shutting down the internet doesn't work -- but governments keep doing it</a>
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<p>In some cases, official reasoning has shifted over time. When Uganda shut down digital media surrounding its January 2021 elections, foreign affairs minister Sam Kutesa initially <a href="https://pctechmag.com/2021/01/facebook-and-twitter-shut-down-to-ensure-equity/">said</a> the move was retaliation for Facebook’s and Twitter’s actions against government accounts. Investigations had alleged the government was behind <a href="https://medium.com/dfrlab/social-media-disinformation-campaign-targets-ugandan-presidential-election-b259dbbb1aa8">“coordinated inauthentic behaviour”</a> using fake accounts to spread disinformation and intimidate the opposition. After the election, however, Kutesa <a href="https://www.independent.co.ug/internet-shutdown-prevented-violence-minister-kutesa/">said</a> the move was “a necessary step to stop the vitriolic language and incitement to violence.”</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/uganda-election-museveni-social-media-ban-caps-violent-campaign-153338">Uganda election: Museveni social media ban caps violent campaign</a>
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<h2>Views on digital media limits</h2>
<p>Online commentary usually harshly criticises these shutdowns. But these posts aren’t necessarily representative of general public opinion in affected countries. </p>
<p>To get a sense of broader opinion on these issues, we <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/ad410-promise_and_peril-africas_changing_media_landscape-afrobarometer_dispatch-1dec20.pdf">analysed</a> data from Afrobarometer. This is an independent African research network that conducted nationally representative surveys in 18 countries in 2019/20. About 27,000 Africans participated in these surveys. </p>
<p>A larger share of respondents supported access to digital media. When given a choice between two statements, 48% agreed that “unrestricted access to the internet and social media helps people to be more informed and active citizens, and should be protected”. Only 36% agreed that “information shared on the internet and social media is dividing (our country), so access should be regulated by the government”. </p>
<p>Majorities in 10 countries supported unrestricted access. Support was highest in Cabo Verde (64%), Gabon (63%), Côte d’Ivoire (63%) and Nigeria (61%). Majorities supported regulation in only three countries: Mali (53%), Ethiopia (53%) and Tunisia (59%). </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-internet-shutdowns-have-affected-the-lives-of-millions-of-ethiopians-134054">How internet shutdowns have affected the lives of millions of Ethiopians</a>
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<h2>Guarding freedoms</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, regular users of digital media were more supportive of freedoms. Of the 37% of respondents who reported using some form of digital media for their news at least a few times a week, 62% favoured unrestricted access. Only 35% favoured regulations. </p>
<p>Over half (54%) of respondents reported never using digital media for news in the last month. Those non-users were more divided, with 37% favouring regulations and 39% favouring unrestricted access. A quarter (24%) of non-users did not share an opinion or could not choose between the positions.</p>
<p>Factors like age, residence and education also made a difference. The groups more likely to use digital media were also more supportive of unrestricted access. The youngest respondents (18-25) were almost twice as likely to oppose restrictions than the oldest respondents (over 60) were (56% vs 30%). Urban residents favoured unrestricted access more than rural residents (56% vs 43%). And those with post-secondary education were much more favourable towards unrestricted access than those without formal education (60% vs 34%). Men were only slightly more supportive of unrestricted digital media than women (50% vs. 47%).</p>
<p>Perhaps surprisingly, support for unrestricted digital media does not fall neatly along political lines. Even among those who said they trusted their president “somewhat” or “a lot”, 45% still supported unrestricted digital media, versus 39% who favoured restrictions. Those who said they only trusted their national leader “a little” or “not at all” were even more supportive of open digital media: 53% supported unrestricted access and 34% supported regulations.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africans-are-concerned-about-ills-of-social-media-but-oppose-government-restrictions-137653">Africans are concerned about ills of social media but oppose government restrictions</a>
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<h2>Cost of shutdowns</h2>
<p>Restricting digital media is a gamble for African leaders. On the one hand, many governments are embracing digital media shutdowns, particularly around elections and protests, to <a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-shutdowns-in-africa-threaten-democracy-and-development-142868?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1595781241">limit threats</a>. They argue such moves are necessary to halt “the dissemination of messages inciting hate and division”, as a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/4/chad-slows-down-internet-to-curb-hate-speech-on-social-media">Chadian government spokesperson</a> put it. In some cases, like Ethiopia and Mali, populations seem generally supportive of governments’ restrictions. </p>
<p>But commerce, education and social communication are increasingly online. <a href="https://techpoint.africa/2021/02/26/sub-saharan-africa-internet-shutdown-loses/">One analysis</a> found that digital media restrictions cost African economies some $237 million in 2020. And using Afrobarometer data from 16 countries, we find that the share of Africans who regularly get news from digital media almost doubled, from 22% to 38%, between 2014 and 2019.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/internet-shutdowns-in-africa-threaten-democracy-and-development-142868">Internet shutdowns in Africa threaten democracy and development</a>
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<p>If African populations are sceptical now of limits on digital media, that opposition might grow as more enter the digital space for commerce, work, education, entertainment and social communications. Shutdowns will generate not only higher economic costs, but likely greater public outrage as well.</p>
<p><em>Joseph Koné, a research associate and finance officer at Centre de Recherche et de Formation sur le Développement Intégré (CREFDI), the Afrobarometer National Partner in Ivory Coast, was co-author of the research on which this article is based.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159788/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Digital media shutdowns in Africa will lead to higher economic costs and greater public outrage.Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1589532021-04-26T15:28:01Z2021-04-26T15:28:01ZGhana’s secessionist conflict has its genesis in colonialism: it’s time to reflect<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396397/original/file-20210421-15-lr2gdm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Modern secession claims find their roots in the Trusteeship System of the UN</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:United_Nations_Trusteeship_Council_chamber_in_New_York_City_2.JPG">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ghana’s secessionist conflict is rooted in a system that was meant to promote peace.</p>
<p>Since the advent of decolonisation after <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">World War II</a>, secessionist conflicts have been the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590960">main cause of civil wars</a> worldwide. An historical example is the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-40507324">Biafra War (1967-1970)</a>. A current one is Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis around the calls for <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/who-are-cameroons-self-named-ambazonia-secessionists/a-50639426">the secession of “Ambazonia”</a>.</p>
<p>Over the past couple of years, Ghana has also been kept on tenterhooks by calls for secession. In November 2019, the <a href="https://unpo.org/article/22103">Homeland Study Group Foundation</a> <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2019/11/separatist-movement-declares-independence-for-western-togoland/">declared the independence of “Western Togoland”</a>. Its call was for the secession of Ghana’s Volta region and parts of the Northern and Upper East regions. At first peaceful, this demand led to <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Detailed-account-of-how-Western-Togoland-group-staged-successful-attacks-in-Volta-Region-1076896">violence in September 2020</a> with the emergence of the Western Togoland Restoration Front. </p>
<p>The antecedents of this claim go back over 60 years, and the role played by the United Nations (UN). Prior to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13433790">Ghana’s independence</a> in 1957, the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/">United Nations</a> oversaw <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501019?seq=1">British (Western) Togoland</a> through the <a href="https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/history/international-trusteeship-system-and-trust-territories">International Trusteeship System</a>. This system was created to administer and supervise certain territories. Its <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-12">aim</a> was to promote development towards independence and to maintain international peace and security. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2021.1890935?journalCode=risb20">study</a> we conducted, we argue that the UN trusteeship system after <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II">World War II</a> had the unintended effect of perpetuating secessionist conflicts. Colonial powers framed secessionism as a threat to state-building – not as an expression of self-determination. We looked specifically at the Ewe/Togoland unification conflict in the bordering regions of the British Gold Coast and the trusteeship territories of Togoland. </p>
<p>Our analysis leads us to caution against a rhetoric that polarises the issue in terms of “threats”.</p>
<h2>A history of distrust</h2>
<p>International intervention by the UN is generally supposed to provide a peaceful solution – not the perpetuation of conflicts. But <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704242?seq=1">historical research</a> using colonial archives and UN documents points to precisely such a pattern. A significant number of the former <a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/tc/territories">11 UN trust territories</a> in various parts of the world experienced some form of secessionist conflict. </p>
<p>The UN trusteeship system was by no means a venue of tranquil diplomacy. Rather, it involved a politically heated negotiation process between the UN, its trustees and national elites.</p>
<p>The Western Togoland secessionism fits this pattern too. Many of the actors involved in the system attempted to escalate, de-escalate or ignore conflicts around the separation of Western Togoland from the erstwhile Gold Coast. They used a mode of conflict communication called <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/14/securitisation-theory-an-introduction/">“securitisation”</a>. This involves reframing an issue as a security problem to gain room for manoeuvre and push through more far-reaching, controversial measures politically.</p>
<p>When France and Britain divided up <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/history-in-africa/article/abs/historiography-of-german-togoland-or-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-model-colony/E9C35F0CA7CC012CB656E163F4DF9F25">German Togoland</a> after World War I, the new colonial demarcation separated the<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321785130_The_Ewe_in_West_Africa_One_Cultural_People_in_Two_Different_Countries_TogoGhana_1884-1960"> Ewe-speaking population</a> into three territories. These were the British Gold Coast Colony, British Togoland and French Togoland. A <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/ewe-unification-movement-a-political-history/oclc/24013896">movement</a> then formed to campaign at the UN for the political unification of the Ewes.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of the division of Ewe-speaking peoples by colonial borders" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=656&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=656&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396122/original/file-20210420-21-1x57a10.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=656&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Colonial division of the Ewe-speaking peoples (1920-1956)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Authors</span></span>
