tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/drought-strategies-32512/articlesDrought strategies – The Conversation2023-10-04T03:56:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2117682023-10-04T03:56:59Z2023-10-04T03:56:59ZBradfield’s pipedream: irrigating Australia’s deserts won’t increase rainfall, new modelling shows<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/549959/original/file-20230925-19-sjqj2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C8%2C5467%2C3647&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/long-awaited-rain-storm-one-drop-1541576591">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For generations, Australians have been fascinated with the idea of turning our inland deserts green with lush vegetation. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/queensland/leaders-tout-bradfield-scheme-options-in-queensland-election-fight-20191101-p536o2.html">Both sides</a> of politics have supported proposals to irrigate the country’s centre by turning northern rivers inland. Proponents have argued water lost to evaporation would rise through the atmosphere and fall back as rain, spreading the benefits throughout the desert. But this claim has hardly ever been tested.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2023GL103913">recently published research</a> shows irrigating Australia’s deserts would not increase rainfall, contrary to a century of claims otherwise. </p>
<p>This provides a new argument against irrigating Australia’s deserts, in addition to critiques on economic and environmental grounds.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">What is the Bradfield Scheme? Featuring Griffith University’s Professor Fran Sheldon.</span></figcaption>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/new-bradfield-rerouting-rivers-to-recapture-a-pioneering-spirit-127010">'New Bradfield': rerouting rivers to recapture a pioneering spirit</a>
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<h2>The Bradfield scheme</h2>
<p>Proposals to irrigate the country’s centre by diverting water inland date back to at least the 1930s. The person most widely credited with the idea is John Bradfield, the civil engineer who designed the Sydney Harbour Bridge. He <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/97050378">proposed a series of dams and tunnels</a> that would transport water from northern Queensland to Kati Thanda-Lake Eyre.</p>
<p>Variants of the original scheme have been proposed <a href="https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/politics/queensland/a-turning-point-lnp-vows-to-irrigate-drought-addled-western-qld-20201018-p5665l.html">as recently as 2020</a>. The Queensland Liberal National Party campaigned on a policy to build a Bradfield-like scheme in the last state election. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">An aerial view of the Queensland LNP’s ‘new Bradfield scheme’ (Liberal National Party of Queensland, October 2020)</span></figcaption>
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<p>Despite our fascination with it, the Bradfield scheme has well-documented problems. It is not cost-effective and would likely be a disaster for the environment. These findings have been confirmed repeatedly by <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/97099323">multiple</a> <a href="https://www.csiro.au/en/research/natural-environment/water/water-resource-assessment/the-bradfield-scheme-assessment">reviews</a>, as recently as <a href="https://www.rdmw.qld.gov.au/water/consultations-initiatives/bradfield-regional-assessment-development-panel">2022</a>.</p>
<p>Yet the idea resurfaces <a href="https://theconversation.com/new-bradfield-rerouting-rivers-to-recapture-a-pioneering-spirit-127010">over and over again</a> and the debate around it remains active and ongoing. </p>
<p>Crossbencher Bob Katter, the federal member for Kennedy in Queensland, is a prominent supporter of the scheme. He <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-12-09/queensland-government-abandons-bradfield-scheme-after-report/101751678">rejected the critical findings</a> of a <a href="https://www.csiro.au/en/research/natural-environment/water/water-resource-assessment/the-bradfield-scheme-assessment">recent CSIRO review</a> that found the scheme and others like it were not economically viable. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/curious-kids-why-cant-we-just-build-a-pipe-to-move-water-to-areas-in-drought-123454">Curious Kids: why can't we just build a pipe to move water to areas in drought?</a>
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<h2>Would it increase rainfall?</h2>
<p>Would the Bradfield scheme increase rainfall in central Australia? Given all the debate about the scheme, this question has received surprisingly <a href="https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-964034842/view?partId=nla.obj-964065417">little</a> <a href="https://www.cmar.csiro.au/e-print/internal/mcgregor_x2004a.pdf">attention</a>.</p>
<p>Bradfield argued the added irrigation water would effectively <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/97050378">double or triple the region’s rainfall</a>:</p>
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<p>This irrigation water would augment the average rainfall of the district from 10 to 20 inches per annum […] Sceptics and croakers say the water will evaporate or seep away […] [but] it will not go far.</p>
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<p>To test Bradfield’s claim, we turned to climate models. In a collaboration between scientists at the University of Melbourne, Harvard University, National Taiwan University and the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, we simulated two worlds: one with a Bradfield-like scheme and one without it. </p>
<p>In our model of the Bradfield-like scheme, we permanently filled the region around Kati Thanda-Lake Eyre with water. That differs a bit from Bradfield’s original scheme but captures the basic idea. If anything, it is more extreme than Bradfield’s scheme. If Bradfield is right, we would expect our scheme’s effects on rainfall to be even larger.</p>
<p>Our simulations showed no significant increase in rainfall. This may sound surprising but can be explained with basic physical arguments.</p>
<h2>Why no rain?</h2>
<p>Rain forms when moist air rises. As it rises, temperatures drop, water condenses from vapour to liquid and clouds form. </p>
<p>Hot air rises, so high temperatures near the surface can promote rainfall. But in our simulations, irrigating the surface led to evaporative cooling of the air. The colder air did not rise as much, and rainfall was suppressed.</p>
<p>Where does all that extra water go? In our simulations, the water evaporated and was blown all over the Australian continent by wind. The additional water ended up being spread thinly over a large area. When it did eventually rain out, the effect on local rainfall was tiny.</p>
<p>Climate models aren’t perfect and have known weaknesses in simulating rainfall. But the basic explanation for the small change in rainfall can be understood without appealing to climate models. </p>
<p>Could irrigating a larger region, or a different part of the country, change the results? Maybe, and we are looking into it. But the Bradfield scheme is already <a href="https://www.rdmw.qld.gov.au/water/consultations-initiatives/bradfield-regional-assessment-development-panel">not cost effective</a>. Making the scheme larger or moving it away from natural flow paths would only make this problem worse.</p>
<p>Previous reviews of the Bradfield scheme have mainly focused on the economics of the scheme. Australian economist <a href="https://www.rdmw.qld.gov.au/water/consultations-initiatives/bradfield-regional-assessment-development-panel">Ross Garnaut’s report</a> in December 2022 is the most recent to find the scheme is economically unviable. </p>
<p>Our study provides a new argument against the Bradfield scheme, separate to economic arguments.</p>
<p>The idea of transforming our dry continent is seductive. But our study shows no plausible engineering scheme would be capable of making it rain enough to do so. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-cant-drought-proof-australia-and-trying-is-a-fools-errand-124504">We can’t drought-proof Australia, and trying is a fool's errand</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kaighin McColl receives funding from the National Science Foundation, NASA, the Sloan Foundation, the Sahara Project, and Harvard University. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dongryeol Ryu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New research shows turning northern rivers inland to irrigate Australia’s dry interior would not increase rainfall. This is another argument against the Bradfield scheme.Kaighin McColl, Assistant Professor of Earth and Planetary Sciences and Environmental Science and Engineering, Harvard UniversityDongryeol Ryu, Professor, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880152022-08-09T15:23:10Z2022-08-09T15:23:10ZHow not to respond to drought: lessons from Angola<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476935/original/file-20220801-24-txgy0r.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Breakdown in local canal that led to micro-drought situation in Humpata (Huíla).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ruy Blanes</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Three years after a severe drought in southwestern Angola, people in the area continue to suffer. Hunger remains pervasive and they are still losing livestock.</p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://secaangola.hypotheses.org/files/2022/04/Drought-in-Angola-Report-2022-compressed.pdf">report</a> we looked at fallout from the extreme drought in the region in 2019. There was almost no rain for 10 years. This led to a humanitarian and environmental disaster. According to <a href="https://www.unicef.org/media/74536/file/Angola-Sitrep-June-2019.pdf">data published by Unicef</a> in June 2019, around 2.3 million people experienced food insecurity as a result of the drought, and hundreds of thousands became malnourished. </p>
<p>Our <a href="https://secaangola.hypotheses.org/files/2022/04/Drought-in-Angola-Report-2022-compressed.pdf">research</a> included interviews with local herding and pastoralist communities, local politicians, activists and members of NGO. </p>
<p>Our report attempted to unpack why the situation remains so dire. Rainfall continues to be irregular and scarce, making most local rural communities unable to survive the cacimbo (dry season) without relying on donations of food and water. Crops have failed and livestock lack pasture. Many people are migrating to Namibia or urban areas. This is despite the fact that the crisis triggered national and international responses.</p>
<p>The report set out factors that made the impact of the drought worse. These included the way in which the government provided assistance, as well as infrastructure failures. While existing transport and energy networks were breaking down due to a lack of maintenance and repair, the government’s response focused on new, long term construction projects. These privileged large-scale farming projects over the traditional farming and herding.</p>
<p>We found that no solutions had been found to the impact of the drought and the suffering of communities. The reasons for this include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>dispersed and disconnected development and aid responses </p></li>
<li><p>lack of infrastructure repair </p></li>
<li><p>land exploitation through agroindustrial and mining projects </p></li>
<li><p>no serious consideration of the local rural communities’ lifestyles. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>We conclude that drought aid will not be enough unless these issues are addressed.</p>
<h2>The interventions</h2>
<p>In 2019, southwestern Angola became one of the hotspots of international <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKVyRdMwFNA">climate debates</a>, due to an extreme drought situation. Millions of people were affected, as well as millions of livestock. </p>
<p>The drought cycle had begun a decade earlier, with a succession of years with irregular rainfall patterns, as reported by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction <a href="https://www.preventionweb.net/publication/droughts-angola-2012-2016-post-disaster-needs-assessment">back in 2016</a>. Local rural communities were already accustomed to living in arid and semi-arid conditions. But in 2019, the cycle peaked, and traditional survival strategies were no longer effective.</p>
<p>International organisations, such as <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/unicef-angola-humanitarian-situation-report-july-2019">Unicef</a>, described the situation as “the worst drought in 40 years”. This triggered an unprecedented response from Angolan civic society, government and opposition parties.</p>
<p>First there were immediate campaigns to distribute food and water. The government under President João Lourenço also sponsored several programmes focused on water distribution and infrastructure. New dams and pipelines were built. It also refocused <a href="https://fresan-angola.org/">a financial programme</a> designed to strengthen food security in rural areas towards immediate aid to local communities.</p>
<p>In addition, several NGOs focused on immediate, small-scale solutions.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Water storing hills" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/476936/original/file-20220801-77595-ydkfbm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Small-scale water retention solution ‘cisterna-calçadão’ in Gambos (Huíla)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ruy Blanes</span></span>
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<p>Three years after the crisis, what has been the effect of the relief efforts? </p>
<h2>What’s left</h2>
<p>During our research in the provinces of Huíla, Cunene and Namibe we saw several different projects and interventions. These ranged from large infrastructural projects, in particular the <a href="https://www.africa-press.net/angola/all-news/cunene-river-water-transfer-system-starts-operating-in-april">Cunene River water transfer system</a>, to local water access and retention systems such as the <a href="https://www.adra-angola.org/artigos/projecto-parmes-preve-construir-100-cisternas-calcadao"><em>cisterna calçadão</em></a> or livelihood diversification programmes. </p>
<p>But we also found that the level of humanitarian vulnerability and insecurity had not changed significantly. These were the main problems we identified:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Firstly, an unexpected factor added to the crisis: the COVID-19 outbreak. While the rate of infection among local communities was low according to government figures, restrictions had an impact. For instance, the closure of the Angola-Namibia border throughout 2020 and 2021 interrupted trade.</p></li>
<li><p>The immediate assistance programmes (food, seed and water distribution campaigns) were irregular and unsystematic. Several communities living in the more remote areas were left out. Water distribution projects began with large cistern tanks that were too big and heavy to reach off-track areas. Later on, a <a href="https://www.jornaldeangola.ao/ao/noticias/150-motos-cisternas-apoiam-vitimas-da-seca/">“moto-cistern” system</a> with motorcycles carrying water tanks was introduced. But poor road conditions hampered this.</p></li>
<li><p>The role and capacity of local authorities (communal or municipal) was hindered by excessive centralism. All the major initiatives, such as the poverty reduction programmes and infrastructural development schemes, were designed and promoted from the presidential cabinet without sustained engagement with local authorities. All also involved painstaking bureaucratic processes. </p></li>
<li><p>A number of problems have emerged with the long-term projects. One example is the water transfer system around the Cunene River. Firstly, it faces an uncertain conclusion. Secondly, it could create further inequalities <a href="https://epito-reporter.com/?p=4674">in the distribution of and access to water</a>. In our visit to the commune of Oncocua in the province of Cunene, local communities were wondering why the projected pipelines didn’t include their areas. In addition, the projects privilege big businesses involved in new construction projects instead of rehabilitating existing infrastructure. Examples include the Neves and Matala dams which hark back to the colonial period (pre-1975). Local communities historically organised their livelihoods around them. But the lack of maintenance has created <a href="https://www.blogalstudies.com/post/drought-terroirs-in-southern-angola">“micro-droughts” in water-rich areas</a>.</p></li>
<li><p>Aid and relief projects organised by NGOs provided immediate solutions. These ranged from the construction of water holes and pumps to the repair of water retention systems. But the response depended on external funding and lacked an overarching plan.</p></li>
<li><p>Large-scale agro-industrial and mining projects in the region have intensified the pressure on the soil and water resources, and interrupted or hampered the patterns of traditional pastoralists. As Amnesty International reported in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr12/1020/2019/en/">2019</a> and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/angola-millions-facing-hunger-as-thousands-flee-their-homes-as-drought-ravages-the-south-of-angola-2/">2021</a>, these projects in Huila province led to traditional communal pasture lands being appropriated. This increased conflict.</p></li>
