tag:theconversation.com,2011:/us/topics/zulu-20993/articleszulu – The Conversation2021-03-12T11:20:33Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1569652021-03-12T11:20:33Z2021-03-12T11:20:33ZSouth Africa’s Goodwill Zwelithini: the Zulu king without a kingdom<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/389238/original/file-20210312-13-dsezxb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Goodwill Zwelithini in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Khaya Ngwenya/Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>King Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, who has <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/king-goodwill-zwelithini-dies">died at the age of 72</a>, was the longest reigning of all Zulu kings on record. This was the 50th year of his incumbency. </p>
<p>His reign spanned turbulent decades in South Africa. He assumed the throne at the height of apartheid, and went on to rule through the country’s violent and turbulent decades, a period which included contestation of the role of the Zulu monarchy. This spilled over into post-apartheid South Africa when the country’s new constitution recognised traditional leaders along with its democratically elected representatives. </p>
<p>Chapter 12 – a single page – of the 1996 constitution of the democratic Republic of South Africa recognises traditional leaders, <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-chapter-12-traditional-leaders">laws and customs in general terms</a>. Subsequently, through specific and continually contested legislation, attempts were made to concretise such authority, despite discriminatory consequences for millions of South African citizens who were made <a href="https://www.amazon.de/-/en/Gerhard-Mar%C3%A9/dp/1869144562">subjects of this parallel system</a>. </p>
<p>Kings and other traditional leaders have continued to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-04-bantustan-bills-trample-on-the-rights-of-rural-people/">demand lucrative recognition</a> under this chapter.</p>
<p>Goodwill bore ideological power of value to himself and to others. Core was the repeated reminder that without a “predestined” king there would be no Zulu nation. </p>
<p>But kingship is an historical creation, wherever it is found. </p>
<p>So whom did his rule benefit? And at whose expense? Why, during apartheid and beyond, did politicians and economic interests rush to show support for this “king of goodwill”, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/King-Goodwill-Authorised-Zwelithini-Kabhekuzulu/dp/0799421448">as his authorised biographers punned</a>? Why was his actual, and not just symbolic, landlordship ensured, at the last minute, under apartheid by the <a href="https://www.amazon.de/-/en/Gerhard-Mar%C3%A9/dp/1869144562">Ingonyama Trust</a>, which placed all kwaZulu land under King Zwelithini as the only trustee? And why was this confirmed in the democratic period?</p>
<p>It is because such undemocratic centralised power is too big a temptation for those who seek to benefit. Access to – and manipulation of – such power explains the cynically justified acceptance over half a century of his political influence and ideological authority by politicians and capitalists. It enabled human and material exploitation through association, control over people as workers, justification for exclusion, votes from a specific group, and, more recently, access to what lies beneath the land on which the subjects live.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>Kingship and nation are inextricably linked. In this case it most commonly starts with <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/shaka-zulu">Shaka</a>, the warlord who defeated other clans, and became the original father of a Zulu nation, people of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301199553_Zulu_Identities_Being_Zulu_Past_and_Present">legendary courage and prowess in war</a>. </p>
<p>The Zulus themselves had to be made subservient. In the 19th century this was initially through military defeat of Zulu armies and the kings who held them together. Defeats were inflicted by the <em>trekboere</em> – settlers who left the Cape to escape British rule, reaching KwaZulu Natal (Natal and
Zululand) in the late 1830s – and then British colonial authority. </p>
<p>In the newly formed state, the Union of South Africa, from 1910, policy was less clear: white rule, yes, but what of the black majority? </p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/natives-land-act-1913">1913 Land Act</a> the country was divided into African residential occupancy areas and white controlled areas which housed big industry, including mines, and farming. Initially 87% of the land was designated to white control and the remainder was set aside as reserves for African people.</p>
<p>The idea was to ensure spatial separation in reserves, but economic integration through migrant labour. Migrant labour provided individual workers without their families the right to periodic employment in white controlled areas and farmlands. </p>
<p>But it was apartheid, and its policy of “separate development” <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190921767.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190921767-e-11">from 1951</a>, that step by step defined an essentially different approach to the inhabitants of these erstwhile reserves (“bantustans”). Determining who was going to be in charge became important. Ethnic nations would govern themselves, but under whom?</p>
<p>Enter a 23-year-old Goodwill Zwelithini. Through bizarre processes – described with naïve directness by his elder sister in the authorised biography – he was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Buthelezi-Biography-Ben-Temkin/dp/0714682314">installed</a> on December 1 1971 into a Zulu Territorial Authority. This had been newly created in terms of the 1959 Promotion of Bantu (later Black) Self-Government Act. His relative, Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Buthelezi-Biography-Ben-Temkin/dp/0714682314">already the chief executive officer</a>. </p>
<h2>Power battles</h2>
<p>Over the next few years, there were struggles for control. These involved, on the one hand, the apartheid state and some of the Zulu middle class, on the other, the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly under Buthelezi. </p>
