tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/yugoslavian-war-46713/articlesYugoslavian war – The Conversation2023-12-11T15:50:13Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2194342023-12-11T15:50:13Z2023-12-11T15:50:13ZSerbian election: another win for the Serbian Progressive Party will threaten peace in Europe<p>The outcome of Serbia’s parliamentary elections on December 17 will have profound implications for peace in Europe. Though somewhat obscured by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and more recently the crisis in Gaza, tensions in the Balkans have <a href="https://theconversation.com/kosovo-and-serbia-in-crisis-talks-as-regional-tension-escalates-thanks-to-russian-meddling-215038">risen sharply</a> in recent months. Should Serbs reelect the main party of government, the likelihood of regional conflict will increase. </p>
<p>The Serbian Progressive Party (SPP) has been in government since 2012. Formed in 2008, the SPP was initially seen as a pro-EU-integration party that would lead Serbia towards the west. </p>
<p>The SPP, however, became increasingly authoritarian and Serbia is today widely regarded as an example of <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/news/captured-states-western-balkans-turkey">state capture</a>. This is where a small number of influential actors in the public and private sectors have colluded to change rules, sponsor legislation and co-opt institutions to further their own narrow interests at the expense of the broader public interest.</p>
<p>The SPP has, according to the US-based advocacy group, <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/freedom-world/2023">Freedom House</a>, “steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations”. Press freedom advocates, <a href="https://rsf.org/en/country/serbia">Reporters Without Borders</a>, recently noted that the dominant state-run media perpetuates “rampant fake news and propaganda” where “journalists are threatened by political pressures”. </p>
<p>Corruption has also <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/corruption-index">increased</a> since 2012 and <a href="https://ocindex.net/country/serbia">the Global Organized Crime Index</a> reported that “criminal networks are widespread”. An in-depth investigation by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/03/magazine/aleksandar-vucic-veljko-belivuk-serbia.html">the New York Times</a> alleged that Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić – a founding member of the SPP – and his inner circle were closely linked to these criminal gangs. </p>
<p>Since 2012, Serbia’s government has stoked regional tensions to the extent that many fear 2024 may see <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/the-spectre-of-a-second-war-in-europe-looms-large-with-tensions-extraordinarily-high-in-kosovo-12978280">renewed war</a> with neighbouring Kosovo. </p>
<p>Given Vučić’s past – and that of many of the SPP’s leading figures – this was hardly a surprise. Throughout the 1990s Vučić supported aggressive Serbian nationalism. Just days after the Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia in July 1995, he declared: “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PU6t2XWFQD8">Kill one Serb and we will kill 100 Muslims</a>.” </p>
<p>Between 1998 and 2000, he was Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević’s “minister for information” during which time the war in Kosovo erupted. During that conflict, roughly 10,000 Kosovo Albanians were killed and over 90% of the population were displaced. </p>
<p>In 2018 Vučić described Milošević as “<a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/vucic-s-great-milosevic-evokes-ghost-of-greater-serbia-/29486327.html">a great Serbian leader who undoubtedly had the best intentions</a>”.</p>
<h2>Destabilising Kosovo and Bosnia</h2>
<p>The SPP has stoked nationalist sentiments among Serbs living outside Serbia. Their attempts to redraw the borders of Yugoslavia’s successor states along demographic lines – to create what they call a “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/">Serbian world</a>” – would almost certainly lead to war in Bosnia and Kosovo. </p>
<p>Indeed, Vučić <a href="https://thegeopost.com/en/news/vucic-made-gloomy-predictions-for-2024-next-year-will-bring-conflicts-it-will-be-the-most-difficult-in-the-modern-history-of-serbia/">recently stated</a> that 2024 “will bring us much more conflict and unrest than the previous one” specifically highlighting Bosnia and Kosovo as likely to erupt. </p>
<p>Vučić exercises near complete control over the main Serb parties in Bosnia and Kosovo and has encouraged each to undermine the authority of the central government in both states. </p>
<p>Milorad Dodik – the president of the Serb-majority Republika Srpska federation within Bosnia – now openly talks about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-charged-over-defying-peace-envoys-decisions-2023-08-11/">seceding from Bosnia</a>. Kosovo Serbs in favour of integration in Kosovo have been <a href="https://www.cins.rs/en/bombs-and-bullets-fear-and-loathing-in-north-kosovo/">bullied into submission</a> or <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/20/kosovo-serb-politician-murdered-for-political-reasons-brother-says/">murdered</a>. </p>
<p>In addition to regularly vowing to <a href="https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2023&mm=11&dd=26&nav_id=117128">never recognise Kosovo’s independence</a>, Vučić <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2019/12/06/serbian-president-accused-of-spreading-hate-by-denying-massacre/">has denied</a> that Serb-perpetrated massacres occurred in Kosovo. He has also <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64099388">threatened Nato troops</a> stationed there and branded the prime minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, as “<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/serbia-boycotts-eu-summit-calls-kosovo-pm-terrorist-scum/">terrorist scum</a>”. </p>
<p>Vučić and the SPP prime minister, Ana Brnabić, have repeatedly claimed – <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/10/23/kosovo-serbs-may-feel-insecure-but-theyre-not-ethnically-cleansed/">without supporting evidence</a> – that the government of Kosovo is engaged in “<a href="https://twitter.com/BalkanInsight/status/1706252062248305143">brutal ethnic cleansing</a>” against Serbs. In September, close Vučić ally Milan Radoičić, the deputy leader of the Belgrade-controlled Serbian List party, was part of a militia group that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kosovo-serb-politician-admits-role-gun-battle-that-killed-four-2023-09-29/">attacked the Kosovo Police</a> – killing one officer – in what many believe was a Belgrade-orchestrated attempt <a href="https://www.helsinki.org.rs/press_t85.html">to spark a war</a>.</p>
<p>Despite the SPP’s record, western leaders have sought to maintain that Serbia is, as the US ambassador to Serbia recently stated, “<a href="https://twitter.com/usambserbia/status/1686405557089869824">headed towards the west</a>”. Many have <a href="https://n1info.rs/english/news/a579353-merkel-and-vucic-discuss-kosovo-taxes-dialogue-coronavirus-via-video-link/">posed with Vučić</a>, <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/03/pec-tusk-letter-vucic/">celebrated his electoral victories</a> and “<a href="https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies">turned a blind eye</a>” to his government’s policies at home and abroad. </p>
<p>The logic behind this <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/29/the-flare-up-of-violence-in-kosovo-shows-the-folly-of-the-wests-appeasement-of-serbia">appeasement</a> stems from a determination to coax Serbia away from its traditional ally, Russia. This has evidently failed. </p>
<p>Following the invasion of Ukraine, Serbia <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/serbia-aleksandar-vucic-europe-russia-choice/">refused to join</a> western sanctions against Russia, because – Vučić says – Serbs “<a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/serbia-must-not-be-putins-accomplice/">love Russia</a>”. The country continues to maintain <a href="https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1705272005535183113">close relations</a> with Moscow.</p>
<p>The Serbian government has also cultivated links with other likeminded autocrats throughout Europe – particularly <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/06/26/orbans-alliance-with-vucic-demonstrates-strategic-hungarian-interests-in-the-western-balkans/">Hungary’s Viktor Orbán</a> – who openly reject democratic values. </p>
<h2>Future directions</h2>
<p>There is little to suggest the SPP will change; they have signed an election pact with the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party – led by <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2018/04/11/vojislav-seselj-hague-tribunal-war-crimes-appeal-verdict-04-11-2018/">convicted war criminal</a> Vojislav Šešelj – and are likely to again seek to form a coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia, led by Ivica Dačić. Known as “little Slobo”, he was Milošević’s spokesman in the 1990s. </p>
<p>There are signs that a more progressive movement – the <a href="https://serbiaelects.europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/12/02/evolution-of-the-party-scene-since-2012-who-are-the-members-of-the-serbia-against-violence-coalition/">Serbia Against Violence</a> coalition – will <a href="https://serbiaelects.europeanwesternbalkans.com/2023/11/15/first-poll-released-since-the-start-of-the-campaign-finds-sns-at-39-serbia-against-violence-at-26/">increase its share of the vote</a>. It seeks to capitalise on the public anger which boiled over in June when a series of <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/06/22/mass-protests-demand-political-change-in-serbia">mass protests</a> were held against gun violence and corruption. </p>
<p>But the SPP has sought to steer the election campaign away from domestic concerns – especially the high inflation, <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/serbia/inflation-cpi">which stands at 8.5%</a> – towards nationalist issues, such as the plight of Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. </p>
<p>In this, it has been successful due to its <a href="https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/elections-in-serbia---vu%C4%8Di%C4%87-s-party-now-controls-the-whole-state-system-/49005478">near monopoly</a> over the media in Serbia and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/nov/28/critics-of-serbias-government-targeted-with-military-grade-spyware?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter">targeted cyberattacks</a> and <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2023/12/01/belgrade-opposition-candidate-quits-election-campaign-over-private-video-leak/">smear campaigns</a> against critics of the government. The prospects of the SPP being removed thus appear remote and the spectre of regional conflict looms. </p>
<p>However, this could yet be averted. Despite the SPP’s nationalistic and anti-western rhetoric, realistically, Serbia cannot prosper outside the west. Russia’s ability to support its allies since the invasion of Ukraine has decreased, as <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91121">Armenia recently discovered</a> in Nagorno-Karabakh. </p>
<p>Serbia is surrounded by EU and Nato member states and thus vulnerable to western sanctions. As such, a forceful stance by the west would probably compel the SPP to change course and prevent renewed conflict. Whether the west has the unity and will to do so, however, remains to be seen.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219434/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aidan Hehir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Serbia’s nationalist government seeks re-election. If it succeeds, Europe may be poised for renewed war in the Balkans.Aidan Hehir, Reader in International Relations, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2066802023-05-31T12:55:48Z2023-05-31T12:55:48ZKosovo government must take most of the blame for the latest violence, but any long-term solution will require a constructive response from Serbia as well<p>Renewed <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/northern-kosovo-ethnic-albanian-mayors-kfor-serbs/32432330.html">violence in northern Kosovo</a> reminds us that parts of the western Balkan region have a long way to go on the route to recovery from the wars of the 1990s that broke up the former Yugoslavia. Despite decades of western stabilisation efforts, the region remains mired in multiple <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2023.2182994">inter-linked conflicts</a> that are manipulated and exploited by local politicians. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/kosovo-ethnic-tensions-have-created-a-political-volcano-that-could-erupt-anytime-197629">Kosovo: ethnic tensions have created a political 'volcano' that could erupt anytime</a>
