tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/aid-603/articles
Aid – The Conversation
2024-03-19T12:31:45Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/225941
2024-03-19T12:31:45Z
2024-03-19T12:31:45Z
Haiti is in crisis, but foreign intervention comes with an ugly past
<p>Haiti is <a href="https://news.miami.edu/stories/2024/03/haiti-is-close-to-becoming-a-failed-state.html">fast becoming a failed state</a>. </p>
<p>Armed gangs <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/16/overthrow-the-system-haiti-gang-leader-cherizier-seeks-revolution#:%7E:text=The%20UN%20has%20estimated%20that,foreign%20troops%20from%20entering%20Haiti.">control most of the capital, Port-au-Prince</a>, and have forced the <a href="https://www.tampabay.com/news/nation-world/2024/03/16/haitis-airports-are-closed-those-with-money-there-is-still-way-out/">shutdown of the capital’s international airport</a> and gasoline refinery. Most <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/18/world/haiti-crisis-militias-battle-intl-latam/index.html">businesses are closed or are being extorted by the gangs</a>.</p>
<p>Ordinary Haitians fear for their safety without the umbrella of law and order that only the government can provide. But there is not much government left: Elections have not been held <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2985/">since 2016</a>; the last president, Jovenel Moïse, was <a href="https://theconversation.com/haitis-president-assassinated-5-essential-reads-to-give-you-key-history-and-insight-164118">assassinated in 2021</a>; and the current prime minister and acting president, Ariel Henry, is <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/06/1236288645/haiti-crisis-prime-minister-henry-puerto-rico">stuck in Puerto Rico</a>, unable to fly back to Haiti.</p>
<p>It is increasingly becoming clear that Haiti has neither the means nor the ability to <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/03/haiti-private-meeting-2.php">pull itself out of this quagmire on its own</a>, raising the prospect of – and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/21/haiti-un-international-specialized-support-force">calls for</a> – foreign intervention. So far, to that end, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/01/world/africa/haiti-kenya-police-security.html">Kenya has offered</a> 1,000 armed policemen; other countries may chip in. The United States and Europe have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-aid-chief-announce-25-million-humanitarian-assistance-haiti-2024-03-15/#:%7E:text=The%20additional%20aid%20comes%20after,the%20U.S.%20since%20October%202022.">pledged millions of dollars</a> in aid. </p>
<p>But can a multinational security mission provide Haiti with a way out of its current crisis? My experience <a href="https://www.libarts.colostate.edu/people/esagas/">studying authoritarianism and democratization in Latin America and the Caribbean</a> tells me that international intervention will only take care of Haiti’s immediate security crisis – but it does not guarantee any long-term solutions to Haiti’s challenges. Moreover, history shows that in the case of Haiti, a multinational security mission may create problems of its own.</p>
<h2>Occupational hazards</h2>
<p>This is not the first time that talk has turned to sending foreign troops to Haiti. Since their hard-fought <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/86417/the-black-jacobins-by-c-l-r-james-with-a-new-introduction-by-david-scott/">independence from France in 1804</a>, the Haitian people have seen their country’s sovereignty disrupted many times.</p>
<p>From 1915 to 1934, <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/haiti">U.S. Marines occupied</a> Haiti <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/haiti-history-of-crises-present-unrest/">to impose order in the riot-struck republic</a>, create a professional military force and secure U.S. strategic interests in the process.</p>
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<p>The lengthy military occupation was a humiliating affair for the <a href="https://www.aaihs.org/the-black-republic-the-meaning-of-haitian-independence-before-the-occupation/">world’s first Black republic</a>, which had to endure being ruled by white foreigners. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of the U.S. occupation, the new Haitian military <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1823">became the main force</a> in the country’s politics, either ruling directly or as the power behind the throne.</p>
<p>In 1994, <a href="https://time.com/5682135/haiti-military-anniversary/">U.S. troops once again landed in Haiti</a>, this time to return to power the democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been ousted by the military just seven months into his term.</p>
<p>This second U.S. occupation led to the dissolution of the Haitian military, setting the stage for the current security crisis. Since then, Haiti has lacked a national security force capable of imposing order without being challenged by insurgents, paramilitaries and gangs.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah">United Nations eventually took over</a> and sent several missions to stabilize the country starting in 1994. But the U.N. mission eventually left in 2019 once its mandate expired. U.N. troops were accused of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1YM27V/">sexually exploiting poor women</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/americas/united-nations-haiti-cholera.html">being responsible for a major cholera outbreak</a> that killed thousands of Haitians.</p>
<h2>Routes of transition</h2>
<p>This sorry history with foreign intervention means that Haiti faces a conundrum now: The country desperately needs outside help to rein in the gangs and provide order, but at what cost? </p>
<p>With the U.S., U.N. and the Ariel Henry administration seemingly in agreement over the <a href="https://ht.usembassy.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-haitian-prime-minister-henry/">need for outside assistance</a>, it seems like foreign intervention is increasingly likely.</p>
<p>Henry has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haitian-leader-says-he-will-quit-after-transitional-council-formed-gang-violence-2024-03-12/">promised to step down</a> as soon as a transitional administration is set up. Any multinational security mission mandate is likely to be pretty straightforward: provide a modicum of security to assist the transitional administration.</p>
<p>But disarming the gangs is a major challenge. They will likely either resist, leading to a potential bloodbath, or, more likely, hide and wait until foreign troops leave Haiti and then reemerge. </p>
<p>That was one of the major failures of previous security missions in Haiti. U.N. peacekeepers kept the peace, but the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/14/haiti-gang-violence-us-guns-smuggling">flow of arms</a> coming <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/widespread-gang-violence-in-haiti-continues-bolstered-by-weapons-trafficked-from-the-u-s">into the country</a> from the United States continued unabated. Once the peacekeepers left, the violence resumed. Any international mission sent to Haiti will have to tackle this problem head on, or it will ultimately fail. </p>
<p>Gangs hold so much power over <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-63707429">vast swaths of the country</a> that any mediated solution to the Haitian crisis will likely have to include them. Moreover, there is a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/15/opinions/haiti-gangs-violence-pierre-pierre/index.html">working relationship</a> between the Haitian political elites and the gangs, with the former arming the latter and using them to pursue their short-term goals. Ignoring the political power of the gangs is, I believe, engaging in wishful thinking about the nature of the Haitian political system.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tank painted white with UN written on it drives down the street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582600/original/file-20240318-20-o5lry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582600/original/file-20240318-20-o5lry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582600/original/file-20240318-20-o5lry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582600/original/file-20240318-20-o5lry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582600/original/file-20240318-20-o5lry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582600/original/file-20240318-20-o5lry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582600/original/file-20240318-20-o5lry1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=513&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Haitians have bitter memories of U.N. troops in their country.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/troops-ride-in-an-armored-personnel-carrier-while-news-photo/1543529746?adppopup=true">Thony Belizaire/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And what about Haiti’s other challenges, such as holding free elections, organizing a functioning, legitimate government and improving the lives of its citizens? </p>
<p>None of these goals can realistically be achieved until peace is restored. Only in the conditions of stability and order can a transitional caretaker government start planning the arduous task of holding free, fair and competitive elections. </p>
<p>It may be years before Haiti can organize such elections or restore trust in democracy among the populace. If this process is rushed, Haiti runs the risk of ending up with an illegitimate administration – <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/11/haiti-democracy-relations-united-states-gang-violence/">as Henry’s is seen to be</a> – heightening the chances of the resumption of violence. </p>
<p>This has been the case over the past two decades: Haiti’s elections and authorities have became less legitimate, to the point where the country was unable to hold free elections after 2016. </p>
<h2>The challenge ahead</h2>
<p>If a multinational security mission is in Haiti’s immediate future, then the chances of it having lasting success will hang on whether the international community can provide enough support to the country after foreign troops leave.</p>
<p>A new police force will have to be recruited and trained, institutions such as the judiciary have to be reinforced, and the new administration will need time to earn the trust of the people. This is a difficult task considering <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/haiti-in-2023-political-abyss-and-vicious-gangs/">Haiti’s political polarization</a>.</p>
<p>To overcome these challenges, the international community will have to pump funds into Haiti. While history has shown that this risks exacerbating governmental corruption, I believe it is a small price to pay for the maintenance of peace.</p>
<p>Without sustained funding from the international community, Haiti will again become a <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/immersive/haiti-forgotten-crisis?id=100287588">forgotten crisis</a>. For example, in the aftermath of the devastating 2010 earthquake, US$4.5 billion dollars were promised in aid, but only <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/11/haiti-earthquake-promised-aid-not-delivered">a little over half of it was delivered</a>. </p>
<p>The fear is that now an international community distracted by crises elsewhere, such as wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, may soon lose interest in Haiti’s plight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225941/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ernesto Sagás does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Can a multinational security mission provide Haiti with a stable future? Not without sustained funding for after the troops leave.
Ernesto Sagás, Professor of Ethnic Studies, Colorado State University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/225369
2024-03-08T17:10:51Z
2024-03-08T17:10:51Z
Joe Biden’s plan to build a pier to get aid into Gaza isn’t enough – here are six issues needed for an effective aid strategy
<p>In his <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2024/">State of the Union address</a>, Joe Biden announced an idea to alleviate the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/factbox-what-is-humanitarian-situation-war-torn-gaza-2024-03-05/">desperate humanitarian situation</a> in Gaza. The American president said he is “directing the US military to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the Gaza coast that can receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters”. </p>
<p>Hopes of a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/07/politics/us-military-aid-port-gaza-biden/index.html">humanitarian ceasefire</a>, which seemed within reach only recently, have dwindled once again as both Israel and Hamas have doubled down on their incompatible positions. So Biden’s announcement represents the latest desperate attempt to get around the Israeli blockade that severely limits the flow of supplies into Gaza. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiZTVkYmEwNmMtZWYxNy00ODhlLWI2ZjctNjIzMzQ5OGQxNzY5IiwidCI6IjI2MmY2YTQxLTIwZTktNDE0MC04ZDNlLWZkZjVlZWNiNDE1NyIsImMiOjl9&pageName=ReportSection3306863add46319dc574">number of trucks</a> going through the two opened border crossings has been particularly low lately – with an average of 100 trucks a day in February to supply millions of people.</p>
<p>More aid is desperately needed. Children are dying of <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-rising-death-toll-from-hunger-a-stark-reminder-of-starvation-as-a-weapon-of-war-225197">malnutrition and dehydration</a> in Gaza. Overcrowded shelters offer very little space and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/regional-response-crisis-occupied-palestinian-territory-situation-report-20-7-march-2024">most people in Gaza live</a> with limited access to water and poor sanitation facilities. The few operational <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/collapse-gazas-health-system">hospitals are struggling</a> with a lack of staff, electricity and medical supplies. </p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68457937">air drops</a> by the Jordanian and US air forces and now Biden’s plans for a pier for aid deliveries may look spectacular, but they can have only limited impact. </p>
<p>Air drops are an <a href="https://blogs.hanken.fi/humlog/2023/10/20/humanitarian-air-drops-an-option-of-last-resort/">option of last resort</a>, delivering very few supplies at high cost. Meanwhile, sea transport can handle large volumes at reasonable costs, so opening a sea route would be beneficial. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Joe Biden announces the US will build a temporary pier to allow more aid into Gaza.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But any cargo reaching Gaza on this route would encounter the same issues that are plaguing humanitarian deliveries by road. The Israeli blockade requires strict checks on goods, which in the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240308-eu-commission-chief-hopes-aid-route-from-cyprus-to-gaza-opens-sunday">new maritime channel</a> will be carried out in Cyprus. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-ec-cyprus-uae-us-and-uk-endorsing-activation-maritime-corridor-deliver-humanitarian-2024-03-08_en">joint statement</a>, the European Commission, Cyprus, the UAE, the US, and the UK stressed that “efforts will be closely coordinated with the Government of Israel”.</p>
<p>As humanitarian logistics researchers who have been following the Gaza response of the <a href="https://logcluster.org/en/ops/pse23a">Logistics Cluster</a>, the coordination mechanism of a number of humanitarian agencies, we believe a workable plan for aid logistics in Gaza should include the following points.</p>
<h2>1. Safe access guarantee</h2>
<p>All parties need to agree to ensure the safety of humanitarian convoys. Aid, no matter how it arrives, needs to be distributed to the population. Aid organisations are warning that <a href="https://www.msf.org/attacks-humanitarian-workers-gaza-make-vital-assistance-nearly-impossible">attacks on humanitarian workers</a> make their work nearly impossible. </p>
<p>Aid convoys <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/new-incident-medical-evacuation-al-amal-hospital-marks-unacceptable-security-conditions-humanitarian-aid">have come under fire</a> <a href="https://palestine.un.org/en/259747-food-convoy-waiting-move-northern-gaza-was-hit-israeli-naval-gunfire">from Israel</a> and are denied access to those in need. As a result, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-struck-palestinian-police-escorting-gaza-aid-says-us-envoy-2024-02-16/">Palestinian police</a> have become hesitant to escort aid deliveries. </p>
<p>Receiving aid can also be deadly. In the recent so-called <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/un-experts-condemn-flour-massacre-urge-israel-end-campaign-starvation-gaza">“flour massacre”</a>, at least 112 Palestinians died as they gathered to collect basic food aid. <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unmiss-peacekeepers-provide-protective-escort-to-world-food-programme-convoy">UN peacekeepers</a> should be allowed to provide protective escorts for aid convoys. </p>
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<h2>2. Eliminate bottlenecks</h2>
<p>More entry points into Gaza need to be opened. The planned pier is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/07/biden-us-port-gaza-aid-delivery">step in the right direction</a>, but it will take weeks to be operational. Opening more road crossings would be much faster and alleviate pressure on the <a href="https://logie.logcluster.org/?op=pse">two operational crossings</a>, Rafah and Kerem Shalom. </p>
<p>At the moment, aid deliveries encounter <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/hungers-border-why-aid-trucks-taking-humanitarian-gear-and-food-gaza-face-long-waits">long waits</a> at checkpoints. In Gaza, roads need to be open and any checks on humanitarian workers and their cargo minimised to limit delays. </p>
<p>Trucks being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/food-aid-convoy-bound-for-northern-gaza-looted-after-being-stopped-at-israeli-checkpoint">held for hours</a> at Israeli military checkpoints can mean they don’t reach areas further away from the border crossings and have to turn back. This has resulted in looting by desperate Palestinians.</p>
<h2>3. Access to northern Gaza</h2>
<p>Humanitarian aid has to be delivered to all parts of Gaza, but access to the north has been particularly challenging. Humanitarian operations to the north were <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024">halted on February 5</a> after a UN-coordinated food convoy was hit by Israeli naval fire and humanitarian workers reported intimidation by soldiers at an Israeli checkpoint. </p>
<p>Opening a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/03/07/background-press-call-on-humanitarian-aid-for-gaza-ahead-of-the-state-of-the-union/">border crossing</a> giving aid convoys access to the northern part of Gaza is currently being discussed between the USA and Israel. The UN is also exploring the use of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-test-israeli-military-road-get-aid-gazas-north-2024-03-06/">Israeli military road</a> along the border fence to get aid to the north and checking new potential routes to make sure they are free of unexploded ordnance. </p>
<h2>4. Restricted items</h2>
<p>Not all humanitarian supplies are allowed into Gaza. Items are restricted, especially where Israel is citing concerns about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/civilians-or-hamas-dual-use-issue-complicates-gaza-aid-efforts-2024-01-05/">potential use by Hamas</a>. Various items, including filtration systems and even sleeping bags, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/01/middleeast/gaza-aid-israel-restrictions-investigation-intl-cmd/index.html">have been blocked</a> while others have been stuck in bureaucratic limbo, waiting weeks for clearance.</p>
<p>Even with clearance, there is no guarantee items will be allowed into Gaza. To scale up humanitarian aid, restrictions have to be lifted. Rules need to be clear and consistent. Allowing sufficient quantities of fuel to enter is critical to operate trucks, hospital equipment and water-purification plants. </p>
<h2>5. Humanitarian visas</h2>
<p>Humanitarian work also requires humanitarian workers. While many are local staff, international personnel are also essential for such a large-scale aid effort. Recently, Israel <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-25/israel-is-denying-visas-to-aid-groups-working-with-palestinians?embedded-checkout=true">has ceased issuing visas</a> for international humanitarian personnel working in the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Dozens of international humanitarian workers have left, while some are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/29/humanitarian-workers-face-deportation-from-israel-after-freeze-on-visas">risking deportation</a> by outstaying their visa limits. At least <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-war-hamas-humanitarian-visas-5d306d367e6522495a4ee8045859a3b8">99 humanitarian workers’ visas</a> have either expired or will expire in the next six months. This is impeding endeavours to deliver essential supplies to Gaza.</p>
<h2>6. Commercial trade</h2>
<p>In the longer term, it is both impossible and undesirable to support a population as large as Gaza’s entirely through humanitarian aid. It is important that the movement of goods also includes the resumption of trade to complement the humanitarian response. </p>
<p>Currently, there is very limited <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/4737126-us-first-commercial-trucks-enter-gaza-war">commercial traffic</a> across the border. But a functioning local market is paramount for any <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/preliminary-assessment-economic-impact-destruction-gaza-and-prospects-economic-recovery">prospects of economic recovery</a> in Gaza. </p>
<p>A minimum target for trucks entering Gaza every day should be the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/03/gaza-aid-convoy-israel-war/">pre-war average of 500</a>. Given the scale of destruction and destitution, the aim for combined traffic of commercial vehicles as well as those operated by the United Nations and other non-government organisations should now be even higher.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225369/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The US president has ordered a pier to be built so that it can supply aid to Gaza. But it will not be enough.
Sarah Schiffling, Deputy Director of the HUMLOG (Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management Research) Institute, Hanken School of Economics
Foteini Stavropoulou, Senior Lecturer in Operations and Supply Chain Management, Liverpool John Moores University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/225197
2024-03-06T17:14:58Z
2024-03-06T17:14:58Z
Gaza conflict: rising death toll from hunger a stark reminder of starvation as a weapon of war
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68434443">deaths of more than 100 Palestinians</a> who had been waiting for an aid convoy on February 29 were a grim reminder of the catastrophe unfolding daily in Gaza. While an independent investigation has yet to establish clear responsibilities for the tragedy, the toll from Israel’s assault on the Gaza Strip grows ever higher.</p>
<p>Five months into the conflict, deaths from hunger and thirst are <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/04/middleeast/gaza-children-dying-malnutrition-israel-ceasefire-talks-intl-hnk/index.html">beginning to mount</a>. A report from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs quoted claims by the Ministry of Health in Gaza on March 3 that 15 children had <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/6/israels-war-on-gaza-live-un-food-convoy-blocked-from-north-gaza-by-israel">died of malnutrition and dehydration</a> at Kamal Adwan hospital in northern Gaza, with another six considered to be at grave risk of dying. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO),
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, <a href="https://twitter.com/DrTedros/status/1764652624492515832">reported on March 4</a> that WHO visits to Al-Awda and Kamal Adwan hospitals found “severe levels of malnutrition, children dying of starvation, serious shortages of fuel, food and medical supplies, hospital buildings destroyed”. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1764652624492515832"}"></div></p>
<p>Addressing the UN security council on February 27, the deputy executive director of the World Food Programme, Carl Skau, warned of a <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-deputy-chief-warns-security-council-imminent-famine-northern-gaza-unless-conditions-change">“real prospect of famine by May”</a>, saying there were more than 500,000 people in Gaza at risk.</p>
<p>He said: “Even before October, two-thirds of the people in Gaza were supported with food assistance. Today, food aid is required by almost the entire population of 2.2 million people. One child in every six under the age of two is acutely malnourished.”</p>
<h2>Weaponising starvation</h2>
<p>Starvation has always been used as <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-weaponisation-of-food-has-been-used-in-conflicts-for-centuries-but-it-hasnt-always-resulted-in-victory-221476">weapon of war</a>. And there is now a considerable body of international law which prohibits it and provides for the prosecution of those responsible for deliberate starvation in conflict.</p>
<p>Article 54 of the Geneva conventions <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-54">clearly spells this out</a>. In May 2018, the UN security council unanimously adopted <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2018/sc13354.doc.htm">resolution 2417</a> after identifying 74 million people facing starvation as a result of armed conflict. </p>
<p>Resolution 2417 “strongly condemns the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare in a number of conflict situations and prohibited by international humanitarian law” and “strongly condemns the unlawful denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival”. </p>
<p>Intentional starvation is punishable as a war crime by the International Criminal Court (ICC) under article 8 of the <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/icc-statute-1998/article-8">Rome statute</a>. In December 2019, the 122 state parties to the ICC parties voted unanimously to <a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-g&chapter=18&clang=_en">extend the court’s jurisdiction</a> to the use of starvation as a weapon of war. </p>
<h2>Food insecurity</h2>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5240-conflict-and-right-food-report-special-rapporteur-right-food">2022 report</a> to the Human Rights Council, the UN rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri, said that “conflict and violence were the primary causes of hunger, malnutrition, and famine”, rather than “because there was not enough food to go around”.</p>
<p>A report from the UN security council on February 13 2024 identified more than 330 million people at risk from food insecurity, most because of climate change – or, increasingly, armed conflict. The security council highlighted conflict or post-conflict famines in Syria, Myanmar, Haiti, and Yemen. </p>
<p>In Africa, the report said, 149 million people were living in food insecurity, notably in Sudan, where the World Food Program has said more than 25 million people scattered across Sudan, South Sudan and Chad are “trapped in a spiral” of food insecurity.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1765260588370854169"}"></div></p>
<h2>The right to food</h2>
<p>The right to food <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights">is enshrined</a> in the UN’s international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. This recognises the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, which includes access to “adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”. </p>
<p>Paradoxically, there is more than enough food produced in the world to feed everyone on the planet. But, despite being nine years into the UN’s <a href="https://www.un.org/nutrition/">“decade of action on nutrition”</a>, and despite eradicating hunger being the second of the UN’s sustainable development goals, world hunger is once again on the rise.</p>
<p>The UN’s <a href="https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/The-Sustainable-Development-Goals-Report-2023.pdf">2023 report on its sustainable goals</a> says that 735 million people, more than 9% of the world’s population, suffer from hunger – 122 million more than in 2019. </p>
<p>The report also found that nearly 1.3 billion people rely entirely on imported food. This is where <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/issn/1477-0024/vol/22/iss/3">trade agreements</a> and international trade law can play a significant role in supporting access to food. </p>
<p>In June 2022, a ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization produced a <a href="https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W17R1.pdf&Open=True">declaration on the emergency response to food insecurity</a>, reinforcing the WTO’s commitment to improve the functioning and long-term resilience of global markets for food and agriculture. The conference also declared that members “shall not impose export prohibitions or restrictions on foodstuffs purchased for non-commercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Programme”.</p>
<p>But the realisation of the right to food as a human right, and the success of the UN’s pledge to eradicate hunger by 2030, will rely on international cooperation and a balance between liberalising trade and protecting states’ agricultural industries. </p>
<p>In February 2007, 500 experts gathered in Mali for the World Forum for Food Sovereignty. They produced <a href="https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf">the Nyéléni declaration</a>, which seeks to establish the “right of people to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems”.</p>
<p>The starving people of Gaza – and millions like them around the world – have been denied this basic right for decades. Their plight can be ignored for no longer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leïla Choukroune does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Children are particularly at risk from malnutrition as food supplies in Gaza run out.
