tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/migrant-crisis-16372/articles
Migrant crisis – The Conversation
2021-12-01T18:19:47Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/172132
2021-12-01T18:19:47Z
2021-12-01T18:19:47Z
The EU is the real villain in the Poland-Belarus migrant crisis
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434258/original/file-20211128-27-vz2wdw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C84%2C3543%2C2270&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this September 2021 photo, Warsaw residents place candles before the national Border Guards Headquarters in Warsaw, Poland, as a sign of mourning for four migrants found dead a few days earlier along the border between Poland and Belarus. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski) </span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In 2019, when we were doing research on the integration of refugees in Romania, the topic seemed irrelevant for Romanians and other eastern Europeans. During an interview we conducted, <a href="https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog/following-refugee-relocation-scheme-ideological-interpretations-of-interstate-shared-responsibility-in-romania">one member of Romanian parliament stated</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We don’t see them. We don’t meet them on the street, they don’t exist.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Two years later, and eastern European nations that aren’t in the European Union — Serbia, Bosnia, Belarus and Turkey — are being accused of using migrants as pawns against the EU member states of Romania, Poland, Greece and Croatia.</p>
<p>Romania is in the news for becoming an entry hotspot for migrants on the Balkan route, the so-called “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210528-poor-people-s-route-why-migrants-are-heading-for-romania">poor people’s route to Europe</a>,” and for <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/09/22/whips-sticks-and-batons-romanian-border-police-accused-of-violence-against-migrants">violently pushing asylum-seekers</a> back to Serbia. Similar stories are unfolding in Croatia, with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/7/croatia-greece-romania-illegal-pushbacks-borders">hundreds of illegal pushbacks</a> at the border with Bosnia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three people walk in single file in an arid field." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434254/original/file-20211128-15-rv8i2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434254/original/file-20211128-15-rv8i2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434254/original/file-20211128-15-rv8i2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434254/original/file-20211128-15-rv8i2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434254/original/file-20211128-15-rv8i2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434254/original/file-20211128-15-rv8i2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434254/original/file-20211128-15-rv8i2x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=460&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Migrants walk in a field near the village of Majdan, Serbia, in July 2021. Groups of people walked in scorching heat through corn or sunflower fields toward the border with Romania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Darko Vojinovic)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Poland, police have used <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59302919">tear gas and water cannons</a> to deter asylum-seekers from crossing the Belarusian-Polish border. </p>
<p>Similar to how <a href="https://theglobepost.com/2020/04/17/eu-turkey-refugees/">Turkey opened its borders to EU member Greece in March 2020</a> to allow Syrian refugees to make their way to western Europe, Belarus has been using migrants as leverage against Europe. The Turks did so to force NATO, especially Europe, to back their position in the Syrian war following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/27/russian-strike-in-syrias-idlib-a-message-to-ankara">2020 conflict between Syrian government forces and Turkish-backed rebels in Idlib</a>.</p>
<p>Now Belarus is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/12/hold-belarus-accountable-for-bid-to-destabilise-eu-border-says-west">diverting public attention</a> away from its own human rights violations. Poland says Belarus has lured hundreds of Middle Eastern migrants to the country for the purpose of sending them across the Polish border to retaliate against <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-economic-sanctions-belarus-come-into-effect-2021-06-24/">economic sanctions imposed by the EU earlier this year</a>.</p>
<h2>Sharing responsibility in the EU is impossible</h2>
<p>In 2015, the European Commission adopted two procedural decisions <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-refugee-quotas-160000-italy-greece-failing-european-commissioner-legal-cases-obligations-a7739396.html">to relocate, on a quota agreement, 160,000 people</a> in need of international protection from the over-burdened front-line nations of Italy and Greece to the least affected member states.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/eu-migration-case-hungary-poland-asylum-refugees/">Poland refused</a> to participate. </p>
<p>That’s despite a legal requirement as part of the EU to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/document/download/bb78e089-e157-4e9d-b36a-0d2bf291a870_en">relocate 6,182</a> migrants. It’s also despite the EU’s 2017 <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/DA/IP_17_1607">sanctions against Poland</a>, the Czech Republic and Hungary for failing to comply with the requirements.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in a head kerchief and wearing a mask holds a grey cat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434255/original/file-20211128-23-1tparak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434255/original/file-20211128-23-1tparak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434255/original/file-20211128-23-1tparak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434255/original/file-20211128-23-1tparak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434255/original/file-20211128-23-1tparak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434255/original/file-20211128-23-1tparak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434255/original/file-20211128-23-1tparak.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A migrant woman holds a cat in an area between the borders of Belarus and Poland in the village of Usnarz Gorny, Poland, in August 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Michal Kosc)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It would be easy to blame eastern European racism and suggest the region is xenophobic and culturally backward. Yet such simplistic reasoning would overlook the disparities between the EU and its western, more developed nations compared to their eastern European counterparts. </p>
<p>The EU’s <a href="https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/">Schengen agreement</a>, which carves out a region within the union with no internal border controls, is available to western EU nations but not their eastern neighbours, as is the euro currency. That’s already created “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The+Lure+of+Technocracy-p-9780745686820">a union of different speeds</a>.”</p>
<p>Member states have different positions in EU, not only in terms of geography, economics and demographics, but also in relation to political power and migrant integration initiatives. </p>
<p>For instance, the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/IPOL_STU(2021)694413">EU-wide relocation strategy for transferring migrants rescued at sea</a> was developed on the basis that all EU members are equal and should therefore share responsibility for refugees.</p>
<p>But research has shown that eastern European nations are not on equal footing when it comes to asylum. <a href="https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2021/the-integration-of-refugees-in-romania-a-non-preferred-choice/">The former communist states lack effective refugee integration strategies</a>, like national administrative structures for managing migration. </p>
<p>They have <a href="https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/articles/2016/12/01/refugees-relocated-by-e-u-struggle-to-get-by-in-romania">weak systems</a> of providing refugees with adequate accommodation, meals or pocket money — benefits that have been present for decades in the western part of the continent.</p>
<h2>Inequities among EU nations</h2>
<p>How fair is it to equally share responsibility given the economic, social and political differences among the EU’s member states? The wealthier nations of western Europe — Sweden, Finland and France, for example — have higher capacity to welcome asylum-seekers <a href="https://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/79457/OXMO-Vol-7-No-1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">due to well-established</a> systems of migration management. </p>
<p>Migrants don’t want to settle in eastern member states like Poland, Croatia or Romania because their socio-economic conditions and refugee integration systems leave a lot to be desired. As stated by one of the Romanian bureaucrats we interviewed in 2019: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We transferred a total of 728 people, because that’s how many Greece and Italy sent us. There were foreigners that refused … generally speaking, they were refusing the eastern countries. All of them wanted the western European states.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33153">Dublin Agreement</a> was adopted in 2003 to determine which EU member states were responsible for accepting asylum-seekers. It constitutes the backbone of the EU’s <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/56424">shared responsibility</a> on refugee issues, tying asylum claims to where migrants enter the EU. </p>
<p>That protects the western, wealthiest nations from dealing with high migrant flows, and allows the EU to hand over responsibility for asylum-seekers to eastern and southeastern European countries. That’s why the Greek and the Italian asylum-processing systems were tapped out in 2015 at the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/11/greece-humanitarian-crisis-islands#">peak wave of refugee entries</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men and boys in a boat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434257/original/file-20211128-19-xtf8mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434257/original/file-20211128-19-xtf8mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434257/original/file-20211128-19-xtf8mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434257/original/file-20211128-19-xtf8mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434257/original/file-20211128-19-xtf8mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434257/original/file-20211128-19-xtf8mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434257/original/file-20211128-19-xtf8mz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Migrants and refugees, mostly from Egypt, aboard a Coast Guard rescue ship wait to enter in the port of Roccella Jonica in southern Italy in November 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alessandra Tarantino)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet isn’t the EU to blame for leaving southern Europe on its own to deal with crisis, which could have been easily avoided by allowing people to freely move within the entire EU? </p>
<p>Consider the beginning of the refugee crisis. It emerged from <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/once-destination-migrants-post-gaddafi-libya-has-gone-transit-route-containment">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.unrefugees.org/news/afghanistan-refugee-crisis-explained">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/9/9/the-iraq-war-the-root-of-europes-refugee-crisis">Iraq</a> and <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html">Syria</a>. Whether we look at the <a href="https://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/western-travellers-in-the-islamic-world/england-and-russia-face-to-face-in-asiatravels-with-the-afghan-boundary-commission-travels-with-the-afghan-boundary-commission;ilm1534">colonial maps</a> drawn by western European empires or at the recent NATO-backed foreign policies pursued by an EU servile to the United States, <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2021/10/tariq-ali-afghan-war-us-imperialism">foreign involvement</a> in the Middle East has led to instabilities in the region. </p>
<p>As NATO members, western European states have been regularly involved in fuelling the refugee crisis. It’s not surprising that non-EU countries like Turkey or Belarus have attempted to reap some regional benefits by using refugees as pawns against the EU.</p>
<h2>EU efforts to deter migrants</h2>
<p>Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s attempts to do so merely represent half of the story. The EU has also done its best to deter people from entering its territory. In 2016, the EU <a href="https://theglobepost.com/2020/04/17/eu-turkey-refugees/">signed a deal</a> with Turkey that specified that in return for six billion euros and the promise of waiving visa requirements for Turkish nationals, Turkey would take in migrants arriving on the Greek islands. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434252/original/file-20211128-17-1dunmwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with a moustache glares." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434252/original/file-20211128-17-1dunmwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434252/original/file-20211128-17-1dunmwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434252/original/file-20211128-17-1dunmwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434252/original/file-20211128-17-1dunmwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=394&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434252/original/file-20211128-17-1dunmwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434252/original/file-20211128-17-1dunmwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434252/original/file-20211128-17-1dunmwo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this March 2012 photo, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko looks at the media in the Grand Kremlin Palace at the start of the Euro Asian Economic Union summit in Moscow.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In other words, the EU has been paying Turkey for five years to take in migrants.</p>
<p>With the arrival of refugees in 2015, the EU found itself at odds with its liberal claims of human rights, sanctity of life and a globalized open world. Suddenly, the borderless world imagined under globalism — particularly free movement within the EU — was put on hold. </p>
<p>The wealthy European nations have since left the peripheral states, and their emerging right-wing governments, on the front lines, bearing the blame for <a href="https://ecre.org/balkan-route-tens-of-thousands-pushed-back-from-croatia-evidence-of-pushbacks-and-border-violence-in-romania-presented-to-un-rights-body-stonewalling-of-asylum-seekers-in-serbia-a/">violently pushing back migrants</a> and for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50700345">inhumane conditions</a> at reception sites. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men, some wearing masks, stand together and stare at armed soldiers in camouflage uniforms." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434256/original/file-20211128-25-1gtgidx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3199%2C1743&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/434256/original/file-20211128-25-1gtgidx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434256/original/file-20211128-25-1gtgidx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434256/original/file-20211128-25-1gtgidx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434256/original/file-20211128-25-1gtgidx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434256/original/file-20211128-25-1gtgidx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/434256/original/file-20211128-25-1gtgidx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Polish security forces surround migrants stuck along the Belarus border in Poland in September 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The EU is attempting to position itself as a beacon of liberalism and human rights as it exempts itself from political responsibility for migrants desperately seeking better lives — all while condemning their brutal determent at the continent’s periphery. It’s also trying to portray eastern European countries as racist villains infringing upon the human rights of refugees.</p>
<p>But it’s the EU itself that’s the real villain in the eastern European migrant crisis.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Raluca Bejan receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for the "Refugee Integration in South East Europe (RISEE)" project. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salim Nabi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The European Union is attempting to portray eastern European countries as racists infringing upon the human rights of refugees. But it’s the EU itself that’s primarily to blame for the refugee crisis.
