tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/emmerson-mnangagwa-46278/articlesEmmerson Mnangagwa – The Conversation2023-09-08T14:22:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2117552023-09-08T14:22:22Z2023-09-08T14:22:22ZZimbabwe elections 2023: a textbook case of how the ruling party has clung to power for 43 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543488/original/file-20230818-29-34nlfh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Opposition supporters calling for free and fair elections outside the offices of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission in Harare in 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeksai Njikizana/AFP via Getty Images.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few were surprised as, near midnight on 26 August, the <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/2023-presidential-elections-results/">Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</a> announced incumbent president Emmerson Mnangagwa’s reelection in yet another of Zimbabwe’s tendentious contests. His <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/snubbed-by-most-regional-leaders-emmerson-mnangagwa-parties-on-with-ex-adversaries-instead-20230904">inauguration</a> on 4 September sanctified his return to power.</p>
<p>Fewer still were shocked when South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, attended Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/ramaphosa-warned-not-to-undermine-sadc-ahead-of-mnangagwas-inauguration-4fd42c99-fdf2-4070-be0c-69b5117b8962">inauguration</a> regardless of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) election observation team’s <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/87928/zimbabwes-troubled-election-might-southern-african-leaders-follow-the-example-of-their-observers/">critical report</a> and the absence of most of <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/mnangagwa-inauguration-ramaphosa-expected-to-attend-along-with-a-few-regional-leaders-20230903">his peers</a> from the SADC and the African Union.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa gained 52.6% of the 4,561,221 votes cast. Nelson Chamisa, head of the main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), garnered 1,967,343 or 44%. Zanu-PF’s 136 of parliament’s 210 seats is just under the two-thirds needed to change the constitution. </p>
<p>I’ve observed and written about all <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971404900106">Zimbabwe’s elections</a> since 2000, when Zanu-PF first faced strong opposition from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. My <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">book</a> Mugabe’s Legacy: Coups, Conspiracies, and the Conceits of Power in Zimbabwe covers nearly 50 years of Zanu-PF’s propensity to gain power by any means - even <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-president-was-security-minister-when-genocidal-rape-was-state-policy-in-1983-4-now-he-seeks-another-term-211633">genocide</a>.</p>
<p>This election displayed many of these patterns. However, each election has registered variations as Zimbabwe hovers between open democracy and fully shut authoritarianism. Zanu-PF’s score, with contemporary variants, ranges from pre- and post-election intimidation to electoral “management” and playing off its regional neighbours. The CCC and civil society choirs also shift their tone in response: from outright rejection and court challenges to pleas for reruns and transitional governments.</p>
<h2>Long-term, immediate and post-election intimidation</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/99/article/703839">post-2017 coup period</a> foreshadowed many of Zanu-PF’s contemporary strategies. First was the soldiers killing at least six demonstrators (and bystanders) just after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">mid-2018 elections</a>. In January 2019, a “stayaway” kicked in just after Mnangagwa announced a 150% increase in fuel prices. Planned chaos ensued as riots, looting and protests were encouraged by a multitude of unidentified forces. More than 17 people were killed. As many women were raped. Nearly 1,800 other bodily violations ensued amid <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv2s0jd56">mass trials and convictions</a>. </p>
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<p>Since then, Zanu-PF has reminded many people not to engage in opposition. </p>
<p>By mid-2020 the targets moved towards <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/12/the-gendering-of-violence-in-zimbabwean-politics/">women in the MDC</a>. The case of CCC activist <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXsUkP00M9k">Moreblessing Ali’s</a> murder in May 2022 indicates a new variant on “silent murder”. Ali’s brother, Washington, a long-time MDC-CCC activist in the UK, gained the help of CCC MP and lawyer Job Sikhala to publicise his sister’s murder. Sikhala has been imprisoned since his campaign on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">behalf of Ali</a>. </p>
<p>I examine this horrific assassination in the next issue of the journal <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/198">Transformation</a>. It illustrates how the move towards <a href="https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/18/sweets-for-the-people-zimbabwe-elections-housing-voters-lured-promises-land-barons-zanu-pf">land-baron-led gangsterism</a> in Harare connects with Zanu-PF hierarchies of power.</p>
<p>The August 2023 pre-election murder by stoning of <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/7210805.html">CCC activist Tinashe Chitsunge</a> indicated this sort of politics running wild. </p>
<p>After the election, demonstrators and soldiers did not encounter each other <em>en masse</em>: no shootings. However, residents visiting pubs in “high density suburbs” encountered rough treatment from unidentified people with guns and brand-new uniforms. Later, Glen Norah councillor Womberaishe Nhende and fellow activist Sonele Mukuhlani were left naked after their abduction, whipping and injection with poison on 3 September. Their lawyers, Douglas Coltart and Tapiwa Muchineripi, were arrested when visiting them <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202309060001.html">in hospital</a>.</p>
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<p>The well-funded “Forever Associates of Zimbabwe” (FAZ) earned its keep by intimidating folks during the pre-election phases. FAZ is a <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/if-it-still-breaks-dont-fix-it-time-for-another-election-in-zimbabwe/">Zanu-PF</a> mix of semi-intellectuals and aspirant entrepreneurs. They are Mnangagwa enthusiasts needing connections to the Zanu-PF state. </p>
<p>They ran illegal <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/zimbabwes-vote-is-well-short-of-free-and-fair-standards-say-foreign-observers-20230825">“exit polls” at the stations</a>. FAZ’s members, purportedly <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2023/03/11/wife-of-cio-boss-accused-of-terrorising-zanu-pf-and-cio-members/">paid by the Central Intelligence Organisation</a>, kept their promise to “dominate and saturate the environment while <a href="https://faztrust.com/">denying the same to opponents</a>” – including those within Zanu-PF during its primary <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/311011/zimbabwe-how-intelligence-and-military-are-running-the-upcoming-general-polls/">nomination contests</a>. </p>
<h2>Judicial and electoral ‘management’</h2>
<p>The clouds over liberal horizons darkened further in the legal spheres of repression. The “<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-patriotic-act-erodes-freedoms-and-may-be-a-tool-for-repression-209984">Patriotic Act</a>”, passed ahead of the elections, makes too much opposition-talk with foreigners treasonous. The still unsigned amendment to the Private Voluntary Organisations Bill promises to end all hints of civil society support for <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-01-23-zimbabwean-government-passes-law-designed-to-throttle-independent-civil-society/">opposition parties</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6099">gerrymandered delimitation exercise</a> remapped mostly urban constituencies so they stretch to peri-urban and nearly rural areas. Zanu-PF hoped the majority would thus support it, as in the countryside. This tactic linked well to election day’s improprieties. Up to 75 urban polling stations experienced unexpected and unprecedented <a href="https://www.zawya.com/en/world/africa/polling-delays-and-extension-of-time-for-voting-zimbabwe-e39rl0b4">shortages of ballot papers</a>. This caused long and uncertain waits. Some stations extended voting to the next day. </p>
<p>In Glenview, a Harare suburb, hundreds of poor voters walked kilometres to vote by 7am. They waited – peacefully, fortunately – eight hours for the ballot papers. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-patriotic-act-erodes-freedoms-and-may-be-a-tool-for-repression-209984">Zimbabwe’s ‘Patriotic Act’ erodes freedoms and may be a tool for repression</a>
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<p>At other stations, night-time voting added to voters’ roll problems due to the hasty delimitation exercise that left <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/mnangagwas-son-turned-away-from-polling-station-as-logistical-troubles-and-fear-mar-zim-voting-20230823">many in the wrong constituency</a>. They were advised to find the correct one. </p>
<p>Where voting continued to 24 August, how many returned? </p>
<h2>The V11 forms</h2>
<p>Widespread concerns about the <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6544">V11 forms</a> came on top of worries about the thousands of people giving up on the lost ballot papers. These sheets are posted on the outside walls of the 12,000 polling stations. They show all the votes. They are meant to enable anyone to keep score at the first polling stage. Then the official counting moves on to ward, constituency, and provincial counting centres, and finally to the national “command centre” where the presidential vote is tallied and announced. Suspicion runs rampant about what happens at the links in this chain.</p>
<p>Election NGOs and other organisations were collecting and tabulating images of the V11 forms for digital release. Too late: Zanu-PF conducted on-the-night <a href="https://paradigmhq.org/press-release-the-netrights-coalition-condemns-raids-of-digital-technologies-of-civil-society-actors-in-zimbabwe-during-the-2023-elections/">raids</a> as they were at work. </p>
<p>As the Institute for Security Studies’ southern Africa programme head Piers Pigou noted in conversation with me, if the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was worried about the election’s legitimacy, the V11 forms would have been on its website immediately. But they are not there – or anywhere. </p>
<h2>Regional responses, CCC plans and democracy’s future</h2>
<p>As noted, the election observers’ reports do not paint a pretty picture of the election. The Citizens Coalition for Change hoped to exploit the split between the SADC observers and their <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/analysis/in-depth-zimbabwe-elections-analysts-on-why-sas-response-legitimises-an-authoritarian-regime-20230830">SADC masters</a>. But the SADC’s council of elders seems unable to help the CCC’s plans to arrange a rerun guided by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQQi1Xu_dts">an international committee</a>. South Africa’s enthusiasm for its neighbour gives little solace <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-09-05-ancs-fikile-mbalula-dismisses-talk-of-fresh-poll-in-zimbabwe/">to northern democrats</a>. Given Zimbabwe’s courts’ past biases on the legality of elections, the CCC did not bother taking <a href="https://zimfact.org/fact-check-has-chamisa-filed-an-election-court-challenge/">the judicial route</a>. </p>
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<p>Mnangagwa’s inauguration has put all those plans to rest. No reruns. No new versions of government of “<a href="https://africanarguments.org/2013/07/review-the-hard-road-to-reform-the-politics-of-zimbabwes-global-political-agreement-reviewed-by-timothy-scarnecchia/">national unity</a>”, modelled after the disputed, violence-marred 2008 contest, or <a href="https://gga.org/please-sign-petition-for-a-transitional-government-in-zimbabwe/">transitional councils</a>. At most, the election observers’ reports portend further critique. The Zimbabwean democratic forces have to think again, and harder, about ways to a better future. </p>
<p>In sum, if Zimbabwe’s 2023 election foreshadows future battles between authoritarianism and liberal democracy, the former has gained the upper hand. Zanu-PF’S iron fist remains, with a velvet coating, albeit fraying. As a woman overheard discussing this election observed, the only hope may be Zanu-PF destroying itself as it almost did in 2017.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211755/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore watched Zimbabwe's 2023 election as a non-accredited observer.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s 2023 elections look like their predecessors: stolen. But this one is a bit different. Opposition strategies and regional responses have changed too. What does this mean for the future?David B. Moore, Research Associate, Dept of Anthropology & Development Studies and Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121312023-08-30T12:40:58Z2023-08-30T12:40:58ZZimbabwe’s election was a fight between men – women are sidelined in politics despite quotas<p>Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65775996">2023 harmonised elections</a> have largely been depicted as a battle between the two “Big Men” – President <a href="https://apnews.com/article/zimbabwe-elections-emerson-mnangagwa-president-crocodile-56668e87d9459980b9d38b57175c31ce">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> of the ruling Zanu-PF and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/who-is-nelson-chamisa-can-he-win-zimbabwes-election-2023-08-23/">Nelson Chamisa</a> of the leading opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). Significant media attention focused on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/315335/zimbabwe-police-ban-92-ccc-opposition-party-campaign-rallies/">uneven playing field</a> between the ruling party and the opposition.</p>
<p>The election results announced on the 26 August are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-embassy-joins-others-voicing-concern-about-zimbabwe-election/7242392.html">being disputed</a> due to <a href="https://www.sadc.int/slide-item/sadc-electoral-observation-mission-2023-harmonised-elections-zimbabwe-launched">reports</a> of delayed voting, voter intimidation and ballot paper irregularities. <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/2023-presidential-elections-results/">Mnangagwa</a> has been announced as the official winner of the presidential poll, but the CCC has <a href="https://twitter.com/ccczimbabwe/status/1695576909839487050?s=46&t=knTMoeo4WZETacMv4PIpAw">rejected these results</a>. </p>
<p>Another concern distinct to this election was the stark decline in the number of women candidates nominated by the main political parties for direct election. </p>
<p>We are working on a three year research <a href="https://nai.uu.se/research-and-policy-advice/project/making-politics-safer---gendered-violence-and-electoral-temporalities-in-africa.html">project</a> with a focus on the representation of women in politics in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe as well as gendered electoral violence. This project seeks to explore barriers to women’s participation in politics in Africa and pathways forward, initially researched in the book <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/gendered-institutions-and-womens-political-representation-in-africa-9781913441210/">Gendered Institutions and Women’s Political Representation in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe ranks low in measures of gender parity in southern Africa. South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique boast <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS">46%, 44% and 42% women’s participation</a> in parliament, respectively. Zimbabwe’s political parties need to field more women for direct election, outside the confines of the quota, in order to reach gender parity. </p>
<h2>Gender quota</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20Updated%20to%202021.pdf">constitution in 2013</a> introduced a gender quota to ensure the equitable representation of women in parliament. Zimbabwe’s parliament is composed of a National Assembly (lower house) and a Senate (upper house). The <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20Updated%20to%202021.pdf">quota requires</a> that the lower house reserve 60 of its 270 seats (22%) for women representatives. The upper house is to appoint 60 of its 80 senators from a list that alternates between female and male candidates, called the “zebra-list”. </p>
<p>The purpose of the quota is to push the country towards gender parity – 50/50 female/male representation – as directed by the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights-rights-women-africa">2003 Maputo Protocol</a> and the Southern African Development Community’s 2008 <a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Protocol_on_Gender_and_Development_2008.pdf">Protocol on Gender and Development</a>.</p>
<p>However, women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined since 2013, in spite of the quota. <a href="https://wpp-africa.net/sites/default/files/2021-05/English%20Policy%20brief%20on%20women%20participation%20in%20politics%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf">In 2013</a> women made up 33% of the National Assembly and 48% of the Senate. Only 12% of these women were elected directly. In <a href="https://wpp-africa.net/sites/default/files/2021-05/English%20Policy%20brief%20on%20women%20participation%20in%20politics%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf">2018</a> the numbers in the National Assembly and Senate fell to 31% and 44%, respectively. </p>
<p>There was a significant decline in the number of women nominated to contest the 2023 elections. Only 68 (11%) of 633 aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. </p>
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<p>In spite of these challenges, <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/national_assembly/">23 women were elected into parliament</a> (against 26 in <a href="https://www.womenpoliticalleaders.org/women-make-up-more-than-one-third-of-zimbabwe-s-new-parliament-un-women-1447/">2013</a> and 25 in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">2018</a>). The 23 newly elected women will be added to the 60 women appointed through the quota, making a total of 83, or 30.7% representation of women, in the lower house. After the appointment of senators, as <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/zw/zw038en.pdf#page=52">stipulated by the constitution</a>, the number of women in the full parliament will increase. Though commendable, this still places Zimbabwe below average within the region. </p>
<p>These gains may fail to go beyond the 31% representation achieved in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">2018</a>. The women in the National Assembly will still be less than 50% of parliamentarians and have limited decision making powers. Moreover, there is little indication of the substantive impact these women will have to empower Zimbabwean women, considering their limited numbers. The country’s record of democratic deficits is another important challenge. </p>
<p>The newly elected women MPs may have limited room for manoeuvre to promote gender equality in this political context. But they are still important as decision makers, legislators and role models for other women to enter politics. </p>
<h2>Looking beyond the quota</h2>
<p>A gendered audit of the <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download/government-gazette-extraordinary-vol-64-30-06-2023-electoral-act-2/">published list of nominated candidates</a> for direct elections reveals that Zimbabwe’s political parties did not field enough women to reach gender parity in 2023. </p>
<p>Data shows that 633 registered candidates contested 210 seats through direct election. Of these candidates only 68 were women. That is, only 11% of aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. Of these 68, Zanu-PF fielded 23 women (34%), the CCC fielded 20 (29%), and the remaining 25 women were from small minority parties (27%) and independent candidates (10%).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/animal-farm-has-been-translated-into-shona-why-a-group-of-zimbabwean-writers-undertook-the-task-206966">Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task</a>
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<p>Harare and Bulawayo provinces nominated the highest number of women candidates for election. In Mashonaland Central only one woman was nominated across 18 constituencies. Only two women were nominated in Matebeleland South across 12 constituencies.</p>
<p>It is important to ask why political parties are not fielding more women for direct election. And what this means for the future of representative politics in Zimbabwe. </p>
<h2>Gender bias within political parties</h2>
<p>The data above indicates a bias against woman candidates that permeates across political parties. Apart from the women nominated through the obligations of the quota, neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF fielded enough women to make gender parity a reality in the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>The active exclusion of women from politics is driven by gendered prejudices. These are informed by social, cultural and religious beliefs <a href="https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/29600">rooted in patriarchal values </a> that view women as inherently weak and untrustworthy. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/women-bear-brunt-of-political-violence/">threat and use of violence against women candidates</a> continues to be used to coerce and discourage women from contesting elections. As argued by Zimbabwean scholars <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909620986576?journalCode=jasa">Sandra Bhatasara and Manase Chiweshe</a>, </p>
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<p>patriarchy, intertwined with the increase in militarised masculinities, is producing exclusion with limited spaces for women’s participation. </p>
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<p>A negative perception is also linked to “quota women” as they were not elected by “the people”. These women are often subjected to <a href="https://core.ac.uk/reader/188770530">elite patriarchal bargaining</a>. They primarily serve the needs of their party, rather than representing Zimbabwean women.</p>
<h2>Gatekeeping</h2>
<p>The presence of a gender quota system provides a facade of progress. This conceals the stark reality that neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF is committed to increasing women’s representation outside the confines of the quota. Political parties function as “election gatekeepers”. They determine the level of women’s inclusion in representative politics, outside the quota system.</p>
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<p>The number of women elected indicates that, unlike in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">past elections</a>, Zimbabweans seem more willing to vote for women representatives. Political parties should build on these small gains and nominate more women for elections. This will allow the country to move closer to the goals of gender parity, gender equality and democratic plurality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diana Højlund Madsen is a project leader for the project 'Making Politics Safer - Gendered Violence and Electoral Temporalities in Africa' funded by the Swedish Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shingirai Mtero works for the Nordic Africa Institute on the project Making Politics Safer. This project receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>Women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined in spite of a quota imposed in 2013.Diana Højlund Madsen, Senior Gender Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, The Nordic Africa InstituteShingirai Mtero, Postdoctoral Researcher, The Nordic Africa InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116152023-08-22T13:19:50Z2023-08-22T13:19:50ZZimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543288/original/file-20230817-27-gcauag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change, addresses supporters at a rally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/profile-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa">Nelson Chamisa</a>, the 45-year-old leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), is making a second bid to be Zimbabwe’s next president. </p>
<p>A lawyer and a pastor, Chamisa is the most formidable candidate against the ruling Zanu-PF led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The incumbent took over after the coup that ousted the country’s founding president Robert Mugabe in 2017. </p>
<p>Chamisa is over three decades younger than his (<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/03/profile-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-s-crocodile-president//">81-year-old</a>) opponent, and the youngest person running for president in this election. His youthfulness has been a major issue in this election, as it was in the last. </p>
<p>At least 62% of the population is <a href="https://zimbabwe.unfpa.org/en/topics/young-people-2">under 25</a>. They are <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-youth-speak-out-independence-day/2718352.html">“born-frees”</a> who feel the brunt of Zimbabwe’s failing economy. The actual unemployment rate is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42116932">unclear</a>; some claim it is as high as <a href="https://worldhelp.net/zimbabwe-unemployment-as-high-as-80-amid-pandemic/">80%</a>. The government claims it is <a href="https://www.zimstat.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2021_Fourth_Quarter_QLFS_Report_8032022.pdf#page=13">18%</a>. What is true is that many of Zimbabwe’s youth eke a living in the informal sector, estimated to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">90% of the economy</a>. </p>
<p>Many young graduates have settled for being street vendors or have taken the dangerous <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-precarious-road-zimbabweans-travel-to-seek-a-new-life-in-south-africa-58911">illegal track</a> across the crocodile infested Limpopo River to find work in neighbouring <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/zimbabwe-immigration/">South Africa</a>. Others with some financial means seek work overseas, even if it’s below their qualifications.</p>
<p>It is to this demographic that Chamisa is speaking directly. He promises the young a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/08/gift-mugano-unpacking-the-ccc-manifesto-launched-by-nelson-chamisa/">total revamp of the economy</a>. His messaging often includes glossy pictures of high-rise buildings and modernised highway networks that stand in contrast to many dilapidated roads and buildings in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As a political scientist who focuses on voting behaviour, migration and social media, I think Chamisa would have a more than fair chance to win in a truly free and fair election. He resonates with the country’s large disenchanted youth, mainly because of the poor state of the economy. However, campaigning in autocratic conditions is not ideal for the opposition. His and his party’s weakness are also serious hurdles.</p>
<h2>Youth appeal</h2>
<p>According to the independent African surveys network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, 67% of Zimbabweans are <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/zimbabwe_r8_diss1-zs-bh-11june21-v2_17june2021finalreleaseversion.pdf">unsatisfied with the direction the country is taking</a>. </p>
<p>In its recently released <a href="https://www.zimeye.net/2023/08/09/download-ccc-manifesto-a-new-great-zimbabwe-blueprint/">election manifesto</a>, the Citizens Coalition for Change promises to transform Zimbabwe into a US$100 billion economy over the next 10 years. The World Bank puts the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-heads-to-the-polls-amid-high-inflation-a-slumping-currency-and-a-cost-of-living-crisis-209841">battered economy</a> at just under <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/ZW">US$ 21 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare. His party’s manifesto promises universal healthcare and basic education. He also promises to open Zimbabwe to international trade and re-engagement, ending over 20 years of <a href="https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/africa/zimbabwe/opinion-zimbabwes-continued-isolation/">isolation</a>. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth and excluded from debt relief programmes due to ongoing human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe was once Africa’s breadbasket but can no longer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/15/we-could-have-lost-her-zimbabwes-children-go-hungry-as-crisis-deepens">feed</a> its small population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZW">just over 16 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Chamisa’s appeal to the youth vote has been received along partisan lines. For supporters of the ruling party, he is too young, too naïve, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/chamisa-incompetent-western-puppet-faking-political-bravery/">too western-leaning</a>, and lacks liberation credentials. For his support base of mostly young urbanites, Chamisa’s youth is his <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-07-zimbabwes-voters-favour-nelson-chamisa-over-president-mnangagwa-survey-shows/">trump card</a>. They have turned the age mockery from Zanu-PF into a campaign slogan, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxqs4l0RGaA">Ngapinde Hake Mukomana</a>” (let the young man enter the state house). </p>
<p>Chamisa is popular, as shown by huge attendance at his rallies. But will this be enough to help him win his first election as the founding leader of CCC? </p>
<h2>Voter apathy, funding and harassment</h2>
<p>Chamisa and his party face a number of hurdles. The first is getting the youth to vote. </p>
<p>Youth political participation in Zimbabwe has historically been very <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/2023-08-12-zimbabwes-2023-elections-who-votes-and-why/">low</a>. Although the election body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, is still to release a full voter’s roll, analysis by the Election Resource Center shows that <a href="https://twitter.com/ercafrica/status/1692100040196575545?s=20">while 85%</a> (6.6 million) of eligible voters are registered, only a third are under the age of 35. </p>
<p>In addition to voter apathy, Chamisa must contend with other hurdles within the opposition movement and the usual obstacles of running for office in electoral authoritarian state. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">founded</a> the CCC following his forced exit from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2021. The married father of three had been mentored by the opposition movement’s founder, the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/19/zimbabwes-opposition-leader-died-heres-what-you-need-to-know/">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. But Tsvangirai’s death <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066175">in 2018</a> ended Chamisa’s career in the party as divisions grew between him and the old guard. </p>