<p>Buthelezi increasingly had backers, and “sides” were taken by national and international supporters. One example was the sugar industry and Progressive Party sponsoring a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3330064?seq=1">major event</a> in the 1980s to explore an integrated KwaZulu as an example of what South Africa could be.</p>
<p>Pretoria, and those who saw benefits in bantustan independence such as businesses wanting to operate outside the control of the apartheid government, desired an executive king as existed in Swaziland (now eSwatini). They found this in the person of the immature and malleable Goodwill. Buthelezi and most of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly needed, for their purposes, kingship as a binding factor of the people over whom they governed, but certainly could not afford a contesting seat of authority.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/buthelezis-retirement-wont-end-ethnic-traditionalism-in-south-africa-102213">Buthelezi's retirement won't end ethnic 'traditionalism' in South Africa</a>
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<p>They were helped by the fact that Goodwill, under the bantustan constitution, had limited powers, and was simply assigned the role of a cultural figurehead. </p>
<p>“Independence” would have boosted apartheid policy nationally and internationally. KwaZulu, most prominent of the bantustans, would then have been a state equivalent to Swaziland and Lesotho. </p>
<p>But Buthelezi had national political ambitions, which demanded resistance against such fragmentation. To safeguard himself against the apartheid state removing him, he established a political base by <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Buthelezi-Biography-Ben-Temkin/dp/0714682314">launching Inkatha in 1975</a>. This provided him with a base from which to consolidate his popular power among Zulus. Goodwill’s kingship provided important leverage for the organisation.</p>
<p>After Inkatha’s <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Buthelezi-Biography-Ben-Temkin/dp/0714682314">break</a> with the African National Congress (ANC) from 1979, Goodwill served in an alignment against the largest trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, as well as the United Democratic Front, a loose alliance mobilising against apartheid. The result was that the politics of Zulu kingship became deeply mired in a civil war over battles for popular support – for the time, as well as for the anticipated changes that were to come. These contestation grew <a href="https://www.upress.virginia.edu/title/5763">during the transition from apartheid</a>. Both positions – the ANC camp and the Inkatha camp – needed the support of Zulus through the king.</p>
<h2>Power dynamics</h2>
<p>King Zwelithini could define kingship during his reign, but only while he had the support of whoever wielded wider power. From apartheid’s bantustan schemes, to support for the politics of Inkatha and Buthelezi, and then to the new ruling party, he claimed to be a bearer of traditional authority. </p>
<p>For example, association with the Zulu kingship was important for the authority of South Africa’s former president Jacob Zuma. His <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-94222018000200008&lng=en&nrm=iso">claim</a> to be “100% Zulu” brought him votes and legitimised his behaviour as he pillaged the republic. King Goodwill costs <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-03-07-zulu-king-goodwill-zwelithinis-budget-set-to-reach-r75m-in-202122-estimates-show/">millions of rands per year</a>, but provided value through votes, through the “brand” he provided the tourist industry, and access to the mineral wealth <a href="https://theecologist.org/2021/jan/28/remember-mama-ntshangase-and-organise">under the Ingonyama Trust land</a>. Battles continue over the trust.</p>
<p>But for Inkatha’s push-back against homelands (bantustans), the apartheid state might have succeeded in installing Goodwill into a King Sobhuza II equivalent (in other words an executive king) in kwaZulu. After all, the Swazi model of supreme monarchy was in the making by <a href="https://ozoutback.com.au/Swaziland/ndiphete_71/slides/1971090522.html">the end of 1971</a>, following its constitutional independence from <a href="https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1968/jul/05/swaziland-independence-bill">Britain in 1968</a>. </p>
<p>By the time of his death King Zwelithini was firmly established not as executive king, but certainly as powerful Ingonyama Trust landholder.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156965/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerhard Maré is author of Ethnic Continuities and a State of Exception: Goodwill Zwelithini, Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Jacob Zuma, published by UKZN Press in 2020.</span></em></p>The king retained his position because undemocratic centralised power is too big a temptation for those who seek to benefit.Gerhard Maré, Emeritus Professor of Political Sociology, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1229642019-09-18T11:04:16Z2019-09-18T11:04:16ZPolitician’s succession sparks democracy debate in South Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291744/original/file-20190910-190002-135834g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C40%2C575%2C376&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi's replacement as leader of Inkatha Freedom Party after 44 marked the end of an era.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The year 2019 will go down as a momentous year for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the South African political party started by Prince <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/mangosuthu-gatsha-buthelezi">Mangosuthu Buthelezi</a> as a cultural movement in 1975. </p>
<p>At its birth, the IFP also sought to fill the political void created by the <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/pac-formed">banning</a> of the country’s liberation movements, notably the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), by the apartheid government <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-national-congress-timeline-1960-1969">in 1960</a>. </p>