<li><p>The government’s initiatives took place without the support or knowledge of local communities. This was particularly true when it came to the design of practical solutions such as the installation and maintenance of water holes and the development of farm plots.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In August of 2022, Angola will be holding presidential elections. As part of his campaign ahead of polls, President Lourenço has said that efforts to manage the effects of the drought would be his <a href="http://www.embaixadadeangola.pt/pr-prioriza-combate-seca-sul-de-angola/">priority in the next cabinet</a>. The announcement may seem like a positive gesture. But the fact that it is formulated three years after the crisis shows that the response to drought in southwestern Angola has, so far, been inefficient.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188015/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ruy Llera Blanes receives funding from FORMAS (Sweden). </span></em></p>Despite international and national responses to the drought, the situation is dire. The government’s response is a lesson in how not to deal with drought.Ruy Llera Blanes, Associate Professor in Social Anthropology, University of GothenburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1368542020-04-22T02:08:10Z2020-04-22T02:08:10ZThere are 10 catastrophic threats facing humans right now, and coronavirus is only one of them<p>Four months in, this year has already been a remarkable showcase for existential and catastrophic risk. A severe drought, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-50951043">devastating bushfires</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-does-bushfire-smoke-affect-our-health-6-things-you-need-to-know-130126">hazardous smoke</a>, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-27/how-long-until-drought-stricken-towns-run-out-of-water/11655124">towns running dry</a> – these events all demonstrate the consequences of human-induced climate change. </p>
<p>While the above may seem like isolated threats, they are parts of a larger puzzle of which the pieces are all interconnected. A report titled Surviving and Thriving in the 21st Century, published today by the Commission for the Human Future, has isolated ten potentially catastrophic threats to human survival. </p>
<p>Not prioritised over one another, these risks are:</p>
<ol>
<li>decline of natural resources, particularly water</li>
<li>collapse of ecosystems and loss of biodiversity</li>
<li>human population growth beyond Earth’s carrying capacity</li>
<li>global warming and human-induced climate change</li>
<li>chemical pollution of the Earth system, including the atmosphere and oceans</li>
<li>rising food insecurity and failing nutritional quality</li>
<li>nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction</li>
<li>pandemics of new and untreatable disease</li>
<li>the advent of powerful, uncontrolled new technology </li>
<li>national and global failure to understand and act preventatively on these risks.</li>
</ol>
<h2>The start of ongoing discussions</h2>
<p>The Commission for the Human Future formed last year, following earlier discussions within <a href="http://www.humansforsurvival.org/sites/default/files/J3015%20-Pathways%20past%20Precipice.pdf">emeritus faculty at the Australian National University</a> about the major risks faced by humanity, how they should be approached and how they might be solved. We hosted our first round-table discussion last month, bringing together more than 40 academics, thinkers and policy leaders.</p>
<p>The commission’s report states our species’ ability to cause mass harm to itself has been accelerating since the mid-20th century. Global trends in demographics, information, politics, warfare, climate, environmental damage and technology have culminated in an entirely new level of risk. </p>
<p>The risks emerging now are varied, global and complex. Each one poses a “significant” risk to human civilisation, a “<a href="http://www.global-catastrophic-risks.com/">catastrophic risk</a>”, or could actually extinguish the human species and is therefore an “<a href="https://concepts.effectivealtruism.org/concepts/existential-risks/">existential risk</a>”.</p>
<p>The risks are interconnected. They originate from the same basic causes and must be solved in ways that make no individual threat worse. This means many existing systems we take for granted, including our economic, food, energy, production and waste, community life and governance systems – along with our relationship with the Earth’s natural systems – must undergo searching examination and reform.</p>
<h2>COVID-19: a lesson in interconnection</h2>
<p>It’s tempting to examine these threats individually, and yet with the coronavirus crisis we see their interconnection. </p>
<p>The response to the coronavirus has had implications for climate change with <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/04/coronavirus-causing-carbon-emissions-to-fall-but-not-for-long/">carbon pollution reduction</a>, increased discussion about <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/04/12/999186/covid-19-contact-tracing-surveillance-data-privacy-anonymity/">artificial intelligence and use of data</a> (<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-52157131/coronavirus-russia-uses-facial-recognition-to-tackle-covid-19">including facial recognition</a>), and changes to the landscape of <a href="https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-shows-we-are-not-at-all-prepared-for-the-security-threat-of-climate-change-136029">global security</a> particularly in the face of massive economic transition.</p>
<p>It’s not possible to “solve” COVID-19 without affecting other risks in some way.</p>
<h2>Shared future, shared approach</h2>
<p>The commission’s report does not aim to solve each risk, but rather to outline current thinking and identify unifying themes. <a href="https://www.science.org.au/supporting-science/science-policy-and-analysis">Understanding science, evidence and analysis</a> will be key to adequately addressing the threats and finding solutions. An <a href="https://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/subscriber.nsf/0/356E27A3CE3FFEAACA2577C80012F997/$File/evidence_web.pdf">evidence-based approach to policy</a> has been needed for many years. Under-appreciating science and evidence leads to unmitigated risks, as we have seen with climate change.</p>
<p>The human future involves us all. Shaping it requires a collaborative, inclusive and diverse discussion. We should heed advice from political and social scientists on how to engage all people in this conversation.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/from-the-bushfires-to-coronavirus-our-old-normal-is-gone-forever-so-whats-next-134994">From the bushfires to coronavirus, our old 'normal' is gone forever. So what's next?</a>
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<p>Imagination, creativity and new narratives will be needed for challenges that test our civil society and humanity. The bushfire smoke over the summer was unprecedented, and COVID-19 is a new virus. </p>
<p>If our policymakers and government had spent more time using the available climate science to understand and then imagine the potential risks of the 2019-20 summer, we would have recognised the potential for a catastrophic season and would likely have been able to prepare better. Unprecedented events are not always unexpected.</p>
<h2>Prepare for the long road</h2>
<p>The short-termism of our <a href="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190318-can-we-reinvent-democracy-for-the-long-term">political process needs to be circumvented</a>. We must consider how our actions today will resonate for generations to come. </p>
<p>The commission’s report highlights the failure of governments to address these threats and particularly notes the short-term thinking that has increasingly dominated Australian and global politics. This has seriously undermined our potential to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/commentisfree/2020/jan/14/the-government-has-been-forced-to-talk-about-climate-change-so-its-taking-a-subtle-and-sinister-approach">decrease risks such as climate change</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/listen-to-your-people-scott-morrison-the-bushfires-demand-a-climate-policy-reboot-129348">Listen to your people Scott Morrison: the bushfires demand a climate policy reboot</a>
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<p>The shift from short to longer term thinking can began at home and in our daily lives. We should make decisions today that acknowledge the future, and practise this not only in our own lives but also demand it of our policy makers. </p>
<p>We’re living in unprecedented times. The catastrophic and existential risks for humanity are serious and multifaceted. And this conversation is the most important one we have today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136854/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arnagretta Hunter is a board member of the Commission for the Human Future. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Hewson is Chair Commission for the Human Future</span></em></p>Other existential risks include the decline of natural resources (particularly water), human population growth beyond the Earth’s carrying capacity, and nuclear weapons.Arnagretta Hunter, ANU Human Futures Fellow 2020; Cardiologist and Physician., Australian National UniversityJohn Hewson, Professor and Chair, Tax and Transfer Policy Institute, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1270102019-11-26T18:40:37Z2019-11-26T18:40:37Z‘New Bradfield’: rerouting rivers to recapture a pioneering spirit<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/303353/original/file-20191125-74567-1lshtdu.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C205%2C4031%2C2776&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Waters from the Herbert River, which runs toward one of northern Australia's richest agricultural districts, could be redirected under a Bradfield scheme.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Patrick White</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The “<a href="https://www.deb2020.com.au/newbradfield/">New Bradfield</a>” scheme is more than an attempt to transcend environmental reality. It seeks to revive a pioneering spirit and a nation-building ethos supposedly stifled by the <a href="https://www.townsvillebulletin.com.au/news/townsville/townsville-enterprise-to-receive-24m-for-hells-gates-dam-case-after-months-of-bureacratic-delay/news-story/492dba14afd4ce71ffd08f12d38c15a6">bureaucratic inertia</a> of modern Australia.</p>
<p>This is not a new lament. Frustrated by bureaucracy, politicians in North Queensland have long criticised the slow pace of northern development. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/you-cant-boost-australias-north-to-5-million-people-without-a-proper-plan-125063">You can't boost Australia's north to 5 million people without a proper plan</a>
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<p>In 1950, northern local governments blamed urban lethargy. <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/63184273?searchTerm=concern%20at%20drift%20in%20north%27s%20population&searchLimits=">One prominent mayor</a> complained:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… these young people lack the pioneering spirit of their forebears, preferring leisure and pleasure to hardships and hard work.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>These sentiments were inspired by an agrarian nostalgia that extolled toil and toughness. Stoic responses to the challenges of life on the land are part of the <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/9284258">Australian legend</a>.</p>
<p>With drought devastating rural and urban communities and a state election looming in Queensland in 2020, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/queensland/leaders-tout-bradfield-scheme-options-in-queensland-election-fight-20191101-p536o2.html">both sides of politics</a> have proposed a “New Bradfield” scheme.</p>
<h2>An idea with 19th-century origins</h2>
<p>Civil engineer John Bradfield devised the original scheme in 1938. His plan would <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/97050378?browse=ndp%3Abrowse%2Ftitle%2FQ%2Ftitle%2F379%2F1939%2F05%2F04%2Fpage%2F10280686%2Farticle%2F97050378">swamp inland Australia</a> by reversing the flow of North Queensland’s rivers. Similar proposals go back to at least 1887, when geographer <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/35590102?q&versionId=44284267+219718360+231090219">E.A. Leonard recommended</a> the Herbert, Tully, Johnstone and Barron rivers be turned around to irrigate Australia’s “<a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/13361128">dead heart</a>”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302057/original/file-20191117-66921-mj64sz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302057/original/file-20191117-66921-mj64sz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302057/original/file-20191117-66921-mj64sz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302057/original/file-20191117-66921-mj64sz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302057/original/file-20191117-66921-mj64sz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302057/original/file-20191117-66921-mj64sz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302057/original/file-20191117-66921-mj64sz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302057/original/file-20191117-66921-mj64sz.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Blencoe Falls, on a tributary of the Herbert River, North Queensland, during the dry season.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Patrick White</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As the “dead heart” became the “<a href="http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/finlayson-hedley-herbert-14881">Red Centre</a>” in the 1930s, <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/6707892?q&versionId=7723963">populist writers</a> revived the dreams of big irrigation schemes. </p>
<p>These schemes have always been contested on both <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-18/fact-file-bradfield-scheme-drought-relief/11216616">environmental and economic grounds</a>. A <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/20252029">compelling history of Bradfield’s</a> proposal reveals many errors and miscalculations. But what the scheme lacked in substance it made up for in grandiose vision.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.textpublishing.com.au/books/the-water-dreamers">Water dreaming</a> has been a powerful theme in Australian history. The desire to transform desert into farmland retains appeal and <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/97099323?searchTerm=bradfield%20AND%20%22Nimmo%22&searchLimits=exactPhrase=Nimmo%7C%7C%7CanyWords%7C%7C%7CnotWords%7C%7C%7CrequestHandler%7C%7C%7CdateFrom=1944-01-01%7C%7C%7CdateTo=1948-01-01%7C%7C%7Cl-advstate=National%7C%7C%7Cl-advstate=New+South+Wales%7C%7C%7Cl-advstate=Queensland%7C%7C%7Cl-advstate=Victoria%7C%7C%7Csortby">discredited</a> schemes like Bradfield keep reappearing.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-keys-to-unlock-northern-australia-have-already-been-cut-69713">The keys to unlock Northern Australia have already been cut</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<h2>Contempt for nature and country</h2>
<p>While less ambitious than the original plan, the “New Bradfield” scheme still engineers against the gradient of both history and nature. It would have irreversible consequences for Queensland’s <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/am/experts-dismiss-new-drought-proofing-bradfield-scheme/11666006">environment</a>, society and culture.</p>
<p>What’s more, the new scheme manifests much the same mindset as the old. </p>
<p>It’s an attitude that privileges the conquest of nature: in this case literally up-ending geography by turning east-flowing rivers westward. Its celebration of the human struggle against defiant nature reprises the pioneering ethos.</p>
<p>Like many pioneers, “New Bradfield” proposals disregard the interests and land-management practices of Indigenous people. The bushfires ravaging the eastern states show the folly of <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-14/traditional-owners-predicted-bushfire-disaster/11700320?sf223598160=1&fbclid=IwAR2UkvGj_wyO4s6tbRqyI5sI6UgEI6SvqkoMwxCFEkKEV6FO7ZGJfGMP3Kc">ignoring traditional ways of caring for country</a> . </p>
<p><a href="http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case_d1-2018">Overlooking native title realities</a> can also cost governments and communities.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/remote-indigenous-australias-ecological-economies-give-us-something-to-build-on-123917">Remote Indigenous Australia's ecological economies give us something to build on</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<h2>Polarising debate neglects more viable projects</h2>
<p>“New Bradfield” is promoted as “<a href="https://www.deb2020.com.au/newbradfield/?utm_source=Digitaliyf&utm_medium=GSearch&utm_campaign=NBradfield&gclid=CjwKCAiA8K7uBRBBEiwACOm4d-0xBRkgojO1Wykl937_rMhWhPhAb2ZsKhcKHOqdM2OuG11V34XdHBoCxBMQAvD_BwE">an asset owned by all Queenslanders for all Queenslanders</a>”. But <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-darling-river-is-simply-not-supposed-to-dry-out-even-in-drought-109880">environmental destruction</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/drought-and-climate-change-are-driving-high-water-prices-in-the-murray-darling-basin-119993">disputes over water sales</a> in the Murray-Darling Basin sound a warning.</p>