<p>The formation of the CCC helped him draw in a younger generation of politicians like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2022/7/7/the-zimbabwean-political-leader-fighting-for-her-countrys-future">Fadzayi Mahere</a>. But it also opened up Chamisa to new problems. The CCC has <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/politics-zimbabwe-elections-economy-human-rights-violations/">little money</a> against Zanu-PF’s elections war chest.</p>
<p>Chamisa lost access to state funds and opposition institutions when he left the MDC. His departure also left him with few friends at home or abroad. </p>
<p>He argues that what some see as disorganisation and isolation is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/theindependent/local-news/article/200013680/chamisa-its-time-for-clarity-not-ambiguity">strategic ambiguity</a>. He claims that his party keeps its cards closely guarded against infiltration and manipulation.</p>
<p>Chamisa has valid reasons to do so. The ruling party has successfully co-opted opposition leadership by offering patronage. The ruling party also uses courts to their advantage and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/45b09177-bfbe-41ea-9cbd-ea4c0218f447">violence against</a> opponents. </p>
<p>In 2007, in the months leading up to the election, Chamisa suffered a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17646957">fractured skull</a>. In 2021, his party reported threats to his life when his envoy was attacked using a <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-assailants-attack-nelson-chamisa-vehicle-leader-safe/6277026.html">homemade bomb</a>. Members of his party have been beaten up, and others have even lost <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200014816/ccc-member-stoned-to-death-in-harare-violence">their lives</a>. Job Sikhala, a senior member of the opposition, has been in jail for over a year on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">unclear charges</a>. </p>
<h2>One man show</h2>
<p>Chamisa’s vagueness on policy adds to his challenges. On the social platform X, where he has more than a <a href="https://twitter.com/nelsonchamisa?s=20">million followers</a>, he regularly only shares <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/chamisas-followers-says-they-are-tired-of-bible-verses/">Bible verses</a> or ambiguous messages. This is a lost opportunity for a candidate counting on the youth vote.</p>
<p>His party structures are unclear and it has yet to release its constitution. The only formal position in the party is his position of president. Everyone else is known only as a change agent. </p>
<p>Chamisa has not announced a running mate. This feeds into rumours that he has weak leadership skills and prefers to centre power on himself. One might even wonder if he does not trust his supporters.</p>
<p>Still, those supporting him say they do not need to know his structures. Zimbabweans are hungry for change after four decades of Zanu-PF rule. Many who hoped for change after Mugabe’s ouster are dismayed by the continuing economic challenges and increasing militarisation of the Zimbabwean politics. For these voters, Chamisa is the change they hope to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chipo Dendere receives funding from the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and Wellesley College to support research. </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare to support healthcare and basic education.Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor, Africana Studies, Wellesley CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116332023-08-20T09:27:25Z2023-08-20T09:27:25ZZimbabwe’s president was security minister when genocidal rape was state policy in 1983-4. Now he seeks another term<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543031/original/file-20230816-17-eic0p6.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tafadzwa Ufumeli/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Trigger warning: this article contains accounts of sexual violence.</em></p>
<p>Zimbabwe will hold its elections on 23 August. The current president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, is running for re-election. This is despite his having oversight in the execution of the genocide of a minority group of Zimbabweans in the south-west region, as evidenced in my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">newly published study</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hazel-Cameron-2">genocide scholar</a>, I have studied the nature, causes and consequences of genocide and mass atrocities, as well as the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41917771?seq=6">role of external institutional bystanders</a>. Since 2011, I have researched the crimes of the powerful of Zimbabwe. Much of this has involved an <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">analysis of official British and US government communications</a>. This has shed new light on what knowledge was available to the British and US governments about <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">atrocity crimes targeting the Ndebele</a> in the early post-independence years of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">latest study</a> explores a military operation, known as Gukurahundi, between 1983 and 1984 in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands in Zimbabwe. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with survivors, my study provides new insights into <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7388214.stm">Operation Gukurahundi</a>. It identifies systematic patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the operation. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">British policy towards Zimbabwe during Matabeleland massacre: licence to kill</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>The study concludes that these patterns indicate a state policy of systematic genocidal rape in 1983 and 1984. This policy was deployed with the intent to destroy, in part, a specific ethnic group: the minority Ndebele of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>My study acknowledges the immense suffering of the victims of the genocide and their descendants. It also illustrates that genocide creates victims across generations. Time cannot eliminate the trauma inflicted or the need for justice. </p>
<h2>The genocide</h2>
<p>In January 1983, the Zanu-PF government of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27519044">Robert Mugabe</a>, in the newly
independent Zimbabwe, launched a massive security clampdown on the Ndebele. This was <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">both politically and ethnically motivated</a>. At the heart of the operation was a strategy of state-ordered terror. It was perpetrated by a 4,000-strong all-Shona Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army led by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-minister-idUSKCN24U0MK">Perrance Shiri</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-a-mnangagwa-presidency-would-not-be-a-new-beginning-for-zimbabwe-87641">Mnangagwa</a> had oversight over both the army’s Fifth Brigade and the Central Intelligence Organisation in his role as minister of internal security and chairman of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/17/could-mnangagwa-be-zimbabwes-comeback-crocodile">Joint High Command</a>. He <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/">reported directly to Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-24-00-gukurahundi-ghosts-haunt-mnangagwa/">denied accusations</a> he played an active role in Operation Gukurahundi.</p>
<p>The stated objective of the campaign was to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jocelyn-Alexander/publication/250225505_Dissident_Perspectives_on_Zimbabwe%27s_Post-Independence_War/links/566858c308ae193b5fa0379f/Dissident-Perspectives-on-Zimbabwes-Post-Independence-War.pdf">rid the country of “dissidents”</a>. However, the overwhelming majority of those targeted by security forces were non-combatant Ndebele civilians. The government viewed them as supporters, or potential supporters, of the political opposition.</p>
<p>In 1983, the Fifth Brigade moved from village to village in Matabeleland North and some areas of the Midlands. Their presence led to <a href="https://www.pearl-insights.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/The-Matabeleland-Massacres-Britains-wilful-blindness.pdf">extreme violence</a>. The operation shifted to Matabeleland South in February 1984, where state-led atrocities and violence
continued. This included the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325887696_State-Organized_Starvation_A_Weapon_of_Extreme_Mass_Violence_in_Matabeleland_South_1984">orchestrated starvation of the Ndebele</a>. </p>
<p>Estimates vary on the number of non-combatant civilians massacred during Operation Gukurahundi. One conservative estimate is <a href="https://apnews.com/article/df5722c221bf4c5ca894e5e481413ca3">between 10,000 and 20,000</a>. However, Dan Stannard, the director internal of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation during Operation Gukurahundi, believed that between <a href="http://researchdata.uwe.ac.uk/104/240/roh-oh-sta-da1-appr.pdf">30,000 and 50,000</a> Ndebele may have been killed. </p>
<p>Although the peak of the violence occurred between 1983 and 1984, the operation didn’t end until December 1987 with the signing of a <a href="https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/explandict/unity-accord-of-1987/">national unity accord</a>. </p>
<h2>Rape and sexual violence</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">My research</a> reveals what has, until now, been omitted from criminological scrutiny: a state policy of rape and sexual violence that targeted the Ndebele people during Operation Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal">International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</a> made a <a href="https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTR,40278fbb4.html">historic judgment</a> which established that rape and other forms of sexual violence could be acts of genocide as defined by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">United Nations Convention on Genocide Article II</a>. The tribunal recognised how rape and sexual violence functioned to destroy the minority Tutsi group of Rwanda in 1994.</p>
<p>I gathered data for my <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">study</a> from 36 in-depth interviews with male and female survivors in a representative sample of geographical locations across Matabeleland. While small in comparison to the sheer scale of the violence and the numbers who were victimised, this study nonetheless establishes reliable conclusions about the nature of events. </p>
<p>The patterns I identified include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>public spectacles of multiple perpetrator rape targeting children and adults</p></li>
<li><p>people forced to witness the rape of female and male family members</p></li>
<li><p>rape and sexual violence followed by mass killing</p></li>
<li><p>forced intrafamilial rape</p></li>
<li><p>forced bestiality</p></li>
<li><p>forced nudity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These are acts that can be interpreted as “deliberately inflicting on the (Ndebele) group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (c) of the UN Genocide Convention</a>.</p>
<p>The systematic dehumanisation and degradation of the Ndebele through forced intrafamilial rape was a recurring pattern of state harm. It was pervasive in both Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South.</p>
<p>One of the people I interviewed, Bukhosi, who was 19 in 1984 and living in Matabeleland South, <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">shared the cruelty</a> of knowing that the Fifth Brigade might force him to attempt to have sex with his relatives. They would threaten to shoot him if he refused. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There were times we were afraid even to be in the company of our sister, even to go to the shop. Because I know when these guys come and see us together, they say ‘sleep with your sister’. Then you are afraid to go with your mother because something terrible would happen, they will say ‘do this to your mother’. You are afraid even to be with your brother at home, because they … these guys (Fifth Brigade), when they find the two of you. It is terrible … So we were all separated ….</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Such <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm">rituals of degradation</a> are found wherever a policy of genocidal rape is adopted. They cause shame and humiliation. They leave communities and individual families destroyed, their bonds crushed through the annihilation of social norms. </p>
<p>Forty years later, the intergenerational impacts of Operation Gukurahundi on the Ndebele group are profound. My interviewees widely reported mental health issues. Children born of survivors are angry and struggle to understand their family’s brutal history when questions about these painful experiences are met with silence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543484/original/file-20230818-15-ngn1e6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Mnangagwa
with Senior Royal Prince William in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kingston Royal</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I also identified patterns of reproductive violence targeting males and females. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>killing the foetuses of pregnant women</p></li>
<li><p>internment in concentration camps for sexual servitude (rape camps)</p></li>
<li><p>forced pregnancies </p></li>
<li><p>genital mutilation. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Fifth Brigade officers targeted the wombs of pregnant women with knives, bayonets or through stamping.</p>
<p>These acts can be interpreted as “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the (Ndebele) group”, a contravention of <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf#page=1">Article II (d) of the Genocide Convention</a>. </p>
<p>Every participant in my study reported the presence of a military rank structure – and complicity of senior officers in mass rapes and sexual violence. There was no evidence of sexual predation by army personnel for personal satisfaction. </p>
<p>Another study participant, Phindile, was 37 and lived in Matabeleland South in 1984. There were 21 homesteads in her village. She told me there were three commanders in her area. </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Those were the ones who were giving the instructions. Rape was done (by) daylight and darkness but most were done in the evening. The commanders would be there eating. The chief commander would be sitting at a distance and giving instructions on what to do. They used to do the raping according to their rank.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My <a href="https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.13169/statecrime.12.2.0001">research</a> establishes that the policy of rape and other forms of sexual violence was systematic and predicated on the government’s intent to destroy the Ndebele in part. The policy reflects the ideology and strategic goals of those in high office. The fundamental human rights of many survivors remain affected <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/gukurahundi-the-election-dilemma-for-undocumented-victims/">to this day</a>. </p>
<h2>Swept under the carpet</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Prosecution for genocide</a> extends to those who plan, instigate, order, commit or aid and abet in its <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/genocide">planning, preparation or execution</a>.</p>
<p>In the early 1990s, reports of state-organised rape, the detention of women in rape camps, enforced pregnancy and other sexual atrocities trickled out of Bosnia and Croatia. Securing indictments became an <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/war-crimes-brutality-genocide-terror-and-the-struggle-for-justice-by-aryeh-neier-new-york-times-books-1998-pp-xiv-274-index-25-can35-between-vengeance-and-forgiveness-facing-history-after-genocide-and-mass-violence-by-martha-minow-boston-beacon-press-1998-pp-xiii-202-index-23/47336631C6CF464C84E5226AB62AD274">international political priority</a>. </p>
<p>Similar <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/uk/revealed-british-diplomats-pressured-bbcs-jeremy-paxman-understand-true-perspective-massacres-zimbabwe-61535">reports had trickled out</a> of Zimbabwe a decade earlier but were <a href="https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/16176/Cameron_2017_TIHR_BritainsWilfulBlindness_AAM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">swept under the carpet</a>. </p>
<p>Intelligence on genocidal rape and other atrocities was <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">minimised by British representatives</a> in Zimbabwe. This was clearly politically influenced, as expressed in <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316020728_The_Matabeleland_Massacres_Britain%27s_wilful_blindness">numerous diplomatic cables</a> between Harare and London.</p>
<p>The crimes of genocide committed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the Hutu government of Rwanda were subjected to investigation, prosecution and judgment in international courts. </p>
<p>Yet, 40 years after the mass atrocities of Operation Gukurahundi, there has been no official investigation, prosecution or judgment. The most senior surviving person accused of overseeing the genocide and other crimes against humanity, the incumbent president of Zimbabwe, enjoys impunity. He is endorsed and flattered – for example, he was <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202304190012.html#:%7E:text=Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%2C%20President%20of%20Zimbabwe%20.&text=President%20Emmerson%20Mnangagwa%20has%20been,ceremonial%20home%20of%20Britain's%20monarchy.">invited</a> to the May 2023 coronation of King Charles III of the UK.</p>
<p>Rather than being subjected to a process of international justice before a court with the jurisdiction to try the mass crimes of Gukurahundi, Mnangagwa will stand for re-election on 23 August. The survivors will continue their <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/memory-and-erasure">search for justice and accountability</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hazel Cameron received funding for this research project from Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, the British Academy and a Principal’s Special Award, University of St Andrews. </span></em></p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa has not faced official investigation or prosecution over his role in Operation Gukurahundi – 40 years on.Hazel Cameron, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2101992023-08-02T12:52:29Z2023-08-02T12:52:29ZZimbabwe’s rulers won’t tolerate opposing voices – but its writers refuse to be silenced<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539973/original/file-20230728-19-7tnmnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">NoViolet Bulawayo, Zimbabwean author of the politically charged novels We Need New Names and Glory.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Levenson/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The ruling elite in Zimbabwe has always tried to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/zimbabwe-43-years-independence-commemoration-marred-by-rapidly-shrinking-civic-space/">silence</a> opposing political voices and erase histories it does not wish to have aired. Although “democratic” elections have been held since 1980, the country has become what the scholar Eldred Masunungure <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24388181">calls</a> a state of “militarised, electoral authoritarianism”. </p>
<p>As Zimbabwe heads to the polls again in 2023, it’s worth considering the role that writers have played in engendering political resistance. Their voices have been important in challenging oppression, exposing social injustices and advocating for political change. </p>
<h2>The liberation struggle</h2>
<p>Literature was vital for raising awareness about the harshness of colonial rule. It was used to mobilise resistance against the white minority regime and garner international support for the liberation struggle. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of an African man against a spider's web, a needle stitching a wound on his forehead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=905&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539976/original/file-20230728-27-n59hy5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1137&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heinemann African Writers Series</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Texts like <a href="https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/voices-of-liberation-ndabaningi-sithole">Ndabaningi Sithole’s</a> foundational 1955 novel Umvekela wamaNdebele (The Revolution of the Ndebele) and <a href="https://theconversation.com/dear-dambudzo-marechera-the-letters-zimbabweans-wrote-to-a-literary-star-144299">Dambudzo Marechera</a>’s 1978 magnum opus The House of Hunger were instrumental. Many others like <a href="https://www.gale.com/intl/databases-explored/literature/charles-mungoshi">Charles Mungoshi</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/tsitsi-dangarembga-and-writing-about-pain-and-loss-in-zimbabwe-144313">Tsitsi Dangarembga</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/21/chenjerai-hove">Chenjerai Hove</a> produced texts that encouraged resistance against colonial rule. </p>
<p>These works showcased the resilience of Zimbabweans in the face of adversity, inspiring the population to continue their fight for freedom.</p>
<h2>Independence</h2>
<p>Since independence in Zimbabwe, there has remained little space for dissenting voices – first under the leadership of <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a> and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-three-barriers-blocking-zimbabwes-progress-zanu-pf-mnangagwa-and-the-military-89177">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/story/zimbabwes-genocide-an-open-wound/">Gukurahundi genocide</a>, which novelist <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Novuyo_Rosa_Tshuma/">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> called the country’s “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/aug/09/house-of-stone-novuyo-rosa-tshuma-review">original sin</a>”, marked the first instance in which the state quashed opposing voices. Between 1982 and 1987, the government sent a North Korean-trained brigade to quell dissenters in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands. An estimated 20,000 civilians were killed. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of an African woman looking directly ahead with traditional hairstyle." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=950&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539978/original/file-20230728-15-vc4suo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Women's Press</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Interestingly, despite the shrinking of the civic and political space in Zimbabwe, literary production has thrived in providing political resistance.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/tvl/article/view/168612">My research</a> as a scholar of African literature has demonstrated that literature in Zimbabwe has highlighted diverse forms of state sponsored violence. Through their works, writers have raised awareness, sparked dialogue, and inspired readers to engage in opposition and activism.</p>
<h2>The turbulent ‘lost decade’ (2000-2010)</h2>
<p>From around 2000, Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-inflation-idUSL1992587420070919">experienced</a> economic meltdown, coupled with an increased shrinking of the civic space. The rise of a formidable opposition, the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Movement-for-Democratic-Change">Movement for Democratic Change</a>, in 1999 <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/election-violence-in-zimbabwe/movement-for-democratic-change-was-number-one-enemy-in-2000/2CB944ACBCDB63C2311FDAB85ACD8037">was met with violence</a> by the state. </p>
<p>This period also saw a flourishing in literary production. Fresh voices emerged, among them <a href="https://writersmakeworlds.com/brian-chikwava/">Brian Chikwava</a>, <a href="https://novioletbulawayo.com/about/">NoViolet Bulawayo</a>, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e1fad84a-903e-44ec-b7c5-920e88a91eac">Petina Gappah</a>, <a href="https://www.poetryinternational.com/en/poets-poems/poets/poet/102-5757_Eppel">John Eppel</a>, <a href="https://www.icorn.org/writer/christopher-mlalazi">Christopher Mlalazi</a> and <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/lawrence-hoba">Lawrence Hoba</a>.</p>
<p>Literature from this period captured the socioeconomic realities of the country. Gappah’s debut collection of short stories in 2009, <a href="https://soundcloud.com/faberbooks/petina-gappah-an-elegy-for">An Elegy for Easterly</a>, depicts the emotions experienced by Zimbabweans in the face of diverse challenges. Some characters express disillusionment and despair, while others maintain optimism and resilience, representing a complex reality.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with illustrative fonts spelling the words " src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539979/original/file-20230728-24712-naw856.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1130&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Random House</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Bulawayo’s award-winning 2013 novel We Need New Names depicts the political situation through the perspective of its teenage protagonist, Darling. The story delves into the effects of political turmoil, economic challenges and societal changes on regular lives. Her 2022 novel <a href="https://theconversation.com/noviolet-bulawayos-new-novel-is-an-instant-zimbabwean-classic-185783">Glory</a> parodies a dictatorship, protesting the irrationality of a police state.</p>
<p>White Zimbabwean writers have also criticised autocracy in books like Catherine Buckle’s <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/AFRICAN_TEARS/haxhDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0">African Tears: The Zimbabwe Land Invasions</a> (2000) and Graham Lang’s <a href="https://www.google.co.za/books/edition/Place_of_Birth/TzCsAAAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0&bsq=Place%20of%20Birth%20graham%20lang">Place of Birth</a> (2006). </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration showing the portrait of a woman with butterflies instead of hair." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=923&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539980/original/file-20230728-3718-jawgb2.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1160&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Faber and Faber</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These novels portray the emotional effects of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">Fast Track Land Reform Programme</a> on many white Zimbabweans, who found themselves dispossessed of their farms and their sources of income.</p>
<p>Writers from the 2000s have offered multifaceted portrayals, highlighting the interconnectedness of personal lives and political realities. The stories illuminate the human cost of political decisions and the resilience of ordinary people in the face of hardships.</p>
<h2>Literature in the Second Republic</h2>
<p>Literature after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/when-the-state-is-the-man-and-that-man-is-mugabe-a-new-era-begins-with-his-fall-87868">demise</a> of Mugabe and his four-decade regime – a period referred to as the Second Republic – has continued to grapple with Zimbabwe’s prevailing sociopolitical environment. In the book <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Zimbabwean-Crisis-after-Mugabe-Multidisciplinary-Perspectives/Mangena-Nyambi-Ncube/p/book/9781032028149">The Zimbabwean Crisis after Mugabe</a>, my colleagues and I contend that today’s Zimbabwe is similar to the Mugabe years in many ways.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539974/original/file-20230728-19-7nqol2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tsitsi Dangarembga was arrested in 2020 for staging a protest.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Autony/AFP/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.batsiraichigama.com/">Batsirai Chigama</a>’s collection of poems Gather the Children captures the vicissitudes of contemporary life in Zimbabwe. In <a href="https://www.poetryinternational.com/en/poets-poems/article/104-29416_On-Chigama-8217-s-Gather-the-Children">his analysis</a> of this collection, literary scholar Tinashe Mushakavanhu explains: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe’s political crisis has been a different kind of catastrophe, one that has occurred in slow motion: its mechanisms abstract and impersonal, although the economic, physical, and psychological consequences have been very real and devastating. These strictures insinuate themselves into the ambience of everyday life and language, something that Chigama observes with careful attention. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>In her poem Zimbabwe, Chigama writes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Like eating olives</p>
<p>we have acquired the taste of discomfort</p>
<p>over the longest time</p>
<p>it has gently settled on our tongues</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Her poems highlight how Zimbabweans have normalised the abnormal.</p>
<p>Other writers from the post-Mugabe period like <a href="http://www.panashechigumadzi.com/bio">Panashe Chigumadzi</a> and <a href="https://novuyotshuma.com/about">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> grapple with similar issues and themes. Writer and academic <a href="https://brittlepaper.com/2023/03/siphiwe-ndlovu-on-the-rise-and-rise-of-zimbabwean-literature/">Siphiwe Ndlovu</a> explains that in contemporary Zimbabwean fiction</p>
<blockquote>
<p>there is anger, outrage, disappointment, disillusionment, hope (and the loss of it), but most importantly, there is a call for reckoning and change that the politics of the country have failed to successfully address.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The power (and limits) of literature</h2>
<p>Despite its power, reading remains a luxury that many Zimbabweans cannot afford. Books are extremely expensive and few people have disposable income to read for pleasure. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover with an illustration of birds flying into a tree and down into a red backdrop." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=850&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/539982/original/file-20230728-16223-8s27vs.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1068&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ntombekhaya Poetry</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>It’s for this reason that, since independence, the state has not banned the many novels which are critical of the situation in the country. Writer Stanley Nyamfukudza <a href="http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:240525/FULLTEXT02.pdf">explains</a>: “It has been suggested that one of the best ways to hide information in Zimbabwe is to publish it in a book.” </p>
