tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/uk-migration-8471/articlesUK migration – The Conversation2024-03-21T15:47:16Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262092024-03-21T15:47:16Z2024-03-21T15:47:16ZRwanda asylum deportation plan faces more delays – how did we get here?<p>The government’s goal to send a flight of asylum seekers to Rwanda this spring is looking less and less likely. The plan has been in the works, blocked by a number of legal rulings, for nearly two years. All now hinges on the passage of a bill declaring Rwanda to be a “safe” country to send asylum seekers to. </p>
<p>But the bill has faced yet another parliamentary hurdle in the House of Lords. The upper house passed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/mar/20/rwanda-bill-likely-to-be-stalled-at-least-till-april-after-seven-defeats-in-the-lords">several amendments</a> to bring the bill in line with the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951-refugee-convention">refugee convention</a> and international law. It is now due back in the House of Commons, a process known as parliamentary “ping pong”. If the bill passes, it won’t be until after Easter. </p>
<p>Rishi Sunak has repeatedly said that the government would like <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/bill-cash-uk-government-rwanda-rishi-sunak-government-b2514668.html">flights to take off in the spring</a>. While it was recently reported that no flights to Rwanda <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rwanda-flights-pause-bill-migrants-9zxsjqpw0">would occur before mid-May</a>, the government might now need to wait even longer due to these latest delays.</p>
<h2>How did we get here?</h2>
<p>In April 2022, the UK and Rwandan governments announced a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/migration-and-economic-development-partnership-factsheet/migration-and-economic-development-partnership-factsheet">migration and economic development partnership</a>. Under this arrangement, some asylum seekers who travel to the UK irregularly (such as by small boat across the Channel) will be sent to Rwanda. There, Rwandan officials will process their protection claims. If the person is found to be a refugee, they will be resettled in Rwanda.</p>
<p>In exchange, the UK has agreed to pay Rwanda <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-68440653">£370 million to support economic growth in the country</a>. The UK will also resettle a small number of vulnerable refugees from Rwanda in the UK. </p>
<p>Two months after the partnership was announced, the government’s attempt to send the first plane of people to Rwanda was foiled by the courts. After a number of legal challenges, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-deportations-what-is-the-european-court-of-human-rights-and-why-did-it-stop-the-uk-flight-from-taking-off-185143">European Court of Human Rights</a> issued an emergency order to stop the plane taking off.</p>
<p>Just before Christmas 2022, the High Court (one of the senior courts of England and Wales) ruled that the policy was lawful – but this finding was later overturned. Both the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-uk-court-ruled-rwanda-isnt-a-safe-place-to-send-refugees-and-what-this-means-for-the-governments-immigration-plans-208768">Court of Appeal</a> and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-rules-rwanda-plan-unlawful-a-legal-expert-explains-the-judgment-and-what-happens-next-217730">Supreme Court</a> found that Rwanda was not a “safe” country to send asylum seekers to.</p>
<p>In particular, judges raised concerns about Rwanda’s domestic legal system, and the extent to which it would make accurate and fair decisions about whether a person was a refugee.</p>
<p>Because of this, both courts found that people sent to Rwanda were at risk of refoulement – that is, being sent back to their home country where they might be tortured, persecuted or killed. Non-refoulement is a key principle in the refugee convention and is recognised in UK law.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-uk-court-ruled-rwanda-isnt-a-safe-place-to-send-refugees-and-what-this-means-for-the-governments-immigration-plans-208768">Why UK court ruled Rwanda isn't a safe place to send refugees – and what this means for the government's immigration plans</a>
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<h2>Resurrecting the Rwanda plan</h2>
<p>Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the government doubled down. It has taken a number of desperate steps to try and bypass the courts, making it legal to send people to Rwanda for asylum processing and resettlement.</p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-rwanda-treaty-provision-of-an-asylum-partnership/uk-rwanda-treaty-provision-of-an-asylum-partnership-accessible">signed a new treaty with Rwanda</a>, requiring Rwanda to process claims in accordance with the refugee convention and provide refugees with support and accommodation. Rwanda’s commitments under this treaty are binding under international law.</p>
<p>In September and November last year, the Home Office held training days for Rwandan government officials, lawyers and judges on refugee law and effective asylum decision-making. </p>
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<p>Most significantly, the government introduced the <a href="https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3540">safety of Rwanda (asylum and immigration) bill</a>. This requires every immigration officer, tribunal and court in the UK to treat Rwanda as a safe country. By declaring in law that Rwanda is safe, the government is hoping to prevent courts from ruling against its policy.</p>
<p>The bill also says that courts and tribunals must <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-rule-39-uk-government-tells-civil-servants-to-ignore-european-court-of-human-rights-on-rwanda-deportations-221636">ignore any emergency orders made by the European Court of Human Rights</a> to prevent a person being removed to Rwanda.</p>
<p>The House of Lords opposed many of these provisions as contrary to the domestic and international rule of law. The Lords have repeatedly pushed back on the Rwanda plan, but appear unlikely to try and block the bill altogether. It has now been sent back to the House of Commons for further debate. </p>
<h2>What happens if the bill passes?</h2>
<p>Even if the legislation is passed, the Rwanda plan will likely be subject to another round of legal challenges. We can expect these to focus on whether or not the government can pass a law that overrides the courts on whether Rwanda is safe. Legal experts have <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-bill-to-declare-rwanda-a-safe-country-for-refugees-could-lead-to-a-constitutional-crisis-219777">expressed serious concerns</a> about the legislation, suggesting it could even trigger a “constitutional crisis”. </p>
<p>Courts might also be asked to consider whether the government’s efforts to ensure Rwanda’s safety (such as signing a new treaty and training Rwandan officials) are sufficient to overcome the problems previously identified with the policy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-bill-to-declare-rwanda-a-safe-country-for-refugees-could-lead-to-a-constitutional-crisis-219777">How the bill to declare Rwanda a 'safe' country for refugees could lead to a constitutional crisis</a>
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<p>Even if the bill somehow avoids legal hurdles, there are still questions of logistics, capacity and cost. In addition to the £370 million being paid to Rwanda to support economic growth, the UK will also pay it <a href="https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/investigation-into-the-costs-of-the-uk-rwanda-partnership/">£151,000 for every person relocated</a>. </p>
<p>Currently, Rwanda only has capacity to accept <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rwanda-flights-pause-bill-migrants-9zxsjqpw0">up to 200 asylum seekers at a time</a> from the UK. This pales in comparison to the 29,437 people who crossed the English Channel <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-53699511">in small boats in 2023</a>. Many people who travel to the UK on small boats are found to be refugees.</p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-government-passed-a-major-immigration-law-last-year-so-why-is-it-trying-to-pass-another-one-207343">Illegal Migration Act</a>, passed in 2023, anyone who travels to the UK irregularly will never have their asylum claim considered by the government. These people, if not sent to Rwanda, will likely be trapped in legal limbo in the government’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/feb/28/sunaks-asylum-laws-trapping-55000-people-in-perma-backlog-says-uk-thinktank">“perma-backlog” of asylum applications</a>.</p>
<p>Politically, the government is staking a lot on this plan. But it also needs a plan for the thousands of asylum seekers who will not be removed to Rwanda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalie Hodgson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An expert on immigration law explains the latest developments with the safety of Rwanda bill.Natalie Hodgson, Assistant Professor in Law, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2217982024-03-21T09:54:20Z2024-03-21T09:54:20ZI’ve spent time with refugees in French coastal camps and they told me the government’s Rwanda plan is not putting them off coming to the UK<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582207/original/file-20240315-30-4n1fo5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=188%2C970%2C5326%2C3017&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees in line for food outside a 'wild camp' in Loon Plage in 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Frédérique de Bels</span></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>I was warned by a French Egyptian not to cross the channel, not to go to the UK and to try to stay in France … But I have not escaped the police brutality from my country, smugglers from Libya, the crossing of the Mediterranean and the ‘jungle’ in France for nothing. I was determined to come to the UK. DM Boss (pseudonym), Egyptian asylum seeker</p>
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<p>It is 7am and I’m sitting in Pierre Lascoux’s old van with his dog, Arthur, at my feet. Lascoux, a 60-year-old volunteer, has dedicated the past two years of his life to helping refugees. </p>
<p>Every morning for four weeks we have talked about the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/12/16/in-calais-the-blind-spots-of-the-french-government-s-immigration-bill-are-laid-bare_6350192_7.html">plight of refugees</a> in the Loon Plage camp in Dunkirk’s industrial zone. Lascoux recently finished a 42-day hunger strike in order to raise awareness about the awful living conditions endured by the migrant population at the border. </p>
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<img alt="Man posing with dog and child. Child's faced blurred out so as not to identify them." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582601/original/file-20240318-20-fy8o7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582601/original/file-20240318-20-fy8o7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=717&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582601/original/file-20240318-20-fy8o7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=717&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582601/original/file-20240318-20-fy8o7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=717&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582601/original/file-20240318-20-fy8o7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582601/original/file-20240318-20-fy8o7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582601/original/file-20240318-20-fy8o7r.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=901&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Volunteer Peirre Lascoux, of Salam charity, with dog Arthur helping refugees at Loon Plage camp.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pierre Lascoux</span></span>
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<p>I volunteered in French refugee camps in Dunkrik and Calais in the summer of 2023. It was part of my fieldwork and research around the concept of “hospitality” at different militarised border zones. </p>
<p>While I was in the camps I witnessed police violence and saw refugees cramming on a boat that was clearly not big enough to take them. I heard guns being fired and moved among the smuggling gangs and mafia in charge of the crossings, hearing stories from people who had been through hell in their own countries and on the journey to France. </p>
<p>Despite the relentless hardships and suffering, one thing appeared to unite them: they wanted to seek sanctuary in the UK. And headline-grabbing policies about <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/feb/05/the-tragedy-of-leonard-farruku-the-gifted-young-musician-whose-dream-of-a-better-life-ended-on-the-bibby-stockholm">floating prisons</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/even-many-critics-of-the-rwanda-deportation-policy-are-missing-the-point-of-why-its-wrong-221425">flights to Rwanda</a> were not going to stop them. They had come this far and they were determined to finish their journey.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This article is part of Conversation Insights</em></strong>
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em></p>
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<h2>Loon Plage</h2>
<p>Back in Lascoux’s van, we survey the horizon for French riot police, the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), who frequently come early in the morning to dismantle the camp. Faced by a mound of rubbish at the entrance (because the local authorities refuse to provide a skip), Lascoux waits every morning to provide aid to the refugees when they get thrown out. These days, the police dismantle Loon Plage every two weeks and the Calais camps every two days. </p>
<p>Lascoux lets people leave their personal belongings in his van so the cleaning company which accompanies the police doesn’t throw away all their cherished belongings. During the last evacuation the police forcibly removed Lascoux from the camp and illegally confiscated his van. </p>
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<img alt="A man is carried away by police." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582604/original/file-20240318-28-zrq5eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582604/original/file-20240318-28-zrq5eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582604/original/file-20240318-28-zrq5eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582604/original/file-20240318-28-zrq5eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=840&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582604/original/file-20240318-28-zrq5eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582604/original/file-20240318-28-zrq5eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582604/original/file-20240318-28-zrq5eh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1055&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Pierre Lascoux being forcibly removed from Loon Plage camp by French police.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pierre Lascoux</span></span>
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<p>The camp is reminiscent of the infamous <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-the-calais-jungle-is-there-a-long-term-solution-views-from-france-and-britain-67352">Calais Jungle</a>, which was shut down in 2016. I will never forget the image of a group of people, whose boat had capsized, walking back to the camp in the early hours of the morning. One couple pushed a supermarket trolley with two young children who must have been younger than five-years-old and who were drenched and haggard. They must have walked at least a dozen kilometres from the beach where they had probably stayed for days before trying to climb into the rubber dinghy. Everyone there tries several times before being successful and each time they fail they have to trudge back to the camp, exhausted.</p>
<p>Loon Plage is a series of wild camps; they cannot really be called refugee camps. Refugee camps are usually places run by state organisations or charities; places where people can seek sanctuary and, <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/camps/#:%7E:text=Food%2C%20water%20access%20points%20and,services%20of%20the%20host%20community">according to</a> the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), refugees have to be provided with shelter, food, water and latrines. </p>
<p>But Loon Plage really is a “jungle”. That’s what the refugees call every wild camp along the north coast. There used to be <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/04/1006481">access to water</a>, which was originally intended for use by the fire service. But because refugees used it to wash, the police blocked it. As a result, a 22-year-old <a href="https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/1215355/article/2022-08-10/loon-plage-un-migrant-meurt-noye-dans-un-canal">Sudanese man died</a> in 2022 while trying to wash in the canal which runs adjacent to the camp. In Calais, it is not uncommon to see 1,000 litre water tanks distributed by charities like <a href="https://calaisfood.wixsite.com/home/">Calais Food Collective</a> being stabbed by the police forces or disappearing overnight. According to Rachel Read, a volunteer for Calais Food Collective: </p>
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<p>It does not matter how hostile the state tried to make it here, they are not going to stop coming. If anything they are going to keep coming more because France is such a hostile place that they try to move through it and out.</p>
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<p>Lascoux works for <a href="https://www.associationsalam.org/">Salam</a>, a refugee charity which was established after the arrival of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/may/23/immigration.immigrationandpublicservices1">first Kosovar refugees</a> in the 1990s. Salam recently succeeded in obtaining a water point and a skip for the Loon Plage camp following Lascoux’s <a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/occitanie/tarn/albi/40-jours-sans-manger-pour-aider-les-migrants-l-ancien-boulanger-du-sud-de-la-france-obtient-gain-de-cause-2899565.html">hunger strike</a>, which ended with his hospitalisation. Lascoux is currently regaining his strength. The last time we spoke he told me: </p>
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<p>It is a small victory but the fight must go on. It is intolerable to see human beings treated worse than animals in France in the 21st century.</p>
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<h2>‘Stop the boats’</h2>
<p>I have been interested in the <a href="https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/98681/3/Mathieu%20Pernot%20and%20Les%20Migrants-%20Voicing%20the%20Silence%20and%20Exposing%20French%20Neo-colonial%20History%20and%20Practices..pdf">representation of migration</a> for several years, and I had already been to Calais with Franco-Swiss <a href="https://www.centrephotogeneve.ch/en/artist/elisa-larvego/">photographer Elisa Larvego</a> in January 2023 researching <a href="https://player.sheffield.ac.uk/exhibits/calais-and-out-focus">alternative representations of migration</a>. </p>
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<img alt="Barbed wire fencing surrounding coastal refugee camp." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583138/original/file-20240320-28-cw6l8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583138/original/file-20240320-28-cw6l8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583138/original/file-20240320-28-cw6l8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583138/original/file-20240320-28-cw6l8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583138/original/file-20240320-28-cw6l8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583138/original/file-20240320-28-cw6l8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583138/original/file-20240320-28-cw6l8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Video still from ‘The Going Towards’ by Elisa Larvego, 2023. Images shows the end of the harbour that has been ‘protected’ from the refugees trying to reach the lorries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.centrephotogeneve.ch/en/artist/elisa-larvego/">Elisa Larvego</a></span>
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<p>I use the term “refugee” instead of the negative term of “migrant” because on the camps there are <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/stories/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-or-migrant-which-right">both categories</a>. But the people I met all sought refuge from desperate circumstances and should all be deserving of protection.</p>
<p>I wanted to see what was happening with my own eyes and speak with both volunteers and refugees: to hear their stories directly and gain a better understanding of these highly contentious border areas – all of which are linked to the highly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jan/29/uk-france-small-boats-pact-doubling-drownings-directly-linked">politicised migration argument</a> between France and the UK.</p>
<p>According to the UK government, in the year ending September 2023, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-september-2023/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-september-2023#:%7E:text=In%20the%20year%20ending%20September%202023%20there%20were%2037%2C556%20people,as%20shown%20in%20Figure%202">37,556 people arrived in the UK</a> in small boats which sailed from the northern coast of France. (There were 44,490 in 2022.)</p>
<p>According to Lascoux, in summer 2023, the population of Loon Plage fluctuated from around 300 in June to 2,000 in August, depending on appropriate weather conditions for attempting a crossing. These numbers were based on the number of meals that were distributed by Salam each day and Lascoux’s knowledge of the camp.</p>
<p>Since February 2003 and the <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/273239/6604.pdf">Touquet agreement</a>, the French and British governments have operated <a href="https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2023/04/06/the-uks-juxtaposed-border-controls/">juxtaposed border controls</a>. In return for financial compensation, France agreed to take charge of border surveillance and the regulation of illegal migration flows. Then, 20 years later, at the 36th bilateral Franco-British summit in March 2023, the UK pledged <a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/pas-calais/calais/traversees-de-la-manche-londres-investit-541-millions-d-euros-pour-securiser-la-frontiere-2730574.html">€541 million</a> (around £460 million) to France over three years to curb illegal crossings into the UK – to stop the boats.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/letzWz7_Jqo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>But it is not working. What I witnessed during my stay on the camps is that securing the borders does not prevent people from crossing – everyone crosses, it is just a matter of time. </p>
<p>Rather than stopping the boats the policy, which has seen the French police enforce “<a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/10/07/enforced-misery/degrading-treatment-migrant-children-and-adults-northern-france">zero-fixation points</a>” to prevent refugees settling anywhere, has simply led to an increase in violence by the authorities. This, in turn, has made crossing <a href="https://alarmphone.org/en/2024/01/28/the-deadly-consequences-of-the-new-deal-to-stop-the-boats/?post_type_release_type=post">more costly, violent and dangerous</a>. But violence and danger were just a daily reality inside the camps, as I was to learn. </p>
<h2>Smugglers run the camps</h2>
<p>I soon realised that the Loon Plage was run by <a href="https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/1379909/article/2023-10-01/grande-synthe-ils-partent-en-prison-pour-une-quarantaine-de-passages-illegaux-en">Iraqi-Kurdish smugglers</a>, who have also infiltrated the town of <a href="https://webdoc.france24.com/france-first-humanitarian-camp-grande-synthe/">Grande Synthe</a> and have a monopoly on boat crossings on this part of the <a href="https://www.visitpasdecalais.com/">Pas de Calais</a> coast.</p>
<p>The mafia-like organisation they belong to is structured and runs quite smoothly. Permanent “staff” run the “shops”, maintain the camp and feed the refugees who have paid for an “all-inclusive” passage. These “permanents” are people who have decided to remain in the region to control who comes and goes. The shops are small stalls at the entrance of the camp where food and cigarettes are sold. Some people, whose families have sold everything or who have more financial means, will manage to pay for the whole journey from their country of origin to the UK. This category of people do not usually stay long in camps because their journey has already been negotiated and paid for from the outset.</p>
<p>The shops are sometimes used as payment points and also act as relays for <em>les petites mains</em>, or “little hands”, the ever-changing mafia workforce. The little hands include recruiters who generally work between Calais and Grande-Synthe to recruit refugees who have arrived alone and who want to make the crossing and the “organisers” who accompany each convoy of refugees on the beach on the night of the crossing and who stay with them while waiting for the boats.</p>
<p>I learned from my interviews that the smuggling network has many recruiters working from other towns and countries in Africa and in the Middle East. They also recruit refugees to pilot the boats. It is hard to find boat pilots, so at times they get paid in addition to getting a free crossing.</p>
<h2>The permanents</h2>
<p>So during our morning visits to the camp, Lascoux and I would talk to the permanents. They are exclusively men. When women are present they are often part of a family and they only transit via the camp – they never stay. The camp can be especially brutal for women travelling alone, so associations like <a href="https://www.dunkirkrefugeewomenscentre.com/">Refugee Women Centre</a> try to relocate them to refuge houses where they are safer like at the <a href="https://maisonsesame.org/">Maison Sésame</a> in the town of Hezeele, northern France. </p>
<p>In a supermarket trolley, which they normally use to transport belongings, the shop owners set up a wood fire and two large black cast-iron kettles and heat the water for the coffee on a blackened grate. The pungent smell from the fire is due to the hydro-alcoholic gel and plastic crates they use for fuel. They ask if we want to join them for a coffee. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582208/original/file-20240315-18-ma9m6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582208/original/file-20240315-18-ma9m6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582208/original/file-20240315-18-ma9m6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582208/original/file-20240315-18-ma9m6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582208/original/file-20240315-18-ma9m6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582208/original/file-20240315-18-ma9m6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582208/original/file-20240315-18-ma9m6g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Camp coffee with the ‘permanents’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sophie Watt</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These men would often come and ask me to eat with them or join them for mugs of tea. It seems nice, but it is also to check out who I am and to figure out what I’m doing there. The shop “owners” and the little hands are suspicious of everyone. </p>
<p>Human trafficking brings in huge sums of money for smugglers operating out of Paris, London and even Baghdad. But the fact that I’m volunteering for Salam to distribute meals quells some of their suspicions. As does the fact that I’m with Lascoux, who regularly brings wood, tents, blankets and clothes.</p>
<h2>The crossings</h2>
<p>There is little freedom in the camp and each refugee is attached to a recruiter, who works for one or two smugglers. The traffickers have claimed different parts of the beaches along the coast and compete with each other in order to gain more custom. Once the refugees have paid their passage (between €800 and €4,500, depending on their nationality), the smuggler allocates them a convoy “team” which often waits in the woods near the beach for several days before attempting to cross. Kevin, from Guinea, who tried to cross while I was there and whom I interviewed both in Calais and when he arrived in the UK, told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were 55 people in my convoy and in the forest there were more than 250 people who waited for four days because there were five smugglers who had their group. In our group, there were women and children too, and we had nothing to eat for four days. It was raining, the weather was bad and the waves were rough. One of the boats overturned on departure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Many families and children transit via Loon Plage rather than Calais, where conditions are even more harsh due to more frequent police evacuations. DM Boss said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I tried three times to cross but only paid once. Each time we were waiting in the woods for hours and even days before the crossing.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At each stage, the refugees are surrounded by the little hands, different teams for different places, who keep an eye on them and tell them what to do. The convoys are also infiltrated by the gangs to ensure that the refugees are not working for the police or informing journalists. </p>
<p>As in Loon Plage, the convoys mix nationalities and therefore prices. Sub-Saharan Africans pay less (between €800 and €1,200) than the Vietnamese or Albanians, who can pay up to €4,500 and who have arrived in the north of France as part of their own smuggling networks. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582209/original/file-20240315-16-s9emcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582209/original/file-20240315-16-s9emcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582209/original/file-20240315-16-s9emcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582209/original/file-20240315-16-s9emcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582209/original/file-20240315-16-s9emcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582209/original/file-20240315-16-s9emcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582209/original/file-20240315-16-s9emcw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A young refugee walking with all his belongings in a shopping trolley.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sophie Watt</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are few sub-Saharan Africans at Loon Plage and they are often recruited as the boat pilots or as recruiters, as this pays for the crossing. Making sure that a group of sub-Saharan Africans gets on board, despite the fact that they can usually only afford minimum price, allows the pilot to remain unidentified once in Dover. The pilot is often therefore a refugee who did not have any other means to pay for the crossing and who has very limited experience in steering boats.</p>
<p>This network of people trafficking can only exist and be extremely lucrative because the French and the British governments have not agreed to establish safe passages between France and the UK and are determined to invest in “securing” the border instead.</p>
<h2>The sound of gunfire</h2>
<p>It was difficult to get close to refugees in the camp because being seen talking to me could put them at risk. A few of the interviews I undertook with refugees I met in the camp took place in the UK once they had crossed. </p>