<p>Buthelezi adopted the black, green and gold colours of both the ANC and PAC, and recruited several ANC stalwarts into his fold. And after more than four decades in charge, in August 2019, Prince Buthelezi (90) <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ifp-leader-mangosuthu-buthelezi-steps-down-after-44-years-20190824">eventually stepped down</a>. This marked the end of an era, a long journey which was at times characterised by turbulent moments.</p>
<p>Among its successes, the IFP under Buthelezi refused to accept nominal independence for Kwa-Zulu, in line with the apartheid government’s strategy of giving black people <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/inkatha-freedom-party-ifp">limited self-rule</a> in economically depressed <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/homelands">ethnic homelands</a>, denying them citizenship and political rights in the rest of the country. It once led the province of KwaZulu-Natal. On the negative side, it was implicated in <a href="https://theconversation.com/buthelezis-retirement-wont-end-ethnic-traditionalism-in-south-africa-102213">deadly political violence</a> ahead of the 1994 elections that ended apartheid. </p>
<p>It is irrefutable that, despite many challenges, Prince Buthelezi held the IFP together. He also ensured that the party bounced back time and again when commentators and political adversaries had written it off. </p>
<p>The IFP’s stronghold is <a href="http://www.ifp.org.za/kwazulu-natal-provincial-elective-conference/">KwaZulu-Natal</a>. Over the years, it has used Zulu identity as its rallying point. But is has also attracted support from other racial groups and other provinces. The party has <a href="https://www.pa.org.za/organisation/national-assembly/party/ifp/">14 MPs</a> in the 400-member <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/how-parliament-is-structured">National Assembly</a>. </p>
<p>As Prince Buthelezi signed off, it was the manner of the leadership transition that captured many people’s attention. Many thought that Inkosi Mzamo Buthelezi – no relation to Prince Buthelezi – who was <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Another-Buthelezi-set-to-lead-IFP-20121217">elected as the party’s deputy president in 2012</a>, would be the shoo-in. However, the top brass in the IFP had other ideas. </p>
<p>Instead, it was unanimously agreed that Velenkosini Hlabisa, a 54-year-old former school principal, would be the right person to take over from Prince Buthelezi.</p>
<p>The party’s constitution provides that the nomination of national office bearers – including the president – must have approval right through from the branches to the top. But this was not done in the nomination of its new president. Instead, Hlabisa’s name was proposed by the party’s leadership.</p>
<p>This deviation from this constitutional imperative raises two questions. The first is why the IFP leadership followed this route. The second is how this sits with the country’s broader debate on democratic governance. </p>
<h2>Choice of replacement</h2>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291921/original/file-20190911-190002-3uvsia.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291921/original/file-20190911-190002-3uvsia.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291921/original/file-20190911-190002-3uvsia.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291921/original/file-20190911-190002-3uvsia.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291921/original/file-20190911-190002-3uvsia.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291921/original/file-20190911-190002-3uvsia.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291921/original/file-20190911-190002-3uvsia.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=772&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">New IFP president Velenkosini Hlabisa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">African News Agency(ANA)</span></span>
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<p>The best way to answer the first question is to consider the political context in KwaZulu-Natal. Both the National Freedom Party (NFP), which<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-01-28-inkatha-freedom-party-falls-apart-again-and-this-may-be-terminal/"> split from the IFP in 2011</a> under the leadership of Zanele ka Magwaza-Msibi, and the ANC – the oldest political party in Africa which was formed in 1912 – have been struggling to deal with <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/politics/2166411/its-time-to-take-the-gloves-off-mr-president/">leadership squabbles</a> triggered by succession politics. </p>
<p>Having watched mud-slinging <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/nfp-leader-disgusted-by-party-squabbles-1920238">in the NFP</a> and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2019-06-16-anc-kzn-faction-plots-to-remove-president-ramaphosa/">ANC </a> – epitomised by public insults and accusations among politicians as well as factional politics which dominated the media, the IFP leadership resolved to do all in its power to avert a similar situation in its own party. This explains the decision to propose a successor’s name from the top.</p>
<p>The extent to which this decision was a wise move will become clear as time goes on. The fact that the IFP’s elective conference endorsed Hlabisa vindicates the leadership’s decision. However, it does not refute the fact that the decision was not in sync with the IFP’s constitution and was, therefore, undemocratic.</p>
<h2>The democracy debate</h2>
<p>This leads us to the second question on how this episode invokes the debate on democracy. Two points are worth considering. The first is that there is a clear distinction between liberal (Western) democracy and democracy as understood and practised by Africans during the pre-colonial era.</p>
<p>While liberal democracy touts simple majority as a determining factor for decision making, Africans believed in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23739547?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">consensus</a>. Consensus meant that discussions would take longer as attempts were being made to win over those of a contrasting view.</p>
