tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/us-iran-conflict-73960/articlesUS-Iran conflict – The Conversation2024-02-05T14:23:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2227682024-02-05T14:23:35Z2024-02-05T14:23:35ZMiddle East crisis: US airstrikes against Iran-backed armed groups explained<p>US airstrikes on Iran-backed armed groups <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-2-2024">on February 2</a> have been anticipated for some time. Since the Hamas attacks in Israel on October 7, US forces in the Middle East have been targeted more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/28/us/politics/biden-iran-drone-strike.html">150 times</a>. These attacks, mainly on US bases in Iraq and Syria caused minimal damage thanks to US air defence capabilities.</p>
<p>The Biden administration had responded with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/21/us/politics/us-militias-tipping-point.html">modest strikes</a> on the militias’ weapons storage and training sites. But a <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-troops-killed-jordan-american-service-members-syria/">drone attack</a> on January 28 on Tower 22, a US base on the Jordanian-Syrian border, killed three soldiers and wounded dozens of others. </p>
<p>The deaths represented an unofficial red line for many in Washington, and <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=biden+pressure+to+bomb+iran&oq=biden+pressure+to+bomb+iran&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l3j33i671l4.10890j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#:%7E:text=Political%20pressure%20builds,political%2Dpressure%2Dbuil...">political pressure</a> mounted fast on President Biden to respond more forcefully against the armed groups – or even <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-28/biden-faces-pressure-to-confront-iran-after-us-troops-killed">against Iran</a> itself.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Officials</a> said the air strikes targeted command-and-control sites, intelligence centres and drone storage facilities in Iraq and Syria affiliated with the militias and also with the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Quds Force</a>, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. </p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">also stated</a> that the US would continue strikes at times and places of their choosing.</p>
<p>Though more widespread than previous strikes, the response was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news">carefully calibrated</a> to avoid stoking a broader war. Furthermore, the US signalled its intentions days in advance, giving the groups and their advisers time to move to minimise casualties.</p>
<h2>Militant groups targeted</h2>
<p>There are about <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-backed-groups-iraq-militias-middle-east/">40 militant groups</a> in the region backed by Iran. These include high-profile groups such as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">Hamas</a>, which carried out the October 7 attack in Israel as well as <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, which has been engaged in cross-border fire with Israel on the Lebanon border since October. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">Houthi rebels</a> in Yemen have faced separate <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68159939">US and UK strikes</a> in response to their targeting of commercial ships in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>But many other, smaller groups operate as well. Responsibility for the lethal drone strike was claimed by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/29/jordan-drone-strike-who-are-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-and-what-is-tower-22">Islamic Resistance of Iraq</a>, a loose network of Iran-backed militias including <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/islamic-resistance-in-iraq-israel-hamas/">Kataib Hezbollah</a>, which fought against coalition forces during the Iraq war. These and other militias have continued to target US troops who remain in the region to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing attacks on US bases in Middle East by armed groups." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573413/original/file-20240205-21-awmjo4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1015&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map showing the location and number of attacks on US bases in the Middle East since October 7.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute for the Study of War</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/world/middleeast/iran-militias-israel.html">provides</a> a mix of training, intelligence, funding and weapons to groups within its self-described “axis of resistance”. But Tehran <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/01/iran-proxies-intel-houthis-00139099">does not fully control</a> the militias, who operate with varying degrees of autonomy, and who might be better seen as affiliates than proxies.</p>
<h2>US political choices</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has been walking a tightrope in the Middle East. On the one hand, the administration’s primary aim for the past four months has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67911825">preventing</a> a regional war in the aftermath of the Hamas attack and the subsequent war in Gaza. At the same time, the US has sought to deter adversaries who have been using increasing degrees of armed force against US personnel (and, in the case of the Red Sea, against international commercial vessels).</p>
<p>The challenge has been in determining a response that is forceful enough to deter further attacks, but not so devastating as to provoke a fully fledged war.</p>
<p>With the election year, Biden is also facing <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-conflict-joe-biden-must-weigh-the-risks-of-using-force-in-an-election-year-222410">additional scrutiny</a> from home on his foreign policy decisions. Donald Trump has long sought to make Biden <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/donald-trump-joe-biden-us-drone-strike-iran-world-war-three-b1135418.html">look weak</a> on Iran, while many Democrats have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-67959375">critical</a> of the president’s use of airstrikes, as well as his approach to the war in Gaza. The calibrated airstrikes of the weekend will probably attract further <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/27/biden-houthi-rebels-strike-congress">criticism</a> from both sides – for going too far or not far enough.</p>
<h2>Gaza conflict</h2>
<p>There’s no guarantee that a ceasefire (temporary or permanent) would bring a stop to attacks on US troops in Iraq and Syria, or to Houthi attacks on vessels in the Red Sea. But it’s undeniable that the crisis in Gaza has emboldened armed groups around the region, who have repeatedly <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wT2NTbZ7Q2w">used the war to justify</a> their actions.</p>
<p>The US, Egypt and Qatar have been mediating between Israel and Hamas to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/27/us/politics/hostage-deal-cease-fire-hamas-gaza.html">negotiate a deal</a> that would see a halt of military operations in Gaza in return for a phased release of hostages. While clearly crucial for the <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b1r11o1b9t">hostages</a> and their families and for the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-middle-east-67920784/page/2">civilian population of Gaza</a>, the deal could also be the key to defusing other tensions in the region, at least temporarily. </p>
<p>While the deal is far from a final <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/hamas-signals-that-wide-gaps-remain-on-reaching-a-cease-fire-agreement?smid=url-share">agreement</a>, the nature of the US strikes was probably calibrated in part to avoid disrupting the process.</p>
<h2>Preventing regional war</h2>
<p>Iran, as well as Iraq and Syria, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/syria-and-iraq-are-angered-by-us-strikes-warning-they-could-deepen-regional-turmoil?smid=url-share">have denounced</a> the strikes, and accused the US of aggression. But Iran has not indicated it <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/iran-denounces-the-us-strikes-but-doesnt-threaten-to-retaliate?smid=url-share">plans to retaliate</a>. This suggests that Tehran – like Washington – is still keen to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/01/world/middleeast/iran-us-war.html#:%7E:text=After%20Iran%2Daligned%20militants%20killed,awaiting%20President%20Biden's%20promised%20response.">avoid</a> a head-to-head conflict with the US. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, while Kataib Hezbollah has announced it <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/31/kataib-hezbollah-says-it-suspends-attacks-on-us-forces">will halt</a> attacks on US troops, other armed groups have said that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/02/03/world/us-strikes-israel-hamas-news/iran-denounces-the-us-strikes-but-doesnt-threaten-to-retaliate?smid=url-share">this</a> is not the end, and they will continue to strike against the US presence in the region.</p>
<p>For the Biden administration, the aim of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67911825">preventing</a> a regional war is still the right objective, even – perhaps especially – in the face of rising tensions. A policy of careful calibration, coupled with meaningful negotiations to halt the war in Gaza, may not be as politically enticing as flexing US military might – but it’s the approach that is most in line with the longer-term interests of the US and the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222768/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie M Norman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Biden administration has calibrated its strikes so as not to provoke a wider armed conflict in the region.Julie M Norman, Senior Associate Fellow on the Middle East at RUSI; Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations; Deputy Director of the Centre on US Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1837662022-09-27T12:27:49Z2022-09-27T12:27:49ZUnrest across Iran continues under state’s extreme gender apartheid<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486562/original/file-20220926-4427-sp0ee8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=610%2C277%2C2475%2C1799&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this Sept. 21, 2022, photo, Iranian demonstrators gather along a street in Tehran.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/picture-obtained-by-afp-outside-iran-on-september-21-shows-news-photo/1243408188?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-mahsa-amini-death-widespread-protests-intl-hnk/index.html">Unrest continues to erupt across Iran</a> following the death of a 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman, who died after being arrested and reportedly beaten by <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-morality-police-mime-intl/index.html">Iran’s morality police</a>. </p>
<p>The Iranian force took Mahsa (Zhina) Amini into detention on Sept. 16, 2022, for not wearing her hijab according to the rules. </p>
<p>As of Oct. 26, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63397159">at least 234 people have been confirmed killed</a> and hundreds have been <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/09/iran-deadly-crackdown-on-protests-against-mahsa-aminis-death-in-custody-needs-urgent-global-action/?fbclid=IwAR3lh8TLZ8Nyxhx0hMA9WPyg0ZmLmSqkAJQ0qFjvFI7UIIZhxlcHWmD5Gcc">arrested and wounded</a> in protests that erupted after Amini’s death. </p>
<p>As a Kurdish-born scholar and <a href="https://cah.ucf.edu/languages/faculty-staff/profile/414">a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Central Florida</a>, I have previously written about <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurds-targeted-in-turkish-attack-include-thousands-of-female-fighters-who-battled-islamic-state-125100">gender in Middle Eastern cultures</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-in-iran-will-continue-until-religious-rule-ends-90352">Iranian protests</a>.</p>
<p>With the exception of bland condemnations, the discrimination against women in Iran is often overlooked while the world focuses on <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/578024/EXPO_IDA(2017)578024_EN.pdf">limiting the country’s nuclear capabilities</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45302144">Some scholars and activists</a> have criticized international law for its lack of initiative and public action in recognizing Iran’s systematic discrimination against women as gender apartheid and acting to prevent it.</p>
<p>But many discriminatory laws, including those forcing women to cover their head and face with a hijab, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/there-are-two-types-of-hijabs-the-difference-is-huge/2019/04/07/50a44574-57f0-11e9-814f-e2f46684196e_story.html">honor neither tradition nor religion</a> and are applied to women of all ethnicities and faiths.</p>
<p>After all, Amini was not a Shiite woman by ethnicity or religion. </p>
<h2>Iran’s gender apartheid</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">1979 Islamic Revolution</a> established a republic that implements similar inhumane policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in <a href="https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/apartheid">South Africa under the government’s former brutal apartheid regime</a>. </p>
<p>The laws and policies in Iran establish and maintain domination by men and the state over women and their right to choose their own clothing or obtain a divorce. Systematic gender inequalities are prescribed legally and enforced by the regime to deny the women the “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">right to life and liberty</a>” and “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">basic human rights and freedoms</a>,” which according to <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">Article II of the United Nations’ Apartheid Convention in 1973</a>, are considered “the crime of apartheid.”</p>
<p>For example, according to <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2017/07/married-women-in-iran-still-need-permission-to-travel-abroad-under-amendment-to-passport-law/">Article 18 of Iran’s Passport Law</a>, a married woman still needs written permission from her male guardian to travel abroad.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Several cars are unable to move through thousands of demonstrators." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands of demonstrators stop traffic in Iran on Sept. 19, 2022, to protest the death of Mahsa Amini while in police custody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-in-protest-against-the-death-of-mahsa-amini-news-photo/1426271257?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Women in Iran are unable to hold any positions within the judicial, religious and military systems, nor are they able to serve as members of the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/02/09/everything-you-need-to-know-about-irans-assembly-of-experts-election/">Assembly of Experts</a>, the <a href="https://irandataportal.syr.edu/political-institutions/the-expediency-council">Expediency Discernment Council</a> or the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Council-of-Guardians">Guardian Council</a>, the three highest councils in the Islamic Republic.</p>
<p>Women under law cannot be president or supreme leader of
Iran. <a href="https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">According to Article 115</a>, the president of the Islamic Republic must be elected from among the “religious and political men.”</p>
<p>In addition, the Iranian state <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45302144">has added discriminatory features to the criminal code</a> – one such feature is the principle that the value of a woman is one-half of the value of a man. </p>
<p>That principle applies in matters involving compensation for a killing and in what a son or daughter receives from a family inheritance. They also apply in the weight given to legal testimony or in obtaining a divorce.</p>
<p>Such laws, policies and practices continue to mark women as lesser citizens, legally and socially unequal.</p>
<h2>Segregation in daily life</h2>
<p>The state also has imposed <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202209012125">systematic segregation</a> in schools, hospitals, universities, transportation, sports and other major areas of day-to-day life.</p>
<p>For many decades, Iran’s gender apartheid had relegated women to the back of the bus with <a href="https://wcfia.harvard.edu/publications/women-place-politics-gender-segregation-iran">a metal bar segregating</a> them from men.</p>
<p>Under the government’s direction, universities <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/middleeast/20iht-educbriefs20.html">have set limits on women’s options</a> and have banned them from many fields of study. </p>
<p>Iran has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/31/iran-women-blocked-entering-stadium#:%7E:text=Over%20the%20past%2040%20years,detention%2C%20and%20abuses%20against%20women.">generally barred female spectators</a> from soccer and other sports stadiums since the 1979 revolution. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A protestor in California holds a sign with the image of the 22-year-old Iranian woman who died in Iranian police custody." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486563/original/file-20220926-17-y19r3i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=516&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators in California hold signs at a protest over the death of Mahsa Amini.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-hold-signs-at-a-protest-over-the-death-last-news-photo/1427444152?adppopup=true">Rodin Eckenroth/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Clerics play a major role in decision-making and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220330-iran-again-bans-women-from-football-stadium">have argued that women must be shielded</a> from the masculine atmosphere and sight of semi-clad men during sporting events.</p>
<p>Under such discriminatory policies, the Persian terms such as za'ifeh, meaning weak and incapable, has found its way into <a href="https://vajehyab.com/dehkhoda/%D8%B6%D8%B9%DB%8C%D9%81%D8%A9">Persian dictionaries</a> as synonyms for “woman” and “wife.”</p>
<h2>‘Women, life, freedom’</h2>
<p>Iran’s notorious extrajudicial morality police <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-morality-police-mime-intl/index.html">have terrorized women for decades</a>. </p>
<p>Like the articles of the <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en">Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran</a>, principles of the morality police are founded on an interpretation of <a href="https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/hadith-collection">canonical Shiite texts</a> and are implemented through modern tools of control and prosecution.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A fire is blazing in the middle of a street in Iran as hundreds of people gather." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486631/original/file-20220926-22-bb07bs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People gather in Tehran on Sept. 19, 2022, during a protest for 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who died while in police custody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-during-a-protest-for-mahsa-amini-who-died-news-photo/1243377054?adppopup=true">Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In international criminal law, specific unlawful acts that are committed within a system of oppression and domination are considered crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>As set out in the U.N.’s <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.10_International%20Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf">Apartheid Convention</a>, these crimes include denial of basic rights that prevent a racial group or groups from participating in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country. </p>
<p>Most known for the brutal regime in South Africa, apartheid comes from the Afrikaans word meaning “apartness.” It <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa">was the ideology</a> that was introduced in South Africa in 1948 and supported by the National Party government. </p>
<p>The compulsory hijab is at the center of what I call Iran’s extreme gender apartheid, where a misplaced headscarf can result in up to <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/anti-hijab-activist-in-iran-sentenced-to-15-years-in-prison/30133081.html">15 years in prison</a>, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/09/04/iran.stoning/index.html">lashing</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iranian-women-fined-260-bad-hijabs">fines</a> and inhumane and unlawful arrest and death.</p>
<p>Several <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/middleeast/iran-hijab-law-report-intl/index.html">anti-compulsory hijab movements</a> emerge every few years in Iran, such as in the case of Zhina Amini.</p>
<p>In the Kurdish language, her name originates from “jin,” the word for woman and shares a root with the word for life, “jiyan.”</p>
<p>Those Kurdish words are at the heart of the most used slogan by
the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-small-but-powerful-band-of-women-led-the-fight-against-isis">Kurdish Female Fighters against the Islamic State</a> in Iraq and Syria, and by women across Iran today against the Islamic Republic of Iran.</p>
<p>Add in “azadi” – the Kurdish word for freedom – and the slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” means “Women, Life, Freedom” and is resounding among protesters in streets throughout Iran and the world to dismantle the state’s gender apartheid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haidar Khezri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, women in Iran have been forced to accept second-class citizenship, as Shiite religious leaders control most aspects of women’s lives.Haidar Khezri, Assistant Professor, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1576382021-06-16T12:39:23Z2021-06-16T12:39:23ZRacial bias makes white Americans more likely to support wars in nonwhite foreign countries – new study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403414/original/file-20210528-19-1lm3qqr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C22%2C3790%2C2494&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">White Americans who hold racist attitudes are likely to prefer military action over diplomacy in foreign countries like Iran and, in particular, China.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/soldiers-marching-in-desert-royalty-free-image/dv144072?adppopup=true">Frank Rossoto Stocktrek via Getty</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The effects of American racial bias and anti-Asian sentiment do not end at the nation’s borders. The racial attitudes of white people also influence their support for American military intervention abroad, according to <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/djkl9ads9y60394/2021-02-10_Ebner-and-Medenica_Racial-Empire_Working-Draft.pdf?dl=0">our working paper on U.S. foreign policy and racism</a>.</p>
<p>White Americans who hold racist beliefs are significantly more likely to endorse aggressive military interventions over diplomacy or economic strategies in foreign countries at odds with the United States, if the residents of those countries are perceived as nonwhite. </p>
<p>This is particularly true when it comes to China.</p>
<h2>Race and public opinion</h2>
<p>Researchers have long known that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716210390288?casa_token=4Q5QjiDimlEAAAAA:nmcoUTTuE15x2ybH8_gnGHdj-EsRQWZMv7O-f4PKoWXImAgkTERzB8sgP854KMmVlMBl2EA0SKtj">race and racism</a> powerfully shape white Americans’ views on <a href="https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/15/16781222/trump-racism-economic-anxiety-study">domestic issues</a> like social welfare and criminal justice. </p>
<p>Scholars have given less attention to how the racial resentment harbored by white people influences <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/19/why-race-matters-international-relations-ir/">their foreign policy views</a>, in part because the typical voter <a href="https://www.cfr.org/news-releases/americans-lack-knowledge-international-issues-yet-consider-them-important-finds-new">cares less about</a> foreign policy than about domestic policies that affect their everyday lives. </p>
<p>But when tensions between the U.S. and another country escalate, as they have lately with Iran, North Korea and China, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/26/will-foreign-policy-be-a-major-issue-in-the-2016-election-heres-what-we-know/">popular interest in foreign policy rises</a>. That can <a href="https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-impact-of-public-opinion-on-us-foreign-policy-since-vietnam-9780195105285?cc=us&lang=en&">influence policy</a> decisions.</p>
<p>To analyze how racial attitudes affect support for U.S. military action abroad, we examined 30 years of public opinion data collected by one of the country’s longest-running national public opinion surveys, the <a href="https://electionstudies.org/">American National Election Study</a>. Our analysis focused on answers by white Americans from 1986 to 2016. </p>
<p>Specifically, we examined their responses to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/15/white-racial-resentment-has-been-gaining-political-power-for-decades/">“racial resentment” scale</a>. Social scientists use this meticulously tested set of questions to assess anti-Black prejudice in the post-civil rights era. In recent decades, white Americans have become <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691070711/the-race-card">less willing</a> to express <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2805831/">explicitly racist</a> views, such as opposing interracial marriage or supporting segregation. But they may still harbor bigoted perceptions, doubting Black Americans’ work ethic or commitment to self-reliance, for example. </p>
<p>The racial resentment scale is designed to capture this kind of discriminatory anti-Black views. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Bearded older man at a white supremacist rally carrying a sign that says 'White Lives Matter'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403417/original/file-20210528-17-gr01vv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A ‘White Lives Matter’ rally held in Shelbyville, Tenn., in 2017, hosted by Nationalist Front, a coalition of white supremacist organizations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/white-nationalist-attend-a-rally-on-october-28-2017-in-news-photo/867653312?adppopup=true">Scott Olson/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Social scientists have repeatedly demonstrated that <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/1645-racecraft">white people who hold such views</a> are also likely to hold negative views of <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Racial-Formation-in-the-United-States/Omi-Winant/p/book/9780415520317">other nonwhite U.S. populations</a>, including <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Ignored-Racism-Animus-Toward-Latinos/dp/110849532X">Latinos</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/07/10/racial-resentment-is-biggest-predictor-immigration-attitudes-study-finds/">immigrants</a>, <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2019.1623053">Muslim Americans</a> and <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300093308/bitter-fruit">Asian Americans</a>.</p>
<p>Based on responses to the racial resentment scale in the most recent American National Election Studies – administered in 2012 and 2016 to about 3,000 non-Hispanic white respondents each – we found that racist attitudes are correlated with and meaningfully influence white Americans’ support for U.S. military interventions in other countries. </p>
<p>For example, people with racist attitudes favored more <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/america-and-iran-from-fascination-to-antagonism/2021/02/24/d6078bb4-7246-11eb-85fa-e0ccb3660358_story.html">aggressive action against Iran</a>. Thirty-five percent would support bombing Iranian suspected nuclear development sites, compared with 15% of whites with less racist attitudes and 31% of white Americans overall. </p>
<p>White Americans with racist views also favor military engagement against Muslim populations. For example, they are five percentage points more supportive of continuing the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/02/11/biden-endless-wars-drones-afghanistan/">global “war on terror”</a> than the overall white population, 46% to 41%. </p>
<p>Because a number of factors influence people’s foreign policy opinions – including educational status, income, gender, ideology, military service and partisan affiliation – we adjusted for these in our study. We also controlled for respondents’ reported attention to political news, their level of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00534.x">white ethnocentrism</a> and their <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912913492019">authoritarian leanings</a>. </p>
<p>We find that racial resentment has a significant effect above and beyond these other variables. </p>
<h2>Anti-China views</h2>
<p>Racial resentment seemed especially influential in white American <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-economy-growth-coronavirus/2021/01/17/2138ef2c-5935-11eb-a849-6f9423a75ffd_story.html">views of China</a> – which has become an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-china-russia/u-s-military-puts-great-power-competition-at-heart-of-strategy-mattis-idUSKBN1F81TR">economic and political competitor to the U.S. over the last decade</a>.</p>
<p>In 2012, of the 3,196 white Americans surveyed in the <a href="https://electionstudies.org/">American National Election Study</a>, 28% believed that China posed a “major” military threat to the U.S., 53% saw China as a “minor” threat and 19% did not see China as a threat. Racially resentful whites were 36 percentage points more likely to see China as a major threat than other white respondents, according to our analysis.</p>
<p>In 2016, 3,505 white Americans answered the same survey questions about China. Forty-five percent saw China as a “major” threat to the U.S. and 43% saw it as a “minor threat”; only 11% of whites believed that China presented no threat to the U.S. </p>
<p>Again, racial attitudes strongly shaped these perceptions. Our analysis found that whites with racist attitude were 20 percentage points more likely to consider China a major threat in 2016 than other whites. </p>
<p>While at first glance this might suggest that racial attitudes were less of a factor in 2016 than 2012, the lower percentage reflects the fact that a much higher percentage of Americans viewed <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/">China as a threat in 2016 than 2012</a>. </p>
<p>This trend continued during the presidency of Donald Trump, who portrayed China as a great adversary, calling it a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/us/politics/trump-china-theat-to-world.html">threat to the world</a>.” Today 22% of all Americans see China as the greatest enemy of the U.S., according to <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/287108/fewer-regard-china-favorably-leading-economy.aspx">a 2020 Gallup poll</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People march with signs that say 'Stop Asian Hate'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/403420/original/file-20210528-15-at8wtw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A march against anti-Asian hate crimes in New York City, April 4, 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/april-4-2021-people-march-to-protest-against-anti-asian-news-photo/1232140624?adppopup=true">Wang Ying/Xinhua via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A vicious cycle</h2>
<p>Americans’ growing perception of <a href="https://theconversation.com/rethinking-the-us-china-fight-does-china-really-threaten-american-power-abroad-148672">China as a threat</a> comes as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-security/china-says-u-s-military-in-south-china-sea-not-good-for-peace-idUSKBN29U0P0">both countries compete for control</a> over the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210408-us-warns-china-against-aggressive-moves-in-contested-south-china-sea">South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>China and the U.S. routinely deploy weapons and engage in <a href="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/the-united-states-china-and-taiwan-a-strategy-to-prevent-war.pdf">military planning</a> and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/beijing-tests-biden-south-china-sea-exercises">exercises</a> in the South China Sea. U.S. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/29/politics/president-joe-biden-china-democracy/index.html">President Joe Biden</a> frames tensions between the two countries as a competition between democracy and autocracy. He has described relations with China as one of the top priorities of his administration. </p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Many analysts, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/23/russia-china-and-the-risks-of-war-my-conversation-with-general-mark-milley/">including high-ranking U.S. military personel</a>, view the risks of violent conflict between the U.S. and China as relatively low. </p>
<p>But all that saber-rattling in the South China Sea, and years of heated presidential rhetoric under Trump, have domestic implications. <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/rational-security-it-was-always-russia-edition">Studies suggest</a> that when politicians describe the relationship between the U.S. and China as a “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2364137/great-power-competition-can-involve-conflict-below-threshold-of-war/">great power competition</a>,” it stokes anti-Asian beliefs among white Americans.</p>