<p>Each talked about the <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/societe/flambee-de-violences-a-loon-plage-des-migrants-a-la-merci-des-reseaux-20220916_L2TWS6SD35BUNHXFWL7X27N6OM/">violence</a> at night and the fact that the Kurdish mafia is heavily armed. While on the camp I heard gunshots several times and was told they were “just shooting rats”. DM Boss, who stayed at Loon Plage for two months, confessed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I could not sleep in the tent at night, I had to get out and wait in the woods because in the evenings once the NGOs and charities are gone the smugglers and little hands talk and argue and get their guns out; so I used to wait until they went to sleep.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In May 2022, two Iraqi men <a href="https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/1184033/article/2022-05-24/grande-synthe-un-homme-tue-par-balle-et-un-autre-blesse-pres-d-un-camp-de">were shot</a> in the camp and one died from his wounds. In February 2023 another Iraqi man <a href="https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/nord-0/dunkerque/un-blesse-grave-par-balle-dans-le-camp-de-migrants-de-loon-plage-2713962.html">was shot</a> and seriously injured. Many more incidents go unreported. </p>
<p>The Kurdish network is renowned for its efficacy, but due to the increasing police presence on the beaches, they are starting to take more risks. The coordinator of the charity Utopia 56 Grande Synthe, Fabien Touchard, explained that police violence has gradually moved from the camp to the beaches at night because it is harder for the associations (mainly <a href="https://utopia56.org/grande-synthe-3/">Utopia 56</a> and <a href="https://www.helloasso.com/associations/osmose-62">Osmose 62</a>) to witness everything that happens along the coast as far as Belgium. </p>
<p>Smugglers are taking risks with the lives of refugees, by forcing them in ever more dangerous numbers on to boats which cannot handle them in order to escape the French police. In fact, in the year ending September 2023, there was <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-september-2023/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-september-2023">an average of</a> 48 people per small boat, which was higher than the previous year (37) and much higher than earlier years – in 2020 there were 13 per small boat, in 2019 11 and in 2018 the number was seven.</p>
<p>The boat crossings have become better organised, as risk levels have increased. For example, <a href="https://wedodata.fr/productions/lesjours-morts-calais/">397 refugees</a> have died since 1999 trying to cross the Franco-British border. And in one single incident on November 24, 2021, <a href="https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/calais-5-migrants-meurent-dans-un-naufrage-darmanin-sur-place-24-11-2021-2453649_23.php#11">27 refugees drowned</a>. Just after I left Calais, on August 12, <a href="https://www.nordlittoral.fr/182172/article/2023-08-13/six-nouveaux-morts-en-mer-et-des-disparus-au-large-de-calais-retour-sur-la">six people died</a> at sea, while on January 14 2024 <a href="https://calaismigrantsolidarity.wordpress.com/deaths-at-the-calais-border/">four Syrian refugees</a> (two young men and two children) were killed attempting a crossing.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582210/original/file-20240315-30-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582210/original/file-20240315-30-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582210/original/file-20240315-30-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582210/original/file-20240315-30-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582210/original/file-20240315-30-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582210/original/file-20240315-30-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582210/original/file-20240315-30-ebnnj2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graffiti in Loon Plage, near the railway line.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sophie Watt</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The most recent victim is a seven-year-old girl, named Roula, <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/they-dont-see-us-as-humans-familys-anger-at-people-smugglers-after-daughter-dies-in-boat-tragedy-13089652">who died</a> while crossing the Channel with her pregnant mother, father and her three siblings.</p>
<p>More frequent boat crossings began in 2018 after a few successful attempts were made in 2017 following the dismantlement of the Calais Jungle in 2016. They gradually replaced the crossings in lorries which had become too dangerous and almost impossible due to new technology employed by border police.</p>
<h2>Night patrols and ‘taxi boats’</h2>
<p>I patrolled the coast around Boulogne-Sur-Mer at night with <a href="https://www.facebook.com/p/Association-Osmose62-100085195519283/">Osmose 62</a>. Charity founders and volunteers Dany Patous and Olivier Moctar Barbès patrol the coast most nights before going to work. They explained how the smugglers were changing their techniques to adjust to the increased policing. The latest technique is called “taxi boat”. </p>
<p>Instead of awaiting pick-up on the beach, refugees are told to wait in the water at different locations along the coast to stop the police from chasing them. The boats then pick up the groups at sea the same night, and end up cramming in more people and taking longer, more perilous routes to Dover.</p>
<p>The night patrols, or <em>marauds</em>, are surreal. Walking through a ghost town at night, along small roads, along the coast, as well as car parks near beaches; being on the lookout for any signs of refugees and on constant alert for the police.</p>
<p>For me it was high in adrenaline and emotion because the objective was to help refugees who had failed to cross, while at the same time making sure not to reveal their presence to the authorities.</p>
<p>Before I arrived at the rendezvous point at 4am I saw a big group of refugees roaming the streets of Boulogne and I told Barbès. It was then impossible to find them again. Barbès said: “They have learned the art of making themselves invisible because of the chase with the police forces.” After patrolling the town, we drove along the coast and stopped at different beaches where we met a group of French police. They asked us for ID and told us that they were looking for a large group that was hiding in the nearby woods.</p>
<p>That night, we stopped for a group of young Syrian men who needed hot drinks and food before going back to Calais on foot. </p>
<p>Later, we watched as 40 people crammed on a small inflatable zodiac boat leaving the coast in the early hours of the morning at around 6am. We arrived just after the boat had left but the police officers present, who had not bothered chasing them, told us that the departure had been chaotic with women and children shouting. The boat had a problem with the motor and was progressing slowly in circles. It looked so flimsy and so small and was taking so long to reach the open sea that one of the police officers said that they would never make it. </p>
<p>This boat was later rescued by the coastguard because it had started sinking. They did not reach British waters this time. According to the refugees I interviewed and some volunteers, departures are extremely traumatic, because they are all fighting to get on board as quickly as possible when there is not enough space to accommodate everyone. Marie, from <a href="https://www.osrefugeeaidteam.org/projects/refugee-womens-centre-rwc/">Refugee Women Center</a>, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is not uncommon for the little hands to throw women overboard when the boat is too crowded. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>And DM Boss told me: “I retrieved a little boy by the leg while he was being stepped on by people jumping on board.”</p>
<p>When I was in Calais I met a Sudanese refugee, a professor in political science at the University of Khartoum, with his nine-month-old baby. They had been separated from the baby’s mother and the couple’s two other children while trying to get on board a boat. He was caught by the police and had been prevented from crossing with the rest of his family. He has been staying in a refuge house ever since and has tried to cross with his baby dozens of times with no success, while his wife and other two boys are near London. </p>
<h2>The many jungles of Calais</h2>
<p>Many refugees travel between Calais and Loon Plage in order to negotiate their crossing. In Calais I interviewed around 20 volunteers and refugees in safe places but I could only interview one refugee away from the camp in Grande-Synthe and a few others in my car. </p>
<p>Since the dismantling of the big jungle, the mayor of Calais, Natasha Bouchard, has tried everything to deter refugees from arriving in the region to the extent that she managed to obtain the right to <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/34530/calais--larrete-interdisant-la-distribution-de-repas-aux-migrants-de-nouveau-reconduit">forbid food and water distribution</a> in September 2020. Partly because of this more arduous environment, the “jungles” in Calais are smaller and usually populated by younger men and teenagers. </p>
<p>The camps are grouped by nationality, which means that the tensions are not always as high as in Loon Plage. I informally talked with a few Afghan people who had to leave Afghanistan because they had been working for the British and American forces as translators and saw their lives put at risk after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/10/thousands-of-afghans-who-helped-british-forces-remain-stranded-by-uk">recent withdrawal</a> of the British forces in the region.</p>
<p>I managed to interview five people from Guinea, Chad, Iran and Sudan and found a smaller camp of Francophone Africans within the Sudanese camp who did not want to be interviewed but who were proud to show me their survival skills. They were cooking when I arrived and although their tents were deep in mud they had managed to build a common area for eating with a roof made of wood and recycled tent material. </p>
<p>Most of these young men, aged between 15 and 25, had been through Ceuta or Melilla together (Spanish enclaves in Morocco) where the living conditions were even more dangerous and precarious than on the French northern border and they were talking about their journey through Morocco like they were war veterans. They had managed to climb over the three six-metre high border fences despite being wounded and under attack from both the Moroccan and Spanish police forces. They were proud and felt invincible and spoke like an army of child soldiers ready to conquer the world. </p>
<h2>Kevin’s journey</h2>
<p>Kevin, who is from Nzérékoré, a city in Guinea’s south-eastern forest region, took me to his camp after our first interview in my car. He was proud to show me that they had built a “Francophone corner” within the Sudanese camp. He introduced me to all his friends one by one who shook my hand and asked me if I wanted to stay and eat with them. They were all from different parts of West Africa – Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Ivory Coast – and they were proud of their journey, but were tired of staying in Calais where they had been for several months. Kevin said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I managed to climb the three walls in Ceuta with a broken hand after seven years on the road and in the desert going through Mali, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. I should have stayed in Spain but I needed to try for the UK. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kevin said he came from a beautiful country, though from a <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/25/they-let-people-kill-each-other/violence-nzerekore-during-guineas-constitutional">persecuted ethnic group</a>; he is from the Guerzé tribe. He told me he “had to eat stale bread and cheap jam and live in a mud bath in the north of France while France was exploiting natural resources in his country”. And yet because his country is not at war, despite the most recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/least-two-killed-guinea-anti-junta-protests-eve-coup-anniversary-2023-09-05/">military coups</a>, it was difficult for him to make a case for political asylum in France.</p>
<p>When I first spoke to him, Kevin and his “crew” had just survived another eviction. They had managed to hide their belongings along the railway tracks within the Sudanese camp. Kevin remembers suffering from the effects of “tear gas that had been launched inside the tent” a few weeks earlier. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was asleep when they sprayed tear gas inside the tent and my lungs burnt for hours afterwards. I could not use the covers I had because of the smell. This smell is impossible to get rid off so I had to find another blanket.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The mayor’s policy since 2008 is <a href="https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Calais-la-mairie-depose-des-rochers-sur-les-quais-pour-empecher-les-refugies-de-s-installer">ruthless and relentless</a>: evacuated every two days and chased from any public spaces, the refugees are mentally and physically exhausted.</p>
<p>“We try crossing by trucks or by boats every night so during the day we sleep but the police usually come and force you out of your tent. You have to be quick and get all your papers with you otherwise everything is destroyed. It is scary”, said Kevin. </p>
<p>Mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, refugees in Calais often don’t have the financial means to pay for a crossing with the Kurdish mafia and thus access the Calais network of smugglers who are mostly Sudanese and North-African and who are less organised and less reliable because they use cheaper, poor quality boats and motors. Kevin told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This network is a lot less safe than the Kurdish one and if you fail the crossing they often keep your money.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kevin negotiated his passage from €1,200 to €800 with Kurdish smugglers. It took him four months to make the money he needed because he told me: “I could not work as recruiter for them because all my friends are poor, they could not pay the crossing, so I had to do small jobs to save that money.” Kevin finally crossed in August 2023 with a convoy of people which left from the beach called Graveline. They had to wait for four days before setting off.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The weather was horrendous, the wind was very strong and another boat capsized under my eyes. I am still scarred from the crossing, the sea was so dangerous, I don’t think I will ever go back on a boat in my life. Everyone was shouting and crying especially the women and the children who were terrified because of the waves. Somebody wanted to jump and we had to stop him and someone else fell in the water, we just had time to catch him and drag him back on the boat. I stayed at the front of the boat with my friend and a lot of us wanted to go back, we were terrified. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Brutal evacuations</h2>
<p>Every evacuation is brutal and dehumanises the refugees a little more. Apparently, the process of dehumanisation justifies <a href="https://basta.media/controle-aux-frontieres-migrants-exiles-Calais-Briancon-couts-de-la-repression-bunkerisation-militarisation-Darmanin">the costly</a> daily harassment of refugees that was heavily criticised by the <a href="https://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/sites/default/files/2023-10/ddd_rapport_droits-fondamentaux-etrangers_3ans-apres-calais_synthese_20181207.pdf">UN Special Rapporters in 2018</a>.</p>
<p>When I was in Loon Plage, the camp had not been evacuated for a month. One morning, I witnessed the camp evacuating itself because people could not stand the anticipation of the police forces coming to dismantle the camp. I arrived at 7am only to see a long line of people pushing supermarket trolleys full of their belongings to another part of the industrial zone along the canal.</p>
<p>They had internalised the process so much that it was just easier to “self-evacuate” instead of living with the anxiety of the police arriving in the early hours of the morning. When I asked one refugee why he was moving everything he said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I cannot stand it anymore. I am too tired, every morning I think they are going to come and they don’t come. I am moving so I can sleep better.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The evacuations are performative in the sense they fulfil the role the French government plays in order to justify the sums of money being <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/11/europe/uk-france-illegal-immigration-funding-intl-hnk/index.html">paid by the UK government</a> to secure the border – despite the fact most refugees come back to the exact same settlements after the evacuation and will cross eventually.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/12/20/what-s-in-france-s-controversial-immigration-law_6361995_7.html">new anti-immigration law</a> passed by the French parliament on December 19 2023 will do little to ease the climate of suspicion and fear which surrounds the refugee debate in both the UK and France. </p>
<p>But nobody I spoke to would be deterred; not by the brutal camp evacuations; the fear of smuggling gangs, the terror of the crossings, or even the <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-asylum-deportation-plan-faces-more-delays-how-did-we-get-here-226209">promise of a flight to Rwanda</a> once landing in the UK. If anything, the violence and lack of hospitality at the French border which represent unprecedented breaches
of fundamental rights of refugees further motivates people to cross. As DM Boss told me: “I could not live in the jungle any longer, I was determined to come to the UK. I had to try.”</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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</figure>
<p><em>For you: more from our <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insights series</a>:</em></p>
<ul>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/gp-crisis-how-did-things-go-so-wrong-and-what-needs-to-change-208197?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">GP crisis: how did things go so wrong, and what needs to change?</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/would-better-buildings-help-fix-the-nhs-the-story-of-britains-hospitals-from-grand-designs-to-counting-the-costs-208090?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Would better buildings help fix the NHS? The story of Britain’s hospitals, from grand designs to counting the costs</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/its-like-being-in-a-warzone-aande-nurses-open-up-about-the-emotional-cost-of-working-on-the-nhs-frontline-194197?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">‘It’s like being in a warzone’ – A&E nurses open up about the emotional cost of working on the NHS frontline</a></em></p></li>
<li><p><em><a href="https://theconversation.com/insomnia-how-chronic-sleep-problems-can-lead-to-a-spiralling-decline-in-mental-health-224131?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK">Insomnia: how chronic sleep problems can lead to a spiralling decline in mental health
</a></em></p></li>
</ul>
<p><em>To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/the-daily-newsletter-2?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=TCUKengagement&utm_content=InsightsUK"><strong>Subscribe to our newsletter</strong></a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221798/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sophie Watt receives funding from the BA Leverhulme Small Grants and HEIF from the University fo Sheffield.</span></em></p>Despite the relentless hardships and suffering, one thing appeared to unite the refugees I met: they wanted to seek sanctuary in the UK, no matter what.Sophie Watt, Lecturer, School of Languages and Cultures, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2226312024-02-05T12:30:42Z2024-02-05T12:30:42ZMorecambe Bay cockling tragedy: 20 years on, remembering the victims and their impact on modern slavery law<p>On February 5 2004, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1w_l2izMW4">23 people drowned</a> while picking cockles on the beach of Morecambe Bay in Lancashire. The victims were illegally smuggled Chinese immigrants, brought via Liverpool by criminal gangmasters, and forced to work in highly dangerous conditions, scavenging for shellfish. </p>
<p>When the tide rushed in that night, only 15 were able to leave the water. Twenty-one bodies were pulled from the sea, with only <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-25986388">Li Hua being rescued</a>. A woman’s skull was found six years later, and one body has never been discovered.</p>
<p>If the cocklers had been given even basic information about the treacherous tides or been supervised, they could have survived. This wholly avoidable tragedy served as a dramatic wake-up call to the extent and dangers of modern slavery, which still affects an estimated <a href="https://www.antislavery.org/slavery-today/slavery-uk/">130,000 people in the UK today</a> and <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents/publication/wcms_854733.pdf">50 million</a> globally.</p>
<h2>An alert to modern slavery</h2>
<p>As a Lancashire lass, I remember the dramatic effect this tragedy had on local feelings toward the plight of immigrants. There was true shock at the level of exploitation uncovered. Morecambe was a favoured local seaside spot for family adventures and bracing walks that was now the site of mass manslaughter and terror.</p>
<p>There had been instances of forced labour reported before Morecambe, not least the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/jun/20/immigration.immigrationandpublicservices3">58 Chinese immigrants found dead</a> in a lorry in Essex in 2000. But it was this incident that truly exposed what the world of criminal gangmasters, people trafficking and international labour exploitation looked like in Britain.</p>
<p>The cocklers had reached Britain, were grafting in desperate conditions, but were abandoned and exploited by those who promised them a better life. The lead detective <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-25914594">found at the time</a> that around £1 million a day was being funnelled from the UK to China from exploited labour. </p>
<p>Gangmaster <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/gangmaster-guilty-over-deaths-of-21-cockle-pickers-6105761.html">Lin Liang Ren</a> was jailed 14 years for manslaughter and facilitation of breaking immigration law. His girlfriend and cousin were also jailed. </p>
<h2>How the law has evolved</h2>
<p>The Morecambe Bay tragedy had a profound and immediate influence on <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/definition/lang--en/index.htm#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20ILO%20Forced,offered%20himself%20or%20herself%20voluntarily.%22">forced labour and modern slavery</a> protections and new laws to ensure this never happened again. </p>
<p>A few weeks after the tragedy, the government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/feb/27/immigrationpolicy.conservatives">backed a bill</a> to introduce statutory licensing of <a href="https://www.gov.uk/agricultural-workers-rights/gangmasters">gangmasters</a> – individuals or businesses who provide workers for agricultural, horticultural and shellfish sectors. </p>
<p>The bill was enacted as the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/11/contents">Gangmasters (Licensing) Act</a> in April 2005, making it a criminal offence for gangmasters to operate without a licence, or for unlicensed workers to be used. The law set standards of health and safety, pay, accommodation and training for workers. It also established the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA), to safeguard worker welfare and provide a legal framework for prosecuting criminal gangmasters.</p>
<p>In 2017 the GLA became the <a href="https://www.gla.gov.uk/who-we-are/legislation/#:%7E:text=The%20Gangmasters%20(Licensing)%20Act%202004,and%20using%20an%20unlicensed%20gangmaster.">Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA),</a> with the added remit of investigating modern slavery in relation to labour abuse. By 2021, it had granted 16,000 licences and successfully prosecuted <a href="https://www.gla.gov.uk/whats-new/press-release-archive/08042021-glaa-marks-15-years-of-licensing/">77 unlicensed gangmasters</a>.</p>
<p>Eventually, this tragedy contributed to the development of the 2015 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/modern-slavery-bill">Modern Slavery Act</a>, bringing to the fore the issue of <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10610-018-9375-4#Fn7">exploitative work conditions</a>. As researcher <a href="https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/jpsj/22/2/article-p159.xml">Gary Craig explained</a>, the Morecambe Bay disaster expanded understandings of modern slavery from involving the sexual exploitation of a few hundred women, to being a “numerically significant issue” taking many forms. </p>
<p>The Modern Slavery Act was the world’s first law on modern slavery and the first <a href="https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2020/03/26/media-factsheet-modern-slavery-act/">requiring businesses to report</a> how they prevent it in their supply chains. It also introduced the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-trafficking-victims-referral-and-assessment-forms/guidance-on-the-national-referral-mechanism-for-potential-adult-victims-of-modern-slavery-england-and-wales#:%7E:text=6.-,Access%20to%20support,protection">National Referral Scheme</a>, offering support, legal aid and accommodation for victims. </p>
<h2>Lessons still to be learned</h2>
<p>Despite these developments, modern slavery remains a serious problem in the UK. As I’ve found in my own research with <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/david-bek-685460">David Bek</a>, it occurs in many sectors and supply chains, from chickens to flowers. A <a href="https://www.idhsustainabletrade.com/uploaded/2023/03/Building-Collaboration-in-the-UK-Floriculture-Sector-Report.pdf?x56932">UK flower distributor told us</a> that many of their UK growers pose more risk in terms of modern slavery than their Colombian flower farms do. </p>
<p>And this is not just a business risk, this can be a risk to life for vulnerable, untrained, ill-equipped forced labourers.</p>
<p>On the tenth anniversary of the Morecambe tragedy, in 2014, campaigners claimed the UK situation for exploited workers had actually become <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-25914594">worse</a>. After the introduction of the Modern Slavery Act, there are, formally, more protections for those experiencing slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour. But the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal8#targets_and_indicators">global power imbalances</a> and complex networks of supply chains that facilitate modern slavery remain.</p>
<p>And campaigners, researchers and legal experts have <a href="https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/jpsj/30/2/article-p98.xml#CIT0021">criticised</a> the Modern Slavery Act, saying it focuses too much on prosecutions and does not provide enough <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/nov/03/modern-slavery-bill-lost-opportunity-human-trafficking-adviser">support for victims</a>.</p>
<p>We now have the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/illegal-migration-bill">Illegal Migration Act</a>, which experts have said <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-uks-new-immigration-law-will-put-more-people-at-risk-of-modern-slavery-209746">puts even more people at risk</a> of modern slavery. This is because the act places a legal duty on the home secretary to detain and remove anyone entering the country irregularly – which often includes people who have been trafficked or forced to work. </p>
<p>The government claims the act will focus support on <a href="https://theconversation.com/modern-slavery-uks-focus-on-genuine-victims-has-failed-survivors-since-the-1800s-192528">“genuine victims”</a>. But with a lack of intelligence-sharing between <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinese-irregular-migration-to-britain-has-a-tragic-history-how-routes-have-evolved-125839">UK and Chinese law enforcement</a>, this could make evidence gathering for prosecutions even more challenging, making victims even less likely to seek help.</p>
<p>After <a href="https://www.beyondradio.co.uk/news/local-news/memorial-service-to-be-held-on-promenade-to-mark-20-years-since-morecambe-bay-cockling-tragedy/">20 years</a>, the tragedy continues to make a physical mark on the Lancashire community. The <a href="https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/the-praying-shell">Praying Shell</a> sculpture dedicated to the victims overlooks the bay. A memorial plaque includes their Chinese names and the red-crowned crow, the national bird of China. </p>
<p>These surround an original poem by Laverne, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/lancastercc/posts/the-plaque-installed-on-morecambe-promenade-in-memory-of-the-chinese-cockle-pick/2752004818220181/">The Bay of Words</a>, the lines of which feel relevant as ever in today’s tense climate around immigration: “Remember us with love, not fear. We, like you, now live here.” </p>
<hr>
<p><em>If you ever suspect modern slavery, report it to the <a href="https://www.modernslaveryhelpline.org/">Modern Slavery Helpline</a> on 08000 121 700 or the police on 101. In an emergency call 999. <a href="https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-threats/modern-slavery-and-human-trafficking#:%7E:text=The%20nature%20of%20the%20threat,10.3%25%20on%20the%20previous%20year.">Your information could save a life</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jill Timms received funding from the Vulnerable Supply Chains Facility (VSCF), a rapid COVID-19 response fund set up by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) for the Building Resilience in Flower Supply Chains Project.</span></em></p>Nearly two dozen Chinese migrants, who had been trafficked, lost their lives in the tragedy.Jill Timms, Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2214252024-02-02T16:25:21Z2024-02-02T16:25:21ZEven many critics of the Rwanda deportation policy are missing the point of why it’s wrong<p>The UK government’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-67627696">proposals</a> to send asylum seekers arriving to the UK onto Rwanda continue to spark intense opposition. </p>
<p>This includes opposition from right-wing Conservative MPs who don’t think the plan goes far enough. Several <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68009249">recently attempted a rebellion</a> against the latest bill, arguing that it failed to conclusively stop refugees from legally challenging their own deportation to Rwanda. </p>
<p>The government’s proposal now faces challenges in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68126734">the House of Lords</a>. Politicians on the left and in the centre, international human rights experts and humanitarian organisations continue to warn that the bill poses <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/rwanda-bill-lords-sunak-charities-treaty-b2485340.html">a constitutional danger</a> and breaches international law. </p>
<p>Labour has said that it <a href="https://www.stephenkinnock.co.uk/rwanda-plan-cost-and-asylum-system-debate/">opposes the policy</a> on the grounds that it is unworkable, a breach of international law, and unaffordable. It has vowed to scrap it if they enter government. </p>
<p>The ongoing debate has focused mainly on <a href="https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/immigration/our-view-on-safety-of-rwanda-bill">the legality of the bill and on Rwanda’s perceived saftey</a>. In my view as a political philosopher, this fails to articulate exactly why the policy is fundamentally wrong. Opponents of the policy on the left must reckon with the racist undertones of the policy and its prejudicial treatment of specific groups of refugees. </p>
<p>Much recent discussion suggests that the policy is wrong primarily because Rwanda is not a “safe” place for refugees. Indeed, this was the basis of the UK Supreme Court’s ruling of the plan as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67423745">unlawful</a>. The court’s main concern was that many refugees, if sent to Rwanda, would face the risk of refoulement: being returned to a country where they could <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/nov/15/supreme-court-rejects-rishi-sunak-plan-to-deport-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda">face persecution</a>.</p>