<p>Literature can achieve greater effects if there is a robust culture of critical thinking and reading.</p>
<p>However, despite the continued oppression and the lack of a robust reading culture, Zimbabwean writers have been unrelenting in telling the world what is really happening in Zimbabwe. They have always spoken truth to power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210199/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Writers have challenged oppression, exposed social injustices and advocated for political change.Gibson Ncube, Lecturer, Stellenbosch UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099842023-07-30T11:14:46Z2023-07-30T11:14:46ZZimbabwe’s ‘Patriotic Act’ erodes freedoms and may be a tool for repression<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/539472/original/file-20230726-23-fk6s12.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's repressive new law will further erode civilian rights.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jekesai Njikizana /AFP/ via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/local-news/article/200012321/parliament-passes-a-bill-that-seeks-to-punish-unpatriotic-citizens">introduction</a> of the controversial “Patriotic Act” in Zimbabwe will contribute to the erosion of political and civil liberties in a country that has been in the grip of one political party since independence in 1980.</p>
<p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa signed the new act, officially called the <a href="https://www.law.co.zw/download/criminal-law-codification-and-reform-amendment-act-2023">Criminal Law Codification and Reform Amendment Act, 2023</a>, into law on 14 July. His government said the law was <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/as-patriotic-zimbabweans-celebrate-occasion/">indispensable</a> to holding accountable those who jeopardised national interests. It allows for monitoring and suppressing of political organisations and journalists who are critical of the government. </p>
<p>It carries harsh sentences, including death, for acts the government deems to be <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/07/zimbabwe-presidents-signing-of-patriotic-bill-a-brutal-assault-on-civic-space/">“unpatriotic”</a>. </p>
<p>Such a law, in a country with a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/election-violence-in-zimbabwe/FE079C46754D9F31DB5E3D5CE7AC4B38">history</a> of abuses of individual freedoms, will further undermine the right to freedom of expression enshrined in the <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20of%20Zimbabwe%20Amendment%20%28No.%2020%29.pdf">constitution</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ezekiel-guti-revered-zimbabwean-church-leader-who-preached-hard-work-and-morals-over-miracles-209556">Ezekiel Guti: revered Zimbabwean church leader who preached hard work and morals over miracles</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>I have researched post-liberation Zimbabwe’s political economy and noted how the ruling Zanu-PF party has become <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.10520/ejc-afrins-v49-n4-a10">conflated</a> with the state. The party-dominated legislature passes laws that erode political and civil liberties. The new act represents another move by the party to tighten its grip on power.</p>
<p>In my view, the act will enable the government to label legitimate criticism as <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/local-news/article/200012321/parliament-passes-a-bill-that-seeks-to-punish-unpatriotic-citizens%20%22%22">unpatriotic behaviour</a>. It will, for instance, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/zimbabwe-passes-draconian-patriotic-bill-ahead-of-elections-20230601">penalise</a> individuals who hold meetings with foreign diplomats. </p>
<p>As the French philosopher <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=aabd337816cd732dcb43b782fc269daeca4ed67b">Montesquieu</a> stated in 1742, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>There is no crueller tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of law and in the name of justice.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>‘National interest’</h2>
<p>Opposition activists have <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/zimbabwe-rights-groups-opposition-furious-over-signed-patriotic-bill-/7184729.html">expressed concern</a> that the law is designed to punish citizens, civil society organisations and political adversaries of the ruling party. Zimbabwe is due to hold general elections <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/4047/">on 23 August</a>. The government could launch a crackdown on dissent. </p>
<p>Some people see the act as a response to the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ99/PLAW-107publ99.pdf%22">sanctions</a> the United States imposed on the Zimbabwean government in 2001 for human rights abuses. The state-owned <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/the-patriotic-bill-a-necessity-for-vision-2030/">The Herald</a> newspaper said the law was a response to Zimbabweans who advocated for the enforcement of sanctions on Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The government has exploited the sanctions as a <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-20-corruption-and-state-capture-not-sanctions-are-the-cause-of-zimbabwes-economic-meltdown/">pretext</a> to suppress dissent and shift the blame for the country’s problems.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/economic-reforms-wont-fix-zimbabwes-economy-ethical-leadership-is-also-needed-170569">Economic reforms won't fix Zimbabwe’s economy. Ethical leadership is also needed</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>While the Patriotic Act <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6068">amends</a> the criminal law code to include mandatory minimum prison terms for rape sentences, it also criminalises acts it deems as</p>
<blockquote>
<p>wilfully injuring sovereignty and national interests of Zimbabwe. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The problem lies in the broad definition of “national interests”. This can be manipulated to serve political agendas. It could be interpreted in a way that compromises individual freedoms and hinders government accountability. For instance, opposition activists have previously been <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/fadzai-mahere-and-ccc-trying-to-destroy-zimbabwe/">accused</a> of treason and unpatriotic behaviour for expressing concerns about human rights abuses in Zimbabwe at the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Using this law, individuals who express concerns about human rights abuses and corruption could be targeted for unpatriotic behaviour.</p>
<p>For example, the TV news network Al Jazeera recently <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evWEuVR1XIs">exposed</a> a case of gold smuggling corruption involving public officials in Zimbabwe. The revelations could potentially lead to the arrest of journalists behind the revelations. </p>
<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>The Patriotic Act contravenes Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20of%20Zimbabwe%20Amendment%20%28No.%2020%29.pdf">constitution</a>, which upholds the right to freedom of expression. This fundamental right is meant to foster an environment conducive to peaceful demonstrations and the presentation of petitions. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe is also bound by international and regional instruments that protect freedom of expression. They include the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf">African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights</a>. The Southern African Development Community <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/sadcprinc.htm">principles and guidelines</a> governing democratic elections also emphasise the importance of freedom of expression. Zimbabwe is a member of the grouping.</p>
<p>Sadly, both the African Union and the Southern African Development Community have failed to prevail on Zanu-PF to uphold the human rights of Zimbabweans.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/animal-farm-has-been-translated-into-shona-why-a-group-of-zimbabwean-writers-undertook-the-task-206966">Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Civil society organisations need to collaborate with media outlets to show the act’s potential impact on society. That way, the public will get a broader understanding of the act’s negative effects. That might spur Zimbabweans to challenge the oppressive act, and defend their individual and collective liberties.</p>
<p>Social media could be pivotal in mobilising resistance to the Patriotic Act. Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp have proven effective in disseminating information and rallying public opinion against oppression in Zimbabwe. There is also a need for active citizen participation to resist the Patriotic Act. The 2016 <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/12/10/569757806/fight-for-rights-will-continue-in-zimbabwe-thisflag-movement-pastor-vows">#ThisFlag</a> resistance movement is an example. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/analysis-across-africa-shows-how-social-media-is-changing-politics-121577">Analysis across Africa shows how social media is changing politics</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
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<p>But, given the Zimbabwean government’s history of repression, a stronger solution would be for citizens to use their votes in the upcoming elections in August to choose a new government that would uphold their rights and human dignity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209984/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Sithole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Opposition activists have previously been accused of treason and unpatriotic behaviour for expressing concerns about human rights abuses.Tinashe Sithole, Post-doctoral research fellow at the SARChI Chair: African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069662023-06-11T05:58:48Z2023-06-11T05:58:48ZAnimal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530850/original/file-20230608-30-g3nm04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alan Hopps/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since independence in 1980, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe/Rhodesia-and-the-UDI">Zimbabwe</a> has in some ways become like <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Animal-Farm">Animal Farm</a>. Like the pigs in the classic 1945 novel by English writer <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/George-Orwell">George Orwell</a>, the country’s post-liberation leaders have hijacked a revolution that was once rooted in righteous outrage. In Zimbabwe, the revolution was against colonialism and its practices of extraction and exploitation. </p>
<p>The lead characters in Animal Farm have the propensity for evil and the greed for power found in despots throughout history, including former Zimbabwe president <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a>. Zimbabwe’s leaders have also acted for personal gain. They remain in power with no <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/zimbabwe-43-years-independence-commemoration-marred-by-rapidly-shrinking-civic-space/">accountability</a> to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-deepening-crisis-time-for-second-government-of-national-unity-122726">suffering</a> of the people they claim to represent. </p>
<p>Animal Farm’s relevance is echoed in celebrated young Zimbabwean author NoViolet Bulawayo’s recent novel <a href="https://theconversation.com/noviolet-bulawayos-new-novel-is-an-instant-zimbabwean-classic-185783">Glory</a>. Her satirical take on Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup and the fall of Mugabe is also narrated through animals. And visual artist <a href="https://zeitzmocaa.museum/artists/admire-kamudzengerere/">Admire Kamudzengerere</a> founded <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjpVCcDZARQ">Animal Farm Artist Residency</a> in Chitungwiza as a space for creative experimentation.</p>
<p>It’s within this context that a group of Zimbabwean writers, led by novelist and lawyer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/nov/13/petina-gappah-zimbabwe-writer-interview">Petina Gappah</a> and poet <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/wait-is-over-for-muchuri/">Tinashe Muchuri</a>, have translated Animal Farm into <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shona">Shona</a>, the country’s most widely spoken language. A dozen writers contributed to the translation of <a href="https://houseofbookszim.com/product/chimurenga-chemhuka/">Chimurenga Chemhuka</a> (Animal Revolution) over five years.</p>
<p>It’s clear to me, as a <a href="https://www.st-annes.ox.ac.uk/cpt_people/mushakavanhu-dr-tinashe/">scholar</a> of Zimbabwean literature, that too few great books are available in the country’s indigenous languages. This matters particularly because there are few bookshops and libraries where young people can access good writing. But Zimbabwe’s writers are taking matters into their own hands. </p>
<h2>The translation project</h2>
<p>Translating Animal Farm into Shona makes perfect sense. Historically, Shona novelists have used animal imagery to conjure up worlds of tradition and custom, and also to examine human foibles. Great Shona writers – such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Solomon-M-Mutswairo">Solomon Mutswairo</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Patrick-Chakaipa">Patrick Chakaipa</a> and more recently <a href="https://munyori.org/2022/04/interview-with-ignatius-mabasa/">Ignatius Mabasa</a> – have written books that use allegory to respond to a range of crises in Zimbabwe. (Allegory is a literary device that uses hidden meaning to speak to political situations – such as using pigs instead of people in Animal Farm.) </p>
<p>Gappah kickstarted the <a href="https://pentransmissions.com/2015/10/22/on-translating-orwells-animal-farm/">translation project</a> in a private post on Facebook in 2015:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A group of friends and I thought it would be fun to bring the novel to new readers in all the languages spoken in Zimbabwe. This is important to us because Zimbabwe has been isolated so much in recent years, and translation is one way to bring other cultures and peoples closer to your own.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover featuring an illustration of the imprint of a pig's hoof in blood." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1090&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1090&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1090&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The House of Books</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Eight years later, Chimurenga Chemhuka has come to life. It’s a big achievement, considering that publishing has not been performing well in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-economy-is-collapsing-why-mnangagwa-doesnt-have-the-answers-104960">dire Zimbabwean economy</a>. Gappah and her friends have ambitions to translate and publish Animal Farm in all indigenous languages taught in Zimbabwe’s schools. </p>
<h2>Chimurenga Chemhuka</h2>
<p>Though Chimurenga Chemhuka is mainly in standard Shona, its characters speak a medley of different Shona dialects – such as chiKaranga, chiZezuru, chiManyika – plus a smattering of contemporary slang. It’s a prismatic translation in one text. As leading UK translation theorist Matthew Reynolds <a href="https://books.openbookpublishers.com/10.11647/obp.0206/ch6.xhtml">explains</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>To translate is to remake, not only in a new language with its different nuances and ways of putting words together, but in a new culture where readers are likely to be attracted by different themes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The use of dialects activates the book in a comical way that also leaves it open to different interpretations and connections. For example, Zimbabwe’s president <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, who does not have the same rhetorical gifts as his predecessor, has always tried to distinguish himself with his use of chiKaranga, a dominant dialect of Shona. He adopts a popular wailing Pentecostal style that rises and falls, raising laughter and dust among the rented crowds who attend his rallies.</p>
<p>The title, Chimurenga Chemhuka, is poignant and a direct reference to Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/DC/renov82.10/renov82.10.pdf">liberation war</a>. Chemhuka (animal) Chimurenga (revolution) is not a literal translation of Animal Farm, but here the writers take liberties to connect the book to the country’s larger struggles for independence, commonly known as Chimurenga. </p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>This translation project is a significant event in Shona literature. </p>
<p>It’s done by an eclectic group of writers who are passionate about language and literature. They use Orwell’s book and its satiric commentary as a way to creatively express themselves collectively. If this was a choir, the choristers Gappah and Muchuri do a good job of leading a harmonious ensemble.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/noviolet-bulawayos-new-novel-is-an-instant-zimbabwean-classic-185783">NoViolet Bulawayo’s new novel is an instant Zimbabwean classic</a>
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<p>This is also the first of a series of Shona translations from <a href="https://houseofbookszim.com/">House of Books</a>, a new publishing house in Zimbabwe. The book is being promoted via social media platforms, where it is generating conversation about the need for more Zimbabwean translations of classic literature.</p>
<p>Translation was a major activity in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. It was a way for the newly emergent nation to reintegrate into the pan-African intellectual circuit. As Zimbabwe again reels from political and economic oppression, the translation of Animal Farm reveals to the country that what it’s going through is not new. It has happened before, and it will happen again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Novelist Petina Gappah’s call for translators on Facebook has resulted in the publication of Chimurenga Chemhuka.Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Junior Research Fellow, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2028582023-04-20T15:06:01Z2023-04-20T15:06:01ZZimbabwe’s ruling party vilifies the opposition as American puppets. But the party itself had strong ties to the US<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521045/original/file-20230414-16-97marz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa addressing a rally in Bulawayo recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), which has governed Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, is well known for denouncing the United States’ role as a superpower that polices the world. </p>
<p>In a 2007 address at the United Nations, then Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-zimbabwe-mugabe/mugabe-slams-bush-hypocrisy-on-human-rights-idUSN2627903020070926">assailed</a> his American counterpart, George W. Bush. Mugabe charged:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>his hands drip with innocent blood of many nationalities. He kills in Iraq. He kills in Afghanistan. And this is supposed to be our master on human rights? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Confrontation with the US, a recurrent feature of Zimbabwe’s political history since <a href="https://roape.net/2020/01/17/one-who-preferred-death-to-imperialism/">the 1960s</a>, surged after Washington adopted a bipartisan <a href="https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/11/2019/post-mugabe-zimbabwe-retreats-western-outreach-embraces-africa">sanctions package</a> in 2001. The European Union also imposed sanctions. </p>
<p>US officials have <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1158">repeatedly stated</a> that the sanctions target specific individuals or entities that have abused human rights or undermined democracy. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200924-zimbabwe-leader-tells-un-that-sanctions-hurt-development">Zanu-PF has responded</a> by pointing to UN reporting which notes that the sanctions have weakened the country’s economy and impeded national development.</p>
<p>I am a historian of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. My <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Pan-Africanism-Versus-Partnership-Decolonisation-Rhodesian-ebook/dp/B0BSKNHMYH/ref=sr_1_2?qid=1681393772&refinements=p_n_publication_date%3A1250228011&s=books&sr=1-2">forthcoming book</a> focuses on its formative stages in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This was when Mugabe first became active in politics and the US got more involved in the politics of what was then Rhodesia, a British colony. In my view, the 21st century hostility obscures a nuanced historical relationship between the US and Zanu-PF.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/winky-d-is-being-targeted-by-police-in-zimbabwe-why-the-music-stars-voice-is-so-important-202246">Winky D is being targeted by police in Zimbabwe – why the music star's voice is so important</a>
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</p>
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<p>At first, the fledgling liberation movement valued American support. Zanu-PF <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=18593742X">broke away</a> from the Soviet-aligned Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in August 1963. Zanu-PF was originally known as Zanu, but adopted the “PF” suffix <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zanu-pf-wins-first-free-elections-zimbabwe">ahead of elections in 1980</a>.</p>
<p>This context is relevant now because Zanu-PF efforts to consolidate both domestic and pan-African support selectively overlook more compatible aspects of its historical relations with the US.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s anti-American bluster</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF has exploited sanctions to its advantage.</p>
<p>Emmerson Mnangagwa, previously Mugabe’s deputy, <a href="https://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/sadc-mobilizes-anti-sanctions-day-25-october/">came to power</a> in a factional coup in late 2017. He has successfully mobilised pan-African support against sanctions.</p>
<p>Since 2019, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union have observed 25 October as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/26/zimbabwe-regime-sanctions-zanupf">“Anti-Sanctions Day”</a> in solidarity with the Zanu-PF leadership.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/25/thousands-in-zimbabwe-denounce-evil-western-sanctions">anti-American rhetoric</a> is not only deployed to win friends abroad. It is also a prominent campaign tactic at home. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/president-mnangagwa-claimed-zimbabwe-was-open-for-business-whats-gone-wrong-154085">President Mnangagwa claimed Zimbabwe was open for business. What's gone wrong</a>
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<p>With general elections expected <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar2023.php">in July</a> or August, Zanu-PF is following the strategy again. It’s discrediting its leading opponent, Nelson Chamisa of the Citizens Coalition for Change, as a <a href="https://twitter.com/TafadzwaMugwadi/status/1631150059122221056">“US pawn”</a>. </p>
<p>His predecessor, Morgan Tsvangirai, faced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election/mugabe-belittles-opponents-as-frog-and-puppet-idUSL2321227420080223">similar treatment</a>.</p>
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<img alt="A man points ahead with his right index finger in front of banners bearing the acronym 'CCC'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images)</span></span>
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<p>Zimbabwe’s partisan state media routinely employ such terms as <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/us-president-exposes-puppets-in-zim/">“puppets”, “pawns” and “lackeys”</a> to describe Chamisa and his party. These jibes are intended to convince Zimbabwean voters that Chamisa would prioritise foreign interests.</p>
<p>The rhetoric conceals ZANU-PF’s own American ties.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s American connections</h2>
<p>Historically, relations between the US and Zanu-PF have fluctuated. Mugabe formed a <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/a-walk-down-memory-lane-with-andrew-young/">close bond</a> with Andrew Young, the US ambassador to the UN during <a href="https://theconversation.com/jimmy-carters-african-legacy-peacemaker-negotiator-and-defender-of-rights-200744">Jimmy Carter’s presidency</a>. Carter’s government was the <a href="https://diplomacy.state.gov/encyclopedia/u-s-embassy-harare-zimbabwe/">first to open an embassy</a> in independent Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Solid relations continued during the early years of the Reagan administration. Harare was one of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/12/20/us-slashes-aid-to-zimbabwe-by-almost-half/e67886cf-9f52-4fde-beee-83ba1b40c3e0/">top three African recipients</a> of US aid in the early 1980s. </p>
<p>US vice-president <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/11/18/Vice-President-George-Bush-arrived-today-for-talks-with/7630406443600/">George H.W. Bush travelled to Harare</a> in 1982. In 1997, first lady Hillary Clinton made a <a href="https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1997/03/1997-03-11-first-lady-travels-in-africa-later-this-month.html">goodwill visit</a> to Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Ties were even deeper in the early 1960s when the US government encouraged the party’s very establishment. Historian <a href="https://www.kent.edu/history/profile/timothy-scarnecchia">Timothy Scarnecchia</a>, who has mined records in the US national archives, has <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781580463638/the-urban-roots-of-democracy-and-political-violence-in-zimbabwe/">documented the ties</a> that Zanu forged with American officials 60 years ago. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-and-dialogue-in-zimbabwe-twin-strategies-that-arent-working-122139">Repression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren't working</a>
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<p>The organisation’s core leadership in temporary exile in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (then Tanganyika), regularly consulted with US embassy officials in that country. Its leading representatives, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137543462_5">including Mugabe</a>, lobbied the US government for funding. (There is no evidence that the new party received any directly.) </p>
<p>Zanu’s first president, <a href="https://www.sithole.org/biography.php">Ndabaningi Sithole</a>, received theological education in the US in the late 1950s. Archival records show that on the eve of Zanu’s formation he met with State Department officials in Washington DC who connected him to private American funders. In another archived account of a meeting with the US ambassador in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in July 1963, Leopold Takawira, subsequently Zanu’s first vice-president, relayed that Sithole regarded the US as his second home.</p>
<p>Herbert Chitepo, who became Zanu’s national chair, visited the US in July 1963 and also met with American diplomats. According to a record of their conversation in the US national archives, Chitepo expressed his desire to accept US funding and defied</p>
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<p>anyone to call him an American stooge.</p>
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<p>The 11 July 1963 issue of Zimbabwe Today, a periodical produced by Zapu in Tanzania, declared that following Sithole’s return from the US,</p>
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<p>the American dollar and its ugly imperialist head is clearly visible in the actions of Mr. Sithole. </p>
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<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on Chamisa and his party’s supposed American connections is a repackaging of the very attacks Mnangagwa’s party faced from Zapu when it was formed 60 years ago. </p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>Although it has not been well documented, the US provided critical support during Zanu’s founding in 1963. It also helped the party consolidate its authority following independence in 1980. Since the US government imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2001, these ties have been overshadowed. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">Can Zimbabwe finally ditch a history of violence and media repression?</a>
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<p>As elections approach in Zimbabwe, the role of the US looms large. Zanu-PF overlooks historical aspects of its own relations with the US as it seeks to undermine its domestic opposition and appeal to continental allies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zanu-PF’s anti-American rhetoric is not only deployed to win friends abroad. As elections approach, it is also a prominent campaign tactic at home.Brooks Marmon, Post-doctoral Scholar, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1857832022-07-27T14:52:14Z2022-07-27T14:52:14ZNoViolet Bulawayo’s new novel is an instant Zimbabwean classic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475654/original/file-20220722-234-kbs6yj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Noviolet Bulawayo, Zimbabwean writer.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Leonardo Cendamo/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In Zimbabwean author <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/19/noviolet-bulawayo-animal-farm-style-allegory-important-hope-zimbabwe-orwell-glory">NoViolet Bulawayo</a>’s new novel <a href="https://novioletbulawayo.com/books/glory/">Glory</a> – <a href="https://thebookerprizes.com/the-booker-library/prize-years/2022">longlisted</a> for the Booker Prize 2022 – animals take on human characteristics. Through this she explores what happens when an authoritarian regime implodes, using characters who are horses, pigs, dogs, cows, cats, chickens, crocodiles, birds and butterflies. </p>
<p>Bulawayo’s celebrated first novel, <a href="https://novioletbulawayo.com/books/we-need-new-names/">We Need New Names</a>, was a coming-of-age story about the escapades of a Zimbabwean girl named Darling who ends up living in America. Its hallmarks are accentuated in this new work: the troubled real world of class struggles, psychological dualities, colonial and postcolonial histories, war and the dog-eat-dog politics of contemporary Africa.</p>