Raluca Bejan, Assistant Professor of Social Work, Dalhousie University
Salim Nabi, Research assistant, Migration, Dalhousie University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/167476
2021-09-13T15:30:58Z
2021-09-13T15:30:58Z
I’ve been talking to Afghans stuck on the Bosnian border – their predicament is horrifying
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420734/original/file-20210913-19-l5qzjk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=32%2C0%2C3600%2C2398&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alessandra Fuccillo</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the Taliban closed in on Afghanistan, the European Union co-signed a <a href="https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-afghanistan/">joint statement</a> with dozens of nations agreeing that “the Afghan people deserve to live in safety, security and dignity” and that the international community was “ready to assist them”.</p>
<p>As someone who has been researching the refugee crisis on Europe’s borders for years, I found the statement surprising. Before it was making bold statements about events in Kabul, the EU had spent years failing to help thousands of Afghans seeking help at its borders. </p>
<p>Since 2015, more than 570,000 Afghan citizens <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210831-eu-holds-emergency-meeting-on-possible-influx-of-afghan-refugees">have sought protection in the EU</a>. Thousands of them remain stuck in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after having been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/oct/21/croatian-police-accused-of-sickening-assaults-on-migrants-on-balkans-trail-bosnia">pushed back by the Croatian police</a> catching them on the EU border.</p>
<p>Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a member of the EU, nor of the Schengen area, so only a small number of migrants apply for asylum there. A large majority try to move forward – to pass through in order to reach EU countries where they have a better chance of obtaining asylum. </p>
<p>For four years, migrants attempting to cross the Bosnian-Croatian border have been sent back by Croatian police forces. The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights <a href="https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/push-back/">defines</a> pushbacks as “a set of state measures by which refugees and migrants are forced back over a border – generally immediately after they crossed it – without consideration of their individual circumstances and without any possibility to apply for asylum or to put forward arguments against the measures taken”. Pushbacks violate – among other laws – the prohibition of collective expulsions stipulated in the <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf">European Convention on Human Rights</a>, which <a href="https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf">defines collective expulsion</a> as “any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group”. </p>
<p>The Border Violence Monitoring Network recorded <a href="https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/croatia/asylum-procedure/access-**procedure-and-registration/access-territory-and-push-backs/">110 testimonies of pushbacks</a> affecting 1,656 people in 2020 alone. In almost 90% of the cases, witnesses reported some form of degrading treatment or torture.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Men wrapped in blankets sit around a pot boiling on a fire in a camp on the Bosnian border." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420758/original/file-20210913-16-h4wngy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420758/original/file-20210913-16-h4wngy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420758/original/file-20210913-16-h4wngy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420758/original/file-20210913-16-h4wngy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420758/original/file-20210913-16-h4wngy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420758/original/file-20210913-16-h4wngy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420758/original/file-20210913-16-h4wngy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A group prepares food in a camp at the border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alessandra Fuccillo</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Afghans arrive at this border alongside Syrian, Iranian, Iraqi and Pakistani refugees. From Bosnia, they attempt the so-called <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/03/27/976648642/for-migrants-in-bosnia-the-game-is-a-perilous-journey-to-a-better-life?t=1631180808924">“game”</a>. Refugees use this expression to describe the attempt to cross a border on foot. The “game” consists of days and nights walking in the woods that connect national frontiers. It takes at least 20 days to travel from the Bosnian border to Italy. The “game” is “played” against the border and against the police. They face low temperatures, wild animals and food and water shortage on one hand, the fear of police pushbacks on the other. </p>
<p>Several told us the police have taken their phones, shoes and money. Others have reported violence.</p>
<h2>Testimony from the border</h2>
<p>Amir has been travelling for five years. He left Afghanistan when the Taliban invaded his village. He went to Turkey where he worked for three years in a factory. When his temporary papers expired, he was afraid of being deported and continued his journey into Bosnia. “I have been stuck in Bosnia for nine months. I have tried the game 27 times and I am still here,” he told me.</p>
<p>The majority of those who remain blocked in Bosnia and Herzegovina stay in the so-called “jungle camps” scattered around the provincial roads that connect the cities of Bihac, Cazin and Velika Kladuša, or in the International Organization for Migration’s temporary reception centres. They live in awful conditions, far away from urban centres, often with no access to running water or electricity. </p>
<p>With each deportation, migrants have to regroup to find money and resources. Most of them are financially assisted by relatives in their home countries. But in the last month, many Afghan migrants have lost contact with their families.</p>
<p>Ali, a 26-year-old man from Kabul told us that he has not been able to talk to his dad:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>My dad lives alone in Kabul. He did not like the Taliban and now I don’t know what happened to him. The Croatian police stole my phone, and I don’t have the money to buy another one and cannot ask him to send it. I don’t even know if he is alive.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Ali is not the only one who has not been able to contact his family. The physical and psychological stress of squatting and deportation mixes with the anxiety generated by the events that are taking place in Afghanistan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man looks around a dark room in a migrant camp. Graffiti on the wall reads 'Fight Fortress Europe'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420760/original/file-20210913-21-1hge50n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/420760/original/file-20210913-21-1hge50n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420760/original/file-20210913-21-1hge50n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420760/original/file-20210913-21-1hge50n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420760/original/file-20210913-21-1hge50n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420760/original/file-20210913-21-1hge50n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/420760/original/file-20210913-21-1hge50n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Migrants are living in terrible conditions while they try to make it to Europe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alessandra Fuccillo</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are around 15 Afghan families living between the villages of Bojina and Sturlic, right on the Bosnian border. They have found shelter in the ruins of houses abandoned after the Bosnian war. Kala, a 17-year-old girl from Kabul has been travelling for four years with her mother and her younger brother. They have been stuck in Bosnia for nine months. She said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>During the last game, they even took our jackets and our backpacks. My brother was left in the rain with only a t-shirt. In the backpack there were my mom’s medicines. She is very ill and she needs them but they did not care and now she does not have them anymore.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Kala told us that the police had started being violent with women. “They use tasers on our necks to make us fall down,” she said. “They use sticks against us even if we surrender. Usually, it is a female officer to beat the women, but sometimes they even use dogs against us.” Sana, another girl travelling with her family, showed us dog bite marks on her leg and told us the police set dogs on her and her mother.</p>
<p>The stories of these people living in limbo at the border remind us that the Afghan crisis, while currently acute, is not new and is not far away. The EU’s indignation over what is happening in Afghanistan rings hollow when contextualised with the consistent unwillingness to address the situation in its own neighbourhood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/167476/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benedetta Zocchi receives funding from Leverhulme Trust</span></em></p>
European leaders expressed solidarity with people trapped in Kabul with no reference to the people trapped in makeshift camps on its periphery.
Benedetta Zocchi, Leverhulme Trust Doctoral Scholar, Queen Mary University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/134422
2020-04-29T17:03:49Z
2020-04-29T17:03:49Z
The Schengen zone in the face of coronavirus
<p>In <a href="https://www.amazon.fr/peur-Occident-XIVe-XVIIIe-si%C3%A8cles/dp/2213005567"><em>Fear in Western Countries</em></a>, a remarkable book first published in 1978, the French historian Jean Delumeau highlighted two phenomena that underlie collective behaviour: invasion and disease. In less than five years, Europe had to tackle both – the migrant crisis of 2015 and the Covid-19 epidemic of 2020. The comparison in terms of crisis management is striking.</p>
<h2>Migrant crisis and health crisis: two rapid and far-reaching phenomena</h2>
<p>The seriousness and scale of both phenomena are striking. In 2015, the European Union had to deal with a massive and unprecedented influx of non-European migrants. According to a <a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/publications/ara-2016-EZGrEA">Frontex report</a>, more than 1.8 million crossings were recorded that year. While it is difficult to put a figure on the Covid-19 epidemic given its evolving nature, the disease poses a serious crisis in terms of its scale. According to the <a href="http://www.euro.who.int/en/about-us/regional-director/statements/statement-every-country-needs-to-take-boldest-actions-to-stop-covid-19">regional director of the World Health Organisation</a>, Europe is currently regarded as the centre of the pandemic of coronavirus.</p>
<p>The speed of the phenomena and the lag in the political response should be noted. The European Parliament sounded the alarm on the migration crisis in a resolution approved after a <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement/">European Council meeting on April 23, 2015</a>. However, the EU did not mobilise itself substantially until after the informal meeting of Heads of State and Government on September 23, 2015. By mid-October, that public action was effectively structured around the implementation of short- and medium-term measures – for example acceleration of the deployment of crisis management centres, the hotspots, in Greece and Italy.</p>
<p>At first glance, the Covid-19 epidemic presents similar characteristics – a rapid acceleration followed by a late political reaction. The meeting of EU heads of state and government didn’t take place until March 17, 2020, at the request of the President of the Republic, even though Italy had established a “protected area” targeting 15 million inhabitants on March 9, 2020.</p>
<h2>What re-establishment of boundaries?</h2>
<p>The comparison does not end there. The EU witnessed disorderly decisions of individual member states to seal off the internal borders of the Schengen area, both in 2015 and 2020. Political leadership in Brussels was <a href="http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/travel-bans-in-europe-a-legal-appraisal-part-i/">caught off guard</a> by the resurgence of travel restrictions during the Covid-19 spreading across Europe. According to the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0399&from=EN">Schengen Borders Code</a>, member states are entitled to reintroduce police controls at the border within the Schengen area, in particular for a “threat to public health”. However, the code does not as such provide for the re-establishment of borders on such grounds.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the European Commission <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020XC0316(03)&from=EN">accepts an interpretation from a public health perspective</a>, while recalling the importance for member states not to apply any measure that could jeopardise the integrity of the single market for goods, particularly with regard to supply chains. Rather, the disorganized movement as part of unilateral closure of internal borders within the Schengen area – that is to say, without consultation – infringes the code despite the commission’s flexible interpretation. Here again, the progressive re-establishment of border controls in disarray is reminiscent of those of 2015, in violation of the provisions of the code as revised at the end of the 2011 migration crisis.</p>
<h2>Under-utilisation of existing means</h2>
<p>Yet another point of convergence between the two events is the under-utilisation of existing European instruments. In 2015, member states had to faced up with the influx of migrants, yet were slow in deploying EU tools related to civil protection, among others. In 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), which is the European structure responsible for the early detection of emerging epidemic threats to the EU, was not sufficiently supplied with health data by the member states.</p>
<p>To put it another way, this reflects the prevalence of individual and uncoordinated responses to health emergencies. Italy deplored the refusal of France and Germany to send masks and denounced the EU’s <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/14/coronavirus-eu-abandoning-italy-china-aid/">lack of solidarity</a>. When a shortage of face masks gravely affected France, the country’s border guards stopped two trucks carrying 130,000 of them bound for the UK health care service, <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/11221578/french-snatch-lorries-130000-coronavirus-masks/">sparking anger in the UK</a>.</p>
<p>Here again, the re-partitioning of the Schengen area is a symptom of member states’ individual management of the crisis. In 2015, those situated downstream on the Balkan migration route (successively Northern Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary) allowed the transit of migrants through their territory, leaving the responsibility for settling the migration issue to the states situated upstream (successively Serbia, Hungary and Austria). This was what the European Commission had termed a <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0120&from=EN">laissez-passer policy</a>. Consequently, downstream states introduced controls to block the flows of migrants at their southern borders. This lack of coordination brought about a bottleneck at the border, tasking the upstream state – Serbia in the example of the Hungarian border – with the management of the massive influx of migrants at a portion of its northern border.</p>
<h2>What division of competences between the EU and the Member States?</h2>
<p>This lack of solidarity is aggravated by the fact that migration policies competences (in the sense of entry and residence of more than three months) are not conferred upon the Union and its action is strictly constrained within the provisions of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=FR">Treaty on the Functioning of the EU</a> (TFEU). Member states have not made the same choices, to say the least: Germany had, for a time at least, opted for a more open policy, while Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were hostile to any admissions.</p>