<p>Since the Supreme Court ruling, the government has <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9918/">drafted new legislation</a> to declare that Rwanda is safe, and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-67627696">signed a new treaty with Rwanda</a> guaranteeing against the risk of refoulement.</p>
<p>It is dispiriting to those of us familiar with the history of the UK’s relationship with Rwanda – particularly the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2001/jan/31/guardianletters4">gross lack of care the UK government showed Rwanda</a> during the country’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1RI0FU/">genocide</a> – to see the government now appear so interested in Rwanda’s safety. </p>
<h2>The real problem with the policy</h2>
<p>This should be a discussion not only about how (and how not to) treat refugees in general, but also about the value we place on the humanity of the specific refugees that will most likely be affected by the policy. Instead, we have been left with a debate on the government’s own, self-serving terms. </p>
<p>I would argue that what is wrong with the government’s policy has almost nothing to do with the destination of deportations, and everything to do with who is being sent there. </p>
<p>In March 2023, the government signed a deal with the Albanian government that <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-63473022">significantly reduced</a> the flow of Albanians into the UK. The refugees that continue to enter the UK on small boats (and that would be the ones sent to Rwanda) therefore, are primarily from <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/11/15/african-refugees-relieved-by-uk-court-decision-to-block-rwanda-asylum-deal">Somalia, Sudan</a>, <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/people-crossing-the-english-channel-in-small-boats/">Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Eritrea</a>. </p>
<p>With this policy, the government suggests that even among those who we regard as vulnerable, there are those we should distinguish as being unworthy of sharing in the country’s political, economic and moral resources. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A cardboard sign sitting on the ground that reads 'would we do it to them if they were white?'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572158/original/file-20240130-23-h9sc60.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/572158/original/file-20240130-23-h9sc60.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572158/original/file-20240130-23-h9sc60.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572158/original/file-20240130-23-h9sc60.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572158/original/file-20240130-23-h9sc60.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572158/original/file-20240130-23-h9sc60.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/572158/original/file-20240130-23-h9sc60.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A protest sign against the Bibby Stockholm migrant accommodation barge that gets to the heart of the issue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/falmouthcornwalluk-31-23-falmouths-4th-protest-2311533163">JMundy/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It should concern us that one of the reasons that Rwanda might not be “safe” for the type of refugees the UK wants to deport is precisely because there is almost nowhere that is safe for people who are not only poor and vulnerable, but also black, brown and Muslim.</p>
<p>There is, therefore, nothing random about the UK government’s choice of Rwanda. It is a place, in that “other continent,” where the government can send people it does not distinguish from waste – people not immediately or suitably exploitable – to be easily discarded. </p>
<p>It is a place where no one who is really “from here” will ever go. As such, it is on the government’s own racist bait that much of what has recently counted for dissent has been caught. </p>
<p>Critics of the plan have also raised concerns that under Rwanda’s authoritarian regime, many refugees’ <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-shameless-farce-of-boris-johnsons-attempt-to-send-refugees-to-rwanda">basic human rights may be violated</a>. Yet, despite decades-long accounts of gross human rights abuses, the UK has been purposeful in developing and maintaining <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiS5p6L7YeEAxVvgP0HHcItCY8QFnoECA4QAw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fassets.publishing.service.gov.uk%2Fmedia%2F65a8004b94c9970013aeb973%2Frwanda-trade-and-investment-factsheet-2024-01-19.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3F9laEHcwK5FhgAZrJPvRu&opi=89978449">strong economic relations with Rwanda</a> when this has served its interests. </p>
<h2>The humanity of refugees</h2>
<p>The UK government has had no trouble recognising the humanity of numerous other <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/ukrainian-migration-to-the-uk/">groups of refugees</a>. But instead of sustaining a robust moral argument that questions why the government refuses to do the same for the people most likely to be affected by the Rwanda policy, public debate remains centred on its perceptions of Rwanda’s safety. This risks feeding into the <a href="https://www.jrsuk.net/blog/plans-for-removing-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda-are-cruel/">prejudice</a> that frames the UK’s understanding of Rwanda. </p>
<p>There are, of course, many who have strongly, and rightly, opposed the government’s plans on the basis that they do not reflect how <a href="https://www.thetablet.co.uk/blogs/1/2263/why-sending-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda-for-processing-is-deeply-immoral">“a decent society”</a> should treat people. Yet the current debate now, almost exclusively, focuses on questioning Rwanda’s safety, and the <a href="https://www.bigissue.com/news/politics/rwanda-plan-cost-asylum-planes-rishi-sunak/">cost</a> of the policy to the British taxpayer. </p>
<p>Those genuinely opposed to the policy should ask the government to prove not whether Rwanda is a safe place, but why the government itself persists in falling so far short of being of the character that these refugees deserve in their search for respect, compassion, and yes, for safety.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221425/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ẹniọlá Ànúolúwapọ́ Ṣóyẹmí is a Board Member of Internews Europe. </span></em></p>The debate over the Rwanda plan has focused on the safety of Rwanda, not on the policy’s racist undertones.Ẹniọlá Ànúolúwapọ́ Ṣóyẹmí, Departmental Lecturer in Political Philosophy and Public Policy, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216362024-01-23T15:07:46Z2024-01-23T15:07:46ZWhat is rule 39? UK government tells civil servants to ignore European court of human rights on Rwanda deportations<p>The UK government is once again navigating legal and political hurdles over its plan to send asylum seekers to Rwanda. The latest debate is over the emergency bill that legally declares Rwanda a safe place to send refugees (despite the supreme court ruling the opposite).</p>
<p>The government has now told civil servants that, if a minister tells them to, they must <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/civil-servants-told-to-ignore-european-court-judges/">ignore rule 39 orders</a> from the European court of human rights in Strasbourg. </p>
<p>The court enforces the European convention on human rights, to which the UK and 45 other European countries are party. Rule 39 allows the court to issue interim measures to stop any of these governments from taking action that could or would violate someone’s human rights. </p>
<h2>When is rule 39 used?</h2>
<p>The court uses rule 39 only in urgent, exceptional cases where the person at the heart of the case faces real and irreparable harm to their life and health. Usually, this is when facing extradition or deportation to a country where they may be tortured or killed. Rule 39 measures are sometimes called “pyjama injunctions” because of the late-night nature of some rulings. </p>
<p>The court has been using this power for many years, and states usually comply. The court has only issued a handful of rule 39 orders to the UK. In some years it hasn’t issued any. In 2021 and 2022 it issued <a href="https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/echr/viz/InterimMeasures/OverviewInterimMeasures?publish=yes">five per year</a>. For comparison, in 2022 the court used these measures against Greece 101 times, Poland 64 times and Russia 59 times. </p>
<p>These measures are temporary. They simply stay the execution of extradition or deportation orders so the court can review the case. This is what happened in June 2022 to stop the first planned deportation flight to Rwanda <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-deportations-what-is-the-european-court-of-human-rights-and-why-did-it-stop-the-uk-flight-from-taking-off-185143">from taking off</a>. </p>
<p>The court has also used an interim measure to <a href="https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2020/08/24/alexei-navalny-evacuated-to-germany-european-court-of-human-rights-orders-interim-measures-against-russia/">secure Russian opposition</a> leader Alexei Navalny’s transfer to Germany for treatment after being poisoned by a nerve agent. In another case, the court prevented the closure of an <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194445">opposition television station in Georgia</a>, which could have violated freedom of speech protections.</p>
<h2>Can rule 39 injunctions be overruled or ignored?</h2>
<p>Because these measures are temporary, rare and often made as a last resort, the court does not have time to present its reasons in detail for granting them. There is also technically no way to formally appeal against them, but the court will lift them if the relevant parties can show the measures are no longer necessary. More often, the measures are lifted when the court delivers its final judgment on the case.</p>
<p>In response to criticism, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10931803/Lord-Sumption-says-method-ECHR-Rwanda-ruling-unsatisfactory-pulling-ridiculous.html">largely from the UK</a>, the court has recently acted to make the process more transparent, deciding that the identity of the judge who issues the measures <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-7796609-10812486">should be publicised</a>, and the formal judicial decision sent to the parties. These are welcome developments, but may mean slower decision making which could be disastrous for human rights in some cases.</p>
<p>The court is clearly open to improving its practices, but such reforms need to be done in a spirit of collaboration, rather than an outright rejection.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Home secretary James Cleverley walking past Number 10 Downing Street" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570708/original/file-20240122-29-imzeac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570708/original/file-20240122-29-imzeac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570708/original/file-20240122-29-imzeac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570708/original/file-20240122-29-imzeac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570708/original/file-20240122-29-imzeac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570708/original/file-20240122-29-imzeac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570708/original/file-20240122-29-imzeac.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=542&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">James Cleverly is the third home secretary trying to get flights to Rwanda off the ground.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-united-kingdom-september-05-2023-2358461525">Fred Duval/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The UK has already been condemned once <a href="https://theconversation.com/illegal-migration-bill-can-the-government-ignore-the-european-court-of-human-rights-204583">for failing to respect a rule 39 order</a>. The court <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97575">prevented British forces</a> from transferring two suspected terrorists over to Iraqi authorities in 2010, as there was a risk they could be sentenced to death. The UK ignored this measure, and the court found that by doing this the UK government violated the European convention on human rights – a significant condemnation in its own right. </p>
<p>Persistent violation of rule 39 measures would be more problematic. Even countries with much worse record of compliance with the court’s orders than the UK have never legally declared that interim measures can be ignored by its ministers. States cannot use domestic law to ignore their obligations under international law. </p>
<p>In extreme cases, persistent violation of human rights can mean that a state is expelled from the Council of Europe, the body that oversees the convention, as <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/the-russian-federation-is-excluded-from-the-council-of-europe">happened with Russia in 2022</a>. </p>
<h2>The UK and human rights law</h2>
<p>It is difficult to overstate the role the UK played in the creation and functioning of the Council of Europe and the European convention on human rights. The statute of the Council of Europe was signed in London in 1949, and the UK is a founding member. </p>
<p>The prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has vowed not to let <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/dec/01/rishi-sunak-wont-allow-foreign-court-to-block-rwanda-plan">“foreign” courts</a> stop the UK from sending asylum seekers to Rwanda. A policy of ignoring rule 39 measures does not mean leaving the European convention on human rights immediately, but it doesn’t look good. </p>
<p>The UK should not be able to pick and choose which decisions of the court to follow, because everyone else could feel enabled to do the same. Similarly, calls from some Conservative politicians to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/09/uk-could-leave-european-convention-on-human-rights-to-stop-channel-migrant-boats">withdraw from the convention</a> altogether arguably undermine the system that great British experts and diplomats helped to build by implying it is not fit for purpose. </p>
<p>Withdrawing would ultimately leave people in the UK without a robust instrument or framework for <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/explainers/the-european-convention-on-human-rights/">challenging violations of their human rights</a>.</p>
<p>The government must make a sober calculation: is ignoring around five interim measures per year worth undermining the most effective international system of human rights protection in the world? I would very much hope not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou consults to the Council of Europe. </span></em></p>The UK government must decide if it wants to risk undermining the robust system of human rights protections.Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Professor in Human Rights Law, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2197772023-12-13T16:31:44Z2023-12-13T16:31:44ZHow the bill to declare Rwanda a ‘safe’ country for refugees could lead to a constitutional crisis<p>Rishi Sunak has had a small win in the ongoing saga of the UK government’s plan to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda. The second reading of the safety of Rwanda (asylum and immigration) bill has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/dec/12/rishi-sunak-survives-rwanda-bill-commons-vote">passed the Commons</a>, despite rightwing Conservative MPs abstaining. </p>
<p>This bill has been proposed as a way to effectively defy the UK Supreme Court’s ruling that the Rwanda plan <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2023-0093-etc-judgment.pdf">was unlawful</a>. The court found that Rwanda was not a “safe” country to send refugees, because there could be a risk of individuals being returned to their country of origin, where they may suffer ill treatment.</p>
<p>This is prohibited under international law, including the <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG">European convention on human rights</a> and <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951-refugee-convention">the UN refugee convention</a>. It is also enshrined in domestic UK law through the <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents">Human Rights Act</a>, <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/23/contents">the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act</a>, <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/41/contents">the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act</a> and <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/19/contents">the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act</a>. </p>
<p>The government has now introduced a revised <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/rwanda-treaty">treaty with Rwanda</a>, as well this emergency <a href="https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3540">legislation</a> which would declare the country to be safe and limit further court challenges.</p>
<h2>Why does the government think it can ‘overrule’ the courts?</h2>
<p>At the centre of these developments is the issue of whether Rwanda is a safe country, as well as who should answer that question, the government or the courts.</p>
<p>This goes to the centre of the UK’s constitutional framework. The bill’s existence depends on the principle of <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/parliamentary-sovereignty/">parliamentary sovereignty</a>. This means that parliament can pass any law, and that its lawmaking authority cannot be challenged. </p>
<p>Hypothetically, if the government introduced a bill saying the Earth was flat, and that was passed by parliament, that would become law, but would not change reality. In the same sense, introducing the Rwanda bill does not, in itself, change the reality on the ground. </p>
<p>The government, however, has agreed a new treaty with Rwanda, which it argues does materially change the situation and addresses the court’s concerns. The home secretary has stated that Rwanda has made <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-67627696">“clear commitments”</a> to the safety of the people who will go there. </p>
<p>Also, under the new agreement, Rwanda will set up an appeal body (composed of judges of mixed nationalities) where refused asylum claims can be reviewed.</p>
<h2>Constitutional principles and the rule of law</h2>
<p>As the UK does not have a <a href="https://consoc.org.uk/the-constitution-explained/the-uk-constitution/">written constitution</a>, addressing the constitutionality of the government’s actions depends on a broad range of sources, including principles defined in common law.</p>
<p>These Rwanda developments have called into question the government’s commitment to the <a href="https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/human-rights/the-rule-of-law-what-does-it-really-mean">rule of law</a>, the principle that <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/attorney-general-delivers-speech-on-the-rule-of-law">no one is above the law, including the government</a>.</p>
<p>The bill does allow for individual cases where a court could decide, based on compelling evidence, that it would be unsafe to send someone to Rwanda (for example, if they were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-67680136">pregnant or had rare medical conditions</a>).</p>
<p>However, it effectively “overrules” the court’s previous decision, and prevents domestic courts from reconsidering whether Rwanda is generally safe. It is difficult to see how these proposals respect the <a href="https://binghamcentre.biicl.org/publications/safety-of-rwanda-asylum-and-immigration-bill-a-preliminary-rule-of-law-analysis-for-house-of-commons-second-reading">rule of law</a>.</p>
<p>There is also the issue of <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06053/SN06053.pdf">separation of powers</a>. The UK theoretically has a system of checks and balance, whereby parliament, government and judges should limit and keep each other in check. </p>
<p>Parliament can make any law it wishes and the courts must dutifully apply it. Similarly, government must respect, preserve and not interfere with judicial independence. Such tensions arose during Brexit litigation, but <a href="https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2019/09/24/the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-cherry-miller-no-2-a-new-approach-to-constitutional-adjudication/">the decision of the court</a> upheld the sovereignty of parliament. </p>
<p>What is different about the Rwanda proposals is that we are in the territory where parliament could pass something that is so contentious as to be unconstitutional.</p>
<h2>Possible constitutional crisis</h2>
<p>There is precedent for parliament passing legislation to reverse the effect of a court decision. </p>
<p>In 1965 parliament passed the <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1965-02-03/debates/9c473bda-2ba4-47b0-a54d-346af752996a/WarDamageBill">War Damage Act</a> that nullified a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20689759">court decision</a> regarding compensation for the destruction of oil fields in Burma. While initially the court found that the proprietor should be compensated from public funds, legislation that came later retrospectively limited the government’s financial liability for damage caused during war.</p>
<p>With the Rwanda bill, much broader rule of law and international obligation issues are also engaged. Some have argued that the UK may now be heading for an <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/12/12/supreme-court-could-bring-down-the-government/">unprecedented constitutional crisis</a>, particularly if the government amends the bill to impose more draconian measures that would limit judicial oversight. </p>
<p>If the government introduced these kind of measures, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2018-0004.html">judges have previously warned</a> that it is “ultimately for the courts, not the legislature, to determine the limits set by the rule of law”. </p>
<h2>What happens next?</h2>
<p>Much of what happens next rests on amendments to the draft law – for example, whether the bill will command support in the House of Lords – as well as whether the prime minister is able to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/dec/12/collective-of-rightwing-tory-mps-say-they-will-not-support-rwanda-bill">unify splits within his party</a>.</p>
<p>The bill also stops short of disapplying the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-67641805">European convention on human rights</a>. It is still possible, then, that the bill could face legal challenges at the European court of human rights, which can determine whether the law is consistent with the UK’s international human rights obligations. </p>
<p>Any attempts to further limit judicial oversight will see the UK potentially stray into unprecedented territory surrounding the rule of law. This could run the risk of forcing courts to do the previously <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/dec/12/collective-of-rightwing-tory-mps-say-they-will-not-support-rwanda-bill">unthinkable</a> in striking down an act of parliament as unconstitutional.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219777/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Clear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The government is attempting to overrule the supreme court by passing a new law.Stephen Clear, Lecturer in Constitutional and Administrative Law, and Public Procurement, Bangor UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2140142023-10-03T16:43:02Z2023-10-03T16:43:02ZSuella Braverman warns of ‘unmanageable’ numbers of asylum seekers – the data shows we hardly take any<p>A migration “hurricane” is coming, Suella Braverman has warned. Speaking at the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/suella-braverman-conference-speech-live-b2423149.html">Conservative party conference</a>, the home secretary claimed that without action by the Conservatives, millions more people will come to Britain, “uncontrolled and unmanageable”. </p>
<p>The idea that there is a “right” amount of migration has a long history in Britain, despite not being <a href="https://theconversation.com/net-migration-how-an-unreachable-target-came-to-shape-britain-206430">very helpful as a metric</a>. But let’s play along, as it’s clear that migration and asylum – largely discussed in terms of numbers of small boat arrivals – will be a major campaigning focus ahead of the next election. </p>
<p>The reality is that, compared to our European neighbours, the UK does not currently take a fair share of asylum seekers.</p>
<p>Home Office statistics released in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-system-statistics-year-ending-june-2023/how-many-people-do-we-grant-protection-to#international-comparisons">June 2023</a> reported that in the past year, the UK received the 6th largest number of asylum applicants in the EU and UK. But when measured per head of population, the UK ranks 21st – taking just under 10% of the total number of asylum seekers received in the EU and UK.</p>
<p>This is despite the fact that, in 2022, the UK received more asylum applicants than it has in 20 years. <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/12/8/451">Asylum applications in the UK</a> peaked at 84,130 in 2002, falling sharply to 17,916 in 2010 and fluctuating between about 20,000 and 40,000 for the following decade.</p>
<p>The European migration “crisis” – referring to the increase in arrivals of refugees into Europe in 2015 – largely passed the UK by. The UK received 39,720 applicants in 2015 and 39,240 in 2016, accounting for just 3.3% and 3.4% of all asylum applications in the EU during those two years. Germany, which had the most applications in the EU, received 441,805 and 722,270 <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA/default/table?lang=en">respectively</a>.</p>
<h2>Why applications have risen</h2>
<p>Arrivals to the UK and Europe generally in 2022 were due to increased political instability, particularly in Afghanistan, Syria and Eritrea. The most significant difference for the UK was the higher number of applications from Albanians, which was not reflected across the EU – possibly because Albanians can travel visa free for <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/albanian-asylum-seekers-in-the-uk-and-eu-a-look-at-recent-data/">90 days in the EU</a>.</p>
<p>But it is not simply an increase in asylum applications that has affected the UK.</p>
<p>As applications have risen, the speed at which officials have made decisions on applications has declined. This has been true every year since 2011, leading to the current backlog of asylum applicants. The most recent count is that <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn01403">138,000 people</a> are awaiting a decision.</p>
<p>There are another 41,200 people whose applications have been rejected and are waiting to be removed from the UK. The number of removals of rejected asylum seekers has also fallen.</p>
<p><strong>UK asylum applications with a positive decision, 2004-2021</strong></p>
<p>Although decisions are taking longer, a greater proportion of them are positive. In 2021, 77% of all decisions resulted in a grant of asylum, after all appeals. This is a new high, up from only 27% in 2004. In every year since 2012, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/immigration-system-statistics-data-tables#asylum-applications-decisions-and-resettlement">more than half</a> of all applications for asylum have resulted in applicants being granted refugee status.</p>
<p>In addition to seeking asylum, refugees may arrive in the UK through resettlement and other <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn01403/">country-specific schemes</a>. Between 2014 and June 2023, 51,000 people arrived through these schemes, mostly from Syria and Afghanistan. A further 179,000 Ukrainians have arrived and in 2022, an estimated 52,000 British National (Overseas) visa holders arrived from Hong Kong.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Asylum seekers walking ashore on a beach after leaving an RNLI rescue vessel" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550195/original/file-20230926-17-7ehf99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=221%2C51%2C5465%2C3419&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/550195/original/file-20230926-17-7ehf99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550195/original/file-20230926-17-7ehf99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550195/original/file-20230926-17-7ehf99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=367&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550195/original/file-20230926-17-7ehf99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550195/original/file-20230926-17-7ehf99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/550195/original/file-20230926-17-7ehf99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=461&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/dungeness-kent-uk-29th-august-2022-2198927701">Sean Aidan Calderbank/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The need for safe and legal routes</h2>
<p>By most measures, the current government is the most aggressively anti-refugee administration in British history. They have passed laws threatening to send asylum seekers to Rwanda, and have <a href="https://theconversation.com/performative-cruelty-the-hostile-architecture-of-the-uk-governments-migrant-barge-210300">stuck them on a barge</a>. </p>
<p>The language ministers use to discuss refugees has been linked with <a href="https://scottishrefugeecouncil.org.uk/research-reveals-link-between-governments-anti-migrant-rhetoric-and-far-right-activity/">increasing hate crime</a> towards refugees. And their landmark piece of legislation, the Illegal Migration Act 2023, is widely considered to breach the UK’s <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/uk-illegal-migration-bill-un-refugee-agency-and-un-human-rights-office-warn">international legal obligations</a> by organisations such as UNHCR. </p>
<p>But despite appearing tough on borders, this government has recognised a greater proportion of asylum seekers as refugees than any previous administration. It has also enacted the largest refugee support scheme in UK history with Homes for Ukraine and the Ukraine Family Scheme.</p>
<p>In addition to these, there are a significant number of people from Hong Kong and Afghanistan currently arriving through specially designed schemes outside the asylum system. Such programmes demonstrate an important direction for future policy – even the current government recognises the need for safe and legal routes for vulnerable people to reach the UK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/214014/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Collyer receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He is chair of Sanctuary on Sea, Brighton's City of Sanctuary group. He is also (voluntary) chair of the Independent Advisory Group on Country Information. </span></em></p>The numbers on how many asylum seekers the UK accepts.Michael Collyer, Professor of Geography, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2093542023-07-20T16:44:56Z2023-07-20T16:44:56ZRwanda plan is in legal limbo, but history shows such migration deals are unlikely to disappear<p>The UK government is taking its controversial Rwanda asylum plan <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/braverman-rwanda-illegal-migration-bill-appeal-b2374718.html">to the supreme court</a>, after the court of appeal <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/suella-braverman-rwanda-deportation-court-b2367097.html">ruled</a> that the proposal was illegal.</p>
<p>However, even if the higher court appeal fails, agreements like the UK-Rwanda asylum partnership are unlikely to disappear. This is because migration “deals”, as historical analysis shows, are almost never just about migration. Rather, they are more often quid pro quo arrangements linked to other domestic and foreign policy goals. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9568/">UK-Rwanda partnership</a> involves the UK committing to provide Rwanda with £120 million in economic development aid. This is on top of an estimated <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2a510246-495c-49e8-a064-07871122db6f">£170,000 per asylum seeker</a> that the government expects to spend if the agreement is implemented. </p>