<p>Glory is set in a kingdom called Jidada, which could be <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Mugabe</a>’s Zimbabwe, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Idi-Amin">Idi Amin</a>’s Uganda, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hastings-Kamuzu-Banda">Hastings Banda</a>’s Malawi, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">Mobutu Sese Seko</a>’s Zaire, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/12/1/the-hypocrisy-of-emmerson-mnangagwa">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>’s Zimbabwe or any other authoritarian regime in Africa, for there are many. The tropes Bulawayo makes fun of are so recognisable and familiar. </p>
<p>Perhaps as memorable as the names in her first novel (Bastard, Godknows) are those of these animal characters (Comrade Nevermiss Nzinga, General Judas Goodness Reza). There is also a Father of the Nation, Sisters of the Disappeared and Defenders of the Revolution, Seat of Power and the Chosen. And there’s the Soldiers of Christ Prophetic Church of Churches.</p>
<p>In fact, there is something almost playful about this book. When politics becomes a farce, it only requires a virtuoso like Bulawayo to marshal the faux pas into a memorable fictional narrative. </p>
<p>The novel fictionalises the real politics of Zimbabwe, from the removal of Mugabe to the rise to power of his former vice-president, Mnangagwa, in 2017 and the years since, during which Zimbabwe’s economy has suffered and the political promises of the “second republic” have gone unfulfilled. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover in bright red and green with black animals illustrated - a horse, cow, dog and a pig on a yellow moon with the words 'GLORY'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=907&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/475655/original/file-20220722-18-90zoy.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Chatto & Windus/Penguin Books</span></span>
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<p>But in order to transcend the particular, the novel is allegoric, capturing the essence of the matter as told by a bold, vivid chorus of animal voices that helps us see our human world more clearly. </p>
<p>In Jidada, the tyrannical Old Horse is ousted in a coup after a 40-year rule. At first there is excitement about the change that will come. But Tuvius Delight Shasha (a former vice-president) leads the country into despair. Destiny Lozikeyi Khumalo, a goat who returns to Jidada after a decade away, becomes a chronicler of her nation’s history and an advocate for its future. </p>
<h2>Humour as resistance</h2>
<p>In an interview in the immediate aftermath of the Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2017/nov/15/zimbabwe-army-control-harare-coup-robert-mugabe-live">coup d’etat</a> in 2017, Bulawayo talked about attempting to write about the fall of <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Mugabe</a> in nonfiction but <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2022/mar/19/noviolet-bulawayo-animal-farm-style-allegory-important-hope-zimbabwe-orwell-glory">abandoning that effort</a>. She found the novel to be a better form for political satire.</p>
<p>Bulawayo’s writing is distinctive. There is a lyricism to her prose, a poetics of language that mesmerises and surprises. This gives her fiction an applied, intense focus. </p>
<p>Translating a present-day political and cultural milieu is tricky. The political language of contemporary Zimbabwe is oppositional, underpinned in historically deep-seated ethnic “for or against” binaries. By refusing to limit her language, Bulawayo shows the shallowness and historical ignorance behind political power in her utopian African country. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/guide-to-the-classics-orwells-1984-and-how-it-helps-us-understand-tyrannical-power-today-112066">Guide to the classics: Orwell's 1984 and how it helps us understand tyrannical power today</a>
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<p>Bulawayo also knows how to use language to good effect by deploying irony and comedy. Her use of humour in the novel is a form of political resistance that splinters the make-believe world of an out-of-touch political class.</p>
<h2>Massacres</h2>
<p>Glory is an unforgettable book that goes beyond the obvious comparison to its inspiration, the UK author George Orwell’s 1945 classic <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Animal-Farm">Animal Farm</a>. His book reflects events leading up to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and provides a strong critique against <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Stalinism">Stalinism</a>.</p>
<p>Glory has a lively rhetorical idiom; it is full of colour and vigour. As <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/06/books/review/noviolet-bulawayo-glory.html">one reviewer</a> wrote: “Bulawayo is really out-Orwelling Orwell.” Both authors reference the disarray and traumatic conditions of the world in a distinct and powerful way. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artists-have-preserved-the-memory-of-zimbabwes-1980s-massacres-143847">How artists have preserved the memory of Zimbabwe's 1980s massacres</a>
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<p>Bulawayo’s novel is also an epic that narrates the misdeeds and violent adventures of the past history of Jidada, such as the time of “Gukurahundi” when the rulers tortured, raped and executed the animals. The Gukurahundi was a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artists-have-preserved-the-memory-of-zimbabwes-1980s-massacres-143847">genocide</a> that took place in Zimbabwe between 1983 and 1987 when more than 20,000 people were massacred in Matebeleland.</p>
<h2>A global story</h2>
<p>The challenge for Bulawayo, or any writer for that matter, was how to write about a coup still in progress that was described as <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-20-zimbabwe-when-is-a-coup-not-a-coup/">a-coup-not-a-coup</a>. How could one write about the events that started when Mugabe was overthrown with the promise of new Zimbabwe that is yet to come?</p>
<p>The end of his reign was a festival of dancing and singing for a generation that knew nothing else but his brutality. Young people posed for Instagram photos with friendly-looking gun-wielding soldiers. They welcomed back a disgraced former vice-president who – like Tuvius Delight Shasha – became the new “Ruler of the Nation and Veteran of the Liberation War, the Greatest Leader of Jidada, Enemy of Corruption, Opener for Business, the Inventor of the Scarf of the Nation, the Survivor of All Assassination Attempts…”</p>
<p>It’s a particular challenge to write about regimes that enforce everything with violence. And yet Bulawayo’s vibrant satire succeeds in telling a political parable that also reflects the times. </p>
<p>Glory is a tour de force. It is not a story about endings but about unravellings. It is not a book about the past, but a book about the present and the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185783/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Playing out in an animal kingdom, Glory is a devastating political commentary on Zimbabwe today.Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Junior Research Fellow, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1804552022-05-01T08:42:45Z2022-05-01T08:42:45ZHow informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe shape notions of citizenship<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458856/original/file-20220420-20-u819n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vincent Nhidza, right, and colleague Mathew Simango, arrange coffins at a street workshop in Harare, Zimbabwe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the late 1990s, as companies in Zimbabwe have shut down and laid off workers due to the country’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282076567_The_Crisis_in_Zimbabwe_1998-2008_Brian_Raftopoulos">economic crisis</a>, people have resorted to the informal sector to earn a living. It is estimated that <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-lockdown-on-zimbabwes-informal-economy/">90%</a> of Zimbabweans now have informal sector livelihoods.</p>
<p>Gradually, informal sector organisations emerged in response to fundamental changes in the economy, politics, and social life from the 2000s. They allowed people to network, get training in business, finance and collective bargaining, and campaign for their socio-economic rights.</p>
<p>Traditionally, trade unions and NGOs were a major focus of study for the country’s political scientists. By the mid-2010s, though, informal sector organisations had become prominent civil society actors. They had become closer to people than other organisations. </p>
<p>But how exactly did they contribute to the political sphere? This question is important for two reasons. Firstly, the informal sector in Zimbabwe is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2013.858541">highly politicised</a>, and any organisation in the informal sector has a potential for some political outcome. Secondly, the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/making-an-impact-from-the-margins-civil-society-groups-in-zimbabwes-interim-powersharing-process/24EDBBF6B3B50994D0399FB5DE5E4F08">civil society</a> in Zimbabwe has also played an important role in politics, and it is useful to understand the political role of newly emerged actors.</p>
<p>My 2016 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2022.2023295">study</a> focused on three informal sector organisations that were prominent in the mid-2010s. The <a href="https://www.zciea.org.zw/">Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations</a> grew out of the once politically potent <a href="http://www.zctu.co.zw/">Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The <a href="https://zimvendors.wordpress.com/">National Vendors Unions of Zimbabwe</a> was especially politically active at that time. The Zimbabwe Informal Sector Organisation focused on business development. It was led by a former opposition youth leader, <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/whos-who-in-zimbabwes-anti-government-struggle-20160830">Promise Mkwananzi</a>.</p>
<p>For my qualitative study, I interviewed their leaders and regular members as well as civic activists, politicians and city councillors. I expanded my original pool of over 80 respondents during <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d46cddbd-00e2-44a8-ad65-3c87f887d5ed">further research</a> on citizenship in urban Zimbabwe in 2017-2018. </p>
<p>I asked them about informal sector organisations and the role they played in their members’ lives. I inquired about how they affected people’s views and relations with the authorities and political parties. I also asked about their place in Zimbabwe’s civic and political arenas.</p>
<h2>Shaping perceptions, driving self-reliance</h2>
<p>Because of these bodies’ organisational characteristics and relations with civic actors, I expected to find direct linkages with party politics and so-called hashtag movements, such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/this-time-the-uprising-in-zimbabwe-is-different-but-will-it-bring-regime-change-62447">#Tajamuka and #ThisFlag</a>. These were booming in 2016 in response to the economic and financial crisis, corruption and political oppression.</p>
<p>Contrary to my expectations, I discovered more unique, subtle, and nuanced influences of the informal sector organisations on people’s perceptions of themselves as political actors in relation to parties, social movements, the government, and local authorities. They also influenced how individuals and groups viewed the political community, informal sector, and their place in these structures.</p>
<p>I learned that these organisations had a significant impact on stimulating their members to become self-reliant citizens. In contrast, the government’s approach to the informal sector, especially to street vendors and cross-border traders, was ambiguous and frequently <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/06/vendors-army-backs-off/">confrontational</a>. </p>
<p>The local authorities’ attitudes were often hostile to street vendors and people engaged in “backyard industries”. For example, they <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/07/live-updatesvendors-evicted-from-harare-cbd/">evicted</a> vendors from undesignated vending sites in the city centre many times.</p>
<p>The organisations did not abandon regular governmental politics. They wrote petitions and engaged in protests and demonstrations. But, to a large extent, they shifted to survival, or non-governmental politics. This is citizen-driven political action that is small in scope, with a primary goal of self-help to survive.</p>
<p>National Vendors Unions of Zimbabwe members, for example, united to confront political patronage at a market in the Harare city centre when a pro-ruling party organisation seized vending spaces. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations established a revolving fund to help members save money to use to develop their businesses.</p>
<p>While these actions were quite limited, they helped develop a sense of community. They also provided tools for ensuring safety and support as most people did not rely on help from the authorities. This self-reliance became the norm.</p>
<p>I was surprised to discover that these three informal sector organisations, besides stimulating their members to become self-reliant, also shaped very distinct notions, and consequently practices of citizenship, among them. This was through training and collective action.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association’s notion of citizenship was collectivist. Its members often referred to it as “family”. This was due to the chamber’s former close connection to the trade unions that gave it a start. Its members expected trade union-like protection from it. </p>
<p>The National Vendors Unions of Zimbabwe, the most politically active of the three, cultivated the classic rights-based definition of citizenship. Its members had a profound awareness of their socio-economic and human rights. Their agenda was quite broad.</p>
<p>They campaigned for issues that affected street vendors <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit-m-vendors-stage-protest-at-town-house-newsday-zimbabwe/">directly</a>, such as harassment and confiscation of their wares. They also took on broader political issues. An example was the <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/06/protests-mphoko-hotel-stay/">inappropriate spending of taxpayers’ money</a> by Vice-President Phelekezela Mphoko in June 2016. They also opposed the <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2016/09/06/vendors-surprise-police-defy-ban-protests/">ban on protests</a> in September 2016.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Informal Sector Organisation, the youngest of the three organisations, focused on business training and financial literacy. It shaped a notion of citizenship based on respectability. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe has had very particular notions of urban <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=epkrt-Y-qOkC">modernity and respectability</a> since the colonial and early post-colonial periods. These are related to formal employment, a clear and direct link between education and employment, urban planning, and lifestyle. Many <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319393229_Harare_From_a_European_settler-colonial_'sunshine_city'_to_a_'zhing-zhong'_African_city">aspects of this modernity were lost</a> due to the economic crisis that led to informalisation. </p>
<p>In my interviews, the organisation’s members proudly referred to themselves as businessmen and businesswomen and entrepreneurs. They were rethinking these notions of modernity in line with the radically changed economic conditions.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The informal sector in Zimbabwe has been very dynamic, fluid, and affected by broader economic and political developments. </p>
<p>Being novel actors, these and other informal sector organisations try to find the space for themselves to engage with people, other civil society actors, and influence politics. This while combating marginalisation of the informal sector by the authorities. </p>
<p>The development of informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe has no fixed trajectory yet. What is without doubt and unique about their diversity is that they have the potential to influence politics at a personal and societal level – by shaping particular notions of what it means to earn a living in the informal sector.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristina Pikovskaia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe have the potential to influence politics at a personal and societal level.Kristina Pikovskaia, Tutor, International Development, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624532021-06-10T14:44:35Z2021-06-10T14:44:35ZA new film about Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections is worth watching, but flawed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405442/original/file-20210609-14813-1i0akh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A still featuring opposition leader Nelson Chamisa from the film President (2021).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louverture Films/President/Encounters South African International Documentary Festival</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Danish director <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1600828/">Camilla Nielsson</a>’s documentary <a href="https://www.encounters.co.za/film/president/#jp-carousel-242670"><em>President</em></a> (2021) is an up-close, intimate tale. It follows the election travails of Zimbabwe’s main <a href="https://www.mdcallianceparty.org">opposition party</a> the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance and its leader, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa</a>.</p>
<p>Winner of the prestigious Sundance Film Festival’s Special Jury <a href="https://www.sundance.org/blogs/news/2021-sundance-film-festival-awards-announced">Award</a> for Verité Filmmaking, the film deploys an “in the moment” technique as it follows the lead-up to the 2018 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">general elections</a>. </p>
<p>It documents Chamisa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-mdc-faces-a-leadership-contest-but-can-it-be-peaceful-112967">battle</a> against the governing Zanu-PF party leader and acting Zimbabwean president <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-and-the-military-may-mean-more-bad-news-for-zimbabwe-87646">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. Mnangagwa ousted Zimbabwe’s 37-year ruler <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a> in 2017. As the film’s promotional material explains: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>As the election looms closer, it becomes increasingly clear that … an election is no guarantee of a democratic outcome.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If you have lingering hopes that the Zanu-PF soldiers’ coup replacing the doddering nonagenerian would leave <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">Mugabe’s legacy</a> behind, settle down for an intense viewing. </p>
<p>Your hopes will crash, with the opposition troops that <em>President</em> follows. They will die, shot down as brutally as the six demonstrators – and bystanders – displaying their anger at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s delayed <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">election tallies</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps enough Zimbabwean politics-watchers in southern Africa can move the discussion beyond the liberal <a href="https://www.screendaily.com/reviews/president-sundance-review/5156629.article">good vs evil</a> <a href="https://variety.com/2021/film/reviews/president-review-sundance-1234895097/">platitudes</a> repeated by the film’s reviewers to date. A local audience should offer critical and nuanced views.</p>
<h2>Political thriller?</h2>
<p>A Fulbright graduate of visual anthropology and filmmaking at New York University, director Nielsson has several socially conscious films under her belt, often about the plight of children, in <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0408818/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_8">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2115303/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_7">Darfur</a> and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1641626/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_6">India</a>. Her <a href="https://variety.com/2014/film/festivals/film-review-democrats-1201361085/">famed</a> documentary <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4143306/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_4"><em>Democrats</em></a> (2014) covered Zimbabwe’s 2010-2013 constitution-making excursion. </p>
<p><em>President</em> avoids feeding the audience a lot of background history and politics. Nielsson <a href="https://cineuropa.org/en/interview/397158/">says</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We … try to be there when things happen, instead of telling it all backwards and coming up with some sort of analysis. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The film is sold as a political thriller. But as Eric Kohn – perhaps the sole, though mild, critical voice – <a href="https://www.indiewire.com/2021/02/president-review-documentary-zimbabwe-election-1234614636/">writes</a>: the long meetings with Chamisa and company debating how to beat the unbeatable are “less thrilling than exhaustive, a kind of informational activism in feature form”.</p>
<p>Maybe 45 wasted minutes covering meetings could have been used to fill in some glaring gaps that local audiences will notice. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/hthioiO6i0A?wmode=transparent&start=41" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The trailer for the documentary, released in 2021.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Classic documentary moments</h2>
<p>One such moment might have followed the (unnamed) academic <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/staff/phillan-zamchiya/">Phillan Zamchiya</a>. (The film does not identify enough of its characters.) In a hotel room, Chamisa’s lawyerly team debates the next steps. It becomes starkly apparent that this election will go down the drain too. </p>
<p>The camera catches Zamchiya from behind. No polite critic, he <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2013.858546">argues</a> that Zanu-PF are military. They are guerrillas, he says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If people are not prepared to die, to go to prison … you are not going to take power away from this regime, believe me or not. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He might have qualified that Zanu-PF is especially so after the coup, when the pro-Mugabe ‘intelligentsia’ faction was dumped.</p>
<p>Once a student leader severely battered during the early struggles for Zimbabwe’s democracy – as is true for Chamisa, the film shows – Zamchiya knows of what he speaks.</p>
<p>The tortured polling agents filing affidavits about their beatings as they posted ballot reports speak eloquently of that plight. However, the film is silent about how ill-prepared they were for their crucial task. The deceased 1 August demonstrators, angry at the deliberately slow counting of the vote, speak for their last time. The timid <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-motlanthe-commissions-anniversary-of-shame">commission of inquiry</a> into their deaths muted them further.</p>
<p><em>President</em>’s filming of those moments is classic. It’s clear why a good documentary can beat the stills. Watch very closely as the officer claps the back of the soldier who shot at the dispersing crowd. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chaotic street scene featuring half eight soldiers in camouflage and a policeman. One soldier has kneeled and is shooting his rifle. Behind him another has his hand up to slap him on the back, laughing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A screen grab showing a soldier clapping the back of another who has fired on the crowd.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louverture Films/President</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet Zamchiya’s challenge, if pursued, could have raised more questions of the film’s unfolding events.</p>
<h2>Ignored issues</h2>
<p>Like what other forces shaped this moment? During <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a>’s white rule the liberation armies’ military pressure forced the racist regime to the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/race-and-diplomacy-in-zimbabwe/0598BE6A7E9C4D1F0F1DCE36291EB473">negotiating table</a>. This would not have happened without the West because of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a>. But the West’s post-1989 enthusiasm for democracy-lite <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597">waned</a>. By 2017 it seemed the once opposition-friendly Brits were <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/11/08/zimbabwe-the-uks-misguided-role-in-the-rise-and-fall-of-mnangagwa/">backing</a> the sluggish thug Emmerson Mnangagwa who took over the country. </p>
<p>Or the context of how the original opposition’s <a href="https://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/store/history,-politics-and-development/building-from-the-rubble-the-labour-movement-in-zimbabwe-since-2000-by-lloyd-sachikonye-et-al-detail">trade union</a> roots disappeared due to devastating de-industrialisation after the fast track land reform started in the early 2000s – leading to the opposition party’s takeover by lawyers and neo-liberal fantasies.</p>
<p>Lawyers do argue well. <a href="https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/thabani-mpofu-released-on-bail/">Thabani Mpofu</a>’s valiant, expertly filmed, attempts at the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe to challenge the vote counting amounted to nothing in the end. It was pleasurable, though, to watch electoral commission bosses and judges trying not to squirm. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But those who adored Nielsson’s previous film <em>Democrats</em> and its hero, the lawyer Douglas Mwonzora, will know that he has become a leader of a splinter opposition faction <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/mwonzora-dumped-accused-of-duping-supporters-to-join-zanu-pf/">allegedly</a> working with Zanu-PF. They will wonder how long this move brewed. </p>
<p>The Movement for Democratic Change’s earlier splits, patched up in the alliance only as elections approached, are ignored too. So too Chamisa’s rapid and contested <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mdc-t-does-succession-the-zanu-pf-way">moves</a> to the top of the party after former opposition leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> died.</p>
<p>Those 45 minutes could have offered much more meaning. Aside from avoiding Chamisa’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6hfvMP7IE8">religious side</a> <em>President</em> could have screened its footage of Chamisa’s press conference in the wake of Zanu-PF’s chaotic <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">coup consolidator</a>, as 2019 began. </p>
<p>Dead: at least 17 demonstrators and bystanders. Raped: the same number. Meanwhile, Zanu-PF ‘youth’ set the opposition headquarters alight. The charred walls said it all. They would answer the question of why Chamisa’s pursuit of free and fair elections will not go far in 2023, but also why there are no other choices.</p>
<p><em>President</em> zooms in on the moment at the cost of the big picture. Zooming out could have helped.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>President opens the <a href="https://www.encounters.co.za">Encounters</a> South African International Documentary Festival in Johannesburg on 10 June and then plays in select South African cinemas from 11-21 June.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162453/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The award-winning documentary - now on in South Africa - follows opposition leader Nelson Chamisa. But it spends too much time in meetings instead of giving insight into the bigger picture.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1540852021-01-31T14:55:02Z2021-01-31T14:55:02ZPresident Mnangagwa claimed Zimbabwe was open for business. What’s gone wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380858/original/file-20210127-21-12mklr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa meets his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping in Beijing, in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Lintao Zhang / POOL</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In November 2017 Zimbabwe’s military <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-coup/index.html">replaced</a> Robert Mugabe as head of state with his long-time confidante Emmerson Mnangagwa. He declared Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/24/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-new-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-tells-davos.html">“open for business”</a>, linking foreign relations with economic policy. As he <a href="https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/ff7b7050/files/uploaded/HE%20INAUGURATION%20SPEECH.pdf">stated</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>We look forward to playing a positive and constructive role as a free, democratic, transparent and responsible member of the family of nations.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>International expectations (more so than those among local people) looked forward to <a href="https://www.odi.org/blogs/10581-zimbabwe-after-mugabe-three-reasons-hope">translating these promises into policy</a>. This was despite the fact that Mugabe’s departure had been anything but democratic.</p>
<p>But there have been few if any changes in Zimbabwe’s political trajectory. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-shattered-economy-poses-a-serious-challenge-to-fighting-covid-19-135066">deepening economic crisis</a> combined with a brutal crackdown on the government’s domestic opponents has resulted <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">in disappointments</a>.</p>
<p>On the foreign policy front Mnangagwa has fared no better. In a recently published <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909620986579">analysis</a> we examine the status of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. We identify what’s gone wrong in its efforts at rapprochement with Western countries in a bid to get sanctions lifted, and why its efforts at cosying up to China haven’t gone to plan either. </p>
<p>We conclude that Mnangagwa’s hopes of reorienting Zimbabwe’s foreign policy have been confounded by his government’s own actions. Its repressive response to mounting economic and political crisis increased rather than diminished its isolation. The more the Mnangagwa government <a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-and-dialogue-in-zimbabwe-twin-strategies-that-arent-working-122139">fails to engage democratically</a> with its own citizens, the more it will negate any prospect of re-engagement. </p>
<h2>Relations with its neighbours</h2>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Mugabe</a> era the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been tolerant of the Zanu-PF regime’s politics.</p>
<p>SADC’s annual summit in 2019 demanded an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49386829">end to Western sanctions</a>.
