tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/us-china-relations-13475/articlesUS-China relations – The Conversation2024-03-20T01:44:50Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258892024-03-20T01:44:50Z2024-03-20T01:44:50ZIf TikTok is banned in the US or Australia, how might the company – or China – respond?<p>TikTok’s owner is once again navigating troubled waters in the United States, where the US House of Representatives has <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/14/1238435508/tiktok-ban-bill-congress-china">issued an ultimatum</a>: divest or face shutdown within six months. </p>
<p>In Australia, Opposition Leader <a href="https://www.crikey.com.au/2024/03/15/tik-tok-ban-peter-dutton-chris-minns-nsw-bail-tabcorp/">Peter Dutton</a> and Senator <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/mar/17/liberal-mp-urges-australia-to-follow-us-in-tiktok-crackdown-calling-app-a-serious-threat-to-national-security">James Paterson</a>, the shadow home affairs spokesperson, want Canberra to follow suit.</p>
<p>TikTok, owned by the Beijing-based tech giant ByteDance, has been here before. It <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/03/11/trump-tiktok-donor-china-foreign-policy/">fought off</a> a similar order by the Trump administration banning the video-creating and sharing app in the United States several years ago. </p>
<p>In a bid to mollify US security concerns about user data potentially being handed over to the Chinese Communist Party, TikTok pledged to migrate American user data to US-based <a href="https://time.com/6281946/tiktok-oracle-source-code/">Oracle Cloud</a>. However, TikTok has reportedly <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktok-pledged-to-protect-u-s-data-1-5-billion-later-its-still-struggling-cbccf203">struggled</a> to live up to this promise. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/attempts-to-ban-tiktok-reveal-the-hypocrisy-of-politicians-already-struggling-to-relate-to-voters-225870">Attempts to ban TikTok reveal the hypocrisy of politicians already struggling to relate to voters</a>
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<h2>TikTok’s growing resistance to US pressures</h2>
<p>The platform’s survival in Western markets depends on its ability to navigate these geopolitical complexities. This situation will test TikTok’s adaptability and strategic approach, as well as the power of its user base.</p>
<p>In the past four years, TikTok has seen tremendous growth in both its user base and advertising revenue, though this has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/tiktoks-american-growth-is-already-stalling-980aa276">started to slow</a> somewhat in the US. Last year, ByteDance was <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2023/05/04/bytedance-scrutiny-leaves-midas-investors-waiting-billions/?sh=3026954c3ccf">valued at US$220 billion</a> (A$337 billion), which was down from US$500 billion (A$766 billion) in 2021, but still ranked as the world’s most valuable non-public startup. </p>
<p>This valuation not only highlights its worldwide appeal, but also uniquely equips it to deal with US regulatory hurdles.</p>
<p>Indeed, TikTok’s response to the latest attempted US ban has demonstrated the power of its resistance. On March 7, the platform <a href="https://time.com/6898845/tiktok-ban-bill-us-congress-what-to-know/">engaged</a> its users directly with a pop-up message urging them to contact Congress to complain. In doing so, it shifted the narrative from a direct confrontation between itself and Washington to a broader conflict between the US government and American citizens over <a href="https://www.wsj.com/us-news/law/tiktok-ban-legal-court-challenges-fdc06180">freedom of expression</a>.</p>
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<p>The bill that would force ByteDance to sell the app or face a nationwide ban must still <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/15/technology/tiktok-ban-bill-senate.html">pass the Senate</a>, so public pressure may come to bear. President Joe Biden has said <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-tiktok-ban-house-china-aaa884d8c974f0a35856af5ee6aa4e99">he would sign the bill</a> if it’s passed.</p>
<p>Although the bill has widespread support on both sides of the political spectrum, senators from both parties will need to consider the potential backlash from young people in a pivotal election year. Already, former President Donald Trump – the Republican nominee in the 2024 presidential contest – has <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/11/trump-says-a-tiktok-ban-would-empower-meta-slams-facebook-as-enemy-of-the-people.html">backflipped</a> on a potential TikTok ban, which underscores ByteDance’s growing political leverage.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-cyber-expert-lesley-seebeck-on-tiktoks-future-in-australia-226222">Politics with Michelle Grattan: Cyber expert Lesley Seebeck on TikTok's future in Australia</a>
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<p>Should the bill become law, civil liberty groups could also <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-tiktok-ban-in-the-u-s-could-violate-1st-amendment-rights">challenge</a> it in US Federal Court as an infringement on TikTok users’ First Amendment rights to free speech. Some groups are already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/column-if-tiktok-is-banned-brace-epic-first-amendment-fight-2023-03-28/">mobilising</a> for action.</p>
<p>Federal judges have struck down attempted bans in the US in the past, but on different grounds. (One of these cases was brought by TikTok users, but was reportedly <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-three-tiktok-stars-beat-back-u-s-plans-to-ban-the-app-11606418513">orchestrated</a> by TikTok and its Chinese parent company.)</p>
<p>A new challenge on free speech grounds, which have yet to be tested in court, could lead to an eventual appeal to the US Supreme Court. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="TiktokEmbed" data-react-props="{"url":"https://www.tiktok.com/@debateher/video/7345674449372384555?q=congress%20ban\u0026t=1710894882015"}"></div></p>
<h2>Other ways China could retaliate</h2>
<p>Although US national security officials were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-officials-brief-senators-wednesday-threats-posed-by-tiktok-aide-2024-03-18/">briefing</a> US senators on the risks posed by TikTok this week, this isn’t the sole reason the social media app has run into problems in Washington.</p>
<p>TikTok has also been targeted because of the burgeoning tech rivalry between the US and China, where many fear the spectre of a far-reaching <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/07/07/is-us-china-decoupling-heading-in-a-dangerous-direction/">tech decoupling</a> between the countries or even an outright <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/08/winning-the-tech-cold-war.html">tech cold war</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tiktok-ban-isnt-a-data-security-solution-it-will-be-difficult-to-enforce-and-could-end-up-hurting-users-202732">A TikTok ban isn't a data security solution. It will be difficult to enforce – and could end up hurting users</a>
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<p>Facing potential pressure to sell at a reduced value, ByteDance might decide to exit the US market altogether, considering the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/tiktok-sues-us-government-over-trump-ban.html">challenges</a> faced by other Chinese tech companies in Western countries, like <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-district-court-dismisses-huawei-lawsuit-that-federal-ban-is-unconstitutional/">Huawei</a>. </p>
<p>Such a decision could prompt retaliatory trade restrictions or other actions by the Chinese government due to nationalistic pressures. This could boost ByteDance’s stature in China – similar to what happened to Huawei after it was banned in the US.</p>
<p>China already blocks many US media outlets, social media platforms and other websites, such as Facebook, Twitter and Google. But it could retaliate with sanctions, as <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-imposes-sanctions-on-u-s-consulting-firm-d7a201ba">it has in the past</a> against US data firms, officials and researchers (with limited impact).</p>
<p>The Chinese government has also said any sale of TikTok would have to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/24/tiktok-wants-to-distance-from-china-but-the-governments-getting-involved.html">comply with its law</a> on tech exports, which requires licenses for the export of certain technologies. It’s not entirely clear how the law would apply to TikTok, but some experts believe it could <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/15/business/china-tiktok-house-bill.html">encompass</a> the algorithm that powers the app. This means, theoretically, China could prevent ByteDance from selling this technology to a foreign company.</p>
<p>TikTok’s predicament in the US also could set a precedent for other Chinese tech companies, like the e-commerce <a href="https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3205544/chinese-e-commerce-apps-temu-shein-tiktok-shop-emerge-online-retail-force-us-other-overseas-markets">platforms</a> Temu and Shein. Both companies are also under <a href="https://apnews.com/article/temu-shein-forced-labor-china-de7b5398c76fda58404abc6ec5684972">increasing congressional scrutiny</a>, which likely makes them apprehensive about potential mandates for divestment or other regulatory hurdles they could <a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/retail/the-spend-spend-spend-strategy-behind-temus-rapid-ascent-in-america-d2bdefc3">face in the future</a>.</p>
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<h2>Could Australia be next?</h2>
<p>In Australia, TikTok is already banned on government-issued devices. Now, there is renewed momentum for a nationwide ban as well. </p>
<p>As a close ally of the US and a major trading partner of China, Australia is in a particularly vulnerable position. It could be forced to choose between a US strategy of decoupling its tech industry from China’s, or prioritising its improving relationship with Beijing. </p>
<p>As the debate in the US drags on, the point of difference between the two major parties in Australia will likely become more defined. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his <a href="https://www.news.com.au/technology/online/social/anthony-albanese-reveals-australias-plans-on-tiktok-after-us-vote/news-story/9a635ec36c4f97b2b928963786008b8f">government has no plans</a> – at this stage – to follow the US lead on a TikTok ban, but this could change as the next federal election gets closer.</p>
<p>Politicians on both sides will need to take into account the impact of a potential ban among TikTok supporters, as well as the Chinese-Australian community. Many Chinese-Australians would see a ban as yet another slap in the face to their country of origin and further evidence of anti-China foreign policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wanning Sun receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina Yue Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>TikTok has mobilised its vast user base to contest a possible US ban, plus it could challenge it in court as an infringement of people’s free speech.Marina Yue Zhang, Associate Professor, University of Technology SydneyWanning Sun, Professor of Media and Cultural Studies, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244382024-03-04T13:41:42Z2024-03-04T13:41:42ZDemand for computer chips fuelled by AI could reshape global politics and security<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578585/original/file-20240228-18-rudxyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=28%2C0%2C6361%2C3592&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/close-silicon-die-being-extracted-semiconductor-2262331365">IM Imagery / Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A global race to build powerful computer chips that are essential for the next generation of artificial intelligence (AI) tools could have a major impact on global politics and security. </p>
<p>The US is currently leading the race in the design of these chips, also known as semiconductors. But most of the manufacturing is carried out in Taiwan. The debate has been fuelled by the call by Sam Altman, CEO of ChatGPT’s developer OpenAI, for <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/sam-altman-seeks-trillions-of-dollars-to-reshape-business-of-chips-and-ai-89ab3db0">a US$5 trillion to US$7 trillion</a> (£3.9 trillion to £5.5 trillion) global investment to <a href="https://venturebeat.com/ai/sam-altman-wants-up-to-7-trillion-for-ai-chips-the-natural-resources-required-would-be-mind-boggling/">produce more powerful chips</a> for the next generation of AI platforms. </p>
<p>The amount of money Altman called for is more than the chip industry has spent in total since it began. Whatever the facts about those numbers, overall projections for the AI market are mind blowing. The data analytics company GlobalData <a href="https://www.globaldata.com/media/technology/generative-ai-will-go-mainstream-2024-driven-adoption-specialized-custom-models-multimodal-tool-experimentation-says-globaldata/">forecasts that the market will be worth US$909 billion</a> by 2030.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, over the past two years, the US, China, Japan and several European countries have increased their budget allocations and put in place measures to secure or maintain a share of the chip industry for themselves. China is catching up fast and is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/china-boosts-semiconductor-subsidies-as-us-tightens-restrictions/">subsidising chips, including next-generation ones for AI</a>, by hundreds of billions over the next decade to build a manufacturing supply chain. </p>
<p>Subsidies seem to be the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/germany-earmarks-20-bln-eur-chip-industry-coming-years-2023-07-25/">preferred strategy for Germany too</a>. The UK government has announced its <a href="https://www.ukri.org/news/100m-boost-in-ai-research-will-propel-transformative-innovations/#:%7E:text=%C2%A3100m%20boost%20in%20AI%20research%20will%20propel%20transformative%20innovations,-6%20February%202024&text=Nine%20new%20research%20hubs%20located,help%20to%20define%20responsible%20AI.">plans to invest £100 million</a> to support regulators and universities in addressing challenges around artificial intelligence. </p>
<p>The economic historian Chris Miller, the author of the book Chip War, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ai-chip-race-fears-grow-of-huge-financial-bubble/a-68272265">has talked about how powerful chips have become a “strategic commodity”</a> on the global geopolitical stage.</p>
<p>Despite the efforts by several countries to invest in the future of chips, there is currently a shortage of the types currently needed for AI systems. Miller recently explained that 90% of the chips used to train, or improve, AI systems are <a href="https://www.siliconrepublic.com/future-human/chip-war-semiconductors-supply-tech-geopolitics-chris-miller">produced by just one company</a>.</p>
<p>That company is the <a href="https://www.tsmc.com/english">Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)</a>. Taiwan’s dominance in the chip manufacturing industry is notable because the island is also the focus for tensions between China and the US. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">The microchip industry would implode if China invaded Taiwan, and it would affect everyone</a>
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<p>Taiwan has, for the most part, <a href="https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php#:%7E:text=The%20ROC%20government%20relocated%20to,rule%20of%20a%20different%20government.">been independent since the middle of the 20th century</a>. However, Beijing believes it should be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-calls-taiwan-president-frontrunner-destroyer-peace-2023-12-31/">reunited with the rest of China</a> and US legislation requires Washington to <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Declares%20that%20in%20furtherance%20of,defense%20capacity%20as%20determined%20by">help defend Taiwan if it is invaded</a>. What would happen to the chip industry under such a scenario is unclear, but it is obviously a focus for global concern.</p>
<p>The disruption of supply chains in chip manufacturing have the potential to bring entire industries to a halt. Access to the raw materials, such as rare earth metals, used in computer chips has also proven to be an important bottleneck. For example, China <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">controls 60% of the production of gallium metal</a> and 80% of the global production of germanium. These are both critical raw products used in chip manufacturing.</p>
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<img alt="Sam Altman" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578592/original/file-20240228-30-178em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">OpenAI CEO Sam Altman has called for a US$5 trillion to $7 trillion investment in chips to support the growth in AI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/openai-ceo-sam-altman-attends-artificial-2412159621">Photosince / Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>And there are other, lesser known bottlenecks. A process called <a href="https://research.ibm.com/blog/what-is-euv-lithography">extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography</a> is vital for the ability to continue making computer chips smaller and smaller – and therefore more powerful. <a href="https://www.asml.com/en">A single company in the Netherlands, ASML</a>, is the only manufacturer of EUV systems for chip production.</p>
<p>However, chip factories are increasingly being built outside Asia again – something that has the potential to reduce over-reliance on a few supply chains. Plants in the US are being subsidised to the tune of <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">US$43 billion and in Europe, US$53 billion</a>. </p>
<p>For example, the Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturer TSMC is planning to build a multibillion dollar facility in Arizona. When it opens, that factory <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-microchip-industry-would-implode-if-china-invaded-taiwan-and-it-would-affect-everyone-206335">will not be producing the most advanced chips</a> that it’s possible to currently make, many of which are still produced by Taiwan.</p>
<p>Moving chip production outside Taiwan could reduce the risk to global supplies in the event that manufacturing were somehow disrupted. But this process could take years to have a meaningful impact. It’s perhaps not surprising that, for the first time, this year’s Munich Security Conference <a href="https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2024/technology/">created a chapter devoted to technology</a> as a global security issue, with discussion of the role of computer chips. </p>
<h2>Wider issues</h2>
<p>Of course, the demand for chips to fuel AI’s growth is not the only way that artificial intelligence will make major impact on geopolitics and global security. The growth of disinformation and misinformation online has transformed politics in recent years by inflating prejudices on both sides of debates. </p>
<p>We have seen it <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26675075">during the Brexit campaign</a>, during <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20563051231177943">US presidential elections</a> and, more recently, during the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-gaza-misinformation-fact-check-e58f9ab8696309305c3ea2bfb269258e">conflict in Gaza</a>. AI could be the ultimate amplifier of disinformation. Take, for example, deepfakes – AI-manipulated videos, audio or images of public figures. These could easily fool people into thinking a major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/26/ai-deepfakes-disinformation-election">political candidate had said something they didn’t</a>.</p>
<p>As a sign of this technology’s growing importance, at the 2024 Munich Security Conference, 20 of the world’s largest tech companies <a href="https://news.microsoft.com/2024/02/16/technology-industry-to-combat-deceptive-use-of-ai-in-2024-elections/">launched something called the “Tech Accord”</a>. In it, they pledged to cooperate to create tools to spot, label and debunk deepfakes. </p>
<p>But should such important issues be left to tech companies to police? Mechanisms such as the EU’s Digital Service Act, the UK’s Online Safety Bill as well as frameworks to regulate AI itself should help. But it remains to be seen what impact they can have on the issue.</p>
<p>The issues raised by the chip industry and the growing demand driven by AI’s growth are just one way that AI is driving change on the global stage. But it remains a vitally important one. National leaders and authorities must not underestimate the influence of AI. Its potential to redefine geopolitics and global security could exceed our ability to both predict and plan for the changes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224438/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alina Vaduva is affiliated with the Labour Party, as a member and elected councillor in Dartford, Kent. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kirk Chang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The effects of AI’s growth on global security could be difficult to predict.Kirk Chang, Professor of Management and Technology, University of East LondonAlina Vaduva, Director of the Business Advice Centre for Post Graduate Students at UEL, Ambassador of the Centre for Innovation, Management and Enterprise, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215852024-01-22T19:03:08Z2024-01-22T19:03:08ZFrom the Middle East to the South China Sea: NZ’s new government inherits a defence dilemma<p>When the previous government released the first ever <a href="https://theconversation.com/nzs-first-national-security-strategy-signals-a-turning-point-and-the-end-of-old-certainties-210885">national security strategy</a> last year, it forecast stormy geopolitical weather ahead. In the brief few months since then, the sky has darkened further still.</p>
<p>Beyond a <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/16/three-takeaways-from-biden-xi-meeting-pub-91042">slight rapprochement</a> between China and the United States at the end of 2023, <a href="https://theconversation.com/oppenheimers-warning-lives-on-international-laws-and-treaties-are-failing-to-stop-a-new-arms-race-210545">arms control</a> remains poor, measures to prevent <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-black-sea-drone-incident-highlights-the-loose-rules-around-avoiding-accidental-war-202030">accidental war</a> limited, and a genuinely rule-based international order patchy at best.</p>
<p>British foreign secretary David Cameron may have been <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/more-attacks-in-red-sea-if-uk-didnt-act-says-david-cameron-as-he-defends-military-action-13048021">speaking to his own government’s agenda</a> when he said the “lights are absolutely flashing red on the global dashboard”. But the analogy still holds.</p>
<p>Three big issues are now rising to the boil: the war in Ukraine, tension in the South China Sea, and the widening disaster in Israel and Gaza. Each instance of global disorder touches Aotearoa New Zealand and its largely untested coalition government.</p>
<h2>Ukraine in the balance</h2>
<p>While New Zealand has not joined the fighting, it is not neutral on Ukraine. It has provided weapons, training and other forms of assistance – including joining actions against Russia at the International Court of Justice.</p>
<p>But the prognosis is not good. Russia’s military counterpunch is coming while external support for Ukraine is at risk of fading.</p>
<p>Defence officials in Sweden <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67935464">have warned</a> their country should prepare for the possibility of conflict. A leaked plan from the German government shows it is also preparing for potential widening Russian aggression.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-being-a-welcome-guest-at-nato-nz-now-needs-to-consider-what-our-partnership-with-the-alliance-really-means-209316">partner to NATO</a>, New Zealand needs to consider its response should the tide of war turn against Ukraine – or worse still, spreads to other countries.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-talk-of-russian-spring-offensive-raises-fears-that-kyiv-is-ill-prepared-to-face-it-221142">Ukraine war: talk of Russian spring offensive raises fears that Kyiv is ill-prepared to face it</a>
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<h2>US-China standoff</h2>
<p>New Zealand has said it is “deeply concerned” about China’s tactics over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Of particular concern have been Chinese efforts to stop Philippine vessels resupplying citizens in the islands (to which the Philippines has sovereign rights).</p>
<p>The <a href="https://pca-cpa.org/home/">Permanent Court of Arbitration</a> has affirmed Philippine claims to its territories. Although China opposes the court decision, a clear majority – including New Zealand – <a href="https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/">either positively acknowledge or support the ruling</a>.</p>
<p>New Zealand <a href="https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Environment/Oceans-and-fisheries/20210803NzNote.pdf">also asserts</a> “there is no legal basis for states to claim ‘historic rights’ with respect to maritime areas in the South China Sea”.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden last year <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67224782">promised to defend</a> the Philippines should China attack. The region – where the Chinese navy <a href="https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/300907470/nz-frigate-confronted-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-seas-investigation-reveals">confronted a New Zealand frigate</a> during a freedom of navigation exercise last year – remains a raw nerve.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1733692031229431833"}"></div></p>
<h2>Widening Middle East threats</h2>
<p>The situation in Israel and Gaza is a legal, political and ethical mess that risks spilling over. New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has already <a href="https://beehive.govt.nz/release/joint-statement-prime-ministers-new-zealand-australia-and-canada">joined Australia and Canada</a> to reiterate the need for a negotiated two-state solution and the importance of respecting international law.</p>
<p>However, there has so far been no mention of accountability for war crimes through the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-can-learn-from-south-africa-the-gambia-and-others-when-it-comes-to-international-accountability-221114">New Zealand can learn from South Africa, The Gambia and others when it comes to international accountability</a>
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<p>New Zealand’s focus has shifted to the protection of global waterways, specifically the Red Sea. With nine other countries, it has <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/11/joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-australia-bahrain-canada-denmark-germany-netherlands-new-zealand-republic-of-korea-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states/">pledged</a> to defend lives and protect the free flow of commerce in one of the world’s most critical waterways.</p>
<p>New Zealand has not been involved in the first military actions against Houthi rebels trying to control the sea lanes. But if things escalate, the coalition government has effectively signed up to fight a proxy group directly connected to an angry and dangerous Iran.</p>
<h2>Increasing military spending</h2>
<p>To meet these challenges at a practical and logistical level, New Zealand will need to invest more in its military. While the new government <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/504787/tough-defence-budget-decisions-loom-for-new-government">wants to control spending</a>, it would be prudent to increase defence spending to at least 2% of GDP to match various allies.</p>
<p>It makes sense for New Zealand to focus on inter-operability and shared spending on common military platforms with its one official ally, Australia.</p>
<p>New Zealand can still maintain its nuclear-free policy and work for arms control while improving its own self-defence. It does not need the offensive capacity of the next generation of armaments (from AI and cyber capabilities to bioweapons), but it must have access to defences against them.</p>
<p>At the same time, self-defence need not be linked to new alliances such as the AUKUS security pact. The security issues outlined here are separate, not part of one large fire. China, North Korea, Russia and Iran are close. But they are not connected by mutual military obligations.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-number-8-wire-days-for-nzs-defence-force-are-over-new-priorities-will-demand-bigger-budgets-211182">The 'number 8 wire' days for NZ's defence force are over – new priorities will demand bigger budgets</a>
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<h2>Independence and self-defence</h2>
<p>It might make more sense for New Zealand to join agreements like AUKUS if other like-minded countries (such as Canada, South Korea and Japan) joined at the same time.</p>
<p>But this might also create problems. First, it could accelerate a divide of the world into two large blocs. And second, without the kind of trade agreements with the US that other partners enjoy, New Zealand would be more exposed than most.</p>
<p>An independent foreign policy where each issue is treated on its own merits should still be the preferred approach. There is much to be said for working with countries which have shared values and common histories.</p>
<p>At the moment, some challenges warrant New Zealand’s involvement, but others do not. Defending the values and agreements that underpin the United Nations and a rule-based international order is the best guide.</p>
<p>Simply to follow the US, come-what-may, is a dangerous bet, especially given the uncertainties around the presidential election in November. At the same time, not to be better militarily prepared is a utopian position New Zealand can no longer afford.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>With geopolitical tension and uncertainty rising, New Zealand’s ruling coalition faces urgent questions about defence spending, alliances and its independent foreign policy.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2136382023-10-10T12:37:50Z2023-10-10T12:37:50ZIs Taiwan a country or not?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551450/original/file-20231002-16-7lnaiy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C0%2C5946%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier holds Taiwan's national flag during military drills. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TaiwanDrill/c91b47b9541d404983d22810e48f1f35/photo">AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Defining what is and isn’t a country <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2010/04/08/in-quite-a-state">is a lot more complicated</a> than many people would realize. Take the case of Taiwan.</p>
<p>On <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmfaff/172/summary.html">Aug. 30, 2023</a>, a committee of the U.K. Parliament <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-parliament-calls-taiwan-independent-country-report-says-james-cleverly-visit-china/">referred</a> to Taiwan as an “<a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/41144/documents/204045/default/">independent country</a>” in a report. This is the <a href="https://en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2009887">first time</a> any part of the British political system has used that phrasing. </p>
<p>Officially, <a href="https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CDP-2022-0031/CDP-2022-0031.pdf">the U.K. “does not recognise Taiwan”</a> as a country, nor does it “maintain formal diplomatic relations with the island,” which is one way states recognize each other as equals on the international stage. </p>
<p>Like the U.K., <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/">the U.S. also “does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan,”</a> although there is a “robust unofficial relationship,” according to the State Department. <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/03/29/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/taiwan-china-diplomatic-recognition-analysis/">Many other countries</a> are in a similar boat.</p>
<p>So <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/07/taiwans-status-geopolitical-absurdity/593371/">where does that leave Taiwan</a>? Is it, or is it not, a country?</p>
<p>From my perspective as <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXXZBEkAAAAJ&hl=en">a political scientist</a>, here’s how I would approach this question.</p>
<p><iframe id="a6G0S" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/a6G0S/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>A country by declaration</h2>
<p>According to what’s known as the “<a href="https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/declarative-theory-of-statehood/">declarative theory of statehood</a>,” a <a href="https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/country">country</a> – which is <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-makes-a-state-a-state-why-places-like-kosovo-live-in-limbo-132403">often</a> referred to as a “<a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity">state</a>” in political science and international relations terminology – must <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp">possess the following qualities</a>: “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”</p>
<p>These four qualities were agreed upon in the 1933 <a href="https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-40.html">Montevideo Convention</a> on the Rights and Duties of States, which is an international treaty <a href="http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/LNTSer/1936/9.html">registered</a> with the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-league-of-nations-was-formed-100-years-ago-today-meet-the-australian-women-who-lobbied-to-join-it-129185">League of Nations</a>, the precursor to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-the-united-nations-still-so-misunderstood-59284">United Nations</a>. </p>
<p>Article 3 of <a href="http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/LNTSer/1936/9.html">that treaty</a> says that the existence of a “state is <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp">independent of recognition by the other states</a>.” In other words, as long as the four qualities above are met, an area qualifies as a country even if other countries choose not to recognize it.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27009671">One criticism</a> of this framework is that it opens the door for <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/micronations-and-the-search-for-sovereignty/B0414A3A322695D9EE71E4CDDFDA06DE">many areas</a> to be considered countries, even though they may seem <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/micronations-around-the-world-2016-7">outlandish</a>.</p>
<p>For example, in the 1960s, Italian engineer Giorgio Rosa <a href="https://www.rose-island.co">built a 4,000-square-foot (400-square-meter) platform</a> 7 miles (11 kilometers) off the coast of Italy. On June 24, 1968, Rosa – whose last name means “rose” in English – <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rose-island-the-amazing-story-of-a-self-declared-republic-off-the-italian-coast-wc3q77wb6">declared</a> that his platform was an independent country named the Republic of Rose Island. This artificial island had <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-55092341">a restaurant, bar, souvenir shop and post office</a>. Its <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/sheenascott/2020/12/12/rose-island-fun-italian-film-on-netflix-based-on-a-true-story/?sh=48e2df372232">official</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-ukrainian-a-language-or-a-dialect-that-depends-on-whom-you-ask-and-how-the-war-ends-180849">language</a> was <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brief-history-of-esperanto-the-135-year-old-language-of-peace-hated-by-hitler-and-stalin-alike-186025">Esperanto</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110770162-004">It could be argued</a> that Rose Island met the criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention, as there was a permanent population because Rosa lived there; his humanmade platform had a defined territory; there was a government because <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/the-man-who-built-rose-island-creating-it-was-his-scream-for-freedom-12155168">Rosa declared himself president</a>; and Rose Island’s post office gave it the capacity to communicate with, and thus enter into relations with, other countries.</p>
<p>Although <a href="https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-40.html">several countries</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-view.pdf">including the U.S.</a>, have ratified the Montevideo Convention, Italy has not. So, <a href="https://www.distractify.com/p/is-rose-island-real">55 days after Rose Island declared independence</a>, the Italian military destroyed the platform.</p>
<h2>A country by recognition</h2>
<p><a href="https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf1661/files/2002-2.pdf">In contrast</a> to the declarative theory of statehood, what’s called the “<a href="https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/constitutive-theory-of-statehood/">constitutive theory of statehood</a>” considers a country to be a country only if it is recognized by other already recognized countries. </p>
<p>There is no magic number for how many countries one must be recognized by. Rather, those that aspire to be regarded by the world as an independent country <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2008/02/26/how-to-start-your-own-country-in-four-easy-steps/">must join the United Nations as a full member</a>.</p>