<p>These anti-Asian beliefs, in turn, make white Americans more likely to see China as a major threat, according to our research – one potentially worthy going to war over. We document a vicious cycle of racial animosity with potentially global consequences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157638/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Analysis of US survey data finds that white people who hold racist views are more likely than others to favor military action over diplomacy in China and Iran, and to endorse the global war on terror.Vladimir Enrique Medenica, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of DelawareDavid Ebner, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of DelawareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1562812021-03-03T13:26:11Z2021-03-03T13:26:11ZWhy repressive Saudi Arabia remains a US ally<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387331/original/file-20210302-13-2trpe7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=43%2C75%2C4125%2C3131&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A demonstrator dressed as Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman with blood on his hands protests outside the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C., on Oct. 8, 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotografia-de-noticias/demonstrator-dressed-as-saudi-arabian-crown-fotografia-de-noticias/1048899574?adppopup=true">Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman “approved an operation … to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi,” according to a scathing <a href="https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/the-report-on-jamal-khashoggi-killing/ddc9578e0994f690/full.pdf">new report</a> from the Biden administration. Yet President Joe Biden says the U.S. will not sanction the Saudi government, calculating that any direct punishment <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/us/politics/biden-mbs-khashoggi.html">could risk Saudi Arabia’s cooperation</a> in confronting Iran and in counterterrorism efforts.</p>
<p>Like his predecessors, Biden is <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/02/biden-middle-east-china-pivot-clinton-obama/">grappling with the reality</a> that Saudi Arabia is needed to achieve certain U.S. objectives in the Middle East.</p>
<p>This is a change from Biden’s criticism of Saudi Arabia on the campaign trail. He said his administration would turn this repressive kingdom – a longtime U.S. ally – into a global “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-retreats-saudi-arabia-sanctions-khashoggi-killing-d91d31edece5db07112d1c2d4dd3be33">pariah</a>.”</p>
<p>The Khashoggi affair highlights a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B001AOUBMM/">persistent oddity in American foreign policy</a>, one <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2015.1034570">I observed</a> in many years working at the State Department and Department of Defense: selective morality in dealing with repressive regimes.</p>
<h2>A panoply of dictators</h2>
<p>The Trump administration was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/us/politics/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-deal.html">reluctant</a> to confront Saudi Arabia over the killing of Khashoggi, a Washington Post columnist who lived in Virginia. Beyond <a href="https://www.apnews.com/9c79116125c740d084eaf3576d8958a8">revoking the visas</a> of some Saudi officials implicated in Khashoggi’s death, Trump did nothing to punish the kingdom for Khashoggi’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/world/middleeast/erdogan-khashoggi-turkey-saudi-arabia.html">torture, assassination and dismemberment</a>. </p>
<p>Trump and other White House officials reminded critics that Saudi Arabia buys <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-security/obama-administration-arms-sales-offers-to-saudi-top-115-billion-report-idUSKCN11D2JQ">billions of dollars in weapons</a> from the U.S. and is a crucial partner in the American pressure campaign on Iran. Biden has taken a slightly tougher line, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/26/us/report-jamal-khashoggi-killing.html?searchResultPosition=18">approving the release</a> of the intelligence report that blames bin Salman for Khashoggi’s murder and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-khashoggi-sanctions/u-s-imposes-sanctions-visa-bans-on-saudis-for-journalist-khashoggis-killing-idUSKBN2AQ2QI">sanctioning 76 lower-level Saudi officials</a>.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia isn’t the only nation to get a free pass from the U.S. for its terrible misdeeds. The U.S. has for decades <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B007FI40QU/">maintained close ties</a> with some of the world’s worst human rights abusers. Ever since the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world’s dominant military and economic power, consecutive American presidents have seen financial and geopolitical benefit in overlooking the bad deeds of brutal regimes. </p>
<p>Before the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran was a close U.S. ally. Shah Reza Pahlavi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/years-of-torture-in-iran-comes-to-light.html">ruled harshly</a>, using his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/12/13/savak-jails-stark-reminder-of-shahs-rule/b2b37be2-356a-43e2-ba68-dd474e9023b0/?utm_term=.b82257b17760">secret police</a> to torture and murder political dissidents. </p>
<p>But the shah was also a secular, anti-communist leader in a Muslim-dominated region. President Nixon <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249664268_The_Persian_Gulf_British_Withdrawal_and_Western_Security">hoped</a> that Iran would be the “Western policeman in the Persian Gulf.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241639/original/file-20181022-105767-1n8n2y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241639/original/file-20181022-105767-1n8n2y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241639/original/file-20181022-105767-1n8n2y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241639/original/file-20181022-105767-1n8n2y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241639/original/file-20181022-105767-1n8n2y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241639/original/file-20181022-105767-1n8n2y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241639/original/file-20181022-105767-1n8n2y2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nixon hosted Iranian Shah Reza Pavlavi at the White House in 1969.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-Associated-Press-Domestic-News-Dist-of-/a6784660844b49a69c5fc2b4e34e53df/211/0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After the shah’s overthrow, the Reagan administration in the 1980s became <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/31/iraq.politics">friendly with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein</a>. The U.S. supported him with intelligence during Iraq’s war with Iran and looked the other way at his use of chemical weapons.</p>
<p>And before Syria’s intense <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-war-in-syria-may-be-ending-but-is-likely-to-bring-a-fresh-wave-of-suffering-104635">bloody civil war</a> – which has killed an estimated 400,000 people and featured grisly <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-chemical-weapons-and-the-limits-of-international-law-95045">chemical weapon attacks</a> by the government – its authoritarian regime enjoyed relatively friendly relations with the U.S. </p>
<p>Syria has been on the State Department’s list of <a href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm">state sponsors of terrorism</a> since 1979. But presidents Nixon, Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton all visited President Bashar al-Assad’s father, who ruled from 1971 until his death in 2000. </p>
<h2>Why Saudi Arabia matters</h2>
<p>Before the alleged assassination of Khashoggi by Saudi operatives, the 35-year-old crown prince was cultivating a reputation as a moderate reformer.</p>
<p>Salman has made newsworthy changes in the conservative Arab kingdom, allowing women <a href="https://qz.com/1313101/saudi-arabias-women-are-finally-allowed-to-drive-a-car-on-their-own/">to drive</a>, combating corruption and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-crown-prince-talks-to-60-minutes/">curtailing some powers</a> of the religious police. </p>
<p>Still, Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes. </p>
<p>Though women may now obtain a passport without the permission of a male guardian, they <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/saudi-arabia#49dda6">still need a guardian’s approval</a> to get married, leave prison or obtain certain medical procedures. And they must have the consent of a male guardian to enroll in college or look for a job. </p>
<p>The Saudi government also routinely arrests people without judicial review, according to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/saudi-arabia">Human Rights Watch</a>. Citizens can be killed for nonviolent crimes, often in public. Between January and mid-November 2019, 81 people <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/saudi-arabia#49dda6">were executed</a> for drug-related crimes.</p>
<p>Saudi Arabia ranks just above North Korea on political rights, civil liberties and other measures of freedom, according to the democracy watchdog <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">Freedom House</a>. The same report ranks both Iran and China ahead of the Saudis.</p>
<p>But its wealth, strategic Middle East location and petroleum exports keep the Saudis as a vital U.S. ally. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-visit-to-ally-saudi-arabia-shadowed-by-tensions-with-the-kingdom/2016/04/20/a0a987e0-06eb-11e6-a12f-ea5aed7958dc_story.html?utm_term=.ec236b5e369b">President Obama visited Saudi Arabia more</a> than any other American president – four times in eight years – to discuss everything from Iran to oil production.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241641/original/file-20181022-105751-1n9jelr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241641/original/file-20181022-105751-1n9jelr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241641/original/file-20181022-105751-1n9jelr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241641/original/file-20181022-105751-1n9jelr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=487&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241641/original/file-20181022-105751-1n9jelr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241641/original/file-20181022-105751-1n9jelr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241641/original/file-20181022-105751-1n9jelr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=611&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Obama administration had a close relationship with Saudi Arabia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Saudi-Arabia-US-Obama/9dd3372647cc49c393cc2eee197e3589/60/0">AP Photo/Hassan Ammar</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>American realpolitik</h2>
<p>This kind of foreign policy – one based on practical, self-interested principles rather than moral or ideological concerns – is called “realpolitik.” </p>
<p>Henry Kissinger, secretary of state under Nixon, was <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/the-realpolitik-of-the-american-people/">a master of realpolitik</a>, which drove that administration to normalize its relationship with China. Diplomatic relations between the two countries had ended in 1949 when Chinese communist revolutionaries took power. </p>
<p>Then, as now, China was incredibly repressive. Only 16 countries – including Saudi Arabia – <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores">are less free than China</a>, according to Freedom House. Iran, a country the U.S. wants Saudis to help in keeping in check, ranks ahead of China.</p>
<p>But China is also the world’s most populous nation and a nuclear power. Nixon, a fervent anti-communist, sought to exploit a growing rift between China and the Soviet Union. </p>
<p>Today Washington retains the important, if occasionally rocky, relationship Kissinger forged with Beijing, despite its ongoing <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45474279">persecution of Muslim minority groups</a>.</p>
<p>American realpolitik applies to Latin America, too. After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the U.S. regularly backed Central and South American <a href="https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/u-s-support-for-brutal-central-american-dictators-led-to-todays-border-crisis/">military dictators</a> who tortured and killed citizens to “defend” the Americas from communism. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241672/original/file-20181022-105748-1ogzdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241672/original/file-20181022-105748-1ogzdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241672/original/file-20181022-105748-1ogzdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241672/original/file-20181022-105748-1ogzdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241672/original/file-20181022-105748-1ogzdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241672/original/file-20181022-105748-1ogzdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241672/original/file-20181022-105748-1ogzdak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The U.S. supported Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 military coup in Chile, which overthrew Socialist President Salvador Allende and ushered in a murderous regime.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Chile-Coup-Anniversary/1ffc40b46e52475eae3debfa3defb895/26/0">AP Photo/Enrique Aracena, File)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>US not ‘so innocent’</h2>
<p>U.S. presidents tend to underplay their relationships with repressive regimes, lauding lofty “American values” instead. </p>
<p>That’s the language former President Barack Obama used in 2018 to <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/9/7/17832024/obama-speech-trump-illinois-transcript">criticize Trump’s embrace of Russia’s authoritarian president</a>, Vladimir Putin, citing America’s “commitment to certain values and principles like the rule of law and human rights and democracy.”</p>
<p>But Trump defended his relationship with Russia, tacitly invoking American realpolitik. “You think our country’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/donald-trump-vladimir-putin/index.html">so innocent</a>?” he asked on Fox News. </p>
<p>As Trump alluded to, the U.S. has maintained close ties to numerous regimes, and still does, whose values and policies conflict with America’s constitutional guarantees of democracy, freedom of speech, the right to due process and many others. </p>
<p>It has for decades. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia’s crown prince had a dissident journalist killed. American realpolitik explains why the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/us/politics/trump-saudi-khashoggi-midterms.html">tight U.S.-Saudi relationship</a> will likely <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/26/mohammed-bin-salman-is-guilty-murder-biden-should-not-give-him-pass/?arc404=true">continue anyway</a>.</p>
<p><em>This story is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabia-is-a-repressive-regime-and-so-are-a-lot-of-us-allies-105106">article</a> originally published Oct. 22, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeffrey Fields receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation. </span></em></p>Saudi’s crown prince approved the killing and dismemberment of a Washington Post columnist in 2018, the Biden administration says. So how can the US still see the Saudis as good partners?Jeffrey Fields, Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1437162020-10-19T18:32:37Z2020-10-19T18:32:37ZBiden’s plan to revive Iran talks could calm the Middle East – but on Israel he and Trump largely agree<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364032/original/file-20201016-13-nj77ka.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C148%2C4300%2C2677&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vice President Biden with a U.S. delegation at the Riyadh airport in Saudi Arabia in 2011. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/saudi-foreign-minister-prince-saud-al-faisal-welcomes-us-news-photo/130620634?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the Taliban <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/taliban-on-trump-we-hope-he-will-win-the-election-withdraw-us-troops/">recently voiced its hope that Donald Trump would win a second term</a> because he would withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, it was a reminder that the 2020 U.S. election has big implications for the Middle East – and, by consequence, for American national security.</p>
<p>Foreign policy <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2020-10-13/why-foreign-policy-has-been-missing-from-the-2020-campaign">barely registers on Americans’ election agenda this year</a> in a race dominated by the coronavirus pandemic, economic woes and structural racism. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the United States’ global role is on the ballot in November. Trump has an “America First” vision in which <a href="https://theconversation.com/trumps-foreign-policy-is-still-america-first-what-does-that-mean-exactly-144841">narrowly defined U.S. interests rank as more important than helping maintain the global order</a>. Biden, whose decades of foreign policy experience include chairing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wants to restore the United States’ international stature.</p>
<p>A Biden win would change American foreign policy significantly. But my research on <a href="https://www.academia.edu/43596835/Post_Orientalism_and_Geopolitics_Three_Debates_that_Inform_Islam_and_U_S_Foreign_Policy">U.S. policy in the Middle East</a> suggests the United States’ actual engagement there might only show cosmetic changes. </p>
<h2>Trump’s Mideast policy</h2>
<p>Trump came to office promising to tame Iran, end the Islamic State and make “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/05/donald-trump-s-middle-east-promises-can-he-keep-them-pub-66346">the deal of the century</a>” between Israel and the Palestinians. </p>
<p>But he <a href="https://cgpolicy.org/articles/the-absence-of-a-u-s-grand-strategy-for-the-middle-east/">has executed no grand strategy in the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>Today Iran is emboldened, there’s no Israeli-Palestinian peace deal and, despite Trump’s claims, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-strategic-dialogue-troops.html">Islamic State still exists</a>. Trump withdrew the U.S. from a 2015 international agreement that restricted Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions. But <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/new-sanctions-on-irans-banks-crippling-or-more-window-dressing/">restoring sanctions</a> has not curbed the Iranian government’s regional influence, much less forced regime change. </p>
<p>New sanctions just imposed on Iran’s banking system, for example, are mostly just making life harder for <a href="https://apnews.com/article/3b9108c6cbbb496380a81eb7b3bbb979">ordinary Iranians during a pandemic</a> by reducing the value of the Iranian currency. </p>
<p>One consistency in Trump’s Middle East policy is Israel. Trump steadfastly supports its escalating opposition to Iran and <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-suspends-formal-annexation-of-the-west-bank-but-its-controversial-settlements-continue-144469">aggressive policies in the Israeli-occupied West Bank</a> and Gaza territories. Trump also departed from decades of settled U.S. policy on Israel’s capital, Jerusalem – <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B000QCQSWG/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i2">a holy city for Muslims</a> that <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-trumps-recognition-of-jerusalem-as-the-capital-of-israel-means-for-the-middle-east-88722">the Palestinians likewise claim as their capital</a> – by moving the U.S. embassy there from Tel Aviv. This shift angered Muslim nations across the Middle East and beyond, and effectively killed hopes of peace with Israel. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364034/original/file-20201016-19-1hqj74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Aerial shot of a dusty building site with a concrete structure under construction" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364034/original/file-20201016-19-1hqj74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364034/original/file-20201016-19-1hqj74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364034/original/file-20201016-19-1hqj74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364034/original/file-20201016-19-1hqj74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364034/original/file-20201016-19-1hqj74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364034/original/file-20201016-19-1hqj74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364034/original/file-20201016-19-1hqj74g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Construction underway in an Israeli settlement in the occupied West Bank, July 31, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/palestinian-labourers-work-at-a-construction-site-in-the-news-photo/1158822881?adppopup=true">Menahem Kahana/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Trump White House scored one diplomatic victory in the region by normalizing relations <a href="https://theconversation.com/historic-israel-deal-wont-likely-bring-peace-to-the-middle-east-144480">between Israel and two Arab nations, the United Arab Emirates</a> and Bahrain. </p>
<p>In numbers, that matches what presidents Bill Clinton and Jimmy Carter together achieved in the Middle East: Carter normalized Israeli ties with Egypt and Clinton with Jordan. But without a just solution to Palestinian demands for statehood, critics say, genuine <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/15/without-palestinians-israeli-normalization-is-still-beyond-reach-pub-82702">peace with Arabs is not possible</a>. </p>
<p>Either way, Trump has unquestionably altered the geopolitics of the Middle East, pushing aside Israel-Palestine as the region’s main conflict. For both the U.S. and leading Arab nations, the priority is now stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons and reducing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death/">Iranian attacks on American interests and allies</a>. </p>
<h2>Biden’s challenges</h2>
<p>If Biden wins the election, he would have to contend with <a href="https://www.ijtihad.org/trump-can-avoid-war-and-negotiate-with-iran.htm">more hostile U.S.-Iran relations</a> than what he and Barack Obama bequeathed to Trump in 2016. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/13/opinions/smarter-way-to-be-tough-on-iran-joe-biden/index.html">CNN op-ed</a> when Biden promised to rejoin the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Biden wrote that through greater cooperation, he believes Iran can be pacified. Rejoining the deal – signed by the U.S., China, Russia and several European powers – would have the effect of improving frayed U.S. cooperation with those nations, too. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364033/original/file-20201016-23-11gdujb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Obama speaks at a lectern with Biden behind his right shoulder" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364033/original/file-20201016-23-11gdujb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/364033/original/file-20201016-23-11gdujb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364033/original/file-20201016-23-11gdujb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364033/original/file-20201016-23-11gdujb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364033/original/file-20201016-23-11gdujb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364033/original/file-20201016-23-11gdujb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/364033/original/file-20201016-23-11gdujb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Obama, with Vice President Biden, announces that an Iran nuclear deal has been reached after 18 days of intense negotiation, July 14, 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-barack-obama-standing-with-vice-president-joe-news-photo/639607331?adppopup=true">Andrew Harnik/White House Pool/Corbis/VCG via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But increased engagement with Iran would hurt U.S.-Saudi relations, which have grown closer under Trump’s son-in-law and Mideast adviser, Jared Kushner. Saudi Arabia is entangled in what it considers to be a zero-sum struggle with Iran for domination of the Gulf region. The Saudis see U.S. <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1573786/saudi-arabia">pressure on Iran</a> as a key component of its strategy to contain Iranian influence. </p>
<p>Biden has also signaled that the U.S. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/05/01/biden-calls-end-us-support-saudi-war-yemen/">will no longer support</a> Saudi Arabia in its devastating intervention in Yemen’s civil war. </p>
<p>Iraq, Syria and Libya are all also embroiled in civil wars, conflicts that Biden – who <a href="https://theconversation.com/bidens-long-foreign-policy-record-signals-how-hell-reverse-trump-rebuild-old-alliances-and-lead-the-pandemic-response-143671">believes the U.S. has “an obligation to lead”</a> – would have to decide how to engage with. </p>
<p>Biden would also contend with a new development in the Middle East: Turkey, which now has military presence in Syria, Iraq, Qatar and Libya. Trump <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/21/trump-has-accommodated-turkey-erdogan-if-he-wins-biden-should-seek-an-elusive-balance/">has largely accommodated</a> Turkey’s growing regional assertion of its influence. </p>
<h2>Israel-Palestine</h2>
<p>Biden’s rhetoric about Israel differs from Trump’s. In May he <a href="https://www.jta.org/2020/05/20/politics/joe-biden-tells-jewish-donors-i-do-not-support-annexation-and-will-reverse-trump-policies-on-israel-and-the-palestinians">came out publicly against Israel’s proposed annexation</a> of the West Bank – an inflammatory plan that <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-undecided-support-west-bank-annexation-u-s-envoys-arrive-n1232205">the Trump administration may have quietly opposed</a> but <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/24/trump-aide-concerns-over-occupied-west-bank-annexation-overblown">would not condemn</a>. Israel has since suspended that plan <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/world/middleeast/israel-uae-annexation.html">as part of the United Arab Emirates deal</a>.</p>
<p>But there’s no sign the United States’ Israel policies would differ substantively under Biden. His <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/10/bipartisan-consensus-defense-of-israeli-occupation-palestine-biden">campaign has repeatedly stated</a> its “ironclad” support for Israel, condemning any effort to boycott the country or withhold aid to force policy change. As vice president, Biden in 2016 helped <a href="https://joebiden.com/joe-biden-and-the-jewish-community-a-record-and-a-plan-of-friendship-support-and-action/#">get the country its biggest ever U.S. aid package</a>, US$38 billion. Biden has already announced he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/29/biden-says-hed-leave-us-embassy-in-jerusalem-if-elected">would not move the U.S. embassy back to Tel Aviv if elected</a>.</p>
<p>The U.S. is Israel’s strongest ally. Every American president <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and-overview-of-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel">since 1973</a> has given substantial foreign aid and military technology to the Israelis while <a href="https://www.israelhayom.com/2019/04/16/trump-defends-and-protects-israel-from-international-criminal-court/">shielding Israel from international condemnation</a> over its policies toward Palestinians.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Palestinians almost certainly won’t get their land back under Biden. But they could get more money and political support. <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/1671061/world">Biden promises to restore</a> some of the <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22967.pdf">$600 million in U.S. aid</a> to the Palestinian Authority and to the United Nations agency for Palestinian refugees, among other agencies. Trump eliminated that funding last year in a failed effort to force Palestinians to accept his peace plan. </p>
<p>Obama <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/obama-and-middle-east">created some goodwill in the Mideast</a>, which may help Biden. But the region presents challenges that have for decades stymied American presidents, Democratic and Republican alike.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143716/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muqtedar Khan is the academic director of the American Foreign Policy Institute at the University of Delaware, which has received a SUSI grant from the U.S. Department of State. </span></em></p>Biden and Trump are like night and day on foreign policy, and American global engagement would change radically under a Biden presidency. But actual Mideast policy might show only cosmetic changes.Muqtedar Khan, Professor, Islam and Global Affairs, University of DelawareLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296102020-02-10T13:56:21Z2020-02-10T13:56:21ZHow Iran’s millennials are grappling with crippling US sanctions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/314336/original/file-20200209-27548-14r5cyp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Within Iran’s lower classes, there is a highly conformist youth culture.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Farzin Mahmoudzadeh</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In early January, after tensions between Iran and the United States escalated to the brink of war, President Donald Trump announced a detente of sorts, <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/08/donald-trump-address-nation-iran-attacks/2842056001/">stating</a>, “The United States is ready to embrace peace with all who seek it.” </p>
<p>It may have sounded like a conciliatory gesture, but the Trump administration went on to levy <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/dc897e76-33a3-11ea-9703-eea0cae3f0de">additional economic sanctions</a> against the country only two days later. </p>
<p>As someone who has studied the lives of Iran’s working classes, I know just how damaging <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/09/us-iran-sanctions-donald-trump-iran-deal-oil-banks">economic warfare has been</a>. It’s hit young Iranians, who comprise a <a href="https://iran.unfpa.org/en/node/15299">large portion of the population</a>, particularly hard. High rates of inflation – on the order of <a href="https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/444440/Inflation-rate-slides-1-4-SCI">38.6%</a> over the past 12 months – and a youth unemployment rate of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS">28.6%</a> have drastically reduced their ability to purchase basic goods and feel any semblance of financial security.</p>
<p>Over the past 12 years, I’ve studied various groups of lower-class young people and their families in their homes, neighborhoods and workplaces, in shops, and in parks. I’ve also interviewed 44 youth between the ages of 15 and 29 who have been sidelined to the socioeconomic margins. </p>
<p>I wanted to know how they cope with prolonged insecurity and the constant threat of crisis.</p>
<p>Interestingly – <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-faces-growing-criticism-at-home-abroad-over-downing-of-ukrainian-plane-11578836990">and despite what you might see on the news</a> – many don’t react by rebelling against authority or by regularly taking to the streets. </p>
<p>A central observation from my research and <a href="https://nyupress.org/9781479881949/coming-of-age-in-iran/">forthcoming book</a> has been that, when faced with conditions of uncertainty, the young people I spoke with simply sought respect, acceptance and support from their communities. Life becomes a quest not for revolution, riches or vengeance, but for dignity. </p>
<h2>A highly conformist culture</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00210862.2013.810078">The desire for status and dignity</a> is an integral part of Iranian society. </p>
<p>Most of the poor, younger city dwellers I studied try to achieve this through both their conduct and their dress. They want to be seen as classy, diligent and moral. In communities that value prestige and look down on poverty, this becomes their ticket to a better life.</p>
<p>So in an attempt to conceal their poverty, they’ll spend their limited income on the latest trends so they can attain a “modern” appearance, from having the latest smartphones to wearing brand-name shoes and shirts – or at least knockoffs. </p>
<p>In order to avoid being seen as lazy or delinquent, the young people I interviewed work diligently and avoid being associated with petty criminals, like drug dealers. Even though there’s rarely enough work to go around, they get creative. They work in the informal economy as shop apprentices, street vendors and seamstresses. Those who can’t find work take up unpaid work babysitting for family members or helping with a family business in an effort to appear hardworking. By doing this, they can assume a moral high ground – regardless of how little money they’re actually making. </p>
<p>As one local, middle-aged woman told me, “There’s something wrong with a kid who doesn’t work.”</p>
<p>These young men and women are adhering to a set of values prized by their communities and promoted by society through <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33224168">billboards</a>, national television and official <a href="http://english.khamenei.ir/news/6657/We-should-promote-the-culture-of-work-production-and-diligence">speeches</a>. </p>
<p>The result is a relatively stable social order – and a youth culture that’s highly conformist.</p>
<p>This might come as a surprise to some, since some Western media outlets sometimes fixate on <a href="https://www.huckmag.com/perspectives/activism-2/iran-liberal-youth-grassroots-revolution-activism/">acts of rebellion</a>.</p>
<p>In reality, deviance – especially among the lower classes – is rare. Many simply can’t afford the consequences of being shunned by those around them. </p>
<h2>Rewards don’t need to be material</h2>
<p>The quest for dignity is only part of the story. Like many young people around the world, most youth in Iran have dreams of a better future. But for those dealing with daily economic hardship, there’s a chasm between their goals and what’s possible. </p>
<p>“I wanted to get my bachelor’s degree and have a job where I sat behind a desk,” said Babak, a street vendor, “but I had to drop out of ninth grade in order to meet my family’s expenses.”</p>
<p>That gap may never be fully breached. But many young Iranians I met still feel as if it’s possible to – in the words of a mechanic’s apprentice – “bring themselves up.”</p>
<p>The young people I interviewed do this not by trying to game the system, but by following the rules: diligence, self-sufficiency, a smart appearance, and moral and sexual cleanliness. For this, communities reward them with jobs, small promotions, or even just more deference. The material benefits might be minimal, but people nonetheless feel validated and included in the broader fabric of the nation. </p>