<p>The Queensland Farmers Federation has <a href="https://www.qff.org.au/media-releases/qff-welcomes-lnp-commitment-new-bradfield-scheme/">cautiously welcomed</a> the new scheme. Others have dismissed it as a “<a href="https://www.queenslandcountrylife.com.au/story/6479100/cold-water-poured-on-bradfield-mark-ii/">pipe dream</a>”. </p>
<p>Thus, northern Australia again sits amid a polarised debate about its utility to the nation. Such polarising contests diminish the likelihood of more viable projects being implemented.</p>
<p>Extravagant expectations of “untapped” northern resources have been <a href="https://scholarly.info/book/northern-dreams/">proffered for nearly two centuries</a>. Distant governments have fantasised the Australian tropics as a land of near-limitless potential. Northern communities have many times been disappointed by the results.</p>
<p>Today’s promises to “<a href="https://www.townsvillebulletin.com.au/news/opinion/flow-of-jobs-water-vital-for-nq-says-lnp-leader-deb-frecklington/news-story/053bb635b9cb86461ead6eedd39756ca">drought-proof</a>” large areas of Queensland rely on similar images. “Drought-proofing” aims to keep people on the land but often defies economic and social reality.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/we-cant-drought-proof-australia-and-trying-is-a-fools-errand-124504">We can’t drought-proof Australia, and trying is a fool's errand</a>
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<h2>Dam developments have an underwhelming record</h2>
<p>The “New Bradfield” rhetoric echoes the inflated expectations of myriad disappointing northern development plans in the past. The <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781349905737">Ord River project</a> was touted as an agricultural wonder that would put hundreds of thousands of farmers into the Kimberley. Its success lies forever just over the horizon.</p>
<p>Much closer to the present proposal is the Burdekin Falls Dam. It sits in the lower reaches of the same river earmarked for the <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-11-01/bradfield-scheme-is-moving-water-from-north-to-south-feasible/11662942">Hells Gates Dam that would feed</a> the “New Bradfield” scheme. Damming Hells Gates has been advocated since at least the 1930s and has <a href="https://www.townsvilleenterprise.com.au/news-media/news-centre/advocacy-alert-hells-gates-funding-agreement-signals-boots-on-the-ground/">new supporters</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302055/original/file-20191117-66921-zna3a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302055/original/file-20191117-66921-zna3a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302055/original/file-20191117-66921-zna3a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302055/original/file-20191117-66921-zna3a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302055/original/file-20191117-66921-zna3a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302055/original/file-20191117-66921-zna3a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302055/original/file-20191117-66921-zna3a6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The proposed site for Hells Gates Dam is on Gugu Badhun country on the Burdekin River.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dr Theresa Petray</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Back in the 1950s, damming the Burdekin was expected to generate hydro-electric power and irrigate vast swathes of farmland. After decades of political squabbling, the dam was completed in 1988. It does not generate hydro power. Although it irrigates some land downstream, the anticipated huge agricultural expansion never happened.</p>
<p>The Burdekin Falls Dam has helped the regional economy and could help to overcome the water shortages of the nearby city of Townsville. But it has not met the inflated expectations widely proffered decades earlier. The benefits that would flow from another dam further upstream are likely to be even more meagre.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/damming-northern-australia-we-need-to-learn-hard-lessons-from-the-south-53885">Damming northern Australia: we need to learn hard lessons from the south</a>
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<p>Grandiose visions of northern development have a habit of <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/8505121?selectedversion=NBD660057">failing</a>. A “New Bradfield” scheme, animated by an old pioneering ethos, is unlikely to be different. </p>
<p>Drought-affected communities would derive more benefit from sober proposals that acknowledge the past, integrate Indigenous knowledge and incorporate agricultural innovation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Patrick White receives funding from an Australian Government Postgraduate Award.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janine Gertz’s PhD Doctoral research was funded by a JCU Australian Postgraduate Award and a JCU Prestige Indigenous Research Award. Janine provides administrative support to the Gugu Badhun Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC. Gugu Badhun Aboriginal Nation is participating in a Nation-Building research project “Prerequisite conditions for Indigenous nation self-government” which is funded by an ARC Discovery Grant, led by the Jumbunna Institute for Indigenous Education and Research, University of Technology Sydney. Gugu Badhun is also a research partner on a native food project with the ARC Training Centre for Uniquely Australian Foods, University of Queensland. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Russell McGregor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The ‘New Bradfield’ scheme seeks to revive a nation-building ethos supposedly stifled by bureaucratic inertia. But there are good reasons the scheme never became a reality.Patrick White, PhD Candidate in History and Politics, James Cook UniversityRussell McGregor, Adjunct Professor of History, James Cook UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1245042019-10-15T18:59:57Z2019-10-15T18:59:57ZWe can’t drought-proof Australia, and trying is a fool’s errand<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297013/original/file-20191015-98632-dqisge.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The push to 'drought-proof' Australia is dangerous nonsense.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP Image/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is a phrase in the novel East of Eden that springs to mind every <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/new-government-authority-established-to-build-dams/11515278">time politicians speak of “drought-proofing” Australia</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>And it never failed that during the dry years the people forgot about the rich years, and during the wet years they lost all memory of the dry years. It was always that way.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>While author John Steinbeck was referring to California’s Salinas Valley, the phrase is particularly pertinent to Australia where the <a href="http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/updates/articles/a020.shtml#targetText=La%20Ni%C3%B1a%20occurs%20when%20equatorial,and%20eastern%20tropical%20Pacific%20Ocean.&targetText=As%20a%20result%2C%20heavy%20rainfall,to%20the%20north%20of%20Australia.">El Niño-Southern Oscillation</a> exerts a profound influence. Water availability varies greatly across the country, both in space and time. El Niño conditions bring droughts and devastating bushfires, while La Niña is accompanied by violent rainfall, floods and cyclones. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/recent-australian-droughts-may-be-the-worst-in-800-years-94292">Recent Australian droughts may be the worst in 800 years</a>
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<p>This variability is innate to the Australian environment. And now, climate change means that in some regions, the dry years are becoming drier and the wet years are becoming less frequent. Managing water resources under a changing climate and burgeoning population requires innovative and realistic solutions that are different to those that have worked in the past. </p>
<h2>Drought-proofing is impossible</h2>
<p>Planning for the dry years involves setting sustainable usage limits, using more than one source of water, efficiency improvements, managed aquifer recharge, water recycling and evaluation of the best usage of water resources. It does not <a href="https://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/social-affairs/australia-should-never-be-%E2%80%98drought-proofed%E2%80%99-again">involve misleading claims of drought-proofing</a> that infer we can somehow tame the unruly nature of our arid environment instead of planning and preparing for reality. </p>
<p>Unlike managing for the wet and dry periods, drought-proofing seeks to negate dry periods through infrastructure schemes such as large dams (subject to huge evaporative losses) and dubious river diversions. It fails to acknowledge the intrinsic variability of water availability in Australia, and modify our behaviour accordingly. </p>
<p>The reality is that in many parts of the country, <a href="http://www.groundwater.com.au/media/W1siZiIsIjIwMTQvMDMvMjUvMDFfNTFfMTNfMTMzX0dyb3VuZHdhdGVyX2luX0F1c3RyYWxpYV9GSU5BTF9mb3Jfd2ViLnBkZiJdXQ/Groundwater%20in%20Australia_FINAL%20for%20web.pdf">groundwater is the sole source</a> of water and the climate is <a href="http://www.bom.gov.au/water/waterinaustralia/">very dry</a>. A cornerstone of the recently launched <a href="https://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/mccormack/media-release/national-water-grid-authority-future">$100 million National Water Grid Authority</a> is the construction of more dams. But dams need rain to fill them, because without rain, all we have is empty dams. And we have enough of those already.</p>
<h2>A history of denial</h2>
<p>Just because Dorothea Mackellar wrote of “droughts and flooding rains” over 100 years ago, it doesn’t mean water management should proceed in the same vein it always has. </p>
<p>Australia has always had a <em>variable climate</em>, which changes significantly from year to year and also decade to decade. This not the same as a <a href="https://www.pacificclimatefutures.net/en/help/climate-projections/understanding-climate-variability-and-change/#targetText=Climate%20is%20the%20long%20term,trend%20in%20the%20mean%20climate.">long-term climatic trend</a>, better known as climate change. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/weather-and-climate-are-used-interchangeably-they-shouldnt-be-110129">"Weather" and "climate" are used interchangeably. They shouldn't be</a>
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<p>Climate change is making parts of Australia even drier. Rainfall in the south-eastern part of Australia is <a href="https://publications.csiro.au/rpr/download?pid=csiro:EP127070&dsid=DS3">projected to keep declining</a>. We cannot rely on blind faith that rains will fill dams once more because they have in the past.</p>
<p>Yet inevitably, during the dry years, claims that Australia can be “drought-proofed” are renewed. Deputy Prime Minister Michael McCormack <a href="https://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/mccormack/media-release/national-water-grid-authority-future">recently praised </a>the <a href="https://go-gale-com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T002&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&searchResultsType=SingleTab&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&currentPosition=3&docId=GALE%7CA202253089&docType=Essay&sort=Relevance&contentSegment=ZAHD&prodId=PPWH&contentSet=GALE%7CA202253089&searchId=R1&userGroupName=unimelb&inPS=true">Bradfield scheme</a>, an 80 year old infrastructure project intending to divert northern river flows inland. It has been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-18/fact-file-bradfield-scheme-drought-relief/11216616">so thoroughly debunked</a> on all scales, it is better described as a pipe-dream than piping scheme. It has no place in reasonable water management discourse.</p>
<p>The concept of drought-proofing harks back to the days of European settlement. Early water management techniques were more appropriate for verdant English fields than the arid plains of Australia. </p>
<p>In the early twentieth century, water resources were vigorously developed, with government-sponsored irrigation schemes and large dams constructed. During this time, little thought was given to sustainability. Instead, the goal was to stimulate inland settlement, agriculture and industry. Development was pursued despite the cost and ill-advised nature of irrigation in particular areas.</p>
<h2>Shifting long entrenched perceptions of water management</h2>
<p>All this said, irrigation certainly has its place: it supports a quarter of Australia’s agricultural output. And there are substantial efforts underway to rebalance water usage between irrigation and the environment. </p>
<p>However, acknowledgement of the relative scarcity of water in certain parts of Australia has only really occurred in the last 30 years or so. </p>
<p>Widespread droughts in the <a href="https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/lookup/1301.0Feature%20Article151988">late 1970s and early 1980s</a> highlighted the importance of effective water management and shifted long-entrenched perceptions of irrigation and development. <a href="https://www.crcpress.com/Water-Policy-in-Australia-The-Impact-of-Change-and-Uncertainty/Crase/p/book/9781933115986">Water reforms were passed</a>, mandating future water development be environmentally sustainable development, which meant, for the first time, water resource management sought a balance between economic, social and environmental needs.</p>
<p>Antiquated ideas about drought-proofing, pushed by politicians, promise much yet deliver little. They distract attention and siphon funds from realistic solutions, or actually re-evaluating where and how we use our limited water resources. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-air-above-antarctica-is-suddenly-getting-warmer-heres-what-it-means-for-australia-123080">The air above Antarctica is suddenly getting warmer – here's what it means for Australia</a>
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<p>We need practical, effective and well-considered management such as water recycling, efficiency measures and source-divestment that accounts for both shorter term climatic variability and long term changes in temperature and rainfall due to climate change. A big part of this is <a href="https://www.wentworthgroup.org/docs/Can_We_Myth_Proof_Australia.pdf">managing expectations through education</a>. </p>
<p>Attempting to drought-proof Australia is not “managing for the dry periods”, as advocates claim. It is sticking our heads in the dry, salty sand and pretending the land is cool and green and wet.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124504/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Emma Kathryn White receives funding from the Bureau of Meteorology, the Department of Land, Water, Environment and Planning, and Northern Territory Power and Water. </span></em></p>Yes, Australia naturally cycles through dry and wet periods. But that doesn’t mean we can simply build more dams and trust they’ll be filled.Emma Kathryn White, PhD Candidate, Infrastructure Engineering, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1014442018-08-27T20:11:43Z2018-08-27T20:11:43ZDrought is inevitable, Mr Joyce<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233724/original/file-20180827-75990-12btncd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Scott Morrison visiting a Queensland farm this week.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alex Ellinghausen/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Barnaby Joyce, Australia’s new <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/drought-push-started-in-cabinet-morrison">special envoy for drought assistance and recovery</a>, will have to be careful he doesn’t do more harm than good. </p>
<p>Government funding of agriculture during a drought typically falls into three categories:</p>
<ul>
<li>subsidies for farm businesses</li>
<li>income supplements for low-income farm families</li>
<li>support for better decision-making.</li>
</ul>
<p>Unfortunately, none of these government outlays induces the much-needed rainfall. But, as this article will explain, income supplements and help with decision-making are better ways of supporting sustainable farming. Subsidies are much more problematic. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/death-of-national-drought-policy-takes-us-back-to-policy-on-the-run-23289">Death of National Drought Policy takes us back to policy on the run</a>
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<h2>Drought as a fact of farming</h2>
<p>Farming is a known risky business. Seasonal conditions vary from drought to normal and above-average rainfall. Some are hit by floods and cyclones. Farmers also face outbreaks of pests and diseases. </p>
<p>Farm commodity prices are volatile. Farmers, and others along the food and fibre supply chains, are fully aware of volatile and uncertain seasons and markets. </p>
<p>People commit to farming if anticipated returns in the good times balance low or negative returns during droughts and other adverse conditions. This is consistent with the productive allocation of limited national labour and capital between agriculture and other sectors of the economy.</p>