<p>In order <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/about-un-membership">to join the United Nations</a>, applicants must be recommended by the <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">Security Council</a>, which comprises <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/">15 members</a>. Five of those members are permanent and have a <a href="https://theconversation.com/hard-evidence-who-uses-veto-in-the-un-security-council-most-often-and-for-what-29907">veto</a>. Applicants must have the support of nine of the 15 members, including each of the permanent members.</p>
<p>If the Security Council recommends admission, the application is presented to the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml">General Assembly</a>, where each full member of the United Nations has a single vote. A two-thirds majority is necessary before a country can join.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551451/original/file-20231002-17-5ih5jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People stand in a row watching two people shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551451/original/file-20231002-17-5ih5jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551451/original/file-20231002-17-5ih5jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551451/original/file-20231002-17-5ih5jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551451/original/file-20231002-17-5ih5jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551451/original/file-20231002-17-5ih5jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551451/original/file-20231002-17-5ih5jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551451/original/file-20231002-17-5ih5jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Rep. Rob Wittman, vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, met with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, right, at the presidential office in Taipei, Taiwan, in September 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TaiwanUS/b77c457fd7da4c7b80ca8dec6c374b2c/photo">Taiwan Presidential Office via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>One China or two?</h2>
<p>Today, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/09/many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china-pub-89003">most of the world’s countries</a> officially adhere to <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/2021-10/27/c_1310273116.htm">some variation</a> of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Se1f-fhJuB8">the idea</a> that there is <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/03/14/what-is-the-one-china-policy">only one China</a>, whose capital is Beijing, and which encompasses both the mainland territory and the island of Taiwan.</p>
<p>There is a government there, but there is also a government on Taiwan, based in its capital, Taipei. That government calls itself the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/has-taiwan-always-been-part-of-china/">Republic of China</a> and <a href="https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php">traces its history</a> to the <a href="https://archive.org/details/jstor-2212590/mode/2up">early 20th century</a>, when a <a href="https://asia-archive.si.edu/learn/for-educators/teaching-china-with-the-smithsonian/explore-by-dynasty/qing-dynasty/">revolution overthrew the emperor</a> of China.</p>
<p>Notably, at that time, nobody’s definition of China included the island of Taiwan, which was then commonly called <a href="https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/formosa">Formosa</a>. <a href="https://china.usc.edu/treaty-shimonoseki-1895">Japan had seized the island</a> in a <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/First-Sino-Japanese-War-1894-1895">war in the late 19th century</a>.</p>
<p>In 1927, an uprising by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-communist-party-at-100-revolution-forever-163665">Chinese Communist Party</a> attacked the Republic of China government. That kicked off a <a href="https://www.thecollector.com/chinese-civil-war-bloodiest-in-modern-history/">bloody civil war</a> that lasted until 1949.</p>
<p>In that year, the <a href="https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php">government</a> of the Republic of China <a href="https://www.hoover.org/research/starting-anew-taiwan">retreated to the island of Taiwan</a>. That <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">same year</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/mao_zedong.shtml">Mao Zedong</a>, leader of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-communist-party-claims-to-have-brought-prosperity-and-equality-to-china-heres-the-real-impact-of-its-rule-163350">Chinese Communist Party</a>, <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/proclamation-central-peoples-government-prc">proclaimed</a> the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/china-republic-establishment/">founding</a> of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/peoples-republic-of-china-at-70-how-the-chinese-state-uses-marxism-today-123885">People’s Republic of China</a>, with its capital in Beijing. </p>
<p>But Mao still sought control over his enemy’s territory, declaring, “<a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/speech-mao-zedong-fifteenth-meeting-supreme-state-council-excerpt-0">Taiwan is ours</a>, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs.”</p>
<p>To this day, the <a href="http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202208/t20220810_10740168.htm">government</a> of the People’s Republic of China, whose capital is Beijing, considers Taiwan part of its “<a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2018">sacred territory</a>.” The <a href="https://constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2018.pdf">constitution</a> of the People’s Republic of China states that “(i)t is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.” Its foreign affairs ministry says, “Taiwan is a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/200011/t20001117_697847.html">sacred and inseparable part</a> of China’s territory.” On Oct. 2, 2023, the Beijing government celebrated its national day by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/two-elves-scroll-china-military-releases-animation-taiwan-reunification-2023-10-02/">releasing a video signifying its focus on unity</a> with the people of Taiwan.</p>
<p>In contrast, the Republic of China refers to the area under its control as “<a href="https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=Q0010001">the Taiwan area</a>,” or “<a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Taiwan_2005?lang=en">the free area</a>.” It refers to the rest of China as “<a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Taiwan_2005.pdf">the mainland area</a>,” which the Taiwanese government has described as being under a “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20160303230804/http://taiwaninfo.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=11700&CtNode=103&htx_TRCategory=&mp=4">Period of Communist Rebellion</a>.”</p>
<p>Other countries are similarly delicate. <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-china-principle-what-this-interesting-aspect-of-diplomacy-means-for-china-and-taiwan-173008">For example</a>, in 1972, the U.S. “acknowledge(d) that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203">there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China</a>.” In 1979, <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/02/16/americas-affirmation-of-the-one-china-policy-pleased-taiwan-too">the U.S.</a> <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/03/09/why-the-absurd-one-china-policy-must-be-upheld">again</a> “acknowledge(d) the Chinese position that <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d104">there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551452/original/file-20231002-29-y8bvth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people gathers in a public area." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551452/original/file-20231002-29-y8bvth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/551452/original/file-20231002-29-y8bvth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551452/original/file-20231002-29-y8bvth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551452/original/file-20231002-29-y8bvth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551452/original/file-20231002-29-y8bvth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551452/original/file-20231002-29-y8bvth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/551452/original/file-20231002-29-y8bvth.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Taipei’s Mid-Autumn Festival drew crowds to the Night Market.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TaiwanDailyLife/28419b3512ac41d8960531ae96da6337/photo">AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Taiwan’s place in the world</h2>
<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20090215122022/http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/anti/mofa940329e.htm">Taiwan argues</a> that it meets the Montevideo Convention’s criteria for being considered a country under the declarative theory of statehood. However, <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-the-complex-question-of-taiwanese-independence-188584">Taiwan has not yet formally declared</a> itself to be a new, independent country. According to President <a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-what-election-victory-for-tsai-ing-wen-means-for-the-islands-future-129802">Tsai Ing-wen</a>, “(w)e don’t have a need to,” because “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51104246">(w)e are an independent country already</a> and we call ourselves the Republic of China.”</p>
<p>But recall that, according to the constitutive theory of statehood, <a href="https://world101.cfr.org/understanding-international-system/building-blocks/how-self-determination-shaped-modern-world">a country is only a country</a> if it’s recognized by other already recognized countries, and the ultimate manifestation of such recognition <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-un-dilemma-to-be-or-not-to-be/">is full membership in the United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>Interestingly, the Republic of China was actually <a href="https://research.un.org/en/unmembers/founders">a founding member</a> of the United Nations. However, in 1971, the United Nations <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/PDF/NR032774.pdf">voted “to expel” the Republic of China</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-invasion-should-russia-lose-its-seat-on-the-un-security-council-177870">instead</a> recognized the Communist government “as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.” Subsequent attempts by Taiwan to join the United Nations <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6913020.stm">have been unsuccessful</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/03/28/why-is-taiwan-losing-its-friends">only</a> a <a href="https://en.mofa.gov.tw/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=1294&sms=1007">dozen or so</a> countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tale-of-two-chinas-the-story-of-south-africas-switch-from-taipei-to-beijing-100348">continue</a> to maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, most of which are <a href="https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/list-sids">small island developing states</a> such as Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu.</p>
<p>Each of these countries recognizes Taiwan as “the Republic of China,” and none of them simultaneously maintains <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden">offical ties with the People’s Republic of China</a>. </p>
<p>Until Taiwan formally declares itself <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/2003/10/02/the-forbidden-word">independent</a> of the rest of China – or until Taiwan is recognized by <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2020/05/17/why-taiwan-is-not-recognised-on-the-international-stage">the international community</a> as being <a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwans-rocky-road-to-independence-and-democracy-188378">independent</a> of the rest of China – Taiwan’s status as a country will continue to be questioned.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Holzer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There are treaties and agreements and organizations, but, ultimately, other countries get to define who else is or isn’t a country.Joshua Holzer, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Westminster CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2120102023-09-27T03:44:15Z2023-09-27T03:44:15ZChina’s new anti-espionage law is sending a chill through foreign corporations and citizens alike<p>Earlier this year, China <a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202304/b964e9c05be34eb3a7090f2456a4e139.shtml">updated</a> its anti-espionage law amid an intensifying rivalry with the US and growing distrust of the Western-led international order. </p>
<p>The law broadens the scope beyond what it originally sought to prohibit – leaks of state secrets and intelligence – to include any “documents, data, materials, or items related to national security and interests.” </p>
<p>The law also empowers authorities with new surveillance powers. These include the ability to access people’s emails or social media accounts on electronic devices.</p>
<p>The Chinese government is clearly using the new catch-all provision to cast a wider net to identify “spies”. It is targeting not only Westerners working in China, but also Chinese nationals who work for foreign companies or organisations or interact with foreigners in any way. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1704318496942010654"}"></div></p>
<p>The law is more than just theoretical – it has teeth. Last month, a new national campaign was launched with rewards of up to <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-04/10/c_1120777169.htm">500,000 renminbi</a> (just over A$100,000) for anyone reporting suspicious individuals or suspected espionage activities. </p>
<p>Red banners have started appearing on Chinese streets, proclaiming </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Implement the new anti-espionage law, mobilise collective efforts to safeguard national security. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Posters with a hotline number for reporting suspicious individuals can now be found on public transport, as well.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545464/original/file-20230830-19-l3kvt9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hotline number for reporting suspicious activities.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These visible signs serve as reminders that spies could be anywhere, potentially feeding sensitive information to foreign entities that pose threats to China’s national security and interests.</p>
<h2>Implications of the new law</h2>
<p>The new law has sent a chill through multinational corporations, Chinese companies and other organisations. </p>
<p>State-owned companies or those affiliated with the government are <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b869421-10fd-41e7-8280-5d09a224062f">distancing themselves</a> from
multinationals offering legal, investment and consultancy services, fearful of being associated with foreign entities.</p>
<p>Multinationals themselves were once welcomed with open arms to help accelerate China’s economic and technological development. Now, they find themselves entangled in a complex web of regulations governing the cross-border transfer of data and other information. Many are considering <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2f52965f-3bdb-4223-891b-e2208ad2e16e">decoupling</a> their data and IT systems from China.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1706457355058319662"}"></div></p>
<p>From an individual standpoint, anyone with foreign affiliations, including those who have returned from overseas, feel as if they are on a kind of community “watch list” upon arrival in China. </p>
<p>Some Chinese firms indicate in <a href="https://www.toutiao.com/article/7272284502448407055/?log_from=d0901d6b2a217_1693371484238">recruitment</a> drives for new employees they will not consider applicants who have returned from certain overseas regions. The perception is they may have been exposed to foreign forces who use money, friendship or even romance to coerce them into becoming an undercover agent or informant. </p>
<p>An invisible net has been cast over every stratum of Chinese society. Many Chinese people will no doubt become more hesitant in their interactions, cautious in their communication and sceptical in their collaborations. This will only further encourage people to retreat into silence or resort to coded language in both face-to-face conversations and social media. </p>
<p>And those perceived as having divergent political or ideological views will especially be under scrutiny. This includes private businesspeople, entrepreneurs and those working in non-government sectors who openly voice political or ideological values that go against the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The expansive nature of the law evokes memories of the Cultural Revolution, an era in which little trust existed in society and even among family members. </p>
<p>An unsettling divide is emerging today between those in governmental circles and everyone else. Having a foreign diploma or other affiliation was once seen as a positive, offering one a different perspective and international experience. Now, however, it could be seen as a liability or even a crime.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-us-and-china-may-be-ending-an-agreement-on-science-and-technology-cooperation-a-policy-expert-explains-what-this-means-for-research-212084">The US and China may be ending an agreement on science and technology cooperation − a policy expert explains what this means for research</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Ambiguity has risks</h2>
<p>The first iteration of the anti-espionage law was enacted in 2015 and was aimed at bolstering national security and generally protecting against espionage activities detrimental to the country’s interests. </p>
<p>The updated law comes in a changed world. The rivalry between the US and China has escalated in recent years in trade, technology, defence and influence over global institutions. Both nations are actively engaging in intelligence operations to understand each other’s capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/no-indication-of-aliens-spy-balloon-saga-continues-to-surprise-amid-rising-us-china-tension-199769">'No indication of aliens': spy balloon saga continues to surprise amid rising US–China tension</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Because the new law is so expansive and ambiguous, however, the implementation and enforcement could be difficult. And it could diverge significantly from the initial objectives of lawmakers. </p>
<p>When laws are ambiguous, it leaves ample room for interpretation and potential exploitation. The lack of clarity with the revised anti-espionage law could give rise to witch hunts, leaving people vulnerable to accusations that lack substantial evidence. The ripple effect could extend beyond China’s borders, affecting academic exchanges, technological cooperation and diplomatic relations. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1704405881591619992"}"></div></p>
<p>If collaboration with the outside world becomes secondary to perceived threats, it could also deter both foreign investment and domestic private enterprises in China, stifling economic growth. </p>
<p>At a time when the Chinese economy is grappling with domestic challenges and an increasingly hostile global environment, this could hasten the “decoupling” from China that many in the West are advocating for.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marina Yue Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The revised law is targeting not only Westerners working in China, but also Chinese nationals who work for foreign companies or organisations or interact with foreigners in any way.Marina Yue Zhang, Associate Professor, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2119872023-08-30T18:15:05Z2023-08-30T18:15:05ZWhy the United States will have to accept China’s growing influence and strength<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/why-the-united-states-will-have-to-accept-chinas-growing-influence-and-strength" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>After wrapping up a recent four-day trip to China, United States Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen told a media briefing: “<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1603">We believe that the world is big enough for both of our countries to thrive</a>.” </p>
<p>While optimistic, Yellen’s statement is far from persuasive. It doesn’t represent the tense geopolitical landscape saturated with sanctions, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-detail-plans-restricting-some-us-investments-china-source-2023-08-09/">investment restrictions</a> and containment efforts.</p>
<p>Yellen’s was one of many visits by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/18/world/asia/blinken-china-xi-diplomacy.html">U.S. officials</a> to China in recent months. These overtures come on the heels of concentrated American efforts against what the U.S. perceives to be China’s increasing expansion and assertiveness in Asia. President Joe Biden’s administration has made its intentions clear about maintaining the status quo in Asia, and Beijing is responding cautiously.</p>
<p>How did relations between the U.S. and China become so antagonistic over the last decade?</p>
<h2>Conflicting policies</h2>
<p>In a news conference with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 2002, then-President George W. Bush said: “<a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020221-7.html">China’s future is for the Chinese people to decide</a>.” But the current state of relations indicates the path the Chinese chose for themselves is not sitting well with the U.S.</p>
<p>In 2009, Secretary of State <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/01/115450.htm">Hillary Clinton suggested the Barack Obama administration wanted to go further than Bush had in developing the China-U.S. relationship</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We need a comprehensive dialogue with China. The strategic dialogue that was begun in the Bush administration turned into an economic dialogue.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Obama-era approach then culminated in a comprehensive pivot to <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament">the Asia-Pacific region in 2011</a> that resulted in American economic, security and diplomatic resources shifting towards the area.</p>
<p>During Donald Trump’s administration, U.S. policy priorities on China shifted back to economic relations as the trade <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-trade/trump-calls-china-trade-deficit-horrible-ahead-of-asia-visit-idINKBN1D15AM">deficit between the two nations</a> became a central point of contention. The Trump approach was no longer dialogue, but rather direct confrontation.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-china-u-s-conflict-is-about-much-more-than-trade-96406">The China-U.S. conflict is about much more than trade</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Under Biden, China <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy/">is deemed a “competitor</a>.” </p>
<p>Policy choices have included reducing economic dependence on Chinese supply chains, the creation of the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/">Australia, United Kingdom and United States partnership known as AUKUS</a> and <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3350297/new-edca-sites-named-in-the-philippines/">gaining U.S. access to four additional military bases in the Philippines</a>. </p>
<h2>Chinese pragmatism</h2>
<p>While America’s China policy has transformed into confrontation, China’s overall foreign policy trajectory has largely been pragmatic and linear. </p>
<p>Since the 1990s, China has been explicit in its grand objective of a <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/234074?ln=en">multi-polar world</a> in which global politics is shaped by several dominant states.</p>
<p>When Xi Jinping ascended to the presidency in 2013, this aspiration became increasingly overt and assertive. A year earlier, Vice-President Xi announced China’s “two centennial goals” — one calling for China to be “<a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202210/1277160.shtml">prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful</a>” with influence over the global world order by 2049.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545362/original/file-20230829-16-tnyyuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men in dark suits with red ties shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545362/original/file-20230829-16-tnyyuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545362/original/file-20230829-16-tnyyuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545362/original/file-20230829-16-tnyyuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545362/original/file-20230829-16-tnyyuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545362/original/file-20230829-16-tnyyuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545362/original/file-20230829-16-tnyyuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545362/original/file-20230829-16-tnyyuy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=527&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hu Jintao, left, poses with his successor Xi Jinping after Xi was elected at a plenary session of the National People’s Congress in Beijing in March 2013.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ng Han Guan)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To analyze Chinese-American relations, the metaphor of the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/">Thucydides’ trap</a> — in which a rising power challenges an existing one — may not be the most appropriate analogy. And phrases like “the rise of China” don’t do justice to China’s history. </p>
<p>China has been a great power, regionally at least, for thousands of years and was a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13010">manufacturing behemoth even in the 1750s</a>.</p>
<p>Geopolitically, the U.S. continues to retain a military and diplomatic edge over China. It has demonstrated its will and capability to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18/">determine the rules of engagement in China’s own backyard</a>. </p>
<p>But even though China trails the U.S. in many areas, it doesn’t need American support as much as it used to. Astonishingly rapid development in the last two decades is probably still far from China’s most creative and innovative phase.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-should-tread-carefully-in-southeast-asia-where-memories-of-colonialism-linger-205261">NATO should tread carefully in Southeast Asia, where memories of colonialism linger</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>American limitations</h2>
<p>There are also limits to the American field of influence in the region.</p>
<p>The U.S. has failed to move beyond strengthening existing alliances and fortifying its military installations. Its geo-strategic options are also limited. If, for example, the Americans shored up Japan’s offensive capabilities or deepened their partnership with India to challenge China, they would be inadvertently creating a multi-polar world.</p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/world/asia/china-us-xi-jinping.html">is not deterred</a> by American policy. It is <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/12/europe-china-policy-brussels-macron-xi-jinping-von-der-leyen-sanchez/">countering it through the art of persuasion and dialogue</a>. But it too has exhibited its limits. </p>
<p>With <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/11/solomon-islands-signs-controversial-policing-pact-with-china">a few exceptions</a>, China has failed to convince even its neighbours of the sincerity of its intentions. A majority of Asian nations are either U.S. allies <a href="https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2023/04/09/pm-asean-should-remain-neutral-amid--us-china-rivalry">or neutral</a>.</p>
<p>The ongoing tit-for-tat between the two nuclear and highly interdependent powers will continue to shape their relations, which is concerning for global peace and stability.</p>
<p>Will the U.S. peacefully share global influence with China? Will China abide by its <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201407/t20140701_678184.html">Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence</a> and its <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/zggcddwjw100ggs/jszgddzg/202208/t20220826_10754228.html">claim that it will never seek world domination</a>? It’s hard to say.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1516979705932808192"}"></div></p>
<h2>Four indicators of what lies ahead</h2>
<p>Several indicators, however, point to a somewhat balanced co-existence between the two as dominant power centres in the coming decades. </p>
<p>First, the U.S. has been unsuccessful in inhibiting China’s growth and expansion, and will likely be incapable of preventing the second-biggest economy from achieving its centennial goals.</p>
<p>Second, China is already present around the globe in terms of human capital, investment, manufactured products — and <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/06/29/across-19-countries-more-people-see-the-u-s-than-china-favorably-but-more-see-chinas-influence-growing/">world public opinion about China is changing</a>.</p>
<p>Third, to use the Taoist metaphor, <a href="https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/taoism/">China is a hub that has many spokes</a> and has the capacity and will to invent many more. The hub is united and efficient; an economic downturn will only slow the social organism, not cause it to collapse.</p>
<p>When <a href="https://time.com/3901419/space-station-no-chinese/">China was barred from the International Space Station after the passage of a law by U.S. Congress</a> in 2011, for example, it constructed <a href="https://www.space.com/tiangong-space-station">Tiangong, a permanent space station</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An Asian woman and two Asian men in blue jumpsuits smile and wave standing in front of a large red and gold chinese flag." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545361/original/file-20230829-21-pufgvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/545361/original/file-20230829-21-pufgvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545361/original/file-20230829-21-pufgvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545361/original/file-20230829-21-pufgvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545361/original/file-20230829-21-pufgvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545361/original/file-20230829-21-pufgvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/545361/original/file-20230829-21-pufgvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=526&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s astronauts wave as they arrive to meet the media at the Jiuquan satellite launch center near Jiuquan in western China in June 2013 before later boarding a spacecraft to dock with China’s Tiangong 1 space lab.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Andy Wong)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fourth, the rise of non-liberal democratic regimes and weaknesses in democracies are creating a situation where some nations are gravitating towards China while others are moving away from the U.S.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-fuelled-chaos-shows-democracy-is-in-trouble-heres-how-to-change-course-152728">Trump-fuelled chaos shows democracy is in trouble — here's how to change course</a>
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<p>That said, political reason is too often at the mercy of short-term calculations. </p>
<p>The U.S. has shown no interest in sharing world leadership, nor has China shown any interest in deviating from its global aspirations. But even though they may appear to be on a collision course, it seems likely China is going to be successful in its pursuit, and both nations will ultimately learn to co-exist and thrive. </p>
<p>Until then, one can only hope that they spare the world the chaos and ugliness of power politics and use their creative energies for the betterment of the human condition.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211987/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yasar Bukan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Relations between the U.S. and China have become antagonistic over the last decade. Here’s why the relationship must change.Yasar Bukan, Lecturer in Global Politics & Political Philosophy, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2097632023-07-25T12:24:41Z2023-07-25T12:24:41ZNATO isn’t the only alliance that countries are eager to join – a brief history of the Five Eyes<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538355/original/file-20230719-19-92axgr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=47%2C23%2C5182%2C3457&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The July 2023 NATO summit in Lithuania saw movement toward expanding the alliance.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LithuaniaNATOSummit/379be0fe4c174cd79e040b362b0c85ad/photo">Paul Ellis/Pool Photo via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-takeaways-from-the-nato-summit-and-where-it-leaves-the-military-alliance-209665">NATO summit</a> in <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-vilnius-summit-will-reflect-fresh-sense-of-purpose-over-ukraine-war-but-hard-questions-remain-over-membership-issues-208293">Vilnius</a>, Lithuania, it is anticipated that <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-a-history-of-neutrality-ends-after-200-years-183583">Sweden</a> will soon become <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-is-joining-nato-what-that-means-for-the-alliance-and-the-war-in-ukraine-209539">the alliance’s 32nd member</a>.</p>
<p>The heart of this <a href="https://theconversation.com/at-70-is-nato-still-important-5-essential-reads-128267">alliance</a> – which was <a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-aggression-prompted-the-birth-of-the-nato-alliance-heres-why-that-matters-now-209608">established</a> in the aftermath of World War II to promote the collective security of its mostly Western European members – is <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm">Article 5</a> of the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_89597.htm">North Atlantic Treaty</a>, which requires that <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-poland-demand-nato-act-in-event-of-russian-attack-an-expert-explains-article-4-and-5-commitments-following-missile-blast-194714">if one member is attacked</a>, then all of the other members will respond as if they themselves had been attacked.</p>
<p>Its most recent addition came in April 2023, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-joins-nato-in-a-major-blow-to-putin-which-doubles-the-length-of-the-alliances-border-with-russia-203217">Finland</a> became <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213448.htm">the 31st country</a> to join.</p>
<p>At present, NATO currently recognizes <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm">Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine</a> as aspiring members.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://theconversation.com/beyond-nato-new-alliances-could-defend-democracy-and-counter-putin-177683">NATO isn’t the only alliance</a> that countries across the globe are eager to join.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1338655960">For more than 75 years</a>, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. have been <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/newly-disclosed-documents-five-eyes-alliance-and-what-they-tell-us-about-intelligence-sharing">sharing intelligence with one another</a> as part of what they call the Five Eyes alliance.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">I am a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst</a> who now studies and teaches <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=vXXZBEkAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">political science</a>. I know from personal experience that the Five Eyes is still very active in the 21st century, even though it’s not as well known as its younger sibling NATO.</p>
<h2>Origins</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An image of a typewritten letter with handwritten markings and a 'Most Secret' stamp across the top." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=732&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538356/original/file-20230719-25-to4yyw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=920&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 1941 document in which U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved sharing key intelligence secrets with the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nationalchurchillmuseum.org/">Image courtesy of America’s National Churchill Museum</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 1940, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1083458138">during the prime ministership of Winston Churchill</a>, a secret effort by U.K. codebreakers to deconstruct Germany’s Enigma machine succeeded, allowing the British to read German military messages. These messages ended up being a major source of intelligence throughout World War II, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1075737">providing much-needed information</a> about German troop numbers, military maneuvers and technological developments.</p>