But the continued repressive nature of Mnangagwa’s regime is not making this loyalty easy.</p>
<p>Tensions have begun to show. In August 2020, South Africa <a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-in-zimbabwe-exposes-south-africas-weakness-144309">dispatched official envoys</a> to Harare to press for restraint on the Mnangagwa government in its actions against opposition figures. The envoys weren’t greeted warmly. Instead they were subjected to a presidential harangue and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-08-11-mnangagwa-blocks-ramaphosa-envoys-from-meeting-opposition-leaders/">denied the opportunity to meet the opposition</a>. </p>
<p>A subsequent mission by South Africa’s governing party the African National Congress (ANC), acting as a fellow liberation movement, was as <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-not-a-province-of-sa-zanu-pf/">shoddily treated</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa’s patience may be wearing thin. But, for its part, the Southern African Development Community has preferred to officially ignore developments by remaining silent. But while “business as usual” translates into continued political loyalty, it does not translate into increased economic collaboration.</p>
<h2>The West</h2>
<p>Two decades ago the US and European Union imposed sanctions on those linked to the government in <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR/article-full-text-pdf/AB5078E40670">response to human rights abuses</a>. Mugabe’s regime reacted by blaming its economic woes on the West. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Mnangagwa</a> decried sanctions as western attempts to bring about <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202008280420.html">“regime change”</a>.</p>
<p>Unimpressed by the rhetoric, the US extended restrictive measures against targeted individuals and companies <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2779/text">in August 2018</a>. In March 2019, US sanctions <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-zimbabwe-sanctions-idUSKCN1QM01Q">were renewed</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, the EU demonstrated more willingness to reengage with Harare. In October 2019 the EU announced an aid package, bringing support during the year to €67.5 million. Aid to Zimbabwe since 2014 stood at <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6170">€287 million in 2020</a>. This made the EU Zimbabwe’s biggest donor. To ease the woes of the COVID-19 pandemic, it added another €14.2 million humanitarian assistance <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/eu-gives-zimbabwe-nearly-r14-billion-aid">in 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, continued to blame the West for sanctions he compared with cancer. Responding to criticism <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/10/we-aint-moved-by-march-eu-us/">the EU declared</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe is not where it is because of the so-called sanctions, but years of mismanagement of the economy and corruption.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, the US Ambassador <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/zimbabwe-s-anti-sanctions-march-much-ado-about-nothing/1652712">dismissed</a> “any responsibility for the catastrophic state of the economy and the government’s abuse of its own citizens”. </p>
<p>US Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Jim Risch called upon the Southern African Development Community’s 16 members states to </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/10/we-aint-moved-by-march-eu-us/">focus their energies on supporting democracy, not kleptocratic regimes</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Looking East</h2>
<p>The deterioration of Zimbabwe’s relations with the West coincided with growing Chinese interest in access to African resources for its own rapidly expanding industries. Zimbabwe’s growing isolation offered a convenient entry point. </p>
<p>But, China’s greater involvement was spurred less by solidarity than by self-interest. And it’s singular importance in throwing a life-line to the Zimbabwean regime in need gave it enormous influence in directing the collaboration. Failure to mend relations with the West and other global institutions leaves Zimbabwe with no other partners for development and cooperation, thus <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0974928417749642">vulnerable to manipulation by China</a>.</p>
<p>An initial honeymoon started at the turn of the century, after Zimbabwe became isolated from the West through its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2019.1622210">fast-track land reform</a> of 2000, and the increased repression of the political opposition. But China became increasingly concerned about Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329144700_The_Indigenisation_Policy_and_Economic_Emancipation_in_Zimbabwe_A_Case_Study_of_the_Zimunya-Marange_Communities">indigenisation policy</a>. With Chinese companies the largest foreign direct investors, the announced enforcement of the 51% Zimbabwean ownership in assets exceeding US$ 500,000 from April 2016 <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/04/26/chinas-pains-over-zimbabwes-indigenization-plan/">caused discomfort</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s elevation to the presidency may have received China’s blessing as the best option available. Nonetheless, strains soon appeared. When it became increasingly apparent that Zimbabwe was unable to service its debts, China wrote off some of the liabilities <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/china-writes-off-zims-debt-report-20180405">in 2018</a>. </p>
<p>What particularly rankled Beijing was that Harare’s incapacity to pay its debts was deemed to be due to the government’s misappropriation or misuse of Chinese funds. Accordingly, there was need to tighten controls. This culminated in the signing of a currency swap deal <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1786207/chinas-currency-swap-deal-with-zimbabwe-could-backfire/">in January 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Back in mid-2019 China’s embassy in Harare had already <a href="http://zw.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxws/t1677101.htm">stressed</a> that development relied mainly on a country’s own efforts. It expressed hope that the Zimbabwean side would continue to create a more favourable environment for all foreign direct investment, including Chinese enterprises.</p>
<p>Indications suggest that China’s patience with the ailing Zimbabwean “all weather friend” is <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3037104/will-china-ever-tire-zimbabwes-corruption-and-bad-debt">wearing thinner</a>. The new economic challenges following the COVID-19 pandemic might have shifted priorities in global supply chains. This is also affecting the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, China’s massive global infrastructure project. This might reduce interest in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26937614?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">what Zimbabwe has to offer</a> by way of natural resources. </p>
<h2>No stability, no money, few friends?</h2>
<p>Zimbabwean foreign policy remains locked in the parameters of recent times past: looking to regional solidarity, estranged from the West, and increasingly dependent on China. </p>
<p>Yet China has its own very clearly defined interests. These focus on resource extraction in mining and agriculture for its own domestic economy. As a strategic and developmental partner, Zimbabwe is of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/polp.12373">minor interest</a>. </p>
<p>Chinese-Zimbabwean relations serve <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0021909619848783">an elite in the Zanu-PF government</a>. They are accused of <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/03/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-wants-to-give-china-investors-the-boot.html">“asset stripping”</a>. They exclude any oversight, civil society involvement, and lack transparency and accountability. The absence of visible benefits for ordinary Zimbabweans has engendered <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0975087820971443">anti-Chinese sentiments</a>.</p>
<p>Having failed to restore friendly relations with the West, and its “look east policy” not bearing fruits, has left the Mnangagwa regime with few options. Russia has entered the arena, showing increased interest in the extractive industries, arms trade and <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/russias-resurgence-in-africa-zimbabwe-and-mozambique/">political fraternisation</a>.</p>
<p>This sounds not much like an alternative to the current ties with China. The bedfellows remain more than less of the same. And an old adage comes to mind: with friends like these one does not need enemies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The more President Mnangagwa’s government fails to engage democratically with its own citizens, the more it will negate any prospect of re-engagement with the West.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaRoger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1225862020-09-17T08:01:03Z2020-09-17T08:01:03ZThousands of unidentified Zimbabweans lie in secret mass graves – and I want to find them<p>One of my earliest memories is of violence and death. It happened in Harare in 1984 when I was about seven years old. I was supposed to meet a friend to play at a dump site together. He got there before me and started playing with what turned out to be a hand grenade. The bomb exploded in his hands. He died. I was lucky to survive but I have no doubt that the incident shaped who I was to become.</p>
<p>The device, from my understanding now, had been left by either Rhodesian soldiers or guerrilla fighters during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tribute-to-zimbabwean-liberation-hero-dumiso-dabengwa-117986">war of liberation</a> which raged between 1966 and 1979. Death from grenades and <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/landmine-monitor-2017/casualties.aspx.">landmines</a> was commonplace in Zimbabwe during and after the struggle against colonial rule. </p>
<p>My next exposure to serious violence came when I joined the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) as a constable in 1998. I was trained by former liberation war fighters and soldiers whom we suspected had been redeployed from the notorious “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mugabe-violence/mugabes-legacy-thousands-killed-in-rain-that-washes-away-the-chaff-idUSKCN1VR18H">5th Brigade</a>”. This army unit was responsible for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">murder of thousands</a> of Ndebele speaking people and supporters of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union in the 1980s. I joined the police partly due to the lack of employment opportunities and the influence from my stepfather who was a police sergeant. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">ZRP officer Keith Silika in the late 1990s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>The police trainers would subject recruits like me to various forms of torture, including water boarding and battering the soles of our feet with rifle butts and sticks. There were other “endurance exercises” that went way over the top. For example, recruits would be ordered to lie down and forced to roll over repeatedly until we were dizzy and throwing up. Apparently, this was done to strengthen us – both physically and mentally – and to get rid of “civilian weaknesses”, as one trainer put it. I spent most of my post probation period with the Police Protection Unit – the agency responsible for the protection of prominent state ministers, judges and other VIPs.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>This article is part of Conversation Insights
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em> </p>
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<p>But I only really began to realise the extent of the systemic violence in my home country when I left Zimbabwe and started looking up texts, documentaries and meeting surviving victims of atrocities. In the last 50 years, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289331331_When_a_state_turns_on_its_citizens_60_years_of_institutionalised_violence_in_Zimbabwe">five main conflicts</a> have taken place in Zimbabwe. The liberation war (1966-1979), political violence (1980-present day) and the Matabeleland democides (1981-1987) – this is also known as Gukurahundi which is a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shona_language">Shona</a> word meaning “early rain that washes the spring chaff”. </p>
<p>Finally there were the violent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/02/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">farm invasions</a> and the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_9556000/9556242.stm">Marange diamond massacre</a>. Hundreds of thousands of people who were caught up in these conflicts have been killed and gone missing – their deaths covered up and brushed under the carpet by the state.</p>
<p>By 2005 I had joined the police in the UK. But despite my new life I couldn’t stop thinking about how, when and where people were being kidnapped, killed and concealed back home. This had a profound influence on what I chose to do with the next chapter of my life in academia and research. I enrolled for a degree in Forensics and Criminology, pursued a master’s degree in Crime Scene Investigation and then a PhD in Forensic Archaeology.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15740773.2020.1729614#metrics-content">My research</a> has brought me full circle and taken me back to those dangerous playgrounds which I drifted in and out of as a child. I wanted to use my skills as a forensic investigator to find the secret mass graves, the clandestine burial spots. I wanted to know where “the missing” were being hidden. I realised that no systematic forensic investigation of that kind had ever been undertaken.</p>
<p>I was interested in forensic identification, exhumation and the cultural aspects of burial. I interviewed over 60 witnesses – including current and former MPs, human rights defenders and victim family members. I had to keep the identity of my witness a secret to protect them, as many were in fear of their lives. Speaking out can be fatal in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Some of what I discovered during my journey was startling. The sheer scale of the killing was shocking – so were the methods of torture. Some burial locations seemed to be selected at random, some were opportunistic interment while others took forethought and planning. The burial methods were dependent on which arm of the state had done the killing and when. Despite this, my research was able to uncover the tactics used by the state to hide thousands of bodies. Tactics including, stacking multiple bodies on top of each other at cemeteries, dumping bodies in mortuaries and burying them in forests, near schools, hospitals and in disused mine shafts. </p>
<h2>‘Fallen heroes’</h2>
<p>I discovered – mainly through witness testimony – that the Fallen Heroes Trust (FHT), which is aligned to the ZANU-PF government, has been on the forefront of dubious exhumation and identification practises since the early 1980s. It used approaches which made it almost impossible to find anyone accountable for the deaths. The <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1372034/Zimbabwes-killing-fields-Mass-grave-600-bodies-shaft.html">Monkey William Mine exhumation</a> of over 600 human remains in Chibondo is one such example. Here, standard anthropological identification methods where ignored. And when human remains are discovered, state <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/Zim-mass-grave-becomes-propaganda-20110401">propaganda machinery</a> goes into overdrive. </p>
<p>Supporters of then President Robert Mugabe claimed the bodies were those of people killed between 1966 and 1979 under the regime of former president Ian Smith – the last white prime minister of the former colony of Rhodesia. Forensic tests and DNA analysis were not carried out. Instead, Saviour Kasukuwere, a government minister at the time, told the media that traditional African religious figures would perform rites to invoke spirits to identify the dead.</p>
<p>Mr Kasukuwere, <a href="https://africabriefing.org/2020/06/former-zimbabwe-minister-saviour-kasukuwere-says-coup-plot-allegations-laughable/">who is now in exile</a>, said the Chibondo remains were discovered in 2008 by a gold panner who crawled into the shaft. But spirits of war dead had long “possessed” villagers and children in the district. He said: “The spirits have refused to lie still. They want the world to see what Smith did to our people.”</p>
<p>I spoke to an anthropologist who attended the exhumation as an observer who told me that some of the bodies were wearing contemporary clothing which did not exist during the liberation war. Amnesty International advised the government to halt exhumation, pending <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/exhumation-of-bodies-at-chibondo-mine-causes-controversy-as-organizations-call-for-government-to-end-process-119348439/1458156.html">forensic investigation</a>. But this advice was ignored. </p>
<p>My research also found that the state of the human remains in Chibondo pointed to the presence of <a href="https://www.news-medical.net/life-sciences/What-are-Lipids.aspx#:%7E:text=Lipids%20are%20molecules%20that%20contain,not%20made%20up%20of%20protein.">lipids</a>, blood and decaying flesh. It is highly likely that these bodies are the remains of supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) cadres. Since its formation 1999 hundreds of supporters have been killed, injured or <a href="http://mdc-youthassembly.blogspot.com/p/roll-of-honor.html">disappeared</a>.</p>
<p>The FHT routinely exhumes remains without following accepted and professional forensic approaches. For example, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/humus/">black humus soil</a> was incorrectly attributed to human remains found at an exhumation at Castle Kopje farm in Rusape according to one witness I spoke to. During a different exhumation, another witness told me: “One member of the FHT picked up a walking stick and assigned the remains to the individual next to it.” No other identification was used to ascertain identity, according to my witness.</p>
<p>The FHT also claims to have exhumed over 6,000 bodies around the country using “<a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/man-with-a-rare-calling/">spirit mediums</a>” – who are seemingly deemed more effective than forensic science.</p>
<h2>‘Blood soaked human remains’</h2>
<p>One witness I spoke to described how they were detained at Bhalagwe Camp, which is south of Bulawayo where the 5th Brigade set up a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/1852133.stm">concentration camp</a> in 1985. The source, aged only 14 at the time, witnessed a daily routine of dead bodies <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7388214.stm">being dumped</a> into the disused Antelope mine shafts 5km away. They were dumped in the old gold mine after they had been tortured and killed in the camp. The man, now in his 50s, told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I used to be selected, often to assist in dragging blood soaked human remains from the campsite to be deposited into toilet latrines or transported into nearby disused mineshafts.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another male victim I interviewed recalled how he was seized from a bus travelling from Kezi to Bulawayo at a roadblock. He was 20 at the time and was forced off the bus by the 5th brigade and made to stay at a makeshift detention centre.</p>
<p>It was here, he told me, that he saw a pile of human flesh decomposing and later set alight by soldiers. “Most were killed on the false allegation of harbouring and supporting army deserters or dissidents”, he said. This was quite a common narrative at the time. Up until the present day, vital documents and information about the <a href="https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/MURDER.HTM">democide</a> are not known due to the continued obfuscation of information surrounding the massacres by the government.</p>
<h2>State brutality</h2>
<p>Police are seen by some as being just another partisan arm of the state. But Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabwe1108/7.htm">has reported</a> that people “routinely” die in police custody. Human Rights Watch and my own interviews found that the police and Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) often refuse to transfer the bodies of the dead through normal burial processes and sometimes even refuse victims access to their deceased relative. There have also been cases where they denied further investigation. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the army has been killing people on behalf of the state with impunity since 1980. Witnesses <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9Bk5VIhjiY">have reported</a> seeing the army digging mass grave in Dangamvura cemetery and piling the human remains inside them. On one occasion, a witness saw the army using prisoners to dig the graves.</p>
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<p>The state intelligence services are much more elusive and wield authority over other security departments. They have more resources and can use other apparatus to <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2019/09/01/history-abductions-assassinations/">transfer abductees or human remains</a>. They own properties for training and logistics and some of these locations are are believed to have been used for torture and even burial of human remains, according to <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/10/cio-offices-torture-centres-exposed/">surviving witness testimony</a>. This was also confirmed with a witness I spoke to.</p>
<p>Another witness I interviewed went to the Marange diamond fields at the height of government operation in 2008 – <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/gemd/5644252/Zanu-PF-and-Zimbabwe-military-profiting-from-diamond-massacre.html">Operation Hakudzokwi</a> (“do not return” in Shona). He travelled all the way to Marange, about 120 miles from Chitungwiza, with three friends and got introduced to a syndicate leader who turned out to be a police officer. They were then given a map and some equipment and were directed where to go. He told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We spent three days in the fields playing cat and mouse with security details. We often heard gunshots in the night. In the day we would see police officers collecting bodies in metal coffins.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since 2000, there have been more than 5,000 abductions by the state with about 49 abductions recorded in 2019 alone, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25944&LangID=E">according to the UN</a>. I spoke to three witnesses who were abducted, tortured, stripped naked and then dumped near lake Chivero, which is 37km south-west of Harare. One said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was bundled into a Toyota Land Cruiser vehicle after being trailed by the unmarked vehicle in Harare. When we arrived near the lake they started beating me up with boots and fists.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The man said the thugs were demanding to know what the opposition plan was on an upcoming demonstration. When he could not confirm anything, they left him to walk naked to the main road for help.</p>
<h2>What happened to the dead?</h2>
<p>According to my study of the Gukurahundi killings, bodies were thrown down mine shafts in Antelope, Chibondo, Silobela, Filabusi and Nkayi. Human remains have been found at schools, hospitals, river banks, dams and caves. They have been dumped near business centres, disused airports and at former detention centres like Bhalagwe and Sun Yet Sen, which were set up during elections by war veterans and ZANU-PF youths. In 2011, for instance, a mass grave containing the remains of 60 people collapsed on a field while <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/mass-grave-found-zimbabwe-school">children played football</a>. Victims who are not claimed at mortuaries are given pauper burials. This makes the search and recovery process even more difficult. </p>
<p>The use of cemeteries, like Hanyani and Kumbudzi, for stacking bodies in mass graves, is a particularly nefarious method. Cultural myths associated with the dead mean people very rarely venture into cemeteries. There is a belief that the spirits of the dead roam those places.</p>
<p>The victims of the Marange fields atrocities were killed by criminal syndicates attached to certain military personnel. They were either buried in the mines or taken away. Those taken away were buried by prisoners in cemeteries in Dangamvura, which is 22km away from the mining fields. The army dug two mass graves in Dangamvura cemetery in 2008 and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/06/26/diamonds-rough/human-rights-abuses-marange-diamond-fields-zimbabwe">buried over 60 bodies</a> there.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Missing person Miriam Gonzo" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Miriam Gonzo, 50, from Rushinga, Zimbabwe, listed as missing by Interpol.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices#2019-104770">Interpol</a></span>
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<p>Many of these things are common knowledge in Zimbabwe. Yet despite the alarming number of deaths and kidnaps, the official missing person database for Zimbabwe with Interpol currently stands <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices">at just 15</a>. It includes my cousin, <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices#2019-104770">Miriam Gonzo</a>, who went missing in South Africa. </p>
<p>Curiously it excludes people missing from the various democides, including journalist and human rights defender <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/journalist-and-activist-disappeared-in-zimbabwe">Itai Dzamara</a> who was kidnapped by state agents in broad daylight in 2016 while having a haircut. </p>
<h2>Clouded in secrecy</h2>
<p>Another layer of deception that emerged during the Mugabe era was the issuing of death certificates for the Gukurahundi democide. The vice president at the time, Phelekezela Mphoko, started a programme of issuing <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-government-gukurahundi-atrocities/4868914.html">death certificates</a> to surviving families without any investigation. Such processes will add to the conundrum of trying to identify and reconcile records of the missing in future.</p>
<p>The state often denies all killings and blames them on “insurgents”, “malcontents” and “third parties”. This is the narrative that was offered for the January and August 2019 state killings that saw over 18 people murdered by men in army uniforms. A subsequent <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/motlanthe-commission-s-anniversary-shame.">inquiry</a>, led by former South African president, Kgalema Motlanthe, concluded that the army was culpable – but there are still no prosecutions as a result.</p>
<p>Despite the death of Mugabe, the government continues to mislead the population. In May three women, including MP Joana Mamombe, said they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/10/zimbabwe-charges-activists-with-lying-about-police-torture">were kidnapped</a>, tortured and sexually assaulted by state agents. Not only did the state deny the abductions but they charged the women with breaking COVID-19 lockdown regulations and presenting false information to police.</p>
<p>In 2018 President Emmerson Mnangagwa enacted the <a href="http://www.nprc.org.zw/">National Peace and Reconciliation Act</a>: legislation that facilitated the formation of a commission to look into previous human rights abuses. In addition, the Zimbabwean Parliament is debating the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/coroners-bill-tightens-noose-on-cops-zpcs-and-doctors/">Coroners Act Bill</a> which will establish the office of the coroner to investigate suspicious deaths.</p>
<p>There is a pressing need for human rights groups to compile a comprehensive missing persons database. An independent regulatory authority must oversee this whole process. International organisations, such as the <a href="https://oic.icmp.int/index.php?w=mp_reg">International Commission for Missing Persons</a>, could help.</p>
<p>I hope my research will support this effort and help correct the <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-01902018000100003">inaccurate historical record</a>. More importantly, I want to help grieving relatives bury their loved ones and finally achieve some sort of closure. </p>
<p>When I finished my research, the image of my school friend was even more ingrained in my consciousness. It is for people like him, that investigations like mine must be allowed to continue.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith K Silika does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A forensic archaeologist and former Zimbabwe police officer uses his investigative skills to find the missing and the dead in his homeland.Keith K Silika, PhD Candidate in Forensic Archaeology, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1443092020-08-12T08:29:36Z2020-08-12T08:29:36ZRepression in Zimbabwe exposes South Africa’s weakness<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352286/original/file-20200811-18-i8su44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and President Cyril Ramaphiosa of South Africa in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South African president Cyril Ramaphosa’s <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2020/08/10/sa-special-envoys-get-red-carpet-welcome-in-zim-amid-tensions">despatch of envoys to Zimbabwe</a> in a bid to defuse the latest crisis, in which the government has engaged in a vicious crackdown on opponents, journalists and the freedoms of speech, association and protest, has been widely welcomed.</p>
<p>Such has been the brutality of the latest assault on human rights by President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s regime that something had to be done. And, as the big brother neighbour next door, South Africa is the obvious actor to do it. </p>
<p>It may be guaranteed that Ramaphosa’s envoys – <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/fholisani-sydney-mufamadi">Sydney Mufamadi</a>, a former government minister turned academic, and <a href="https://www.gov.za/about-government/contact-directory/baleka-mbete-honourable">Baleka Mbete</a>, a former deputy president of South Africa, former speaker of the National Assembly and former chairperson of the African National Congress (ANC) – were sent off to Harare with a very limited brief. They were accompanied by <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/who-is-ngoako-ramatlhodi-29368263">Advocate Ngoako Ramatlhodi</a> and diplomat <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ndumiso-ntshinga-13b3a348/?originalSubdomain=ke">Ndumiso Ntshinge</a>.</p>
<p>The mission quickly ran into trouble. The envoys returned to South Africa without <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/ramaphosas-envoys-snub-zimbabwean-opposition-parties-after-meeting-president-mnangagwa-20200811">meeting members of the opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Observers and activists are rightly <a href="https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/392334/zimbabweans-skeptical-as-past-envoys-in-mbeki-mugabe-era-used-as-a-whitewash-or-cover-up">sceptical</a> about how much will come out of it. The best that is seriously hoped for is that South African diplomacy will bring about immediate relief. This would include: the release of journalists, opposition figures and civil society activists from jail; promises to withdraw the military from the streets; perhaps even some jogging of the Mnangagwa government to meet with its opponents and to make some trifling concessions.</p>
<p>After all, the pattern is now well established: crisis, intervention, promises by the Zanu-PF regime to behave, and then relapse after a decent interval to the sort of behaviour that prompted the latest crisis in the first place. </p>
<p>But in a previous era, South Africa once made Zimbabwe’s dependence count.</p>
<h2>South Africa has done it once</h2>
<p>Back in 1976, apartheid South Africa’s Prime Minister John B. Vorster fell in with US plans to bring about a settlement in then Rhodesia, and hence relieve international pressure on his own government, by withdrawing military and economic support and closing the border between the two countries. </p>
<p>Ian Smith had little choice but to comply. Today, no one, not even the most starry-eyed hopefuls among the ranks of the opposition and civil society in Zimbabwe, believe that Ramaphosa’s South Africa will be prepared to wield such a big stick. The time is long past that Pretoria’s admonitions of bad behaviour are backed by a credible threat of sanction and punishment.</p>
<p>So, why is it that Vorster could bring about real change, twisting Smith’s arm to engage in negotiations with his liberation movement opponents that eventually led to a settlement and a transition to majority rule, and ANC governments – from the time of Nelson Mandela onwards – have been so toothless? </p>
<p>If we want an answer, we need to look at three fundamental differences between 1976 and now.</p>
<p>First, Vorster was propelled into pressuring Smith by the US, which was eager to halt the perceived advance of communism by bringing about a settlement in Rhodesia which was acceptable to the West. In turn, Vorster thought that by complying with US pressure, his regime would earn Washington’s backing as an anti-communist redoubt. Today there is no equivalent spur to act. It is unlikely that US president Donald Trump could point to Zimbabwe on a map. </p>
<p>Britain, the European Union and other far-off international actors all <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/opinion/arrest-of-zimbabwe-journalist-shows-mnangagwas-heavy-hand-4b45fffd-43a2-4f0f-a81b-0feca5ebb6eb">decry</a> the human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. But they have largely given up on exerting influence, save to extend vitally needed humanitarian aid (and thank God for that). Zimbabwe has retreated into irrelevance, except as a case study as a failed state. They are not likely to reenter the arena and throw good money and effort at the Zimbabwean problem until they are convinced that something significant, some serious political change for the good, is likely to happen.</p>
<p>Second, South African intervention today is constrained by liberation movement solidarity. They may have their differences and arguments, but Zanu-PF and the ANC, which governs South Africa, remain bound together by the conviction that they are the embodiments of <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-liberation-movements-can-they-abandon-old-bad-habits-101197">the logic of history</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-liberators-turn-into-oppressors-a-study-of-southern-african-states-57213">How liberators turn into oppressors: a study of southern African states</a>
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<p>As the leading liberators of their respective countries, they believe they represent the true <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">interests</a> of the people. If the people say otherwise in an election, this can only be because they have been duped or bought. It cannot be allowed that history should be put into reverse.</p>