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<p>The latest flare-up <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-kosovo-tensions-police-clash-serb-majority-north/32430434.html">was triggered</a> when recently elected ethnic Albanian mayors tried to assume office in three ethnic Serb majority towns in the north of Kosovo. A heavy police presence sought to secure the mayors’ access to municipal buildings in Zvecan, Leposavic and Zubin Potok by trying to disperse crowds of local Serb protesters. </p>
<p>But this is only the latest in a set of worrying developments in relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and between Kosovo and Serbia. Last November, the mayors of four ethnic Serb majority towns <a href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/11/05/serbs-resign-from-all-institutions-in-kosovo/">resigned</a>. They were joined by local councillors, ethnic Serb members of Kosovo’s parliament, the judiciary and Kosovo’s police. </p>
<p>This mass resignation was coordinated by the Serb List, Kosovo’s most influential ethnic Serb political party, and led to the further strengthening of <a href="https://www.evropaelire.org/a/institucionet-paralele-te-serbise-qe-pritet-ti-menaxhoje-asociaiconi/32331435.html">existing</a> parallel administrative structures, <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/07/kosovo-serbs-continue-mass-resignations-from-state-institutions/">funded by Belgrade</a>.</p>
<p>The mass resignation <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/07/kosovo-serbs-continue-mass-resignations-from-state-institutions/">was a protest</a> triggered by attempts to force ethnic Serb drivers to adopt official <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-nato-and-the-eu-can-turn-kosovo-border-crisis-into-an-opportunity-to-put-more-pressure-on-russia-188078">Kosovo number plates</a>. But above all, ethnic Serbs were unhappy about the endless delays in establishing self-governance arrangements for their municipalities as agreed by the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue_en">EU-mediated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue</a> in 2013 and reconfirmed in 2015. </p>
<p>After considerable <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2022/12/08/eu-us-civil-society-query-conditions-for-north-kosovo-elections/">delays</a> new local elections were finally held on April 23. Boycotted by ethnic Serbs, average <a href="https://prishtinainsight.com/preliminary-results-vetevendosje-and-pdk-candidates-win-snap-elections-in-northern-municipalities/">turnout</a> across the four municipalities was just under 3.5%.</p>
<h2>The west’s response</h2>
<p>With the democratic legitimacy of the newly elected mayors in significant doubt, the EU issued a strongly worded statement immediately after the elections. It <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/kosovo-statement-spokesperson-elections-north_en">noted</a> that the elections “do not offer a long-term political solution” for the four municipalities. </p>
<p>Throughout the following four weeks, western diplomats sought to avert further escalation – but to little avail. They finally vented their frustration on May 26 in a <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-violence-in-the-north-of-kosovo/">joint statement</a> by the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quint_(international_organization)#:%7E:text=The%20Quint%20is%20an%20informal,OECD%20and%20the%20G7%2FG20.">Quint</a> (the US, France, Italy, Germany and the UK). The statement condemned “Kosovo’s decision to force access to municipal buildings in northern Kosovo despite our call for restraint”. It also demanded that “Kosovo’s authorities … immediately step back and de-escalate, and … closely coordinate with EULEX and KFOR [the EU’s civilian mission to support rule of law and Nato’s peacekeeping force in Kosovo].” It is hard to imagine a more unambiguous allocation of blame for the escalating violence.</p>
<p>In an indication of how serious the situation is considered to be, Nato has decided to deploy an additional 700 troops to Kosovo, beefing up KFOR’s current force of 3,700 soldiers.</p>
<p>Perhaps even more significantly, the US, traditionally Kosovo’s strongest western ally, has cancelled Kosovo’s further participation in the <a href="https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/DefenderEurope/">Defender Europe 23</a> joint military drills. And the US ambassador to Pristina, Jeff Hovenier, was <a href="https://xk.usembassy.gov/press_roundtable/">unequivocal</a> in his condemnation of the lack of responsiveness on the part of Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, to de-escalate the crisis in the north. He left little doubt that the US was running out of patience with the Kosovo government and was considering further punitive measures.</p>
<h2>Entrenched divisions</h2>
<p>The deeper problem here is that this particular crisis is embedded in the long-running dispute over Kosovo’s status. Once an autonomous province within the Serbian republic of the former socialist federation of Yugoslavia, its status is far from resolved. The conflict between Serbs and Albanians goes back for decades and builds on selective memories of a supposedly centuries-old confrontation between different ethnic groups. </p>
<p>It reached a tipping point in the late 1990s, which necessitated the 1999 Nato intervention and eventually led to the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008. While recognised today by some 100 countries around the world, it remains opposed by Serbia, China and Russia. In addition, Kosovo is not recognised by five EU member states, four of which are Nato members. </p>
<p>For more than a decade, the EU mediated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade has attempted to resolve this conflict, by nudging the parties towards concessions and compromises. Two key sticking points remain: Serbia giving up on blocking Kosovo’s membership in international organisations and Kosovo’s acceptance of local autonomy for ethnic Serbs in areas in which they form a majority of the population. A <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-eu-proposal-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en">proposal</a> by the EU at the end of February to resolve these two issues remains contested between the two sides.</p>
<p>The dead end that EU efforts appeared to have reached was thrown into further sharp relief when the Kosovo government failed to move forward on implementing local self-governance arrangements for ethnic Serbs. To make matters worse, it but also appeared to curtail what little existed by its ill-judged attempts to impose the newly elected mayors with their highly questionable democratic legitimacy.</p>
<p>This is not to argue that Serb shadow authorities in northern Kosovo are any more legitimate or stabilising. On the contrary. The current situation requires de-escalation by the Kosovo authorities, but the deeper underlying problems in relations between Pristina and Belgrade require a more comprehensive and inclusive solution that reflects the interests of Kosovo, Serbia and Kosovo Serbs. </p>
<p>As the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, poignantly <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/kosovo-statement%C2%A0-high-representative-josep-borrell-ongoing-confrontations%C2%A0_en">noted</a> on May 30: “There has been enough violence – there has been too much violence. We have too much violence in Europe already today – we cannot afford another conflict.” </p>
<p>But appeals to rationality are unlikely to impress the self-serving politicians across this part of the western Balkans. So it remains unclear whether the combined west can muster the leverage necessary to not merely contain the current violence, but to forge the path to a stable future for the people of Kosovo.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206680/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Once again ethnic tensions have boiled over in Kosovo.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1924722022-11-07T10:07:56Z2022-11-07T10:07:56ZUkraine war: Serbia is shifting closer to Russia – here’s why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493485/original/file-20221104-21-em1yo3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladmir Putin is very popular in Serbia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Sasa Dzambic Photography</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-20/serbia-s-friendship-with-russia-gets-awkward-as-putin-escalates-war-in-ukraine">Putin is the world leader</a> that Serbs admire the most and 95% of Serbs see Russia as a true ally, compared to only 11% who see the EU that way, despite the <a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Legal+Issues+of+Economic+Integration/49.3/LEIE2022015">EU being Serbia’s major financial supporter</a>, according to a recent poll. </p>
<p>And 68% of Serbs said in the same poll that they believed Nato, not Vladimir Putin, had started the war in Ukraine, with 82% against the sanctions imposed on Russia. </p>
<p>While much of Europe is backing Ukraine in the current war, Serbia is taking a very different position. In Serbia, the government and the public both display high levels of support for Putin and Russia.</p>
<p>For example, Serbia has not <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/30/the-war-is-forcing-russias-balkan-friends-to-recalibrate">imposed sanctions on Russia</a> or distanced itself from <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/07/06/eu-parliament-calls-for-serbia-to-change-its-stance-on-russia">Putin</a>. </p>
<p>Instead, Serbia has signed an agreement with Russia to “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/serbia-ap-russia-new-york-aleksandar-vucic-b2174618.html">consult</a>” each other on foreign policy issues. Putin and the Serb president Aleksandar Vučić also have signed a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbias-vucic-says-agreed-3-year-gas-supply-contract-with-putin-2022-05-29/">new gas agreement</a>, and the state-controlled Air Serbia airline has doubled its flights from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/mar/11/wealthy-russians-using-air-serbia-loophole-to-avoid-eu-flights-ban">Belgrade to Moscow</a>. </p>
<p>All this runs counter to the EU’s foreign policy decision to sever some of its ties with Putin over Ukraine. Serbia, as an <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ejcl/8/4/article-p271_271.xml">EU candidate state</a>, is expected to do the same. </p>
<p>After Putin invaded Ukraine, he had strong support in Serbia, where <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/pro-russia-serbs-march-belgrade-country-treads-ever-finer-line-between-east-west-2022-03-04/">multiple rallies</a> were held in his honour. Graffiti on walls in Belgrade, Serbia’s capital, also included the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/z-makes-ukrainians-feel-unsafe-in-serbia-ambassador-says/">“Z” symbol</a>, which has come to represent public <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/07/why-has-the-letter-z-become-the-symbol-of-war-for-russia">support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>Since the war in Ukraine began, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-russia-ukraine-graffiti-war/31955728.html">a mural depicting Putin</a> with the flags of Russia and Serbia and the word “<a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/10/06/the-war-in-ukraine-has-awakened-memories-in-the-balkans">brother</a>” were seen in Belgrade. Billboards featuring a picture of Putin and the words “<a href="https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/birthday-message-to-putin-on-belgrade-billboards/">happy birthday to President Putin from Serb brothers</a>” with the letter Z printed much larger than the others were put up to mark Putin’s 70th birthday.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-recap-russias-modern-siege-tactics-fail-to-break-the-peoples-will-to-resist-193898">Ukraine recap: Russia's 'modern siege tactics' fail to break the people's will to resist</a>