<p>British mathematician <a href="https://theconversation.com/imitation-game-will-finally-bring-alan-turing-the-fame-he-so-rightly-deserves-34324">Alan Turing</a> is probably the <a href="https://theconversation.com/alan-turing-visionary-war-hero-and-the-only-choice-for-the-50-note-106470">most widely recognized</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/alan-turing-was-one-of-many-persecuted-by-whitehall-for-their-sexuality-58018">person</a> who worked to help crack the Enigma machine. But in reality it was the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/575581/geniuses-at-war-by-david-a-price/">collective effort</a> of hundreds of men <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-female-enigmas-of-bletchley-park-in-the-1940s-should-encourage-those-of-tomorrow-36640">and women</a>, including <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/management/organisation-studies/decoding-organization-bletchley-park-codebreaking-and-organization-studies">mathematicians, linguists and even chess champions</a>.</p>
<p>Parallel to these developments, <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/BROOKS_Stealing_the_Japanese_Codebooks_from_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol25_No2_Fall_2019.pdf">U.S. codebreakers</a> were able to successfully <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/OLESON_WIMAD_Breaking_of_JN-25_from_AFIO_Intelligencer_Vol26_No2_WinterSpring_2021.pdf">crack diplomatic codes</a> used by the Japanese.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/world/europe/bletchley-park-us-britain-surveillance.html">In February 1941</a>, an American military delegation was invited to visit the U.K. codebreaking operation, based on an estate called <a href="https://bletchleypark.org.uk">Bletchley Park</a>. However, when “approving the visit, Churchill … <a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=633">prohibited any British discussion of their success against the Enigma</a>” machine, according to a 2016 speech by Richard Ledgett, then the <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/1621334/richard-h-ledgett-jr-named-nsas-new-deputy-director/">deputy director of the U.S. National Security Agency</a>.</p>
<p>Upon their arrival, the American officers “<a href="https://news.wcmo.edu/features-carousel/conversation-with-nsa-ledgett/">explained how to break the Japanese codes</a>,” Ledgett said, going on to observe that the information “<a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=698">caused the British to re-examine their initial decision</a>” to keep their Enigma success a secret.</p>
<p>Afterward, <a href="https://youtu.be/nLlzHSmI5tw?t=3001">Churchill approved a request</a> to reveal “<a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">to our American colleagues the progress</a> … made in probing German Armed Force cryptography.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/1231608251">Throughout the remainder of the war</a>, the U.K. and U.S. continued working together to enhance their codebreaking capabilities. In 1943, this informal relationship was formalized with the Britain-United States of America, or <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0161-119791885742">BRUSA</a>, agreement.</p>
<p>This intelligence alliance was further strengthened by <a href="https://www.gchq.gov.uk/information/brief-history-of-ukusa">the UKUSA agreement</a> signed on March 5, 1946. That same day, Churchill was at <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZA5ISi9yhhs&t=59s">Westminster College</a> in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2FM3_h33Tg">Fulton, Missouri</a> – the <a href="https://www.wcmo.edu">college</a> where I now teach – giving his “<a href="https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/">Iron Curtain</a>” speech.</p>
<p>In 2010, <a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf">this top-secret agreement was declassified</a> and made publicly available for the first time. </p>
<p>Canada joined the UKUSA agreement in 1948. Australia and New Zealand joined in 1956. Thus, the <a href="https://www.afio.com/publications/HOLZER_GIBSON_Ultra_Diplomacy-WIMAD_AFIO_Intelligencer_WinterSpring_2023_Vol28_No1.pdf">the Five Eyes was born</a>.</p>
<h2>Recent developments</h2>
<p>To address the <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2021/05/08/china-wants-the-world-to-know-that-resistance-to-its-rise-is-futile">rising power of China</a>, members of the Five Eyes have recently expanded the scope of the alliance <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/five-eyes-blurring-lines-between-intelligence-policy">beyond intelligence sharing into the realm of policy</a>. Five Eyes <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2019/08/five-country-ministerial-and-quintet-of-attorneys-general-concludes.html">attorneys general</a> now regularly <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quintet-attorneys-general-statement-support-prosecutor-general-ukraine-and-investigations-and">meet</a>, as do <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1039">finance</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2228642/joint-statement-five-eyes-defense-ministers-meeting/">and defense</a> <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2384146/five-eyes-defence-ministers-meeting-press-release/">ministers</a>. </p>
<p>In November 2020, the once-secretive Five Eyes alliance took the bold step of publicly issuing a joint statement condemning China’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52765838">National Security Law</a> for “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20201119004529/https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-hong-kong-2/">undermin[ing] Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy</a>.”</p>
<p>China responded by warning that “<a href="http://au.china-embassy.gov.cn/engsghdxwfb_1/202112/t20211221_10473480.htm">attempts by certain countries to meddle in Hong Kong politics</a> … are futile and doomed to fail.”</p>
<p>Notably, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-56970640.amp">China is New Zealand’s largest export market</a>. At the time, New Zealand was also hoping to conclude an <a href="http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/201911/41742_1.html">upgraded free trade deal</a> with China.</p>
<p>In January 2021, the Five Eyes countries – except New Zealand – issued a joint statement condemning “the <a href="https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-arrests-hong-kong">mass arrests of 55 politicians and activists in Hong Kong</a> for subversion under the National Security Law.” That same month, China and New Zealand signed <a href="http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/202102/44483_1.html">the upgraded free trade deal</a>.</p>
<p>Since that time, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3130094/new-zealand-uncomfortable-growing-scope-five-eyes-members">New Zealand</a> has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_new-zealand-criticized-five-eyes-alliance-stance-china/6205205.html">continued to avoid</a> taking as strong a position <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/03/asia/new-zealand-xinjiang-china-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">as the rest of the Five Eyes</a>. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/new-zealand-will-not-join-the-us-coalition-against-china-anytime-soon/">As a result</a>, the U.S. has sought to circumvent New Zealand’s reluctance by formalizing <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/09/22/john-bolton-on-how-a-new-era-of-american-alliances-is-under-way">other agreements</a> without the Kiwis.</p>
<p>For example, in September 2021, Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. announced <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">the AUKUS partnership</a>. Under this agreement, the three countries “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/">will expand and accelerate [the] sharing of sensitive information</a>.” <a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-exclusion-from-the-aukus-security-pact-reveals-a-failing-national-defence-policy-168235">Canada</a> has expressed a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/08/canada-aukus-defence-pact">desire</a> to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/canadian-membership-aukus-time-action">join</a> the <a href="https://www.economist.com/international/2021/09/19/the-strategic-reverberations-of-the-aukus-deal-will-be-big-and-lasting">AUKUS</a> partnership. This would leave New Zealand as the only Five Eyes member <a href="https://theconversation.com/approach-with-caution-why-nz-should-be-wary-of-buying-into-the-aukus-security-pact-203915">outside of the pact</a>.</p>
<p>The Five Eyes alliance has had to deal with other <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/suspicion-creeps-five-eyes">internal difficulties</a> as well. For example, the U.S. has had several notable intelligence failures, including the leaks of classified documents by <a href="https://theconversation.com/redefining-privacy-in-the-age-of-edward-snowden-21891">Edward Snowden</a> and former President Donald <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-exposure-of-highly-classified-documents-could-harm-us-security-and-why-there-are-laws-against-storing-them-insecurely-207484">Trump’s alleged hoarding of classified documents</a>. Both of those events undermine <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/10/ukraine-russia-war-leaks-classified-damage-control/">U.S. assurances</a> to its allies that it can keep a secret.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd looks at a large sign with the Australian, U.K. and U.S. flags, while three men stand at lecterns just below it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538358/original/file-20230719-29-c4lisd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The leaders of the U.S., U.K. and Australia make an announcement about the AUKUS alliance in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/USBritainSunak/65a989fb98ac4a08b7d11a699f2c509c/photo">Stefan Rousseau/Pool via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1633186">Over the years</a>, several countries have been considered as potential candidates to join the Five Eyes, including <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/could-india-join-five-eyes">India</a>, <a href="https://www.australianjewishnews.com/calls-for-israel-to-join-five-eyes-intelligence-network/">Israel</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/us-lawmakers-push-for-german-entrance-to-five-eyes-spy-alliance/a-17246049">Germany</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3148806/chinas-top-diplomat-wang-yi-slams-us-move-south-korea-join">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Currently, the most likely candidate is probably <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-five-eyes-to-six-japans-push-to-join-the-wests-intelligence-alliance-159429">Japan</a>. At the end of 2016, Australia and the U.S. signed a <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Australia-Japan-U-S-Trilateral-Information-Sharing-Arrangement-Signing.pdf">trilateral agreement</a> with Japan to deepen their covert security cooperation. As of 2020, Japan’s minister of defense was enthusiastically <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Japan-wants-de-facto-Six-Eyes-intelligence-status-defense-chief">in favor of joining</a> the Five Eyes. In 2021, Japan’s ambassador to Australia argued that “in terms of interests and capability, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/japan-should-join-five-eyes-intelligence-network-says-ambassador-20210420-p57kv6.html">Japan is the best candidate</a>” to consider for enlarging the Five Eyes. </p>
<p>In 2022, the U.S. House <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/subcommittees/intelligence-and-special-operations-117th-congress">Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations</a> “acknowledge[d] that the <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20210901/114012/BILLS-117HR4350ih-ISOSubcommitteeMark.pdf">threat landscape has vastly changed</a> since the inception of the Five Eyes arrangement, with primary threats now emanating from China and Russia.” It recommended “<a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-117hrpt118/html/CRPT-117hrpt118.htm">expanding the Five Eyes arrangement to include … Japan</a>.”</p>
<p>Regardless of whether <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/01/01/how-japan-sees-china">Japan</a> – or others – ends up joining the alliance, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman warned in 2020 that “no matter how many eyes they have, five or 10 or whatever, should anyone dare to undermine China’s sovereignty, security and development interests,” they should “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-threatens-to-poke-the-eyes-of-five-eyes-nations-over-hk-20201120-p56gep.html">be careful not to get poked in the eye</a>.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209763/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Holzer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>NATO gets the headlines, but the Five Eyes alliance is another close connection between key Western powers, and it may expand.Joshua Holzer, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Westminster CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2086452023-07-07T12:27:15Z2023-07-07T12:27:15ZChina’s ties to Cuba and growing presence in Latin America raise security concerns in Washington, even as leaders try to ease tensions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536158/original/file-20230706-17-yl4bur.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=58%2C0%2C6470%2C4164&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen arrives at Beijing Capital International Airport in Beijing, China, on July 6, 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/treasury-secretary-janet-yellen-arrives-at-beijing-capital-news-photo/1507503422?adppopup=true">Pedro Pardo/POOL/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is a push by leaders in Washington and Beijing to get U.S.-China relations back on track. U.S. Secretary of State <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-the-us-are-locked-in-struggle-and-the-visit-by-secretary-of-state-blinken-is-only-a-start-to-improving-relations-207981">Antony Blinken met with President Xi Jinping</a> in China in June 2023 to reopen the lines of communication between the countries. And Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is spending four days in China, beginning July 6, 2023, to try to stabilize U.S.-China economic ties.</p>
<p>But work to steady security issues between the two countries, a longtime point of contention, may have a longer horizon.</p>
<p>In fact, the U.S. military’s decision to <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/03/politics/china-us-balloon-intl/index.html">shoot down a suspected Chinese spy balloon</a> that had been flying over the country in February 2023 derailed the scheduled diplomatic trip Blinken planned for China earlier in the year.</p>
<p>Now there are <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-to-host-secret-chinese-spy-base-focusing-on-u-s-b2fed0e0?mod=article_inline">news reports that China made deals</a> with Cuba to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-post-spy-facility-cuba-off-southeastern-us-wsj-2023-06-08/">set up an electronic eavesdropping station</a> on the island nation, just 90 miles from Florida – something <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-to-host-secret-chinese-spy-base-focusing-on-u-s-b2fed0e0?mod=article_inline">Cuban government officials have denied</a> – and to build a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-plans-a-new-training-facility-in-cuba-raising-prospect-of-chinese-troops-on-americas-doorstep-e17fd5d1">military training facility</a> there. Such moves reflect <a href="https://time.com/5936037/us-china-latin-america-influence/">efforts by China to grow its influence</a> in Latin America and the Caribbean. </p>
<p>A Biden administration official in June said China’s spying from Cuba is an ongoing issue that predates the president’s time in office and that U.S. intelligence knew China had upgraded existing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china-has-been-spying-cuba-some-time-us-official-says-2023-06-10/">espionage facilities</a> in Cuba in 2019.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536166/original/file-20230706-17-oy0vu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="An illuminated spy balloon flies in the night sky near lit buildings and above a sanded section of a beach near the ocean." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536166/original/file-20230706-17-oy0vu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536166/original/file-20230706-17-oy0vu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536166/original/file-20230706-17-oy0vu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536166/original/file-20230706-17-oy0vu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536166/original/file-20230706-17-oy0vu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536166/original/file-20230706-17-oy0vu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536166/original/file-20230706-17-oy0vu1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A suspected Chinese spy balloon flies over Myrtle Beach, S.C., on Feb. 4, 2023, before the U.S. military shot it down.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-spy-balloon-flies-over-the-myrtle-beach-sc-united-news-photo/1246809673?adppopup=true">Peter Zay/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>As <a href="https://sipa.fiu.edu/people/staff/profiles/jack-gordon-institute/leland-lazarus.html">a researcher of China-Latin America relations</a> and a former U.S. government official, I have seen firsthand China’s growing influence in Latin America and the Caribbean and am concerned about its <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/11/07/chinas-latin-america-move/?sh=2261482a1d52">far-reaching implications for U.S. national security</a>.</p>
<h2>Too close for comfort</h2>
<p>China’s planned spy base and military training facility in Cuba would be located near the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/world/guantanamo-bay-naval-station-fast-facts/index.html">U.S. naval station in Guantanamo Bay</a>, home to several <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-06-13/cuban-base-would-let-china-spy-on-us-military-targets-in-florida#xj4y7vzkg">U.S. military facilities</a> like <a href="https://www.southcom.mil/">U.S. Southern Command</a> in Miami and <a href="https://www.centcom.mil/">U.S. Central Command</a> and <a href="https://www.socom.mil/">U.S. Special Operations Command</a> both in Tampa, along with their various component commands.</p>
<p>The facility would allow Chinese intelligence officers to better intercept sensitive military information transmitted between U.S. military commands, track senior U.S. diplomatic and military leaders as they travel across the region, monitor U.S. naval and commercial ship movement and gain details about U.S. military exercises, conferences and training <a href="https://www.southcom.mil/About/Area-of-Responsibility/">with various Latin American and Caribbean countries</a>.</p>
<p>The facility could also bolster China’s use of telecommunications networks to spy on U.S. citizens. </p>
<p>U.S. officials have long suspected Chinese telecommunications companies <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-tracked-huawei-zte-workers-at-suspected-chinese-spy-sites-in-cuba-355caddc">Huawei and ZTE</a> of setting up servers and network equipment around the world, including in Cuba, to help the Chinese government collect sensitive information about local government leaders and private citizens. </p>
<p>Chinese companies such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/china-panama-idUSL8N1MU072">China Harbor Engineering Company</a> have constructed dozens of deep-water port projects in Latin American and Caribbean countries, where Chinese intelligence agencies could track U.S. commercial or naval ship movements around important sea lanes like the Panama Canal, <a href="https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/2023%20SOUTHCOM%20Posture%20Statement%20FINAL.pdf?ver=rxp7ePMgfX1aZVKA6dl3ww%3d%3d">which could help China understand where to restrict U.S. maritime routes</a> during a potential military conflict.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536170/original/file-20230706-18-46b0t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing a light blue, open-collared shirt, reads into a microphone from a sheet of paper." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536170/original/file-20230706-18-46b0t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536170/original/file-20230706-18-46b0t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536170/original/file-20230706-18-46b0t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536170/original/file-20230706-18-46b0t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=437&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536170/original/file-20230706-18-46b0t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536170/original/file-20230706-18-46b0t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536170/original/file-20230706-18-46b0t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=549&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cuban Foreign Vice Minister Carlos Fernandez de Cossio rejected U.S. press reports about a planned Chinese espionage base there during a press conference on June 8, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/cuban-foreign-vice-minister-carlos-fernandez-de-cossio-news-photo/1258544010?adppopup=true">Yamil Lage/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Chinese companies have also either built or operate <a href="https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/">12 space research facilities</a> in South America that can be used for legitimate space research. But U.S. and other officials have voiced concern that these same sites could be used <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight-idUSKCN1PP0I2">to spy on U.S. satellites</a> and intercept sensitive information. </p>
<h2>Illegal Chinese police</h2>
<p>Chinese police forces are a growing presence as well. In April 2023, the FBI arrested two Chinese citizens for allegedly operating an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/17/nyregion/fbi-chinese-police-outpost-nyc.html">illegal police station</a> in New York City’s Chinatown. According to The New York Times, the men <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/17/nyregion/fbi-chinese-police-outpost-nyc.html">allegedly harassed Chinese dissidents</a> living in the U.S. </p>
<p>China <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/04/world/china-overseas-police-stations-intl-cmd/index.html">allegedly operates 100 of these police outposts</a> around the world. Fourteen of them are in eight Latin American and Caribbean countries. </p>
<p>China has also been stepping up its law enforcement engagement in Latin American and the Caribbean, <a href="https://www.defensa.com/centro-america/china-dona-miles-equipos-tacticos-proteccion-panama">donating anti-bullet vests</a>, <a href="https://www.tn8.tv/nacionales/china-dona-trajes-de-proteccion-a-la-policia-nacional-de-nicaragua/">helmets</a> and <a href="https://newssourcegy.com/news/china-donates-military-equipment-and-vehicles-to-guyana-defence-force/">vehicles to local security forces</a>, and Latin American and Caribbean law enforcement officers have gone to China to receive training.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536167/original/file-20230706-24-inmlu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A sign that reads, " src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536167/original/file-20230706-24-inmlu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536167/original/file-20230706-24-inmlu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536167/original/file-20230706-24-inmlu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536167/original/file-20230706-24-inmlu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536167/original/file-20230706-24-inmlu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536167/original/file-20230706-24-inmlu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/536167/original/file-20230706-24-inmlu5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The FBI suspects the Chinese government used this building in Chinatown in New York City as a secret police station to intimidate dissidents living in the U.S.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/building-that-is-suspected-of-being-used-as-a-secret-police-news-photo/1483121085?adppopup=true">Spencer Platt/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Chinese technology companies <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2022/11/28/fcc-huawei-zte-hikvision-hytera-dahua-ban/">Huawei, ZTE, Dahua and Hikvision</a> have donated surveillance cameras and facial recognition technology to city governments in Argentina, Brazil, <a href="https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/china-exports-citizen-control-model-to-bolivia/">Bolivia,</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-police-government.html">Ecuador</a>, <a href="https://www.stabroeknews.com/2019/07/27/news/guyana/advanced-city-surveillance-system-unveiled/">Guyana</a> and <a href="https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/caribbean-news/china-to-upgrade-cctv-security-system-in-suriname/">Suriname</a>. </p>
<p>While these Chinese companies deploy these technologies to help Latin American and Caribbean governments reduce crime, they could also use them to spy on U.S. government personnel living in these countries. In fact, the U.S. has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/26/us/us-washington-huawei-zte-ban-security-risk-intl-hnk/index.html">banned some of these companies</a> out of concern they spy for the Chinese government.</p>
<p>China’s participation in law enforcement activities in these countries erodes the U.S. position as the region’s preferred security partner.</p>
<h2>Decades of growing influence</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, a major source of conflict between the U.S. and China is the supply of the drug fentanyl. In April 2023, the Biden administration declared fentanyl an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/briefing-room/2023/04/12/biden-harris-administration-designates-fentanyl-combined-with-xylazine-as-an-emerging-threat-to-the-united-states/">emerging threat</a> to U.S. national security. The fentanyl global supply chain often ends on U.S. streets, but it begins in various pharmaceutical company labs in China. The U.S. <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1413">Treasury</a> and <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-against-china-based-chemical-manufacturing-companies">Justice</a> departments have sanctioned or charged several Chinese companies and individuals for knowingly selling fentanyl precursors to Mexican cartel operatives, who then produce the deadly fentanyl and sell it to Americans.</p>
<p>The China-Cuba connection is just one example of how the Chinese government and Chinese companies have been expanding their influence on America’s doorstep for decades. Not just through trade and investment, but also through espionage, military, law enforcement and drug activities. Such activities will greatly affect U.S. national security for years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208645/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leland Lazarus is a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonresident Fellow of the Atlantic Council Global China Hub, and a Board Member of the Fulbright Association.</span></em></p>The US and China are talking again, but security issues between the two countries linger.Leland Lazarus, Associate Director of National Security, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2011192023-05-17T12:39:52Z2023-05-17T12:39:52ZHow China uses ‘geostrategic corruption’ to exert its influence in Latin America<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/526566/original/file-20230516-23-rcqcyf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C95%2C5762%2C3746&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The successful courting of Honduras is the latest example of China's influence in Latin America.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/chinese-foreign-minister-qin-gang-and-honduras-foreign-news-photo/1476447324?adppopup=true">Lintao Zhang/Pool/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Corruption has long been a <a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/01/radical-transparency-the-last-hope-for-fighting-corruption-in-latin-america%EF%BF%BC/">scourge in parts of Latin America</a>. </p>
<p>Traditionally, it has funneled down domestic routes, with <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/press/2022-corruption-perceptions-index-cycle-corruption-organised-crime-instability-americas">local politicians, business interests</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-long-war-drugs-crime-and-cartels">drug lords</a> benefiting from graft and dodgy dealings. Indeed, a 2022 report from Transparency International found that 27 out of 30 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have shown <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">stagnant corruption levels</a> with no improvement in recent years.</p>
<p>But over the last two decades, a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/rise-strategic-corruption">new form of corruption</a> has taken hold in countries in the region, a phenomenon we call “geostrategic corruption.” </p>
<p>It is characterized by external countries using corrupt methods – no-bid contracts, insider financial deals, special relations with those in power – to become stakeholders in multiple facets of the politics, economy and society of a country. China is <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/08/12/adm-faller-china-exploiting-corruption-in-latin-america-493948">a master of the art</a>; the United States, less so.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/political-science-graduate-students/valeriia-popova1/valeriia-popova.html">scholars of</a> <a href="https://pir.fiu.edu/people/faculty-a-z/eduardo-gamarra1/eduardo-gamarra.html">Latin American politics</a>, we have seen how China has used geostrategic corruption to gain a foothold in the region as <a href="https://time.com/6186494/americas-summit-biden-china/">U.S. influence has waned</a>.</p>
<h2>What is geostrategic corruption?</h2>
<p>Geostrategic corruption builds on <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">traditional pervasive patterns</a> of clientelism and patronage. In Latin America in particular, the growth of the drug gangs since the 1980s introduced “narco-corruption” in which police and local officials collude with organized gangs, which are able to “<a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2021-Report-Resisting-corruption-along-drug-trafficking-routes-Crimjust.pdf">buy protection</a>” from prosecution. </p>
<p>As a result, police, local governments and elected representatives are considered by watchdogs as among <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/latin-america/corruption-on-the-rise-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean">the most corrupt political entities</a> in Latin America, with the region consistently scoring low in annual global <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2022-americas-corruption-criminal-networks-human-rights-abuses">corruption perception rating</a>.</p>
<p>This pattern of corruption has coincided with a period in which the U.S. has turned its attention away from Latin America and toward <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/07/reflections-on-the-long-term-repercussions-of-september-11-for-us-policy-in-the-middle-east/">first the Middle East</a> <a href="https://www.cfr.org/project/us-pivot-asia-and-american-grand-strategy">and then Asia</a>.</p>
<p>The vacuum has largely been filled by China. Trade between the region and China skyrocketed from <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-rise-in-latin-america/">US$10 billion worth of goods in 2000</a> to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">$450 billion in 2021</a>. China is now the top trading partner of South America, making up to 34% of total trade in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">Chile, Brazil and Peru</a>.</p>
<p>China’s expansion in the region is largely driven by the country’s <a href="https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-south-america/">search for resources</a> such as cobalt, lithium, rare earths, hydrocarbons and access to foodstuffs, which are abundant in Latin America. In the past 20 years, China has also poured <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri">massive investments</a> into infrastructure, energy and financial sectors of Latin America.</p>
<p>And China isn’t alone in upping its interest in Latin America. The last two decades have also seen an increase in investment and influence in the region <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228">from Russia</a> <a href="https://www.iri.org/news/foreign-authoritarian-influence-in-latin-america-irans-growing-reach/">and Iran</a>. </p>
<p>These countries have found Latin America a fertile ground due in no small part to the region’s culture of corruption and weak institutions, we argue. Local criminal networks and the disregard of democratic norms on the ground have made it easier for countries that themselves are <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/bribes-transparency/chinese-and-russian-firms-fare-worst-in-bribery-index-idINL5E7LV31T20111101">perceived to be dogged by corruption</a> to gain a foothold in Latin America.</p>
<h2>US-China global competition</h2>
<p>China’s presence in the region forms part of the country’s long-term strategic objective to <a href="https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/el-embajador-stanley-admitio-que-eeuu-necesita-mas-herramientas-para-poder-competir-con-china-en-nid04052023/">challenge U.S. influence across the globe</a> through economic, military, financial and political means.</p>
<p>That process has been aided by global trends. Countries such as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-brazil-lula-xi-jinping-91c34b4a9fb78f263d6f81f1e9a16f49">Brazil</a> and <a href="https://worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/argentina-china-in-americas">Argentina</a> have increasingly sought to diversify bilateral relationship and become less dependent on U.S. trade.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russian aggression in Ukraine has seemingly given China more weight on the international scene, with Beijing positioning itself as an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-saudi-arabia-iran-global-mediator-45ec807c8fd2b2aa65eef4cc313b739d">alternative diplomatic force</a> to Washington, especially to countries that feel nonaligned to the West. A recent example was seen in March, when Honduras announced it would <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/27/1166177955/honduras-establishes-ties-with-china-after-break-from-taiwan">establish diplomatic relations with Beijing</a> and break off ties with Taiwan – a development that Taiwanese officials say followed the “<a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202303230006">bribing” of Honduran officials</a>.</p>
<p>What gives China an added competitive edge as it extends its influence is that it is able to eschew constraints that bind many would-be investors in the West – such as environmental concerns or hesitation over a country’s labor rights and level of corruption. Chinese companies are <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-flows-along-chinas-belt-and-road">judged by international watchdogs to be</a> <a href="https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2016_transparencyincorporatereporti?e=2496456/37122985">among the least transparent</a> in the world, and bribery watchdogs have long noted Beijing’s <a href="https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2018_Report_ExportingCorruption_English_200402_075046.pdf">reluctance to prosecute Chinese companies or individuals</a> accused of bribery in regard to foreign contracts. A 2021 study found that <a href="https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road">35% of China’s “Belt and Road” projects</a> worldwide have been marked by environmental, labor and corruption problems.</p>
<p>The U.S. administration, in contrast, is more restricted by <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/29/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-abiding-commitment-to-democratic-renewal-at-home-and-abroad/">commitments to encourage democratic development</a> as well as public pressure and international image. Washington does not have the same privilege of <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm">diplomatic pragmatism</a> as China. </p>
<p>U.S. companies are, of course, not spotless when it comes to engaging in corrupt practices overseas. But unlike China, the U.S. government is bound to an <a href="https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm">international treaty</a> <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/governments-turn-a-blind-eye-to-foreign-bribery-transparency-international/a-55252806">prohibiting the use of bribes</a> to win contracts. Moreover, the U.S. <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78dd-1">Foreign Corrupt Practices Act</a> strictly prohibits American companies from bribing foreign officials; China has no such equivalent.</p>
<h2>Chinese corruption in the region</h2>
<p>Chinese investment <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/populism-china-and-covid-19-latin-americas-new-perfect-storm">has been easier where populist regimes govern</a> and where the rule of law has long been undermined, such as <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Argentina">Argentina</a>, <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Bolivia/">Bolivia</a> and <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Venezuela%2C%20RB/">Venezuela</a>.</p>
<p>For example, in Bolivia during the 14-year tenure of President Evo Morales, Chinese companies <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bolivia-lithium-china/bolivia-picks-chinese-partner-for-2-3-billion-lithium-projects-idUSKCN1PV2F7">achieved a major foothold</a> in key sectors of the economy that has translated into a monopoly over the lithium industry there, despite a <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-consortium-to-develop-lithium-deposits-in-Bolivia">strong anti-mining movement in the country</a>.</p>