<p>In other contexts, researchers have found that “<a href="https://www.livescience.com/54829-income-attractiveness-men-women.html">looking the part</a>” – performing what’s deemed to be attractive to society – matters to people’s life prospects. The youth I knew in Iran do the same. They might not fully escape poverty, but they can escape stigma. </p>
<p>To them, that matters.</p>
<h2>The limits of virtue</h2>
<p>Of course, not everyone in Iran can maintain an appearance of industry, class and virtue.</p>
<p>There are young people who are desperately poor, who can’t even scrape together enough money for a new pair of shoes. There are drug addicts. There are young women who have been outed as prostitutes. </p>
<p>Focused on only helping those they deem “deserving,” communities do little to lift up people who have fallen through the cracks. Friends and acquaintances are unwilling to recommend them for jobs, neighbors avoid connecting with them, families view them with shame. </p>
<p>It can all seem a bit Darwinian, with those deemed unfit becoming social pariahs. </p>
<p>And yet, there are many youth who persevere, who believe that living by the rules, day in and day out, is the right way to live. As Ibrahim, a laborer, emphasized, “I try to live in a good way. If people remember you as good, this is reason to be proud.” To youth like Ibrahim, living a worthy life means not simply accumulating material goods, but staying true to a moral code. </p>
<p>In the face of rising prices, dwindling jobs, and few prospects for <a href="http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/930061553672411223/Iran-MEU-April-2019-Eng.pdf">socioeconomic change</a>, the routines of daily life create space for those who have suffered most under the weight of suffocating sanctions to breathe – and, in many cases, grow. </p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129610/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Manata Hashemi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite what you might see on the news, many of Iran’s young people are far from rebellious. Instead, they have dealt with dwindling job prospects by conforming to a strict code of morality.Manata Hashemi, Farzaneh Family Assistant Professor of Iranian Studies, University of OklahomaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1295362020-01-22T13:41:16Z2020-01-22T13:41:16ZHow Iran’s military outsources its cyberthreat forces<p>In the wake of the U.S. killing of a top Iranian general and Iran’s retaliatory missile strike, should the U.S. be concerned about the cyberthreat from Iran? Already, pro-Iranian hackers have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/us/politics/iran-attack-cyber.html">defaced several U.S. websites</a> to protest the killing of General Qassem Soleimani. One group wrote “This is only a small part of Iran’s cyber capability” on one of the hacked sites.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/following-the-developing-iranian-cyberthreat-85162">Two years ago</a>, I wrote that Iran’s cyberwarfare capabilities lagged behind those of both Russia and China, but that it had become a major threat which will only get worse. It had already conducted several highly damaging cyberattacks. </p>
<p>Since then, Iran has continued to develop and deploy its cyberattacking capabilities. It carries out attacks through a network of intermediaries, allowing the regime to strike its foes while denying direct involvement. </p>
<h2>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-supported hackers</h2>
<p>Iran’s cyberwarfare capability lies primarily within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a branch of the country’s military. However, rather than employing its own cyberforce against foreign targets, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps appears to mainly outsource these cyberattacks.</p>
<p>According to cyberthreat intelligence firm <a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/iran-hacker-hierarchy/">Recorded Future</a>, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps uses trusted intermediaries to manage contracts with independent groups. These intermediaries are loyal to the regime but separate from it. They translate the Iranian military’s priorities into discrete tasks, which are then bid out to independent contractors. </p>
<p>Recorded Future estimates that as many as 50 organizations compete for these contracts. Several contractors may be involved in a single operation.</p>
<p>Iranian contractors communicate online to hire workers and exchange information. Ashiyane, the primary online security forum in Iran, was created by hackers in the mid-2000s in order to <a href="https://www.memri.org/reports/irans-cyber-war-hackers-service-regime-irgc-claims-iran-can-hack-enemys-advanced-weapons">disseminate hacking tools</a> and tutorials within the hacking community. <a href="https://theconversation.com/following-the-developing-iranian-cyberthreat-85162">The Ashiyane Digital Security Team was known for hacking websites</a> and replacing their home pages with pro-Iranian content. By May 2011, Zone-H, an archive of defaced websites, had recorded 23,532 defacements by that group alone. Its leader, Behrouz Kamalian, said his <a href="https://www.memri.org/reports/irans-cyber-war-hackers-service-regime-irgc-claims-iran-can-hack-enemys-advanced-weapons">group cooperated with the Iranian military</a>, but operated independently and spontaneously.</p>
<p>Iran had an active community of hackers at least by 2004, when a group calling itself <a href="https://theconversation.com/following-the-developing-iranian-cyberthreat-85162">Iran Hackers Sabotage</a> launched a succession of web attacks “with the aim of showing the world that Iranian hackers have something to say in the worldwide security.” It is likely that many of Iran’s cyber contractors come from this community.</p>
<p>Iran’s use of intermediaries and contractors makes it harder to attribute cyberattacks to the regime. Nevertheless, investigators have been able to trace many cyberattacks to persons inside Iran operating with the support of the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.</p>
<h2>Cyber campaigns</h2>
<p>Iran engages in both espionage and sabotage operations. They employ both <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/REPORT_IranCEEW.pdf">off-the-shelf malware and custom-made software</a> tools, according to a 2018 report by the Foundation to Defend Democracy. They use spearfishing, or luring specific individuals with fraudulent messages, to gain initial access to target machines by enticing victims to click on links that lead to phony sites where they hand over usernames and passwords or open attachments that plant “backdoors” on their devices. Once in, they use various hacking tools to spread through networks and download or destroy data. </p>
<p>Iran’s cyber espionage campaigns gain access to networks in order to steal proprietary and sensitive data in areas of interest to the regime. Security companies that track these threats give them APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) names such as APT33, “kitten” names such as Magic Kitten and miscellaneous other names such as OilRig.</p>
<p>The group the security firm FireEye calls <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html">APT33</a> is especially noteworthy. It has conducted numerous espionage operations against oil and aviation industries in the U.S., Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. APT33 was recently reported to use small botnets (networks of compromised computers) to target <a href="https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/more-than-a-dozen-obfuscated-apt33-botnets-used-for-extreme-narrow-targeting/">very specific sites</a> for their data collection.</p>
<p>Another group known as APT35 (aka Phosphoros) has attempted to gain access to email accounts belonging to individuals involved in a <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/04/microsoft-iran-phosphorous-attack/">2020 U.S. presidential campaign</a>. Were they to succeed, they might be able to use stolen information to influence the election by, for example, releasing information publicly that could be damaging to a candidate. </p>
<p>In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/nine-iranians-charged-conducting-massive-cyber-theft-campaign-behalf-islamic">charged nine Iranians with conducting a massive cyber theft campaign</a> on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. All were tied to the Mabna Institute, an Iranian company behind cyber intrusions since at least 2013. The defendants allegedly stole 31 terabytes of data from U.S. and foreign entities. The victims included over 300 universities, almost 50 companies and several government agencies.</p>
<h2>Cyber sabotage</h2>
<p>Iran’s sabotage operations have employed “wiper” malware to destroy data on hard drives. They have also employed botnets to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks, where a flood of traffic effectively disables a server. These operations are frequently hidden behind monikers that resemble those used by independent hacktivists who hack for a cause rather than money.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/j5m-s9E0k8I?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Hacking groups tied to the Iranian regime have successfully defaced websites, wiped data from PCs and have attempted to infiltrate industrial control systems.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In one highly damaging attack, a group calling themselves the Cutting Sword of Justice <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1">attacked the Saudi Aramco oil company</a> with wiper code in 2012. The hackers used a virus dubbed Shamoon to spread the code through the company’s network. The attack <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/REPORT_IranCEEW.pdf">destroyed data on 35,000 computers</a>, disrupting business processes for weeks.</p>
<p>The Shamoon software reappeared in 2016, wiping data from thousands of computers in Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation agency and other organizations. Then in 2018, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-shamoon-idUSKBN1OB2FA">variant of Shamoon hit</a> the Italian oil services firm Saipem, crippling more than 300 computers.</p>
<p>Iranian hackers have conducted massive distributed denial-of-service attacks. From 2012 to 2013, a group calling itself the Cyber Fighters of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam launched a series of <a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/deconstructing-the-al-qassam-cyber-fighters-assault-on-us-banks/">relentless distributed denial-of-service attacks against major U.S. banks</a>. The attacks were said to have caused tens of millions of dollars in losses relating to mitigation and recovery costs and lost business.</p>
<p>In 2016 the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-to-unseal-indictment-against-hackers-linked-to-iranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html">U.S. indicted seven Iranian hackers</a> for working on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to conduct the bank attacks. The motivation may have been retaliation for economic sanctions that had been imposed on Iran.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>So far, Iranian cyberattacks have been limited to desktop computers and servers running standard commercial software. They have not yet affected industrial controls systems running electrical power grids and other physical infrastructure. Were they to get into and take over these control systems, they could, for example, cause more serious damage such as the 2015 and 2016 <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracing-the-sources-of-todays-russian-cyberthreat-81593">power outages caused by the Russians</a> in Ukraine.</p>
<p>One of the Iranians indicted in the bank attacks <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-to-unseal-indictment-against-hackers-linked-to-iranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html">did get into the computer control system for the Bowman Avenue Dam</a> in rural New York. According to the indictment, no damage was done, but the access would have allowed the dam’s gate to be manipulated if it not been manually disconnected for maintenance issues.</p>
<p>While there are no public reports of Iranian threat actors demonstrating a capability against industrial control systems, Microsoft recently reported that APT33 appears to have <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/iran-apt33">shifted its focus</a> to these systems. In particular, they have been attempting to guess passwords for the systems’ manufacturers, suppliers, and maintainers. The access and information that could be acquired from succeeding might help them get into an industrial control system.</p>
<p>Ned Moran, a security researcher with Microsoft, speculated that the group may be attempting to <a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/11/a-notorious-iranian-hacking-crew-is-targeting-industrial-control-systems/">get access to industrial control systems</a> in order to produce physically disruptive effects. Although APT33 has not been directly implicated in any incidents of cyber sabotage, security researchers have found <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/iran-hackers-apt33/">links between code</a> used by the group with code used in the Shamoon attacks to destroy data.</p>
<p>While it is impossible to know Iran’s intentions, they are likely to continue operating numerous cyber espionage campaigns while developing additional capabilities for cyber sabotage. If tensions between Iran and the United States mount, Iran may respond with additional cyberattacks, possibly ones that are more damaging than we’ve seen so far.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129536/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dorothy Denning does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Iranian military operates cyber espionage and sabotage through a network of dozens of contractors, allowing the state to attack foes while denying involvement.Dorothy Denning, Emeritus Distinguished Professor of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296212020-01-21T10:29:53Z2020-01-21T10:29:53ZThe US-Iran conflict and what it means for Indonesia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/311073/original/file-20200121-117911-f8ujuk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C22%2C4962%2C3320&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Iranian boy walk past next to a wall painting of Iran’s national flag in a street of the capital city of Tehran, Iran, in early January.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The bitter US-Iran relationship <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661">has been going on</a> for decades, but the tension between the two countries has started to escalate to a critical point after <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50991810">the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani</a>, the head of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (<a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/13/world/middleeast/the-quds-force-in-irans-national-security.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all"><em>Quds</em> Force</a>). </p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://apnews.com/c7116313efdb56f4e928289faa1ad8cd">retaliated</a> against the assassination of Soleimani, considered one of its influential figures, with missile strikes on Iraqi bases housing US troops on January 8. The Muslim country also announced it <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-pulling-out-nuclear-deal-following-u-s-strike-killed-n1110636">ended</a> its commitment to limit the development of its nuclear programs. The conflict has even taken an unexpected turn with <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/01/10/795252134/ukrainian-plane-crash-in-iran-heres-what-the-available-evidence-shows">the downing of a commercial plane</a> by an Iranian missile.</p>
<p>As tensions rise between the US and Iran, Indonesia, with the world’s largest Muslim population, is expected to face no political impacts from this conflict due to its minimal involvement in the region. </p>
<p>However, Indonesia needs to be prepared for the conflict’s impacts on oil prices and the national macro economy.</p>
<h2>Staying neutral in the Middle East</h2>
<p>Middle Eastern politics has been marked by the continued struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and and Iran. Most people tend to see the conflict as <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/05/sunni-shia-why-conflict-more-political-than-religious-sectarian-middle-east">revolving</a> around both countries’ different religious values. Iran represents moderate Shia Muslims and Saudi Arabia Sunni Muslims. </p>
<p>But the conflict is more than that. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have engaged in various conflicts due to their different political stance on the US and the West’s influence over the region. </p>
<p>The US <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-persian-gulf-understanding-the-american-oil-strategy/">came</a> to the region for the oil. Before the Iranian Revolution in 1979, both Iran and Saudi Arabia <a href="https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/history-us-iran-relations">were close allies</a> of the US. The US helped to <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-the-shah-entangled-america-8821">provide</a> national security facilities in both countries. </p>
<p>However, right after the revolution, the Iranian position changed dramatically to oppose the US presence in the region. The revolution <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution">was also</a> a response to economic inequality under the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was known for his westernised ideas. The result of the revolution was the birth of an anti-American and anti-Western Islamic republic. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia decided to strengthen its alliance with the West, mostly the US. This can be seen in its stance in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/The-Persian-Gulf-War-and-its-aftermath">the Gulf War</a> and <a href="https://mepc.org/journal/saudi-arabias-motives-syrian-civil-war">Syrian civil war</a>.</p>
<p>Amid conflicts and political rivalry in the Middle East, Indonesia always maintains a <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/121420/indonesia-to-not-join-imctc-but-shares-similar-spirit">neutral position</a>. Despite being the largest Muslim population, Indonesia manages to avoid any major confrontation and play safely between conflicting countries in the region. </p>
<p>Right after Saudi Arabia’s King Salman visited Indonesia in 2016 as part of his tour to Asian countries to promote Saudi Arabian investment, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo <a href="https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/16/12/13/oi4u9a354-presiden-jokowi-awali-kunjungan-kenegaraan-di-iran">visited</a> Tehran, Iran, in the same year in an attempt to stay neutral in the Iran-Saudi conflict. </p>
<h2>Indonesia’s foreign policy</h2>
<p>Indonesia’s minimal involvement in Middle Eastern politics follows the country’s free and active international relations policy. Under this policy, this largest archipelago nation makes domestic issues a priority while actively promoting peace to the world. Indonesia is part of the <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/01/24/indonesia-committed-to-greater-peacekeeping-contribution-fm-retno.html">International Peacekeeping Force</a>.</p>
<p>Diplomacy and peace come first in Indonesian foreign policy. One example is Indonesia’s reaction to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Indonesia has shown solidarity with the Muslim world by supporting <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-domestically-focused-foreign-policy">a draft resolution</a> condemning Israel’s occupation of the West Bank rather than deploying armed forces. </p>
<p>Looking at the above precedents, Indonesia will most likely stay away from the US and Iran conflict. </p>
<p>Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi only <a href="https://en.antaranews.com/news/139240/indonesian-foreign-minister-marsudi-summons-us-iranian-ambassadors">summoned</a> both ambassadors in Jakarta to encourage the two countries to ease the tensions. However, there will be no further coercive measures from Indonesia in response to this conflict.</p>
<p>Interfering in foreign conflicts is not one of Indonesia’s <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/01/03/construing-41-priorities-of-indonesias-diplomacy.html">2020 foreign policy priorities</a>.</p>
<p>When the country addresses international issues, it is mostly motivated <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-domestically-focused-foreign-policy">by national issues</a>. This is evident in Jokowi’s speeches in international forums. They are mostly rhetoric to attract foreign investment and avoid taking a stand on issues such as the South China Sea crisis or the repression of the Rohingya in Myanmar. </p>
<p>Indonesia has established good relations with both Iran and the US and has no interest in putting these at risk.</p>
<h2>Economic impacts</h2>
<p>One thing Indonesia should prepare for in relation to the Iran-US conflict is a rise in oil prices. </p>
<p>Oil-producing countries are mostly in the Middle East and when conflicts erupt in the region oil production may drop with production facilities being disrupted. </p>
<p>On January 8 2020, after Iranian ballistic missile strikes, oil prices <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50979492">rose</a> by 1.4% to US$69.21 per barrel. </p>
<p>If the price keeps rising, Indonesia will have to revise its annual budget. </p>
<p>The oil price rise will also affect Indonesia’s currency rate as dollars are used in crude oil transactions. </p>
<p>The weakened rupiah will later affect national expenditure. Finance Minister Sri Mulyani <a href="https://money.kompas.com/read/2020/01/08/103000826/sri-mulyani-awasi-dampak-konflik-iran-as-ke-ekonomi-ri">has warned</a> about the possible effects of the conflict on the archipelago’s economy. </p>
<p>Even though Indonesia will not be involved in the tension, Indonesia must anticipate the impact on its macro-economy. By minimising interference, Indonesia has been on the right path to secure stability in its own region along with enhancing a peaceful approach to the situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129621/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mohamad Rezky Utama tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>Indonesia, which has the world’s largest Muslim population, is expected to face no political impacts from US-Iran conflict due to Indonesia’s minimal involvement in the region.Mohamad Rezky Utama, Lecturer, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) YogyakartaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1300112020-01-16T15:53:11Z2020-01-16T15:53:11ZIn defence of Michael McCain: Speaking out is what strong leaders do<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310350/original/file-20200115-134772-18i3op6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2000%2C1110&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Michael McCain, president and CEO of Maple Leafs Foods, speaks during the company's annual general meeting in Toronto in April 2011. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Darren Calabrese</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While leaders often take pains to avoid controversial topics and the glare of hostile publicity, it is the <em>sine qua non</em> — the absolute necessity — of strong leaders to speak out about what’s right and wrong, especially at critical moments in history. </p>
<p>As one researcher <a href="https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=lux">has argued</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Leaders fill the role of mythical heroes through actions such as saving companies, championing causes for the poor or disenfranchised, and defending our closely held beliefs.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>That includes those helming companies, in my opinion.</p>
<p>Michael McCain, the CEO of Maple Leaf Foods, demonstrated such leadership with his recent tweets defending <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/liberal-internationalism">liberal institutions</a> and expressing outrage about <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/13/business/maple-leaf-foods-ceo-ukraine-plane-intl-hnk/index.html">the deaths of 57 Canadians</a>, including the wife and son of one of his employees.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1216529697288355840"}"></div></p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/The%20Right%20and%20Wrong%20Way%20to%20Do%20CEO%20Activism%20-%20WSJ%202019-02-25_ee4cde54-a398-49ed-ac37-80588e93c776.pdf">activist CEO</a> called out an aggressive American act, undertaken at U.S. President Donald Trump’s behest, to assassinate a high-ranking Iranian official in Baghdad.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-assassinations-were-once-unthinkable-why-the-us-killing-of-soleimani-sets-a-worrying-precedent-129622">Political assassinations were once unthinkable. Why the US killing of Soleimani sets a worrying precedent</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>The targeted killing escalated tensions between the United States and Iran. Iranians then mistakenly directed missiles at Flight PS752 shortly after takeoff, killing 176 people, many of them bound for Canada.</p>
<p>Even though he’s faced <a href="https://www.narcity.com/news/ca/maple-leaf-foods-boycott-hashtag-gets-some-competition-on-twitter">mixed reactions on social media</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0019850108000291">McCain has helped to enhance a distinctly Canadian brand, Maple Leaf Foods</a>, by defending Canadian values as the country still reels from the tragedy.</p>
<h2>McCain wealth</h2>
<p>McCain has been the president and chief executive officer of Maple Leaf Foods for a couple of decades. The billionaire <a href="https://www.macleans.ca/economy/money-economy/top-25-richest-canadians-2018/image/11/#gallery/canadas-richest-people-2018/slide-11">is one of the wealthiest people</a> in Canada. Although <a href="https://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol21/iss1/7/">we may not like income inequality in Canada</a>, it helps when we see wealthy people standing up for what’s right. </p>
<p>McCain has a track record of leadership and trying to do what’s right. In fact, he <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/the-testing-of-michael-mccain/article598005/">has said that doing the right thing was his goal, and in line with the company’s values</a>, during <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/how-maple-leaf-foods-is-handling-the-listeria-outbreak-1.763404">the company’s 2008 listeria crisis</a>. Instead of covering up the extent of the outbreak, McCain was fully transparent and took full responsibility.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/retail-marketing/michael-mccain-whacked-a-hornets-nest-and-those-who-know-him-arent-surprised/wcm/5746c092-b45d-48bd-bd07-5c212105bcdb">Knowing there is a desire to assign blame, the buck stops here</a>,” he said. “I emphasize: this is our accountability and it’s ours to fix.”</p>
<p>McCain knew that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.12.003">Canadians have to trust a company producing the food they eat</a>, and the Maple Leaf brand recovered from the crisis. </p>
<p>The CEO’s actions were not only ethical, but they also demonstrated his business acumen and effective communication skills. He understood the value of a corporate brand and that a good reputation must back it up. Indeed, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2008.02.005">research has shown reputation can motivate consumer purchase intentions.</a></p>
<h2>Siemens’ puzzling coal move</h2>
<p>Contrast this to the recent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51089468">baffling announcement</a> made by Joe Kaeser, CEO of Siemens, the German engineering giant. Kaeser, the company’s highest paid executive with an annual salary of <a href="https://ca.wallmine.com/otc/siegy/officer/1694562/joe-kaeser">US$9.6 million</a>, says that although he knows it’s the wrong thing to do, his firm will remain on the controversial Adani project, a huge coal mine in Australia.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jan/14/australia-bushfires-harbinger-future-scientists">Australia’s horrific, climate change-fuelled bush fires rage on</a>, possibly wiping out <a href="https://www.sciencenews.org/article/australian-fires-incinerated-habitats-threatened-species-ecological-disaster">entire species</a>, Kaeser’s decision shows incredibly poor judgment. He has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b619eb2-3580-11ea-a6d3-9a26f8c3cba4">dismayed employees</a> by seemingly tossing aside Siemens’ <a href="https://new.siemens.com/global/en/company/stories/home/climate-action.html">carefully cultivated environmental corporate reputation</a> and tarnished the brand, all for a relatively small US$20 million project. <a href="https://ycharts.com/companies/SIEGY/market_cap">Siemens is a US$100 billion company.</a> </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310357/original/file-20200115-134809-1vpfta3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310357/original/file-20200115-134809-1vpfta3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310357/original/file-20200115-134809-1vpfta3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310357/original/file-20200115-134809-1vpfta3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310357/original/file-20200115-134809-1vpfta3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310357/original/file-20200115-134809-1vpfta3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310357/original/file-20200115-134809-1vpfta3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Activists attend a protest rally against Australia’s climate policy in front of the Australian embassy in Berlin, headquarters of Siemens, on Jan. 10, 2020, over the Adani coal mine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michael Sohn)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The mine stands to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/aug/16/why-adanis-planned-carmichael-coalmine-matters-to-australia-and-the-world">add to climate change and further damage Australia’s Great Barrier Reef</a>, already battered by bleaching due to rising ocean temperatures and marine heatwaves. Dubbed the <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/adani-mine-australia-climate-change-848315/">“world’s most insane energy project” by <em>Rolling Stone</em> magazine</a>, protesters around the world have made their opposition known. </p>
<p>A Bloomberg opinion writer called Kaeser’s announcement one of the “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-14/siemens-ceo-joe-kaeser-s-odd-defense-of-carmichael-coal-project">strangest pieces of executive communication</a>,” noting that the Adani project doesn’t even make economic sense, especially with the declining price of coal. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explaining-adani-why-would-a-billionaire-persist-with-a-mine-that-will-probably-lose-money-117682">Explaining Adani: why would a billionaire persist with a mine that will probably lose money?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>In fact, Siemens <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-20/siemens-ceo-seeks-to-shake-up-conglomerate-with-energy-spinoff">has cut thousands of jobs</a> from a related energy division it plans to spin off. In other words, Kaeser sold out his multinational’s reputation for a project not even part of Siemens’ future. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/13/adani-coalmine-siemens-ceo-has-empathy-for-environment-but-will-honour-contract">He says that he doesn’t see a legal way out of the contract</a> the company signed with India’s Adani.</p>
<p>Although some may claim that it’s easy for McCain to use his company’s corporate Twitter feed however he likes because he owns a good chunk of the business he leads, both men lead publicly traded companies and have shareholders to consider.</p>
<p>With all of Kaeser’s millions, and Siemens’, he could walk away, just as McCain could risk a dent in his company’s stock price with his surprising tweets about Trump. As it were, Maple Leaf Foods <a href="https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/quote/MFI.TO/">share prices dipped briefly but soon recovered</a>, suggesting there will be no lasting damage from McCain’s tweets. In fact, many of us may recognize the brand now even more when we’re in grocery stores, and Maple Leaf Foods’ employees, customers and other stakeholders will know the Canadian company can be trusted to do the right thing.</p>
<p>The difference is leadership, not corporate structure. Both men can make independent decisions. But only one is a leader, and that’s Michael McCain.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130011/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deborah de Lange receives funding from SSHRC and Ryerson University on occasion to support her research.</span></em></p>Michael McCain has been criticized for maligning Donald Trump on the Maple Leaf Foods corporate Twitter account over Flight PS752. But strong leaders don’t shy away from taking a stand.Deborah de Lange, Associate Professor, Global Management Studies, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296842020-01-14T19:46:13Z2020-01-14T19:46:13ZIran-U.S. crisis reminds us how culture matters in war time<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310028/original/file-20200114-151848-dp9x71.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=59%2C90%2C1665%2C1058&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tourists visit Persepolis, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, northeast of the Iranian city of Shiraz. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/world/middleeast/iran-fires-missiles-us.html">tensions</a> have ratcheted up between the United States and Iran, a <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1213593975732527112">series of tweets</a> by President Donald Trump threatening the deliberate targeting of Iranian cultural sites triggered a strong <a href="https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-01-05/iran-donald-trump-cultural-sites-war-crime?fbclid=IwAR02suK0e4KDSd6phHoqve86OfORqpxQJeQa-0u4zBzatnEmlzGvg0H3O2w">negative reaction</a> around <a href="https://news.artnet.com/art-world/trump-iran-cultural-sites-threat-1745940">the world</a>.</p>
<p>In fact, following Trump’s tweets, Pentagon officials <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/us/politics/trump-esper-iran-cultural-sites.html">reassured the world</a> that the U.S. would not target Iran’s cultural sites, and would follow the laws of armed conflict.</p>