<p>In exchange, Rwanda would host these asylum seekers and determine whether their claims are genuine, in which case they would be offered refugee status in Rwanda. The court of appeal found that the Rwandan asylum system would be unable to accurately and fairly assess asylum claims, therefore putting refugees in danger.</p>
<p>In addition to its aim of tackling irregular migration, the arrangement allows the UK to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-uks-plan-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda-is-21st-century-imperialism-writ-large-181501">increase its influence</a> in the <a href="https://waronwant.org/resources/new-colonialism-britains-scramble-africas-energy-and-mineral-resources">mineral-rich</a> Great Lakes region of Africa.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-uks-plan-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda-is-21st-century-imperialism-writ-large-181501">How the UK's plan to send asylum seekers to Rwanda is 21st-century imperialism writ large</a>
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<p>The partnership provides Rwanda with resources and an opportunity to boost its international profile. It also means Britain exercising restraint in critiquing or putting pressure on Rwanda in areas where it might otherwise be far more vocal, such as human rights and meddling in the affairs of its neighbours. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6da56e7f-0d01-4883-bca7-050c0aae6e02">the UK refused to directly criticise</a> Rwanda’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/13/dr-congo-killings-rapes-rwanda-backed-m23-rebels">backing of the M23</a> rebel military group involved in a series of rapes and other crimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while the US, France, Germany and Belgium called on Rwanda to halt its support of the group.</p>
<p>The UK-Rwanda partnership is also a sign of how future migration “deals” could shape UK foreign policy. The government’s <a href="https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3429">illegal migration bill</a> hinges on the detention and removal of migrants who arrive in the UK irregularly. It lists 57 other countries that could be potential future partners, including Ecuador, Gambia, Moldova, Mongolia and Sierra Leone. Deals with any or all of these states could similarly affect UK foreign policy in arenas far beyond migration and border control.</p>
<h2>Deals throughout history</h2>
<p>The government <a href="https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2022/04/14/factsheet-migration-and-economic-development-partnership/">claims</a> that its approach is “completely new and innovative”. But in recent decades, <a href="https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/news/2022/the-uk-governments-plan-to-send-refugees-to-rwanda-isnt-that-different-to-policies-in-europe">Denmark</a>, the US, Australia, the <a href="https://www.rescue.org/eu/article/what-eu-turkey-deal#:%7E:text=The%20'EU%2DTurkey%20deal'%20is%20the%20term%20often%20used,Turkey%20to%20the%20Greek%20islands.">European Union</a> and others have all pursued deals that strongly resemble the UK-Rwanda partnership.</p>
<p><a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/99/2/707/7024981">Transactional migration schemes</a> commonly involve the exchange of cash and other incentives for hosting, assisting with or accepting the return of people who have been deemed “illegal” or “unwanted”. History is <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/99/2/707/7024981">full of attempts</a> to transfer “unwanted” populations to far-flung locales in exchange for financial or foreign policy benefits. </p>
<p>In 1902, British colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain proposed that parts of eastern Africa would be settled by Jewish immigrants. This came to be known as the “<a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/A_Concise_History_of_the_Jewish_People/z4eaj09hscAC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=joseph+chamberlain+uganda+scheme&pg=PA240&printsec=frontcover">Uganda scheme</a>”. </p>
<p>This was sold to domestic constituents as a solution to the “alien” (Jewish) migration of “persecuted people” to Britain. But it also served numerous <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/In_the_Shadow_of_Zion/Ej_UBAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover">British imperial and economic interests</a>, including justifying public investments in failed colonial infrastructure projects and deterring German expansionism in the region.</p>
<p>Jews were not the only group to be a focus of involuntary resettlement in distant lands. The League of Nations’ Nansen International Office for Refugees received numerous proposals for such schemes. </p>
<p>In 1934, it led the search for a “suitable home” in which to resettle Iraqi Assyrians. It considered venues such as British Guiana, Brazil and Timbuktu. The <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45334591">prospect of resettlement in Brazil</a> was due in part to the interests of the London-based Paraña Plantations Company. </p>
<p>The company operated in Brazil and offered to sell the League of Nations tracts of land for the project as a moneymaking scheme that would simultaneously attract usable labour.</p>
<p>Like the migration partnerships of today, these schemes were often justified on grounds of pragmatism, and cast as humanitarian responses designed to <a href="https://sup.org/books/title/?id=28037">stop human suffering</a>. They also involved promises of financial and other assistance in exchange for receiving populations, and were deeply intertwined with states’ larger geopolitical objectives.</p>
<h2>When deals backfire</h2>
<p>Beyond the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/26/eu-migration-aid-tunisia-betrayal-values-imprisoned-dissidents-children">human rights implications</a> and legal questions, these deals can also cause problems for the states that sign onto them.</p>
<p>States that agree to migration deals can commit to ongoing transfers of resources in exchange for arrangements that ultimately <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/australia-s-cambodia-refugee-deal-is-dead/4638263.html">never come to fruition</a> or fail to achieve their aims. They might also become locked into expensive contracts that continue long after detention facilities are no longer in use. </p>
<p>This has happened with Australia, which is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/may/23/nauru-offshore-detention-immigration-processing-to-cost-australia-485m-22-asylum-seekers">still paying</a> the tiny island nation of Nauru AU$350 million (£184 million) annually, despite the fact that its processing centres now stand empty.</p>
<p>Countries that agree to receive migrants can also exploit their position as de facto refugee and migrant warehouses. They can <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027464">threaten</a> not to cooperate with the terms of the deal, or expel those housed on their soil to extract more aid and other concessions over time. </p>
<p>This is something now deposed Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi did on <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/coercion-9780190846343?cc=us&lang=en&">multiple occasions</a> in the early 2000s while hosting migrants and asylum seekers from several Middle Eastern, North African and sub-Saharan countries.</p>
<p>In some cases, authoritarian regimes may use the aid received as part of a migration deal to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/imig.13075">bolster their power</a> and increase control in their own countries. This can, ironically, lead to more people fleeing the country as refugees amid escalating political repression.</p>
<p>History shows that migration partnerships voluntarily entered can backfire. And yet, the current UK government seems determined to push ahead with these deals (in Rwanda or elsewhere) as a central aspect of its border control policy. Doing so may also lead to unexpected outcomes and consequences in regions far beyond its borders – with lasting implications for foreign policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209354/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This piece is based on research that has received funding from the Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy.</span></em></p>Migration arrangements like the Rwanda plan have existed for well over a century.Fiona B. Adamson, Professor of International Relations, SOAS, University of LondonKelly M. Greenhill, Associate Professor and Senior Research Fellow at Tufts University and at MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099932023-07-19T16:06:58Z2023-07-19T16:06:58ZIllegal migration bill to become law: what you need to know<p><em>The UK government has succeeded in passing its illegal migration bill. After a series of late-night votes and months of controversy, the bill is now set to receive royal assent and become the Illegal Migration Act 2023. The following round-up will give you the key details of the bill and the analysis of the academic experts who have written about it for The Conversation.</em></p>
<p>The illegal migration bill is the central pillar of Rishi Sunak’s plan to stop small boat crossings, one of his <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-outlines-his-five-key-priorities-for-2023">five promises</a> as prime minister. On its journey to becoming law, the bill faced opposition from the House of Lords, Conservative backbenchers in the House of Commons, activists and organisations who support refugees in the UK, and the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/uk-illegal-migration-bill-un-refugee-agency-and-un-human-rights-office-warn">United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>A key facet of the bill – the Rwanda migration partnership – remains in legal limbo. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-uk-court-ruled-rwanda-isnt-a-safe-place-to-send-refugees-and-what-this-means-for-the-governments-immigration-plans-208768">Court of Appeal ruled</a> that Rwanda would not be able to fairly and accurately assess refugees’ asylum claims if they were sent there from the UK, and that therefore the plan was unlawful. The government will appeal this decision at the Supreme Court.</p>
<p>But regardless of whether the appeal is successful, the act sets the stage for future migration partnerships, where asylum seekers who enter the UK irregularly (such as by small boat) may be sent to another country the government deems “safe”.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-uk-court-ruled-rwanda-isnt-a-safe-place-to-send-refugees-and-what-this-means-for-the-governments-immigration-plans-208768">Why UK court ruled Rwanda isn't a safe place to send refugees – and what this means for the government's immigration plans</a>
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<p>This act is the second major immigration law passed in the last 15 months. The Nationality and Borders Act, <a href="https://theconversation.com/nationality-and-borders-act-becomes-law-five-key-changes-explained-182099">enacted in April 2022</a>, was the Boris Johnson government’s plan to fix a “broken” asylum system. But after it failed to have any discernible impact on the number of people making the dangerous journey across the Channel in small boats, the government introduced the illegal migration bill. </p>
<p>Erica Consterdine, an immigration policy expert at Lancaster University, has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-government-passed-a-major-immigration-law-last-year-so-why-is-it-trying-to-pass-another-one-207343">explained the difference</a> between the two pieces of legislation for us. She describes the new law as “the most extreme piece of immigration legislation to date”. It will effectively ban asylum seeking in the UK, by requiring the home secretary to detain and deport anyone who enters the UK illegally (most asylum seekers), before their cases can be considered.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-government-passed-a-major-immigration-law-last-year-so-why-is-it-trying-to-pass-another-one-207343">The government passed a major immigration law last year – so why is it trying to pass another one?</a>
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<p>This would include potential victims of modern slavery. One of the most controversial aspects of the legislation is that it would deny modern slavery protections to anyone who enters the UK illegally. This is, as expert Alex Balch from the University of Liverpool <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-uks-new-immigration-law-will-put-more-people-at-risk-of-modern-slavery-209746">explains</a>, because the government has accused asylum seekers of falsely claiming to be modern slavery victims in order to avoid deportation. </p>
<p>The House of Lords tried to soften these parts of the bill through a series of amendments, but was ultimately defeated by the government.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-uks-new-immigration-law-will-put-more-people-at-risk-of-modern-slavery-209746">How the UK's new immigration law will put more people at risk of modern slavery</a>
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<h2>Legal concerns</h2>
<p>From the moment it was announced, critics have said the illegal migration bill would clash with the UK’s human rights obligations. The home secretary, Suella Braverman, said herself that the bill would “push the boundaries” of international law. </p>
<p>Helen O'Nions, an expert in human rights law at Nottingham Trent University <a href="https://theconversation.com/illegal-immigration-bill-does-more-than-push-the-boundaries-of-international-law-201332">writes that</a> the provisions in the bill hinge on a “shaky interpretation” of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951, an international treaty that sets out the rights of refugees. While international refugee law is difficult to enforce, there are a number of issues in the bill that are likely to face prolonged legal battles.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/illegal-immigration-bill-does-more-than-push-the-boundaries-of-international-law-201332">Illegal immigration bill does more than 'push the boundaries' of international law</a>
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<p>It’s notable that these two migration policies have been passed under two ethnic minority home secretaries, and endorsed by other ministers who are the descendants of immigrants themselves. Politics researchers Neema Begum (University of Nottingham), Michael Bankole (King’s College) and Rima Saini (Middlesex University) have <a href="https://theconversation.com/minority-ethnic-politicians-are-pushing-harsh-immigration-policies-why-representation-doesnt-always-mean-racial-justice-206885">dug into this phenomenon</a> and argue that the appearance of ethnic diversity in government is used to prop up hard right views on immigration and race.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/minority-ethnic-politicians-are-pushing-harsh-immigration-policies-why-representation-doesnt-always-mean-racial-justice-206885">Minority ethnic politicians are pushing harsh immigration policies – why representation doesn't always mean racial justice</a>
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<h2>Will it even work?</h2>
<p>At the heart of the act is the government’s claim that people won’t come to the UK to seek asylum if they know they will be detained and deported to Rwanda or elsewhere. But there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-governments-plan-to-remove-asylum-seekers-will-be-a-logistical-mess-and-may-not-deter-people-from-coming-to-the-uk-201248">very little evidence</a>) to show that this approach of “deterrence” would be effective, writes Peter William Walsh, a researcher at Oxford University’s Migration Observatory.</p>
<p>Explaining the logistical problems with the proposals, he says that with the future of the Rwanda partnership uncertain, it’s not clear how the “detain and remove” approach will actually be put into practice. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-governments-plan-to-remove-asylum-seekers-will-be-a-logistical-mess-and-may-not-deter-people-from-coming-to-the-uk-201248">The government's plan to remove asylum seekers will be a logistical mess – and may not deter people from coming to the UK</a>
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<h2>The trauma of the asylum system</h2>
<p>This new legislation comes against the backdrop of an asylum “backlog” – tens of thousands of applications that have not yet been decided, leaving people uncertain about their future in the country. </p>
<p>This longform article by Steve Taylor, senior lecturer in psychology at Leeds Beckett University, details the physical and psychological impacts of being stuck in the UK’s asylum system. Taylor’s interviewees described experiences of trauma, suicidal thoughts, hostility and threats, from years spent in asylum limbo.</p>
<p>And, as he points out, the act “is predicted to lead to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/22/draconian-migration-bill-could-leave-tens-of-thousands-destitute-or-locked-up">more long-term detention</a>”. This will come at high cost to taxpayers, and to the human lives caught up in the policy. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-like-youre-a-criminal-but-i-am-not-a-criminal-first-hand-accounts-of-the-trauma-of-being-stuck-in-the-uk-asylum-system-202276">'It’s like you’re a criminal, but I am not a criminal.' First-hand accounts of the trauma of being stuck in the UK asylum system</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209993/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A recap of our expert analysis of the UK’s new migration law.Avery Anapol, Commissioning Editor, Politics + SocietyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2064372023-06-13T15:20:17Z2023-06-13T15:20:17ZThe government says migration is too high – but the latest numbers reflect a crisis of its own making in social care<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531123/original/file-20230609-23-fp5kxo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=351%2C162%2C5655%2C3845&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/admirable-caring-nurse-helping-feeble-lady-645695140">Dmytro Zinkevych/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The UK government’s response to the latest net migration figures is that the numbers <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-65643684">need to come down</a>. But the UK needs migrants and the skills they bring – and employers know this. </p>
<p>This is particularly true in the social care sector, which has been in crisis for years, and is increasingly important given the country’s <a href="https://census.gov.uk/census-2021-results/phase-one-topic-summaries/demography-and-migration/census-2021-results-and-our-ageing-population">ageing population</a>.</p>
<p>In recent years, social care has faced serious difficulties in <a href="https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/pp/45/3/article-p413.xml">recruiting and retaining</a> workers. Despite being recognised as essential during the pandemic, the reality for workers has been low pay and insecure hours. And there are still <a href="https://www.skillsforcare.org.uk/Adult-Social-Care-Workforce-Data/Workforce-intelligence/publications/Topics/Recruitment-and-retention.aspx">record high vacancies</a> in adult social care.</p>
<p>A key section of the social care workforce in recent years has been migrant workers. The recruitment of migrant workers has of course been transformed by Brexit, with new rules and regulations for those arriving to work in the UK. </p>
<p>The government, aware of the importance of migrant workers for the social care sector, sought to address the shortage in December 2021 by expanding the health and care worker visa to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/biggest-visa-boost-for-social-care-as-health-and-care-visa-scheme-expanded">include social care jobs</a>. </p>
<p>While this scheme, which came on line in February 2022, was meant to be for a 12-month period, these jobs remain on the UK’s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/skilled-worker-visa-shortage-occupations/skilled-worker-visa-shortage-occupations">shortage occupations list</a> and care workers appear to still be <a href="https://www.gov.uk/health-care-worker-visa">recruited</a> via this route.</p>
<p>This decision appears to have achieved a degree of success: the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-system-statistics-year-ending-march-2023/summary-of-latest-statistics#why-do-people-come-to-the-uk">latest figures reflect</a> a 59% rise in skilled worker visas issued, and an even larger rise (171%) in specific health and care visas. An increasing number of these workers are coming from non-EU countries, a logical consequence of Brexit. </p>
<p>Migrant workers also <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-adult-social-care-2022/adult-social-care-and-immigration-accessible#executive-summary">help to deliver social care in an increasingly diverse country</a>. As Britain’s demographics change it therefore makes sense that the social care workforce reflects that change.</p>
<h2>Investing in the workforce</h2>
<p>Looking back over the past 10 years, the labour shortages in social care stem from <a href="https://www.careengland.org.uk/net-migration-figures-renew-calls-for-targeted-social-care-workforce-support/">a lack of investment in the sector</a>. This includes the decade of austerity measures which resulted in real-terms cuts. By the time the pandemic hit, the workforce was <a href="https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/2023-06/TUC_Austerityandthepandemic_June23.pdf">already stretched</a>, and things have worsened since. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-care-workers-are-feeling-less-valued-and-leaving-the-sector-after-the-pandemic-169961">Why care workers are feeling less valued and leaving the sector after the pandemic</a>
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<p>If the UK government thinks migration is too high, it needs to invest more in the sector at home. This includes, for example, more resources and measures to improve training opportunities. Increasing pay would demonstrate to workers that their contributions are valued, and <a href="https://www.skillsforcare.org.uk/Adult-Social-Care-Workforce-Data/Workforce-intelligence/documents/State-of-the-adult-social-care-sector/The-state-of-the-adult-social-care-sector-and-workforce-2022.pdf">offering regular training</a> could help the sector thrive. </p>
<p>While the needs of social care workers need to be <a href="https://www.adass.org.uk/media/9685/adass-time-to-act-april-2023.pdf">addressed now</a>, part of that requires long-term planning and investment that goes further than <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-sets-out-next-steps-to-support-social-care">recent commitments</a>. That planning should include ensuring a welcoming and supportive environment for migrant workers who have (or will) come to the UK to work in social care and continuing to allow these workers to arrive via the health and care visa.</p>
<h2>Messaging on migration</h2>
<p>The social care situation shows the immediate benefits that migrant workers bring to the economy. As people come to the UK to take up roles that would otherwise remain unfilled, they create other jobs by generating <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-labour-market-effects-of-immigration/">demand in the economy for goods and services</a>. This is before we even turn to the wider social and cultural contribution that migrants bring to the country.</p>
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<img alt="View from behind of a nurse walking down a street while neighbours standing outside their houses applaud" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531124/original/file-20230609-25-vc24yo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531124/original/file-20230609-25-vc24yo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531124/original/file-20230609-25-vc24yo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531124/original/file-20230609-25-vc24yo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531124/original/file-20230609-25-vc24yo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531124/original/file-20230609-25-vc24yo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531124/original/file-20230609-25-vc24yo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Care workers were stretched thin long before the pandemic labelled them ‘key workers’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/watford-hertfordshire-uk-may-21-2020-1740457625">Eric Johnson Photography/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>Despite these positives, the government has reacted negatively to the rise in net migration. Rather than focus on improving the experience of those arriving to work and recognise the benefits they bring, the discussion has largely focused on border control and characterising the number of migrant workers as a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-has-too-many-low-skilled-migrants-interior-minister-2022-10-01/">problem to be addressed</a>. There is a growing gap between the realities of the UK’s needs and the political rhetoric on migration.</p>
<p>Whether the focus is on asylum seekers or migrant workers (often there is a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1369148119851385">misguided conflation between all new arrivals</a> to the country), the language continually presents those arriving in a negative light and creates an environment that makes it more difficult for migrants to settle in the country. In sectors such as social care, where research has demonstrated that migrant workers have faced <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-021-00807-3">racism and discrimination</a>, harsh comments from the government are unlikely to alleviate these experiences. </p>
<p>At the same time, the government has persisted with legislation banning asylum seekers from working. This <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-social-policy/article/you-have-to-workbut-you-cant-contradictions-of-the-active-labour-market-policies-for-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-the-uk/BAB5F0158743627F092641B0DD71472C#">delays access to training opportunities</a> and creates issues for them later in finding employment.</p>
<p>Rather than a concern, the rise in the number of people arriving to work in the UK should be a source of relief for politicians who have failed to implement and fund long-term planning for crucial workforces.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206437/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Montgomery has conducted research on issues of social care, migration and labour markets that has been funded by the European Commission.</span></em></p>The social care sector has been struggling for years, and relying on migrant workers to support it.Tom Montgomery, Lecturer in Work and Organisations, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2073872023-06-12T09:59:33Z2023-06-12T09:59:33ZIllegal migration bill: the concern for children’s rights keeping the House of Lords up all night<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531160/original/file-20230609-29-1wtswc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=131%2C51%2C4732%2C3026&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/dungeness-kent-uk-may-5th-2022-2152529247">Sean Aidan Calderbank/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3429">illegal migration bill</a> passed through the House of Commons earlier this year, but is being fiercely contested in the House of Lords. The bill is currently at the <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2023/may-2023/lords-scrutinises-illegal-migration-bill/">committee stage</a> which allows the members to scrutinise the text and make amendments.</p>
<p>With only five days <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/house-of-lords-illegal-migration-bill-night-sitting-suella-braverman-b1086385.html">scheduled for this process</a>, the debate continued overnight on June 7 until 4am. Many were <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/house-of-lords-illegal-migration-bill-late-sitting">frustrated</a> with the unusually late sitting.</p>
<p>Peers <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2023-06-07/debates/41061D9F-F385-4CF5-9B77-8EB8852381A3/IllegalMigrationBill">expressed concerns</a> about a number of provisions in the government’s plan to deter migrants from crossing the channel in small boats. But a key sticking point has been the issue of detention for immigration purposes, particularly of children. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/22/section/5/enacted">Immigration Act 2014</a> banned the detention of unaccompanied children (who have arrived in the UK without a responsible adult) for more than 24 hours at any one time. But there are still some circumstances where unaccompanied children are detained. For example, when awaiting an <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/asylum-age-assessments-children-home-office-high-court-uk-b1996272.html">age assessment</a> if the Home Office believes they are <a href="https://theconversation.com/children-are-sometimes-held-in-immigration-detention-in-the-uk-too-this-must-stop-98910">over 18</a>. </p>
<p>The new bill would allow the government to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/illegal-migration-bill-factsheets/illegal-migration-bill-detention-and-bail-factsheet#:%7E:text=The%20bill%20will%20create%20new,a%20reasonable%20period%20of%20time">indefinitely detain</a> all asylum seekers who enter the UK illegally, including children and potential victims of trafficking.</p>
<p>In a strong condemnation of this aspect of the bill, Conservative peer Baroness Mobarik described detention without charge or trial as <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/thehouse/article/child-detention-illegal-migration-bill-misguided-stopped">“one of the most draconian powers the state has over the individual”</a>. She summed up the proposed reintroduction of child detention succinctly: “This cannot be right.”</p>
<p>If an unaccompanied child who arrives in the UK illegally is from a safe country of origin, they may be returned there even before they reach 18. Crossbench peer Baroness Butler-Sloss described a hypothetical situation where a 10-year-old could live and attend school in England for several years, only to be callously uprooted under the proposals. They could be removed at age 18 (or earlier) to a country where they may not know the language or have family or other connections. She described the bill as “quite simply … cruel.” </p>
<h2>Child victims of modern slavery</h2>
<p>Researchers and activists have been criticising the bill’s proposals that would deny certain protections and support to potential victims of <a href="https://modernslaverypec.org/assets/downloads/Modern-Slavery-PEC-Explainer-Illegal-Migration-Bill-v1.3.pdf">modern slavery</a>, including “unaccompanied asylum-seeking children” or “unaccommpanied children”. This label alone means refugee children are often excluded from the duties and protections that are afforded (at least in theory) to all children in England and Wales. </p>
<p>But the current protections are not as strong as activists may like, and children in particular face many barriers in the immigration system. Only <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/119973/pdf/">2% of child trafficking victims between 2019-2020</a> with irregular migration status in the UK were granted the leave to remain. This is despite being entitled to such protections under several aspects of international law.</p>
<p>As I <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/119973/pdf/">wrote in evidence</a> for Parliament’s <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/work/7389/legislative-scrutiny-illegal-migration-bill/">human rights joint committee</a>, the proposals will have a detrimental impact on children. They may even increase the risk of child exploitation or going missing, as has already happened with asylum-seeking unaccompanied children in hotel accommodation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/migrant-children-in-the-uk-are-going-missing-from-care-heres-how-to-protect-them-199646">Migrant children in the UK are going missing from care – here’s how to protect them</a>
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<h2>International law</h2>