<p>Geostrategic corruption in Argentina is firmly rooted at the local level, in provinces and regions across the country, <a href="https://icaie.com/2023/03/new-report-the-prc-feudal-governors-and-no-accountability-lithium-mining-in-argentinas-northwest-district/">feudal-like governors</a> have enabled a <a href="https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/world/argentina-retains-low-score-in-global-corruption-ranking.phtml">sophisticated corruption network</a> that China has seemingly used to invest in everything from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/argentina-wants-china-fully-fund-83-bln-nuclear-plant-amid-cash-shortfall-2022-04-05/#:%7E:text=The%20South%20American%20nation%20signed,faces%20a%20tighter%20fiscal%20outlook.">nuclear plants</a> and building lithium battery plants to constructing a satellite-tracking <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/08/us-military-warns-of-threat-from-chinese-run-space-station-in-argentina/">deep-space ground station</a>, railroads, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/23/argentina-china-us-imf-bri-debt-economy-summit-americas/">hydroelectric plants</a>, research facilities and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3213774/argentina-revives-possibility-chinese-fighter-jet-purchase-renewing-beijings-hopes-jf-17-south">maybe even fighter jets</a>.</p>
<p>In Ecuador, such projects <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html">include a dam</a> built in exchange for <a href="https://theglobalamericans.org/2019/12/latin-america-and-china-choosing-self-interest/">oil contracts</a>; the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric plant, which <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-power-china-idUSL1N2OW10M">developed massive cracks soon after construction</a>; and the Quijos hydroelectric project, which <a href="https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/empresa-china-electrica-ecuador-incumplida.html">failed to generate promised volumes of power</a>. Similarly, the Chinese-financed Interoceanic Grand Canal in Nicaragua was estimated by opponents of the project to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/nicaraguas-chinese-financed-canal-project-still-in-limbo/">irreversibly impact the ecosystem and displace about 120,000 people</a>, while local activists faced <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr43/6515/2017/en/">harassment, violence and unlawful detention</a>. </p>
<p>In Venezuela, China initiated but never completed construction of a multibillion dollar <a href="https://apnews.com/article/3367297bb5cc4fc497579164f679ec75">bullet train line</a>, and an iron mining deal not only allowed the Asian country to buy Venezuela’s iron ore at a price 75% below market, but also turned out to be an instance of Chinese predatory financing, leaving Venezuela in a catastrophic <a href="https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/40016-a-dream-deal-with-china-iron-ore-that-ended-in-nightmarish-debt-for-venezuela/">$1 billion debt</a>. Likewise, in Panama, port concessions and a high-speed train line were <a href="https://dialogochino.net/en/trade-investment/34472-has-chinas-winning-streak-in-panama-ended/#:%7E:text=A%20Chinese%20proposal%20for%20a%20US%244.1%20billion%20high,was%20cancelled%20and%20recast%20as%20a%20public-private%20partnership">frozen or canceled</a>, while the investor is under <a href="https://www.newsroompanama.com/business/big-time-chinese-investor-in-panama-under-probe-cloud">investigation</a> in China.</p>
<p>Throughout the region, Chinese firms have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-corruption/venezuela-charges-five-officials-with-embezzling-china-funds-idUSBRE9670VW20130708">cited in numerous</a> <a href="https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/bolivias-roads-agency-raided-following-bribe-allegation">cases involving bribery</a> <a href="https://cuencahighlife.com/attorney-general-opens-bribery-investigation-of-chinese-construction-company-projects/">and kickback schemes</a> that have enriched local officials in return for contracts and access.</p>
<h2>What does it mean for the US?</h2>
<p>This use of geostrategic corruption works to the direct detriment of U.S. interests. </p>
<p>In Argentina and Bolivia, Chinese expansion means that sectors that are crucial for the success of the U.S.’s green energy goals are increasingly under Beijing’s hold. It also undermines U.S. efforts to counter corruption and human rights abuses in the region. </p>
<p>And U.S. companies are unable to compete. The Biden administration has set <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Nearshoring%20and%20Renewable%20Energy-%20Building%20on%20the%20Los%20Angeles%20Summit%20of%20the%20Americas.pdf">high standards for U.S. investment</a> in the very sectors where the Chinese have a strong foothold. These include <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">transparency and accountability</a>, as well as commitments to environmental, labor and human rights standards.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden has stated that adherence to these standards is what distinguishes U.S. foreign investments from its competitors. But it does hamstring American companies when it comes to competing with China.</p>
<p>In the meantime, while the U.S. is looking for answers and trying to figure out how to reestablish influence in Latin America, China is quietly and pragmatically increasing its presence in the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201119/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>As an academic and as director of a university research center, I've received funding from foundations, US government agencies, and multilateral institutions.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Valeriia Popova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As US influence in Latin America has waned, Beijing has been able to expand business interests in the region on the back of shady practices.Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International UniversityValeriia Popova, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1900532022-09-13T01:23:13Z2022-09-13T01:23:13ZUS takes a renewed interest in the Pacific – and China’s role in it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483918/original/file-20220912-18-hl7846.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Andrew Harnik/AP/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>If you are trying to find traces of the United States’ long and layered ties with the Pacific Islands in Washington D.C., you need to look hard. Apart from the names of iconic battles chiselled into the Washington Mall’s second world war memorial, evidence of America’s complex Pacific history stretching back to the beginning of the Republic is not there. </p>
<p>Until very recently, this absence was replicated throughout Washington’s institutions, where the Pacific Islands have been at the back of mind since those epic battles were fought 80 years ago. </p>
<p>But over the past few months, things have changed. </p>
<p>The reason for this dramatic shift is plain for all to see: China. Washington is now undergoing a Pacific re-discovery that goes all the way to the top.</p>
<p>At the end of September, US President Joe Biden will host Pacific leaders at the White House for the first <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/02/statement-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-the-first-u-s-pacific-island-country-summit/">US-Pacific Island Country Summit</a>. This will be in the style of the <a href="https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Final-ENG-ASEAN-Chair-Press-Statemen-on-AUSS-12-13-May-2022.pdf">ASEAN meeting</a> held in May. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483920/original/file-20220912-18-jww77z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/483920/original/file-20220912-18-jww77z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483920/original/file-20220912-18-jww77z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483920/original/file-20220912-18-jww77z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483920/original/file-20220912-18-jww77z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483920/original/file-20220912-18-jww77z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/483920/original/file-20220912-18-jww77z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The US has responded to the increasing presence of China in the Pacific, most notably a security pact brokered between China and the Solomon Islands this year.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Xinhua/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>After the second world war, the US was largely absent in the Pacific. There were notable exceptions, not least the shameful Marshall Islands atomic testing programme that <a href="https://theconversation.com/75-years-after-nuclear-testing-in-the-pacific-began-the-fallout-continues-to-wreak-havoc-158208">continues to deeply affect the present</a>. </p>
<p>Now the US is striving to be seen and viewed as a force for good in a part of the world where China has been making deep, transformative and worrying inroads for over 15 years. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/75-years-after-nuclear-testing-in-the-pacific-began-the-fallout-continues-to-wreak-havoc-158208">75 years after nuclear testing in the Pacific began, the fallout continues to wreak havoc</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This isn’t the first time <a href="https://spfusa.org/publications/u-s-japan-cooperation-in-the-pacific75-years-after-the-end-of-the-pacific-war/">US postwar hegemony</a> has been challenged in the Pacific. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was disrupting the Pacific Islands power balance and the US responded with a series of treaties and agreements. One was the <a href="https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/pacific-islands/international-affairs/south-pacific-tuna-treaty">1987 South Pacific Tuna Treaty</a>, signed with 16 Pacific Islands. The treaty’s ongoing importance was <a href="https://www.state.gov/big-blue-pacific-continent">underscored</a> in recent weeks as part of the renewed US diplomatic drive. </p>
<p>The US also brokered three <a href="https://www.doi.gov/oia/compacts-of-free-association">Compacts of Free Association</a> (COFA) with its former United Nations Trust Territories that became the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau in the mid-1980s. (Rather than becoming independent at this time, the Northern Marianas Islands opted to join American Samoa and Guam as <a href="https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands">US territories</a>).</p>
<p>When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, so too did US interest in the Pacific. But the compacts spurred the formation of numerous Micronesian diaspora communities across the US. Meanwhile, in exchange for certain rights, the COFA states gave the US exclusive control over their oceanic territories and a vital military base on Kwajalein Atoll. </p>
<p>In the current geopolitical context, these 20-year agreements were expiring and languishing, much to the frustration of several <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/the-us-is-squandering-its-cofa-advantage-in-the-pacific/">congressional representatives</a> from both political sides. Fears of Chinese encroachments spurred the <a href="https://www.state.gov/announcing-the-special-presidential-envoy-for-compact-negotiations/">White House into action</a> in March. </p>
<p>Since then, the visibility of the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/can-the-us-open-a-new-chapter-with-the-pacific/">US’s Pacific outreach</a> has risen. Congress took the lead in upping the US game in the Pacific, with numerous bills such as the 2021 <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2967">Blue Pacific Act</a>. Its budget lines were also designed to address both the immense needs of the region and shore-up the geopolitical interests of the US and its friends and allies, not least Australia.</p>
<p>In August, the urgency of US outreach has been on display in the Solomon Islands, the nation most precariously situated in the unfolding geopolitical contest thanks to the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/the-china-solomon-islands-security-deal-changes-everything/">security deal</a> signed in April with China. </p>
<p>At the beginning of August, Deputy Secretary of State <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-new-zealand-australia-caroline-kennedy-solomon-islands-c120e8aa1afb5e0540ef3a5fbd859f3d">Wendy Sherman</a> and US Ambassador to Australia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/08/us-ambassador-caroline-kennedy-meets-children-of-solomon-islanders-who-saved-her-father-jfks-life-in-second-world-war">Caroline Kennedy</a> led poignant and very personal commemorations of the 80th anniversary of the commencement of the Battle of Guadalcanal in August 1942.</p>
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<p>At the month’s end, the US hospital ship <a href="https://fb.watch/ff70PkM-Ux/">Mercy</a> docked in Honiara, where it was welcomed by <a href="https://solomons.gov.sb/solomon-islands-celebrate-inaugural-visit-by-us-navy-hospital-ship-mercy/">Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare</a>. Only days before, he had prevented US coastguard cutter, <a href="https://solomons.gov.sb/pm-sogavare-clarifies-misinformation-on-us-coast-guard-vessel/">Oliver Henry</a>, from doing likewise. </p>
<p>Along with urgently needed <a href="https://solomons.gov.sb/capt-henry-kim-commander-of-the-pacific-partnership-mission-pays-a-courtesy-visit-to-the-ministry-of-health-and-medical-services/">medical</a>, dental and <a href="https://solomons.gov.sb/pacific-partnership-dog-and-cat-consultations/">veterinary</a> aid, the Mercy brought music and a <a href="https://fb.watch/flN6VuC1Ja/">sense of celebration</a>, with the US navy band even singing Solomon Islands tunes, in a demonstration of distinctive tone the US now seeks to set. </p>
<p>Also in August, USAID released its five-year <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Strategic-Framework-Pacific-Islands-March-2022-2027.pdf">Strategic Framework</a>. This detailed how the US is going to rapidly restore itself in the region as it challenges “authoritarian actors” who “challenge the region’s stability and democratic systems”. The three development objectives are:</p>
<ul>
<li>strengthening community resilience particularly in the face of acute climate challenges</li>
<li>bolstering Pacific economies</li>
<li>strengthening democratic governance. </li>
</ul>
<p>The framework cites the regional objectives laid out by the <a href="https://www.forumsec.org/">Pacific Islands Forum</a> over the past eight years as the framework’s guide in 12 Pacific Island nations. It has a particular agenda to drastically improve the lives and status of women and girls across the region. The USAID plan is ambitious in its hope to transform conservative Pacific societies, while at the same time offer opportunities more attractive than those of China, thereby limiting its power projection throughout the region. </p>
<p>It is the 12 Pacific nations where USAID seeks to expand operations that have been invited to the White House in late September. The withholding of invitations to the <a href="https://www.cookislandsnews.com/uncategorised/national/no-invite-for-cook-islands-in-pacific-nations-meeting/">remaining members</a> of the Pacific Islands Forum – the Cook Islands, Niue, French Polynesia and New Caledonia – has been duly noted. </p>
<p>It is a puzzling move, but one that indicates the agenda for the summit: for Biden’s administration to specifically develop its US programmes. The recent revelation that <a href="https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20220911-57624/">the five foreign ministers</a> heading the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative (US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Britain) will meet before the summit also suggests multilateral proposals will be tabled too.</p>
<p>Given how little the region has been seen and heard in Washington, the summit offers a rare opportunity for the administration to listen to what Pacific leaders have to say and reshape their approach accordingly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190053/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patricia A. O'Brien received funding from the Australian Research Council as a Future Fellow, the Jay I. Kislak Fellowship at the John W. Kluge Center, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. and New Zealand's JD Stout Trust.</span></em></p>At the end of September, US President Jo Biden will host Pacific leaders at the White House – a sign the US is taking the region, and China’s role in it, more seriously.Patricia A. O'Brien, Faculty Member, Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University; Visiting Fellow, Department of Pacific Affairs, Australian National University; Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC., Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881442022-08-03T08:30:22Z2022-08-03T08:30:22ZPelosi’s visit to Taiwan raises temperatures, but it’s in everyone’s interest to cool them down again<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477363/original/file-20220803-14-6ql8mv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/Taiwan Presidential Palace handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s provocative visit to Taiwan has been ill-timed from the perspective of China’s leader Xi Jinping.</p>
<p>In seeking to further consolidate his hold on power ahead of a <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/understanding-the-significance-of-the-china-party-congress-of-the-chinese-communist-party/">National Party Congress</a> in November, Xi needs to demonstrate that he is in command.</p>
<p>The Pelosi visit challenges Xi’s strongman narrative domestically at a time when he will be seeking the support of his colleagues in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for a third term as party secretary.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-took-a-sledgehammer-to-us-china-relations-this-wont-be-an-easy-fix-even-if-biden-wins-147098">Trump took a sledgehammer to US-China relations. This won't be an easy fix, even if Biden wins</a>
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<p>If nothing else, the Pelosi mission illustrates the limitations on Xi’s pledge to return Taiwan peacefully to mainland control as part of his declared policy of “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/01/world/asia/china-taiwan-pelosi.html">national rejuvenation</a>” into a modern superpower. This goes some way towards explaining Beijing’s reaction to a visit to Taiwan by a member of the US Congress, albeit one who ranks third in the hierarchy behind President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris.</p>
<p>There are two other factors at play. The first is suspicion in Beijing that the Biden administration is steering away from the US’s longstanding policy of “<a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3160692/us-has-practised-strategic-ambiguity-taiwan-decades-set-change">strategic ambiguity</a>”, or avoiding confronting the “what if” issue if China threatened Taiwan militarily.</p>
<p>Biden has appeared on occasions to suggest that the US would come to Taiwan’s defence in the event of overt Chinese aggression. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/23/world/asia/biden-taiwan-china.html">This exchange</a> between a reporter and Biden in May will have concerned Beijing: </p>
<p><em>Reporter: You didn’t want to get involved in the Ukraine conflict militarily for obvious reasons. Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan, if it comes to that?</em></p>
<p><em>Biden: Yes.</em></p>
<p><em>Reporter: You are?</em></p>
<p><em>Biden: That’s the commitment we made.</em></p>
<p>The White House subsequently sought to walk back Biden’s statement, as it has done on other occasions when he has appeared to step away from a policy fudge on Taiwan.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477366/original/file-20220803-22-qh3gw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477366/original/file-20220803-22-qh3gw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477366/original/file-20220803-22-qh3gw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477366/original/file-20220803-22-qh3gw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=486&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477366/original/file-20220803-22-qh3gw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477366/original/file-20220803-22-qh3gw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477366/original/file-20220803-22-qh3gw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">US President Joe Biden has appeared to suggest that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid China if necessary.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/zz/Dennis Van Tine/STAR MAX/IPx</span></span>
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<p>The episode will have gnawed away at China’s confidence in the US commitment to a “one China policy” negotiated in various communiques and enshrined in the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy">normalisation agreement of 1979</a>. That agreement, under the Carter administration, extended full diplomatic recognition to China and severed normal ties with Taiwan.</p>
<p>Congress then enacted the <a href="https://china.usc.edu/taiwan-relations-act-1979">Taiwan Relations Act</a>, which allowed commercial and cultural relations and authorised the supply of weapons to bolster Taiwan’s defences. This has been a sore point with Beijing.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-risks-of-a-new-cold-war-between-the-us-and-china-are-real-heres-why-103772">The risks of a new Cold War between the US and China are real: here's why</a>
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<p>A second important element in China’s reaction almost certainly rests with Xi’s own exposure to the Taiwan issue as deputy party secretary in Fujian Province and political commissar in the People’s Liberation Army reserve during the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/RP9697/97rp14">rolling crises</a> with the US in 1995-96. Fujian is the province nearest to Taiwan.</p>
<p>In 1995, China was infuriated when President Bill Clinton authorised a visit to the US by Lee Teng-hui, leader of Taiwan’s Nationalist Party. This reversed a 15-year ban on visits by Taiwanese leaders.</p>
<p>Lee’s election the following year in Taiwan’s first free presidential election further displeased Beijing. This contributed to tensions throughout 1995-96 during which China conducted military exercises off Taiwan and the US sent warships to deter Chinese aggression.</p>
<p>Tensions between the US and China over Taiwan have surfaced sporadically since, but this latest eruption is probably the most serious given the high political stakes involved for Xi. However, it is in neither China’s nor the US’s interests to allow a military confrontation, although the possibility of an accident leading to a wider conflagration cannot be excluded.</p>
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<p>It is notable that in its <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/02/chinese-warplanes-buzz-line-dividing-taiwan-strait-reuters.html">military exercises in and around Taiwan</a>, China has been careful to avoid crossing a median line in the strait itself. The Chinese military has conducted air and sea drills. These have included live fire exercises.</p>
<p>Pelosi has been unrepentant about the diplomatic fallout her visit has caused. In a Washington Post <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/08/02/nancy-pelosi-taiwan-visit-op-ed/">opinion piece</a> released after she landed in Taiwan, she criticised Beijing for increasing tensions with Taiwan. She also took Beijing to task for its “brutal crackdown” on political dissent in Hong Kong, and its mistreatments of its Muslim Uighur minority.</p>
<p>White House spokesman <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-could-use-economic-coercion-against-taiwan-2022-08-02/">John Kirby</a> noted the administration’s misgivings about Pelosi’s visit. “What we don’t want to see is this spiral into any kind of a crisis or conflict,” Kirby said Tuesday. “There is no reason to amp this up.” This is particularly so at a moment when the US has been urging Beijing to use its influence with Moscow to end the war in Ukraine.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/us-china-relations-were-already-heated-then-coronavirus-threw-fuel-on-the-flames-137886">US-China relations were already heated. Then coronavirus threw fuel on the flames</a>
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<p>So far, threats of Chinese retaliation have involved restrictions on some Taiwanese exports to China, and a melodramatic summoning in the middle of the night of US Ambassador to Beijing Nicholas Burns to the Foreign Ministry to receive a dressing down. The Pelosi visit may herald greater tensions in the US-China relationship, but a possible <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-xi-float-face-to-face-meeting-hold-honest-talks-taiwan-2022-07-28/">face-to-face meeting</a> between Biden and Xi will be aimed at lowering temperatures.</p>
<p>From Australia’s perspective, there’s no benefit to be gained from tensions between its security guarantor and the destination for one-third of its exports. This was reflected in remarks by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in an <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/television-interview-cnn-state-union">interview with CNN</a> when asked whether Australia would defend Taiwan militarily:</p>
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<p>Australia supports a one-China policy, but we also support the status quo when it comes to the issue of Taiwan. It is not in the interests of peace and security to talk up those issues of potential conflict.</p>
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<p>Albanese’s remarks mirror those of the White House spokesman regarding Taiwan, a reflection that it is not in anyone’s interests for this dispute to escalate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188144/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker is a board member of The Conversation.</span></em></p>The US speak of the house’s visit to Taiwan has provoked more sabre-rattling from China, but neither China nor the US will want tensions to escalate further.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1870612022-07-18T20:06:28Z2022-07-18T20:06:28ZWhy China’s challenges to Australian ships in the South and East China Seas are likely to continue<p>Last week it was <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-07-13/australian-defence-warship-tracked-by-chinese-military/101229906">reported</a> an Australian warship had, in early July, been closely followed by a Chinese guided-missile destroyer, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, and multiple military aircraft as it travelled through the East China Sea.</p>
<p>This incident followed a <a href="https://www.9news.com.au/national/chinese-fighter-jet-intercepts-australian-surveillance-aircraft-south-china-sea/e99a9d3e-8453-4f1d-ae01-130e6681d8f8">confrontation</a> on May 26, when an Australian maritime surveillance plane was dangerously intercepted by a Chinese fighter over the South China Sea.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-05/australian-government-wont-be-intimidated-in-south-china-sea/101127204">Reportedly</a>, the Chinese fighter flew treacherously close to the Australian plane, releasing flares, before cutting across its path and dropping chaff (a cloud of aluminium fibre used as a decoy against radar).</p>
<p>While there are good reasons not to exaggerate these events, the bad news is these incidents are almost certain to continue. When they do occur, it’s important to place them within their broader historical and geopolitical context and not sensationalise them – we must not frame them as if we’re on the brink of war.</p>
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<h2>The good news: 3 reasons not to panic</h2>
<p>There are three reasons why the significance of these events shouldn’t be exaggerated. </p>
<p>First, Asia’s seas are among the world’s busiest. The warships of different navies are constantly operating in close proximity with each other and most of these interactions are professional and even courteous. This includes most encounters with the Chinese navy.</p>
<p>A second, and related, point is that both the Chinese and Australian navies have grown significantly in size over the past decade. More ships means more total days at sea, which means more opportunities for the navies to come into contact.</p>
<p>Most of these encounters are innocuous. In our research on <a href="https://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/soundings-papers-indo-pacific-endeavour-reflections-and-proposals-australias-premier-naval-diplomacy-activity">Australia’s naval diplomacy</a>, for instance, the team at Macquarie University investigated <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-09/chinese-spy-ship-docks-next-to-hmas-adelaide-in-fiji/9852748">reports</a> a Chinese ship had spied on HMAS Adelaide visiting Fiji.</p>
<p>The reality, however, was the Chinese ship was deployed semi-permanently to the South Pacific as a satellite relay and regularly came in-and-out of Suva (Fiji’s capital) for supplies. It was nothing more than a chance run-in.</p>
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<p>Third, although confrontations aren’t common, they are also far from unprecedented. During the Cold War, the warships of the United States and the Soviet Union frequently sparred. Few forward deployments occurred without some contact with the opposing forces that may have included overflights, shadowing or dangerous manoeuvring. </p>
<p>Indeed, potentially dangerous interactions were common enough that in 1972 the Americans and Soviets signed the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm">agreement</a>. The agreement spelt out the “rules of the road”. The superpowers also committed to an annual meeting between their senior naval officers, with the hosting responsibility alternating between them.</p>
<p>The agreement didn’t eliminate incidents at sea, but it did create a mechanism for the two parties to vent their frustrations, voice their protests and work constructively on solutions. As the meetings were between the two nations’ top professional naval officers, there was a <a href="https://www.usni.org/press/books/incidents-sea">high degree of mutual respect</a> and a genuine attempt to make the seas a safer place for their sailors.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/japan-signals-a-sense-of-crisis-over-taiwan-this-is-why-it-is-worried-about-chinas-military-aims-164562">Japan signals a 'sense of crisis' over Taiwan — this is why it is worried about China's military aims</a>
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<h2>The bad news: these incidents will continue</h2>
<p>The US attempted to replicate their Soviet agreement with China. In 1998, the US and China <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999/august/military-maritime-consultative-agreement">agreed</a> to the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, which copied many of the successful parts of the Soviet agreement, including the annual meeting between their admirals to discuss concerning incidents.</p>
<p>The challenge, however, is that the geopolitical backdrop to the US-China agreement is significantly different from its Cold War antecedent. During the Cold War, tensions at sea rose and fell just as they did on land. However, the areas where the Soviet Union attempted to assert its claims (such as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea) were isolated and icy and generally unimportant to everyone except the Soviets. The Americans would prod there occasionally on intelligence gathering, freedom of navigation operations, or simply to rile up their rivals – but on the whole both sides understood the game.</p>
<p>In contrast, China has claimed exclusive coastal territorial sovereignty over the majority of the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and large parts of the East China Sea. These are among the most geopolitically important and busiest waterways in the world.</p>
<p>Beijing’s options for convincing regional states to recognise its claims are limited, especially when foreign navies continue to traverse these waters, dismissively ignoring China’s sovereignty declarations.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-if-growing-us-china-rivalry-leads-to-the-worst-war-ever-what-should-australia-do-185294">Friday essay: if growing US-China rivalry leads to 'the worst war ever', what should Australia do?</a>
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<h2>Beijing has few options</h2>
<p>Politically, China could attempt to horse trade, such as we’ll treat you as the custodians of the South Pacific if you accept our claims to the South China Sea. Or use economic and diplomatic coercion.</p>
<p>In Australia’s case, neither of these strategies are likely to be successful as they would undermine our relationship with the US, and there’s the fear China will renege in the future. </p>
<p>This leaves tactical deterrence. Describing how deterrence works, American economist Thomas Schelling used the <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1007.3938&rep=rep1&type=pdf">analogy</a> of two people in a row boat where one starts “rocking the boat” dangerously, threatening to tip it over unless the other one does all the rowing. The threat is shared equally between them, but the boat rocker is counting on the other to back down because their appetite for risk is lower.</p>
<p>Confrontations in the air and sea are risky for both the perpetrator and the target. On 1 April 2001, for instance, a Chinese fighter <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hainan_Island_incident">collided</a> with an American signals intelligence aircraft. The American plane was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island, while the Chinese plane crashed and the pilot died.</p>
<p>What China is counting on is Australia not being as risk tolerant as they are. They hope Australia will blink first. But, Australia has shown no indication it will stop deploying to the region. Indeed, the aircraft that was threatened and damaged by chaff on May 26 was one of two Australian aircraft flying out of the Philippines at the time. The Australians were not deterred and the second aircraft appears to have flown missions on <a href="https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/general/details-surface-on-china-s-dangerous-interception-of-raaf-p-8a">May 27, May 30 and June 2</a> through the same airspace as the incident occurred.</p>
<p>As China and Australia have few other options than to continue doing what they’re doing, these incidents look likely to continue.</p>
<p>When they occur, however, it’s important they’re not taken out of their historical and operational contexts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187061/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Lockyer receives funding from the Department of Defence through its Strategic Policy Grant Program. The funding supports his ongoing research on conventional maritime deterrence. </span></em></p>While there are good reasons not to exaggerate these events, the bad news is these incidents are almost certain to continue. But we shouldn’t frame them as if we’re in the brink of war.Adam Lockyer, Associate Professor in Strategic Studies, Macquarie UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1820422022-04-28T20:02:30Z2022-04-28T20:02:30ZPeter Dutton says Australia should prepare for war. So how likely is a military conflict with China?<p>We are fated, whether we like it or not, to live in interesting times, having entered, as <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/avoidable-war-decade-living-dangerously">one prominent observer puts it</a> a “decade of living dangerously”. </p>
<p>He is speaking of the very high probability of entering into some form of open military conflict with China, most likely precipitated by a sharp escalation in Beijing’s <a href="https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/what-war-between-australia-and-china-could-look-like-if-taiwan-conflict-escalates/news-story/76547d9b2bee3baaf0932cd45a61f68c">efforts to reunify Taiwan</a> with the mainland.</p>
<p>Even without this particular acute threat, we face enormous dangers on multiple fronts. Climate change is fast <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/climate-change-already-worse-than-expected-un-report">reaching the point</a> of constituting an existential threat. There is still time to avoid this nightmare scenario, but it is going to take enormous effort and unprecedented cooperation. It will require sustained levels of good governance.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ipcc-says-the-tools-to-stop-catastrophic-climate-change-are-in-our-hands-heres-how-to-use-them-179654">IPCC says the tools to stop catastrophic climate change are in our hands. Here's how to use them</a>
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<p>Unfortunately, we are living at a time when good governance cannot be taken for granted. Threats to democracy and open society <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated">are more acute</a> than they have been in decades. The rise of populism, and the corruption of clinical institutions and traditions previously taken for granted, threaten a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/democracy-in-decline-worldwide/a-60878855">sharp contraction of democracy</a> and constructive cooperation, both within nations and across the global community.</p>
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<span class="caption">If there is a war with China, it will most likely be over its efforts to reunite Taiwan with the mainland.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Ritchie B. Tongo</span></span>
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<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a reminder of how quickly the world can fall apart and peace evaporate. Fortunately, Ukraine was ready for what much of the global community was dismissing as an exaggerated threat. And, as it turns out, Vladimir Putin’s Russia – corrupted, hollowed out and delusional – was not ready. What should have been a devastatingly formidable military was reduced to a pathetic facsimile of what Russian national myth and Western assessment had proclaimed.</p>