<p>Former South African president Thabo Mbeki played a crucial role in forging a coalition government between Zanu-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) after the latter effectively won the parliamentary election <a href="https://theconversation.com/sham-or-not-election-flaws-unlikely-to-unseat-mugabe-16737">in 2008</a>. But South Africa held back from endorsing reliable indications that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai had also won the presidential election against Robert Mugabe. </p>
<p>As a result, Tsvangirai was forced into a runoff presidential contest, supposedly because he had won less than 50% of the poll. The rest is history. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF struck back with a truly vicious campaign against the MDC, <a href="http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1817057,00.html">Tsvangirai withdrew from the contest</a>, and Mugabe remained as president, controlling the levers of power. The ANC looked on, held its nose, and scuttled home to Pretoria saying the uneasy coalition it left behind was a job well done.</p>
<p>Third, successive Zanu-PF governments have become increasingly militarised. Mnangagwa may have put his military uniform aside, but it is the military which now calls the shots. It ultimately decides who will front for its power. There have been numerous statements by top ranking generals that they will never accept a government other than one <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwe-army-wont-allow-opposition-to-rule-minister-idUSKCN1IO2B9">formed by Zanu-PF</a>. The African Union and Southern African Development Community have both <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">outlawed coups</a>, but everyone knows that the Mnangagwa government is a military government in all but name.</p>
<h2>Lamentably inadequate</h2>
<p>So, it is all very well to call for a transitional government, one which would see Zanu-PF engaging with the opposition parties and civil society and promising a return to constitutional rule and the holding of a genuinely democratic election. But we have been there before.</p>
<p>The fundamental issue is how Zimbabwe’s military can be removed from power, and how Zimbabwean politics can be <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">demilitarised</a>. Without the military behind it, Zanu-PF would be revealed as a paper tiger, and would meet with a heavy defeat in a genuinely free and fair election.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Ibbo_Mandaza">Ibbo Mandaza</a>, the veteran activist and analyst in Harare, what Zimbabwe needs is the <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2020/05/03/no-way-national-transitional-authority/">establishment of a transitional authority</a> tasked with returning the country to constitutional government and enabling an economic recovery. Nice idea, but a pipe dream.</p>
<p>No one in their right mind believes that a Ramaphosa government, whose own credibility is increasingly threadbare because of its bungled response to the coronavirus epidemic, its corruption and its economic incompetence, has the stomach to bring this about. We can expect fine words and promises and raised hopes, but lamentably little action until the next crisis comes around, when the charade will start all over again.</p>
<p>Any relief, any improvement on the present situation will be welcomed warmly in Zimbabwe. But no one in Harare – whether in government, opposition or civil society – will really believe that Ramaphosa’s increasingly ramshackle government will be prepared to tackle the issue that really matters: removing the military from power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144309/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall is author of Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa.</span></em></p>The time is long past that Pretoria’s admonitions of bad behaviour by Zimbabwe’s leaders are backed by a credible threat of sanction and punishment.Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1437532020-08-05T14:40:15Z2020-08-05T14:40:15ZZimbabwe wants to raise money through a sovereign bond. Why this is ill-advised<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351048/original/file-20200804-16-1igb83g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Central bank (in the background) can no longer perform its function of being the lender of last resort</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwean government recently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2020/07/zimbabwe-pay-white-farmer-35bn-land-compensation-deal-200729135752062.html">signed an agreement</a> to pay 4,500 white farmers US$3.5 billion for infrastructure improvements on the land expropriated by the government during the chaotic land <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">reform programme</a> of 1997/8. </p>
<p>The initiative shows commitment to constitutionalism and respect for property rights and restoring the rule of law. The agreement is also a noble attempt at bringing closure to a questionable episode of the country’s land history. </p>
<p>But the proposal to fund the exercise by issuing a sovereign bond is highly ambitious. With <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/17/zimbabwe-could-be-headed-for-political-upheaval-as-economic-health-crises-spiral.html">an ailing economy</a>, the country simply doesn’t have the resources to meet its commitment to white farmers. In his <a href="https://zimbabwe.shafaqna.com/EN/AL/734195">letter dated 2 April 2020</a> to the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), Paris Club and European Investment Bank, Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube clearly outlined that the country does not have the medical and financial resources to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the government cleared its US$107.9 million arrears with the IMF in 2016, it is still <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/why-zim-didnt-get-imf-covid-19-debt-relief/">struggling to settle its US$2.2 billion debt</a> to other international financial institutions, including the World Bank and African Development Bank.</p>
<p>The government has proposed issuing <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-30/zimbabwe-sees-bond-sale-as-answer-to-two-decade-land-dispute">a long-term sovereign bond</a>, a process where the government sells bonds to investors on either domestic or international financial markets to raise funds. This year, only Ghana, Gabon and Egypt have managed to do so.</p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/zimbabwe-pay-white-farmer-35bn-land-compensation-deal-200729135752062.html">called on international donors</a> to help it raise the needed funding. If these options do not raise sufficient funds, another proposal is to sell municipal land around the nation’s biggest cities. </p>
<p>In my view issuing a sovereign bond would be ill-advised. The main reasons for this are that the economic and political conditions are not conducive to an issuance of such a bond. For a country to successfully issue a sovereign bond, it needs some basics in place. It needs an international sovereign credit rating, stable domestic economic fundamentals and investor confidence. None of these are currently present in Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Why it’s a bad idea</h2>
<p>Most of the factors relate to internal political and economic fundamentals.</p>
<p>Firstly, Zimbabwe does not have a sovereign credit rating from the three international credit rating agencies – Fitch, Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s. Without a rating, it is impossible to successfully issue a sovereign bond on international markets because it’s a <a href="https://theconversation.com/qanda-why-credit-rating-agencies-matter-for-developing-countries-51964">key input in determining</a> yield and coupon payment on a bond. The government has not yet solicited a rating from the big three rating agencies. It is among the 23 African countries that are yet to request an international sovereign rating.</p>
<p>Secondly, the country has no domestic debt market. If it did, it could try to mobilise local investors who understand the associated risk exposures and could perform their own due diligence. Domestic institutional investors would have to subscribe for the government’s bond issuance to be successful.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the country has changed its currency more than 10 times since 2000. In 2019, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757080">the Central Bank banned</a> the use of foreign currency for trading and reintroduced the Zimbabwe dollar quasi-currency that had been abandoned in 2009. The local currency <a href="https://www.mycurrencytransfer.com/currency-converter/ZWL-to-USD">depreciated</a> by more than 320% in less than a year. This eroded savings and pensions, and saw a further loss of confidence in the entire financial system. Strength of a country’s currency determines the attractiveness of its bond issues. A weak currency compounds the risk of default and debt sustainability as repayments will still have to be made in foreign currency. </p>
<p>Fourthly, the increasing economic crisis in the country has eroded the goodwill that the current government accrued post-Mugabe era. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/zimbabwe-president-vows-flush-opponents-200804141615075.html">actions</a> have failed to tally with his “open for business” mantra. His trips to Davos have <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/eyes-zimbabwes-mnangagwa-wef-davos-180124125748504.html">failed to yield</a> any significant foreign direct investment as investors question his credibility.</p>
<p>The government is also in bad favour with institutions such as the <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/Africa/locked-out-of-aid-zimbabwe-begs-imf-and-world-bank-for-help-20200504">IMF and World Bank</a>. It has <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/zimbabwe-among-african-nations-defaulting-imf-loans">defaulted</a> on IMF loans and failed to implement reforms agreed with the organisations.</p>
<p>Fifth, the government has been hostile to the private sector. It ordered the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-06/for-zimbabwe-investors-stock-exchange-closing-is-the-last-straw">closure of the stock exchange</a> on 29 June 2020 and accused businesses of fuelling <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/zimbabwe-president-currency-attack-prices-spiral-200610173443771.html">currency devaluation</a>. State security agencies attempted to stop certain business operations of <a href="https://www.developingtelecoms.com/telecom-technology/mobile-financial-services/9799-zimbabwe-issues-econet-warrant-over-alleged-money-laundering.html">Econet</a> and <a href="https://www.biznews.com/global-investing/2020/07/12/old-mutual-zimbabwe">Old Mutual</a>, the two largest companies listed on the stock exchange. They were accused of fuelling hostilities against the government. It is these companies and their multinational networks that would support the bond issuance by purchasing the government bonds.</p>
<p>Sixth, the government’s brand has been damaged by a number of government officials being targeted for sanctions. Some are <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-07-29-peter-hain-calls-for-stronger-sanctions-against-zimbabwe-for-human-rights-abuses/">calling for stronger sanctions</a> for human rights abuses. Investors perceive a country that does not respect its rule of law as unlikely to respect its sovereign bond covenants nor honour its obligations on time.</p>
<p>In addition, the government’s commitment to transparency and integrity has been called into question on the back of accusations of <a href="https://anticorruptiondigest.com/2020/06/08/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-govt-engulfed-in-corruption-scandals/#axzz6TjHsXutV">mass corruption</a>. Despite promises, there has been little to no action against government officials embroiled in <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-07-07-mnangagwa-fires-zimbabwes-health-minister-after-corruption-charge/">corruption scandals</a>. </p>
<p>Seventh, Zimbabwe’s economy has failed to pick up in the post-Mugabe era. Instead, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ecae3702-bde1-11e9-89e2-41e555e96722">it has become worse</a>. Food production is at its all time low, the health sector has been paralysed by constant protests and inflation has been <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/408053/zimbabwes-inflation-rate-hits-785-55/">estimated at more than 800%</a>.</p>
<p>The last internal factor to consider is that the country’s central bank <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2020/06/19/inefficient-foreign-exchange-market-costing-zim-billions/">can no longer perform</a> its functions as the lender of last resort and facilitating cross-border transactions, because of the lack of foreign exchange reserves. Forex access has been restricted to government agencies, departments and selected individuals. Local banks technically have the liberty to make their own forex transaction arrangements with other international corresponding banks.</p>
<p>There are also some external factors that make raising capital this way a bad idea right now. The international debt market has been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-26/coronavirus-chaos-brings-corporate-debt-market-to-its-knees">depressed</a> as a result of COVID-19 and is likely to remain so for the next two years as investors wait to see how countries emerge from the crisis. And the cost of issuing a bond has doubled, which has priced most African countries out of the market. Zimbabwe is no exception.</p>
<p>All these factors are not favourable for Zimbabwe to issue a sovereign bond.</p>
<h2>Solutions</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe has many pressing issues. Given that the economy is at its lowest, compensating farmers is a luxury the country cannot afford. It will not yield the implied results of increasing foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Instead, Zimbabwe should focus on demonstrating the political will to restore business confidence. Evidence of this will include the removal from public office and prosecution of people involved in corruption. </p>
<p>It should also acknowledge the challenges it faces and commit to genuine political dialogue. International partners and investors interpret the denial of the challenges faced by the country as being dishonest and untrustworthy.</p>
<p>Lastly, the government should implement the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-imf/zimbabwe-reaches-agreement-with-imf-on-economic-reform-program-idUSKCN1RN0PZ">economic reforms previously agreed</a> with multilateral lenders. Under the agreement, policies should focus on eliminating the government’s double-digit fiscal deficit and adopting reforms to allow market forces to drive the functioning of foreign exchange and other financial markets. These will help stabilise the currency and monetary policy. Without fully implementing these reforms agreed with multilateral agencies, mobilising foreign direct investment will remain a dream.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143753/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Misheck Mutize is the Lead Expert consultant with the African Union - African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on supporting countries on their engagements with international credit rating agencies.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe wants to issue a sovereign bond to raise $3.5 billion it has agreed to pay as compensation to white farmers, but the economic and political conditions aren’t conducive to such an issuance.Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1438472020-08-04T15:24:33Z2020-08-04T15:24:33ZHow artists have preserved the memory of Zimbabwe’s 1980s massacres<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350897/original/file-20200803-14-1vcb9b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A scene from a play about the Gukurahundi genocide, 1983 The Dark Years, performed in Harare in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Let people vent,” lamented performing artist and television personality <a href="http://almasiartsalliance.org/category/kudzai-sevenzo/">Kudzai Sevenzo</a> in a <a href="https://twitter.com/KudzaiSevenzo/status/1288407558097641472?s=20">tweet</a> as Zimbabweans on social media reacted to the death of <a href="https://apnews.com/7afe3ad83057f11f793dd54228e8e8d9">Perence Shiri</a>. Shiri was the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/zenzele-ndebele">Zenzele Ndebele</a>, an investigative journalist, also spoke out in a <a href="https://twitter.com/zenzele/status/1289075563236413441?s=20">tweet</a>: “Shiri gets to be buried like a hero. We never got a chance to mourn our relatives who were killed by the 5th Brigade.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/zimbabwe/who-is-perrance-shiri-black-jesus-dead-29-july-2020/">Shiri</a> was a military man who commandeered a praetorian army that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">killed</a> over 20,000 civilians in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands between 1983 and 1987. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2b5iVGCDs0">Gukurahundi</a> saw his North Korean-trained unit, the <a href="https://gijn.org/2018/12/03/digging-up-zimbabwes-gukurahundi-massacre-dossier/">Fifth Brigade</a>, descend on provinces inhabited by the Ndebele people to quell dissent. <a href="https://bit.ly/2Po03WA"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a> is a Shona term referring to the early summer rains that remove chaff and dirt from the fields.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1289075563236413441"}"></div></p>
<p>The death of Shiri on 29 July 2020 has kindled flames of debate that the ruling party has tried to shut down for many years. </p>
<p>I argue, in a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021989415615646">paper</a> on Gukurahundi, that writers and artists have left behind a richly textured memory on what writer <a href="https://www.novuyotshuma.com/">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> has called the country’s “<a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/12/06/old-faces-new-masks-zimbabwe-one-year-after-the-coup/">original sin</a>”.</p>
<h2>Enforced ‘collective amnesia’</h2>
<p>In the aftermath of Gukurahundi, <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">former president</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Mugabe</a> enforced collective forgetting of this period in Zimbabwe’s history. He referred to it simply as a “<a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabes-moments-of-madness">moment of madness</a>” and suggested that discussing the events would undermine attempts to nurture national unity. </p>
<p>His successor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, Minister of State Security at the time of the Gukurahundi <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">genocide</a>, has also implored Zimbabweans to “let bygones be bygones”. At his 2017 <a href="https://bit.ly/2PqhhSY">inauguration</a> he said that the past cannot be changed, but “there is a lot we can do in the present and the future to give our nation a different positive direction”.</p>
<p>However, as l contend in another <a href="https://journals.assaf.org.za/index.php/tvl/article/view/1548">paper</a>, silence on Gukurahundi has not led to any national cohesion. Instead, it has been a part of what’s responsible for the culture of state violence and impunity in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. </p>
<h2>Writing against forgetting</h2>
<p>Yet, a rich body of literary and visual artworks has emerged thematising the genocide. There have been books in indigenous languages such as <em><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Uyangisinda_lumhlaba.html?id=U80JAQAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Uyangisinda Lumhlaba</a></em> (This world is unbearable) in Ndebele by Ezekiel Hleza and <em><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Mhandu_dzorusununguko.html?id=jBAkAQAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Mhandu Dzorusununguko</a></em> (Enemies of independence) in Shona by Edward Masundire. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=896&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351046/original/file-20200804-24-11pe3tq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1126&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Farrar, Straus and Giroux</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>There has been an even bigger corpus of texts written in English. Among them is the late Yvonne Vera’s 2002 novel <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781466806061"><em>The Stone Virgins</em></a>. It details the horrors faced by villagers from a ruthless army. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/zimbabwe-running-with-mother-robert-mugabe"><em>Running with Mother</em></a>, a 2012 novel by Christopher Mlalazi, a child narrator, Rudo, recounts the arrival of the Fifth Brigade in her village.</p>
<p>Peter Godwin’s largely autobiographical <a href="https://www.orwellfoundation.com/book-title/mukiwa-a-white-boy-in-africa/"><em>Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa</em></a>
in 1996 gives a picture of Gukurahundi from the eyes of a young white journalist. And <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/books/review/house-of-stone-novuyo-rosa-tshuma.html"><em>House of Stone</em></a>, the 2018 novel by Novuyo Rosa Tshuma, tells the story of an orphaned young man trying to explore his past. He’ll find out that his father is Black Jesus (a name by which Shiri was known). Tshuma’s descriptions of the genocide are detailed, graphic and ghastly. </p>
<p>Literary creativity has made it possible to remember, commemorate and document experiences that otherwise would have been forgotten or dispersed through wilful omission. In doing so, literary texts create narratives of Zimbabwe’s history and national identity. </p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=902&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/351049/original/file-20200804-22-1gyina7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1134&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">W. W. Norton & Company</span></span>
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<p>“To write is to banish silence,” writes Vera in her 1995 <a href="https://ocul-yor.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01OCUL_YOR/q36jf8/alma991010694059705164">doctoral thesis</a> on colonialism and narratives of resistance. “As a writer, you don’t want to suppress history, you want to be one of the people liberating stories.” </p>
<p>She explains that “to write is to engage possibilities for triumphant and repeated exits, inversion and recuperation of identity”. In this line of thinking, writing can offer victims of Gukurahundi a voice which the state continues to deny them. </p>
<h2>Art of torture</h2>
<p>Visual artworks have also engaged with Gukurahundi, such as in the exhibition <em>Sibathontisele</em> by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/04/zimbabwe-artist-arrest-mugabe-censorship">Owen Maseko</a>, which has stood for years as a material text-under-erasure in Zimbabwe. <em>Sibathontisele</em> is a Ndebele word meaning “we drip it on them”. It refers to an infamous torture technique used by the Fifth Brigade in which they dripped hot and melted plastic on victims.</p>
<p>Unlike literary texts, which have remained unbanned and uncensored, Maseko’s 2010 exhibition was banned by state security a day after its opening at the <a href="http://www.nationalgallerybyo.com/">National Arts Gallery</a> in Bulawayo and the artist was arrested. Visual art, it appears, is deemed more subversive than written texts. In spite of such restrictions, Maseko’s exhibition has been hosted outside Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The artist explains in this <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/artcul/osisa_trials_tribulatn_of_artist_110630.pdf">article</a> that art, justice and human rights are intricately interrelated. Visual art plays a role in bringing to the surface narratives on Gukurahundi, which have been buried for almost three decades.</p>
<h2>The rich memory</h2>
<p>Writers and visual artists are able to create alternative spaces for marginalised and forgotten stories. And Zimbabwe’s artists have created a rich memory and archive that counters the culture of forgetting and criminalising open discussion of Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>Through their works, histories are revisited so that they can be better understood and can be accorded their rightful recognition. They have opened new spaces of discussion and have gestured towards the importance of remembering and learning from the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Artists are filling the state’s silence by revisiting history so that it can be discussed.Gibson Ncube, Associate Professor, University of ZimbabweLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1421952020-07-26T09:52:15Z2020-07-26T09:52:15ZEternal mothers, whores or witches: being a woman in politics in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349183/original/file-20200723-29-8mzr6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Grace Mugabe at the funeral of former president Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The political arena in Zimbabwe is a de facto male space in which women play very peripheral and insignificant roles. <a href="https://www.theindigopress.com/these-bones-will-rise-again">Author</a> and scholar Panashe Chigumadzi sums the situation up in an op-ed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/opinion/zimbabwe-elections-mugabe-fear-women.html">article</a>, writing that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Politics in Zimbabwe remains a man’s game, and virility is a measure of one’s ability to rule over others. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is not the place of women to rule, especially over men. Women who dare to aspire to rule are considered to be wild and unruly.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30307333">Grace Mugabe</a>, the former first lady of Zimbabwe, is one such woman, I <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10130950.2020.1749523">argue</a> in a paper on the tropes used to describe women in politics in the southern African country. </p>
<p>Grace rattled political cages in 2019 in her bid to replace her ageing <a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-is-dead-but-old-men-still-run-southern-africa-123611">husband</a>, both as leader of the ruling <a href="https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/events/zanu-pf-history-1963-2017">ZANU-PF</a> party and also possibly as president of the country. </p>
<p>But instead of focusing on the merits and demerits of her political interests, the recurring comment was that she was a sex-starved <em>hure</em> (a Shona word for “whore”). This sexist slandering has not been used to describe just Grace Mugabe. It has been used systematically to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/mudslinging-sexism-scath-female-politicians/">denigrate women</a> who aspire for any political positions.</p>
<h2>From ‘gold-digger’ to mother figure</h2>
<p>Grace became a public figure in 1996 when she married Robert Mugabe after the death of his first wife. She had previously been his personal assistant. At the time of the marriage, she was defamed for having an affair while his first wife, Sally, was terminally ill. </p>
<p>Moreover, Grace was labelled a gold-digger because she had married a rich and powerful man who was 40 years her senior. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349196/original/file-20200723-21-aerk5c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1146&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sally Mugabe (1931-1992), former first lady.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>She was often compared to Sally, the latter characterised as womanly, motherly and homely. Sally was a saint, according to public opinion, partly because she had assumed a more ornamental role as first lady. </p>
<p>However with time, Grace was embraced as the proverbial mother of the nation and the endearing appellation of <em>Amai</em> (mother) was bestowed on her.</p>
<p>In 2014, she took her first steps in politics when she was elected president of the women’s league of the ruling Zanu-PF party. She was fronted as the face of the Generation 40 faction within the ruling party. Generation 40 was a group of young party members who felt there was need for a change of power from the old guard that had waged the liberation war. Grace began a series of rallies across the country. The rallying call at these events was the Shona phrase <em>Munhu wese kuna Amai</em> (Everyone, side with Mother). </p>
<p>She used the rallies to <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/g40-plots-anti-mnangagwa-demo/">attack</a> not just members of the opposition but more importantly members of the competing faction which was headed by current president <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. Her outbreaks were far from diplomatic, they were blunt, <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/zimbabwe/mugabes-launch-scathing-attack-on-vp-mnangagwa-20170911">scathing and contemptuous</a>.</p>
<h2>From mother figure to ‘whore’</h2>
<p>It was around the time of the countrywide interface rallies that the name <em>Amai</em> was gradually replaced by the tag of <em>hure</em>. Academic and writer Rudo Mudiwa in the <a href="https://www.africasacountry.com/2017/11/on-grace-mugabe-coups-phalluses-and-what-is-being-defended">article</a> <em>On Grace Mugabe: coups, phalluses, and what is being defended</em>, explains how Grace came to be called <em>hure</em> and shows how the name was linked to the November 2017 “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/15/zimbabwe-when-a-coup-is-not-a-coup/">coup that was not a coup</a>”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Grace, already branded a harlot, was considered a threat to the nation-state on the basis that she was improperly influencing Mugabe, weaponising their pillow talk to sway a senile old man. Her speeches, nakedly ambitious, only seemed to confirm that it was she who was in power in Harare. The phallus had been deposed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <em>hure</em> label was used because Grace had subverted the image of the domesticated first lady who was not interested in politics. In Mudiwa’s argument, the soft coup that overthrew Mugabe was actually a defence of patriarchy and a counter attack against the anxieties that Grace was causing men in politics. The military intervention could thus be read as the protection of male dominance which had been challenged by a woman who had left behind her decorative role as a silent, domesticated and thus respectable woman.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/349181/original/file-20200723-15-ztomms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grace Mugabe addresses a religious gathering and rally in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What this tells us</h2>
<p>Grace Mugabe’s short stint in politics has shown that women are far from being afforded a place in Zimbabwean politics. </p>
<p>Sexist and misogynistic slurs such as <em>hure</em> point to how women continue to be sexualised and objectified. The treatment of women in politics is no different from how women in general are regarded in the country, because their competencies are often disregarded or unnoticed. Emphasis is placed rather on their bodies and sexualities.</p>
<p>In the few instances that women are accorded a space in politics, they are used as pawns in factional battles within political parties, as Grace was. </p>
<p>When she attacked other women politicians like former vice president <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-35708891/joice-mujuru-mugabe-s-new-rival-in-zimbabwe-my-hands-are-clean">Joice Mujuru</a>, she was not considered dangerous. However, when her verbal attacks targeted men like Mnangagwa she was deemed to be treading treacherously. When the coup that toppled Mugabe was in progress, the men in the Generation 40 faction clandestinely left the country, leaving Grace alone to deal with the military.</p>
<h2>The future of women in Zimbabwean politics</h2>
<p>As long as safe and conducive spaces are not created for women in Zimbabwe, they will continue to be sidelined from positions of political power and authority. As Zimbabwe continues to aspire towards democracy and democratic ideals, despite the odds, more needs to be done to level the political playing field.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-is-dead-but-old-men-still-run-southern-africa-123611">Mugabe is dead, but old men still run southern Africa</a>
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</em>
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<p>Women who do choose to venture into the field of politics will need to do so fully aware of the multifarious challenges that lie in wait. They will need to be strategic in their actions and how they navigate a space that is slanted heavily against them.</p>
<p>For as long patriarchal societies, such as Zimbabwe, do not recognise the vast potential women have as knowledgeable politicians and skilled decision-makers, an equitable society cannot be realised.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/142195/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Sexist slandering has been used not just to describe Grace Mugabe, but to denigrate any women who aspire to political positions.Gibson Ncube, Associate Professor, University of ZimbabweLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1350662020-04-12T14:04:15Z2020-04-12T14:04:15ZZimbabwe’s shattered economy poses a serious challenge to fighting COVID-19<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326155/original/file-20200407-85423-12r0p9p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hawkers' stalls in Harare, Zimbabwe, lie deserted following lockdown in a bid to slow down the spread of the coronavirus.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has left Zimbabwe in an extremely difficult situation. As of early April, the number of infections and deaths from the pandemic <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-records-3rd-coronavirus-death/">appeared low</a>, although the available data isn’t necessarily reliable. </p>
<p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/breaking-mnangagwa-decrees-21-day-covid-19-lockdown-starting-monday/">announced</a> a 21-day lockdown which began on 30 March, in a bid to contain the spread of the coronavirus. The decree ordered all citizens to stay at home, “except in respect of essential movements related to seeking health services, the purchase of food”, or carrying out responsibilities that are in the critical services sectors. </p>
<p>Other measures include the shutting down of public markets in the informal sector, except those that sell food. </p>
<p>None of this will be easy to implement in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>The country has an economic profile similar to that of many developing countries. The difference is that its informal sector makes up a much higher percentage of the overall economy. According to a 2018 International Monetary Fund report, Zimbabwe’s informal economy is <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/01/25/Shadow-Economies-Around-the-World-What-Did-We-Learn-Over-the-Last-20-Years-45583">the largest in Africa</a>, and second only to Bolivia in the world. The sector accounts for at least 60% of all of Zimbabwe’s economic activity. </p>