Leïla Choukroune, Professor of International Law, University of Portsmouth
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/213669
2023-09-15T14:04:38Z
2023-09-15T14:04:38Z
Libya floods: why cash is the best way to help get humanitarian aid to people affected by disasters
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/548542/original/file-20230915-27-9t1f7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=314%2C134%2C5308%2C3826&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/mature-man-working-volunteer-community-center-2147202215">Drazen Zigic/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The heavy rainfall that hit <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-66787997">Libya during Storm Daniel</a> caused two dams and four bridges to collapse in the coastal city of Derna, submerging most of the city in floodwater and claiming thousands of lives. </p>
<p>As you watch the disturbing scenes of this disaster on the news, you might wonder about the best way to help. Sending that blanket in the closet you have never used or those painkillers in the cabinet you overbought last time you had a headache might seem helpful. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://jhumanitarianaction.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41018-016-0015-7">research suggests otherwise</a>. Such “in-kind donations” (physical items such as food, clothing, household items and medicine) can actually place a heavy burden on the humanitarian aid network.</p>
<p>If items are delivered to disaster areas in bulk, humanitarian organisations can struggle to receive, sort and send them to people in need quickly. Any accumulation can clog critical airports and warehouses. </p>
<p>This is known as “<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1366554522001272?via%3Dihub">material convergence</a>”. Humanitarian organisations can become overwhelmed with unsolicited donations. </p>
<p>This can <a href="https://www.magonlinelibrary.com/doi/abs/10.12968/bjhc.2022.0091">range from</a> medicine and food (sometimes at or near expiry), to equipment that’s just not compatible with the country’s systems – whether that’s because of voltage differences or product labels written in a different language.</p>
<p>To avoid such backlogs, <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-014-1623-5">research shows</a> donating money in cash or via bank transfer to <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en">verified</a> international <a href="https://crisisrelief.un.org/donate">humanitarian</a> organisations is the most helpful and efficient response to humanitarian crises. Within the past decade, some organisations have even launched <a href="https://www.wfp.org/cash-transfers">successful cash and voucher assistance programmes</a> to pass this money on to people in dire need. </p>
<p>Giving cash rather than in-kind donations also respects the dignity of beneficiaries, and prevents duplication and delivery of unneeded aid. Also, perhaps most importantly, it helps to support a local economy that might be crippled by crisis. </p>
<p>Cash-based interventions safeguard people’s purchasing power and help them cover urgent needs during crises, according to <a href="https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000150584/download/">the Word Food Programme (WFP)</a>. This isn’t as simple with in-kind donations.</p>
<h2>Delivering humanitarian aid to Derna</h2>
<p>The recent flooding in Libya has left <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66807956">the city of Derna</a> in dire need of such support for its people and its local economy. But even before the floods, the area has been crippled by civil conflict for more than a decade. </p>
<p>Libya is divided into zones ruled by different militias and two governments on the east and west of the country. There is constant fighting between the various factions. </p>
<p>The country already suffers from weak economic growth. Its GDP per capita <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview">dropped by 50%</a> between 2011 and 2020 due to this conflict, despite Libya being among the top 10 global sources of proven oil and natural gas reserves.</p>
<p>Storm Daniel had <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-greece-bulgaria-extreme-weather-d2aaa1701dbc7a3722a85aee04a977ac">already hit</a> Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey before it was <a href="https://www.climatecentre.org/11608/the-storm-daniel-medicane-turns-on-libya/#:%7E:text=The%20danger%20Storm%20Daniel%20posed,forecaster%20Matt%20Taylor%20said%20then.">forecast</a> to cause heavy rainfalls in Libya. But the country’s fragile economic and political environment and lack of <a href="https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/north-africa/libya/libya-economic-outlook">national climate change strategy</a> left it far from prepared for this disaster. </p>
<p>Worse, Derna is a neglected city in eastern Libya controlled by a rival administration to the western government. The region’s government does not allow free access of humanitarian organisations to Derna so <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/13/middleeast/libya-flood-political-rift-mime-intl/index.html">it’s unclear</a> if much-needed aid is reaching the right people and being distributed equally. But this political status has also created other complications for the current situation.</p>
<p>The city’s two now-collapsed dams <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/12/infrastructure-in-libyas-derna-not-built-to-withstand-storm-deputy-mayor?traffic_source=KeepReading">have not been maintained</a> for more than two decades, despite erosion concerns. Also, a functional meteorological service could have saved thousands of lives by issuing an early evacuation warning, according to <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/libya-floods-weather-deaths-warning-b2411558.html">the head of World Meteorological Organization (WMO)</a>.</p>
<p>After years of conflict, reports say <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/12/infrastructure-in-libyas-derna-not-built-to-withstand-storm-deputy-mayor">the only hospital</a> serving Derna’s 100,000 residents was a five-bedroom villa. Road and telecommunication infrastructure has also been weakened, while new road renovation and construction projects <a href="https://dlca.logcluster.org/libya-23-libya-road-network">have been suspended</a> due to security concerns. The port of Derna <a href="https://dlca.logcluster.org/213-libya-port-derna">was also closed due to security issues</a> for about three years until 2021, affected the local economy.</p>
<h2>The compounding effect of concurrent disasters</h2>
<p>When disasters happen in a setting already hit by other crises, there is a compounding effect. This means a disaster can have a higher detrimental impact on the livelihood of the people and the local economy. Responding to concurrent disasters is more challenging and can require more resources from humanitarian organisations.</p>
<p>The likes of the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) are no strangers to delivering humanitarian aid to remote or troubled areas, of course. Their supply chains are designed in a fundamentally different way from <a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJOPM-04-2016-0202">commercial supply chains</a>. They are typically decentralised to allow swift decision making and the mobilisation of resources as required. </p>
<p>The Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations such as WFP, which runs the <a href="https://unhrd.org/">UN Humanitarian Response Depot</a> also keep essential items “prepositioned” in strategic locations so they can be dispatched to disaster areas <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0038012119303489">as a first emergency response</a>. </p>
<p>The compounding effect of prolonged civil conflict makes delivering humanitarian aid challenging, but climate change <a href="https://www.icrcnewsroom.org/story/en/1921/icrc-report-climate-change-and-conflict-are-a-cruel-combo-that-stalk-the-world-s-most-vulnerable?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&linkId=100000013447880">is adding another layer of complexity to such situations</a>. Of the 20 countries most vulnerable to climate change, most are dealing with armed conflict. </p>
<p>By 2050, humanitarian organisations will need to deliver aid to <a href="https://www.icrcnewsroom.org/story/en/1921/icrc-report-climate-change-and-conflict-are-a-cruel-combo-that-stalk-the-world-s-most-vulnerable?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&linkId=100000013447880">200 million people</a> – almost double current needs. Much of this aid will go to people hit by concurrent disasters, making delivery challenging, slow and arduous. </p>
<p>So, when donating in the wake of a disaster, consider giving cash to a reputable aid organisation. Research shows it has the best chance of getting to the heart of the crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213669/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hossein Zarei does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Even before Storm Daniel hit, Derna in Libya was in dire need of help. But it’s not always clear how best to help humanitarian organisations to deliver aid most effectively.
Hossein Zarei, Lecturer in Business Strategy, Coventry University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/199618
2023-02-10T14:52:26Z
2023-02-10T14:52:26Z
Turkey-Syria earthquake: why it is so difficult to get rescue and relief to where it is most needed
<p>The death toll from the earthquakes that struck Turkey and Syria on February 6 has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/09/turkey-syria-earthquake-death-count-updates/">climbed above 21,000</a> in four days, exceeding the World Health Organization’s estimate of 20,000. But it continues to rise by the hour as more grim discoveries are made under the rubble.</p>
<p>Search-and-rescue efforts are well under way in Turkey after an initially slow response, but have yet to really take off in northern Syria. Syrians in rebel-controlled areas were kept waiting for help due <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/2023/02/08/syria-earthquake-victims-icrc-idlib/">political tensions</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-turkey-earthquake-rebel-held-civil-war-survivors-cold-winter-rcna69463">shattered infrastructure</a> following the earthquake and more than ten years of conflict. </p>
<p>So far, nobody knows how many people are still stuck under the rubble. Ovgun Ahmet Ercan, a Turkish earthquake expert, <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02/07/the-scale-of-the-disaster-in-turkey-and-syria-keeps-growing?">told The Economist</a> he had estimated that 180,000 people or more may be trapped under the rubble, nearly all of them dead.</p>
<p>A UN convoy <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/09/middleeast/turkey-syria-earthquake-aid-bab-al-hawa-intl-hnk/index.html">finally gained access</a> to northern Syria on Thursday morning – a day after what is considered to be the <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/turkey-syria-earthquake-latest-updates-on-death-toll-and-rescue-operation-12804459?postid=5398592#liveblog-body">critical 72-hour window</a> for finding survivors. But hopes of a really effective rescue mission were dashed as there was <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/turkey-earthquake-latest-babies-rescued-alone-flown-to-ankara-as-erdogan-admits-quake-response-shortcomings-12804459?postid=5400363#liveblog-body">no heavy search-and-rescue equipment</a> provided. Now the survival rate of people trapped under the rubble stands at <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/turkey-syria-earthquake-latest-updates-on-death-toll-and-rescue-operation-12804459?postid=5398592#liveblog-body">less than 6%</a>.</p>
<p>To avoid losing more lives and reduce suffering, the international aid response will now be more critical than ever. Based on my <a href="https://research.rug.nl/nl/publications/mission-impossible-operations-management-in-complex-extreme-and-h">doctoral research</a> which focused on humanitarian aid in conflict and political crisis situations, here are the key priorities. </p>
<h2>Huge challenges</h2>
<p>This will be an extremely challenging aid operation. For a start, the weather is not on the responders’ side – both countries are experiencing a harsh wet winter. There are also regional political tensions and <a href="https://cccmcluster.org/operations/syria">millions of refugees in both countries</a> due to the conflict in Syria.</p>
<p>Syria faces a <a href="https://turkiye.un.org/en/218301-turkiye-syria-quake-latest-full-scale-disaster-still-unfolding-un-humanitarians-warn">convergence of disasters</a>. Conflict, a <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/whole-syria-cholera-outbreak-situation-report-no-11-issued-15-january-2023#">cholera outbreak</a> and already <a href="https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/msf-responds-overwhelming-medical-needs-following-earthquakes-turkey-and-syria">dangerously overstretched</a> medical facilities are just some of the issues to deal with.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133177">crucial UN aid hub</a> for northern Syria, close to the epicentre of the initial earthquake in Turkey, was affected. This could have worsened the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-turkey-earthquake-rebel-held-civil-war-survivors-cold-winter-rcna69463">shortages of key supplies</a> needed immediately after the earthquake struck. </p>
<h2>Political response</h2>
<p>One of the most important decisions a government makes in disasters is whether to <a href="https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/state-of-emergencystate-of-siege/">declare a state of emergency</a>. For humanitarian organisations, this means that they can freely work in the affected areas. Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64548985">declared a three-month state of emergency</a>. As a result, the response in Turkey has received significantly more resources and media attention. </p>
<p>The Syrian government has not declared a state of emergency. This means that it does not officially recognise or support any organisations that work in rebel-controlled areas. This is risky for aid workers. There are no official safety guarantees yet and the proliferation of armed groups increases security risks for rescue-and-relief missions. </p>
<p>The support available to Syria will only be effective if the Assad regime is willing to grant access to rebel-controlled areas. International aid organisations can only do so much when facing an <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272696316300468">uncompromising government</a>. Other governments should make earnest attempts to engage with Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. The priority for Syria is to negotiate with the government and other armed groups for safe and unhindered access to ensure that more aid is delivered for as long as needed.</p>
<h2>Money is vital</h2>
<p>Cash donations from the public and from governments are important. Ideally, they should <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/earmarked-funding-four-reasons-why-we-shouldnt-dictate-where-our-charitable-donations-go/">not be earmarked</a> – meaning that donors should not dictate how the money should be spent. This allows aid organisations to quickly adapt their responses when needed. </p>
<p>Obviously, at present, the top priorities are food and water, access to medical assistance and clothing and shelter suitable for the current weather conditions. </p>
<p>It’s understandable that the public wants to see supplies sent as quickly as possible – but the state of infrastructure in the earthquake region will not support this and storing supplies in the area increases the risk of theft. Also the type of support needed is changing fast as focus shifts from search and rescue to keeping people alive. </p>
<p>The goal should be to ensure slow but steady supply of essential items. This means finding safe alternative access routes, for example using sea freight to build a continuous pipeline of international supplies and constantly delivering supplies to badly hit areas using small vehicles. Pack animals such as donkeys can also play an important role in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/1500-donkeys-trek-aid-darra-souf-afghanistan">delivering basic supplies</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-donkey-ambulance-maternity-saddle/25120705.html">providing an ambulance service</a> for people in difficult to reach places. </p>
<p>Aid corridors to the northern Syria must be opened. In the recent past Russia and China have blocked UN efforts to reopen several routes from Turkey to Syria closed by the Assad regime. Meanwhile, Damascus refuses to allocate resources to rebel-controlled territory and is accusing responding international organisations of “funding terrorists”. This is going to require a major diplomatic effort so that aid flows from both sides.</p>
<p>Aid organisations must coordinate and collaborate efforts with local communities and political actors, especially important in northern Syria where international <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-aid-workers-were-forced-out-of-syria-the-same-thing-could-happen-in-this-war-179781">aid workers were forced out</a> several years ago because high security risks. </p>
<h2>Caring for the dead</h2>
<p>As already mentioned, there is also a cholera outbreak in the afflicted region. The <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/risks-posed-by-dead-bodies-after-disasters">World Health Organization</a> identifies cholera as one of the few diseases that can be transmitted from dead bodies, so this can pose a huge public health risk following a natural disaster.</p>
<p>To avoid repeating the same mistakes that were made in <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/cholera/haiti/index.html#">Haiti</a> where huge numbers of people ended up infected, disease control should be a priority. This will require specialist help to ensure proper sanitary conditions and burials. </p>
<p>The slow response does not need to be defining feature of this crisis. There is still time for coordination, collaboration and diplomacy to get things moving and save as many lives as possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199618/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nonhlanhla Dube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A cholera outbreak, a harsh winter, ten years of civil war and obstruction from the Syrian government are some of the difficulties faced by aid agencies.
Nonhlanhla Dube, Lecturer in Operations Management, Lancaster University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/199440
2023-02-09T12:54:23Z
2023-02-09T12:54:23Z
Turkey-Syria earthquake: the challenge of delivering aid in a disaster zone
<p>It’s the middle of the night and you are fast asleep. Suddenly you have ceiling plaster smashing down on you, pictures are falling off the walls and your bedroom is swaying. You wake your partner, grab the kids and make your way down a stairwell in the darkness as you are hurled from side to side.</p>
<p>You find yourself standing in the street in your pyjamas in the freezing cold. It is pitch black with only a few car headlights and mobile phone torches lighting up the dust and debris.</p>
<p>This is a snapshot of the kind of experiences that families and individuals caught up in the devastating <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-syria-earthquakes-a-seismologist-explains-what-has-happened-199340">earthquakes that shook Turkey and Syria</a> in the early hours of February 6 will have endured. For those outside the event, the experiences of people inside the disaster are difficult to comprehend. Yet, despite the confusion and mayhem, and having been part of several humanitarian disaster responses around the globe, I know there are three priorities for aid.</p>
<p>One is rescuing those who are trapped. The window of opportunity for getting people out of the rubble is small. As every hour and day passes, more lives will be lost as people buried in collapsed buildings succumb to their injuries, the cold or dehydration.</p>
<p>Another priority is treating the injured. Collapsing buildings can leave survivors with broken bones, spinal, chest and head injuries and even burns and open wounds.</p>
<p>At the same time, the hospitals and clinics people would usually use for treatment may be swamped with injured people. Or the buildings themselves may be damaged and unable to function as normal. Plus the medical staff required to treat and care for patients may also be either dead or injured.</p>
<p>Finally, there is a need to help those left homeless. The earthquakes and aftershocks in Turkey and Syria have affected thousands of people in this way. The true number remains unknown and will probably not become clear for several more weeks.</p>
<p>A lack of shelter is itself a killer, especially during the cold winter months. The situation is particularly treacherous for children, older people, those with disabilities and long-term health conditions.</p>
<p>The people who have lost their homes <a href="https://www.unicef.org/eca/press-releases/unicef-geneva-palais-briefing-note-situation-children-and-families-affected">will need shelter, food and water</a> as a bare minimum. They will also need to reconnect with family members who they will have lost contact with in the chaotic aftermath of the earthquake.</p>
<p>These three priorities do not represent a hierarchy of need. A lack of rescue, treatment for the injured and housing for the homeless are three immediate life-threatening needs that all exist at the same time.</p>
<p>This makes responding to disasters very difficult because a decision in one direction may leave other much-needed aid undelivered. One of the tragedies of such human disasters is being faced with a level of need that overwhelms the ability to respond.</p>
<p>Delivering aid in disasters is logistically difficult as roads, ports, and bridges are put out of use. At the same time, essential services for aid such as power, IT and mobile phone systems may also be out of action. Even so, local and international disaster response teams have ways of working to ensure aid is distributed to those most in need. Aid agencies conduct rapid needs assessments paying particular attention to disaster victims who are particularly vulnerable, then make sure that the aid available matches the requirements of the population. Multiple aid agencies then coordinate their efforts to ensure aid is distributed efficiently.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-syria-earthquake-how-disaster-diplomacy-can-bring-warring-countries-together-to-save-lives-199329">Turkey-Syria earthquake: how disaster diplomacy can bring warring countries together to save lives</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The immediate response over the next few days and weeks is only the first step to recovery, however. Disaster response teams and international aid workers may stay on the ground for several more weeks to help with the delivery of medical care and essential services such as the distribution of food and water and providing shelter.</p>
<p>But eventually, they will withdraw. This leaves the survivors to cope with their grief and attempt to rebuild a life that has some degree of meaning and purpose. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>They took assistance, but our problems were not resolvable with these assistances. We lost everything, what we built in years. This assistance was like a dress on the deep wound that covers the surface of the wound, but it doesn’t help repair.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5027670/">quote from an earthquake survivor in Iran</a> published in 2016 and is a reminder of the depth of loss experienced by disaster survivors. It also reminds us the deep wounds inflicted by the earthquakes in Turkey and Syria – not only physical wounds but psychological wounds – will take a long time to heal.</p>
<p>We can hope that the immediate aid offered in Turkey and Syria will go some way to saving lives and allowing survivors to begin to recover.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199440/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Evans is affiliated with Brecon Mountain Rescue Team, and is a board member of the World Society of Disaster Nursing</span></em></p>
The window of survival after an earthquake is narrow and there are three top priorities for aid workers.