<p>The great lesson of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that powerful leaders, particularly populist autocrats surrounded by the structures of a one-party state and accountable only to a circle of sycophants, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60807134">choose to pursue</a> an irrationally dangerous course contrary to all reasonable self-interest.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/morrison-dutton-go-hard-on-national-security-but-will-it-have-any-effect-on-the-election-181868">Morrison, Dutton go hard on national security - but will it have any effect on the election?</a>
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<p>In late 2021 and early 2022, there was a high level of consensus among military analysts that Russia was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/us/politics/russia-ukraine-helicopters.html">preparing for war</a>. There was also a similar level of consensus among political experts of international relations that Putin was bluffing. All rational calculations pointed to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60468264">the risk of war</a>, both to the leader and to his nation, to be so enormously great that it made no sense to initiate conflict. </p>
<p>Sadly, the military analysts studying satellite imagery and the rapid escalation of military build-up on the borders of Ukraine proved to be correct. Thankfully, they had greatly overestimated Russia’s military preparedness and underestimated both the political will and defensive capacity of the people of Ukraine.</p>
<p>Could the same not be true of China? Is it not foolish to talk up threats of war and make inevitable what is avoidable? Or were Defence Minister Peter Dutton’s extraordinary comments – on Anzac Day, of all days – about the need to prepare for war with China, however distasteful and reckless, founded on reasonable assessment?</p>
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<p>Wishful thinking would have it that <a href="https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/home-affairs-boss-warns-drums-of-war-are-beating/news-story/183c411ad712c199182b4ee597fda42f">talk of war</a> involving China is a confected threat manufactured by vested interests and hawkish assessments. There is far too much at stake, however, to fall back on wishful thinking. “Peace in our time” is exactly what we should be working for, but we can’t achieve it simply by proclaiming it.</p>
<p>The problem with Dutton’s comments lies not in the assessment of the risk, but in how the government responds to it. In the midst of a tightly contested federal election campaign, with the Coalition on the back foot, there is a great temptation to resort to fearmongering in the name of national security to shore up votes.</p>
<p>In the words of former US President Theodore Roosevelt, we need to “speak softly and carry a big stick”. The concern with what Dutton is doing is not that his analysis is wrong, but that his response to the threat is reckless and counterproductive. We are neither carrying a big stick nor speaking softly.</p>
<p>It was Kevin Rudd who coined the phrase a “decade of living dangerously”. He uses it in his <a href="https://www.hachette.com.au/kevin-rudd/the-avoidable-war-the-dangers-of-a-catastrophic-conflict-between-the-us-and-xi-jinpings-china">new book</a>, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US and Xi Jinping’s China. </p>
<p>Rudd makes a compelling and cogent argument that any form of war involving China and the United States is likely to be devastatingly costly. It would also risk cascading consequences that could dangerously transform the world we live in. </p>
<p>Avoiding conflict with China, he argues, will not be easy. If nothing changes, we are on a trajectory to disaster.</p>
<p>Rudd sets out ten scenarios for possible conflict with China. Only one of the ten ends well.</p>
<p>Yet, as is the case with the looming threat of catastrophic global warming, disaster is not inevitable. War with China is very likely, but avoidable if we take the threat seriously and act now.</p>
<p>The path to avoiding war with China, Rudd argues, is to work to achieve a system of managed strategic competition that is mutually beneficial to both China and the US. This would present a compelling alternative to an inevitable slide to war. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460184/original/file-20220428-24-9s2b2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/460184/original/file-20220428-24-9s2b2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460184/original/file-20220428-24-9s2b2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460184/original/file-20220428-24-9s2b2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460184/original/file-20220428-24-9s2b2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460184/original/file-20220428-24-9s2b2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/460184/original/file-20220428-24-9s2b2a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd argues they way to avoid war is for managed strategic relationships that benefit both the US and China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Joel Carrett</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At one level, this requires making preparations for war such that China judges the risks of acting now to be unreasonably high. Beijing is not yet ready to escalate military pressure on Taipei. It judges that it <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-05/kevin-rudd-usa-chinese-confrontation-short-of-war?check_logged_in=1">needs another five or ten years</a> to prepare. </p>
<p>Part of what is required in avoiding war is to constantly shift the calculus, so the risk of immediate action and the uncertainty of victory remain intolerably high.</p>
<p>Deterrence, backed by considerable and steadily increasing capacity, is an essential part of the response required to avoid a hot war. But so, too, is making the case for avoiding the descent into a new Cold War. </p>
<p>The truth is, both China and America have more to gain from strategic competition than they do from a further deterioration of relations to the point at which war becomes a live option. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-morrison-government-wants-a-khaki-election-how-do-the-two-major-parties-stack-up-on-national-security-179472">The Morrison government wants a 'khaki' election. How do the two major parties stack up on national security?</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>China’s rise, although not without problems, has so far been a <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/china-economic-growth-history/">net good</a> for the world. It can continue to be good. Australia has enjoyed decades of peaceful growth and prosperity driven by the rise of Asia and led by the transformation of China. </p>
<p>Constructively managed competition with China is not only essential to avoiding war, it has the potential to enable both an effective, cooperative response to the challenge of climate change and the global need for improving good governance.</p>
<p>A great strength of Australian approaches to defence and security, historically, has been sensible bipartisanship. There is too much at stake with national security to let short-term self-interest distort and distract.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182042/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. And he is engaged in a range of projects working to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia that are funded by the Australian government.</span></em></p>War with China is very likely, but it is avoidable if we take the threat seriously and act now.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1764852022-02-21T17:29:03Z2022-02-21T17:29:03ZNixon-Mao meeting: four lessons from 50 years of US-China relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/447587/original/file-20220221-22-5c6wve.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=64%2C131%2C1900%2C1168&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Making history: US president Richard Nixon meeting Chinese leader Mao Zedong in Beijing in1972.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">White House Photo Office Collection (Nixon Administration)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It was “the week that changed the world”. On February 21 1972, Chinese leader Mao Zedong and US president Richard Nixon <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/21/fifty-years-on-nixon-in-china-loses-its-sparkle-in-beijing-and-washington">met in Beijing</a> to reset their countries’ relations, which had been frozen for the previous two decades. </p>
<p>China needed protection from the USSR. Washington was keen to gain a new heavyweight partner to counter Moscow. But the US’s long-term objective was to bring the most populous country into a rising global economic order. Strategic interests of the two great powers were as aligned at the time as they clash nowadays.</p>
<p>The Nixon-Mao meeting was just the beginning of a durable, stable relationship. A few years after Nixon’s China trip, “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40201818">normalisation</a>” was achieved by Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping, and the US finally moved its embassy from Taiwan to Beijing.</p>
<p>The relationship has since survived two crucial passages. First, it made it through the administration of Ronald Reagan from 1980 to 1988. This was characterised by spirited support for Taiwan, which in the early days meant representatives such as vice-president (and later president), George H W Bush, and the former national security adviser Henry Kissinger had to conduct some diplomacy of reparation. </p>
<p>Most strikingly, the relationship made it through the repression of Tiananmen Square’s protests in 1989. Despite the shock to the world, Bush bypassed what Kissinger described as <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/On_China.html?id=GldTEJnmbeAC&redir_esc=y">“the bureaucracy and his own ban on high-level exchanges”</a>, writing a secret letter to Deng addressing him as <em>lao pengyou</em> – old friend – in memory of the years Bush had spent as liaison officer in Beijing.</p>
<p>If the US-China train did not derail, it was because, at the time, the US continued to prioritise economic interests. Indeed, a positive peak was reached during the 1990s. With <a href="https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm">a passionate speech</a> in March 2000, Bill Clinton sought to convince the US Congress that supporting the PRC’s entry into the World Trade Organisation was the right thing to do for those leaders who believed in “a future of greater openness and freedom for the people of China [and] in a future of greater prosperity for the American people”. </p>
<h2>Hidden tensions</h2>
<p>This was enough for a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2626754">military crisis in the Taiwan Strait</a> in 1995-96 and the US <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48134881">bombing of China’s embassy</a> in Belgrade in 1999 – declared involuntary by the Americans – not to destroy Nixon’s and others’ diplomatic efforts. But this would not last. </p>
<p>China’s defence expenditure was growing fast and when George W Bush started his race to the White House, he described China as <a href="https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm">“a competitor, not a strategic partner”</a>. Meanwhile, to his secretary of state, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2000-01-01/campaign-2000-promoting-national-interest">Condoleeza Rice</a>, China was a “potential threat”. </p>
<p>The shock of 9/11 and the financial crisis of 2008 meant that structural tensions between the US and China could be hidden under the carpet throughout the 2000s. But Barack Obama’s “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44289339">pivot to Asia</a>” launched between 2011 and 2012, implemented with more warmongering rhetoric by Donald Trump through his trade offensive, revealed that the world is just too small for two great powers like these, regardless of who the leaders are. </p>
<p>So tensions between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not end when Donald Trump left the White House in January 2021. Only two months ago, Joe Biden was inviting the west to join the US in a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics – a practice unheard of since the cold war. </p>
<h2>Complex relationship</h2>
<p>The current relationship is probably too complex to attach a label to – although clearly the trend is one of diplomatic unravelling. Five decades after the meeting between Nixon and Mao, there are four important lessons to be drawn. </p>
<p><strong>1. Nothing is eternal</strong> </p>
<p>Everything changes more quickly than western strategy-makers believe. Fifty years is a short time in historical perspective, and during this time we have managed to move from a cold war with Russia and the unfreezing of relations with China, to a new type of cold war between the US and China. </p>
<p>Many would admit that economic interdependence means we are in a much better place compared to the cold war years. Yet others might note that during that time there was an equilibrium of power, and diplomacy was able to operate efficiently with necessary agreements. In the case of current US-China relations, instead, we have a clearly declining superpower with a clearly rising economic and military power with a long list of grievances, and the two unable to reach much-needed diplomatic arrangements.</p>
<p><strong>2. The <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/deglobalization-and-international-order">liberal international order</a> was never truly global</strong> </p>
<p>It did spread unevenly. This is a critique to the west’s tendency to see the world on its own terms, but in this lesson there is probably an even harder truth. Conceptions of two competing orders are taking shape. As two China-based scholars, Adam Grydehøj and Ping Su <a href="https://www.routledge.com/China-and-the-Pursuit-of-Harmony-in-World-Politics-Understanding-Chinese/Grydehoj-Su/p/book/9781032194660">have pointed out,</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>One person’s “wolf warrior foreign policy” and “debt trap diplomacy” may be another person’s pursuit of a “harmonious world” and “community of common destiny”. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This truth is hard to digest. On the one hand, the US is seeking to prevent the erosion of the liberal international order through the containment of China and initiatives like Biden’s <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/">Build Back Better World (B3W)</a>. On the other hand, there are Chinese president Xi Jinping’s “common prosperity” campaign and a grand strategy based on the concept of “harmony”. These reject domestic interference and seek to shape international regimes to suit the PRC’s societal model.</p>
<p><strong>3. There is no US without China, and vice-versa</strong> </p>
<p>Both powers’ trajectories have been tied to one another during the past 50 years, at the very least. It is unrealistic to even think of a modern history of China without looking at its relationship with the west, especially during the “century of humiliation”, when China had to watch – and be bossed around by – imperialist nations running the world. The same is true specifically of its relationship with the US, especially since 1972.</p>
<p><strong>4. National interests still matter</strong> </p>
<p>The US has learned that the neoliberalism of the 1990s has weakened the country, as production of many strategic goods – such as rare earths and widely used pharmaceuticals – has shifted to China. Few people would admit that such shift was also inspired by the objective success of capitalism with Chinese characteristics. </p>
<p>Yet, if this shift is welcome, the COVID-19 emergency, economic austerity and social turmoil might lead us to copy China and introduce this political-economic model in an illiberal fashion. This is a lesson that we would be better to heed and avoid now rather than in a few decades.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zeno Leoni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Richard Nixon’s visit sparked a new era of collaboration but now the relationship between US and China is beginning to unravel.Zeno Leoni, Lecturer, Defence Studies Department and Lau China Institute, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1755072022-02-16T14:25:20Z2022-02-16T14:25:20ZHow companies should respond to U.S.-China tensions and global supply chain disruptions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444875/original/file-20220207-19-15vhn9p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C217%2C5000%2C2417&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tesla vehicles are parked outside of a building during a meeting between Tesla CEO Elon Musk and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in Beijing in 2019. Tesla is a company with both high reliance on North American technology and Chinese supply chains.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html">Ongoing tensions between the United States and China</a> have affected many companies around the world, including those in Canada.</p>
<p>Canada’s relationship to China has suffered due to the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/24/huawei-cfo-meng-wanzhou-to-be-released-after-agreement-with-us-in-fraud-case.html">legal saga involving Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou</a>. The COVID-19 pandemic has also made it very clear that a reliance on Chinese suppliers — for companies everywhere — can have disastrous consequences when these <a href="https://hbr.org/2020/09/global-supply-chains-in-a-post-pandemic-world">supply chains are interrupted</a>. </p>
<p>In this challenging and uncertain time, many companies are trying to reorganize their supply chains and reduce dependencies that are vulnerable to <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/supply-chain-vulnerability.aspx?lang=eng">political tensions and rising costs</a>. </p>
<p>While the pandemic <a href="https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-lessons-companies-need-to-learn-from-the-supply-chain-crisis-51634574031">has already compelled many companies to become more agile</a> — for example by increasing their number of suppliers — business leaders must now start thinking about the long-term implications of increased uncertainty in the markets since volatility is likely here to stay.</p>
<p>Our ongoing research suggests two factors are most important when making decisions on how to respond to the U.S.-China trade war: location and supply chain dependence, and technology. </p>
<h2>Ending dependence on two fronts</h2>
<p>The first factor deals with how much dependence companies have on Chinese suppliers and customers. China offers a uniquely complete <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/chinas-supply-chain-bottlenecks-winners-and-losers/">combination of supply chains</a> and <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3158753/chinas-expanding-middle-class-starting-look-lot-us-its-not">a growing middle class</a> that fuels high demand for almost any good. </p>
<p>According to a United Nations report, China is home to almost every industry and its companies offer almost the <a href="https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_4rev4e.pdf">full range of products and services</a> in each of these industries. </p>
<p>The second factor is technology dependence. In some industries, blazing a trail on the technology frontier is key to success. North America is still the <a href="https://www.visualcapitalist.com/national-innovation-the-most-innovative-countries-by-income/">leading region for many of these technologies</a> (including <a href="https://www.nationmaster.com/nmx/ranking/number-of-patents-in-the-biotechnology-sector">biotechnology</a>, <a href="https://thespoon.tech/europe-the-u-s-israel-which-country-might-be-next-to-approve-cultured-meat/">cultured meat</a> and <a href="https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/ai/ai-index-us-china-artificial-intelligence">artificial intelligence</a>) and it’s increasingly concerned about its intellectual property falling into Chinese hands.</p>
<p>Recent restrictions on Chinese researchers in Canadian universities are one example of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-canada-universities-research-waterloo-military-technology-1.5723846">protectionist actions</a> spurred by these concerns.</p>
<p>In the future, companies that deal with North American technologies in cutting-edge areas will probably have to avoid delivering to China or using this technology in collaborations with any Chinese companies.</p>
<h2>Low vs. high Chinese dependence</h2>
<p>Companies with different degrees of dependence on Chinese supply chains and North American technologies are likely to behave very differently. We walk through the four scenarios.</p>
<p>Companies with low reliance on both North American technology and Chinese supply chains tend to relocate their manufacturing facilities to a third, low-wage country, <a href="https://www.gpminstitute.com/publications-resources/Global-Payroll-Magazine/august-september-2016-issue/features-minimum-wage-debate-across-china-india-and-vietnam">such as Vietnam and India,</a> because it’s easy to find alternative production sites and to access technology.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444814/original/file-20220207-21-uxau20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a mask walks by a Samsung sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444814/original/file-20220207-21-uxau20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444814/original/file-20220207-21-uxau20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444814/original/file-20220207-21-uxau20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444814/original/file-20220207-21-uxau20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444814/original/file-20220207-21-uxau20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444814/original/file-20220207-21-uxau20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444814/original/file-20220207-21-uxau20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A visitor walks near the logo of Samsung Electronics at semiconductor exhibition in Seoul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Lee Jin-man)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://displaysolutions.samsung.com/main/index">Samsung’s display business</a>, offering digital signage and hospitality displays, is an example. Samsung’s reliance on Chinese supply chains is low because it owns a relatively complete supply chain ranging from upstream activities (inputs to products, such as chip design) to downstream activities (outputs such as products, like smartphones). </p>
<p>In short, Samsung designs, manufactures and markets its own products. The reliance on North American technology is also low because the technology required to produce display devices is not limited to North America. As a result, Samsung has shifted its manufacturing of IT and mobile displays from China to India, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4d8285a2-eff0-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195">avoiding tariffs and higher wages in China</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man's hards hold a black smartphone." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444815/original/file-20220207-25-u5wgf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444815/original/file-20220207-25-u5wgf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444815/original/file-20220207-25-u5wgf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444815/original/file-20220207-25-u5wgf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444815/original/file-20220207-25-u5wgf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444815/original/file-20220207-25-u5wgf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444815/original/file-20220207-25-u5wgf1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 2019 photo, a Google Hardware executive holds a new Pixel 4 phone in Mountainview, Calif.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Jeff Chiu)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But companies with high dependence on Chinese supply chains could have a hard time leaving China. Take Google’s Pixel phone as an example. </p>
<p>In 2019, Google decided to relocate the manufacturing of the Pixel phone from China to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2019/08/28/google-to-move-pixel-smartphone-production-out-of-china-to-an-old-nokia-factory-in-vietnam-report/?sh=1a65267f4f6c">Bac Ninh in northern Vietnam</a> to avoid tariffs into the U.S., an important market for its phones. Two years later, Google reversed the decision and started producing the new smartphone in China due to supply chain problems amid increasing <a href="https://www.gizmochina.com/2021/08/21/google-pixel-6-and-6-pro-will-be-made-in-china-due-to-covid-19-restrictions/">uncertainty from pandemic-related restrictions</a>. </p>
<h2>Relocations to North America</h2>
<p>Companies with a high reliance on North American technology and a relatively low reliance on Chinese supply chains, on the other hand, are likely to relocate manufacturing to North America. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444820/original/file-20220207-999-fjex6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man in a mask walks into a building with a TSMC logo on the front of it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444820/original/file-20220207-999-fjex6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444820/original/file-20220207-999-fjex6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444820/original/file-20220207-999-fjex6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444820/original/file-20220207-999-fjex6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444820/original/file-20220207-999-fjex6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444820/original/file-20220207-999-fjex6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444820/original/file-20220207-999-fjex6z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A person walks into the TSMC headquarters in Hsinchu, Taiwan, in October 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://time.com/6102879/semiconductor-chip-shortage-tsmc/">TSMC, one of the world’s leading semiconductor foundries</a>, uses substantial American technologies and equipment, including advanced equipment for <a href="https://aip.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/1.4863412">ultraviolet lithography</a>. Therefore, the Taiwanese company decided to build a new <a href="https://pr.tsmc.com/english/news/2033">advanced chip factory in Arizona</a>, a decision closely connected to its dependence on both U.S. technology and customers. </p>
<p>Companies with high reliance on both North American technology and the Chinese supply chain face the biggest challenges. They have no choice but to keep operating in both countries while navigating political risks and market turbulence. </p>
<p>Tesla is a prime example. While dependent on its research and development in the U.S. to enhance its leading technology position, China’s supply chain benefits Tesla with manufacturing speed, cost and proximity to the Chinese market. That leaves companies like Tesla with no choice but to navigate political tensions and stay present in both markets. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="People warning face masks look at a Tesla." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444827/original/file-20220207-15-6gb8s9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444827/original/file-20220207-15-6gb8s9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444827/original/file-20220207-15-6gb8s9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444827/original/file-20220207-15-6gb8s9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444827/original/file-20220207-15-6gb8s9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444827/original/file-20220207-15-6gb8s9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444827/original/file-20220207-15-6gb8s9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Visitors look at a Tesla vehicle on display at a trade show in Beijing in September 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a result, Tesla has built and expanded a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/tesla-invest-188-mln-expand-shanghai-factory-capacity-beijing-daily-2021-11-26/">factory in Shanghai</a>. Additionally, it has promised to conduct more <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2020/01/21/tesla-is-changing-china-will-china-change-tesla/?sh=4e9916ca79f4">research and development activities in China and to recruit local talent for local design</a>.</p>
<p>The COVID-19 pandemic has been another wake-up call for business leaders that should have prompted them to consider the importance of technological progress and supply chain security. While we don’t know how long the pandemic and its restrictions will endure, successful companies think ahead and build resilience and flexibility into their operations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175507/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Zhou receives funding from NSFC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abby Jingzi Zhou, Christiaan Röell, Felix Arndt, and Xiaomeng Liu do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Research suggests that two factors are most important when making decisions on how businesses should respond to the U.S.-China trade war: location and supply chain dependence, and technology.Felix Arndt, John F. Wood Chair in Entrepreneurship, University of GuelphAbby Jingzi Zhou, Associate Professor, International Business, University of NottinghamChristiaan Röell, Lecturer in International Business, University of SheffieldSteven Shijin Zhou, Associate Professor, International Business, University of NottinghamXiaomeng Liu, PhD Student, International Business, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1692282022-02-01T13:13:46Z2022-02-01T13:13:46ZChina has no plan for who will succeed Xi Jinping – leaving the nation and the world in uncertainty<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432508/original/file-20211117-23-xmkt5p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=160%2C24%2C8021%2C5470&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Since becoming China's top leader in late 2012, President Xi Jinping has centralized power to the point that it's unclear when he'll step down, or who might succeed him.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/large-screen-displays-chinas-president-xi-jinping-during-a-news-photo/1353609270?adppopup=true">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images AsiaPac via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since becoming China’s paramount leader in 2012, Xi Jinping has overseen enormous economic growth and solidified China’s standing as an economic and geopolitical superpower. He has also <a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership">centralized his power</a> over domestic politics. In 2018, Xi oversaw the <a href="https://theconversation.com/xis-indefinite-grasp-on-power-has-finally-captured-the-wests-attention-now-what-92721">repeal of</a> the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-term-limit-explainer.html">two-term limit on holding presidential office</a>, which has opened a path for him to stay in power after 2023. </p>
<p>Xi is arguably the most powerful leader of China since <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">Deng Xiaoping</a>, the architect of the economic reforms that <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/19/40-years-ago-deng-xiaoping-changed-china-and-the-world/">transformed China</a> from a poor agrarian nation into a major economic powerhouse. Before Xi became the leader of China, the Chinese Communist Party had a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-to-personalistic-rule/">system in place</a> for the peaceful transfer of power. This system was, for the most part, adhered to by <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/jiangzemin.shtml">Jiang Zemin</a> and <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/hujintao.shtml">Hu Jintao</a>, the two leaders who preceded Xi in office.</p>
<p>In the past, a lack of faith in a succession plan for the peaceful transition of power has led to <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-rise-of-the-xi-gang/">dissension within the ruling party</a>, domestic political interference by the <a href="https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-2.pdf">Chinese military</a> and tendencies toward a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">greater centralization of power</a> by Chinese leaders. Because of China’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908">major role on the world stage</a>, the lack of a plan to succeed Xi is likely to affect other nations. It is causing uncertainty about issues including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s41072-020-00076-w">potential trade disruptions</a>, foreign policy changes resulting from <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">domestic instability</a> and the potential for a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/after-xi#sec44501">military coup</a>.</p>
<p>I’ve found in my <a href="https://people.rit.edu/aabgsh/">research</a> on Chinese <a href="https://rsaiconnect.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rsp3.12193">economics</a> and <a href="https://rsaiconnect.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rsp3.12123">politics</a> that knowing more about how peaceful transfers of power have taken place in the past in China is key to fully grasping what might happen if Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-successor.html">does not name</a> a successor.</p>
<h2>How power is supposed to transition</h2>
<p>Since the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party">Chinese Communist Party</a> has held sole control of the government, and the general secretary, the top leader of the party, has ruled the nation. That role usually includes being chairman of the nation’s military, and holding the largely ceremonial title of “president.”</p>
<p>On paper, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/08/the-chinese-communist-partys-experiment-with-transparency/">here’s how</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">power passes without struggle from one top leader to another</a>: At the National Congress, a meeting held every five years, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41250273">delegates elect</a> members to the party’s Central Committee. </p>
<p>This committee then elects the general secretary and a body called the Politburo Standing Committee to lead the nation for the next five years.</p>
<h2>How power really transitions</h2>
<p>Yet since the era of <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1900_mao_early.htm">Mao Zedong</a>, the founding father of Communist China and its ruler from 1949 to 1976, the nation’s top leader has typically <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-successor.html">wielded significantly more influence</a> over these processes than the written rules suggest.</p>
<p>For many years, Mao did not name a successor. But in the final months of his life, Mao <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-china-has-a-succession-problem/">named and then discarded</a> one successor after another. He was attempting to avert the ascension to top leadership of a powerful Communist Party leader named <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Deng-Xiaoping">Deng Xiaoping</a>, fearing that <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">Deng would overturn</a> the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion">Cultural Revolution</a>, Mao’s movement to forcefully eradicate all remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese society. </p>
<p>Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, did become the nation’s top leader following Mao’s death in 1976. But he accomplished relatively little, and by 1977, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">pressure was on to oust him</a> in favor of Deng. By 1981, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">Deng had seized power</a>.</p>
<p>Deng instituted several <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725867">social and economic reforms</a> that created the foundation for China’s blistering economic growth over the past few decades. In the process, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/09/24/whats-next-for-poverty-reduction-policies-in-china/">hundreds of millions of Chinese</a> citizens have progressed from poverty into the middle class, and China has become the <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/">second-largest economy</a> in the world. </p>
<p>When Deng stepped down in 1989, he created his own succession crisis. Deng tagged a relatively obscure politician named <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/jiangzemin.shtml">Jiang Zemin</a> to succeed him but also declared that politician <a href="http://en.people.cn/data/people/hujintao.shtml">Hu Jintao</a> should succeed Jiang after two terms. Jiang and Hu became <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/world/analysts-see-tension-in-china-within-the-top-leadership.html">powerful rivals</a> for the next two decades.</p>
<p>Tensions with Jiang slowed Hu’s attempts to introduce reforms seeking economic growth in China’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">western and northeastern regions</a> instead of its more dynamic east coast. They also hurt Hu’s ability to carry out <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/01/world/analysts-see-tension-in-china-within-the-top-leadership.html">political changes</a> desired by China’s liberal intellectuals.</p>
<p>The Hu era came to an end in 2012 with a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">peaceful transfer of power to Xi Jinping</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Photos of four men" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443223/original/file-20220128-23-7puub3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A museum in Beijing displays portraits of Chinese leaders, from left, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChinaUSLeadersVisits/bbfa65769f234c279a83bd49f66ecbe6/photo">AP Photo/Andy Wong</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A potential ruler for life</h2>