<p>In addition to the usual problems faced by countries with large informal economies, including poor governance and low tax revenues, Zimbabwe has an added set of problems: its economy is broken.</p>
<p>To implement the nationwide <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/breaking-mnangagwa-decrees-21-day-covid-19-lockdown-starting-monday/">lockdown</a> Mnangagwa is likely to have to inflict further damage to an already extremely fragile economy. </p>
<p>The president did not announce a stimulus financial package to cushion business from the impact of the lockdown. This might result in the total collapse of some businesses. </p>
<h2>Fragile economy</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s economy has been shrinking since <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/3.%20Zimbabwe%20Report_Chapter%201.pdf">2000</a>, triggered by the government’s controversial land <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/5-lessons-sa-can-learn-from-zim-land-grabs-20180305-2">re-distribution programme</a> of that year. The violent programme wreaked havoc on agriculture, which was then the mainstay of the Zimbabwean economy. </p>
<p>This was compounded by subsequent sanctions imposed by the West in response to the <a href="http://www.thethinker.co.za/resources/Thinker_81/81%20chagonda.pdf">seizures of white-owned farms and land</a>. </p>
<p>Around <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">6 million Zimbabweans</a> – about 34% of the population – live in extreme poverty.</p>
<p>The IMF recently gave a very bleak <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/02/26/pr2072-zimbabwe-imf-executive-board-concludes-2020-article-iv-consultation">assessment</a>, saying that the country’s economy had contracted by 7.5% in 2019. It put the inflation rate at over 500%, meaning that the country was heading back to the traumatic hyper-inflation era of <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">2007/8</a>, when inflation peaked at an official <a href="https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/390/inflation/hyper-inflation-in-zimbabwe/">231 million percent</a>.</p>
<p>The IMF report shows that Zimbabwe’s economy performed the worst in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019. Its prognosis is disheartening, showing that if </p>
<blockquote>
<p>…governance, and corruption challenges, entrenched vested interests, and enforcement of the rule of law, (were not observed) then…there is little prospect of a major improvement to Zimbabwe’s economic and financial challenges in the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">short to medium term …</a>. </p>
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<p>The dire economic situation is further worsened by the fact that the country is suffering its <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">worst hunger crisis in a decade</a>, largely due to an ongoing drought that started last year. The shortage of essential foods, such as the staple maize meal, often results in stampedes at the few <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/millers-avail-40-000t-maize-for-roller-meal/">markets</a> where they can still be found. </p>
<h2>Zimbabwe’s informal sector</h2>
<p>Two decades of economic turmoil have seen Zimbabwe’s formal economic sector shrinking significantly. For example, manufacturing, clothing and textile industries have almost totally collapsed, with factories reduced to <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/SET-Outlook-for-Zimbabwe-Economy_Sep2017.pdf">dilapidated shells</a>.</p>
<p>The consequence is that the informal sector has grown exponentially. It’s estimated that a staggering 90% of Zimbabwe’s working population is <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/SET-Outlook-for-Zimbabwe-Economy_Sep2017.pdf">employed in this sector</a>. </p>
<p>I have been doing <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&hl=en">research</a> on Zimbabwe’s informal sector for the last 12 years. I have found that it sustains many families’ livelihoods, even though the majority of participants in the sector live from hand to mouth as petty traders. This reality that confronts Zimbabwe’s informal economy is corroborated by <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/simbabwe/13714.pdf">research</a> by the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>In addition, almost everyone who is employed in the formal economy augments their income through informal sector activities such as <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&hl=en">cross-border trading</a>.</p>
<p>Reliable numbers are hard to come by, but a very high number of Zimbabweans <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/zimbabwe-economy-founders-millennials-eke-living-190910134415766.html">eke out a living in this sector</a>, or rely on it for food, clothing, fuel, local currency and forex. </p>
<h2>Stern test</h2>
<p>The lockdown in Zimbabwe is going to provide a stern test for its informal economy, which is the country’s dominant economy. Most traders are subsistence traders and are already mired in extreme poverty. The jury is out on the extent to which they will observe the lockdown. </p>
<p>The government should immediately put in place a stimulus package that can cushion the informal economy. </p>
<p>Otherwise, a lot of livelihoods are going to be destroyed. The ramifications for the country and the whole region, especially neighbouring South Africa, will be grim.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-deepening-crisis-time-for-second-government-of-national-unity-122726">Zimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135066/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>The current lockdown in Zimbabwe is going to provide a stern test for its informal economy, which is the country’s dominant economy and employs 90% of people.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1236112019-09-17T12:32:18Z2019-09-17T12:32:18ZMugabe is dead, but old men still run southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292643/original/file-20190916-19030-ryoxe2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at the funeral of his predecessor, Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of Robert Gabriel Mugabe (95) saw another of the first-generation leaders of newly independent southern African states leave the world stage. </p>
<p>Southern Africa was the last region on the continent to obtain majority rule. The independence of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and democracy in South Africa (1994) ended white settler minority regimes. They were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24487678?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">replaced in power by liberation movements</a>. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu, later Zanu-PF), the South West African People’s Organisation (Swapo) and the African National Congress (ANC) have been in government since then. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s death invites a look at the succession – or lack of – in these three countries.</p>
<p>Despite the cultivation of heroic narratives and patriotic history, the first-generation freedom fighters who took over the state offices are not immortal. <a href="https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/gerontocratic">Mugabe’s</a> male-dominated leadership structures based on liberation struggle credentials remain entrenched.</p>
<p>In all three countries a second struggle generation is gradually entering the higher echelons of party and state. But the “born free” – people who were born after liberation – as well as women have hardly made significant inroads into the meritocratic, male-dominated core structures of power. </p>
<p>The question is how much longer the “old men syndrome” will remain alive and kicking in the three countries, despite growing frustration among the politically powerless.</p>
<h2>Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>Celebrated by many as an <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/obituary-zimbabwes-robert-mugabe-a-revolutionary-20190906">icon of the anti-colonial struggle</a>, Mugabe was nevertheless an autocratic ruler who overstayed his time in office. The military finally replaced him with his longtime confidante Emmerson Mnangagwa in <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/11/16/understanding-the-military-takeover-in-zimbabwe/">a soft coup</a> in November 2017.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-vice-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-grace-mugabe">sidelining</a> was initiated by Mugabe’s younger wife Grace (born in 1965, she was 40 years his junior) to hijack the succession of her husband. She led a group of Zanu-PF members, dubbed the <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/13/Thinking-after-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-ConCoup-Now-Then-and-Then-Again">G40</a> (for Generation 40). The name referred to a constitutional clause that everyone above the age of 40 qualified as a presidential candidate. But, the military and security apparatus and its leadership was still firmly rooted in the struggle generation and opted for <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/11/21/what-is-behind-the-military-coup-in-zimbabwe/">“Team Lacoste”</a> named after “the Crocodile”, which is Mnangagwa’s nickname. </p>
<p>This ended the political careers of the G40. So far, the “elders” remain in charge and in firm control.</p>
<p>Morgan Tsvangirai (born 1952) founded the <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/zimbabwe-went-wrong-mdc/">Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai</a> in 1999. The opposition party has been denied electoral victory several times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/obituaries/morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-dead.html">since 2002</a>. </p>
<p>After Tsvangirai’s death earlier this year the much younger Nelson Chamisa (born in 1978) won the internal party <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-t-endorses-nelson-chamisa-as-morgan-tsvangirais-successor-13558886">power struggle</a>. He challenged Mnangagwa in the elections in July last year. </p>
<p>Thanks mainly to rural area results, Zanu-PF recorded a landslide victory in the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimelections2018-full-details-of-parliament-results-16378869">parliamentary elections</a>. Mnangagwa also secured a (disputed) and much more narrow first term in office as elected head of state. </p>
<p>This is partly due to a continued stricter social control in rural areas. Political interaction and activities in villages can be much more easily monitored than in urban areas. But it also suggests that traditional values – such as respect for elders – remain alive. This gives the generation in power a comparative advantage over younger competitors. </p>
<p>Similar generational constellations also benefited the governing parties in Namibia and South Africa.</p>
<h2>Namibia</h2>
<p>Namibia has had three state presidents <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290429183_From_Nujoma_to_Geingob_25_years_of_presidential_democracy">since independence in 1990</a>. Sam Nujoma, co-founder of Swapo in 1960, was its president until 2007 and the country’s first head of state for three terms until 2005. In May he celebrated his 90th birthday in seemingly good health. Though he remains influential, he has been less visible lately.</p>
<p>In a heavy-handed inner-party battle he ensured that his crown prince Hifikepunye Pohamba (born 1936) followed for <a href="https://brill.com/view/title/33326">two terms</a>. Pohamba was succeeded by Namibia’s first Prime Minister Hage Geingob (born 1941).</p>
<p>After a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2002-09-01-geingob-out-in-the-cold-before-demotion">clash with Nujoma</a>, Geingob left Namibia to <a href="http://ahibo.com/ticad/en/LP2_8GlobalCoalition_E.pdf">head the Global Coalition for Africa</a> in Washington. Returning to Namibia’s parliament, he made a comeback under Pohamba. Reappointed as Prime Minister <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-07-namibias-geingobs-comeback-paves-way-for-swapo-moderates">in 2012</a>, he became state president in 2015 and party leader in 2017.</p>
<p>Geingob is tipped to be reelected as head of state for another five-year term in the next presidential and parliamentary elections <a href="https://www.nbc.na/news/namibias-general-elections-be-held-27-november.20811">in November</a>. His current Vice President <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axBhO1aqECg">Nangolo Mbumba</a> is the same age. In the Swapo electoral college on 7 September he secured another top ranking on the party’s candidate list for the National Assembly and will remain in the inner circle of <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/82885/read/Geingobs-loyalists-win-big-at-the-pot">“Team Hage”</a>.</p>
<p>Five years ago the delegates, in a surprise move, ousted some of the old party cadres. But the elders remained <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/116/463/284/2760214">dominant in cabinet</a>. This time the expected further <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/82880/read/Swapo-concludes-electoral-college">generational shift did not happen</a>.</p>
<p>Party president Geingob could also fill ten secure seats on the electoral list and brought some of those seniors back, who <a href="https://www.nbc.na/news/president-geingob-throws-old-guard-party-list-lifeline.23864">did not make the cut</a>. As the head of state <a href="http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/publication/journal/155-173-How-Democratic-Is-Namibias-Democracy.pdf">he can appoint</a> another eight non-voting members to parliament. This will allow him to retain several more of the trusted old cadres.</p>
<p>Despite this, Namibia’s second struggle generation (those who went into exile in the mid-1970s) is gradually taking over. </p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela,(1918-2013)</a> served only one term as state president. His successors <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Jacob Zuma</a> (both born 1942) were recalled by the ANC and did not survive the full two terms in office. </p>
<p>Zuma was succeeded by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. Born in 1952, he is ten years younger than his predecessor.</p>
<p>Inter-generational tensions have begun to show in South Africa. In the latest national elections young South Africans, or “born frees”, showed their disdain for the ANC’s old guard and agenda by staying away from the polls as a <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1614389/south-africa-election-young-voters-stay-away-from-polls/">form of protest</a>. </p>
<p>This younger generation has shown its frustration with the limits to liberation. Many <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">dismiss formal politics</a>. Their preference is to engage in social movements or other parties.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">Study shows young South Africans have no faith in democracy and politicians</a>
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<p>One such choice is to support Julius Malema (born 1981) and his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) which was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/economic-freedom-fighters-eff">founded in 2013</a> and appeals to a smaller pan-African segment of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-eff-excellent-politics-of-props-and-imagination-59918">younger generation</a>. But the party’s election results remained behind its expectations and kept it in a distant third place, garnering <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">only 10,80% in the latest polls</a>.</p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>For obvious reasons, the first-generation freedom fighters, who took over the state offices after liberation, continue to place a high value on seniority in age. </p>
<p>Younger generations of leaders and women make only limited inroads into the structures of power, and the “born free” are not represented. </p>
<p>Rather, the second struggle generation is moving upward to take over, maintaining a system which leaves little room for renewal beyond the confines of individual credentials within the ranks of the former liberation movements.</p>
<p>The continued cultivation of a heroic narrative and patriotic history includes the internalised conception that freedom fighters never retire. Theirs is a lifelong struggle. <em>“A luta continua”</em> remains alive as long as they are. </p>
<p>But this is a backward looking perspective, nurtured by a romanticised past. It blocks new ideas and visions by younger generations contributing to governance, which would create ownership and make them feel represented. It prevents rather than creating a common future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber has been a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p>It remains to be seen how much longer the ‘old men syndrome’ will persist in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, despite growing frustration among the politically powerless.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215962019-09-06T09:08:13Z2019-09-06T09:08:13ZRobert Gabriel Mugabe: a man whose list of failures is legion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287334/original/file-20190808-144862-11u42pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe, former President of Zimbabwe, addressing media in Harare, in July 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One wishes one could say “rest in peace”. One can only say, “may there be more peace for Zimbabwe’s people, now that <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Gabriel Mugabe</a> has retired permanently”. Zimbabwe’s former president <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">has died</a>, aged 95.</p>
<p>His failures are legion. They might start with the 1980s Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland and the Midlands, with perhaps <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">20 000 people killed</a>. Next, too much welfare spending <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/reviews/59-becoming-zimbabwe?start=10">in the 1980s</a>. Then crudely implemented <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289336044_The_Economic_Structural_Adjustment_Programme_The_Case_of_Zimbabwe_1990-1995">structural adjustment programmes</a> in the 1990s, laying the ground for angry war veterans and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a strong labour union and civil society based opposition party.</p>
<p>In 1997 Mugabe handed out unbudgeted pensions to the war-vets and promised to really start the “fast track land reform” that got going <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287199114_The_impact_of_land_reform_in_Zimbabwe_on_the_conservation_of_cheetahs_and_other_large_carnivores">in 2000</a>, when the MDC threatened to defeat Zanu (PF) at the polls. That abrogation of property rights started the slide in the Zimbabwean dollar’s value.</p>
<p>From 1998 to 2003 Zimbabwe’s participation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s second war cost US$1 million a day, creating a military cabal used to getting money fast. Speedy money printing presses led to <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/hany_besada_zimbabwe_picking_up_the_piecesbook4you.pdf">unfathomable hyperinflation</a> and the end of Zimbabwe’s sovereign currency, still the albatross around the country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757080">neck</a>. </p>
<p>In 2008, the MDC’s electoral victory was reversed with a presidential run-off when at least 170 opposition supporters were murdered. Hundreds more were beaten and <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/elec/rau_critique_zec_elec_report_090612.pdf">chased from their homes</a>. Even Mugabe’s regional support base could not stand for that, so he was forced to accept a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2013/07/15/review-the-hard-road-to-reform-the-politics-of-zimbabwes-global-political-agreement-reviewed-by-timothy-scarnecchia/">transitional inclusive government</a> with the MDC.</p>
<p>Over the next decade, Mugabe was unable to stop his party’s increasing faction fighting. His years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f05aec20-6d98-425a-8d82-56688ea93246/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=State%2Bintelligence%2Band%2Bthe%2Bpolitics%2Bof%2BZimbabwe%2527s%2Bpresidential%2Bsuccession.pdf&type_of_work=Journal+article">finally wore too thin</a>. When in early November 2017, at his wife Grace’s instigation, he fired his long-time lapdog Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the generals with whom he’d colluded for decades turned on him. A <em>coup petit</em> ensued and returned Mnangagwa from exile, soon to be elevated to the presidency and heavily indebted to his comrades.</p>
<p>Where did Mugabe gain his proclivity for factionalism? And how did he learn to speak the language all wanted to hear – only to make them realise they had been deluded in the end? </p>
<h2>The beginning</h2>
<p>Mugabe and many other Zimbabwean nationalists were jailed in 1964. Ian Smith was preparing for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the first nationalist party had split into Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union and Ndabaningi Sithole’s Zanu. Mugabe had been Nkomo’s Publicity Secretary. </p>
<p>As far back as 1962, Mugabe was registering on the global scales: Salisbury’s resident British diplomat <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9781137543448#aboutAuthors">thought Mugabe was</a> “a sinister figure” heading up a youthful “Zimbabwean Liberation Army … the more extreme wing of Zapu”. </p>
<p>But almost as soon as Mugabe was imprisoned, a man in her majesty’s employ travelled down from his advisory post in newly free Zambia to visit the prisoner. Dennis Grennan returned to Lusaka having <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/opin/080120dm.asp?sector=OPIN&year=2008&range_start=571">promised</a> to look after Mugabe’s wife Sarah, known as “Sally”. Grennan and people like Julius Nyerere’s British friend and assistant <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3518465.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4d7659d7e9f1b2a3dd3124c9a249a47c">Joan Wicken</a> played an important role in Mugabe’s rise. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean nationalists emerged from Salisbury’s prisons late in 1974, as Portugal’s coup led to Angola and Mozambique emerging from colonialism into the Soviet orbit. The fifties generation of Zimbabwean nationalists were to participate in the Zambian and South African inspired détente <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/25/archives/mr-vorsters-detente.html">exercise</a>. This inspired much competition for Zanu’s leadership: Mugabe arrived in Lusaka after ousting Ndabaningi Sithole, Zanu’s first leader. </p>
<p>Samora Machel, freshly in Mozambique’s top office, wondered if Mugabe’s quick rise was due to a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40201256.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1d1f7a14b762adff6a6007321af29132">“coup in prison”</a>. Herbert Chitepo’s March 1975 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3557400.pdf">assassination </a> (which got many of Zanu’s leaders arrested and its army kicked out of Zambia) was only one marker of the many fissures in the fractious party that by 1980 would rule Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In late 1975 the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Vashandi_"><em>vashandi</em></a> group emerged within the Zimbabwean People’s Army. Based in Mozambique’s guerrilla camps, they tried to forge unity between Zimbabwe’s two main nationalist armies and push a left-wing agenda. They were profoundly unsure of Mugabe’s suitability for <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2016/08/08/heroes-day-review-dzino-memories-freedom-fighter/">leadership</a>.</p>
<p>When Mugabe found his way to Mozambique also in late 1975, Machel put him under house arrest in Quelimane, far from the guerrilla camps. In January Grennan helped him to London to visit a hospitalised Sally. He made contacts around Europe and with a few <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03057078008708020">London-based Maoists</a>.</p>
<p>Soon after Mugabe’s return the young American congressman Stephen Solarz and the Deputy Head of the American embassy in Maputo, Johnnie Carson, wended their way to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">Quelimane</a>. Mugabe wowed them.</p>
<p>Solarz and Carson reported back that Mugabe was “an impressive, articulate and extremely confident individual” with a “philosophical approach to problems and … well reasoned arguments”. He claimed to control the “people’s army”. Yet by January 1977, he persuaded Samora Machel to imprison the young advocates of unity with Zapu. His many reasons included their initial refusal to support him at a late 1976 conference in Geneva organised by the British, helped immeasurably by Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State. </p>
<p>At a hastily called congress in March 1977 to consecrate his ascension, Mugabe uttered his leitmotif: those appearing to attempt a change to the party’s leadership by “maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks” would be struck by the <a href="http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuzn197707">“the Zanu axe”</a>.</p>
<p>This was Mugabe’s strategy, embedded at an early stage: tell foreign emissaries what they wanted to hear, use young radicals (or older allies) until their usefulness subsided, and then get rid of them. All the while he would balance the other forces contending for power in the party amid a general climate of fear, distrust, and paranoia. </p>
<h2>Dealing with dissent</h2>
<p>It is not certain if Margaret Thatcher knew about this side of Mugabe when they met less than a month after his April 1980 inauguration. He seemed most worried about how Joshua Nkomo’s Zapu – which he had dumped from the erstwhile “Patriotic Front”, and the violence against which had put Zimbabwe’s election in some doubt – was making life difficult for the new rulers. He <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2016.1214116">warned</a> that he might have “to act against them soon”.</p>
<p>In as much as Zapu was linked with the South African ANC and Thatcher and her colleagues tended to think the ANC was controlled by the South African Communist Party, Zapu intelligence chief <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tribute-to-zimbabwean-liberation-hero-dumiso-dabengwa-117986">Dumiso Dabengwa’s</a> perspective might be more than conspiracy theory. Perhaps Thatcher’s wink and nudge was a green light for the anti-Soviet contingent to eliminate a regional threat. Gukurahundi <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561">followed</a>. It was certainly the biggest blot on Mugabe’s career and created the biggest scar over Zimbabwe. The scar is still there, given the lack of any effort at reconcialitation, truth, or justice.</p>
<p>Four years later the ruling party’s first real congress since 1963 reviewed its history. Mugabe tore the Zipa/Vashandi group that had annoyed him eight years before to shreds. “Treacherous … counter-revolutionary … arms caching … dubbed us all <em>zvigananda</em> or bourgeois”. Thus it “became imperative for us to firmly act against them in defending the Party and the Revolution… We had all the trouble-makers detained”. </p>
<p>The great helmsman recounted the youthful dissenters’ arrest and repeated the axe phraseology. </p>
<p>But few saw these sides of Mugabe’s character soon enough; those who did were summarily shut up. </p>
<h2>The end</h2>
<p>After he’d been ousted, Mugabe could only look on in seeming despair over the ruination he had created. Sanctimonious as ever he wondered how his successor, current President Emmerson Mnangagwa, had become such an ogre. At his 95th birthday, February 21 2019, a few weeks after Mnangagwa’s troops had killed 17 demonstrators, raped as many women, and beaten hundreds more in the wake of his beleaguered finance minister’s methods to create <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">“prosperity from austerity”</a>, Mugabe <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-156949.html">mused to his absent successor</a>:</p>
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<p>We condemn the violence on civilians by soldiers … You can’t do without seeing dead bodies? What kind of a person are you? You feed on death? </p>
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<p>He only had to look into his own history to see what kind of people he helped create.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Robert Mugabe’s years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself finally wore too thin in 2017.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1227262019-09-05T09:02:06Z2019-09-05T09:02:06ZZimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290911/original/file-20190904-175686-v3skdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Zimbabweans have turned to hawking to keep the wolf from the door as the economic crisis in the country deepens. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is going through its worst socio-economic and political crisis in two decades. Crippling daily power outages of <a href="https://www.biznews.com/africa/2019/08/05/zimbabwe-tipping-point-economic-crisis">up to 18 hours</a> and erratic supply of clean water are just some of the most obvious signs. Meanwhile, an inflation rate of over 500% has put the prices of basic goods beyond the reach of most people.</p>
<p>Hopes that the end of President Robert Mugabe’s ruinous rule in November 2017 would help put the country on a new path of peace and prosperity have long <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">dissipated</a>. Efforts by his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">attract foreign investors</a>, who are critical in reviving Zimbabwe’s ailing economy, have also largely failed.</p>
<p>The situation has not been helped by the rejection of the 2018 presidential election results by the main opposition party. The Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) claims the governing Zanu-PF stole the elections even though the results were <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Regional-observers-Zimbabwe-election-free-and-fair/4552902-4692254-e75fje/index.html">endorsed</a> as free and fair by the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Only the European Union observers were somewhat circumspect <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">in their assessment</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
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<p>The opposition alliance has been calling for Mnangagwa’s government to relinquish power, and a <a href="https://www.openparly.co.zw/chamisa-calls-for-national-trasitional-authority/">national transitional authority</a> appointed to run the country for at least two years, or until the 2023 general elections.</p>
<p>How individuals who will sit on the national transitional authority will be chosen and by whom, is not clear. But the party and <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/01/towards-the-national-transitional-authority/">some academics</a> believe such a transitional authority would normalise Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political situation and help it revive its relations with the West.</p>
<p>The opposition may have a point on re-engagement with the West. This is key to helping end the investment drought that started in earnest <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.908.3003&rep=rep1&type=pdf">between 2000 and 2003</a> under sanctions imposed by Western countries for human rights violations linked to Zanu-PF’s violent land reform seizures and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/03/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">election rigging</a>.</p>
<p>But the transitional authority idea is doomed to fail because of lack of buy-in by Zanu-PF. So, it’s time to consider a more viable alternative path to peace for Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Clamping down</h2>
<p>For now, the government has dismissed talk of a transitional authority as unconstitutional. Instead, in May it launched its own platform, called the <a href="https://www.panafricanvisions.com/2019/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-launches-the-political-actors-dialogue-to-address-long-term-economic-challenges/">Political Actors Dialogue</a>. The forum comprises 17 small political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. </p>
<p>The main opposition party is boycotting the process on grounds that Mnangagwa is an illegitimate president. Recently, it attempted to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-gdPunLfkAhXfSBUIHdWZCeIQFjAEegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-africa-49366224&usg=AOvVaw0fkr2f1y4BV0-4W2SlJHGY">embark on public protests</a> in the hope of bringing the government to its knees. The protests fell flat after being blocked by the courts and the police.</p>
<p>It boggles the mind why the MDC-A, led by Nelson Chamisa, insists on marches when previous attempts were crushed with brute force. These led to deaths in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=21&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwingbiQ87TkAhVsZhUIHWexAsIQFjAUegQICBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.news24.com%2FAfrica%2FZimbabwe%2Fzimbabwean-generals-deny-troops-shot-and-killed-6-protesters-20181113&usg=AOvVaw02nyk1uLwat64nJso2EImF">August 2018</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwicyIfl87TkAhV9SBUIHXzrAC4QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2019-01-30-zim-army-responsible-for-murders-rapes-report&usg=AOvVaw1fiTJ2kraC9xNiMyQ4TBM6">January 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The Zanu-PF regime has always clamped down heavily on perceived threats to its rule since 1980. Why then does the MDC-A continue to endanger people’s lives through this deadly route as a way of resolving Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crises?</p>
<p>I firmly believe that the opposition needs to change tack and focus on entering into dialogue with the government. </p>
<h2>Dialogue and unity government</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis requires the two leading political protagonists - Mnangagwa and Chamisa - to enter into serious dialogue. Both leaders need to soften their hard-line stances towards each other and put the people of Zimbabwe first.</p>
<p>There’s a precedent for this. Ten years ago, then South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to bring then President Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiMheeVnrfkAhVXShUIHeBIDw04ChAWMAB6BAgAEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.france24.com%2Fen%2F20080721-mbeki-harare-mediate-talks-zimbabwe-political-crisis&usg=AOvVaw2pLPeTVwBEVrH2TSAcW5e3">negotiation table</a>. </p>
<p>The talks culminated in the formation of the government of national unity that ran Zimbabwe from February 2009 to July 2013, with Mugabe as the President and Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister. The unity government was fairly successful and managed to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiv9PjanrfkAhUUTBUIHQR0D0cQFjAJegQIABAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theindependent.co.zw%2F2013%2F07%2F11%2Freflecting-on-positive-zimbabwe-gnu-moments%2F&usg=AOvVaw25plQQHFWt-5PTjI9_Fi6J">stabilise the economy</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades of suffering have shown that it is not the threat of protests or sanctions from the West that can move Zanu-PF to change, but neighbouring countries under the aegis of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwia1fucj7HkAhWnRhUIHcY8Dvc4ChAWMAB6BAgAEAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.fes.de%2Fpdf-files%2Fbueros%2Fmosambik%2F07874.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2PSzn2eTrgI53Cnw2yrI2t">SADC</a>. South Africa is pivotal in this regard as the region’s strongest economic and military power. </p>