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<p>Unwilling to cede territory, France and Britain pointed out the dangers of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkanization">balkanisation</a>“ to the UN. Allowing the Ewes to decide on unification would implicitly give them the right to secession. It would create an incalculable domino effect by setting a precedent for numerous other dependent territories whose borders had been drawn arbitrarily. </p>
<p>The UN itself <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/794632">reported</a> in 1949 that in the interest of peace and stability a solution should be sought with urgency. In view of France’s and Britain’s reluctance to consider the Ewes’ demands, representatives of the anti-colonial UN member states cautioned that their nationalistic clamour was a danger to peace in West Africa. </p>
<p>Faced with the apparent futility of Ewe unification, the movement shifted in the early 1950s to the more promising <a href="https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/T/1218">reunification of French and British Togoland</a>. Its supporters pursued a strategy of pointing to human rights violations, which discredited the French in particular. While anti‑imperial UN member states acknowledged the problem, the permanent members of the Trusteeship Council did not seriously consider Ewe or Togoland reunification.</p>
<p>In 1956 the UN-supervised referendum <a href="https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/1044%20(XI)">sealed</a> the incorporation of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Those in support of unification then asked the UN as the "world peace organisation” to revise the result, or at least consider the electoral districts separately on the grounds that there could be “serious unrest” or an “ultimate war”. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17502977.2021.1890935?journalCode=risb20">Overruling the request</a>, the UN followed the wishes of the colonial authorities. It framed secessionism as a “threat” to state-building rather than an expression of self-determination. </p>
<p>By curbing secessionism during the period of decolonisation, the UN laid the foundation for it to escalate again later. The issue of Western Togoland fortunately never turned into a full civil war. Nevertheless low-level violence and political conflicts remained. The <a href="http://elibrary.jsg.gov.gh/fg/laws%20of%20ghana/2%20REP/AVOIDANCE%20OF%20DISCRIMINATION%20ACT,%201957%20NO.%2038.htm">1957 Avoidance of Discrimination Act</a> and <a href="http://www.justiceghana.com/index.php/en/law-a-justice/7443-human-rights-individual-freedoms-and-democracy-in-ghana-the-preventive-detention-act-and-after?start=1">1958 Preventive Detention Act</a> practically outlawed Togoland secessionism overnight. It <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/160799">revived only briefly in the mid-1970s</a>, and seemed to have disappeared until recently. </p>
<h2>Changing legacies</h2>
<p>The long history of the conflict around “Western Togoland” illustrates two points.<br>
First, the vocabulary of international law and <a href="https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/637(VII)">the UN implies a clear meaning of terms such as self-determination or decolonisation</a>. In reality, the specific meanings in the decolonisation period were shaped by the perception of whose self-determination was seen as a threat to the international order. Secessionist movements and territorial changes could easily be portrayed as an overriding threat to the state and regional order and therefore considered illegitimate. </p>
<p>Secondly, the introduction of the <a href="https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/637(VII)">right to self-determination</a> by the UN in 1952 led to new conflicts over secession, a very real legacy of colonialism and the UN trusteeship system. The UN, with no genuine answer as to <em>who</em> could claim independence and <em>how</em>, adhered to colonial borders. </p>
<p>Both points led to the fact that in Ghana, almost 60 years after independence, the conflict over “Western Togoland” does not seem to have been resolved. </p>
<p>Politicians and security analysts have joined the securitisation of the secessionists and called for heavy-handed solutions. But the past shows that this kind of rhetoric might solve the issue in the short term but not in the longer term.</p>
<p>A public dialogue that avoids portraying the other side as a threat would be more likely to succeed in settling the conflict once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors receive funding from by the German Research Foundation (DFG) under grant number TRR 138/2–2018.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Werner Distler receives funding from German Research Foundation (DFG)</span></em></p>Colonial powers framed secessionism as a threat to state-building and not as an expression of self-determinationJulius Heise, Research Fellow, Center for Conflict Studies, University of MarburgWerner Distler, Research Fellow, Center for Conflict Studies, University of MarburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1579812021-03-31T13:34:35Z2021-03-31T13:34:35ZHas ECOWAS made West Africa a safer place? Yes, but its track record is lumpy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/392569/original/file-20210330-19-1na56za.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nigeria's president Buhari chairing the 55th ordinary session of the ECOWAS.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Adam Abu Bashal/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In an article published in 1994 titled <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/">The Coming Anarchy</a>, the American journalist Robert Kaplan predicted an impending Armageddon for West Africa due to what he considered its notoriety for breeding crime, coups and tyrannical regimes. Twenty-six years later, it bears examining whether the region has measured up to this grim forecast.</p>
<p>In my <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909615570951">paper</a>, I examined how the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had fared in the context of some emerging and recurring security threats in the region. These included jihadist terrorism, <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity">drug trafficking and piracy</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/10/30/threats-to-democracy-in-africa-the-rise-of-the-constitutional-coup/">unconstitutional changes of government</a>. </p>
<p>ECOWAS was <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/history/">formed in 1975</a> by West African states to accelerate economic growth and development in the region. Its member states include Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Nigeria. The adoption of the Accord on Non-aggression and Defence in 1978 marked the inroads of ECOWAS into security <a href="https://codesria.org/IMG/pdf/sesay.pdf">regionalism</a> as a prerequisite for the attainment of economic integration. </p>
<p>I assessed the progress of ECOWAS in resolving the main security challenges in the region. I concluded that there are reasons to be optimistic. But recent conflict trends have reignited a great deal of concern about the political stability of the region. </p>
<p>I <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909615570951">concluded</a> that ECOWAS is limited in what it can achieve. Nonetheless, it needs to be decisive in enforcing its protocols and policies and sanctioning member states and governing elites who flout them. </p>
<h2>Democracy landscape</h2>
<p>I reviewed the period between 1989 and 2020. </p>
<p>One of the categories of political instability I looked at was trends in constitutional coups. </p>
<p>Within this period, unconstitutional changes of government accounted for a high percentage of the conflicts in the region. These <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26295349?seq=1%22">included</a> Liberia (1989–2005), Sierra Leone (1991–2002), Cote d’Ivoire (1992–2002; 2010–2011), Guinea Conakry (2007–2010), and Guinea Bissau (2005–2009). </p>
<p>Only <a href="https://www.oecd.org/swac/publications/38961785.pdf">Cape Verde and Senegal</a> were spared a military coup. Even so, the erstwhile president of Senegal, the then 86-year-old Abdoulaye Wade, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/1/28/controversy-of-abdoulaye-wades-presidential-bid">did attempt a constitutional coup in 2012</a> to run for a third term. </p>
<p>In response to many of these developments, ECOWAS deployed both military and diplomatic tactics at different times. For instance, ECOWAS deployed the military in the Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts and recorded a modicum of success, but this intervention was controversial because of alleged <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/">human rights abuses</a>.</p>
<p>Diplomacy was deployed in 2012, when a festering <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0975087813515979">terrorist challenge and Tuareg rebellion</a> in Mali led to the ousting of President Amadou Toumani Touré in a putsch. ECOWAS initiated a <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/52122968.pdf">mediated</a> settlement with the junta to restore constitutional order while granting them amnesty. It failed to deploy a military tactic due to lack of capacity and disagreements by member states. </p>
<p>However, the use of Blaise Compaoré as mediator in the Mali intervention contradicted the organisation’s protocols given his despotic tactics at home. Compaoré was eventually <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/blaise-compaore-burkina-faso-president-resigns-after-violent-protests-1.2819254">toppled by a popular protest</a> in 2014. </p>
<p>After a military coup in Burkina Faso in 2015, ECOWAS returned the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/burkina-faso-foiled-military-coup">interim president</a>, Michel Kafando, to office. And it facilitated a political transition in the Gambia in 2017. </p>
<p>Yet it has been ineffectual in dismantling the Gnassingbé dynasty in Togo. And it failed to deplore the move by Alpha Condé of Guinea to push through a <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/defusing-political-crisis-guinea/">constitutional referendum</a> in March 2020. This saw him return to power for a third term as president.</p>
<p>Similarly, President Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire capitalised on a new constitution and ran for a third term in 2020 amid some <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/7/ivory-coast-president-alassane-ouattara-to-run-for-third-term">violent protests in the country</a>. According to Adam K. Abebe in the Africa Report, the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/34674/cote-divoire-ouattaras-bid-for-3rd-term-opens-up-a-can-of-worms/">new constitution</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“retains the two-term limit on presidential aspirants but says nothing about terms served prior to its adoption”. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In 2020, Mali was back in the spotlight when a popular <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54134614">uprising and coup</a> ended the administration of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. This time, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/62698/mali-a-whos-who-of-bah-ndaws-transitional-government-cabinet">ECOWAS imposed</a> economic sanctions and gave a deadline for the military to hand over to a transitional government.</p>
<p>Overall, I found that ECOWAS’s achievements in responding to the crises of governance wrecking the region have been strained by the non-compliance of its own leaders with its <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf">good governance protocol</a>. </p>
<h2>Drugs, piracy and terrorism</h2>
<p>One of the major security threats in the region is drug trafficking. Coastal states of Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Senegal have become major transit routes for <a href="https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/abstract/10.5334/sta.df/">drug traffickers</a>. And <a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_COCAINE.pdf">substantial seizures of drugs</a> were made between 2005 and 2007. This challenge has been coupled with alarming <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/gulf-of-guinea-piracy-a-symptom-not-a-cause-of-insecurity">kidnappings at sea</a> in the Gulf of Guinea.</p>
<p>ECOWAS tried to address the drug crime through <a href="https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/ecowasresponseactionplan.html">the adoption of a policy in 2009</a> and a year later agreeing <a href="https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/November/new-initiative-to-improve-airport-intelligence-sharing-on-drug-trafficking-in-west-africa.html">the Dakar Initiative</a>. Most of its efforts have focused on <a href="https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/WACD_En_Report_WEB_051114.pdf">restricting the flow of drugs, strengthening borders, and prosecuting culprits</a>. </p>
<p>Then there is the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/world/africa/terrorism-west-africa.html">ongoing terrorism of Boko Haram</a> and its splinter sects in Nigeria. This has become a normalised phenomenon with seismic reverberations in neighbouring states. The challenge is compounded by the activities of armed bandits and kidnappers.</p>