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<p>Serbia and Russia have a long <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220309-brothers-forever-many-in-serbia-back-russia-amid-global-outcry">history of close ties</a> due to their shared Slavic and Orthodox heritage. The Serbian language is also closely connected to Russian. </p>
<p>Since sanctions on Russia were put in place following Putin’s attack on Ukraine, Serbia has emerged as the top location for Russian <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/nearly-300-russian-owned-firms-registered-in-serbia-since-ukraine-invasion/">businesses</a> and highly qualified individuals, particularly in the tech industry, to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-race-to-lure-russian-talent-and-capital-serbia-emerges-as-front-runner-11666793707">relocate</a> to in order to escape sanctions.</p>
<p>The most recent political alliance between <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/06/russia-s-game-in-balkans-pub-78235">Serbia and Russia</a> is founded on a deep sense of resentment toward Nato for its role in the establishment of new republics that were a part of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, namely <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/03/serbia-kosovo-russia-eu-tensions/">Kosovo</a> and <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/2022-SU-Valur-RussKosovo.pdf">Ukraine</a>. Putin and Vučić argue that Serbia and Russia have been wrongly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-serbia-russia.html">portrayed as aggressors</a> when they are only trying to protect their ethnic brothers.</p>
<p>The main driving force behind the recent increase in support for Putin is Serbia’s hopes that a Putin victory in Ukraine will somehow enable them to regain control of parts of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-08-04/could-kosovo-and-serbia-get-into-a-mini-version-of-the-ukraine-war">Kosovo</a> and other parts of the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-herzegovina-dodik-secession-ukraine/31886186.html">Balkans</a>. Recently, Vučić has gone so far as to suggest that <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/serbia-warns-nato-over-safety-of-kosovo-serbs/a-62882004">Serbia</a> might interfere in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/37d30041-99d2-4228-a134-b0776da77a2a">Kosovo</a> to defend its Serbian minority.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Coloured map of the Balkans." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/493507/original/file-20221104-19-d44nix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=709&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>His threats were made in part as a result of pressure that Putin applied on Vučić to threaten an armed incursion into Kosovo and to destabilise the Balkans and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/01/western-balkans-kosovo-ukraine/">draw attention away</a> from Russia’s war in Ukraine. But neither Putin’s actual influence in the Balkans nor Serbia’s facilitation of Russia’s geopolitical goals in the region are being taken seriously by the <a href="https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/08/25/latest-kosovo-serbia-tensions-reveal-eu-s-diplomatic-limits-pub-87755">EU</a>.</p>
<p>Since Vučić came to power ten years ago, Serbia has maintained a facade of <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/bound-to-russia-serbias-disruptive-neutrality/">neutrality between Russia and the EU</a>. He has done a good job of playing the two sides against one another to increase Serbia’s bargaining power on issues like energy, security, EU membership, and prolong the recognition of <a href="https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Kosovos-EU-candidate-status-a-goal-within-reach%7E20a56c">Kosovo by five EU member states</a>. Meanwhile, Serbia’s adherence to EU foreign policy has significantly decreased from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/serbia-report-2022_en">64% in 2020 to 45% in 2022</a>. </p>
<p>This strategy has been successful for the interests of Serbia, which is the primary recipient of <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/eu-representative-serbia-may-receive-10-times-more-money-after-joining-eu/">EU funding in the Balkans</a> and is considered a <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/01/19/is-serbia-still-on-course-to-join-the-european-union">frontrunner</a> to join the EU by <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-france-germany-kosovo-eu-entry/32071236.html">2025</a>.</p>
<p>The main source of Putin’s influence in the Balkans is Serbia, and as part of cementing that Vučić has welcomed a Russian military installation <a href="https://lseideas.medium.com/from-russia-with-love-serbias-lukewarm-reception-of-russian-aid-and-its-geopolitical-implications-a911b3ec09a7">into Serbia</a>. According to Nato, the facility acts as a hub for Russian <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-sees-russia-humanitarian-center-serbia-spy-outpost/3902402.html">espionage operations</a>. </p>
<p>Putin uses the Balkans, particularly Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a bargaining chip in his dealings with Nato and the EU. He has even sought to use <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/03/putin-ukraine-russia-nato-kosovo/">Nato intervention in former Yugoslavia</a> in 1990s to support his attack on Ukraine. </p>
<h2>Putin backs Balkan politicians</h2>
<p>Putin has also been effective in endorsing or backing <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-62897570">political candidates and parties</a> that can enhance its reputation and weaken the influence of Nato and the EU across the Balkans. The conservative <a href="https://euronews.al/en/albania/2022/09/14/lulzim-basha-reacts-to-claims-that-russia-secretly-funded-dp-back-in-2017/">Democratic party of Albania</a> received close to US$500,000 (£443,000) during the 2017 parliamentary elections, according to a recent declassified <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/13/russia-foreign-election-interference-state-department">US intelligence report</a>. Some lawmakers in Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina also received funding from Russia.</p>
<p>The rest of Europe has not fully recognised Russia’s influence in the Balkans and Serbia’s role in advancing Putin’s geopolitical objectives. Some members of the <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/09/25/Serbia-s-foreign-minister-defends-deal-with-Russia">European Parliament have suggested</a> that the EU needs to reevaluate Serbia’s membership. </p>
<p>The EU states, in particular Germany and France, are still divided over Putin’s considerable influence in the Balkans, and have only expressed their “<a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/accelerated-candidacy-ukraine-s-possible-eu-accession-not-universally-welcome-a-b7504043-0cb7-4d38-b7f5-a963fb195429">disappointment</a>” with Vučić’s decisions.</p>
<p>Putin’s influence in the Balkans shouldn’t be ignored and since Serbia has made it obvious that it wants to deepen its ties with Russia, the EU shouldn’t be duped by the facade of neutrality that Vučić’s has skilfully maintained over the years. </p>
<p>If the EU cautions Serbia that a EU candidate state’s relations with Russia cannot be “<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/87959">business as usual</a>” then it may have to rethink its pro-Russia policy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andi Hoxhaj OBE does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>European leaders have failed to notice how much support Serbia is providing to Russia, an expert says.Andi Hoxhaj OBE, Lecturer in Law, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1820292022-06-15T12:27:18Z2022-06-15T12:27:18ZInternational courts prosecuting leaders like Putin for war crimes have a mixed record – but offer clues on how to get a conviction<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468824/original/file-20220614-13-1ed69p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C8%2C5634%2C3736&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A sign reading 'Putin, murderer' is shown during a protest in Krakow, Poland, on May 8, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/banner-reading-putin-murderer-is-seen-during-rape-is-a-war-news-photo/1240544629">Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There have been mounting calls from Ukrainian and other activists and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/the-eu-must-help-prosecute-putin-for-crimes-of-aggression-heres-how/">political leaders</a> to prosecute Russian President Vladimir Putin for war crimes in Ukraine, including authorizing attacks on civilians. There has also been <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/19/the-1-percent-chance-that-putin-will-be-prosecuted/">public skepticism</a> that this could actually happen. </p>
<p>History provides some lessons on charging political leaders with war crimes – a <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml">legal term</a> that includes attacking and killing civilians during war.</p>
<p>Ukraine already <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/31/ukraine-russian-war-crimes-second-trial-sentencing/">convicted and sentenced</a> three Russian soldiers, in May 2022, for war crimes during the ongoing Ukraine conflict, and it plans to prosecute at least 80 more soldiers. But as a <a href="https://isearch.asu.edu/profile/858959">scholar of human rights</a>, conflict and international courts, I think it is important to understand that
there has been a mixed record of arresting and prosecuting senior political and military leaders allegedly responsible for atrocities. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article-abstract/6/2/401/858328?redirectedFrom=fulltext">international trial of Serbian leader Slobodan Misolevic</a> in the mid-2000s is one example of how international courts can prosecute war criminals.</p>
<p>Here’s the bottom line: It’s only when leaders like Milosevic fall from power that there is any chance that their governments may arrest and hand them over to international courts for prosecution. </p>
<p>But history also shows that even if Putin is overthrown or otherwise loses power, there’s no clear guarantee that he will ever stand trial before an international court.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Milosevic sits in a suit, with two guards in blue shirts on either side of him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468825/original/file-20220614-14-1doh7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468825/original/file-20220614-14-1doh7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468825/original/file-20220614-14-1doh7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468825/original/file-20220614-14-1doh7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468825/original/file-20220614-14-1doh7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468825/original/file-20220614-14-1doh7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468825/original/file-20220614-14-1doh7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic refused a lawyer during his hearings before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the early 2000s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/slobodan-milosevic-refuses-the-presence-of-any-lawyer-news-photo/110138118">Raphael Gaillarde/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Milosevic’s fall from power</h2>