<p>Quickly, the president himself appeared to backtrack, declaring: “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-trump-sites/trump-says-will-obey-international-law-on-targeting-cultural-sites-idUSKBN1Z62DA">You know what, if that’s what the law is, I like to obey the law</a>.” </p>
<p>Explaining his earlier position, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/us/politics/trump-iran-cultural-sites.html">Trump had embraced a dangerous logic</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[Iran is] allowed to kill our people. They’re allowed to torture and maim our people. They’re allowed to use roadside bombs and blow up our people. And we’re not allowed to touch their cultural sites? It doesn’t work that way.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The argument is disingenuous, as it purports to highlight the value of human life as higher than that of cultural sites, while suggesting that those who want to protect heritage are implicitly attaching more importance to culture than to the torturing and maiming of people. This is simply not true.</p>
<p>Both international law and the U.S. military <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190">Law of War manual</a> are clear on why protecting cultural sites in conflicts should be a priority for the belligerents.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310023/original/file-20200114-151829-ad8to0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310023/original/file-20200114-151829-ad8to0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310023/original/file-20200114-151829-ad8to0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310023/original/file-20200114-151829-ad8to0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310023/original/file-20200114-151829-ad8to0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310023/original/file-20200114-151829-ad8to0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310023/original/file-20200114-151829-ad8to0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A view of Iran’s UNESCO world heritage site of the Qara Kelisa (Black Church), in Chaldran, 850 kilometres northwest of the Iranian capital Tehran. Also known as St. Thaddeus Church, it is believed to have been built in AD 66.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Hasan Sarbakhshian</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>‘Law of War’</h2>
<p>In 1954, the <a href="http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-and-heritage/convention-and-protocols/1954-hague-convention/">Hague Convention</a> tackled the issue of “Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.” The convention established cultural property as a legal category in international law where cultural property was defined as “movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people.”</p>
<p>The convention addresses wartime behaviour by prohibiting the use of cultural property in manners that could lead to its destruction or damage, and establishing the obligation to refrain from any act of hostilities directed at cultural property except in “cases of unavoidable military necessity.” </p>
<p>Furthermore, countries are forbidden from using their own cultural sites for military purposes (such as storing weapons or explosives) in hopes that they will be protected from an attack.</p>
<p>The Hague Convention was very much a reaction to the devastation brought about by the Second World War, which saw the deliberate destruction of countless <a href="https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0085">cultural treasures</a>. It signalled a desire on the part of the international community to protect the world’s cultural heritage from the ravages of war, and recognition that the loss of this heritage represents a loss for the country affected as well as for humanity.</p>
<h2>Why is cultural heritage important?</h2>
<p>More recently, the world has witnessed the wanton destruction and plundering of historical heritage driven by ideological motives in the former <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10610-013-9220-8">Yugoslavia</a>, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5615/neareastarch.78.3.0187?seq=1">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/CulturalRights/DestructionHeritage/NGOS/RASHID.pdf">Iraq</a>, <a href="https://pages.vassar.edu/realarchaeology/2017/10/26/the-role-of-conflict-in-the-looting-and-destruction-of-cambodian-temples-in-the-late-20th-century/">Cambodia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/timbuktu-destruction-landmark-ruling-awards-millions-to-malians-82540">Mali</a>, <a href="https://news.artnet.com/art-world/isis-cultural-heritage-sites-destroyed-950060">Syria</a> and in many other countries rich in archeological heritage.</p>
<p>These events have highlighted how the destruction of cultural heritage can become just another <a href="https://www.uclpress.co.uk/products/118162">weapon of war</a>, one with targets that aren’t military resources or infrastructure, but rather the memories, history and identity of a people. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310043/original/file-20200114-151834-viqik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310043/original/file-20200114-151834-viqik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=234&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310043/original/file-20200114-151834-viqik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=234&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310043/original/file-20200114-151834-viqik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=234&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310043/original/file-20200114-151834-viqik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310043/original/file-20200114-151834-viqik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310043/original/file-20200114-151834-viqik.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=294&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Left: Temple of Bel in April 2010, Palmyra, Syria. Right: ISIL propaganda image showing the temple’s destruction in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Left: Bernard Gagnon; right: ISIL propaganda)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indeed, often the deliberate performative destruction of cultural heritage is used exactly for that purpose: <a href="https://www.iccrom.org/sites/default/files/ICCROM_18_ProtectingHeritageConflict_en.pdf">erasing traces of a past</a> that someone wants forgotten, so that a new history can be written. </p>
<p>Examples of this abound, from the Taliban’s demolition of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan to the destruction of the Timbuktu manuscripts in Mali at the hand of the Islamist rebels of Andar Dine and the annihilation of Shi’a and Sufi heritage by ISIS in its controlled territory.</p>
<h2>Teaching military cultural awareness</h2>
<p>Awareness of the importance of preserving cultural sites in war, both to protect the world’s cultural heritage and to signal respect of every country’s history and contribution to humankind, is incorporated in the training received by the United States’ armed forces. The Department of Defense’s Law of War <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190">manual</a> includes literally hundreds of references to this issue.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310020/original/file-20200114-151848-du0la5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310020/original/file-20200114-151848-du0la5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310020/original/file-20200114-151848-du0la5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310020/original/file-20200114-151848-du0la5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310020/original/file-20200114-151848-du0la5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310020/original/file-20200114-151848-du0la5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310020/original/file-20200114-151848-du0la5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310020/original/file-20200114-151848-du0la5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Pentagon deck of cards, ‘Respect Afghan Heritage,’ was handed out to troops with hopes of raising cultural awareness.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://twitter.com/HannahBloch/status/1213996272035741696?s=20">(@hannahbloch)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Pentagon even distributed decks of <a href="https://twitter.com/HannahBloch/status/1213996272035741696?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1213996272035741696&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.npr.org%2F2020%2F01%2F06%2F794006073%2Ftrump-says-hell-target-iran-s-cultural-sites-that-s-illegal">playing cards</a> with photos of cultural sites to troops serving in Iraq and Afghanistan to underscore the need to safeguard heritage sites and artifacts. One of the cards showed a <a href="https://twitter.com/HannahBloch/status/1213996272035741696/photo/2">picture</a> of the Statue of Liberty, with the words, “How would we feel if someone destroyed her torch?” </p>
<p>At times of heightened tensions, when relations between two or more countries veer dangerously towards conflict and countless lives are at stakes, it is worth remembering why culture matters not only in peacetime but also, or perhaps especially, in conflict, when humanity is most at risk of getting lost in the fog of war.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129684/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Costanza Musu receives funding from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p>When the loss of this heritage is used as a weapon of war, it represents a loss for the country affected as well as for humanity. It targets the memories, history and identity of a people.Costanza Musu, Associate Professor, Graduate Scool of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297272020-01-14T13:47:33Z2020-01-14T13:47:33ZWhy the US-Iran conflict isn’t driving oil prices higher – and why it probably should<p>Assassinations, militaries on high alert, geopolitical tensions at the boil. Any one of these in Persian Gulf countries would have roiled oil prices a few years ago. Today, even in combination, <a href="https://fortune.com/2020/01/09/war-with-iran-oil-price/">they hardly register</a>.</p>
<p>Is the oil market now so secure that even the prospect of war between Iran and the U.S. has little effect? More broadly, is this relatively <a href="https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/oil-price-gold-spikes-fizzle-after-iran-attack-as-escalation-fears-wane-2020-1-1028802249">sanguine response</a> warranted at this time?</p>
<h2>Reasons oil traders should be nervous</h2>
<p>The assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s top military commander and head of its Revolutionary Guards, happened on Iraqi soil, without Iraqi permission, while Soleimani was <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/qassem-soleimani-death-iran-baghdad-middle-east-iraq-saudi-arabia-a9272901.html">reportedly</a> on official business. </p>
<p>This attack by a U.S. drone, which killed up to 10 Iranian and Iraqi personnel, transgressed two nations’ sovereignty. It could be <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-us-assassinated-suleimani-the-chief-exporter-of-irans-revolution-but-at-what-price">easily defined</a> as an act of war. </p>
<p>Iran <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/soleimani-killing-iran-zarif-vows-response-act-war-200107120523488.html">did so</a> and responded with a <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/irgc-says-it-fired-missiles-at-us-base-soleimani-killing-2020-1">missile barrage</a> at two U.S. bases, apparently causing no casualties. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/10/us-not-willing-to-withdraw-troops-from-iraq-mike-pompeo">completely rejected</a> Iraq’s demand that American troops leave its soil, only a week after U.S. warplanes carried out <a href="https://apnews.com/cde30d5913e29ad7aa067fd09e84909e">lethal attacks</a> on Iran-backed militias in Iraq, also without Iraqi authorization.</p>
<p>These are grim new events in a volatile region essential to global oil supply, yet they had no important impact on oil prices. Over a few days, prices went from $US66 per barrel to $69, then <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CO1:COM">down to $65</a>. This isn’t even a hiccup; in a year, it will be invisible on the price curve.</p>
<p>True, President Donald Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/08/trump-backs-away-from-further-military-confrontation-iran">said</a> Iran was “standing down,” and there would be new sanctions, not attacks. Yet this president is notorious for <a href="https://apnews.com/b6b1b478c36e4f07ad991ca2d2b1f6c9">impulsive decisions</a>. Iran, moreover, may take its time in seeking revenge. </p>
<p>And in the midst of military tensions, Iran <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iran-unintentionally-shot-plane-latest-updates-200111100314438.html">mistook</a> a commercial airliner for a warplane and shot it down, killing 176. It was a terrible echo of <a href="https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/crash-a-grim-echo-of-us-downing-of-iran-flight-in-1988-1.614444">the 1988 downing</a> of an airliner by the U.S. warship Vincennes in another moment of high military anxiety.</p>
<h2>Reasons they aren’t</h2>
<p>Oil traders therefore have much reason to be nervous. But they aren’t. Why? </p>
<p>A big reason, which I noted in <a href="https://theconversation.com/attacks-on-saudi-oil-why-didnt-prices-go-crazy-123823">a previous Conversation article</a>, is that the global oil market has abundant supply, fed by soaring U.S. production. In under a decade, America has been transformed from a huge importer to a major new exporter. These exports <a href="https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WTTEXUS2&f=W">grew</a> from 0.6 million barrels per day in early 2017 to <a href="https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_MOVE_WKLY_DC_NUS-Z00_MBBLPD_W.htm">over 4 million by December 2019</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="IDVt6" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/IDVt6/4/" height="550px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>For several years, OPEC and Russia have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-opec/opec-allies-agree-to-deepen-oil-output-cuts-idUSKBN1Y90UK">cut their own production</a> to keep prices from falling, due to U.S. supply. Also, oil demand has weakened due to the global <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2019/10/15/the-world-economy-synchronized-slowdown-precarious-outlook/">economic slowdown</a>, caused by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/us-china-trade-war-72804">U.S.-China trade war</a>, a slumping <a href="https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/auto-industry-shrinking-at-peak-car-dragging-global-economy-lower-2019-10-1028644883">auto industry</a> and other factors. This has supported a perception that the oil market can absorb almost any shock, even the loss of life in a military exchange.</p>
<p>Experienced observers I know say that a stable oil market is often an oxymoron. A host of churning uncertainties exist just beneath the surface. War in the Gulf, however limited initially, could easily get out of hand – that’s what wars do. No one in the region wants this. </p>
<p>Yet no one is in control of an extremely tense situation that continues to worsen and now involves loss of life. To me, oil prices today do not reflect this reality of risk. </p>
<p>Higher prices would be better for a reason that has nothing to do with geopolitics, too. The world needs less consumption, fewer emissions, and help in its shift to electric transport. Cheap oil will not help. </p>
<p>[ <em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129727/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott L. Montgomery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Tensions between Iran and the US have spiked, but oil prices have barely budged. Why not? And is the oil markets’ muted response an accurate reflection of the rising tensions?Scott L. Montgomery, Lecturer, Jackson School of International Studies, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297612020-01-13T16:57:44Z2020-01-13T16:57:44ZWill Flight PS752 victims be remembered differently than those killed in the Air India bombing?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309541/original/file-20200112-103987-c627mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C23%2C3864%2C2563&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Candles are lit at a vigil organized for the Winnipeg victims killed on Flight PS752. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/John Woods</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s been an incredible outpouring of grief across Canada since Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752 was shot down by Iran, killing all 176 passengers and crew on board.</p>
<p>We have learned that among the 57 Canadians killed, there were beloved students, professors, doctors and engineers. Children, newlyweds and entire families perished. Many of them have been described by Canadian news media and leaders as “<a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6388464/toronto-vigil-iran-plane-crash/">exceptional</a>.” They belonged to Canada’s vibrant Iranian communities and are being remembered as such in tributes and memorial services across the nation. </p>
<p>“Your entire country stands with you tonight, tomorrow, and in all the years to come,” Prime Minister Justin Trudeau <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2020/01/12/justin-trudeau-to-attend-edmonton-memorial-service-for-iran-crash-victims.html">told about 2,300 people who attended a memorial service</a> in Edmonton on Sunday. “<a href="https://www.macleans.ca/news/justin-trudeaus-statement-after-plane-crash-in-iran-full-transcript/">We share your grief</a>,” he said on the day of the crash.</p>
<p>Trudeau called it a “moment of national pain” and recounted stories he’d heard from impacted families over the past few days, including one of a 10-year-old “who was confident he’d one day be prime minister of this country he loved so much.”</p>
<figure>
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<p><a href="https://www.uap.ualberta.ca/titles/878-9781772122596-remembering-air-india">I’ve spent more than a dozen years researching public memory of another air disaster</a> that resulted in an even greater number of Canadian casualties — the Air India tragedy. </p>
<p>Indeed, news of PS752 is triggering memories of June 23, 1985, when <a href="https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/r-nd-flght-182/index-en.aspx">Air India Flight 182 fell into the Atlantic Ocean near Cork, Ireland, after a bomb hidden among the luggage exploded</a>. All 329 passengers and crew on board that flight were killed. Among them were 280 Canadians, the majority from Indian-Canadian families, as reported by the official <a href="https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rspns-cmmssn/index-en.aspx">inquiry by Public Safety Canada</a>.</p>
<h2>‘I felt gutted’</h2>
<p>Winnipeg resident Nicky Mehta was 13 at the time that her uncle, aunt and two young cousins were killed on the Air India flight. On the day after Flight PS752 crashed, she woke up to an abbreviated list of “deadly plane crashes that killed Canadians” published in the <em>Winnipeg Free Press</em> that did not include Air India. “I felt gutted,” she told me. “It was re-traumatizing to see that Air India was not even worth a mention here.” The article has since been removed.</p>
<p>Back in 1985, there was no collective outpouring of grief or statement of national solidarity for the victims of Air India Flight 182. Were these victims not “exceptional” enough? In fact, they too were beloved students, professors, doctors and engineers, as well as homemakers, teachers, civil servants and more.</p>
<p>Notoriously, <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-canada-chose-to-unremember-air-india-and-disown-its-victims/article1212010/">Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney offered his condolences to Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi for India’s loss</a> instead of addressing his own citizens.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309543/original/file-20200112-103954-1dvaooo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309543/original/file-20200112-103954-1dvaooo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309543/original/file-20200112-103954-1dvaooo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309543/original/file-20200112-103954-1dvaooo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=443&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309543/original/file-20200112-103954-1dvaooo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309543/original/file-20200112-103954-1dvaooo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309543/original/file-20200112-103954-1dvaooo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=557&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A member of the Iranian community in Calgary lights a candle during a memorial for the victims of Flight PS752 crash.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Todd Korol</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It is clear that for many Canadians (not just Mulroney) the Air India bombing was unthinkable — and thus unmemorable — as a tragedy of national consequence due to the dominant assumption that Canadian identity is synonymous with whiteness. Indeed, <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/air-india-hearings-conclude-with-racism-claims-1.267421">critics as well as relatives of the dead have raised the obvious question</a>: would there have been such trouble recognizing the bombing as a national tragedy if the majority of those killed were white rather than brown Canadians?</p>
<h2>Crucial evidence lost</h2>
<p>Now well-documented as the result of criminal trial proceedings and a long-awaited federally appointed <a href="http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/bcp-pco/CP32-89-5-2010-1-eng.pdf">Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India 182</a> are repeated instances where government officials, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the RCMP and Canadian airport authorities ignored, disbelieved, erased and lost crucial evidence — including surveillance tapes of eventually acquitted suspects and warnings by the Indian government and Air India officials of an attack on the airline. </p>
<p>Relatives of those killed in the bombing of Flight 182 also testified to how the government failed to provide them with the most basic, practical supports in the days, months and years following the deaths of their loved ones, many citing compounded grief as a result of being treated like second-class citizens for their “Indian-ness.”</p>
<p>Sociologist Sherene Razack has said that although “there is evidence that some Canadian officials acted heroically,” <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/racism-issue-resurfaces-as-testimony-ends-at-air-india-inquiry-1.765605">systemic racism played a role in Canada’s pre- and post-bombing response</a> or lack thereof. In her expert witness report for the inquiry, she observed:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“When police, political and media elites all consistently treated the Air India bombings as a foreign event, it is not surprising that Canadians do not recall June 23, 1985. As a nation, we were not shaken, transformed and moved to change our own institutional practices for a tragedy we considered had little to do with us.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p><a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/stephen-harpers-apology-to-air-india-victims-families">It would take 25 years of lobbying by Air India families</a> before the government of Canada would publicly claim their loved ones, as well as the suspected perpetrators, as Canada’s own.</p>
<h2>Has Canada changed?</h2>
<p>Does the national mourning as a result of the tragedy of PS752 mean then that Canada has since changed? Are we befittingly shaken this time around? Other news reports are citing diversity and multiculturalism experts who think so, some claiming that there has been a “<a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/iran-airline-crash-air-india-disaster-1.5422525">180-degree shift</a>.” But I am curious to see how the victims of this tragedy (and those of the Air India bombings, for that matter) continue to be remembered in time.</p>
<p>Despite the fact that the Air India bombing is now referred to by public authorities as “<a href="https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/lssns-lrnd/index-en.aspx">the worst encounter with terrorism Canada has experienced</a>,” or even “<a href="https://ottawasun.com/2012/09/30/air-india-flight-182-tragedy-canadas-own-911/wcm/fea91482-356f-4782-8e6b-f15f8988628d">Canada’s 9/11</a>,” most of my undergraduate university students have never heard of the incident. </p>
<p>The 35th anniversary of the Air India bombings approaches this coming June. It remains to be seen how long it will take for the Flight PS752 victims to be forgotten. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309542/original/file-20200112-103987-1v71am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309542/original/file-20200112-103987-1v71am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309542/original/file-20200112-103987-1v71am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309542/original/file-20200112-103987-1v71am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309542/original/file-20200112-103987-1v71am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309542/original/file-20200112-103987-1v71am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309542/original/file-20200112-103987-1v71am.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visit the memorial honouring victims of the 1985 Air India bombing at a ceremony in Toronto in 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Michelle Siu</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It also remains to be seen if the deaths of these passengers will be mobilized in the interests of increased western military involvement in the Middle East. Again I can’t help but think of the Air India bombings, and the ways in which the government of Stephen Harper <a href="https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rspns-cmmssn/index-en.aspx">strategically used the memory of its victims to bolster support for conservative anti-terrorist legislation</a>; or more recently, <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-strange-loyalties-of-jagmeet-singh/">conservative pundits who invoked the bombings</a> over and over again to bait NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh before last fall’s federal election. </p>
<p>Nor am I convinced that Canada’s response to this recent air tragedy and the loss of so many Iranian-Canadian lives means racist reactions won’t still emerge.</p>
<p>Often during times of national crises and heightened political tensions, race-based fears and anxieties about foreign and/or domestic terrorism result in the intensified stereotyping of particular people and places as inherently threatening — as exemplified in President Donald Trump’s latest characterization of Iran as a “<a href="https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a30459657/trump-iran-flight-rough-neighborhood/">rough neighborhood</a>.” To be sure, the potential for rising anti-Iranian sentiment in Canada also exists.</p>
<p>And so as further details of the tragedy in Tehran unfold and political players in and beyond Canada negotiate their stakes, I expect that public memory will shift along with it, including how the incident and its casualties are remembered and understood.</p>
<p>This is how public memory works: when new information and investments become present, we tend to revise how we make sense of the past.</p>
<p>The best we can hope for is that our practice of collective remembrance might become the grounds upon which those of us who were not immediately affected by the downing of PS752 — or the Air India bombings — join in memory and mourning with those who were. In doing so, we learn to live alongside one another in the aftermath of loss with renewed connection.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129761/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angela Failler receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Canada Research Chairs Program.. </span></em></p>When Canada’s worst airline tragedy happened 35 years ago, the country had a different reaction than the national outpouring of grief for those killed when PS752 was shot down in Tehran.Angela Failler, Canada Research Chair in Culture and Public Memory, University of WinnipegLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297712020-01-13T14:28:16Z2020-01-13T14:28:16ZThe long history and current consequences of the Iranian-American conflict<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309568/original/file-20200112-103982-13c2pwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4500%2C2701&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters chant slogans and hold up posters of Qassem Soleimani during a demonstration in front of the British Embassy in Tehran on Jan. 12, 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Understanding historical cause and effect can be difficult and contentious. The downing of Ukrainian International Airlines Flight PS752 is a prime example. </p>
<p>While there’s now no question about the Iranian regime’s responsibility for attack, the broader blame game is ongoing. Indeed, it is integral to Tehran’s defence in the face of international condemnation and increasing domestic unrest.</p>
<p>Historians trace the state of Iranian-American relations to 1953, when the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/64-years-later-cia-finally-releases-details-of-iranian-coup-iran-tehran-oil/">Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated a coup against Mohammed Mossadegh</a> and installed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as a puppet ruler for 25 years.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309575/original/file-20200112-103954-5tbtbv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this September 1951 photo, Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh rides on the shoulders of cheering crowds outside Tehran’s parliament building after reiterating his oil nationalization views to his supporters. The U.S. overthrew his government two years later.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo, File</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The 1978 Iranian Revolution ensued, ultimately producing the authoritarian theocracy in power today. Iran’s brutal war from 1980 to 1988 with neighbouring Iraq, then an American ally, helped to entrench the Islamist regime and fuelled further enmity with the U.S. </p>
<p>So too has constant American support for Israel and Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s wide-ranging <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/iran-uses-proxies-punch-above-its-weight-middle-east-experts-n1008731">“proxy wars” in the Middle East</a> through militias and terrorist organizations. </p>
<p>More recently, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-invasion-iraq-anniversary-how-it-changed-middle-east-country-2018-3">the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq</a> provided a lightning rod for conflict. It simultaneously threatened Iran with perceived regime change while creating the conditions for the country’s expanded influence in the region <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-shia-shift-why-iran-hezbollah-abandoned-martyrdom-25992">through control of disaffected Shia.</a> <a href="https://apnews.com/a0557de2499d53eb9d298bbea35bb9d8">The subsequent civil war in Syria</a>, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the ongoing conflict in Yemen furthered opportunities for Tehran to project its power.</p>
<h2>Support for reformists</h2>
<p>To be sure, there have been glimmers of hope for a better relationship over the years. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-06-14/irans-green-movement-never-went-away">The so-called Green Movement</a> in Iran in 2009 signalled that not all was well with the fundamentalist regime. Support for reformists since the late 1990s, while intermittent, also points to a more diverse, progressive society in Iran than is often imagined.</p>
<p>On the international stage, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (better known as the Iran nuclear deal) provided at least an initial framework for dialogue, however debatable its effectiveness. But that process ended with the withdrawal from the protocol in 2018 by Donald Trump’s administration. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/obituaries/qassem-soleimani-dead.html">The more recent decision to assassinate Qassem Soleimani,</a> major general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and commander of the Quds Force — and one of the most important officials in the Iranian government — was an even more obvious hard turn away from any diplomacy with Tehran.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s murder necessitated a response from Iran. </p>
<p>After many threats, that response was Iranian missile attacks on American military bases in Iraq. It was an expected and relatively restrained response from a regime cornered between appearing tough in the face of American aggression and running the risk of a major military escalation with the U.S. that could conceivably imperil its very existence.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-vows-revenge-for-soleimanis-killing-but-heres-why-it-wont-seek-direct-confrontation-with-the-us-129440">Iran vows revenge for Soleimani's killing, but here's why it won't seek direct confrontation with the US</a>
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<p>It is of course too early to know if that’s the extent of Tehran’s response. Soleimani’s death is a major blow to Iranian operations in Iraq and Syria, where he served as the political and military point-man. At the head of the Quds Force, he ran myriad clandestine operations through proxies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and Afghanistan. The U.S. ranked him as one of the most important terrorists in the world.</p>
<h2>Soleimani a national hero</h2>
<p>Soleimani’s assassination was taken as a clear, personal attack on the regime and particularly Iran’s theocracy. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309569/original/file-20200112-103982-2qkz21.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this picture released by the official website of the office of the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks to a group of residents of the city of Qom, in Iran on Jan. 8, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Quite separate from the Iranian military, the IRGC answers directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Historically, the IRGC has also been a kind of barometer of the regime’s integrity with the Iranian populace.</p>
