tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/un-general-assembly-31319/articlesUN General Assembly – The Conversation2024-03-05T14:18:54Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248962024-03-05T14:18:54Z2024-03-05T14:18:54ZBritish troops operating on the ground in Ukraine – what international law says<p><a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/03/03/germany-intelligence-leak-uk-troops-ground-ukraine-nato/">Leaked communications</a> involving high-level German government and military figures appear to confirm that British army personnel are engaged on the ground in Ukraine. An unencrypted telephone call intercepted and leaked to Russian broadcaster RT suggested British troops were helping the defending forces in the <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/british-soldiers-in-ukraine-germany-b2504462.html">use of Storm Shadow cruise missiles</a> the UK has supplied to help Kyiv’s war effort. </p>
<p>In response, the UK prime minister, Rishi Sunak, confirmed that there are a “small number” of British army personnel “supporting the armed forces of Ukraine”. But he added that “we haven’t got any plans for large-scale deployment”. </p>
<p>There have also been <a href="https://www.declassifieduk.org/polish-minister-saw-uk-special-forces-operating-in-ukraine/">unconfirmed reports</a> that British special forces personnel were operating inside Ukraine shortly after the beginning of Russia’s invasion in the spring of 2022. Again, this has not been confirmed by the UK ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Russia has consistently maintained that any non-Ukrainian military personnel training troops to operate weapons systems in-country would be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-medvedev-says-british-training-troops-ukraine-could-be-legitimate-2023-10-01/">legitimate military targets</a> for Russia – as would the factories producing those weapons systems in third-party countries.</p>
<p>The episode raises some important questions as to whether training Ukrainian troops on the battlefield comprises an act of war – and whether this means Britain risks being designated a co-combatant alongside Ukraine. </p>
<p>Konstantin Kosachev, the deputy speaker of Russia’s federation council, was reported by Russia’s state-run news agency Tass <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1752055">as saying</a> that by supplying weapons to Ukraine, Nato countries were progressing along a path towards direct confrontation. Sending troops to Ukraine, he said, “can be interpreted as the alliance’s direct involvement in hostilities, or even as a declaration of war”. </p>
<h2>What international law says</h2>
<p>The day after Russia invaded Ukraine, as Kyiv’s allies scrambled to find a response, it was reported that the US government was reviewing the legality of providing arms to help with the country’s defence.</p>
<p>Within days, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, had declared that even imposing economic sanctions would be an “act of war”. His defence ministry released a statement that if third-party countries allowed Ukraine to use their bases as a safe haven for Ukrainian aircraft, then “subsequent use against the Russian armed forces can be regarded as the involvement of these states in an armed conflict”.</p>
<p>Since the second world war, the laws of neutrality <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/supplying-arms-ukraine-not-act-war">have been interpreted</a> so that states can provide weapons and other support to a state unjustly attacked by a belligerent country, to enable it to defend itself. According to this definition, third-party countries would become co-combatants only if they resort to armed force against Russia.</p>
<p>Russia’s incursion into Ukraine has been ruled as a flagrant breach of Article 2(4) of the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/purposes-and-principles-un-chapter-i-un-charter#">UN Charter</a>, which prohibits the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”. Russia’s war in Ukraine has been denounced as an act of aggression by the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/un-general-assembly-demands-russian-federation-withdraw-all-military-forces-territory-ukraine_und_en#">UN general assembly</a> and the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/91781/taking-stock-of-icj-decisions-in-ukraine-v-russia-cases-and-implications-for-south-africas-case-against-israel/#">International Court of Justice</a>. </p>
<p>Moreover, it is claimed that Russia has been implicated in <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80709/why-china-giving-military-assistance-to-russia-would-violate-international-law/">breaches of international humanitarian law</a> through its apparent indiscriminate bombing and other violent attacks, and <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/80709/why-china-giving-military-assistance-to-russia-would-violate-international-law/">crimes against civilians</a>. This would mean that anyone supplying Russia – the belligerent in this conflict – with arms <em>is</em> in breach of international law.</p>
<p>But the question remains, if it is legal to supply Ukraine with weapons to help defend itself, would actually helping the Ukrainian military use them to hit Russian targets make the UK a co-combatant?</p>
<p>While the law is not settled, legal scholars believe supplying Ukraine with the means to defend itself against Russia does not in itself constitute a breach of international law – and nor does it make the UK a co-combatant. Any action by UK forces would only constitute a combat operation if these actions, carried out by UK personnel without any further action by Ukrainians, would launch a missile or any other kind of attack on Russian forces. </p>
<h2>Risk of escalation</h2>
<p>But there remains the question of escalation. Whatever the legal situation – and Russia has shown itself willing to ignore the rules of warfare by violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity since the incursions of 2014 and in the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – Putin and his senior ministers have regularly warned Kyiv’s western allies that their aid may constitute an escalation to which it would respond with all available means, including nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>Accordingly, to prevent a direct confrontation with Russia, Nato countries have been wary about the kinds of weapon they will supply to Ukraine. The guiding principle has been that western-supplied weapons should not be used in <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-general-jones-interview-long-range-weapons/32700251.html">attacks against Russian territory</a>. </p>
<p>But this may change. Germany has, up to now, been very reluctant to supply Ukraine with its <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-russia-taurus-missiles-4ff5e559c887448fc3ecd9e2e6f58812">Taurus missiles</a>, which have a range of 500km and could be used against targets deep in Russian territory. However, recent reports suggest the German government is considering supplying these missiles to Ukraine. </p>
<p>The German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, was quick, though, to insist that “German soldiers must at no point and in no place be linked to targets this system reaches”, making it absolutely clear that Germany would not risk its involvement being interpreted as a direct act of escalation.</p>
<p>And despite the Kremlin’s repeated threats, it is not eager to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/dec/17/russia-ukraine-war-live-vladimir-putin-volodymyr-zelenskiy-latest-updates-live?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-657eb9f88f08a684d3bd8a12">engage Nato militarily</a>. So, despite all the strong words being exchanged by both sides, there has been no sign that Nato and Russia will face each other on the battlefield in Ukraine – for the moment, at least.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth received funding from the Volkswagen Foundation and the British Council.</span></em></p>Helping Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression is not a violation of international law – but Russia might interpret it as escalation.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2177122023-11-17T13:20:28Z2023-11-17T13:20:28Z300,000 Tanzanians were killed by Germany during the Maji-Maji uprising – it was genocide and should be called that<p>Political actors in Tanzania have in recent years <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/geschichte/kolonialismus-in-tansania-aus-der-nummer-kommt-deutschland-nicht-heraus-a-1137502.html">demanded</a> compensation from Germany for colonial atrocities committed in the early 20th century. In early 2017, the National Assembly of Tanzania <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/maji-maji-war-in-the-spotlight-2580318">stopped short</a> of putting the label of genocide on the atrocities committed by German troops during the Maji-Maji uprising (1905–1907).</p>
<p>During a visit to Tanzania recently, the German president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, asked for “forgiveness” and expressed “shame” for the colonial atrocities committed in what was then German East Africa. This was in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67285182">reference to</a> the killing of up to 300,000 people during the Maji-Maji uprising. </p>
<p>German involvement in Tanzania began in 1890 when Berlin decided to take over administration of east African territories which German traders and travellers had secured. To reduce the cost of administration, governance rested on a few German officers with unchecked power, along with African and Arab fighters (called Askari) to suppress resistance. </p>
<p>Abuse of power was rampant in this system, which provoked rather than prevented resistance. By the end of the 19th century, German troops had brutally quashed an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17532520902793254">uprising of the Wahehe</a> in southern Tanzania.</p>
<p>In 1905, the Maji-Maji uprising <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=170175375">began</a> as a rebellion against Arab traders and cotton plantation owners of the south-eastern coast. Usually the insurgents would first uproot the cotton plants, and then raid farmhouses or office buildings. But the raids transformed into a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/179833">peasants’ revolt</a> as the violence progressed into the interior.</p>
<p>The German response was <a href="https://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-16013">brutal and catastrophic</a> (page 265). A three-year-long mass starvation (page 274) devastated a large part of the southern territory. Entire areas were depopulated or ravaged by disease (page 274). In one location, 25% of the women became unable to fall pregnant. As many as <a href="https://shop.koeppe.de/en/produkt/gilbert-clement-kamana-gwassa-the-outbreak-and-development-of-the-maji-maji-war-1905-1907-pdf/">300,000</a> people were killed.</p>
<p>We are widely published scholars of transitional justice and international criminal justice. Our historical and legal <a href="https://academic.oup.com/hgs/article/35/2/235/6330489">analysis</a> of the suppression of the Maji-Maji uprising shows that there were indeed widespread instances of war crimes committed in the conflicts between the German military and various anti-colonial groups. It also shows that German conduct in that conflict can be described as genocidal in terms of intent and impact. </p>
<p>There is a nuance to our finding. We could not find any genocidal directive from the imperial authorities in Berlin. But the evidence suggests that the atrocities committed against civilians were indeed intended to destroy an identifiable group in whole or in part. This is the core element of the current <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">definition of genocide</a>. </p>
<p>Finding that the violent quashing of the Maji-Maji uprising would be regarded as genocide in the legal sense doesn’t have any practical implications, such as a legal obligation to pay compensation. Today’s international law doesn’t apply to what happened then. The implications are instead political and moral: if Germany’s colonial actions were to be regarded as genocide, the German public might be open to Tanzanian compensation claims, as they were to Namibia’s.</p>
<h2>Suppression as genocidal violence</h2>
<p>Many of the atrocities committed during this conflict could be construed as war crimes committed by both sides. But our focus was the possibility of a genocide.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/209873?ln=en">resolution</a> adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1946 noted that, historically, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This resolution was precursor to the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Genocide Convention of 1948</a>. The convention defines the crime of genocide and serves as the basis for the prevention and punishment of genocide as a crime under international and domestic laws. </p>
<p>Under international law, the Genocide Convention and its progeny don’t apply to states or individuals retrospectively. These laws cannot be invoked as a basis for a legal claim against Germany for events that occurred in the early 20th century.</p>
<p>But characterising an atrocity as a genocide <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-adheres-to-contested-namibia-genocide-deal/a-65081066">can serve as impetus</a> for acknowledgement and some form of voluntary compensation. </p>
<h2>The genocide question</h2>
<p>We analysed first-hand archival records from Germany and Tanzania to examine whether German actions constitute genocide according to the Genocide Convention or the International Criminal Tribunals’ jurisprudence. </p>
<p>German documents and letters from the time rarely distinguished between ethnic groups and usually referred to “Negroes” (Neger) and “Blacks” (Schwarze) in a sweeping way. Racialisation didn’t indicate victimisation in itself, because some of these populations were regarded as friendly to the German colonial authorities. </p>
<p>One could conclude that the German authorities targeted their political (anti-colonial) opponents rather than a group that’s protected under the current definition of genocide. The protected groups are national, racial, ethnic or religious. </p>
<p>But a more expansive reading of genocide law leads to a different conclusion. </p>
<p>The first genocide conviction delivered by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was in the case of <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTR,40278fbb4.html">Akayesu</a>. In this <a href="https://internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/50/Akayesu/">case</a> the judges reasoned that the four protected groups should not be seen as inflexible categories. They stretched the limits to accommodate groups that have similar qualities to the groups explicitly protected. </p>
<p>Subsequent decisions by international criminal tribunals followed that reasoning. They took into account the way the perpetrator saw the group.
A group protected by the Genocide Convention does not have to exist objectively. It is enough if it exists in the mind of the perpetrator and he wants to destroy it in whole or in part. </p>
<p>The “Blacks” the Germans had in mind when they wrote and spoke about their enemies did not exist as such a group. Instead they consisted of a plethora of ethnic groups, tribes and extended family clans. They had as much in common with each other as the Germans had with their colonising British neighbours in the Uganda protectorate. </p>
<p>But in the German officers’ minds these “Blacks” did exist as such a group. That is why they would have been protected if the Genocide Convention and the respective jurisprudence had been in force then. </p>
<p>This has relevance for the question of whether the German conduct during the Maji-Maji uprising was genocidal. </p>
<p>The lack of genocidal directives doesn’t imply a lack of genocidal intent. Circumstantial evidence suggests the German administration wanted to destroy not only hostile individual members of a racialised group, but the group in whole or in part. </p>
<p>The trial and appeals chambers of the <a href="https://www.icty.org/en">International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</a> accepted this kind of reasoning: the basis for establishing a perpetrator’s genocidal intent does not always have to be written evidence or witness testimony. Sometimes the perpetrator’s own behaviour allows such a conclusion.</p>
<p>In Srebrenica it was the policy to separate men from women and children and then to kill the men in mass executions. In a patriarchal society like the Bosnian Muslims’ the whole Muslim group would not survive without its men. </p>
<p>We apply a similar standard to the German conduct to eradicate the traditional leaders of the communities that took part in the Maji-Maji uprising. These communities would have perished without their leaders. In some cases, they did perish. And depriving these groups of their ability to make collective decisions and to “survive as groups” (rather than as individuals or nuclear families) was the explicit aim of the German commanders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Research for parts of this research was sponsored by the National Science Centre, Poland (NCN grant no.
2015/19/B/HS3/02497 “A history of Rwanda”) and by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in Poland
under the 2019–2022 program “‘Regional Initiative of Excellence,’ project number 012/RID/2018/19.”
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerhard Kemp receives funding from the Research Foundation of South Africa, the British Academy, and the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. He is affiliated with the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation as a member of the board of directors. He writes in his personal capacity. </span></em></p>The evidence suggests that atrocities committed against civilians and communities were indeed intended to destroy an identifiable group.Klaus Bachmann, Professor of Political Science, SWPS University of Social Sciences and HumanitiesGerhard Kemp, Professor of Criminal Law, University of the West of EnglandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2165822023-10-30T12:01:21Z2023-10-30T12:01:21ZIsrael-Hamas war: hard experience says a land war won’t go well – and faltering international support suggests the world knows it<p>For the past four decades, Israel’s experience of fighting paramilitary militias has been grim.</p>
<p>Its last major operation was in southern Lebanon, which started with <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/lebanon-war-1982">Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982</a>. While initially successful, the subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon led directly to the rise of the Hezbollah Shia militias, persistent losses for the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), a withdrawal to a nine-mile security zone within three years and from Lebanon as a whole in 2000.</p>
<p>In 2006 Israeli military units went back into Lebanon to counter Hezbollah rockets but ended with exhausted troops withdrawing in some disarray and the IDF resorting to a massive air war that did huge damage to the infrastructure of much of the country.</p>
<p>Then there is Gaza.</p>
<p>Before the current war, the IDF fought <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/7/timeline-israels-attacks-on-gaza-since-2005">four other wars in Gaza</a> since 2007, primarily to control Hamas’s use of rockets and its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/28/a-spiders-web-of-tunnels-inside-gazas-underground-network-being-targeted-by-israel">growing network of infiltration tunnels</a>. The most significant one was <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/israelpalestine-operation-protective-edge-gaza-13-june-26-august-2014">Operation Protective Edge in 2014</a> which involved troops in a ground assault. In the event, they found the fighting extremely difficult, with the elite Golani Brigade experiencing serious casualties from the start.</p>
<p>Once again, there was intense use of air power and, as in the other wars, it was civilians that suffered most. Overall, the Israelis lost more than 300 killed in those four wars but for the Palestinians in Gaza, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/25/israel-hamas-war-assault-gaza-doomed-to-failure">death toll exceeded 5,300</a>.</p>
<h2>Bitter experience</h2>
<p>Experiences in other wars are relevant to what happens now in Gaza. After the 9/11 attacks there was considerable international support for the US. War <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/afghanistan_3849jsp/">against the Taliban seemed</a> inevitable though very few security analysts warned of the US-led coalition falling into a trap. The warnings were ignored and 20 years later the western troops finally retreated in disarray. Then came the Iraq war from 2003, with warnings once again ignored and, once again, with disastrous results.</p>
<p>As to Gaza, there are multiple concerns about <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/afghanistan_3849jsp/">what comes next</a>, the current incursions being far short of a full-scale ground intervention. There are sharp differences of belief of what should come next within the military and within Benjamin Netanyahu’s government as well as within Israel as a whole, with much of it heightened by the concern over the loss of international support.</p>
<p>There is also concern about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/24/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-invasion.html">experience of urban warfare</a> elsewhere. Just six years ago, it took nine months for the US-led coalition to take back the Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State. The US led the huge air assault, aided by France, the UK and other partners. The ground forces then were Iraqi troops and militias and they lost 8,200 troops.</p>
<p>A further 10,000 civilians were killed, and the old city was wrecked. It was <a href="https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-battle-of-stalingrad">likened to Stalingrad</a> in early 1943.</p>
<p>Just last year, a small force of Ukrainian soldiers held off a large Russian force for nearly three months in the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/24/world/europe/ukraine-war-mariupol-azovstal.html">siege of the Azovstal steel works in Mariupol</a> using a network of 24 kilometres of Soviet-era tunnels. Hamas <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/28/us/politics/gazas-tunnels-israel-ground-war.html">has constructed vastly more tunnels under Gaza</a> and is no doubt ready for months of combat.</p>
<h2>Dwindling international support</h2>
<p>Three weeks ago, Israel suffered a grievous loss and rightly got huge initial support, but that is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/29/uae-calls-emergency-un-security-council-meeting-to-seek-pause-to-gaza-fighting">already fading</a>. Worse still, there is a terrible inability of the current Israeli government to understand what it is dealing with in a ground invasion of Gaza. But the death toll tells us all we need to know. If we look at the five Gaza wars since 2007, including the current devastating war, the Israelis have lost 1,700 people, but the Palestinians have lost more than 13,000 – and the numbers are rising by hundreds every day.</p>
<p>For now, the public mood in Israel <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/europe/israel-reservists-hamas-war.html">still supports the Netanyahu government</a>, however unpopular it might have been just a month ago. But the small but persistent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/families-israeli-hostages-taken-by-hamas-tour-europe-keep-focus-plight-2023-10-26/">campaign by families of the hostages</a> for them to be the priority is having an effect.</p>
<p>Above all, it is the change of mood internationally that is a deep concern in Israel and, indeed, in the Biden administration. This was shown by the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/un-resolution-vote-israel-hamas-gaza-truce-7eec00b0e28ef2036636b166b48ca030">weekend debate in the UN general assembly</a> when only 12 states supported the US and Israel in voting against a “humanitarian pause”. Also, eight EU states were among the 120 supporting the motion and the 45 who abstained even included Britain.</p>
<p>In some previous Israeli military actions, the end has effectively come about when international support for Israel has collapsed or got close to that. If the ground war against Hamas had started within a few days of the shock of October 7, and if that operation had been successful and Hamas had collapsed, then Netanyahu could have claimed success.</p>
<p>That has not happened and will not happen now. Instead, there is every prospect of a bitter war with many thousands more Palestinians killed, tens of thousands of young Palestinians all too ready to fight in the future, and a peaceful resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict delayed by at least another generation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216582/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Rogers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>History is full of examples that show why a ground war in Gaza is a bad idea – but is the Netanyahu government listening?Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2139132023-09-25T16:21:33Z2023-09-25T16:21:33ZUkraine war: mixed signals among Kyiv’s allies hint at growing conflict fatigue<p>It is now almost 600 days since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the war that has followed has tested the resilience of both countries. But it has also tested those in the west that have supported Ukraine from the start. </p>
<p>This much was evident from the mixed reception Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, received last week when he visited the US and Canada. Meanwhile, tensions in Europe over support for Ukraine have flared up again. </p>
<p>With the Ukrainian counteroffensive still not living up to – the perhaps inflated – expectations, we are beginning to see the first serious signs of a fraying consensus in the west about how seriously different governments are committed to supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes.</p>
<p>Zelensky’s North American visit started with a <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/en/78/ukraine">speech at the UN general assembly</a> in New York in which he made a passionate appeal to fellow world leaders to uphold international law and order and support his country. While there remains widespread backing for the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity, it gets fuzzier when it comes to how to end the war. </p>
<p>There are two camps: many western leaders following Ukraine’s line that the country’s territorial integrity needs to be restored first. Others – including a large number of countries in the global south – prefer to emphasise the importance of dialogue and an early cessation of violence.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/lZ1FcAjRzXM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Volodymyr Zelensky’s savages Russia at the United Nations.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This pattern was repeated the following morning at the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15416.doc.htm">UN security council’s open debate</a> on the war in Ukraine, with a predictable clash between Zelensky and the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who presented very different accounts of causes and dynamics of the war. But before the debate could conclude, the security council <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15418.doc.htm">turned its attention</a> to the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, a clear indication that Ukraine is not the only urgent issue on the global agenda.</p>
<p>Zelensky continued to Washington DC where he <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3534283/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/">secured another military aid package</a> worth US$325 million (£192 million). This aid can be allocated by US president Joe Biden directly under the so-called <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3509657/aim-9m-missiles-250-million-in-additional-security-assistance-headed-for-ukraine/">presidential drawdown authority</a>. </p>
<p>A further US$24 billion in aid, which is subject to congressional approval, is more problematic. The Republican House majority leader, Kevin McCarthy, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-09-21-23/h_799534c38ffd8d5f474b2cf1592bdb02">would not commit</a> to putting a bill to that effect on the legislative schedule before the end of the year. </p>
<p>McCarthy <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/20/us/politics/mccarthy-zelensky-republicans.html">also denied</a> the Ukrainian president an opportunity to address a joint session of the House and the Senate, another sign of growing Republican resistance to the enthusiastic support offered to Ukraine by the Biden administration.</p>