<p>So, if the IFP’s leaders sat down to deliberate on how to avoid a power struggle within the party as Prince Buthelezi stepped down, they may have opted for consensus and not simple majority per se. But the fact that branches were not part of this process raises a question on whether consensus was carried out properly. Being mindful of the dictates of <a href="https://sk.sagepub.com/books/key-concepts-in-governance/n42.xml">representative democracy </a>, the leadership deemed it necessary to take a decision on behalf of the party’s general membership. This is part of the debate.</p>
<p>Another important point worth noting is that the word “democracy” has different meanings. One of them relates to executing the will of the people. The fact that the IFP’s elective conference, whose delegates carried the mandate from their constituencies, officially elected Hlabisa as the new leader means that democracy was not undermined.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291748/original/file-20190910-190007-122lsfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291748/original/file-20190910-190007-122lsfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291748/original/file-20190910-190007-122lsfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291748/original/file-20190910-190007-122lsfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=597&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291748/original/file-20190910-190007-122lsfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291748/original/file-20190910-190007-122lsfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291748/original/file-20190910-190007-122lsfz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=750&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>What triggers interest is that other members of the leadership structure were elected through normal channels. Candidates were nominated and then voted into office. This was in line with the IFP’s Constitution.</p>
<p>Within this context, although Hlabisa’s name came from the leadership structure and not the branches, it could be argued that the IFP’s leadership reached consensus on its preferred candidate but still left it to the conference delegates to elect the new leader. </p>
<p>But this process would have to be explained for it to pass the litmus test of a democratic process. Without such an explanation, the impression created would be that the leadership of the IFP acted undemocratically.</p>
<h2>Action and democratic practice</h2>
<p>The IFP’s action has unwittingly sparked a debate on democracy. Given that the IFP is rooted in <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/elections2019-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-ifp-19859977">African customary practices</a>, consensus is an acceptable approach to democratic practice. But, such consensus needs to be inclusive of the party structures. The IFP’s Constitution embraces both liberal democratic practices and African customary practices.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen if other political parties will adopt this approach in future to avoid potential leadership squabbles. It will also be interesting to see if the IFP will follow the same approach when Hlabisa’s term of office ends in five years.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bheki Mngomezulu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The IFP’s constitution provides that the nomination of national office bearers be approved by the branches. But this was not done in the nomination of its new president.Bheki Mngomezulu, Professor of Political Science, University of the Western CapeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/911652018-02-08T12:49:02Z2018-02-08T12:49:02ZA personal journey sheds light on why there are so few black women in science<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/205280/original/file-20180207-74490-1qqziwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many black women scientists feel isolated or worry about being "perfect" to impress their peers.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/33026035184/in/photolist-Sjp4DJ-T1Z58N-T1Z5hW-TpwLRP-T1Z4Pm-Sjp5AU-Sjp4oU-Sjp4t3-RRDcUA-RUcw5B-T9aVai-RRDcnU-T9aVn2-RUcvCp-RUcvJ6-VqtDZP-Wso7A4-uKaqmd-uKahrY-u5Ubtr-KocydQ-JSJqcb-KGtFP2-KPiapr-KocxCG-JSJj2W-KGtG2B-KPibda-KE2Cew-KGtFnk-KGtFaM-KocxXj-KLvPgJ-fWmy4P-fWmY6p-fWmHW5-KPi9CM-g9V841-g9V8fo-YE3268-YE31VZ-XACgJy-SjpWqo-Tna2MC-bRSeLx-bCXw17-bCXvZo-Tpxydv-SjpWxC-TpxxP4">Laura Gil Martinez/IAEA/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nine years into my research and academic career, one of the most common questions I hear from family and friends is, “uzoqedanini ukufunda?” (“Will she ever finish studying?”)</p>
<p>They’re not the only ones who struggle to understand what it is that I do. My experience is that most black women “fall into” research and academia, rather than deliberately choosing it as a career direction from the start. That would explain why black women undergraduates often ask me “What is research?” and “Is reading all you do?” </p>
<p>The United Nations marks February 11 each year as the <a href="http://www.un.org/en/events/women-and-girls-in-science-day/">International Day of Women and Girls in Science</a>. This is an important occasion – but, based on the kinds of questions I receive almost daily, I’d suggest that retention rather than participation should be the focus of February 11 and related initiatives.</p>
<p>In South Africa, where I conduct my research and am working towards a PhD in <a href="http://deliveringfoodsecurity.org/team/">climate change and food production</a>, there is a particular need to attract and retain black women to the sciences. This has been a difficult, fraught process. Mamokgethi Phakeng, a full professor of mathematics education and a deputy vice-chancellor at the University of Cape Town, has <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/sajs/v111n11-12/09.pdf">offered</a> several reasons for this.</p>
<p>For instance, she has pointed out that black women wishing to enter “non-traditional” careers face opposition from patriarchal <a href="http://journals.co.za/docserver/fulltext/ju_sajhr/25/3/ju_sajhr_v25_n3_a5.pdf?expires=1518079336&id=id&accname=57716&checksum=D0043B7597EABAA80F6AD94865BE1ED6">African cultures</a>. This, she suggests, is part of the reason that <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-12/Report-03-10-122001.pdf">men dominate</a> science and technology-related careers.</p>