<p>There were three major wars in southeastern Europe in the 1990s. In total, approximately <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/balkan-camp-alic-photo/31385822.html">130,000 people died</a> during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The rise of nationalism and tension between different ethnic groups triggered these conflicts.</p>
<p>The spark for these wars was kindled in 1991, when Yugoslavia, a former communist republic that once included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, began to <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia">split apart</a>.</p>
<p>Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist leader, was one of the most influential politicians in the region. He fueled the regional wars around and after the time of this dissolution. </p>
<p>In 1993, as the war in Bosnia was still being fought, the United Nations Security Council set up a special court, called the <a href="https://www.icty.org">International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</a>, to address crimes committed during the wars there. </p>
<p>This court indicted Milosevic for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 1999 during the the ongoing Kosovo war in 1999. Milosevic’s alleged crimes in Kosovo included a massive ethnic cleansing campaign waged against Kosovar Albanians, the largest ethnic group there. Most of the people who died during this war were Kosovar Albanians.</p>
<p>But Milosevic was still in power when the indictment was issued, and the Serbian government shielded him from arrest. </p>
<p>Milosevic lost a presidential election in late September 2000 but initially refused to give up power. After widespread protests, Milosevic <a href="https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/serbians-overthrow-milosevic-bulldozer-revolution-2000">stepped down</a> a week later, and a democratic government took over.</p>
<h2>Milosevic standing trial</h2>
<p>Almost two years later, Serbian police <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/02/world/milosevic-surrender-overview-milosevic-arrest-came-with-pledge-for-fair-trial.html">arrested Milosevic</a>, though on domestic corruption and abuse of power charges. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/06/29/serb-leaders-hand-over-milosevic-for-trial-by-war-crimes-tribunal/a209e0ed-e7d5-428e-a462-d0999d29961c/">Serbian government</a> transferred <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/press/slobodan-milosevic-transferred-custody-international-criminal-tribunal-former-yugoslavia">Milosevic to the international tribunal</a> in June 2001. </p>
<p>This happened in the wake of U.S. threats to withhold much-needed loans to Serbia, unless the government turned over Milosevic. Serbia later also arrested other former leaders wanted for war crimes – following intense Western political pressure and assurances by European countries and the U.S. that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ijtj/article-abstract/5/1/52/2356990?redirectedFrom=fulltext">the government’s cooperation</a> could result in Serbia’s gaining European Union membership. </p>
<p>The international tribunal <a href="https://www.icty.org/en/press/trial-slobodan-milosevic-will-begin-tuesday-12-february-930-am">launched its trial</a> in The Hague, Netherlands, against Milosevic in February 2002. Milosevic faced dozens of charges for alleged crimes he committed in three different wars.</p>
<p>But Milosevic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/12/warcrimes.milosevictrial">died in prison</a> in 2006, shortly before the end of his trial. </p>
<h2>The challenge for international courts</h2>
<p>International courts set up by the U.N., like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, have a twofold problem. First, these tribunals do not have an actual international police force to carry out arrests. </p>
<p>Governments implicated in their leaders’ alleged crimes also often try to obstruct international courts by not turning over suspects.</p>
<p>The enforcement problem, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/international-justice-in-rwanda-and-the-balkans/975BC3287F9A8262731808D09BE0B27C">as my scholarship has shown</a>, can allow a powerful country like Russia to evade arrest warrants from international courts – as long as the suspect remains within the country.</p>
<p>The International Criminal Court, for example, has not been able to persuade the Sudanese government to hand over former president Omar al-Bashir for alleged war crimes committed in Darfur in the 2000s.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468827/original/file-20220614-13-75uv2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A row of people wearing dark jackets walk in front of a Ukrainian church" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468827/original/file-20220614-13-75uv2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/468827/original/file-20220614-13-75uv2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468827/original/file-20220614-13-75uv2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468827/original/file-20220614-13-75uv2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468827/original/file-20220614-13-75uv2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468827/original/file-20220614-13-75uv2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/468827/original/file-20220614-13-75uv2d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Iryna Venediktova, left, walks with International Criminal Court prosecutor Karim Khan during a visit to Bucha, Ukraine, in April 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/graphic-content-ukraines-prosecutor-general-iryna-venediktova-and-of-picture-id1239959385?s=2048x2048">Fadel Senna/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A potential playbook for Putin</h2>
<p>Milosevic escaped a final verdict and potential prison time with his death. </p>
<p>But his trial still shows that under specific circumstances, international courts can overcome their lack of enforcement powers and bring high-level suspects to trial. International political pressure and incentives often serve a role in this process. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/17/icc-sends-largest-ever-investigative-team-to-war-torn-ukraine">In May 2022</a>, the International Criminal Court – the main international tribunal that prosecutes war crimes – sent its largest-ever team of experts to investigate the situation in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Karim Khan, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, will need to decide whether to target lower-level or midlevel suspects in the military – or to indict top Russian leaders, including Putin. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/06/karim-khan-british-barrister-icc-russia-war-crimes-inquiry">Some analysts caution</a> against Khan’s aiming too high, too soon, given the court’s poor track record of prosecuting high-level defendants, such as former Côte d'Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo.</p>
<p>As long as Putin remains in power, it is unlikely that any amount of political pressure or promises will persuade Russia to cooperate with an international court and turn over Putin, if he is indicted. </p>
<p>That could change if Putin ever falls from power. </p>
<p>But much would still depend on the new Russian government and whether Western countries would provide the type of incentives that pushed Serbian leaders to turn against their former political leaders and military heroes.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/182029/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Victor Peskin, as an associate professor at Arizona State University, is currently part of a U.S. State Department grant intended to support transitional justice efforts in South Sudan and Ukraine. </span></em></p>Prosecuting a leader like Vladimir Putin accused of war crimes is difficult. But the trial of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in the early 2000s offers a potential playbook.Victor Peskin, Associate professor of politics and global studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1572882021-03-26T12:26:12Z2021-03-26T12:26:12ZMontenegro was a success story in troubled Balkan region – now its democracy is in danger<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391222/original/file-20210323-22-m8nlbn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C8%2C2986%2C2038&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Celebrating Montenegrin independence on May 21, 2006. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/podgorica-serbia-and-montenegro-a-supporter-of-montenegrin-news-photo/71003303?adppopup=true">Diminar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Tiny Montenegro has long been different from its neighbors in the former Yugoslavia. </p>
<p>After a decade of bloody civil wars that included <a href="https://theconversation.com/srebrenica-25-years-later-lessons-from-the-massacre-that-ended-the-bosnian-conflict-and-unmasked-a-genocide-141177">ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide</a>, Yugoslavia in the 1990s split violently along ethnic lines into six different independent republics. But Montenegro escaped the worst of the war and for years remained with Serbia – its dominant, Russian-allied neighbor – as part of the “<a href="https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0504/04022.html">rump Yugoslavia</a>.” </p>
<p>In 2006, Montenegrins <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/22/balkans1">voted for independence</a> and separated from Serbia peacefully. Montenegro became a <a href="http://en.unesco.org/creativity/cdis/profiles/montenegro">stable and inclusive democracy</a>. It is a mountainous, postage-stamp sized country of 640,000 on the eastern Adriatic Sea. </p>
<p><iframe id="1hZ3s" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/1hZ3s/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Rather than maintain the Slavic ethnic identity of Serbia, Montenegro made room for all kinds of people. It was home to Montenegrins – who are Orthodox, Muslim, Catholic and atheist – yes, but also Bosniaks, Albanians, Roman-Catholic Croats and Serbs. <a href="https://eurojewcong.org/communities/montenegro/">Montenegro also has a Jewish community</a>.</p>
<p>Montenegro’s post-independence leaders in the socialist party worked to build a broad civil society that <a href="https://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/ajis/article/viewFile/9561/9219">recognized the many identities of its citizens</a>. Many refugees from the Balkan wars sought <a href="https://borgenproject.org/10-facts-about-refugees-in-montenegro/">safety in Montenegro</a>. </p>
<p>Its political system favored neither majorities nor minorities, a value system inherited from Yugoslavia. In 2017, Montenegro joined NATO, the transatlantic security alliance, <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-an-alleged-coup-and-montenegros-bid-for-nato-membership-74795">against Russia’s wishes</a>. It <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2021/02/01/montenegro-wants-to-join-the-eu-but-will-brussels-have-it">wants to join the European Union</a>. </p>
<p>Montenegro’s Balkan success story – and its very national identity – is now in danger after a right-wing coalition aligned with <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-malign-influence-montenegro">Serbia and Russia</a> <a href="https://www.total-montenegro-news.com/politics/5837-djukanovic-s-dps-goes-to-opposition-branches-after-31-years">took power in December</a>. </p>
<h2>A language grows and struggles</h2>
<p>A fight over the Montenegrin language is symbolic of the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-montenegro-government-idUKKBN26T2B7">broader political fight playing out in Montenegro</a>.</p>
<p>All the former Yugoslavian republics – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia – share a mutually intelligible language, previously called Serbo-Croatian. The differences among them are comparable to the varieties of English spoken by Americans, Australians, British and South Africans. </p>