<p>ECOWAS adopted a counter-terrorism strategy and implementation plan in 2013. This outlined <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IMPLEMENTATION-PLAN-CT.pdf">three main pillars: prevent, pursue, reconstruct</a>. </p>
<p>The priority of member states has been to pursue culprits, with little investment in addressing the ideological and political conditions of violence. </p>
<p>There are also major shortfalls when it comes to the organisation’s military unit. The most pressing are corruption and a lack of sustained and improved training.</p>
<p>And, despite its measured progress, ECOWAS still has the critical challenge of resource scarcity. There is also the lack of will to follow through on the implementation of protocols, non-compliance with the protocols, a lack of leadership by members, the brutality of state forces and a general disconnect with the realities of people on the ground. </p>
<h2>The way ahead</h2>
<p>The decline of interstate violence and civil wars in West Africa, and the greater prominence of ECOWAS in conflict management, are perhaps indications that the security situation of West Africa didn’t turn out to be as gloomy as Kaplan forecast two decades ago. But there are important lessons that have been learnt. </p>
<p>The organisation should support and safeguard the rights of its citizens to stage peaceful protest as a way of balancing the excesses of politicians.</p>
<p>The people should use their rights granted by <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5546&context=faculty_scholarship">Article 4 of the 2005 revised protocol</a> under the ECOWAS Court to seek justice in situations where they have been abused by the state or other oppressive groups.</p>
<p>ECOWAS should appoint individuals who are not former heads of state and do not hold political office as regional mediators. Given Nigeria’s mammoth internal challenges and weakened political clout, other countries within the region must step up and drive the organisation to achieve its mandate of becoming a <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/vision-2020/">community of people</a> rather than an institution that enhances the status and profile of <a href="https://gup.ub.gu.se/file/119483">subversive regimes</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Maiangwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ECOWAS needs to be decisive in enforcing its protocols and sanctioning members that flout the provisions of its protocols and policies.Benjamin Maiangwa, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lakehead UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1539072021-02-11T13:39:31Z2021-02-11T13:39:31ZWhat’s in the way of quality antenatal care for women in West and Central Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/382980/original/file-20210208-13-ell7cu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-advertisement-by-the-government-to-promote-antenatal-news-photo/485249637?adppopup=true">Lam Yik Fei/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Globally, <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/327596/WHO-RHR-19.23-eng.pdf?ua=1">nearly 300,000</a> women die from pregnancy-related causes each year. Most of <a href="https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/maternal-mortality-2000-2017/en/">these deaths</a> are in the low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/maternal-mortality">leading causes</a> of maternal mortality include severe bleeding, hypertensive disorders, infection, unsafe abortion and embolism. There are also indirect causes such as HIV, malaria and anaemia. <a href="https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/250796/9789241549912-eng.pdf;jsessionid=04B3A497B42C9AD42D6C49E53844F989?sequence=1">About three in four</a> maternal deaths could be prevented if women had adequate access to quality care before, during and after pregnancy. </p>
<p>Quality antenatal care can save lives by <a href="https://www.who.int/woman_child_accountability/ierg/reports/Countdown_Accountability_2013Report.pdf">identifying and addressing</a> health problems that can cause pregnancy complications and poor birth outcomes. But the women most at risk tend to be the ones who <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7118439/">do not access</a> life-saving health services. <a href="https://www.cochranelibrary.com/cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD012392/full">Barriers</a> to quality antenatal care include lack of information, cultural practices, poverty and distance to health services. Others are inadequate and poor health services. </p>
<p>There is already global <a href="https://data.unicef.org/resources/maternal-newborn-health-disparities-country-profiles/">evidence</a> of social and economic differences in access to maternal health care and the quality of that care. We sought to understand the quality of antenatal care in sub-Saharan Africa. <a href="https://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/WCARO_2015_ROAR.pdf">Countries</a> in the West and Central African sub-region have notably poor reproductive health indicators, as well as high levels of poverty and civil unrest or political fragility. </p>
<p>Yet, the region has been largely underrepresented in empirical research. Research findings can help inform policy and programme interventions for improving the reach and quality of antenatal care. They can also contribute to reducing the unacceptable rates of maternal and newborn deaths in the region. </p>
<p>At the time of our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03630242.2020.1847748">study</a>, household survey data from the same source were available for seven countries in the United Nations region of West and Central Africa: Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo. We analysed the data on 32,718 women whose pregnancies resulted in a live birth, considering the levels of poverty in the households and communities where these women resided. </p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>Our findings indicated that one in four pregnant women did not receive antenatal care. The majority of these women were in Chad (37%) and Nigeria (38%). Among women who had antenatal care, the majority received low-quality care. This means receiving fewer than five of six possible antenatal care services. The proportion of women who received high quality antenatal care ranged from 3% in Chad to 33% in Nigeria. </p>
<p>Among women who received antenatal care, the most common services provided across all seven countries were blood pressure monitoring and tetanus vaccination. The figures ranged from 79% in Chad to 99% in Ghana for blood pressure monitoring. For tetanus vaccination they ranged from 87% in the DRC to 97% in Sierra Leone. </p>
<p>Less frequently provided services included HIV testing, malaria treatment and blood tests. We also found that higher levels of household wealth <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/cr6/cr6.pdf">increased</a> the likelihood of women reporting high-quality antenatal care. Poorer households are in the top 20% of the household wealth index. This measures the living standard of a family, based on the possession of certain household goods and infrastructure. The relationship of household wealth with quality of antenatal care was more noticeable in the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo. </p>
<p>Similarly, women who had secondary or higher levels of education were between two and three times as likely to receive high-quality antenatal care as women without formal education. With the exception of Chad, women who had more antenatal care visits reported high quality care. </p>
<p>Our results indicate that the quality of antenatal care varied according to the level of poverty in communities. Women who lived in poor communities were between 15% and 52% less likely to report high-quality antenatal care. Poor communities are clusters of households headed by someone with no formal education, and in the lowest 20% of the wealth index. The poorest household wealth quantile is the lowest 20%. </p>
<p>The findings indicate that living in a poor household and in close proximity to poor households is a risk factor for low quality antenatal care. Poor women and their families are already vulnerable and <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1000294">may have underlying conditions</a> that can increase their risks for experiencing pregnancy complications and poor birth outcomes. But these women may miss out on the benefits of antenatal care altogether because they face financial and social barriers to healthcare. </p>
<h2>What should be done</h2>
<p>In countries with low coverage of antenatal care, for instance Chad and Nigeria, policies should focus on expanding access to maternal health services. Educational policies that support the enrolment and retention of women in school can <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/536581">contribute</a> to raising awareness on health and well-being. They also empower women to demand quality care. Although some countries provide free or subsidised health services for pregnant women and young children, it is evident that these policies do not adequately bridge the gap between need and access to services. </p>
<p>Therefore, additional economic policies that empower women financially to afford direct and indirect costs of services are needed.</p>
<p>Across all the countries in our study, there is a dire need to improve the quality of services. The health systems are clearly missing an important opportunity to intervene early in pregnancy to address behaviours and health problems that could cause serious complications or pregnancy-related deaths among the poorest women. </p>
<p>Targeted support for health systems should also be provided. These include ensuring adequate supplies of medicines and equipment, enhanced pre-service and in-service training and supervision of healthcare providers. Equitable distribution of healthcare resources, including providers, would also contribute to improved access and quality of antenatal care services in West and Central Africa. </p>
<p>These recommendations, if implemented, would significantly reduce maternal and newborn deaths and increase wellbeing and social capital in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153907/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Comfort Z. Olorunsaiye does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>High quality antenatal care can improve maternal health in West and Central Africa by identifying and addressing underlying problems that can cause pregnancy complications.Comfort Z. Olorunsaiye, Assistant Professor of Public Health, Arcadia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1419002020-07-09T15:13:10Z2020-07-09T15:13:10ZBeyond Florence Nightingale: how African nurses have decolonised the profession<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/346290/original/file-20200708-3991-aytiee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nurses attend the 2015 International Nurses' Day celebrations in Johannesburg, South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ihsaan Haffejee/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This year – 2020 – marks the 200th anniversary of Florence Nightingale’s birth. It’s therefore understandable that it’s being marked as <a href="https://www.who.int/campaigns/year-of-the-nurse-and-the-midwife-2020">the year of the nurse and midwife</a>. </p>
<p>Nightingale is <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Florence-Nightingale">best known</a> for her pioneering spirit and fearless approach to changing atrocious conditions and improving healthcare service delivery. These qualities still characterise the attitudes and habits of nurses around the world. They are often the only frontline healthcare workers caring for people – whether they are vulnerable and living in poor and isolated settings or well-off in rich parts of the world.</p>
<p>But Nightingale left two legacies. The other is less known. </p>
<p>She held strong prejudices against indigenous people. While she wasn’t afraid to challenge the status quo in some areas, her role in colonialism and her expressed attitudes towards indigenous populations was deeply concerning. So troubling in fact, that the New Zealand Nurses Organisation chose not to celebrate or acknowledge her birthday this year. The organisation <a href="https://croakey.org/nz-nurses-organisation-why-we-arent-celebrating-florences-birthday/">labelled</a> her </p>
<blockquote>
<p>statements on colonisation and the fate of indigenous people a dangerous legacy. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>They view Nightingale’s writing about indigenous peoples in the South Pacific as “racist, paternalistic and patronising”. </p>
<p>Both legacies had a profound effect on nursing, particularly in countries colonised by the British. Nursing and midwifery were formally established with the dawn of colonialism and Nightingale’s two legacies <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/IJNM/article-full-text-pdf/8C859081115">played a large role</a> in the structure and shape of nursing on the continent. </p>