<p>Xi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-party-term-limit.html">moved speedily</a> to <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT503/RAND_CT503.pdf">centralize power</a> to an extent not seen since Deng. He <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rethinking-chinese-politics/D7623CCAA7ADEE7A03453F69C9154BA4">purged political enemies</a> from influential party positions. He also positioned his <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/events/seminars/02nov2020-what-is-xi-fighting-the-dynamics-of-corruption-in-post-mao-china.html">campaign against corruption</a> as critical to the <a href="https://www.soas.ac.uk/china-institute/events/seminars/02nov2020-what-is-xi-fighting-the-dynamics-of-corruption-in-post-mao-china.html">ongoing existence of the party</a> and the nation.</p>
<p>Expert observers believe it likely that Xi is intent on keeping the power he’s amassed, by remaining in office for an <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Xi-s-third-term-plans-in-focus-ahead-of-China-s-party-conclave">unprecedented third term</a> and possibly longer.</p>
<p>Xi’s authoritarian rule has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-works-to-stifle-dissent-amid-concerns-about-chinas-economy-11551609000">stifled domestic dissent</a>, resulted in the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/xi-jinping-successor-sun-zhengcai-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-2018-5">jailing</a> of many of his political rivals, led to the widespread <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang">persecution of Uyghurs</a> in Xinjiang and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/19/world/asia/taiwan-china-identity.html">alienated the Taiwanese people</a> – whom the Communists wish would reunify with China.</p>
<p>Expert China watchers are now assessing the risks of a potential <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/after-xi">leadership challenge or a coup</a> to oust Xi, which could be resisted by Xi’s own supporters. Observers believe this could lead to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/27/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-lifting-term-limits-for-xi-jinping/">public turmoil and repression</a> of the sort seen in Tiananmen Square in 1989, when <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48445934">peaceful student-led protests</a> were <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/tiananmen-square-tank-man-china/">harshly put down</a> by troops armed with assault rifles and accompanied by tanks.</p>
<p>To prevent this, Xi has expanded the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/03/how-has-tiananmen-changed-china/">existing security regime</a> into an elaborate <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-paper-tiger-surveillance-state/">surveillance state</a> in which digital technologies and artificial intelligence are used to maintain the government’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/china-ai-surveillance/614197/">totalitarian control</a>.</p>
<h2>Global reach</h2>
<p>Finally, the Chinese succession problem could also become a global problem. China has the world’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-12445925">second-largest economy</a>. Uncertainty stemming from domestic political instability is likely to hurt <a href="https://hbr.org/2006/11/hedging-political-risk-in-china">global markets and interest in investing in China</a>. This could mean <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1260.pdf">financial stress</a> in China, trade disruptions and the <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/asia-pacific/china-supply-chain.html">rerouting of supply chains</a> out of China. Nations closely tied to China would also see their <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1260.pdf">trade and financial pictures change for the worse</a>.</p>
<p>China has become a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/04/what-the-pentagons-new-report-on-china-means-for-u-s-strategy-including-on-taiwan/">potent military power</a>. A domestic power crisis may lead to a chaotic transfer of leadership, whether or not the People’s Liberation Army <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china-s-looming-succession-crisis">stages a coup</a>. </p>
<p>Globally, China’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/us-china-tensions-explained.html">relations with the U.S.</a> and its present desire for <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/10/09/chinas-xi-jinping-calls-peaceful-reunification-taiwan/6072388001/">peaceful reunification with Taiwan</a> may both change. In addition, China may be less able to manage <a href="https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/09/CPA_memos_Managing_Instability_China_Periphery.pdf">unstable neighbors</a> like North Korea, Myanmar, Kazakhstan and Pakistan.</p>
<p>In 1980, at age 75, Deng Xiaoping <a href="https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/on-the-reform-of-the-system-of-party-and-state-leadership/">said</a>, “We must take the long-term interest into account and solve the problem of the succession in leadership.” Unfortunately, this has not happened. Since instability in China is likely to have global impacts, Xi and the Chinese Communist Party have an obligation to establish a credible system for an orderly transfer of power.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amitrajeet A. Batabyal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the past, the lack of a succession plan for China has led to political unrest in the country. If it happens again, it will also affect the world.Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Arthur J. Gosnell Professor of Economics, Rochester Institute of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1719262021-11-16T21:13:13Z2021-11-16T21:13:13ZXi-Biden meeting is cordial, but will anything change between the superpowers?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432140/original/file-20211116-25-bwyq99.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Susan Walsh</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>American-Chinese summit diplomacy comes and goes, but there will not be a much more <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/11/15/world/biden-xi-summit">consequential meeting</a> between two leaders than the latest of Joe Biden and Xi Jinping’s consultations.</p>
<p>If a measure was needed of how transformational the relationship between the US and China has become, one only needs go back to the first post-revolution summit between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/books/chapters/0225-1st-macm.html">Richard Nixon and an ailing Mao Zedong in 1972</a>.</p>
<p>Then, no-one could have predicted that within a generation the two countries would be locked in strategic competition. Nor would they have foreseen China surging forward economically to become the world’s second largest economy.</p>
<p>They also would not have forecast the leaders of the world’s most powerful countries meeting virtually, in contrast to the staged audience <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/24/document-of-the-week-pompeo-buries-u-s-china-engagement-policy/">Mao conducted with Nixon in Beijing’s fortified leadership compound</a> a half century ago.</p>
<p>As always, US-China summits are framed by the <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d203">Shanghai Communique</a> signed in 1972 by Nixon and then Premier Zhou Enlai. This acknowledged a “one-China” policy and set aside the issue of Taiwan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432141/original/file-20211116-17-1spt1u7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432141/original/file-20211116-17-1spt1u7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432141/original/file-20211116-17-1spt1u7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432141/original/file-20211116-17-1spt1u7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432141/original/file-20211116-17-1spt1u7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432141/original/file-20211116-17-1spt1u7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/432141/original/file-20211116-17-1spt1u7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=621&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nixon and Mao meet during Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In his virtual discussions with Xi, Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">reiterated America’s acceptance of “one China”</a>, while re-stating Washington’s insistence the status quo in the Taiwan Strait not be altered by force.</p>
<p>While it is much too soon to talk about a reset in US-China relations, a reasonable conclusion is that Biden and Xi have at least got the relationship more or less back on track after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/mar/14/chaos-under-heaven-josh-rogin-donald-trump-china-covid">chaotic Trump era</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinping-sends-message-to-us-on-chinas-rising-power-in-boao-address-159324">Xi Jinping sends message to US on China's rising power in Boao address</a>
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<p>Comments from the two sides on the encounter, which stretched over three-and-a-half hours, indicate that not much was off the table. Both emphasised the need for ongoing dialogue.</p>
<p>A White House <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">readout</a> indicated that Biden emphasised strong US opposition to China’s attempt to throw its weight around.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>President Biden underscored the United States will continue to stand up for its interests and values and together with our allies and partners, ensure the rules of the road for the 21st century advances an international system that is free, open, and fair.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From an Australian perspective, given the bad state of relations between Canberra and Beijing, these expressions of support for “allies and partners” will be welcome,</p>
<p>In another significant intervention, Biden called for greater cooperation to avoid possible conflict.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>President Biden also underscored the importance of managing strategic risks. He noted the need for commonsense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict […]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Chinese “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/15/biden-xi-kick-off-virtual-meeting-with-calls-to-increase-communication.html">readout</a>” came via Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, who said the meeting was “wide-ranging, in-depth, candid, constructive, substantive and productive”.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1460466813368602627"}"></div></p>
<p>Chinese state media quoted Xi as describing the talks as a “new era” in which the principles of “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation should be followed”.</p>
<p>Both Biden’s and Xi’s words indicated a wish to improve the relationship through more frequent communication.</p>
<p>Biden’s <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/biden-opens-xi-meeting-with-message-on-avoiding-conflict-20211116-p599cn">remarks</a> before the two leaders began the talks suggested he was keen to establish a less combative relationship. He said</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It seems to be our responsibility as the leaders of China and the United States to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict whether intended or unintended, rather than simple, straightforward competition.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Xi responded by calling Biden an “old friend” and expressed the wish to “work with you, Mr President, to build consensus, take active steps and move China-US relations forward in a positive direction”.</p>
<p>The above sentiments expressed by both sides could be regarded as nothing more nor less than what might be expected in exchanges between US and Chinese leaders in a summit setting. But there is at least a chance that a more constructive relationship will emerge from these talks.</p>
<p>In a complex world in which both the US and China are facing immense challenges domestically, it is in neither’s interest for relations to spiral.</p>
<p>Indeed, it is in their collective interest for a more workable relationship to emerge. Agreement between Washington and Beijing at the recent COP26 climate summit to <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-china-joint-glasgow-declaration-on-enhancing-climate-action-in-the-2020s/">work constructively towards climate targets</a> is an example of the sort of collaboration that serves each other’s interests.</p>
<p>However, it would be extremely naïve to believe the world is about to enter a new and more benign phase following the Biden-Xi talks. Multiple structural differences between the competing powers are such that it is inevitable the two will continue to be at odds on a range of issues.</p>
<hr>
<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-global-diplomatic-approach-is-shifting-and-australia-would-do-well-to-pay-attention-to-it-169930">China's global diplomatic approach is shifting, and Australia would do well to pay attention to it</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>Most concerning for America and its friends, one of those issues is China’s continuing <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d7c50283-18c8-4f2e-8731-970d9a547688">military build-up</a>. This includes additions to its nuclear arsenal and the development of space-enabled hypersonic missiles that would pose a serious threat to US military supremacy in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>China’s military buildup in the East and South China Seas, despite assurances provided by Xi to President Barack Obama that Beijing’s intentions were benign, represents a significant concern for the US and its allies. This includes Australia.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-would-a-biden-presidency-mean-for-australia-148516">What would a Biden presidency mean for Australia?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>China’s use of its cyber capabilities in a provocative manner is another cause for concern. Its intellectual property theft weighs heavily on relations with Washington. Its human rights abuses represent another serious drag on the relationship.</p>
<p>All that said, personal diplomacy between Xi and Biden may serve to smooth off some of the rougher edges of a relationship that will continue to be tested. This is because of the simple reality that China, as a rising power, will continue to disrupt the US and its allies on many different fronts.</p>
<p>The question that should be asked about this latest attempt to restore a level of equilibrium to the relationship is whether there is reasonable expectation a more constructive partnership will develop.</p>
<p>There are reasons why relations might become less contentious. On the other hand, there are compelling arguments for why deep and aggravating differences are such that a dysfunctional relationship remains likely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171926/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The meeting of the leaders of the world’s most powerful countries hit all the right diplomatic notes, but there are still vast differences and disagreements to work through.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1699302021-10-17T19:14:38Z2021-10-17T19:14:38ZChina’s global diplomatic approach is shifting, and Australia would do well to pay attention to it<p>In 1934, Mao Zedong’s embattled guerrilla forces began what was to prove an epic military withdrawal from southern China to a stronghold in the north of the country.</p>
<p>This became known as the <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1900_mao_march.htm">Long March</a>. It enabled the Communists to break out of so-called “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/mao-lin-biao-and-the-fifth-encirclement-campaign/8F7B0C06F0C4A49A1C3CB73051AF1C04">encirclement campaigns</a>” to fight another day against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists.</p>
<p>In Chinese Communist Party history, there is hardly a more indelible moment. It is certain to have been imprinted on the consciousness of Xi Jinping by his father <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/what-xi-jinping-learned-and-didnt-learn-from-his-father-about-xinjiang/">Xi Zhongxun</a>, a Mao-era military commissar and later a vice premier.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=412&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426605/original/file-20211015-15-b7zk3w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=518&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In Chinese history, there is hardly a more indelible moment than the Long March.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">www.schoolshistory.org.uk</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fast forward to 2021, and there have been signs in recent weeks of China seeking to reduce the risk of geopolitical isolation in its own diplomatic “long march” – to become the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA400/RRA447-1/RAND_RRA447-1.pdf">pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific and global rival to the US</a>.</p>
<p>Sometimes forgotten in the ideological debate in the West about Beijing’s motivations under Xi is that Chinese leaders are pragmatists conditioned by ruthless internal Communist Party politics.</p>
<p>So a reasonable question now is whether Xi and his advisers have understood that the risks of overreach in China’s interactions with the outside world outweigh the benefits.</p>
<p>In other words, where lies the <a href="https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/geopolitics-is-winning-economics-is-losing-20211013-p58zqs">zero-sum game</a>?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-drives-to-counter-china-come-with-a-major-risk-throwing-fuel-on-the-indo-pacific-arms-race-168734">New drives to counter China come with a major risk: throwing fuel on the Indo-Pacific arms race</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One aspect of Chinese statecraft to keep in mind is that Beijing will seek to get away with whatever it can.</p>
<p>Viewed from behind the vermilion walls of Zhongnanhai, Beijing’s leadership compound, American-led efforts to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/30/four-principles-to-guide-u.s.-policy-toward-china-pub-83074">“contain” China</a> will have taken on some of the characteristics of an encirclement campaign.</p>
<p>Beijing’s reaction has been relatively muted, by its standards, to the recent announcement of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/world/australia/australia-china-submarines.html">AUKUS alignment</a> between Australia, the UK and the US as a China containment front. But Chinese leaders will nonetheless view this as part of a latter-day encirclement campaign.</p>
<p>Likewise, the elevation of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know">Quad grouping</a> of the US, Japan, India and Australia would be seen in Beijing as a further example of US-led China containment architecture.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426609/original/file-20211015-20689-129fu3u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Beijing will see a recent meeting of the Quad in Washington as another example of encirclement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sarahbeth Maney/EPA/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Apart from the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234751.shtml">usual bluster</a> in Chinese Communist Party mouthpieces like the Global Times, what has been Beijing’s response to all this?</p>
<p>The short answer is that it has been engaging in some creative diplomacy to lessen risks of geopolitical isolation.</p>
<p>This has involved:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the engagement at presidential level between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/06/us/politics/biden-xi-jinping-china-summit.html">Xi and Joe Biden</a> with promise of a virtual summit by the end of the year</p></li>
<li><p>the makings of a <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1235276.shtml">charm offensive</a> in Beijing’s dealings with the European Union</p></li>
<li><p>an application to join the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/23/china-moves-to-join-the-cptpp-but-dont-expect-a-fast-pass/">Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)</a> on top of joining the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1219113.shtml">Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)</a></p></li>
<li><p>a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/24/us/politics/huawei-meng-wanzhou.html">hostage exchange</a>” enabling the release from detention of the daughter of one of China’s most powerful businessmen</p></li>
<li><p>an announcement that China would <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58647481">stop funding coal-fired power stations abroad</a>. This comes ahead of the <a href="https://ukcop26.org/uk-presidency/what-is-a-cop/">United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26)</a>, where it is expected to play a leading role.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In Canberra policymaking circles, dominated by a national security establishment wedded to seeing China as a threat, the above developments might be weighed.</p>
<hr>
<p>
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Read more:
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<p>In the case of Xi and Biden, the issue is not so much whether there is a thaw in Sino-US relations after the wrenching Donald Trump era. It is more about whether the world’s dominant powers can establish a relationship that enables reasonable dialogue and even co-operation.</p>
<p>In the Xi-Biden phone call on September 9, the two agreed there was too little communication between Beijing and Washington. It was followed this month by a six-hour in-person meeting in Zurich between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/06/us/politics/biden-xi-jinping-china-summit.html">National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi</a>.</p>
<p>The upshot is that Xi and Biden will meet “virtually” within weeks.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426610/original/file-20211015-21-18ish3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Can US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping build a meaningful and productive relationship?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lintao Zhang/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Significantly, Biden in his conversation with Xi reiterated <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/biden-xi-jinping-agree-to-abide-by-taiwan-agreement/100518846">America’s commitment to the spirit of the Shanghai communique</a> that enabled the issue of Taiwan to be set aside.</p>
<p>This should be regarded as a positive development.</p>
<p>In Beijing’s dealings with the European Union, the several sessions with top European officials conducted in late September by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi are notable.</p>
<p>Wang’s strategic dialogue with Josep Borell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, followed discussions with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.</p>
<p>These were aimed at clearing the air after strong criticism and censure in Europe of China’s mistreatment of its Uighur minority, and arguments over Taiwan.</p>
<p>In another important development, Xi was due last Friday to speak with European Council President Charles Michel.</p>
<p>On Wednesday of last week, the Chinese leader held a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-angela-merkel-holds-farewell-call-with-chinese-president-xi/a-59496213">“friendly” phone call</a> with outgoing German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The two discussed preparations for the <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/2021-road.html">G20 summit in Rome</a>, climate change issues ahead of COP26 and the European Union’s <a href="https://www.china-briefing.com/news/european-parliament-votes-to-freeze-the-eu-china-comprehensive-agreement-on-investment/">stalled investment agreement with China</a>.</p>
<p>The latter has been interrupted because of tensions between Beijing and Brussels on the Uighur issue and other stresses.</p>
<p>This flurry of diplomatic activity could not contrast more sharply with the <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/australian-business-faces-years-in-the-china-deep-freeze-20210719-p58aw9">deep freeze</a> in relations between Beijing and Canberra, with high-level contacts at ministerial level suspended.</p>
<p>Perhaps most significant of recent China’s diplomatic manoeuvres has been its request to join the CPTPP, which groups 11 Asia-Pacific countries in a trade bloc.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-a-great-chance-to-engage-in-trade-diplomacy-with-china-and-it-must-take-it-154737">Australia has a great chance to engage in trade diplomacy with China, and it must take it</a>
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<p>The Obama administration originally conceived of the CPTPP as a means of pressuring China on trade and security issues. Trump’s abandonment of the trade bloc has enabled China to make a bid for membership.</p>
<p>The Australian government has said <a href="https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-applies-to-join-pacific-trade-bloc-as-security-tensions-rise-20210917-p58sgv">China could not be considered for membership</a> until it relaxes its punitive trade campaign against Australian exports. Individual members have veto power over new entrants.</p>
<p>In any case, Beijing would have difficulty meeting the trade-liberalisation requirements of the CPTPP.</p>
<p>On the other hand, China’s request for membership simultaneously with that of Taiwan renews focus on regional trade agreements in which Beijing is active.</p>
<p>China joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) last year and is a principal sponsor of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/426612/original/file-20211015-20689-1920a46.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=484&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The release of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou back to China has removed a major diplomatic hurdle between Beijing and Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darryl Dyck/AP/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On the diplomatic front, the deal enabling <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-58682998">Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou’s return to China</a> from Vancouver in a hostage swap removed a significant irritation in US-China ties.</p>
<p>Finally, China’s announcement it was ending its funding of coal-fired power stations abroad was clearly aimed at window-dressing its <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-response-climate-change-study-contrasts-and-policy-crossroads-0">patchy performance on climate issues</a> ahead of the G20 summit in Rome and COP26 in Glasgow.</p>
<p>These diplomatic shifts do not necessarily amount to a breakout moment for China in its troubled relationship with the international community. But it would be a mistake for countries like Australia to assume China will continue to alienate a wider international community if it believes its actions are proving inimical to its own interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169930/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Mao’s Long March has a storied place in Chinese history. There are resonances in China’s current approach to international relations.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687342021-09-27T03:08:03Z2021-09-27T03:08:03ZNew drives to counter China come with a major risk: throwing fuel on the Indo-Pacific arms race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423254/original/file-20210927-125162-1mqlqi7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=480%2C41%2C4580%2C3636&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Evan Vucci/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>An accelerating arms race in the Indo-Pacific is all but guaranteed now that China finds itself a target of new security arrangements — AUKUS and <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-exactly-is-the-quad-and-whats-on-the-agenda-for-their-washington-summit-167988">the Quad</a> — aimed at containing its power and influence.</p>
<p>This has the makings of a new great game in the region in which rival powers are no longer in the business of pretending things can continue as they are.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-aukus-pact-born-in-secrecy-will-have-huge-implications-for-australia-and-the-region-168065">AUKUS agreement</a>, involving Australia, the US and UK to counter China’s rise means a military power balance in the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/forget-asia-pacific-it-s-the-indo-pacific-we-live-in-now-where-is-that-exactly-20210810-p58hku.html">Indo-Pacific</a> will come more sharply into focus.</p>
<p>The region has been re-arming at rates faster than other parts of the world due largely to China’s push to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military">modernise its defence capabilities</a>.</p>
<p>In their latest surveys, the London-based <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2021">International Institute of Strategic Studies</a> (IISS) and the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/sipri-fact-sheet-april-2021-trends-world-military-expenditure-2020">Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</a> (SIPRI) report no let-up in military spending in the Indo-Pacific. This is despite the pandemic.</p>
<p>SIPRI notes a <a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2021/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2020">47% increase in defence spending in the Indo-Pacific in the past decade</a>, led by China and India.</p>
<p>China can be expected to respond to threats posed by the new security arrangements by further expediting its military program. </p>
<p>It will see the formation of AUKUS as yet another attempt to <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/aukus-submarine-deal-response-to-chinese-aggression-by-chris-patten-2021-09">contain its ambitions</a> — and therefore a challenge to its military capabilities.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-it-time-for-a-new-way-of-war-what-chinas-army-reforms-mean-for-the-rest-of-the-world-134660">Is it time for a 'new way of war?' What China's army reforms mean for the rest of the world</a>
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<h2>The Quad makes clear its ambitions</h2>
<p>Unambiguously, AUKUS implies a containment policy.</p>
<p>Likewise, the further elevation of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-diamond-past-present-and-future-quadrilateral-security-dialogue">Quad security grouping</a> into a China containment front will play into an atmosphere of heightened security anxiety in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>The four Quad participants – the US, Japan, India and Australia – have their own reasons and agendas for wanting to <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-vision-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-quad-leaders-send-a-clear-signal-to-china-167896">push back</a> against China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Quad leaders in Washington" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/423255/original/file-20210927-125746-1hv8gno.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Quad leaders unveiled a host of initiatives after their face-to-face meeting last week.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Evan Vucci/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After their summit last week in Washington, the Quad leaders used words in their <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/">joint statement</a> that might be regarded as unexceptional in isolation. </p>
<p>Together with other developments such as AUKUS, however, the language was pointed, to say the least:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Together, we re-commit to promoting the free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster security in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The “beyond” part of the statement was not expanded on, but might be read as a commitment to extend the Quad collaboration globally.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-vision-of-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific-quad-leaders-send-a-clear-signal-to-china-167896">With vision of a 'free and open Indo-Pacific', Quad leaders send a clear signal to China</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>All this has come together at the dawn of a new US administration whose members include several conspicuous China hawks, and at a moment when China has shown itself to be ever-willing to throw its weight around.</p>
<p>Beijing’s crude campaign against Australian exports in an effort to bend Australia’s policy to its will is a prime example. It is doubtful an AUKUS or an invigorated Quad would have emerged without this development.</p>
<p>The Obama administration talked about <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific">pivoting to the Asia-Pacific</a> without putting much meat on the bones.</p>
<p>Under President Joe Biden, this shift will be driven by a hardening in American thinking that now recognises time is running out, and may already have expired, in the US ability to constrain China’s rise.</p>
<p>These are profound geopolitical moments whose trajectory is impossible to predict.</p>
<h2>Australia commits fully to China containment</h2>
<p>Canberra is now a fully paid-up member of a China containment front, whether it wants to admit it, or not. In the process, it has yielded sovereignty to the US by committing itself to an interlocking web of military procurement decisions that includes the <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security">acquisition of a nuclear-propelled submarine fleet</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nuclear-submarines-are-a-smart-military-move-for-australia-and-could-deter-china-further-168064">Why nuclear submarines are a smart military move for Australia — and could deter China further</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Whether these submarines are supplied by the US or Britain is a bit immaterial since the technology involved originates in America.</p>
<p>The submarines will not be available for the better part of two decades under the most optimistic forecasts. However, in the meantime, Australia could base US or British submarines in its ports or lease American submarines.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Australia is committing itself to a range of US-supplied hardware aimed at enhancing the inter-operability of its military with the US.</p>
<p>This is the reality of fateful decisions taken by the Morrison government in recent months. Such a commitment involves a certain level of confidence in America remaining a predictable and steadfast superpower, and not one riven by internal disputes.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1442310305854414851"}"></div></p>
<h2>Australian defence spending likely to rise</h2>
<p>What is absolutely certain in all of this is that an Indo-Pacific security environment will now become more, not less, contentious.</p>
<p>SIPRI notes that in 2020, military spending in Asia totalled $US528 billion (A$725 billion), 62% of which was attributable to China and India.</p>
<p>IISS singled out Japan and Australia, in particular, as countries that were increasing defence spending to take account of China. Tokyo, for example, is budgeting for <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2021-08-31/japan-record-defense-budget-f-35-china-2727340.html">record spending of $US50 billion</a> (A$68 billion) for 2022-23.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-exactly-is-the-quad-and-whats-on-the-agenda-for-their-washington-summit-167988">Explainer: what exactly is the Quad and what's on the agenda for their Washington summit?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Australia’s <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defence-budget-climbs-to-44-6-billion/">defence spending stands a tick over 2% of GDP in 2021-22 at A$44.6 billion</a>, with plans for further increases in the forward estimates.</p>
<p>However, those projections will now have to be re-worked given the commitments that have been made under AUKUS.</p>
<p>Neglected in the flush of enthusiasm that accompanied the AUKUS announcement is the likely cost of Australia’s new defence spending under a “China containment policy”. It is hard to see these commitments being realised without significant increases in defence allocations to 3-4% of GDP.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1439175836159066113"}"></div></p>
<p>This comes at a time when budgets will already be stretched due to relief spending as a consequence of the pandemic.</p>
<p>In addition to existing weapons acquisitions, Canberra has indicated it will ramp up its purchases of longer-range weapons. This includes Tomahawk cruise missiles for its warships and anti-ship missiles for its fighter aircraft.</p>
<p>At the same time, it will work with the US under the AUKUS arrangement to <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/quantum-sensors-sea-drones-and-hypersonic-missiles-what-are-the-new-frontiers-of-war-20210923-p58ubz.html">develop hypersonic missiles</a> that would test even the most sophisticated defence systems.</p>
<h2>What other Indo-Pacific nations are doing</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/an-intensifying-arms-race-asia-2021-09-21/#:%7E:text=In%25202020%252C%2520the%2520U.S.%2520government,about%2520%25245%2520billion%2520in%2520total.">Many other Indo-Pacific states</a> can now be expected to review their military acquisition programs with the likelihood of a more combative security environment.</p>