<p>In current situation, member states control the choices to be made in their fight against the Covid-19 epidemic – the Union cannot impose any specific options upon them. Although there seems to be some convergence, the Netherlands and Sweden have opted for <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-herd-immunity-route-to-fighting-coronavirus-is-unethical-and-potentially-dangerous-133765">distinct health choices</a>. Despite the April 15 <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication_-_a_european_roadmap_to_lifting_coronavirus_containment_measures_0.pdf">joint European roadmap</a> intended to enhance the coordination between member states on the lifting of Covid-19 containment measures, the de-escalating process is going forward in disarray. Indeed, it seems that the pandemic is afflicting not only European citizens, but also <a href="http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-pandemic-kills-also-the-european-solidarity/">European solidarity</a>.</p>
<p>Are we therefore heading toward an institutional crisis on the same scale as that of 2015? While the crisis is undeniable, the EU appears to have learned the lessons of the migration crisis. Indeed it is important to note that the process of building the Union’s response is more rapid. This is reflected in the <a href="https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6038-2020-INIT/fr/pdf">measures identified by the Council of Health Minister</a> on March 13, as well as the aforementioned Commission guidelines adopted on March 16, which are intended to both issue a wide range of recommendations in the field of public health and strengthen the external borders by applying a temporary ban on travel to the EU for a period of 30 days (since prolonged). This stringent restriction is one of the five priorities identified by the European Council on March 17. Moreover, much improvement have been made, for instance the new project of reinforcement of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism or the impending <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0175&from=FR">activation of the emergency funds</a>. The goal is to create medical supplies at the European level to provide assistance to any affected member states and to support the administration of large-scale application of medical tests.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, all these measures can’t really paper over the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/28/eu-coronavirus-fund-share-crisis-soul-european-parliament-fiscal">need for solidarity</a>: unlike the declaration of the European council promoting a better co-ordination between Member States, some of them are currently discussing of an intra-Schengen border lift selection beneficial to central and eastern EU countries, paving the way for a bilateral system of pick-and-choose tourist migration during this summer.**</p>
<p>“By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail”, as Benjamin Franklin wrote. The health public choices leading to unpreparedness for the pandemic and competition between member states in terms of medical supplies, the crying need for solidarity and the blatant lack of coordination impairing a forceful political response, all these aspects must be scrutinised, but in the future.</p>
<p>As the European Council president, Charles Michel, <a href="https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/03/18/charles-michel-cette-crise-va-nous-obliger-a-changer-nos-paradigmes-economiques-et-sociaux_1782261">stated</a>, we have to stay focus on the fight against the virus. “The debate is not institutional: when the house burns down, we don’t have to shilly-shally about the water bill”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/134422/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pierre Berthelet ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>
What parallel can be drawn between the Schengen countries’ management of the migrant crisis in 2015 and their response to the current health epidemic?
Pierre Berthelet, Docteur en droit (UE) & chercheur associé à l'Univ. Grenoble-Alpes (CESICE) & univ. Aix-Marseille (CERIC), Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/135355
2020-04-07T16:33:09Z
2020-04-07T16:33:09Z
How Covid-19 breaks down solidarity with migrants
<p>The spread of the coronavirus Covid-19 is pushing governments to act with urgency and define strategies to control the movement of people in the global context. The refugee issue was at the centre of this debate until a few weeks ago, but has now taken a back seat after a foreseeable shift in governmental priorities. However, migrants continue to arrive in Europe and be crowded into reception centres, which are currently experiencing a crisis of tragic proportions.</p>
<p>What is the impact of the Covid-19 emergency on the refugee issue? How can the directives on social distancing be adopted in reception centres, and by extension in all the other sites of collective forced confinement? What effect can the pandemic have on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/forms-and-outcomes-of-citizens-mobilisations-during-europes-refugee-reception-crisis-122834">interaction of migrants and non-migrants</a>, on both the solidarity practices that have emerged since the summer of 2015, and the hostile attitudes toward migrants and refugees?</p>
<h2>European disunion</h2>
<p>The fragilities and divisions caused by the pandemic are undermining the <a href="https://time.com/5805783/coronavirus-european-union/">governance of the European Union</a>, particularly on issues related to the mobility of people. Countries are <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/health/coronavirus-response/travel-and-transportation_en">closing in on themselves</a>, as internal and external border controls are rapidly intensifying.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/324306/original/file-20200331-65514-b83fwv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/324306/original/file-20200331-65514-b83fwv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324306/original/file-20200331-65514-b83fwv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324306/original/file-20200331-65514-b83fwv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=507&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324306/original/file-20200331-65514-b83fwv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324306/original/file-20200331-65514-b83fwv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/324306/original/file-20200331-65514-b83fwv.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=638&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ec.europa.eu</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the same time as the first coronavirus infections and deaths were recorded in Italy, Turkey was engaging in a geopolitical conflict with Europe by <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/inside-europe-turkey-opens-border-for-migrants/av-52651447">opening its borders</a>, pushing thousands of migrants into the transit camps in Greece. Athens’ reaction and diplomatic pressure from the EU have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/world/europe/turkey-greece-border-migrants.html?smid=fb-share&fbclid=IwAR0Q71K954sxYRTNN4tFdPj-XHMaVRXyKqOBRFtuPIGdob3SJ1MzH3OJfdM">held back Ankara</a> after two weeks of border tensions.</p>
<h2>Death and violence on the rise on Greek islands</h2>
<p>The spread of Covid-19 in Europe coincided with a peak in tensions in the five Greek islands hosting more than 42,000 asylum seekers. Thousands of migrants amassed in and around the Mória camp, the main hotspot on the island of Lesbos, saw their already <a href="https://giuliopiscitelli.viewbook.com/album/between-olive-trees-and-mud?p=1">miserable living conditions</a> worsening sharply.</p>
<p>Suicide attempts and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/16/child-killed-in-lesbos-refugee-camp-fire">fatal accidents</a> keep occurring with frightening regularity. The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) held an <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/20200323RES75640/20200323RES75640.pdf">appeal to the EU Commission</a> to evacuate the most vulnerable population from the camp.</p>
<p>On-the-scene reporters such as German photojournalist <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hk3v8sRDcik">Michael Trammer</a> denounced attacks by far-right groups against migrants, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/04/we-left-fearing-for-our-lives-doctors-set-upon-by-mob-in-lesbos">humanitarian activists and journalists</a>. These groups come from the Greek mainland, but are likely to be supported by others from <a href="https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/23294/greece-far-right-activists-in-violent-clashes-to-defend-europe-against-migrants">continental Europe</a>.</p>
<p>After five years of increasing pressure, part of the local population is now <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AyHIZRNGsVs">turning against migrants</a>. Hostile sentiments spread among the very same society that had shown <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/10/57f7732d4/volunteers-saved-lives-lesvos-nominated-nobel-peace-prize.html">great solidarity</a> during the 2015-18 reception crisis. The island of Lesbos is representative of the magnitude of the tragedy that migrants are experiencing in Europe. In many other places, however, similar problems require urgent action, such as on the border with Bangladesh where <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/a-rohingya-coronavirus-catastrophe-looms-if-their-internet-blackout-continues/">millions of Rohingyas are at risk</a> within the world’s largest refugee camp.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/3TQslfF-lok?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">There is little protection against Covid-19 in the Mória refugee camp.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unenforceable health measures</h2>
<p>Public heath measures and social distancing rules intended to fight the Covid-19 pandemic are absolutely irreconcilable with the reality of imprisonment, as evidenced by the <a href="https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/03/10/coronavirus-carceri-in-rivolta-altri-3-detenuti-morti-a-rieti-nuove-proteste-a-siracusa-e-caserta-a-foggia-evasione-di-massa-23-ricercati-la-procura-di-milano-apre-inchiesta-sulla-sommossa-a-san/5730183/">riots sparked in Italian penitentiaries</a> during which several inmates died. These events should draw public attention on the global issue of the <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/03/prison-jail-coronavirus-release-abolition-incarceration">application of anti-contagion regulations in overcrowded prisons</a>, where a possible explosion of the virus would be catastrophic.</p>
<p>Other overcrowded places include collective centres for asylum seekers and irregular migrants across Europe, whether they are transit or detention centres. Unsurprisingly, the actions taken by many governments in order to deal with the migration issue under the Covid-19 emergency are oriented toward reducing – and eventually stopping – the arrival of new migrants. For example, the responsible institutions in <a href="https://www.fedasil.be/fr/actualites/accueil-des-demandeurs-dasile/coronavirus-mesures-dans-les-centres-daccueil">Belgium</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-stops-accepting-refugees-over-coronavirus/a-52826716">Germany</a> have decided to stop registering new asylum applications for an indefinite period of time.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, calls and mobilisations for the regularisation of irregular migrants continue to spread. Hundreds of migrants in the French detention centres are currently on a <a href="https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/1584466767-liberer-tous-etrangers-sans-papiers-retenus-dans-cra-migrants-coronavirus-epidemie-expulsions">hunger strike</a>. Humanitarian organisations held <a href="https://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/2020/03/21/news/_subito_una_sanatoria_per_difendere_gli_stranieri_irregolari_dal_coronavirus_e_dallo_sfruttamento_lettera_di_sindacati_e_a-251909165/">an appeal to the Italian government</a> to guarantee the right to health to tens of thousands of irregular migrants employed in the agricultural sector in the country. </p>
<p>For the moment, the only country that followed a principles of solidarity is Portugal, where those migrants who were waiting for their applications to be processed have been temporarily <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/29/coronavirus-portugal-grants-temporary-citizenship-rights-to-migrants">regularised until the 1st of July</a>.</p>
<h2>Solidarity at risk</h2>
<p>All these appeals and mobilisations show that the principle of solidarity toward migrants and refugees rests on solid foundations, at least within the civil society. However, the coronavirus emergency and the rules of social distancing are leading to the rarefaction – and often the complete disappearance – of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/forms-and-outcomes-of-citizens-mobilisations-during-europes-refugee-reception-crisis-122834">practices of direct solidarity</a> that characterised the 2015-2018 reception crisis.</p>
<p>These practices were often transformed into structured and sustainable supportive actions, and became a fundamental component of the reception and integration network in Europe. The reception centres around which citizen movements had developed, such as the <a href="http://www.bxlrefugees.be/">BxlRefugees</a> platform created to help asylum seekers and refugees in Belgium, have now been closed to the outside world.</p>
<p>As one of the most vulnerable, most isolated and less visible groups, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/mar/18/ngos-raise-alarm-as-coronavirus-strips-support-from-eu-refugees">unaccompanied minors</a> risk to be abandoned to their fate.</p>
<h2>Collective fear fuels xenophobia</h2>
<p>As shown in Greece, the far-right did not miss the opportunity to capitalise on the collective fear for the virus and revive their xenophobic message. Also in the mainstream political debate, however, the migration issue often merges with the new virus emergency. This is the case of Viktor Orbán, who directly <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200313-hungary-s-pm-orban-blames-foreign-students-migration-for-coronavirus-spread">blamed migrants</a> for the spread of Covid-19 in Hungary.</p>
<p>With similar intentions, Donald Trump has spoken of a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/11/politics/read-trump-coronavirus-address/index.html">“foreign virus”</a> since the beginning of the crisis. In Italy, part of <a href="https://youmedia.fanpage.it/video/aa/XnaJrOSw1AH3g-fz">mainstream journalism</a> is translating one of the most recurring leitmotifs from the migration debate into the Covid-19 debate. Those populist politicians and opinion leaders who accused NGOs of facilitating the smuggling of migrants in 2015-2018, are pointing the finger at them today for not being supporting national hospitals during the current crisis. The reality is different, however, as shown by the case of <a href="https://www.emergency.it/cosa-facciamo/risposta-covid/">Emergency</a> which is largely involved in first-line care.</p>
<h2>A hierarchy of emergencies</h2>
<p>It is clear how all these arguments take advantage of the radical shift in priorities that European governments have undergone in the last few weeks. At the national and local level, strategies to face the pandemic have included a gradual increase in social control measures. Police operations have been implemented with the aim of controlling and punishing those who do not comply with confinement rules. There are currently hundreds of thousands of <a href="https://www.interno.gov.it/it/coronavirus-i-dati-dei-servizi-controllo">daily checks</a> in Italy, but police corps are active throughout Europe, on the national <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9JS69SSUJ6w">borders</a> and in the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200318-france-coronavirus-lockdown-violation-attestation-epidemic-christophe-castaner-public-health">city streets</a>.</p>
<p>In the eyes of millions of citizens trying to cope with the huge stress and anxiety of isolation, any sort of violation to the anti-contagion rules will be seen as unacceptable. Any exception to the rule of confinement will be seen as a privilege at the expense of national security. Hostile reactions in the case that such privileges will be granted to migrants are sadly predictable.</p>
<p>Sadly, the nationalistic egoism that embedded within slogans such as “Britain first”, “La France d'abord” or “Prima gli italiani” – to give just a few examples – risks becoming more present than ever. Until the end of the Covid-19 crisis, any emergency or disaster that forces people to migrate will be seen as less urgent, less important than the emergency that forces us to remain confined to our homes.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The photographer <a href="https://giuliopiscitelli.viewbook.com">Giulio Piscitelli</a> provided the reportage pictures in this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135355/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>
The health crisis is pushing governments to try to control the movement of people, but migrants continue to arrive in EU reception centres, which are currently experiencing a crisis of tragic proportions.