<p>Farmers employ production and financial strategies to adapt to changing seasonal and market conditions. This includes smoothing over time the availability of funds for family consumption. Most farmers <a href="https://www.theland.com.au/story/5489716/pit-silage-saved-for-a-dry-day/">prepare for</a> and adjust to the ups and downs of farming, including droughts.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-help-drought-affected-farmers-we-need-to-support-them-in-good-times-as-well-as-bad-101184">To help drought-affected farmers, we need to support them in good times as well as bad</a>
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<p>So why a new round of government handouts for another drought? Current drought relief amounts to <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/immediate-relief-farming-families-takes-drought-relief-576-million">$576 million</a>, a figure that excludes concessional loans to farmers. Of course, drought conditions are tough, but they are not a surprise. They do, however, provide <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-05/federal-drought-relief-for-farmers/10074216">graphic material for the media</a>, and some families <a href="https://theconversation.com/farm-poverty-an-area-of-policy-aid-built-on-sands-of-ignorance-23756">fall into poverty</a>.</p>
<h2>Farm subsidies</h2>
<p>One general form of government drought assistance involves subsidies. These help pay for interest on loans, freight and fodder. Some have even <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/radio/sydney/programs/breakfast/farmer-economics/10060890">suggested subsidies through raising the prices of farm products</a>. </p>
<p>Drought subsidies have the effect of raising the average return from farming. They might be said to “privatise the profits of good seasons and subsidise some of the losses of droughts”. </p>
<p>Subsidies must be paid for, though, by higher taxes or lower government outlays affecting others. Artificially increasing the average returns to farming leads to a misallocation of limited national labour, capital and other resources from the rest of the economy to agriculture. The effect is much the same as the efficiency costs of tariffs protecting the car assembly industry.</p>
<p>Farm drought subsidies have important and unintended side effects. Knowing that subsidies will be provided during drought and other adverse conditions reduces the incentives for some farmers to adopt appropriate drought preparation and mitigation strategies. </p>
<p>Structural adjustment is a continuing feature of farming, as it is for all other industries. Increased costs of labour relative to capital equipment, as well as the scale bias of much farming technological change, favour the expansion of farm sizes over time. Drought subsidies work to hold up inevitable structural changes, including smart farmers who have planned for and adapted to drought buying out less successful operators.</p>
<p>Subsidies for farm outputs or inputs are a very blunt policy instrument to support farm families facing poverty. Direct household income measures, as discussed next, are more effective.</p>
<h2>Farm household income support</h2>
<p>Australia has long-established equity objectives of a minimum income and safety net for all citizens. Newstart is the policy for the unemployed, Age Pension for retirees, Disability Support Pension for the disabled, and so forth. </p>
<p>Because of poor decisions or bad luck, some farm households find themselves short of money to provide basic food, clothing, education and so forth for the family. The <a href="https://www.humanservices.gov.au/individuals/services/centrelink/farm-household-allowance">Farm Household Allowance</a> (FHA) is a means-tested (assets and income) government-funded safety net to counter poverty of farm households.</p>
<p>This allowance raises horizontal equity issues. Initially, the FHA rate was the same as for Newstart. In an <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/turnbull-defends-12-000-drought-relief-payments-to-farmers">August 5 policy announcement</a>, the government added additional lump-sum payments, described as a supplement. Arguably, the supplement can be interpreted as a form of farm subsidy.</p>
<p>Providing a minimum income support to the self-employed, including farmers but also many small-business people in other parts of the economy, has been a challenge. A key challenge is the difficulties of applying a means test. Why other small-business families experiencing a downturn in business income – including some who depend on the farm sector – are not eligible for an equivalent to the Farm Household Allowance remains an issue.</p>
<p>Government funding of <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/immediate-relief-farming-families-takes-drought-relief-576-million">mental health, social and other support</a> for farmers and their families adversely affected by drought can be regarded as an important social equity instrument. These programs may also be a valuable investment in society.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/farmers-experiencing-drought-related-stress-need-targeted-support-98239">Farmers experiencing drought-related stress need targeted support</a>
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<h2>Better farm business decision-making</h2>
<p>A number of programs to support better farm plans to manage droughts are funded. This includes the provision of meteorological and other data on seasonal conditions to guide decisions. </p>
<p>Hands-on education and support to individual farmers in developing more appropriate decision strategies and plans are also available. This adds to a more robust and self-sufficient farming sector.</p>
<p>To summarise, government funding for farm household incomes to avoid poverty and to improve farm decision-making make sense. Subsidies for farm inputs or outputs have undesirable longer-term resource misallocation effects, and are relatively blunt income-support measures.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-australias-current-drought-caused-by-climate-change-its-complicated-97867">Is Australia's current drought caused by climate change? It's complicated</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101444/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Freebairn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Having an envoy for drought and a prime minister keen to visit drought-affected areas puts the government under pressure to do the wrong thing.John Freebairn, Professor, Department of Economics, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/949982018-05-21T15:22:46Z2018-05-21T15:22:46ZSmall, local solutions can crack water crises: a South African case study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218627/original/file-20180511-135202-z7ui7a.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People in the HaMakuya community go without potable water for months.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Melissa McHale</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>World attention has recently been <a href="http://time.com/cape-town-south-africa-water-crisis/">focused</a> on the water crisis facing the South African city of Cape Town, a metropolis of four million people. There is obviously deep sympathy with the plight of the residents. But the drama draws attention away from an even more concerning set of issues. The main one is that many people in rural southern Africa live without any potable water at all. And many are at serious risk because of global <a href="https://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/handle/10204/7382/Archer%20van%20Garderen2_2013.pdf?sequence=3">climate change</a>.</p>
<p>Residents of the wealthy suburbs of Cape Town have been asked to reduce their consumption to less than 50 litres <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/01/africa/cape-town-water-crisis-intl/index.html">per person per day</a>, one sixth of the daily consumption of the average American. But elsewhere in village after village in sub-Saharan Africa women walk miles to scoop water from polluted ground wells for their average daily ration of less than <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/06/01/the-crushing-toll-african-women-pay-to-collect-cleaner-water/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.af62de580b5e">20 litres a day</a>.</p>
<p>We have been studying this kind of crisis in South Africa for the last <a href="https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1890/120157">two decades</a>. Our most recent work examined water quality, reliability and accessibility in rural communities living along the western edge of one of the world’s largest game reserves, South Africa’s Kruger National Park. </p>
<p>Our data, over the last seven years, reveal a very complex and desperate situation. We set out to understand more than basic water quality problems and integrated social and environmental factors into our research. To do this, we used a variety of methods to collect information about people’s experiences in the different locations they collected, stored and used water. </p>
<p>This approach provides a clear picture of the solutions needed to support people’s quality of life. In some instances, where government’s audit on <a href="https://www.green-cape.co.za/assets/Water-Sector-Desk-Content/DWS-2014-Blue-Drop-report-national-overview-part-1-of-2-2016.pdf">water services</a> found successful water service provisioning, our data found the complete opposite. </p>
<h2>A different research approach</h2>
<p>South Africa’s post-apartheid <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw_act/NWA.pdf">National Water Act</a> is one of the most advanced examples of legislation globally. It asserts that both people and the environment have constitutional rights to water. But achieving this has yet to be realised.</p>
<p>HaMakuya, a group of 21 villages nestled in the north eastern corner of South Africa, face set of common challenges. These communities remain marginalised. Their situation hasn’t improved since the end of apartheid.</p>
<p>National government surveys claim that these areas are fully provided for when it comes to water. This isn’t true. Communities are plagued by drying boreholes, broken and poorly maintained infrastructure, degraded water resources, increasing droughts, urbanisation pressures and nonfunctional local government structures.</p>
<p>After working with the HaMakuya community for 20 years, we have seen clear evidence of a long-term water crisis that’s getting worse over time. People go without a stable and potable water source for months. Sometimes they don’t even have enough water to cook staple foods <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wPoYtf5poA">like maize meal</a>. </p>
<p>It was not surprising, therefore, when community leaders asked us eight years ago to help them understand and resolve their water resource challenges. The request prompted us to try a different approach to studying the water crisis in the region. We started working with local people, including them as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-015-0334-4">active participants</a>. We also trained young people as environmental monitors to collect long-term water quality data.</p>
<p>We found that every village had a different story. For example there were high concentrations of nitrates in water in one community which posed a health hazard. Another had water that was highly saline in taste. Even villages dependent on the same water source sometimes had different challenges: while one had quality water, others suffered from E. Coli contamination.</p>
<p>This complexity poses a problem for implementing large-scale, regional solutions. But it also provides an opportunity to introduce local, positive changes that have an immediate impact. </p>
<p>What makes the need for local-level solutions even more urgent is that present problems have the maximum impact on the most vulnerable populations. For example, when water is available most of the schools in this region have water that is contaminated with E. coli.</p>
<p>But as local solutions are developed, there also need to be ways of providing feedback, and tracking potential unintended consequences. Many technological solutions have failed because specific cultural, social, and environmental factors were overlooked in trying a quick fix. </p>
<h2>A different approach</h2>
<p>Across the world a range of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0043135413008208">studies</a> on water technologies, planning, and resource challenges show that local, place-based solutions must be invested in. Our work in HaMakuya supports this increasingly important call for a different approach to water management. </p>
<p>And solutions don’t have to involve huge money investments. At the right scale, and with careful consideration of the cultural, social, environmental, and technological landscape, they can lead to sustainable and resilient communities – a hopeful future for people who have been consistently under-resourced and ill-treated.</p>
<p>Grand visions of a Utopian state in which each citizen has equal access to environmental resources are all very well, and laudable. But unless there is investment in the more modest, local complexities of maintenance, training, and village distribution, poor people will continue to suffer at the expense of the wealthier and more distant cities. </p>
<p>The Cape Town crisis has all the hallmarks of crises soon to be faced by <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378014000880">large cities</a> like <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-42982959">Mexico City</a>, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-23/melbourne-water-supply-could-be-under-threat-within-a-decade/8735400">Melbourne</a>, <a href="https://www.sentinelcolorado.com/news/ciruli-colorado-facing-growing-water-shortage/">Denver</a>, and <a href="https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/02/cape-town-running-out-of-water-drought-taps-shutoff-other-cities/">Jakarta</a>. We believe that the true political and environmental character of the immediate global emergency is better read in the dust, the creak of ancient pistons, and the meagre, saline seepage from failing wells that have come to define daily life in rural South Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94998/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa McHale receives funding from the National Science Foundation. A large team of researchers and community partners associated with the IMAGINE Program (<a href="https://imaginesouthafrica.wordpress.com/">https://imaginesouthafrica.wordpress.com/</a>) contributed to the research discussed in this article. Notably, Terrie Litzenberger, Elizabeth Nichols, and April James developed the water quality methods and Terrie led our students in implementing that effort on the ground in South Africa. Two graduate students, Scott Beck and Shawn Shiflett, have made a substantial contribution to the interdisciplinary water analysis and will be publishing our results. This work could not have been completed without the time and energy of the HaMakuya community and support provided by the Tshulu Trust.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Bunn receives funding from South Africa's National Research Foundation. He is a board member of the Tshulu Trust, and of the Nsasani Trust, both in South Africa.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Eddie Riddell receives funding from the Water Research Commission, WWF Nedbank Green Trust and the NRF.</span></em></p>Small solutions done properly can play a huge role in dealing with water scarcity.Melissa McHale, Associate Professor, Colorado State UniversityDavid Bunn, Senior Research Scientist, Natural Resource Ecology Laboratory, Colorado State UniversityEddie Riddell, Research Associate, University of KwaZulu-NatalLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/940452018-04-03T14:58:01Z2018-04-03T14:58:01ZFive key lessons other cities can learn from Cape Town’s water crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/212651/original/file-20180329-189824-uwlzk5.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Berg River Dam on 7 March 2018 about 48% full. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author supplied</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-03-28-day-zero-averted-or-only-postponed-water-trading-the-way-to-go/#.WrzPoC5ubIU">Postponing Day Zero</a> in Cape Town for 2018 comes as no surprise. There was no sense to it once the day had been pushed into the winter rainfall period. It also didn’t make sense for the Western Cape and Cape Town governments to continue drafting detailed <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-reveal-day-zero-safety-plans-20180228">logistical plans</a> for points of water distribution in the event that taps were turned off across the city. </p>
<p>But Cape Town’s water supplies remain at high risk because the long-term predictions for rainfall in the south-western Cape remain uncertain. Dam levels continue to fall while people are struggling to achieve the city’s target of 450 million litres per day. And yields from new water schemes will only be known in the coming months and next year.</p>
<p>The general perception is that the onset of climate change would be slow and measured. This would afford authorities the time to intervene with considered plans. But climate change is a disrupter and takes no prisoners. Over the past three years, Cape Town and the surrounding regions has experienced successive years of well <a href="https://qz.com/1110143/cape-town-drought-and-water-shortage-in-south-africa-is-now-a-disaste/">below average rainfall</a>. The experience is changing the way people think about water and how it is managed. </p>
<p>There are five key lessons that have been learnt so far.</p>
<p><strong>1. Adaptation to climate change</strong></p>