<p>Initially the vanguard of the revolution, the IRGC came to epitomize the oppressive nature of clerical rule and had lost much of its support among Iranians. </p>
<p>Soleimani was key to its rehabilitation, especially in the face of what many saw as American military adventurism in the Middle East.</p>
<p>His status as a national hero was premised largely on the notion that the IRGC was, once again, defending Iranian sovereignty: challenging the U.S. and its allies throughout the region. In many respects he had tapped into an <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/iraq-and-iran-have-nationalists-too/604573/">even deeper sense of Persian nationalism</a> — he represented the legitimate regional aspirations of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/08/if-trump-knew-anything-about-iran-he-would-never-have-threatened-its-culture/">an ancient and proud people</a>, long besieged by enemies on all fronts. He was, to some degree, a symbol of unity in a fractured state.</p>
<p>It is dangerous to leap from Soleimani’s death to the downing of Flight PS752, or to ultimately blame Washington as Iran now seeks to do. But cause and effect still cast their shadows. </p>
<h2>Iran feared further escalation</h2>
<p>Clearly Iranian authorities feared military escalation from the U.S. after their reprisal for the assassination. And clearly their fears were exacerbated by incompetency evident now on multiple levels, particularly the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority for not closing airspace over Tehran. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flight-ps752-a-deadly-combination-of-irans-recklessness-and-incompetence-129749">Flight PS752: A deadly combination of Iran's recklessness and incompetence</a>
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<hr>
<p>Most problematic for the regime is that the IRGC — <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-crash-missiles-explainer/explainer-missile-system-suspected-of-bringing-down-airliner-short-range-fast-and-deadly-idUSKBN1Z90A1">the only unit with the Russian-made Tor system in question</a> — ultimately bears responsibility for launching the missiles. Admitting to the attack, especially after a series of vigorous denials, has humiliated the regime. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/iran-iraq-crash-soleimani-trump-1.5423238">Evidenced by anti-government protests in Iran</a> soon after its admission, it’s also exposed the leadership to precisely what it fears most: the domestic opposition it has been battling for years.</p>
<p>Often overlooked by Westerners in this calculation is the 1988 Iranian Airlines Flight 655 incident, when missiles from the USS Vincennes <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/middleeast/iran-air-flight-655-us-military-intl-hnk/index.html">were mistakenly launched at the civilian jet, killing all on board.</a> </p>
<p>That event became a central pillar of the clerics’ attempts to carve a collective Iranian identity built principally on vehement anti-Americanism, and to consequently legitimize their own control. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309574/original/file-20200112-103990-zslstp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this July 1988 file photo, a funeral procession is held for six Pakistani and Indian nationals who were killed aboard Iran Air Flight 655.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Commemorated in speeches, educational curriculums, even postage stamps, Flight 655 reinforced notions that Iran was perpetually under attack. Indeed, just a couple of days before the attack on Ukrainian International Airlines, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/rouhani-tweeted-about-iran-flight-655-before-ukrainian-plane-downed-2020-1">tweets from senior Iranian officials reminded followers about Flight 655</a>. </p>
<p>Now, with Flight PS752, Iran was the attacker. Hypocrisies were revealed, and opportunities to exploit <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/11/they-killed-our-sons-and-daughters-anger-rises-in-iran-over-flight-752">both domestic and international support in the face of American actions were lost</a>.</p>
<h2>Justification changes</h2>
<p>So what about the United States? As Trump so quickly pointed out, the “mistake” most definitely came “<a href="https://www.rollcall.com/news/whitehouse/trump-suggests-iran-downed-ukrainian-airliner">from the other side</a>.” But his decisions still loom large in a fair discussion of cause and effect. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-real-backstory-of-why-trump-ordered-the-killing-of-suleimani-is-becoming-more-clear">There are serious questions</a> about what went into the decision to kill Soleimani. Parallels to Osama bin Laden are inevitable, but neither the context nor the consequences are analogous. </p>
<p>Attacks on Iranian interests have the potential of far greater, and faster, escalation than any involving al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations. And the initial rationale — that Soleimani was planning an “imminent attack” on U.S. interests — has changed. Instead, Trump argued, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/politics/qasem-soleimani-reasons-justifications/index.html">the hit was for past actions</a>. </p>
<p>That’s a very different calculation, especially in the eyes of public opinion. </p>
<p>Even if the assassination is still considered legitimate, questions about possible consequences seem to have been ignored. Soleimani’s status as a national hero doesn’t seem to have registered. A sophisticated understanding of the Iranian regime and its need to respond to any attack on its interests also seems to have been lacking. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309579/original/file-20200113-103971-4ew46g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators protest outside of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 9, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Historical calculations were probably never even entertained in calculating what might happen after the hit. In an administration notorious for its revolving door of senior officials and advisers, whose expertise was instrumental in making a decision of that magnitude? Was any sought at all?</p>
<p>Regardless of any moral and ethical considerations, the assassination of Soleimani constitutes a dramatic escalation in a region already dangerously volatile, and it was arguably disproportionate to the threat he posed.</p>
<h2>Stephen Harper cut diplomatic ties</h2>
<p>Questions about cause and effect don’t spare Canada, either. The 2012 decision by the government of Stephen Harper to cut diplomatic ties with Iran now significantly complicates Ottawa’s efforts to take part in the investigation of Flight PS752 and to best represent Canadian victims. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/canadas-non-diplomacy-puts-canadians-at-risk-in-an-unstable-middle-east-129758">Canada's non-diplomacy puts Canadians at risk in an unstable Middle East</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s demands for a full, open, international investigation into the incident are helped by Iran’s belated admissions, but he cannot expect the regime to fully comply in straightforward fashion. A significant improvement in Iranian-Canadian relations remains a distant dream. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more important is the disturbing fact that Ottawa was left in the dark about Trump’s Soleimani intentions. Especially with allies so close, it is customary — and necessary — to consult in matters of national security. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309572/original/file-20200112-103974-1uuxodz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Iranian community break down during a memorial for the victims of the Ukrainian plane disaster in Iran in Edmonton on Jan. 12, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Todd Korol</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Canadians, both soldiers and civilians, who were potentially in danger in the region could have been warned if Ottawa had been informed. It also raises serious questions about the current state of the Canada-U.S. relationship.</p>
<p>Trump’s personal dislike of Trudeau, and evident disregard for Canada, is obvious. Less clear is how the historically high degree of communication and integration between the two countries has changed under Trump’s watch. </p>
<p>Asked directly about whether he thought the U.S. bore some responsibility for the downing of PS752, Trudeau said: “I think it is too soon to be drawing conclusions or assigning blame or responsibility in whatever proportions.”</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1215365771922214915"}"></div></p>
<p>It was a quiet but obvious suggestion that the Trump administration was not above reproach in a great tragedy with significant international consequences.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129771/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arne Kislenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The history of the Iran-United States relationship is complex and often brutal. Understanding it helps put today’s turmoil into sharper focus.Arne Kislenko, Associate Professor of History, Toronto Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1294872020-01-13T11:48:09Z2020-01-13T11:48:09ZCyberspace is the next front in Iran-US conflict – and private companies may bear the brunt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309559/original/file-20200112-103959-1w0dwab.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=415%2C67%2C2080%2C1519&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In the wake of U.S. killings, Iran's supreme leader vowed 'harsh revenge' – which could come in the form of cyber attacks.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Iran-Soleimani/e2f14b805bf6438c969cc4aa8f374368/2/0">Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Iran and other nations have waged a stealth cyberwar against the United States for at least the past decade, largely targeting not the government itself but, rather, critical infrastructure companies. This threat to the private sector will get much worse before it gets better and businesses need to be prepared to deal with it.</p>
<p>As in the days of <a href="https://www.crn.com/news/security/expert-rogue-states-haven-t-been-this-aggressive-since-pirates-roamed-the-seas">pirates and privateers</a>, much of our nation’s critical infrastucture is controlled by private companies and enemy nations and their proxies are targeting them aggressively.</p>
<p>The U.S.-Iran cyberconflict has simmered for years, but the current crisis boiled over with <a href="https://www.state.gov/on-attacks-by-irans-proxies-in-iraq/">Iranian attacks on U.S. interests in Iraq</a> that led to the Jan. 3 U.S. drone strike that <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-01-06/muhandis-was-tehrans-man-in-iraq-his-killing-by-the-u-s-may-have-more-blowback-than-suleimanis">killed a senior Iranian general and terrorist leader</a>. Iran’s supreme leader threatened “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/07/how-iran-could-retaliate-against-the-us-after-solemani-killing.html">harsh revenge</a>,” but said Iran would <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2020/iran-200105-presstv08.htm">limit those efforts to military targets</a>.</p>
<p>But even before Iranian missiles struck U.S. military bases in Iraq on Jan. 7, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7852819/Iranian-hackers-breach-government-website-retaliation-airstrike.html">pro-Iranian hackers reportedly attacked</a> at least one U.S. government-related website, along with a number of private company sites. Of greater concern, a new report details significant recent efforts by <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/iran-apt33-us-electric-grid/">Iran to compromise the U.S. electric</a>, oil and gas utilities.</p>
<p>Iran, which has reportedly attacked <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-attacks-un-exclusive/exclusive-u-n-investigators-find-yemens-houthis-did-not-carry-out-saudi-oil-attack-idUSKBN1Z72VX">Saudi Arabian energy production</a>, is also capable, according to U.S. officials, of conducting “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iran-has-laid-groundwork-extensive-cyberattacks-u-s-say-officials-n893081">attacks against thousands of electric grids</a>, water plants, and health and technology companies” in the U.S. and Western Europe. Disrupting those systems could cause significant damage to homes and businesses and, in the worst case, injuries and death.</p>
<p>Much of our targeted critical infrastructure is under the control of private companies. Without government protection – and in the absence of any agreed-upon rules of cyber warfare – businesses are at high risk, and strict American criminal laws prohibit many forms of cyber self-defense by private companies. But there are straightforward measures companies can take both to protect themselves and to enhance our collective national cybersecurity. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309561/original/file-20200112-103987-fi5bdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309561/original/file-20200112-103987-fi5bdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309561/original/file-20200112-103987-fi5bdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309561/original/file-20200112-103987-fi5bdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309561/original/file-20200112-103987-fi5bdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=430&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309561/original/file-20200112-103987-fi5bdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309561/original/file-20200112-103987-fi5bdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309561/original/file-20200112-103987-fi5bdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=540&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hackers with ties to the Iranian government attacked the Bowman Avenue Dam near New York City in 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Dam-Cyberattack/e4b86953ce4e4047ae689f288e1d0ced/1/0">AP Photo/Seth Wenig</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What will Iran do?</h2>
<p>Though it’s impossible to predict with certainty the behavior of the Iranian regime and their many proxies, their cyberattacks likely will continue to go well beyond governmental systems, which are <a href="https://www.cybercom.mil/default.aspx">reasonably well defended</a>. Iran and its supporters likely will focus on easier targets operated by private companies.</p>
<p>A recent U.S. Department of Homeland Security alert highlights <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-006a">Iran’s capabity and willingness</a> to engage in <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iran-has-laid-groundwork-extensive-cyberattacks-u-s-say-officials-n893081">multiple types of destructive cyberattacks</a> over the last decade. According to indictments filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, as cited in the DHS alert:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Beginning as far back as 2011, Iran has conducted numerous Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, sending <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/834996/download">massive amounts of internet traffic to knock websites offline</a>. Iran’s DDoS attacks have targeted, among others, financial institutions, for whom the resulting downtime reportedly cost millions of dollars.</p></li>
<li><p>In 2013, one or more Iranians working for the country’s Revolutionary Guard <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-cyber-idUSKCN0WQ1JF">illegally accessed the control system of a New York dam</a>, although no direct damage apparently was done. </p></li>
<li><p>In 2014, Iran <a href="https://money.cnn.com/2015/02/27/technology/security/iran-hack-casino/index.html">conducted an attack on the Sands Las Vegas Corporation</a>, stealing customer credit card, Social Security and driver’s license numbers and wiping all data from Sands’ computer systems.</p></li>
<li><p>Between 2013 and 2017, hackers working on behalf of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard conducted a “massive” cyber theft operation targeting academic and intellectual property data, along with email information, from hundreds of universities, more than 45 companies, at least two federal agencies, at least two state governments and the United Nations.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>It is possible that new efforts along these lines could be planned and timed to <a href="https://www.engadget.com/2019/10/04/iran-cyberattacks-targeted-us-presidential-campaign/">affect upcoming American elections</a>. In addition, other countries could launch attacks and <a href="https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/92770/apt/turla-false-flag-iran.html">try to blame them on Iran, or vice versa</a>.</p>
<h2>No clear cyber rules of engagement</h2>
<p>For conventional and even nuclear warfare, nations have, over the centuries, agreed to rules of armed conflict. They’ve developed ways to signal their intentions to escalate or deescalate a conflict. The U.S. and Iran have, for now, deescalated their public military conflict, thanks to Iran warning of its missile attack and not killing or injuring anyone and the U.S. not taking any further military action.</p>
<p>But cyberspace remains the wild west, with few, if any, <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-a-world-of-cyber-threats-the-push-for-cyber-peace-is-growing-119419">agreed-on rules of engagement</a> or <a href="https://www.americansecurityproject.org/attacking-the-grid-the-danger-of-us-russia-cyber-escalation/">well-understood signaling mechanisms</a>. This makes any ongoing cyberconflict between Iran and its enemies all the more dangerous, with critical infrastructure companies at risk of being caught in the crossfire.</p>
<p>Without government assistance, those companies are largely on their own in defending against Iranian or other foreign government attacks. Strict criminal laws <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/legislative-hackback-notes-active-cyber-defense-certainty-act-discussion-draft">severely restrict companies’ defensive options</a>, prohibiting, for example, technologies to trace and destroy stolen data. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309495/original/file-20200110-97158-qftkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309495/original/file-20200110-97158-qftkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309495/original/file-20200110-97158-qftkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309495/original/file-20200110-97158-qftkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309495/original/file-20200110-97158-qftkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309495/original/file-20200110-97158-qftkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309495/original/file-20200110-97158-qftkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309495/original/file-20200110-97158-qftkhw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Front lines in an Iran-U.S. cyberwar are spread out all over the country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/M5tzZtFCOfs">Taylor Vick/Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Collective cyberdefense</h2>
<p>All of that said, there are steps companies can take to <a href="https://theconversation.com/5-ways-to-protect-yourself-from-cybercrime-120062">protect themselves</a>, not only from Iranian or other governmental attacks but against hacking by data thieves, ransomware gangs, corporate rivals, disgruntled employees or anyone else. </p>
<p>Vigilance and communication is key. Companies, particularly in critical infrastructure sectors such as energy, financial, telecommunications and health care, should stay in closer-than-usual touch with appropriate governmental bodies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI and the appropriate cyber <a href="https://www.nationalisacs.org/member-isacs">Information Sharing & Analysis Centers</a>. ISACs can help companies quickly get threat intelligence from the government and report attacks that may have implications beyond a single company.</p>
<p>Businesses also should carefully check their systems for malware previously inserted maliciously to enable future attacks. They should, of course, scan their systems on an ongoing basis for viruses and other malicious code that could let hackers have unauthorized access to systems or data. <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-006a">Companies should also</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-secure-is-your-data-when-its-stored-in-the-cloud-90000">securely back up their data</a>, closely monitor data traffic on their networks, require workers to use <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-age-of-hacking-brings-a-return-to-the-physical-key-73094">multi-factor authentication</a> when logging into IT resources, and provide cybersecuritiy training and awareness to employees. </p>
<p>Protecting our national and economic security from attack is in the hands of private citizens and companies in a way that hasn’t been true perhaps since <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Dunkirk-evacuation">British boat owners rescued their nation’s army from annihilation</a> at Dunkirk in 1940. By taking reasonable cybersecurity measures, companies, and all of us individually, can not only help protect ourselves and our nation but, perhaps, even help to prevent a war. </p>
<p>[ <em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129487/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bryan Cunningham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Less overt than conventional military actions, cyber attacks can have dangerous consequences – especially when they target critical infrastructure systems controlled by the private sector.Bryan Cunningham, Executive Director of the Cyber Security Policy & Research Institute, University of California, IrvineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1296692020-01-12T19:18:23Z2020-01-12T19:18:23ZIran flexes its missile muscle with terrible consequences<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309555/original/file-20200112-103959-1exzvar.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C0%2C4500%2C2977&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather for a candlelight vigil to remember the victims of the Ukraine plane crash in Tehran on Jan. 11, 2020.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) recently demonstrated its sophisticated missile technology by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51042156">attacking U.S. military bases</a> in Iraq. But later the same day, its missiles <a href="https://apnews.com/21f4a92a2dfbc38581719664bdf6f38e">unintentionally destroyed an airliner</a> in Iran, killing 176 civilians, including 57 Canadians.</p>
<p>That combined success and blunder suggest Iran’s military and government “human systems” have not kept up with the weapon technology they wield. They also illustrate how missile threats pose challenges to other countries worldwide.</p>
<h2>Airliner interception over Iran</h2>
<p>Iran belatedly admitted Saturday that IRGC surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) had shot down the passenger jet near Tehran. The SAM crew somehow mistook the Ukrainian airliner for an American cruise missile. Ukrainian investigators believe the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-investigators-knew-within-hours-missile-ps752-1.5423957">missile exploded near the airplane’s cockpit</a>, instantly killing the crew.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309557/original/file-20200112-103963-1buca11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309557/original/file-20200112-103963-1buca11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309557/original/file-20200112-103963-1buca11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309557/original/file-20200112-103963-1buca11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309557/original/file-20200112-103963-1buca11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309557/original/file-20200112-103963-1buca11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309557/original/file-20200112-103963-1buca11.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A rescue worker searches the scene where a Ukrainian plane crashed southwest of Tehran, killing 176 passengers, including 57 Canadians, after being shot down by the Iranian military.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The airplane was defenceless against the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-crash-missiles-explainer/explainer-missile-system-suspected-of-bringing-down-airliner-short-range-fast-and-deadly-idUSKBN1Z90A1">apparently Russian-made SAM</a>. The only major airline <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/israeli-airline-missile-defenses-israel-us-carriers-wont/story?id=24684650">whose planes carry missile countermeasures</a> is Israel’s El Al. And those are effective mostly against <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/stinger-missile-back-25882">simple heat-seeking SAMs</a>, not sophisticated radar-guided ones.</p>
<p>It’s unclear why IRGC personnel didn’t realize the aircraft was civilian. Their radar should have displayed the airliner’s <a href="https://calaero.edu/the-airplane-transponder/">transponder code</a>. <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/rebecca-grant-iranian-shoot-down-of-ukrainian-plane-heres-what-went-wrong">Did the IRGC disable</a> that potentially life-saving feature?</p>
<p>(Iran is not alone in making interception errors. In 2018, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/17/politics/syrian-regime-shoots-down-russian-plane/index.html">Syria used Russian-supplied SAMs</a> to <a href="https://apnews.com/49ff908bba924ee1a43b5a6db3917bcd/Putin-seeks-to-defuse-downing-of-Russian-plane-off-Syria">down a Russian airplane</a> they mistook for an Israeli fighter jet. And in 1988, a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/middleeast/iran-air-flight-655-us-military-intl-hnk/index.html">U.S. warship destroyed an Iranian airliner it thought was a warplane</a>.)</p>
<p>You could call the incident “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iran-admits-unintentionally-shot-ukrainian-plane-200111040653138.html">human error</a>” or “recklessness and incompetence.”</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/flight-ps752-a-deadly-combination-of-irans-recklessness-and-incompetence-129749">Flight PS752: A deadly combination of Iran's recklessness and incompetence</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<p>Either way, it indicates problems with <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Lessons-from-Irans-shoot-down-of-Ukrainian-Airlines-752-613845">organizational co-ordination and communication</a>, rather than the technology itself.</p>
<p>In fact, the IRGC had showcased its technological strengths earlier that day.</p>
<h2>Ballistic missiles into Iraq</h2>
<p>On Jan. 8, the IRGC launched <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/01/08/794517031/satellite-photos-reveal-extent-of-damage-at-al-assad-air-base">between 15</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51042156">22 ballistic missiles</a> toward U.S. military bases in Iraq. Some landed many kilometres off target. But most struck the bases and at least five destroyed buildings. Fortunately, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iran-tensions-soleimani-killing-latest-updates-200109052154824.html">the Americans suffered no casualties</a> because <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/11/middleeast/iran-strike-al-asad-air-base-exclusive-intl/index.html">they had taken shelter</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that some missiles never reached the target zone indicates their reliability remains problematic. But the direct hits that others scored shows the growing accuracy of Iran’s missile guidance systems.</p>
<p>Most importantly, the attack demonstrated Iran can strike U.S. targets hundreds of kilometres away. That’s despite overwhelming American military superiority.</p>
<h2>Cruise missiles against Saudi Arabia</h2>
<p><a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/why-irans-cruise-missiles-are-serious-threat-113021">Iran’s cruise missiles</a> have achieved similar sophistication. (Ballistic missiles soar high into the air before arcing down toward their targets. By contrast, cruise missiles fly close to the ground like small airplanes — hence the IRGC’s mistake.)</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309556/original/file-20200112-103987-vx9vd0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309556/original/file-20200112-103987-vx9vd0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309556/original/file-20200112-103987-vx9vd0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309556/original/file-20200112-103987-vx9vd0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309556/original/file-20200112-103987-vx9vd0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309556/original/file-20200112-103987-vx9vd0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309556/original/file-20200112-103987-vx9vd0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iranian army member looks at a missile in an exhibition in which the Revolutionary Guard also displays pieces of the American drone Global Hawk shot down by the Guard in the Strait of Hormuz in June 2019, in Tehran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Those improvements were evident last September. That’s when <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-sending-troops-saudi-arabia-shows-short-range-air-defenses-ncna1057461">seven cruise missiles and 18 smaller drones</a> <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/iran-fired-cruise-missiles-attack-saudi-oil-facility/story?id=65632653">heavily damaged two Saudi Arabian oil refineries</a>. Yemen’s Houthi rebels claimed they made that attack. But many observers believe Iran supplied the missiles.</p>
<h2>Military vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>Iran’s successful cruise and ballistic missile attacks represent not only its missile strengths, but also other countries’ vulnerabilities. Even the powerful and <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/05/02/us-remains-top-military-spender-sipri-reports/">well-funded</a> U.S. military has trouble blocking such missiles.</p>
<p>Ballistic missiles’ high-altitude flights are easy to spot on radar. But their fast speed makes them difficult to hit. Even if hit, their downward trajectories mean they might damage targets anyway.</p>
<p>Conversely, cruise missiles are relatively easy to destroy once detected. But their low flying altitudes mean they’re often undetected until too late.</p>
<p>(Capturing launch sites is one way to counter both missile types. That’s how Allied forces shut down Germany’s <a href="https://www.smh-hq.org/jmh/jmhvols/831.html">V-2 ballistic missiles and V-1 cruise missiles</a> during the Second World War.)</p>
<p>The U.S. Army does have medium-range <a href="https://www.army-technology.com/projects/patriot/">Patriot missile interceptors</a>, but only at a few locations. Besides, that system’s effectiveness against ballistic missiles <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/28/patriot-missiles-are-made-in-america-and-fail-everywhere/">is questionable</a>. And Saudi Patriots failed to stop the refinery cruise missile attack there.</p>
<p>Consequently, the U.S. Army is developing new <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/12/12/after-complex-test-is-the-armys-major-missile-defense-command-system-ready-for-primetime/">short-range missile defences</a>. It’s also <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/us-army-signals-israels-iron-dome-isnt-the-answer/">buying two interceptor systems from Israel</a> in the meantime. But those aren’t deployed yet.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, most other countries’ armies, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/ballistic-missile-defence-1.4488470">including Canada’s</a>, completely lack interceptors. (By contrast, <a href="https://theconversation.com/missile-interception-from-yemen-to-the-south-china-sea-84676">many nations’ warships carry interceptors for self-defence</a>.)</p>
<h2>Israeli concerns</h2>
<p>The country best equipped for missile defence is Israel. But even it worries about Iranian developments.</p>
<p>Israel developed its <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/arrow-3/">Arrow</a> and <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/davids-sling/">David’s Sling</a> systems to intercept ballistic missiles. Its <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/iron-dome/">Iron Dome</a> system protects against short-range rockets and mortars. Even its <a href="http://en.globes.co.il/en/article-rafael-to-sell-tank-protection-system-to-us-army-1001243212">tanks can intercept anti-tank guided missiles</a>.</p>
<p>Iron Dome has seen extensive use against <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-missiles-fly-a-look-at-israels-iron-dome-interceptor-94959">attacks from Gaza</a>. The system was first deployed in 2011 and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/3/2/113/4964794">became really effective in 2014</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309558/original/file-20200112-103990-1nycsme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309558/original/file-20200112-103990-1nycsme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309558/original/file-20200112-103990-1nycsme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309558/original/file-20200112-103990-1nycsme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309558/original/file-20200112-103990-1nycsme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309558/original/file-20200112-103990-1nycsme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309558/original/file-20200112-103990-1nycsme.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iron Dome defence system, installed on a Sa'ar 5 Lahav Class corvette of the Israeli Navy, is seen in the northern port of Haifa, Israel, in February 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Jack Guez via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But that effectiveness partly relies on rocket inaccuracy. Even when fired at large targets like entire towns, roughly three-quarters land harmlessly in fields. Very few would directly hit buildings. Iron Dome batteries can focus on stopping those few.</p>
<p>That’s one reason Iranian missile improvements concern Israel. Suppose the IRGC were to supply Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in Lebanon with precision guidance systems. Those militants could greatly increase their weapons’ accuracy.</p>
<p>Instead of blindly firing rockets at whole towns, the militants could target important buildings like power plants. And instead of worrying about just a fraction of the rockets, Iron Dome units would need to intercept most of them. That could quickly <a href="https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/opre.2014.1309?journalCode=opre&">overwhelm their capacity</a>.</p>