Alessandro Mazzola, Post-doc Research Fellow, Sociologist, Guildhall School, City of London Corporation, Université de Liège
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/132990
2020-03-04T17:54:10Z
2020-03-04T17:54:10Z
Tensions mount at Greek border with Turkey amid contested history of migration in the Aegean
<p>The ongoing refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean has taken a dramatic turn in recent days with an escalating humanitarian situation on the land and sea borders between Greece and Turkey. </p>
<p>After Turkey removed its border restrictions with Greece on February 29, thousands of people began to make their way across the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/just-run-on-the-turkey-greece-border-as-refugees-try-to-break-through">country to the Greek border</a>. They have been met with tear gas, and <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2020-03-02/greek-coast-guard-fire-warning-shots-towards-migrant-boat/">warning shots</a> fired by the Greek coastguard at boats trying to cross the Aegean sea.</p>
<p>The latest “crisis” started suddenly – yet migration in the region has been going on for many years, if not millennia. As an ancient route of cultural and trade interchange, the Aegean has always been a sea of overlapping waves of migrations – and the rich history of this criss-crossing is ever-present in the region today. </p>
<p>My <a href="http://www.isrf.org/about/fellows-and-projects/ilay-ors/">ongoing research</a> in the Greek islands and mainland suggests the living memory of previous experiences of displacement forms a vivid background to the current arrival of refugees, who have been coming since the Syrian civil war intensified in around 2015. </p>
<p>On February 29, Turkey woke up to the news that <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51667717">at least 30 of its soldiers</a> had been killed in an air attack at an army base in Idlib in northern Syria. Turkish political leaders responded by promising to retaliate in what is another escalation of the military conflict in the region. </p>
<p>But the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, also made good on a previous threat and declared that no migrant attempting to leave the country via the border with Greece would be stopped. This was a major shift in policy since the signing of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/refugees-out-of-sight-out-of-mind-two-years-on-from-eu-turkey-deal-93451">2016 deal between Turkey and the EU</a>, under which Erdoğan agreed to regulate and reduce the migrant flows to Europe in exchange for financial support.</p>
<p>In a matter of two days, tens of thousands <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/migrants-at-turkish-greek-border-we-want-another-life/a-52627031">gathered at the main checkpoints</a> at the land and sea borders, only to find that the Greek side was closed. In response, the government announced that Greece would <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-51695468">not accept any more irregular migrants</a>, nor would it process any asylum applications for a month. </p>
<p>Despite <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/3/5e5d08ad4/unhcr-statement-situation-turkey-eu-border.html">criticism</a> from humanitarian agencies and <a href="https://www.guengl.eu/left-meps-tell-council-commission-to-end-greek-border-violence/">European parliamentarians</a> over the legality and legitimacy of such measures, the Greek government stood firm. On March 3, the EU Commission’s president, Ursula von der Leyen, travelled to the border city of Evros and thanked Greece “for being our European <em>aspida</em>.” By using the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_380">Greek word for shield</a>, and reiterating that the Greek borders were European borders, she gave the Greek prime minister a strong message of unity and support.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1234474136442982400"}"></div></p>
<h2>Half open, half closed</h2>
<p>Those who wish to believe that a half-closed border is still half open continue to wait for their ever-slimmer chances to enter Greece. Thousands of people are <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/refugee-crisis-turkey-syria-greece-border-afghanistan-war-latest-a9373211.html">spending days and nights</a> in near freezing temperatures in the buffer zone between the two borders with only limited humanitarian assistance provided by locals and NGOs. </p>
<p>In the Aegean islands, the situation is even thornier. As of January 31, 2020, there were <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/74134">115,600 refugees and migrants</a> in Greece, according to the UNHCR. So far, there have been <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179">8,432 arrivals in 2020</a>. While the numbers are not at the levels they were in 2015, when <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/620777">Greece was caught off guard</a> in the initial phases of refugee flows, it’s not the quantity of the migrants but the changes in the quality of their reception that matters. </p>
<p>In the past five years, the irregular flow of refugees arriving in Greek shores with dinghies has continued with some fluctuations. Greece established five migrant hotspots in its Aegean islands, yet these have not addressed the needs of those arriving. With multiple accounts documenting the <a href="https://theconversation.com/samos-grim-winter-leads-to-protests-by-refugees-living-in-limbo-on-greek-island-110116">appalling conditions</a> in various refugee camps, especially at the Moria camp on the island of Lesvos, this has led to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/19/greece-refugee-hotspots-unsafe-unsanitary">criticism</a> of Greece’s ability or willingness to deal with the migration issue.</p>
<p>The new government of Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the Greek prime minister, vowed to take drastic measures and passed a <a href="https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-allodapoi/prosphuges-politiko-asulo/nomos-4636-2019-phek-169a-1-11-2019.html">new migration law</a> in November 2019 which came into effect in January. This was <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/249370/article/ekathimerini/news/construction-of-closed-centers-to-start-next-month-mitarakis-says">followed by a plan</a> to build closed reception centers in the islands of Chios, Samos and Lesvos which would replace the current open camp structures of the hotspots. </p>
<p>These measures have been presented as effective solutions to accelerate the asylum procedures and to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-mayors/greek-island-mayors-press-government-to-lighten-migrants-overload-idUSKBN1ZM1GH">decongest the islands</a>”. But they have been met with anger by locals, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/25/clashes-over-greeces-migrant-detention-camp-plans-continue">protested extensively</a> against the central government’s decisions, leading to a <a href="https://greece.greekreporter.com/2020/02/25/migrant-crisis-northern-aegean-islands-will-go-on-general-strike-wednesday/">general strike on February 25</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/01/refugee-crisis-in-greece-tensions-soar-between-migrants-and-locals.html">rising tension</a> has heightened the ideological polarisation among the locals on the Aegean islands. Anti-migrant protesters, alongside far-right extremists, have demonstrated that they are prepared to use violent means to protect their borders. In early March, some angry protesters <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/islanders-lesbos-block-camp-port-refugee-arrivals-spike-200301181623591.html">tried to block</a> refugee boats from arriving into harbours and block roads. Cars and buildings have been burnt and <a href="https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/03/01/lesvos-locals-mob-migrants-journalists/">journalists attacked</a>.</p>
<p>The opposing camp <a href="https://today.rtl.lu/news/world/a/1477895.html">condemns</a> the use of refugees <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/03/02/inhumane-and-reckless-amnesty-international-condemns-greeces-measures-block-migrants">as bargaining chips</a> for political ends. They are appealing to concepts such as hospitality, civilisation and humanity to underline their stance in solidarity with the migrants, using slogans such as “open the borders” and “no human is illegal”. </p>
<h2>Evoking history</h2>
<p>Both anti-migrant groups and those in solidarity with migrants are using the region’s history to promote their own ideological positions. </p>
<p>Those in solidarity claim that migration is not a crime, but rather an element of the human condition that has occurred repeatedly throughout the region’s history. They recall how during the second world war, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36499727?fbclid=IwAR1yPE-8t16v800lyMgt6W8y0MiphpQVDRyb_UA3JkRaniQNX9T5hylCBUg">thousands of Greeks</a> crossed the Turkish border to escape the German occupation and seek <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/02/the-forgotten-story-of-european-refugee-camps-in-the-middle-east/">refuge in the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>The Aegean islands were also where boats filled with Greek Orthodox residents of Asia Minor came in the wake of the <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Crossing_the_Aegean.html?id=CtDQqKh90YwC&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">Convention of the Forced Exchange of Populations of 1923</a> between Greece and Turkey, signed after the first world war. Following the arrival of <a href="http://www.transanatolie.com/english/turkey/turks/Ottomans/ejz18.pdf">more than 1.5 million people</a> in Greece, the population of the islands almost doubled to the extent that many locals still have family members from among the group originally and still known as the “Asia Minor refugees”. </p>
<p>The ongoing tensions in the region have once again made it into a place where complex negotiations take place over ideology and identity. The shifting way the past is being imagined stands as a testimony to how the history of overlapping migrations is currently being kept alive in the Aegean.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/132990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilay Romain Ors receives funding from Independent Social Research Foundation.</span></em></p>
The Aegean has long been a place of overlapping migration. Now it is facing a new crisis.