<p>The big lesson is being better prepared to deal with a prolonged drought. Cape Town was, and continues to be, under prepared. <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/photos-cape-towns-water-crisis/">Over 95%</a> of the city’s water comes from surface water dams. After three years of below average rainfall, the lowest on record, the dams are now running on empty. </p>
<p>Sixty years ago the Australian city of Perth was in a similar position with most of its water supply from dams. The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17887572">Australian Big Dry</a> drought changed everything. Over 50% of their water supply comes from desalination plants and 40% from groundwater.</p>
<p>A water resilient city should be capable of reducing risk by diversifying water sources to include supplies from groundwater, storm water, reused water, treated effluent and desalination. Resilient, water sensitive cities also integrate the whole urban water cycle into its water resource management system. This means, for example, being smarter about capturing rainfall across the city, in storing storm water underground, and in reusing treated effluent for a variety of purposes not necessarily for drinking purposes. </p>
<p>Cities are the new catchments. There should be no reason to hesitate on implementing these actions. They won’t only climate proof the city, they’ll also make them healthier and more sustainable places to live.</p>
<p><strong>2. Cities lead</strong></p>
<p>National government can’t be expected to lead cities in dealing with water scarcity and drought. This is the experience of many cities dealing with water scarcity. Local governments are in a better position to take decisive action and act at a local scale where they can engage citizens, communities and businesses in averting the water crisis. National governments are slow to intervene, and when they do their actions are often not at the right scale or timely enough. </p>
<p>Cities need more autonomy to act decisively, although proactive, inter-governmental support and cooperation is both helpful and necessary. </p>
<p><strong>3. Measure more, manage better</strong></p>
<p>‘You can’t manage what you don’t measure’ should be the rallying cry for improving the quality of data and analysis needed to support and inform decisions. A city without reliable data will struggle to implement strategic plans and priorities. A good example is Melbourne, one of the first cities in the world to implement digital water metering <a href="https://www.yvw.com.au/help-advice/water-meters/digital-metering-joint-program">throughout the city</a>. </p>
<p>Measuring and monitoring is essential to understand water demand and flows. But not all data are useful and more data adds little value in the absence of robust analytical and reporting systems.</p>
<p><strong>4. Mixed messages</strong></p>
<p>Public responses to communication and messaging put out by local authorities is often unpredictable. And social media is rapid and unrelenting in its criticism of messages. Politicians and officials often don’t correct these perceptions which can result in misinformation being shared. The City of Cape Town’s public awareness website has been recognised worldwide– for example by the <a href="https://www.awwa.org/">American Water Works Association</a> – as one of the best. But hard evidence does little to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/awwa.1027">change public opinion.</a></p>
<p>What citizens really want to know is what actions are being taken to alleviate the crisis and relieve the risk. In the case of Cape Town the city has been reporting on the state of the water by supplying information on <a href="https://theconversation.com/nudging-the-city-and-residents-of-cape-town-to-save-water-92192">dam levels, water demand, models and water quality</a>. What it hasn’t done well enough is contain the level of misinformation shared in the public domain and media. </p>
<p><strong>5. Public trust</strong></p>
<p>Above all, public trust is key to encouraging water saving and helping to establish confidence in managing the crisis. Trust is strengthened by a combination of factors. These include honest, credible messaging when progress towards averting the crisis is demonstrated and understood, and when ordinary citizens, communities and businesses are engaged in making a meaningful contribution. Trust gains momentum when citizen voices are heard and when politicians and officials respond accordingly. </p>
<p>Large cities that have experienced ongoing water crises, such as Sao Paulo, are often criticised for failing to establish <a href="https://theconversation.com/sao-paulo-water-crisis-shows-the-failure-of-public-private-partnerships-39483">public-private agreements and robust partnerships</a></p>
<h2>Planning for uncertainty</h2>
<p>How cities anticipate and prepare to adapt to drought conditions depends on factors such as their financial, technical and human capital.</p>
<p>But if cities are going to become more resilient and responsive to climate change then a search for new water supplies will be necessary. It is also essential to establish new forms of governance. Innovative approaches need to be explored because we might not yet know what these should look like. The future is uncertain, but there is a lot that can be done right now and we need to learn some hard lessons.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94045/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Winter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The drought in Cape Town has taught the city some valuable lessons.Kevin Winter, Senior Lecturer in Environmental & Geographical Science, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/920552018-02-20T10:00:51Z2018-02-20T10:00:51ZDay Zero is meant to cut Cape Town’s water use: what is it, and is it working?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/207069/original/file-20180220-116327-17xa2vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">If Cape Town reaches Day Zero, taps will be closed and people will have to go to collection points for 25 litres of water.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The City of Cape Town has introduced the idea of Day Zero to focus everyone’s attention on managing water consumption as tightly as possible by cajoling water consumers into reducing usage. Day Zero is when most of the city’s taps <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-dayzero-12801609">will be switched off</a> – literally. </p>
<p>The consequences of reaching this point will be far reaching. For one, it will mean residents will have to stand in line to collect 25 litres of water per person per day. The water will be sourced from the remaining supplies that are left in the dams. </p>
<p>Day Zero isn’t a fixed target. The city moved it out from <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2018/02/20/day-zero-pushed-back-to-9-july">April 12 to July 9</a>. The reason for this is that a number of factors affect the date. These include how much residents are reducing their demand. There are already signs that water users are saving more. The goal is to achieve an average daily demand of less than 450 million litres which equates to about 50 litres per person per day. The city isn’t there yet, but for the first time figures are consistently closer <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/cape-town-isues-first-tender-to-produce-extra-500ml-of-water-20170817">to 500 million litre per day</a>.</p>
<p>The City of Cape Town describes Day Zero as the point at which the <a href="http://www.capetown.gov.za/departments/Disaster%20Risk%20Management%20Centre">Disaster Risk Management Centre</a> introduces phase 2 of its plan. Phase 2 will be triggered when the city’s big six dams supplying Cape Town reach a storage level of 13.5%. This leaves just enough water to supply critical services. This will include sufficient water to distribute to collection sites across the city. </p>
<p>Day Zero is being used in a desperate bid to avoid the final crisis stage – Phase 3 – when there is no longer any surface water available to supply the city. At that point, bottled water that’s been collected from groundwater, springs, and from whatever desalination plants can contribute will be distributed. Phase 3 will mark the point of complete failure.</p>
<h2>What happens on Day Zero</h2>
<p>Day Zero will be the start of active water rationing. As far as possible, drinking water will continue to be supplied to some critical areas. These will include strategic commercial areas, high-density areas with significant risk of increased waterborne disease such as informal settlements, and critical services like hospitals.</p>
<p>But water will be cut off to residential taps and large numbers of households and businesses will be unable to access drinking water in their homes and places of work. People will be forced to go to collection sites across the city to fetch water. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, city authorities intend to maintain sewerage systems with minimal flow by injecting water into the pipelines. It also means that a portion of water collected from the distribution points will have to be used, for example, to flush toilets.</p>
<p>In Phase 2 the plan is to roll out distribution points across the city. This will be impractical and hugely challenging at the very least. Site selection is unlikely to be evenly distributed across the city because distribution sites will depend on existing water pipelines.</p>
<h2>Avoiding Day Zero</h2>
<p>Cape Town is using a relatively simple model to manage water in an effort to move circumstances from a critical zone, and potential failure, to a position where the risk of running out of water is greatly reduced. </p>
<p>Each week the city updates its model to show progress <a href="http://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/City%20research%20reports%20and%20review/damlevels.pdf">in avoiding Day Zero</a>. </p>
<p>Tough water restrictions, plus punitive tariffs, will drive down water demand, helping to postpone Day Zero – or even leading to it being cancelled. Reduced demand is one way of postponing Day Zero. But there are other factors too.</p>
<p>The agricultural sector is already using 60% less water than what’s usually allocated to it. Some irrigation boards have closed off their water supply and farmers are reducing the amount they draw from the <a href="https://memeburn.com/2018/02/cape-town-dams-agriculture-usage/">Western Cape Water Supply System</a>.</p>
<p>Another factor is rainfall. But that’s unpredictable. In April 2005 a thunderstorm broke the drought and <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/analysis-this-water-crisis-wont-be-cape-towns-last-20170218">provided some relief</a>. </p>
<p>A final factor is that new projects will also bring additional water from tapping into the aquifers and from desalination. </p>
<h2>Painful months ahead</h2>
<p>There are some painful months ahead for Capetonians. For now, Day Zero remains a useful tool in the sense that it’s a target to be avoided. </p>
<p>There are encouraging signs suggesting that the city will get through this difficult period. For now, the city’s water risk model is showing how Day Zero is being managed. This is creating greater trust and confidence in the technical capacity of water managers along with the collective public and private efforts to reduce demand and avoid disaster. </p>
<p>Day Zero is not, as some have suggested, a hoax. It is a vital concept that is helping to strengthen the city’s ability in managing the water crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92055/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Winter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Day Zero will be the start of active water rationing when taps will be cut off and people will have to go to collection sites.Kevin Winter, Senior Lecturer in Environmental & Geographical Science, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/881912017-12-12T14:57:30Z2017-12-12T14:57:30ZCape Town’s water crisis: driven by politics more than drought<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198783/original/file-20171212-9383-1yaltbe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Six major dams make up 99.6% of the volume of water in Cape Town's water supply.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Cape Town, South Africa’s <a href="http://cs2016.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=270">second most populous city</a>, is hurtling towards “Day Zero”: <a href="http://www.capetown.gov.za/Media-and-news/City%20launches%20new%20weekly%20water%20dashboard%20to%20track%20supply,%20savings%20and%20Day%20Zero">the day taps run dry</a>. This is expected in March.</p>
<p>Cape Town is quite used to surviving dry years. Water restrictions get it through and then dams refill, thanks to the wet years that <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/whats-causing-cape-towns-water-crisis/">usually follow</a>.</p>
<p>But this time it’s different. Never in recorded history has Cape Town encountered a drought of such severity for <a href="http://www.csag.uct.ac.za/2017/08/28/how-severe-is-this-drought-really/">three consecutive years</a>.</p>
<p>One of the biggest debates is whether local government is handling the crisis effectively. Investigating this question exposes politics, not rainfall, at the heart of the problem.</p>
<p>The Western Cape is the only province in the country run by the official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance. South Africa’s ruling African National Congress runs <a href="http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Results/2014-National-and-Provincial-Elections--National-results/">the rest</a>. This means that the relationship between national government and the Western Cape is <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/03/02/da-and-anc-trade-blows-over-western-cape-water-crisis">complicated</a>, as the water crisis shows.</p>
<p>Two tiers of governance – the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.WiZdjNR94sh">Western Cape province</a> and the <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.WiZdjNR94sh">City of Cape Town</a> – went above and beyond what was required to prepare for drought. The system failed, however, at the level of national government.</p>
<p>Wasteful expenditure in the <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-times/20171114/281706909968579">national Department of Water and Sanitation</a>, erroneous <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Projects/RS_WC_WSS/Docs/ATSG%2010/ATSG%20No10_20150712%20Presentation.pdf">water allocations to agriculture</a> and a failure to acknowledge or respond to provincial and municipal <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.Wg7NAE3NtxQ">calls for help</a> obstructed timely interventions.</p>
<p>National government’s numerous spanners jammed up the works of a system that could have managed the crisis quite effectively.</p>
<h2>The Western Cape’s water situation</h2>
<p>Six major dams make up 99.6% of the volume of water in the <a href="https://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/City%20research%20reports%20and%20review/damlevels.pdf">Western Cape Water Supply System</a>.</p>
<p>Cape Town’s strategy for handling droughts is based on a warning system that kicks in when dam levels are lower than normal for a particular <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237212850_Analysis_of_water_savings_A_case_study_during_the_200405_water_restrictions_in_Cape_Town">time of year</a>. About once every ten years, there is extremely low rainfall around the major Theewaterskloof Dam. The last dam level <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/whats-causing-cape-towns-water-crisis/">scare</a> was in 2004-2005.</p>
<p>In 2007, the national Department of Water and Sanitation issued a warning about Cape Town’s water supply, saying the city would need new water sources <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Projects/RS_WC_WSS/Docs/Summary%20Report.pdf">by 2015</a>. </p>
<p>The deadline was based on normal rainfall and water demand trends. Unusually dry winters and higher water consumption could shorten this deadline considerably.</p>
<p>The city took the warning seriously and acted quickly. It implemented a water demand management strategy involving water meter replacements, pressure management, leak detection and <a href="http://www.c40.org/awards/2015-awards/profiles">free plumbing repairs for indigent households</a>.</p>
<p>The strategy was so effective that the city met its 2015-2016 water saving target <a href="https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=339119017068085105071003087120111006099039071063064018087114113025127091088103003098102118004001052027117107105114001009123077109094092045027125066114090067114105009082045078084092011116116121091123078066089019120108005094018118117012065098125090118&EXT=pdf">three years early</a>. This pushed the deadline back to <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Projects/RS_WC_WSS/Docs/Minutes/SSC%20No10%2028%20August%202013%20Minutes%20Final.pdf">2019</a>, based on normal rainfall and normal water use.</p>
<p>Following a wet <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/whats-causing-cape-towns-water-crisis/">2013-2014</a>, the South African Weather Service estimated that Cape Town’s 2014-2016 rainfall would be only <a href="https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=339119017068085105071003087120111006099039071063064018087114113025127091088103003098102118004001052027117107105114001009123077109094092045027125066114090067114105009082045078084092011116116121091123078066089019120108005094018118117012065098125090118&EXT=pdf">slightly lower than normal</a>, conforming to weather patterns recorded <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/whats-causing-cape-towns-water-crisis/">since 1976</a>.</p>