<p>It’s truly impressive how far the world’s engineers have advanced missile technology. Now politicians must make similar advances in diplomacy. Otherwise, missile mayhem will become increasingly common.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The downing of Flight PS752 suggests Iran’s missile technology has grown increasingly sophisticated. But its ability to responsibly control that technology has not.Michael J. Armstrong, Associate professor of operations research, Goodman School of Business, Brock UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297582020-01-12T13:36:32Z2020-01-12T13:36:32ZCanada’s non-diplomacy puts Canadians at risk in an unstable Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309536/original/file-20200111-97183-nq1520.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C0%2C4950%2C3482&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau pauses as he speaks during a news conference in Ottawa on Jan. 11. Trudeau says Iran must take full responsibility for mistakenly shooting down a Ukrainian jetliner, killing all 176 civilians on board. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Justin Tang</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Canada is caught in a mess of its own diplomatic making following the recent escalation in conflict between the United States and Iran. This escalation seemed to contribute to the downing <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iran-jetliner-unintentionally-shot-down-1.5423608">by Iran</a> on its own soil of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752, <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6396760/canadians-killed-iran-crash/">with 57 Canadians aboard</a>.</p>
<p>This is not just a matter of Canada being caught in an international conflagration involving the Trump administration after its targeted killing of Iranian Maj.-Gen. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-soleimani/irans-soleimani-and-iraqs-muhandis-killed-in-air-strike-militia-spokesman-idUSKBN1Z201C">Qassem Soleimani</a>. </p>
<p>It is also the result of an unnecessarily aggressive posture of Canada’s own when, in 2012, Stephen Harper’s Conservative government closed its embassy in Tehran and expelled Iranian officials on short notice from Canada. </p>
<h2>The context of war and Flight PS752</h2>
<p>Flight PS752, with its stop in Kyiv, was popular with Iranians flying to Canada because there are no direct links between the two countries. It is also a cheap alternative route in Iran, which is impoverished by sanctions, conflict and corruption.</p>
<p>For months, the U.S. and Iran had been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/monitors-houthis-saudi-aramco-attacks-report-200109062732396.html">antagonizing one another across</a> the Middle East. These regional rivals have been particularly aggressive since the U.S. withdrew in 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) treaty, brokered by Barack Obama’s administration, and imposed new sanctions on Iran.</p>
<p>The JCPOA had been designed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/iran-is-complying-with-nuclear-deal-restrictions-iaea-report-idUSKCN1LF1KR">had been upholding</a> its part in the agreement.</p>
<p>This tension escalated to dramatic new heights when the U.S. carried out the unprecedented act of openly assassinating another country’s top official. A fate <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/14/13577464/obama-farewell-speech-torture-drones-nsa-surveillance-trump">typically reserved</a> for non-state players in the post 9/11 era, it was carried out at Baghdad’s international airport. Ten people died in the drone attack, including Iraqi factional commander <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/03/abu-mahdi-al-muhandis-iraq-iran-militias-suleimani">Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis</a>. This has effectively demolished existing international norms for conduct.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309538/original/file-20200111-97149-1x21v4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309538/original/file-20200111-97149-1x21v4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309538/original/file-20200111-97149-1x21v4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309538/original/file-20200111-97149-1x21v4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309538/original/file-20200111-97149-1x21v4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309538/original/file-20200111-97149-1x21v4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309538/original/file-20200111-97149-1x21v4i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pedestrians walk past banners of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in Iraq in a U.S. drone attack.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Hillary Mann Leverett, a former White House National Security official, told <em>Al Jazeera</em> the killing of Soleimani amounted to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iraq-3-katyusha-rockets-fired-baghdad-airport-200102232817666.html">“declaration of war.”</a> </p>
<h2>Iran retaliated</h2>
<p>The killing led directly to Iran saying it would no longer honour the JCPOA and launching <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/08/politics/trump-iran-retaliation-missile-attacks/index.html">missile attacks</a> on American military bases in Iraq three days later, with no casualties. It may not be surprising in such a <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-iran-crash-panic-bad-training-may-led-missile-attack-2020-1">tense environment</a> if the Iranian military fired missiles at an airliner taking off from its own airport, fearing an imminent U.S. strike. Iran, however, should likely have grounded all flights that day, too.</p>
<p>Iran first denied it had shot down the plane, but after Iranian social media users ran rampant with speculation that Iranian missiles were responsible, the government admitted to its actions. Protesters have since taken to the streets against the regime.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1216005829641543689"}"></div></p>
<p>Canada’s 2012 decision to cut diplomatic ties with Iran has played a role affecting the tragic loss of Canadian citizens.</p>
<p>It was a decision based heavily on internal political calculations. It has been at great cost to Canada’s ability to have a presence and institutional contacts in Iran to understand the politics and society there — and provide services to Canadians. </p>
<p>This lack of basic intelligence on the ground has hobbled Canada at the worst possible time. Because of these poor relations, Canada also has only limited access to participate in the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/iran-plane-crash-canada-access-investigation-1.5421352">investigation of the downed flight</a>.</p>
<h2>Trudeau primarily blamed Iran</h2>
<p>Canada justified cutting ties in 2012 by saying <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-closes-embassy-in-iran-expels-iranian-diplomats-1.1166509">Iran was</a> the world’s “most significant threat to global peace and security.” Prime Minister Justin Trudeau seemed <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/6398641/iran-plane-crash-update-trudeau/?utm_source=notification/">to toe that line in his Jan. 11 news conference</a>, laying blame primarily on Iran. </p>
<p>Trudeau has largely been an adherent of his predecessor’s Middle East policy. However, diplomatic representation would significantly help in the aftermath of the downing of Flight PS752. What is more, countless Iranians are looking abroad for support for their own cause of reform and liberalization, and instead have been subjected to sanctions that harm innocent citizens most.</p>
<p>Diplomatic ties offer opportunities for dialogue essential to avoid conflict and resolve disputes. Further, Canadians live, travel and do business around the world, and a large community of Canadians of Iranian descent <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canadian-woman-held-in-iran-after-husband-died-now-home-safe-freeland-1.4634767">need access</a> to Canadian diplomatic representation for their own safety and well-being.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309537/original/file-20200111-97171-1h8tmeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309537/original/file-20200111-97171-1h8tmeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309537/original/file-20200111-97171-1h8tmeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309537/original/file-20200111-97171-1h8tmeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309537/original/file-20200111-97171-1h8tmeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309537/original/file-20200111-97171-1h8tmeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309537/original/file-20200111-97171-1h8tmeg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners in Edmonton place candles and photographs during a vigil for those who were among the 176 people who were killed when Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752 crashed after takeoff near Tehran, Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Codie McLachlan</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That is why Canada has representation with other states around the world, even some of the most notorious. Indeed, one of Trudeau’s campaign promises <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/justin-trudeau-i-ll-end-isis-combat-mission-restore-relations-with-iran-1.3124949">in 2015</a> was to restore diplomatic relations with Iran. </p>
<p>Though the Harper government added legislation that <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2018.1564683">made it difficult</a> to reverse the 2012 decision, it can be done with political will.</p>
<h2>Canadians need an embassy in Iran</h2>
<p>No one yet knows what the fallout will be from the escalation between the U.S. and Iran. The Middle East is now even more unsafe and unstable. Iran will feel compelled to respond after so egregious an attack on its officials, to save face and show attacks on its leadership come with a cost. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/war-iraqis-revive-protests-iran-tension-200110201417699.html">Iraq is in greater upheaval</a>. And no one can determine yet what the global impact will be after the U.S. so dramatically smashed existing norms of statecraft.</p>
<p>More than ever, Canada needs a presence to be able to deal on its own with the aftermath of these terrible events, with Canadian interests front and centre. As the tragedy of Flight PS752 has made explicit, Canada only hurts itself and Canadians without it. </p>
<p>[ <em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129758/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeremy Wildeman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The downing of Flight PS752 isn’t just the result of Canada being caught in U.S.-Iran crossfire. It’s also the result of an unnecessarily aggressive posture of Canada’s own against Iran in 2012.Jeremy Wildeman, Visiting Research Fellow, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1297492020-01-11T03:09:42Z2020-01-11T03:09:42ZFlight PS752: A deadly combination of Iran’s recklessness and incompetence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309521/original/file-20200111-97130-2uxxiu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C3976%2C2497&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this Jan. 8, 2020 photo, rescue workers search the scene where a Ukrainian plane crashed in Shahedshahr, southwest of the capital Tehran, Iran. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/AP-Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The crash of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-ukraine-plane-crash-flight-752-timeline-unfolded-events-allegations-2020-1">with the loss of all 176 people on board</a>, including 15 children and 57 Canadians, was a horrific tragedy. It’s also deeply revelatory regarding several seminal issues involving Iran.</p>
<p>Flight PS752 went down shortly after it took off from the Tehran airport, just hours after Iran fired some 15 ballistic missiles at two large bases in Iraq that housed American and allied forces, as retaliation for the U.S. drone strike that killed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/03/asia/soleimani-profile-intl-hnk/index.html">Qassem Soleimani</a>.</p>
<p>The coincidence of the airline crash and the Iranian retaliation resulted in speculation and suspicion. The Iranian regime immediately and implausibly <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/08/iran-plane-crash-170-passengers-feared-dead-ukraine-boeing-737/">claimed mechanical problems</a> as the crash cause. As telling evidence emerged that <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51055219">the aircraft was brought down by Iran’s own anti-aircraft missiles</a>, Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization chief, Ali Abedzadeh, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-plane-crash-iranians-deny-us-claims-missile-shot-down-ukrainian-plane-today-2020-01-10-live-updates/">adamantly denied that the crash was caused by missiles</a>. And then the story changed again: <a href="https://apnews.com/21f4a92a2dfbc38581719664bdf6f38e">Iran finally admitted that it “unintentionally” shot down the airliner</a> and blamed “human error.”</p>
<h2>No weapons of mass destruction</h2>
<p>Certainly, initial claims by Western intelligence that the airliner was brought down by Iranian missiles deserved careful scrutiny. “Intelligence-based” assertions by George W. Bush and Dick Cheney that there <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/07/usa.iraq1">were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, after all, proved to be starkly wrong</a>. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, it seemed a reasonable conclusion when extremely cautious leaders like Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau asserted that on the basis of strong evidence, including from Canadian intelligence services, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/09/politics/is-iran-ukraine-plane/index.html">it was highly likely that Iranian missiles shot down the airliner</a> – an assertion backed by the British prime minister. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309522/original/file-20200111-97165-xv4rrt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prime Minister Justin Trudeau attends a candlelight vigil for victims of the Ukraine International Airlines crash in Tehran, in Ottawa, on Jan. 9, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/video/iran-plane-missile.html">There was also a video</a> verified by the <em>New York Times</em> that appeared to show an Iranian missile hitting a plane in the air near Tehran’s airport, and by a video trending on Iranian social media showed the same.</p>
<p>Further, there were reports that Iran <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/iran-bulldozers-ukrainian-jet-crash-site-complicate-investigation-2020-1">has been bulldozing part of the crash site</a>, that it did not secure the site as protocol would require, that much of the ground evidence is now gone and that Tehran is refusing to hand over the black boxes as normal procedure would demand. </p>
<p>It all strongly reinforced the impression that the Iranian regime was dissembling about the cause of the crash.</p>
<h2>Larger picture of Iranian regime</h2>
<p>But what’s likely to be most disturbing to the Iranian people is the larger picture of the behaviour of the Iranian regime and its long-term implications. </p>
<p>The theocratic regime has efficiently and violently suppressed all domestic dissent, and carefully but brutally fostered an image of regional and internal invincibility. It’s moved relentlessly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/16/from-tehran-to-beirut-shia-militias-aim-to-firm-up-irans-arc-of-influence">to create a Shia arc controlled from Tehran, stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean</a>. There was an aura of invulnerability around Soleimani, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who-are-iran-s-secretive-quds-forces-n1110156">who led the Quds Force</a>, representing the tip of the spear of Iranian imperial regional ambitions, domestic repression and world support for terrorism. </p>
<p>Soleimani seemed untouchable. Yet the Americans managed to so effectively reach him and remove him.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309523/original/file-20200111-97158-8zk51k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters demonstrate in Tehran, Iran, on Jan. 4, 2020, against the U.S. airstrike in Iraq that killed Iranian Revolutionary Guard Gen. Qassem Soleimani.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Iranian regime, which <a href="https://au.news.yahoo.com/iran-attack-us-troops-at-iraqi-base-in-revenge-operation-000247595.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAALUPVt_kihc07j8nx_6J3tQOpZGfmV1Urj0XuizXzUh3oPYBRPZk8tjzT3PGGhpr5vU5cTx6zs01AZPtsnBsWng8qW75p9uimzea55SJmoui_-7k9lIFsY0GRplfWk4VP--P9IJQUaoKJxblUoKhP1jgY2HHSRL6rkATxtSx7hIu">threatened “hard revenge”</a> for his targeted killing, settled for symbolic and feckless face-saving. Some of its ballistic missiles malfunctioned and others, either by design or prudent allied defence measures, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51042156">failed to inflict any casualties when fired at U.S. bases in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>The response revealed something more than just fecklessness. The efficiency that the Iranian regime has repeatedly demonstrated in repressing any internal dissent seems to have evaporated when faced with an unpredictable, narcissistic and vindictive opponent like U.S. President Donald Trump, who chose not to play the game by the old rules. </p>
<p>The Iranian response was not only uncharacteristically weak but it reflected the fear of an all-out confrontation. Iranian overreach met Trumpian unpredictability.</p>
<h2>Reckless and incompetent</h2>
<p>The admission by Iran that its missiles brought down the flight is more than just a terrible tragedy.</p>
<p>It’s also revealed a deadly combination of the regime’s breathtaking recklessness and monumental incompetence. That the Iranian regime did not shut down air traffic when it was firing missiles at Iraqi bases, as any normal procedure requires, was nothing short of gross negligence. </p>
<p>The deaths of so many civilians, mostly Iranians, demonstrates the regime’s weakness, incompetence and callous disregard for the safety of its own citizens. </p>
<p>To be sure, the regime in the future may well engage in asymmetrical warfare. Iranian military leaders are bloviating and making dire threats against the United States and the West, but the image of the regime’s invulnerability has been forever punctured by its corruption, melded with its carelessness and incompetence.</p>
<p>For now, the U.S. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/10/politics/us-sanctions-iran-mnuchin/index.html">is imposing additional sanctions</a> on top of the already devastating ones, and Soleimani is gone. </p>
<p>The people of Iran <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/11/iran-anti-government-protests-us-support/">have been demonstrating en masse for months</a>, making it clear they don’t want to die fighting for Iraq, Syria or Lebanon or spend scarce resources that are so desperately needed at home. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-in-iran-could-spell-trouble-for-the-middle-east-at-large-89588">Protests in Iran could spell trouble for the Middle East at large</a>
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<p>They may now more openly begin to blame the regime and become more emboldened.</p>
<p>Perhaps the tragedy of Flight PS752 may also finally convince the Iranian theocratic dictatorship that it’s time to stop pursuing dangerous foreign adventures.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/ca/newsletters?utm_source=TCCA&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129749/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurel Braun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Flight PS752 is more than just a terrible tragedy. It’s also revealed the potential future costs of Iran’s irresponsibility.Aurel Braun, Professor, International Relations and Political Science, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1295052020-01-10T13:47:11Z2020-01-10T13:47:11ZKilling of Soleimani evokes dark history of political assassinations in the formative days of Shiite Islam<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309304/original/file-20200109-80137-927xbh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C0%2C4338%2C2883&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iranians publicly mourn the death of Gen. Qassem Soleimani four days after he was killed in a US drone strike, Jan 7., 2020. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/women-cry-over-the-death-of-general-qasem-soleimani-four-news-photo/1192501684">Babek Jeddi/SOPA Images via Getty</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qassem-soleimani-iran-general-quds-force-commander-killed-us-airstrike-2020-01-03/">Gen. Qassem Soleimani</a>, who promoted the religious and political influence of the Iranian regime across the Middle East with covert military operations, was an important figure in the Iranian government. </p>
<p>But that’s not the only reason his targeted killing by the United States has elicited <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/middleeast/soleimani-burial-kerman-intl-hnk/index.html">explosive grief</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-iran-showdown-conflict-could-explode-quickly-and-disastrously-129306">outrage</a> in Iran. </p>
<p>Soleimani’s killing is also roiling Iran – including some people who don’t necessarily follow military affairs – for religious and cultural reasons related to the country’s Shii Muslim history. </p>
<h2>Veneration of martyrdom</h2>
<p>Islam, the world’s <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/05/christians-remain-worlds-largest-religious-group-but-they-are-declining-in-europe/">second largest religion</a>, has two main denominations: the Sunnis and the Shiites. Iran is about <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html">95% Shiite</a>.</p>
<p>While these two branches have the same basic beliefs, they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/q-and-a-how-do-sunni-and-shia-islam-differ.html">differ somewhat</a> in their interpretation of the Quran and whether imams are seen as divinely guided leaders.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, as I teach the students in my courses on Islam and politics, the main conflict between the Sunnis and Shiites is a political one. A power struggle between the two sects have <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183p1xz">long created tensions in the Middle East</a>. Today, it plays out in a growing competition between the Sunni kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Shii-majority Iran and Iraq. </p>
<p>Most relevant to the killing of Soleimani – but absent from most analysis of Iran’s response to the United States’ military action – is that Shiism as a separate sect was <a href="http://www.goodwordbooks.com/products/social-justice-islam">born of political assassinations</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309309/original/file-20200109-80144-1ikcw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309309/original/file-20200109-80144-1ikcw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309309/original/file-20200109-80144-1ikcw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309309/original/file-20200109-80144-1ikcw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309309/original/file-20200109-80144-1ikcw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309309/original/file-20200109-80144-1ikcw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309309/original/file-20200109-80144-1ikcw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309309/original/file-20200109-80144-1ikcw3v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hundreds of thousands of people attended Soleimani’s funeral on Jan. 7.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/iranian-mourners-gather-around-a-vehicle-carrying-the-coffin-of-slain-picture-id1192344051?s=2048x2048">ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D., in Medina, one group believed that leadership of the community should go to Abu Bakr, Muhammad’s father-in-law, a trusted friend and one of the first converts in Islam. </p>
<p>A second group disagreed: They wanted Muhammad’s cousin Ali to become caliph, or leader. This group became known as Shi’at-‘Ali – partisans of Ali – or “Shi'a.” </p>
<p>Eventually, Ali did assume leadership of the Muslim community, becoming Islam’s fourth caliph. Four years later, he was murdered by his political rivals. Because Ali had agreed to arbitration to resolve Shiite differences about the future direction of the Muslim community, followers saw his assassination as an <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e120">act of high treason</a>.</p>
<p>Ali was succeeded by his two sons Hasan, who was later poisoned, and <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2011/10/hussein/">Hussein</a>, who was also murdered. Hussein’s martyrdom is remembered each year on the Shiite Muslim holiday of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-ashura-how-this-shiite-muslim-holiday-inspires-millions-122610">Ashura</a>.</p>
<p>So when a prominent leader like Soleimani – who joined the Iranian Revolutionary Guard at age 24 after Iran’s 1979 revolution, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qassem-soleimani-iran-general-quds-force-commander-killed-us-airstrike-2020-01-03/">expanding Shiite influence across the Middle East</a> for four decades – is killed in a targeted attack, the death necessarily recalls this <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/soleimani-living-martyr-rose-above-iran-rifts-153339832.html">dark history of assassinations in the Shiite culture</a>.</p>
<h2>Extreme and cruel injustice</h2>
<p>Another element of Shiite historical memory relevant to Soleimani’s killing is the concept of extreme injustice, or “zulm.”</p>
<p>Zulm is an Arabic word that in Shii Islam may be used to describe everything from a false accusation to <a href="https://www.crcpress.com/Theology-of-Discontent-The-Ideological-Foundation-of-the-Islamic-Revolution/Dabashi/p/book/9781412805162">government tyranny</a>.</p>
<p>According to the Shiite scholar <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/greater-sins-volume-3-ayatullah-sayyid-abdul-husayn-dastghaib-shirazi/short-biography-ayatullah">Ayatullah Dastaghaib Shirazi</a>, zulm refers to “various kinds of oppressions [that] include insulting, abusing, degrading or imprisoning a person.”</p>
<p>Shirazi, who was imprisoned by the shah of Iran several times for preaching against his rule, before the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/iran-1979-revolution-shook-world-2014121134227652609.html">1979 revolution</a>, was intimately familiar with this form of zulm. </p>
<p>“Another form of oppression is to usurp someone’s property,” Shirazi <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/greater-sins-volume-2-ayatullah-sayyid-abdul-husayn-dastghaib-shirazi/twenty-ninth-greater-sin">writes in his book “Greater Sins”</a>, or “to forcefully occupy a position reserved for someone else.”</p>
<p>This is the “supreme injustice” committed against <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/greater-sins-volume-2-ayatullah-sayyid-abdul-husayn-dastghaib-shirazi/twenty-ninth-greater-sin">Muhammed’s cousin Ali, his sons</a> and their descendants, Shiites believe. Their right to lead Islam was repeatedly usurped.</p>
<p>Because Soleimani’s death is widely seen by Iranians to have been <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/qassem-soleimani-iran-general-quds-force-commander-killed-us-airstrike-2020-01-03/">unprovoked</a>, it is likely to evoke memories of extreme injustices past. Soleimani had run military operations targeting Americans, but the Trump administration has offered no evidence that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/politics/qasem-soleimani-reasons-justifications/index.html">he presented a direct threat to the United States</a> when he was killed.</p>
<p>Acute awareness of injustice is a defining feature of the Shiite faith, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674064287">according to the Columbia University professor Hamid Dabashi</a>. Millions of Iranians have turned out to mourn Soleimani in recent days, calling him a martyr and vowing revenge for his killing.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309308/original/file-20200109-80144-17jmsy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309308/original/file-20200109-80144-17jmsy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309308/original/file-20200109-80144-17jmsy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309308/original/file-20200109-80144-17jmsy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309308/original/file-20200109-80144-17jmsy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309308/original/file-20200109-80144-17jmsy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309308/original/file-20200109-80144-17jmsy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309308/original/file-20200109-80144-17jmsy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The killing of Gen. Soleimani on Jan. 7, 2020 elicited deep anger in Shiite Middle East countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/an-iraqi-woman-holds-a-placard-during-the-funeral-of-iranian-military-picture-id1191561965?s=2048x2048">AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unity in dissent</h2>
<p>Such public support for the government is not necessarily common these days in Iran. </p>
<p>Mass youth-led protests in 2018 and 2019 demonstrated a clear backlash against the <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-in-iran-will-continue-until-religious-rule-ends-90352">regime of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei</a>. When the government cracked down on dissent in November 2019, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/iran-s-propaganda-implies-soleimani-being-widely-mourned-u-s-ncna1112641">Soleimani</a> himself was in charge of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-usa/u-s-says-iran-may-have-killed-more-than-1000-in-recent-protests-idUSKBN1Y926W">Revolutionary Guard forces that killed up to 1,500 protesters</a>.</p>
<p>But when the Iranian people agree that an extreme injustice has occurred, history shows, they can become powerfully united in opposition to it. Several scholars point to the 1979 Iranian Revolution as an <a href="https://www.crcpress.com/Theology-of-Discontent-The-Ideological-Foundation-of-the-Islamic-Revolution/Dabashi/p/book/9781412805162">example of an uprising inspired by zulm</a>. </p>
<p>By the late 1970s, the Shah of Iran was abusing his absolute power both <a href="https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1913&context=jil">politically</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/259537">economically</a> to create a huge gap between the ruling elite and the Iranian people. Iranians understood these actions as tyranny, Dabashi <a href="https://www.crcpress.com/Theology-of-Discontent-The-Ideological-Foundation-of-the-Islamic-Revolution/Dabashi/p/book/9781412805162">argues</a>.</p>
<p>When they rose up in revolt, overthrowing the monarchy to establish an Islamic republic, Dabashi says, Iranians were invoking “qiyam” – meaning to rise in one’s defense. Zulm and qiyam are “thematically related in the moral universe of Shi'i political culture,” he writes in his 2011 book “<a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674064287">Shiism: A Religion of Protest</a>.” </p>
<p>Those who died in the revolution are <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1408549">considered martyrs</a>.</p>
<p>The Iranian Revolution succeeded not because “all Iranians thought the same way,” <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2019/02/iran-revolution-shook-world">according to the late British academic Michael Axworthy</a>, “but because for a brief time a large majority, despite differences between the social and ideological groups to which they belonged, came together.” </p>
<p>Today, the religious and cultural symbolism of Soleimani’s killing appears to have inspired Iranians once again to set aside their differences, at least temporarily, to mourn a new martyr. </p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129505/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deina Abdelkader does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>‘Zulm,’ an Arabic word meaning extreme injustice, could explain why Iran appears to be so united in anger at the US killing of Gen. Qassam Soleimani.Deina Abdelkader, Associate Professor of Political Science, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1295732020-01-10T11:13:04Z2020-01-10T11:13:04ZHow real is the threat of cyberwar between Iran and the US?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309302/original/file-20200109-80116-qeisbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=77%2C88%2C7271%2C4814&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">It can be hard to tell who is behind a cyber-attack. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/iranian-hacker-laptop-binary-computer-code-721814395"> Aleksandar Malivuk/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The world shook at the news in early January that a <a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">US drone strike had killed</a> Iran’s top military general, Qassem Soleimani, outside Baghdad’s airport. According to the Pentagon, the attack was conducted as a decisive defensive action at the direction of President Donald Trump <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/07/politics/qasem-soleimani-reasons-justifications/index.html">to protect US personnel abroad.</a></p>
<p>The supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50986185">“severe revenge” for Soleimani’s death</a> and on January 8, Iran launched missiles against US military bases in Iraq in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2020/jan/07/trump-news-today-live-impeachment-articles-iran-latest-updates-democrats">retaliation</a>. </p>
<p>There are <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/04/us/iran-protests-roundup-trnd/index.html">widespread concerns</a> that these events might fuel further conflict between the two countries. Considering the importance of information networks and cyberspace for our everyday lives, there is also concern that this conflict might not only take place in the physical world but could take the form of cyber-attacks. These could have serious consequences, particularly since Iran has <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/05/tech/iran-cyberattacks-retaliation/index.html">demonstrated an increase</a> in its cyber-capability in the past decade.</p>
<h2>Cyber capabilities</h2>