<p>Taiwan, for example, is proposing to <a href="https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-to-spend-an-usd-869-billion-in-defence-sector-amid-gwonig-threats-from-china20210916225841/">spend $US8.69 billion</a> (A$11.9 billion) over the next five years on long-range missiles, and increase its inventory of cruise missiles. It is also adding to its arsenal of heavy artillery.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1293771829488877568"}"></div></p>
<p>South Korea is actively adding to its missile capabilities. This includes the testing of a <a href="https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/south-korea-test-fires-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile-2541467">submarine-launched ballistic missile</a>. </p>
<p>Seoul has also hinted it might be considering building its <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/205_235969.html">own nuclear-propelled submarines</a> (this was among President Moon Jae-in’s election pledges in 2017). Signs that North Korea may have developed a submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles will be concentrating minds in Seoul.</p>
<p>All this indicates how quickly the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific is shifting.</p>
<p>Australia — perhaps more so than others — is the prime example of a regional player that has put aside a conventional view of a region in flux. It now sees an environment so threatening that a policy of strategic ambiguity between its custodial partner (the US) and most important trade relationship (China) has been abandoned.</p>
<p>The price tag for this in terms of equipment and likely continuing economic fallout for Australian exporters will not come cheap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168734/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The region is already arming at the fastest rate in the world, but China and other nations can be expected to respond to AUKUS by further expanding their militaries.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1576382021-06-16T12:39:23Z2021-06-16T12:39:23ZRacial bias makes white Americans more likely to support wars in nonwhite foreign countries – new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403414/original/file-20210528-19-1lm3qqr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C22%2C3790%2C2494&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">White Americans who hold racist attitudes are likely to prefer military action over diplomacy in foreign countries like Iran and, in particular, China.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/soldiers-marching-in-desert-royalty-free-image/dv144072?adppopup=true">Frank Rossoto Stocktrek via Getty</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The effects of American racial bias and anti-Asian sentiment do not end at the nation’s borders. The racial attitudes of white people also influence their support for American military intervention abroad, according to <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/djkl9ads9y60394/2021-02-10_Ebner-and-Medenica_Racial-Empire_Working-Draft.pdf?dl=0">our working paper on U.S. foreign policy and racism</a>.</p>
<p>White Americans who hold racist beliefs are significantly more likely to endorse aggressive military interventions over diplomacy or economic strategies in foreign countries at odds with the United States, if the residents of those countries are perceived as nonwhite. </p>
<p>This is particularly true when it comes to China.</p>
<h2>Race and public opinion</h2>
<p>Researchers have long known that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716210390288?casa_token=4Q5QjiDimlEAAAAA:nmcoUTTuE15x2ybH8_gnGHdj-EsRQWZMv7O-f4PKoWXImAgkTERzB8sgP854KMmVlMBl2EA0SKtj">race and racism</a> powerfully shape white Americans’ views on <a href="https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/15/16781222/trump-racism-economic-anxiety-study">domestic issues</a> like social welfare and criminal justice. </p>
<p>Scholars have given less attention to how the racial resentment harbored by white people influences <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/19/why-race-matters-international-relations-ir/">their foreign policy views</a>, in part because the typical voter <a href="https://www.cfr.org/news-releases/americans-lack-knowledge-international-issues-yet-consider-them-important-finds-new">cares less about</a> foreign policy than about domestic policies that affect their everyday lives. </p>
<p>But when tensions between the U.S. and another country escalate, as they have lately with Iran, North Korea and China, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/26/will-foreign-policy-be-a-major-issue-in-the-2016-election-heres-what-we-know/">popular interest in foreign policy rises</a>. That can <a href="https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-impact-of-public-opinion-on-us-foreign-policy-since-vietnam-9780195105285?cc=us&lang=en&">influence policy</a> decisions.</p>
<p>To analyze how racial attitudes affect support for U.S. military action abroad, we examined 30 years of public opinion data collected by one of the country’s longest-running national public opinion surveys, the <a href="https://electionstudies.org/">American National Election Study</a>. Our analysis focused on answers by white Americans from 1986 to 2016. </p>
<p>Specifically, we examined their responses to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/15/white-racial-resentment-has-been-gaining-political-power-for-decades/">“racial resentment” scale</a>. Social scientists use this meticulously tested set of questions to assess anti-Black prejudice in the post-civil rights era. In recent decades, white Americans have become <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691070711/the-race-card">less willing</a> to express <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2805831/">explicitly racist</a> views, such as opposing interracial marriage or supporting segregation. But they may still harbor bigoted perceptions, doubting Black Americans’ work ethic or commitment to self-reliance, for example. </p>
<p>The racial resentment scale is designed to capture this kind of discriminatory anti-Black views. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bearded older man at a white supremacist rally carrying a sign that says 'White Lives Matter'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A ‘White Lives Matter’ rally held in Shelbyville, Tenn., in 2017, hosted by Nationalist Front, a coalition of white supremacist organizations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/white-nationalist-attend-a-rally-on-october-28-2017-in-news-photo/867653312?adppopup=true">Scott Olson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Social scientists have repeatedly demonstrated that <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/1645-racecraft">white people who hold such views</a> are also likely to hold negative views of <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Racial-Formation-in-the-United-States/Omi-Winant/p/book/9780415520317">other nonwhite U.S. populations</a>, including <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Ignored-Racism-Animus-Toward-Latinos/dp/110849532X">Latinos</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/07/10/racial-resentment-is-biggest-predictor-immigration-attitudes-study-finds/">immigrants</a>, <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2019.1623053">Muslim Americans</a> and <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300093308/bitter-fruit">Asian Americans</a>.</p>
<p>Based on responses to the racial resentment scale in the most recent American National Election Studies – administered in 2012 and 2016 to about 3,000 non-Hispanic white respondents each – we found that racist attitudes are correlated with and meaningfully influence white Americans’ support for U.S. military interventions in other countries. </p>
<p>For example, people with racist attitudes favored more <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/america-and-iran-from-fascination-to-antagonism/2021/02/24/d6078bb4-7246-11eb-85fa-e0ccb3660358_story.html">aggressive action against Iran</a>. Thirty-five percent would support bombing Iranian suspected nuclear development sites, compared with 15% of whites with less racist attitudes and 31% of white Americans overall. </p>
<p>White Americans with racist views also favor military engagement against Muslim populations. For example, they are five percentage points more supportive of continuing the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/02/11/biden-endless-wars-drones-afghanistan/">global “war on terror”</a> than the overall white population, 46% to 41%. </p>
<p>Because a number of factors influence people’s foreign policy opinions – including educational status, income, gender, ideology, military service and partisan affiliation – we adjusted for these in our study. We also controlled for respondents’ reported attention to political news, their level of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00534.x">white ethnocentrism</a> and their <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912913492019">authoritarian leanings</a>. </p>
<p>We find that racial resentment has a significant effect above and beyond these other variables. </p>
<h2>Anti-China views</h2>
<p>Racial resentment seemed especially influential in white American <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-economy-growth-coronavirus/2021/01/17/2138ef2c-5935-11eb-a849-6f9423a75ffd_story.html">views of China</a> – which has become an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-china-russia/u-s-military-puts-great-power-competition-at-heart-of-strategy-mattis-idUSKBN1F81TR">economic and political competitor to the U.S. over the last decade</a>.</p>
<p>In 2012, of the 3,196 white Americans surveyed in the <a href="https://electionstudies.org/">American National Election Study</a>, 28% believed that China posed a “major” military threat to the U.S., 53% saw China as a “minor” threat and 19% did not see China as a threat. Racially resentful whites were 36 percentage points more likely to see China as a major threat than other white respondents, according to our analysis.</p>
<p>In 2016, 3,505 white Americans answered the same survey questions about China. Forty-five percent saw China as a “major” threat to the U.S. and 43% saw it as a “minor threat”; only 11% of whites believed that China presented no threat to the U.S. </p>
<p>Again, racial attitudes strongly shaped these perceptions. Our analysis found that whites with racist attitude were 20 percentage points more likely to consider China a major threat in 2016 than other whites. </p>
<p>While at first glance this might suggest that racial attitudes were less of a factor in 2016 than 2012, the lower percentage reflects the fact that a much higher percentage of Americans viewed <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/">China as a threat in 2016 than 2012</a>. </p>
<p>This trend continued during the presidency of Donald Trump, who portrayed China as a great adversary, calling it a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/us/politics/trump-china-theat-to-world.html">threat to the world</a>.” Today 22% of all Americans see China as the greatest enemy of the U.S., according to <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/287108/fewer-regard-china-favorably-leading-economy.aspx">a 2020 Gallup poll</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People march with signs that say 'Stop Asian Hate'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A march against anti-Asian hate crimes in New York City, April 4, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/april-4-2021-people-march-to-protest-against-anti-asian-news-photo/1232140624?adppopup=true">Wang Ying/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A vicious cycle</h2>
<p>Americans’ growing perception of <a href="https://theconversation.com/rethinking-the-us-china-fight-does-china-really-threaten-american-power-abroad-148672">China as a threat</a> comes as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-security/china-says-u-s-military-in-south-china-sea-not-good-for-peace-idUSKBN29U0P0">both countries compete for control</a> over the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210408-us-warns-china-against-aggressive-moves-in-contested-south-china-sea">South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>China and the U.S. routinely deploy weapons and engage in <a href="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/the-united-states-china-and-taiwan-a-strategy-to-prevent-war.pdf">military planning</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/beijing-tests-biden-south-china-sea-exercises">exercises</a> in the South China Sea. U.S. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/29/politics/president-joe-biden-china-democracy/index.html">President Joe Biden</a> frames tensions between the two countries as a competition between democracy and autocracy. He has described relations with China as one of the top priorities of his administration. </p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Many analysts, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/23/russia-china-and-the-risks-of-war-my-conversation-with-general-mark-milley/">including high-ranking U.S. military personel</a>, view the risks of violent conflict between the U.S. and China as relatively low. </p>
<p>But all that saber-rattling in the South China Sea, and years of heated presidential rhetoric under Trump, have domestic implications. <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/rational-security-it-was-always-russia-edition">Studies suggest</a> that when politicians describe the relationship between the U.S. and China as a “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2364137/great-power-competition-can-involve-conflict-below-threshold-of-war/">great power competition</a>,” it stokes anti-Asian beliefs among white Americans.</p>
<p>These anti-Asian beliefs, in turn, make white Americans more likely to see China as a major threat, according to our research – one potentially worthy going to war over. We document a vicious cycle of racial animosity with potentially global consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Analysis of US survey data finds that white people who hold racist views are more likely than others to favor military action over diplomacy in China and Iran, and to endorse the global war on terror.Vladimir Enrique Medenica, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of DelawareDavid Ebner, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of DelawareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1593242021-04-21T00:38:52Z2021-04-21T00:38:52ZXi Jinping sends message to US on China’s rising power in Boao address<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396175/original/file-20210420-13-896ius.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Ju Peng</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Chinese President Xi Jinping’s muscular speech to the Boao Forum Asia annual conference was clearly designed to send a signal to the United States that China regarded the change of administration as an opportunity for a renewed dialogue on contentious issues.</p>
<p>Xi did not take a backward step <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/20/c_139893137.htm">in his remarks</a>, which emphasised a shifting international power balance. He avoided directly naming the US in his relatively brief address opening the forum, but America was clearly in his sights.</p>
<p>He wants the Biden administration, and the international community for that matter, to accept China not only as an emerging superpower but also as an equal in addressing global challenges. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/1WKkVv_QbDE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>In a telling statement, Xi said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Global governance should reflect the evolving political and economic landscape.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is shorthand for saying that because of its growing weight economically and militarily, China expects to be given its due.</p>
<p>The title of Xi’s speech, <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-04-20/Full-text-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-at-BFA-Annual-Conference-2021-ZBRd9uTb0c/index.html">Pulling Together Through Adversity and Toward a Shared Future for All</a>, was clearly designed to emphasise China’s global leadership aspirations.</p>
<p>Xi did not make specific reference to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/china-and-tibet">widening criticism</a> of China’s human rights abuses in its Xinjiang region, its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/12/china-is-breaking-hong-kong-treaty-with-uk-says-dominic-raab">interference in Hong Kong</a> in contravention of its undertakings to the UK, its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34729538">pressure on Taiwan</a>, and its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/20/us-warns-beijing-against-using-force-in-south-china-sea">assertiveness in the South China Sea</a>.</p>
<p>However, building international displeasure on all these issues formed a backdrop for a speech that warned against countries “bossing others around”. This was a clear reference to the US at the head of a global coalition increasingly exercised about China’s provocative behaviour.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-attempts-to-stifle-foreign-media-criticism-are-likely-to-fail-158785">Why China's attempts to stifle foreign media criticism are likely to fail</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<hr>
<p>Xi also spoke of the dangers of “decoupling” global economies. He called for greater global integration.</p>
<p>His speech to the Boao forum is more than usually significant this year. It marks an important statement by a Chinese leader early in a US administration, and also comes just days before a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/26/president-biden-invites-40-world-leaders-to-leaders-summit-on-climate/">climate summit</a> to be hosted by US President Joe Biden.</p>
<p>Xi will participate in the summit along with other world leaders, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>The Biden multilateral climate summit could hardly represent a sharper contrast with the “America First” policies of the previous Trump administration.</p>
<p>On the face of it, this is a positive development.</p>
<p>Significantly, Xi devoted a section of his speech to climate issues.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We will build a closer partnership for green development. We will strengthen cooperation on green infrastructure, green energy, and green finance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Xi’s reference to a green agenda comes days after the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/17/world/asia/china-us-emissions.html">US and China resolved to fight climate change</a> “with the seriousness and urgency that it demands.’’</p>
<p>America’s climate czar, John Kerry, and his Chinese counterpart resolved to strengthen cooperation in combating global warming in three days of talks in Shanghai.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56790077">Shanghai climate accord</a>, ill-defined though it might be, represents the most positive development in Sino-US relations since the Obama administration left office in 2017. At the very least, it indicates a willingness by Beijing and Washington to work together on issues that require global coordination.</p>
<p>Biden has made it clear he will <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/apr/19/joe-biden-to-reveal-us-emissions-pledge-in-key-climate-crisis-moment">press for more ambitious greenhouse gas emission targets</a>. He is expected to allude to these at the climate summit that will be held virtually.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396183/original/file-20210420-13-1dretlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396183/original/file-20210420-13-1dretlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396183/original/file-20210420-13-1dretlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396183/original/file-20210420-13-1dretlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396183/original/file-20210420-13-1dretlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396183/original/file-20210420-13-1dretlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/396183/original/file-20210420-13-1dretlf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US President Joe Biden has made action on climate change a central policy of his administration. Xi has indicated he wants China to be equal partners in that.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/AP/Andrew Harnik</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Xi’s choice of the Boao Forum for a keynote enabled him to set the stage, from China’s perspective, for his participation in the Biden event, given expectations the US will seek to reassert a global leadership role.</p>
<p>The Boao forum has evolved since it was first held on Hainan Island 20 years ago, to the point now where it is described as the "Asian Davos”.</p>
<p>This is a reference to the World Economic Forum gathering held in the Swiss town of Davos each year, to which political and business leaders gravitate.</p>
<p>The Chinese version is important in the sense Beijing regards it as a counterweight to Davos, which is dominated by Americans and Europeans.</p>
<p>The forum this year has some 2,000 participants. The heads of the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations addressed it by video link.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-a-great-chance-to-engage-in-trade-diplomacy-with-china-and-it-must-take-it-154737">Australia has a great chance to engage in trade diplomacy with China, and it must take it</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-19/xi-to-address-global-risks-at-china-s-high-profile-boao-forum">Prominent American business figures in attendance</a> include Apple’s Tim Cook, Tesla’s Elon Musk, Blackstone’s Steven Schwarzman, and Bridgewater Associates’ Ray Dalio.</p>
<p>The convening of the forum, after it was cancelled last year due to the pandemic, and amid tensions surrounding the US-China relationship, give the event added significance. The number of high-level attendees underscores the complexities of China’s fractious relationship with the rest of the world.</p>
<p>The world might want to distance itself, given disquiet about China’s various provocations. But the international community can hardly ignore economic realities. China, whose <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-16/chinas-economy-grows-in-first-quarter-of-2021-in-covid19-rebound/100074920">economy is on fire</a> with growth rates in double digits, is contributing about one-third to global growth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159324/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Walker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Chinese president has used a major address to reassert China’s role as a rising superpower and its willingness to be front and centre on major global issues, including climate change.Tony Walker, Vice-chancellor's fellow, La Trobe UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1486722021-02-19T13:18:38Z2021-02-19T13:18:38ZRethinking the US-China fight: Does China really threaten American power abroad?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385087/original/file-20210218-15-hzdjn4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C58%2C4896%2C3364&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Biden has so far kept most of his predecessor's tough-on-China policies.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/ilustración/hands-waving-small-american-and-ilustraciones-libres-de-derechos/1195223738?adppopup=true">Malte Mueller via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Joe Biden is so far <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/17/business/economy/biden-china.html">maintaining his predecessor’s tough China policy</a>, which aims to curb China’s international power both economically and politically.</p>
<p>In the U.S. and Europe, China is <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-faces-the-world-5-foreign-policy-experts-explain-us-priorities-and-problems-after-trump-149805">widely recognized as a rising star that threatens Western power</a>. </p>
<p>But my research on the country suggests China may no longer see itself that way. </p>
<h2>China’s rise</h2>
<p>In the three decades I’ve <a href="https://www.macalester.edu/politicalscience/facultystaff/andrewlatham/">studied and taught</a> Chinese foreign policy, I have witnessed three discrete eras in China’s approach to international relations. </p>
<p>After the death of the Communist Chinese leader Mao Zedong in 1976, Mao’s successors, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, introduced <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-01/40-years-of-reform-that-transformed-china-into-a-superpower/10573468">economic reforms</a> that launched China on a path of phenomenal economic growth. The country rose from 11th to second place in the <a href="https://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2019-gdp-by-country-data-and-charts">global GDP rankings</a> between 1990 and 2020.</p>
<p><a href="https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/trade/what-happened-when-china-joined-wto">The prevailing view</a> in Western capitals in the 1990s was that China’s economic transformations would inevitably culminate in an affluent, peaceful and democratic country. </p>
<p>To ensure this outcome, the major economic powers were prepared to embrace China as a <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm">full member of their club of open-market societies</a>, admitting it into international institutions like the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wto-accession/">World Trade Organization</a> and integrating it into global markets. The West was keen to bring it into this network of international political institutions constructed after World War II to promote cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution. </p>
<p>And China was happy to join the club, at least when it came to trade and investment. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s foreign relations strategy in the 1990s was to “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hus-to-blame-for-chinas-foreign-assertiveness/">hide capabilities and bide time</a>,” adopting a policy of “<a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-character.htm">tao guang yang hui</a>” – keeping a low profile. </p>
<p>In the early 2000s, President Hu Jintao took a few <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hus-to-blame-for-chinas-foreign-assertiveness/">modest steps</a> toward greater Chinese assertiveness on the world stage, building up China’s navy and initiating a series of port projects in Pakistan and beyond. For the most part, however, Hu still espoused a policy of “peaceful rise.”</p>
<h2>China’s dream</h2>
<p>That changed when China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, assumed power in 2012. </p>
<p>Xi projected nationalism and power. His China would no longer bide its time. Xi proclaimed the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/offshore-balancing-a-grand-strategy-for-the-china-dream/">China Dream</a>,” envisioning the country <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/3149544d7930575a306c5562684a335a764a4855/index.html#:%7E:text=China%20is%20getting%20broadly%20old,for%20retirees%20could%20exceed%2040%25">as a major power</a> with increasing influence not just in Asia but worldwide.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385095/original/file-20210218-12-1rip30d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Xi stands on a balcony in black suit with a Mao-style collar, flanked by his predecessors" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385095/original/file-20210218-12-1rip30d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385095/original/file-20210218-12-1rip30d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385095/original/file-20210218-12-1rip30d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385095/original/file-20210218-12-1rip30d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385095/original/file-20210218-12-1rip30d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385095/original/file-20210218-12-1rip30d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385095/original/file-20210218-12-1rip30d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping attends a military parade with former Presidents Hu Jintao, left, and Jiang Zemin in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on Oct. 1, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotografía-de-noticias/chinese-president-xi-jinping-attends-a-military-fotografía-de-noticias/1172700156?adppopup=true">Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Under Xi, China took a much <a href="https://thegeopolitics.com/should-xi-take-the-blame-for-chinas-assertive-diplomacy/">more aggressive stance</a> toward the world, flexing its military muscle in the South China Sea and elsewhere, and coupling diplomacy with <a href="https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/35908-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-latin-america-and-caribbean">heavy investment in infrastructure development across Latin America</a> and Africa.</p>
<p>Over time, many Western foreign policy leaders, among them Barack Obama, came to see China as bent on upending, not sustaining, the <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/2020/08/15/david_goldman_chinas_plan_to_sino-form_the_world_520322.html">economic order they had created</a> and enthusiastically welcomed China into.</p>
<p>In 2015, the U.S. undertook a “<a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific">strategic pivot</a>” toward Asia and away from the Middle East, the focus of Washington’s attention since 9/11. </p>
<p>In an effort to contain – or at least constrain – China, the U.S. strengthened alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, formed a coalition of countries in China’s neighborhood, and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/tag/quadrilateral-security-dialogue/">increased defense cooperation</a> with India, Australia and Japan. </p>
<h2>American anxieties</h2>
<p>In October 2017, at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi confirmed Western fears. He publicly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41647872">declared his goal</a> of moving China to the “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-12-08/world-china-wants">center stage</a>” of world affairs. </p>
<p>Xi said China did not seek global domination but warned that no one “should expect China to swallow anything that undermines its interests.” He also hinted that China’s rise would create a world order with “<a href="https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr87_aug2020.pdf">Chinese characteristics</a>.”</p>
<p>In December 2017 an updated <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=806478">U.S. national security strategy</a> officially declared China’s rise a threat, citing <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-china-is-a-leader-in-intellectual-property-and-what-the-us-has-to-do-with-it-93950">intellectual property</a> theft and the development of advanced weapons capable of nullifying America’s military advantage. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385096/original/file-20210218-20-1nesqtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Trump and Xi shake hands in front of a Chinse and American flag" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385096/original/file-20210218-20-1nesqtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/385096/original/file-20210218-20-1nesqtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385096/original/file-20210218-20-1nesqtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385096/original/file-20210218-20-1nesqtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385096/original/file-20210218-20-1nesqtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385096/original/file-20210218-20-1nesqtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/385096/original/file-20210218-20-1nesqtv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump, who saw China as a serious threat, had a combative relationship with Xi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotografía-de-noticias/in-this-file-photo-taken-on-june-28-chinas-fotografía-de-noticias/1189044734?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China against the world</h2>
<p>But the China dream isn’t guaranteed to come true. As President Xi told Communist Party members at a gathering in January 2019, the country faces <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/world/asia/china-xi-warnings.html">serious challenges</a> </p>
<p>Beijing faces a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/27/us-china-beijing-wants-to-stop-an-anti-china-coalition-in-asia.html">U.S.-led coalition</a> that is committed to resisting China’s economic, military and diplomatic power plays in Asia. China also has <a href="https://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm">rising debt</a>, stagnating GDP <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2019&locations=CN&start=2007">growth rate</a> and <a href="https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/">declining productivity</a>. </p>
<p>Then there are China’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b909e162-11f6-44f3-8eab-ebc48d8c6976">troubling demographics</a>: The population is both shrinking and getting old.</p>
<p>China’s population declined in 2018 for the first time since the deadly famines induced by Mao’s “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/giving-historys-greatest-mass-murderer-his-due/">Great Leap Forward</a>” in the 1960s. The <a href="https://time.com/5523805/china-aging-population-working-age/">Chinese Academy of Science predicts</a> that if fertility continues to drop from its current rate of 1.6 children per woman to a projected 1.3, China’s population would be reduced by about 50% by the end of this century. </p>
<p>China ended in 2015 its policy of limiting families to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/world/asia/china-end-one-child-policy.html">one child</a>, but its population still skews old, leaving fewer workers to support increasing numbers of elderly.</p>
<p>Together, these predictions have raised concerns within the Chinese Communist Party that the nation will “<a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/3149544d7930575a306c5562684a335a764a4855/index.html#:%7E:text=China%20is%20getting%20broadly%20old,for%20retirees%20could%20exceed%2040%25">get old before it gets rich</a>.” This predicament could create serious social unrest. </p>
<p>Xi and others in China’s Communist leadership no longer project unbridled confidence. Instead, they telegraph concern that global leadership is slipping out of reach.</p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p>
<h2>Diverging views</h2>
<p>These concerns are already reshaping China’s foreign policy, leading it to take increasingly direct military action toward neighboring India – where it is engaged in a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/tag/china-india-border-disputes/">territorial dispute</a> in the Himalayas – and near <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/chinas-worrying-military-exercises-near-taiwan/">Taiwan</a>. China is also redoubling its military efforts to assert its territorial rights to disputed islands the South China Sea and cracking down on democracy in Hong Kong. </p>
<p>Xi has embraced a confrontational new form of global diplomacy that more actively undermines U.S. interests abroad. Some call it “<a href="https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-prompts-international-backlash">wolf-warrior diplomacy</a>,” after two blockbuster Chinese movies about Chinese special forces vanquishing American mercenaries in Africa and Asia.</p>
<p>This is the first time in six decades that China and the West hold such fundamentally different views of China’s global trajectory.</p>
<p>The results could be destabilizing. If a weakened China feels threatened by Western containment, it may double down on its nationalistic displays in India, Taiwan, <a href="https://theconversation.com/with-mass-arrests-running-for-office-in-hong-kong-is-now-not-only-futile-it-can-be-criminal-152755">Hong Kong</a> and the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/tag/south-china-sea-disputes/">South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>The post-World War II international order, built to promote economic cooperation and avoid war, may not be able to withstand the stress of China’s mounting challenges from within. A war between the West and China is still a remote possibility, but perhaps not as remote as it once seemed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/148672/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Latham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of global relations says China seems worried about its future. Meanwhile, the US and Europe still treat China as a threat. The clash of world views could be destabilizing.Andrew Latham, Professor of Political Science, Macalester CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1542342021-02-12T13:19:06Z2021-02-12T13:19:06ZYoung Republicans split from Trump and GOP elders on US foreign policy: 3 charts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383860/original/file-20210211-15-1uckzlw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C168%2C4709%2C3403&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In a post-Trump era, the GOP must decide which of the former president's policies to keep – and which to scrap.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photo-illustration-donald-trump-supporters-election-news-photo/1256649175?adppopup=true">Leonard Ortiz/MediaNews Group/Orange County Register via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>No matter the outcome of Donald Trump’s impeachment trial, the Republican Party must now decide whether to maintain or abandon Trump-era policies during the Biden administration. Among them is Trump’s “<a href="https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/docs/Resolution_Platform_2020.pdf">America First</a>” foreign policy agenda. </p>