<p>Based on the information available to the city, it was on target for implementing the first water augmentation project by 2019: increasing water supply to the <a href="https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=339119017068085105071003087120111006099039071063064018087114113025127091088103003098102118004001052027117107105114001009123077109094092045027125066114090067114105009082045078084092011116116121091123078066089019120108005094018118117012065098125090118&EXT=pdf">Voëlvlei dam</a>. Then disaster struck: a drought more severe than anything in Cape Town’s history.</p>
<h2>Bad decisions</h2>
<p>Provinces don’t have the power to make water allocations to agriculture. This is done by the <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw_act/NWA.pdf">national government</a>.</p>
<p>In 2015, the city of Cape Town was allocated <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Projects/RS_WC_WSS/Docs/ATSG%2010/ATSG%20No10_20150712%20Presentation.pdf">60% of the water</a> from the Western Cape’s water supply system. Almost all of the rest went to <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Projects/RS_WC_WSS/Docs/ATSG%2010/ATSG%20No10_20150712%20Presentation.pdf">agriculture</a>, particularly long-term crops like fruit and wine as well as livestock. </p>
<p>The drought began to take its toll on provincial dam levels. Yet the national Department of Water and Sanitation took no action to <a href="https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=339119017068085105071003087120111006099039071063064018087114113025127091088103003098102118004001052027117107105114001009123077109094092045027125066114090067114105009082045078084092011116116121091123078066089019120108005094018118117012065098125090118&EXT=pdf">curtail agricultural water use</a> in 2015/2016. </p>
<p>There is evidence that the department’s failure went even further: that it allocated <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Projects/RS_WC_WSS/Docs/ATSG%2010/ATSG%20No10_20150712%20Presentation.pdf">too much water to agriculture</a> in the Western Cape. This pushed demand for water beyond the capacity of the supply system and consumed Cape Town’s safety buffer of <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Projects/RS_WC_WSS/Docs/ATSG%2010/ATSG%20No10_20150712%20Presentation.pdf">28 thousand megaliters</a>. </p>
<p>Cape Town shows some of the best water saving levels <a href="https://theconversation.com/cape-town-water-crisis-7-myths-that-must-be-bust-86582">in the world</a>. But its supply dams are being hit by national government’s bungled water allocations to agriculture.</p>
<h2>Calls for help</h2>
<p>In response to low winter rainfalls in 2015, provincial government took pre-emptive action and applied to national government for R35 million to increase water supplies by drilling boreholes and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.WiZdjNR94sh">recycling water</a>. </p>
<p>But national government <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.Wg7NAE3NtxQ">rejected the request</a>, possibly because dams were <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.WiZdjNR94sh">still 75% full</a>. </p>
<p>The following year, national government agreed to recognise only five of the 30 Western Cape municipalities as <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.WizM2tR97UJ">drought disaster areas</a>. (Significantly Cape Town was <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.WhJ8hk3NtxQ">not included</a>.) But by October 2017, national government had still not released <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.Wg7NAE3NtxQ">the promised funds</a>.</p>
<p>The Cape Town Mayor appealed directly to the Department of Water and Sanitation for disaster relief funding. But this was <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.WifzVhDpXoY">rejected</a> on the grounds that Cape Town was <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2017-10-30-the-cape-water-crisis-faqs-and-honest-answers/#.Wg7NAE3NtxQ">“not yet at crisis level”</a>.</p>
<h2>The cause of the crisis</h2>
<p>The civil society group, <a href="http://emg.org.za/images/downloads/water_cl_ch/SAWC_State-of-DWS-Report.pdf">South African Water Caucus</a>, reveals that national government’s reluctance to release drought relief funding stemmed from spiralling <a href="http://emg.org.za/news/213-damning-report-reveals-department-of-water-and-sanitation-in-crisis-and-sa-s-water-security-under-serious-threat">debt, mismanagement and corruption</a> in the national Department of Water and Sanitation.</p>
<p>This claim is supported by the Auditor General, which attributes “irregular and
fruitless and wasteful expenditure” to the department exceeding its 2016-2017 budget by <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-times/20171114/281706909968579">R110.8 million</a>.</p>
<p>The department has no funding allocated to drought relief in <a href="http://emg.org.za/images/downloads/water_cl_ch/SAWC_State-of-DWS-Report.pdf">the Western Cape</a> next year. Again, provincial government will have to <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/cape-argus/20171023/281578060905658">foot the bill</a>.</p>
<p>Had systems in national government been running smoothly, Cape Town’s water crisis could have been mitigated. Appropriate water allocations would have made more water available to Cape Town. And with timely responses to disaster declarations, water augmentation infrastructure could have been up and running already.</p>
<p>Cape Town teaches us that water crises are rarely a matter of rainfall. Understanding disasters like droughts involves seeing the issue from many different perspectives, including politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88191/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David W. Olivier does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The water crisis in South Africa’s Cape Town teaches us there’s more at play than just rainfall. Disasters like droughts means the issue must be seen from many different perspectives, like politics.David W. Olivier, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Global Change Institute, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/818452017-08-07T16:01:27Z2017-08-07T16:01:27ZWhat’s driving Cape Town’s water insecurity, and what can be done about it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/181005/original/file-20170804-27491-1wb4fh6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cape Town's main storage dam, the Theewaterskloof in May 2017 with 9% of water left in storage.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kevin Winter</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In pre-colonial times the Khoisan called Cape Town, <em>//Hui !Gaeb</em>, the place “where clouds gather” and <em>Camissa</em> “the place of sweet waters”. The future of the city will be shaped by water as it was in the past. But far more attention will need to be paid to the drivers and early warning signs.</p>
<p>The city has been experiencing well below average rainfall over the last two-and-a-half years resulting in limited recharge of its main storage dams. The Western Cape region has been <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/western-cape-declared-disaster-zone-over-drought-20170522">declared a disaster area</a> amid a prolonged drought. </p>
<p>Rainfall over the next six weeks will be crucial. Cape Town has a Mediterranean climate with rains falling in the winter months. If there are no major thunderstorms and no significant interventions to bolster supplies from alternate sources such as local aquifers, treated effluent or desalination, then the city could run out of water by the end of year, or in early 2018.</p>
<p>Cape Town is almost entirely dependent on surface water from six main storage dams. Despite population growth and increased demand for water, it has successfully used water demand management over the past 17 years to conserve water by fixing leaks, reducing water pressures, educating users and restricting outdoor water use. But on their own these steps are unlikely to be adequate to avert “day zero”. Alternate water supplies need to be added.</p>
<p>There are two things that Cape Town needs to get right: firstly, it must improve its early warning systems. That is easier said than done. The current drought arrived at a speed and without a confident warning from the scientific community. And, secondly, it must diversify its water supply and become less reliant on surface water supplies.</p>
<h2>Early warning systems are not enough</h2>
<p>Early warning signs of a pending drought in 2017 were not clear or loud enough to <a href="https://africacheck.org/2016/02/03/frequently-asked-questions-about-south-africas-drought/">prompt timely actions</a>. As a result, the city was caught relatively unaware. Perhaps the success of the water demand programme created a false sense of security. </p>
<p>Citizens, businesses, officials and politicians responded slowly to early warnings about potential shortages. This is for a number of reasons. Water is taken for granted; there are too many confusing messages about how to manage water; and there is general apathy to adapt to water scarcity because it doesn’t seem to be a priority until it’s in short supply.</p>
<p>Lessons from the 1996 to mid-2010 <a href="http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/updates/articles/a010-southern-rainfall-decline.shtml">Australian Millennial Drought</a> show that threat of drought was clearly understood following several severe droughts. Despite the experience, central government was only able to act once the risk became extreme. But then it acted swiftly, investing heavily in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-california-can-learn-from-australias-15-year-millennium-drought-55300">new technologies and infrastructure</a>.</p>
<p>This meant substantial increases in the unit cost of water. But Australians understood, and accepted them. </p>
<p>Australians also learnt that there are no quick fixes. They are still working on new interventions and education 10 years after the drought ended.</p>
<p>The City of Cape Town is following a similar trend by investigating new technologies. But these will take time to implement and deliver water in sufficient volume to rescue the city from disaster. In the meantime, saving water is the only game in town in the hope that it will buy the city sufficient time until the next winter rainfall in 2018. </p>
<h2>What should be done?</h2>
<p>Drivers of water resources are like the cogs in a mechanical system. They turn slowly – some more so than others. Often they fail to attract political will or financial attention because water management is competing with other priorities and demands. </p>
<p>The immediate imperative is to ensure that Cape Town has sufficient water to serve 4 million people with a collective demand of at least 500 million <a href="http://www.sapeople.com/2017/07/04/cape-town-warned-reduce-water-consumption/">litres per day</a>. It will involve significant investment in alternative water supplies like stormwater, groundwater, seawater or treated wastewater for non-potable use. </p>
<p>But investment to alleviate the crisis must be carefully managed. Emergency spending can restart further crises which in turn could lead to installing new technologies that can’t be used because they are inappropriate or not affordable.</p>
<p>The long term plans need to focus on “climate proofing” the city to ensure that it becomes a water sensitive city. These plans should include treating the city as a catchment where water is collected naturally. Water should be captured and stored in rain tanks, detention ponds, in recharged groundwater and floodplains.</p>
<p>Plans should also include bringing new life to the city’s waterways and regenerating natural systems. This is about rethinking the value of springs, rivers and streams. These blue and green corridors are water sources as well as valuable in <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-016-1596-2">reducing urban temperatures.</a></p>
<p>The city must ensure it has proper plans in place that anticipate future events, such as prolonged changes in weather patterns, so that it can respond quickly. This must include being able to unlock investments and establishing private and government partnerships. </p>
<p>In addition, this drought is setting the conditions for the “new normal” in which citizens will need to become skilled at adapting to a sustainable threshold of water use.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81845/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kevin Winter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Early warning signs of a pending drought are difficult to recognise but cities will have to be better prepared for prolonged changes in weather patterns, so that it can respond quickly.Kevin Winter, Senior Lecturer in Environmental & Geographical Science, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/792812017-07-16T10:20:30Z2017-07-16T10:20:30ZWhat Cape Town can learn from Windhoek on surviving droughts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178048/original/file-20170713-19675-1z2fza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Cape Town is experiencing the worst drought in 100 years.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.730268">Human population growth</a>, <a href="http://www.geography.learnontheinternet.co.uk/topics/urbanisation.html">urbanisation</a>, and <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/">climate change</a> are all changing the world. To adapt, attitudes and behaviour <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1303-0">must change</a> and unsustainable attitudes and behaviours must shift. In addition, the social and political will to <a href="http://www.futurelens.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Changing-Cultural-Values.pdf">implement technological solutions</a> must increase. Without these changes the world will continue to be vulnerable to the impact of climate change and the over-use of limited resources like water.</p>
<p>Populations in cities are growing, putting pressure on resources like water. This is likely to increase as climate change leads to more <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.289.5477.284">frequent and extreme droughts</a>, particularly in southern Africa.</p>
<p>For decades Namibia’s capital city, Windhoek, has faced serious challenges providing water for its citizens. Water is a precious commodity in the city which gets a mean annual rainfall of a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.desal.2005.04.104">meagre 360mm</a>. For comparison, Los Angeles receives <a href="https://www.currentresults.com/Weather/California/Places/los-angeles-weather-averages.php">about 380mm every year.</a>. In addition, evaporation levels are high and the closest perennial river, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.desal.2005.04.104">the Orange river</a>, is 750 kilometres away. And the city’s population <a href="http://cms.my.na/assets/documents/p19dmn58guram30ttun89rdrp1.pdf">has grown</a>.</p>
<p>Even though they have very different weather patterns, there’s a lot a city like Cape Town, which is experiencing the worst <a href="https://theconversation.com/water-shortages-in-cape-town-are-here-to-stay-what-the-city-can-learn-from-others-80519">drought in 100 years</a>, can learn from Windhoek and how the city has conquered multiple water crises. </p>
<p>Windhoek, which is dry and gets a summer rainfall, has proved that technology can come to the rescue. But technology alone is not the solution. Water management has historically been engineer based with a focus on technical solutions. A change in culture around perceptions of water use formed a major part of Windhoek’s efforts. And learning from others can help <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.08.007">to save water</a>.</p>
<h2>Lessons from Windhoek</h2>
<p>Cape Town has very different weather patterns to Windhoek. The city has a Mediterranean climate with wet winters and warm dry summers. It usually gets over 500mm per annum, has a lower evaporation rate and has a number of rivers within a 150km radius of the city. These include the Breede, Olifants and Berg rivers.</p>
<p>Cape Town’s current water crisis follows two consecutive years of low rainfall in catchment areas. This has been in conjunction with an increase in the size of the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=city-of-cape-town-municipality">city’s population</a>.</p>
<p>Even though the cities have different characteristics, Cape Town should consider the actions taken by Windhoek which stretch back over the last 50 years.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178049/original/file-20170713-18558-1cngyzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178049/original/file-20170713-18558-1cngyzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178049/original/file-20170713-18558-1cngyzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178049/original/file-20170713-18558-1cngyzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178049/original/file-20170713-18558-1cngyzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=379&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178049/original/file-20170713-18558-1cngyzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178049/original/file-20170713-18558-1cngyzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/178049/original/file-20170713-18558-1cngyzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=477&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Namibia has suffered a succession of droughts over the past 40 years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Namibia has suffered a succession of droughts over the past 40 years. But by the time of a major drought in 1996 the city had built three reservoirs and a waste-water reuse plant. On top of this water supply regulations were being strictly enforced. These included:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>A public awareness and education campaign.</p></li>