Jeff Evans, Senior Lecturer, Disaster Healthcare, University of South Wales
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/188015
2022-08-09T15:23:10Z
2022-08-09T15:23:10Z
How not to respond to drought: lessons from Angola
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476935/original/file-20220801-24-txgy0r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Breakdown in local canal that led to micro-drought situation in Humpata (Huíla).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ruy Blanes</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Three years after a severe drought in southwestern Angola, people in the area continue to suffer. Hunger remains pervasive and they are still losing livestock.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://secaangola.hypotheses.org/files/2022/04/Drought-in-Angola-Report-2022-compressed.pdf">report</a> we looked at fallout from the extreme drought in the region in 2019. There was almost no rain for 10 years. This led to a humanitarian and environmental disaster. According to <a href="https://www.unicef.org/media/74536/file/Angola-Sitrep-June-2019.pdf">data published by Unicef</a> in June 2019, around 2.3 million people experienced food insecurity as a result of the drought, and hundreds of thousands became malnourished. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://secaangola.hypotheses.org/files/2022/04/Drought-in-Angola-Report-2022-compressed.pdf">research</a> included interviews with local herding and pastoralist communities, local politicians, activists and members of NGO. </p>
<p>Our report attempted to unpack why the situation remains so dire. Rainfall continues to be irregular and scarce, making most local rural communities unable to survive the cacimbo (dry season) without relying on donations of food and water. Crops have failed and livestock lack pasture. Many people are migrating to Namibia or urban areas. This is despite the fact that the crisis triggered national and international responses.</p>
<p>The report set out factors that made the impact of the drought worse. These included the way in which the government provided assistance, as well as infrastructure failures. While existing transport and energy networks were breaking down due to a lack of maintenance and repair, the government’s response focused on new, long term construction projects. These privileged large-scale farming projects over the traditional farming and herding.</p>
<p>We found that no solutions had been found to the impact of the drought and the suffering of communities. The reasons for this include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>dispersed and disconnected development and aid responses </p></li>
<li><p>lack of infrastructure repair </p></li>
<li><p>land exploitation through agroindustrial and mining projects </p></li>
<li><p>no serious consideration of the local rural communities’ lifestyles. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>We conclude that drought aid will not be enough unless these issues are addressed.</p>
<h2>The interventions</h2>
<p>In 2019, southwestern Angola became one of the hotspots of international <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKVyRdMwFNA">climate debates</a>, due to an extreme drought situation. Millions of people were affected, as well as millions of livestock. </p>
<p>The drought cycle had begun a decade earlier, with a succession of years with irregular rainfall patterns, as reported by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction <a href="https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/droughts-angola-2012-2016-post-disaster-needs-assessment">back in 2016</a>. Local rural communities were already accustomed to living in arid and semi-arid conditions. But in 2019, the cycle peaked, and traditional survival strategies were no longer effective.</p>
<p>International organisations, such as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/unicef-angola-humanitarian-situation-report-july-2019">Unicef</a>, described the situation as “the worst drought in 40 years”. This triggered an unprecedented response from Angolan civic society, government and opposition parties.</p>
<p>First there were immediate campaigns to distribute food and water. The government under President João Lourenço also sponsored several programmes focused on water distribution and infrastructure. New dams and pipelines were built. It also refocused <a href="https://fresan-angola.org/">a financial programme</a> designed to strengthen food security in rural areas towards immediate aid to local communities.</p>
<p>In addition, several NGOs focused on immediate, small-scale solutions.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Water storing hills" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Small-scale water retention solution ‘cisterna-calçadão’ in Gambos (Huíla)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ruy Blanes</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Three years after the crisis, what has been the effect of the relief efforts? </p>
<h2>What’s left</h2>
<p>During our research in the provinces of Huíla, Cunene and Namibe we saw several different projects and interventions. These ranged from large infrastructural projects, in particular the <a href="https://www.africa-press.net/angola/all-news/cunene-river-water-transfer-system-starts-operating-in-april">Cunene River water transfer system</a>, to local water access and retention systems such as the <a href="https://www.adra-angola.org/artigos/projecto-parmes-preve-construir-100-cisternas-calcadao"><em>cisterna calçadão</em></a> or livelihood diversification programmes. </p>
<p>But we also found that the level of humanitarian vulnerability and insecurity had not changed significantly. These were the main problems we identified:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Firstly, an unexpected factor added to the crisis: the COVID-19 outbreak. While the rate of infection among local communities was low according to government figures, restrictions had an impact. For instance, the closure of the Angola-Namibia border throughout 2020 and 2021 interrupted trade.</p></li>
<li><p>The immediate assistance programmes (food, seed and water distribution campaigns) were irregular and unsystematic. Several communities living in the more remote areas were left out. Water distribution projects began with large cistern tanks that were too big and heavy to reach off-track areas. Later on, a <a href="https://www.jornaldeangola.ao/ao/noticias/150-motos-cisternas-apoiam-vitimas-da-seca/">“moto-cistern” system</a> with motorcycles carrying water tanks was introduced. But poor road conditions hampered this.</p></li>
<li><p>The role and capacity of local authorities (communal or municipal) was hindered by excessive centralism. All the major initiatives, such as the poverty reduction programmes and infrastructural development schemes, were designed and promoted from the presidential cabinet without sustained engagement with local authorities. All also involved painstaking bureaucratic processes. </p></li>
<li><p>A number of problems have emerged with the long-term projects. One example is the water transfer system around the Cunene River. Firstly, it faces an uncertain conclusion. Secondly, it could create further inequalities <a href="https://epito-reporter.com/?p=4674">in the distribution of and access to water</a>. In our visit to the commune of Oncocua in the province of Cunene, local communities were wondering why the projected pipelines didn’t include their areas. In addition, the projects privilege big businesses involved in new construction projects instead of rehabilitating existing infrastructure. Examples include the Neves and Matala dams which hark back to the colonial period (pre-1975). Local communities historically organised their livelihoods around them. But the lack of maintenance has created <a href="https://www.blogalstudies.com/post/drought-terroirs-in-southern-angola">“micro-droughts” in water-rich areas</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Aid and relief projects organised by NGOs provided immediate solutions. These ranged from the construction of water holes and pumps to the repair of water retention systems. But the response depended on external funding and lacked an overarching plan.</p></li>
<li><p>Large-scale agro-industrial and mining projects in the region have intensified the pressure on the soil and water resources, and interrupted or hampered the patterns of traditional pastoralists. As Amnesty International reported in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr12/1020/2019/en/">2019</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/angola-millions-facing-hunger-as-thousands-flee-their-homes-as-drought-ravages-the-south-of-angola-2/">2021</a>, these projects in Huila province led to traditional communal pasture lands being appropriated. This increased conflict.</p></li>
<li><p>The government’s initiatives took place without the support or knowledge of local communities. This was particularly true when it came to the design of practical solutions such as the installation and maintenance of water holes and the development of farm plots.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In August of 2022, Angola will be holding presidential elections. As part of his campaign ahead of polls, President Lourenço has said that efforts to manage the effects of the drought would be his <a href="http://www.embaixadadeangola.pt/pr-prioriza-combate-seca-sul-de-angola/">priority in the next cabinet</a>. The announcement may seem like a positive gesture. But the fact that it is formulated three years after the crisis shows that the response to drought in southwestern Angola has, so far, been inefficient.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188015/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruy Llera Blanes receives funding from FORMAS (Sweden). </span></em></p>
Despite international and national responses to the drought, the situation is dire. The government’s response is a lesson in how not to deal with drought.
Ruy Llera Blanes, Associate Professor in Social Anthropology, University of Gothenburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/184744
2022-07-04T13:27:57Z
2022-07-04T13:27:57Z
Do humanitarian agencies help refugees become independent? Evidence from history
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471577/original/file-20220629-14-ldhj3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees take shelter in front of the UN refugee centre in South Africa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ihsaan Haffejee/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When 5.3 million Ukrainians <a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/5-3-million-ukrainians-have-entered-eu-since-the-beginning-of-invasion-HbXkUz">entered</a> the EU between February and June 2022, alongside life-saving emergency assistance came similarly crucial support: the right to stay and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/information-people-fleeing-war-ukraine_en#your-rights-in-the-eu">work in the EU</a> for up to three years. This arose out of the recognition that people deserve the chance to make a living in exile – and that doing so can benefit host countries as well. </p>
<p>The UN agency for refugees (UNHCR) <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/44bf7b012.pdf">defines</a> self-reliance as the ability to meet essential needs in a “sustainable manner and with dignity”. Yet in my work I have witnessed that this often means refugees live independently from humanitarian assistance, but in destitution. </p>
<p>An estimated two-thirds are in <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/global-compact-refugees-indicator-report/">poverty</a>. They rarely gain citizenship in host countries and many are even forbidden from leaving camps. At times, there’s a blatant disregard for refugees’ own agency and skills. Yet these are the very attributes that provide a foundation for living independently. </p>
<p>While living and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/art-of-selfreliance-stories-from-refugees-who-stay/">working in Uganda</a>, I grew curious: has fostering refugee self-reliance always been a goal for the humanitarian and development community? And has it ever been successful?</p>
<p>These questions led me to archives, and in turn to reports by the UN Refugee Agency, UN Development Programme, World Bank, Oxfam, International Rescue Committee, and other actors. These documented decades’ worth of self-reliance projects for refugees in Greece, Tanzania, Pakistan and beyond. My book, <a href="https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/refugees-self-reliance-development">Refugees, Self-Reliance, Development: A critical history</a>, shares many of the stories I found.</p>
<p>Whether examining refugee situations in the 1920s or in 2022, I’ve seen how the promotion of self-reliance and livelihoods often comes at the expense of refugee well-being and protection. <a href="https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/56713/9781529219098_Chapter%201.pdf?sequence=1">This knowledge</a> demands a closer look at current trends in refugee self-reliance programming, and whose interests are being served. </p>
<h2>Refugee labour versus livelihoods</h2>
<p>Refugee labour has commonly been used to further the aims of host countries, and even international agencies, sometimes at the expense of refugees’ own livelihoods. </p>
<p>In the 1920s, for example, humanitarian agencies and the League of Nations sought to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276111408_From_Bottom-Up_to_Top-Down_The_%27Pre-History%27_of_Refugee_Livelihoods_Assistance_from_1919_to_1979">help refugees in Greece</a> become commercial farmers. They were encouraged to take out loans to grow cash crops such as tobacco. But then tobacco rapidly dropped in price on the global market. The livelihoods encouraged by humanitarians led to refugees becoming bankrupt and struggling to feed their families. </p>
<p>In this instance, a drive to boost Greece’s export economy came at the expense of refugees. Encouraging subsistence farming or crop diversification might have yielded better results. These approaches focus on refugee needs rather than that of their host country or the global economy.</p>
<h2>Using existing skills</h2>
<p>Attempts to foster refugee self-reliance in east Africa in the 1970s often came through farming. Attempts were made to coerce refugees to farm cash crops in collective settlements. Reports document that <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Evan-Easton-Calabria/publication/276111408_From_Bottom-Up_to_Top-Down_The_'Pre-History'_of_Refugee_Livelihoods_Assistance_from_1919_to_1979/links/622b5516a39db062db93b95b/From-Bottom-Up-to-Top-Down-The-Pre-History-of-Refugee-Livelihoods-Assistance-from-1919-to-1979.pdf">refugees were put into camp prisons</a> for fishing instead of farming. </p>
<p>By 1985 most settlements were food-insecure and thus considered failures. “Self-reliant” refugee settlements – defined at this time as those growing enough to feed inhabitants – generally held just a few thousand refugees. Thousands of others had left, seeking to create their own lives and livelihoods beyond the purview of the humanitarians tasked to help them.</p>
<h2>Outside influences</h2>
<p>My research shows that refugee self-reliance and livelihoods programming is not developed in a vacuum. Instead it is influenced by national and international economic, social and political trends. </p>
<p>In the 1920s programming focused on settling refugees on farms or placing them into formal work, such as the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276111408_From_Bottom-Up_to_Top-Down_The_%27Pre-History%27_of_Refugee_Livelihoods_Assistance_from_1919_to_1979">International Labour Organization’s employment-matching scheme</a>. This reflected a perception of refugees as labour migrants, the availability of agricultural land in countries like Greece, and significant shortages in labour markets in countries like France. In the 1980s in Pakistan, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article-abstract/33/1/143/5593613?redirectedFrom=fulltext">self-reliance assistance for Afghan refugees</a> shifted to fostering entrepreneurship, reflecting not necessarily refugees’ skill sets but their restrictions on land use by the Pakistani government. </p>
<p>Today, refugees are encouraged to join the informal sector, sometimes even as host states <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/research/working/56bd9ed89/refugees-asked-fish-themselves-role-livelihoods-trainings-kampalas-urban.html">crack down on it</a>. Fostering refugee self-reliance through <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/digital-livelihoods-people-move">digital remote work</a> is also on the rise. These changes reflect global trends in the world of work – perhaps more than they reflect opportunities for wide-scale refugee self-reliance. Sometimes these routes to livelihoods are promoted to help agencies avoid hard conversations about refugee rights in the first place. </p>
<h2>Self-reliance in the 21st century</h2>
<p>Today humanitarian and development actors need to reconsider how to help refugees in the face of global economic, political, and social upheaval and change. These changes include the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uks-plans-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda-raise-four-red-flags-182709">normalising of violations</a> to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and more frequent and severe climate shocks to economies. COVID-19 has shown the precarity of refugees’ lives. The UN Refugee Agency <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/ga2021/pdf/Chapter_GlobalInitiatives.pdf">found</a> that <a href="https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/ga2021/pdf/Chapter_GlobalInitiatives.pdf">74% of refugees</a> could meet just half or less of their basic needs. </p>
<p>Discussions on refugee self-reliance and livelihoods must be premised on refugees’ access to national <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/5ad5b4084.pdf">social protection systems</a>. Linkages to wider efforts to improve the decency of informal work, in which most refugees are involved, has the potential to improve many refugee livelihoods. Serious consideration must also be given to promoting refugees’ rights <em>not</em> to work in instances where the only work available is dangerous and exploitative. And there are important ongoing conversations about <a href="https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/refugee-self-reliance-moving-beyond-the-marketplace">moving beyond the economic</a> focus of self-reliance to encompass its <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/brochures/61a739054/summary-of-roundtable-4-self-reliance.html">multi-dimensional definition</a>.</p>
<p>Forces influencing refugee self-reliance are much greater than what any livelihood training can achieve. Acting on this understanding is crucial for refugee self-reliance to be a concept worth promoting in the future. If this does not happen, then it is neither a meaningful nor reasonable <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html">objective</a> of the international refugee regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184744/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Evan Easton-Calabria does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Most refugees rarely gain citizenship in host countries and the work that is available to them is informal, irregular and precarious.
Evan Easton-Calabria, Senior Researcher at the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, and Research Associate at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/180020
2022-03-25T03:32:36Z
2022-03-25T03:32:36Z
Saying China ‘bought’ a military base in the Solomons is simplistic and shows how little Australia understands power in the Pacific
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-24/draft-leak-chinese-military-base-solomon-islands/100937632?s=03">draft security agreement</a> between China and Solomon Islands circulating on social media raises important questions about how the Australian government and national security community understand power dynamics in the Pacific Islands.</p>
<p>In Australian debates, the term “<a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020-defence-strategic-update">influence</a>” is <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7227988/australia-losing-influence-in-south-pacific-to-china-report/">often</a> <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinese-influence-pacific-islands">used</a> to characterise the assumed consequences of China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific.</p>
<p>There’s an assumption China generates influence primarily from its economic statecraft. This includes its concessional loans, aid and investment by state-owned enterprises (which partly manifests in Beijing’s involvement of Pacific Islands in its Belt and Road Initiative).</p>
<p>On its face, the leaked draft seemingly proves Chinese spending “bought” enough influence to get the Solomon Islands government to consider this agreement. But such an interpretation misses two key issues.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1507176221469249536"}"></div></p>
<h2>The role of domestic politics</h2>
<p>First, the draft agreement is primarily about Solomon Islands domestic politics – not just geopolitics. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio-australia/programs/pacificbeat/analyst-absolutely-certain-australia-not-interfering-solomons/13656652">explained by Dr Tarcisius Kabutaulaka</a> after the November 2021 riots in Honiara, geopolitical considerations intersect with, and can be used to, advance longstanding domestic issues.</p>
<p>These include uneven and unequal development, frustrated decentralisation, and unresolved grievances arising from prior conflicts.</p>
<p>Power in the Pacific is complex. It is not just politicians in the national government who matter in domestic and foreign policy-making.</p>
<p>Take, for example, the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/behind-the-scenes-in-the-solomons-local-leader-has-leveraged-china-issue-to-his-advantage-20211126-p59cks.html">activism of Malaita provincial governor</a> Derek Suidani, who pursued relations with Taiwan after Solomon Islands switched diplomatic recognition to China in 2019. This highlights the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-United-States-Subnational-Relations-with-Divided-China-A-Constructivist/Tubilewicz-Omond/p/book/9780367763190">important role sub-national actors</a> can play in the both domestic and foreign policy arenas.</p>
<p>Neither Solomon Islanders (nor other Pacific peoples) are “<a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-whispers-and-pacific-agency">passive dupes</a>” to Chinese influence or unaware of geopolitical challenges – and opportunities. Some do, however, face resource and constitutional constraints when resisting influence attempts.</p>
<h2>Australia’s current policy settings are not working</h2>
<p>The second key issue is that Australia’s current policy settings are not working – if their success is measured by advancing Australia’s strategic interests.</p>
<p>Australia is by far the Pacific’s largest aid donor and has been on a spending spree under its “<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific">Pacific Step-up</a>” initiative. </p>
<p>Australia spent <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australias-costly-investment-solomon-islands-lessons-ramsi">billions</a> leading the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as well as significant bilateral programs to the country. Yet Australia has not been able to head off Honiara considering the security agreement with China.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australia-deploys-troops-and-police-what-now-for-solomon-islands-172678">As Australia deploys troops and police, what now for Solomon Islands?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Perhaps Canberra has not sought to influence Solomon Islands on this matter. But given Australia’s <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/pacific-power-paperback-softback">longstanding anxieties</a> about potentially hostile powers establishing a presence in the region, this is unlikely.</p>
<p>Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews has already <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-24/draft-leak-chinese-military-base-solomon-islands/100937632">commented</a> in response to the leaked draft that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is our neighbourhood and we are very concerned of any activity that is taking place in the Pacific Islands. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-10/china-military-base-in-vanuatu-report-of-concern-turnbull-says/9635742">rumours</a> (subsequently denied) that China was in talks to establish a military base in Vanuatu, and China’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/25/solomons-government-vetoes-chinese-attempt-to-lease-an-island">attempt to lease</a> Tulagi Island in Solomon Islands had already intensified Australia’s anxieties. Such concerns partly motivated the government’s investment in the Pacific Step-up.</p>
<h2>A closer look at the draft security agreement</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://twitter.com/AnnaPowles/status/1506845794728837120">terms of the draft</a> security agreement should make Australia anxious. It goes significantly beyond the bilateral security <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2018/14.html">treaty between Solomon Islands and Australia</a>.</p>
<p>Article 1 provides that Solomon Islands may request China to “send police, police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands” in circumstances ranging from maintaining social order to unspecified “other tasks agreed upon by the Parties”.</p>
<p>Even more concerningly for Solomon Islands’ sovereignty, Article 1 also provides that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It remains unclear what authority the Solomon Islands government would maintain once it consents to Beijing’s deployment of “relevant forces” to protect Chinese nationals.</p>
<p>Article 4 is equally vague. It states specific details regarding Chinese missions, including “jurisdiction, privilege and immunity […] shall be negotiated separately”.</p>
<p>The agreement also raises questions about the transparency of agreements Beijing makes and their consequences for democracy in its partner states. </p>
<p>According to Article 5, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>without the written consent of the other party, neither party shall disclose the cooperation information to a third party. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This implies the Solomon Islands government is legally bound not to inform its own people and their democratically elected representatives about activities under the agreement without the Chinese approval.</p>
<p>The version circulating on social media may prove to be an early draft. Its leak is likely a bargaining tactic aimed at pursuing multiple agendas with multiple actors – including Australia.</p>
<p>Australian High Commissioner Lachlan Strahan met yesterday with Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australian-defence-minister-says-china-base-solomons-would-be-concerning-2022-03-25/">announced</a> Australia will extend its assistance force until December 2023. It will build a national radio network, construct a second patrol boat outpost, and provide SI$130 million (A$21.5 million) in budget support. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1507172261404774401"}"></div></p>
<h2>Playing whack-a-mole</h2>
<p>While the timing was likely coincidental, it highlights an emerging dynamic in Australia’s Pacific policy: playing <a href="https://www.9dashline.com/article/pushing-the-limits-of-australias-strategic-imagination-in-the-pacific-islands">whack-a-mole</a> by seeking to directly counter Chinese moves through economic statecraft. Think of <a href="https://exchange.telstra.com.au/expanding-the-telstra-family-with-digicel-pacific/">Telstra’s recent purchase of Digicel Pacific, headquartered in PNG</a> – a move <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australias-telstra-digicel-deal-about-shutting-china-out-of-pacific-analysts-say/7pbq85euv">seen by some analysts</a> as really an attempt to shut China out of the Pacific.</p>
<p>That China has been able to persuade Solomon Islands to consider an intrusive security agreement raises questions about our understanding of how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-push-into-png-has-been-surprisingly-slow-and-ineffective-why-has-beijing-found-the-going-so-tough-140073">China's push into PNG has been surprisingly slow and ineffective. Why has Beijing found the going so tough?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>If influence is taken to result in concrete behavioural changes (such as entering into a bilateral security agreement), and if Australia is going to “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-will-compete-with-china-to-save-pacific-sovereignty-says-bishop-20180617-p4zm1h.html">compete</a>” with China on spending, you’d need to ask, for example: how much “influence” does an infrastructure project buy? </p>
<p>This understanding of power, however, is insufficient. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required.</p>
<p>Influence is exercised not only by national governments, but also by a variety of non-state actors, including sub-national and community groups. </p>
<p>And targets of influence-seekers can exercise their agency. See, for example, how various actors in Solomon Islands are leveraging Australia, China and Taiwan’s overtures to the country.</p>
<p>We must also consider how power affects the political norms and values guiding governing elites and non-state actors, potentially reshaping their identities and interests.</p>
<p>The draft security agreement may come to nothing – but it should provide a wake-up call to Australia and its partners.</p>
<p>Old assumptions about how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific need urgent re-examination – as does our assumption that explicitly “competing” with China advances either our interests or those of the Pacific.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joanne Wallis receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Czeslaw Tubilewicz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A leaked draft security agreement seemingly proves Chinese spending ‘bought’ enough influence to get the Solomon Islands government. But such an interpretation misses two key issues.
Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, University of Adelaide
Czeslaw Tubilewicz, Senior Lecturer, University of Adelaide
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/166816
2021-08-30T20:06:24Z
2021-08-30T20:06:24Z
The situation in Afghanistan is beyond horrifying: this is what you can do to help
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418156/original/file-20210826-23147-1vtyfi0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Akhter Gulfam/EPA/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The situation in Afghanistan is rapidly unfolding as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-a-way-to-get-refugees-out-of-afghanistan-after-this-weeks-deadline-if-the-taliban-agrees-166739">humanitarian crisis</a>. We are seeing images and stories of violence and despair on a daily, sometimes even an hourly basis. </p>
<p>If you are looking at practical ways to help, here are some suggestions to support refugees from Afghanistan locally, nationally, and internationally.</p>
<h2>Show your support for policy change</h2>
<p>One option is to support what many Australians from Afghanistan are calling for. </p>
<p>The Afghan Australian Advocacy Network, made up of a diverse range of ethnic and religious groups from Afghanistan, <a href="https://www.actionforafghanistan.com.au/">wants</a> the federal government to increase our humanitarian intake, grant permanent protection to people from Afghanistan in Australia on temporary visas and prioritise family reunions.</p>
<p>An easy first step is to support and share the Afghan Australian Advocacy Network’s <a href="https://www.change.org/p/prime-minister-scott-morrison-action-for-afghanistan">petition</a>, which currently has more than 140,000 signatures. </p>
<p>Another option is to <a href="https://saveafghanistannow.good.do/contact/mp/">write</a> to federal members of parliament and ask them to support of these actions. When you write to your local federal MP, ask to meet with them to discuss your concerns.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1428305776116830215"}"></div></p>
<p>Approach your state, territory and local governments. Ask them to demonstrate acts of solidarity such as providing <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/states-step-up-for-afghan-humanitarian-arrivals/">additional quarantine places</a>, follow the South Australian parliament’s lead to <a href="https://welcoming.org.au/initiatives/afghanistan-solidarity/#1630288394860-1dbc5abe-39bf">pass a motion</a> supporting refugees from Afghanistan or lighting up public buildings. </p>
<h2>Donate or volunteer</h2>
<p>There are many local, national and international organisations working with refugee communities from Afghanistan. </p>
<p>While many people want to donate goods, most agencies <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-giving-cash-not-clothing-is-usually-best-after-disasters-83405">prefer</a> a financial donation as agencies are able to work with communities and find out what they need. </p>
<p>War artist Ben Quilty has taken matters into his own hands, and is appealing for funds for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (<a href="https://www.unrefugees.org.au/campaigns/afghanistan-crisis/?utm_code=meda0821&utm_source=media&utm_medium=media&utm_content=&utm_campaign=au_en_media_afghanistan_emergency">UNHCR</a>). </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1430771910258794501"}"></div></p>
<p>Apart from the UNHCR, some other established organisations supplying practical things like food, water and supplies in Afghanistan are the <a href="https://www.redcross.org.au/get-involved/take-action/help-refugees">Australian Red Cross</a> and <a href="https://www.unicef.org.au/appeals/help-children-in-afghanistan#donateform">UNICEF</a> Australia. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://emergencyaction.org.au">Emergency Action Alliance</a> is made up of 16 Australian-based charities. It has set up a list of ten of its members, including World Vision and Save the Children, who are running appeals for Afghanistan. </p>
<p>People in each state can donate or volunteer with local organisations to support their work with refugees.</p>
<p>This includes:</p>
<ul>
<li>NSW: the <a href="https://asylumseekerscentre.org.au/">Asylum Seekers Centre</a> and <a href="https://aus.jrs.net/en/jesuit-refugee-service/">Jesuit Refugee Service</a> </li>
<li>Victoria: <a href="https://asrc.org.au/">Asylum Seeker Resource Centre</a> </li>
<li>Western Australia: <a href="https://www.carad.org.au/">Coalition Assisting Refugees and Detainees</a> </li>
<li>South Australia <a href="https://welcoming.org.au/">Welcoming Australia</a> </li>
<li>Queensland: <a href="https://www.multiculturalaustralia.org.au/">Multicultural Australia</a> and <a href="https://romero.mercycommunity.org.au/">Romero Centre</a></li>
<li>ACT: <a href="https://www.companionhouse.org.au/">Companion House</a> </li>
<li>Tasmania: <a href="https://mrctas.org.au/">Multicultural Resource Centre</a> </li>
<li>Northern Territory: <a href="http://www.melaleuca.org.au/">Melaluca Centre</a> </li>
</ul>
<h2>Help for refugees in the community</h2>
<p>If you or someone you know is seeking information for their family or friends in difficulty in Afghanistan, their priority will be trying to access legal advice or assistance. </p>
<p>The Asylum Seeker Resource Centre <a href="https://asrc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Infosheet-Afghanistan-Help-1.pdf">has a list</a> of legal resources. Refugee Legal in Melbourne also have <a href="https://refugeelegal.org.au/">a hotline</a> for people impacted by the crisis in Afghanistan.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/theres-a-way-to-get-refugees-out-of-afghanistan-after-this-weeks-deadline-if-the-taliban-agrees-166739">There's a way to get refugees out of Afghanistan after this week's deadline — if the Taliban agrees</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Foundation House (a Victorian organisation for torture survivors) has basic <a href="https://foundationhouse.org.au/news/to-all-members-of-the-afghan-community-foundation-house-stands-in-solidarity-with-you/">information</a> about visas and mental health support in English and Dari. The Refugee Council of Australia has a comprehensive <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/services/">list of services</a>, including legal and financial support to refugees, all around Australia.</p>
<p>Legal services, advocates and advisers are experiencing a huge increase in demand and are working at capacity. So, another practical way you can help here is to donate to a refugee community legal centre in your state or territory.</p>
<h2>How to provide emotional support</h2>
<p>People from refugee backgrounds are likely to be highly distressed by the crisis in Afghanistan. Distress can come and go in waves.</p>
<p>The Australian Torture and Trauma network has <a href="https://www.refugeehealthnetworkqld.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/210823-Responding-to-People-in-Distress.pdf">useful tips</a> on how to respond in a compassion first, trauma-informed way. This includes: listening and acknowledging feelings, resisting the urge to offer quick solutions and encouraging people to take breaks from the media coverage. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1428308840718626823"}"></div></p>
<p>For teachers supporting students and families from refugee backgrounds, Foundation House has a <a href="https://sifr.foundationhouse.org.au/news-event/supporting-students-and-families-of-afghan-background/">video</a> to support students and families of Afghan backgrounds. </p>
<h2>Own a business? Sponsor a refugee</h2>
<p>An organisation called <a href="https://www.talentbeyondboundaries.org/blog/responding-to-the-crisis-in-afghanistan">Talent Beyond Boundaries</a> helps connect businesses to people with skills who are displaced. </p>
<p>It uses visa programs in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom to help employers gain a talented refugee while also bringing them to safety.</p>
<p>Employers can get in touch direct and the organisation also takes tax-deductible donations.</p>
<hr>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ykv6CrUrCEM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<hr>
<p><em>Correction: this piece has been updated to amend the work of the Emergency Action Alliance.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166816/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary Anne Kenny is a member of the WA Refugees and People Seeking Asylum Network. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Reza is Board of Director at Community Refugee Sponsorship Australia and a volunteer Partnership Coordinator with Indigo Foundation Australia.
He has been appointed to the federal government's Advisory Panel on Australia’s Resettlement of Afghan Nationals. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Caroline Fleay is a member of the WA Refugee and People Seeking Asylum Network.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas Procter receives funding from Overseas Services to Survivors of Torture and Trauma. </span></em></p>
Here are some ways to support people from Afghanistan locally, nationally and overseas.
Mary Anne Kenny, Associate Professor, School of Law, Murdoch University
Ali Reza Yunespour, Academic Internships Coordinator, The University of Melbourne
Caroline Fleay, Associate Professor, Curtin University
Nicholas Procter, Professor and Chair: Mental Health Nursing, University of South Australia
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/166229
2021-08-22T08:10:56Z
2021-08-22T08:10:56Z
How Ethiopia’s conflict has affected farming in Tigray
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416365/original/file-20210816-25-rif7oi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In north Ethiopia, farmers commonly use an ox-drawn single-tined plough called mahrasha</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by: Edwin Remsberg / VWPics/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since fighting broke out in November 2020 between the Tigrayan regional government and the Ethiopian army, the conflict has <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-tigray-region-has-seen-famine-before-why-it-could-happen-again-150181">wreaked havoc</a> on the lives of people living in the Tigray state. Over 9,500 <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349824181_Tigray_Atlas_of_the_humanitarian_situation">civilian deaths have been documented</a>, with <a href="https://eritreahub.org/tigray-opposition-parties-blame-ethiopian-troops-and-eritrean-forces-for-52000-civilian-deaths">many more unrecorded</a>. In addition <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/stories/2021/7/60daa5954/displaced-nurses-provide-vital-health-care-others-displaced-ethiopias-tigray.html#:%7E:text=Close%20to%202%20million%20people,in%20the%20region's%20main%20cities">about 2 million</a> people have been displaced and at least 400,000 are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/03/over-400000-people-in-ethiopias-tigray-now-in-famine-un-warns">now in famine</a>.</p>
<p>Situated in the northern periphery of Ethiopia, about 75% of the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20210223_acaps_secondary_data_review_ethiopia_pre-crisis_situation_in_tigray.pdf">5.7 million population of Tigray</a> are farmers. Most people who live there depend on local yields for survival. It’s expected that there’ll be an even greater demand on local yields this year <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349824181_Tigray_Atlas_of_the_humanitarian_situation">because millions</a> cannot be reached with aid and <a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-tigray-region-has-seen-famine-before-why-it-could-happen-again-150181">last year’s harvest largely failed</a>. </p>
<p>Hence, we <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351516150_Ploughing_in_the_Tigray_War">set out to know</a> what the state of farming is in Tigray and have put together our findings in this <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351516150_Ploughing_in_the_Tigray_War">pre-print paper</a>. We were concerned that, due to warfare, ploughing and planting might not occur on time or at all. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-tigray-region-has-seen-famine-before-why-it-could-happen-again-150181">Ethiopia's Tigray region has seen famine before: why it could happen again</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Tigray’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349824181_Tigray_Atlas_of_the_humanitarian_situation">growing period</a> is generally 90 to 120 days long, depending on weather conditions in different areas. This stretches from June to September. Land preparation (ploughing) <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334334014_Major_Crops_and_Cropping_Systems_in_Dogu%27a_Tembien">usually</a> happens between March and July. </p>
<p>We investigated the status of ploughing from a distance because, due to the war, we couldn’t be present on the ground. Our main research tools were satellite imagery and telephone communications. This study covered March to early June 2021. </p>
<p>Sadly, our findings revealed a painful situation in which farmers try to grow crops, but they’ve lost many of their assets and fear for their lives. War conditions have made ploughing very challenging as oxen, used to plough farmlands, have been looted and deliberately killed. In addition, there was hardly any access to farm inputs such as seed and fertiliser, while farm tools have been destroyed by Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers.</p>
<p>The targeted destruction of Tigray’s economic basis – especially the agricultural sector – has been framed as a <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/starving-tigray/">deliberate attempt to starve Tigray</a>.</p>
<h2>Tillage in Tigray</h2>
<p>Crop cultivation in Tigray has a long history as settled agriculture started <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334334014_Major_Crops_and_Cropping_Systems_in_Dogu%27a_Tembien">more than 3,000 years ago</a>. This is reflected in the region’s high crop diversity, including endemic crops, such as the renowned <a href="https://teffco.com/what-is-teff/"><em>tef</em> cereal</a>. Overall, farmers have small plots (less than a hectare in total). They mainly grow subsistence crops on rain-fed lands and cash crops on irrigated lands in narrow river valley bottoms. </p>
<p>Farming methods are mostly traditional and low-cost, but effective. Oxen-drawn ploughs (or <em>mahrasha</em>) are <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329922172_26_Farmland_management_tillage_and_resulting_cultivation_terraces">widely used to till the soil</a>, seeds are mainly sown by hand and most <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334334014_Major_Crops_and_Cropping_Systems_in_Dogu%27a_Tembien">crops depend entirely on rainfall</a> without supplemental irrigation. </p>
<p>Farmers in Tigray have modernised a lot over the last decades: they <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320833212_Geographical_determinants_of_inorganic_fertiliser_sales_and_of_resale_prices_in_north_Ethiopia">use mineral fertilisers</a> and selected seeds and advice is mainly provided by the Office of Agriculture.</p>
<p>As a whole, we found that rainfall conditions in early 2021 were conducive to a normal planting season. However, we contrasted bird’s eye photographs with historical Google Earth imagery and saw that in early May, in comparison to previous years, less cropland had been ploughed. </p>
<p>To better understand why this was happening, we used 17 telephone interviews with key witnesses – all of whom who are well experienced within Tigray’s agricultural sector and have strong networks. </p>
<h2>Challenges to farming</h2>
<p>Several key reasons were given for why land wasn’t being prepared. </p>
<p>In many cases, soldiers – mostly mentioned were Eritrean soldiers who had <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-idUSKBN2BF1NT">entered Tigray as an ally of the Ethiopian forces</a> – weren’t allowing farmers to plough their land. They told farmers, “we are here fighting to die, and you want to plough?” </p>
<p>Another reason was that young men, who would usually do most of the tillage work, left for fear of being killed. Some became fighters.</p>
<p>Having experienced atrocities, many young Tigrayans felt compelled to join the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/84350/ethiopias-war-in-tigray-is-but-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-when-it-comes-to-conflicts-ravaging-the-country/">forces</a>. A witness said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The number of youngsters joining the Tigrayan Defence Forces per household may vary based on what happened in their surroundings (especially massacres, rape and destruction). In a village that I know well, almost all the young men joined after witnessing the indiscriminate killing of 13 people. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Even if farmers were “allowed” to farm, the absence of farm implements and inputs was often quoted as a major challenge. An agricultural expert in Mekelle said that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Most oxen have been slaughtered or looted by Ethiopian and
Eritrean soldiers. The Eritrean soldiers are not only disallowing farmers to plough but also burnt and destroyed their farm tools.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And a staff member of Mekelle University said that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There are no farm inputs (seeds and fertilisers) available, and many oxen have been taken (without which ploughing is impossible).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Who farmed has also changed. Farmers feared that they’d be killed while ploughing. We were told that, in some places, during the daytime elderly people, women and children worked on the lands. Adult men worked at night and stayed in the village during the day because they were a target of the Ethiopian army and supporting Eritrean forces.</p>
<h2>Still hope, but…</h2>
<p>Farmers have been late with land preparation, but in June most rural areas <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/tigray-mekelle-ethiopia-retreat.html">came under the control of the Tigray forces</a>. This meant that farmers could start working on their land again. Rural markets – where farmers bought or exchanged seeds – thrived. </p>
<p>Despite the difficult conditions, a big effort was made in June and July to prepare the land for crops. An analysis of True Colour Composite images (combining the red, green and blue bands of <a href="https://gisgeography.com/how-to-download-sentinel-satellite-data/">Sentinel satellite imagery</a>) showed that, by June, most farmlands had been tilled at least once – the share of exposed dark earth was similar to that of 2019 or 2020.</p>
<p>But this wasn’t uniform across the region. Western Tigray, for instance, remains <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/ethiopia-s-amhara-seize-disputed-territory-amid-tigray-conflict-1.1577772">occupied by Amhara Special Forces and militia</a>. Most farmlands have not been tilled and, on the satellite imagery, many display the typical reddish colour of the standing unharvested sorghum from last year. </p>
<p>We do have hope though for many farmers. Tigrayan smallholder farming systems are resilient. From interviews, we learned that farmers adapted by switching to crops that require minimal management and to fast-growing cereal landraces. Cereals require less human presence on the fields (as compared to tomatoes or onions for instance), hence less risk for the farmers to encounter soldiers and get killed. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, for many the last food that people had at hand has been consumed and the next harvest will only be in November. And we read that a <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202108170074.html">fresh locust infestation</a> is threatening.</p>
<p>While it was in a minimal food insecurity situation before the war, the larger part of Tigray has now entered emergency and famine conditions. This corresponds to <a href="https://fews.net/east-africa/ethiopia/food-security-outlook/june-2021">at least two starvation deaths per 10,000 inhabitants per day</a> in areas under famine. </p>
<p>With currently a meagre <a href="https://www.wfp.org/news/world-food-programme-convoy-reaches-tigray-many-more-are-vital-meet-growing-needs">10% of the required food aid getting into Tigray</a>, it’s imperative that any <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-legal-implications-of-humanitarian-aid-blockades-154847?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1629298528-1">aid blockades on Tigray are lifted</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166229/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Nyssen receives funding from the Belgian Government, through VLIR University Development Cooperation and through FWO Fund for Scientific Research. Ghent University also provides funding through its Special Research Fund.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emnet Negash receives funding from Ghent University's Special Research Fund and from Mekelle University. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sofie Annys receives funding from the Belgian Government, through FWO Fund for Scientific Research.</span></em></p>
Due to warfare, ploughing and planting was not timely in Tigray. This may lead to a second year with failed crops.
Jan Nyssen, Professor, Ghent University
Emnet Negash, PhD Candidate, Ghent University
Sofie Annys, Researcher, Ghent University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/165787
2021-08-09T14:04:44Z
2021-08-09T14:04:44Z
Comply or leave: the dilemma facing humanitarian agencies
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/415113/original/file-20210808-27-1baqbia.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Humanitarian agencies are often thrust into the heart of contentious crises without easy or quick solutions.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Houthis accused the WFP of giving out expired food assistance. The UN agency delivers monthly rations or money to 10.2 million people of Yemen's 26-million population. EPA-EFE/YAHYA ARHAB</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Humanitarian agencies are often thrust into the heart of divisive situations. This can sometimes leave them in a tough spot if they want to continue their operations in a country. Moina Spooner, from The Conversation Africa, asked <a href="http://www.mukeshkapila.org/about/inbrief.html">Mukesh Kapila</a>, a specialist in humanitarian affairs, to provide insights into the challenges humanitarian agencies face and what can be done to better support them.</em></p>
<h2>What are the main political challenges that humanitarian agencies face when working in volatile environments?</h2>
<p>Humanitarian agencies are often thrust into the heart of divisive situations. These are contentious crises without easy or quick solutions. Tools we may have turned to before, such as <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652071/EPRS_BRI(2020)652071_EN.pdf">multilateralism</a> – including the UN Security Council – seem to be paralysed nowadays. Diplomacy is generally ineffective and other UN-mandated interventions impossible.</p>
<p>Examples of these crises include Ethiopia’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54964378">Tigray</a> conflict, the resurgence of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan">Taliban</a> in Afghanistan, or resistance against <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/myanmar-news-protests-coup.html">Myanmar’s</a> military regime. </p>
<p>In such situations, the core operating <a href="https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf">principles</a> of humanitarian agencies – neutrality and impartiality – are little match for the egregious bad behaviour of warring groups hell-bent on achieving their objectives by any means.</p>
<p>The result is that humanitarian agencies are trodden-over and heavily pressured to co-operate with conflicted parties. Inevitably, compromises are struck to gain humanitarian access, and this can be manipulated as a war tactic. We see this with aid access controversies in <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/un-vote-aid-syria">Syria</a> and <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2021/7/12/aid-access-to-tigray-remains-stalled-despite-ceasefire">Tigray</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, part of the traditional humanitarian mission is to give ‘voice to the voiceless.’ But an agency doing that risks annoying one or other group, and suffers intimidation or expulsion. That means the end of any life-preserving help it was giving. A classic example was the <a href="https://odihpn.org/magazine/the-development-of-the-international-criminal-court-some-implications-for-humanitarian-action/">arrest</a> of Médecins Sans Frontières’ (MSF) Darfur Coordinator in 2005 over a report on the high numbers of rape victims received in its clinics. </p>
<p>There is always much internal angst among humanitarians: should we speak up or not?</p>
<p>When humanitarianism is politicised, trust and respect can be lost. This results in a vicious downward spiral. It starts with increased suspicion, diminished access, and even attacks on aid workers. This happened recently with MSF staff <a href="https://www.msf.org/msf-staff-killed-tigray-ethiopia-are-remembered-their-colleagues">killed</a> in Tigray.</p>
<h2>What are the implications of humanitarian aid agencies being forced to stop operations?</h2>
<p>Many crisis-affected people are remarkably resilient, and should not be looked down upon as victims. They are immensely resourceful and draw on mutual support networks. I saw this, for example, in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQSj6eIW8IE">Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile</a> where people survived for many years with little aid while under constant attack by the Sudanese government.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, there are always gross inequalities within crisis-affected communities. The <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/81e5965c-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/81e5965c-en">most vulnerable</a> – the bottom 30% – are extra fragile. This is because they do not have any spare capabilities or resources to deal with sudden shocks. Typically, they include the unemployed, child-headed households, the elderly or disabled. They are the worst affected by disasters and wars. Often external humanitarian aid is their only means of survival.</p>
<p>When wars are waged without limits, the prevalent social safety net of health, education, water, growing crops, shelter, and local services are often targeted to weaken the resolve and capacity of the enemy. This has happened in <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/decade-destruction-attacks-health-care-syria">Syria</a>, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/civilians-yemen-remain-stuck-between-warring-parties-and-waiting-justice">Yemen</a>, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56399882">Tigray</a>. The inevitable consequence is that the weakest are crushed first.</p>
<p>So, when humanitarian agencies are forced to stop operations – by political decision or huge physical insecurity – the most vulnerable succumb first through starvation and disease. </p>
<p>As the conflict goes on, the general population is affected with rising rates of hunger and malnutrition, breakdown of basic water and sanitation, collapse of health and social services. Death rates rise. For example since the current Tigray crisis <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopia-a-timeline-of-the-tigray-crisis/a-55632181">started</a>, 5.2 million have <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia">urgent needs</a> including a million who are close to famine. Yet only <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/08/05/ethiopia-only-10-of-humanitarian-aid-reaches-tigray/">10%</a> of necessary aid has been allowed to get into Tigray.</p>
<p>Tigray’s experience is not unusual. For instance, <a href="https://youtu.be/WEUWU8JwnDI">I saw</a> this first hand in the genocidal war in Sudan’s Darfur region. In 2004, I was obliged to leave my post as <a href="http://www.mukeshkapila.org/book/about-book.html">UN Humanitarian Coordinator</a>, when I spoke up publicly on the government’s obstruction of humanitarian operations.</p>
<h2>Are there any legal mechanisms which can prevent this from happening?</h2>
<p>We are not short of legal proscriptions. At the national level, most countries have laws to protect life and preserve human dignity. In addition, the <a href="https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule32">military laws and doctrines</a> of many countries include prohibitions on the violation of humanitarian installations or operations.</p>
<p>Countries have also universally recognised the right to provide humanitarian aid through creating – by parliamentary or other <a href="https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/guidance-for-national-society-statutes-2018/">statutes</a> – national Red Cross or Red Crescent organisations. These are not “ordinary NGOs” but special <a href="https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/what-we-do/promoting-principles-and-values/policy-and-diplomacy/the-auxiliary-role/">auxiliaries</a> to national authorities. </p>
<p>But when a state authority itself is party to a conflict or perceives itself to be under grave threat, it can suspend constitutional guarantees and legal safeguards. We have seen that in the mass arrests and disappearances of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/ethiopia-end-arbitrary-detentions-of-tigrayans-activists-and-journalists-in-addis-ababa-and-reveal-whereabouts-of-unaccounted-detainees/">people of Tigray origin</a> inside Ethiopia.</p>
<p>When there is no credible domestic remedy for deliberately-placed constraints on humanitarian access and assistance, international laws –- to which most countries have signed up – are a fall back.</p>
<p>In the modern age, the <a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions">Geneva Conventions</a> on international humanitarian law prohibit attacks on humanitarian operations and workers. The <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf">Rome Statute</a> of the International Criminal Court criminalises such aggression in the context of war crimes. And the UN <a href="http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1502">Security Council Resolution 1502</a> protects humanitarian personnel and access.</p>
<p>There are several other similar treaty laws. For example, the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa">Kampala Convention</a> prohibits attacks on relief work.</p>
<p>Such international treaty-based laws may have a broadly positive effect because of the fear of prosecution under national and international laws. However, this is more theory than practice. There are few examples of successful accountability. The <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/7/4/723/857155">constraint</a> is in bringing transgressors physically to the courts. This is because states are often implicated themselves and unwilling to be held accountable.</p>
<p>There is slow, but steady, progress in <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx">prosecuting</a> perpetrators of war crimes. However, there is no equivalent advancement of justice in relation to the specific transgressions of the right to give and receive humanitarian aid.</p>
<h2>What can be done to ensure humanitarian agencies continue to help people in politically volatile situations?</h2>
<p>There are no easy solutions. A ‘zero tolerance’ policy needs a multi-pronged, long-term approach.</p>
<p>First, there could be better data collection and monitoring of humanitarian violations to understand patterns and trends. This would inform tailored strategies in particularly problematic contexts.</p>
<p>Second, humanitarians must <a href="https://theconversation.com/humanitarian-workers-risk-life-and-limb-to-deliver-aid-to-the-most-vulnerable-163980">work professionally</a> and resist political manipulation and intimidation as courageously as possible. This needs better training and organisational management. It also means preparing-for inherent risks – including to life and limb – that come with operating in volatile contexts. Modern humanitarian practice is not for the faint-hearted.</p>
<p>Third, politicians, law-makers, and legal practitioners must extend current frameworks – especially on where and how alleged offences are tried – to reduce the bureaucratic and physical spaces where perpetrators can hide.</p>
<p>Fourth, the public can help by standing up more to egregious misbehaviours that threaten humanitarianism. This can be done through expressing outrage, lobbying political policymakers, and supporting reputable journalists and investigators who expose wrong-doings.</p>
<p>In conclusion, the face of humanitarianism is <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2021/7/12/three-challenges-for-humanitarian-impartiality">changing</a> fast. Its values-driven, consent-based modus operandi frays in the face of so many threats. Reclaiming that noble mission will be a long and uncertain endeavour.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165787/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mukesh Kapila does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
When humanitarian agencies are obliged to stop operations by political decision or because of huge physical insecurity, the poorest and most vulnerable succumb first through starvation and disease.