<p>Measures to clamp down on irregular migration are often enacted in the name of combating modern slavery and trafficking. But they have had calamitous consequences for people entitled to protection under international law on refugees. Often, children are caught up in these policies.</p>
<p>During the remaining two days of committee stage, peers (including some from the Conservative party) will continue arguing for a number of amendments to the bill. <a href="https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/international-treaties-house-of-lords-illegal-migration-bill">One would prevent</a> the government from breaching international law relating to refugees and human rights.</p>
<p>One such treaty is the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child">Convention on the Rights of the Child</a> 1989, the most widely ratified human rights treaty in the world. While not immune to <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/chil/28/1/article-p66_66.xml?language=en&ebody=full%20html-copy1">criticism</a>, it is pivotal in the protection of children’s rights globally. Under the convention, the UK government has clear obligations when it comes to the protection, care and treatment of unaccompanied or separated asylum-seeking children.</p>
<p>In this regard, the illegal migration bill has drawn a range of international criticism. The UN’s <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/crc">Committee on the Rights of the Child</a> urged the government to “<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/06/un-child-rights-committee-publishes-findings-finland-france-jordan-sao-tome">repeal all draft provisions</a> that would violate children’s rights. This includes ensuring that all asylum-seeking and refugee children can access necessary support, and to guarantee that unaccompanied children have a right to apply for family reunification. </p>
<p>Researchers and activists <a href="https://modernslaverypec.org/assets/downloads/Childrens-Outcomes-Research-Summary.pdf">called on the home office</a> in 2022 to ensure that immigration and asylum system does not re-traumatise children or increase the risk of exploitation. They emphasised the negative impact of lengthy immigration procedures on young people.</p>
<p>Unaccompanied children are subject to considerable psychological harm as a consequence of the threat of detention and removal. The discretionary power of the home secretary to return <a href="https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/law/research/european-childrens-rights-unit/campaigns/vulnerable-children-in-a-hostile-environment/">Albanian unaccompanied minors</a> to Albania – as could happen under the bill’s proposals – may <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/119969/pdf/">violate their human rights</a>. </p>
<p>As long as children in the UK’s immigration system face restrictions and the removal of their rights, this bill will be in clear violation of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/07/illegal-migration-bill-joint-civil-society-briefing-house-lords-second-reading">international law</a>. The attempt to push through an inhumane and punitive piece of legislation should alarm us all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207387/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth A Faulkner receives funding from the British Academy, the Royal Irish Academy and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). </span></em></p>Provisions related to detention of children and protections for trafficking victims are the subject of ongoing debate.Elizabeth A Faulkner, Lecturer in Law, Keele UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2053092023-05-09T16:27:30Z2023-05-09T16:27:30ZI’ve worked in precarious jobs for more than 10 years – here’s what unions should do to support migrant workers<p>As I rush to clean everything before the sink overfills with plates and pans, I am confronted, yet again, with the brutality of my working conditions. My feet and legs throb and ache from sole to calf; I can feel the onset of cramps. But the chef won’t be able to work unless I clean these pans.</p>
<p>The clatter of plates and screaming of orders around me have become a constant, thumping backdrop. The only noise I pay attention to is the “beep” of the service elevator next to me – its door opens to reveal an explosion of leftovers, hastily thrown in by the upstairs waiters amid dirty napkins and cutlery.</p>
<p>To me, the beep has come to resemble a form of torture: every new sound signals more pressure, less space, more to catch up on. I haven’t taken a break since I started working 11 hours ago. There are at least three more hours to go.</p>
<p>The cost of the uneaten food is more than I make each day. I wonder if the customers have considered the pain that goes into the food they enjoy upstairs, just above our heads.</p>
<h2>Intensely precarious working conditions</h2>
<p>As a migrant worker since my arrival to the UK in 2011 and as a trade union organiser since 2013, I was already aware of the difficulties facing migrant workers who seek to challenge exploitation, both individually and collectively. To further understand <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/wusa.12346">these barriers</a>, I took on (and <a href="https://theses.gla.ac.uk/82275/">analysed</a>) jobs in a number of different precarious workplaces in Glasgow between 2017 and 2021, including as a kitchen porter in the Mediterranean restaurant in central Glasgow described above.</p>
<p>While some politicians and commentators rage against UK immigration levels, the fact that its economy does not simply rely on migrant labour but is, in my view, <a href="https://interregnum.live/2018/01/22/the-crack-in-the-edifice-modern-capitalism-migrant-workers-and-social-movements/">purposely designed to attract and exploit it</a>, is rarely mentioned. Ever since the days of empire, the UK has recruited migrant workers to staff the most precarious and labour-intensive occupations, in line with the demands of the economy. Regardless of whether they are from former colonies, European, documented or undocumented, migrants form an inseparable part of the nation’s economic infrastructure.</p>
<p>Making up about <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-labour-market-an-overview/">18% of the UK’s total labour force</a>, migrant workers are overrepresented in sectors such as factories, food manufacturing, hospitality and logistics. These are also the occupations that are the most likely to be characterised by intensely precarious working conditions, such as agency work or zero-hours contracts, punitive reductions of hours, unsociable shifts, and a lack of trade union representation.</p>
<p>On top of precarious employment, migrant workers face other barriers that are connected to the UK’s <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0261018320980653">hostile environment policies</a>, such as a lack of access to benefits. This means that the lives of many migrant workers in the UK are in a state of constant insecurity with regard to employment, income, accommodation and even food.</p>
<p>Whether their job is underpinned by a zero-hours contract, an online platform, an employment agency, or more “informal” and unregulated working arrangements, the overarching experience is one of intense insecurity and individualisation.</p>
<p>In these precarious workplaces, the pressure to perform is omnipresent. Watching colleagues being arbitrarily dismissed due to a lack of (over)exertion or for making trivial mistakes makes you realise that you are alone, exposed and vulnerable to the demands of your employer. Your relationships with your superiors and your personal abilities to push yourself are the only substitutes for contractual safety.</p>
<h2>‘I’ve only seen a union once’</h2>
<p>This isolation is worsened by the near-total non-existence of unions in precarious workplaces, despite <a href="https://www.tuc.org.uk/standing-migrant-workers-everywhere">official pronouncements</a> that claim to support migrant workers. Since 2011, I have worked in more than 20 different locations in the hospitality, manufacturing and logistics sectors – I have only seen a union once, and it was oriented towards the permanent staff.</p>
<p>Many migrants I met weren’t even sure whether they could join unions as foreigners. And in every workplace I entered, the word “strike” was only uttered as a joke. Then, they dismissed the prospect. In a life saturated by insecurity, thinking of change is a luxury.</p>
<p>This is not to say that <a href="https://www.gmb.org.uk/news/gmb-pressure-forces-home-office-u-turn-migrant-indefinite-leave">unions haven’t made attempts</a>. But, due to the transient and insecure nature of precarious employment, the stability and trust between colleagues and between workers and union organisers that is required to build meaningful campaigns are simply not there.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-heroes-left-behind-the-invisible-women-struggling-to-make-ends-meet-198210">COVID heroes left behind: the 'invisible' women struggling to make ends meet</a>
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<p>Instead, a vicious cycle is created where precarious conditions breed precarious mindsets – an acceptance of insecure and low pay, poor working conditions and abuse. Indeed, <a href="https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/91404/3/forde_mackenzie_ciupijus_and_alberti.pdf">it has been argued</a> that such working conditions act as forces of socialisation: they teach migrant workers what to expect and how to conduct themselves.</p>
<p>This, when combined with <a href="https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2010/anderson_work_employment_society_2010/">migration controls</a> such as being dependent on an employer to remain in the country, lack of access to information and language barriers, renders migrant workers even more vulnerable and exploitable.</p>
<h2>A new breed of social centre</h2>
<p>I believe a crucial element of how unions and social movements can counteract the debilitating effects of precarity is to encourage and materially support the creation of new <a href="https://roarmag.org/essays/amazon-neoliberal-worker/">social centres</a> within neighbourhoods. This is already happening, both formally and informally, in <a href="https://iwc-cti.ca/about-us/">North America</a> and <a href="https://en.squat.net/2021/04/06/athens-zizania-new-squatted-social-center-in-victoria/">parts of Europe</a>, where social movements have set up physical community spaces that allow migrant and other precarious populations to congregate and organise.</p>
<p>These are not top-down initiatives but horizontal structures managed by workers with an understanding of the particularities associated with being an immigrant. But they need to be connected to cross-workplace organising structures, such as the Independent Workers’ Union of Great Britain’s <a href="https://iwgb.org.uk/en/page/clb/">Couriers and Logistics Branch</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/im-always-delivering-food-while-hungry-how-undocumented-migrants-find-work-as-substitute-couriers-in-the-uk-201695">'I’m always delivering food while hungry': how undocumented migrants find work as substitute couriers in the UK</a>
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<p>The value of such spaces is to allow workers who experience high degrees of transience (such as couriers or agency workers) to connect with each other, and with unions, in order to collectively organise to challenge their labour conditions.</p>
<p>This new breed of social centre could also address the interrelated factors that maintain migrant precarity, such as migration restrictions and housing. They would allow migrant workers to access a safe, supportive space outside of the workplace in their own time. Above all, they would be physical examples that grassroots support is there – and that they are not alone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Panos Theodoropoulos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since 2011, I’ve worked in more than 20 precarious workplaces in hospitality, manufacturing and logistics – and I have only seen a union once.Panos Theodoropoulos, Teaching Fellow of Work, Employment, Management and Organisation, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2045832023-04-27T15:17:13Z2023-04-27T15:17:13ZIllegal migration bill: can the government ignore the European court of human rights?<p>The illegal migration bill has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/26/controversial-uk-asylum-bill-passes-third-reading-in-commons">approved by MPs</a> and now moves to the House of Lords. The controversial bill would make it so that anyone who arrives in the UK irregularly (for example, by small boat) can be removed to their country of origin or a third country (for example, Rwanda). </p>
<p>The bill passed the Commons with a number of amendments, including one that allows the government to disregard “interim measures” issued by the European court of human rights. </p>
<p>The court typically uses <a href="https://echr.coe.int/documents/fs_interim_measures_eng.pdf">interim measures</a> to temporarily suspend an expulsion or extradition of an asylum seeker until their case can be properly heard by the court. These measures are used sparingly, and when the court suspects that sending someone to a particular country could risk violating their right to life, or put them in danger of torture or inhumane treatment. They are not the final say in a particular case – they just ensure that the court has a chance to consider all the evidence before someone is removed.</p>
<p>It is this sort of measure that <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-deportations-what-is-the-european-court-of-human-rights-and-why-did-it-stop-the-uk-flight-from-taking-off-185143">blocked the first deportation flight</a> to Rwanda from taking off in June 2022. </p>
<p>If the bill becomes law in its current form, the UK would be the only country in Europe that legally gives ministers permission to disregard the legally binding order of the European court of human rights.</p>
<p>According to the court’s rule 39, interim measures <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/pd_interim_measures_intro_eng.pdf">can be used</a> in cases where the victim is facing an imminent and serious threat to their human rights. For instance, the court can ask a state to transfer a prisoner from a prison hospital to the civil one if they cannot be treated properly in the former. Or, to order a state not to discontinue medical treatment if it might violate a patient’s right to life. </p>
<p>The most widespread use of interim measures is in immigration cases. The court can temporarily prevent a migrant from being deported while deciding whether the deportation complies with human rights. If the court finds that the deportation is legal, the interim measures will be lifted and the applicant can be deported. </p>
<p>However, if the court decides that the applicant should not be deported, interim measures ensure that this can actually be carried out – if someone is deported to a country where they face threat of harm, it could be difficult to bring them back. </p>
<p>The court has ruled that failure to comply with <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68183">interim measures</a> violates a state’s obligations under the European convention on human rights (and therefore, international law). The convention, to which the UK is a party, states in Article 34 that parties must ensure the court can effectively deal with applications from alleged victims of human rights violations. Disregarding interim measures would disrupt this.</p>
<h2>Complying with the court</h2>
<p>Despite regular <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11703793/We-need-ditch-ECHR-tackle-Channel-migrants-crisis-Brexit-backing-MPs-say.html">criticism of the European court of human rights</a>, the UK has a good record of compliance with the court’s interim measures and final judgments. </p>
<p>Only once has it been condemned for failure to follow an interim measure. In a 2010 <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-97575">case</a>, two alleged terrorists arrested by UK troops in Iraq were transferred to the Iraqi authorities despite a court-ordered interim measure preventing it. However, in this case, the government argued that there was no objective opportunity for them to comply. The amendments in the illegal migration bill would give power to the minister to disregard international law by setting aside the court’s interim measures.</p>
<p>More generally, interim measures are very well complied with. To keep compliance high, the court uses them rarely and only when it is strictly necessary. There are <a href="https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22documentcollectionid2%22:%5B%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22%5D%7D">fewer than 50 cases</a> where the court found a state violated the convention by failing to comply with an interim measure. </p>
<p>Russia, which was <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/the-russian-federation-is-excluded-from-the-council-of-europe">recently expelled</a> from the Council of Europe, is still the leader in this unfortunate ranking, with around 20 judgments delivered against it. Although Russia has regularly failed to comply with interim measures, this practice isn’t part of Russian legislation.</p>
<p>There are some notable instances of compliance with interim measures even in Russia. For instance, when opposition leader Alexei Navalny <a href="https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2020/08/24/alexei-navalny-evacuated-to-germany-european-court-of-human-rights-orders-interim-measures-against-russia/">was poisoned</a>, the European court of human rights ordered Russian authorities to transfer him to Germany for medical treatment, which they did. </p>
<p>Generally, states take interim measures seriously, and even in cases of failure to comply, usually argue in court that they could not enforce them due to some objective reason. </p>
<h2>Can they do that?</h2>
<p>Put simply, states cannot just disregard valid and ongoing international obligations, such as the UK’s obligations under the European convention on human rights.</p>
<p>However, sometimes states do that. The example of Russia again comes to mind, when its parliament ruled that in certain circumstances the Russian Constitutional Court can set aside the judgments of the European court of human rights. This decision was widely criticised by <a href="https://www.echrblog.com/2016/04/the-russian-response-to-prisoner-voting.html">academics</a>, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/europerussia-venice-commission-denounces-putin-constitutional-amendments-which-avoid-execution-of-ecthr-rulings/">and international human rights organisations</a>.</p>
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<img alt="Home Secretary Suella Braverman walking outdoors in front of a black car, holding a red minister's folder under her arm" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523207/original/file-20230427-681-mzys49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/523207/original/file-20230427-681-mzys49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523207/original/file-20230427-681-mzys49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523207/original/file-20230427-681-mzys49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523207/original/file-20230427-681-mzys49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523207/original/file-20230427-681-mzys49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/523207/original/file-20230427-681-mzys49.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The law would allow ministers to ignore the European court of human rights’ interim measures.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-united-kingdom-november-22-2022-2285216867">ITS/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>The European court of human rights is part of an international judicial system that only works if all parties agree and comply. According to the <a href="https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf">Vienna convention on the law of treaties</a> states cannot use their domestic laws to avoid international treaty obligations. This is exactly what the illegal migration bill now does. </p>
<p>The fact that interim measures are usually complied with shows that they are a respected tool that allows the court to effectively deal with important cases of human rights. They are temporary and can be lifted when a judgment is delivered, but still hold states to binding international obligations. Adopting a legal clause that allows the government to ignore such obligations is a very dangerous precedent that could easily backfire, for example, if the court were to issue interim measures in respect to another member state that the UK government would be in favour of.</p>
<p>To use the football metaphor, imagine a team in the English Premier League suddenly decides not to abide by the offside rule, and introduces this in their team’s statute. This would not work in a match, and the team’s reputation would suffer so much that it would have much less of a say if, for example, a rival team decided to allow players to use their hands.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204583/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The European court has ruled that interim measures are legally binding under international law.Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Professor in Human Rights Law, University of LiverpoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2012482023-03-09T11:50:38Z2023-03-09T11:50:38ZThe government’s plan to remove asylum seekers will be a logistical mess – and may not deter people from coming to the UK<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514292/original/file-20230308-14-32z1dt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=45%2C9%2C5990%2C3520&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Migrants rescued by Border Force after crossing the English Channel.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/dover-kent-uk-april-30th-2022-2151230933">Sean Aidan Calderbank/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In its new <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-03/0262/220262.pdf">illegal migration bill</a>, the UK government has introduced some surprisingly radical proposals designed to discourage people from crossing the Channel in small boats to claim asylum.</p>
<p>Chiefly, it targets people who arrive in Britain through irregular routes, barring them from seeking asylum. And the UK does not offer many legal routes, with exceptions such as the schemes for Ukrainian and Afghan refugees.</p>
<p>Immigration lawyers are still picking over the details of the bill – initial debate is focused on whether it violates the UK’s legal obligations under international human rights or refugee law. While these questions are important, the practical and operational constraints are arguably the biggest obstacle to implementing it.</p>
<p>On paper, the bill effectively opts the UK out of the global asylum system as we know it, by preventing people from claiming asylum if they have arrived through irregular routes. That global system is, after all, based on the principle that people must usually reach a country’s territory in order to claim asylum. And this often involves irregular entry, because people fleeing threatening or otherwise dire circumstances may not have proper documents.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/illegal-immigration-bill-does-more-than-push-the-boundaries-of-international-law-201332">Illegal immigration bill does more than 'push the boundaries' of international law</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2023/3/6407794e4/statement-on-uk-asylum-bill.html">UN</a> has said the new UK bill represents a “clear breach” of the refugee convention, “which explicitly recognises that refugees may be compelled to enter a country of asylum irregularly”.</p>
<p>Instead of hearing asylum claims, the bill stipulates that people entering through irregular routes should be “detained and removed” from the UK. This applies regardless of nationality, including people from countries such as Afghanistan and Eritrea who would be very likely to be granted asylum in the UK under the current system.</p>
<h2>Will people actually be removed?</h2>
<p>But making something law does not mean it can be implemented. One of the biggest questions the bill raises is where people would be removed to.</p>
<p>If people do not come from countries deemed “safe” by the UK, they cannot be sent back to their country of origin without a decision on their asylum claim. If this is the case, the bill says they should be sent to “safe third countries”. There is currently just one third country, Rwanda, that is willing to take asylum seekers from the UK. </p>
<p>But even if the Rwanda scheme gets up and running, it is only expected to have capacity for <a href="https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2022-11-28/97762">around 200 people</a> at first, though more could perhaps be processed per year. Without other safe third countries to remove people to, it is not obvious that many people could be removed in practice.</p>
<p>Past data illustrates this. Since January 1 2021, the UK government has already had a policy in place to remove asylum seekers it believes could have applied for asylum in another country. This would presumably include most people arriving by small boat from France. As of September 30 2022, the government had assessed around 18,000 people for removal – but <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-uks-asylum-backlog/">had removed just 21</a>.</p>
<p>Oddly, one <a href="https://twitter.com/ColinYeo1/status/1633429475068092419">strange quirk</a> of the new bill is that it appears to make it harder, not easier, for the government to remove people who are not considered refugees. By preventing the government from considering asylum claims at all, it means that claims cannot be refused. People from “unsafe” countries who would have been refused cannot, under the new bill, be sent back to their countries of origin – instead, the UK will have to detain them (a costly endeavour) until a third country is willing to take them.</p>
<p>In 2022, the UK’s detention facilities were estimated to have a total capacity of no more than 2,500, while in the month of August last year, small boat arrivals exceeded 8,000. To accommodate more people, there would need to be a major increase in the use of detention. This is a reversal of previous government policy, which over the last ten years has <a href="https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2016-01-14/HCWS470">aimed to minimise the use of immigration detention</a>.</p>
<p>If people continue to arrive in the UK in substantial numbers, not being able to process and resolve their asylum claims could create considerable operational difficulties and financial costs – aside from the obvious human cost.</p>
<h2>The deterrent may not work</h2>
<p>At the heart of the proposal is a gamble: that the UK will not actually need to impose this penalty on many people, because the deterrent effect will be so strong.</p>
<p>While this may seem like a sort of policy catch-22 – “introduce a policy to deter arrivals so that you don’t need to implement the policy to deter arrivals” – it <a href="https://twitter.com/i/status/1632316599465017345">is the argument made by some government ministers</a>.</p>
<p>It’s hard to predict how much of a deterrent effect the provisions in the bill will have. They are more extreme than polices adopted in most other high-income countries, which is where most of the evidence on policy deterrence comes from.</p>
<p>With that said, to date there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-no-evidence-that-asylum-seeker-deterrence-policy-works-8367">surprisingly little evidence</a> that asylum deterrence policies put people off in large numbers, for the simple reason that asylum seekers often have little understanding of what policies they will face when they arrive. Indeed, this has been the finding of the Home Office’s own internal research, which was released to an NGO working on migration after a Freedom of Information request and shared with our team. </p>
<p>There’s certainly a risk, therefore, that the UK would end up detaining (or otherwise housing and supporting) quite large numbers of people for indefinite periods if this bill is enacted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter William Walsh receives funding from Trust for London and Oak Foundation. He is Senior Researcher at The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford. </span></em></p>The UK may be setting itself up to detain many people for indefinite periods.Peter William Walsh, Researcher, The Migration Observatory, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1936382022-11-02T15:58:45Z2022-11-02T15:58:45ZSuella Braverman’s talk of a refugee ‘invasion’ is a dangerous political gambit gone wrong<p>When someone hears the UK home secretary speaking about “<a href="https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/britain-facing-invasion-south-coast-asylum-broken-suella-braverman/">stopping the invasion</a> on our southern coast”, they might be forgiven for thinking Britain is at war. Suella Braverman’s description of refugees landing at Kent as an “invasion” is an unprecedented comment from a government minister speaking in parliament. </p>
<p>Many in the Conservative party have traditionally distanced themselves from more outspoken right-wingers – <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nigel-farage-kent-beach-invasion-video-anti-migrant-immigration-a9658246.html">Nigel Farage, for example</a> – who have regularly spoken of the “invasion” of asylum seekers. Even the former home secretary, Priti Patel, who promoted a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/priti-patel-chanel-crossing-migrants-b1955024.html">“turn back the boats” strategy</a> and spearheaded <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/oral-statement-on-rwanda">sending migrants to Rwanda</a>, was careful to avoid such dehumanising language.</p>
<p>Invoking invasion metaphors is dangerous precisely because it assumes the motives of a population whose experiences, backgrounds and migration stories are complex and often traumatic. Depicting refugees as an invading army – or <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/bbc-under-fire-nigel-farage-194412564.html">a flood that threatens to sweep over the nation</a> – represents them as a marauding force bent on aggression.</p>
<p>This language of invasion is one used often by right-wing extremist groups, who take it upon themselves to patrol the Kent coast and spread disinformation about asylum seekers through social media. In September 2019, the far-right group Britain First started <a href="https://www.kentonline.co.uk/dover/news/far-right-group-patrols-beaches-for-migrants-212472/">beach patrols on Samphire Hoe</a>, the country park created from the Channel Tunnel excavations. Tellingly, they dubbed this “Operation White Cliffs”. In 2020, its members <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/05/port-of-dover-is-brought-to-a-standstill-by-far-right-groups">blocked the port of Dover</a>, causing gridlock. Later they launched their own patrol boat Alfred the Great, promising to stand firm “against the <a href="https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/b/far-right-mob-britain-first-launch-migrant-patrol-ship-off-dover">unprecedented invasion by economic migrants”</a>.</p>
<p>With the context of the terrorist attack on the Dover <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-63473640">immigration centre</a>, Braverman’s unapologetic use of such inflammatory language plays into the hands of such groups. So why is she using it now?</p>
<p>In the run-up to Brexit, immigration was at the fore of public attention. Leave campaigners and parts of the press regularly invoked a narrative of territorial encroachment, suggesting that the British way of life was being threatened from the outside. The increasing number of refugees crossing the Channel was often conflated with the threat posed by EU bureaucracy and laws. This was one argument for “seizing back control” of British borders. </p>