<li><p>Water control officers and meter readers actively reducing wastage on private properties and enforcing watering times, the covering of pools and water saving equipment like low flow showers.</p></li>
<li><p>Fixing leaks and the reduction of water use on municipal gardens.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>These interventions had lasting effects. After the drought, residents reduced their garden sizes and changed garden types and irrigation methods. There was also a move to build houses in new suburbs that had smaller gardens. Changes were also made to industrial policy: no new development of water intensive industries like <a href="http://www.sustainabilityinstitute.net/si-library/50-archive-categories/mphil-theses/1915-urban-water-security-in-the-city-of-windhoek">Coca-Cola was allowed</a>.</p>
<p>During the 1990s there was an increase in the capacity of the <a href="http://www.wabag.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Water-management-in-Windhoek-2007.pdf">waste-water reuse plant</a> and consideration was given to recharging Windhoek’s <a href="http://www.wabag.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Water-management-in-Windhoek-2007.pdf">aquifer</a>. Storing water underground was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.desal.2005.04.104">an attractive option</a>. More water was evaporating from water reservoirs than was being used by the city.</p>
<p>By 2002, the new Goreangab wastewater treatment plant was completed with the aim of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.desal.2005.04.104">providing potable water</a>. By 2004, four boreholes were equipped for aquifer recharge with treated surface water – a process of pumping treated water from above ground <a href="http://sadc-gmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Booklet_GMI_24022017.pdf">into the aquifer.</a></p>
<p>But in 2016 water storage levels became very low again and immediate action needed to be taken. Severe water restrictions were imposed on residents and industry’s like Coca-Cola stopped production. Abattoirs had to cut down on production and there were job losses <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/jul/13/namibia-drought-coca-cola-meat-construction-industry-water-crisis-climate-change">in the construction industry.</a></p>
<p>The City of Windhoek activated its <a href="http://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/18_DB_WATER_FINAL_WEB1.pdf">drought management plan</a> which included: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>setting increasing water saving targets,</p></li>
<li><p>a progressive increase in tariffs,</p></li>
<li><p>cutting off the water supply to big users, and</p></li>
<li><p>rapidly implementing abstraction from the aquifer.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>On top of this the country’s <a href="http://www.gov.na/documents/10181/264466/HPP+page+70-71.pdf/bc958f46-8f06-4c48-9307-773f242c9338">Prosperity Plan</a> for 2016 prioritised the development of water infrastructure. In particular, recharging Windhoek’s aquifer and seawater desalinisation were identified as areas for immediate action.</p>
<p>Cape Town also has water saving goals and water restrictions <a href="https://issuu.com/glen.t/docs/imiesa_may_2017">plans</a>. These include pumping water out of aquifers, constructing desalinisation plants and building more water treatment capabilities. </p>
<p>The proposed plans are in line with actions that have been successful in providing water to Windhoek.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>Windhoek hasn’t always got it right. Despite attempted public awareness and education campaigns, a major criticism has been the city’s failure to sustain a <a href="http://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/18_DB_WATER_FINAL_WEB1.pdf">public awareness and communication campaign</a> – particularly when there isn’t a perceived water crisis.</p>
<p>This has meant that targets for water use haven’t always been met. There’s a lesson in this for Cape Town. The fact that there’s been a slow response by residents to reducing their water use could mean that more communication, awareness and education is needed.</p>
<p>People won’t save water unless they perceive the <a href="http://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/18_DB_WATER_FINAL_WEB1.pdf">need to do so</a>. In Windhoek, about 60% of the water used is used by private households. Around 50% of this <a href="http://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/18_DB_WATER_FINAL_WEB1.pdf">is used for gardens.</a> This means that changes in household consumption can play a major role in water saving. </p>
<p>Other steps that can be taken include increasing awareness by teaching water conservation in schools. In times of crisis, Windhoek is a good example of how raising awareness can play an important role in coping with water scarcity. Cape Town needs to follow suit.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79281/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dian Spear receives funding from UK's Department for International Development (DFID), Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and South Africa's Department of Science and Technology.</span></em></p>Windhoek can teach Cape Town on dealing with drought. Technology alone is not enough.Dian Spear, Southern Africa lead, Adaptation at Scale in Semi-Arid Regions, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/794412017-07-03T14:54:26Z2017-07-03T14:54:26ZCape Town needs a new approach to manage water<p>Cape Town, located in South Africa’s Western Cape, is facing one of its worst droughts <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40002770">in over a century</a>. The city, and southern Africa more broadly, have been experiencing significant water shortages for the last two years that were <a href="https://theconversation.com/el-nino-threatens-southern-africa-with-yet-another-drought-50491">not entirely unforeseen</a>. </p>
<p>Since 2001, Cape Town has had a <a href="http://greencape.co.za/assets/Sector-files/water/Water-conservation-and-demand-management-WCDM/CoCT-Long-term-water-conservation-and-water-demand-management-strategy-2007.pdf">water conservation and demand management policy</a> to reduce the city’s water demand. These efforts have kept overall water demand relatively stable until 2014, when demand started to rise. Due to a combination of <a href="http://www.dwa.gov.za/Hydrology/Provincial%20Rain/Default.aspx">lower rainfall in the winter of 2016</a> and a relatively slow initial governance response to the drought, the city officially declared a <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/bolander/news/city-of-cape-town-declares-water-crisis-9316276">water crisis</a> this year. </p>
<p>In early April, Cape Town was down to its last <a href="http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/100-days-of-water-left-in-cape-town-dams-restrictions-to-be-tightened-20170403">100 days of water</a>. The water <a href="http://www.capetown.gov.za/Family%20and%20home/residential-utility-services/residential-water-and-sanitation-services/this-weeks-dam-levels">levels</a> in the dams that supply the city had fallen to 20% of their capacity. In response, the city imposed <a href="http://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/Procedures%2c%20guidelines%20and%20regulations/Water%20Restrictions%20Guidelines.pdf">level four water restrictions</a>. These include stricter limits on residential water use and strongly recommend a limit of 100 litres per person per day. They also include a ban on irrigation, and a <a href="http://resource.capetown.gov.za/documentcentre/Documents/Procedures%2c%20guidelines%20and%20regulations/Water%20Restrictions%20Guidelines.pdf">350 litres per day cap</a> on the free basic water allocation for impoverished households, regardless of household size. </p>
<p>More recently, the Mayor of Cape Town <a href="https://www.westerncape.gov.za/eadp/news/statement-mayor-de-lille-water-resilience-heightened-approach-avoiding-water-shortages-and">announced</a> the preparation of a new “Water Resilience plan” to address the future of the city’s water. The details of the plan have not yet been publicly announced, however the mayor <a href="http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/opinion/de-lille-building-climate-resilient-cities-8730287">highlighted</a> that because of climate change, the city should shift towards water sensitive planning. This would involve:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>managing all urban water (stormwater, groundwater, rivers and treated wastewater effluent) in an integrated way.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The city is considering <a href="http://edges.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2017/06/The-Future-of-Drought-Management-for-Cape-Town-Summary-for-Policy-Makers.pdf">stormwater harvesting and groundwater storage</a> as potential longer term solutions. They have been shown to address <a href="https://phys.org/news/2015-05-stormwater-cities-dont-flush-rainwater.html">drought risk and improve resilience</a>. </p>
<p>Building resilience in the city’s water sector will also require addressing climate change, drought, and flooding in the winter seasons. Experts at the University of Cape Town have promoted the implementation of a <a href="http://wsud.co.za">Water Sensitive Urban Design</a> that offers ways to build resilience to various risks. This approach involves various interventions at the city scale that use the water that flows through the city more efficiently. This includes focusing on sustainable management and use of stormwater. This approach has been successfully applied in others contexts, such as <a href="https://www.melbournewater.com.au/Planning-and-building/Stormwater-management/WSUD-intro/Pages/default.aspx">Australia</a>. </p>
<p>Given that Cape Town is currently facing significant water shortages and can expect <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022169415003789">more frequent droughts</a> in the future, the time is ripe for more carefully planned long term interventions. </p>
<h2>Building a water resilient city</h2>
<p>There is no established way to build resilience in the water sector, but a few ideas have been proposed.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>To build water-related resilience a city needs flexible institutions that can respond quickly and proactively to changes. </p></li>
<li><p>Breaking down the silos that isolate water-related and other government departments, such as spatial planning and disaster risk management, community organisations and civil society, to facilitate more inclusive and informed planning.</p></li>
<li><p>Making use of natural or green infrastructure in the water system which can serve as a natural buffer against water-related risks, such as flooding or drought. </p></li>
</ol>
<p>Cape Town has already started considering <a href="https://theconversation.com/stormwater-harvesting-could-help-south-africa-manage-its-water-shortages-74377?sa=google&sq=stormwater+harvesting&sr=1">stormwater harvesting</a>, which has shown initial success. It involves collecting, treating and storing stormwater for potential reuse. It’s usually used for non-potable purposes or to <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/">replenish water in aquifers</a>. But it has only been done on a very small scale in South Africa, limited to on site systems used for irrigation at factories or other businesses. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.sajs.co.za/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/SAJS-113-1-2_Carden_ResearchLetter.pdf">Research has shown</a> that if treated stormwater is used for non-potable purposes -– such as irrigation and toilet flushing – it could reduce the total current residential potable water demand by more than 20%. This could be a significant water savings for the city. Of course, there are challenges associated with implementing reused stormwater, including <a href="http://www.sajs.co.za/system/tdf/publications/pdf/SAJS-113-5-6_Knight_Commentary.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35701&force=">water quality concerns</a> and <a href="http://edges.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2017/06/The-Future-of-Drought-Management-for-Cape-Town-Summary-for-Policy-Makers.pdf">limited institutional capacity</a>. </p>
<p>Successful stormwater management involves building or creating space for natural (green) ponds or corridors. These can absorb excess flood water, and prevent or reduce downstream flooding by slowing down the flow of stormwater through the city. They can also help replenish groundwater, either naturally, or through artificial recharge – the process of using stormwater to manually recharge groundwater <a href="http://www.sajs.co.za/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/SAJS-113-1-2_Carden_ResearchLetter.pdf">aquifers</a>. But natural detention ponds may also increase the <a href="https://theconversation.com/resilience-in-south-africas-urban-water-landscape-60461">vulnerability to flooding of informal settlements</a>, if they are not carefully planned. </p>
<p>More importantly, building resilience in the water sector involves more than just technical solutions. It requires institutions that are able to respond proactively to early signs of stress, and to cater to the needs of diverse populations. Cape Town, like other African cities, has <a href="https://theconversation.com/resilience-in-south-africas-urban-water-landscape-60461">unique urbanisation</a> challenges and persistent social justice <a href="https://theconversation.com/fighting-injustice-helps-in-creating-resilient-urban-spaces-68939">issues</a> that need to be considered in the transformation to a more water sensitive city. </p>
<p>Implementation should take into account Cape Town’s ongoing social inequality challenges. Research has already shown that the <a href="http://www.comminit.com/dfid/content/rising-waters-working-together-cape-towns-flooding">impact of disasters are not equally distributed</a>. In dealing with the current water shortages and planning for the future, the city should consider carefully how the costs and benefits of building resilience in the water sector are distributed among different members of society. </p>
<p><em>This article is based on a <a href="http://edges.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2017/06/The-Future-of-Drought-Management-for-Cape-Town-Summary-for-Policy-Makers.pdf">policy brief</a>, co-authored with <a href="http://edges.sites.olt.ubc.ca/people/emma-luker/">Emma Luker</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/79441/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lucy Rodina receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the University of British Columbia (including the Peter Wall Institute for Advanced Studies and the Liu Institute for Global Issues)</span></em></p>Building resilience in Cape Town’s water sector will require addressing risks like climate change, drought and flooding. Stormwater and groundwater are tipped as potential solutions.Lucy Rodina, PhD Candidate, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/681722016-11-08T19:04:28Z2016-11-08T19:04:28ZThe lessons we need to learn to deal with the ‘creeping disaster’ of drought<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/144988/original/image-20161108-4711-eg80dc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Millennium drought had a huge impact on the Murray-Darling river system.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">suburbanbloke/Flickr/Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The journal <a href="http://link.springer.com/journal/10584">Climatic Change</a> has published a <a href="http://link.springer.com/journal/10584/139/1/page/1">special edition</a> of review papers discussing major natural hazards in Australia. This article is one of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/australian-natural-hazards-series-32987">series</a> looking at those threats in detail.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Droughts are a natural feature of the Australian environment. But the <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-is-not-ready-for-the-next-big-dry-12819">Millennium drought (or “Big Dry”)</a>, which ran from 1997 to 2010, was a wake-up call even by our parched standards. </p>
<p>The Millennium drought had <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wrcr.20123/abstract">major social, economic and environmental impacts</a>). It triggered water restrictions in major cities, and prompted severe reductions in irrigation allocations throughout the vast <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-drought-looms-the-murray-darling-is-in-much-healthier-shape-just-dont-get-complacent-50063">Murray-Darling Basin</a>.</p>
<p>The Millennium drought also highlighted that, compared to the rest of the world, the impacts of drought on Australia’s society and economy are particularly severe. This is mainly because our water storage and supply systems were originally designed by European settlers who failed to plan for the huge variability in Australia’s climate.</p>
<h2>Have we learned the lessons?</h2>
<p>Are we likely to fare any better when the next Big Dry hits? It’s important to reflect on how much we actually understand drought in Australia, and what we might expect in the future.</p>