<p>Moving up to Canada, Zelensky received a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/zelensky-gets-standing-ovation-as-he-calls-on-canada-to-stay-with-ukraine-moscow-must-lose/ar-AA1h8kwm">universally warm reception</a> and left with a <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-volodymyr-zelenskyy-canada-trudeau-visit/">military aid package</a> worth C$650 million (£394 million).</p>
<h2>Europe: growing division</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, in Europe, three of Kyiv’s neighbours inside the EU – Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/16/europe/ukraine-grain-imports-pland-slovakia-hungary-intl/index.html">defied</a> the end of an EU-wide ban on grain imports from Ukraine. Poland then went one step further and also put a – temporary – halt on any <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/20/europe/poland-ukraine-weapons-grain-intl-hnk/index.html">weapons deliveries</a> to Ukraine. This was decried by Zelensky <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/%5Bvariable%3Acurrent_session%5D/ua_en_rev.pdf">in his speech</a> before the UN general assembly as “political theatre” and a gift for Moscow. </p>
<p>The grain dispute between Poland and Ukraine has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/12/ukraine-poland-tensions-grain-war">simmering for some time</a>, and it was a question of when, not if, it would ultimately escalate. Importantly, it foreshadows other potential obstacles in Ukraine’s path to EU membership. </p>
<p>Some of these are potentially within Ukraine itself. As Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_4426">noted in her annual state-of-the-union</a> address at the European parliament, “accession [to the EU] is merit-based”, she acknowledged “the great strides Ukraine has already made”. </p>
<p>But accession negotiations will not be opened before a positive recommendation from the commission on Kyiv’s progress concerning seven conditions set in June 2022 when Ukraine was granted candidate status. This decision is <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/06/22/ukraine-has-fully-met-two-of-the-seven-conditions-needed-to-start-eu-accession-talks">expected</a> before the end of 2023.</p>
<p>Once accession talks start, the interests of individual EU member states will play a greater role in determining the speed at which Ukraine can progress. The current spat with Poland is but one indication of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8de02993-9713-4350-9bc5-9bd9e8e91b44">potential trouble ahead</a>, albeit in the particularly sensitive area of the EU’s common agricultural policy. This will be deeply affected if Ukraine – a global agricultural superpower – joins.</p>
<p>Poland’s prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, clearly wants to be seen to be <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/poland-says-it-will-stop-arming-ukraine-how-did-we-get-here-and-what-does-it-mean-for-the-war/ar-AA1h3bvR">protecting his country’s farmers</a> from uncompetitive practices by Ukrainian exporters, particularly in the run-up to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/23/europe/morawiecki-ukraine-zelensky-insult-poland-intl-hnk/index.html">a parliamentary election</a> next month. </p>
<p>But this is also about leadership and the potential challenge that Ukrainian EU membership would pose to Poland’s ambitions to be the main voice of the bloc’s eastern members. </p>
<p>Such an open attack on Zelensky and his policies significantly shifts the dial in what is considered acceptable criticism of the highly charismatic Ukrainian president. It comes in the wake of growing western unease about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/22/us/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-war.html">course</a> and <a href="https://app.23degrees.io/view/x67vE7NsM3NeQu7z-atlas-slideshow_v4-atlantic/fY83zKIZpbLi3ll5-choro-ukraine-aid-tracker-final-data">cost of the war</a>.</p>
<p>This is not to say that Ukraine has not made progress since its offensive began just before the summer. In recent days, Ukraine <a href="https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2023">has made further gains</a> in the south and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66887524">launched a spectacular attack</a> on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet in occupied Crimea at the weekend.</p>
<p>But Ukraine’s recent successes are almost certainly not enough to dispel the growing sense that the war is becoming a lasting stalemate. Until now, western support has underwritten Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself. But it has done no more than that and is not sufficient to enable a Ukrainian victory. </p>
<p>If the events of last week are a sign that this support begins to weaken, the prevention of a Ukrainian defeat can no longer be taken as a given. Nor could it be argued that this was merely a defeat for Ukraine – it would also mean that the western alliance did not have the stamina to prevail in the current confrontation with Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213913/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tetyana Malyarenko receives funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. She is affiliated with the Regensburg University, Germany as a Philipp Schwartz research fellow</span></em></p>As the war nears 600 days, there are signs that support for Ukraine could be beginning to waver in some parts.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamTetyana Malyarenko, Professor of International Relations, Jean Monnet Professor of European Security, National University Odesa Law AcademyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2125852023-09-06T12:26:55Z2023-09-06T12:26:55ZThe US committed to meet the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, but like other countries, it’s struggling to make progress<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546246/original/file-20230904-15-tjmfsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=229%2C467%2C3173%2C2207&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many colonias along the Texas-Mexico border still lack basic infrastructure, including running water.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TexasBorderColonias/47c19c2a66e340d49a1d534f3b6df91e/photo">AP Photo/Eric Gay</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a Zen parable, a man sees a horse and rider galloping by. The man asks the rider where he’s going, and the rider responds, “I don’t know. Ask the horse!”</p>
<p>It is easy to feel out of control and helpless in the face of the many problems Americans are now experiencing – <a href="https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/americans-challenges-with-health-care-costs/">unaffordable health care</a>, <a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/stories/poverty-awareness-month.html">poverty</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ipcc-report-climate-solutions-exist-but-humanity-has-to-break-from-the-status-quo-and-embrace-innovation-202134">climate change</a>, to name a few. These problems are made harder by the ways in which people, including elected representatives, often talk past each other.</p>
<p>Most <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/06/21/inflation-health-costs-partisan-cooperation-among-the-nations-top-problems/">people want</a> a strong economy, social well-being and a healthy environment. These goals are interdependent: A strong economy isn’t possible without a society peaceful enough to support investment and well-functioning markets, or without water and air clean enough to support life and productivity. This understanding – that economic, social and environmental well-being are intertwined – is the premise of sustainable development. </p>
<p>In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2015/ga11688.doc.htm">unanimously adopted</a> 17 <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/12/sustainable-development-goals-kick-off-with-start-of-new-year">Sustainable Development Goals</a>, known as the SDGs, with 169 measurable targets to be achieved by 2030. Though not legally binding, all nations, including the U.S., agreed to pursue this agenda.</p>
<p>The world is now halfway to that 2030 deadline. Countries have made some progress, such as reducing extreme poverty and child mortality, though the COVID-19 pandemic <a href="https://www.un.org/en/desa/it%E2%80%99s-now-or-never-achieving-sdgs-hinges-effective-crises-response">set back progress</a> on many targets.</p>
<p>On Sept. 18-19, 2023, countries are reviewing global progress toward those goals during a meeting at the United Nations. It’s a good opportunity for Americans to review their own progress because, as we see it, sustainable development is fundamentally American.</p>
<h2>Environment, economy and health intertwined</h2>
<p>Though not widely recognized, sustainable development has been a core American policy since President Richard Nixon signed the <a href="https://www.energy.gov/nepa/downloads/national-environmental-policy-act-1969">National Environmental Policy Act </a> into law in 1970. The law says that Americans should “use all practicable means and measures … to create and maintain conditions under which man [sic] and nature can exist in productive harmony and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.”</p>
<p>While it is tempting in today’s sour political climate to dismiss this as wishful thinking, the U.S. has made some progress reconciling economic development with environmental protection. </p>
<p>Gross domestic product, for example, grew 196% between 1980 and 2022, while total emissions of the six most common non-greenhouse air pollutants, including lead and sulfur dioxide, fell 73%, <a href="https://www.epa.gov/air-trends/air-quality-national-summary">according to the Environmental Protection Agency</a>. </p>
<p>The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, a major sustainable development law, is designed to further accelerate the use of renewable energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions through tax credits and other incentives. <a href="https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/the-us-is-poised-for-an-energy-revolution.html">Goldman Sachs</a> estimated the law would spur about US$3 trillion in renewable energy investment. The law has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/one-year-biden-still-needs-explain-his-signature-clean-energy-legislation-2023-08-16/">already been credited with creating</a> 170,000 new jobs and leading to more than 270 new or expanded clean energy projects. That impact further demonstrates that environmental goals can align with economic growth.</p>
<p>The 2015 Sustainable Development Goals cover a broader range of environmental, social and economic issues, and there are indicators for assessing progress on each.</p>
<h2>How is America doing?</h2>
<p><a href="https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/rankings">The U.S. ranked 39th</a> out of 166 countries in a 2023 review of national efforts to implement the Sustainable Development Goals. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.unsdsn.org/about-us">Sustainable Development Solutions Network</a>, which operates under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary-General, finds that America is lagging behind the targets set <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals">for many of the Sustainable Development Goals</a> that are critical to the nation’s defense, competitiveness and health, such as reducing obesity, increasing life expectancy at birth, protecting labor rights, reducing maternal mortality, decreasing inequality and protecting biodiversity.</p>
<p>To understand where the U.S. is falling short, we asked <a href="https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/files-pdf/GoverningforSustainability-TOC.pdf">26 experts working on various areas of sustainable development</a> to review the nation’s progress and make recommendations for future action. The resulting 2023 book, <a href="https://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/governing-sustainability">Governing for Sustainability</a>, provides some 500 U.S.-specific recommendations for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A young child, looking bored, sits on a woman's lap as a nurse tests her blood pressure." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546248/original/file-20230904-27-721s7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546248/original/file-20230904-27-721s7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546248/original/file-20230904-27-721s7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546248/original/file-20230904-27-721s7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546248/original/file-20230904-27-721s7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546248/original/file-20230904-27-721s7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546248/original/file-20230904-27-721s7p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Residents waited in long lines for a free annual health clinic in Wise, Va., in 2017. A nonprofit operated the annual pop-up clinic for two decades until the state expanded Medicaid eligibility in 2019, which helped more residents afford local health care.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ruby-partin-and-her-adoptive-son-timothy-huff-visit-a-free-news-photo/820902146">John Moore/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Health and access to quality health care loom large in many of the goals. The authors in several chapters explain why the nation cannot eliminate poverty or hunger, or have a vibrant economy, gender equality or education gains, without widely available, affordable health care. Yet, the U.S. has some of the <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2023/07/why-are-americans-paying-more-for-healthcare">highest health care costs in the world</a>. Several states have <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/georgia-medicaid-program-work-requirement-off-slow-start-102389380">rejected efforts to expand eligibility</a> for federal Medicaid health insurance for low-income residents, leaving many people without care.</p>
<p>Similarly, the authors show that human health, ecological health, clean water and economic vitality <a href="https://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/governing-sustainability">all require sound climate policy</a>. A quickly warming world <a href="https://theconversation.com/8-billion-people-four-ways-climate-change-and-population-growth-combine-to-threaten-public-health-with-global-consequences-193077">poses new health risks</a>, decimates ecosystems, strains potable water supplies and reduces global economic productivity.</p>
<p>Clean and abundant water is critical to a functioning economy and a stable, diverse ecosystem, and yet some areas of the United States <a href="https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-rules-the-us-is-not-required-to-ensure-access-to-water-for-the-navajo-nation-202588">still lack clean water</a> or <a href="https://theconversation.com/youth-living-in-settlements-at-us-border-suffer-poverty-and-lack-of-health-care-103416">indoor plumbing</a>. This often occurs in communities of color and low income, and it can impede economic prosperity and development in these areas.</p>
<p>Ready access to nutritious food is also a bedrock need to support many of the Sustainable Development Goals, from poverty alleviation to education, yet far too many American children <a href="https://doi.org/10.1001%2Fjamanetworkopen.2021.5262">rely on school lunches</a> for <a href="https://www.ppic.org/blog/feeding-children-when-schools-are-closed-for-covid-19/">basic sustenance</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man squints into the sun as he holds a large hose that pours water into a tank in the back of a pickup truck." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546249/original/file-20230904-27-t1qoyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/546249/original/file-20230904-27-t1qoyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546249/original/file-20230904-27-t1qoyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546249/original/file-20230904-27-t1qoyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546249/original/file-20230904-27-t1qoyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546249/original/file-20230904-27-t1qoyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/546249/original/file-20230904-27-t1qoyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A U.S. Army veteran fills a tank in the back of his pickup with water in Laredo, Texas, to provide water for his mother’s home. Rural residents in parts of the Southwest have to truck in clean water.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/carlos-salas-u-s-army-veteran-fills-his-water-tank-that-is-news-photo/916823510">Salwan Georges/The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The goals covering <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal16">peace, justice, strong institutions</a> and <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal17">partnerships</a> are necessary to achieve all of the goals. A society at war with itself and without rule of law cannot support a vibrant, diverse economy and lasting democracy. This has been shown repeatedly as some developing nations <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/20/understanding-and-responding-to-global-democratic-backsliding-pub-88173">backslide from democratic progress</a> and prosperity to civil war and poverty. <a href="https://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/governing-sustainability">Developed nations</a> are subject to the same forces.</p>
<h2>Taking the reins</h2>
<p>Sustainable development is emphatically not about government alone solving the nation’s problems. Businesses, universities and other organizations, as well as individuals, are essential to help the country realize its environmental, health and climate goals, fair practices and living wages. </p>
<p>The right place to “take the reins” is where you are, and with the problems or tasks in front of you – at work and at home. Figure out more sustainable ways to use water and energy, for example. Look at what our book recommends and what others are already doing to meet the Sustainable Development Goals. Seize opportunities such as saving money, and reduce risks by, for example, cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Every individual can contribute to a better future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Halfway to the SDGs’ 2030 deadline, countries have made progress, but most are struggling to meet all 17 goals. The US is no exception.Scott Schang, Director of Environmental Law and Policy Clinic; Professor of Practice, Wake Forest UniversityJohn Dernbach, Professor of Law Emeritus, Widener UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1935952022-11-04T10:56:35Z2022-11-04T10:56:35ZWhy a chain of tiny Pacific islands wants an international court opinion on responsibility for the climate crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493016/original/file-20221102-14-xmat9f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mark and Anna Photography / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Small island states are losing their patience with big polluting nations as they suffer the devastating impacts of climate change. Without significant movement at the forthcoming COP27 climate talks in Egypt, a pivotal vote at the next UN general assembly meeting, brought by the tiny Pacific islands of Vanuatu, could open the floodgates to international climate litigation.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.vanuatuicj.com/statement-icj-core-group">core group of 16 states</a> led by Vanuatu, will table a draft resolution at the general assembly in December requesting that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gives an “<a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/en/advisory-jurisdiction">advisory opinion</a>” to clarify the rights and obligations of states under international law in relation to the adverse effects of climate change. </p>
<p>Vanuatu needs only a simple majority of members present and voting (50% plus one), and support is growing. If successful, the baton passes to the ICJ to bring legal clarity to this complex issue.</p>
<p>The advisory opinion would be non-binding. Nonetheless, such an opinion draws enormous moral power and legal authority. Although the vote takes place after COP27, Vanuatu’s initiative could have an influence on negotiations in Egypt.</p>
<h2>Responsibility and compensation for loss and damage</h2>
<p>Low-income island states like Vanuatu have contributed the least to climate change, but as a group are <a href="https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/SIDS_sustained_development_WP_jr.pdf">the most directly affected by it</a>. For low-lying atolls in particular, sea-level rise poses an existential threat – some Pacific nations will be <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec/04/in-30-years-maybe-kiribati-will-disappear-climate-change">entirely underwater</a> by the end of the century. So it’s not surprising to see states seeking clarity from the ICJ. Vanuatu has taken the lead in going to international courts, but others could follow suit.</p>
<p>As far back as 1991, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) first called for a mechanism to compensate countries affected by sea level rise. These days, there are calls for “<a href="https://theconversation.com/cop26-deal-how-rich-countries-failed-to-meet-their-obligations-to-the-rest-of-the-world-171804">loss and damage</a>” payments to address impacts associated with climate change that cannot be adapted to. </p>
<p>But repeated attempts to raise the profile of loss and damage within the negotiations have been met with hostility from rich countries. At COP26 in Glasgow last year, AOSIS, supported by a coalition of 134 developing countries and China, called for a new facility to finance loss and damage, but this was firmly <a href="https://study.soas.ac.uk/loss-damage-climate-change/">blocked by the US and EU</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493017/original/file-20221102-49447-tdv3og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Pacific islands" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493017/original/file-20221102-49447-tdv3og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493017/original/file-20221102-49447-tdv3og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493017/original/file-20221102-49447-tdv3og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493017/original/file-20221102-49447-tdv3og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493017/original/file-20221102-49447-tdv3og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493017/original/file-20221102-49447-tdv3og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493017/original/file-20221102-49447-tdv3og.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vanuatu is one of many small island states in the Pacific threatened by rising seas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Hermes Furian / shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The costs of responding to climate disasters in developing countries <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/06/1094762">could be in the trillions of dollars</a> by 2050, and rich countries will want to avoid any legally binding commitment to meet these costs with public resources. But an ICJ advisory opinion could help unstick negotiations, as the threat of expansive litigation in the future may encourage the rich countries to capitulate.</p>
<h2>Diverging interests</h2>
<p>All of this plays into the increasingly contentious geopolitics between developing island states and larger, richer nations. A simple divide between rich and poor, north and south, or in the lingo of climate policy <a href="https://unfccc.int/parties-observers">“Annex I” and “non-Annex I”</a> countries does not tell the whole story.</p>
<p>For instance <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/the-brics-countries-where-next-and-what-impact-on-the-global-economy">many middle income “emerging” countries</a> are rapidly industrialising. Their fast-growing emissions are causing their <a href="https://research.fit.edu/media/site-specific/researchfitedu/coast-climate-adaptation-library/latin-america-and-caribbean/regional---caribbean/Bishop--Payne.--2012.--CC--the-Future-of-Caribbean-Development..pdf">interests to diverge</a> from those of small island states, and it is unclear whether the large group of developing countries will remain united in loss and damage negotiations.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493012/original/file-20221102-49280-m0jwjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Aerial view of Mexico City" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493012/original/file-20221102-49280-m0jwjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493012/original/file-20221102-49280-m0jwjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493012/original/file-20221102-49280-m0jwjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493012/original/file-20221102-49280-m0jwjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493012/original/file-20221102-49280-m0jwjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493012/original/file-20221102-49280-m0jwjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493012/original/file-20221102-49280-m0jwjq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Middle-income countries are not necessarily on the same side as low-income islands.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">WitR / shutterstock</span></span>
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<h2>Recognising the power of small states</h2>
<p>Vanuatu’s initiative acknowledges the failures of the climate change negotiations but exemplifies the unique ways that small island developing states can exercise power.</p>
<p>First, the recognition <a href="https://climatechangenews.com/2022/09/23/vanuatu-calls-fossil-fuel-non-proliferation-treaty-un-general-assembly/">by the country’s president</a> that the ICJ is “the only principal organ of the UN system that has not yet been given an opportunity to help address the climate crisis” is extremely insightful. This seemingly banal observation about a process with no legal force, actually carries huge political significance because, if given the opportunity, the ICJ could make a judgement that powerful polluting countries would rather not have to hear.</p>
<p>Second, Vanuatu’s initiative is triggered by the low level of ambition under current <a href="https://unfccc.int/ndc-information/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs">nationally determined contributions</a> (the amount each country pledges to cut its emissions by). International law requires states to prevent harm to the environment and protect human rights. At best, these obligations are not being met; at worst, they are actively being undermined by the lack of transformative climate action being demanded by vulnerable states.</p>
<p>Third, this initiative is being spearheaded by a country of just 300,000 people across 83 islands and atolls, many of which are literally going under water. This is a remarkable example of the kind of leverage that can be exercised by small and vulnerable states. In the absence of conventional sources of power (size and military might) island states have been able to build multilateral coalitions and <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2010.01377.x">leverage institutional forms of influence</a> (such as their UN membership, international law, and moral persuasion) to redress the imbalance.</p>
<p>Powerful nations should stand up and take notice. Vanuatu and its partners are pursuing a ground-breaking diplomatic strategy and others will likely follow. </p>
<p>But regardless of the ICJ initiative outcome, any acknowledged responsibility for loss and damage caused by climate change will only have meaningful effects when countries redress them. For the sake of the smallest, most vulnerable nations on earth, it’s high time that they did.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193595/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Thanks to Vanuatu, a vote at the next UN General Assembly could open the floodgates to international climate litigation.Emily Wilkinson, Co-director, Caribbean Resilience and Recovery Knowledge Network, University of the West Indies, Mona CampusMatt Bishop, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of SheffieldNadia Sánchez Castillo-Winckels, Visiting Research Fellow, Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924612022-10-13T16:26:28Z2022-10-13T16:26:28ZUkraine recap: Russia targets civilians as the world argues about how to end the war<p>Ever since Vladimir Putin sent Russian troops across the border into Ukraine, the role of the UN as global problem solver has come under scrutiny. Any attempts for meaningful action by the security council are immediately stymied by the fact that – as a permanent member – Russia can simply wield its veto. But resolutions voted on by the general assembly at least make for a good indication of where – broadly speaking – the world stands on Vladimir Putin’s invasion.</p>