Mukesh Kapila, Professor Emeritus in Global Health & Humanitarian Affairs, University of Manchester
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/159412
2021-07-20T12:14:07Z
2021-07-20T12:14:07Z
Low- and middle-income countries lack access to big data analysis – here’s how to fill the gap
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411975/original/file-20210719-13-78d2fh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C278%2C5676%2C3790&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Statistical infrastructure can help improve everything from health care to politics. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/abstract-linear-bar-graph-royalty-free-image/1295429677?adppopup=true"> Andriy Onufriyenko/Moment via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ability to collect and learn from large amounts of data has been a <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/googlecloud/2020/05/20/how-the-world-became-data-driven-and-whats-next/">major driver of innovation</a> over recent decades. Everything from <a href="https://www.jmir.org/2017/6/e232">health care</a> – think patient analytics, wearable devices and the COVID-19 response – to <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Data-Analytics-Intelligent-Transportation-Systems/dp/0128097159">transportation</a> – Uber and Lyft – to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netflix_Prize">entertainment</a> – Netflix – is now driven by data and statistics.</p>
<p>Yet the ability to collect good data, the capacity to derive insights from it and the skills to turn those insights into change aren’t spread evenly across the globe. </p>
<p>Taking a page from the way Doctors Without Borders sends medical personnel and expertise to developing countries, <a href="https://swb.wildapricot.org/projects">some organizations</a> have begun to do the same with statistics. But overall, the need to improve local statistical capacity in developing nations <a href="https://datatopics.worldbank.org/statisticalcapacity">remains largely unmet</a>.</p>
<p>We are two mathematicians at the <a href="https://outreach.colorado.edu/program/lisa-2020-building-statistical-analysis-and-data-science-capacity/">University of Colorado Boulder</a> and are part of a project called the <a href="https://colorado.edu/lab/lisa/">Laboratory for Interdisciplinary Statistical Analysis</a> that is working to develop statistical infrastructure across the world. The goal of the program is to help build data science infrastructure in developing nations. In 10 countries and counting, we have started “stat labs” – academic centers that train young statisticians to collaborate on important local statistics projects. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411971/original/file-20210719-21-yhyfyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Health care workers in yellow protective equipment treating a group of people in a white tent." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411971/original/file-20210719-21-yhyfyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/411971/original/file-20210719-21-yhyfyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411971/original/file-20210719-21-yhyfyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411971/original/file-20210719-21-yhyfyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411971/original/file-20210719-21-yhyfyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411971/original/file-20210719-21-yhyfyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/411971/original/file-20210719-21-yhyfyl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">During Liberia’s Ebola outbreak in 2014, an early lack of data collection and analysis made it hard for the government to send health care workers where they were most needed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LiberiaEbola/b28423ef9e9142bc9336c69b1166834f/photo?Query=ebola%20AND%20liberia&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1100&currentItemNo=45">AP Photo/Abbas Dulleh</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Where statistics matter</h2>
<p>The benefit of a program like Doctors Without Borders is obvious – the group provides medical care. The benefit of improved statistical capacity is harder to see but can be just as important. </p>
<p>For example, during the great cholera outbreak in London in 1854, John Snow used statistical data collection and analysis to <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2FB978-0-12-804571-8.00017-2">identify and close off the contaminated water pump</a>. Later that year, Florence Nightingale, the founder of modern nursing, used statistics to show that simple hygiene measures could <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/089801019801600215">drastically reduce infection and death in hospitals</a>.</p>
<p>Every year, the <a href="https://datatopics.worldbank.org/statisticalcapacity">World Bank scores countries</a> on a scale of 1-100. One represents a complete lack of basic statistical data and analysis capacity, and 100 represents the statistical capacity of a developed nation like the U.S. According to <a href="https://datatopics.worldbank.org/statisticalcapacity">the 2020 report</a>, the average statistical capacity of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America are 57.1, 69.8 and 70.1, respectively. </p>
<p>This disparate statistical capacity has played an important role in the pandemic. Strong data collection and analysis of COVID-19 cases allowed some countries – like Nigeria and the U.S. – to <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.7189%2Fjogh.10.020399">better respond to the initial outbreaks</a> and take an informed approach when <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/schools-childcare/operation-strategy.html">reopening sections of the economy</a>.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, during the pandemic, fully <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-96-covid-19-how-the-data-and-statistical-community-stepped-up-to-the-new-challenges/">80% of national statistics offices</a> in lower- to middle-income countries indicated they needed additional support to perform important data collection and analysis.</p>
<p>Just as good data can lead to good decisions, lack of data can often lead to less effective decisions. For example, during the 2014 to 2016 Ebola epidemic in Liberia, the government <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.4269%2Fajtmh.15-0229">did not initially</a> have access to accurate, real-time mortality data or effective analysis tools. This lack prevented public health authorities from quickly and effectively responding to outbreaks. Once the government introduced a <a href="https://www.mhero.org/countries/liberia">phone-based data collection system</a>, officials were better able to allocate doctors and nurses to where they were needed. </p>
<figure class="align-Centre zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409020/original/file-20210630-22-ga3owm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two people kneeling in the sand over a piece of paper." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409020/original/file-20210630-22-ga3owm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409020/original/file-20210630-22-ga3owm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409020/original/file-20210630-22-ga3owm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409020/original/file-20210630-22-ga3owm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409020/original/file-20210630-22-ga3owm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409020/original/file-20210630-22-ga3owm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409020/original/file-20210630-22-ga3owm.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecologists, like the one Eric Vance met in western Africa, use statistics to learn about the animals and ecosystems they study.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Vance</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Statistics in ecology, health and politics</h2>
<p>The idea for the Laboratory for Interdisciplinary Statistical Analysis started in northwestern Africa, on the border of Western Sahara and Mauritania. One of us, Eric Vance, was in the middle of a five-year stint traveling around the world before his Ph.D. At a border checkpoint in the middle of an old minefield, he coincidentally met a biologist who was studying the Saharan desert fox. </p>
<p>When the biologist found out Vance was studying statistics, his eyes lit up, and he said, “Oh, a statistician! I have questions for you.” But before Vance could offer any help, he had to get on a bus and cross the mine-filled border. When Vance got back to the U.S., he realized the widespread need for statistics capacity and education <a href="https://2015.isiproceedings.org/Files/IPS138-P3-S.pdf">in developing countries</a>. To address this gap, he launched the global <a href="https://www.lisa2020.org">LISA 2020 Network</a> in 2012. </p>
<p>The goal of the program is to give local college students the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04898-2_63">skills and tools</a> to do the statistics they need to drive development. We help local professors establish a statistics laboratory at universities where they work. These statistics labs are collaborative centers where local professors teach students to provide statistics consulting to other academics, businesses and policy makers. While the students are learning statistics they’re also using their technical skills to drive real, local change. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409026/original/file-20210630-16-1o7lkt6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing laboratory locations in South America, Africa, the Middle East and India." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409026/original/file-20210630-16-1o7lkt6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/409026/original/file-20210630-16-1o7lkt6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409026/original/file-20210630-16-1o7lkt6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409026/original/file-20210630-16-1o7lkt6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409026/original/file-20210630-16-1o7lkt6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409026/original/file-20210630-16-1o7lkt6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/409026/original/file-20210630-16-1o7lkt6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The LISA 2020 network has grown to include more than 30 statistical laboratories.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Eric Vance/LISA</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of our <a href="https://www.lisaui.com/">partner labs</a> is working with Nigeria’s <a href="https://www.inecnigeria.org/">Independent National Electoral Commission</a>. Together, they are assessing the accuracy, completeness, consistency and reliability of data within Nigeria’s Continuous Voter Registration policy to explore ways to improve the electoral process for voters.</p>
<p>In Ethiopia, another local lab is helping the Ethiopian government improve the registry of births and deaths. Using surveys, effective database management and statistical training programs the goal is to improve health outcomes. </p>
<p>Since launching in 2012, our network of stat labs has grown substantially, with particularly strong roots in Africa, South Asia and Brazil. As of July 2021, it consists of <a href="https://sites.google.com/colorado.edu/lisa2020/stat-labs">31 stat labs</a> located in 10 low- and middle-income countries.</p>
<p>As statistics continues to play an ever more important role in society, equal access to data resources in <a href="https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/7198/ER163_BigDataandInternationalDevelopment.pdf;sequence=1">developing countries is becoming more essential</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159412/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eric Vance receives funding from USAID, NSF, NIH, and NASA. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Gunderman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Data science infrastructure is sorely needed in many places. Doctors Without Borders brings medical help to nations in need, but similar efforts are relatively small for statistics.
David Gunderman, Research Fellow, University of Colorado Boulder
Eric Vance, Associate Professor and Director of LISA, University of Colorado Boulder
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/160710
2021-05-17T15:47:13Z
2021-05-17T15:47:13Z
International aid to Africa needs an overhaul. Tips on what needs to change
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/400750/original/file-20210514-23-1odk6ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many African countries still rely heavily on <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.511.8554&rep=rep1&type=pdf">foreign aid</a>. However, several studies have shown that <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8705862/bauer.2009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">foreign aid has failed to deliver sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction</a>. </p>
<p>The fact that foreign aid as currently practised has failed to achieve its poverty reduction targets in Africa is clear from the data. Over <a href="https://borgenproject.org/10-quick-facts-about-poverty-in-africa/">75%</a> of the world’s poor live in Africa today. In 1970 the figure was 10%. Some forecasts suggest it could rise to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/accelerating-poverty-reduction-in-africa-in-five-charts#:%7E:text=%20Accelerating%20Poverty%20Reduction%20in%20Africa%3A%20In%20Five,much%20better%20leveraged%20to%20accelerate%20poverty...%20More%20">90% by 2030</a>. </p>
<p>Africa is the only continent in the world where <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-03946-2_2">official aid inflow outstrips private capital inflow</a> by a large margin. This is problematic since no country in the world has achieved substantial development based on reliance on aid. </p>
<p>This points to the need for reform.</p>
<p>There are two sides to the debate on <a href="https://www.lejournalinternational.fr/Foreign-aid-is-hurting-not-helping-Sub-Saharan-Africa_a2085.html">foreign aid to developing countries</a>, in particular <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-03946-2_2#FPar1">in sub-Saharan Africa</a>.</p>
<p>One is that Africa’s aid-dependent economic model <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20685/w20685.pdf">provides “free” money</a> which prevents countries from taking advantage of opportunities provided by the global economy. </p>
<p>The other is that foreign aid is not a problem by itself, but misallocation of resources, corruption, and bad governance limit Africa’s ability to use aid. As South Korea’s ambassador to South Africa <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-03946-2_2">has argued</a>, aid is ineffective in places where there is bad governance, and unnecessary where there is good governance. </p>
<p>The arguments against aid point to gaps in the management of foreign aid. Recipient countries <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20685/w20685.pdf">pour aid money</a> into poor and inefficient white elephant projects that neither foster growth and development nor build good institutions. And there’s <a href="https://www.lejournalinternational.fr/Foreign-aid-is-hurting-not-helping-Sub-Saharan-Africa_a2085.html">misuse of the money</a>. </p>
<p>The aim of this article is to provide some key pointers to reforms that should take place. Timely reforms of foreign aid can help to achieve significant growth and poverty reduction in Africa.</p>
<h2>An old debate</h2>
<p>Nearly 50 years ago the well-known Hungarian-born British development economist, <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8705862/bauer.2009.pdf">Peter Bauer</a>, strongly criticised government-to-government aid as neither necessary nor efficient. He argued that it posed the danger of promoting government power, destroying economic incentives as well as eroding civic initiatives and dynamism. </p>
<p>In 2009 the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo challenged many assumptions about aid in her book <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alan-Whiteside/publication/38091995_Dead_aid_Why_aid_is_not_working_and_how_there_is_a_better_way_for_Africa/links/558c058d08aee43bf6ae0fe3/Dead-aid-Why-aid-is-not-working-and-how-there-is-a-better-way-for-Africa.pdf">Dead Aid</a>. She argued that aid had not merely failed to work but had compounded Africa’s problems. </p>
<p>New York University economics professor William Easterly has also been an opponent. He argues that poverty results from an absence of economic and political rights, and that only the restoration of these will address the issue.</p>
<p>The arguments put forward by these critics point to the fact that official aid creates dependency, fosters corruption, encourages currency overvaluation, and doesn’t allow countries to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the global economy. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/coep.12418">recent study</a> highlighted the marginal effect of aid on promoting growth in Africa. The research, done by Alabama State University economics professor Shaomeng Jia and Mississippi State University associate professor of economics Claudia R. Williamson, was based on extensive data from 1962 to 2013. </p>
<p>They found that, in the absence of good governance and institutions, aid had minimal impact on delivering long-term growth. </p>
<h2>Reform ideas</h2>
<p>One way to reform foreign aid is to de-link African institutions from an aid-dependent economic model that has made many governments think of aid as a source of income. </p>
<p>Instead, African countries should promote private sector development, entrepreneurship, and improving the tax culture. </p>
<p>Another way could be to adopt the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan-1">Marshall Plan</a>. This innovative foreign aid model was introduced by the US to assist 16 European nations build their economies and strengthen democracy following the devastation of World War II in 1948. </p>
<p>Finally, the way aid priorities are set needs to be overhauled. If aid is going to foster growth and development, the following five key points need to be taken on board.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Economic and foreign aid must be directed to achieving sustained growth in per capita income by encouraging a shift from agrarian-based production to manufacturing and a technologically sophisticated service sector. This will require African leaders to re-think their economies, become more democratic, be open to change information and develop their own self-dependent programmes.</p></li>
<li><p>Bilateral or multilateral collaborations must be established with countries that have already pushed the technology frontier. International aid needs to be in line with this.</p></li>
<li><p>Both the national and foreign policies of governments need to target a development programme that can embrace growth and that leads to eventual reduction in reliance on aid. </p></li>
<li><p>Poverty and underdevelopment are exacerbated by natural disasters. This points to the need for humanitarian aid to be directed to helping countries reinvest in resilience. In addition, developed nations must follow cooperation and diplomacy to solve problems like conflicts rather than using aid to pressurise governments.</p></li>
<li><p>Foreign aid reform needs to be designed to strengthen the <a href="https://au.int/en/cfta">agenda of the African Continental Free Trade Area</a>. The pact, agreed in 2018, establishes one of the <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2020/arz/afcfta-secretariat-commissioned-accra-free-trade-set-begin-january-2021#:%7E:text=AfCFTA%20Secretariat%20commissioned%20in%20Accra%20as%20free%20trade,people%20with%20a%20combined%20GDP%20of%20%243%20trillion.">largest free trade areas in the world</a>. Lessons learned from the Eurozone trademark as well as cooperation with the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/02/global-trade-wto-ngozi-okonjo-iweala/">World Trade Organization</a> would also be valuable. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Taking these issues into consideration would go a long way to help reform foreign aid for growth and development and achieve the <a href="https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview">2063 agenda</a> of the Africa Union.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/160710/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tigist Mekonnen Melesse does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The way foreign aid is disbursed needs to be revisited to avoid the traps it’s fallen into in the past.
Tigist Mekonnen Melesse, Post-PhD Visiting Research Fellow at the Center for Effective Global Action, University of California, Berkeley
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/159992
2021-05-04T20:06:54Z
2021-05-04T20:06:54Z
India is facing a terrible crisis. How can Australia respond ethically?
<p>India’s COVID-19 crisis has revived a longstanding debate about whether foreign governments should come to the aid of countries facing major economic or humanitarian challenges and, if so, what kind of help they should provide.</p>
<p>There’s a common assumption foreign aid produces undoubted benefits. But there’s actually <a href="https://academicjournals.org/article/article1379931879_Andrews.pdf">limited evidence</a> that it does. <a href="http://econ4life.com/assets/why-foreign-aid-is-hurting-africa.pdf">Increasing data</a> suggests it may perpetuate existing inequities and inefficiencies, enable corruption, and generate adverse cultural and economic effects. </p>
<p>There are serious questions about the underlying causes of India’s crisis. There’s evidence the Modi government <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/01/india-covid-crisis-government-ignored-warnings-on-variant-scientists-say">repeatedly ignored warnings from public health experts</a> and refused to plan for the predicted increases in need. Instead, it pursued a public discourse of misinformation, <a href="https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/10/fraud-nation-critics-blast-indian-government-s-promotion-traditional-medicine-covid-19">promoted fake cures</a>, withheld health data, intimidated journalists, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-in-india-how-the-modi-government-prioritised-politics-over-public-health-160016">encouraged super-spreading events</a>. </p>
<p>Government officials also <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-its-about-time-the-indian-government-took-responsibility-for-the-covid-crisis/a-57358906">continue to deny</a> the existence of shortages of vaccines and other medicines. These facts suggest there are underlying structural obstacles, which aid contributions would be unlikely to reverse.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-in-india-how-the-modi-government-prioritised-politics-over-public-health-160016">COVID in India: how the Modi government prioritised politics over public health</a>
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</em>
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<p>But the moral arguments about the obligations humans have to each other are well established. So is the principle that we should come to someone’s aid if they’re in need. We are also bound by mutually beneficial values such as equity, justice, solidarity and altruism. Consequentialist philosophers, who argue the only things that matter are outcomes (rather than principles, obligations or intentions), claim foreign aid generally provides more benefit than harm overall.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the fact we have a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-020-01566-0">moral obligation to rescue someone from harm</a> provides little or no guidance about what kind of help or assistance is thereby required.</p>
<p>We should enter into discussions, led by the Indian people, about what kinds of support are likely to make a difference.</p>
<p>As imperfect as the outcome may be, Australia might genuinely be able to help in areas such as assisting the development of expertise and infrastructure, and advocating for the relaxation of vaccine patent restrictions.</p>
<h2>Here’s how Australia can help</h2>
<p>Last week, Australia <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-27/scott-morrison-pause-flights-india-covid-outbreak/100098322">committed to sending an initial support package</a> of ventilators, oxygen, and personal protective equipment to India.</p>
<p>If we choose to act further, we should do so in a generous and compassionate manner, but also with prudence and circumspection. We should be realistic about the limited options available to us. Aid cannot be given with conditions attached — for example, that it be directed preferentially to those in greatest need.</p>
<p>What’s more, it cannot be contingent on the enforcement of a value system that’s contrary to those presently in authority. Foreign donors have no straightforward right to insist on the abolition of corrupt or counterproductive policies and practices in the countries they’re supporting. </p>
<p>However, there are options available to us that can ensure we actually make a difference — and some of these may appear to undermine our own interests.</p>
<p>Top health officials have suggested wealthy countries, which have contracted to purchase many more vaccine doses than they need, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/15/global-officials-urge-rich-countries-to-donate-coronavirus-jabs">should urgently donate excess vaccines</a> to middle- and lower-income countries such as India. Some people may argue that, because of our present lesser need, Australia could donate its entire stock of available vaccines. However, this wouldn’t likely be of much benefit given the logistical, political and structural impediments described above.</p>
<p>Instead, we should draw on our experience over the past year in developing effective processes for responding to the pandemic. We should offer to provide India with expertise about quarantine measures, hygiene, masks, and vaccine education campaigns. Our experts and policymakers could respectfully advise on appropriate economic and social policies. </p>
<p>What’s more, we could call for the relaxation of patent and other intellectual property restrictions. These have, since the late 1980s, imposed severe limits on the ability of poorer countries to produce vaccines and pharmaceuticals developed in the United States and Europe. Although India is the <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/03/18/978065736/indias-role-in-covid-19-vaccine-production-is-getting-even-bigger">world’s largest vaccine producer</a>, the current demand <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56912977">obviously exceeds supply</a>.</p>
<p>What vaccines are available are much less likely to find their way to poorer sections of India’s population than wealthier ones. This is partly because of insufficient government support, but is also exacerbated by the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/mar/10/australia-urged-to-back-plan-to-let-poor-countries-make-cheap-copies-of-covid-vaccines">refusal of rich countries</a> (including Australia) to allow the relaxation of the strict patent laws that prevent state-of-the-art vaccines being manufactured cheaply and efficiently in developing countries. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/over-700-health-experts-are-calling-for-urgent-action-to-expand-global-production-of-covid-vaccines-159701">Over 700 health experts are calling for urgent action to expand global production of COVID vaccines</a>
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<p>There’s already a well-tested mechanism for suspending patent restrictions in an emergency, known as the “<a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/healthdeclexpln_e.htm">Doha Declaration</a>”. This was negotiated in 2001 in response to the urgent need for increased access to newly developed HIV medications. This instrument is ready to use and could be implemented rapidly. Australia should announce its unqualified support for the immediate application of the Doha Declaration to COVID vaccine production. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1387480296342401027"}"></div></p>
<h2>But that’s not all</h2>
<p>India’s huge pharmaceutical industry has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-29/india-covid-crisis-disrupting-coronavirus-vaccine-supplies/100100324">previously provided vaccines and medicines to developing countries</a> — many of them in Africa — largely funded by the World Health Organization. The Indian crisis has left these countries vulnerable, through no fault of their own.</p>
<p>Rather than merely responding to the crisis in India, largely self-inflicted by its own government, we should also turn our attention to the increasingly urgent needs of those countries that now face their own major emergencies as a consequence.</p>
<p>Regardless of what anyone does, many people will still die. All that’s open to us is to act ethically in accordance with our own values, informed by knowledge about the complexity of the multiple forces at work.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159992/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wendy Lipworth receives funding from the National Health & Medical Research Council and the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ian Kerridge and Paul Komesaroff do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Providing foreign aid is not always straightforward. But here are some practical ways Australia might be able to help India.