<p>Since Yugoslavia broke up, each new Balkan nation has used language to <a href="http://hdl.handle.net/1808/10248">create a common political and cultural identity</a> for itself, establishing each language with its distinctive style and standardizing its usage. </p>
<p>As my <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=m6EZq4IAAAAJ&hl=en">research</a> and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/language-and-identity-in-the-balkans-9780199208753">others’</a> show, some were more successful in that effort than others. Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian are now well established as national languages, used in schools, the press, business and government. </p>
<p>Montenegrin, however, remains contested. </p>
<p>It is embraced by citizens who stand for an inclusive, multi-ethnic Montenegrin society. But those who view Montenegro as fundamentally an extension of the Serbian state consider Montenegrin merely a dialect of Serbian. According to a leader of the Serbian Orthodox Church, “<a href="https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crnogorski_jezik_amfilohije/2276351.html">Montenegrin does not exist</a>.” </p>
<p>Montenegro’s new coalition government seems to side with the Serbs on the language question. </p>
<p>In March the new minister of education, science, culture and sports, Vesna Bratić – <a href="https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/politika/484387/bratic-vrijedjala-dezulovica-kontekstom-brani-stav-da-je-dezulovic-djubre-ustasko">who identifies as a Serbian nationalist</a> – threatened to close the Faculty of Montenegrin Language and Literature in the old royal capital of Cetinje and has <a href="https://www.pobjeda.me/clanak/odbor-o-fakultetu-za-crnogorski-jezik-i-knjizevnost">blocked its funding since January</a>. The institute has led efforts to standardize the Montenegrin language and foster scholarship about Montenegrin literature and culture. </p>
<p>In a young country still forging its national identity, erasing the Montenegrin language that has bound its people together is akin to eliminating the Montenegrin identity. </p>
<h2>A nation falls apart</h2>
<p>Multi-ethnic Montenegro has so far achieved stability through a balancing act that recalled how Yugoslavian premiere Josip Broz Tito <a href="https://europe.unc.edu/background-titos-yugoslavia">ran multi-ethnic Yugoslavia for much of the last century</a>. </p>
<p>Yugoslavia, founded in 1918, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/european-history-after-1450/short-history-yugoslav-peoples?format=PB">was dominated by Slavic-speaking Serbs</a>, Croats and Slovenes but was home to many Hungarians and Albanians, among other non-Slavic minorities. It was also divided religiously, between Roman Catholicism – the faith of Slovenians and Croatians – and the Eastern Orthodox Christianity of Serbians, Montenegrins and Macedonians.</p>
<p>After the Second World War, Marshal Tito and his Partisans – having driven out Nazi occupiers – led Yugoslavia under socialist rule. For four decades, Tito maintained order and quelled rivalry within Yugoslavia with an iron fist and by careful balancing of conflicting claims for cultural dominance. </p>
<p>From the Yugoslavian capital, Belgrade, Tito promoted <a href="https://theconversation.com/from-macedonia-to-america-civics-lessons-from-the-former-yugoslavia-143322">a one-party system and ideology</a> fostering “brotherhood and unity” among Yugoslavia’s many disparate traditions and communities. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Black-and-white image of a very elderly Churchill sitting and laughing with a younger Tito" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391219/original/file-20210323-2283-1kf8j7f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Wartime leaders Tito, right, and Winston Churchill, in Split, Yugoslavia, in 1960.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/winston-churchill-et-le-maréchal-tito-lors-de-leur-entrevue-news-photo/953407732?adppopup=true">Keystone France/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That delicate balance broke down after <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1980/05/05/archives/tito-dies-at-87-last-of-wartime-leaders-a-rotating-leadership-took.html">Tito’s death in 1980</a>. </p>
<p>Wars erupted in Yugoslavia along national, ethnic and religious lines. Serbian and Croatian paramilitaries seeking to carve out ethnically pure states carried out <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/yugo-hist4.htm">ethnic cleansing operations against their rivals in each others’ territories</a> and elsewhere. Bosnia and Herzegovina – fragmented among Catholics, Muslims and Eastern Orthodox – witnessed <a href="https://theconversation.com/international-court-upholds-srebrenica-massacre-verdicts-37003">the gravest atrocities</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="People walk on a mountainous road, wearing backpacks and carrying language; there is snow on the ground" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391228/original/file-20210323-15-9k5kdn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Refugees from Kosovo cross the mountains on foot to reach Montenegro in 1999.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/refugees-from-pec-cross-the-mountains-on-foot-to-arrive-in-news-photo/540011190?adppopup=true">David Brauchli/Sygma via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>History repeats itself</h2>
<p>Montenegro now seems to be at risk of a similar unraveling with its long-ruling Democratic Party of Socialists out of power. While rhetorically supporting Montenegro’s NATO and EU membership, Montenegro’s new political leadership is ideologically aligned with Serbia and Russia.</p>
<p>Many Montenegrins are appalled by their young democracy’s unexpected <a href="https://youtu.be/29jwDywtTmc">twist of fate</a>. They fear Serbian cultural hegemony will negate their progress in nation-building and move Montenegro away from European values – <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-s-balkan-insecurities/">and toward Russia</a>. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 100,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletter to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=100Ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>Russian President Vladimir Putin is watching the struggle over Montenegro’s future closely. Russia has traditional <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-montenegro-putin-idUKKBN1HI2CB">cultural and religious</a> ties to Montenegro, and having Montenegro in Putin’s “portfolio” would give <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/stop-giving-putin-a-free-pass-to-europes-backyard-opinion/ar-BB1eBcdS">Russia access to a Mediterranean port</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Putin and another man in a suit look at each other intensely, flanked by two other serious-looking men, against a gilded backdrop" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C37%2C5064%2C3327&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/391213/original/file-20210323-20-1m5hrjn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Montenegro’s ambassador to Russia meets Vladimir Putin in 2018. The two countries have longstanding ties.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russias-foreign-minister-sergei-lavrov-and-russian-news-photo/944781460?adppopup=true">Alexei Druzhinin\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some Montenegrins even worry that violent ethnic conflict could begin again anew. For them, the Balkan wars are still a fresh memory. And they’ve seen several <a href="https://theconversation.com/europes-illiberal-states-why-hungary-and-poland-are-turning-away-from-constitutional-democracy-89622">democracies in Eastern Europe</a> – Poland and Hungary chief among them – come under autocratic rule. </p>
<p>The West learned the hard way 25 years ago that conflict in the former Balkans can end in tragedy. Will this history repeat itself in Montenegro?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/157288/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marc L. Greenberg has served as a volunteer expert international advisor to the Democratic Alliance of Montenegro, a political group.</span></em></p>Western leaders learned the hard way 25 years ago that conflict in the Balkans can become ethnic cleansing. Add Russia into the mix, and Montenegro’s new problems are US and European problems, too.Marc L. Greenberg, Professor of Slavic Languages & Literatures, University of KansasLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1052342018-10-19T08:42:21Z2018-10-19T08:42:21ZViolence against women: Nobel Peace Prize is a start – but legal backing is long overdue<p>The decision to award the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize to two campaigners against sexual violence against women in conflict, <a href="https://theconversation.com/nobel-peace-prize-awarded-to-nadia-murad-and-denis-mukwege-for-campaigns-against-sexual-violence-104494">Nadia Murad and Denis Mukwege</a> has rightly been hailed as a much-needed signal that the international community recognises the severity of this problem in an increasingly conflict-ridden world.</p>
<p>Violence against women has been a topic engaging feminist legal scholars and international lawyers for a long time. A sustained feminist advocacy emerged around widespread reports of sexual violence experienced by women during the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early 1990s. This culminated in the creation of the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/">International Criminal Court</a> in 2002, whose statute enables the prosecution of a range of sexual harms.</p>
<p>So giving this prestigious prize to two frontline human rights activists does highlight the growing global recognition of the widespread and endemic sexual harms women suffer during wartime. But despite this welcome recognition – and in spite of the widespread reporting of sexual violence incidences in conflict – the international legal system lacks a binding legal convention on the prohibition of violence against women. There is therefore a gap between symbolism and legal reality.</p>
<h2>Personal ordeals</h2>
<p>Murad was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her advocacy work in relation to her experience as a Yazidi-Kurdish woman who survived sexual violence assaults – including numerous rapes and prolonged sexual enslavement at the hands of Islamic State (IS) in northern Iraq in 2014. In 2016 she became the UN goodwill ambassador for the dignity of survivors of human trafficking, using her appointment as a platform to raise awareness of the widespread nature of human trafficking of women before the United Nations Security Council. </p>
<p>In 2017 she published <a href="https://www.economist.com/books-and-arts/2017/11/30/nadia-murads-tale-of-captivity-with-islamic-state">her memoir</a>, The Last Girl: My Story of Captivity, and My Fight Against the Islamic State, in which she recounts her ordeal at the hands of IS and advocates for the prosecution of IS fighters before the International Criminal Court. She has also continually reiterated the idea that rape and sexual slavery need to be conceptualised as weapons of war and treated as such by international criminal law. In a recent interview she said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Rape has been used throughout history as a weapon of war. I never thought I would have something in common with women in Rwanda – before all this, I didn’t know that a country called Rwanda existed – and now I am linked to them in the worst possible way, as a victim of a war crime that is so hard to talk about that no one in the world was prosecuted for committing it until just 16 years before ISIS came to Sinjar.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mukwege gained worldwide acclaim for his work as a surgeon, gynaecologist and women’s rights activist. He founded the <a href="https://www.panzifoundation.org/panzi-hospital/">Panzi Hospital</a> in Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999 as a clinic specialising in gynaecological and obstetric care, performing complex surgeries on women who had been raped and viciously sexually assaulted during armed conflict in the DRC from 2003 to 2016. </p>