<p>So when the general assembly voted last night on a resolution condemning Russia’s annexation of the four Ukraine regions it was interesting to see who sponsored it, who supported it, who voted against and who abstained. Apart from Russia, only Belarus, North Korea, Nicaragua and Syria voted against. China, India, Pakistan, Iran and the states of Central Asia were among 35 countries which abstained. Which left 143 nations who voted in favour of the condemnation – the biggest vote of censure against Russia since the beginning of the war.</p>
<p>The most worrying aspect of this, however, is that while there is clearly a consensus that Russia’s invasion is a bad thing, there are deep divisions as to how to bring the conflict to an end. Stefan Wolff, an international security expert at the University of Birmingham – who has written here regularly since the start of the war – <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-latest-un-vote-shows-world-wants-conflict-to-end-but-cant-agree-on-how-to-prevent-putin-going-nuclear-192219">has identified</a> a fairly unbridgeable rift between those countries who want Russia to withdraw from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea and the areas it has occupied since 2014, and those who want to bring Ukraine and Russia to the table to negotiate. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-latest-un-vote-shows-world-wants-conflict-to-end-but-cant-agree-on-how-to-prevent-putin-going-nuclear-192219">Ukraine war: latest UN vote shows world wants conflict to end – but can't agree on how to prevent Putin going nuclear</a>
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<p>As you’d expect, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has been firm in his insistence that there can be no negotiations until Russia has withdrawn from Ukraine completely. He is backed in that position by most western countries. Their thinking is that basing talks on the idea that Putin and Russia might be offered any concessions in the shape of territorial gains would set a disastrous precedent by effectively rewarding force of arms.</p>
<p>Joseph O'Maloney, an international relations scholar at the University of Reading, has gone back over 20th-century history to <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-the-world-cant-afford-to-let-russia-get-away-with-its-land-grab-lessons-from-history-191782">give us an example</a> of where a lack of international solidarity over Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia in the 1930s led to a policy of appeasement which was to prove disastrous when dealing with Hitler’s Germany. Meanwhile there are multiple examples of non-recognition of territorial conquest has held firm for decades, as in northern Cyprus. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-the-world-cant-afford-to-let-russia-get-away-with-its-land-grab-lessons-from-history-191782">Ukraine war: why the world can't afford to let Russia get away with its land grab – lessons from history</a>
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<img alt="Ukraine Recap weekly email newsletter" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/449743/original/file-20220303-4351-1xhaozt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><strong><em>This is our weekly recap of expert analysis of the Ukraine conflict.</em></strong>
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<p>In light of these arguments, it’s hard to see what the US president, Joe Biden, means when he says Putin must be given an “off-ramp”. Rod Thornton, an international relations expert at King’s College London, who served in the military and has lived in both Moscow and Kyiv, believes that, other than selling Ukraine short, there’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putins-off-ramp-and-why-he-is-unlikely-to-take-it-191879">little the west can do</a> to provide Putin with a get-out clause he can sell to his own backers. Thornton sees Biden’s words as both a signal to the Kremlin of the extent of the catastrophe Russia is risking and also a betrayal of lack of options available to the US when it comes to de-escalation. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putins-off-ramp-and-why-he-is-unlikely-to-take-it-191879">Ukraine war: Putin's off ramp and why he is unlikely to take it</a>
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<h2>Kerch bridge</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Putin continues to escalate. It’s hard to imagine the Russian leader wasn’t personally stung by the targeting of the Kerch bridge last weekend. The bridge was a project he had consistently pushed for and personally opened, driving the first truck across the bridge from Russia to Crimea when its road section opened in 2018. So he is bound to have taken it personally. But quite apart from that, writes Frank Ledwidge – a military strategist at the University of Portsmouth – the bridge is a key strategic asset for Russia, supplying its southern offensive.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1580349993558237184"}"></div></p>
<p>The severe damage to the bridge inflicted (we think) by Ukrainian special forces will <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-desperate-russia-defaults-to-attacking-civilians-192222">seriously hamper Russia’s war effort</a> and put its occupation of Crimea at risk. Ledwidge sees Putin’s decision to escalate by targeting civilians in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities as a direct consequence of this setback.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-desperate-russia-defaults-to-attacking-civilians-192222">Ukraine war: a desperate Russia defaults to attacking civilians</a>
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<p>We also have this fascinating piece by Colin Caprani from Monash University and Sam Rigby of the University of Sheffield, both engineering experts, <a href="https://theconversation.com/crimean-bridge-blast-experts-assess-the-damage-192161">assessing the damage to the bridge</a>. They look at how it could be made safe to use again, concluding that work of this scale will take time and cause a great deal of disruption.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/crimean-bridge-blast-experts-assess-the-damage-192161">Crimean Bridge blast: experts assess the damage</a>
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<h2>Putin’s popularity sliding?</h2>
<p>Many observers are also interpreting Russia’s decision to resume strikes against Ukraine’s cities and civilian populations as an indication of increasing pressure being felt by Putin. </p>
<p>Arik Burakovsky is a scholar of Russia and public opinion at Tufts University in the US. He is <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-enlisting-hundreds-of-thousands-of-men-to-fight-against-ukraine-but-public-support-for-putin-is-falling-191158">sceptical of opinion polls</a> emerging from Russia showing continuing high levels of support for the war and for the president. Burakovsky says polls are now reporting that the most common emotions evoked by the war are no longer national pride but rather “anxiety, fear, horror” and “anger, indignation”. </p>
<p>The recent mobilisation hasn’t helped, as more and more families have or know someone directly affected by the conflict. And it’s also worth noting that Putin’s personal approval ratings have begun to fall.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-is-enlisting-hundreds-of-thousands-of-men-to-fight-against-ukraine-but-public-support-for-putin-is-falling-191158">Russia is enlisting hundreds of thousands of men to fight against Ukraine, but public support for Putin is falling</a>
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<p>Meanwhile, if the draft hasn’t helped Putin’s ratings at home, it’s hardly helping the Russian army in the field. Jack Adam MacLennan and James Horncastle, American scholars of national security and international relations, believe that shipping 300,000 reluctant and poorly trained and equipped conscripts into an already adverse military situation <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-russian-draft-isnt-likely-to-help-vladimir-putin-win-the-war-in-ukraine-191838">will further damage Russian morale</a> and could also exacerbate their army’s growing problem with shortage of equipment.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-russian-draft-isnt-likely-to-help-vladimir-putin-win-the-war-in-ukraine-191838">The Russian draft isn't likely to help Vladimir Putin win the war in Ukraine</a>
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<h2>Talking at cross-purposes</h2>
<p>One of the issues that has emerged regularly over the course of the invasion is that of language and the large number of Ukrainians who speak Russian as their first language. It was one of the justifications for the invasion used by the Kremlin which has taken this as a “proof” that Ukraine has always traditionally been a part of Russia. Certainly, in some part of the eastern provinces annexed recently by Russia, nearly half of the population uses Russian as its first language. </p>
<p>But it’s not as simple as that, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-many-ukrainians-speak-russian-as-their-first-language-190856">writes Ievgeniia Ivanova</a> of the University of Aberdeen, who explains the fascinating history of the Ukrainian language over many centuries.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-many-ukrainians-speak-russian-as-their-first-language-190856">Why many Ukrainians speak Russian as their first language</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a weekly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192461/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Some of the key articles from our coverage of the war in Ukraine over the past week.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1922192022-10-13T12:33:04Z2022-10-13T12:33:04ZUkraine war: latest UN vote shows world wants conflict to end – but can’t agree on how to prevent Putin going nuclear<p>Each time the United Nations gathers to debate and vote on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it becomes more obvious that the vast majority of the international community condemns the invasion and wants the conflict to stop. But what is also becoming clear is that the world is hopelessly divided as to how to bring the war to an end.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12458.doc.htm">latest vote</a> in the UN General Assembly saw a clear condemnation of Russia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/united-nations-condemns-russias-move-annex-parts-ukraine-2022-10-12/">illegal annexation</a> of four Ukrainian regions and a demand for the withdrawal of all occupying forces. The initial draft resolution was sponsored by 43 member states and eventually supported by 143. Apart from Russia, only four other countries voted against the resolution: Belarus, North Korea, Nicaragua and Syria. </p>
<p>So it’s clear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has negligible international support. But where international consensus is crucially insufficient is in relation to how the international community should respond. The key issue appears to be whether – and under what conditions – Moscow and Kyiv should enter into negotiations. This is clearly obvious from the <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12458.doc.htm">statements</a> made before and after the vote. </p>
<p>China, India and South Africa, which all abstained from the vote, <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12458.doc.htm">expressed concern</a> that the resolution neglected the broader consequences of the war and wasn’t conducive to finding a political solution. Brazil, while voting in favour, <a href="https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20221012/dFzEq0YD96nf/WTYWLKRHwLms_en.pdf">echoed these sentiments</a>. Its representative expressed the country’s disappointment that the “proposal to include a clear message urging the parties to cease hostilities and engage in peace negotiations was not included in the draft”.</p>
<p>Similar sentiments in favour of the need to find a diplomatic solution were expressed by most other countries from the global south taking the floor. In terms of the vote, members of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-putins-failure-will-pave-the-way-for-chinas-rise-to-pre-eminence-in-eurasia-190038">China-led</a> Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) either abstained (China, India, Pakistan, Iran and the states of Central Asia) or voted against (Russia and Belarus). </p>
<p>In clear contrast, western delegates focused on Russia’s violations of the UN charter and key principles of international law. As the US permanent representative to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12458.doc.htm">put it</a>: “the only way to bring peace is for the international community to show what it will not tolerate”.</p>
<h2>Diplomatic dilemma</h2>
<p>The problem, therefore, is this. No country has recognised Russia’s annexations – either of Crimea in 2014 or of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions in 2022. Almost no country has shown support for Russia’s increasingly brutal military campaign in Ukraine. Yet the international community is not united enough to bring an end to the war – either by forcing Russia to cease its military campaign and withdraw troops from Ukraine or by facilitating a negotiated deal to end the war. </p>
<p>As long as countries such as China and India refuse to demand Russia end its occupation of Ukraine – and as long as Ukraine and its western backers insist on no negotiations with Russia until then, the resulting impasse allows Putin to keep <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-desperate-russia-defaults-to-attacking-civilians-192222">escalating</a> in Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Danger of escalation</h2>
<p>Importantly, there are also signs the Russian president may up the ante beyond Ukraine. This could include clandestine attacks on critical infrastructure, such as the one on the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/qa-nord-stream-gas-sabotage-whos-being-blamed-why-2022-09-30/">Nord Stream 2</a> gas pipeline, or on undersea data cables and cyber attacks targeting public services and utilities in countries supporting Ukraine.</p>
<p>Reneging on the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/obstacles-overcome-before-ukraine-grain-deal-eases-global-food-crisis-2022-08-09/">Turkey-UN brokered deal</a> allowing Ukraine to export grain would be another lever that Putin could use. And there are again <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-russia-form-joint-military-group-lukashenko-says-2022-10-10/">signs</a> that Belarus might be dragged into Russia’s war.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fears-that-belarus-might-invade-on-russias-side-are-growing-185416">Ukraine war: fears that Belarus might invade on Russia's side are growing</a>
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<p>Giving Putin space and time to escalate, thus, presents a problem. And as Putin’s attempts to turn the tide in a war that he is clearly not winning <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-a-desperate-russia-defaults-to-attacking-civilians-192222#comment_2874680">bear little fruit</a>, the ultimate danger of an all-out confrontation with the west and of nuclear Armageddon increase. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_208040.htm">Nato</a>, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5989">EU</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-leaders-joint-statement-on-ukraine-11-october-2022">G7</a> have <a href="https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/">doubled down on their support</a> for Ukraine and for sanctions against Russia. As important as this western support is, it has arguably shaped Putin’s perceptions of what his choices are – keep escalating and keep threatening further escalation until a deal between Kyiv and Moscow is seen in the west as the lesser evil and Ukraine is pressured to negotiate something that offers Putin a face-saving way out.</p>
<p>Putin has so far managed to prevent the emergence of a truly international coalition against the war. This is just one symptom of a broader problem – the Ukrainian and western narrative on Russia’s illegal war is not universally embraced. This is not because it is wrong, but because it does not suit everyone’s agendas. Curtailing western influence remains popular with autocrats fearful of democracy. </p>
<p>The lack of outright condemnation from members of the Brics and the SCO shows the limitations of the western approach. Simply keeping up support for Ukraine and tightening sanctions on Russia is clearly not enough to force the Kremlin to withdraw from occupied Ukrainian territory and constrain Russian military adventurism in the future. </p>
<p>This strategy of proactive containment of Russia can be credited with enabling Ukraine to stand up to Russia. But to secure the full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the west’s approach needs to be complemented with a more nuanced and comprehensive diplomatic strategy that thwarts Russian efforts to score points among fellow autocrats. The latest UN vote is an indication that efforts in this direction are under way: Saudi Arabia and the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council voted in favour of the resolution. </p>
<p>But above all, what is required is more constructive <a href="https://fpc.org.uk/could-china-be-a-partner-for-the-west-in-managing-the-ukraine-crisis/">engagement</a> with China, perhaps the only other critical actor that can force Putin on to an off-ramp. The sooner this happens, the more it can come from a position of relative strength because, given its global ramifications, in the Ukraine war, time is on nobody’s side any more.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. He is a past recipient of grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>A UN resolution condemning the war passed with an overwhelming majority. But there is little consensus about how to cease hostilities.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880602022-08-05T12:13:47Z2022-08-05T12:13:47ZThe UN declared a universal human right to a healthy, sustainable environment – here’s where resolutions like this can lead<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477771/original/file-20220805-25-eya5kz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4423%2C2979&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A young protester in India makes a statement about dangerous levels of air pollution.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-indian-youth-wearing-a-pollution-mask-participates-in-a-news-photo/874336822">Prakash Singh/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Climate change is already affecting much of the world’s population, with startlingly <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/oppressive-heat-wave-persists-across-large-swath-of-northern-hemisphere">high</a> <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/climate-change-made-india-and-pakistans-2022-early-heatwave-30-times-more-likely%EF%BF%BC/">temperatures</a> from the <a href="https://www.uow.edu.au/media/2022/record-smashing-heatwaves-are-hitting-antarctica-and-the-arctic-simultaneously.php">Arctic</a> to <a href="https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2022/01/australia-ties-southern-hemispheres-all-time-heat-record-of-123f-epic-heat-cooks-argentina/">Australia</a>. Air pollution from <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envres.2021.111872">wildfires</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-74524-9">vehicles</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/feart.2018.00131">industries</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2020.00014">threatens human health</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.145788">Bees and pollinators</a> are dying in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-021-01534-9">unprecedented numbers</a> that may force changes in crop production and food availability.</p>
<p>What do these have in common? They represent the new frontier in human rights.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3982659?ln=en">United Nations General Assembly</a> voted overwhelmingly on July 28, 2022, to declare the ability to live in “<a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3982508?ln=en">a clean, healthy and sustainable environment</a>” a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40390000#metadata_info_tab_contents">universal human right</a>. It also called on countries, companies and international organizations to scale up efforts to turn that into reality.</p>
<p>The declaration is not legally binding – countries can vote to support a declaration of rights <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/Universal-Rights-Down-to-Earth/">while not actually supporting</a> those rights in practice. The <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3982508?ln=en">language</a> is also vague, leaving to interpretation just what a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is.</p>
<p>Still, it’s more than moral posturing. Resolutions like this have a history of laying the foundation for effective treaties and national laws.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Viewed from above, a person paddles a wide canoe down a river lined with plastic and other trash." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477772/original/file-20220805-1342-r9lahc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477772/original/file-20220805-1342-r9lahc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477772/original/file-20220805-1342-r9lahc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477772/original/file-20220805-1342-r9lahc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477772/original/file-20220805-1342-r9lahc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477772/original/file-20220805-1342-r9lahc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477772/original/file-20220805-1342-r9lahc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Buriganga River in Dhaka, Bangladesh, is strewn with trash and contaminated by industries and waste. It’s one of several heavily polluted rivers around the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-paddles-on-a-boat-as-plastic-bags-float-on-the-water-news-photo/1195130532">Munir Uz Zaman/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I am a <a href="https://www.latam.ufl.edu/people/center-based-faculty/joel-correia/">geographer</a> who focuses on <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2022.2040351">environmental justice</a>, and much of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=dUKNamkAAAAJ&hl=en">my research</a> investigates relationships between development-driven environmental change, natural resource use and human rights. Here are some examples of how similar resolutions have opened doors to stronger actions.</p>
<h2>How the concept of human rights expanded</h2>
<p>In 1948, in the aftermath of World War II, the newly formed United Nations adopted the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/human-rights">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a> in response to the atrocities of the Holocaust. The declaration wasn’t legally binding, but it established a baseline of rights intended to ensure the conditions for basic human dignity.</p>
<p>That <a href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/03/udhr.pdf">first set of rights included</a> the right to life, religious expression, freedom from slavery and a standard of living adequate for health and well-being.</p>
<p>Since then, the scope of human rights has been expanded, including several agreements that are legally binding on the countries that ratified them. The U.N. conventions <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading">against torture</a> (1984) and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racial">racial discrimination</a> (1965) and on the rights <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child">of children</a> (1989) and <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html">persons with disabilities</a> (2006) are just a few examples. Today, the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Compilation1.1en.pdf">International Bill of Human Rights</a> also includes binding agreements on <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights">economic, cultural</a>, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights">civil and political rights</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/RBiA_7yU0nc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Eleanor Roosevelt and others read from the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Today’s triple planetary crisis</h2>
<p>The world has changed dramatically since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written, perhaps most notably with regard to the scale of environmental crises people worldwide face.</p>
<p>Some <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/461472a">experts argue</a> that the “<a href="https://youtu.be/oykGxLQaNXs">triple planetary crisis</a>” of <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf">human-driven climate change</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/brv.12816">widespread biodiversity loss</a> and unmitigated pollution now threaten to surpass the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-012320-080337">planetary boundaries</a> necessary to live safely on Earth.</p>
<p>These threats <a href="https://www.aaihs.org/the-environment-as-freedom-a-decolonial-reimagining/">can undermine</a> the right to life, dignity and health, as can air pollution, contaminated water and pollution from plastics and chemicals. That is why <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123142">advocates argued</a> for the U.N. to declare a right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three girls in white school uniforms walk down a smoggy street holding kerchiefs over their noses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477773/original/file-20220805-1334-rtzukl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477773/original/file-20220805-1334-rtzukl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477773/original/file-20220805-1334-rtzukl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477773/original/file-20220805-1334-rtzukl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477773/original/file-20220805-1334-rtzukl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477773/original/file-20220805-1334-rtzukl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477773/original/file-20220805-1334-rtzukl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Smog has gotten so bad in Delhi at times that the government has closed elementary schools.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/indian-schoolchildren-cover-their-faces-as-they-walk-to-news-photo/871511920">Sajjad Hussain/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>The U.N. has been discussing the environment as a global concern for over <a href="https://theconversation.com/50-years-of-un-environmental-diplomacy-whats-worked-and-the-trends-ahead-182207">50 years</a>, and several international treaties over that time have addressed specific environmental concerns, including binding agreements on <a href="https://www.un.org/en/observances/biological-diversity-day/convention">protecting biodiversity</a> and <a href="https://www.unep.org/ozonaction/who-we-are/about-montreal-protocol">closing the ozone hole</a>. The 2015 <a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement">Paris climate agreement</a> to limit global warming is a direct and legally binding outcome of the long struggles that follow initial declarations.</p>
<p>The resolution on the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment was approved without dissent, though <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3982659?ln=en">eight countries abstained</a>: Belarus, Cambodia, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Syria. </p>
<h2>The human right to water</h2>