<p>The most memorable cyber-attack between Iran and the US was <a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5772960">the Stuxnet virus</a> which infected Iranian uranium enrichment facilities and caused their centrifuges to malfunction in 2010. Although no country claimed responsibility, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html">it is widely considered</a> to be the work of state-supported US and Israeli experts. </p>
<p>At the moment, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt17rw5gb.19?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">US cyberwarfare capabilities</a> are multifaceted, organised and of a very high level. In October 2019, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-military-cyber-exclusive-idUSKBN1WV0EK">US officials told Reuters</a> the US had launched a secret cyber-operation against Iran’s propaganda infrastructure following an alleged Iranian drone and missile attack on Saudi Arabian oil facilities. </p>
<p>On the other side, it was <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iranian-hackers-claim-cyber-attack-new-york-dam-n484611">discovered in 2013</a> that Iranian hackers who allegedly perform work for the Iranian government had penetrated the computer controls of a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/nyregion/rye-brook-dam-caught-in-computer-hacking-case.html">small dam</a> north of New York city. These same hackers also launched cyber-attacks <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/middleeast/us-indicts-iranians-in-cyberattacks-on-banks-and-a-dam.html">against dozens of large financial institutions</a> and blocked customers from accessing their accounts online.</p>
<p>In the current climate, Iran could consider using its cyber-attack capability as part of its retaliation for the killing of Soleimani. Acknowledging the possibility of a spate of cyber-attacks from Iran-affiliated parties, US Homeland Security <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/06/homeland-security-iran-cyberattacks/">warned US companies</a> to consider and assess the possible impact such an attack could have on their business. </p>
<p>Contrary to these concerns, Iran’s capability to launch major cyber-attacks that could affect a large part of the US population <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/opinion/iran-cyber-attack-hacking.html">has been downplayed</a> by some cybersecurity experts. Others have argued that cyber-attacks might not be aggressive enough retaliation for Iran, which is <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2020/01/03/will-iran-respond-to-general-qassem-soleimani-killing-with-a-cyber-attack/#6a2b07c3122e">more vulnerable than it is capable online</a>. </p>
<p>It’s one thing to talk about cyber-attacks by hackers with a political or nationalist motivation – <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/08/tech/iran-hackers-soleimani/index.html">of which there has been a reported increase</a> in the wake of Soleimani’s death. But it’s another issue altogether to talk about acts that are so forceful and monumental that they could amount to cyberwar. </p>
<p>Cyberwarfare is far more serious and could amount to taking control of critical infrastructure to disable military targets or seriously harm sections of the public. Acts of war involve states and relate to actions led by governments or military forces. But it’s often difficult to <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/CTIIC/documents/ODNI_A_Guide_to_Cyber_Attribution.pdf">attribute a certain cyber-attack</a> to a particular government. Attacks can be perpetrated at a distance and by hacker groups not openly employed by the government involved. </p>
<p>Under international law, countries can <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml">legitimately</a> defend themselves if they come under armed attack – which could <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/tallinn-manual-on-the-international-law-applicable-to-cyber-warfare/50C5BFF166A7FED75B4EA643AC677DAE">include an equally serious cyber-attack</a>. The US has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-cybersecurity/u-s-reserves-right-to-meet-cyber-attack-with-force-idUSTRE7AF02Y20111116">explicitly reserved</a> the right to respond to cyber-attacks with military force. But the justification for any counter-strike would be weakened if it’s unclear whether the state accused of being behind a cyber-attack <a href="https://theconversation.com/cyber-attacks-are-rewriting-the-rules-of-modern-warfare-and-we-arent-prepared-for-the-consequences-117043">had explicit knowledge</a> that the attack was going on. </p>
<h2>From cyber to physical attacks</h2>
<p>In the current climate, there is a serious concern that a cyber-attack – even if it’s not successful – could lead to physical retaliation. The memory of an Israeli <a href="https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1125066395010699264">missile attack in May 2019</a> against Hamas hackers, accused by the Israeli Defence Force of attacking Israeli targets, is still fresh. </p>
<p>If the US believed that Iran was imminently about to target critical infrastructure in a cyber-attack, this could provide legitimate justification under international law for a <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Art-06-Anticipatory-and-Preemptive-Self-Defense-in-Cyberspace-The-Challenge-of-Imminence.pdf">pre-emptive physical strike</a> against Iranian targets. But judging when an attack is imminent <a href="https://www.crcpress.com/Cybercrime-Key-Issues-and-Debates/Gillespie/p/book/9781138541788">in cyberspace is challenging</a>: a serious cyber-attack could be planned well in advance or be executed very quickly.</p>
<p>Although the immediate threat of further military violence between the US and Iran <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-fires-missiles-at-military-bases-iraq-used-by-us-coalition-troops-today-live-updates-2020-01-08/">seems to be diffusing</a>, the fallout from the strike on Soleimani is taking place in a new era of modern warfare, where basic notions of war and international law are constantly evolving. </p>
<p>Although the world is yet to see a government admit to launching a cyber-attack so grave that it’s been considered an act of war by the target country, the potential for such attacks does exist. Even if such capabilities are not used, the threat of them could provide justification for physical counterattacks with destructive results in future conflicts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129573/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vasileios Karagiannopoulos receives funding from EU Interreg 2 Seas, the UK National Cyber Security Centre and the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats. </span></em></p>After the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, further esclation in the conflict between Iran and the US could come in the form of a cyber-attack.Vasileios Karagiannopoulos, Reader in Cybercrime and Cybersecurity, University of PortsmouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1295282020-01-09T22:12:25Z2020-01-09T22:12:25ZTrump, like Obama, tests the limits of presidential war powers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309154/original/file-20200108-107224-164b3w5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1200%2C799&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In an official White House photo, President Donald Trump stands alone.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse/49328109428/https://www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse/49328109428/">Shealah Craighead/White House</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>To many observers, President Donald Trump’s decision to kill a senior Iranian general is yet another example of his unique impetuousness and determination to go it alone in his foreign policy. Congress has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/83/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22slotkin%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=2">begun to take steps</a> to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/08/democrats-trump-iran-war-power-096193">reel in Trump’s independence</a>.</p>
<p>There are important similarities between Trump’s action and the decision by President Barack Obama to <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/19/barack-obama-libya-airstrikes-1224550">attack Libya in 2011</a>.</p>
<p>Both acted unilaterally without much apparent concern for Congress’ role in military actions, a topic I discuss in my recent book, “<a href="https://kansaspress.ku.edu/978-0-7006-2873-5.html">The Politics of War Powers</a>.”</p>
<p>But there are some pretty significant differences, too. </p>
<h2>Congressional power</h2>
<p>The Constitution reserves for Congress <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei#section8">the power to declare war</a>. However, after World War II, several presidents – including John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon – initiated military operations without congressional approval. They claimed that they could <a href="https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/radio-and-television-address-on-the-situation-in-korea/">take military action short of actual war</a> through their <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section2">constitutional capacity as commander-in-chief of the military</a>. Often they also said they needed to support U.N. or NATO allies who were using force.</p>
<p>By 1973, Congress wanted to reclaim its authority. Over President Nixon’s veto, bipartisan supermajorities passed the War Powers Resolution, requiring presidents to <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/war-powers-act">get congressional permission in advance of military action</a> that goes beyond defending against an actual attack.</p>
<p>There are two loopholes, though: If the president does take unilateral action, he must <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1543">inform Congress within 48 hours</a>. And the president can initiate and <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warpower.asp">carry out military operations for up to 90 days</a> even without congressional approval. </p>
<h2>Obama attacks Libya and Congress wags a finger</h2>
<p>In 2011, the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/arab-spring">Arab Spring</a> movement saw citizens across North Africa and the Middle East call on authoritarian regimes to become more democratic.</p>
<p>Many leaders in the region responded with violent crackdowns on protests, some of which <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Arab-Spring-fails-yet-to-deliver-on-human-rights">appeared to violate the protesters’ human rights</a>. Due to the especially violent repression in Libya, the United Nations Security Council authorized countries to take “<a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/Libya-S-RES-1973.php">all necessary measures</a>” to protect the protesters there.</p>
<p>Without informing or consulting Congress, as the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution require, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12795971">Obama launched airstrikes against Libyan armed forces</a> on March 19, 2011, alongside NATO allies. Two days later, the president formally <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-commencement-operations-libya">informed Congress of his action</a>.</p>
<p>Only a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/africa/21assess.html">few hawkish Republicans</a> supported the president’s unilateral action. Most Republicans criticized the move. Sens. Richard Lugar and Rand Paul <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-obamas-libya-offensive-constitutional/">decried Obama’s actions as unconstitutional</a>, claiming he had encroached on legislators’ war powers. Michigan Congressman Justin Amash said, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/22powers.html">When there is no imminent threat to our country</a>, he cannot launch strikes without authorization from the American people, through our elected representatives in Congress.” </p>
<p>Some Democrats also criticized Obama’s action. Ohio Congressman Dennis Kucinich and other liberal Democrats went so far as to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/kucinich-other-house-members-file-lawsuit-against-obama-on-libya-military-mission/2011/06/15/AGrzd6VH_blog.html">file a lawsuit against him</a>, objecting to the use of military force without congressional approval.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309155/original/file-20200108-107235-11dd3ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309155/original/file-20200108-107235-11dd3ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309155/original/file-20200108-107235-11dd3ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309155/original/file-20200108-107235-11dd3ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309155/original/file-20200108-107235-11dd3ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309155/original/file-20200108-107235-11dd3ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309155/original/file-20200108-107235-11dd3ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309155/original/file-20200108-107235-11dd3ho.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S.-led NATO air strikes destroyed these vehicles belonging to pro-Gadhafi forces in Libya in March 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Mideast-US-Libya/d1abcb85aa224fc9aac0f298374dc68f/80/0">AP Photo/Nasser Nasser</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Obama’s Cabinet members and the Pentagon <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12796972">coordinated with each other and NATO allies</a> to organize the operation, but the operation took time. As the airstrikes passed the 90-day mark, Obama didn’t follow the War Powers Resolution’s requirement to pull troops out. </p>
<p>Instead, he sent a State Department lawyer, Harold Koh, to Congress to explain that their U.S. military actions <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Koh_Testimony.pdf">didn’t actually amount to the sort of “hostilities” defined</a> by the law. </p>
<p>Koh’s testimony took a certain amount of criticism, but beyond wagging their fingers, senators did nothing to impede or authorize Obama’s actions. The House chastised Obama for failing to notify Congress, but a motion to <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/164675-house-approves-boehners-libya-resolution-rejects-kucinich-proposal">pull all U.S. forces out of Libyan action failed</a> – with most Democrats choosing not to limit Obama’s unilateral action, even though it encroached on their legislative powers. </p>
<h2>Trump’s drone strike</h2>
<p>President Trump’s decision to order a lethal drone strike against Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani on Jan. 3 has some similarities. They include both sudden, unilateral action by a president and sharp criticism from his political opponents. </p>
<p>But there are important differences that show how much farther Trump is willing to push the boundaries of his own individual power.</p>
<p>First, with Obama’s action, there was a humanitarian crisis and broad multilateral support. But with Trump’s killing of Soleimani, there was no U.N. resolution calling for Soleimani’s death nor a humanitarian crisis. </p>
<p>Congress had already been worried about Trump taking unilateral military action: In April 2019, Congress <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/politics/trump-veto-yemen.html">tried to invoke the War Powers Resolution</a> to pull U.S. support out of Yemen.</p>
<p>And in December 2019, Congress tried to pass a defense spending bill that <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/3/21048098/iran-qassem-soleimani-ndaa-2019-vote-ro-khanna-aumf">limited Trump’s ability to engage militarily with Iran</a>. Missouri Republican Sen. Roy Blunt, along with others, objected to that proposal, however, saying he favored “<a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/3/21048098/iran-qassem-soleimani-ndaa-2019-vote-ro-khanna-aumf">flexibility</a>” for the president. That objection won out over Congress asserting its war powers.</p>
<p>When Trump exercised that “flexibility” and ordered Soleimani killed, there was – as with Obama – a great deal of congressional criticism. But this time, it was split along partisan lines. </p>
<p>Republican Sen. Jim Risch from Idaho praised Trump’s “<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-general-killed-lawmakers-divided-over-airstrike-killing-iranian-military-leader-qassem-soleimani/">decisive action” and the “successful outcome</a>.” South Carolina Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham tweeted a threat to the Iranian government saying, “<a href="https://www.rawstory.com/2020/01/your-bloodlust-is-disturbing-lindsey-graham-faces-brutal-backlash-for-joking-about-killing-iranian-civilians/">if you want more, you will get more</a>.”</p>
<p>Conversely, Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi worried that Trump’s action “<a href="https://time.com/5758264/qasem-soleimani-2020-democrat-reaction/">risks provoking further dangerous escalation of violence</a>.” Democrats <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/us/politics/us-iran-war.html">demanded Trump consult with Congress</a> and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-general-killed-lawmakers-divided-over-airstrike-killing-iranian-military-leader-qassem-soleimani/">called on their fellow legislators</a> to reassert their authority under the War Powers Resolution.</p>
<p>The Democratic-controlled <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/09/politics/house-vote-war-powers-resolution-iran/index.html">House has approved a resolution</a> that would <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/83/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22slotkin%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=2">limit Trump’s ability to fight against Iran</a>. It is unlikely to make it through the Republican-controlled Senate.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309158/original/file-20200108-107249-1x27m50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An official photo from the Iranian government shows Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a Jan. 3 drone strike ordered by President Trump.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/file-photo-dated-september-18-2016-shows-iranian-news-photo/1191356889">Iranian Supreme Leader Press Office/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A new view of presidential power</h2>
<p>Trump’s unilateral action stands out from his predecessors’ in part because of his apparent disregard for congressional power. </p>
<p>A week after the killing of Soleimani, Trump’s administration <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/national-security-officials-to-deliver-iran-briefings-for-congress-as-conflict-appears-to-de-escalate/2020/01/08/2854e8ea-322d-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_story.html">began to formally tell Congress</a> <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mike-lee-senator-utah-lambasts-trump-briefing-soleimani-strike-worst-hes-received-on-military-issue/">about the strike on Soleimani</a>. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the president <a href="https://time.com/5758982/us-troops-deployed-kuwait/">unilaterally decided to send troops to Kuwait</a>. He also claimed that <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/05/trump-says-tweet-serves-as-notification-to-congress-that-us-may-quickly-fully-strike-back-against-iran/">sending a tweet</a> about military force could serve as a formal notification of Congress.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1213919480574812160"}"></div></p>
<p>Trump has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trumps-team-offers-mixed-messages-about-imminent-attack-from-iran-as-justification-for-killing-soleimani/2020/01/07/365e98e4-318f-11ea-91fd-82d4e04a3fac_story.html">claimed various authorities</a> for the drone strike, including a 2002 law authorizing the president – then George W. Bush – to use military force in Iraq. </p>
<p>Trump has also said he acted against Soleimani to stop “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-intelligence/trump-says-soleimani-plotted-imminent-attacks-but-critics-question-just-how-soon-idUSKBN1Z228N">imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel</a>,” a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/politics/trump-soleimani.html">justification</a> that isn’t allowed under the War Powers Resolution, which only authorizes a response to an actual attack after it happens.</p>
<p><iframe id="wsdzF" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/wsdzF/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Public opinion may be a factor</h2>
<p>With Congress bitterly divided along partisan lines, it’s clear the majority of senators – Republicans – will have veto power over any congressional effort to check Trump’s actions. If lawmakers do nothing, Congress will have effectively ceded its war powers to the president. If the dispute goes deeper, the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/political_question_doctrine">Supreme Court would likely avoid getting involved</a>, because it’s a dispute between the other two branches about their respective claims to constitutional powers.</p>
<p>The only remaining check would be popular opinion, which can <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx">rise and fall as national security crises unfold</a>. But <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings/">Trump’s popularity is unusually stable</a>, leaving him free to act with the confidence that his base won’t abandon him. </p>
<p>The executive branch will continue to determine the course of action with Iran. On Jan. 8, Trump himself told the nation, “As long as I’m president of the United States, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/08/transcript-trumps-iran-speech/">Iran will never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon</a>.” Without congressional restraint, what that means – and how he carries out that promise – rests entirely in Trump’s hands.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129528/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Burns is a fellow at the Quincy Institute and receives funding from the Institute for Humane Studies. </span></em></p>Both President Trump and President Obama used military force without informing Congress, or getting its approval. But the differences reveal more than the similarities.Sarah Burns, Associate Professor of Political Science, Rochester Institute of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1295062020-01-09T18:56:25Z2020-01-09T18:56:25ZThe US-Iran conflict and the consequences of international law-breaking<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309283/original/file-20200109-80111-h7jlq1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mourners carry the coffins of slain Iraqi paramilitary chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Iranian military commander Qasem Soleimani and eight others during a funeral procession in Karbala, Iraq on Jan. 4, 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/mourners-carry-the-coffins-of-slain-iraqi-paramilitary-news-photo/1191712299?adppopup=true">MOHAMMED SAWAF/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Editor’s note: Iran’s <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/politics/rockets-us-airbase-iraq/index.html">missile attack on a U.S. base in Iraq</a> in retaliation for the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/01/02/world/middleeast/02reuters-iraq-security-blast.html?searchResultPosition=36">Trump administration’s killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani</a> has dramatically escalated global tensions.</em></p>
<p><em>Dozens of questions have swirled around the events. Beyond the politics, international law and Middle Eastern scholar David Mednicoff from the University of Massachusetts Amherst addresses five key points about the legal status of those attacks and the larger conflict.</em></p>
<h2>1. What role does international law play in this conflict?</h2>
<p>The U.S. and other prominent countries established the contemporary system of international law after World War II with three broad goals. </p>
<p>First, and foremost, law <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/sep/14/making-war-illegal-changed-the-world-but-its-becoming-too-easy-to-break-the-law">should minimize global war</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the only accepted justifications in international law for countries to wage war are <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/66372/on-the-principle-of-non-use-of-force-in-current-international-law/">obvious self-defense and collective security authorized by the United Nations</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the international legal system expects national governments to <a href="https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1472">pursue their own strategic interests</a>, consistent with the first two goals of global peace and cooperation.</p>
<p>International law has fostered <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law/International-cooperation">predictable procedures for the conduct of political and economic affairs among countries</a>. </p>
<h2>2. But who enforces international law?</h2>
<p>International law is founded on the idea that nations have authority to run their countries and shouldn’t be coerced by a global government. This means that enforcement largely <a href="https://www.justia.com/international-law/">depends on governments accepting the importance of compliance</a>. </p>
<p>Such acceptance happens in general because countries, like people, have diverse incentives to obey law. There is benefit to being known as reliable in one’s obligations. International law is made most often through treaties that countries negotiate and sign. They follow these treaties because they see them as helpful. Countries get used to and internalize some international law. </p>
<p>Finally, international organizations have large bureaucracies to exert pressure and resolve disputes around international law. The relatively new <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/">International Criminal Court</a> can detain, charge and punish leaders who commit certain severe crimes.</p>
<p>Given its power, the U.S. has been willing to flout some international law. But such violations are noticed and have effects. </p>
<p>Major breaches of international law contribute to erratic and destructive behavior among nations as the norms of good behavior are degraded. The <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/breaking-down-democracy-goals-strategies-and-methods-modern-authoritarians">increasing influence of anti-democratic political systems</a> across the globe is <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/authoritarians-are-filling-vacuum-left-trump/596173/">partially a result</a> of the U.S., the world’s most powerful democracy, retreating openly from its ideals.</p>
<p>Still, the challenge of upholding international law is compelling with a country like Iran, which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/world/middleeast/iran-tensions-explainer.html">works against U.S. priorities in the Middle East</a> and has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661">threatened Americans</a>. </p>
<h2>3. Did the US attack that killed Soleimani violate international law?</h2>
<p>It likely did. For the U.S. to kill another government’s official without a major attack or clear threat of attack to its basic autonomy is an <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793412105/was-it-legal-for-the-u-s-to-kill-a-top-iranian-military-leader">illegal act of war</a>. </p>
<p>Doing so on Iraqi territory without apparent Iraqi consent is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/01/04/world/middleeast/04reuters-iraq-security-blast-legal-analysis.html">an additional problem</a>. U.S. activity within Iraq depends on following specific treaties between the two countries, which would not give Washington free rein to attack foreign government officials on Iraqi soil.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309291/original/file-20200109-80169-1s046nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309291/original/file-20200109-80169-1s046nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309291/original/file-20200109-80169-1s046nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309291/original/file-20200109-80169-1s046nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309291/original/file-20200109-80169-1s046nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309291/original/file-20200109-80169-1s046nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309291/original/file-20200109-80169-1s046nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309291/original/file-20200109-80169-1s046nq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pieces of missiles are seen at the site after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq, a facility jointly operated by U.S. and Iraqi forces, on Jan. 8, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pieces-of-missiles-are-seen-at-the-site-after-irans-islamic-news-photo/1192535874?adppopup=true">Ahsan Mohammed Ahmed Ahmed/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>U.S. officials <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/soleimani-strike-law/604417/">have implied</a> that killing Soleimani was self-defense, as he helped plan, or may have been planning, deadly acts against American citizens in the Middle East. </p>
<p>Yet the use of force in international law has to take account of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.3.0563?seq=1">issues of necessity, immediacy and proportionality</a>. So far, the world has seen <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51007961">little evidence</a> that killing a member of the Iranian government was necessary for basic American self-defense. </p>
<p>Indeed, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/trump-has-produced-extraordinarily-dangerous-moment/604456/">Iran’s compliance and behavior under the 2015 nuclear treaty</a> and <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/476919-killing-soleimani-how-trump-united-iran-against-america">evidence of limited cooperation between the U.S. and Soleimani</a> to combat the Taliban and ISIS suggest that he and his government did not threaten the U.S. fundamentally. </p>
<h2>4. Is the Iranian strike on US military bases in Iraq legal under international law?</h2>
<p>International law does allow for defensive reprisals – which would probably cover Iran’s Jan. 8 missile attacks on U.S. bases based in Iraq, which killed nobody but did damage property. </p>
<p>It’s most logical to interpret Trump’s deliberate killing of an Iranian official as an act of war. The principle of self-defense allows reprisals, <a href="https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780199673049.001.0001/law-9780199673049-chapter-41">so long as they are proportional to the original attack and directed against military targets</a>.</p>
<p>In light of the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, which Iran appeared to be respecting, and its act of war in killing Soleimani, the missile attacks seem a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/world/middleeast/us-iran-war.html">measured – even minimalist</a> – justified response.</p>
<h2>5. Why should Americans care if international law was broken?</h2>
<p>I suspect a typical response in the U.S. to this is “So what.” Americans, including the president, may ignore when the U.S. acts against international law. Yet, law-breaking reduces other countries’ trust in the U.S. and increases the risk other countries will violate the rules in ways that harm Americans at home and abroad.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309293/original/file-20200109-80107-v55hvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309293/original/file-20200109-80107-v55hvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/309293/original/file-20200109-80107-v55hvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309293/original/file-20200109-80107-v55hvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309293/original/file-20200109-80107-v55hvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309293/original/file-20200109-80107-v55hvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309293/original/file-20200109-80107-v55hvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/309293/original/file-20200109-80107-v55hvq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US President Donald Trump leaves after speaking about the situation with Iran in the White House in Washington, D.C., Jan. 8, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-donald-trump-leaves-after-speaking-about-the-news-photo/1192553961?adppopup=true">SAUL LOEB/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are already practical consequences developing from Trump’s violation of international laws about using force against another country. Illegal acts of war can enrage an opponent, solidifying its determination. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-suleimani-killing.html">Iranians of all stripes have come together</a> to object to Soleimani’s killing. The last time Iranian streets saw this level of unified popular outrage against the U.S., it <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/04/iranian-militants-storm-us-embassy-nov-4-1979-244437">helped consolidate the 1979 Islamic revolution</a>. Iran’s fury over a plausible narrative that the U.S. attacked its leaders illegally may yet <a href="http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/soleimanis-assassination-backfires-big-time">help bring on devastating, full-scale war</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, when one country <a href="https://time.com/5626498/trump-asylum-rule-international-law/">violates international law</a>, other nations often get upset. The system of international law requires mutual collaboration and trust. </p>
<p>If, as a result, other nations are reluctant to cooperate with U.S. efforts – say on immigration, trade or international crime – that hurts American interests. <a href="https://theconversation.com/trump-asks-nato-allies-for-help-with-iran-after-years-of-bashing-the-alliance-129599">Trump’s Jan. 8 speech</a> seeking to deescalate the conflict may have come in part because killing Soleimani illegally made U.S. allies <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-asks-us-allies-for-help-iran-but-abandoned-him-2020-1">reluctant to back Trump in further confrontations</a>.</p>