Ilay Romain Ors, Research Affiliate, Centre of Migration, Policy, and Society, University of Oxford
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/122834
2019-10-16T17:00:48Z
2019-10-16T17:00:48Z
Forms and outcomes of citizens’ mobilisations during Europe’s refugee reception crisis
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292502/original/file-20190915-8678-1vquf13.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1790%2C1198&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Mass mobilization of citizens and organizations around Brussels-North railway station.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=735478233328234&set=a.735474743328583&type=3&theater">FRANÇOIS DVORAK/fdvphotoreporter.wixsite.com/monsite</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The long summer of migration in 2015 had a profound impact on civil society throughout Europe. Whether countries were arrival points, on transit routes or were final destinations, and regardless of their geopolitical situations, a large and diversified set of attitudes and practices emerged.</p>
<p>The actions taken by citizens, whether they were negative or positive, intended to reject or welcome newcomers, made visible their dissatisfaction and criticism toward the way their political elites and institutions attempted to manage the situation. Over time they became systematic and structured, ultimately questioning the <a href="https://www.cogitatiopress.com/socialinclusion/issue/view/107">relationship between citizens and political institutions</a>. They also give a sense of what political participation means today.</p>
<p>As shown in <a href="https://www.oapen.org/search?identifier=1005529">our research</a>, while public opinions remained relatively stable throughout from 2015 to 2018, civil-society mobilisation rose and became polarised in all European countries. The profiles of those involved differed, as did their relationships with institutions and the outcomes. The range of motivations themselves showed to be relatively stable, and determined by sociocultural and political motivations.</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Positive mobilisations</strong>: Humanitarian solidarity is the strongest catalyst and has an important impact on support activities. Donations and emergency help such as the distribution of food and clothes are the most common practices among individual volunteers and civil society groups. This is also true in those contexts where public opinion is more critical of migration, where institutions take a more restrictive approach, or where civil society is generally less proactive.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Negative mobilisations</strong>: These are inspired by tropes about the demographic threat from the Global South, including conspiracy theories on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_genocide_conspiracy_theory">“ethnic substitution”</a>, opposition to “foreignisation”, the conception of the national territory as “private property”, and the depiction of nations as victims of an <a href="https://www.leganord.org/component/tags/tag/stop-invasione">“invasion”</a>. During the reception crisis, perceived cultural threats revolving around national identity, cultural norms and values have significantly increased, especially in Eastern and Southern Europe.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Negative sociocultural beliefs are also embodied by political parties or movements. In Italy, far-right organisations as well as the anti-immigration mainstream party, the League and its leader Matteo Salvini, played this role. In Hungary, xenophobia is completely integrated into the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/21/hungary-accused-of-fuelling-xenophobia-human-rights-violations">rhetoric of the Orbán government</a>.</p>
<h2>From the social to the political</h2>
<p>In a second phase of the reception crisis, groups motivated by solidarity shifted to politically driven mobilisation, showing that sociocultural and the political forms of mobilisation are not exclusive or conflictual, but <a href="http://www.uninomade.org/the-gaze-of-autonomy-capitalism-migration-and-social-struggles/">overlapping</a>.</p>
<p>Only in rare instances did citizens’ reactions align with the governments’ stance. Instead, initiatives often aimed to correct – or more precisely, to suggest corrections to – state policies. When politically driven, positive mobilisation embraced the issue of formal access to rights, including questions of citizenship and <a href="https://sanspapiers.be/qui-sommes-nous/">recognition of undocumented people</a>. It aimed to have a direct impact on national politics, the policymaking process and field practices, as well as in those contexts where institutions show relative tolerance toward asylum seekers. Similarly, mobilisation against asylum seekers sought to integrate the government’s restrictive field practices such as <a href="https://euobserver.com/justice/142739">border and access control</a>. This happened especially when the reception systems in transit countries were overwhelmed and clearly no longer effective.</p>
<p>Interestingly, while positive mobilisation rarely sprang directly from political organisations or got backing from formal political parties, the most evident cases of negative mobilisation were structured around political groups that existed before 2015 – <a href="https://www.pegida.de">Pegida</a> in Germany, the Greek far-right party <a href="http://www.xrisiavgi.com">Golden Dawn</a> or Jobbik’s paramilitary wing, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/hungarys-future-antiimmigration-antimulticulturalism-and-antiro/">Hungarian Guard</a>. Italy is a case where the connection between negative mobilisation and formal politics is particularly evident: opposition to asylum seekers <a href="http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/sindaco-non-vuole-i-profughi-e-prefetto-deve-arrendersi-1150548.html">came directly from local governments</a>, and saw the spontaneous mobilisation of citizens only in rare cases.</p>
<p>The reception crisis also allowed far-right groups to portray asylum seekers as a national threat, and to gain space in the public debate. Golden Dawn had a strong impact, shaping the widespread impression that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d88eab00-5d30-11e5-a28b-50226830d644">Greece was a xenophobic country</a>. In Italy, the reception crisis was an opportunity for different segments of the right-wing and far-right spectrum to <a href="https://www.open.online/2019/05/02/matteo-salvini-e-casapound-un-rapporto-lungo-cinque-anni/">work together</a>. Even in Germany, where the concept of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/06/germany-refugee-crisis-syrian"><em>Willkommenskultur</em></a> shaped the mainstream debate and inspired the humanitarian response at the international level, a strong representation of anti-migration views and <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-222-refugee-homes-burned-or-attacked-arrests-a6763506.html">extreme violence</a> against immigrants emerged in 2015.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297127/original/file-20191015-98653-34r8vl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">On December 17, 2015, German chancellor Angela Merkel and other European leaders sought to establish a new border and coast guard force to slow the influx of migrants across the EU’s external frontiers.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alain Jocard/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mobilisation outcomes</h2>
<p>The long summer of migration in 2015 had an impact on the relationship between civil society and the state. This happened in the way the former represents claims and takes actions within the public affairs, and how the latter interacts with – and reacts to – citizens’ sentiments and engagement.</p>
<p>There was an unprecedented wave of solidarity from Europeans who hadn’t previously been active supporters of asylum seekers or migration-related issues. Mobilisation was primarily in urban settings, with the exception of areas such as the Serbian/Croatian border in Hungary and the Greek islands that experienced mass arrivals. The crisis of reception structures led to the creation, consolidation, interaction and evolution of heterogeneous organisations, citizen initiatives and networks at the <a href="http://www.bxlrefugees.be">national</a> and <a href="https://www.refugees-welcome.net">international level</a>.</p>
<p>Mobilisation also occurred when dormant organisations reactivated and existing ones embraced the issue of asylum seekers and refugees. The nature of their activities and their principles adapted to the situation, the needs of newcomers and the policy structures surrounding them. European civil society reacted more or less explicitly to the problems, gaps and failures of political institutions and institutional policy measures. In doing so, citizen organisations and NGOs made visible the <a href="https://books.google.be/books?id=JSlWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT88&lpg=PT88&dq=organized+non-responsibility+pries&source=bl&ots=ji-emGEMoj&sig=ACfU3U13Zmyl6FAWnIR544gyhTlHK5runw&hl=it&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj628nI6bHkAhXKEVAKHU79DYAQ6AEwC3oECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=organiz&f=false">“organized non-responsibility”</a> that characterised the institutional approach of the European Union and the indifference of many countries during the emergency.</p>
<h2>The emergence of the local dimension</h2>
<p>As a consequence of the reception crisis, volunteer groups, citizen initiatives and civil-society organisations paved the way for inclusive approaches toward asylum seekers and migration in general. These approaches are specific to regions, municipalities and local areas. A new paradigm of integration established in these contexts, and marked a “local turn” in the management of the contemporary migration issue. Recent scientific articles published by <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1368371">Younes Ahouga</a> or <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0020852316688426">Zapata-Barrero, Caponio and Scholten</a> have observed this paradigm to be growing in Europe.</p>
<p>The crisis created opportunities for citizens to transform spontaneous mobilisation – negative and positive – into forms of political action and advocacy. In several instances at the local level, groups of citizens and volunteers working alongside the state-designated reception actors took on a formal organisational structure and became involved in the decision-making process.</p>
<p>While strong civil-society mobilisation provided an alternative to anti-migrant rhetoric and violence, it did not always have positive political repercussions. This is reflected in the strategies of anti-migrant governments to challenge the leadership of non-institutional actors, as well as in the attempts to criminalise NGOs and obstruct their support activities. Examples of such institutional strategies are Hungary’s so-called <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/hungary-passes-anti-immigrant-stop-soros-laws">“Stop Soros” laws</a>, or Italy’s second <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/15/italy-adopts-decree-that-could-fine-migrant-rescue-ngo-aid-up-to-50000">“Security Decree”</a>.</p>
<p>A few years before than international migration was turned into a political problem and the EU sought to fortify its external borders, sociologist <a href="http://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/la-double-absence-des-illusions-de-l-emigre-aux-souffrances-de-l-immigre-abdelmalek-sayad/9782020385961">Abdelmalek Sayad</a> reminded us that contemporary migration has a mirror function. It makes visible how governmental trends in the treatment of immigrants anticipate the way forms of social control and legal measures are designed to be directed toward native citizens. The 2015-2018 refugee reception crisis is no exception.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122834/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The author does not work for, consults, owns shares in or receives funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The 2015 reception crisis had a profound impact on civil society in Europe. A significant set of attitudes and practices emerged that give a sense of what political participation means today.