<p>On the one hand nursing was recognised as the first modern clinical profession on the continent. On the other, patterns of racism as well as elitism were passed on too. These traits are reflected in a <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26186472/">paper</a> published five years ago on how institutional models and ideas were transported from colonial nursing leaders in Europe to African nursing students. The research was based on the oral histories collected from 13 retired nurses from Mauritius, Malawi and Togo who had studied and practised nursing from the late colonial era (1950s) through decolonisation and independence (1960s-70s).</p>
<h2>Legacies</h2>
<p>The British influence, through Nightingale’s post Crimean War reforms in nursing education, affected the nursing education and practice in African colonies in the early 20th century. In 1940, for example, Britain established a <a href="https://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/qeons.htm">Colonial Nursing Service</a>. The service sent British nurses to the Colonies to care, initially, for sick British personnel and subsequently for the indigenous populations. </p>
<p>The British style hospital-oriented system of training was adopted. This would continue for decades to the detriment of empowering nurses and decentralising nursing services to more remote and rural areas.</p>
<p>How nurses and midwives <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c338/99af7ad0fcd5e4f45b04426520abe4049f6f.pdf">were viewed was imported</a> almost without adaptation from Europe. For example, in France nurses are still perceived as a handmaiden to the doctor, with very little independent practice. Midwives are almost unknown. The severe shortage of midwives in many African countries speaks to the continuing dominance of non-applicable models in African health services.</p>
<p>The European style of nursing continued into post-colonial Africa. The oral histories of African nursing leaders describing their experiences in the post colonial period show vividly how colonial stereotypes dictated their lives.</p>
<h2>Evolution of nursing</h2>
<p>But their stories also attest to the fact that nursing slowly changed and evolved in different African countries. The nurses interviewed about nursing practices 50 years ago explained how they adapted European models and ideas to meet their own needs. </p>
<p>A particularly poignant example of this was the expressed desire of the nurses in the study to serve their country and help their country heal from the effects of colonialism.</p>
<p>Moreover, out of necessity, African nurses expanded their scope of practice in ways that only occurred decades later in countries with more resources. An example is in the prescribing of medication which was always the province of doctors, few of whom practice in rural and remote areas. Following the outbreak of the HIV pandemic, nurses in Africa began prescribing antiretroviral drugs. In countries like Uganda and Rwanda nurses began to prescribe oral morphine for pain management in cancer and related terminal diseases exacerbated by the high prevalence of HIV. </p>
<p>African nurses have also led the way in taking over tasks previously undertaken only by physicians. In Ethiopia nurses in rural and remote areas carry out caesarean sections. And in countries like South Africa, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia, there are clinical specialist roles in nursing and midwifery such as critical care nursing, palliative care nursing and perioperative nursing among many others. </p>
<p>Increasingly, the profession has moved to become autonomous, self-regulated, research-focused, and centred on the needs of the population. </p>
<p>This ability to move beyond traditional Western models of care has been important in the management of the disease profile of Africa, where geographical location has added to the burden of disease not found in developed countries. </p>
<h2>Paving a new way</h2>
<p>Given the events of 2020 it’s appropriate and fitting to applaud the visionary work of nurses because of their pivotal roles in addressing health inequity on the global stage. Nurses are commonly described as the <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/nursing-report-2020">“backbone”</a> of the health system. </p>
<p>Their inventiveness and ingenuity in adapting general practices to local conditions should be especially acknowledged. </p>
<p>For example, a <a href="https://www.cochranelibrary.com/cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD001271.pub3/full?highlightAbstract=nurse%7Csubstitut*%7Cnurs%7Ccare%7Cprimary%7Cprimari">systematic review suggests</a> that nurse-delivered care in primary care settings generates similar or better outcomes than doctor-delivered care for a wide range of conditions. In addition, nursing-led primary care services can lead to similar – or even better – patient health outcomes and higher patient satisfaction than other care delivery models. This is because nurses have longer consultations with patients. </p>
<p>Other reviews have shown that nurses are effective in the initiation and follow-up of <a href="https://www.cochranelibrary.com/cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD007331.pub3/full?highlightAbstract=initi%7Cmaintenanc%7Ctherapy%7Cshift%7Cfor%7Cmainten%7Cnon%7Cshifting%7Cdoctor%7Cantiretroviral%7Ctask%7Cinitiation%7Cdoctors%7Ctherapi%7Cantiretrovir%7Cfour%7Cof%7Cfrom%7Cto%7Cmaintenance">HIV therapy</a>. And that <a href="https://www.cochranelibrary.com/cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD001188.pub3/abstract?cookiesEnabled">nursing interventions</a> for tobacco cessation increase the likelihood of quitting. </p>
<p>Further <a href="https://www.cochranelibrary.com/cdsr/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD009149.pub2/abstract">research</a> has shown that non-specialist health workers, including nurses, may improve outcomes for general and perinatal depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol use disorders, and patient and carer outcomes for dementia.</p>
<p>As the world continues to battle the COVID-19 scourge, their contribution has never been more profound. Nurses personify the indomitable trailblazing spirit Nightingale showed 200 years ago. But their song is now much richer and more humane. And their impact reaches much further in terms of addressing global health equity and championing the plight of the world’s most vulnerable populations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/141900/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With the dawn of colonialism, nursing and midwifery were formally established and, in many colonies, recognised as the first modern clinical profession on the African continent.Timothy A. Carey, Director: Institute of Global Health Equity Research, Andrew Weiss Chair of Research in Global Health, University of Global Health EquityAgnes Binagwaho, Vice Chancellor, University of Global Health EquityJudy Khanyola, Chair, Center for Nursing and Midwifery, University of Global Health EquityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1304802020-02-03T13:51:44Z2020-02-03T13:51:44ZGulf of Guinea: fighting criminal groups in the Niger Delta is key to defeating piracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313087/original/file-20200131-41490-3adlyo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo: Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Different reports have recently highlighted security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. One was published by the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1286-unprecedented-number-of-crew-kidnappings-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-despite-drop-in-overall-global-numbers">International Maritime Bureau</a>, another by the French Navy’s <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/download/bilan.pdf">Mica centre</a> and another by the <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2020-002-gulf-guinea-piracyarmed-robberykidnapping-ransom">US Maritime Administration</a>. </p>
<p>These reports come against a backdrop of pirate attacks against merchant ships in West Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea between Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon. They have also led to attention-grabbing headlines about a <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/piracy-surges-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-with-spate-of-deadly-attacks/">“piracy surge”</a> or even <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/waves-terror">“waves of terror”</a>. </p>
<p>In 2019, kidnappings of seafarers in the Gulf of Guinea reached an unprecedented number. Attacks against merchant ships were recorded off Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. The area is often described as “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48581197">the world’s most dangerous seas</a>”. </p>
<p>Piracy is a significant threat for shipping companies operating in the region. Industry organisations have pointed out that urgent action is required and that seafarers should not be <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/priority-news/20190610-gulf-of-guinea-piracy-continues-to-threaten-seafarers">“exposed to such appalling dangers”</a>.</p>
<p>The human cost is significant and hostages aren’t the only victims. Representatives from seafarers’ unions <a href="https://www.nautilusint.org/en/news-insight/news/latest-gulf-of-guinea-kidnapping-prompts-union-call-for-international-action-on-piracy/">have pointed out</a> that their members are at considerable risk for just doing their jobs, and even crews on ships that are merely transiting are on edge.</p>
<p>Based on a thorough analysis of attack patterns and overall maritime activities in the region, I am convinced that it will be impossible for navies and other security agencies to improve maritime security as long as root causes are not addressed. Many security incidents at sea, and notably kidnappings of seafarers, are merely an extension of land-based issues.</p>
<p>At the heart of the problem are activities by criminal groups based in the Niger Delta where kidnappings on land have long been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-nigeria-must-do-to-deal-with-its-ransom-driven-kidnapping-crisis-116547">security challenge</a>. Unless the massive security problems in the Delta are resolved, no significant headway will be made at sea.</p>
<h2>The numbers</h2>
<p>Beyond attention-grabbing headlines there’s no consensus on figures. Not even the reports mentioned above include the same numbers. That matters because shipping companies make commercial decisions based on official statistics, and budgets for security agencies are allocated depending on the scope and scale of the problem. </p>
<p>For example, the International Maritime Bureau reported that <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1286-unprecedented-number-of-crew-kidnappings-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-despite-drop-in-overall-global-numbers">121 seafarers</a> were taken as hostages during attacks in the Gulf of Guinea in 2019. This represented more than 90% of global kidnappings at sea recorded by the centre.</p>
<p>At the same time, the organisation only reported 64 attacks in the Gulf of Guinea last year. This was a decrease of 19% compared with 2018. </p>
<p>The US Maritime Administration highlighted a similar trend in a <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/content/2020-002-gulf-guinea-piracyarmed-robberykidnapping-ransom">recent advisory</a> even though the overall numbers are much higher. It reported that there were 129 attacks in 2019 after 145 attacks in 2018, representing an 11% drop. </p>
<p>The French Navy’s <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/download/bilan.pdf">Mica centre</a>, on the other hand, reported a 20% increase in attacks against ships across the Gulf of Guinea between 2018 and 2019 (from 90 to 111 incidents).</p>
<p>Overall, numbers differ due to reporting standards and categorisations aren’t comparable. Similar events are often classified in different ways. For example, the IMB recorded four hijacked ships in 2019, the US Maritime Administration noted six, and the MICA centre classified 26 incidents as hijackings. </p>
<p>Annual statistics are further complicated by increased awareness. Incidents that would not have been reported a few years ago are now included in publicly available data, even though they may be linked to other criminal activities at sea.</p>
<p>During my <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030226879">own research</a>, I have come across many cases where such activities were linked to incidents broadly described as “pirate attacks”, without a detailed analysis of individual circumstances.</p>
<p>Such differences <a href="https://www.dirksiebels.eu/publications/2020/01/16/piracy-in-west-africa-annual-reports/">underline</a> that annual statistics are not necessarily a valuable tool for understanding issues in the Gulf of Guinea. Rather, security agencies have to gain a broad understanding of all maritime security challenges. Based on such knowledge, a transparent analysis of incidents is possible, providing the necessary background for commercial decisions or law enforcement operations. </p>
<h2>Extension of a land problem</h2>