<p>Voluntary human rights declarations can also <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/cjil2&div=12&id=&page=">be instrumental</a> in changing state policy and providing people with <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/books/book/1462/The-Elusive-Promise-of-Indigenous">new political tools</a> to demand better conditions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/human_right_to_water.shtml#:%7E:text=On%2028%20July%202010%2C%20through,realisation%20of%20all%20human%20rights.&text=It%20is%20a%20prerequisite%20for%20the%20realization%20of%20other%20human%20rights%22.">human right to water</a> is one of the strongest examples of how U.N. resolutions have been used to shape state policy. The resolution, adopted in 2010, recognizes that access to adequate quantities of clean drinking water and sanitation are necessary to realize all other rights. Diarrheal disease, largely from unsafe drinking water, <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/diarrhoeal-disease">kills half a million children</a> under age 5 every year.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A boy crouches next to a puddle where a woman is filling plastic water bottles with a hose." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477774/original/file-20220805-7849-o3ktyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477774/original/file-20220805-7849-o3ktyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477774/original/file-20220805-7849-o3ktyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477774/original/file-20220805-7849-o3ktyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477774/original/file-20220805-7849-o3ktyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477774/original/file-20220805-7849-o3ktyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477774/original/file-20220805-7849-o3ktyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman in Sudan fills a water bottle for a child during the 2017 drought.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/sudanese-woman-fills-water-bottles-held-by-a-young-boy-news-photo/634410354">Ashraf Shazly/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Human rights advocates used the resolution to help pressure the Mexican government to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.06.014">reform its constitution</a> and adopt a human right to water in 2012. While the concept still <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00929.x">faces</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1405">challenges</a>, the idea of a right to water is also credited with <a href="https://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/volume-13/issue-1/562-a13-1-2/file">transforming water access</a> in marginalized communities in <a href="https://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC202985/">Bangladesh</a>, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2020/07/10th-anniversary-recognition-water-and-sanitation-human-right-general-assembly">Costa Rica, Egypt</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1067">other countries</a>. </p>
<h2>The rights of Indigenous peoples</h2>
<p>The 2007 U.N. <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf">Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples</a> is another example. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305815288_Indigenous_Peoples%27_Land_Rights_under_International_Law_From_Victims_to_Actors">It recognizes</a> the specific histories of <a href="http://www.beacon.org/An-Indigenous-Peoples-History-of-the-United-States-P1164.aspx">marginalization, violence and exploitation</a> that many Indigenous peoples around the world have endured and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.10.013">contemporary human rights violations</a>.</p>
<p>The resolution outlines rights for Indigenous peoples but stops short of recognizing their sovereignty, something many critique as <a href="https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/318565/The_UNDRIP_and_the_Legal_Significance.pdf?sequence=1">limiting the scope of self-determination</a>. Within these limits, however, several countries have <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2019.1568993">incorporated some of its recommendations</a>. In 2009, <a href="https://www.iwgia.org/en/bolivia/3389-iw2019-bolivia.html">Bolivia</a> integrated it <a href="https://social.un.org/unpfii/sowip-vol4-web.pdf">into its constitution</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People walk down a highway carrying banners demanding the state return their ancestral lands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477732/original/file-20220804-1334-khplij.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477732/original/file-20220804-1334-khplij.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477732/original/file-20220804-1334-khplij.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477732/original/file-20220804-1334-khplij.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477732/original/file-20220804-1334-khplij.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477732/original/file-20220804-1334-khplij.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477732/original/file-20220804-1334-khplij.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Enxet and Sanapaná Indigenous peoples of Paraguay protest in 2015 to demand land restitution and protection of their human rights.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Joel E. Correia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples discusses a right to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1314648">free, prior and informed consent</a> about development and industrial projects that would affect Indigenous people. That has been a powerful tool for Indigenous peoples to <a href="https://environmentalpolicyandlaw.com/news-blog/indigenous-rights-and-resource-extraction-one-step-forward-two-steps-back">demand due process</a> through the legal system. </p>
<p>In <a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-02702009">Canada</a>, <a href="https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2014/case-indigenous-community-xakmok-kasek-v-paraguay">Paraguay</a> and <a href="https://minorityrights.org/publications/endorois-decision/">Kenya</a>, Indigenous peoples have used the resolution to help win important legal victories before human rights courts with rulings that have led to land restitution and other legal gains.</p>
<h2>Tools for change</h2>
<p>U.N. declarations of human rights are aspirational norms that seek to ensure a more just and equitable world. Even though declarations like this one are not legally binding, they can be vital tools people can <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.11.014">use to pressure governments</a> and private companies to protect or improve human well-being.</p>
<p>Change can take time, but I believe this latest declaration of human rights will support climate and environmental justice across the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188060/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joel E. Correia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s more than moral posturing. Resolutions like this have a history of laying the foundation for effective treaties and national laws.Joel E. Correia, Assistant Professor of Latin American Studies, University of FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1877112022-07-26T14:41:48Z2022-07-26T14:41:48ZWhy Russia is on a charm offensive in Africa. The reasons aren’t pretty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476058/original/file-20220726-26-ddxqbt.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin and Sergey Lavrov are intent on growing Russia's African influence</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kremlin/Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/why-russia-is-on-a-charm-offensive-in-africa-the-reasons-arent-pretty-187711&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>Russia is the <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/russias-ongoing-charm-offensive-in-africa-78348">source</a> of less than 1% of the foreign direct investment into Africa. Substantively, then, Russia brings little to the continent. But the fact that Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is making a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/lavrov-tours-africa-amid-diplomatic-isolation/a-60745880">high-profile trip</a> to Africa in the throes of Russia’s war on Ukraine reveals how much Russia needs Africa. </p>
<p>A priority for Lavrov’s trip to Egypt, the Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia is to show that Russia is not isolated internationally, despite expansive western sanctions. The objective is to portray Russia as an unencumbered Great Power that maintains allies around the globe with whom it can conduct business as usual. </p>
<p>Russia is also vying to <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/russias-authoritarianism-looms-over-international-order-africa-34914">normalise an international order</a> where might makes right. And democracy and respect for human rights are optional. </p>
<p>Lavrov’s Africa trip is significant, accordingly, for Russia’s geostrategic posturing. Russian messaging recasts Russia’s imperialistic land grab in Ukraine as a broader East-West ideological struggle. To the extent that Moscow succeeds in this framing, few African countries will criticise it. </p>
<p>This, in part, explains why 25 of Africa’s 54 states <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">abstained or did not vote</a> to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine during the UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 in March. This ambivalent response was in stark contrast to the overwhelming condemnation of Russia’s aggression from every other region of the world. </p>
<p>Lavrov can also be expected to portray the <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-grain-export-deal-promises-major-benefits-for-poor-countries-if-it-holds-187595">recent Ukrainian-Russian deal</a> to unblock more than 20 million metric tonnes of Ukrainian grain for export as a humanitarian gesture by Moscow. This, even though it was Russia’s invasion and blockade of Ukrainian ports that has prevented the grain from reaching international markets. Russia’s bombing of the Ukrainian port of Odessa the day after the agreement was signed suggests that Moscow will continue to try to weaponise the food crisis. All while blaming the west. </p>
<p>Egypt and Ethiopia – key countries on Lavrov’s itinerary – have been particularly hard hit by this disruption in food supply. The Russian blockade has caused <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/commodity-prices-surge-due-war-ukraine">global grain</a> prices to double this year, creating intense political and social strains throughout Africa.</p>
<h2>What African hosts gain</h2>
<p>Focusing on ideological themes helps obscure how modest Russia’s official economic and diplomatic investments in Africa are. </p>
<p>This begs the question of what African leaders gain from hosting Lavrov at a time when Russia is under severe criticism for its unprovoked aggression and the destabilisation of global food, fuel, and fertiliser markets. The short answer is political support. </p>
<p>Russia’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-is-growing-its-strategic-influence-in-africa-110930">expanding influence</a> in Africa in recent years is mostly a result of Moscow’s use of unofficial means — deploying mercenaries, disinformation campaigns, arms for resources deals, and trafficking of precious metals. These low-cost, high impact tools are typically employed in support of isolated African leaders with dubious legitimacy. Russian backing of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/7/russian-troops-deploy-to-malis-timbuktu-after-french-exit">beleaguered leaders</a> in Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Sudan has been vital to keeping these actors in power. </p>
<p>Russia’s asymmetric approach to gaining influence in Africa is also notable in that these “partnerships” are with the individual leaders Moscow is propping up – and not with the broader public. It’s about <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/03/21/how-russia-is-pursuing-state-capture-in-africa-ukraine-wagner-group/">elite co-option</a> more than traditional bilateral cooperation. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785">Ukraine war: fresh warning that Africa needs to be vigilant against Russia's destabilising influence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Understanding these motivations brings Lavrov’s trip and itinerary into sharper focus. </p>
<p>Egypt’s President Abdel al Sisi is a key ally in Russia’s efforts to install a proxy government in Libya. This would enable Russia to establish an enduring naval presence in the southern Mediterranean and tap Libyan oil reserves. Sisi has also been a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/growing-relations-between-egypt-and-russia-strategic-alliance-or-marriage-of-convenience/">Russian partner</a> in attempting to derail the democratic transitions in Sudan and Tunisia. </p>
<p>Russia, moreover, is <a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-russia-will-affect-arms-sales-to-africa-the-risks-and-opportunities-180038">a major arms supplier for Egypt</a>. A <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/russia-s-rosatom-starts-construction-of-egypt-s-first-nuclear-plant-01658424307">$25 billion Russian-financed loan</a> for Russian atomic energy company Rosatom, to construct the Dabaa nuclear power plant in Cairo, makes little economic sense. But it does provide a potential windfall for cronies of Sisi and Putin. And it is a means for Russia to gain further leverage over Sisi.</p>
<p>Lavrov’s trip to Uganda provides political cover for the increasingly <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-ugandan-state-outsources-the-use-of-violence-to-stay-in-power-180447">repressive and erratic regime</a> of President Yoweri Museveni as it attempts to orchestrate a <a href="https://theconversation.com/musevenis-first-son-muhoozi-clear-signals-of-a-succession-plan-in-uganda-181863">hereditary succession</a> to Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba. </p>
<p>Russia’s driving interest in Uganda is to pull another historically western-leaning African country into Moscow’s orbit. For Museveni, drawing closer to Russia sends a none-too-subtle message that he will move further towards Moscow if the west is too critical of his deteriorating human rights and democratisation record.</p>
<p>Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed is also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/08/ethiopia-human-rights-abuses-possible-war-crimes-tigray">fending off fierce international criticism</a> for Ethiopia’s alleged human rights abuses in Tigray and subsequent obstacles hampering the humanitarian response in the region. Russia’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-violence-india-humanitarian-assistance-ethiopia-f93a9a6bc7c0845a37cf7e3e3757e1e7">thwarting</a> of UN Security Council resolutions drawing attention to the Tigray conflict and humanitarian crisis have been well appreciated in Addis. </p>
<p>Ethiopia has long maintained an independent foreign policy. But Addis Ababa is set to host the next Russia-Africa summit meeting later this year. The event would provide a high-profile platform to reinforce Moscow’s message that it remains welcome on the global stage. </p>
<p>While in Addis Ababa, Lavrov can be expected to highlight Russia’s close ties with the African Union. Fear of annoying Russia led the regional body to repeatedly put off a virtual meeting with Ukrainian president Volodymr Zelensky. When the meeting was finally (and quietly) held in July, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61864049">only four African heads of state tuned in</a>. </p>
<p>The Republic of the Congo’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Denis-Sassou-Nguesso">President Denis Sassou-Nguesso</a> has led the Central African country for all but five years since he first came to power in 1979. The country <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo">is ranked 169 out of 180 countries</a> on Transparency International’s annual corruption perception index. It has been on Moscow’s radar for <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/petrochemicals/060722-refinery-news-roundup-progress-reported-on-some-projects-in-africa">expanding control</a> of hydrocarbon exports from the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and CAR through Pointe Noire. This would further enhance Russia’s influence over global energy markets. </p>
<h2>Benefits to ordinary Africans?</h2>
<p>Lavrov’s visit demonstrates that there are African leaders who find political value in retaining ties with Russia, regardless of Moscow’s tarnished international reputation. </p>
<p>Notably, most of the countries on his African tour maintain significant relations with the west. Hosting a high-profile visit from Lavrov is not intended to scuttle these ties. Rather, it is an attempt to gain more leverage vis-à-vis the west.</p>
<p>But this is a dangerous game for these African leaders. Russia has <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/russia/spain?sc=XE15">an economy the size of Spain’s</a>, does not provide significant investment or trade to the continent (other than grains and arms), and <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/compare/russia/spain?sc=XE15">is increasingly disconnected</a> from the international financial system. </p>
<p>Moreover, foreign direct investment is <a href="https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/125965842.pdf">strongly correlated</a> with upholding the rule of law. By signalling that they are open to Russia’s lawless international order, these African leaders risk damaging their prospects for greater western investment. </p>
<p>Nine of the top 10 countries investing in Africa, comprising 90% of foreign direct investment, are part of the western financial system. It may take years for African countries to recover from the reputational damage of embracing the Russian worldview that rule of law is arbitrary. </p>
<p>Lavrov’s trip to Africa is not an isolated event. It is part of an ongoing dance. Moscow is trying to gain influence on the continent without investing in it. This strategy can only gain traction if certain African leaders see Russia as a means to validate their hold on power, despite objectionable human rights and democratic norms. </p>
<p>The advantages to Moscow and these African leaders are clear. For ordinary African citizens, not so much.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia is trying to normalise an international order where might makes right. And democracy and respect for human rights are optional.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1819792022-04-27T16:22:06Z2022-04-27T16:22:06ZUkraine: UN takes a step towards addressing ‘veto problem’ which stopped it condemning Russia<p>The day after Russian troops crossed the border to begin their invasion of Ukraine, the United Nations Security Council drafted a resolution condemning the invasion and calling on Russia to withdraw unconditionally. What happened next was predictable enough: <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/25/1083252456/russia-vetoes-un-security-council-resolution-that-denounces-its-invasion-of-ukra">Russia vetoed the resolution</a>.</p>
<p>As one of five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), Russia has veto powers over any resolution put to the UN. While the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text">UN Charter</a> charges the Security Council with primary responsibility for international peace and security, any action requires the affirmative vote of the P5. A negative vote is, in effect, a veto.</p>
<p>The “veto problem” has plagued the UN since its inception and efforts have been made over the years to reform this. One or another of the P5 – the US, Russia, China, the UK and France – has always stymied those efforts in the past. But now, thanks to some imaginative thinking by the UN General Assembly, there is at least some progress in this area. </p>
<p>From now on, the General Assembly will <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1116982">automatically review</a> any use of the veto by any of the P5. Within ten days of casting its veto, the P5 state is “invited” to justify its use of the veto before the General Assembly. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Russia uses its veto: February 25 2022.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The <a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick">problem of the veto</a> has been a bleeding sore for the UN, effectively dashing hopes and expectations of using the United Nations to maintain a truly collective security. While France and the UK have not formally used their veto since 1989, Russia and the US continue to deploy it and China, having only used it once during the Cold War, has used it 13 times since 1990. </p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, there have been numerous proposals to solve the veto problem – most of which got no further than <a href="https://theelders.org/programmes/strengthening-united-nations">policy exhortations</a>. By contrast, the most recent proposal for a review of veto use – <a href="https://www.ips-journal.eu/interviews/this-is-not-about-russia-this-is-about-multilateralism-5887/">launched in early April</a> – gathered sufficient momentum not only to be debated, but to be “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/how-decisions-are-made-un">adopted by consensus</a>” – reflecting the agreement of the entire General Assembly – in less than a month. </p>
<p>The invasion of Ukraine galvanised UN action to address the veto problem and the spectre of Security Council inertia in the face of pressing crises.</p>
<h2>General Assembly resurgent</h2>
<p>The UN General Assembly has been innovative when filling the void left by the inaction of the Security Council. Of note here is the <a href="https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html">1950 Uniting for Peace procedure</a>, adopted by the General Assembly in response to Security Council inaction on the Korean crisis. It also aided the birth of UN peacekeeping as the General Assembly recommended action following a double veto by France and the UK in respect of the Suez Crisis. </p>
<p>But it has been used sparingly since 1950 as it is only triggered upon a request of any nine states of the 15 members of the Security Council. It was most recently used <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">in early March</a> to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and call for the country’s withdrawal.</p>
<p>But the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N22/267/96/PDF/N2226796.pdf?OpenElement">new mandate</a> to review any use of the veto is not dependent on the Security Council. It is automatic – triggered when any P5 state uses the veto in respect of any situation. So now the tight grip of the Security Council in matters of international peace and security is loosened. </p>
<p>The new mandate means that the Security Council – specifically the P5 – is accountable to the General Assembly for inaction, not only in the face of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – the focus of the current initiatives – but any situation that endangers international peace and security. But will it make a difference?</p>
<h2>An inconvenient truth?</h2>
<p>The adoption of the resolution by consensus was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine there is a palpable desire to both do something and – perhaps as importantly – to be seen to be doing something. </p>
<p>As noted, the resolution is certainly significant – the General Assembly has achieved a coveted victory in its long-running attempt to increase its regulatory powers over the Security Council. Any initiative that diminishes the veto power of the P5 – a source of contention and dismay from the very beginning of the UN – must be welcomed. It is also not inconceivable that this may lead to further, more substantive, reform. </p>
<p>Yet, the General Assembly’s new mandate is far from a panacea. The fact that the proposal passed without objection may actually highlight its central weakness – that it will not significantly inconvenience the P5. </p>
<p>The P5 veto is employed in an overt fashion when a hand is raised, but it is used more frequently in ways we cannot see. Most resolutions doomed to be vetoed are simply not brought to the Security Council – indeed, the formal casting of a veto is essentially theatrics. </p>
<p>No veto has ever come as a surprise. Those who have brought a resolution to the Security Council knowing it will be vetoed have done so to embarrass one of the P5. The General Assembly’s new mandate will not in any way influence the backroom meetings which precede all Security Council debates. </p>
<p>But will this at least serve as a new means by which the P5 can be “shamed”? It is certainly true that states – even the P5 – do not welcome being publicly cast as “heartless” or “aggressors”. The P5’s persistent reluctance to delegate more oversight power to the General Assembly is evidence of this aversion to public scrutiny. </p>
<p>Yet, we should not exaggerate this. Each time a veto has been cast the P5 member has issued an explanatory statement. While at times these justifications have strained credulity, each of the P5 have certainly demonstrated both an ability to publicly defend their vetoes and a willingness to incur the condemnation from others that has often followed. </p>
<p>In short, the P5 are not easily shamed. The new provision does not give the General Assembly any power to censure the Security Council. So, while this is a step in the right direction, it is a very small step and little meaningful change should be expected in the short to medium term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181979/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>UN peacekeeping and security efforts have always been plagued by the Security Council veto. But moves are afoot to solve this problem.Emma McClean, Senior lecturer in Law, University of WestminsterAidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1792032022-03-15T14:26:58Z2022-03-15T14:26:58ZRussia’s invasion of Ukraine is illegal under international law: suggesting it’s not is dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451833/original/file-20220314-28-ezu28b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The destroyed main building of a school in Zhytomyr, Ukraine.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Miguela A. Lopes</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While the world is largely united <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152">against the invasion of Ukraine by Russia</a>, South African public figures, including the government, have attempted to downplay that it is, in fact, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-03-11-ukraine-needs-an-inclusive-and-lasting-roadmap-to-peace/">an invasion</a>. And their frequent calls for negotiation tend to present the conflict as one in which both sides should be prepared to make concessions.</p>
<p>President Cyril Ramaphosa has even reported that Russian president Vladimir Putin appreciates his <a href="https://twitter.com/CyrilRamaphosa/status/1501970616680910850?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">‘balanced approach’</a> to the conflict. So what does international law say about one country sending armed troops across a border and shelling another’s towns? The answer calls for some historical background.</p>
<p>After World War II ended in 1945, the United Nations was established. Its <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/preamble">first stated purpose was</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To this end, it emphasised that the global order was based on the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1">sovereignty of states</a>) (article 2(1)) and <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1">outlawed the use of force</a> by one state against another (article 2(4)). </p>
<p>There are only two, narrowly defined exceptions in the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf">United Nations Charter</a>, the world body’s founding document, to the prohibition on the use of force. These are met when states act either in self defence or under the authorisation of the UN Security Council. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine can, therefore, be legal only if it falls within one of those exceptions. </p>
<p>It is completely uncontroversial that sending armed forces across the border of a state, without its consent, is a use of force. This happened when Russia sent tanks and infantry across the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine. President Putin’s recognition of two breakaway regions in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-60470900">southeast Ukraine</a> before this move does not affect their status as Ukrainian territory under international law. Indeed, it violates a separate rule protecting state sovereignty: that <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-recognition-of-the-separatist-republics-in-ukraine-was-manifestly-unlawful/">states may not interfere in each other’s internal affairs</a>.</p>
<p>Apologists for the invasion have focused on the West’s ‘provocation’ of Russia, particularly through <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-03-11-ukraine-needs-an-inclusive-and-lasting-roadmap-to-peace/">its expansion of NATO</a> to include Eastern European states such as <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm">Croatia, Estonia and Poland</a>.</p>
<p>But focusing on the reasons why Russia feels threatened by the West confuses causation with justification. In addition, by referring only to the reasons why Russia supposedly feels threatened, and failing to address the legal position at all, the South African government, the governing African National Congress – and other apologists – undermine the most cardinal rule of our international legal order. It is a rule on which the South Africa’s own survival as a state depends.</p>
<h2>The legal analysis</h2>