<p><a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-016-1798-7">Our study</a>, part of the Australian Water and Energy Exchanges Initiative (<a href="http://www.ozewex.org">OzEWEX</a>), had two aims related to this question. The first was to document what is known and unknown about drought in Australia. The second aim was to establish how Australia’s scientists and engineers can best investigate those unknowns.</p>
<p>The fact is that despite their significance, droughts are <a href="https://theconversation.com/el-nino-is-here-and-that-means-droughts-but-they-dont-work-how-you-might-think-47866">generally still poorly understood</a>. This makes it hard to come up with practical, effective strategies for dealing with them when they strike. </p>
<p>One reason for this is that unlike natural hazards with more graphic and measurable impacts (such as floods, cyclones, and bushfires), droughts develop gradually over huge areas, and can last for years. Often they go unnoticed until they trigger widespread water or food shortages, or cause significant energy, economic, health or environmental issues. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145003/original/image-20161108-4694-1yu2xzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145003/original/image-20161108-4694-1yu2xzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145003/original/image-20161108-4694-1yu2xzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145003/original/image-20161108-4694-1yu2xzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145003/original/image-20161108-4694-1yu2xzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145003/original/image-20161108-4694-1yu2xzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145003/original/image-20161108-4694-1yu2xzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145003/original/image-20161108-4694-1yu2xzh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">By the time you know it’s arrived, a drought can already be doing damage.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ASheep_on_a_drought-affected_paddock.jpg">Bidgee/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Drought has been described as a “<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wat2.1085/abstract">creeping disaster</a>”, because by the time a drought is identified, it is usually already well under way, the costs to fix it are mounting, and the opportunity to take proactive action has already been missed. </p>
<p>This is complicated still further by the uncertainties around defining, monitoring and forecasting drought – including predicting when a drought will finally end. As in the case of other natural hazards (such as drought’s polar opposite, <a href="https://theconversation.com/planning-for-a-rainy-day-theres-still-lots-to-learn-about-australias-flood-patterns-68170">floods</a>), what we need most is accurate and practically useful information on the likelihood, causes and consequences of droughts in particular areas. </p>
<p>This is a very tricky question, not least because we still need to come up with a rigorous way to distinguish between correlation and causation. For example, are increased local temperatures a <a href="https://theconversation.com/el-nino-is-here-and-that-means-droughts-but-they-dont-work-how-you-might-think-47866">cause or a consequence</a> of drought? </p>
<p>The complications don’t end there. Because droughts are so much <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2009GL041067/abstract">slower and bigger</a> than other natural disasters, they therefore have much more complicated effects on agriculture, industry and society. Bushfires can be devastating, but they also offer ample opportunities to learn lessons for the next time. Droughts, in contrast, give us <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wrcr.20123/abstract">limited opportunities to learn how best to prepare</a>. </p>
<p>Yet prepare we must. Given Australia’s history of <a href="https://theconversation.com/antarctic-ice-shows-australias-drought-and-flood-risk-is-worse-than-thought-59165">decades-long swings between wet and dry</a>, and the fact that these swings are <a href="http://www.csiro.au/state-of-the-climate">projected to grow even stronger</a>, drought will be a key concern for Australia for a long time to come.</p>
<h2>What to do next</h2>
<p>We therefore make several recommendations to help boost our understanding and management of drought. </p>
<p>1). Reconsider the way drought is defined and monitored to remove confusion between drought causes, impacts and risks. Similarly, there is also a need to better distinguish between drought, aridity, and water scarcity due to over-extractions. </p>
<p>The simplest definition of “drought” is a deficit of water compared with normal conditions. But what is normal? How long does the deficit have to persist, and how severe does it need to be, to be considered a drought? What is meant by water: rainfall, snow, ice, streamflow, water in a storage reservoir, groundwater, soil moisture, or all of these? </p>
<p>The answers to these questions depend very much on the local situation in terms of climate and water use, which varies significantly in space and time and is why the simplest definition of drought is insufficient. We need to develop drought definitions that clearly differentiate drought from long-term changes in aridity and water scarcity, and that capture drought start, duration, magnitude and spatial extent. Such definitions should account for the differences between Australia’s climate zones, the wide variety of end-users and applications of drought monitoring information, and the diversity of droughts that have occurred in the past. There needs to be a common understanding of what a drought is and the differences between drought, aridity and human-induced water scarcity.</p>
<p>2). Improve documentation of droughts that took place before weather records began, in roughly 1900. This will improve our understanding of Australia’s long-term “baseline” drought characteristics (that is, how bad can droughts get? how does the worst drought on record compare with the worst that has ever occurred?), and thus provide the fundamental information needed to successfully manage droughts. </p>
<p>This requires compilation of longer-term and more spatially complete drought histories via the merging of palaeoclimate information with instrumental, satellite, and reanalysis data. This will help us better understand instrumental and pre-instrumental drought behaviour, and put the droughts observed in the instrumental record into context. This work will involve looking at <a href="https://theconversation.com/antarctic-ice-shows-australias-drought-and-flood-risk-is-worse-than-thought-59165">ice cores</a>, <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0128533">tree rings</a>, <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2015WR017062/abstract">different tree rings</a>, <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2015WR017059/full">cave deposits</a>, <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2005GL025052/abstract">corals</a>, <a href="http://ozewex.org/?p=1506">sediments</a> and <a href="http://www.thebigflood.com.au/">historical changes to river channels and floodplains</a>.</p>
<p>3). Improve drought forecasting by developing more realistic models of the many factors that cause (or contribute to) drought. This will help us separate out the influences of natural variability and human-induced climate change, which in turn will help us make more accurate long-term projections.</p>
<p>If we can answer these big research questions, we will all be better prepared when the next big dry inevitably arrives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68172/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anthony Kiem receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fiona Johnson receives funding from the Australian Research Council and World Health Organisation.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Seth Westra receives funding from the Australian Research Council and various State Government research funding programs. </span></em></p>Droughts are much bigger and slower than other natural disasters that hit Australia - meaning that despite their huge impacts, we still haven’t figured out how best to protect ourselves.Anthony Kiem, Associate Professor – Hydroclimatology, University of NewcastleFiona Johnson, Senior Lecturer, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, UNSW SydneySeth Westra, Associate Professor, School of Civil, Environmental and Mining Engineering, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/655942016-10-26T17:43:11Z2016-10-26T17:43:11ZHow a climate crisis can lead farmers to joint planning and response<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143046/original/image-20161025-31486-1kr9hmt.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Droughts in South Africa has led to coordinated joint planning and partnerships to combat the problem.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stephanie Midgley</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There is nothing like a major climate disaster to raise interest in the problem of climate change among farming communities. Farmers in many parts of the world have, in the last decade, strained under extended droughts and intense flooding. But farmers in southern Africa last experienced a major drought 30 years ago – and memories tend to fade – until the current devastating <a href="http://www.nstf.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Agri-SA-Drought-Report_CS4.pdf">drought hit</a> the farming community. </p>
<p>Farmers are deeply optimistic people. They have to be, considering the huge numbers of risks they have to deal with. And climate change is usually not anywhere near the top of their list of priority challenges. This seems strange to climate scientists, whose work shows clearly that the agricultural sector is one of the most vulnerable sectors to <a href="http://www.sanbi.org/biodiversity-science/state-biodiversity/climate-change-and-bioadaptation-division/ltas">climate change</a>, particularly in water-scarce regions. </p>
<p>The current severe <a href="http://www.nstf.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Agri-SA-Drought-Report_CS4.pdf">drought</a> appears to have made the penny drop and role players are scrambling to deal with the crisis while assessing what needs to be done to create greater resilience. The message that more frequent climate disasters like droughts can be expected in future is also being taken seriously.</p>
<h2>Constructive discussions</h2>
<p>A team of researchers completed an <a href="http://www.greenagri.org.za/smartagri-2/smartagri-plan/">assignment</a> from South Africa’s Western Cape Government to develop a provincial climate change response strategy and to implement a framework for the agricultural sector. The SmartAgri Plan project <a href="http://www.acdi.uct.ac.za/research/smartagri">began in August 2014</a>, many months before the first signs of the drought appeared. But at the end of the project, in March 2016, the province and country were in the grip of a two-year drought.</p>
<p>This fortuitously provided an environment ripe for engagement on the issue of climate change and how to respond to it. From the start, the project remit was to engage thoroughly across the sector – and related sectors like water and environment – and across the province. The plan was to find out what farmers, government and others are already doing to deal with climate risks. But also, to find out what approaches and measures are needed to build climate resilience.</p>
<p>During the first rounds of engagement it became clear that dialogue between government and the farming communities is sensitive to issues of mistrust and misunderstanding. This emanates from past injustices and present policy uncertainties. The team was surprised at the willingness of all participants to hear each other and try find solutions which benefit everyone, in the context of farming and non-farming problems.</p>
<p>There was real concern for the fate of the most vulnerable farmers, often smallholder communities and new farmers, who needed more support. Equally, all types of farmers generally place a high premium on good catchment management, water management and fire management. Their role in platforms like water user associations and fire protection associations was acknowledged.</p>
<h2>A coordinated response</h2>
<p>This made a valuable contribution to the development of a plan which represents a road map for an integrated and inclusive response across a number of time scales. It is supported by scientific and local knowledge and experience, linking top-down policy guidance with practical bottom-up perspectives. Critically, disaster risk reduction and management is prioritised as a discrete strategic focus area needing greater attention. If this plan is well-resourced for implementation it will strengthen the ability of the sector to plan for and manage multiple interacting climate stresses and contribute to reducing vulnerability.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143047/original/image-20161025-31462-1ymsv0v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143047/original/image-20161025-31462-1ymsv0v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/143047/original/image-20161025-31462-1ymsv0v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143047/original/image-20161025-31462-1ymsv0v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143047/original/image-20161025-31462-1ymsv0v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143047/original/image-20161025-31462-1ymsv0v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143047/original/image-20161025-31462-1ymsv0v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/143047/original/image-20161025-31462-1ymsv0v.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It is crucial for collaboration to adopt approaches and measures to build climate resilience.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Stephanie Midgley</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So far so good. Then, towards the end of 2015 and first half of 2016, the drought hit with a vengeance across the region especially the Western Cape’s west coast and central Karoo (a semi-desert in the southern interior of South Africa). Crop harvests failed with losses of 200 000 tonnes of <a href="http://www.greenagri.org.za/smartagri-2/wcdoa-drought-dialogue-2016/">wheat</a> (50-100% per farm), 230 ha of potatoes and 15% of fruit, and numerous livestock. The knock-on impact was up and down the agricultural value chain, and for farming communities struggling with unemployment, was critical. </p>
<p>Relief was provided in the form of fodder assistance to the most desperate farmers, to feed around 17 000 <a href="http://www.greenagri.org.za/smartagri-2/wcdoa-drought-dialogue-2016/">cattle</a>. The Western Cape provincial government convened a two-day provincial drought dialogue with all involved in June 2016. The aim was to discuss what else the provincial government could do to strengthen the response to the current and future droughts. </p>
<p>Agreement was reached on a set of 32 high priority interventions with further prioritisation of five actions. These focus on bridging finance for farmers to keep farmers on the land, optimising water usage, accurate drought forecasts, a social security net for vulnerable communities affected by the drought, and revisiting water management and policies currently hampering new infrastructure.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>Interestingly, the drought dialogue priorities correspond closely with the SmartAgri Plan. Rather than being confined to the strategic focus area on disaster management, they were spread widely across other focus areas as well. They intersected strongly with natural resources like, soil and water management. They focused on proactive joint planning and coordination, information and communications, regulatory and financial barriers, and social vulnerability. </p>
<p>The role of government in creating a cooperative and supportive environment emerged as the key requirement for building resilience. The provincial government has taken the recommendations forward into further planning and implementation, together with the SmartAgri Plan.</p>
<p>There is certainly value in bringing all involved to the discussions. Government officials, farmers and their leadership, and others like water and conservation managers come together around a table. They jointly built strategies around how to respond to current and future climate challenges. The drought has provided an opportunity to focus minds, acknowledge the urgency of action and identify priorities.</p>
<p>It has also reinforced the understanding that coordinated joint planning and partnerships which enable the much needed shift from typical responses to prevention are required. Everyone would prefer the building of greater resilience to climate stress and disasters compared to the current unsustainable reliance on government relief. </p>
<p>The time to make it happen is now. And hopefully the role players will keep talking and listening. This will build capital based on trust and a common vision of a shared future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65594/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephanie Midgley receives funding from the Western Cape Department of Agriculture. </span></em></p>Drought is a problem in South Africa and it affects farmers. As a result, farmers and government are working together to develop strategies.Stephanie Midgley, Researcher and Project Manager in Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.