<p>These issues can be addressed in several ways. Mentors and role models are crucial; so too are opportunities for black women scientists to find and build more collaborative spaces where they can combine their technical training with other skills. Cultural attitudes to the notion of “women as scientists” also need to be addressed.</p>
<h2>The reality</h2>
<p>During my talk at <a href="http://www.sfsa.co.za/representation-matters-black-women-in-science/">the Science Forum South Africa</a> conference in 2017 a young man asked me: “What is the big deal? Could it be that women are just not interested in the Sciences?” My answer was, “No sir!”, and that’s backed up by figures. <a href="http://www.sun.ac.za/english/InTheNews/05%20Apr%20-%20Business%20Day%20-%20Few%20Africa%20women%20graduating%20in%20science.pdf">University enrolment data</a> shows that attracting young black women to science courses at undergraduate level in South Africa is not the problem. </p>
<p><a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-15-00-why-are-there-so-few-black-professors">Retention</a> is the issue. There is a “<a href="http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/FeesHET/docs/2015-Report-SecondNationalHETSummit.pdf">leaky pipeline</a>” that sees women complete undergraduate science degrees – and then leave academia rather than pursuing postgraduate qualifications.</p>
<p>This means that <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2014-11-07-addressing-the-shortage-of-black-and-women-professors">black women lecturers</a> in the sciences in South Africa’s academy have the <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10734-017-0203-4">lowest representation</a>. Fewer lecturers ultimately mean fewer professors – the most senior, admired and respected in their academic disciplines.</p>
<p>In an environment like this, young black female scientists <a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22258-where-are-all-the-black-women-in-science/">feel isolated</a> and misunderstood. I know this first hand, as a young black women researching methods to improve food production for sub-Saharan Africa on limited land and in the face of changing climate. My own experiences are part of the reason I started an organisation called <a href="https://www.facebook.com/BlackWomenInScience/">Black Women in Science</a>.</p>
<p>I was also responding to complaints from other science students, who felt the same worry about their own skills and sense of isolation that I did. Black Women in Science, which has 150 members, aims to encourage women’s participation in science, technology, engineering and maths by approaching the career of a scientist in a collaborative manner. It’s not about sticking to one discipline or area of specialisation. </p>
<h2>Role models and cultural norms</h2>
<p>So what’s holding young black women back? The giant leap from <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-12/Report-03-10-122001.pdf">high school to university</a> is an enormous hurdle. This is true for all students, but – as <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-01696-w">data</a> about first-year dropout rates in South Africa show – especially among black students. This is because they tend to come from <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/education/2017-12-28-sa-comes-39th-in-grade-9-science-performance--out-of-39-countries/">lower quality</a> primary and secondary school systems than their white peers. </p>
<p>For those who remain in the system and look to pursue postgraduate degrees, the lack of mentorship and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-keep-more-women-in-science-technology-engineering-and-mathematics-stem-61664">role models</a> is another issue. When you don’t identify with people who are lecturing in terms of image, culture and background, it’s easy not to relate to the field or subject. Diversity in the lecture hall is a way to show black women students that they can also take ownership in a particular field.</p>
<p>It’s important for these young women to look beyond the academy for mentors, too. One of the women I admire is Getty Choenyana, who trained as a mechanical engineer, then founded <a href="https://oamobu.co.za/pages/about-us">Oamobu Naturals</a> and uses her scientific skills and knowledge to successfully produce marketable products. </p>
<p>Family, marriage and culture also influence black women’s experiences as scientists. A number of African communities and cultures do not have a tradition of professional women. There is a strong expectation that women must conform to the traditional roles of wife and mother. </p>
<p>I am a Zulu woman. If I were married, my in-laws would probably struggle to understand that I am unable to attend “<a href="http://www.sunika.co.za/traditional-clothing-in-south-africa/86-umembeso/116-planning-for-umembeso">umembeso</a>” (one of the many stages and rituals in a Zulu wedding) because I have a thesis to write-up. </p>
<p>This is an added layer of complexity and a daunting burden. I, and black women scientists like me, feel enormous pressure to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18117295.2017.1371980">be perfect</a> in the eyes of our academic peers and our own communities.</p>
<p>This points to the need for institutions to change too. It’s important that departments, faculties and senior academics understand the language and cultural challenges black women scientists face, and try to be more sensitive to them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/91165/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ndoni Mcunu is doing her PhD at the Global Change Institute - Witwatersrand University. She is the founder of Black Women in Science (BWIS). </span></em></p>Family, marriage and culture are among the factors that influence black women’s experiences as scientists.Ndoni Mcunu, PhD Candidate, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/583512016-05-10T14:27:47Z2016-05-10T14:27:47ZTrump and Zuma: worlds apart but bound by patriarchy and sexism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121891/original/image-20160510-20698-1sslojd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Women support Jacob Zuma outside court during his 2006 rape trial. Women are often complicit in sustaining patriarchy.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In recent months two highly controversial political leaders, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-inoculate-people-against-donald-trumps-fact-bending-claims-56489">Donald Trump</a> and <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/list_by.php?by=Jacob%20Zuma">Jacob Zuma</a>, have received harsh, intense global media coverage. </p>