<p>But years after the referendum, we are moving to a political era where migration is no longer of particular concern to the British people. In 2013, the British Social Attitudes survey suggested 77% of Brits <a href="https://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-31/immigration/introduction.aspx">wanted immigration reduced “a lot”</a>. By 2019 <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/">this was down to 19%</a>, and more recent surveys suggest that most believe immigration has a positive impact on the nation. By 2022, inflation/prices (54%), the economy (34%) and climate change (23%) all far outstripped immigration (11%) in the British public’s <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/ipsos-issues-index-august-2022">political priorities</a>.</p>
<p>With this in mind, Braverman’s rhetoric of invasion could be an attempt to reignite debates about the border, to deflect from some of the economic problems that her party has struggled to address. Following the Tories’ disastrous flirtation with Trussonomics, claims about the threat of migration are a convenient smokescreen. They suggest the nation’s current travails are caused by “illegals” who take British jobs and homes. </p>
<p>Propping up her currently-ailing party’s reputation as one tough on immigration, Braverman’s intervention in the debates around the Channel crisis could have been a masterstroke ahead of a general election which looks set to be a disaster for the Conservatives. But given the reaction, even from her <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/uk-news/suella-braverman-asylum-invasion-jenrick-b2215374.html">fellow ministers</a>, it is one that looks to have badly misfired. </p>
<p>In recent days, harrowing images of child refugees held in the overcrowded Manston airfield accommodation in Kent have undermined Braverman’s tough talk. They have instead fostered widespread sympathy towards the plight of those who come to the UK seeking a better life. In this light, talking of refugees as aggressors threatening the island fortress seems badly out of touch with contemporary public opinion. </p>
<h2>Kent as the frontline</h2>
<p>The language of “invasion” being applied to migrants – legal and otherwise – is of course not uncommon. One of the most notable examples was the 2019 photo in The Sun, claiming to depict “<a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9835451/migrants-arrive-kent-beach-crisis/">The Moment Migrants Storm Kent Beaches</a>”.</p>
<p>Militaristic metaphors of national defence being breached, and descriptions of a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=li_DK-fs_Nw">“deadly cat and mouse game</a>” between border patrol and refugees in dinghies depict Kent as a battleground, rather than a site of reception and hospitality. </p>
<p>This language resonates powerfully because of Kent’s role as the military frontline throughout British history. This is embodied in the memorials, monuments and military structures around Kent’s coastline, from <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1502015582">Dover Castle</a> to the <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/memorials/item/memorial/1587">Road to Remembrance in Folkestone</a>.</p>
<p>During the run-up and immediate aftermath of Brexit, when so much appeared uncertain, these sites were seized upon as part of the mythology of the “island fortress”. The spirit of 1945 was regularly invoked by those arguing it was time for the British to “take back control”. Boris Johnson argued that Winston Churchill would have joined him on his Brexit “battle bus” and compared the EU “superstate” to <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/14/boris-johnson-the-eu-wants-a-superstate-just-as-hitler-did/">Hitler’s Germany</a>. And Nigel Farage entered a 2019 rally to the sound of <a href="https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/brexit-news-nigel-farage-criticised-for-using-air-raid-sirens-for-introduction-51310/">air raid sirens</a>.</p>
<p>Brexit was fuelled by subtle cultural manipulation of ideas of Englishness – embracing both the nostalgia for the British imperial project as well as the class resentments associated with austerity. Brexit was a vote against London, globalisation and multiculturalism as much as it was a vote against Europe. This combination appeared to have particular appeal to many older, mainly white voters living outside the capital. Many would have voted Conservative in 2019, leading to Braverman’s rise to home secretary in the first place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Hubbard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Using military rhetoric like ‘invasion’ plays into the hands of extremist groups.Philip Hubbard, Professor of Urban Studies, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1882462022-08-15T16:06:37Z2022-08-15T16:06:37ZLiz Truss and Rishi Sunak want to crack down on migration – an expert reviews their plans<p>Immigration is an <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13111">ideological headache for the UK’s Conservative party</a>, caught between its neoliberal new right that champions free markets, and its social conservatism, which immigration is said to threaten. But a restrictive immigration stance has been a winning ticket for the Conservatives since David Cameron’s 2010 pledge to <a href="https://general-election-2010.co.uk/2010-general-election-manifestos/Conservative-Party-Manifesto-2010.pdf">reduce net migration</a>. </p>
<p>Conservative voters still consider immigration to be the <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/the-most-important-issues-facing-the-country?crossBreak=conservative">second most important issue facing Britain</a>. But after years of stringent measures, the road has run out on cutting immigration. An <a href="https://www.conservatives.com/our-plan">“Australian style”</a> points-based immigration system has already been <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-points-based-immigration-system-employer-information/the-uks-points-based-immigration-system-an-introduction-for-employers">delivered</a> and can no longer be promised as the panacea. </p>
<p>This leaves the future prime minister to focus on preventing irregular migration, and the reliable vote winner of restricting asylum. So it’s no surprise that leadership contenders Rishi Sunak and Liz Truss are promising hard-line immigration policies. While the rivals differ in their approach, both have pitched ideas whose feasibility and legality are suspect.</p>
<p>Sunak kicked things off with his <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/07/23/asylum-system-broken-ten-point-plan-fix/">ten-point plan</a> to fix the “broken” asylum system. He wants to cap the number of refugees, tackle the asylum backlog, crack down on small boat crossings, and end what he calls the “farce” of housing asylum seekers in hotels.</p>
<p>Sunak wants to “tighten” the legal definition of who qualifies for asylum to be “in line with the [UN] Refugee Convention” instead of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This is baffling given that the ECHR has no definition of asylum seekers. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2022/07/23/rishi-sunak-vows-cap-refugee-numbers-common-sense-asylum-system/">Reports suggest</a> Sunak is alluding to the court’s interpretation of article 3 of the convention, which protects people from being removed from the UK on the grounds of escaping “inhuman or degrading treatment. This can include having a serious medical condition, where the asylum seeker believes that an absence of medical treatment in their country of origin will result in <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/927593/medical-claims-_article3and8_-v8.0ext.pdf">intense suffering</a> or significant reduction in life expectancy.</p>
<p>To address the <a href="https://freemovement.org.uk/briefing-the-sorry-state-of-the-uk-asylum-system">backlog of asylum decisions</a>, Sunak has proposed an increase in case workers and "performance incentives”. As I’ve found in my research, asylum backlogs are part of a long history of <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-64692-3">organisational failure at the Home Office</a>, and performance targets are likely to <a href="https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/targets-public-services.pdf">incentivise quick and therefore sloppy decision making</a>. This proposal might decrease the initial backlog, but would no doubt result in a ballooning of appeals, generating costs to the government and more unnecessary waits for asylum seekers. </p>
<p>Sunak also wants to place immigration as a centrepiece in foreign policy by reassessing aid and trade terms in order to deter illegal migration, including bilateral agreements to return irregular migrants to their country of origin. This will be hard to achieve with a weak geopolitical hand. Post-Brexit Britain is already unpopular with its European neighbours and bilateral deals require cooperation and partnerships. </p>
<h2>Securing the borders</h2>
<p>Liz Truss has been less meticulous in her immigration policy proposals than her competitor. Like her rival, Truss zeroes in on clandestine entry to the UK. But where Sunak wants to overhaul by circumventing international norms, Truss is more interested in securing borders by tinkering with the existing regime. </p>
<p>Truss nebulously refers to pushing for reforms of the ECHR so that it <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/liz-truss-and-rishi-sunak-enter-arms-race-immigration-plans-both-vow-tougher-rwanda-style-schemes-1759195">“works for Britain”</a>. Much to the distaste of the right of the Conservative base, she also promises a <a href="https://www.fdf.org.uk/fdf/news-media/news/2022-news/liz-truss-pledges-to-unleash-british-food/">short-term expansion</a> of the seasonal agricultural scheme, which allows foreign workers to come to the UK for <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2022/07/31/let-migrants-pick-fruit-farms-says-liz-truss/">summer agricultural jobs</a>. </p>
<p>In a more concrete proposal, she vows to <a href="https://twitter.com/trussliz/status/1551184243803529216">increase the frontline border force</a> by 20% and double the border force’s maritime staffing levels. Staff increase will be welcome, but this is a sticking plaster for the increase in irregular entry.</p>
<p>Where the rivals share a vision is on expanding the highly controversial <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/memorandum-of-understanding-mou-between-the-uk-and-rwanda/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-government-of-the-united-kingdom-of-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-and-the-government-of-the-republic-of-r">Rwanda deal</a>, which allows the UK to send some people to Rwanda who would otherwise claim asylum in the UK. The scheme has been widely criticised at home and abroad over its <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9568/">practicality, efficacy, value for money</a> and compatibility with human rights laws. </p>
<p>The first scheduled flight to send asylum seekers to Rwanda in June 2022 was grounded after a dramatic last minute intervention by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jun/14/european-court-humam-right-makes-11th-hour-intervention-in-rwanda-asylum-seeker-plan">European Court of Human Rights</a>. Despite these ethical and <a href="https://care4calais.org/news/how-were-challenging-the-rwanda-scheme/">legal</a> challenges, both Sunak and Truss are committed to the idea of outsourcing asylum processing, vowing to make the deal work and explore further partnerships. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-deportations-what-is-the-european-court-of-human-rights-and-why-did-it-stop-the-uk-flight-from-taking-off-185143">Rwanda deportations: what is the European Court of Human Rights, and why did it stop the UK flight from taking off?</a>
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<h2>Sticking plaster plans</h2>
<p>Both contenders are papering over the cracks with these plans. The evidence is stacked <a href="https://ecre.org/uk-confusion-over-rawanda-deal-as-home-office-moves-to-detain-asylum-seekers-deterrence-effect-doubtful-as-channel-crossings-continue-ten-years-of-hostile-environment-leaves-nothing-to-celebrate/">against deterrence tactics</a>. The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-62192527">home affairs select committee</a> has found no evidence that the Rwanda scheme will deter migrants. </p>
<p>The reduction of safe, legal humanitarian routes to asylum, as well as <a href="https://freemovement.org.uk/briefing-the-sorry-state-of-the-uk-asylum-system/">inertia on settlement schemes</a>, has and will continue to lead to dangerous clandestine entry and lives lost. Arguably, the most draconian plans are smoke and mirrors designed to appeal to party members who are ideologically to the <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Mind-the-values-gap.pdf">right of Conservative MPs</a>. Whoever governs will likely water these plans down, or can expect them to be stuck in legal purgatory in the courts. </p>
<p>The glaring omission from both candidates is any plan for fixing an immigration system that is contributing to severe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/sep/06/uk-labour-crisis-could-last-up-to-two-years-cbi-warns">labour market shortages</a>. Whoever becomes PM will have to address the reality of the failing immigration system that employers have decried is <a href="https://www.fsb.org.uk/resource-report/a-world-of-talent.html">bloated with red tape</a>. </p>
<p>Ultimately, Sunak and Truss’s dog-whistling to party members may backfire when it comes to a general election. While an authoritarian policy may have been a winning ticket in the 2010s, public concerns over immigration are at a historic low and it <a href="https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/the-most-important-issues-facing-the-country">isn’t a pressing issue</a> with voters anymore.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188246/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erica Consterdine does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An expert breaks down the promises from the two Conservative leadership candidates.Erica Consterdine, Senior Lecturer in Public Policy, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1873162022-07-29T09:34:56Z2022-07-29T09:34:56ZFour ways Brexit and the loss of free movement have made life harder for mixed British-European families<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476074/original/file-20220726-10251-6stikn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C0%2C2959%2C1998&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Brexit is creating barriers within families.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/view-generic-ukeu-lane-sign-air-1197078226">1000 Words / Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Brexit and the end of free movement between the UK and the EU has had notable consequences for family life, particularly for mixed British-European families whether they are living in the UK or Europe. Family members who before Brexit held common status as EU citizens now find they have <a href="https://ukandeu.ac.uk/how-brexit-transformed-mobile-families-into-migrant-families/">different statuses</a> and rights, both in the places they live and when it comes to mobility between locations. </p>
<p>We recently conducted a survey of British citizens living in the EU and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea">EU/EEA</a> plus non-EU/EEA citizens living in the UK (2,024 people in all), looking at <a href="https://migzen.net/publications/british-european-families-after-brexit/">migration and citizenship after Brexit</a>. One fifth of the participants were in mixed-status British-European families. Of those, three quarters said their status difference had been a cause of concern. In their own words, here are four ways Brexit has affected British-European families.</p>
<h2>1. Family members are newly dependent on one another</h2>
<p>Spouses, parents and children are navigating domestic migration and citizenship legislation, often for the first time. No longer enjoying the same mobility and residence rights, in some families relationships suffer as they find themselves newly dependent on each other’s residency statuses. A British woman living in Spain described the effects of her children’s status differences following Brexit:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Two of my children have dual nationality and can live, work and move anywhere in Europe. The third only has British nationality and will have to apply for Spanish nationality to have the same freedom of movement as his siblings, but will have <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_nationality_law#Dual_citizenship">to give up</a> his British nationality in the process.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Brexit has also created inequalities between spouses and partners, making one person’s status dependent on the other’s. This emerges clearly in the words of a British woman living in Malta: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am now dependent on my spouse’s status to reside in my home.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>2. Lost opportunities for migration</h2>
<p>With their residence rights only secured in <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9157/CBP-9157.pdf">their current country of residence</a>, British citizens living in the EU/EEA prior to the end of the Brexit transition period are no longer entitled to use free movement rights to move to another country in the bloc. Doing so now means complying with domestic immigration legislation in the destination country for themselves and for any non-EU/EEA citizen family members. </p>
<p>One British man in Italy highlighted how the changes in his status affected his non-EU/EEA partner’s rights and feelings about possibly moving to a different country: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>My wife is a Russian citizen. Her residency and right to live and work depend upon my status under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eut/withdrawal-agreement/article/18/adopted">article 18</a> of the withdrawal agreement. The uncertainty delayed moving and even now, she fears a potential move to Germany as her residency rights are totally dependent on mine.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>3. Moving from the UK to the EU has become more difficult</h2>
<p>For British citizens who do not work, there are fewer routes to migrate from the UK to the EU. One route is through their status as family members of an EU citizen. Families are having to negotiate with each other, considering compromises and trade-offs, when dealing with this new reality.</p>
<p>As a Hungarian woman living in the UK explained, after Brexit she felt:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Forced to choose between me being a second-class citizen or my (British) husband risking not being able to get permanent residency and (…) receive a pension.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two wedding rings on top of a blue British passport" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476059/original/file-20220726-12-gs5wei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476059/original/file-20220726-12-gs5wei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476059/original/file-20220726-12-gs5wei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476059/original/file-20220726-12-gs5wei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476059/original/file-20220726-12-gs5wei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476059/original/file-20220726-12-gs5wei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476059/original/file-20220726-12-gs5wei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Spouses, parents and children in British-European families are struggling to navigate new mobility rights after Brexit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/gold-rings-on-top-new-dark-2140598679">mundissima / Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Familial negotiations might also reach an impasse, as a German woman in the UK anticipated:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I wish to leave but am stuck here because my children refuse to leave the UK. I intend to move when the youngest turns 18 – after that they are adults and have to take care of their own affairs. As my husband is a British citizen, he does not want to leave if it means that he has to become a <a href="https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/pages/glossary/third-country-national_en">third-country</a> family member, meaning that our marriage (since 2003) will have to end.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>4. Returning to the UK with non-British family members has become more complex</h2>
<p>A common concern for British citizens living in the EU was whether they would be able to return to the UK with <a href="https://issuu.com/amm_france/docs/bie_wa_p5_working_rights_online/2">non-British family members</a>, who are newly subject to immigration controls. There are many reasons why British-European families might want to relocate to the UK in the future, from providing elderly care to work and retirement.</p>
<p>As a British woman in France explained: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I can’t leave (France) for more than a few months if something happens to family overseas. My partner can’t come to the UK without applying for a visa even to care for a relative.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While for a British woman in the Netherlands: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We were planning to return to the UK on my husband’s retirement (around 2041) but now I think it is more likely we will stay in the Netherlands for the rest of our lives.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187316/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michaela Benson receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ES/V004530/1). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elena Zambelli receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ES/V004530/1).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nando Sigona receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ES/V004530/1)</span></em></p>Brexit has created new borders within British-European families.Michaela Benson, Professor in Public Sociology, Lancaster UniversityElena Zambelli, Senior research associate, Lancaster UniversityNando Sigona, Professor of International Migration and Forced Displacement and Director of the Institute for Research into Superdiversity, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1779552022-03-17T14:32:49Z2022-03-17T14:32:49ZThe Home Office is now publishing stats on irregular migration - here’s what they do (and don’t) tell us<p>The Home Office has long collected statistics on irregular migration to the UK, but it has never published them officially until now. The statistics, first <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-december-2021/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-december-2021">published</a> in February 2022, are on detected instances of people entering the UK without immigration permission, such as on small boats, stowing away in vehicles or containers, or using false documents. </p>
<p>The decision to start regularly publishing this data as part of quarterly immigration statistics is welcome. The issue is of strong public interest, yet previously, data on irregular entries appeared in the public domain mainly via freedom of information requests.</p>
<p>After the home secretary declared the rise in channel crossings a “<a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2019-01-07/debates/FD3F5D45-F095-4ED7-A089-C347E93DD7B2/MigrantCrossings">major incident</a>” in 2018, the Home Office gave some news outlets daily counts of small boat arrivals, until January 2022. But these updates lacked information about the quality of the data and its limitations, such as what counts as a “small boat” and when there may be risks of double counting. The new quarterly figures change that, and what they lack in timeliness, they make up for in clarity and accessibility.</p>
<p>The main finding is that the small-boat route appears to be the most common irregular route to the UK. From 2018-21, around 39,000 people arrived by crossing the channel in inflatable boats, dinghies and kayaks.</p>
<p>The statistics show that in 2021 substantially more people were detected travelling to the UK on small boats than by all other irregular means, including by air on false documents, and by stowing away in lorries or containers. Out of around 37,000 detected irregular entries, 78% were by small boat. </p>
<p>Small-boat arrivals also increased substantially in 2020 – to 8,500 from around 1,800 in 2019 – while detection on other routes fell. It is not clear why this is, but the government has <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-december-2021/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-december-2021#about-the-statistics">stated</a> that COVID restrictions made other routes, such as lorry or train, less viable. And the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/933953/An_inspection_of_the_Home_Office_s_response_to_in-country_clandestine_arrivals___lorry_drops___and_to_irregular_migrants_arriving_via__small_boats_.pdf">reported</a> that Home Office officials believe enhanced security at French ports and the channel tunnel – to prevent stowaways on lorries and trains bound for the UK – made the small-boat route more viable. </p>
<h2>Interpret with caution</h2>
<p>As welcome as the new statistics are, they tell only a partial picture. </p>
<p>The Home Office <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-december-2021/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-ending-december-2021">cautions</a> that the data is “not designed for statistical purposes and therefore should be interpreted with caution”. Notably, the Home Office says that the figures cannot be used to infer total levels of irregular migration.</p>
<p>This is because many irregular entries are not detected. And detection rates differ according to the method of entry. Very few people travelling in small boats will evade detection, but those entering the UK by hiding in lorries or containers could. The apparent dominance of the small-boat route in the data could result partly from undercounting of other modes of irregular entry. Another factor is the level of enforcement activity, such as how often lorries are checked, or the number of tip-offs the Home office receives.</p>
<p>The figures also do not include the other main way people add to the UK’s irregular migrant population: by entering lawfully on a valid visa and staying longer than the permitted period. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People approaching electronic gates at an airport, under a blue sign reading UK Border" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452806/original/file-20220317-13-n7o38w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/452806/original/file-20220317-13-n7o38w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452806/original/file-20220317-13-n7o38w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452806/original/file-20220317-13-n7o38w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452806/original/file-20220317-13-n7o38w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452806/original/file-20220317-13-n7o38w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/452806/original/file-20220317-13-n7o38w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The apparent increase in small-boat crossings could have partly been influenced by undercounting other methods of irregular migration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-uk-nov-18-2015-air-372644803">1000 Words / Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The statistics also do not explain why people attempt to enter the UK irregularly. Home Office <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/793/default/">testimony</a> suggests that almost all Channel crossers claim asylum on reaching the UK – 98% did from January to September 2020. This supports an <a href="https://media.refugeecouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/12123010/Safe-Legal-Routes-Briefing-March-2021.pdf">oft-cited</a> explanation for the phenomenon: a lack of safe and legal routes to claim asylum in the UK compels refugees to take dangerous, irregular journeys. </p>
<p>Nor has the government published data on the outcomes of Channel migrants’ asylum applications (<a href="https://www.freemovement.org.uk/channel-boat-people-are-refugees-home-office-officials-confirm/">which we know it holds</a>). <a href="https://media.refugeecouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/16095953/Channel-crossings-and-asylum-outcomes-November-2021.pdf">Research</a> suggests that a large share of these applications are likely to be successful.</p>
<p>The data does not explain changes in irregular migration, including the rise of the small-boat route. Some have <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/1082/html/">speculated</a> that the pandemic and more stringent controls on road travel, have had the effect of closing off lorry and air routes to the UK. </p>
<p>There is nothing in the data on the number of smugglers apprehended or smuggling operations disrupted, nor on the number of people prevented from departing France to reach the UK irregularly. Finally, the data does not share Channel migrants’ explanations of why they decided to cross the Channel, or why they chose to come to the UK when they could have claimed asylum in other European countries they transited through.</p>
<h2>Why now?</h2>
<p>It has not been explicitly made clear why the government has published these statistics now, but the announcement comes against the backdrop of the nationality and borders bill currently before parliament. A principal <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-statement-on-the-new-plan-for-immigration">aim</a> of the bill is to deter small-boat arrivals through tougher criminal sanctions on irregular entry, and giving refugees fewer rights if they entered the UK irregularly. The huge rise in the number of people detected crossing the channel in small boats lends support to the government’s argument that there is a big problem to be solved. </p>
<p>The bill is part of a longer-term effort to decrease the size of the UK’s irregular migrant population. The government’s “hostile environment” policy, first announced in 2012, aimed to make life for people without immigration status so difficult that they would leave the UK of their own accord. There is little evidence that the policy has worked – removals and voluntary departures of irregular migrants have fallen to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-december-2021/how-many-people-are-detained-or-returned">record lows</a>. </p>
<p>It is not clear whether penalising refugees for irregular entry will reduce their arrivals. Evidence <a href="https://personal.lse.ac.uk/thielema/Papers-PDF/CUP-LSE.pdf">suggests</a> that restrictive policies have little effect on the number of asylum claims – conflict and poverty in origin countries are much bigger drivers. Also, the UN has <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2021/5/6097bce14/unhcr-deeply-concerned-at-discriminatory-two-tier-uk-asylum-plans-urges.html">expressed concerns</a> that proposals in the bill violate the refugee convention. Still, it is against this backdrop of legislative restrictions that new statistics help illustrate the size of the issue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The Migration Observatory receives funding from Trust for London and the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.</span></em></p>Publicly available data on irregular migration is a welcome development, but it doesn’t tell the full story.Peter William Walsh, Researcher, The Migration Observatory, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1778742022-02-25T15:13:02Z2022-02-25T15:13:02ZUkraine refugees: how displacement could impact farms and families in the UK<p>One of the most immediate consequences of conflicts and crisis is often displacement, as people seek safety. The crisis in Ukraine means substantial numbers of people <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-war-may-create-millions-of-refugees-zvj9b6rww">may flee</a> the country to seek refuge overseas.</p>
<p>It’s difficult to predict how many Ukrainians will seek asylum in the UK. This will depend on a number of important and unpredictable factors such as the scale, duration and humanitarian consequences of the conflict.</p>