Alessandro Mazzola, Post-doc Research Fellow, Sociologist, Université de Liège
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/115949
2019-04-28T20:21:39Z
2019-04-28T20:21:39Z
Debate: Beware, the European Union can dis-integrate
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270743/original/file-20190424-121220-1qksg3r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C154%2C1500%2C1021&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Rome#/media/File:Treaty_of_Rome.jpg">Wikipedia</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For a long time, scholars of European political integration were almost unanimous in their belief that this process could not be reversed. For decades, there was hardly any reason to think otherwise. More and more countries joined the EU. New treaties expanded the scope of the EU’s competences into numerous new issue-areas. Its agencies grew gradually more powerful compared to those of member states.</p>
<p>Some even argued that crises, when they occurred, prompted closer integration, according to the EU founder Jean Monnet’s adage that Europe would be “forged in crises” and be the sum of the solutions adopted to manage them.</p>
<p>However, the quadruple crisis (Eurozone, Ukraine, refugees, Brexit) that has tormented the EU during the last decade is deeper than any of its forerunners – by its duration, its multidimensionality, by the magnitude of the stakes involved and by the mass politicisation of European integration it has provoked.</p>
<p>Faced with this uniquely severe crisis, the EU has not proved as resilient as in the past. True, the Eurozone has emerged politically more integrated from its crisis, and the pre-existing level of integration in foreign and security policy also survived the Ukraine crisis. In the refugee crisis, however, the EU has suffered some – limited – political disintegration, with various member states defying EU decisions and ECJ rulings concerning refugee reallocation or Commission appeals that they should dismantle re-installed border controls.</p>
<p>Above all, for the first time an EU member state is on the verge of seceding, and not just any. The United Kingdom is the EU’s third most populous member, second-biggest economy, a net contributor to the budget and one of only two members with a significant military capacity, its own nuclear weapons and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.</p>
<p>The (as yet provisional) outcome of the quadruple crisis thus shows us that the EU can indeed <em>dis</em>-integrate politically.</p>
<h2>Driven by elites, not markets</h2>
<p>The confidence of most scholars that European political integration cannot be reversed is rooted primarily in the conviction that this process is fuelled – in a fundamentally market-driven process – by growing levels of socio-economic interdependence between member states.</p>
<p>This belief is erroneous, however. European political integration is much less a response to market pressures than it is a project driven by political elites motivated mainly by long-term geopolitical considerations concerning European security and peace.</p>
<p>Two other factors explain why Europe has integrated politically far more closely than any other region or continent.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Post-World War II (Western) Europe has been dominated politically by internationalist, “pro-European” political forces of the moderate Right, the Centre and the moderate Left (Christian and Social Democrats and Liberals). The EU was built on this political bedrock.</p></li>
<li><p>Political integration and responses to crises have been forged largely by uniquely close and intensive Franco-German cooperation – for which there is no equivalent elsewhere. The Franco-German “tandem” served as the functional equivalent of a hegemonic power that the international political economist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_P._Kindleberger">Charles Kindleberger</a> once argued was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of a maintenance of a stable international system.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>A hegemonic power in Kindleberger’s conception exercises a predominant influence over how systems respond to crises, assumes a disproportionate share of the cost of crisis policies and mobilizes support for them among other members.</p>
<h2>Nationalism and the risk of deadlock</h2>
<p>Neither of the two fundamentally political factors that buttressed European integration is present today to the same extent as in the past. The Eurozone and refugee crises gave an enormous boost to “anti-European” movements that have won political office in several member states and look likely to win an unprecedentedly large proportion of seats in the European Parliamentary elections next month.</p>
<p>In a political system that operates largely on the basis of consensus, growing national-populist representation in the EU’s decision-making organs portends a growing threat of political deadlock.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270744/original/file-20190424-121233-5yvxp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270744/original/file-20190424-121233-5yvxp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270744/original/file-20190424-121233-5yvxp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270744/original/file-20190424-121233-5yvxp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270744/original/file-20190424-121233-5yvxp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270744/original/file-20190424-121233-5yvxp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270744/original/file-20190424-121233-5yvxp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">France’s president Emmanuel Macron (left) with Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel during an European Summit aimed at discussing the Brexit deal, the long-term budget and the single market on December 13, 2018 in Brussels.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Emmanuel Dunand/AFP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, during the last decade the Franco-German alliance at the EU’s heart weakened. Since the EU’s inception, when France was “number one” among the member states, the balance of power between Paris and Bonn/Berlin has been reversed. Economic weakness and domestic political polarization over EU issues reduced French influence during the quadruple crisis, leaving Germany to play the role of a hegemon increasingly alone.</p>
<p>As argued in my new book, <a href="http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/60897"><em>European Disintegration? The Politics of Crisis in the European Union</em></a> (Red Globe Press, 2019), the extent to which the EU has <em>dis</em>-integrated during the quadruple crisis has been largely determined by the extent to which Germany played the role of a stabilizing hegemonic power.</p>
<h2>As Germany goes…</h2>
<p>In the Ukraine crisis, in which Germany played this role fully, no political disintegration occurred. In the refugee crisis, in which it played this role only to a limited extent, some political disintegration took place. In the Brexit crisis, in which it did not play this role at all, the most striking case of disintegration occurred.</p>
<p>The case of Eurozone is anomalous in as far as it survived its crisis despite the German government insisting on a highly asymmetrical distribution of crisis costs. But this is because there was a powerful supranational agency, the European Central Bank, which had the powers to substitute for a hegemonic member state and in 2012 played a decisive role in saving the Eurozone from collapse.</p>
<p>Germany’s uneven and mixed record in managing the EU’s quadruple crisis suggests that it is unable or unwilling to play the role of Europe’s hegemonic power, at least not sufficiently to preclude political <em>dis</em>-integration.</p>
<p>It is unable because it is not big enough relative to other member states to assume a big enough proportion of the costs to resolve crises durably. It is increasingly unwilling in the sense that, competing for voter support, political parties do not want Germany to assume these costs for fear of a domestic political backlash. This fear has of course been accentuated by the breakthrough of a Eurosceptic party, the AfD, in the 2017 federal elections.</p>
<p>If, as history and comparative analysis suggest, stabilizing hegemonic leadership is critical to keeping European political integration on the rails, it remains difficult to see how or by whom this can be provided other than by the usual – French and German – suspects.</p>
<p>The 2017 elections in both countries created a window of opportunity for a renaissance of the Franco-German tandem. France chose its most fervently pro-European president since the creation of the Fifth Republic, while in Berlin, of all feasible political constellations, the resurrection of the Grand Coalition probably represented the one most conducive to forging closer political integration.</p>
<h2>Looking forward</h2>
<p>Two years on, it looks doubtful whether this window will be exploited. The Berlin coalition’s reaction to President Macron’s proposals for closer European integration has been lukewarm at best. None of its constituent parties sees any domestic political benefits in championing this kind of agenda.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270731/original/file-20190424-121245-ppbrlr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/270731/original/file-20190424-121245-ppbrlr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270731/original/file-20190424-121245-ppbrlr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270731/original/file-20190424-121245-ppbrlr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=917&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270731/original/file-20190424-121245-ppbrlr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1152&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270731/original/file-20190424-121245-ppbrlr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1152&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/270731/original/file-20190424-121245-ppbrlr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1152&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Red Globe Press, 2019</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In France, with the explosive rise of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-frances-gilets-jaunes-protesters-are-so-angry-108100">“gilet jaune” movement</a>, Macron’s economic reform agenda and authority are highly contested, raising the question of whether he can revive France’s economic fortunes – which he must for France to regain a role comparable to Germany’s in the EU – or win the next presidential election in 2022.</p>
<p>Absent strong Franco-German leadership, new crises – which are bound to occur – will likely bring about more disintegration than the quadruple crisis during the last decade.</p>
<p>However, after Brexit, no other member state is likely to try to leave the EU in the way that the UK has done. Rather, as member states prove unable to agree how to manage future crises, they will pursue unilateral policies by default and comply less and less with EU rules and regulations when they have been agreed. In this scenario, the EU would not collapse dramatically in a “big bang”, but rather – slowly, even invisibly – wither and die by a thousand cuts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/115949/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Douglas Webber is the author of "European Disintegration? The Politics of Crisis in the European Union" and Professor of Political Science at INSEAD.</span></em></p>
In the past decade the EU has been struck by a series of crises that have proven that it is far more vulnerable than previously imagined.
Douglas Webber, Robert Schuman fellow, European University Institute, and Professor of Political Science, INSEAD
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/102464
2018-09-06T10:43:23Z
2018-09-06T10:43:23Z
4 charts show Venezuela’s worsening migrant crisis
<p>A few years ago, Venezuela seemed to be setting the standard for social welfare in the region.</p>
<p>In 2015, the <a href="http://www.fao.org/americas/noticias/ver/en/c/283757">United Nations recognized Venezuela</a> as having made the most advances in the fight against hunger in the Latin American and Caribbean region. National rates of poverty and inequality declined under President Hugo Chávez from the early 2000s until 2012.</p>
<p>Yet this is the same country where inflation last year <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy-inflation/venezuela-2017-annual-inflation-at-2616-percent-opposition-lawmakers-idUSKBN1EX23B">reached 2,616 percent</a>. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/24/venezuela-inflation-million-percent-imf-warning">International Monetary Fund claims</a> that it could surpass 1 million percent this year. In a survey of hospitals across the country, 78 percent reported shortages of medicine. And the cost of basic food items like beans and pasta increases on a monthly, in many cases a weekly, basis. </p>
<p>The economy has indeed declined at an astonishing rate. This crisis has contributed to <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2018/8/5b6d4f554/unhcr-ramps-response-ecuador-declares-emergency.html">one of the largest population movements in Latin American history</a>.</p>
<h2>How many people are affected?</h2>
<p>Around 2.3 million Venezuelans have left the country over the past few years. That’s about 7 percent of the country’s population.</p>
<p>According to the U.N., <a href="https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/venezuela_sr_20180411-18.pdf">there has been a 900 percent increase</a> in Venezuelan nationals living abroad in South America. </p>
<p><iframe id="Vj1XG" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Vj1XG/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The exodus impacts even those who haven’t left. <a href="http://www.ntn24.com/america-latina/la-tarde/venezuela/al-menos-unas-400-instituciones-educativas-privadas-podrian-cerrar">Many schools and medical centers</a> have closed throughout the country due to lack of personnel. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/venezuelas-higher-education-crisis-worsens/">The fall in wages</a> has forced at least 1,600 professors to leave the five principal universities in the country since 2012. <a href="https://www.vozpopuli.com/altavoz/cultura/Entrevista-universitario-Benjamin-Scharifker-Venezuela_0_1029797901.html">The rector of the Universidad Metropolitana in Caracas</a> said that close to 10 percent of the university’s professors have left the college in recent years. </p>
<p><iframe id="bMBKG" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/bMBKG/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Where are they going?</h2>
<p>Colombia has received the largest number of Venezuelans. This year, <a href="http://robuenosaires.iom.int/sites/default/files/Informes/Tendencias_Migratorias_Nacionales_en_Americas__Venezuela_EN_Julio_2018_web.pdf">the Colombian government estimated</a> that there were 870,093 Venezuelans in the country, over 45,000 of whom have expired visas or entered without authorization.</p>
<p>Though most Venezuelans crossing into Colombia come from the border state of Zulia, many states have lost substantial portions of their population.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Final-VZ-Migration-Report-Final.pdf">According to one report</a>, Brazilian officials claim that there are as many as 60,000 Venezuelans in Roraima state, which borders Venezuela, and that in Boa Vista, the state capital, Venezuelans now make up 10 percent of the city population. </p>
<p>The exodus has sparked conflict in border regions. The Colombian and Brazilian governments have responded <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/08/venezuela-migrants-colombia-brazil-borders">by increasing military presence</a> in frontier regions. Governments in both Colombia and Ecuador now require Venezuelans to show valid documentation to cross borders and access services. These regulations, however, have done little to deter Venezuelans, <a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/responding-exodus-venezuelas-migration-refugee-crisis-seen-colombian-brazilian-borders/">instead placing them in even</a> more precarious positions.</p>
<p>Migration to Europe has also increased, mostly to Spain.</p>
<p><iframe id="Ut0jU" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Ut0jU/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How does this crisis compare to other major waves from recent history?</h2>
<p>Venezuelans are leaving due to an unprecedented economic crisis. This contrasts sharply to the most recent migration waves out of Central America, <a href="https://www.wola.org/analysis/fact-sheet-united-states-immigration-central-american-asylum-seekers/">which are largely driven by violence</a>. </p>
<p>What’s more, most Central American migration largely flows toward the U.S. and Canada, but the majority of Venezuelans have remained in South America. </p>
<p><iframe id="psLPi" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/psLPi/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>It’s unclear how migration might allow Venezuelans abroad to support friends and family back home. Remittances make up about <a href="https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Remittances-2017-1.pdf">20 percent of GDP in countries like Honduras and El Salvador</a>. But the complicated controls that the Venezuelan state has on the exchange rate render money transfers relatively inconsequential. For example, if I were to transfer US$100 to Venezuela today, <a href="https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/">the official exchange rate</a> would convert this to about 25,800,000 bolivares, enough to buy about 11 pounds of meat.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/venezuelas-refugee-crisis-will-exceed-syrias-we-must-help/">Some scholars and journalists</a> have compared the Venezuelan exodus to the forced migration that resulted from the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011. Currently, the Syrian diaspora includes around 7 million people. Though immigration from Venezuela to other countries has been occurring since the 2000s, the most recent wave of migration includes around 2 million people.</p>
<p>Of course, Venezuelan migration may overcome Syria’s. <a href="https://es.panampost.com/daniel-raisbeck/2017/10/11/exodo-venezolano-a-colombia/?cn-reloaded=1">While migration to Europe from the Mediterranean</a> has been decreasing this year, movement to surrounding countries from Venezuela has been increasing. <a href="https://es.panampost.com/daniel-raisbeck/2017/10/11/exodo-venezolano-a-colombia/?cn-reloaded=1">According to Bloomberg</a>, 20,000 Venezuelans crossed the border into Colombia in June 2017; two months later, this number had risen to 60,000.</p>
<p>However, it appears likely that many Venezuelan migrants plan on returning. <a href="https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/cancilleria-y-oim-hacen-publica-radiografia-de-la-migracion-venezolana-articulo-701655">A report released by the Colombian government</a> found that only 5 percent planned on staying in the country permanently, while 23 percent reported that they would only remain in Colombia for a few months to save money.</p>
<p><a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2018/07/31/the-venezuelan-exodus-placing-latin-america-in-the-global-conversation-on-migration-management/">The changing profile of Venezuelan migrants</a> follows a similar pattern to the European migration crisis. In the early phase, most migrants were middle- or upper-class, with high levels of education and professional occupations. Since 2014, migrants have become <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-american-migration-crisis-venezuelan-outflows-test-neighbors-hospitality">increasingly poor and less educated</a>. </p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to clarify the number of Venezuelans crossing the border into Colombia.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Hanson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Fleeing economic collapse, around 2.3 million Venezuelans have left the country over the past few years.