<p>Trump, a white man, is the Republican presumptive nominee in the US presidential race as “leader of the free world”. Zuma, a black man, is the embattled President of the <a href="http://www.anc.org.za/">African National Congress-led</a> government in South Africa, clinging to power in an emerging, developing democracy.</p>
<p>The trajectory of the two men through political power structures in their respective countries cannot be more dissimilar. Trump is the privileged, university-educated billionaire entrepreneur. Zuma is the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/jacob-zuma-likes-to-be-cast-as-a-man-of-the-people-but-is-he-50665">man of the people</a>”, rising from poverty and struggle politics through the ranks of the ANC with little formal education. </p>
<p>These men, seemingly poles apart, have something distinct in common. They are both prominent patriarchs with populist support. </p>
<p>They share a value system based on male supremacy, power and entitlement that has historically, and still continues, to subjugate, oppress, violate and exploit women globally. These men demonstrate that patriarchy transcends race, ethnicity, class, culture and geopolitics.</p>
<p>Its persistence in the US, one of the most advanced, democratised nations in the world, may appear paradoxical. But patriarchy, like all forms of structural violence, is insidious and invisible. It is historic, deeply entrenched and institutionalised in social, cultural and religious mores and practices. Patriarchy succinctly <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/06/22/986641/-Defining-Perpetuating-Challenging-Patriarchy">summarised</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>… is generally not an explicit ongoing effort by men to dominate women. It is a longstanding system that we are born into and participate in, mostly unconsciously. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This means that both men and women perpetuate patriarchal power structures, but men are obviously the main beneficiaries of this system. </p>
<h2>The sexist backlash</h2>
<p>The global backlash against women when they are perceived to be gaining ground, asserting themselves or “cracking the glass ceiling” is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/31/backlash-against-feminism-manosphere-women">well documented</a>.</p>
<p>Trump, the modern, elitist patriarch, has a history of heaping vicious sexist scorn and humiliation on women. He <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-ted-cruz-donald-trump-wives-20160325-story.html">insulted</a> his Republican rivals, including Carly Fiorina’s looks, and humiliated presidential rival Ted Cruz’s wife.</p>
<p>After his recent campaign wins he used the classic, sexist “divide and rule” strategy. He said Hillary Clinton, his rival Democrat front-runner, was playing the “<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/26/donald-trump-if-hillary-clinton-were-man-shed-get-/">woman card</a>” and has nothing else going for her. There has also been a huge outcry at his gaffe against women who have <a href="http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/03/trump-ban-abortion-punish-women-who-get-one.html">abortions</a>.</p>
<p>Zuma, the tribalist, <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-traditionalist-president-versus-modernist-finance-minister-55391">traditionalist</a> patriarch, has a similar history of misogyny. At his 2006 rape trial, which ended with an <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1893561,00.html">acquittal</a>, his sexist defence was that, as a Zulu male, he was obliged to <a href="https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/skeen_2007_thesis.pdf">satisfy a woman</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121889/original/image-20160510-20727-18pc3j6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121889/original/image-20160510-20727-18pc3j6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121889/original/image-20160510-20727-18pc3j6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121889/original/image-20160510-20727-18pc3j6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121889/original/image-20160510-20727-18pc3j6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121889/original/image-20160510-20727-18pc3j6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121889/original/image-20160510-20727-18pc3j6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=495&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Women supporters cheer Donald Trump during a campaign rally in Lynden, Washington.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Jim Urquhart</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The South African Commission for <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2015-01-17-zuma-reprimanded-for-comments-about-women">Gender Equality</a> has censored Zuma for saying the nation’s “daughters” become a societal problem when they do not marry. He was recently accused by the opposition Democratic Alliance of “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/12186363/South-Africas-Jacob-Zuma-accused-of-outrageously-sexist-comments.html">outrageously sexist</a>” and offensive remarks. This, after he said he would like to compliment women more but can’t as it is perceived as harassment in modern times. He added that women were missing out on “<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/12186363/South-Africas-Jacob-Zuma-accused-of-outrageously-sexist-comments.html">good men and marriage</a>”.</p>
<h2>Complicity of women</h2>
<p>The endurance and resilience of patriarchy in modern societies is not determined or sustained solely by men’s actions, but by <a href="http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/35/4/429.short">women’s actions</a> too.</p>