<p>As we have established that Russia has used force against Ukraine, the next step is to analyse whether Russia can call on any of the exceptions justifying force. Before we do so, we must dispose of one possible objection to a legal argument based on the UN Charter. At the time the UN was established, many states, including most African states, were still colonised. They could, therefore, not participate in the creation of the charter. </p>
<p>Although they voluntarily acceded to the UN after acquiring statehood, they played no role in formulating the text of the charter. Such decolonised states have occasionally <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmx012">rejected</a> rules that were drawn up without their consent. But they have never resisted the underlying principle of the sovereignty of states, nor the rule that states may not use force against one another. </p>
<p>Indeed, as the Kenyan representative to the United Nations, Martin Kimani, recently emphasised, decolonised African states even prioritised the norms of territorial integrity and state sovereignty over any right they might have had to reclaim territory they had due to the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tf0gb0sQI40">arbitrary map-making of their former colonial powers</a>. As Kenya has pointed out, African states accepted the borders that the colonial powers had imposed on them in order to preserve peace and foster cooperation.</p>
<p>So does Russia meet the exceptions to art 2(4) of the UN Charter? </p>
<p>There are only two in the charter itself: when force is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">authorised by the UN Security Council</a> (article 42), or when a state is <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7">acting in self-defence</a> (art 51). </p>
<p>A third exception has also been suggested by <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/06/humanitarian-intervention-a-legal-analysis/">scholars and commentators</a>, based not on the charter but on moral considerations and (limited) state practice: humanitarian intervention, or, in its most widely accepted formulation, the duty to protect. In the form in which this has been accepted by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/general-assembly.shtml">UN General Assembly</a>, this exception would not allow Russia to use force <a href="https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/">without Security Council authorisation</a>. The Security Council has not authorised Russia to use force against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Russia’s only remaining justification is, therefore, self defence, which is set out in Article 51. That says that states have the right to self defence “if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations”. </p>
<p>An armed attack is, therefore, an essential prerequisite to a legal use of force, and it is one that is <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf">strictly interpreted</a>.</p>
<p>This legal requirement is supplemented by customary international law. The formulation here is that the necessity of self-defence must be</p>
<blockquote>
<p>instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation … and that the {defending} force, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorised {it} to enter the territories of the {attacking state} at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, <a href="https://www.open.edu/openlearn/society-politics-law/the-use-force-international-law/content-section-1.3">and kept clearly within it</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There must, therefore, be an armed attack, that has already begun or is imminent, and the force used in self-defence must be the only way of averting or repelling it.</p>
<p>Russia has not suffered an armed attack from Ukraine, or, indeed, any state. Neither NATO’s presence in Ukraine nor any of the other justifications offered by Russia and its apologists reach the threshold of an armed attack. This includes a range of <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-is-russias-legal-justification-for-using-force-against-ukraine/">allegations</a>. These cover the alleged mistreatment by Ukraine of Russian speakers in that state, alleged links between the West and the far-right in Ukraine, and the alleged presence of sophisticated weapons in the state.</p>
<p>There are other channels of resolution for these kinds of grievances. And even if these channels don’t work, and Russia is left with a situation in which it ‘feels’ threatened, it does not have the right to use force. Whether the requirements of self defence are met is a question of fact, not feeling. </p>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, therefore, illegal.</p>
<h2>The dangers</h2>
<p>There are two significant dangers that follow from any attempt to disguise or distort the illegality of the invasion, which South Africa’s foreign affairs department’s recent pronouncements illustrate only too well. </p>
<p>The department’s call to “all sides to uphold international law, humanitarian law, human rights, and the principles of the UN Charter, and to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-03-11-ukraine-needs-an-inclusive-and-lasting-roadmap-to-peace/">respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity</a>” misrepresents the facts. That’s because it creates the impression that Ukrainian troops are occupying Russian territory, or shelling its towns. </p>
<p>The moral equivalence that this creates between the opposing states is then underscored by the department’s <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-03-11-ukraines-ambassador-calls-for-two-sided-talks-and-for-ramaphosa-to-call-the-situation-a-war/?utm_source=top_reads_block&utm_campaign=ukraine_crisis">call for negotiation for resolution of the current ‘situation’</a>. </p>
<p>This is the second, and more dangerous, threat, in South Africa’s defence of Russia. We dare not ignore that it is a shocking proposal that Ukraine should have to negotiate to secure the withdrawal of Russian troops. It is shocking because it transfers responsibility for the invasion to Ukraine itself. In fact, Ukraine should not have to do anything at all to get Russia to obey one of the most cardinal rules of international law. </p>
<p>No state, whether Ukraine or anyone else in the global community, should have to earn Russia’s compliance with the law. If the rule of law is not respected, the entire global community becomes as vulnerable as Ukraine is now.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179203/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cathleen Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>No state in the global community should have to earn Russia’s compliance with the law. If the rule of law is not respected, the entire global community becomes as vulnerable as Ukraine is now.Cathleen Powell, Associate Professor in Public Law, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1786632022-03-08T14:52:14Z2022-03-08T14:52:14ZRussia-Ukraine war: decoding how African countries voted at the UN<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/450616/original/file-20220308-19-1lsnolj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Sergiy Kyslytsya, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations, speaks during a special session of the General Assembly on March 02, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent weeks the world has witnessed <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/07/asia/china-india-ukraine-reaction-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">the most tense moments</a> in international relations since the end of the Cold War. This was evident in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-general-assembly-set-censure-russia-over-ukraine-invasion-2022-03-02/">deliberations</a> and voting by members of the United Nations on resolutions calling on Russia to halt its invasion and withdraw its forces from Ukraine.</p>
<p>The events have also been a stress test for military and political alliances. </p>
<p>Africa yielded significant influence on the voting outcome with <a href="https://www.nationalworld.com/news/world/un-general-assembly-vote-on-russia-ukraine-results-who-abstained-which-countries-opposed-3587664">54 countries</a>, (27,97 % of all votes).</p>
<p>First, was the meeting of the 12-member Security Council on 25 February 2021. The three African representatives, Gabon, Ghana and Kenya, along with eight other countries <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14808.doc.htm">voted for the resolution</a>. However, Russia used its veto power to block it. This veto prompted the US and 94 countries to call an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on 27 February 2022 where a similar, but non-binding motion was tabled. The assembly’s first emergency meeting in 40 years.</p>
<p>The resolution included a condemnation of Russia’s decision to “increase the readiness of its nuclear forces”. It was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text">adopted</a> with the required two-third votes of all member-states.</p>
<p>There was less unanimity in African votes at the General Assembly than in the Security Council where the allocation of non-permanent seats, while obeying a certain geographical distribution, does not require representative countries to be their regions’ mouthpieces.</p>
<p>The majority of African countries clearly sided with Ukraine – 28 out of 54 (51,85%). Only Eritrea voted against the resolution. But nearly a third refrained from taking sides (17 out of 54) – that’s if one understands abstention to be halfway between a yes and a no. Eight countries were absent.</p>
<p>My research has investigated the similarities and differences in countries’ reactions to crises. For example, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21599165.2015.1129946?journalCode=fjcs21">I examined</a> the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe and the opposite reactions of Western and Eastern European countries. I explained these through their different identities – or the “who we are?”. </p>
<p>I also examined the Joint-Valletta Action Plan, an immigration pact signed by the European Union and African Union in reaction to the refugee crisis. I showed that the plan, which has helped <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-migration-and-mobility-pact-has-helped-to-reset-au-eu-relations-176603">reset AU-EU relations</a>, was based on interdependence, a kind of interest whereby parties held to their interests (territorial integrity for the Europeans and economic development for the Africans) but recognised (especially the more powerful Europeans) that they needed each other to advance these interests.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203405345-14/data-analyses-voting-united-nations-general-assembly-erik-voeten">Research</a> carried out by authors such as the Dutch political scientist Erik Voeten also shows that voting at the General Assembly is – generally speaking – motivated by interests. But, as the American political scientist Alexander Wendt has shown, what constitutes interest depends on <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexander-Wendt#ref1203935">each government’s perception</a>. So much so that, two rival countries can sometimes vote for the same resolution.</p>
<p>Historically, as Voeten showed, voting patterns have been shaped by the big issues of the day. In the 1950s, colonialism pitted European countries against Asian and African countries. From the 1960s to the 1980s, it was the Cold War and the division between Eastern or Western Blocs. More recently, voting patterns have been structured by developing countries’ desire to obtain or secure aid from developed countries and increasingly the liberal-illiberal <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/02/09/a-new-low-for-global-democracy">divide</a> between democratic and authoritarian regimes </p>
<p>This divide trumps other potential explanations for voting patterns at the emergency general assembly meeting on the Ukraine invasion. The degree of closeness of the country’s ties with either the West or Russia is an additional explanation. </p>
<h2>The dividing line</h2>
<p>The group of 27 African countries that voted for the resolution was mostly made of <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220305-comment-la-rdc-se-positionne-dans-le-conflit-ukrainien?ref=tw_i">western aligned-democracies</a>. They were Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo , Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Zambia. </p>
<p>But the list included a few non-democratic or hybrid regimes too. They were Côte d’ivoire, Gabon, Libya, Chad, Egypt, Mauretania, Rwanda, and Somalia. </p>
<p>They did, however, all have one thing in common: they are all Western allies, with close military ties such as military bases and joint military operations against jihadists.</p>
<p>Conversely, most of the 17 African countries that abstained or, like Eritrea, voted against the resolution, are authoritarian or hybrid regimes. These included Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Some of these have close military and ideological ties with Russia sometimes going back to the Cold War. This list includes Algeria, Angola, Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Mali, Central African Republic. </p>
<p>There were also some exceptions to the rule. </p>
<p>A number of functioning democracies – Namibia, South Africa, and Senegal – also abstained. All have strong affinities with the West. But in the case of Namibia and South Africa, their respective ruling parties, – the South West African People’s Organisation and the African National Congress – received support from the Soviet Union during their struggles for independence. </p>
<p>Senegal’s case is more puzzling. The country is a darling of the West because of its long democratic tradition. The Senegalese government <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20220305-senegal-blasts-kyiv-over-illegal-call-for-fighters">stated</a> that its abstention conformed to the “principles of non-alignment and the peaceful settlement of disputes”. However, its president’s <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20220224/african-union-statement-situation-ukraine">official statement</a> as the current president of the African Union together with the AU Chairperson could be construed as supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine.</p>
<p>This liberal or illiberal cleavage conveys three sorts of insights.</p>
<p>Firstly, that the world is convulsed by the kind of clash of civilisations <a href="https://www.routledge.com/An-Analysis-of-Samuel-P-Huntingtons-The-Clash-of-Civilizations-and-the/Quinn/p/book/9781912127924">predicted</a> by the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington who claimed that cultural identity will be the faultline in world conflicts. </p>
<p>This faultline will give way to world-civilizations: Western, Chinese, Islamic, Latin, Slavic and perhaps African. While his idea of a clash – and identity as its engine – appears to materialise, this identity is based on ideology – not culture. Illiberalism having replaced communism.</p>
<p>We simply had not yet arrived at the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/End-History-Last-Man/dp/0743284550">triumph of democracy</a> proclaimed by the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his book the End of History published in 1992 after the fall of the Berlin wall. </p>
<p>Secondly, that authoritarian regimes find comfort and support in the proximity of similar regimes for their survival. This works like an insurance policy. Russia having shown its determination to rescue authoritarian regimes such as Syria, these countries don’t want to close off the option of resorting to its help if they faced an existential threat.</p>
<p>Thirdly, that if the war in Ukraine escalates globally and a Cold War 2.0 including China settles in, African countries would split into blocs instead of presenting a common front. </p>
<p>Seen in the context of the EU-AU renewed partnership, this cleavage will take more importance now than at their Brussels summit, a week before the conflict eruption, where they proclaimed a Joint Vision for 2030 and sought a strategic alliance. </p>
<p>The EU’s demands regarding democracy and as such alignment would likely increase and it naturally will seek to deepen its relations with like-minded African countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178663/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mahama Tawat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The resolution is not legally binding, but is an expression of the views of the UN membership.Mahama Tawat, Research fellow, Université de MontpellierLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1778702022-02-24T17:54:41Z2022-02-24T17:54:41ZUkraine invasion: should Russia lose its seat on the UN Security Council?<p>It’s ironic that Russia holds the presidency of the Security Council, the UN’s body delegated to make peace, just as Russia is perceived by many to be the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-what-the-west-needs-to-do-now-expert-view-177860">greatest threat to that peace</a>. Ukraine’s ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, has even suggested that Russia should be removed from the Security Council. But can this happen?</p>
<p>The Security Council was established by the 1945 UN Charter and comprises 15 members. Ten rotating non-permanent countries are elected by the UN General Assembly to do a two-year term on the Security Council. Five members – the USSR (now Russia), Republic of China (now People’s Republic of China), the US, UK and France – have the status of permanent members and so have a veto on any vote before the Council.</p>
<p>There is no mechanism to remove a permanent member of the Security Council written into the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text">UN Charter</a>. The word “permanent” was to mean just that. But there is a process to remove a country from the United Nations. That would require a vote of the UN General Assembly based on the recommendation of the Security Council. This has never been done. And given that Russia has a veto on the Security Council, the Council cannot recommend Russia’s removal without Russia’s agreement. This simply will not happen. So no, Russia cannot be kicked out. </p>
<p>But is Russia validly there at all? This is Ukraine’s question. The UN Charter says that <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5">the USSR, not Russia, is the permanent member</a>. While no permanent member of the Security Council has ever been removed, two have changed – and it is worth analysing how and why, not just for the current crisis but for the next one surely coming over Taiwan. </p>
<p>Because the two changes were China and Russia. </p>
<h2>The China question</h2>
<p>From the formation of the UN in 1945 until 1971, the “Chinese seat” was held by the Republic of China (ROC), the Taiwan-based government that claimed to represent “all of China”. But in 1971, the seat switched to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Beijing-based Communist government that also claims to govern “all of China” and which still holds it.</p>
<p>While it is often said that “<a href="https://theconversation.com/nixon-mao-meeting-four-lessons-from-50-years-of-us-china-relations-176485">Nixon recognised China</a>” in 1971, the truth is that the then US president did not recognise China – not in so many words, anyway. What Richard Nixon did was to change the recognition of who <em>governs</em> China_ – from Taipei to Beijing. And this also changed which of the two Chinas sat on the Security Council.</p>
<p>It’s an extremely important point. Take the Korean War, which raged from 1950 to 1953 and pitted North Korea and China (Beijing) against South Korea, supported by US and UN forces. The deployment of UN forces had to be approved by the Security Council – including China (Taipei) – to fight against China (Beijing). </p>
<p>These days, few people would argue that Taiwan and mainland China are separate, sovereign nations, and not even Taiwan claims independence. From Beijing’s perspective, which claims Taiwan as a renegade province, a takeover of Taiwan by force would not be an “invasion”, because a country can’t “invade” its own territory. </p>
<p>China certainly won’t want to start a discussion about Russia’s seat on the Security Council, partly because it wouldn’t want its own membership questioned, should it go into Taiwan.</p>
<h2>Continuing states</h2>
<p>But why did Russia get the USSR’s seat following its dissolution? In 1991, the <a href="https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619829">Alma-Ata Protocol</a> was signed by the majority of Soviet republics, declaring the end of the Soviet Union and agreeing that Russia would take over the USSR’s seat. Russia then <a href="http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/3/2/2045.pdf">wrote to the UN</a> requesting that the name USSR be amended to Russian Federation and that nothing else would change.</p>
<p>International lawyers have questioned the legality of this and have debated whether the dissolution of the USSR should have dissolved its seat at the Security Council. This is what Ukraine is now arguing. The whole matter rested on whether Russia was the “Successor State” or a “Continuing State” under international law. In 1991, Alexander Vladimirovich Yakovenko – a recent Russian ambassador to the UK who was at that time a mid-level bureaucrat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow – wrote to argue that Russia should inherit the permanent seat.</p>
<p>He set out that a Successor State is a new country formed from the dissolution of an older one – and had no continuing rights or liabilities. All rights and liabilities would need to be renegotiated. A Continuing State, however, is the largest part of a country after a small part has broken away. It keeps the former rights and liabilities of the old country – including membership to international organisations and embassies. Yakovenko concluded Russia was the Continuing State.</p>
<p>In 1991, I worked as a young lawyer on a case before the High Court of Australia: <a href="https://www.australiancontractlaw.info/cases/database/baltic-shipping-v-dillon">Baltic Shipping v Dillon</a>. A Soviet ship sank in New Zealand killing one crew member and causing harm to many Australian passengers. The Baltic Shipping Company was owned and insured by the Soviet government. But as the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, Baltic Shipping’s lawyers argued in court that the liability became uncertain because nobody knew who the real owners or insurers were. As the lawyers in the case, we then raised the question of Security Council membership. The Russian government quickly admitted liability for the sunken ship, not wanting to lose the Security Council seat.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-what-the-west-needs-to-do-now-expert-view-177860">Ukraine invasion: what the west needs to do now – expert view</a>
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<p>Besides, no one in 1991 wanted to question whether Russia was right because, to be blunt, Russia was a nuclear-armed power. And China will not reopen the question now.</p>
<h2>And another thing</h2>
<p>There is another country that won’t want to not reopen the question – the UK. This is because, if Scotland has another independence referendum and breaks away, England and Wales will likely point to Yakovenko’s memo and claim – like Russia – to be the Continuing State not Successor State to the UK in order to retain the Security Council seat.</p>
<p>So, given that three permanent members of the Security Council – Russia, China and the UK – all likely benefit from the Continuing State argument, Ukraine’s hopes of removing Russia from the Security Council appear doomed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177870/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew MacLeod does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The question centres on whether Russia legally inherited the permanent seat formerly occupied by the Soviet Union.Andrew MacLeod, Visiting Professor, Public Policy, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1678852021-09-24T01:53:35Z2021-09-24T01:53:35ZTwo governments claim to run Myanmar. So, who gets the country’s seat at the UN?<p>As world leaders have gathered for the UN General Assembly in New York this week, there has been uncertainty over who should be representing Myanmar. </p>
<p>Since a coup on February 1, Myanmar’s military has argued it is the legitimate government of the country and should have the power to appoint ambassadors to the UN and elsewhere. </p>
<p>However, a government in exile has also been formed — called the national unity government (or NUG for short) — which is comprised mainly of elected representatives of former leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s deposed government and ethnic minority groups. </p>
<p>It, too, says it’s the legitimate government of Myanmar and should be able to appoint the country’s ambassadors. Civil society groups in Myanmar have <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/burma/open-letter-in-support-of-ambassador-u-kyaw-moe-tun-as-myanmar-s">sent a letter</a> to the General Assembly urging it to retain current UN ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, who opposed the coup and is a vocal critic of the junta.</p>
<p>So, why does it matter who represents Myanmar on the global stage and who currently has the upper hand?</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Kyaw Moe Tun, Myanmar's ambassador to the United Nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422830/original/file-20210923-22-1jc23kk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Kyaw Moe Tun, Myanmar’s ambassador to the United Nations, shows a three-finger salute shared by opponents of the country’s military coup.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">KYDPL KYODO/AP</span></span>
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<h2>What is the national unity government?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.nugmyanmar.org/en/">NUG</a> was formed in April in response to the coup and the junta’s brutal suppression of peaceful protesters, which has now led to over <a href="https://twitter.com/aapp_burma/status/1440325025043607559?s=20">1,100 deaths</a>, some 6,600 arrests and hundreds more being forced into hiding or exile.</p>
<p>The NUG’s two main <a href="https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/crph-announces-lineup-of-interim-national-unity-government">leaders</a> are Suu Kyi and ousted President Win Myint, but they have both been under arrest since the coup so their roles are largely symbolic. </p>
<p>The rest of the <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/whos-myanmars-national-unity-government.html">leadership</a> comprises acting Prime Minister Mahn Winn Khaing Thann, an ethnic Karen and Christian politician, and President Duwa Lashi La, an ethnic Kachin politician.</p>
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<img alt="Duwa Lashi La of the national unity government" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/422832/original/file-20210923-23-1sgmser.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Duwa Lashi La, the acting president of the national unity government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Unity Government (NUG) via Facebook/AP</span></span>
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<p>Many NUG ministers were part of the former government led by Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party, but there has clearly been an effort to offer a more inclusive vision of the country’s leadership.</p>
<p>In addition to the NLD, the ministry draws on elected members of parliament from a wide range of political parties and a broad mix of ethnic minorities. Significantly, a <a href="https://mailchi.mp/frontiermyanmar.net/update-on-the-vaccination-drive?e=aa4da994bf">Rohingya activist</a> was appointed an advisor in the Ministry of Human Rights.</p>
<p>Most countries have been reticent to <a href="https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210822/p2g/00m/0na/006000c">recognise</a> the military as the legitimate government of Myanmar, but it has been difficult for the NUG to receive formal recognition, too.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sanctions-against-myanmars-junta-have-been-tried-before-can-they-work-this-time-158054">Sanctions against Myanmar's junta have been tried before. Can they work this time?</a>
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<h2>The quest for international recognition</h2>
<p>In addition to forming a cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic ministry, the NUG also <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/treating-the-rohingya-like-they-belong-in-myanmar/">reversed</a> a controversial policy on citizenship that excluded the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2020.1813251">long-oppressed Rohingya</a>. </p>
<p>And in a canny strategic manoeuvre, the NUG <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/17/myanmars-exile-government-signs-up-to-icc-prosecutions/">announced</a> it would for the first time accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court with respect to all international crimes committed in Myanmar since 2002.</p>