<p>Trump portrayed the United States as a dominant, self-sufficient <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2074985/trump-touts-military-rebuilding-space-force-strikes-against-terror/">world leader</a> that needs little but subservience from other countries. He was <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/06047bc5-81dd-4475-8678-4b3181d53877">skeptical of trade and hostile to China</a>, and he eschewed global diplomacy in favor of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/08/08/trump-vows-north-korea-will-be-met-with-fire-and-fury-if-threats-continue/">military saber-rattling</a>.</p>
<p>That may not be the future of GOP foreign policy, according to <a href="https://jonathansschulman.com">my political science research</a>. I analyzed four surveys taken during the Trump administration asking Americans about foreign policy issues. Breaking down responses by both party and age, I found that younger Republicans diverge from Trump’s “<a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-foreign-policy-is-still-america-first-what-does-that-mean-exactly-144841">America First</a>” agenda.</p>
<p>In fact, on some foreign policy issues, from China to trade, young Republicans are closer on the ideological spectrum to the Democratic mainstream than to their Republican elders.</p>
<h2>1. Globalization</h2>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/12/trump-is-a-new-kind-of-protectionist-he-operates-in-stealth-mode/">espoused economic protectionism</a> and demonstrated a general <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/28/how-globalism-became-the-boogeyman-of-2016/">aversion to trade and other aspects of economic globalization</a>. But young Republicans don’t necessarily feel the same way, according to a <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/2017-chicago-council-survey">2017 survey from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="AgQdu" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/AgQdu/10/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Despite Trump’s description of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, as “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-us-mexico-canada-remarks-oct-18/h_2c0a8c6bad4dc7a2f98acda7c57ea454">perhaps the worst trade deal ever made</a>,” half of Republicans under 35 view it as good for the U.S. economy. </p>
<p>Republicans 35 and older were more inclined toward Trump’s position: Only one-third thought it was good for the economy.</p>
<p>Among Democrats surveyed by the Chicago Council, approval of NAFTA was above 70% for all age groups.</p>
<h2>2. China</h2>
<p>The surveys showed general bipartisan agreement across all age groups that the United States is militarily superior to China. </p>
<p>But younger Republicans were nearly twice as likely as older ones to believe that China has a stronger economy than the United States – 43% for Republicans under 35 versus 23% for those 35 and older, according to the Chicago Council survey.</p>
<p>Recognition of China’s economic power, however, does not lead younger GOP members to demonstrate a Trump-style hostility toward China. In <a href="https://static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2020/05/7ab2e761-Fox_May-17-20-2020_Complete_National_Topline_May-21-Release.pdf">Fox News’ May 2020 poll</a>, 42% of Republicans under 35 identified China as the “worst enemy of the United States.” Among Republicans 35 and older, 60% did.</p>
<p>Age-based differences of opinion on China translate into age-based policy preferences among Republicans. The vast majority of older Republicans – 81% – supported Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-brief-guide-to-how-the-china-us-trade-war-will-affect-your-holiday-shopping-128586">punishing tariffs on Chinese imports</a>, a <a href="https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/2019-chicago-council-survey">2019 Chicago Council survey</a> found. Just 60% of Republicans under 35 agreed. </p>
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<p>Democrats were mostly consistent on attitudes toward China. Around 1 in 5 view China as the worst enemy of the United States regardless of age; around 1 in 4 support raising tariffs on Chinese imports. </p>
<h2>3. Defense spending</h2>
<p>When it comes to funding for the U.S. military and national defense, both parties show a generational divide. </p>
<p><iframe id="PlUTk" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/PlUTk/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In the Chicago Council’s 2017 survey, 64% of Republicans 35 and older said national defense spending should be expanded. Just 40% of Republicans under 35 agreed.</p>
<p>Few Democrats of any age think defense spending should be expanded, and some young Democrats diverge from party elders in thinking the defense budget should be cut. Half of Democrats under 35 would cut defense spending, and one-third of older Democrats would.</p>
<h2>A more bipartisan future?</h2>
<p>I study the political views of young people to shine a light on where American foreign policy may be headed in the coming years and decades. </p>
<p>Young Americans are voting and running for national office at historic rates. The <a href="https://www.millennialaction.org/millennials-on-the-rise-in-congress">number of millennial congressional candidates</a> nearly tripled between 2018 and 2020, according to the <a href="https://www.millennialaction.org/">Millennial Action Project</a>. In last year’s election, 251 candidates for Congress were age 45 or younger; 97 of those young candidates were Republicans. </p>
<p>As more young candidates start to win and occupy office, their views will influence the policy agendas of their party in the post-Trump era. </p>
<p>The surveys I studied show that younger Republicans hold more centrist attitudes on economic globalization, China and defense spending than party elders. In a political climate defined by intense polarization, this data may hint at a slow trend toward more bipartisan agreement on <a href="https://theconversation.com/bidens-long-foreign-policy-record-signals-how-hell-reverse-trump-rebuild-old-alliances-and-lead-the-pandemic-response-143671">certain foreign policy issues</a>.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154234/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Schulman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>‘America First’ may not be long for this world. Surveys show many GOP members under 35 are closer to Democrats on China, trade and defense spending.Jonathan Schulman, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Northwestern UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1507182021-01-28T15:48:20Z2021-01-28T15:48:20ZCOVID-19 misinformation on Chinese social media – lessons for countering conspiracy theories<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/377272/original/file-20210105-19-pm9ae.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=52%2C0%2C5850%2C3853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Influencers and women without huge numbers of followers are more effective than others at debunking conspiracy theories on Chinese social media.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreakChinaCommemoratingVictims/954fbf709c4741949d55810c44c0c03f/photo">AP Photo/Ng Han Guan</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Conspiracy theories about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic from the beginning. Crucial to managing the pandemic is <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/23-09-2020-managing-the-covid-19-infodemic-promoting-healthy-behaviours-and-mitigating-the-harm-from-misinformation-and-disinformation">mitigating the effects of misinformation</a>, which the World Health Organization dubbed an “infodemic.”</p>
<p>Conspiracy theories and misinformation are global phenomena that affect people’s perceptions of other countries, yet little is understood about which COVID-19 conspiracy theories are popular on Chinese social media, how this differs from misinformation on U.S. social media and what lessons this holds for countering global misinformation. </p>
<p>As researchers who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=SLJWhV0AAAAJ&hl=en">study online media and public discourse</a>, my colleagues and I examined conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19 and narratives that debunk them on <a href="https://www.dragonsocial.net/blog/chinese-social-media-weibo-and-twitter-comparison/">Sina Weibo</a>, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter and one of the major Chinese social media platforms. </p>
<p>We found that popular conspiracies on Weibo about the origins of COVID-19 <a href="https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/conspiracy-and-debunking-narratives-about-covid-19-origins-on-chinese-social-media-how-it-started-and-who-is-to-blame/">differ substantially from those in the U.S.</a>, with many claiming that a national government deliberately constructed the coronavirus. Conspiracy posts and posts attributing responsibility to the U.S. surged during Sino-U.S. confrontations. </p>
<p>Surveys show that many Americans also <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/24/a-look-at-the-americans-who-believe-there-is-some-truth-to-the-conspiracy-theory-that-covid-19-was-planned/">believe COVID-19 conspiracy theories</a>, however most of those conspiracy theories involved personalities such as Bill Gates and Anthony Fauci or unfounded alternative explanations for the illness, such as 5G, the new high-speed wireless network technology. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman looks at her phone while standing in a tradeshow booth that has a display in Chinese." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380986/original/file-20210127-15-7t79vy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Weibo is one of China’s largest social media platforms, with over 500 million users active monthly.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChinaNewsControl/a2e13b78340446bf8725e28692291134/photo?Query=Weibo&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=35&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Andy Wong</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We also found in our analysis of Chinese social media that debunking posts can be more effective when they come from women and influencers, who are people with large followings on social media. Debunking posts are also more effective when they cite scientists as the source. We believe these techniques could be effective not only in China but in other countries as well.</p>
<h2>Nationalism and international conflict</h2>
<p>We collected and analyzed <a href="https://doi.org/10.2196/19421">COVID-19 posts from a pool of 250 million Weibo users</a> from Jan. 1 to April 30, 2020. Although conspiracy theories related to 5G, the bogus documentary “Plandemic” and Bill Gates were prevalent in the U.S., these conspiracy narratives were not popular on Weibo (4.95%). Prevalent conspiracy theories on Weibo centered around whether COVID-19 was deliberately made as a bioweapon by the U.S., China, Japan or another country. </p>
<p>The volume of conspiracy theories and debunking narratives surged during times of Chinese-U.S. conflict from January to April 2020. These include when President Donald Trump first referred to the coronavirus as the “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-51928011">Chinese Virus</a>” on March 16; during several diplomatic conflicts around March 25, on April 21 when Trump announced <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-immigration-ban.html">a green card ban</a> to prevent people from immigrating to the U.S.; and when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the <a href="https://share.america.gov/defending-america-s-cyberfrontier-with-5g-clean-path/">5G Clean Path</a> on April 29, which required that wireless communications entering and exiting U.S. diplomatic facilities bypass the equipment of “untrustworthy” communications companies like China’s Huawei.</p>
<p>During these Chinese-U.S. confrontations, we also observed a surge in posts that focused on blaming the U.S. as the original source of COVID-19. </p>
<p>The pandemic has <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/research/rising-nationalism-in-europe-and-asia-in-the-age-of-covid19-72587/">exacerbated a global trend toward nationalism</a>. These two forces have given rise to <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/vaccine-nationalism-threatens-global-plan-distribute-covid-19-shots-fairly">vaccine nationalism</a>, which could threaten the plan for global access to COVID-19 vaccines. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, about <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/07/30/americans-fault-china-for-its-role-in-the-spread-of-covid-19/">78% of Americans faulted China for its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak</a>, according to a Pew Research Center survey. </p>
<p>COVID-19 is an example of how science can be distorted to divide people within a country and across nations. To understand how to effectively communicate about the pandemic, it’s important to take into account the political contexts in which science and health communication occur.</p>
<p><iframe id="2h6KQ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/2h6KQ/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Lessons for countering the COVID-19 infodemic</h2>
<p>Fighting conspiracy theories is a difficult battle. Scholars of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317516111">communication</a> and <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973067">psychology</a> point out the psychological mechanisms that cause people to reject factual information if it challenges their worldview or sense of themselves.</p>
<p>My colleagues and I offer three strategies for countering misinformation that can overcome these political and psychological hurdles. </p>
<p>First, create a constructive media environment to inoculate the public. </p>
<p>We suggest that political parties and media should avoid using nationalistic and politically motivated narratives when communicating about the pandemic. They should produce more messages that advocate for common interests and values for fighting the pandemic and the infodemic. </p>
<p>We also recommend that public agencies, scholars and social media companies conduct more experiments to explore effective <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1443491">misinformation inoculation strategies</a> that can help the public recognize and reject politically driven conspiracy theories. To help the public become more sophisticated in processing messages, researchers and communicators could give the public a small dose of conspiracy narratives and explicitly warn about the <a href="https://issues.org/covid-19-communication-war/">political motives</a> behind these conspiracy theories. </p>
<p>Second, improve public awareness through deliberation.</p>
<p>We recommend that a long-term solution to fight misinformation is to develop opportunities for conversations between people of different political orientations in order to have constructive dialogues that develop mutual understanding and to form thoughtful opinions. People with <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.01005.x">deeply divided views</a> can have constructive conversations with each other. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0963662520966742">Vulnerable populations</a> can be empowered to have thoughtful engagement with each other. </p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Third, choose effective message senders and sources to correct misinformation.</p>
<p>We suggest that social media companies and public agencies consider actively seeking help from credible influencers, and women who don’t have large followings, to disseminate debunking information. Information on social media competes for public attention. Our research found that posts that came from influencers, as well as women without enormous numbers of followers, and that cited scientists or other scholars, received more likes, comments, retweets and hashtags. </p>
<p>The right messenger and the right information source are critical for increasing public engagement and understanding of science.</p>
<p><em>Cuihua Shen and Jingwen Zhang of the University of California, Davis; Anfan Chen of the University of Science and Technology of China; and Jingbo Meng of Michigan State University contributed to this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/150718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaiping Chen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The type and amount of misinformation closely tracks tensions in US-China relations. Effectively countering the misinformation comes down to who does the debunking.Kaiping Chen, Assistant Professor of Science Communication, University of Wisconsin-MadisonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1498052021-01-27T13:27:35Z2021-01-27T13:27:35ZBiden faces the world: 5 foreign policy experts explain US priorities – and problems – after Trump<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380532/original/file-20210125-13-zei5us.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C26%2C4473%2C3019&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Can Joe Biden restore U.S. world leadership?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-elect-joe-biden-waves-as-he-arrives-to-deliver-news-photo/1229521571?adppopup=true">Agela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: President Joe Biden inherits from Donald Trump a United States that was simultaneously isolated from the rest of the world and openly hostile toward parts of it. Biden – <a href="https://theconversation.com/bidens-long-foreign-policy-record-signals-how-hell-reverse-trump-rebuild-old-alliances-and-lead-the-pandemic-response-143671">an internationally minded leader who has longstanding relationships with world leaders</a> – has already begun to rejoin treaties and alliances abandoned by Trump.</em></p>
<p><em>Dire domestic crises will keep Biden’s attention focused on home, at least early in his administration, but he says the U.S. is “ready to lead the world.” Here, experts assess the state of American relations with a world left skeptical of American leadership.</em></p>
<h2>Latin America</h2>
<p><em>Jennifer M. Piscopo, Occidental College</em></p>
<p>Latin America’s <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/04/12/fewer-people-in-latin-america-see-the-u-s-favorably-under-trump/">faith in U.S. leadership</a>, once buoyed by Obama’s <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/07/obama-to-meet-latin-american-leaders-amid-positive-views-of-u-s-in-the-region/">cooperative and collaborative approach</a>, declined under Trump. </p>
<p>The Trump administration ignored authoritarian behavior across the region – <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/04/18/714552854/trump-administration-announces-measures-against-cuba-venezuela-and-nicaragua">except in</a> leftist Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, where it levied sanctions and even threatened military intervention. Many saw those punishments, which evoke the United States’ history of interference in Latin America’s domestic affairs, as aimed more at <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/30/trump-venezuela-florida-policy-1138307">winning anti-Communist emigré votes in Florida</a> than helping citizens of those nations.</p>
<p>Nor did tightening the U.S.-Mexico border aid the region’s interests.</p>
<p>Trump made immigration harder while <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/09/17/761266169/trump-froze-aid-to-guatemala-now-programs-are-shutting-down">cutting foreign aid</a> to Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras – none of which addressed the reasons people kept leaving Central America. Migrants were forced to wait out their U.S. asylum process in Mexico, leading <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/23/us/mexico-migrant-camp-asylum.html">refugee camps</a> to pop up along the border. In the United States, asylum-seeking children <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/14/us/politics/trump-family-separation.html">were separated from their parents</a>. Shoddy paperwork has so far made <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/12/11/immigrant-advocates-cant-locate-parents-separated-border-children/3896940001/">reunification impossible</a> for several hundred families. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380529/original/file-20210125-15-d97wct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A migrant boy walks amid tents" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380529/original/file-20210125-15-d97wct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380529/original/file-20210125-15-d97wct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380529/original/file-20210125-15-d97wct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380529/original/file-20210125-15-d97wct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380529/original/file-20210125-15-d97wct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380529/original/file-20210125-15-d97wct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380529/original/file-20210125-15-d97wct.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trump’s immigration policies created a humanitarian crisis in places like Tijuana.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/migrant-boy-walks-amid-tents-at-the-juventud-2000-migrant-news-photo/1230184596?adppopup=true">Guillermo Arias/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As Trump limited U.S. involvement and economic support in Latin America, China <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-latam-usa-china-insight/in-latin-america-a-biden-white-house-faces-a-rising-china-idUSKBN28O18R">stepped up its own</a>. Chinese money pays for the region’s mines, energy projects, telecommunications, agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, ports and, most recently, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/us/politics/coronavirus-southern-command-china-latin-america.html">access to the coronavirus vaccine</a>. The U.S. remains <a href="https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/mex">Mexico’s largest trading partner</a>, but for the rest of Latin America, the honor goes to China. </p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3gbvy/mexico-just-postponed-the-legalization-of-weed-to-2021due-to-covid">is expected to</a> reinstate the humanitarian support <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-cuts-millions-in-aid-to-central-america-fulfilling-trumps-vow/">Trump cut</a>. And unlike Chinese foreign investment, U.S. money comes <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/how-unconditional-is-chinas-foreign-aid/a-43499703">with conditions that enhance democracy</a> like fighting corruption or keeping elections free and fair.</p>
<p>Still, enthusiasm for democracy in Latin America is waning. Support for democratic governance dropped from about 64% in the mid-2010s to 57% in 2019, <a href="https://news.vanderbilt.edu/2019/10/14/support-for-democracy-in-a-slump-across-americas-according-to-new-survey/">according to polling by Vanderbilt University</a>. From Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro – dubbed the “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/14/bolsonaro-brazil-trump-anti-democracy-elections/">tropical Trump</a>” – to hard-line leaders in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-elsalvador-politics/el-salvador-presidents-power-play-stokes-democracy-concerns-idUSKBN2042M4">El Salvador</a> and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/06/18/620888643/colombia-elects-right-wing-populist-ivan-duque-as-president">Colombia</a>, the Americas feel the allure of strong-man politics. </p>
<h2>Africa</h2>
<p><em>Julius Amin, University of Dayton</em></p>
<p>China is the United States’ main competitor in Africa, too. </p>
<p>China has forged <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/chinas-multifaceted-covid-19-diplomacy-across-africa/">strong economic and political ties with the continent</a>, holding summits with African leaders and providing significant development assistance, including to <a href="https://www.chinacenter.net/2020/china_currents/19-2/sino-ethiopian-relations-from-meles-zenawi-to-abiy-ahmed-the-political-economy-of-a-strategic-partnership/">Ethiopia</a>, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/south-africa-and-china-what-next-for-relations-between-the-two-countries-49135925">South Africa</a> and
<a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/29060/nigeria-and-china-understanding-the-imbalanced-relationship/">Nigeria</a>. In exchange for investment, it has exploited Africa’s enormous resources: <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+New+Scramble+for+Africa%2C+2nd+Edition-p-9781509507085">oil, coffee, rubber, palm oil, diamonds, gold, uranium</a>. </p>
<p>Trump often acted as if Africa was irrelevant, even <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-nations-n836946">crudely insulting the region</a>. His rejection of the Paris Climate Agreement and membership in the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/19/us/trump-who-funding-threat-explainer-intl/index.html">World Health Organization</a> translated into significant loss of money destined to help <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2016/paris-climate-deal-and-africa">African countries</a>. So did his <a href="https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-politics/trump-again-proposes-big-cut-foreign-aid">slashing of foreign aid</a>. Trump was the first U.S. president this century not to visit Africa. </p>
<p>But Africa plays an important role in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-african-union-has-failed-to-silence-the-guns-and-some-solutions-139567">global war against jihadism</a> and it has both young democracies and old autocracies – all strategic U.S. interests.</p>
<p>Biden can still reverse Africa’s drift toward China. Though <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/statement-chair-us-africa-leaders-summit">promises made at the Obama administration’s 2014 U.S.-Africa summit</a>, which Biden participated in as vice president, were not fulfilled, African leaders overwhelmingly <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/african-leaders-welcome-bidens-us-election-win/2035990">welcomed Biden’s victory in November</a>. </p>
<p>Appointing experienced foreign policy staff to cover the region would build on that momentum. And since a large number of State Department professionals <a href="http://www.beacon.org/cw_Search.aspx?k=When+the+World+Calls%3a+The+Inside+Story+of+the+Peace+Corps+an">began their foreign service careers as Peace Corps volunteers in Africa</a>, Biden has a rich talent pool to choose from. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380528/original/file-20210125-19-1l9gguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Biden signing an executive order at the Resolute Desk" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380528/original/file-20210125-19-1l9gguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380528/original/file-20210125-19-1l9gguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380528/original/file-20210125-19-1l9gguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380528/original/file-20210125-19-1l9gguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380528/original/file-20210125-19-1l9gguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380528/original/file-20210125-19-1l9gguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380528/original/file-20210125-19-1l9gguz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Biden’s first move in office was to rejoin the WHO and Paris Climate Accord.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/joe-biden-signs-an-executive-order-in-the-oval-office-news-photo/1230739438?adppopup=true">Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>China</h2>
<p><em>Joyce Mao, Middlebury</em></p>
<p>With China, Biden inherits the same challenges Trump faced and failed to resolve, from a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/truth-about-tariffs?gclid=CjwKCAiAi_D_BRApEiwASslbJ5i8yAHS9L3acpwnMDRXSnslULSLmnZjoFFQRV8sOh4PdQh1k1w3vBoCPioQAvD_BwE">massive trade deficit</a> to Chinese misappropriation of American <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/us-chinas-cold-war-raging-cyberspace-where-intellectual-property-costly-front-1532133">intellectual property</a>. </p>
<p>Then there is the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/12/south-china-sea-us-ghosts-strategic-tensions/617380/">South China Sea</a>, where China’s territorial claims to strategic islands threaten U.S. access to natural resources and to shipping routes. Over the past decade the U.S. has used both <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence/exclusive-satellite-images-reveal-show-of-force-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-sea-idUSKBN1H3135">military</a> <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3116967/us-china-grey-zone-rivalry-south-china-sea-may-be-about">resources</a> and <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/08/from-pivot-to-defiance-american-policy-shift-in-the-south-china-sea/">heated rhetoric</a> to counter Chinese maneuvers there, as have Southeast Asian countries like <a href="https://theconversation.com/whats-at-stake-in-chinas-claims-to-the-south-china-sea-62472">the Philippines</a>. But the South China Sea remains a contentious issue. </p>
<p>Biden has promised to “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/opinion/biden-interview-mcconnell-china-iran.html">fight like hell</a>” to defend America’s global standing against China’s growing power, using more collaborative rhetoric than Trump. But the new president <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/1/1/bidens-china-policy-balancing-engagement-with-deterrence">has not yet signaled</a> a new grand strategy that will ensure consistency, let alone the primacy of American interests.</p>
<h2>Europe</h2>
<p><em>Garret Martin, American University</em></p>
<p>Following <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-a-biden-presidency-means-for-europe-149696">four tumultuous years under Donald Trump</a>, the Biden administration wants to <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/biden-pushes-new-approach-to-eu-in-calls-to-leaders/">repair fractured U.S. relations with the European Union</a>, and fast.</p>
<p>Immediately after taking office, Biden <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/paris-climate-accord-biden-rejoin-president/">rejoined the Paris climate accords</a> and <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/11/9/21556172/trump-biden-transition-team-covid-19-who-join">World Health Organization</a>, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/live-blog-europe-reacts-to-joe-biden-inauguration/">endearing him to European allies</a>. Unlike Trump, he deeply respects NATO, a decades-old transatlantic security partnership Biden has called the “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/16/politics/biden-showcases-foreign-policy-munich/index.html">single most significant military alliance in the world</a>.” America’s European partners will also welcome <a href="https://www.vox.com/21594368/joe-biden-blinken-sullivan-haines-foreign-policy-team">a return to more predictable relations</a> with the U.S. under Biden and an end to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/13/trump-macron-eu-army-german-second-world-war">diplomacy by tweets</a>. </p>
<p>But changes in tone and style will not necessarily change the substance of America’s transatlantic partnership. For all the focus on Trump, the European Union and U.S. still <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/83191">disagree on key matters</a>, such as data privacy, how to deal with China and to what extent Europe can tax American tech giants. </p>
<p>Europeans remain <a href="https://theconversation.com/america-is-back-the-delusion-of-normalcy-that-haunts-the-united-states-153567">wary of the United States’ profound polarization</a>. Is it worth investing time in negotiating long-term deals with a country whose <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/26/politics/trump-european-union-diplomacy-intl-analysis/index.html">policies swing so dramatically from one administration to the next</a>?</p>
<h2>Middle East and South Asia</h2>
<p><em>Muqtedar Khan, University of Delaware</em></p>
<p>Beyond the ongoing Israel-Palestinian conflict, Biden faces two Mideast problems that deteriorated during the Trump administration’s idiosyncratic watch. </p>
<p>The first is an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/25765949.2020.1760542">emerging tension</a> between Arab nations and the non-Arab nations. Iran and Turkey <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrgver1b32E&t=3s">are challenging two of America’s Arab allies, Saudi Arabia and Egypt</a>, for political and military domination of the region. </p>
<p>Trump tried military might and punishment to control Iran, <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-backs-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal-now-what-96317">exiting the international Iran nuclear deal</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/killing-of-soleimani-evokes-dark-history-of-political-assassinations-in-the-formative-days-of-shiite-islam-129505">assassinating a revered general</a>. Biden says he may rejoin the Iran deal. But American relations with Iran have <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-and-iran-have-a-long-troubled-history-129844">rarely been worse</a>. The Trump administration tried diplomatic <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/how-trumps-team-appeased-turkey-up-until-its-final-months-in-office-649350">appeasement to manage Turkey</a>, a fellow NATO member. Still it continues to undermine America’s Mideast allies and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/14/us-sanctions-turkey-over-russian-s400.html">upset Washington by buying weapons from Russia</a>. Biden may be less conciliatory.</p>
<p>The second big problem Biden contends with in the Middle East is its many fragile and <a href="https://time.com/4092987/these-5-failing-middle-eastern-states-may-be-unsalvagable/">failing states</a>, from Yemen and Libya to Syria, Iraq and Sudan. Failing states generate instability, refugees and <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/29/refugees-and-displacement-in-middle-east-pub-68479">humanitarian crises</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380537/original/file-20210125-13-14xxq21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A extremely skinny 10-year-old child squats next to her mother, on the dirt ground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380537/original/file-20210125-13-14xxq21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380537/original/file-20210125-13-14xxq21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380537/original/file-20210125-13-14xxq21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380537/original/file-20210125-13-14xxq21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=393&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380537/original/file-20210125-13-14xxq21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380537/original/file-20210125-13-14xxq21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/380537/original/file-20210125-13-14xxq21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=494&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Yemeni refugee camp in Hajjah Governorate, Jan. 23, 2021. Parts of Yemen are experiencing mass hunger due to civil war.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yemeni-10-year-old-girl-ahmadia-abdo-who-weighs-ten-news-photo/1230750390?adppopup=true">Essa Ahmed/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Historically, the U.S. has been extremely engaged in the Mideast. It has invested over <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-war-anniversary/iraq-war-costs-u-s-more-than-2-trillion-study-idUSBRE92D0PG20130314">US$2 trillion to bring democracy to Iraq since 2002</a>. The U.S. negotiated with Iran and brokered more <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11103745">than a dozen</a> Israel-related peace deals since 1978. Biden’s foreign policy team is likely to focus on the region, too. </p>
<p>As China’s global power grows, South Asia is becoming more critical to U.S. foreign policy, too. </p>
<p>It is home to two nuclear powers – <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/southern-asias-nuclear-powers">India and Pakistan</a> – and the world’s largest democracy, India. Trump was <a href="https://theconversation.com/howdy-modi-in-houston-why-indias-narendra-modi-puts-so-much-effort-into-wooing-the-diaspora-123946">close to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi</a>, and his administration <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf">recognized India</a> – along with Australia and Japan – as key to restraining rising Chinese power in South Asia. Biden may endorse a softer China policy, which <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/biden-and-the-indo-pacific-will-regional-powers-shape-americas-approach/">would change, and potentially weaken</a>, U.S. relations with India. </p>
<p>Finally, there’s Afghanistan. In February 2020 the U.S. signed <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf">a peace deal with the Taliban insurgents</a> to end its 19-year war there. For the remaining U.S. troops to come home, however, the Taliban must also strike a deal with the Afghan government, which it has long sought to overthrow. Peace is far from guaranteed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/149805/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muqtedar Khan receives funding from the Department of State via University of Delaware.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Garret Martin receives funding from the European Union for the Transatlantic Policy Center, which he co-directs.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer M. Piscopo, Joyce Mao, and Julius A. Amin do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Biden wants to restore US global leadership after four years of Trump’s isolationism and antagonism. These are some of the challenges and opportunities he’ll face, from China to Latin America.Muqtedar Khan, Professor, Islam and Global Affairs, University of DelawareGarret Martin, Senior Professorial Lecturer, Co-Director Transatlantic Policy Center, American University School of International ServiceJennifer M. Piscopo, Associate Professor of Politics, Occidental CollegeJoyce Mao, Associate professor of history, MiddleburyJulius A. Amin, Professor, Department of History, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.