Rebecca Hanson, Assistant Professor Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law and Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/89008
2018-02-12T11:42:14Z
2018-02-12T11:42:14Z
Venezuelan refugees inflame Brazil’s already simmering migrant crisis
<p>Though refugee and migration crises have dominated headlines in recent years, most news stories exclude Brazil. That’s because of the world’s roughly <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html">62.5 million forced migrants</a>, according to the United Nations – just a small proportion are thought to be in Brazil.</p>
<p>New research suggests this omission needs correcting. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://migracoes.igarape.org.br/">Forced Migration Observatory</a>, a new database from the Brazilian think tank Instituto Igarapé, which I co-founded, hundreds of thousands of Brazilians are driven from their homes each year by disasters, development and violent crime. </p>
<p>Venezuelans escaping economic crisis at home are also pouring into Brazil. Though neighboring Colombia has born the brunt of this exodus – welcoming <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/08/venezuela-migrants-colombia-brazil-borders">as many as 1 million migrants</a> since 2015 – Brazil has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-05/as-venezuelans-flee-refugee-camps-spring-up-across-the-border">seen some 60,000 Venezuelans arrive</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-colombia/colombia-brazil-tighten-borders-as-venezuelan-crisis-deepens-idUSKBN1FS2VW">numbers are rising fast</a>.</p>
<h2>A neglected crisis</h2>
<p>Despite this <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/03/02/feature/i-cant-go-back-venezuelans-are-fleeing-their-crisis-torn-country-en-masse/?utm_term=.181dafa2fed5">influx</a>, Brazil’s main migrant problem remains the millions of <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/internally-displaced-people.html">displaced people</a> already inside its borders. This domestic crisis has mostly simmered under the radar for nearly two decades. </p>
<p>In part, that’s because internally displaced people are a politically inconvenient topic in Brazil. Each year, hundreds of thousands of Brazilians driven from their land each year by <a href="http://www.trt.net.tr/portuguese/america-latina/2017/06/02/brasil-inundacoes-deixam-dezenas-de-mortos-e-mais-de-50-000-deslocados-744147">natural disaster</a>, <a href="http://diretrizes-grandesobras.gvces.com.br/">infrastructure development</a> and <a href="https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Facing-Violent-State-Repression-Brazils-MST-Issues-Urgent-Call-for-Solidarity-20171213-0030.html">violence</a> – the three main causes of forced migration in Brazil. But because they are overwhelmingly poor and marginalized, politicians see few upsides to highlighting their plight.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204917/original/file-20180205-14104-1t0p069.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204917/original/file-20180205-14104-1t0p069.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204917/original/file-20180205-14104-1t0p069.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204917/original/file-20180205-14104-1t0p069.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204917/original/file-20180205-14104-1t0p069.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204917/original/file-20180205-14104-1t0p069.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204917/original/file-20180205-14104-1t0p069.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204917/original/file-20180205-14104-1t0p069.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=663&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Upwards of 8.8 million people have been displaced across Brazil since 2000.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/41/Brazil_regions.png">Stefan Ertmann and João Felipe/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Officials may also be unaware that they exist. In Brazil, migration scholars tend to focus on <a href="https://fernandonogueiracosta.wordpress.com/2011/07/21/deslocamentos-populacionais-no-brasil/">voluntary population movement</a>: which prosperous Brazilian states are attracting new residents, and which are losing them. </p>
<p>To date, there has been no attempt to compile and analyze comprehensive nationwide data about Brazilian citizens who move – or are moved – against their will. </p>
<p>My team at the <a href="https://migracoes.igarape.org.br/">Forced Migration Observatory</a> began this mammoth task in 2016. Pulling information from Brazil’s national development bank, government agencies and non-governmental organizations, we found that a stunning 8.8 million Brazilians – out of a population of 208 million – have been forced to flee their homes since 2000. </p>
<p><iframe id="B7Oku" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/B7Oku/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Crisis both natural and man-made</h2>
<p>Our data analysis shows that natural disasters cause most migration within Brazil. Between January 2000 and June 2017, floods, storms, mudslides and droughts drove 6.4 million people from their homes – or an average of <a href="https://s2id.mi.gov.br/">357,000 people each year</a>. </p>
<p>Such disasters have a high price tag. According to the United Nations, floods, mudslides and the like cost Brazil the equivalent of <a href="https://nacoesunidas.org/desastres-naturais-custam-r-800-milhoes-ao-brasil-por-mes/">800 million reals</a> – or US$245 million – each month in recovery, reconstruction and lost productivity. That’s almost 2 percent of its gross domestic product each year.</p>
<p>Infrastructure development also contributes to Brazil’s migration woes. Since 2000, the country – which before a 2014 recession <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/brazil/gdp-growth">was among the world’s fastest-growing economies</a> – has <a href="https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-tempering-the-human-cost-of-building-brazil-s-dams-90566">built at least 84 large hydroelectric dams</a>. </p>
<p>The Observatory team estimates that the construction, flooding and environmental changes related to these projects have displaced between 130,000 and 230,000 people. Most of them come from the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Amazonas, Santa Catarina, Minas Gerais and São Paulo. </p>
<p>In total, development schemes have uprooted upwards of 1.2 million Brazilians over the past 18 years. </p>
<p><iframe id="STgIo" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/STgIo/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Many of these citizens, left indigent, head to cities seeking employment. There, they frequently end up <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article-abstract/28/2/222/1546078">in urban slums or on the streets</a>, where they become newly vulnerable to development-induced displacement. </p>
<p>In the lead-up to the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/18/brazil-forcibly-displaced-thousands-of-people-to-make-way-for-the-world-cup/?utm_term=.3b06ac023375">2014 World Cup</a> and <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-olympic-land-grab-snap-story.html">2016 Olympic Games</a>, both hosted by Brazil, at least 47,000 Brazilians — primarily lower-income residents of big cities like São Paulo and Rio do Janeiro — were forcibly evicted to make way for stadiums, subway lines and new housing. </p>
<p>Brazil’s <a href="http://www.citiesalliance.org/brazil-involuntarydisplacementpolicy">Ministry of Cities issued a policy</a> to safeguard the rights of people involuntarily removed from their homes in 2013, but implementation has been sporadic. In practice, most cities and towns have no strategy in place to support new arrivals, whether they hail <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jun/15/brazil-refugee-policy-needs-a-radical-overhaul-in-response-to-venezuela-crisis">from Venezuela or just down the block</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="Or57w" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Or57w/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Homicide epidemic</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-biggest-problem-isnt-corruption-its-murder-78014">Crime and violence</a> also uproot many Brazilians each year, but data on this critical driver of migration is not good.</p>
<p>An analysis of the nonprofit <a href="https://www.cptnacional.org.br/">Pastoral Land Commission’s annual report</a> reveals that approximately 1.1 million Brazilians were evicted or expelled by land and resource disputes since 2000. Such clashes can be deadly: In 2016, 61 land rights activists were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-landrights-politics/feature-politics-of-death-land-conflict-and-murder-go-hand-in-hand-in-brazil-idUSL8N1HW4VP">killed in Brazil</a>. </p>
<p>What migration researchers still don’t know is how much urban violence – which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/brazils-biggest-problem-isnt-corruption-its-murder-78014">reached epidemic proportions in recent years</a> – is compelling city dwellers to move. More than three-quarters of the <a href="http://www2.datasus.gov.br/datasus/index.php?area=02">57,395 Brazilians murdered</a> in 2017 lived in cities, so it’s reasonable to assume that some residents would <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article-abstract/28/2/222/1546078?redirectedFrom=PDF">flee their neighborhoods to escape violence</a>.</p>
<p>Indeed, in Rio, <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/rio/moradores-se-mudam-de-favelas-conflagradas-em-exodo-que-cresce-no-rio-21340415">where gangs now run many of the poorer informal neighborhoods called “favelas”</a>, the news shows that <a href="https://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/familias-sao-expulsas-de-casa-apenas-com-roupa-do-corpo-para-sobreviver-a-perseguicao-de-traficantes.ghtml">entire families</a> are routinely extorted and evicted by <a href="https://m.extra.globo.com/casos-de-policia/assembleia-legislativa-do-rio-recebe-uma-familia-expulsa-por-milicianos-cada-20-dias-22047307.html">organized crime</a>. We just don’t know how many.</p>
<h2>A rough neighborhood</h2>
<p>The current unrest in Venezuela is compounding these already significant domestic migration challenges for Brazil, where <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-05/as-venezuelans-flee-refugee-camps-spring-up-across-the-border">an estimated 60,000 refugees from the crisis-stricken country</a> have sought refuge from <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-venezuelas-crisis-7-essential-reads-89018">starvation, violence and repression</a>.</p>
<p>Historically, Brazilian politicians and diplomats have often made a show of welcoming international refugees. In recent years, the country has won plaudits for <a href="http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article103920161.html">inviting in more than 65,000 Haitians</a> after that country’s 2010 earthquake and <a href="https://brightthemag.com/could-brazil-be-a-lifeline-for-syrian-refugees-227fea139b03">promising to accept 100,000 Syrian refugees</a>. </p>
<p>A souring economy and dampened public mood, however, have since compelled Brazilian authorities to <a href="https://news.vice.com/article/brazil-is-rethinking-its-promise-to-accept-100000-syrian-refugees">reneg</a> on their Syria commitment.</p>
<p>Today’s Venezuelan refugees are streaming into frontier towns in Brazil’s northwest border. Cash-strapped governments in this region are generally unable to provide adequate care for the many asylum-seekers who arrive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-children/more-venezuelan-children-dying-from-preventable-diseases-amid-crisis-idUSKBN19J2FJ">needing treatment</a> for dehydration, malnutrition and disease.</p>
<p>Brazil’s National Immigration Council started <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/18/venezuela-humanitarian-crisis-spilling-brazil">issuing two-year residence permits for refugees</a> in March 2017. The documents give migrants access to health care and other public services, but at $100 apiece, they’re out of reach for most. </p>
<p>Nor has the Brazilian government adequately funded measures to protect asylum applicants, such as shelter or food. Thomson Reuters <a href="https://news.trust.org/item/20180126163424-9ws59">reported in January</a> that many Venezuelans “sleep in tents pitched in public squares … while others beg in the streets and wash car windshields.”</p>
<p>Brazil has responded by tightening security, <a href="https://br.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idBRKBN1FS3DY-OBRDN">including military and police patrols</a>, along the border. Venezuelans fleeing their country may soon be required to <a href="http://www.folhabv.com.br/noticia/Temer-garante-a-deputados-medidas-para-conter-imigracao/36608">show that they’ve been vaccinated</a> before entering Brazil, and plans to “<a href="https://g1.globo.com/rr/roraima/noticia/ministro-afirma-que-governo-trabalha-em-projeto-para-levar-venezuelanos-de-rr-para-outros-estados-destinos-nao-foram-revelados.ghtml">relocate</a>” new arrivals to refugee camps to elsewhere in the country have raised human rights concerns. Some officials believe that the <a href="http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/radio/materias/RADIOAGENCIA/553209-DEPUTADO-SUGERE-FECHAMENTO-TEMPORARIO-DA-FRONTEIRA-BRASIL-VENEZUELA.html?utm_campaign=boletim&utm_source=radio&utm_medium=email">border with Venezuela should be closed entirely</a>.</p>
<p>Under <a href="http://www.ijrcenter.org/refugee-law/">international humanitarian law</a>, Brazil’s national government bears the primary responsibility for resettling and supporting refugees both domestic and international. All of the country’s displaced citizens are additionally entitled to care and <a href="http://www.law.georgetown.edu/idp/english/id_faq.html">compensation</a>. </p>
<p>In practice, though, government responsibility for dealing with migrants <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article-abstract/28/2/222/1546078?redirectedFrom=PDF">is distributed across various federal ministries and departments</a>. As a result, Brazil has no unified <a href="http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/brazil-should-do-more-venezuelas-refugees-and-migrants">resettlement program</a> to respond to <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21672360-government-letting-refugees-problems-come-later-welcome-not-working">the millions of displaced people scattered across the country</a>. </p>
<p>This, in my opinion, has now become a crisis. And it’s past time to act.</p>
<p><em>Maiara Folly, a researcher at the Igarapé Institute, co-authored this article.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Muggah is a the founder of the SecDev Foundation and a co-founder of the Igarapé Institute, a Brazilian think tank. In that capacity he receives research funding from the Canadian, Norwegian and UK governments, as well as Open Society Foundations, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Jigsaw, Porticus, Omidyar Network and several Brazilian donors. </span></em></p>
Since 2000, 8.8 million Brazilians have been displaced by disaster, development and crime, new data shows. Now Venezuelan migrants are pouring into the country. Still, Brazil has no real refugee plan.