<p>Having treated 40,000 survivors of sexual violence, he is today considered one of the world’s leading experts on “repairing” the internal physical damage caused by gang rape. In addition to restorative surgery, the hospital also provides psychological support for victims and offers a one-stop hospital for rape survivors, as well as providing financial support for the women affected in order to enable them to reintegrate into society.</p>
<p>Both activists have brought to the world’s attention the gendered nature of armed conflict and have shone a light on a pervasive phenomenon of modern wars. This has also been one of the central concerns of the UN Security Council, which has passed <a href="https://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions">eight resolutions</a> on Women, Peace and Security, since 2000. </p>
<h2>Time for action</h2>
<p>But despite the powerful symbolic victory of the Nobel Peace Prize, the reality on the ground remains that a binding convention on the prohibition of gender-based violence in all its forms is still lacking. The <a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/">1979 Women’s Convention (CEDAW)</a>, often heralded as the most significant treaty for the elimination of discrimination against women, does not contain a specific prohibition against gender-based violence. </p>
<p>Neither does the <a href="http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cedaw/cedaw.html">1992 CEDAW Committee Declaration No. 19</a> – a landmark declaration defining gender-based violence, which is symbolic rather than binding in nature. The UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, such as <a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/">UN Resolution 1325</a> – which calls on all state actors and those involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts to incorporate a gender-based perspective into the transitional peace process and emphasises the full and equal participation of women in all peace-related efforts – have not led to the securing of a binding resolution on the prohibition of gender-based violence. </p>
<p>There remains a persistent moral gap between rhetoric and practice when it comes to addressing gender-based violence. What is lacking is a clear political will to implement a multilateral convention that would impose obligations on state parties. As former UN special rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/RashidaManjoo.aspx">Rashida Manjoo</a> told me when I interviewed her in 2015: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>One of the challenges is that, whereas the rhetoric is that violence against women is a human rights violation, the reality is that there is an absence of responding to that in a deeper way that demands a different response. So when the rhetoric is that it is a human rights violation, and we do not acknowledge that it is pervasive, that it is systemic and that it has numerous structural causes, including socioeconomic causes, then actions must reflect this reality.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is especially important in light of the fact that gender-based violence almost always exists on a continuum of violence. Frequently, there is a link between the prolonged incidences of domestic violence in peacetime and the levels of sexual violence seen in armed conflict. This has been <a href="https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Manjoo-McRaith-final.pdf">seen time and time again</a>, in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as in the DRC.</p>
<p>The recent recognition of the advocacy efforts of the two Nobel laureates therefore serves as a vital reminder that the actual work of drafting and putting into effect a binding convention for the prohibition of violence against women is an urgent priority, which can no longer go unaddressed by the international community.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105234/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniela Nadj does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>There is an urgent need for a binding convention for the prohibition of violence against women.Daniela Nadj, Lecturer in Public Law, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/918562018-03-09T15:38:36Z2018-03-09T15:38:36ZHow the war in Iraq unintentionally helped stabilise Bosnia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208332/original/file-20180228-36677-1cka32w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An American soldier on a training exercise with a soldier from the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/01/20/the-armed-forces-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-and-the-role-of-nato/">U.S. Army Europe</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Back in March 2003, George W Bush’s “coalition of the willing” launched an invasion of Iraq, the consequences of which reverberate to this day. The now-ubiquitous US military presence in the Middle East began in earnest following the invasion, and it could be <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1353c1d8-4298-11e6-b22f-79eb4891c97d">argued</a> that much of the current instability in the region can be traced back to the war that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/25/tony-blair-is-right-without-the-iraq-war-there-would-be-no-isis">followed</a>. But new <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2017.1414734">research</a> shows that the conflict had another, very different effect: it was the most significant step in stabilising the Balkans since the violent breakup of Yugoslavia.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/ratko-mladic-orchestrator-of-the-brutal-siege-of-sarajevo-87969">1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina</a> was brought to an end by the Dayton Agreement, which not only halted the conflict, but also laid the foundations of the post-war Bosnian state. In an arrangement that’s been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/08/bosnia-herzegovina-elections-the-worlds-most-complicated-system-of-government">described</a> as “the world’s most complicated system of government”, the country was divided into two entities, the Republika Srpska, which is predominantly Bosnian Serb, and the Federation, which is mostly administered by Bosnian Croats and Muslims (Bosniaks). The central government had little authority; most power, including control of the armed forces, was delegated to the entities and other local governments.</p>
<p>While Dayton was a complex agreement, its overwhelming priority was the cessation of hostilities, meaning many key issues were purposefully disregarded or left ambiguous. One such issue was the future of the three armies – the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Army of Republika Srpska, and the Croatian Defence Council – which fought each other in the war: as Dayton made no real stipulations about their future, they simply remained in place. </p>
<p>Richard Holbrooke, a key American mediator in the peace negotiations, <a href="http://www.worldcat.org/title/to-end-a-war/oclc/936664917&referer=brief_results">later lamented</a> that “the most serious flaw in the Dayton Peace Agreement was that it left two opposing armies in one country”. The Peace Implementation Council, the international body responsible for overseeing post-war Bosnia, <a href="http://www.ohr.int/?p=54101">warned</a> of “the instability that is inherent in having two – and in practice three – armies present in one country”. </p>
<p>Yet despite the evident risks, the armies were left largely untouched, and they continued undermining the authority and legitimacy of the Bosnian state – until the prelude to the invasion of Iraq. </p>
<h2>Forcing the issue</h2>
<p>In September 2002, as hundreds of coalition planes <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20061210040821/http:/www.newstatesman.com/200505300013">bombed Iraqi air defences</a> in preparation for the US-led invasion, details began to emerge from the US embassy in Sarajevo that a Bosnian company, the Orao (Eagle) Aviation Institute, was suspected of breaching the <a href="https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/iraq">13-year arms embargo</a>, sparking a scandal known as the “Orao Affair”. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208328/original/file-20180228-36696-18v93cp.JPEG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">US tanks parked under the Hands of Victory in Ceremony Square, Baghdad, 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Technical Sergeant John L Houghton, Jr, United States Air Force</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the Cold War, Iraq and Yugoslavia had developed a range of bilateral agreements, ranging from the construction of infrastructure and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/1507652/Inside-50m-nuclear-bunker-that-couldnt-save-Saddam.html">bunkers</a> in Iraq to the maintenance of Iraqi Migs (Soviet-designed fighter jets) in Yugoslavia. It emerged that the leadership of rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had quietly continued the relationship with Saddam Hussein, and had facilitated a deal worth US$8.5m in which Orao engineers had <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2017.1414734">travelled to Iraq</a> to “get the damaged fleet of Migs back to the heavens”. </p>
<p>The ensuing investigation implicated much of the Bosnian Serb leadership in the trade, and unveiled numerous attempted cover-ups. With evidence mounting, the potential for Bosnia to face economic sanctions became a real possibility, leading international officials to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518046.2017.1414734?journalCode=fslv20">state</a> that Bosnia was facing its “most severe crisis since the war”.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/208335/original/file-20180228-36671-9hayq7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1133&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bosnian troops in Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vanessa Vilarreal, USFOR-A Public Affairs</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As US forces entered Baghdad in 2003, the fallout from the Orao Affair was taking its toll. The Bosnian Serb member of the presidency, the Minister of Defence of Republika Srpska, the Chief of Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, and numerous other officials, ministers, and generals were all removed from their positions. 17 of them were prosecuted. International observers and Bosnian citizens alike demanded reform, and just a week after the invasion of Iraq was declared over, a Defence Reform Commission was <a href="http://www.ohr.int/?p=65835&print=pdf">established</a>. It recommended a complete restructuring of Bosnia’s armed forces, which was duly implemented by the Bosnian parliament.</p>
<p>The result was the demobilisation of a considerable number of soldiers, and the creation of a unified Bosnian army. The largest multi-ethnic institution in the country, it benefited from a clear chain of command, which led all the way up to the presidency via a single Ministry of Defence. The new military was modernised and professionalised with external assistance, and in 2006 it joined NATO’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_50349.htm">Partnership for Peace</a>. The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina have since been deployed in numerous peace-support roles across the world including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/19/iraq">Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>Post-Dayton Bosnia was a fragile and unstable country brimming with soldiers and weapons, and to some extent, it still is – but it’s nonetheless a much more stable and secure state than it was after the peace in 1995. Strange to think that it owes much of its improvement to something as destabilising as the Iraq War.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91856/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elliot Short receives funding from the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies and the University of East Anglia </span></em></p>The revelation that a Bosnian company had broken the arms embargo on Iraq unified three armies which had been fighting each other a decade before.Elliot Short, PhD Candidate and Associate Tutor in Modern History, University of East AngliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879272017-11-23T00:40:44Z2017-11-23T00:40:44ZRatko Mladic, the ‘Butcher of Bosnia’, to spend life in prison for genocide and war crimes<p>The former commander of the Bosnian Serb army, Ratko Mladić, has been found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and sentenced to life in prison. </p>