Paul Komesaroff, Professor of Medicine, Monash University
Ian Kerridge, Professor of Bioethics & Medicine, Sydney Health Ethics, Haematologist/BMT Physician, Royal North Shore Hospital and Director, Praxis Australia, University of Sydney
Wendy Lipworth, Senior Research Fellow, Bioethics, University of Sydney
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/155106
2021-02-18T13:44:36Z
2021-02-18T13:44:36Z
Americans still need a lifeline despite trillions in coronavirus aid
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384866/original/file-20210217-19-1lkwz89.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C47%2C4576%2C2993&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Americas' financial desperation can be seen in the soaring demand for food assistance. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/VirusOutbreakNewYork/62f1bf36663c46d0bc5f67ae256076ad/photo?Query=covid%20food%20bank%20need&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=84&currentItemNo=29">AP Photo/John Minchillo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/02/15/968028373/lawmakers-debate-bidens-1-9-trillion-covid-19-relief-plan">Congress prepares another injection</a> of COVID-19 aid for businesses and individuals, there’s been debate about whether it’s necessary on top of the <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2021/01/heres-everything-congress-has-done-to-respond-to-the-coronavirus-so-far">US$3.5 trillion spent so far</a>.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.vogue.com/article/pandemic-relief-package-what-you-need-to-know">had initially hoped to get bipartisan support</a> for his $1.9 trillion proposal, but the <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/01/31/962554923/10-senate-republicans-plan-to-detail-slimmed-down-covid-19-counteroffer">only counteroffer from Republicans</a> was a $600 billion bill, with many in the GOP suggesting more money wasn’t needed. And <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/experts-worried-about-overheating-suggest-placing-automatic-spending-curbs-on-bidens-1-9-trillion-covid-relief-bill-11612813694">some economists have expressed concern</a> that giving Americans too much right now could overheat the economy. </p>
<p>We are public opinion scholars at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. In cooperation with our partners at the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and National Public Radio, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.2020.1866905">we conducted a survey in July and August of last year</a> to try to understand how the first round of aid had affected American families in need. What we found shocked us then and feels relevant now as the government negotiates its next steps.</p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2021/01/heres-everything-congress-has-done-to-respond-to-the-coronavirus-so-far">trillions of dollars</a> in government assistance, about two-thirds of families that suffered job losses or reduced wages during the pandemic still reported facing serious financial hardship. </p>
<p>Many people were struggling – <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/tracking-the-covid-19-recessions-effects-on-food-housing-and">and still are</a> – just to pay for basic necessities, like food and rent. </p>
<h2>The first round of pandemic aid</h2>
<p>Congress <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/infographic/whats-in-the-cares-act-heres-a-summary">passed most of the initial relief in March</a>, including direct payments to qualifying families, expanded unemployment benefits and loans to small businesses that turned into grants if they kept workers on their payroll. </p>
<p>By July 1, when we began our survey, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/business/economy/coronavirus-stimulus-unemployment.html">most Americans entitled</a> to a direct check should have received it, and unemployed adults were still receiving supplemental aid of $600 a week on top of state benefits.</p>
<p>We wanted to understand the financial burdens experienced by American families that were economically harmed by the coronavirus pandemic. And we wanted to see whether the government aid was helping the people who needed it most.</p>
<p>Using a nationally representative, randomized survey design, we contacted 3,454 adults and asked them about the financial problems facing their households. We focused on the 46% who said they or other adults in their household either lost a job, had to close a business, were furloughed or had their wages or hours reduced since the start of the coronavirus pandemic. We published our findings in the economic affairs journal Challenge in January. </p>
<h2>Serious financial problems</h2>
<p>While it seems like a no-brainer that Americans weren’t ready for the unexpected employment disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, it was surprising to us that federal aid and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-25-billion-the-biggest-us-donors-gave-in-2020-says-about-high-dollar-charity-today-154466">charitable assistance</a> seemed to be doing so little to support the people it was intended to help. </p>
<p>We found that the aid didn’t put much of a dent in the financial problems faced by families earning less than $100,000, whether because relief <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/poverty-inequality-opportunity/only-one-quarter-service-sector">was delayed</a> or <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/whats-happening-to-all-the-cares-act-money">wasn’t spent</a>, the amount wasn’t adequate or the funds <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-701">never made it to the intended recipients</a>. </p>
<p>Among households with employment or wage losses during the pandemic, 87% of those earning less than $30,000 a year and 68% of those earning $30,000 to $99,999 told us they were still facing serious financial problems. And more than half of households in these income brackets reported they had already used up all or most of their savings – or they didn’t have savings to begin with. That share jumped to over three-quarters for people with incomes under $30,000.</p>
<p>Savings take years or decades to accumulate, so it’s likely these households are in even worse trouble now. What’s more, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/08/business/economy/lost-unemployment-benefits.html">significantly less aid has been provided</a> from the federal government since we conducted our survey.</p>
<p><iframe id="k7UjU" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/k7UjU/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Many Americans still need a lifeboat</h2>
<p>Our findings suggest there is a definite need for further government aid on a large scale for tens of millions of families.</p>
<p>A useful way to think about this is how the government provides <a href="https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is7unit_3.pdf">relief after a natural disaster</a>. In disasters, cash payments are often sent directly to those in need, like lifeboats launched to rescue people at risk of drowning.</p>
<p>And in fact, the pandemic has been an economic disaster for some – <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/09/24/economic-fallout-from-covid-19-continues-to-hit-lower-income-americans-the-hardest/">particularly low-income and Black and Latino households</a> – more than others. They still need a lifeboat to get them through the storm. </p>
<p>[<em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary G. Findling received funding for this study from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation under grant #76253.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John M. Benson received funding for this study from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation under grant #76253. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert J. Blendon received funding for this study from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation under grant #76253.
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A survey of the impact of the first few rounds of coronavirus aid shows that most of those who lost jobs or wages due to the pandemic were facing severe economic hardship.
Mary G. Findling, Research Associate at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Harvard University
John M. Benson, Senior Research Scientist at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Harvard University
Robert J. Blendon, Richard L. Menschel Professor of Public Health and Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis, Emeritus, Harvard University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/140884
2020-06-17T14:31:29Z
2020-06-17T14:31:29Z
DfID merger with Foreign Office signals shift from using aid to reduce poverty to promoting British national self interest
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/342453/original/file-20200617-94101-1vz0kxg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=35%2C58%2C1898%2C1200&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Shelter kits delivered to Mozambique after Cyclone Idai by the Department for International Development in 2019. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/dfid/33609100418/">DfID via Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For a prime minister so keen on proclaiming Britain’s world-beating status, whether in response to COVID-19 or in its post-Brexit future, Boris Johnson’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-53062858">announcement</a> of the closure of the Department for International Development (DfID) and its merger into a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office seemed strange. It brought about immediate condemnation from <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jun/16/foreign-office-and-department-for-international-development-to-merge">three former prime ministers</a>, many MPs within Johnson’s own party, and the vast majority of the UK development and humanitarian sector.</p>
<p>First raised in December, many thought the decision had been put on hold until later in the year. Instead, the government acted with ruthless speed, perhaps seeking to prevent the mobilisation of significant opposition. Reportedly not even senior DfID officials <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/department-for-international-development-to-be-scrapped-says-johnson-cgj0svjvw">knew of the decision</a> until just before Johnson spoke in parliament.</p>
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<p>The decision has been presented as an opportunity for encouraging greater efficiency, coordination and cooperation in Britain’s global policy, and the government has maintained it remains committed to maintaining spending on international development. </p>
<p>The current Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is already engaged in international development activity, <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/878395/Statistics-on-International-Development-Provisional-UK-Aid-Spend-2019.pdf">spending around 5% of the aid budget</a> (around a quarter of the total aid budget is spent outside DfID). Increasing numbers of its diplomatic staff have come from a background in DfID, and in many countries the two are housed in the same building. So DfID and FCO already operate in overlapping spheres.</p>
<h2>Mergers elsewhere</h2>
<p>Globally, the trend has been to merge international development functions back into foreign affairs ministries, as for example in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway and New Zealand. DfID is therefore something of an outlier in retaining its independence. But the <a href="https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11983.pdf">experience of other countries</a> suggests that while some mergers are effective, that’s not always the case.</p>
<p>In Denmark, a cabinet-level position overseeing the development function ensures aid priorities are represented and defended. This has protected the poverty-reduction focus of DANIDA, the Danish aid agency, even within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Australia, however, a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/878395/Statistics-on-International-Development-Provisional-UK-Aid-Spend-2019.pdf">review</a> of the merger of AusAID into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade found aid priorities had been reoriented around international trade policy, leading to a loss in quality in aid delivery.</p>
<p>The early indications about the British government’s merger raise cause for concern. In his <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2020-06-16/debates/20061637000001/GlobalBritain">speech in parliament</a>, Johnson questioned why as much aid is given to Zambia as Ukraine, and ten times as much goes to Tanzania as to the Balkan region. A quick look at pretty much any <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mpi_2019_publication.pdf">development index</a> would answer that – and perhaps question why Zambia is not getting more, given significantly higher poverty levels than Ukraine. </p>
<p>But the British government now clearly believes that Ukraine and the Balkans are essential for UK security and it is these issues which should determine spending. This suggests a very clear movement away from the DfID’s <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/1/contents">legally-enshrined</a> focus on poverty reduction, towards prioritising UK international trade and security interests.</p>
<h2>Focus on UK interests</h2>
<p>The problem is not that this will politicise aid. Aid has always been political since it was first established in 1929 by the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/20-21/5/enacted">Colonial Development Act</a>. Whether aid has been seen as a mechanism for supporting British economic growth, or for pursuing security or international trade interests, successive (Labour and Conservative) governments have shaped UK aid to match their own priorities. This has ranged from promoting job creation and UK exports in the 1930s by insisting a proportion of “aid” had to be spent in the UK, to more formal tied aid approaches from the 1950s onwards, which linked aid to spending in the UK – most notoriously seen in the early 1990s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/dec/12/pergau-dam-affair-aid-arms-scandal">Pergau Dam scandal aid for arms scandal</a>.</p>
<p>But the merger will mean the loss of the firewall between both development and humanitarian interests and foreign policy that was established when Tony Blair’s government first separated aid from the FCO and created the independent DfID in 1997. This means policy distortions away from poverty eradication are more likely, will be more severe, and have a more damaging impact. It looks clear that the FCO will be the dominant partner. </p>
<p>DfID has become another casualty of the Brexit wars. It became embroiled in Brexit debates when Johnson as foreign minister, and Priti Patel, then secretary of state for international development, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/18/priti-patel-joins-calls-for-radical-shake-up-of-aid-budget-rules">both demanded</a> the aid budget be used to support building Britain’s post-Brexit future. This is, then, a victory for the hardline Brexit faction in the Conservative Party, which has long questioned the protection of UK aid budgets and demanded aid policy be reoriented to UK interests. An independent DfID was too able to pursue its own course for the government’s liking, and this enforced marriage will ensure its relative independence can be tamed.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-threatens-britains-reputation-as-an-agenda-setter-for-foreign-aid-64999">Brexit threatens Britain's reputation as an agenda-setter for foreign aid</a>
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<p>The tragedy is that DfID was already facing a turbulent immediate future. Its budget, linked to the size of the economy, was <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-dfid-pauses-some-new-decisions-as-aid-budget-expected-to-fall-97416">likely to fall</a> potentially by more than 10%, and discussions were already taking place over what to prioritise and what to cut. Brexit would have brought its own challenges for how DfID cooperated with its major partner, the EU. It seems strange that at this point of uncertainty and confusion for DfID, a prime minister who sets such store on the UK’s world position should destroy one of the country’s most internationally respected tools for persuasive soft power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/140884/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Jennings does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Boris Johnson has announced the UK’s Department for International Development will merge with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Michael Jennings, Reader in International Development, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/137568
2020-05-27T10:01:50Z
2020-05-27T10:01:50Z
Britain needs African partners after Brexit – it must not neglect the continent now
<p>These are uncertain times, for Africa as much as for Britain. Will they prove each others’ friend in need? Or will circumstances pull the UK and African countries apart? It will all depend on what priority each gives to the other. </p>
<p>For many years following the independence of its former African colonies after the second world war, Britain continued to play an outsize role in African affairs – as an economic partner, a place of education and as a donor. Still, the failure to resolve Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 and Britain’s continuing close relations with apartheid South Africa <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/109/434/161/72367">soured the political relationship</a> with the rest of Africa.</p>
<p>But links remained strong, and between 1992 and 2010, Britain had prime ministers who <a href="https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/to-brexit-and-beyond-africa-and-the-united-kingdom/15167604">clearly cared</a> about Africa and supported it politically, economically and internationally. Relations with Britain and the influential role of the Department for International Development (DFID), played a part in the <a href="https://www.economist.com/leaders/2011/12/03/africa-rising">“Africa Rising” narrative</a> of the early 2000s. </p>
<p>Since 2010, the climate has changed. This seems strange, as on the face of it Britain’s policies have not. The UK’s commitment to spending 0.7% of GDP on aid has been enshrined in <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/12/pdfs/ukpga_20150012_en.pdf">legislation</a>. The Commonwealth remains a central part of foreign policy. Britain has been active on international issues affecting Africa, such as climate change, terrorism, Somalia and piracy in the Gulf of Aden. It has also remained one of Africa’s <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/articles/theukstradeandinvestmentrelationshipwithafrica/2016">biggest trade and investment partners</a>, with imports of fruit, vegetables and flowers growing fast and major outward investments in oil, mining and telecoms on the continent. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-commonwealth-and-britain-the-trouble-with-empire-2-0-73707">The Commonwealth and Britain: the trouble with 'Empire 2.0'</a>
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<h2>Neglect and retreat</h2>
<p>But many <a href="https://royalafricansociety.org/africa-uk-a-new-start-in-2020/">Africans I speak to</a>, in all walks of life from Senegal to Kenya and Egypt to South Africa, see it differently. What they feel is political neglect and commercial retreat. British prime ministers have visited rarely, at least compared with those from China, France, Germany and the US. Their perception is that British Airways has pulled out of a number of African routes, the British Council has shrunk from culture into just English language teaching and British brands have disappeared with Land Rovers being replaced by Toyotas. Meanwhile, <a href="https://royalafricansociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/APPG-Report-on-Visa-problems-for-African-visitors-to-the-UK_v1.58web.pdf">visas</a> to visit the UK are ever more expensive and harder to get. </p>
<p>For the young African generation, Britain is seen as part of the past not the future. Many students tell me that for business they prefer to go to China, for education to the US, Canada or India, for fun to Dubai. For older Africans there is still an affection, even respect, especially for the Royal Family, the BBC and for London – but also a growing feeling of distance.</p>
<p>And many are puzzled by Brexit: why would Britain do this and make itself weaker? Still, many also see it as a golden opportunity to create a more balanced relationship between Britain and Africa – one that includes aid with fewer strings, more advantageous terms of trade, bigger investments, easier visas, cheaper education and, above all, more and higher-level political attention. Respect, in short.</p>
<p>Can Britain respond? The government of the former prime minister, Theresa May, made a useful start by recognising the problem, identifying five strategic shifts that would help reposition Britain on the continent, and visiting Africa to signal this change. Her <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-in-cape-town-28-august-2018">speech</a> in Cape Town in August 2019 raised hopes of a new start. </p>
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<p>Her successor, Boris Johnson carried through on the first part of that plan, holding a well-attended <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-aims-to-be-africas-partner-of-choice-for-trade-and-investment">UK-Africa Investment Summit</a> in London in January 2020, and expanding <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-brexit-diplomats-staff-language-increase-foreign-embassies-jeremy-hunt-a8608921.html">Britain’s diplomatic footprint</a> in Africa. The perpetually rotating position of the UK’s Africa minister has at last fallen to someone, in <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/people/james-duddridge">James Duddridge</a>, who knows Africa well from a pre-politics career in finance.</p>
<h2>Coronavirus crisis</h2>
<p>Then came the coronavirus pandemic. The health impact in Africa is so far <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/05/26/coronavirus-in-africa-tracker-how-many-cases-and-where-latest/">limited</a> – thanks, not least, the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/124dd4f4-8a0b-11ea-9dcb-fe6871f4145a">swift response</a> of African governments in locking down and preparing their people, who know well enough the perils of infectious diseases. But the <a href="https://royalafricansociety.org/the-economic-consequences-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-for-africa/">economic impact</a> has been immediate and dramatic. Export prices have fallen off a cliff and some exports, including flowers, stopped completely. Tourists have disappeared. </p>
<p>Remittances – normally three times the volume of aid – have fallen by 20-50% world wide, according to the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/04/22/world-bank-predicts-sharpest-decline-of-remittances-in-recent-history">World Bank</a>. In some African countries, lockdowns and transport restrictions are making it harder for the poor to <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/03/25/covid-19-africa-food-systems/">access food</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-pandemic-could-hit-the-billions-migrant-workers-send-home-in-cash-135602">Coronavirus pandemic could hit the billions migrant workers send home in cash</a>
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<p>To reinforce its future partnership with the continent, Britain must step up as Africa’s friend in need. African governments need liquidity to replace lost revenue, debt relief to give them breathing space, as well as reinforcement for their health sectors and help with developing and disseminating a vaccine.</p>
<p>Britain has already provided <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-leads-global-fight-to-prevent-second-wave-of-coronavirus">£744 million</a> to support debt relief and developing countries’ efforts to combat COVID-19, as well as to provide humanitarian aid and immediate budget support for cash-strapped governments. The government need not be shy of explaining why it is helping others even while Britons are struggling too.</p>
<p>That will help open the door, once Britain’s relations with the EU are defined, to mutually beneficial trade and investment agreements with African countries and relations with the continent. When the coronavirus passes, Africa is still likely to have the world’s fastest growing population and several of its fastest growing economies. Britain will need Africa as a partner, as much as vice versa. So now is the time to commit.</p>
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<p><em>The paragraph in this article about British political neglect and commercial retreat was updated on May 29 to clarify that these were perceptions reported to the author.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/137568/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicholas James Westcott is Director of the Royal African Society, a not-for-profit organisation that receives funding from multiple sources including commercial and governmental organisations. A list of donors is available on the Society's website. </span></em></p>
Why Britain and Africa need each other more than ever.