<p>Attacks at sea are generally conducted by criminal groups based in the Niger Delta. Throughout the region, there is an ample supply of foot soldiers and <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/mumbai-pirates-forced-18-indian-seafarers-to-camp-near-crocodile-infested-swamp-in-nigeria/articleshow/73239638.cms">camps</a> in remote locations where hostages can be held during negotiations, the prerequisites for a lucrative business model.</p>
<p>Violent attacks <a href="https://splash247.com/abducted-jj-ugland-bulker-crew-released-by-pirates">affected various countries in 2019</a>. These are almost exclusively linked to Nigerian perpetrators.</p>
<p>Highlighting the direct link with Nigeria is important. On the one hand, neighbouring countries are unable to solve the problem unless security on land in the Niger Delta improves. On the other hand, spikes in attacks are possible at any time. For operators of merchant ships, the threat level can change within weeks, depending on factors such as weather, changes in traffic patterns or naval operations as well as the general situation on land in certain areas in the Niger Delta.</p>
<p>Furthermore, insecurity at sea is an overarching problem for regional governments. Pirate attacks may be particularly visible. But other concerns, such as <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/story/illegal-smuggling-for-oil-in-ghana/">fuel smuggling</a>, <a href="https://www.icsf.net/images/samudra/pdf/english/issue_77/4319_art_Sam77_e_art06.pdf">illegal fishing</a> or <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2019/08/west-africa-opioid-crisis-190827135612104.html">unregulated shipments</a> of pharmaceuticals like Tramadol, are usually more pressing for government agencies. </p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p>The West and Central African region has made significant progress in fighting all types of illicit activities at sea. Various types of maritime security issues are mentioned in the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf">Yaoundé Code</a> of Conduct, adopted in 2013 and aimed at improving maritime security in West and Central Africa. </p>
<p>However, human and financial resources are scarce and maritime security is generally regarded as less important than land-based security challenges which directly affect domestic populations. </p>
<p>But insecurity at sea has a significant economic impact by hurting activities related to the maritime environment. Maritime business plans therefore must include security-related expenditures for navies, coastguards and other government agencies. These are needed to maximise the potential of the maritime environment. This, in turn, would show that better maritime security has direct benefits for economic growth and development.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130480/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels works as a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, specialising in maritime security issues in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily in West and Central Africa.</span></em></p>Navies, and other security agencies, won’t be able to improve maritime security as long as root causes on land are not addressed.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270322019-11-18T14:28:00Z2019-11-18T14:28:00ZFighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea needs a radical rethink<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/301921/original/file-20191115-66945-1tojfeo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ivorian sailors participate in an anti-piracy hostage rescue scenario with the Ghanaian Navy during Exercise Obangame Express. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Bonita had been anchored off Benin for several days, waiting for a berth in the port of Cotonou. On November 2, 2019 the crew had a traumatic awakening. Armed men boarded the vessel and <a href="https://beninwebtv.com/en/2019/11/benin-09-persons-kidnapped-in-a-ship-attack-at-cotonou-port/">kidnapped nine crew members</a>. Only two days later, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pirates-attack-greek-oil-tanker-off-togo/a-51108398">four seafarers were kidnapped</a> from the Elka Aristotle, which was anchored off Lomé in neighbouring Togo.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, these were not the only attacks off the coast of West Africa in which seafarers were kidnapped. Nevertheless, the patterns are changing, with <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">gradual signs of improvement</a>. In addition, attacker success rates in the region have declined from <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">80% over ten years ago to just under 50% in 2018</a>.</p>
<p>Another change has been the fact that attacks have become more visible. This is at least partly due to increased cooperation among countries in West and Central Africa. They adopted the <a href="http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Documents/code_of_conduct%20signed%20from%20ECOWAS%20site.pdf">Yaoundé Code of Conduct</a> in 2013, aimed at fighting illicit activities at sea. Implementation has been slow, yet navies and maritime agencies in the region have become much more active in collecting relevant information.</p>
<p>Based on my research into maritime security in the region, I have become increasingly convinced that sustainable improvements are impossible when the focus is solely on piracy. In many cases, kidnappings of seafarers are an extension of land-based problems – such as fuel smuggling and illegal migration – and have to be tackled as such.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/african-states-dont-prioritise-maritime-security-heres-why-they-should-77685">African states don't prioritise maritime security – here's why they should</a>
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<p>In my view, <a href="https://www.bimco.org/news/priority-news/20190108-call-for-gog-counter-piracy">demands by the shipping industry</a> for international navies to become more involved in counter-piracy operations won’t lead to lasting solutions. These can only be successful if they are designed based on regional requirements and take on board regional initiatives aimed at tackling a multiplicity of social problems, rather than just one.</p>
<h2>Links to crime on land</h2>
<p>High-profile attacks – such as the recent kidnappings – are generally carried out by criminal groups based in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-nigeria-must-do-to-deal-with-its-ransom-driven-kidnapping-crisis-116547">Kidnappings on land have been a long-standing problem</a> for security forces there. Collecting ransoms has become a lucrative business model which requires foot soldiers, access to camps for holding hostages, and negotiators with the necessary skills. All these things can be found in the Niger Delta, where the lines between armed insurgents and organised criminals are often fluid. </p>
<p>For countries like Benin, Togo and Cameroon where Nigeria-based criminals have taken hostages from merchant ships this year, the situation is a concern. Ports in these countries are crucial for economic growth and development in terms of customs revenues. For example, <a href="https://www.mcc.gov/resources/story/story-story-kin-apr-2015-unlocking-a-regional-trade-bottleneck-in-benin">more than 40%</a> of Benin’s government revenues are collected in Cotonou’s port. Ensuring adequate security for maritime trade is therefore a strategic concern in Benin. Hence the government’s <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/07/c_138536961.htm">quick announcement</a> of improved security measures for ships anchoring off Cotonou.</p>
<p>Most kidnappings still take place off the Nigerian coastline. The established pattern is one of hostages being taken and then released several weeks later for a ransom payment. This is according <a href="https://riskintelligence.eu/articles/long-term-perspective-west-africa-and-gulf-guinea-piracy">to analysis done</a> by the Danish security intelligence company Risk Intelligence.</p>
<p>The fact that there are more cases off the Nigerian coastline points to my contention that this criminal behaviour is closely linked to land-based criminal activities – such as fuel smuggling – which is <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tracing-the-flow-of-nigerias-stolen-oil-to-cameroon/a-45918707">widespread in the area</a>.</p>
<p>When such incidents are analysed through a narrow piracy lens, efforts of navies and law enforcement agencies -– which are already suffering from a lack of resources –- are likely to be misguided. The narrow view might mistakenly focus, for example, on the capacity to respond at sea.</p>
<p>The problem of wrong analyses is made worse by international actors, for example the US and European governments, the European Union or international organisations. They often put a strong emphasis on combating piracy and provide financial or technical assistance to partners in West and Central Africa. But they rarely focus on illegal fishing, fuel smuggling or illegal migration. All these activities have been linked to attacks against merchant ships or fishing vessels. </p>
<h2>Broader understanding needed</h2>
<p>Fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea requires a broad understanding of maritime security. Acknowledging links between, for example, piracy and illegal fishing is vital for regional governments and external partners. On the most basic level, illegal fishing destroys fishers’ livelihoods, forcing some into piracy simply to earn an income. </p>
<p>A good example is the EU’s contradictory stance. On the one hand, it provides <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/52490/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en">€29 million</a> to support West Africa’s Integrated Maritime Security project. On the other hand, EU countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-targets-fragile-west-african-fish-stocks-despite-protection-laws-125679">contribute to the depletion of fish stocks across West Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Countries around the Gulf of Guinea also have to <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-states-dont-prioritise-maritime-security-heres-why-they-should-77685">increase their efforts</a>. Laws regulating maritime operations are often deliberately opaque, disguising a lack of enforcement capacity and enabling corruption. Increasing transparency would highlight shortcomings and problems caused by insecurity at sea –- somewhat embarrassing for any government, but necessary to address these issues.</p>
<p>Recent efforts in Nigeria, including a large conference in October that led <a href="https://globalmaritimesecurityconf.com/2019/10/11/communique-for-the-global-maritime-security-conference-2019/">to the Abuja Declaration</a>, are a step in the right direction. The declaration highlighted shortcomings of countries around the Gulf of Guinea related to ocean governance and law enforcement at sea. Concrete actions have to follow.</p>
<p>More transparency could also help to improve relationships between the maritime industry and security agencies in the region. Lack of trust and limited cooperation have often hindered thorough investigations, feeding a simple narrative of piracy without a broader look at other maritime security challenges.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127032/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dirk Siebels works as a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, specialising in maritime security issues in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily in West and Central Africa.</span></em></p>Feeding a simple narrative of piracy without a broader look at other maritime security challenges hinders progress in dealing with it.Dirk Siebels, PhD (Maritime Security), University of GreenwichLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1245192019-10-06T09:04:42Z2019-10-06T09:04:42ZCameroon can’t afford to continue ignoring crime in fisheries sector<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295440/original/file-20191003-52837-6xlxj4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Chinese trawler offloads its catch at a fishing port in Cameroon</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Maurice Beseng</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cameroon’s maritime fisheries, both artisanal and industrial, are <a href="https://www.oceandocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/5228/overview%20management%20and%20exploitation%20of%20fishery%20resources%20of%20Cameroon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">largely dominated</a> by foreign fishers. </p>
<p>Industrial fishing is carried out entirely by foreign trawlers predominantly, from China and Nigeria, in partnership with Cameroon fish entrepreneurs. They are licensed to commercially exploit fish stocks beyond 3 nautical miles of the coastline. Their main catch includes croakers, oysters and a variety shrimp species. </p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://www.oceandocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/5228/overview%20management%20and%20exploitation%20of%20fishery%20resources%20of%20Cameroon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">about 80%</a> of the documented 34 355 artisanal fishers are immigrants from Nigeria, Ghana, Benin and Togo. They operate from around 300 artisanal fishing ports along Cameroon’s 402-kilometre coastline and are allowed to fish within 3 nautical miles of the coast. These artisanal fishers mainly target fish found in shallow depths, such as bonga shad, sardinella, prawns and shrimp. </p>