<p>Mladić was convicted by the <a href="http://www.icty.org">International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</a> of crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-summary-en.pdf">The tribunal declared</a> that the crimes he committed were “among the most heinous known to humankind”.</p>
<p>Trials of former high-ranking war criminals are often peppered with drama, and this week’s verdict announcement was no exception. Disruption of trials is a way for previously powerful people – usually men – to reclaim some of their lost power. </p>
<p>Halfway through the verdict summary announcement, Mladić requested a break. After a lengthy break, the court was informed that Mladić had high blood pressure, but on medical advice, deemed it appropriate to continue. At this point, Mladić refused to sit and began shouting at the judges: “this is a lie” and “shame on you”. </p>
<p>He was thrown out of court, and watched the rest of the proceedings from another room. This unfortunately meant that victims were unable to see his reaction to the long-awaited verdict and sentencing.</p>
<h2>Long road to justice</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.icty.org/en/node/10764">First indicted</a> by the tribunal in 1995, Mladić stayed in military resorts, protected even though a fugitive. He later went into hiding until his arrest in Serbia in 2011. Mladić’s trial began in 2012, concluded in 2016, with the verdict delivered on November 22.</p>
<p>Mladić, who came to be known as the “Butcher of Bosnia”, rose through the ranks to become the commander of the Bosnian Serb army in 1992, participating in atrocities committed under Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević’s regime. Milošević was also tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but died before he could be convicted.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/bosnias-25-year-struggle-with-transitional-justice-75517">Bosnia's 25-year struggle with transitional justice</a>
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<p>Mladić played a leadership role in these atrocities, commanding the army as it committed crimes across the regime. He has been convicted of “Joint Criminal Enterprise” – the international equivalent of conspiracy – alongside other leaders such as Milošević and Bosnian Serb politician Radovan Karadžić. The tribunal found that Mladić was instrumental in the crimes and they would not have taken place without his involvement.</p>
<p>The atrocities included the siege of Sarajevo, which lasted for 44 months from 1992-95. Some 10,000 people died during the siege, including many children. Some of Mladić’s other crimes were committed at internment camps such as Omarska and Foča, where thousands were tortured and raped. He has also been held responsible for the kidnapping of UN peacekeepers in order to leverage NATO to stop air strikes.</p>
<p>Convicting the high-ranking Mladić is symbolic and momentous, as he was the commander of the soldiers who carried out these actions.</p>
<p>Perhaps most significant is the conviction for genocide over mass killings at Srebrenica in July 1995. Some 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed and buried in mass graves.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQ0iT4mSK0I">Identification of remains</a> is ongoing, with thousands of bones and personal belongings still being analysed in hope of a match for families that continue to seek the whereabouts of loved ones. Identification is hampered by the fact that two months after the killings, bodies were moved to alternative mass grave locations.</p>
<h2>A welcome day for survivors</h2>
<p>The many survivors have waited a long time justice, both for themselves and for their lost loved ones. Some victims <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/11/20/families-of-bosnia-victims-head-to-the-hague-for-mladic-verdict">travelled to The Hague</a> to hear the verdict first hand.</p>
<p>It is particularly poignant, given that some of the war criminals convicted by the tribunal have already served their sentences and returned to Serbia and Bosnia, now living in communities with their victims. A life sentence for Mladić is a source of satisfaction to the victims; a minimum justice for their suffering and loss.</p>
<p>Legal consequences of this ruling are also substantial. Proving genocide in court is challenging for prosecutors, with the requirement of a “special intent” to eliminate part or whole of a specific population. </p>
<p>Convictions for genocide are rare; only a handful of convicted perpetrators at the ICTY were found guilty of genocide, including Karadžić and Radislav Krstić, a deputy commander in the Bosnian Serb army. </p>
<p>The confirmation that the Srebrenica massacre was indeed a genocide is important, because many Bosnian Serbs continue to deny the fact. Victims hope the ruling will contribute to a broader acknowledgement, which in turn could help the reconciliation process. </p>
<p>Yet <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/11/bosnia-war-victims-speak-ratko-mladic-verdic-171120142218960.html">others have little hope</a> that the ruling will change things. Srebrenica’s Serb mayor Mladen Grujičić still denies the genocide, and many Serbian nationalists still laud Mladić and his fellow war criminals as heroes.</p>
<p>Mladić was found not guilty of one count of genocide, in reference to a broader spate of killings throughout Bosnia. This is in keeping with previous decisions where Srebrenica has been deemed genocide, but the overall objective of the leadership for the whole of the Yugoslav territory has not.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ratko-mladics-conviction-and-why-the-evidence-of-mass-graves-still-matters-87976">Ratko Mladić's conviction and why the evidence of mass graves still matters</a>
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<p>This verdict is the final judgement to be delivered by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, slated to close at the end of this year. Since it was established in 1993, the tribunal has indicted 161 individuals and convicted 84 perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.</p>
<p>Some <a href="http://www.icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty-facts-figures">4,650 witnesses have appeared</a>, more than 1,000 of whom testified about the Srebrenica genocide. There are only seven proceedings remaining, with the UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals finalising cases. The tribunal has undoubtedly contributed to justice and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.</p>
<p>However, success has not been absolute, with criticism that sentences have been too short. There is also inevitable post-atrocity denial of crimes committed by perpetrators and their communities, with continued rejection by Serbian communities and politicians of the validity and decisions of the Tribunal.</p>
<p>These 84 convictions are clearly only a small proportion of the thousands of perpetrators. With the wind-up of the tribunal, remaining perpetrators will continue to be tried at local war crimes courts in Bosnia.</p>
<p>Throughout Europe, 14 countries have housed convicted tribunal war criminals in their prisons. Mladić will serve his sentence in a country yet to be determined. </p>
<p>While it may not bring their loved ones back, survivors can have some comfort in knowing the man who ordered and oversaw the atrocities will spend the rest of his life in prison.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melanie O'Brien is a member of the Australian Red Cross Queensland International Humanitarian Law Committee, and the Second Vice-President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. </span></em></p>Former commander of the Bosnian Serb army Ratko Mladic has been found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Survivors of the atrocities have today welcomed the long-awaited news.Melanie O'Brien, Research Fellow, TC Beirne Law School, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879692017-11-22T21:41:10Z2017-11-22T21:41:10ZRatko Mladić: orchestrator of the brutal siege of Sarajevo<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195861/original/file-20171122-6031-94dh5o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">General Ratko Mladić – convicted of war crimes and genocide.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/ssoosay/5763104078/in/photolist-9Mgq4q-oMbmvS-bv3iqL-9MHbyF-GQnVnF-GQnVvB-Dpbets-21rZs4G-QmyYtM-ZqwwKn-GQnV18-21rZtkE-GQnVEp-ZqwwVT-GQnWgz-GQnVdT-GQnVNR-GQnWpF-Dpbex5-ZqNupP-Dpbefm-57FJbJ-7uTBvq-9SqZ6C-9Qf31o">Surian Soosay</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ratko Mladić’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/ratko-mladic-convicted-of-genocide-and-war-crimes-at-un-tribunal">sentencing for genocide</a> in Srebrenica will doubtless be the headline in the plethora of press coverage that has accompanied judgement of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). But Mladić was also sentenced for his role in executing <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/it/book/9781137577177">the siege of Sarajevo</a>, the longest siege in modern European history during which citizens were targeted by mortar, shell and sniper fire and the city’s water and electricity was cut off. It was a brutal campaign to break the city’s resistance, and there was no distinction made between military and civilian targets. </p>
<p>Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most multi-ethnic of former Yugoslavia’s six republics. The population of its capital, Sarajevo, mirrored this ethnic complexity and the city itself. But the first multi-party elections in Bosnia in 1990 had brought a tenuous coalition of nationalist parties to power. This coalition, comprising the (Bosniak) Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) were elected with a Bosniak, Alija Izetbegović, as president. </p>
<p>As the Yugoslav state continued to disintegrate, with Slovenia and Croatia both pursuing independence, Bosnia’s situation became increasingly dangerous. In short, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/radovan-karadzic-26073">Radovan Karadžić</a>’s SDS wished to remain in a Yugoslav state, whatever form that would take, while both the SDA and the HDZ pursued independence. During heated exchanges in October 1991, the SDS walked out of parliament and set up a parallel Bosnian Serb assembly and <em>de facto</em> headquarters in the nearby Holiday Inn hotel. </p>
<h2>Sliding into war</h2>
<p>On February 29 and March 1, a referendum on independence was held. The SDS, arguing that the decision to hold a referendum was unconstitutional because it was not reached by consensus, called on Serbs to boycott the vote. Those who did vote, largely Bosniaks and Croats, opted for independence. The result initiated the “war of the barricades”, during which the SDS (and later the SDA) erected barricades in areas of Sarajevo they claimed as theirs. War was avoided then, but on April 6, 1992 shots were fired from <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24730400">the Holiday Inn</a> by snipers into a crowd of peaceful demonstrators who were assembled outside the Bosnian parliament. In the chaos that followed, Karadžić fled. The Bosnian Serb leadership established their wartime base in nearby Pale and heavy weapons were placed on the hills surrounding Sarajevo. Intermittent shelling and sniping began.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-boLmzBnzO8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