Nicholas Westcott, Research Associate, Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/134676
2020-03-29T08:33:09Z
2020-03-29T08:33:09Z
COVID-19 compromises social networks. What this means for people in humanitarian crises
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/323191/original/file-20200326-133027-1ljilxd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Iraqi, Iranian and Somali asylum seekers at a tent camp in the Netherlands</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ROBIN UTRECHT/AFP/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The novel coronavirus is now being transmitted through the six continents. A key concern is for those who are already extremely vulnerable – those who are caught in ongoing humanitarian emergencies, such as those in Syria, South Sudan and the Rohingya refugee crisis.</p>
<p>For people caught in these emergencies, a public health response will be a challenge, but there is another factor that has been largely overlooked: the role of people’s social networks – and how these networks might be compromised by the pandemic.</p>
<p>In crises, whether the threat is severe drought, floods, famine, conflict, or displacement, <a href="https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/facing-famine-somali-response/">people turn</a> for help first to their social network. Research in several countries shows that social connectedness is the main (in some cases, perhaps the <em>only</em>) source of help that ordinary people have when caught in a crisis. Assistance from these networks includes food, shelter, money or credit, forms of employment, emotional support and information or advice.</p>
<p>But what happens when the threat is embedded in that very social network? What happens to the source of support that people have learned to count on, when everyone is affected by the threat in terms of both their health and their livelihoods?</p>
<p>The current global pandemic is an unprecedented situation where the survival resource of the world’s most vulnerable people – their social networks – may become compromised and an additional risk, because the virus is transmitted between people.</p>
<p>This has massive implications for responses to this pandemic. How will it amplify the impact of existing humanitarian crises? </p>
<h2>Social networks in crises</h2>
<p>During the series of shocks (drought, hyperinflation, and conflict) that hit Somalia in 2011, aid agencies <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/famine-in-somalia/">were hobbled</a> by the restrictions of Al-Shabaab - a terrorist group that controlled much of the affected area - and by counter-terrorism <a href="https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/CounterTerrorism_Study_Full_Report.pdf">legislation</a> in western donor countries that criminalised the diversion of aid that ended up in the hands of terrorist groups. As a result, most of the formal assistance that could have averted the crisis was very late to arrive; the crisis spiralled out of control and led to famine, <a href="https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Somalia_Mortality_Estimates_Final_Report_1May2013_upload.pdf">killing</a> a quarter million people.</p>
<p><a href="https://fic.tufts.edu/research-item/food-security-and-resilience-in-somalia/">Our research</a> showed that in large parts of the affected area, people mostly had only their own social networks to fall back on. </p>
<p>Those with stronger networks - particularly with people outside the affected area, or not subject to the same hazards - were the best able to cope with the crisis. </p>
<p>Social networks support their members best when only some people in the network are affected by a particular threat. People who had networks that expanded into the global diaspora of Somali people were able to cope with the crisis much better than those whose networks consisted only of people who were suffering the same fate. The latter types of networks soon ran out of resources to share, and could no longer support people.</p>
<p>Recognising and protecting social solidarity is more important than ever. But even physically distant sources of support are at risk during this pandemic. </p>
<p>Unlike previous crises, where social connections outside the immediately affected areas were mobilised to help, this pandemic knows no boundaries - people in the diaspora are also locked down, and as vulnerable to the virus as people caught in refugee or internally displaced people’s camps. Their livelihoods have been severely disrupted too.</p>
<h2>Building networks</h2>
<p>The pandemic will also affect people’s ability to forge new social connections and maintain their existing networks.</p>
<p>During the recent crisis in South Sudan, <a href="https://www.mercycorps.org/currency-connections">our research</a> shows that households mostly relied on their relatives, neighbours and friends, informal livelihood and community groups in times of need. </p>
<p>While the conflict, displacement, and family separations disrupted households’ support systems, new forms of social connections emerged. <a href="https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/wages-war">Similar results were found in Syria</a>, where households’ social connections were critical for successful coping and livelihood adaptation during the conflict, especially in densely populated besieged areas.</p>
<p>Even in Haiti, which has had a heavy presence of international aid efforts, social networks are often the first and only means of survival. After the earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, even in the midst of significant international aid, most Haitians <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24601934">relied on</a> one another for survival and recovery.</p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>Humanitarians - both local and international - will have to pay attention to what a pandemic like this does, not only to their own programming, but also to the functioning of social networks. We don’t actually know what the effects will be. </p>
<p>In the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, stigma, rumours, and movement restrictions <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5884263/">affected</a> social and economic networks, particularly of survivors and health workers. </p>
<p>Likely, the COVID-19 pandemic will limit the support people are able to mobilise through their networks, certainly in person but also through their distant connections. But in what ways, and who will be most affected by this, remain to be seen. </p>
<p>In times of crises, people’s assets can sometimes become liabilities. The current global pandemic is an unprecedented situation where the very fabric of survival for the world’s most vulnerable people – their social networks – may both become compromised and an additional risk. The humanitarian field needs to work fast to understand the implications and to adapt to this crisis that has challenged the way we work in so many ways.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134676/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeeyon Kim receives funding from DFID, the Center for Resilience and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Maxwell receives funding from DFID, the Swiss Office of Development Cooperation, FAO, Action Against Hunger, REACH, and USAID.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sabina Robillard has recently worked on projects with CDA Collaborative Learning, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Save the Children Denmark, and Concern International. </span></em></p>
The survival resource of the world’s most vulnerable people – their social networks – may become compromised
Jeeyon Kim, Senior Researcher for Resilience at Mercy Corps and a Visiting Fellow, Tufts University
Daniel Maxwell, Henry J. Leir Professor in Food Security, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University
Sabina Robillard, Doctoral student at the Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/125366
2019-10-28T14:57:24Z
2019-10-28T14:57:24Z
African countries are behind on progress towards poverty reduction goals
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298096/original/file-20191022-117981-ggwaej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African countries have an opportunity to reduce poverty with new policies</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In their annual meeting at the United Nations in 2005, world leaders agreed on a common economic <a href="http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm">agenda</a>. This was to halve – between 1990 and 2015 – the proportion of the world’s population living on less than one dollar a day. It’s been nearly 15 years since this resolution. </p>
<p>The world has certainly seen economic progress but it is not even. And countries in Africa lag behind the global average.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/en/research/research-institute/global-wealth-report.html">Global wealth</a> has more than doubled from US$170 trillion in 2000 to $360 trillion in 2019. Global wealth per adult is at a record high of $70,850. </p>
<p>Mean wealth per adult in Africa is $6,488. In Mozambique it is as low as $352.</p>
<p>The proportion of the world’s people living on less than two dollars a day (an updated measure of extreme poverty) has more than <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/poverty-decline-without-china?time=1981..2015">halved</a> from 35.9% in 1990 to 10% in 2015. But in sub-Saharan Africa the figure still stands at 41%, according to the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/19/decline-of-global-extreme-poverty-continues-but-has-slowed-world-bank">World Bank</a>. The bank <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/poverty-and-shared-prosperity">estimates</a> that 87% of the world’s poorest people will live in the region by 2030 if the trends continue.</p>
<p>Life expectancy has been <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN">growing</a> by 16 weeks a year so that those born today are likely to live 20 years longer than a child born in 1960. In Africa, average life expectancy remained at a level that the rest of the world passed in 1974 and is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=ZG">rising</a> at a snail’s pace. </p>
<p>The continent still <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48674909">pays</a> up to 30 times more than the rest of the world for generic medicine, despite a world-wide <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/prescription-drug-prices-arent-rising-theyre-falling-for-the-first-time-in-47-years-2019-03-12">decline</a> in drug prices. And energy prices in Africa are more than three times <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/18/perspectives/africa-affordable-electricity/index.html">higher</a> than in the United States. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297634/original/file-20191018-56198-1ua5b0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297634/original/file-20191018-56198-1ua5b0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297634/original/file-20191018-56198-1ua5b0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297634/original/file-20191018-56198-1ua5b0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=436&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297634/original/file-20191018-56198-1ua5b0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297634/original/file-20191018-56198-1ua5b0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297634/original/file-20191018-56198-1ua5b0m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=548&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Graph global poverty rate, 1981 - 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Our World in Data</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>African countries have missed important opportunities in the past two decades that could have ensured these graphs looked different.</p>
<h2>Interlocking problems: debt and aid</h2>
<p>In 2004 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair <a href="http://www.commissionforafrica.info/wp-content/uploads/2005-report/11-03-05_cr_report.pdf">initiated</a> the Commission for Africa, to “carefully study all the evidence available to find out what is working and what is not.” </p>
<p>The Commission’s main findings were:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The problems… are interlocking. They are vicious circles which reinforce one another. …Africa will never break out of the deadlock with piecemeal solutions and policy incoherence. They must be tackled together. To do that Africa requires a comprehensive ‘big push’ on many fronts at once; which requires a partnership between Africa and the developed world…. Africa is very unlikely to achieve the rapid growth in finance and human development necessary to halt or reverse its relative decline without a strong expansion in aid.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Blair then called for two simultaneous actions: <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/07/hearafrica05.development">forgiving</a> the continent’s debt, and doubling development assistance. This call was partly heeded. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2005/industrial-countries-write-africas-debt">Fourteen</a> African countries <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jun/11/uk.g8">benefited</a> from the 2005 multilateral debt relief initiative. That relief <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jul/01/uk.g8">saved</a> Nigeria – the region’s largest economy – $31 billion. A host of other countries benefited too, <a href="http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/mdri_eng.pdf">ranging</a> from Benin ($690 million) to Ghana ($2.938 billion).</p>
<p>But these countries didn’t make the most of the relief they’d been given. <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/blog/chart-of-the-week-new-african-debt-crisis">Debt</a> in many African countries is on the rise again. What’s more concerning is that debt isn’t being incurred for useful purposes, such as plugging the infrastructure gap. Instead, according to an IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2018/03/22/pp021518macroeconomic-developments-and-prospects-in-lidcs">report</a>, the rise is being driven by corruption and mismanagement.</p>
<p>As for aid, since 2005 the flow to Africa has risen by 50%, reaching $49.27 billion in 2017. African countries <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZG">received</a> more than half a trillion dollars ($0.62 trillion) in aid in the decade and a half after Blair’s appeal.</p>
<p>However, the continent now <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ZG">gets</a> less donor aid per recipient than most regions in the world: an average of 14 cents per person per day. This is because its rapidly <a href="https://www.prb.org/2018-world-population-data-sheet-with-focus-on-changing-age-structures/">rising</a> population size in recent decades is not being matched by the size of aid inflows.</p>
<p>Added to this is the fact that many African countries have failed to stem the flow of illicit money from the continent. An <a href="https://gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/gfi_afdb_iffs_and_the_problem_of_net_resource_transfers_from_africa_1980-2009-highres.pdf">estimated</a> $30.4 billion was transferred from African countries between 2000 to 2009.</p>
<p>Such outflows strip countries of desperately needed financial resources for investment in hospitals, schools and roads.</p>
<p>To stop this trend, Africa needs the help of advanced countries, because some of these countries have been and still serve as havens for illicit funds originating from repressive African regimes and despots. </p>
<p>In “Overcoming the Shadow Economy,” Joseph Stiglitz and Mark Pieth forcefully <a href="https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/sites/jstiglitz/files/Overcoming%20the%20Shadow%20Economy.pdf">argue</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In a globalised world, if there is any pocket of secrecy, funds will flow through that pocket. That is why the system of transparency has to be global. The US and EU are key in tipping the balance toward transparency, but this will only be the starting point: each country must play its role as a global citizen in order to shut down the shadow economy—and it is especially important that there emerge from the current secrecy havens some leaders to demonstrate that there are alternative models for growth and development.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Zuhumnan Dapel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
If trends continue, 87% of the world’s poorest people will live in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030.
Zuhumnan Dapel, Consultant @ODIdev. Priors: IDRC Fellow at the Center for Global Development; Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center Washington DC. Twitter: @dapelzg, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/120189
2019-07-24T11:47:13Z
2019-07-24T11:47:13Z
It will take a lot more than free menstrual pads to end period poverty
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284334/original/file-20190716-173338-1jmbrb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/hand-holding-feminine-sanitary-napkin-absorbent-791583940?src=rqH1p-9SD2pDMUQI8sY4Ag-1-5&studio=1">Iamnoonmai/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>All of those who menstruate, wherever they live, experience challenges when managing their period. These might include a lack of products, toilets or disposal facilities, enduring pain, being bullied or being restricted from activities and locations. In high income countries these challenges are often referred to as “period poverty” and in <a href="http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC_List_ODA_Recipients2018to2020_flows_En.pdf">low-middle income countries</a> as “poor menstrual hygiene management”. But the result is the same: a large proportion of the global population are disadvantaged by having a period.</p>
<p>The solution that is normally advocated is for menstrual products be made affordable, for example by removing the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-so-hard-to-lift-the-tampon-tax-49913">tampon tax</a>”, or providing these <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47553449">free in schools</a> and <a href="https://metro.co.uk/2017/03/22/how-to-donate-sanitary-products-to-women-and-girls-in-the-uk-who-cant-afford-them-6526295/">through food banks</a>. Most programmes that distribute free menstrual products in high-income countries provide disposable pads or tampons, while in low-middle income countries disposable or reusable pads are preferred over tampons. Free and cheaper products are clearly necessary in some situations, and can manage short-term issues, but they will not solve what is a complex socio-economic issue.</p>
<p>Most <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/international-womens-day-period-girls-missed-school-uk-sanitary-products-menstruation-a8244396.html">period poverty headlines</a> focus on girls not attending school because they can’t afford menstrual products. But there is <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0146985">little evidence</a> that pads alone will keep girls in school. The following are stories that we heard from Ugandan girls who received reusable pads, which show that providing products alone is not necessarily enough to improve school attendance.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284328/original/file-20190716-173334-1ksou8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284328/original/file-20190716-173334-1ksou8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284328/original/file-20190716-173334-1ksou8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284328/original/file-20190716-173334-1ksou8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284328/original/file-20190716-173334-1ksou8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284328/original/file-20190716-173334-1ksou8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284328/original/file-20190716-173334-1ksou8j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">School girls examine a reusable menstrual pad as part of a community event.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Irise International</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Having pads but missing school</h2>
<p>Jane*, for example, was given reusable pads but chose not to use them. She didn’t attend school as a result. Jane didn’t have the information she needed to make an informed decision to use the pads. She had heard rumours that washable, reusable pads may increase risk of infection or even cancer. Her mother uses traditional cloths so wasn’t able to advise her. And when Jane got the pads out of the box, it wasn’t clear to her how they should be used. She was too embarrassed to ask at school so she put them back in the box under the bed and continued to skip class when she had her period.</p>
<p>Susan*, on the other hand, decided to use the reusable pads, but it was difficult for her to use them in a school environment while following the instructions she’d been given. So she still ended up skipping class. She had been told that the reusable pads she received needed to be washed with soap and dried in the sun. But the bathrooms at school didn’t have water or working locks. She tried putting the used pad in her bag to take home to wash but she was scared that one of the other pupils would see it in her bag. </p>
<p>So she decided to only change her pads at home. But they started to get uncomfortable and itchy during class and she was so worried that they would leak that she couldn’t concentrate on what the teacher was saying. In the end, she felt it was easier to stay at home. Even there, it was embarrassing to be seen carrying extra water to wash the pads, so she dried them under her bed where her dad and brothers couldn’t see them. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284329/original/file-20190716-173355-ndw5cn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284329/original/file-20190716-173355-ndw5cn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284329/original/file-20190716-173355-ndw5cn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284329/original/file-20190716-173355-ndw5cn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284329/original/file-20190716-173355-ndw5cn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284329/original/file-20190716-173355-ndw5cn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284329/original/file-20190716-173355-ndw5cn.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ugandan school girls complete a feedback questionnaire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Irise International</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, her friend Esther* was having similar challenges with her new disposable pads. There was nowhere to dispose of them at school, and she had heard rumours that menstrual blood can be used in witchcraft. She was also forced to wear them for long periods of time, terrified of leaks. She decided it was easier just to stay at home.</p>
<p>Mariam*, more positively, managed to use her pads comfortably and safely but still didn’t make it to class. She had figured out a way to use her pads at school, but some of her male friends realised that she had her period and teased her mercilessly. They refused to sit next to her because of fears that they would be contaminated by her. The teachers ignored what was happening. They were really embarrassed by the whole situation and didn’t know how to respond. Mariam’s mother was not sympathetic as she had always told her to stay away from men and boys during her period. Unfortunately for Mariam, having a period was incompatible with realising her full potential. She skipped class every month and her grades suffered.</p>
<h2>Menstrual stigma everywhere</h2>
<p>Although the stories above come from Ugandan girls, other work has shown stark similarities to the UK. For example, in interviews with girls from both locations, recent University of Leeds graduate Lizzie Goolden <a href="https://wash.leeds.ac.uk/my-empowering-experience-researching-menstrual-taboos/">was told by one UK girl</a>: “My sister gets very anxious whenever on her period because she is worried about leaking and what people will think. This makes her not want to leave the house.” No doubt the memory or reality of such fears will ring true with anyone who has ever menstruated, and is echoed in a Plan International UK <a href="https://plan-uk.org/act-for-girls/girls-rights-in-the-uk/break-the-barriers-our-menstrual-manifesto">report</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284325/original/file-20190716-173342-1fr96zo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284325/original/file-20190716-173342-1fr96zo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284325/original/file-20190716-173342-1fr96zo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284325/original/file-20190716-173342-1fr96zo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284325/original/file-20190716-173342-1fr96zo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284325/original/file-20190716-173342-1fr96zo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284325/original/file-20190716-173342-1fr96zo.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Irise educator teaches local girls in Uganda.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Irise International</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What all this shows is that there are myriad reasons why someone may not attend school, despite having access to menstrual products. </p>
<p>Building on Coventry University’s community work aiming to <a href="http://www.replacefgm2.eu">end female genital mutilation in Europe</a>, we have been <a href="http://www.irise.org.uk/">partnering with communities</a> to identify why it is that <a href="https://twitter.com/womensmarchlon/status/1087104151123906561">menstruators</a> are unable to manage their periods hygienically and with dignity. A <a href="https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-CHC-1157722-UKAD17">pilot</a> of this method in Uganda was reacted to positively by the community. Local champions worked together with researchers and practitioners to dismantle menstrual taboos in the wider community and create sustainable solutions. This was achieved by educating men, women, boys and girls about menstruation and setting up access to a range of locally made and affordable menstrual products.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284330/original/file-20190716-173334-1hw2424.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/284330/original/file-20190716-173334-1hw2424.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284330/original/file-20190716-173334-1hw2424.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284330/original/file-20190716-173334-1hw2424.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=254&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284330/original/file-20190716-173334-1hw2424.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284330/original/file-20190716-173334-1hw2424.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/284330/original/file-20190716-173334-1hw2424.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=319&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Girls looking at products.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Irise International</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the coming years, we plan to <a href="https://wash.leeds.ac.uk/stop-the-taboo/">expand the work</a> to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach in other parts of East Africa, Melanesia, remote Australian communities and the UK.</p>
<p>Donors across the globe are increasingly distributing funds to end period poverty, which is fantastic news. The UK government recently announced its <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/penny-mordaunt-launches-new-funds-to-tackle-period-poverty-globally">campaign</a> to end “period poverty” globally by 2030. But it is key that these programmes are directed towards evidence-based solutions – which are likely to involve more than supplying girls with pads. Understanding and addressing the root causes of period poverty is the only thing that will allow us to move towards a <a href="https://periodpositive.wordpress.com/">period positive</a> environment for everyone who menstruates.</p>
<p><em>*Names in this article have been changed to protect participants’ anonymity.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/120189/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emily Wilson works for Irise International, an organisation dedicated to creating a world where no girl is held back by her period. Irise International has received funding from UK Aid Direct to develop a menstruation friendly school package for Ugandan schools. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dani Barrington and Hazel Barrett do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
There is little evidence that pads alone will keep girls in school – stigma, lack of appropriate infrastructure, and embarrassment need to be dealt with too.