<p>Both the ICC and the International Court of Justice have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/15/icc-approves-probe-into-myanmars-alleged-crimes-against-rohingya">cases underway</a> related to alleged abuses against the Rohingya. </p>
<p>These moves may well be genuine reassessments of the former government’s much-criticised failure to support the Rohingya. Suu Kyi <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-12/myanmars-leader-says-the-world-has-it-wrong-on-the-rohingya/11791338">previously defended</a> the military for driving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya from their homes into Bangladesh, denying it was a genocide. </p>
<p>But the NUG’s moves may also be engineered to gain international support. In particular, there was pressure from the <a href="https://twitter.com/tedlieu/status/1390090205986578434?s=20">US Congress</a> to address the Rohingya issue prior to the US providing diplomatic and material support to the government in exile.</p>
<h2>Diplomatic fight shifts to the UN</h2>
<p>The key prize in this battle for recognition is Myanmar’s seat at the UN. The seat is important, as it reflects the will of the international community regarding the legitimate Myanmar government.</p>
<p>The NUG has been assisted by the general assembly’s rules, which dictate the incumbent ambassador keeps the seat if there is a credentialing dispute. </p>
<p>The UN was expected to make a formal decision on recognition in the lead-up to the current general assembly session. However, in a back-room <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/13/myanmar-united-nations-china-biden-general-assembly/">compromise</a> between the US and China (and informally endorsed by the European Union, the ASEAN bloc and Russia), it was agreed the military’s representatives would not be allowed to attend the meeting.</p>
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<p>That means the current ambassador, Kyaw Moe Tun, was able to <a href="https://twitter.com/DrSasa22222/status/1438433948607004673?s=20">participate</a> in the opening of the general assembly session, although the agreement required him to refrain from using any tough rhetoric against the military. Nevertheless, this was a big win for the NUG.</p>
<p>The nine-member credentialing panel, which includes the US, China and Russia, will now decide in November who formally takes Myanmar’s UN seat. </p>
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<h2>Is civil war inevitable?</h2>
<p>While the NUG is angling for international recognition, it has simultaneously announced a “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/myanmar-military-war/2021/09/07/46c14ca2-0f93-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html">people’s defensive war</a>” against the junta, abandoning the nonviolent tactics adopted by Suu Kyi during her years of house arrest. </p>
<p>This overt call for violence has caused unease in some quarters, although criticism from the US and UK embassies in Myanmar is <a href="https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/what-has-happened-to-myanmars-tatmadaw.html">relatively muted</a>.</p>
<p>While it is understandable the people of Myanmar are desperate for a solution, it is far from certain that encouraging relatively untrained and poorly equipped civilians to attack the military will produce the desired result. </p>
<p>There is some evidence of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/15/our-only-option-myanmar-civilians-take-up-arms-for-democracy">collaboration</a> between the highly trained ethnic armed groups and more recent recruits from the cities, but given the Myanmar military’s <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2021/08/the-necrometrics-of-myanmars-spreading-war/">long history</a> of absorbing significant casualties without caving in, it does not bode well for a settlement.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, people may feel war is their only option. Indeed, in the short term, the chances of a peaceful resolution to the long-running conflict between Myanmar’s military and its people may have disappeared the moment Suu Kyi and Win Myint were arrested in the early hours of February 1.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-know-how-to-cut-off-the-financial-valve-to-myanmars-military-the-world-just-needs-the-resolve-to-act-158220">We know how to cut off the financial valve to Myanmar's military. The world just needs the resolve to act</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167885/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Myanmar’s government in exile is courting the international community to try to gain recognition over the military junta. The UN seat could be a key prize in that fight.Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, University of South AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1465082020-09-22T13:47:52Z2020-09-22T13:47:52ZUN general assembly: why virtual meetings make it hard for diplomats to trust each other<p>Ashok Mirpuri, Singapore’s ambassador to the US, recently said that achieving trust in diplomacy is “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/16/zoom-diplomacy-coronavirus-188811">about the cues and nuances”</a> that come from face-to-face interactions. What Mirpuri did not elaborate on, however, is that reading others when <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691123899/interaction-ritual-chains">you’re in the same room together</a> can just as easily reveal clues about their untrustworthiness. </p>
<p>Historically, diplomats and world leaders have made great efforts to meet their counterparts, believing face-to-face diplomacy offers the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/facetoface-diplomacy/AFA484F8009DCB34742F4AA6B7412FB4">best possible way to read each others’ intentions</a>. The challenge to diplomacy raised by the coronavirus pandemic is what happens when such physical interactions are becoming increasingly rare. </p>
<p>Recently, a growing number of diplomatic gatherings, including the G8 and UN security council meetings, have taken place virtually. Now, the UN general assembly, is meeting online for the first time in its 75 year history. So, can such virtual interactions still provide sufficient cues and nuances for trusting bonds to be maintained and even develop? </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/un-general-assembly-goes-virtual-a-former-ambassador-on-what-that-means-for-diplomacy-146499">UN general assembly goes virtual: a former ambassador on what that means for diplomacy</a>
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<h2>Physical cues</h2>
<p>The research on building trust online is contested. Some researchers argue there is <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/trusting-enemies-9780199696475?cc=gb&lang=en&">no substitute</a> for physical face-to-face interaction when developing bonds of trust. Others concede that where face-to-face interaction has occurred in the past, and a bond formed, <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/new-tech-new-ties">it may be possible to maintain or even deepen trust virtually.</a> Meanwhile, there is some evidence that people are able to develop weak bonds through non-face-to-face environments, such as text and mobile phone messaging.</p>
<p>Many of the physical cues that Mirpuri references are weakened during virtual interactions. Facial expressions, minute micro-expressions, and other subtle, yet important physical effects that are crucial for the perception of trustworthiness become less clear. Even the most advanced and sophisticated virtual environments offer imperfect digital representations of others. </p>
<p>Researchers also point to <a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/503376.503401">differences between gestures</a> and other movements in physical face-to-face interaction compared to most virtual interactions. Online encounters are essentially head-to-head, compared to whole the body-to-body interaction of physical encounters. Relying purely on facial expressions reduces the ability to perceive other behaviour, such as altered body posture or gestures, which are crucial to ascertaining another’s trustworthiness. </p>
<p>Even a microsecond time lag can result in someone working harder to piece together the full meaning from the cues available. The brain has to work overtime to fill in the gaps left by even the best technology. So while virtual interaction may look and feel similar to physical interaction, it cannot deliver all the pieces of information that are critical to understanding another person’s trustworthiness.</p>
<h2>Hard for newcomers</h2>
<p>The environment in which the interaction takes place is also crucial. Breakthroughs in diplomacy at the general assembly are just as likely to be had in corridors outside the assembly hall as inside it. </p>
<p>Researchers highlight the importance of situations which create <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691123899/interaction-ritual-chains">barriers to outsiders</a> in diplomacy, for example a snatched conversation in a lift. It’s clear in such situations who is excluded and who is included in a particular interaction. Reducing diplomacy to boxes on a screen limits such opportunities, and it also removes spaces for informal and impromptu meetings in which personal bonds of trust can be developed. Without being able to roam the halls and engage in new face-to-face interactions, diplomats’ ability to develop and extend bonds is invariably limited. </p>
<p>This has several implications. World leaders in the general assembly who already trust each other may be able to use virtual platforms to maintain trusting relationships. But their successors may find it harder.</p>
<p>Distrust is often triggered by a previous experience, while mistrust is a general sense of unease and lack of trust. Leaders who mistrust, and perhaps even distrust each other as a result of previous face-to-face meetings, may in subsequent virtual-only interactions avoid potential diplomatic openings that could allow distrust to be dissolved. And for those who have never met face-to-face and approach each other from a position of distrust, it remains questionable whether trust can be restored through virtual interaction. </p>
<p>One reason leaders and diplomats have travelled to meet each other face-to-face for centuries is to have the best chance of answering the most vexing question in world politics: can the other side be trusted? </p>
<p>While today’s technology allows state officials to see each other on screen in a matter of seconds, virtual diplomacy appears unlikely to ever replace face-to-face interaction. The virtual gathering at the UN general assembly will surely be remembered for what diplomats do manage to accomplish online. But it will also be noteworthy for how much leaders miss the opportunity, as former West-German chancellor Willy Brandt once put it, “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-politics/will-trump-putin-summit-be-chemistry-vs-substance">to get a smell of each other</a>”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146508/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When diplomacy is done online, it’s hard to pick up on the gestures and micro-expressions that help create trust.Marcus Holmes, Associate Professor of Government, William & MaryMark NK Saunders, Professor of Business Research Methods, University of BirminghamNicholas John Wheeler, Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science and International Studies., University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1464992020-09-21T11:02:23Z2020-09-21T11:02:23ZUN general assembly goes virtual: a former ambassador on what that means for diplomacy<p>The UN general assembly is one of the main fixtures of the global diplomatic calendar. At no other time are so many global leaders gathered in one place at one time. For diplomats it is Wimbledon, the Masters and the Tour de France all rolled into one.</p>
<p>I attended my first UN general assembly in 1992 as a young British diplomat, but from 2013 to 2017 attended annually as the EU’s managing director for Africa and then the Middle East.</p>
<p>The 2020 general assembly will be very different from those I attended, with the majority of the event happening online. What will a virtual general assembly tell us about the nature of diplomacy and of international relations in the age of COVID-19, the age of Zoom, and an age of growing global instability?</p>
<h2>E-diplomacy</h2>
<p>Twelve years ago I published a short paper on <a href="https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/archive/downloads/publications/RR16.pdf">digital diplomacy</a>. This was well before US foreign policy was made on Twitter, and democratic elections were influenced by insiders and outsiders through Facebook. But it drew some conclusions about the impact of the internet on diplomacy that have stood the test of time. </p>
<p>It would multiply and amplify the voices and interests involved in making foreign policy, complicating decision-making and reducing the predominant role of states by giving non-state actors a bigger role. It would accelerate and free the dissemination of information, whether true or false, making it easier to influence the public but harder to control the flows. And it would make the delivery of consular and advisory services faster.</p>
<p>As well as a small but growing <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Digital-Diplomacy-Theory-and-Practice/Bjola-Holmes/p/book/9781138843820">body of research</a> on digital diplomacy, some <a href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/diplomacy-times-covid-19">diplomats</a> and <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/interdisciplinary-studies/research/SIS%20Briefing%209%20v6%20at%2010%20July%202020.pdf">academics</a> have already started to reflect on what impact the pandemic will have on it. </p>
<p>In this area, as in others, coronavirus is likely to accelerate trends that were already under way. Three are particularly important: moving information online; moving meetings online; and intensifying the efforts to influence public opinion on international issues through social media. </p>
<p>As the former British ambassador to Lebanon, <a href="https://www.harpercollins.co.uk/9780008127589/the-naked-diplomat-understanding-power-and-politics-in-the-digital-age/">Tom Fletcher</a>, has argued, the art of diplomacy is partly to master the medium of the age. Survival will now go to the digitally fittest. So overall, the pandemic may strengthen the hand of those who are most active online, and who may never have got into the official meetings anyway.</p>
<h2>Test case</h2>
<p>The UN general assembly traditionally fulfils a number of functions. First, it is a platform for set-piece presentations by leaders, often geared more to domestic rather than international audiences, for whom being seen to be there is important. </p>
<p>Second, it provides an opportunity to demonstrate the global community’s concern about the particular problems of the day by holding large public meetings involving activists, public figures and politicians. Third, there are the ad hoc bilateral or multilateral meetings between leaders behind closed doors, often to resolve specific crises or problems. </p>
<p>World leaders of course come for all three. Diplomats come for the third, which is where the heavy lifting is done.</p>
<p>A virtual general assembly will allow the first two to go ahead more or less unchanged – though without the podium and without the live audience, we will miss those treasured but symbolic moments, such as when the world <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eN2jqTilLOM">laughed at US president, Donald Trump,</a>, or when Israeli prime minister, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RG4kKdrD6LU">Benjamin Netanyahu</a>, gives one of his traditionally histrionic speeches. </p>
<p>The awareness-raising events may actually increase their audience by being simultaneously broadcast across the world, at least where people have access to the internet and the time to stop and watch.</p>
<h2>What will be lost</h2>
<p>The problem comes with the third. The UN general assembly is the prime venue for diplomatic speed dating – seeing as many fellow leaders as possible in as short a time – and for hammering out difficult decisions in private conversations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Diplomats discussing document at UN general assembly." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359029/original/file-20200921-22-1kq2uca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359029/original/file-20200921-22-1kq2uca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359029/original/file-20200921-22-1kq2uca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359029/original/file-20200921-22-1kq2uca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359029/original/file-20200921-22-1kq2uca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359029/original/file-20200921-22-1kq2uca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/359029/original/file-20200921-22-1kq2uca.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The author, Nicholas Westcott (centre), at the UN general assembly.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>It’s rare for this to result in something announced at the time. But it helps build momentum or expand contacts that can lead to a deal later. The efforts don’t always bear fruit, as I have seen myself many times on issues like Syria, Yemen, Libya and South Sudan. But sometimes they have worked – on Lebanon in the past, on Sudan and Somalia.</p>
<p>In principle, all these conversations can be had, if less securely, by video conference. But will they? And will the quality of interaction really be the same as getting the key heads of state or foreign ministers into the same room? </p>
<p>A critical element in successful diplomacy, like successful politics, is trust. This tends to be built through personal contact and extended conversations over several meetings. A virtual general assembly will impede that contact. Zoom, for all its blessings, does not give the same quality of interaction unless people know each other well already.</p>
<p>So while a virtual UN general assembly will enable a more direct interaction with the global audience for public events on great issues, there could be a real diplomatic cost in weakening the contacts necessary to resolve those issues. Ultimately it will be governments and leaders who must fix the deals to respond to diverse public opinions. Without that, we will drift towards conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/146499/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Westcott does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There could be diplomatic costs to the online UN general assembly.Nicholas Westcott, Research Associate, Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1458862020-09-16T12:28:11Z2020-09-16T12:28:11ZUN: political missions are gradually replacing peacekeeping – why that’s dangerous<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358327/original/file-20200916-20-15silxz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=151%2C44%2C870%2C714&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Moroccan UN peacekeeper in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo helps raise awareness about COVID-19. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/monusco/49816053341/in/photolist-2iSLXHG-2iU5i6p-2j8ZWVK-2iG1Xx5-2iGUhUv-2iKdyH9-2iJa4i9-2iQYv9d-2iLQJr9-2iMQqVh-2jbb3ne-2jh4Feo-2j4vK6c-2jrUUPM-2jthBa9-2jyg6Kp-2iXopzQ-2iXsH1x">MONUSCO Photos/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the world’s leaders and their diplomats prepare to meet for the 75th session of the UN general assembly, much of the discussion will be virtual – and dominated by the response to COVID-19. </p>
<p>When it comes to global peace and security, one of the UN’s core remits, coronavirus has had only a muted impact on peacekeeping operations. At the same time, longstanding calls to transform UN peacekeeping have made little progress. </p>
<p>The scale of UN peacekeeping was already in decline before coronavirus. And yet peacekeepers are a vital tool in the UN’s armoury to protect vulnerable people the world over.</p>
<h2>Peace in the time of coronavirus</h2>
<p>António Guterres, the UN secretary-general has also consistently <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unsgs-remarks-to-security-council-covid-19-pandemic">defended the importance of UN peackeeping</a> missions in light of the pandemic. In July, Guterres eventually <a href="http://www.unscr.com/en/resolutions/2532">secured a security council resolution</a> that called for a general cessation of all hostilities around the world so an effective humanitarian response to the virus could be mounted for people caught up in conflict. But it <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-un-security-council-finally-calls-for-global-ceasefire-after-us-and-china-delay-talks-141858">took months to secure approval</a>, and while 16 armed groups did initially pause fighting, it has resumed in some places, including Yemen and Libya, before the resolution passed.</p>
<p>The UN has also adapted how its missions to build and keep the peace operate on the ground. Rotation of troops has been limited, and the management of peacekeeeping missions have moved to working remotely whenever feasible. In the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, peacekeeping missions have <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/covid-19-cases-grow-car-minusca-supports-government-urgent-response-to-halt-virus-spread">strengthened the response</a> of local authorities to COVID-19. </p>
<p>So far at least, peacekeepers are not considered responsible for spreading the virus – a particular concern for the UN given the recent history of inadvertently <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37126747">introducing cholera to Haiti</a>. The UN may also have been lucky since, so far, COVID-19 has been less widespread in Africa, where most peacekeeping missions are deployed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/they-put-a-few-coins-in-your-hands-to-drop-a-baby-in-you-265-stories-of-haitian-children-abandoned-by-un-fathers-114854">'They put a few coins in your hands to drop a baby in you' – 265 stories of Haitian children abandoned by UN fathers</a>
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<h2>A mission in decline</h2>
<p>At the same time, there is little evidence that coronavirus is transforming UN peacekeeping to make it part of an effective response to support the most vulnerable. </p>
<p>Action for Peacekeeping (<a href="https://www.un.org/en/A4P/">A4P</a>) – which was launched by the UN Secretary General in March 2018 – has remained the main framework to strengthen UN peacekeeping. Even though 154 countries, including the permanent members of the Security Council, have endorsed A4P and signalled their continued commitment to peacekeeping, the relevance of peacekeeping appears to be in decline.</p>
<p>In August 2020, the UN deployed <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/0_front_page_august_2020.pdf">81,820</a> peacekeepers, a reduction by nearly 25% compared to the maximum deployment of 107,805 personnel in April 2015. At that time the UN had mandated 16 missions compared to 13 today. The last large multidimensional mission – MINUSCA to the Central African Republic – was mandated in 2014. UN peacekeeping missions could have been an option since then in Colombia, Ukraine and Syria, but did not happen. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graph showing decline in UN peacekeeping." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/358341/original/file-20200916-18-rl1ice.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/0_front_page_august_2020.pdf">UN Peacekeeping</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Instead, the UN has closed large peacekeeping missions to Haiti (2017), Côte d’Ivoire (2017) and Liberia (2018), replacing them with much smaller policing or political missions. It is taking a similar approach to the drawdown and planned closures of <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2020/202">UNAMID</a> in Sudan (Darfur) and <a href="https://undocs.org/S/2019/842">MONUSCO</a> in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p>
<p>The reduction in the number of large, multidimensional peacekeeping missions is in keeping with the emphasis in the A4P program on the need for political solutions to conflicts and political support for ongoing missions. In fact, over time the UN has developed a broad set of instruments – including political envoys, sanctions and political missions – in support of its peace and security mandate. As well as the 13 peacekeeping missions, it also has nine political ones. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-covid-19-offers-a-chance-to-transform-un-peacekeeping-139416">Why COVID-19 offers a chance to transform UN peacekeeping</a>
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<p>Research I’ve done with colleagues shows how the number of diplomatic initiatives and civilian-led missions <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2020.1772254">surpassed the number of peacekeeping missions</a> since 2010. Using the full array of instruments may well be more cost-effective than relying on peacekeeping alone.</p>
<h2>Hampered response</h2>
<p>At the same time, the <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/peps/ahead-of-print/article-10.1515-peps-2020-0022/article-10.1515-peps-2020-0022.xml?language=en">trend toward fewer and smaller missions</a> reflects three main challenges to an effective global response to threats to peace and security. </p>
<p>First, the main global powers no longer agree that they share a collective responsibility to maintain global peace and stability. National interests increasingly determine their response to crises and civil wars, for example in the recent conflict in Libya. </p>
<p>Second, politicians but also the general public of potential host countries commonly express a lack of trust in foreign peacekeeping interventions. And third, UN agencies lack the necessary resources to sustain large-scale interventions. </p>
<p>The situation of civilians in conflict zones around the world remains precarious. They risk attacks from rebel factions and government forces. They had to worry about infectious diseases such as malaria, cholera, dengue and Ebola, even before COVID-19. The presence of a large peacekeeping mission can make a difference in the immediate aftermath to a crisis as shown after the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2010/01/326472-un-rushing-aid-haiti-following-deadly-tremors">Haiti earthquake</a> in 2010 and <a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/09/role-un-peacekeepers-unmil-tackling-ebola/">Ebola</a> in west Africa in 2013. </p>
<p>So far, fortunately, the worst fears about the effect of coronavirus on conflict-affected communities and refugee sites have not come true. However, as <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-53106164">shown in Yemen</a>, COVID-19 can worsen an already horrific situation. It also illustrates the limited means available to the UN to intervene effectively and to provide necessary humanitarian support.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145886/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Han Dorussen has received funding from the British Academy and currently receives funding from UKRI. </span></em></p>Peacekeeping had been in decline before COVID-19, but they are vital tools in the UN’s armoury.Han Dorussen, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1244552019-10-02T13:44:01Z2019-10-02T13:44:01ZTrump is grabbing headlines. Why Africa can’t afford to be distracted<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/295047/original/file-20191001-173342-95fpik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A view of the General Assembly hall at the start of the 2019 Climate Action Summit. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Justin Lane</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Events of the past week leading up to US President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49881847">impeachment inquiry</a> have reverberated globally for two key reasons.</p>
<p>The first is that they threaten to detract from the important work of galvanising global support for multilateralism on issues vital to Africa. These include <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/sep/18/un-secretary-general-climate-crisis-trump">climate change</a> and the <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/">Sustainable Development Goals</a>. The second is that the events raise important political issues of keen interest among Africa’s democrats.</p>
<p>On its own the international nature of the allegations against Trump would have attracted foreign interest. But the deluge of revelations got even more attention because it <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/timeline-trump-ukraine-scandal">coincided</a> with the opening week of 74th Session of the UN General Assembly. Scores of foreign leaders were in New York for the event.</p>