<p>While most of the industrial caught fish <a href="http://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/fishery-information/resource-detail/en/c/338418/">are destined</a> for Europe and Asia, the artisanal catch is <a href="http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/CMR/en">mainly</a> sold in local markets. It’s a vital source of animal protein, especially for communities that live along the coastline.</p>
<p>Cameroon’s fisheries sector is of huge social and economic importance to the country. Fisheries makes up <a href="http://acpfish2-eu.org/index.php?page=cameroon-fr">1.8%</a> of the country’s <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/cameroon">estimated</a> US$35 billion GDP. The sector employs <a href="http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/CMR/en">more than</a> 200 000 people and, since 2015, fishers catch an average of 205 000 tons of fish each year. The industrial sector accounts for about 9 000 tons of this.</p>
<p>Despite its importance, the maritime fisheries sector is plagued with <a href="https://www.oceandocs.org/bitstream/handle/1834/5228/overview%20management%20and%20exploitation%20of%20fishery%20resources%20of%20Cameroon.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">largely hidden, or ignored,</a> fisheries crimes. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X19303264">My research</a> over the past three years tries to lift the lid on the types of crimes that are happening, the actors involved, their networks and how they operate. I looked at both the industrial and artisanal sectors. </p>
<p>My study documented numerous crimes involving people associated with the fisheries sector. But most go undetected. To tackle criminality in the fisheries sector, all concerned stakeholders – from fishers to policymakers – need to be able to identify and report on the different fisheries crimes they see. </p>
<h2>Endemic problems</h2>
<p>I found that there’s an endemic problem of corruption, fraud and the illegal exploitation of and trade in endangered marine species. I also found a link between the fisheries sector and wider transnational crimes such as the smuggling of contraband, weapons and immigrants.</p>
<p>Because of the hidden nature of these offences it’s difficult to quantify the impact they’ve had on Cameroon. There are some insights. For instance, <a href="https://www.businessincameroon.com/fish/1006-7192-cameroon-a-new-fishing-boat-boarded-and-search-on-wouri-river-for-illegal-fishing">based on</a> government statistics, illegal fishing in Cameroonian waters costs the country about CAF 20 billion (about US$33 million) every year.</p>
<p>If not tackled quickly, these crimes will continue to compromise government efforts to raise income from taxes generated from the sector. Moreover, it will affect the livelihood of millions of people that depend on the sector through job losses, and access to essential food and nutritional security.</p>
<p>I conducted research over a period of three years. I observed fishing operations at industrial and artisanal fishing ports and carried out informal group discussions and semi-structured interviews with state officials, coastal community groups and other civil society organisations. I also analysed existing research and media reports. </p>
<p>I found that in both the industrial and artisanal sectors, fisheries crimes were perpetrated by a variety of stakeholders. These include senior government officials, fisheries officers, elites with stakes in industrial fishing companies, fishers and fish entrepreneurs. </p>
<p>While some fisheries crimes are carried out at sea, most occur on land; in government offices, fish landing sites, beach huts and coastal backwaters, sometimes by those who are meant to protect fish resources. It involved nationals and foreigners, some from as far as China. </p>
<h2>Corruption</h2>
<p>Corruption was identified as a major problem. It manifested as bribery and abuse of office. It was systemic and permeated all aspects of the value chain from acquiring fishing permits, catching fish at sea, processing the catch and marketing the produce to consumers. This <a href="https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/cameroon/">typifies</a> the corruption landscape in the country as highlighted in other areas, such as the judiciary and police administration.</p>
<p>Corruption has enabled other crimes to flourish. This includes document and identity fraud and the abuse of workers. Some workers (particularly immigrants and children) were illegally recruited into the fisheries sector. Most workers were made to work in squalid conditions.</p>
<p>Corruption also allowed for the illegal exploitation of and trade in endangered and critically endangered marine species, such as dolphins and turtles. Of particular concern was the illegal trade in giant croaker fish bladder. This is a <a href="https://qz.com/468358/how-chinas-fish-bladder-investment-craze-is-wiping-out-species-on-the-other-side-of-the-planet/">highly valued delicacy</a> in China and, despite the huge volumes I saw traded, there’s little awareness about it. </p>
<p>I also found that the fisheries sector was used to commit transnational crimes, specifically to smuggle weapons, fuel, ivory, rice, fake bank notes and timber products. Most of this happened between Cameroon and Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Boats were also used to traffic illegal immigrants between Nigeria and Cameroon, and from Cameroon to Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.</p>
<h2>Combating fisheries crime</h2>
<p>There’s <a href="http://www.conac.cm/en/index_en.php">currently</a> a national effort to root out corruption which has mainly focused on the judiciary and police. This needs to pay more attention to the fisheries sector. The best option would be to have a subcommittee dedicated to rooting out corruption in fisheries. </p>
<p>Because of the transnational nature of fisheries crime, regional and international cooperation is vital. A <a href="https://bluejustice.org/copenhagen-declaration/">key first step</a> is for the state to ratify the Copenhagen Declaration – an international framework to specifically support inter-agency cooperation of all relevant stakeholders against fisheries crimes at national, regional and international levels.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maurice Beseng received funding from Coventry University Research Studentship Awards to conduct this research.</span></em></p>Despite its importance, Cameroon’s maritime fisheries sector is plagued with largely hidden, or ignored, fisheries crimes.Maurice Beseng, Visiting Research Fellow in Maritime Security, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1235502019-09-22T09:14:50Z2019-09-22T09:14:50ZGhana’s copyright law for folklore hampers cultural growth<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292606/original/file-20190916-19083-1y62inm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana is very protective of its cultural heritage</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ghana has a rich folkloric tradition that includes <a href="http://www.adinkra.org/htmls/adinkra_index.htm">Adinkra symbols</a>, <a href="http://ultimatehistoryproject.com/kente-cloth-and-the-history-of-the-ashanti-people.html">Kente cloth</a>, traditional festivals, music and storytelling. Perhaps one of Ghana’s best known folk characters is Ananse, the spider god and trickster, after whom the Ghanaian storytelling tradition Anansesem is named. </p>
<p>Ghana also has some of the world’s most restrictive laws on the use of its folklore. The country’s 2005 <a href="https://www.aripo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Ghana-Copyright-Act.pdf">Copyright Act</a> defines folklore as “the literary, artistic and scientific expressions belonging to the cultural heritage of Ghana which are created, preserved and developed by ethnic communities of Ghana or by an unidentified Ghanaian author”. </p>
<p>This suggests that the legislation, which is an update of a 1985 law, applies equally to traditional works where the author is unknown and new works derived from folklore where the author is known. </p>
<p>The rights in these works are “vested in the President on behalf of and in trust for the people of the republic”. These rights are also deemed to exist in perpetuity. This means that works which qualify as folkloric will never fall into the public domain – and will never be free to use.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/gh/gh006en.pdf">1985 Act</a> only restricted use of Ghana’s folklore by foreigners. The 2005 Act extended this to Ghanaian nationals. In principle, this means that a Ghanaian artist wishing to use Ananse stories, or a musician who wants to rework old folk songs or musical rhythms must first seek approval from the National Folklore Board and pay an undisclosed fee. </p>
<p>This is deeply problematic. Following independence in 1957, many artists have explicitly and habitually drawn on Ghana’s folk traditions to develop today’s creative industries. The 2005 Act means that the current generation of cultural practitioners must either seek permission to use and rework their cultural heritage, or look elsewhere for inspiration. </p>
<p>There is clearly a balance to be struck between safeguarding and access when it comes to the protection of a state’s cultural heritage. However, it is important to acknowledge that while Ghana’s legislation appears to tip towards protection at the expense of access, it restricts growth in the creative industries by discouraging artists from engaging with their national cultural heritage. </p>
<h2>History of protection</h2>
<p>Ethnomusicologist and musician John Collins has noted that the development of the 2005 Act was partly in response to US singer Paul Simon’s use of a melody taken from the song <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43561391?seq=7#metadata_info_tab_contents">‘Yaa Amponsah</a>’ for his 1990 album 'The Rhythm of the Saints’. </p>
<p>Simon attributed this melody to the Ghanaian musician Jacob Sam and his band the Kumasi Trio. But on further investigation the Ghanaian government asserted that the melody was a work of folklore and so, belonged to the state.</p>
<p>From this, two things are clear. Firstly, in Ghana folklore belongs to the state and not the originating communities that predate the modern state. Secondly, Jacob Sam received no recompense for Simon’s use of the work, with all royalties owed on the work flowing back the government. </p>
<p>There are a number of issues here that set Ghana apart from other African states. </p>
<p>Many states allow for the use of folklore by nationals and if a fee is applicable then it is paid as a royalty based on revenue raised. This is the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13696815.2016.1256121">case</a> in all three states bordering Ghana: Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire. Consequently, if an artist in one of these countries reworks folklore but makes no money, then no money is paid for that use. If the work becomes successful then the artist and the rights holder benefit. </p>
<p>However, in Ghana, the law states that payment is paid prior to use and so prior to any profits made. This potentially adds to the cost of production and so discourages use of folklore. </p>
<p>The other issue here is who owns the rights in national heritage. In many countries, such as <a href="http://pckamunya.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Copyright-Act.pdf">Kenya</a>, the originating communities retain the rights to their expressions of cultural heritage. </p>
<p>However, in Ghana the rights are vested in the office of the president. This means that any moral or financial benefit that results from uses of folklore flow to the office of the president, rather than being used to support continued safeguarding and growth of cultural heritage within communities. </p>
<h2>Guarding against exploitation</h2>
<p>Though Ghana’s present regime may appear draconian, there are compelling reasons why such protective measures are required. </p>
<p>Firstly, Ghana’s cultural heritage – its traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions – have been and continue to be exploited by non-Ghanaians in international markets with no beneficial interest flowing either to the state or to the originating community. </p>
<p>To give this some context, Simon’s use of Yaa Amponsah was only one use of Ghana’s cultural heritage in the developing of a new, and commercially successful, work. More recently, there were a number of press reports in Ghana that the Ghana Folklore Board intended to <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/entertainment/showbiz-news/folklore-board-to-sue-producers-of-black-panther-movie-over-use-of-kente.html">sue</a> the producers of Marvel’s Black Panther for the unauthorised use of kente cloth in some of the characters’ costumes. </p>