Dani Barrington, Lecturer in Water, Sanitation and Health, University of Leeds
Emily Wilson, Honorary Research Fellow, University of Sheffield
Hazel Barrett, Professor in Development Geography, Coventry University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/117353
2019-06-24T09:26:00Z
2019-06-24T09:26:00Z
How the West is withdrawing into a bunker of its own making
<p>At the US-Mexico border, President Donald Trump’s migration “emergency” has led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jun/12/new-york-city-no-kids-in-cages-protest-family-separations">children being locked up</a> and a threatened <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/world/americas/mexico-tariffs-migration.html">trade war</a>. In Libya, now the frontline of Europe’s own migration “crisis”, people are being detained in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/31/un-calls-for-evacuation-of-libyan-refugees-amid-dire-conditions">horrific conditions</a> as the UN warns of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/09/mediterranean-sea-of-blood-migrant-refugee-rescue-boats-un-unhcr">“sea of blood”</a> amid cuts and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/13/italy-fine-ngo-boats-migrants-salvini">crackdowns</a> on rescues in the Mediterranean.</p>
<p>A chronic state of emergency now infects border politics in the West. But our view of how this has come to pass is too narrow. The politics of crisis must be understood as part of a re-mapping of the relationship between Western powers and their historical “backyards”. The objective is now to keep perceived danger at bay, out of sight and out of mind – and at any cost. Almost two decades on from 9/11, ours is a gated-up world: green versus red zone, safety versus danger, citizen versus unwanted intruder.</p>
<p>In my research on security and conflict for my book <a href="http://rubenandersson.com/nogoworld/">No Go World</a>, I’ve heard the gate clang shut across borders and distant “danger zones”. At the border barriers in Arizona and Spain, guards have told me how they fight back dramatic entry attempts past <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520282520/illegality-inc">“useless” fences</a>. On Lampedusa in 2015, before Italy shut its door to rescue ships, I saw African migrants greeted by biohazard suits, scabies checks and transport to faraway “reception” centres, set behind tall walls. And in danger zones such as conflict-hit Mali, I met European soldiers cowering behind similar walls while insurgents roamed the hinterland. </p>
<p>Maps deepen the divide. On the news, <a href="https://www.institut-numerique.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/D%C3%A9clanchement-de-la-crise1.png">larger-than-life jihadist figures</a> loom across Syria or the Sahara. In <a href="https://travelmaps.state.gov/TSGMap/">travel risk advisories</a>, red blotches of no-go advice bleed across the map while <a href="https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2017/02/02/eu-navies-entering-libyan-waters-to-attack-people-smugglers-a-step-closer/">border agencies</a> and <a href="https://eritreahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Trans-Sahara-trafficking.pdf">think tanks</a> add threatening arrows depicting flows of migration or contraband. Their maps speak of encroaching danger – of how, as former US Vice President Joe Biden put it, the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/03/politics/biden-ebola-isis/">“wolves”</a> are slavering at the door. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280451/original/file-20190620-149814-20tles.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280451/original/file-20190620-149814-20tles.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/280451/original/file-20190620-149814-20tles.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280451/original/file-20190620-149814-20tles.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280451/original/file-20190620-149814-20tles.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=466&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280451/original/file-20190620-149814-20tles.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280451/original/file-20190620-149814-20tles.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/280451/original/file-20190620-149814-20tles.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=585&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Part of a travel advisory map from the US State Department. The stars represent embassies and consular offices.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://travelmaps.state.gov/TSGMap/">US State department website</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Maps tell stories about our world, and the fearful tale of today’s danger maps is haunted by older ones. On medieval European maps of the world, or <em>mappaemundi,</em> <a href="https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315241197.ch18">monstrous figures</a> roamed the margins. In the “age of discovery”, blank spaces on the maps spurred on colonial conquest before giving way to boastful cartographies of <a href="http://www.victorianweb.org/history/empire/1886map.html">empire</a>. Today, the connected world of Google Earth coexists with maps of danger that thrive on distancing and division. In our globalised era, blank spaces are paradoxically re-emerging.</p>
<h2>The ‘banana of badness’</h2>
<p>The end of the Cold War was the catalyst. As the Soviet foe perished, assorted pundits and neoconservatives set out on a search for <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-07-01/toward-neo-reaganite-foreign-policy">“monsters to destroy”</a>. Among them was journalist Robert Kaplan, who prophesied that a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/">“criminal anarchy”</a> would soon become the real strategic danger. President Bill Clinton listened, and so did his successor George W. Bush. On the eve of the Iraq invasion, one Pentagon strategist blithely divided the world into a connected “core” and a <a href="https://classic.esquire.com/article/2003/3/1/the-pentagons-new-map">dangerously disconnected “gap”</a> which must be brought into line by force. The world of counter-terror and border walls had found its map of doom.</p>
<p>However, the security interventions staged in the red zones and along the borders have made things worse. As the “war on terror” escalated, so did worldwide <a href="http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf">terror fatalities</a>. As Washington ramped up border security, <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/684200">more Mexicans stayed in the US</a> and became long-term undocumented migrants. And as Europe spent years <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1139446">“fighting migration”</a>, migrant desperation and smuggling networks were entrenched. One European police attaché told me in 2010 that “we’re in the eye of the cyclone now … when you bolt all doors, you’ll have a pressure cooker”. His prophecy, for one, proved correct.</p>
<p>But instead of changing tack, Western powers double down with each new “crisis”. They reinforce security operations, escalate the rhetoric and sharpen the divides. Consider EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini, who calls the Sahel and Horn of Africa the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/eu-increases-africa-spending-as-studies-criticise-anti-migration-efforts">“one single place”</a> where Europe has to invest all its efforts to combat irregular migration and terrorism. In such turns of phrase – which I have heard time and again from high officials – any sense of local society is washed aside, replaced by swathes of danger stretching across a bewildering array of countries. This <a href="https://www.iucts.org/publications/reports/terrorism-north-africa-2017/">“arc of instability”</a> has become so commonplace that it has even received its own moniker in UK Foreign Office backrooms: the “banana of badness”.</p>
<p>Dealing with this banana ripe with badness is a messy business, as I saw in Mali. In the capital, Bamako, everyone – from border officials to peacekeepers, aid workers and counter-terror operatives – was busy <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2015.1054655">bunkering up</a>. In this cut-price version of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/books/review/Goldfarb.t.html">Baghdad’s green zone</a>, Western aid managers “produce reports and create new little strategies” to “justify their salaries”, as one scathing official put it. European military officers have retreated into intelligence gathering while badly equipped Africans <a href="http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/762381/DIIS_RP_2017_2_WEB.pdf">face attacks</a> by insurgents on the frontlines. Amid this remote-controlled “security”, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/mali-despicable-killings-of-civilians-must-be-investigated/">violence has proliferated</a> and local anger grown – leading the interveners to retreat further behind their bunker walls.</p>
<h2>Shifting blame</h2>
<p>The divided maps reinforce this picture through what psychoanalysts would call projection – it’s others who are at fault. But this is a fallacy. Danger is not geographic but systemic, and those who intervene are part of this system. Western interventions – from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/libyas-unintended-consequences.html">NATO’s campaign in Libya</a> to Washington’s war on terror and meddling in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/07/20/deporting-people-made-central-americas-gangs-more-deportation-wont-help/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e3cb11fdb23d">Central America</a> – have directly contributed to instability in the “red zones”. </p>
<p>The first to note this were those on the frontline. In his military barracks in Bamako, an officer told me: “It’s NATO which went along and did all that in Libya, and it’s Europe which has let all these terrorists loose,” fomenting insurgency in Mali. His voice rose as he pointed at the TV, which showed the advances of Islamic State in Iraq: “It’s you! It’s you!” </p>
<p>He was both right and wrong. Right, in that much as in colonial times, today’s divided map allows for the disastrous blowback of interventions to be shifted onto poorer <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629818301653">“buffer zones”</a> – and the Sahel has become just such a zone. Wrong, in that the politics of danger creates vested interests both in the West and in those buffer zones. </p>
<p>Unscrupulous Western politicians can ramp up the fears at home for political ends, but so can enemies and “partner states” in fighting migration or terrorism. The higher the value attached to fighting one perceived danger or other, the higher the price that is charged to prevent hell from breaking loose. The result is a merry-go-round of danger feeding on danger, as seen from <a href="https://as.tufts.edu/politicalscience/sites/all/themes/asbase/assets/documents/newsEvents/2016mayEuropeanMigrantCrisis.pdf">Turkey</a> to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/opinion/21iht-edgreenhill21.html">Libya</a> and the <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520294608/no-go-world">Sahel</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/migrants-calling-us-in-distress-from-the-mediterranean-returned-to-libya-by-deadly-refoulement-industry-111219">Migrants calling us in distress from the Mediterranean returned to Libya by deadly 'refoulement' industry</a>
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<hr>
<p>An exit from the bunker must start by reversing the negative spiral via different incentives, and a different narrative. In short, we need a new map. But for now, Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta will have the last word. Asked by a <a href="https://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/498791/politique/ibrahim-boubacar-keita-le-mali-est-une-digue-si-elle-rompt-leurope-sera-submergee/">journalist</a> what he would tell those French citizens who thought the country’s counter-terror operation in the Sahel was too expensive, his answer was: “That Mali is a dam and if this dam breaks, Europe will be flooded.”</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=121&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202296/original/file-20180117-53314-hzk3rx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=152&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the Axa Research Fund has been supporting nearly 600 projects around the world conducted by researchers from 54 countries. To learn more, visit the site of the <a href="https://www.axa-research.org/en/">Axa Research Fund</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117353/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruben Andersson has received funding from the AXA Research Fund (2014-16) as well as from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (2008-12).</span></em></p>
Maps that divide the world into ‘no-go’ and ‘safe’ zones has created a new politics of danger.
Ruben Andersson, Associate Professor in Migration and Development, University of Oxford
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/101451
2018-08-24T09:55:58Z
2018-08-24T09:55:58Z
Indonesian NGOs can now access government funds to provide services to communities
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/232056/original/file-20180815-2894-b6gzqb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C2994%2C1994&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In many countries around the world, government agencies work in partnership with NGOs to deliver public services such as health, education and sanitation for communities.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">shutterstock.com</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A new regulation that makes it easier for the Indonesian government to contract social organisations to deliver services reflects a shift in the relationship between the government and NGOs. </p>
<p>The release of Presidential Regulation No. 16 2018 on public procurement has the potential to improve the reach and quality of services delivered to the poorest and most marginalised people. These are people living in remote and isolated communities, ethnic and religious minorities, vulnerable women, children and youth, and people with disabilities – whom government services often fail to reach.</p>
<p>It will also provide access to much-needed funding for grassroots NGOs and faith-based organisations that are often uniquely placed to meet the needs of people who are socially and economically excluded. </p>
<h2>Reliance on international donor funds</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.ksi-indonesia.org/files/1450223212$1$ZEQ3$.pdf">A recent survey</a> found that national and provincial-level NGOs depended on international donors for funding, while local-level organisations relied on funds they generated themselves – for example, through small businesses. At both the national and local levels, government funds represented only a small fraction of NGOs’ income.</p>
<p>The reliance on international donor funds is problematic. Many Western donors are reducing their development assistance as Indonesia consolidates its status as a lower-middle-income country. These overall reductions will have a significant impact on the ability of Indonesia’s NGOs to deliver services effectively – or in some cases at all. </p>
<h2>Domestic funding sources</h2>
<p>In many countries around the world, government agencies work in partnership with NGOs to deliver public services such as <a href="http://www.cgdev.org/doc/ghprn/Lancet_harding.pdf">health</a>, <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pad.420/abstract">education</a> and <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pad.419/full">sanitation</a>. These partnerships take a <a href="http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/idd/research/non-state-providers/basic-services.pdf">variety of forms</a>, including memoranda of understanding, contracts and grants.</p>
<p>In Indonesia, national and local governments do provide some funding for social and community services. Social assistance (<em>bantuan sosial, bansos</em>) funds, for example, can be used for programs or activities relating to community empowerment, poverty reduction, or disaster relief. But the funds are generally only provided for one-off activities. This makes them unsuitable for organisations that provide ongoing services. </p>
<p>In 2011, Indonesia passed a law on legal aid (Law No. 16 2011). This law enables accredited legal aid organisations to claim government funding for legal advice and court representation of poor clients. However, this kind of formal NGO-government partnership is relatively rare.</p>
<h2>Fruits of advocacy</h2>
<p>Before the release of Presidential Regulation No 16 2018, Indonesia’s public procurement regulations only allowed commercial entities to bid for government contracts. This meant NGOs wanting to tender for government work had to establish a limited liability company or PT. </p>
<p>The changes under the new presidential regulation are the result of efforts by research and advocacy organisations <a href="http://www.akatiga.org/">AKATIGA</a>, the <a href="http://www.pshk.or.id/">Centre for Law and Policy Studies</a> (PSHK) and the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM). These organisations worked with the <a href="http://www.lkpp.go.id">National Public Procurement Agency</a> (LKPP) to explain the challenges that NGOs faced and provide input into the revisions to the regulations. </p>
<p>As a result, social organisations can now bid for government contracts that fall within the category of self-managed projects (<em>swakelola</em>). </p>
<h2>Challenges and risks</h2>
<p>This development reflects a shift over the last 15 years in the relationship between government and NGOs, from mutual suspicion to a greater willingness to work together. It acknowledges the important role that NGOs play in Indonesia’s development. But challenges remain.</p>
<p>The changes to the procurement regulations could benefit NGOs that deliver services but will be less beneficial for research and advocacy organisations. These organisations also serve an important function, by deepening understanding of social, economic and political issues and informing the development and implementation of public policy. </p>
<p>Fortunately, the revisions include a new section on procurement of research. This will enable a range of research actors, including universities and non-government think tanks, to tender for government contracts for research. This was a result of input provided by research and advocacy NGOs to LKPP and the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education.</p>
<p>Given that <a href="http://www.antaranews.com/berita/594775/mayoritas-kasus-ditangani-kpk-penyuapan-pengadaan-barang">78% of corruption cases</a> handled by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2016 involved procurement, corruption remains a risk. One way to overcome this is by ensuring that procurement processes are open and transparent. Another is to improve the governance of the NGO sector as a whole, perhaps by having NGOs develop sector-wide standards for governance and accountability.</p>
<h2>Making it work</h2>
<p>Over the past 15 years, Indonesia has more than halved its poverty rate, from 24% in 1999 to 11% in 2014. But inequality has risen, and reaching those at the very bottom will be harder. </p>
<p>Many faith-based and non-government organisations have developed strong networks in local communities and have put in place structures and institutions for delivering critical services. If the government is to achieve its <a href="http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/09/01/govt-urged-to-watch-development-targets-amid-budget-cuts.html">poverty and human development targets</a>, it will need to work with these organisations to extend and improve services for those who are most in need. Rather than setting up new service infrastructure, the government can take advantage of what is already in place.</p>
<p>Translating the changes in regulation into better services for communities will require NGOs and governments to work in genuine partnerships of mutual trust and respect. Both partners will need to ensure they remain accountable to each other and to the communities they serve.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101451/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This work was supported by the Knowledge Sector Initiative, which is funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in partnership with Indonesia’s National Development Planning Agency. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Australian or Indonesian governments.</span></em></p>
A new regulation makes it easier for the government to contract local NGOs.
Elisabeth Jackson, Knowledge Exchange and Learning Lead, Knowledge Sector Initiative, RTI International
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/100845
2018-08-08T12:48:29Z
2018-08-08T12:48:29Z
Many NGO workers on the ground don’t speak the local language – new research
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/231102/original/file-20180808-191019-clit82.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/interpreter-vector-concept-flat-illustration-businessman-1150216268?src=_OwxDCx07zhN_PlkV1kcOg-1-29">Roi and Roi/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After the Oxfam sexual exploitation <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/oxfam-scandal-49793">scandal</a> in Haiti <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/timeline-oxfam-sexual-exploitation-scandal-in-haiti">hit the headlines</a> earlier this year, 22 aid agencies published an <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43167746">open letter</a> declaring that they would “take every step to right our wrongs and eradicate abuse in our industry”. They made a commitment to “listen and take action”. </p>
<p>There is nothing new about NGOs claiming that they “listen” to communities and act on their feedback. A cursory glance at NGO publicity materials reveals that they typically claim that they empower communities by listening and involving them in decisions about aid projects.</p>
<p>It is therefore reasonable to assume that aid workers share the same language as local communities (or at least that they use good interpreters). Otherwise, how could aid providers and aid recipients communicate with one another effectively? You might also assume that it is relatively easy to translate basic development terms into local languages. Development NGOs promote common goals, such as gender equality and human rights. Surely organisations must use common interpretations of these words when interacting with the people that they aim to help?</p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.reading.ac.uk/modern-languages-and-european-studies/Research/mles-listening-zones-of-ngos.aspx">our research</a> suggests that this is typically not the case. We conducted a three-year project to explore the role of languages in international development, in conjunction with UK-based NGO INTRAC. We interviewed dozens of NGOs, officials from the UK’s Department of International Development (DfID), and conducted field research in developing countries. Our data led us to arrive at three startling conclusions.</p>
<h2>Three language problems</h2>
<p>First, we found that languages generally have a low priority in development. DFID officials generally assume that NGOs have sufficient language capacity to communicate with aid recipients. But few NGOs have language policies and language needs tend to be underfunded, even though aid workers are keenly aware of the importance of languages in their work. Many NGOs rely on multilingual staff members on the ground to come up with ad hoc solutions. The problem is that staff are not always fluent in the languages and dialects of the communities that they work with, and so interpretations can be sub par. Communities can become confused about the objectives of aid projects, or even misunderstand them entirely. </p>
<p>Second, many development concepts that are essential to NGO work are not directly translatable into other languages. Examples include accountability, resilience and sustainability. Aid workers often have to invent their own interpretations of these concepts with minimal guidance from management. The interpretations can vary widely, which exacerbates the confusion of the communities about the purpose of aid projects.</p>
<p>Third, these language problems have negative effects on community participation, and the trust that communities have in NGOs. Certain groups, especially those speaking an indigenous language that does not have official status, end up being effectively excluded from participating in project design, and providing feedback on the performance of the NGO. This is an impediment to establishing relationships of mutual respect.</p>
<h2>Change needed</h2>
<p>This needs to change if the aid sector is serious about dealing with the issues raised by the Oxfam scandal. The International Development Committee’s <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmintdev/840/84003.htm">recent report</a> on sexual violence in aid called for the inclusion of the voices of victims and survivors in policy-making. Our research suggests that NGOs should ensure that safeguarding policies and procedures are extremely sensitive to the linguistic and cultural context of the areas where abuse may occur.</p>
<p>In fact, in all areas of their work, it is clear that NGOs need to include language as a key consideration when designing development projects. They should use local interpreters wherever possible, who will have a deep understanding of the culture. They need to make more effort to translate development jargon, and better support multilingual staff who undertake the informal work of language mediation outside of their agreed job descriptions. NGOs should also conduct regular assessments to determine whether communities and fieldworkers understand one another well.</p>
<p>It’s not just NGOs that are problematic. We found that DfID also has a blind spot about the importance of languages. For example, it only accepts funding proposals in English. This prevents thousands of excellent local organisations in developing countries that are unable to speak or write English, but are worthy of financial support, from applying for funding. If they cannot enlist the support of a fluent English speaker, they are unable to access money that might help them to make positive changes in their communities.</p>
<p>DfID <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leaving-no-one-behind-our-promise/leaving-no-one-behind-our-promise">claims</a> that it is committed to “putting the last first”, and that “every person counts and will be counted”. But if development is to be truly inclusive, then it needs to cater for the languages spoken by the recipients of aid, who often tend to be the poorest and most marginalised in society. DfID should open up opportunities for non-English speaking organisations to apply for funds. This would promote a bottom-up approach to development that empowers the grassroots: a radical, much-needed change in the way that development is practised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Angela Crack receives funding from AHRC. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hilary Footitt receives funding from AHRC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wine Tesseur receives funding from AHRC.</span></em></p>
The international aid sector’s use of languages needs to change if it is serious about dealing with the issues raised by recent scandals.
Angela Crack, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Portsmouth
Hilary Footitt, Research Professor in Modern Languages, University of Reading
Wine Tesseur, Postdoctoral Research Assistant in Modern Languages, University of Reading
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/96709
2018-05-17T06:52:00Z
2018-05-17T06:52:00Z
Why China’s ‘debt-book diplomacy’ in the Pacific shouldn’t ring alarm bells just yet
<p>Talk of Chinese “debt trap” diplomacy is nothing new, but a recent report by Harvard University researchers has resurrected long-held fears that China’s debt diplomacy poses a threat to Australian interests in the Pacific. </p>
<p>The crux of the report is that Pacific island states like Vanuatu and Tonga, as well as other nations in Southeast Asia, are at risk of undue influence from China due to unsustainable loans they’ve received for infrastructure projects. </p>
<p>The Australian Financial Review <a href="http://www.afr.com/news/politics/world/us-secret-report-china-debt-trap-on-australias-doorstep-20180513-h0zzwd">quoted the report</a> as saying that while Papua New Guinea in particular has “historically been in Australia’s orbit”, it’s been “rapidly taking on Chinese loans it can’t afford to pay and offers a strategic location in addition to significant LNG and resource deposits” for China. </p>
<p>The story follows a well-trodden path from speculation to suspicion to alarm. Last month, another media report emerged saying <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-military-base-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html">China had approached Vanuatu </a> about building a permanent military presence in the South Pacific – an assertion <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/vanuatu-rules-out-chinese-military-base">Vanuatu quickly shot down</a>.</p>
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<p>The latest report by the Harvard researchers comes with interesting context. A classified version of it was allegedly produced for the US Pacific Command last year, but the version leaked to the Australian Financial Review was written by graduate students, purportedly for the US State Department. </p>
<p>Interestingly, the students were supervised by Professor Graham Allison, who wrote the book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Destined-War-America-Escape-Thucydidess-ebook/dp/B01IAS9FZY">Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?</a>. The <a href="https://www.quora.com/What-is-Thucydides%E2%80%99s-Trap">“Thucydides’s Trap”</a> in the title relates to whether the US as a hegemonic power can accommodate China’s rise without resorting to war. </p>
<p>But this so-called trap does not necessarily point to historical inevitability. Therefore, a thorough analysis of the dynamics in the region is needed to fully understand China’s motivations, and what can be done to avoid conflict. </p>
<p>China has long been accused of using “chequebook diplomacy” to gain favour with nations around the world. The implication of the new “debt-book diplomacy” in the Harvard report is that China is using unsustainable loans to gain influence with Pacific island states that aren’t able to repay them. </p>
<p>Suffice it to say, this form of leveraging takes influence to a different level. </p>
<h2>Historical fears</h2>
<p>There is a long history of alarmism in Australia over the activities of strategic competitors in the Pacific. During the second world war, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/the-citizens-guide-to-war-when-japan-threatened-australia/news-story/0e542f479492d104564d00d963e4c2fb">Japan was widely believed to have been poised to invade Australia</a> from bases in the Pacific islands. This threat was later discredited, but the legacy of this fear of invasion from foreign powers lingers to this day. </p>
<p>During the height of the Cold War, <a href="https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/14904">Soviet fishing agreements with Pacific countries </a> were also perceived to be a threat to Australian interests. These agreements were widely seen as strategic threats that could lead to military bases and/or spying arrangements, but nothing significant ever came from them.</p>
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<p>The constant in Australia’s geostrategic view of the Pacific is that the region is viewed simultaneously as both a buffer and a potential location of threats.</p>
<p>In the second world war and the Cold War, perceived encroachments by strategic competitors led to a “strategy of denial”. This involved creating a buffer through forward defence initiatives, such as the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, in which Australia donated 22 vessels to Pacific island countries at the same time the Soviets were negotiating their “fishing agreements”. </p>
<p>It might not be a coincidence this program has been reinvented with a new Pacific Maritime Security Program that will <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/replacing-pacific-patrol-boats-smart-re-investment-play">see 21 vessels delivered to Pacific island nations</a> from 2018-2021.</p>
<h2>Reassessing Australia’s role</h2>
<p>Australia has also been the largest aid donor to the Pacific region, a position that has withstood recent increases in Chinese aid. Furthermore, this development assistance to the region was prioritised in the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-09/budget-government-makes-biggest-ever-aid-commitment-to-pacific/9740968">latest federal budget</a>. </p>
<p>This is significant considering the relative sizes of the two economies and the relative ease with which China can allocate resources (without transparency and without regard to a domestic constituency scrutinising its actions). Presumably, China could very easily overtake Australia as the largest donor if it wanted to, and the fact that it has chosen not to is telling. </p>
<p>It’s true China is becoming more active in the region. Australia appears to be responding through development assistance, defence cooperation and emergency disaster response with its Pacific neighbours, even if there is <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/us-bemused-by-australia-s-lack-of-leadership-in-the-pacific-labor-20180503-p4zd3r.html">speculation</a> the US doesn’t believe it’s doing enough. </p>
<p>But if there is a genuine Thucydides’s Trap in the Pacific, what’s needed is a coherent analysis of China’s interests in the region, rather than a quick and almost reflexive interpretation of their intentions as aggressive. (One angle worth exploring its China’s ongoing conflict with Taiwan over <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/taiwan-and-its-south-pacific-allies">diplomatic recognition for the self-ruling island</a>, as<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/china-s-new-tug-of-war-with-taiwan-over-influence-in-the-pacific-20180502-p4zcxt.html"> six of Taiwan’s 19 supporters are in the Pacific</a>.)</p>
<p>Of equal importance for Australia would be to understand the motivations of Pacific island nations. What’s missing is any examination of why Pacific states might be welcoming China with open arms, or even whether they are simply begrudgingly welcoming them. </p>
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<p>This opens a Pandora’s box. Could Australia’s (benign) neglect and perceptions of neo-colonialism actually be part of the problem? One that exists independently of China’s intentions? </p>
<p>This is certainly the case with [<a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reader-response-is-compromise-on-fiji-the-same-as-selling-out/">Australia’s sanctions against Fiji</a>]from 2006-2014, which led to Fiji’s suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum and the creation of alternative forms of Pacific regional arrangements, such as the <a href="http://pacificidf.org/">Pacific Islands Development Forum</a>, which are supported by China. </p>
<p>Australia sees threats coming through the Pacific, and not from the Pacific, and this should be the foundation of its Pacific diplomacy. If Australia continues to reflexively see threats in China’s diplomatic moves in the Pacific, it may close off just the sort of creative diplomacy needed to escape a Thucydides’s Trap.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96709/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael O'Keefe has received funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, AusAID, Pacific Leadership Program, Pacific Islands Development Forum and Fijian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.</span></em></p>
Australia has long been concerned about foreign powers gaining influence in the Pacific, but China’s involvement in the region may not be as nefarious as it fears.
Michael O'Keefe, Senior Lecturer of International Relations, La Trobe University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.