<p>It’s time to experiment with a second government of national unity for Zimbabwe. But for this to happen, SADC and South Africa must have the appetite to intervene in Zimbabwe. This is currently lacking. </p>
<h2>Dialogue in Zimbabwe’s history</h2>
<p>Historically, dialogue has moved Zimbabwe forward as a nation during its darkest hours. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A year before independence in 1980, battle-hardened guerrilla commanders agreed to talk to the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to end Zimbabwe’s liberation war even though they were convinced that they were winning. </p></li>
<li><p>In 1987 Joshua Nkomo, who was the leader of the main opposition party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union, agreed to talk to his political nemesis, then Prime Minister Mugabe. Yet before this, he had been hounded out of the country by Mugabe in the mid-80s, and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">thousands of his supporters killed</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>More recently in 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to enter into a unity government with Mugabe, despite winning the first round of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">2008 elections</a>. The unity government briefly resuscitated and stabilised Zimbabwe’s fragile economy. Hyperinflation was tamed, basic commodities became available again and people regained purchasing power.</p></li>
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<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Given the MDC-A’s positive contribution during its brief stint in the 2009-2013 unity government, the party should be expending its energies on dialogue. The main opposition party can enter into a second government of national unity, but continue building and strengthening its own support.</p>
<p>In the same vein, Zanu-PF also needs to realise that without the involvement of the MDC-A, its attempts to revive the economy and end the strife in the country, on its own terms, are destined to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>It’s time for a new approach as it becomes increasingly clear that protests won’t topple the Zanu-PF government.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1225192019-09-03T10:53:12Z2019-09-03T10:53:12ZZimbabwe’s addiction to borrowing continues – as inflation rises<p>Zimbabwe now faces a second major descent into inflation and economic despair in the space of 12 years. </p>
<p>The first, in 2008, involved almost metaphysical rates of inflation – 231m% at one point that year according to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/09/zimbabwe">some reports</a>, with other estimates even higher.</p>
<p>The crisis resulted in hugely controversial elections, which the opposition surely won – but which saw Robert Mugabe re-installed as president in a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/world/africa/16zimbabwe.html">power-sharing deal</a> with the opposition. To stabilise the economy, the worthless Zimbabwean dollar was jettisoned and people were given the option of using a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7859033.stm">basket of foreign currencies</a>, the US dollar chief among them. The problem was then how to source US dollars – and this was done largely by borrowing.</p>
<p>Fast forward to 2019, nearly two years after Mugabe was ousted and Emmerson Mnangagwa installed as president – Zimbabwe’s annual inflation is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-inflation/zimbabwe-inflation-almost-doubles-stirring-memories-of-economic-chaos-idUSKCN1UA0Q0">officially 176%</a>, the highest in the world after Venezuela. </p>
<p>But this official figure is almost certainly false. My own calculations, based on prices I observed during the 2018 Zimbabwean elections and reports from Zimbabwean friends now, estimate inflation at about 600%. And this is within what remains of the formal economy. Recourse to the black market to secure goods such as fuel and bread unavailable elsewhere means a parallel inflation rate that is higher – by my calculations, at about 800%. And now the publication of inflation data has now been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-01/once-famed-for-hyperinflation-zimbabwe-suspends-inflation-data">suspended for six months</a>. </p>
<p>The government’s inability to pay for electricity imports has meant power outages of up to 18 hours each day. This is in part a result of poor rains and low water levels in Lake Kariba, the source of a huge percentage of the nation’s hydro-electricity – <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/kariba-to-be-decommissioned/">amid reports</a> that it might be altogether decommissioned. Even if this is not the case, the turbines at Kariba are far from being in good shape and, even in seasons of abundant rain, Zimbabwe had to depend on electricity supplies from South Africa and Mozambique. These countries now <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/08/23/zesa-faces-zw14bn-loss-over-power-cuts/">want to be paid</a>.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s almost <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/24/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-new-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-tells-davos.html">desperate slogan</a> for Zimbabwe is that it is now “open for business”. But the elections of 2018 that were meant to legitimise his presidency were marred by <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-is-still-in-trouble-but-its-under-too-little-pressure-to-change-101617">violence</a> and deaths and no election observer group validated the polls as fully free and fair. Under those conditions, initial promises of foreign investors <a href="https://www.voanews.com/africa/zimbabweans-hope-foreign-investment-revives-economy">faded away.</a></p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-and-dialogue-in-zimbabwe-twin-strategies-that-arent-working-122139">Repression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren't working</a>
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<p>Dollars began to dry up, sourcing new dollars became impossible, and the new technocratic minister of finance, Mthuli Ncube, began desperate but hugely orthodox measures to instil some discipline in a runaway economy. Those who were rich and powerful declined to make sacrifices of their own, while those who were poor simply got poorer. </p>
<h2>Tight control</h2>
<p>Almost a year into the job, Ncube has reined in some of the profligacy in state spending and managed to bring in an increase in tax revenue. But his tax measures have been hugely unpopular, with poorer business people seeing them as disincentives to invest in future productivity. </p>
<p>One of his hugely unpopular early measures was to <a href="https://www.mobileworldlive.com/money/news-money/zimbabwe-unveils-new-mobile-money-tax/">tax cell phone financial transactions</a>. At a stroke, this jeopardised what was beginning to become a thriving cyber economy. It seems Ncube feels a need to deal only with concrete transactions in a hard currency, however valueless, that he and the government can try to control. </p>
<p>In June, he introduced a <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1652851/zimbabwe-dollar-is-back-but-economists-are-unsure-it-will-work/">new Zimbabwean dollar</a>, outlawing the use of the US dollar. This has already led to a rapid erosion of spending power, with the new currency trading at almost ten to one US dollar. He has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f3e298c2-c8e7-11e9-a1f4-3669401ba76f">defended his decision</a>, although his critics remain many.</p>
<p>With the lack of incentives to small businesses that bridge the formal and informal economies, a huge number of families depend on salaries earned by public servants. There are about 400,000 civil servants in Zimbabwe. Given the lack of real value in the Zimbabwean dollar, they probably live on less than US$2.00 a day. They and their families, not to mention the network of relatives in the extended family, cannot survive on that.</p>
<p>Ncube’s fixation with control shows the dead hand of a government that has run out of ideas and, above all, trust in entrepreneurial initiative and self-creation. Nevertheless, it wishes to have control of all it surveys, even as this diminishes before its own eyes</p>
<h2>Ncube’s astounding plan</h2>
<p>According to an interview with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-16/zimbabwe-has-a-plan-to-end-20-year-creditor-standoff-ncube-says">Bloomberg</a> in mid-August, Ncube said he hopes to establish a nine-member monetary policy committee that will reduce interest rates from 50%. Within 12 to 18 months, Zimbabwe plans to sell domestic bonds with a duration of as long as 30 years to fund infrastructure investment. In time, it will approach international markets, he said. How exactly any of this is to be done is yet to be explained. </p>
<p>Hanging over all this is the size of the debt that Zimbabwe needs to repay before investors will consider the country a viable risk for new loan liquidity. Estimates for this figure range from US$9 billion to as much as $US30 billion. </p>
<p>Under a debt-settlement plan, which Ncube maintains he is discussing with creditors, Zimbabwe would complete an International Monetary Fund (IMF) <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/05/31/pr19189-zimbabwe-imf-managing-director-approves-a-staff-monitored-program">staff-monitored programme</a> in January 2020. He told Bloomberg that Zimbabwe would then borrow the $1.9 billion it owes the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) from the G7 group of industrialised nations. This would allow it to win $1 billion in debt relief from the World Bank and AfDB, which it would pay back to the G7. </p>
<p>But this is an astonishing strategy. It is based on the ability, and credibility, to borrow money to repay money. And there is absolutely no indication that the G7 would loan significant sums to Zimbabwe until both economic and, above all, political reforms are instituted. </p>
<p>Whether Zimbabwe could complete the IMF staff-monitored programme by January is a huge question in itself. The IMF conditions are not easy ones.</p>
<p>Having got this far, Ncube has no choice but to hope that his policies will work. He inherited a mess of gigantic proportions. It was as if the ZANU-PF ruling party, the government, and the oligarchic ruling class thought the free lunch could go on forever. Someone would always loan it more money. </p>
<p>Ncube realised that this could not any longer be the case. But his solution seems to be simply a new way to borrow more money. The first terrible truth is that it is not Zimbabwean money that will save Zimbabwe. The second terrible truth is that Zimbabwe’s economy may not, for some time, be saved.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122519/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Zimbabwe’s financial situation worsens, the government pins its hopes on borrowing more money.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1221392019-08-21T09:42:34Z2019-08-21T09:42:34ZRepression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren’t working<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288885/original/file-20190821-170927-slrpli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's crisis is deepening on all fronts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">globalnewsart.com/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the November 2017 coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the elections in 2018, the regime of President Emmerson Mnangagwa has forged two forms of rule. These have been based on coercion on the one hand, and on the other dialogue.</p>
<p>Following the 2018 general elections and <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1800/Zimbabwe-the-2018-elections-and-their-aftermath/">the violence that marked its aftermath</a>, the Mnangagwa regime once again resorted to coercion in the face of the protests in January 2019. The protests were in response to the deepening <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-06-zimbabwe-hikes-fuel-prices-by-26-percent/">economic crisis in the country</a>, and part of the opposition strategy to contest the legitimacy of the government. </p>
<p>The response of the state to the protests was swift and brutal. Seventeen people were killed and 954 jailed nationwide. In May the state turned its attention to civic leaders, arresting seven for “subverting” a constitutional government. The repressive state response was felt once again on 16 and 19 August, when the main opposition Movement for Democratic Chance (MDC) and civic activists were once again prevented from marching against the <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/police-soldiers-deploy-in-zimbabwe's-bulawayo-as-opposition-challenges-protest-ban/">rapid deterioration of Zimbabwe’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>These coercive acts represent a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era.</p>
<p>At the same time Mnangagwa has pursued his objective of global re-engagement and selective national dialogue. This is in line with the narrative that has characterised the post-coup regime.</p>
<p>In tracking the dialogue strategy of the Mnangagwa government, it is apparent that it was no accident that key elements of it were set in motion in the same period as the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new staff monitored programme. </p>
<p>The purported objective is to move the Zimbabwe Government towards an economic stabilisation programme. This would result in a more balanced budget, in a context in which excessive printing of money, rampant issuing of treasury bills and high inflation, were the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/05/31/Zimbabwe-Staff-Monitored-Program-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-46952">hallmarks of Mugabe’s economic policies</a>. </p>
<p>The dialogue initiatives also took place in the context of renewed discussions on re-engagement with the European Union (EU) in June this year.</p>
<p>But, Mnangagwa’s strategy of coercion and dialogue has hit a series of hurdles. These include the continued opposition by the MDC. Another is the on-going scepticism of the international players about the regime’s so-called reformist narrative.</p>
<h2>Dialogues</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has launched four dialogue initiatives. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Political Actors: This involves about 17 political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. They all have negligible electoral support and are not represented in parliament. The purported intent is to build a national political consensus. The main opposition party, the MDC, boycotted the dialogue, dismissing it as a public relations exercise controlled by the ruling Zanu-PF. </p></li>
<li><p>The Presidential Advisory Council: This was established in January to provide ideas and suggestions on key reforms and measures needed to improve the investment and business climate for economic recovery. This body is largely composed of Mnangagwa allies. </p></li>
<li><p>The Matabeleland collective: This is aimed at building consensus and an effective social movement in Matabeleland to influence national and regional policy in support of healing, peace and reconciliation in this region. But it has come in for some criticisms. One is that it has been drawn into Mnangagwa’s attempt to control the narrative around the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/06/04/gukurahundi-zimbabwe-mnangagwa/">Gukurahundi massacres</a>. These claimed an estimated 20 000 victims in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions in the early 1980’s. Another criticism is that it has exacerbated the divisions within an already weakened civic movement by regionalising what should be viewed as the national issue of the Gukurahundi state violence. </p></li>
<li><p>The Tripartite National Forum. This was launched in June, 20 years after it was <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/building-from-the-rubble">first suggested by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The functions of this body set out in an <a href="https://www.greengazette.co.za/documents/national-gazette-42554-of-28-june-2019-vol-648_20190628-GGN-42554">Act of Parliament</a>, include the requirement to consult and negotiate over social and economic issues and submit recommendations to Cabinet; negotiate a social contract; and generate and promote a shared national socio-economic vision.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The establishment of the forum could provide a good platform for debate and consensus. But there are dangers. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions warned of the long history of the lack of “broad based consultation on past development programmes”. It <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/tnf-launched-20-years-later-amid-visible-tensions">insists that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>reforms must never be deemed as tantamount to erosion of workers’ rights.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The strategy</h2>
<p>In assessing the central objectives of the various strands of Mnangagwa’s dialogue strategy, three factors stand out.</p>
<p>The first is that the Political Actors Dialogue, the Presidential Advisory Council and the Matabeleland Collective were developed to control the pace and narrative around the process of partnership with those players considered “reliable”. Major opposition and civic forces that continued to question the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa boycotted these processes.</p>
<p>Secondly, the formal establishment of the long awaited Tripartite National Forum may serve the purpose of locking the MDC’s major political ally, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions, into a legally constructed economic consensus. The major parameters of this will likely be determined by the macro-economic stabalisation framework of the IMF programme.</p>
<p>When brought together, all these processes place increased pressure on the political opposition to move towards an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa regime, and into a new political consensus dominated by the ruling Zanu-PF’s political and military forces, thus earning them the seal of approval by major international forces.</p>
<p>The MDC has responded with a combined strategy of denying Mnangagwa legitimacy, protests as well as calls for continued global and regional pressure. The MDC believes that the continued decline of the economy will eventually end the dominance of the Mnangagwa regime. </p>
<p>As part of its 2018 election campaign, the MDC made it clear it would accept no other result than a victory for itself and Chamisa. That message has persisted and is a central part of the de-legitimation discourse of the opposition and many civic organisations. The MDC has regularly <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/sikhala-mnangagwa-faces-overthrow-through-citizen-mass-protests/">threatened protests since 2018</a>.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The MDCs strategies have not resulted in any significant progress. The hope that the economic crisis and attempts at mass protests to force Zanu-PF into a dialogue are, for the moment, likely to be met with growing repression. Moreover, the deepening economic crisis is likely to further thwart attempts to mobilise on a mass basis.</p>
<p>The EU, for its part, is still keen on finding a more substantive basis for increased re-engagement with Mnangagwa and will keep the door open. Regarding the US, given the toxic politics of the Trump administration at a global level, and the ongoing <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/trump-administration-condemns-latest-govt-abductions-and-torture-of-opposition-in-zimbabwe/">strictures of the US on the Zimbabwe government</a>, there has been a closing of ranks <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">around a fellow liberation movement</a> in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">recent appointment</a> as Chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Peace and Security in Tanzania will only further cement this solidarity.</p>
<p>There is clearly a strong need for a national dialogue between the major political players in Zimbabwean politics. But there is little sign that this will proceed. Moreover, the current position of regional players means that there is unlikely to be any sustained regional pressure for such talks in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is affiliated with a Zimbabwean NGO Ukuthula Trust. </span></em></p>The Mnangagwa regime’s coercive acts are a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era, while he seeks global re-engagement and selective national dialogue.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129672019-03-11T14:18:25Z2019-03-11T14:18:25ZZimbabwe’s MDC faces a leadership contest. But can it be peaceful?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262465/original/file-20190306-100793-m9f32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of MDC's Nelson Chamisa believe he could win Zimbabwe's 2023 elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance, Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party, has announced that it will hold its elective congress in May 2019. The announcement has stirred interest – inside and outside the party. This is because there could be an intriguing contest for the presidency of the party between the incumbent <a href="https://informationcradle.com/africa/nelson-chamisa/">Nelson Chamisa</a> and the secretary-general <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Douglas_Mwonzora">Douglas Mwonzora</a>. The two have a history of rivalry.</p>
<p>Mwonzora is Chamisa’s political nemesis. In 2014 Mwonzora unexpectedly won a contest for the position of secretary-general even though Chamisa, as organising secretary, was in a position to influence party structures in his favour and had been nominated by 11 out of 12 provinces. One theory is that the MDC’s former leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who died of cancer in <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">February 2018</a>, engineered Mwonzora’s victory by influencing the voting patterns of congress delegates. The reason given for this is that he wanted to curtail Chamisa’s political ambitions because of his perceived role in the MDC’s surprising poor showing in the 2013 national elections.</p>
<p>After his defeat, Chamisa was relegated to an ordinary party member, until Tsvangirai brought him back into the MDC’s executive. The speculation is that Tsvangirai did this because he sensed that Chamisa was still popular within the party’s structures, especially among younger members. </p>
<p>A Mwonzora victory is worrying for some of Chamisa’s most fervent supporters. This is because they believe Chamisa is the future of the party. He’s only 41 years old. Also, they believe he gave Zanu-Pf candidate Emmerson Mnangagwa a run for his money in the 2018 presidential elections. Chamisa’s camp believes he’s better placed to defeat Mnangagwa in the 2023 elections because of his <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-who-is-nelson-chamisa-16237399">widespread national appeal</a>. </p>
<p>Mwonzora too has his fair share of supporters. He’s also widely respected within the MDC because of his easy going temperament. </p>
<p>What this all adds up to is that a victory by either candidate could split the party for the umpteenth time. Even a contest carries risks because the MDC has a chequered history in which violence has been used regularly against opposing factions. If the two do contest the party presidency in May – and Mwonzora in the past few days has <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/i-will-be-tougher-for-zanu-pf-says-mwonzora/">hinted that he might</a> – their supporters’ tactics could heighten the danger of violence and intimidation. This could further divide or damage the party and set Zimbabwean democracy back after decades of authoritarian rule. </p>
<h2>Troubled past</h2>
<p>Tsvangirai’s MDC had a “T” at the end – which stood for Tsvangirai himself. This was to distinguish his MDC from the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/MDC-Welshman_Ncube">Welshman Ncube MDC</a> which had cut ties with Tsvangirai. Ncube was the founding secretary-general of the MDC. </p>
<p>Just before he died Tsvangirai had agreed to bring back former “rebels” who had been founding members of the party. This included Welshman Ncube, Tendai Biti and Job Sikhala. For his part, Chamisa agreed to accommodate and rope in his former “comrades-in-arms” into his election campaign. </p>
<p>The coalition under their umbrella became known as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-chamisa-forced-to-register-mdc-alliance-as-a-political-party-amid-squabbles-20180616">the MDC-Alliance party</a> just before Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections. The reason for the name change was that former MDC member Thokozani Khupe was arguing in the courts that her formation was the bona fide MDC-T. </p>
<p>A succession puzzle was created in the MDC-Alliance when Tsvangirai, as president and before his death, appointed Chamisa as head of policy and research and then as one of three deputy presidents of the party. This muddying of the waters appears to have been deliberate. It meant that Tsvangirai could easily play his deputies against each other if he felt threatened by any one of them. </p>
<p>But having three vice-presidents – Chamisa, Elias Mudzuri and Thokozani Khupe – didn’t do the party any favours. After Tsvangirai’s death a bloody battle for succession ensued, and led to another split in the party.</p>
<h2>The contest hots up</h2>
<p>The MDC’s May congress has inevitably sucked in the ruling Zanu-PF. The two have been at loggerheads since 1999 when the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8338.html">original MDC was formed</a>. A succession of bruising electoral contests, including the highly disputed 2008 elections which the MDC-T was <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">widely believed to have won</a>, galvanised the ruling Zanu-PF party into resolving to weaken, if not destroy, the MDC brand. </p>
<p>It’s against this backdrop that Zanu-PF is being accused of having a role in the unfolding MDC-Alliance drama ahead of the impending congress. </p>
<p>Some top MDC-Alliance leaders in Chamisa’s camp have been claiming that the governing Zanu-PF has set aside between US$ 4 million to US$6 million to pay MDC delegates to vote for Mwonzora <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2019/03/03/zanu-pf-pouring-millions-to-influence-mdc-congress/">at the party congress</a>. Biti, who is currently the party’s vice-chairperson, has said he will reject any candidates sponsored by Zanu-PF.</p>
<h2>Best case scenario</h2>
<p>As party leader Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy. He should make sure that the lead up to the congress is violence- free and that party members who are in good standing can contest any post without being intimidated.</p>
<p>He needs to be wary of political sycophants within his party who want to turn him into a demigod, as was the case during Mugabe’s long reign as the leader of Zanu-PF. Chamisa has already shown that he has nothing to fear from a fair contest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy within Zimbabwe’s main opposition party.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129732019-03-10T09:20:04Z2019-03-10T09:20:04ZResponses to Zimbabwe highlight gulf between the region and the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262191/original/file-20190305-48423-1k7l4u1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa's regime has yet to show it differs from that of Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The post-Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe continues to struggle to establish its legitimacy. While this is the case the terms of its future international re-engagement will continue to occupy the Zanu-PF government.</p>
<p>The government’s problems are compounded by the international outcry over its brutal response to the protests against <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/huge-zim-fuel-price-hike-foreigners-to-pay-in-forex-20190113">massive fuel price hikes</a> in January. At least 16 people died and hundreds were wounded from ‘gunshots, dog bites, <a href="http://kubatana.net/2019/02/03/crimes-humanity-alert-zimbabwe-brink-violations-intensify/">assaults and torture"</a>. </p>
<p>The events of January once again underscored the fault lines in Zimbabwe’s foreign relations. One the one hand the Southern African Development Community came out in support of a member state in the face of clear evidence of state brutality against its citizens. It even went so far as to condemn the continuing <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/sadc-backs-zim-against-onslaught/">“illegal sanctions”</a> against Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In contrast, the UK, EU and the US all condemned the human rights abuses of the Zimbabwean state. They called for a return to the commitment to political and economic reforms. And they renewed their calls for as inclusive, credible national dialogue to map <a href="http://www.newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk/2019/02/us-slams-ed-govt-over-violence.html">the way forward</a>.</p>
<p>These responses once again show how polarised regional and western government policies are on the Zimbabwe crisis. This has had another consequence – the sidelining of efforts to reach a consensus on economic and political reforms. There have been at least three efforts at some sort of reconciliation over the past decade. The first was during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Global-Political-Agreement">Global Political Agreement (2009-2013)</a>, again in the aftermath of the November 2017 coup, and then again in the run up to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">2018 elections</a>.</p>
<p>Another consequence of the fallout from January is that Mnangagwa’s government has reached out further to its authoritarian economic and political partners in <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/with-president-mnangagwa-in-russia-zimbabwe-descends-into-chaos">Eurasia</a>. The problem with this is that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414016666859">linkages with other autocratic regimes</a> provide some protection against forces pushing for democratic change. In addition, these relationships tend to consolidate those in the military and business sectors who see any prospect of serious economic and political reform as a threat.</p>
<h2>Responses</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/statement-sadc-chairperson-his-excellency-dr-hage-g-geingob-president-republic-namibia-political-and-socio-economic-situation-zi/">statement</a> issued by the current head of the Southern African Development Community repeated the official position of the Zimbabwe government. It criticised “some internal players, in particular NGOs, supported by external players (who have) continued to destabilise the country.”</p>
<p>Early signs of this position were clear in South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s speech at the International Labour Organisation in January. He claimed that sanctions against the country were <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ramaphosa-says-lift-zimbabwe-sanction-20190122">no longer necessary</a> because the government had “embarked on democracy”.</p>
<p>Once again the regional body has conflated genuine concerns over imperial interventions in the developing world with the fight for democratic and human rights by national forces. Like Zanu PF – both under former President Robert Mugabe and Mnangagwa – Southern African Development Community has affirmed its support for a selective anti-imperialist narrative by an authoritarian nationalist regime that conflates the fight for democratic rights with outside intervention.</p>
<p>The response from the EU couldn’t have been more different. A <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2019-0116&language=EN">resolution</a> of the European Parliament in mid-February strongly condemned the violence and excessive force used in January. It reminded the government of Zimbabwe that long term support for it is dependent on “comprehensive reforms rather than mere promises”. </p>
<p>The resolution also called on the European Parliament to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(review restrictive measures against) individuals and entities in Zimbabwe, including those measures currently suspended, in the light of accountability for <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2019-0116&language=EN">recent state violence</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This position in effect put on hold any new restrictive measures against the Zanu-PF government. It also left open the option for renewed dialogue.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>The debate on sanctions on Zimbabwe has been lost in the region and on the continent. And this solidarity with the Mnangagwa regime is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>Change, if any, might come from the EU and US. It’s possible that they could change their positions again if the Mnangagwa government made another attempt at minimalist reforms. </p>
<p>The current US policy in Africa is targeted against what it considers to be the “rapidly expanding” financial and political <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/">influence of China and Russia</a> on the continent. Trump is also looking to make the US the major player in the new battle for metal resources in Africa. This new struggle for technology metals is taking place in countries such as Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/business/how-president-trump-is-using-britain-to-fight-his-trade-war-against-china-in-africa-a4078031.html">Tanzania and Sierra Leone</a>. </p>
<p>The White House announced this week that it has extended sanctions against Zimbabwe for <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-03-05-trump-extends-us-sanctions-against-zimbabwe-by-a-year/">another year</a>. Nevertheless, at some stage the politics of US strategic interests in Africa could lead to a more accommodating relationship with an authoritarian regime such as the Mnangagwa administration. This has happened on many occasions in its foreign policy interventions.</p>
<p>The EU is in a “wait and see” mode. It will need evidence of some notable movement by the Zimbabwean state on the political and economic reform front before it pushes the re-engagement process forward. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s regime has yet to show that it is any different from Mugabe’s. Given the continuing factional battles in the ruling party – and its inability to imagine itself out of power – it is difficult to view the current government as anything other than a continuation of the authoritarian Zanu-PF’s legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> He/ is affiliated with Solidarity Peace Trust.. </span></em></p>The debate on sanctions on Zimbabwe has been lost in the southern African region and on the continent.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.