<p>Some in the U.S. act as if only naked might matters in foreign policy. Yet, the peril of American policy in Iran and Iraq illustrates something different. Law, and the legitimacy it conveys, also count.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129506/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US and other countries set up the modern system of international law after World War II. Does the US killing of an Iranian general violate those laws? What about Iran’s attack on US bases in Iraq?David Mednicoff, Chair, Department of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, and Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Public Policy, UMass AmherstLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1293032020-01-07T13:04:21Z2020-01-07T13:04:21ZWhat next for Iran’s proxy network after killing of Qassem Soleimani<p>A gamble, a shot in the dark, a risky move. Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">assassination</a> in Baghdad of Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, at the order of US President Donald Trump, speculation has mounted that the ensuing crisis could lead to <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/qassem-soleimani-what-will-revenge-look-like-for-iran-in-wake-of-generals-killing-11900263">a regional or international war</a>. After all, #FranzFerdinand was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-50982073">trending on Twitter</a> in a nod to the assassination that triggered the first world war.</p>
<p>Iran’s possible reaction to the killing still sits on a wide spectrum: from restraint and harsh rhetorical bark to a full, military response. </p>
<p>The regime has to meet the demands of two audiences, domestic and international. First, Iran finds itself internationally isolated while fully committed to its Middle East expansionism through its network of proxies. Second, it is facing the worst domestic dissent in decades and spared <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50911457">no expense on quashing protests</a> in late 2019. </p>
<p>No matter what action it chooses to take, Iran will make careful and strategic decisions about what to do next. Much like it deliberately sought strategic gains in 2019 from shooting <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48700965">down a US drone</a>, seizing tankers and attacking Saudi oil infrastructure <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/14/middleeast/yemen-houthi-rebels-drone-attacks-saudi-aramco-intl/index.html">through the Yemeni Houthi rebels</a> – whose proxy links to Tehran have been documented by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-probe-details-fallout-of-proxy-war-in-yemen-between-saudi-coalition-and-iran-/2018/01/11/3e3f9302-f644-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html">the UN</a> – Iran’s response will be equally calculated. </p>
<p>It has already swiftly <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/04/middleeast/iran-soleimani-nuclear-deal-intl/index.html">declared its independence from the nuclear deal</a>, cautious not to shift the current narrative characterising the American strike as a strategic blunder. Soleimani’s replacement, General Esmail Ghaani, also <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/05/iran-general-soleimani-revenge-094576">promised</a> a certain, yet patient response to the killing. Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/01/iran-loss-soleimani-killing-iraq-syria.html#ixzz6AKb47JOt">said the programme</a> of the Quds Force, affiliated to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps “will be unchanged from the time of his predecessor.”</p>
<h2>Decades of proxy building</h2>
<p>A key set of questions now concerns Iran’s deployment of its proxy power to retaliate against Soleimani’s killing. It could co-ordinate a multi-pronged series of responses from proxies scattered across the Middle East. Or it could combine direct and indirect military action, while also engaging in cyber retaliation. </p>
<p>For decades, Iran banked on the strategy of wars by proxy through a network it labelled the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/iran-entrenches-its-axis-of-resistance-across-the-middle-east">“axis of resistance”</a>. Aimed at curtailing US presence in the Middle East and its regional rivals, chiefly Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iran has been waging a campaign of low-level, surreptitious proxy wars in the Middle East from Iraq to Syria to Yemen and Afghanistan. As my own research has examined, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0047117818802436">a proxy war is usually a low-level conflict</a> in which states support violent non-state actors militarily, financially and otherwise, with the aim of using these groups as conduits for military action. Simply put, proxy wars are indirect wars which afford deniability, ensure cost-effectiveness and protect against international blowback and condemnation. </p>
<p>Iran’s model emerged from its relationship with Hezbollah, but the Lebanese Shia group has outgrown <a href="https://doi.org/10.1332/204378919X15718898582320">its proxy status</a> and reached near peer status with the Quds Force. Hezbollah has now become a middle-man helping Iran to train proxy militias, as it did in Syria. </p>
<p>According to analysis by the Soufan Center, Iran’s <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/research/irans-playbook-deconstructing-tehrans-regional-strategy/">network now includes</a> the Badr Corps, the Popular Mobilisation Forces, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq, the Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Palestine, and the Houthis in Yemen. It also includes the the <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/fatemiyoun.htm">Fatemiyoun Brigade</a> in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>Long-standing Iranian coordination embedded and socialised these militias into a Shia proxy network, but at no point did it chip away at their ability to operate independently. Independent retaliation for Soleimani’s killing from these proxy militias is now therefore also likely. Proxy loyalty does not mean total subservience. </p>
<p>As such, following the US strikes, the availability of proxy militias exposes the possibility of asymmetric Iranian retaliation across the Middle East. How intense their vengeance might be remains the factor to watch, as Iranian calls for crushing revenge currently spark fears of escalation and all-out war.</p>
<h2>After Soleimani</h2>
<p>But questions have also emerged about whether Iran’s proxy network will survive Soleimani’s assassination, or collapse under a new leadership. There is no doubt Soleimani was central to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy185">Iran’s proxy war strategy</a>. It was not just that the Quds Force coordinated, trained, set up and sponsored militias under his leadership. Soleimani was the policy – he was the embodiment of Iranian military expansionism at its most ruthless. No wonder Foreign Policy magazine included him in a list of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019-global-thinkers/">2019’s Global Thinkers</a> for security and defence, and US General Stanley McChrystal <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/gt-essay/irans-deadly-puppet-master-qassem-suleimani/">called</a> Soleimani “Iran’s deadly puppet master”.</p>
<p>As a consequence he was lionised by the militias he socialised as proxies into the Iranian network. This is why proxy wars should be seen not merely as trade offs, but a thought-out strategic bargain in which the parties negotiate and renegotiate the costs, benefits, and consequences of war. His assassination is no doubt a huge blow to the proxy network because it removes the connecting strategic thread that allowed Iran to link Beirut to Sana’a and Damscus to Baghdad and Tehran. In doing so, it simultaneously reveals both the weakness behind the decade-long investment into proxies and also its resilience. As the writer and anthropologist Narges Bajoghli has <a href="https://t.co/mkJP9P5jBw?amp=1">argued</a>, the relationship between the Revolutionary Guards and Iraqi and Lebanese Shiite armed groups is a long and deep one, leaving the “proxy” institutional infrastructure intact.</p>
<p>The future of Iran’s proxy network will depend not just on the Iranian commitment, but also on the independence of action of these proxies. Some may be drawn even closer to Tehran, others could splinter and defect, while new groups could emerge and embrace the narrative and legacy of Soleimani.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129303/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vladimir Rauta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For decades, Iran has built up a network of proxies across the Middle East. Will it now use them to retailiate for the killing of its top general?Vladimir Rauta, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1293062020-01-06T18:30:51Z2020-01-06T18:30:51ZIn Iran showdown, conflict could explode quickly – and disastrously<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308656/original/file-20200106-123364-1k5psvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C0%2C1800%2C1199&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mourners at the funeral for Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani burn Israeli and U.S. flags.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-take-part-in-the-funeral-procession-of-irgc-quds-news-photo/1192142025">Hamid Vakili/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Despite the claims of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/jul/28/is-the-world-really-better-than-ever-the-new-optimists">optimists</a>, the odds that an international conflict will snowball into a bloody war haven’t gone down significantly since the end of World War II. Trump administration officials’ confidence that the present conflict with Iran can be managed could be dangerously misplaced.</p>
<p>Since a drone strike at Baghdad airport that killed a top Iranian general, Iranians have been <a href="https://twitter.com/Seamus_Malek/status/1213039666519166976">protesting in the streets</a> in massive numbers, and their country has <a href="https://apnews.com/e043255bd33ab318f71d1947716a5b94">pulled out of the 2015 deal</a> limiting its development of nuclear weapons. Iraq’s prime minister and Parliament have moved to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/iran-general-soleimani-iraq.html">kick the U.S. military out</a> of their country – troops who have in the meantime <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/05/us-suspends-training-iraqi-troops-to-focus-on-base-security/">stopped fighting the Islamic State group</a> and are instead focusing on keeping themselves safe.</p>
<p>Iran has vowed “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/baghdad-airport-strike-live-intl-hnk/h_996c3bed1255e7e3e30357771c7be380">harsh revenge</a>” for the Jan. 3 killing of <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/03/qassim-soleimani-shadowy-iranian-general-undermined-washington/">Iranian Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani</a>. </p>
<p>Policymakers in the Trump administration have said they believe that the use of force will <a href="https://twitter.com/OKnox/status/1213219771178770432">prompt Iran to back down</a>, or at least that <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/pompeo-says-administration-would-have-been-culpably-negligent-not-launch-n1110566">any escalation will be manageable</a>. <a href="https://braumoeller.info">My research</a> into how conflicts begin and how deadly they get <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ZW-QEygAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">shows</a> that while most wars don’t escalate very far, those that do can easily become catastrophic.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1213219771178770432"}"></div></p>
<p>As memories of World War II and the Cold War fade into history, policymakers and the public are increasingly prone to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/jul/28/is-the-world-really-better-than-ever-the-new-optimists">think of large-scale warfare as a thing of the past</a>. </p>
<p>But while most wars remain small, <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/only-the-dead-9780190849535?cc=us&lang=en&">my own analysis</a> of trends in warfare concludes that the threat of wars with large numbers of casualties has not decreased. It’s dangerous to assume that Iran will not escalate the crisis further, much less that the U.S. could limit any violence that might ensue.</p>
<h2>Big wars are more common than people think</h2>
<p>Especially bloody deadly wars, while rare, are not actually as rare as most Westerners may think. </p>
<p>World War I and World War II are not even in the top three deadliest international wars in the past two centuries, based on the number of battle deaths as compared with the combined populations of the warring nations. </p>
<p>Two South American wars, the Paraguayan War of the late 1860s and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Chaco-War">Chaco War</a> from the mid-1930s, are the deadliest on record. The Paraguayan War, little known outside of military history circles, may have cost Paraguay <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/christmas/21568594-how-terrible-little-known-conflict-continues-shape-and-blight-nation">half – or more – of its total prewar population</a>. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/iraniraq-war/7C6E42D57383472EA9B9F6101BEABD94">Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s</a>, the most recent of the top five, was the third when ranked by death rates. Only then come the two world wars.</p>
<p>Not every conflict becomes a massive war, of course. It is possible that Iran could be deterred by the threat of large-scale American retaliation, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/pompeo-trump-iran.html">argued on Jan. 5</a>. But it is dangerous to assume there won’t be a war, even if it’s true that neither Iran nor the U.S. wants one.</p>
<p><iframe id="l3MJF" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/l3MJF/8/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Escalation is very hard to predict</h2>
<p>In late summer 1914, as World War I began, German Kaiser Wilhelm II famously promised his troops that they would be “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2011/04/30/135803783/wwi-the-battle-that-split-europe-and-families">home before the leaves have fallen from the trees</a>.” </p>
<p>In World War II, even after Hitler had invaded Poland in 1939, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00117.x">American diplomats believed</a> that economic pressure alone would suffice to bring Nazi Germany to its knees. In both cases, years of bloody warfare followed.</p>
<p>What I’ve found is that escalation typically results from chance occurrences that simply can’t be foreseen. </p>
<p><a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/Strange-Defeat/">Virtually no one predicted</a> the fall of France to the Nazis in the summer of 1940. No one could have known that President Harry Truman would decide, against the advice of his National Security Council, to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Korea/The-Korean-War">send U.S. forces across the 38th parallel</a> during the Korean War, and few observers anticipated that <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1988-11-01.pdf">doing so would bring China into the conflict</a>. </p>
<p>Major wars are “<a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/176226/the-black-swan-second-edition-by-nassim-nicholas-taleb/">black swans</a>” – rare but incredibly consequential events that cannot be predicted.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/308657/original/file-20200106-123403-1ssslcr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Marines in northern Korea are stalled by a Chinese counterattack on Dec. 14, 1950.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-PRK-APHS288575-Korean-War/9d490a77008e4800b4bf29a8c9bb6437/12/0">AP Photo</a></span>
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</figure>
<h2>Chance plays a huge role in war</h2>
<p>The role of chance events in warfare can be dramatic. </p>
<p>Hitler’s successful invasion of France transformed what had been a problem of regional containment into a years-long global conflict with <a href="https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war">more than 16 million people killed</a> in battle. A <a href="https://www.history.com/news/the-assassination-of-archduke-franz-ferdinand-100-years-ago">driver’s wrong turn</a> in Sarajevo in 1914 turned what would have been a botched assassination attempt into World War I. </p>
<p>Chance works both ways, of course: The Union of Concerned Scientists has documented a hair-raising array of <a href="https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/close-calls-nuclear-weapons">nuclear near-misses</a> that mostly caused no harm but could have resulted in millions of deaths.</p>
<p>War can be volatile – while most remain small, big ones can come out of almost nowhere. I see in this imbalance a similarity to a concept called the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_principle">“80/20” rule</a>, in which 80% of outcomes come from 20% of cases: About 80% of world income, for example, is held by 20% of the global population. </p>
<p>In warfare, lethality of international conflict is considerably more concentrated. The data I analyzed shows that over the past 200 years, the deadliest 20% of wars are responsible for 98% of all battle deaths.</p>
<p>No one wants very large wars, and most wars do end up being relatively small. But the potential for chance events to blow up into massive conflicts means nobody really knows, and nobody can predict, when the next really big one will come along.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklysmart">You can get our highlights each weekend</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/129306/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bear F. Braumoeller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It’s very dangerous to assume that Iran will not escalate the crisis further, much less that the US could limit any violence that might ensue.Bear F. Braumoeller, Baranov and Timashev Chair in Data Analytics and Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1222072019-08-22T05:17:46Z2019-08-22T05:17:46ZAustralia’s latest military commitment should spark assessment of how well we use our defence forces<p>Just when we thought Australia was getting serious about shifting priorities away from the Middle East to its own neighbourhood, the prime minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-to-send-naval-and-air-assistance-to-protect-middle-east-sea-lanes-morrison-122187">has announced</a> another Middle East step up. Australia has committed a warship, surveillance aircraft and defence personnel to help keep the Strait of Hormuz open for shipping.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/infographic-what-is-the-conflict-between-the-us-and-iran-about-and-how-is-australia-now-involved-121490">Infographic: what is the conflict between the US and Iran about and how is Australia now involved?</a>
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<p>So what is going on?</p>
<p>As it happens, the commitment to the Middle East is essentially a rebadging of a routine commitment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) assets. Australia has about <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/">2,250 military personnel deployed on operations</a>. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li>Operations <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/operations/middle-east/operation-accordion">Accordion</a> and <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/OpManitou/">Manitou</a> in the Middle East (740 people)</li>
<li>Operation <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/operations/south-sudan/operation-aslan">Aslan</a> in support of UN peacekeeping in Sudan (25)</li>
<li>Operation <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/operations/Egypt/">Mazurka</a> established in Egypt after the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace accord (27)</li>
<li>Operation <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Okra/">Okra</a> in support of counter-ISIL operations in and around Iraq (450)</li>
<li>Operation <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/MiddleEast/">Paladin</a>, with small contingents on rotation for over 70 years with the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in Israel/Lebanon (12)</li>
<li>Operation <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/OpAuguryPhilippines/">Augury</a>, providing training and related support for the armed forces in the Philippines after the siege of Marawi in Mindanao (100)</li>
<li>Operation <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/BorderProtection/">Resolute</a>, involving border protection-related tasks (600).</li>
</ul>
<p>Australia has a defence force of about 60,000 full-time uniformed personnel and 25,000 in the reserves. So this commitment of about 2,250 personnel is sustainable, for now, as long as security challenges closer to home don’t rapidly escalate.</p>
<p>This also means the operational tempo of border protection or any of the other ongoing operations is not expected to decrease as a result of this commitment. Some of these elements, notably Operation Manitou, will perform more than one role.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/OpManitou/">Operation Manitou</a> is the Royal Australian Navy commitment of one warship to the Combined Maritime Forces (with 32 participant nations) that operate in and around the Persian Gulf. Australian warships have been doing this on rotation for the best part of 30 years.</p>
<p>Similarly, the Royal Australian Air Force P8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft have been operating intermittently out of the Persian Gulf for years. The extra defence planning personnel announced likely will be drawn from a pool already assigned to support Australian operations, notably attached to US military headquarters semi-permanently based in and around the Gulf.</p>
<p>So why make all the fuss with the announcement?</p>
<p>It appears <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-likely-to-tick-off-on-us-request-to-help-protect-shipping-in-middle-east-121417">pressure from the United States</a> as well as Britain has convinced the government of the importance of making a contribution.</p>
<p>To be fair, it is not a token contribution. The warship and P8 are capable platforms that have made a tangible difference in the past in countering piracy, smuggling and related security concerns in the Persian Gulf. And, as the prime minister reminded us, the Gulf is the source of much of Australia’s oil.</p>
<p>So, while not a token contribution in one sense, it is not a significantly onerous addition to what Australia has been contributing there for a long time.</p>
<p>However, in international diplomacy, words matter, and small contributions can have significant effects. No doubt, Australian policymakers were mindful of making a contribution that would satisfy the US <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/aug/05/no-request-to-base-us-missiles-near-darwin-defence-minister-says">after declining</a> Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s suggestion to base intermediate-range and potentially nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Australia.</p>
<p>While Australia can sustain this new commitment without a significant surge, there is growing recognition that committing forces to operations in the Middle East detracts from the ability of the ADF to focus on high-priority areas closer to home.</p>
<p>The 2016 <a href="http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf">Defence White Paper</a> referred to three strategic defence interests. These are: a secure and resilient Australia; a secure nearer region (including the Pacific and Southeast Asia) and a stable Indo-Pacific region; and a rules-based global order.</p>
<p>But China’s increasing illiberalism and regional assertiveness across Southeast Asia and into the South Pacific have generated considerable unease over spreading ourselves too thinly.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australias-soft-power-in-the-pacific-fades-chinas-voice-gets-louder-111841">As Australia's soft power in the Pacific fades, China's voice gets louder</a>
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<p>Consequently, a consensus is growing among security and defence experts that we need to double down on our investment in defence and security capabilities. </p>
<p>Reports along similar lines have been published recently by the <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific">United States Studies Centre</a> and my own Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, among others.</p>
<p>My colleague Brendan Taylor warns of the volatility of <a href="https://www.blackincbooks.com.au/books/four-flashpoints">the four flashpoints in Asia</a>: the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, Taiwan and the South China Sea. That was before the Hong Kong protests and the news of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-26/chinese-construction-in-cambodia-raises-military-pact-fears/11345410">militarised ports in Cambodia</a>.</p>
<p>Another colleague, Hugh White, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/13/how-to-defend-australia/">has called for</a> spending up to 3.5% of GDP on defence to boost the air and naval forces. </p>
<p>Senator Jim Molan has argued for a <a href="http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/experts-publications/publications/7188/whatever-security-question-answer-national-security-strategy">fresh national security strategy</a>.</p>
<p>My own <a href="http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2019-06/cog_49_swot_analysis_web.pdf">geostrategic SWOT analysis for Australia</a> points to the need for a more holistic consideration of issues related to looming environmental catastrophe (affecting biodiversity and societal sustainability), a spectrum of governance challenges (such as cyberterrorism and organised crime) and great power contestation. </p>
<p>That paper calls for, among other things, a national institute for net assessment to weigh up how best to respond.</p>
<p>In essence, the prime minister has deftly handled the call for a commitment in solidarity with the United States. But the Strait of Hormuz issue is only one of many looming security challenges. Its emergence at the top of the news pile points to the need for a significant and far-reaching re-examination of our defence and security posture and priorities.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122207/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Blaxland has been commissioned to write a two-volume history of the Australian Signals Directorate</span></em></p>US-Iran tension in the Strait of Hormuz is just one of many looming security challenges that need closer scrutiny.John Blaxland, Professor, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1214902019-08-21T07:17:09Z2019-08-21T07:17:09ZInfographic: what is the conflict between the US and Iran about and how is Australia now involved?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288855/original/file-20190821-170956-1buzzy7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australia will commit a frigate, an aircraft and some headquarters staff to a US-led operation in the Strait of Hormuz.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Marc Tewksbury</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prime Minister Scott Morrison has confirmed that Australia will lend military support to protect shipping in the Middle East. </p>
<p>The commitment has been long expected, with Australia sending a frigate, an aircraft and some headquarters staff as part of a US-led coalition in the Strait of Hormuz, amid deepening tensions between the US and Iran.</p>
<p>So what is this conflict about, what is Australia’s involvement, and what are the risks associated with it?</p>
<h2>What is the Strait of Hormuz?</h2>
<p>The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow body of ocean connecting the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Its width varies, but at its <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/strait-of-hormuz-oil-choke-point-in-focus-as-us-ends-iran-oil-waivers-2019-04-23">narrowest is 39km</a>. It is the main passage for transporting oil from the Middle East out into the Indian Ocean and beyond; a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-oil-emirates-tanker-factbox/factbox-strait-of-hormuz-the-worlds-most-important-oil-artery-idUSKCN1TE1PS">fifth of the world’s oil</a> is shipped through this strait. This includes 15-16% of crude oil and 25-30% of refined oil that is destined for Australia.</p>
<p>Iran and Oman border the Strait of Hormuz. As the littoral states, they have sovereignty over the waters in the Strait of Hormuz, but that <a href="http://ilareporter.org.au/2019/08/did-the-war-on-iran-just-begin-the-use-and-abuse-of-international-law-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-natalie-klein/">sovereignty is subject to navigational rights enjoyed by all states</a>. Ships from all countries have the right to move continuously and expeditiously through these waters without interference from either of the coastal states.</p>
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<h2>What is the conflict between Iran and the US about?</h2>
<p>The primary concern in relation to the Strait of Hormuz at the moment is interference with commercial shipping. The <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-iran-trade-accusations-in-wake-of-tanker-attacks-11560509164">United States has accused Iran of attacks against tankers</a> and has destroyed an Iranian drone.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-49059066">In recent weeks</a>, Iran has seized the Stena Impero, a British-flagged commercial tanker, as well as a US drone. It also boarded but released a Liberian-flagged, British-owned vessel. These actions have heightened concerns about navigational rights through the strait and the consequences for global oil supply.</p>
<p>This is all against a backdrop of heightened tension between Iran and the United States, resulting from American sanctions against Iran and its abandonment of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. It is the latest rift in a relationship that has been fraught for decades, punctuated by events like <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/meast/iran-hostage-crisis-fast-facts/index.html">Iran taking over the US embassy</a> and holding hostages in 1979, the United States <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/26/world/us-secretly-gave-aid-to-iraq-early-in-its-war-against-iran.html">backing Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war</a> in the 1980s, and <a href="https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/">Iran’s development of a nuclear program</a> in the 1990s.</p>
<p>Shipping has previously been threatened within the Persian Gulf and along the Strait of Hormuz, especially during the Iran-Iraq war. This conflict was also known as the Tanker War because of the threats to commercial ships transporting oil out of the Gulf. It resulted in the United States and other neutral states providing naval escorts and conducting convoys to protect shipping.</p>
<h2>What is Australia’s involvement?</h2>
<p>Australia <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-joins-international-maritime-security-construct-gulf">has announced</a> it will be joining an “International Maritime Security Construct” that is focused on ensuring the freedom of shipping lanes and commercial navigation.</p>
<p>This international presence is intended to respond to incidents and threats as they occur during passage through the strait. The prime minister has announced that Australia’s involvement is limited in terms of time and resources and emphasised the importance of de-escalation.</p>
<p>A legal difficulty for Australia is that this sort of convoy relies on a doctrine that is associated with the law of naval warfare, and so would usually only apply if there is an armed conflict between states. Australia is instead maintaining the view that its warships are also exercising their navigational rights through the Strait of Hormuz.</p>
<p>The new mission is cast as an enhancement of previous contributions to counter-terrorism and <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/australia-to-take-on-somali-pirates-20090109-gdt941.html">counter-piracy operations</a>. However, these operations have been directed at non-state actors, rather than the naval forces of another country. Iran may claim that their presence constitutes an unlawful threat of the use of force.</p>
<p>The previous UK foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-23/britain-to-create-euro-maritime-mission-in-hormuz-strait/11336860">characterised Iran’s actions as “state piracy”</a>. He advocated for “<a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-23/britain-to-create-euro-maritime-mission-in-hormuz-strait/11336860">European-led maritime protection mission(s) to support safe passage of both crew and cargo</a>”.</p>
<p>British Prime Minister Boris Johnson <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-49240867">instead decided to join the US-led mission</a>. In joining this effort, Australia has emphasised the importance of its multilateral nature. This matters when it is recalled that the oil tankers concerned are typically flagged to a wide variety of states, are owned by nationals from other states, might be chartered by companies from different states and are frequently crewed by nationals from diverse states.</p>
<p>As a result, far more countries than just Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia have stakes in these issues.</p>
<h2>How does it affect the global oil trade?</h2>
<p>The prospect of oil tankers being seized in the Strait of Hormuz will likely increase the insurance premiums on shipping. In addition to seizing ships, Iran has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-22/iran-will-close-strait-of-hormuz-if-it-can-t-use-it-fars">threatened to close the strait</a>. </p>
<p>Concerns also exist that Iranian military forces might hinder passage, or might go so far as mining the strait. Any of these scenarios poses a risk to global oil supply and even the prospect of these actions causes a jump in crude oil prices.</p>
<h2>What might happen from here?</h2>
<p>Ultimately, Iran shares an interest with the United States and other countries in maintaining navigational rights for commercial shipping. So much is evident in Iran’s own response to the <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-tanker-gibraltar/gibraltar-extends-detention-of-iranian-tanker-for-a-month-idUKKCN1UE15O">British Royal Navy seizing one of its vessels off Gibraltar</a>.</p>
<p>Given that over 90% of the world’s traded goods are carried by ship, every country has a strong reciprocal interest in ensuring freedom of navigation. Iran is using one of the main political tools it has at its disposal to exert pressure in response to current US policies.</p>
<p>Preventing escalation should be the prime concern of all actors and would be the most mutually beneficial outcome.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121490/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natalie Klein does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Australia commits to joining a coalition in the Strait of Hormuz, preventing escalation of any conflict should be the primary concern of all players.Natalie Klein, Professor, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.