<p>Of special concern to Africa was that the focus on Trump distracted much needed international attention from the 23 September <a href="https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/">UN Global Climate Action Summit</a>. The focus was on mobilising greater international support and cooperation. In particular, African countries are dependent on help since they lack adequate resources to mitigate and adapt to global warming. </p>
<p>Africa has already felt the effects of Trump’s climate change denialism. Two years ago he cancelled US support for the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1674927817300849">Green Climate Fund</a> which <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1674927817300849">led to </a> budget cuts in research and the cancellation of donations to the multilateral environmental fund.</p>
<p>Researchers have warned that perhaps the greatest threat presented by the US’s disengagement is that it will <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2018.1490051">demotivate other states</a> from addressing the causes – and effects – of climate change. This would hit poor countries the hardest.</p>
<h2>Connecting the dots</h2>
<p>The impeachment process is, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/28/us/politics/impeachment-foreign-influence.html">for the first time</a> in the history of the US, based on alleged abuse of power by the president in the conduct of the nation’s foreign policy. America’s founders made broad provisions for impeachment in the <a href="https://constitution.findlaw.com/article2/annotation18.html">US Constitution</a> on these grounds. This was informed by their fear that a foreign power might corrupt a US chief executive through bribery or blackmail. </p>
<p>A White House <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/official-readout-president-trump-s-july-25-phone-call-with-ukraine-s-volodymyr-zelensky/4b228f51-17e7-45bc-b16c-3b2643f3fbe0/">summary</a> of a 25 July phone conversation suggests Trump took the lead in trying to extort favours from a vulnerable foreign ally. He promised to invite Ukraine’s President Vlodymyr Zelensky for a state visit if he would help Trump associates get dirt about a leading Democratic candidate in <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/a-ukrainian-push-for-a-white-house-visit-gave-trump-leverage-over-volodymyr-zelensky">next year’s presidential election</a>. </p>
<p>Zelensky, no less than leaders of fragile democratic states in Africa, prizes such recognition to shore up political support domestically and internationally. </p>
<p>A second allegation, still being investigated, is whether Trump’s decision to freeze a Congress-approved military aid package Ukraine urgently needed was also linked again to Trump’s <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/28/trump-ukraine-military-aid-russia-1689531">personal political agenda</a>.</p>
<p>African leaders became accustomed to such strings-attached military aid during the Cold War. This also meant that the US turned a blind eye to abuse of power and suppression of opponents so long as a regime was in its sphere of influence.</p>
<p>In this case Trump seems determined to acquire an electoral advantage by illegal means. As some have commented, there are <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/parallels-between-watergate-trump-white-house-mueller-russia-nixon-2018-9?IR=T">strong parallels</a> with Watergate.</p>
<h2>Democracy</h2>
<p>Trump’s world view is consistent with the virulent white ethnic nationalism that seems to arouse his most passionate supporters. It’s what South African President Cyril Rampahosa rightly <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ramaphosa-warning-to-sa-we-will-never-accept-tribalism-33197019">decries</a> in South Africa as “Primitive Nationalism.” </p>
<p>Just hours after delivering his UN address, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, announced that she would soon schedule a vote on Trump’s impeachment. As only a majority vote is required, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/politics/impeachment-monmouth-poll.html">her party’s full support will guarantee passage</a>.</p>
<p>Her principled justification was that Trump’s own actions crossed
a line by directly threatening the institutions of America’s constitutional democracy. These include electoral integrity, separation of powers and rule of law, and minimum standards of transparency and accountability necessary for sustaining democracy. </p>
<p>These concerns are universal. And the bread and butter of democrats struggling to entrench liberal democracy in countries across Africa.</p>
<p>Last week, the Johannesburg-based Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa convened its 14th Annual Symposium for electoral officials, analysts and activists from across the continent. This year’s <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/symp2019.php">theme</a> was “Electoral Integrity in Africa: Under Imminent Threat?” </p>
<p>The symposium’s focus on threats to electoral integrity in Africa was the very issue that tipped wavering members of the US House of Representatives to support Trump’s impeachment. Credible elections don’t, on their own, make a democracy – whether in Africa or America. What matters is if average citizens view them as having integrity. It is this that makes democracy possible. </p>
<p>In 2012 the members of the African Union (AU) <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance">ratified</a> the African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance. All African governments are obligated to hold periodic national elections. They are also invited the AU to send impartial observers to verify whether they were conducted fairly. And whether the results reflect a valid majority of eligible voters. The charter allows technical support for all <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/eisa2016Stremlau.pdf">AU electoral missions</a>.</p>
<p>Nearly all African nations now conduct regular elections. The integrity of many have been under threat. Two cases that featured in recent deliberations were <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/zimbabwe.php">Zimbabwe</a> and the <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/drc.php">DRC</a>. </p>
<p>This year’s election in the Zimbabwe masked what was effectively a military coup, an unconstitutional change of government proscribed by the AU but finessed with an election that was peaceful but lacked integrity. In the DRC the electoral process was the most robust, inclusive and transparent since the SA brokered transition to a fragile electoral democracy of 2006. Latest electoral results did install an opposition candidate but not the one who garnered the most votes. </p>
<p>Nigeria is a third, more ambiguous example, with an explosion of social media platforms that both <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/epp-nigeria.php">informed and mis-informed voters</a>.</p>
<p>A key takeaway from the symposium was that strategies of electoral manipulation throughout Africa are proliferating and mutating. </p>
<p>Trump’s bad example in the world’s oldest democracy can only comfort autocrats. </p>
<h2>Possible outcomes</h2>
<p>No one can predict how Trump’s presidency will end. But the two most likely scenarios could resonate politically across Africa and globally. If Trump is forced out by US Congressional action – or is voted out of office in presidential elections in November 2020 – this could have positive demonstration effects aspiring liberal democracies abroad. </p>
<p>Almost certainly this will also result in America becoming a more reliable and capable partner for interested Africa nations. </p>
<p>On the other hand, should Trump survive impeachment and win re-election, this almost certainly will inspire and abet electoral authoritarians across Africa and elsewhere.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau is a Board member of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). </span></em></p>Africa has already felt the effects of Donald Trump’s climate change denialism. Recent events are also raising political issues of keen interest among the continent’s democrats.John J Stremlau, Honorary Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1243592019-09-27T08:51:04Z2019-09-27T08:51:04ZVIDEO: Michelle Grattan on Morrison’s US trip - and the ACT’s marijuana legislation<figure>
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<p>University of Canberra Vice-Chancellor Deep Saini discusses Scott Morrison’s trip to Washington - including the state dinner thrown in his honour, his speech at the UN General Assembly, and his message to China - with Michelle Grattan. They also talk about possible Commonwealth intervention after the ACT passed a bill legalising marijuana for personal use.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124359/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>University of Canberra Vice-Chancellor Deep Saini and Michelle Grattan discuss the big stories in politics this week.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1242872019-09-26T12:04:12Z2019-09-26T12:04:12ZGrattan on Friday: Scott Morrison’s dance with Donald gets up Beijing’s nose<p>Scott Morrison has a good deal riding on Donald Trump winning re-election next year. During his week in the United States, the Prime Minister tied himself to the President to a remarkable degree.</p>
<p>Morrison will want the trip’s enduring images to be the White House welcome and the state dinner in the Rose Garden under the stars. And they are the markers that underlined the depth of the Australian-American alliance.</p>
<p>But the startling image was of Morrison and Trump on stage together at billionaire Anthony Pratt’s paper factory in Wapakoneta, Ohio.</p>
<p>No, that wasn’t a rally, the PM’s office insists. But Trump certainly made it look like one.</p>
<p>For a self-respecting Australian leader, this was beyond awkward diplomatically, and may be problematic at home. This year’s Lowy poll showed only 25% of Australians have confidence in Trump to do the right thing in world affairs.</p>
<p>That was, perhaps, something of a turning point in the visit. The Washington days were better than Morrison’s later appearances, which saw him open the China debate and having to defend Australia’s mediocre performance on climate change.</p>
<p>In sum, this has been a trip that will be rated a success but carry some costs. Notably, while reaffirming the alliance and bonding with Trump, Morrison has further annoyed our biggest trading partner.</p>
<p>The alliance was in fine repair already but there’s nothing like some face time in the Oval Office and formal-dress glamour to shout out its closeness.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/albanese-slams-morrison-for-using-a-loud-hailer-to-talk-to-china-from-us-124097">Albanese slams Morrison for using a “loud hailer” to talk to China from US</a>
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<p>While there may not be any specific requests on foot, there’s more credit in the bank for when either partner wants to ask a favour (as the US did recently in relation to the Middle East freedom of navigation operation, and Malcolm Turnbull did a while ago on steel and aluminium tariffs).</p>
<p>Getting close to Trump personally is something most leaders find difficult, and some mightn’t even attempt. </p>
<p>A conservative who won an unexpected election victory, the knockabout Morrison ticks the boxes for Trump. He’s appropriately and voluably grateful for presidential attention; he’s not a man whose charisma threatens to steal the limelight at a joint appearance.</p>
<p>Morrison was fully focused on Trump and the Republicans. Asked, after the Ohio appearance, if he’d felt he had been at a Trump rally and whether he’d reached out to the other side of politics during his trip, he said, “Well, I have been here to see the President – that was the intention”.</p>
<p>We’ve yet to see the longer term implications of the Morrison remarks on China, delivered in his major foreign policy speech in Chicago (where he was avoiding the New York United Nations leaders summit on climate).</p>
<p>His declaration that China has reached the stage of a developed economy and should therefore accept the responsibilities of that status in trade and its environmental obligations, rather than enjoying the concessions of a developing one, was basically an elaboration of what he’d argued earlier at home.</p>
<p>But place and context are pivotal in foreign policy. Said in the US, with a posse of the Australian media in tow, and with Trump’s anti-China rhetoric at full force, Morrison’s words were amplified to high volume.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/defiant-scott-morrison-tells-the-world-australia-is-doing-our-bit-on-climate-change-124269">Defiant Scott Morrison tells the world Australia is 'doing our bit' on climate change</a>
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<p>China has quickly cast Morrison as articulating the Trump position, hitting back in a statement from its embassy in Canberra. “The assertion of China being a ‘newly developed economy’ by the Australian side doesn’t hold much water. It is both one-sided and unfair. And it is basically an echo of what the US has claimed.</p>
<p>"It is true that China, through its own efforts, has made remarkable achievements in economic and social development over the past decades and become the world’s second largest economy. However, there is still a big gap between China and the developed countries in terms of overall development level. China still has a long way to go to achieve full modernisation.</p>
<p>"In a comprehensive analysis, China is still a developing country, which is widely acknowledged by the international community,” the statement said.</p>
<p>China already has Australia in the so-called deep freeze. Morrison would like to visit – there has not been a prime ministerial trip to Beijing since 2016. But as the PM has pointed out, he can’t go without an invitation. His analysis won’t help with that. Morrison’s assertion that a meeting between Foreign Minister Marise Payne and her Chinese counterpart on the sidelines at the United Nations showed “that relationship continues to be in good shape” didn’t cut it.</p>
<p>Climate was always set to be difficult for Morrison on the trip, because the UN leaders’ summit on the issue fell neatly between his commitments in Washington and his speech to the UN General Assembly. But he didn’t want to be there.</p>
<p>The government tried to justify his absence on the grounds that only countries announcing new plans received a speaking spot. But that wasn’t an adequate excuse for Morrison not turning up, sending Payne instead. His no-show simply reinforced the criticism of Australia, which has seen rising emissions over the past several years, after the carbon price was scrapped.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-what-might-lily-and-abbey-say-to-scott-morrison-about-greta-thunberg-124179">View from The Hill: What might Lily and Abbey say to Scott Morrison about Greta Thunberg?</a>
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<p>Morrison used his address to the General Assembly to defend the government’s actions, declaring “Australia is doing our bit on climate change and we reject any suggestion to the contrary”. </p>
<p>He talked a good deal about Australia’s efforts on plastics waste, including “plastic pollution choking our oceans”. Embarrassingly, his speech coincided with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change releasing a report about the urgent need for action to contain rising ocean levels.</p>
<p>As Morrison’s foreign policy continues to emerge, this trip has highlighted his priorities and approach.</p>
<p>Specifically, that he operates on an America-first basis and he has translated that to a Trump-first one. Never mind the unpredictability and idiosyncrasy of the President (and now the attempt to impeach him) - what’s needed is connection. Turnbull, who also sought to get close to Trump personally, pitched to him as one businessman to another. Morrison, having been picked by Trump as a favourite, has struck a mutually useful easy familiarity with the unlikely leader who mobilised the quiet Americans.</p>
<p>When Morrison gave his big trade speech in June, the line from the government was that it was not choosing sides between the US and China (though it did seem to be and it always appeared inevitable it would). After his American trip both the US and China are in no doubt which side Australia is on.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124287/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>During his week in the United States, the PM tied himself to Trump to a remarkable degree. Though, the Washington days were better than later appearances, which saw Morrison open the China debate.Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of CanberraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/963082018-05-14T14:46:34Z2018-05-14T14:46:34ZSouth Africa needs to box clever in its David versus Goliath duel with Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218455/original/file-20180510-34006-1k8sui4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and his team meeting international investors and business leaders in London.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/ Elmond Jiyane</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent actions by US President Donald Trump’s administration are severely straining relations with South Africa’s new government led by President Cyril Ramaphosa. And relations between the two governments are likely to worsen.</p>
<p>The first blow was last month’s threat by Trump’s UN Ambassador Nikki Haley that countries <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-30-us-threatens-to-cut-funding-to-south-africa">unwilling to tow the US line</a> would be punished. According to a list of the 2017 General Assembly vote counts released in March, South Africa was one of the 10 least supportive countries. It voted with the US <a href="https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225048.pdf">only 18% of the time</a>. </p>
<p>More recently, Ramaphosa’s <a href="http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/president-ramaphosa-expresses-concern-decision-us-government-withdraw-jcpoa-iran">expressed disappointment</a> at Trump’s withdrawal from Barack Obama’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/presidents-often-reverse-us-foreign-policy-how-trump-handles-setbacks-is-what-matters-most-now-95580?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Wednesday%20Test%203&utm_content=Wednesday%20Test%203+CID_ba0406ae229f6e4f7aa8d532d878f39d&utm_source=campaign_monitor_us&utm_term=Presidents%20often%20reverse%20US%20foreign%20policy%20%20how%20Trump%20handles%20setbacks%20is%20what%20matters%20most%20now">nuclear deal with Iran</a> is likely to raise the US president’s ire, especially as South Africa presses ahead with plans to expand trade with Iran.</p>
<p>And relations between the two countries could sour further following South Africa’s decision <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/sa-recalls-ambassador-as-israeli-troops-kill-dozens-of-palestinians-20180515">to recall its ambassador to Israel</a> in protest against <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/reaction-gaza-protesters-us-embassy-israel-1.4662331">the killing</a> by the Israeli army of over 50 Palestinians protesting against the relocation of the American embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. The relocation came after Trump recognised the disputed holy city Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. </p>
<p>South Africa has a lot to lose. As the only liberal democracy on the State Department’s list of ten UN members most critical of US policies, it is also the only one that <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-aid/southafrica.php">benefits substantially</a> from extensive trade and assistance agreements with the US.</p>
<p>Trump’s announcement that South Africa wouldn’t be given exemption from his recent unilateral hikes in tariffs on US <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-05-01-united-states-refuses-south-africa-import-exemption-over-national-security-fears">imports of steel and aluminium</a> has not yet been linked to its UN voting record. But commentators have raised this possibility.</p>
<p>Losing out on the exemption could cost South Africa <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2018-05-02-trump-duties-could-cost-sa-7500-jobs/">7,500 jobs</a>. The impact on the country’s economy could be far worse if Trump moves against South African manufactured products that currently enjoy special access to US markets under the African Growth and Opportunity Act <a href="https://za.usembassy.gov/business/trade-and-economic-relations/">(AGOA)</a>. In my view this threat may be exaggerated. And Trump’s targeting of South Africa would be rightly criticised as an attempt to undermine Ramaphosa’s efforts to reform and revitalise his nation’s troubled democracy and economy. </p>
<p>Given the size of the US economy relative to South Africa’s, many will view this as another case of David versus Goliath, with most rooting for David. South Africa’s challenge will be to exploit those conditions and facts that might disarm its more powerful adversary. Several are already evident.</p>
<h2>Disarming Trump</h2>
<p>First, the timing of the Trump administration’s actions are happening just as Ramaphosa’s commitment to <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-zumas-departure-20180216-story.html">redress corruption and misrule</a> under his predecessor Jacob Zuma is receiving international recognition and praise. </p>
<p>In addition, Ramaphosa is embellishing South Africa’s image in a year-long domestic and international campaign celebrating the 100th anniversary of the birth of the iconic Nelson Mandela. He is pledging fresh and determined efforts to <a href="http://www.durban.gov.za/Resource_Centre/new2/Pages/Government-commemorates-centenary-celebrations-of-Nelson-Mandela-and-Albertina-Sisulu.aspx">uphold the Mandela legacy</a>.</p>
<p>In this spirit, Ramaphosa lobbied and received unanimous African support for South Africa’s bid for <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sa-returns-to-the-un-security-council-with-a-new-leader">another two-year term</a> on the UN Security Council. This is almost certain to be affirmed next month by the UN General Assembly in a vote that’s bound to raise South Africa’s standing internationally. </p>
<p>The following month former US president Barack Obama comes to Johannesburg to deliver the <a href="https://www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/president-barack-obama-to-deliver-the-16th-nelson-mandela-annual-lecture">annual Mandela lecture</a>. The world will once again be reminded of Mandela’s values and ideals, as well as the contrasts between Trump’s character and that of his predecessor. </p>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Michael Reynolds</span></span>
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<p>Second, it’s worth revisiting the State Department’s UN voting scorecard. The votes show that the mood of the General Assembly has become much more hostile since Trump became president. On the 92 issues that required UN General Assembly votes last year, the US was backed in only 31% of its resolutions – the lowest level of support since 2008.</p>
<p>This reflects the fact that Trump’s immediate predecessors tended to be pragmatic. Although for decades majorities in the General Assembly disagreed with the US on issues such as Palestinian rights, and the merits of US military adventures, there was nevertheless cooperation in other areas. </p>
<p>But Trump has long been dismissive of the UN and multi-lateralism in general as of little value or importance to the US. </p>
<p>Had South Africa voted with the US a few more times it would have joined the league of African states such as Kenya (20%), Ethiopia (21%) and Nigeria (22%). China (22%), Brazil (23%), and India (25%) aren’t much higher. </p>
<p>Third, the US claim that it was refusing to exempt South African from the steel and aluminium tariff hikes for “national security” reasons was laughable and might <a href="https://nyti.ms/2G*UGFo">not survive World Trade Organisation scrutiny</a>. South Africa supplies less than 2% of these commodities to the US. Yet the US saw fit to exempt nearly 60% of steel exports from the US’s European and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/lighthizer-confirms-steel-tariff...">other allies</a>.</p>
<p>Fears that Trump may try to abrogate other South Africa preferences that allow imports of manufactured products, notably BMW Series 3 and Mercedes C Class automobiles, with a lot more jobs at stake, are understandable. South Africa should lobby a receptive US Congress to prevent this. Bi-partisan majorities recently renewed duty-free access until 2025, after protracted and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/05/20/agoa-moves-forward-reviewing-last-weeks-reauthorization-in-the-u-s-senate/">successful negotiations</a> with South Africa.</p>
<p>South Africa can also draw on Congressional goodwill that so far has resisted Trump’s attempts to cut development assistance to Africa, including SA. </p>
<p>And finally, the business community has responded positively to Ramaphosa’s emissaries seeking support for his global campaign to raise <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-05-04-ingredients-to-realising-ramaphosas-audacious-100-bn-fdi-target/#.WvG8hIiFM2w">USD$100 billion of investments</a> for the country.</p>
<h2>Standing up to a bully</h2>
<p>There are many entrenched networks of cooperation between South Africa and the US among sister cities, provinces and states, civic organisations, educational and scientific exchanges, and various cultural and historical ties. They can all help to shield South Africa from Trump’s bullying.</p>
<p>Other countries, uncertain about how to respond to Trump, may not have the same means that South Africa has to connect directly and extensively with the American people. But, if Pretoria is willing to stand up to Trump, it might encourage African and other smaller countries to rethink simply trying to placate him as he persists in <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/why-foreign-leaders-have-to-keep-putting-up-with-trumps-abuse.html">demeaning and denigrating them</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96308/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John J Stremlau serves on the Board of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA)
. </span></em></p>South Africa’s relations with the US could sour under President Trump.John J Stremlau, 2017 Bradlow Fellow at SA Institute of International Affairs, Visiting Professor of International Relations, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/845562017-09-22T19:53:25Z2017-09-22T19:53:25ZChina’s leverage over ‘Rocket Man’ is key to avoiding nuclear war in East Asia<p>U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un are playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship while also trading personal insults.</p>
<p>Most recently, Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/world/trump-un-north-korea-iran.html?_r=0">blasted the “Rocket Man”</a> in his inaugural speech to the United Nations, promising to “totally destroy” North Korea if it threatens the U.S. or its allies. The Trump Administration also <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/north-korea-sanctions-trump-china-banks-announcement-latest-a7960106.html">added new sanctions</a> aimed at strangling its ability to work with banks. </p>
<p>Kim, for his part, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/asia/north-korea-dotard/index.html">resorted to calling</a> Trump “mentally deranged” and a “dotard,” while his foreign minister <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/22/552861261/north-korea-says-pacific-test-of-nuclear-warhead-is-possible">threatened to test</a> a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific. </p>
<p>With <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/08/08/north-korea-trump-ratchet-up-tension-with-threats-fire-hours-apart.html">tensions escalating</a>, it is important to be realistic about how we can get out of this mess. </p>
<p>In short, any nonmilitary solution will rely on China choosing to apply its massive economic leverage over the North Korean regime. In a positive sign, <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/09/21/552708231/china-cuts-off-bank-business-with-north-korea-as-trump-announces-new-sanctions">China’s central bank recently told Chinese financial companies</a> to stop doing business with North Korea.</p>
<p>Overall, however, it appears that China has increased its trade with North Korea in recent years while doing fairly little to forestall North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. China’s foremost objective seems to be promoting greater stability from its volatile neighbor, in part because it fears being faced with a massive humanitarian crisis should the regime collapse.</p>