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<p>Whether interested in politics or not, the siege imposed itself on ordinary people’s lives in increments. Many continued going to work, despite the sporadic sniper and mortar fire and fierce battles in Ilidža, just west of Sarajevo. They refused to believe it could happen in their city, which was civilised, cultured, part of the European mainstream. But any existing illusions were shattered by the summer of 1992. Mladić assumed command of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) in May 1992, promising to “blow the minds” of the citizens of Sarajevo. Throughout the subsequent months the city was heavily shelled, causing significant civilian casualties and the destruction of many important buildings, such as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-cityhall/sarajevo-reopens-landmark-city-hall-and-library-destroyed-in-war-idUSKBN0DP0XO20140509">Vijećnica</a>, which housed thousands of rare books and manuscripts. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195858/original/file-20171122-6051-yyzqe8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">General Mladić (centre) arrives for UN-mediated talks at Sarajevo airport, June 1993.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ratko_Mladi%C4%87#/media/File:Evstafiev-mladic-sarajevo1993w.jpg">I, Evstafiev</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>It was, however, the first winter of the siege that brought real privation to Sarajevo. No running water, no electricity and limited amounts of food (UN aid and anything that could be purchased for inflated prices on the black market) meant the challenges of surviving were manifold. And the extremities of life under siege had a significant impact upon people’s ability to stay sane. Daily shelling and sniping – sometimes in a slow and methodical manner – and constant danger of death placed citizens of Sarajevo in an unimaginable psychological position. Some withdrew into themselves, while others found survival mechanisms and a way of facing the realities of their lives. Otherwise normal activities became vital mechanisms for survival – dressing well, attending theatre performances or going to <em>ad hoc</em> gigs. Humour, albeit of the rather dark variant, was equally important. Preservation of one’s dignity was a serious matter. </p>
<p>The construction of a tunnel (built by the Bosnian Army) underneath Sarajevo airport in 1993 eased the situation somewhat, with arms and food being brought into the city – breaking somewhat the over-inflation of basic goods. But life under siege became a reality with no end in sight. The international community’s efforts to bring the siege to an end had failed, though <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Deliberate_Force">NATO airstrikes on VRS</a> positions, following the two mortar attacks (in February 1994 and August 1995) would eventually help to do so. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195934/original/file-20171122-6013-14qe5iy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Sarajevo Tunnel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/26781577@N07/15840660490/in/photolist-9fD5ai-9fD5cM-9fGevw-8trhr7-q8Mwu3-qqgH75-C8kFuT-HjxHfD-qqgGwh-wDpDRX-oZtdwu-buTb32-buTNtz-buTNNr-buTMbP-buTN26-bsCwiv-9kav2S-9fJnfS">Clay Gilliland</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>The war in Bosnia ended with the signing of the <a href="http://www.osce.org/bih/126173">Dayton Peace Agreement</a> in November 1995, though the siege of Sarajevo was not lifted until February 1996. As part of the peace agreement, the vast majority of the city – with the exception of Istočno Sarajevo (eastern Sarajevo) – became part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the country’s two entities (the other being Republika Srpska). This initiated the departure of the majority of the city’s Serb population. </p>
<p>By the lifting of the siege over 11,000 people, 5,000 of whom were civilians (2,000 were children), were killed during the siege of Sarajevo. In the context of the charges relating to Sarajevo, Mladić’s sentencing is no surprise – his colleagues, <a href="http://www.icty.org/case/galic/4">Stanislav Galić</a> and <a href="http://www.icty.org/case/dragomir_milosevic/4">Dragomir Milošević</a> both commanders of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the VRS had previously received lengthy sentences. Mladić’s sentencing for the siege of Sarajevo (not to mention his other crimes) will never compensate for the destruction of a city and the targeting of civilians, but it may go some way to bringing a close to a dark chapter in Bosnia, and Sarajevo’s, history.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87969/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kenneth Morrison is author of four monographs on the Balkans, including Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn: On the Frontline of Politics and War (Palgrave MacMillan, 2016).</span></em></p>Bosnian Serb general found guilty of genocide.Kenneth Morrison, Professor of Modern South-East European History, De Montfort UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/879762017-11-22T17:21:41Z2017-11-22T17:21:41ZRatko Mladić’s conviction and why the evidence of mass graves still matters<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195903/original/file-20171122-6061-czl9t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Former general Mladić during proceedings in January.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/icty/31737888363/in/photolist-9Mgq4q-oMbmvS-57FJbJ-bv3iqL-GQnVnF-9MHbyF-7uTBvq-9SqZ6C-GQnVvB-QmyYtM-9Qf31o-Dpbets-21rZs4G-ZqwwKn-21rZtkE-GQnV18-Dpbex5-Dpbefm-GQnVEp-GQnWgz-ZqwwVT-GQnVdT-GQnWpF-GQnVNR">UN ICTY</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ratko Mladić <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/22/ratko-mladic-convicted-of-genocide-and-war-crimes-at-un-tribunal">has been convicted</a> of genocide and persecution, extermination, murder and the inhumane act of forcible transfer in the area of Srebrenica in 1995. He was also found guilty of persecution, extermination, murder, deportation and inhumane act of forcible transfer in municipalities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and of murder, terror and unlawful attacks on civilians in Sarajevo. </p>
<p>In addition, the former Bosnian Serb army general was convicted for the hostage-taking of UN personnel. But he was acquitted of the charge of genocide in several municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992.</p>
<p>The events that occurred in and around the Srebrenica enclave between July 10-19 1995, where an estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslims, mostly men and boys, lost their lives, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/11/reviews/970511.11grimont.html">are well documented</a>. These atrocities, <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Yugoslavia-Death-Nation-Laura-Silber/dp/0140262636">culminating in</a> the “biggest single mass murder in Europe” since World War II, not only resulted in a tremendous loss of life and emotionally scarred survivors, it also left behind a landscape filled with human remains and mass graves.</p>
<p>Forensic investigations into the Srebrenica massacre <a href="http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/24750/1/Karadzic%E2%80%99s%20guilty%20verdict%20and%20forensic%20evidence%20from%20Bosnia%E2%80%99s%20mass%20graves%20Sci-Justice%202016.pdf">assisted</a> in convicting Mladić, who stood accused for his involvement in implementing and orchestrating the forcible transfer and eventual elimination of the Bosnian Muslim population from Srebrenica. For the Srebrenica investigations, between 1996 and 2001, the <a href="http://www.icty.org/">International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</a> (ICTY) conducted exhumations at 23 sites, while a further 20 mass graves were probed to confirm that they <a href="http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/documents/P642-1a.pdf">contained human remains</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195909/original/file-20171122-6016-4ntuqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Srebrenica.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/martijnmunneke/2653413838/in/photolist-53trus-53tuFf-53pecX-53trZG-53tuRh-53tuzf-53tuLW-53pcec-53pcsF-53tvwJ-53pgY6-53tvtd-53pezt-53pdXF-53tsNy-53trCJ-53pftF-53tsru-53tu8y-53tvpG-53trfJ-53phoB-53pe4X-53pffz-53tr4w-53ttaW-53pfn4-53peXP-53tsUY-53tqTq-53pdB4-53pfai-53pgLr-8A4MLN-53pgkx-53tviA-53ph1r-53tvd3-53tuPq-o9UYVS-obNR8L-a5ypHx-53tvaL-53tv93-53pgNn-53pfGX-vSB5KV-a3tvtf-Xefv6v-a3tuw3">Martijn.Munneke/ Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The investigative objectives for these investigations were to:
* Corroborate victim and witness accounts of the massacres;
* Determine an accurate count of victims;
* Determine cause and time of death;
* Determine the sex of victims;
* Determine the identity of victims (a process that is ongoing with the help of DNA analysis); and
* Identify links <a href="http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/documents/P642-1a.pdf">to the perpetrators</a>.</p>
<p>The task of locating and exhuming mass graves in Bosnia continues, as does the general quest of locating the missing in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. And this evidence still matters for the ICTY. Evidence on hundreds of bodies exhumed from the Tomašica mass grave near Prijedor in the north-west of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was <a href="http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/what-post-mortems-of-tomasica-victims-showed.29.html?cat_id=1&news_id=16662">presented in the Mladić trial</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-summary-en.pdf">summary judgment</a> read out in the court room in The Hague made this very clear:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>During several weeks in September and early October 1995, senior members of the VRS [Army of the Bosnian-Serb Republic] and the MUP [Ministry of the Interior] attempted to conceal their crimes by exhuming their victims’ remains from several mass graves, and then reburying those remains in more remote areas in Zvornik and Bratunac municipalities. Their attempt to cover up the Srebrenica massacres ultimately failed. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such attempts at hiding crimes by digging up mass graves only to dispose of the bodies in so called “secondary mass graves” results in commingled and mutilated body parts rendering identification and repatriation of human remains all the more difficult. This causes further and prolonged distress to the survivor population and can be seen as intent to cause suffering.</p>
<p>Properly investigated forensic evidence from mass graves, the presentation of such physical evidence, the testing of expertise, independence and impartiality of the accounts in court, is likely to result in more reliable findings. In the case of Bosnian Serb leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/radovan-karadzic-sentenced-to-40-years-but-peace-is-still-a-work-in-progress-56778">Radovan Karadžić</a> forensic evidence helped confirm the crimes committed – it can be assumed that the same is the case for Mladić; at the time of writing the judgment in its entirety is not available yet. </p>
<p>It is well worth remembering that the information from forensic mass grave investigations has another purpose and does not only speak to a court of law. The work on the ground through organisations such as the <a href="https://www.icmp.int/">International Commission on Missing Persons</a> will continue <a href="https://www.ictj.org/news/karadzic-bosnia-herzegovina-criminal-justice#.VwvL_wtXbgc.twitter">as there are</a> “too many people who are still searching for their children’s bones to bury”. Those forensic findings will have a value and meaning for family members and survivors that judgments such as the Mladić one cannot have. It offers them information on their lost loved ones and, hopefully, the return of their human remains.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87976/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melanie Klinkner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Forensic science of the dead helps to convict the living responsible.Melanie Klinkner, Senior Lecturer In Law, Bournemouth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.