<p>Trump’s campaign success, although decidedly skewed towards the Republican men’s vote, clearly indicates that he has also won the <a href="http://www.salon.com/2016/04/08/the_mystery_of_republican_women_backing_sexist_trump_theyre_female_misogynists_whove_grown_to_accept_oppression/">women’s vote</a>. Republican women voters downplay his misogyny, seemingly more concerned with endorsing his xenophobic, racist and anti-immigration policies.</p>
<p>Like Trump, polygamist Zuma has the support of the <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2016-04-13-ancwl-reiterates-support-for-president-zuma">ANC Women’s League</a>, historically the most powerful women’s lobby in South Africa. This group, which earned sterling credentials in the fight against apartheid, has remained largely silent on the sexist controversies surrounding Zuma. Until just <a href="http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2015/08/06/female-president-on-anc-womens-league-agenda">recently</a> it had not even countenanced having a woman president. </p>
<p>Waiting in the wings in both the US and South Africa are two women touted to be the next presidents of their respective countries. <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-hillary-clinton-is-struggling-to-win-over-americas-young-women-54365">Clinton</a>, running against Trump, is strongly tipped to win the Democratic nomination for the presidential race. If successful she could be the first US woman president, ending a 227-year male legacy.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2016/04/07/Nkosazana-Dlamini-Zuma-touted-as-possible-president">Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</a>, who will be finishing her term as Chairperson of the African Union Commission in July, is tipped to succeed Jacob Zuma, her former husband. She could be the first woman to lead the governing African National Congress in its 104-year history. Ironically, Clinton and Dlamini-Zuma, respectively, will be the wife and ex-wife of former presidents in their respective countries.</p>
<h2>Will women presidents make a difference?</h2>
<p>Women presidents are perceived as crucial for pushing an agenda of women’s rights and freedoms. But the pressures and constraints of the presidential office mean that the heightened expectations for them overcoming patriarchal dominance may not be realised.</p>
<p>It remains to be seen, therefore, whether both Clinton and Dlamini-Zuma, if they do become presidents, will buck the trend and leave a feminist mark in their legacies.</p>
<p>A global groundswell by women, and especially students, may be the impetus needed for society to finally engage with the global scourge of patriarchal dominance and violence.</p>
<p>If elected, Clinton would have to contend with increasing feminist militancy among women at US Ivy League universities and colleges <a href="http://urbanette.com/campus-rape-epidemic/">against</a> against a culture of rape, sexual violence and sexism.</p>
<p>In South Africa, a similar fight against patriarchal dominance and violence appears to be emerging from women students in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-student-movement-splinters-as-patriarchy-muscles-out-diversity-57855">#FeesMustFall</a> movement. They too are calling out men on sexual assault, a culture of rape and what they perceive as increasingly exclusionary, dominant male discourses in the mass social movement for deep transformation.</p>
<p>These movements echo the militant suffragette movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Violent, militant pressure from women in the United Kingdom signalled a profound change in patriarchal power dynamics – and got women the vote.</p>
<p>The overwhelming scrutiny and attention Trump and Zuma receive in their respective countries relates more to their political rhetoric on issues of national and economic security. It is the yardstick they are measured by, rather than their misogyny.</p>
<p>The scathing condemnation against them has little to do with their stance on women’s issues, and their blatant sexism. This illustrates the insidious persistence of patriarchal power structures in the developed and developing world. And both men and women globally perpetuate male dominance by endorsing populist patriarchs and by not holding them to account on women’s issues.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58351/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lyn Snodgrass does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Seemingly poles apart, Donald Trump and Jacob Zuma have something in common: they are both prominent patriarchs with populist support. And they both count women among their staunch supporters.Lyn Snodgrass, Associate Professor and Head of Department of Political and Conflict Studies, Nelson Mandela UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/483302015-10-01T04:40:13Z2015-10-01T04:40:13ZMaking an African language compulsory at university may do more harm than good<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/96665/original/image-20150929-30976-16br7t1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Small conversation or oral groups help people to learn a new language. When classes get too big, it's impossible to teach in this way.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The status of languages is a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/south-african-students-protest-afrikaans-150902065344452.html">political hot potato</a> on South Africa’s university campuses. The country’s minister of higher education and training <a href="http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/call-compulsory-african-language">believes</a> that all university graduates in South Africa should have learned at least one African language during their studies. </p>
<p>The University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), located in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, became the first to heed the minister’s call when it <a href="http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20130531073217996">introduced Zulu</a> as a compulsory subject for all new students from 2014. This is part of its broader <a href="http://registrar.ukzn.ac.za/Libraries/policies/Language_Policy_-_CO02010906.sflb.ashx">language policy</a>, which emphasises “the need to achieve for Zulu the institutional and academic status of English”.</p>