<p>The Folklore Board clarified these reports in a press <a href="https://kuulpeeps.com/2019/05/the-national-folklore-board-say-they-have-not-expressed-any-intention-to-sue-the-the-producers-of-black-panther/">release</a>, saying it did not intend to sue – but rather, wished to discuss attribution. Kente is specifically named as an object of protection under the 2005 Act and the current proliferation of unauthorised cheap kente designs entering global markets from China presents a significant challenge. Attribution, in this case, would ensure that cinema goers across the world would associate kente with Ghana, bringing a traditional craft to a global audience. </p>
<p>The board faces a particularly complex challenge. It must balance safeguarding traditional heritage with allowing creative artists room to reuse and rework elements of that heritage in a way that does not add to the cost or complexity of production. </p>
<p>Though the threat of unfair exploitation is real, equally real is the potential threat to the creative industries and the future development of Ghana’s living heritage if the country’s artists move away from their cultural heritage.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123550/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Collins has previously received funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund and Arts and Humanities Research Council to undertake various research projects connected to cultural heritage in Ghana. </span></em></p>New regulations on the use of folklore are a hindrance to local artists.Stephen Collins, Lecturer, University of the West of ScotlandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1153182019-04-16T13:58:30Z2019-04-16T13:58:30ZUS still sees Africa as important. But it must learn from past mistakes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/269040/original/file-20190412-76827-r8d67p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US National Security Advisor John Bolton sees China as a threat to Washington in Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Shawn Thew</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In December last year the US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, gave a speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC, in which he outlined the Trump administration’s new Africa strategy. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/">According to Bolton</a>, the US now faces “great power competitors” – namely Russia and China. In his view [they both] </p>
<blockquote>
<p>are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa… to gain a competitive advantage over the United States. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Bolton’s portrayal of great power competition sounded like the Cold War era when the US and the communist powers, led by the Soviet Union, fought for influence over the new states emerging from colonialism across sub Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>At the end of the Cold War, the US <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA297401">withdrew</a> almost completely from Africa. In the 1990s, Washington distanced itself from an area of the world in which it no longer saw any vital interests.</p>
<p>But in the 21st century there has been a significant turnaround in US policy. What’s emerged is a return to seeing sub-Saharan Africa as a site of US geopolitical and commercial interests.</p>
<p>This reversal is based on three factors. The first is the increasing significance of new African oil supplies. The second is the alleged presence of terrorists in the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/05/world/threats-responses-expanding-us-presence-pentagon-seeking-new-access-pacts-for.html">large uncontrolled, ungoverned areas</a>” of sub-Saharan Africa. And the third is the emergence of middle class African consumers as a potential new market for US exports.</p>
<h2>Oil</h2>
<p>Under George W. Bush, the US recognised that African oil from the Gulf of Guinea had become an “<a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg91959/html/CHRG-108shrg91959.htm">important factor in determining conditions in the oil market</a>.”</p>
<p>Africa was also <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg97231/html/CHRG-108shrg97231.htm">home to</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>a number of frontier oil provinces that may become hot exploration areas during the coming decade.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These included São Tomé and Principe, Gambia, Liberia, Togo, Benin and Niger. </p>
<p>Washington launched a programme to improve transparency in the oil sectors of the major African producers to <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg97231/html/CHRG-108shrg97231.htm">make these</a> countries </p>
<blockquote>
<p>better hosts to the very large investments needed to develop energy resources and make more reliable contributions to our own energy security.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Energy security considerations led to more US military activity in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2004, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Charles Snyder, <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/31950.htm">called </a> for a West African coastal security programme because </p>
<blockquote>
<p>a lot of this new oil is actually offshore. There is no one to protect it, unless we build up African coastal fleets. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This led to the launch of the US Navy’s <a href="http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=28777">Africa Partnership Station</a> in 2007 to help Gulf of Guinea states secure the region from security threats at sea.</p>
<p>The focus on energy security continued through the Obama years. The Obama administration established <a href="http://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/8104/robert-g-bradley-begins-exercise-obangame-express">Operation Obangame Express</a>, and the <a href="http://www.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/article/27940/african-maritime-law-enforcement-partnership-underway">African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership</a> to train Gulf of Guinea nations to protect offshore energy. </p>
<p>Both have been <a href="https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Media/News/Article/1788649/obangame-express-2019-begins/">continued</a> <a href="https://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/30988/first-phase-of-amlep-closes">under</a> the Trump administration.</p>
<h2>Counter-terrorism</h2>
<p>The terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 resulted in a new counter-terrorism dimension to US security strategy in sub-Saharan Africa. The region began to be viewed as part of an “<a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms2004.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-123447-627">arc of instability</a>” stretching from Latin America, through Africa and the Middle East and extending through Asia. Its “<a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms2004.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-123447-627">ungoverned space and under-governed territories</a>” might provide “<a href="http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms2004.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-123447-627">sanctuary to terrorists</a>.” </p>
<p>To prevent this, the Bush and Obama administrations established a series of programmes designed to strengthen border security and build internal security. A number of initiatives were launched in a bid to build security capacity in African states thought, by Washington, to be vulnerable to penetration by terrorists. </p>
<p>These included (to name but a few), the <a href="https://www.hoa.africom.mil/">Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa</a> (2002-present), the <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#PREACT">Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism</a> (2009-present) and the <a href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_CTPF_J-Book.pdf">Counter-terrorism Partnerships Funding</a> (2014-present).</p>
<p>The expanding US military presence in Africa was symbolised by the establishment in 2007 of a new US military command structure, <a href="https://www.africom.mil/">Africa Command</a>(AFRICOM). It took charge of all US military activity on the continent, including the <a href="https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/charts?show_casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_strikes=1&location=somalia&from=2009-1-1&to=2017-1-1">bombing of Somalia</a>. </p>
<h2>Commercial drivers</h2>
<p>Finally, US interest in Africa has been driven in recent years by commercial considerations. In April 2012, the Assistant US Trade Representative, Florizelle Liser, <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73814/html/CHRG-112hhrg73814.htm">told Congress</a> that sub-Saharan Africa contained </p>
<blockquote>
<p>many of the fastest growing economies in the world with rapidly growing middle class consumers</p>
</blockquote>
<p>who were “increasingly demanding high quality US products.” </p>
<p>One result was a law passed in 2012 that sought <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73814/html/CHRG-112hhrg73814.htm">to increase American Jobs through greater exports to Africa</a>. </p>
<p>Commercial opportunities in Africa were also at the heart of the first ever US-Africa Leaders Summit in 2014. This saw the launch of the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/05/fact-sheet-doing-business-africa-campaign">Doing Business in Africa</a> campaign.</p>
<h2>What now</h2>
<p>The Trump administration’s <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMy1Rj2WH30xQG9nqr8-RXFVvzJE_47NlpeSY/edit#gid=0">expansion of the bombing of Somalia</a>, its continuation of Bush and Obama era counterterrorism programmes, and its own new strategy for Africa suggest that policymakers continue to view the continent through a geopolitical lens. </p>
<p>The particular twist put on this by Trump is his emphasis on the competition the US faces from China - but this is hard to imagine given that China has just <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113300/chinas-djibouti-military-base-logistics-facility-or">one military base in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>But the Trump administration must learn from mistakes made in the recent past by Bush and Obama. This includes the negative impact US action has had in some instances. Take <a href="https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA233_a.html">its support</a> for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 and for the <a href="http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1772/2007">subsequent Ethiopian-led occupation force</a>. These actions contributed to <a href="http://webarchive.ssrc.org/Somalia_Hoehne_v10.pdf">the development of Al Shabaab</a>, the extreme Islamist group that merged with Al Qaeda in 2012 and began to conduct attacks <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/2010711212520826984.html">in other countries</a>. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Yemen.pdf">report by the US Senate</a> concluded that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Al Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous organization in Africa… [It]s foothold in Somalia has probably been facilitated by the involvement of Western powers and their allies.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is likely that US air strikes in Somalia “have only increased popular support for Al-Shabaab.”</p>
<p>More broadly, Washington’s internal security and capacity building initiatives have not worked. If anything, terrorism in Africa has <a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez_03-26-15.pdf">worsened</a> with the emergence of <a href="http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717#p1">Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</a> in Mali and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-battle-boko-haram">Boko Haram</a> in Nigeria. </p>
<p>US policymakers need to think again about whether a security agenda based on US priorities and choices will always solve the problems sub-Saharan African states face.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115318/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maria Ryan has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>The US needs to review whether a security agenda based on US priorities will solve problems in sub-Saharan Africa.Maria Ryan, Lecturer in American History, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1144662019-04-07T11:01:09Z2019-04-07T11:01:09ZWhy age gives West African women more autonomy and power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/267077/original/file-20190402-177196-e650k3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Beninese women attend a "voodoo" festival.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anton_Ivanov/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Several studies, covering about 58 countries across the world, found that as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2015.1091087">women get older</a> they are more able to make decisions independently of men. But scholars <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/13323_womens_empowerment.pdf">have struggled</a> to pin down explanations for this age dividend – why are women given more independence the older they get? We wanted to know what the reasons may be. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1Ymeb_,iVXKG91">recent study</a>, we looked at women’s autonomy across age in Nigeria, Togo, Ghana and Benin. These four West African countries are home to ethnic groups that practice <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/23617817">“voodoo”</a>, a religion that spread with the expansion of the Dahomey kingdom in the 17th century. </p>