<p>But while the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/05/the-messy-data-behind-chinas-growing-trade-with-north-korea/?utm_term=.41435ab3f758">poor quality of the data</a> hinders a detailed analysis, a quick look shows just how much leverage China has, if it wishes to use it. </p>
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<h2>North Korea’s primary patron</h2>
<p>In general, exports from one country to another <a href="http://www.cepii.fr/pdf_pub/wp/2013/wp2013-27.pdf">can be mostly explained</a> by the distance between them and the sizes of their markets, a pattern that holds for China and North Korea.</p>
<p>Geographically, they share a long border, which makes China a natural, though not inevitable, partner for trade. As a case in point, North Korea also shares a long border with South Korea, but these countries have almost no trade between them. In addition, North Korea shares a small border with Russia, with whom it has little, though ever-increasing, trade. </p>
<p>China’s large market, proximity and – most importantly – willingness to trade with North Korea has led to a situation in which North Korea has become highly dependent on trade with what has become its primary patron. <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/">About half</a> of North Korean exports and imports go directly to and from China and most of the rest of its trade is handled indirectly by Chinese middlemen. </p>
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<p>North Korea’s dependence on its neighbor has grown alongside China’s increasing economic dominance of East Asia, which gained momentum 15 years ago when China <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm">joined the World Trade Organization</a>. Since then, both Chinese gross domestic product as well as its annual trade with North Korea have increased nearly tenfold, to around <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/country/china">US$11 trillion</a> and <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/">$6 billion</a>, respectively. </p>
<p>North Korea <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/chn/prk/show/2015/">imports nearly everything</a> from China, from rubber tires to refined petroleum to pears, with no single category dominating. Meanwhile, <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/prk/show/2015/">coal constitutes about 40 percent</a> of North Korean exports to China. </p>
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<h2>Time to use that leverage?</h2>
<p>However, recent events – such as the use of front companies by Chinese firms to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-usa-idUSKCN11W1SL">evade sanctions</a> imposed on North Korea and China’s <a href="http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/01/05/2017010501412.html">reluctance to cut off</a> energy supplies to the country – have led to some uncertainty about the extent to which China is willing to use this economic leverage to rein in North Korea’s military ambitions. </p>
<p>On one hand, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/world/asia/north-korea-china-coal-imports-suspended.html">China previously claimed</a> to have stopped coal imports from North Korea as part of recent efforts to punish the regime for missile tests and the <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/20/asia/kim-jong-nam-death-timeline/index.html">suspected assassination of Kim Jong-nam</a>, the estranged half-brother of North Korean leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-kim-jong-un-tick-77143">Kim Jong Un</a>. This was an important signal of China’s willingness to support U.S. concerns about the missile program since oil represents <a href="http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/prk/">about a third</a> ($930 million) of North Korea’s import revenue. </p>
<p>On the other hand, there is evidence that coal shipments in fact <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2017/07/05/trump_tried_to_make_china_to_do_his_bidding_against_north_korea_and_is_shocked.html">never ceased</a>. And, in any case, China <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/05/the-messy-data-behind-chinas-growing-trade-with-north-korea/?utm_term=.41435ab3f758">may have increased</a> its imports of iron ore from North Korea to offset the lost coal revenues. </p>
<p>This is consistent with the idea that China carefully considers the resources and revenue that are available to the North Korean regime at any moment, and uses trade as a lever to control them. In this way, China walks a fine line between providing too many resources, and thus allowing the regime to prosper, and not enough resources, such that North Korea is in danger of collapsing. Ultimately, trade may be used as a lever to do some light scolding, but China’s overwhelming concern is preventing North Korea’s collapse.</p>
<p>Further evidence that China has tight control over the North Korean economy comes from <a href="https://c4ads.org/reports/">a recent report</a> from <a href="https://c4ads.org">C4ADS</a>. The research group found close, and often common, ownership ties between most of the major Chinese companies who do business with North Korea. This suggests that trade with North Korea is highly centralized and thus easily controlled.</p>
<h2>Russia: North Korea’s other ‘friend’</h2>
<p>China is not the only country that North Korea trades with, though the others currently pale in comparison. Other top export destinations include India ($97.8 million), Pakistan ($43.1 million) and Burkina Faso ($32.8 million). In terms of imports, India ($108 million), Russia ($78.3 million) and Thailand ($73.8 million) currently sell the most to North Korea. </p>
<p>Russia in particular may soon complicate <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/nikki-haley-says-u-s-will-propose-tougher-sanctions-against-north-korea/">U.S. efforts to isolate the regime</a>. While still small, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/06/05/russia-boosts-trade-north-korea-china-cuts/102389824/">Russian trade with North Korea increased</a> 73 percent over the first two months of 2017 compared with the same period of the previous year. </p>
<p>But whereas China is legitimately worried that an economic crisis in North Korea could lead to a flood of refugees or all-out war, Russia likely sees engagement with North Korea in much simpler terms, namely as an additional way to gain geopolitical advantage relative to the U.S.</p>
<h2>A way out?</h2>
<p>Nearly all experts agree that there is no easy way to “solve” the North Korea problem. However, one plausible approach is to encourage South Korea and Japan to begin to develop nuclear weapons programs of their own, and to only discontinue these programs if China takes meaningful steps to use its trade with North Korea to reign in the regime. </p>
<p>Threatening to introduce new nuclear powers to the world is clearly risky, however stable and peaceful South Korea and Japan currently are. But China is highly averse to having these economic and political rivals acquire nuclear capabilities, as it would threaten China’s ongoing pursuit of regional control. In short, this is a sensitive pressure point that could be used to sway the Chinese leadership.</p>
<p>One way or another, China must become convinced that the costs of propping up the North Korean regime through trade are higher than the costs of an increased probability that the regime will collapse.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-china-could-use-trade-to-force-north-korea-to-play-nice-with-the-west-80609">an article</a> originally published on July 6, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84556/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Wright does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest salvo of insults and threats between President Trump and North Korea’s Kim brought the region a little bit closer to war. China, North Korea’s closest trading partner, may be the only way out.Greg Wright, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, MercedLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/837482017-09-21T01:05:34Z2017-09-21T01:05:34ZWhy Trump’s tirades are losing their potency<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186907/original/file-20170920-372-1urip6x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">World leaders listen to President Trump speak at the General Assembly.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Seth Wenig</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Trump on September 19 gave his <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/19/trump-un-speech-2017-full-text-transcript-242879">inaugural speech</a> to the United Nations General Assembly, where <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/world/americas/united-nations-general-assembly.html">he characterized</a> North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un as a “rocket man on a suicide mission.” He also threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea if necessary to defend America or its allies. He even hedged a little, noting “hopefully this will not be necessary” because “that’s what the United Nations is all about.”</p>
<p>While <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/trump-un-speech-north-korea-venezuela-response-terrifying-delusional-a7956306.html">some observers</a> expressed shock and dismay about the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/19/donald-trump-un-speech-analysis-north-korea">deterioration of presidential norms</a>, others (including <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/politics/trump-un-speech-world-leaders-react/index.html">other world leaders</a> in attendance) seemed to <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/world-leaders-faces-react-trump-slideshow-wp-170524939.html">barely react</a> to “Trump being Trump.”</p>
<p>The subdued response may have been a stoic display of diplomatic calm, the core competency of those responsible for unraveling international crises. Or, more dangerously, is it a sign we’re growing complacent about the president of the United States thumbing his nose at legal, international and ethical norms? </p>
<p>A marketing theory that describes how consumers respond to persuasive messaging – the kind you get from a repeated ad for soap or a politician on the stump – offers some clues, and some hope. </p>
<p>Over the last several years, I have been working with social scientists to understand how consumers respond to medical information in attorney advertising. In the course of these collaborations, I learned that consumers respond to persuasive messages – including a president’s – in a much more complex way than you might expect.</p>
<h2>Consumers are sophisticated</h2>
<p>In 1994, marketing professors Marian Friestad and Peter Wright wrote a <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2489738?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">landmark paper</a> that changed the way researchers thought about how consumers respond to persuasion. </p>
<p>Previously, researchers tended to assume that consumers approached persuasive messages <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=IANeAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Jef+richards+deceptive+advertising&ots=a-M20XMycg&sig=8A9FDCmj3YYp4EF2nKIddXXsEEo#v=onepage&q=Jef%20richards%20deceptive%20advertising&f=false">somewhat passively</a>. Scholars knew that consumers responded differently depending on whether they had a <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/3151549">high or low engagement</a> in the marketing message. But they were less interested in how they engaged with those messages.</p>
<p>Friestad and Wright placed consumers at the center of their model. They believed that consumers are sophisticated in how they process persuasive messages, bringing to bear their knowledge of the subject matter, the source of the information and their knowledge about persuasion tactics. If consumers believe that the source is untrustworthy, or that the advertiser is trying to use a deceptive tactic against them, they can respond by discounting or ignoring the message.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186478/original/file-20170918-21624-cdq9dd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/186478/original/file-20170918-21624-cdq9dd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186478/original/file-20170918-21624-cdq9dd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186478/original/file-20170918-21624-cdq9dd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=371&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186478/original/file-20170918-21624-cdq9dd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186478/original/file-20170918-21624-cdq9dd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/186478/original/file-20170918-21624-cdq9dd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This graphic illustrates the marketing model developed by Friestad and Wright using a 1793 engraving by Vernet.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1793-1778-contrast-wholeplate-lowQ.jpg">Venet, Friestad and Wright</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, say a woman spots her boyfriend arm in arm with another woman. After confronting him, she will assess his proffered explanations in light of what she knows about him (something called “agent knowledge”) and how men usually try to explain their way out of such predicaments (known as “persuasion knowledge”). If the boyfriend insists that he has never met the woman, according to the Friestad and Wright model, she would then “cope” with his persuasion attempt by disbelieving his explanation.</p>
<p>Friestad and Wright also described the moment at which consumers realize an advertiser is trying to persuade them as a “change of meaning.” An illustration of this is the moment you realize a co-worker who is complimenting your new hairstyle wants to ask for a favor and is not being merely friendly or just making idle chit-chat.</p>
<p>According to Friestad and Wright, we are constantly updating our knowledge about persuasion tactics and the reliability of different sources, partly based on folk knowledge and partly our own experience. Their model also explains why people respond differently to the same message at different points in time. </p>
<p>The next time you see the flattering co-worker, you’ll be more skeptical of his compliments – and maybe those you receive from others in the office as well.</p>
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<h2>Acclimating to the commander-in-tweets</h2>
<p>The Friestad and Wright model offers a useful way to think about how a nation adapts to a president prone to <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/aug/23/donald-trump/trumps-false-claim-there-werent-too-many-peop/">exaggeration</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/28/upshot/donald-trump-twitter-insults.html?_r=2">accusation</a> and <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/aug/17/donald-trump/donald-trump-wrong-charlottesville-counter-protest/">outright lying</a>.</p>
<p>For better or worse, we don’t interpret Trump’s statements the same way we did a year or two ago. We apply what we have learned about Trump as a person and his arsenal of persuasion tactics. </p>
<p>This tweet is Trump <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/899411254061694979">doubling down</a> after being accused of lying. That one is Trump trying to appear <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/895970429734711298">powerful or unpredictable</a>. The next is Trump trying to appeal to his base after <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/908272007011282944">seeming to take a moderate position</a> on an issue. And sometimes a Trump tweet is just a tweet, or, for lack of a better word, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/31/politics/donald-trump-covfefe/index.html">covfefe</a>.</p>
<p>In other words, we are more conversant in Trump-ese.</p>
<p>A picture of golfers <a href="http://www.snopes.com/people-golfing-right-next-huge-forest-fire/">next to a forest fire</a> went viral on social media as a symbol of complacency in a crisis. But as the photographer explained, the golfers were not as close to the fire as the picture suggests. </p>
<p>Similarly, a more muted reaction to Trump’s inflammatory statements is more complex than it seems. Once Trump is viewed as an unreliable or <a href="http://www.people-press.org/2017/08/29/1-views-of-trumps-presidential-conduct-handling-of-issues/">dishonest</a> messenger, we respond by discounting the message. It ends up in the same mental category as a beer commercial.</p>
<h2>Separating the wheat from the chaff</h2>
<p>Of course, a president’s words matter. We can hope that North Korea will recognize the speech as mere saber rattling, though <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-is-likely-to-fire-more-missiles-after-trumps-speech-experts-say/2017/09/20/1c97d158-9deb-11e7-8ed4-a750b67c552b_story.html">some experts expect</a> the reaction will take the form of missile tests.</p>
<p>That doesn’t make Trump’s bizarre approach to diplomacy less reckless, especially coming from someone with <a href="http://www.npr.org/2017/09/18/551095795/npr-ipsos-poll-most-americans-dont-trust-trump-on-north-korea">unilateral authority</a> to launch a nuclear strike. And not everyone approaches the president’s words with similar levels of skepticism. When a president <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html">falsely equates</a> civil rights demonstrators with neo-Nazis, it emboldens white extremists.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, increased familiarity with Trump’s persuasive style affords some cognitive space for decision making by his listeners. Like the beer commercial, we can recognize the persuasion tactics and consciously decide how to respond – whether that means by calling it out, ignoring or discounting the message, or focusing on other issues of public importance. </p>
<p>That’s not complacency. That’s democracy at its best.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth C. Tippett made a contribution to the Hillary Clinton campaign in the 2016 election.</span></em></p>President Trump’s fiery speech at the United Nations received a mostly subdued response from world leaders and others. Is there a risk we’re becoming complacent?Elizabeth C. Tippett, Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of OregonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/729672017-05-12T06:38:36Z2017-05-12T06:38:36ZGlobal compact on migration should focus on harnessing its win-win benefits<p><a href="http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration">An agreement to address migrant and refugee crises worldwide</a>, which the UN General Assembly adopted in September, has been described by many in the United Nations as nothing short of a miracle. But it also appears imperilled at times by today’s shifting and increasingly difficult political landscape. </p>
<p>Throughout 2017, UN member states are holding consultations on elements of international cooperation and governance of migration as part of the development of a <a href="http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact">Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration</a>. </p>
<p>On May 22 and 23, delegates will turn their attention to the current state of knowledge and good practice on the “drivers of migration”. These include climate change, natural disasters and human-made crises. </p>
<p>Now is the time to dispel outdated models of human mobility in favour of a holistic, nuanced view of migration patterns and their interaction with a changing global environment and economy.</p>
<h2>Simplifying migration drivers</h2>
<p>International discussions often consider development aid as part and parcel of migration management. That’s because of its potential to reduce the so-called “<a href="http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/final_issue_brief_2.pdf">root causes of migration</a>”, or its drivers. </p>
<p>Migration professionals have been seduced by the concept of the “<a href="http://www.popline.org/node/308813">migration hump</a>”. It suggests that emigration may accelerate in the short term as economic development picks up and more households gain the resources needed to migrate. But that it eventually levels off as economic opportunities enable people to remain home or to return. </p>
<p>This idea is used to help explain why already high migration from <a href="journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/011719689300200306">Mexico to the US increased slightly in the late 1990s</a> following the signing of NAFTA, but is now a net negative flow. </p>
<p>If it sounds too convenient to be true, that’s because it is. A host of social factors, household ambitions and individual attributes <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378011001531">contribute to migratory decisions</a>. And economic migrants at times seem caricatured as overly rational actors with perfect foresight of income differentials, embodying the figurative <em>Homo economicus</em> <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=eOxPCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT117&lpg=PT117&dq=homo+economicus+economic+migrants&source=bl&ots=FMgNpiv0Pg&sig=kbzkKwRkL9H3faoDnvz5AAp4-wA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiT676_n-nTAhVM6yYKHYRECCcQ6AEINTAD#v=onepage&q=homo%20economicus%20economic%20migrants&f=false">derided by social scientists</a>. </p>
<p>No matter what its causes, migration is a legitimate way to diversify household income sources and create a buffer against future shocks. And in the context of a changing climate, <a href="https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/migration-environment-and-climate-change-working-paper-series-no-12016">mobility is particularly important for households that are dependent on resource-based livelihoods</a>. </p>
<p>These are usually the very households that lack access to adequate income-generating assets, credit and trade. When the right conditions are fostered, migration brings substantial <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/geoj.12205/abstract">benefits for migrants and their families as well as for their communities of origin and of destination</a>. </p>
<h2>Remittances and development</h2>
<p>To develop resilient communities, low-skill and low-income families cannot be left in the dust. A new <a href="https://publications.iom.int/fr/books/making-mobility-work-adaptation-environmental-changes-results-meclep-global-research">comparative study</a> adds a significant building block to the expanding body of research on how migration serves among household strategies for adapting to changing environments. </p>
<p>Through empirical research in six countries – Dominican Republic, Haiti, Kenya, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam – the study confirms that migration from risky environments is win-win-win. </p>
<p>Despite important variations across the six countries, funds sent by family members abroad are an important source of income. </p>
<p>Households in the lowest 20% of income earnings were the most reliant on remittances. These are also among households demonstrating the lowest levels of education, land ownership, and access to formal credit. The capacity to invest in a family member to migrate, then, is significant. And the dividends can be immense. </p>
<p>Households that receive remittances have higher incomes in the medium to long term. That’s because the funds they receive boost their ability to move beyond basic consumption and invest in structural improvements as well as income-generating assets. </p>
<p>Remittances were used for long-term resilience-building efforts, such as improving housing, education and health care. When households can meet their basic needs for food and shelter, their ability to invest improves. </p>
<p>Migrant diaspora clearly provide a safety net for their home communities, particularly in the wake of <a href="http://essays.ssrc.org/remittances_anthology/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Topic_23_Yang.pdf">natural disasters</a>. In Haiti, the value of remittances from Haitians abroad quadrupled between 1999 and 2013, from US$422 million to over US$1.78 billion. And it <a href="http://publications.iom.int/es/system/files/policy_brief_series_issue8_16june2016.pdf">surged by 20% following the 2010 earthquake</a>, yielding an extra US$360 million. </p>
<p>Migrants can also effectively pass on the skills and knowledge they acquired while away (social remittances), to help improve households and communities in their home countries. </p>
<p>In the study, at least two out of five migrant households surveyed reported learning new skills; in the case of Vietnam, the figure was as high as 82%. Migrant households’ reported ability to apply new skills upon return was 45% in Haiti, more than 70% in Kenya, and more than 80% in the rest of the countries surveyed.</p>
<h2>Raising all boats</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/21/remittances-to-developing-countries-decline-for-second-consecutive-year">Remittance flows to developing countries have declined for two years in a row</a> for the first time in history. This represents a potential loss of about US$29.8 billion (estimated remittances totalled $429 billion in 2016, compared to $429.8 billion in 2015 and $444.3 billion in 2014). </p>
<p><a href="http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/992371492706371662/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27.pdf">A World Bank report</a> suggests the perception of rising xenophobia or xenophobic attitudes and policies discouraging migration are partially to blame. </p>
<p>This is significant as remittance flows have historically been resistant to significant decline even in times of global economic downturn. We <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/C17TDAT_297-320.pdf">saw this most recently</a> after the 2008 financial crisis when remittances dipped slightly (6%) for a year and then rebounded in 2010-11.</p>
<p>In fact, remittances have stably <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf">dwarfed official development aid by a factor of three</a> over two decades. </p>
<p>Remittances are used to care for sick or elderly family members, to bolster communities following crises, and for capital investments. They are a robust source of economic development. In our globalised world, development in these countries <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Theory_of_Economic_Integration.html?id=fKKaAAAAIAAJ">spurs the economic machinery that raises the standard</a> of living in developed countries, too.</p>
<p>The effects of climate change – increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather, significant warming in some hotspots and extreme temperatures, rising sea level, more erratic and unpredictable rain patterns, among other things – will <a href="https://www.routledge.com/products/9781138838178">influence the scale, duration, location and distance of pre-existing migration patterns</a>. </p>
<p>Families affected by environment-related shocks have a difficult time regaining their footing – and become <a href="http://publications.iom.int/es/system/files/policy_brief_series_issue8_16june2016.pdf">more vulnerable with each successive hazard</a>.</p>
<p>The findings outlined above reinforce the importance of migration for low-income and less-skilled households. Migrants respond to labour shortages, often putting themselves in risky situations. </p>
<p>But countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States are <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/who-needs-migrant-workers-9780199580590?cc=us&lang=en&">exploring ways to reduce their imports of migrants</a> to only the most qualified applicants, developing points-based calculators. While the merits of defining a “desirable” migrant in economic terms are questionable at best, states retain the sovereign right to set migration quotas. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, this approach has the <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-1118673432908/Migration_and_Inequality.pdf">potential to reinforce inequality and undermine the positive outcomes</a> of migration worldwide.</p>
<p>As UN states develop a global compact on migration in 2017, there should be less of a focus on reducing complex migration phenomena to their “root causes” and more on the potential of migration as a win-win. </p>
<p>In a changing global environment, migration can be a greater-than-ever contributor to development for communities of origin, destination areas, and for the migrants themselves. </p>
<p>The complexity and wide spectrum of migration – both the highly skilled expat and the less-skilled migrant – should remain a part of these discussions, with a focus on harnessing the power of migration to fuel development and reduce global inequality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julia Blocher previously benefitted from funding from the European Commission for the 'MECLEP' research project mentioned in this article.</span></em></p>In a changing and unsettled world, migration can be a greater-than-ever contributor to development for communities of origin, destination areas, and for the migrants themselves.Julia Blocher, Research Officer, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.