<p>UKZN has been hailed for this move, but some have also <a href="http://www.ufs.ac.za/docs/default-source/timeslive-documents/2013-05-23---master-one-language-before-tackling-another-1258-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=0">warned</a> that making only Zulu compulsory is a political decision that may contribute to linguistic and cultural nationalism.</p>
<p>My current research, which I recently presented at a <a href="http://www.britac.ac.uk/events/2015/African_Multilingualism.cfm">conference</a> of the British Academy, explores the interplay between language dynamics and ideological constructions in South African higher education. It examines UKZN specifically in light of the introduction of the compulsory Zulu module. </p>
<p>Some of the findings suggest that the university’s top-down approach in this instance has alienated even some Zulu language lecturers. They feel this policy is actually doing their language a disservice.</p>
<h2>Problems and paradoxes</h2>
<p>Nearly 78% of KwaZulu-Natal’s residents speak Zulu as <a href="http://census2011.adrianfrith.com/place/5">a first language</a>. The university argues that, given this demography, choosing Zulu as a compulsory African language can contribute to social cohesion and nation building in the province and beyond.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that all South Africans, no matter their background, should ideally be fluent in at least one African language. UKZN’s non-Zulu staff and students can benefit enormously from learning the language.</p>
<p>But there are two major problems with the policy. The first is ideological. Quite simply, Zulu is not a pan-African language. It’s not even a transnational one like Kiswahili, which is the <em>lingua franca</em> in Tanzania and Kenya. Zulu is inextricably linked to Zulu ethnicity – and the policy is therefore seen by some as prioritising one nation or group above any others.</p>
<p>The second problem is more practical and relates to the content of the course. The 2014 policy sees Zulu taught for just one semester – that’s about five months. Zulu language lecturers say this system has created so many problems that any real value is being lost.</p>
<p>During November and December 2014 I interviewed seven people who are involved in developing and championing UKZN’s language policy and six Zulu lecturers at two of the institution’s campuses.</p>
<p>The lecturers said that morale among students in the compulsory module is so low that they are little more than “resistance learners”. One lecturer called the module a “Mickey Mouse” course that gives students only the most basic knowledge of the language. </p>
<p>There is also a paradox between the university’s stated policy and its practice. In interviews with UKZN language policy stakeholders I was informed that the objective of the module is for students to acquire “communicative competence” in Zulu. But there are so many students in each class that there is simply no space for the sort of “conversational” component that would teach them how to “chat” in Zulu.</p>
<p>The UKZN _Basic isiZulu _module had 325 students in 2013, 1381 in 2014 when the policy was implemented and has 2254 in 2015. Oral practice lessons are absolutely impossible with such huge classes. </p>
<h2>The danger of stigma</h2>
<p>Any language can acquire a stigma because of sociopolitical circumstances. During the apartheid era, Afrikaans was viewed as the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/june-16-soweto-youth-uprising">language of the oppressor</a> – a tag it has still not <a href="http://www.thedailyvox.co.za/open-stellenbosch-protest-its-like-the-remnants-of-apartheid-live-here/">shaken off</a>. And this is despite the majority of Afrikaans speakers today being “coloured”, and not Afrikaners. </p>
<p>Some of the Zulu lecturers I interviewed actually drew explicit links between the compulsory teaching of Afrikaans during apartheid and UKZN’s mandatory Zulu lessons. This emphasises that it is the compulsory aspect of the course which is seen as particularly problematic. </p>
<p>It is absolutely necessary for South African education to move away from the English hegemony, and African language learning will play a crucial role in this shift. African language learning – both for mother tongue and second language learners – must be fostered at primary and secondary school level. </p>
<p>The early practice of academic reading and writing in African languages should be taken for granted for all South Africans. My previous <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=90FBAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA107&lpg=PA107&dq=IsiZulu-English+Bilingualisation+at+the+University+of+KwaZulu-Natal:+An+Exploration+of+Students%27+attitudes&source=bl&ots=ie1TpbtY0G&sig=kykdTlvdv3ilskrLaNzQ3ZbQoGk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAGoVChMIjYnF1J-cyAIVw2sUCh2tdwPv#v=onepage&q=IsiZulu-English%20Bilingualisation%20at%20the%20University%20of%20KwaZulu-Natal%3A%20An%20Exploration%20of%20Students'%20attitudes&f=false">research</a> shows that fostering Zulu as an academic language at tertiary level is far too late in academic development. </p>
<p>Linguistic diversity should be approached as a resource and a tool for creativity and nation building. Ideally, every child in KwaZulu-Natal should learn Zulu from a very young age. But this type of change needs to emerge from the bottom up rather than being imposed from the top down. The UKZN language policy seems to be an example of a top-down approach that is deeply shaped by ideological and political interests rather than with sound educational practice in mind.</p>
<p>Ultimately, shouldn’t South African universities aim to make non-African language speakers aware of the beauty and benefits of knowing an African language – rather than forcing students to study them?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/48330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephanie Rudwick receives funding from the DFG (German Research Foundation). This research was funded by the DFG (German Research Foundation), but the views contained in this article are solely the author's.</span></em></p>It is important that all South Africans learn to speak an African language. But is making a single language a compulsory university subject the best way to make this happen?Stephanie Rudwick, DFG-funded researcher in Afrikanistik (African Studies), University of LeipzigLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.