<p>There is no visa for people of any nationality to travel to the UK to make a claim for asylum, so Ukrainians who wanted to do this would generally need to enter through irregular (and <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/qa-migrants-crossing-the-english-channel-in-small-boats/">sometimes dangerous</a>) means. Some civil society organisations have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-60518801">called on</a> the UK government to offer a resettlement scheme to Ukrainian refugees, as it did for Afghan citizens in August 2021 and Syrians in 2015. </p>
<p>In general, people displaced in conflicts tend to move relatively small distances, to other parts of the country or to immediately neighbouring countries. In 2020, <a href="https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/ukraine">Ukraine had</a> nearly three-quarters of a million internally displaced people, mainly due to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the seizure of parts of eastern Ukraine in 2014.</p>
<p>Typically, most people seeking asylum who make it to Europe remain there, and do not then travel on to the UK. Over the past decade, more than 90% of asylum applications <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics">in the EU</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-december-2021/how-many-people-do-we-grant-asylum-or-protection-to">the UK</a> have been in EU27 countries: the UK share has fluctuated between 3-8%. Several EU countries have large Ukrainian diasporas and are thus likely be primary destinations. Poland <a href="https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_resfirst&lang=en">issues</a> hundreds of thousands of residence permits every year to Ukrainian citizens, and the estimated number of Ukrainian national residents <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_POP1CTZ__custom_2166714/default/table?lang=en">exceeds</a> 100,000 in Czechia, Germany, Italy and Spain. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality">ONS estimates</a>, there were around 38,000 Ukrainian-born residents living in the UK in 2019. This is a relatively small number – more than 50 other countries had larger foreign-born populations in the UK in that period.</p>
<h2>Britain’s farms and Ukrainian workers</h2>
<p>Perhaps counterintuitively, it is possible that the conflict could lead not to more Ukrainians coming to the UK, but fewer. This is because over the past two years, Ukraine has quietly become one of the largest countries of origin for work visa holders in the UK. <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-december-2021/list-of-tables#entry-clearance-visas">New data</a> released by the Home Office showed that in 2021, Ukrainians were the second most common nationality -– after Indians -– to be granted work visas to come to the UK. </p>
<p>This is largely because of the seasonal workers visa. After the Brexit referendum, farmers started to complain about labour shortages as fewer workers came for seasonal agricultural roles from EU countries like Poland and Romania. In response -— and in anticipation of the end of free movement -— the government reintroduced a work visa scheme for <a href="https://cers.leeds.ac.uk/projects/feeding-the-nation/">seasonal workers</a>. The scheme covers work in horticulture, and in late 2021 was temporarily expanded to include poultry workers, pork butchers and HGV drivers. Ukrainians have been by far the biggest users of this route, which admitted nearly 30,000 people in 2021.</p>
<p>Indeed, Ukraine supplied more than two thirds of the seasonal workers who stepped in to replace the EU labour force in the UK in 2021. The previous year, when the scheme was being piloted in the UK, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-december-2021/list-of-tables#entry-clearance-visas">the share</a> was even more –- 87% of seasonal workers were from Ukraine </p>
<p>With the UK’s visa services in Ukraine now <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/support-for-family-members-of-british-nationals-in-ukraine-and-ukrainian-nationals-in-ukraine-and-the-uk">suspended</a>, it is clear that recruitment that usually takes place in Ukraine is unlikely to continue as normal. Ukrainian workers currently in the UK on seasonal visas will have their visas <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-announces-visa-concessions-for-ukrainians">automatically extended</a> to the end of 2022, though there are no figures on how many of these workers are currently still present in the UK.</p>
<h2>Keeping families together</h2>
<p>Asylum seeking and labour migration are not the only way that Ukrainian nationals might come to the UK. An unknown number of British citizens live in Ukraine, often with Ukrainian family members. Over the last few days, the UK government made concessions to allow Ukrainian residents who are family members of British citizens to come to the UK more quickly and cheaply. It is <a href="https://www.freemovement.org.uk/can-ukrainians-take-refuge-in-the-uk-immigration-concessions-and-asylum-policy/">also being reported</a> that the minimum income requirement that people would normally need to meet to get a family visa is being waived. </p>
<p>At the time of writing, it is not yet clear whether measures will be introduced to help others who are eligible for UK residence, such as family members of EU citizens who live in the UK and have status under the EU Settlement Scheme. In other cases, family members (like most adult dependent relatives) are not eligible for visas. Uncertainty remains about what the rules will be for family members who are admitted temporarily but do not meet the criteria to renew their visas further down the line. </p>
<p>The government <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-announces-visa-concessions-for-ukrainians">has also begun taking steps</a> to address the immigration status of Ukrainian residents who are already in the UK on temporary visas and may not be able to return home when their status expires. At the end of 2020, there were an <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/migrant-journey-2020-report">estimated</a> 9,600 Ukrainian citizens in the UK with temporary visas, primarily as temporary workers, skilled workers and students. This number will have increased due to the expansion of the seasonal agricultural worker route described above, and also does not include tourists and other visitors.</p>
<p>It’s important to keep this in context. The consequences of the Ukrainian crisis for UK migration are just a small part of the troubling events that are unfolding as we write, and that are already having serious humanitarian, economic and geopolitical repercussions across the world. But within the world of UK migration policy, there are nonetheless some meaningful implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177874/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rob McNeil receives funding from The Trust for London, Esmée Fairbairn Foundation and Barrow Cadbury Trust. He regularly undertakes consultancy work in former Soviet states with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Madeleine Sumption receives funding from the Paul Hamlyn Foundation, Trust for London, Esmee Fairbarin Foundation, Barrow Cadbury Trust, and the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>The conflict is already driving thousands of Ukrainians to leave their country and seek safety elsewhere.Rob McNeil, Researcher, Centre on Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS), Deputy Director, Migration Observatory, University of OxfordMadeleine Sumption, Director, Migration Observatory, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1640312021-07-07T14:06:48Z2021-07-07T14:06:48ZUK offshore asylum plan is just another way of imposing forced movement on vulnerable people<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410141/original/file-20210707-13-hhpauy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C7%2C5184%2C3437&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Incarceration of asylum seekers in offshore camps would be in breach of UK's responsibilities under international human rights conventions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Chisholm via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Asylum seekers who enter the UK “irregularly” – that is, without the required legal documents for entry – will be moved to asylum centres abroad where they will be held until their claims have been processed. </p>
<p>This is part of the UK government’s proposed <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-nationality-and-borders-bill">UK Nationality and Borders Bill</a>. Though the details for this so-called “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/28/uk-eyes-law-permitting-asylum-seekers-to-be-sent-overseas-report">offshore asylum processing</a>” remain unclear, the programme will simply further displace people who have been forced from their homes and are seeking protection. It is a counterproductive response to forced migration – and represents a form of violence that undermines international law. </p>
<p>This model was first introduced <a href="https://theconversation.com/manus-violence-report-highlights-the-futility-of-offshore-processing-27231">in Australia</a> in 2001 and Denmark has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-57343572">recently passed legislation</a> to enable a similar policy. It is not clear where the UK’s offshore asylum centres would be, and whether any state would agree to host them, although there has been much <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/28/home-office-proposals-due-on-sending-asylum-seekers-abroad">speculation</a> – including on Ascension Island or on oil rigs or disused ferries.</p>
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<p>At any rate, these plans are not compatible with international law and have been widely condemned by civil society and international organisations, including the <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/un-condemns-priti-patels-offshore-asylum-plan-vsbbp9tns">UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)</a>. The right to claim asylum is a universal right, which is enshrined in the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html">1951 UN Refugee Convention</a> and its <a href="https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/55726/Convention+relating+to+the+Status+of+Refugees+%28signed+28+July+1951%2C+entered+into+force+22+April+1954%29+189+UNTS+150+and+Protocol+relating+to+the+Status+of+Refugees+%28signed+31+January+1967%2C+entered+into+force+4+October+1967%29+606+UNTS+267/0bf3248a-cfa8-4a60-864d-65cdfece1d47">1967 Protocol</a>, to which the UK is a signatory. </p>
<p>Anyone has a right to claim asylum regardless of how they arrive in a particular country. Asylum seekers have a right of access to the country and to a fair legal process. In addition, under the principle of <em><a href="https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf">non-refoulement</a></em>, asylum seekers and refugees cannot be returned to a country where they might be subject to persecution. </p>
<p>Yet the existence of these rights does not mean that people have access to straightforward routes into many countries. Looking at the European context, it has become increasingly difficult to enter EU countries and the UK by legal means, due to the development of <a href="https://www.inderscience.com/info/inarticletoc.php?jcode=ijmbs&year=2020&vol=6&issue=1/2">sophisticated border regimes</a> since the 1980s, including visa requirements and a range of other physical and technological bordering systems. The latter include the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) and the Schengen Information System (SIS). </p>
<p>The development of internal “<a href="https://www.inderscience.com/info/inarticle.php?artid=108684">freedom of movement</a>” for EU citizens went hand-in-hand with the fortification of the EU’s external borders. People who are forcefully displaced often do not have the documents required to formally cross these borders. This means they can only travel to the EU and UK “irregularly” – turning to smugglers to facilitate travel. This might mean ending up on a rickety boat in the Mediterranean Sea or passing the Alps on foot in snowy conditions. As a result, journeys are lengthier, more dangerous, and more costly.</p>
<h2>Not migrants</h2>
<p>These people are often erroneously referred to in common parlance as “illegal migrants”. <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1468308">My research</a> – and that of other migration scholars – shows that they have rather been made illegal by restrictive border policies. For instance, there are no visas for claiming asylum. The fact is that legal pathways to protection are inaccessible to the vast majority of people seeking asylum. </p>
<p>The new UK Nationality and Borders Bill seeks to fortify the distinction between people who arrive regularly and those who arrive irregularly. The former will be allowed to apply for asylum in the UK, while the latter will be shipped to processing centres offshore, thus denying them the right to apply for asylum in the UK. As noted by the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2021/5/6097bce14/unhcr-deeply-concerned-at-discriminatory-two-tier-uk-asylum-plans-urges.html">UNHCR</a>, making such a distinction contradicts the Refugee Convention by creating a two-tier system. </p>
<p>It is disturbing to see how far the UK government – and especially the Home Office under Priti Patel’s leadership – is willing to push its hostile environment agenda. The measures are not only in breach of international law but will also be inefficient and costly, will not respond to the perceived problem. </p>
<p>From the government’s perspective, moving asylum seekers to countries that might not have the same rights protections would mean not being “burdened” by human rights regulations such as protection from inhuman and degrading treatment. Having said that, it must be said that such protections are constantly under threat in the UK, too. The situation in Napier Barracks in Folkestone, on England’s south coast, where asylum seekers were detained in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/03/napier-barracks-asylum-seekers-win-legal-challenge-against-government">sub-standard conditions</a> that were ruled unlawful by the high court, is but one example of this.</p>
<p>Moving asylum seekers to another country would be a dangerous development from a human rights perspective and might constitute <em>refoulement</em>. In addition, it is not clear that the proposals could be implemented in practice; and it would be very costly to do so. </p>
<h2>Politics of exhaustion</h2>
<p>I see the plans as another example of what my colleague and I have called the “<a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2021/01/politics">politics of exhaustion</a>” – the effort to make life as difficult as possible for irregular migrants. Exhaustion is both a deliberate political strategy to wear people down and a lived experience of enduring this violence. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/asylum-processing-centres-in-north-africa-would-merely-mask-the-eus-migration-failings-98958">As has been shown</a> repeatedly over the years, such measures to deter people from travelling to the UK are hugely inefficient and just make people’s lives miserable. They do not address the underlying reasons people are forced to move, which means people will continue to arrive in the UK (although the numbers remain relatively low: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-march-2021/summary-of-latest-statistics">around 27,000</a> people claimed asylum in the UK in the year ending March 2021, compared to just over <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics#Main_countries_of_destination:_Germany.2C_Spain_and_France">100,000 in Germany</a>).</p>
<p>The sad irony is that, among the many reasons that forced migrants end up in the UK are the connections forged through colonialism and empire. Most asylum seekers in the UK <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781783486168/Asylum-after-Empire-Colonial-Legacies-in-the-Politics-of-Asylum-Seeking">come from countries</a> that were part of the British empire. </p>
<p>A more inclusive and cost-effective approach would be one that starts with solidarity, resisting the differentiation between people on the basis of how they entered the UK, and acknowledging the humanity of all migrants as people with their own histories, skills, stories and dreams. Enabling asylum seekers to settle in and contribute to society, for instance through work and education, would benefit us all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164031/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leonie Ansems de Vries received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council in 2015-16. </span></em></p>Priti Patel’s plan to process asylum seekers offshore is at odds with the UK’s responsibilities under international human rights conventions.Leonie Ansems de Vries, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Chair of the Migration Research Group, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1527662021-01-06T20:22:34Z2021-01-06T20:22:34ZHong Kong: China crackdown is likely to boost migration to UK<p>In recent weeks, dozens of pro-democracy activists and politicians in Hong Kong have been arrested for allegedly trying to overthrow the city’s government. Most recently, on January 6, 53 people <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/06/dozens-of-hong-kong-pro-democracy-figures-arrested-in-sweeping-crackdown">were detained</a> under the notorious <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-how-chinas-new-national-security-law-subverts-the-territorys-cherished-rule-of-law-139683">National Security law</a>. These arrests are the latest in a long line of efforts by the Chinese state to squash political dissent in the special administrative region.</p>
<p>It is in response to such efforts that, on January 31, the UK will open a new immigration route that will, in principle, allow an estimated 5.4 million Hong Kong residents to move to the UK and become British citizens. This is equivalent to almost three-quarters of Hong Kong’s resident population of 7.5 million.</p>
<p>The UK’s visa offer comes after several years of political protest in Hong Kong, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/-sp-hong-kong-umbrella-revolution-pro-democracy-protests">“umbrella protests” of 2014</a>. Its trigger was the enactment by China’s parliament in June 2020 of a new <a href="https://theconversation.com/hong-kong-activists-now-face-a-choice-stay-silent-or-flee-the-city-the-world-must-give-them-a-path-to-safety-141880">Hong Kong security law</a>. This was drafted in response to mass protests against the <a href="https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201905/22/P2019052200565.htm">2019 Extradition Bill</a>, which would have allowed the Hong Kong authorities to detain and transfer people to the Chinese mainland. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-is-becoming-increasingly-assertive-security-law-in-hong-kong-is-just-the-latest-example-142313">China is becoming increasingly assertive – security law in Hong Kong is just the latest example</a>
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<p>The new visa will be available to those with <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/british-nationals-overseas-in-hong-kong">British national (overseas)</a> status – BNOs, for short. A remnant of the British Empire, BNO status was created for Hong Kong residents to retain a connection with the UK after its handover of the region to China in 1997.</p>
<p>At that time, the status was largely symbolic. It conferred the right to live in Hong Kong, but not the UK. Now all that is set to change.</p>
<p>Under the new route, any BNO citizen will be able to come to the UK with their close family members to live, work, or study. After five years of residence, they will be eligible to apply for permanent residence – and, after one further year in the UK, to apply for British citizenship.</p>
<p>Hong Kong’s security law has been <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-hongkong-protests-britain/uk-says-chinas-security-law-is-serious-violation-of-hong-kong-treaty-idUKKBN2425IO">described by the British government</a> as “a clear and serious breach of the Sino-British Joint Declaration”, which “undermines the ‘one country, two systems’ framework”, according to which China agreed to maintain Hong Kong’s distinctive systems of law, finance, and administration after handover.</p>
<h2>Unknown quantity</h2>
<p>But how many Hong Kong residents will take up the opportunity to move to the UK? We have barely the faintest idea. When a new immigration route is introduced, like that created by the BNO visa, there is no sensible way to model the likely migratory flows.</p>
<p>Yet tentative projections of the scale of BNO migration have been put forward. The British government was first to hazard a guess at the numbers. In October 2020, it <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2020/70/pdfs/ukia_20200070_en.pdf">published</a> two scenarios, the first based on the estimated share of recent BNO passport holders who will move to the UK. The second was based on a forecast rate of future applications for BNO passports. Each scenario came with low, central and high estimates, depending on assumptions made about the likelihood of BNO passport applicants to migrate.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377401/original/file-20210106-23-1brpe8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Figure showing the two scenarios for the number of people applying for BNO status from 2021 to 2025." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377401/original/file-20210106-23-1brpe8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377401/original/file-20210106-23-1brpe8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377401/original/file-20210106-23-1brpe8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377401/original/file-20210106-23-1brpe8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377401/original/file-20210106-23-1brpe8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377401/original/file-20210106-23-1brpe8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377401/original/file-20210106-23-1brpe8o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Two scenarios for the estimated number of BNO applicants per year, 2021-2025.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Oxford Migration Observatory</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>Even for rough ballpark estimates, these come with particularly large margins of uncertainty. The lowest and highest estimates across both scenarios suggest that the number of Hongkongers that will come during the first five years of the route lies between around 10,000 and a hundred times that figure, at over 1 million.</p>
<p>Because the low and high estimates for each scenario are intuitively less likely, the government presents the central estimates in each scenario as plausible lower and upper bounds. This gives an estimated range of between 257,000 and 322,000 total BNO visa applicants (rounded to the nearest 1,000), including dependants, over the first five years of the policy.</p>
<p>All these projections should be taken with more than a pinch of salt. They are based on numerous assumptions regarding migratory “push” and “pull” factors, and the propensity of different segments of the BNO population to migrate. Some of these assumptions are made virtually blind, with little to no data to inform them. This explains the government’s own <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2020/70/pdfs/ukia_20200070_en.pdf">description</a> of the estimates as “subject to a very high degree of uncertainty”.</p>
<p>Another <a href="https://www.hongkongers.org.uk/policy-study-coming-for-hope">study</a>, by the recently formed interest group, <a href="https://www.hongkongers.org.uk/">Hongkongers in Britain (HKB)</a>, suggested that more than 600,000 Hongkongers could move in the first three years of the policy.</p>
<h2>Economic benefits</h2>
<p>The HKB research also found that three-quarters of those planning to move had a university degree. They also enjoyed high salaries: around 50% higher than Hong Kong’s median income. This suggests that their economic contribution is likely to be greater than other migrant groups in the UK, such as those from eastern Europe, something borne out by the UK government’s <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2020/70/pdfs/ukia_20200070_en.pdf">estimates of the fiscal impact of BNO migration</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377404/original/file-20210106-17-1w6a93f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Figure showing three lines describing different scnearios for net fiscal benefit to the UK of migration of Hong Kong people." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377404/original/file-20210106-17-1w6a93f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377404/original/file-20210106-17-1w6a93f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377404/original/file-20210106-17-1w6a93f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377404/original/file-20210106-17-1w6a93f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377404/original/file-20210106-17-1w6a93f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377404/original/file-20210106-17-1w6a93f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/377404/original/file-20210106-17-1w6a93f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Home Office scenarios for the likely fiscal benefits of BNO migration from Hong Kong, 2020/21 to 2025/26.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Oxford Migration Observatory</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>As for the level of BNO migration itself, these estimates are based on several assumptions and are highly uncertain. But they do suggest that the British government is confident that BNO migrants will bring net fiscal benefit, contributing an estimated £2.65 billion to public finances in the first five years of the policy.</p>
<p>The HKB findings must also be treated with caution. They are not derived from a random sample, but a survey of 315 people recruited primarily through social media. Such respondents, it is fair to presume, may be those most likely to express a desire to move (97% did).</p>
<p>Others may be put off by the <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/qa-the-new-route-to-citizenship-for-some-hong-kong-residents/">high cost</a>. A single adult moving to the UK under the route will pay around £3,500 in immigration fees alone (comprising the £250 BNO visa, and immigration health surcharge), with the full route to citizenship costing around £7,000 in fees.</p>
<p>This and myriad other considerations, including the political situation in Hong Kong, mean it is too early to say with any precision how many will come to the UK and pursue a path to citizenship.</p>
<p>But if previous efforts to predict the impacts of geopolitical changes on migration are anything to go by – the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/mar/24/how-immigration-came-to-haunt-labour-inside-story">huge underestimate</a> of inflows to the UK following the EU’s 2004 enlargement comes to mind – the products of immigration crystal ball-gazing should be handled with care.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Walsh receives funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. </span></em></p>Predictions of up to 1 million Hongkongers taking up the UK’s offer of residency need more than a pinch of salt.Peter William Walsh, Researcher, The Migration Observatory, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1379112020-05-07T07:42:17Z2020-05-07T07:42:17ZVE Day and coronavirus: this time, let’s not forget the efforts of migrants and ethnic minorities<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333104/original/file-20200506-49546-6xtuiz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C2496%2C1646&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joy to the world: but especially for white British people, apparently.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Piranhi via Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>During the second world war, millions of people arrived in Britain from all over the world, including occupied Europe. They kept essential industries going as war workers, served in the armed forces, worked at the BBC and nursed the sick. Britain’s war effort was <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/mixing-it-9780198735762?cc=us&lang=en&#">multinational and multiracial</a> – just like the effort to save people’s lives and keep essential work going <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/19/foreign-nhs-workers-coronavirus-frontline-nhs-surcharge">during the coronavirus pandemic</a>. </p>
<p>As I discovered during my research, the migrants and minorities involved in this effort were <a href="https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/2305">celebrated in the British wartime media</a>. But when the war was over, the focus shifted to a national story – to the war fought by the British: their courage and resolve, their finest hour, their victory. The presence of Americans in Britain is widely known, but not the bigger picture of large-scale wartime movements to Britain from all parts of the British empire and Europe. </p>
<p>Dunkirk is a name that resonates in British memories, but not the multinational evacuations from ports in western France in 1940 which brought Belgian, Czech, French and Polish troops to Britain, nor the multinational ships involved. Six European armies in exile were stationed in Britain from 1940: Belgian, French, Czechoslovakian, Dutch, Norwegian and Polish. </p>
<p>The escape of prisoners from the Stalag Luft III camp in latterday western Poland is well known from the classic movie The Great Escape. But who would guess from the movie that the 50 airmen murdered by the Gestapo after their recapture included people from eight European countries and four nations of the British empire. Before capture, most had been serving with the RAF. One of them, Porokuru Pohe, was the first Maori in the force. </p>
<p>In 1939, when he applied to join the Royal New Zealand Air Force, he was asked whether he was “of pure European descent” and wrote no but enlisted later after the rule was suspended. Who now remembers that, when the war began, British subjects who did not fit this racial category were barred from service in the armed forces in Britain? Or that this rule applied across the British commonwealth – in Australia and Canada as well as in New Zealand.</p>
<p>During the coronavirus pandemic, the multiethnic, multinational, multiracial NHS has been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/03/uk-doctors-coronavirus-deaths-highlight-crucial-role-bame-medics">very evident</a>. So too all the other people applauded during the weekly clapping ceremony – including those who empty dustbins, work on public transport, deliver post, food and other goods or work in social and domiciliary care. This is for many a rare, joyful moment – coming together to clap, bang saucepans, whistle and whoop, creating a clamorous cacophony. </p>
<p>Many of those applauded, who risk their lives, are on <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-shows-key-workers-need-better-pay-and-protection-heres-what-has-to-change-137037">minimum wages or zero-hour contracts</a>. Are people who oppose immigration aware that they are clapping immigrants and their descendants? It is surely the first time in Britain that their work has been celebrated with whoops and cheers.</p>
<h2>Thank you and goodbye</h2>
<p>If the second world war is anything to go by, these celebrations will not last long. Already, in wartime, the government had made plans for black troops and war workers from the empire to be demobbed back home so that they did not settle in Britain when the war was over. </p>
<p>Post-war government planning included the deportation of Chinese seamen who had served in the wartime merchant navy. In 1946, <a href="http://www.halfandhalf.org.uk/dr.htm">1362 Chinese seamen were duly repatriated</a>. Most British-born wives, partners and children of Chinese seamen who were repatriated and deported never saw them again.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333113/original/file-20200506-49584-ssni0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/333113/original/file-20200506-49584-ssni0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333113/original/file-20200506-49584-ssni0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333113/original/file-20200506-49584-ssni0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333113/original/file-20200506-49584-ssni0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333113/original/file-20200506-49584-ssni0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/333113/original/file-20200506-49584-ssni0u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Battle of Britain Memorial in Dover includes the names of many Polish airmen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many who stayed on, or returned to Britain, remember a change of climate in the aftermath of war – one that was more hostile and in which their wartime contributions were forgotten. Poles fought in the Battle of Britain but when the war was over, walls near Polish Air Force stations were daubed with “Poles Go Home” and “England for the English”. </p>