<p>In these countries women are not equal to men. They sometimes won’t be able to make decisions about their own health – <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09540121.2017.1363363?journalCode=caic20">like</a> negotiating safe sex – or on how <a href="http://a4nh.cgiar.org/2018/09/05/identifying-challenges-and-constraints-experienced-by-women-smallholder-farmers-in-northern-ghana/">household incomes</a> could be used. </p>
<p>In our sample of 21,000 women aged 15 to 49, we found that autonomy in household decision-making increases with age. This was especially true for women who belonged to the four “voodoo-ethnicities”: Fon, Ewe, Adja and Yoruba. We also found that women had even more power if they are menopaused. </p>
<p>Our findings suggest that both age and magico-religious beliefs have a huge role to play in a woman’s independence. Menopaused women from “voodoo-ethnicities” are much more independent to make decisions on how they spend their own earnings, care for their own health, visit family or relatives and what major household purchases need to be made.</p>
<p>These insights are important for female empowerment strategies. To be effective, policies must identify potential agents of change who can, for instance, influence decisions that improve children’s schooling and nutrition or abolish female genital cutting. Despite their apparent agency, elderly women in West Africa have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttt0vh">largely</a> been overlooked.</p>
<h2>Voodoo and menopause</h2>
<p>So, why do women gain more independence the older they get, and especially if they are of voodoo-ethnicities and menopaused?</p>
<p>We analysed data on 21,000 women and their ability to make various decisions. We found that women’s autonomy was related to menstrual bleeding, particularly for voodoo-ethnicities. This was further explored in Benin, the birth place of Voodoo, where we conducted interviews with voodoo priests and menopaused women. </p>
<p>As one woman said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>[Women in menopause] are equipped with supernatural powers. Only she can talk to the ancestors and request their help, assistance and protection. And they respond to her worship and requests, not everyone can do that.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the interviews we gathered that voodoo adherents worship collective deities (related to the sea, the earth, or thunder) and family deities: ancestors that turn into spirits after death. </p>
<p>The interactions with the family deities are led by a menopaused woman, referred to as the “Tassinon”. <a href="https://www.laboutiqueafricavivre.com/livres/8220-guelede-vodoun-et-femmes-au-benin-9782842801953.html">Only she</a> can transmit the family members’ prayers and requests to the ancestors and consult the oracle to see if the spirits have accepted the offering and sacrifices.</p>
<p>These alleged powers, in their turn, increase the bargaining power of elderly women in their communities and households. </p>
<p>In situations where the supernatural power of menopaused women has faded, the cultural norm derived from it – increased awe for elderly women – persists.</p>
<p>Our analysis shows that the “Tassinon effect” is sizeable. We created an autonomy index – which looked at a combination of different situations where decisions had to be made and who made them – to measure this and found that it increased their ability to make decisions by about 10%. </p>
<p>As one woman said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>My opinion matters now in all important decisions or issues in the family and in my community. It was not the case before my designation as <em>tassinon</em>. I could not even attend or talk in certain audiences.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Our research provides support for the argument put forward in the African feminist literature, that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttt0vh">seniority trumps gender in an African context</a>. </p>
<p>It also adds to the evidence that voodoo continues to play a role in West-Africa. Adherence to voodoo has been proven to affect the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.11.024">governance of natural resources</a>. For instance fishermen who adhere to voodoo are more likely to respect rules related to prohibited fishing gear. It also affects the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/698308">uptake of preventive health care</a>; for instance because mothers who adhere to voodoo will rely on traditional healers, they may not immunise their children. Now we know that voodoo also affects the level of independence women have in some communities. </p>
<h2>The way ahead</h2>
<p>A better understanding of cultural attitudes towards elderly African women will become more important for policymakers in the future. As fertility declines and life expectancy increases, elderly women will increase in numbers, both in absolute and relative terms. They could play an important role as agents of change in supporting both child care and female empowerment projects. </p>
<p>For instance in Benin the respect for elderly women <a href="https://social.gouv.bj/ministere/nos-documents/">is already</a> relied upon in interventions targeting children’s health and nutrition, and in the abolishment of female genital cutting. This could be reinforced and extended to other sectors and to other countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/114466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marijke Verpoorten receives funding from the Fund for Scientific Research Flanders (Grant Nr. 1502318N).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alidou Sahawal receives funding from the IOB Research Fund, and the Fund for Scientific Research Flanders (Grant Nr. 1502318N). He is also affiliated with the LICOS – Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance (KU Leuven). </span></em></p>In some West African communities, age and magico-religious beliefs have a huge role to play in a woman’s independence.Marijke Verpoorten, Associate Professor, University of AntwerpSahawal Alidou, PhD candidate and teaching assistant, University of AntwerpLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1086892019-01-23T14:33:13Z2019-01-23T14:33:13ZAfrican countries should rethink how they use e-government platforms<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252680/original/file-20190107-32130-1vvky8m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Different approaches to e-governance could bear fruit for African countries.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">jurgenfr/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>More and more governments around the world are <a href="https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2018-Survey/E-Government%20Survey%202018_FINAL%20for%20web.pdf">turning to electronic methods</a> to deliver services and communicate with citizens via the internet. </p>
<p>These e-government systems, as they are known, allow people to do a number of things. They can pay for their utilities, or settle their fines. They can register new businesses or vehicles. They are also able to get information from government agencies through emails, SMS messages, and mobile apps. </p>
<p>Developed nations were the trendsetters in e-government. Now developing countries are catching up. The United Nations named India among the top 100 of 193 UN Member States that were assessed in its <a href="https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2018-Survey/E-Government%20Survey%202018_FINAL%20for%20web.pdf">2018 e-Government Development Index</a>. </p>
<p>In the same report, four African countries – Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa and Tunisia – were rated as having a high e-government development index. This means they’ve made many types of public services available online. More than 30 other countries on the continent, among them Cameroon, Nigeria, Lesotho, Togo and Rwanda, were rated as having made visible progress in e-government.</p>
<p>In theory, this is a good thing. It allows citizens to directly access public services in a faster way without undue bureaucracy. It can also be used to minimise corrupt practices. Governments can also obtain prompt feedback on the quality of public services.</p>
<p>The reality, though, is that African countries’ adoption of e-government platforms hasn’t served the majority of their citizens. Services like e-taxation, e-payment and e-billing are useful for the middle class and richer people. But e-government initiatives that would support and cater to poorer people are sorely lacking.</p>
<p>For example, e-government initiatives designed to enable skills development for poor citizens and the unemployed, or to promote micro enterprises, are not easy to find in most African countries.</p>
<p>E-government initiatives in Africa need to be redesigned and re-contextualised so they can address the needs of most citizens, rather than relatively few.</p>
<p>My colleague Professor Charles Ayo and I <a href="http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/7146/#.XDNUrlUzbIU">conducted research</a> about e-government using Nigeria as a case study. We outlined the ways that governments on the continent can redefine and offer more effective, useful e-government.</p>
<p>We identified several ways in which e-government could be used to better suit African countries’ contexts. These included using e-government platforms for electoral processes, to coordinate health care, to support small businesses, and for secure and transparent procurement procedures. </p>
<h2>New ways of thinking</h2>
<p>Our analysis found that there’s a growing awareness of e-government’s benefits in Nigeria. It is increasingly being used. But many challenges still exist.</p>
<p>Some of these are related to poor information and communication technology infrastructure. Poor finance, poor political leadership, as well as poor organisation and communication, also play a role. These problems are not peculiar to Nigeria. They’ve hampered the successful implementation of e-government in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>Drawing from our research, we argue that there are several ways in which African e-government platforms can become more useful and relevant for the majority of citizens. </p>
<p>Crucially, such platforms should be accessible on mobile phones; this technology is becoming <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/09/majorities-in-sub-saharan-africa-own-mobile-phones-but-smartphone-adoption-is-modest/">increasingly affordable</a> for most people on the continent. Internet penetration on the continent is <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/09/majorities-in-sub-saharan-africa-own-mobile-phones-but-smartphone-adoption-is-modest/">also improving</a>.</p>
<p>The next question is what services these platforms should offer. We have the following suggestions.</p>
<p>First, there’s e-democracy. This involves the use of information and communication technology to facilitate citizens’ active participation in democratic processes: for instance, voter registration, actual voting and election monitoring. Governance could be made more inclusive and transparent even beyond election time by providing information and promoting continual engagements with elected representatives. </p>
<p>E-government platforms can also create empowering spaces for small and informal businesses. African governments could begin to provide open cloud platforms that can support these enterprises with computing infrastructure, software services, and visibility to a larger consumer market. The beneficiaries could be allowed to access these services for free or for a token fee. </p>
<p>Currently, such initiatives are not common in most African countries. There are social media and advertising platforms, but these are not the same as e-government services designed to help citizens.</p>
<p>Governments’ electronic payment and procurement systems could also be implemented across all sectors of government. This would promote efficiency and reduce corruption to the barest minimum. </p>
<p>E-government solutions could embrace additional aspects: informal learning, skills development, and health campaigns. These would all be valuable approaches to ensure the continent’s e-government platforms do more for the majority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108689/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Justine Olawande Daramola of the Cape Peninsula University of Technology receives funding from National Research Foundation of South Africa, and other academic research funding agencies. </span></em></p>African countries’ adoption of e-government platforms hasn’t served the majority of their citizens.Olawande Daramola, Prof, Cape Peninsula University of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.