<p>Renee Webb, who served as an airman – first in Jamaica and then in Britain – remembers: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was terribly concerned at that time that people should have forgotten so easily … I mean of the many questions that were asked of me, one of the main ones was: ‘When are you going back?‘ </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the 21st century, under the “hostile environment” policy, many men and women from the Caribbean were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/19/lambs-to-the-slaughter-50-lives-ruined-by-the-windrush-scandal">told by the UK government to go back</a>. Some were sacked from jobs in the NHS. Others who were detained, threatened with deportation, or charged for NHS treatment had arrived in Britain as children to join mothers who were working as NHS nurses.</p>
<p>The British Medical Association recently reported that 64% of Black, Asian and ethnic minority (BAME) doctors have felt <a href="https://www.bma.org.uk/news-and-opinion/bame-doctors-hit-worse-by-lack-of-ppe">pressured to work with inadequate personal protective equipment</a> compared to 33% of white doctors. One of the reasons why so many BAME people working in the NHS have <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-is-hitting-bame-communities-hard-on-every-front-136327">died during the coronavirus crisis</a> may be a fear of losing jobs, and being reluctant to speak out about their lack of protective equipment as a result.</p>
<p>How historians will write about coronavirus times is a question that is sometimes raised. Will this history be written and remembered as a multinational, multi-ethnic, multiracial effort to save lives in Britain?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wendy Webster receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council</span></em></p>Just like now, Britain’s war effort depended on the sacrifice of migrants and minorities. But this was soon forgotten.Wendy Webster, Professor of Modern Cultural History, University of HuddersfieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1278912019-11-29T16:22:42Z2019-11-29T16:22:42ZWhat’s happened to UK migration since the EU referendum – in four graphs<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304348/original/file-20191128-178078-728fau.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=76%2C89%2C2901%2C1805&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Net migration has gone down since the referendum.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/london-uk-october-6-2018-air-1278473332">1000 words/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many of the analyses of why a majority of British voters opted to leave the European Union in a referendum in June 2016, have <a href="http://csi.nuff.ox.ac.uk/?p=1153">pointed to a desire to control</a> immigration as a key driving factor. However, <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/britons-are-more-positive-negative-about-immigrations-impact-britain">surveys since the referendum</a> show fewer people are now concerned about the issue than they were before the poll. </p>
<p>But what has actually happened to immigration in the three years since the UK voted for Brexit? </p>
<h2>Decline in net migration</h2>
<p>The latest <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/latest">migration estimates</a> published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) show a steady decline in net migration – the number of immigrants entering the country minus number of emigrants leaving the country – in the three years since the EU referendum in 2016. </p>
<p>The UK saw a net gain of 311,000 migrants in the year to June 2016, which dropped to a net gain of 212,000 migrants in the year to June 2019. This means that while more people are still arriving in the UK than leaving it, the net figure has gone down.</p>
<p>This trend is driven by both sides of the equation. Alongside a decline in the number of people immigrating to the UK – which fell from 652,000 to 609,000 per year in the three year period – the number of people emigrating rose from 341,000 to 397,000. However, the headline figure masks substantial differences between migration from within and outside the EU during this time.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304346/original/file-20191128-178114-fwtutv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304346/original/file-20191128-178114-fwtutv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304346/original/file-20191128-178114-fwtutv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304346/original/file-20191128-178114-fwtutv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304346/original/file-20191128-178114-fwtutv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304346/original/file-20191128-178114-fwtutv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304346/original/file-20191128-178114-fwtutv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304346/original/file-20191128-178114-fwtutv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=493&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">UK long-term international migration UK.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/latest">Office for National Statistics – Long-Term International Migration (LTIM), LTIM with preliminary adjustments based on Department for Work and Pensions and Home Office data</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Increase from outside the EU</h2>
<p>There has been a fall in EU migration since the referendum. In the year ending December 2015 there was a net gain of 218,000 EU citizens. Following a steep decline covering the time of the EU referendum in June 2016 and the immediate aftermath, the figure for the year to June 2019 was 48,000 – its lowest level during the whole of the 16 years covered by the latest ONS data. </p>
<p>EU immigration fell considerably during this time, from 304,000 to 199,000 per year, while emigration of EU citizens increased steadily from 86,000 to 151,000. The net decline can be seen for the EU as a whole, but is most striking for the so-called EU8 group: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. The UK’s net gain of people from these countries was 80,000 in the year ending December 2015, falling to around zero in the year ending June 2019.</p>
<p>In contrast, net migration from outside the EU has steadily risen over the same time period, from 164,000 to 229,000 in June 2019, continuing a trend which began in 2013. This has been driven primarily by an increase in immigration rather than a drop in people leaving.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304347/original/file-20191128-178107-1ka7wst.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304347/original/file-20191128-178107-1ka7wst.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304347/original/file-20191128-178107-1ka7wst.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304347/original/file-20191128-178107-1ka7wst.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304347/original/file-20191128-178107-1ka7wst.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304347/original/file-20191128-178107-1ka7wst.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304347/original/file-20191128-178107-1ka7wst.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304347/original/file-20191128-178107-1ka7wst.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Net migration by citizenship.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/latest">Office for National Statistics – Long-Term International Migration (LTIM), LTIM with preliminary adjustments based on Department for Work and Pensions and Home Office data</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>While the UK is unable to put limits on the number of EU citizens arriving under free movement rules while it remains in the EU, it can control migration from outside the EU. Yet, it is this type of migration that has increased consistently.</p>
<h2>Uncertainty in employment markets</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/surveys/informationforhouseholdsandindividuals/householdandindividualsurveys/internationalpassengersurvey">International Passenger Survey</a>, one of the data sources upon which the latest ONS publication is based, asks for the reasons that people migrate, with employment and study consistently the most common answers. The latest migration data reveal a decline in EU citizens migrating to the UK for work-related reasons, which include looking for a job or to take up a job offer. Work-related reasons are the most common for EU citizens, and more migrate for a definite job than to look for work.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304633/original/file-20191202-66998-9b2sji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304633/original/file-20191202-66998-9b2sji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304633/original/file-20191202-66998-9b2sji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304633/original/file-20191202-66998-9b2sji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304633/original/file-20191202-66998-9b2sji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304633/original/file-20191202-66998-9b2sji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304633/original/file-20191202-66998-9b2sji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304633/original/file-20191202-66998-9b2sji.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">International Passenger Survey Data, Office for National Statistics</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The fall in the number of EU citizens migrating to look for a job is most apparent when comparing the year before the EU referendum against one year after it. The fall in those migrating to take up a definite job is most apparent when comparing the year ending December 2017 with the December 2018 figure. This might reflect uncertainty in the immediate post-referendum period, meaning EU citizens were less prepared to migrate speculatively but still willing to move to take up definite employment. There is consistent evidence that the number of national insurance number registrations (required to work in the UK) for EU nationals has been <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/november2019#work-and-study-remain-the-most-common-reasons-to-move-to-the-uk">falling</a> since a peak in 2015.</p>
<h2>Attraction of British education</h2>
<p>For migrants from outside of the EU there was a similar decline in the number of immigrants looking for work over in the three years since June 2016 (from 24,000 to 8,000), largely driven by a more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/aug/27/hostile-environment-anatomy-of-a-policy-disaster">restrictive migration regime</a>. However, the numbers migrating for a definite job increased from 51,000 in the year to June 2016 to 74,000 in the year to June 2019. </p>
<p>Among migrants from outside the EU the most common reason for migrating to the UK was to undertake formal study – with the number giving this reason up from 113,000 in the year to June 2016 to 157,000 in the year to June 2019. This rise, combined with the rise in those migrating for employment has contributed to the net gain of migrants from outside the EU. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304632/original/file-20191202-67023-vjtc2p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304632/original/file-20191202-67023-vjtc2p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/304632/original/file-20191202-67023-vjtc2p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304632/original/file-20191202-67023-vjtc2p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304632/original/file-20191202-67023-vjtc2p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304632/original/file-20191202-67023-vjtc2p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304632/original/file-20191202-67023-vjtc2p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/304632/original/file-20191202-67023-vjtc2p.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">International Passenger Survey Data, Office for National Statistics</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Given that international students generally stay in the UK for a defined period of time while studying for a course, there was considerable debate about if students should be included in the governments now abandoned <a href="https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/international-students-and-the-net-migration-target-should-students-be-taken-out/">net migration target</a>. However, the debate will continue if similar targets are pursued after the 2019 election.</p>
<h2>Where are British citizens going?</h2>
<p>Net migration for British citizens remains fairly stable, with a net loss in each of the past 16 years. So where do these British citizens go? This is a surprisingly difficult question to answer comprehensively as the data are not routinely collected, rather estimates are constructed from various sources. </p>
<p>In 2006, the <a href="https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/BA_exec_summ_1548.pdf">Institute for Public Policy Research</a>, drawing on individual country census and other data sources, reported that around three quarters of all Britons living abroad live in 10 destination countries: Australia, Spain, US, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, France, Germany and Cyprus. An <a href="https://www.ippr.org/files/publications/pdf/global-brit_2010.pdf">update</a> in 2008 showed that UAE and Switzerland had taken Cyprus’s place at number 10. </p>
<p>Recent research published by demographers <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41597-019-0089-3">Guy Abel and Joe Cohen</a> broadly confirms the top nine destinations using 2010 data, although Italy comes in at tenth spot in their work.</p>
<h2>An eye on the future</h2>
<p>The latest 2018-based <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/bulletins/nationalpopulationprojections/2018based">National Population Projection</a> from the ONS take into account trends in migration over the past 25 years. This helps put things in to perspective, as over the longer term, trends tend to fluctuate less than in the short term, where they are influenced by events such as economic conditions or Brexit. </p>
<p>The principal projection has factored in a decline in net migration over the next six years, with a fall to 190,000 annually from 2025. It remains to be seen if the current short-term trend for an overall decline in net migration seen in the latest estimates will continue, or indeed accelerate depending on the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. If it does, then there is a more radical low migration projection <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/datasets/tableg11lowmigrationvariantuksummary">variant</a>, which assumes a much lower annual 90,000 net gain by 2025.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127891/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nik Lomax does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is substantial difference in what’s happening to migration from inside and outside the EU.Nik Lomax, Associate professor in Data Analytics for Population Research, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1034612018-09-19T15:38:36Z2018-09-19T15:38:36ZWhat EU migration has done for the UK<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/237107/original/file-20180919-158237-grrr92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/confirm/629715428?src=oWuz4KUO2a3ZwZOEglKvrA-1-11&size=medium_jpg">JaneHYork/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Contrary to the negative stereotypes perpetuated by many politicians and sections of the media, a comprehensive <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/740991/Final_EEA_report_to_go_to_WEB.PDF">new report</a> from the UK’s Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) has found that migration from the EU has a positive impact on many areas of society.</p>
<p>The long-awaited report made a set of recommendations which the government has promised to consider before announcing its own post-Brexit immigration strategy. The key recommendation is that, unless there is a specific trade deal reached between the EU and UK which makes special provision for immigration, EU citizens should be treated no differently from non-EU citizens under a new UK-managed migration system.</p>
<p>Before reaching its recommendations, the MAC undertook an extensive consultation. It concluded that migration from the European Economic Area (EEA) – the EU states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – does not, on the whole, have a negative impact on society. </p>
<p>It has little or no impact on the overall employment, unemployment and wages of UK-born workers. It has a positive impact on productivity and innovation, especially so from highly skilled migration. EEA migrants also contribute more in taxation than they consume in services, especially so for the NHS and social care. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the report noted that any negative impact of migration may be felt more by lower-skilled workers, although this finding is “subject to uncertainty”.</p>
<h2>Housing and education</h2>
<p>The MAC also investigated areas regarded as particular pressure points: housing and education. Despite the increased numbers of migrant children in schools, the MAC found no negative impact on parental school choices or school attainment. Children who speak English as a second language outperform native English speakers. </p>
<p>The situation for housing is more complex and geographically variable. The impact of migration needs to be understood against wider pressures due to housing shortages, especially in some regions. Migrants are underrepresented in social housing but overrepresented in privately rented accommodation. So, any impact on housing supply is likely to be felt in the private rental market. </p>
<p><iframe id="LBRqi" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/LBRqi/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>These findings help explain some of the ways in which anti-immigrant feelings against EEA migrants have grown in the UK recently. Despite the numerous positive benefits, it may be in private-rented accommodation and low-paid work where the impact is most perceived. However, as the MAC report emphasises, these pressures cannot be understood in isolation from wider policies around working pay and conditions and housing supply. As we migration scholars have <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137380616_2">long argued</a>, migrants are often the scapegoats for deeply-rooted structural problems. </p>
<h2>A focus on high-skilled workers</h2>
<p>Given evidence of the economic advantages of highly-skilled migration, it’s no surprise then that the MAC recommended retaining this route from EEA countries. Any changes would not apply to the 3m or so EU nationals already living and working in the UK, or those who arrive before the end of the proposed Brexit transition period in December 2020.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/eu-citizens-what-settled-status-after-brexit-really-means-a-legal-expert-explains-97810">EU citizens: what settled status after Brexit really means – a legal expert explains</a>
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<p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/tier-2-general">Tier 2 visas</a> are the main entry route to the UK for non-EEA migrants. The MAC recommended that rather than creating a new visa, EEA migrants should be treated in the same way as people from outside the EEA. However, the report recommended several modifications, including the removal of the current cap on numbers. The £30,000 salary threshold should be retained but the list of eligible jobs should be extended. “Medium-skilled” jobs should also be eligible for Tier 2 visas it says, presumably to ensure supply of much needed staff in the NHS, for example. As an added incentive to attract skilled migrants, the report recommended that it should be easier for Tier 2 visa-holders to change jobs once here. </p>
<p>Despite the absence of conclusive evidence on the impact of low-skilled EEA migration, the MAC was not inclined to recommend any special visa scheme for this group – with the possible exception of <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-farms-could-get-a-special-pass-to-hire-migrant-workers-after-brexit-103393">seasonal agricultural workers</a>. However, it’s worth noting that this recommendation may be overridden by any UK-EU trade deal that may have a special free movement arrangement for EU citizens. </p>
<p>Overall, there are few surprises in the report. Its recommendations are driven by an economic agenda that privileges certain groups of workers perceived to be most beneficial to the UK economy because they are the least “drain” on public resources. </p>
<p>Yet any closure of UK borders to lower-skilled EEA workers after Brexit is controversial and probably unworkable given the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=eu+workers+">UK’s reliance</a> on large numbers of low-skilled workers in key sectors of the economy. </p>
<p>The care sector is a point in question. The report acknowledges that care work is often low paid and it is difficult to recruit and retain staff. However, the MAC makes no specific provision for this sector in their new migration vision. The social care sector, which is likely to grow given an ageing population, currently employs significant numbers of migrants, increasing numbers of whom are from the EEA. Mostly low paid, they would not qualify under the Tier 2 scheme if the salary threshold remains at £30,000. </p>
<p>The only other option mentioned in the report is an <a href="https://theconversation.com/youth-mobility-scheme-after-brexit-wont-fill-gaps-left-by-end-to-free-movement-99955">expansion of the current youth mobility scheme</a>, which currently allows young migrants from certain countries to work in the UK for a maximum of two years. This is hardly likely to provide the continuity of experienced care workers which is so badly needed to provide an appropriate service to the UK’s ageing population. And if such a youth mobility scheme is expanded to meet demands for lower skilled labour, it could effectively become a “guest worker” programme – which could have consequences on the well-being of those involved. </p>
<p>The government should make a careful assessment of the MAC’s recommendations before announcing its immigration policy. This should not be focused only on the potential losses and gains for the UK economy. The consequences of such a selective approach to EEA migration on the rights of UK nationals also need to be considered, as they may find their rights to go and work in other European countries become restricted in a tit-for-tat reaction.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/103461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Ryan receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the European Commission.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Majella Kilkey receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the European Commission. She is an executive member of the UK Social Policy Association. </span></em></p>Here’s the evidence the UK will use to design a new managed migration policy after Brexit.Louise Ryan, Professor of Sociology, University of SheffieldMajella Kilkey, Reader in Social Policy, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911752018-02-07T14:06:23Z2018-02-07T14:06:23ZThe next step for suffrage: give all immigrants the right to vote<p>The centenary celebration of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/womens-suffrage-21400">women’s suffrage</a> in Britain offers a chance to reflect on the limited scope of democracy today.</p>
<p>It’s striking how just a few generations ago more than half the adult population was subject to laws they had no say in making. Women, and men without property, were permanent outsiders within the state, denied basic respect and standing. Only in 1928 did parliament extend the vote to all women over the age of 21, affording them suffrage on equal terms with men. </p>
<p>Today, not everybody living in Britain has a right to vote. While no one is legally barred from voting based on gender, race, religion or class, large numbers still lack participation rights due to the circumstances of their birth.</p>
<p>For immigrants who live in the UK without citizenship rights, unless they qualify as a citizen of <a href="http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/faq/voting-and-registration/who-is-eligible-to-vote-at-a-uk-general-election">a Commonwealth country or Ireland</a>, they lack the right to vote in general elections and referendums. This includes EU citizens who had no voice in the UK’s referendum on EU membership – a vote which had huge ramifications for their futures. </p>
<p>Non-citizen residents may have migrated to the UK for work, study or family reasons or they may be refugees and forced migrants fleeing persecution, poverty and war. National politics is very often about these people, but it is certainly not by them and hence very rarely for them either. </p>
<p>But this is unjust – and there are good reasons why non-citizen residents who have based their lives in the UK should be accorded full voting rights.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/hundred-years-of-votes-for-women-how-far-weve-come-and-how-far-theres-still-to-go-91169">Hundred years of votes for women: how far we've come and how far there's still to go</a>
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<h2>Subjection to the law</h2>
<p>In the same way as resident British nationals, non-citizen residents are expected to obey the country’s laws or face being arrested, fined and imprisoned. Without voting rights, they lack a very important means to assert their interests – and politicians have few incentives to address their concerns. Whatever the drawbacks of the UK’s first-past-the-post <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/09/electoral-reform-society-result-nail-in-coffin-first-past-the-post">electoral system</a>, the vote remains an important source of power.</p>
<p>This lack of political voice is especially troubling in the case of the estimated <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/file?uri=/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/illegalimmigrantsintheuk/irregularmigrantsfullreport.pdf">half a million people</a> in the UK deemed “illegal immigrants” who lack formal residency status. Often working in the shadow economy, they are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation at the hands of unscrupulous landlords and greedy bosses. In reality, they are doubly disenfranchised since in exercising their political rights to freedom of speech, protest and association they risk drawing the unwelcome attention of the authorities. </p>
<p>These “non-status” residents should be given a pathway to legal residence and the right to vote. Some people might object that this would only reward their “bad behaviour” in entering the country illegally. Yet, even if irregular migrants had broken immigration law, political participation is a basic right and not something to be withheld from unpopular groups of people.</p>
<p>It is for this reason that the UK was <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4315348.stm">ruled</a> in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights in 2005 for its blanket ban on votes for prisoners. The government is only now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/oct/29/government-planning-to-allow-some-prisoners-to-vote-european-court-human-rights">beginning to address</a> this exclusion.</p>
<h2>Contribution and duty</h2>
<p>Another argument for giving migrant residents the vote is based on the contribution they make. This was famously expressed by the <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/parliamentary-archives/explore-guides-to-documentary-archive-/archives-highlights/archives-stamp-act/">American colonists</a> in the phrase “No taxation without representation”. It was also <a href="http://taxjustice.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/hammer-blows-of-tax-protest-suffragette.html">deployed</a> by the British Suffragettes, who pointed to the vital contribution that women’s labour had made to fighting World War I. </p>
<p>Non-citizen residents are currently integrated into the UK labour market and economy, but not its political life. In that sense, their situation is like that of a live-in servant: someone whose labour you benefit from, and whose activities you direct, but who has no effective say. As well as working and paying taxes, non-citizen residents also contribute to the social and cultural life of the country.</p>
<p>I don’t think that political rights should ultimately depend on a group’s particular contribution – we don’t think the elderly and the disabled are any less entitled to vote for example. But there is no doubt that historically this has been a powerful rhetorical tool in suffrage struggles.</p>
<p>Some political theorists even <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64921/1/Yip_Mandatory%20Citizenship.pdf">argue</a> that when a section of the population does not vote it’s a form of free-riding and hence unfair to those citizens who do vote. Voting is often viewed not only as a right but as a duty, like jury service. Casting your ballot in an informed way takes time and effort. It means keeping up with current affairs, following the various proposals of the political parties and holding representatives to account.</p>
<p>As it stands, this burden is shared unevenly. By giving non-citizen residents the vote, we would be asking them to take up a civic duty and participate as equals in public decision-making. UK citizens may then be less disposed to view them as outsiders, and enfranchising them could be a powerful signal against racism and xenophobia.</p>
<h2>It works elsewhere</h2>
<p>Extending the franchise could be done by offering easier routes to citizenship after a period of residence. Another idea is to decouple voting rights from nationality. Those who have been in the UK for some time – say one or two years – could be afforded the right to vote even if they were not yet eligible for citizenship or had no intention of becoming naturalised.</p>
<p>A large number of states (65 by <a href="http://www.ivotenyc.org/?page_id=1189">some estimates</a>) already allow non-citizen residents to vote at local elections, such as for local councillors or mayors. In the UK, EU citizens can vote in local elections, while Irish and Commonwealth citizens can vote in both local and national elections. Yet this is the product of the UK’s history of colonialism and supranational agreements, rather than any consistent democratic principle. </p>
<p>The first country to grant voting rights to women – New Zealand – is one of only a handful of countries that <a href="http://www.elections.org.nz/voters/enrol-check-or-update-now/who-can-and-cant-enrol">allow permanent residents to vote</a> in national elections as well. Chile, too, <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_2012.pdf">allows foreign residents</a> to vote after five years.</p>
<p>Instead of pandering to intolerance and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/31/theresa-may-brexit-transition-no-deal-for-eu-citizens-coming-to-uk">restricting rights</a>, the UK government should extend the franchise to all immigrant residents. So long as this group continues to be marginalised, political energy will be misdirected and the interests of all will suffer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Guy Aitchison receives funding from the Irish Research Council for the project, 'Citizenship at the margins: The case of migrant activism'.</span></em></p>As the American colonists famously said: ‘No taxation without representation.’Guy Aitchison, Post-Doctoral Researcher, School of Politics and International Relations, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.