Robert Muggah, Associate Lecturer, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio)
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/87718
2017-11-21T15:57:37Z
2017-11-21T15:57:37Z
How spending time in city parks helps asylum seekers to feel at home
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195624/original/file-20171121-6051-rvlp86.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Beth Steddon</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Across Europe, unprecedented <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/appendix-a-asylum-applications-1985-through-2015/">numbers of asylum seekers</a> are currently waiting for a decision on their refugee status. Unable to legally work or study, and with <a href="https://www.gov.uk/asylum-support/what-youll-get">very limited funds</a>, many of them feel as though they’re in a state of limbo; like their lives have been put on hold. </p>
<p>With <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/few038">shrinking public sector funding</a>, there are even fewer resources available to help asylum seekers in this position. But now, <a href="https://issuu.com/clarerishbeth/docs/refugeeswelcome_20in_20parks_20reso">new research</a> shows that urban parks and public spaces can provide a crucial free resource to enhance asylum seekers’ well-being, and help them to integrate.</p>
<p>Our interviews with asylum seekers, support workers and park managers revealed that parks and other green spaces in the city are places where asylum seekers can gain confidence by taking part in local life, and find much needed moments of respite from hardship. Khalid, a Syrian refugee in London, said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I like to see people happy. When we sit in the park we say “hello” to people. When we see someone with an Arabic face we talk to them, but we talk to anyone if they can understand our English.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>A group effort</h2>
<p>Some media outlets are quick to highlight instances of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-cologne-attacks-were-a-disaster-for-women-and-migrants-a6805066.html">misconduct</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-refugees-slip-through-cracks-francken-asylum-reception-office/">rough sleeping</a> by refugees in public spaces. But in reality, many asylum seekers try to remain invisible, staying indoors for fear of attracting the wrong sort of attention.</p>
<p>Recalling their first weeks and months in new cities, many asylum seekers talk about feeling lost, confused and lonely. They use smart phones to find essential facilities, but Google Maps doesn’t provide much insight into local places or customs. Some parks and public spaces can feel unsafe, especially if asylum seekers have experienced racism or abuse in the past.</p>
<p>We found out that asylum seekers are much more confident exploring outdoors with others. Going with friends or in a group reduces anxiety and makes people feel safer and more comfortable – rather than feeling out of place because of their race, ethnicity or religion. It can also help to challenge negative perceptions of asylum seekers, and the areas in which they live. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195620/original/file-20171121-6013-1491dqr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195620/original/file-20171121-6013-1491dqr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195620/original/file-20171121-6013-1491dqr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195620/original/file-20171121-6013-1491dqr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195620/original/file-20171121-6013-1491dqr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195620/original/file-20171121-6013-1491dqr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195620/original/file-20171121-6013-1491dqr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Class time.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Melora Koepke</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For example, in Paris, asylum seekers are offered daily French classes at the steps around the Platz de la Batille de Stalingrad. These free classes help newcomers to improve their language skills and serve as social occasions for meeting friends and exchanging information in the bustling square. </p>
<p>Suddenly, being visible becomes a positive thing. Passers-by can see that asylum seekers are committed to integrating, and open-air educational activities like these challenge perceptions of the neighbourhood as a place for drug dealing and rough sleeping.</p>
<h2>Overcoming anxieties</h2>
<p>Organised group visits can also help people to discover places that they like in their local neighbourhood, which they can return to later on. Over time, this can help asylum seekers feel more independent in their day-to-day lives. </p>
<p>For example, in Plymouth, UK, an initiative called <a href="http://www.studentsandrefugeestogether.com/">START Walking</a> offers a series of walking tours, giving university students and asylum seekers a chance to explore the city’s parks and nearby countryside. The walks are opportunities to make friends both within the asylum seeker community and outside it, to exchange experiences and to share memories of home.</p>
<p>Without options to work or study, the daily life of an asylum seeker can feel monotonous and meaningless. One told us, “if you do not get depressed by your journey here, the asylum system will make you depressed”. It can take months or even years for a legal decision to be reached on whether an asylum seeker is granted residence. Many experience high <a href="https://www.mind.org.uk/media/192447/Refugee_Report_1.pdf">levels of stress</a> as a result of previous trauma, and uncertainty regarding their future.</p>
<p>But initiatives which get people together outdoors can help asylum seekers to relieve their anxieties, learn new skills, talk to locals and even improve their neighbourhoods. </p>
<p>There is a wealth of research that proves the <a href="http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/321971/Urban-green-spaces-and-health-review-evidence.pdf?ua=1">mental health benefits</a> of contact with nature. Even just <a href="https://youngfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/The-Bench-Project_single-pages.pdf">sitting on a bench outside</a> can help people feel like they are a part of city life. Being outside and enjoying the natural qualities of parks gave many of the asylum seekers we spoke to a few moments of respite from their problems. </p>
<p>Joining in activities such as gardening or outdoor sport also helped them to regain a sense of purpose and develop a routine. For example, gardening projects delivered by <a href="https://www.grueneliga-berlin.de/themen-projekte2/stadtbegruenung/integration-und-inklusion/">Green League</a> in Berlin and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2017/jun/28/nhs-therapeutic-gardening-help-refugees-trauma">the NHS trauma unit</a> (together with local environmental charity <a href="https://rootsandshoots.org/">Roots and Shoots</a>) in London helped asylum seekers to spend time outside, meet local people and even recover from post-traumatic stress disorder. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195621/original/file-20171121-6016-755ur7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195621/original/file-20171121-6016-755ur7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195621/original/file-20171121-6016-755ur7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195621/original/file-20171121-6016-755ur7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=266&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195621/original/file-20171121-6016-755ur7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195621/original/file-20171121-6016-755ur7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195621/original/file-20171121-6016-755ur7.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Free wheelin’.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Refugee Action</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, in Manchester, the <a href="https://www.groundwork.org.uk/Sites/targetwellbeing/pages/refugee-well-being-project-tw">Wheels for Well-being Cycling Club</a> provides cycling training for asylum seekers and refugees. Group rides build a sense of community among participants, and allow them to explore their neighbourhood more freely. </p>
<p>Both locals and asylum seekers may view parks with suspicion, especially if they’ve heard negative reports or had negative experiences in the past. But we repeatedly found evidence to challenge these perceptions, in the stories joy, participation and healing we heard from our participants. Urban parks can enhance asylum seekers’ mental health and provide opportunities for integration.</p>
<p>Of course, local people and organisations must be realistic about the need to address barriers, and pragmatic about the limited capacity of both the refugee support sector and the parks sector to develop new initiatives. That’s why <a href="https://issuu.com/clarerishbeth/docs/refugeeswelcome_20in_20parks_20reso">we recommend</a> that local organisations look for opportunities to collaborate, and find ways to adapt programmes that already work to increase the diversity of participants. </p>
<p>That way, parks have the power to raise the quality of life for newcomers by providing free opportunities to socialise, have fun and take part in community activities – when it’s not raining, that is.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87718/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominika Blachnicka-Ciacek receives funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Clare Rishbeth receives funding from Arts and Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>
Walking, gardening and cycling can all help relieve anxiety and help asylum seekers become a part of the local community.
Dominika Blachnicka-Ciacek, Research Associate, University of Sheffield
Clare Rishbeth, Lecturer, University of Sheffield
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/83665
2017-09-25T15:11:32Z
2017-09-25T15:11:32Z
Citizen aid – and why ordinary people are founding their own development projects
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187018/original/file-20170921-8202-ddgevs.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Development projects can start small.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/migrant-crisis-16372">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the height of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/migrant-crisis-16372">European refugee crisis</a>, volunteers delivered goods to makeshift camps in Calais, set up soup kitchens, and helped recent arrivals on the Greek island of Lesvos. But such grassroots humanitarianism does not always play out on Europe’s doorstep. “Citizen aid” – whereby driven individuals set up their own, small-scale aid projects – is taking off in the Global South, too. </p>
<p>The number of these micro-organisations has <a href="https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article/62/2/309/1618650/New-American-Relief-and-Development-Organizations">risen dramatically</a> in the US, the UK and other European countries in the last ten years. Many, but not all of them, are registered as charities. They are typically run by people with no previous experience in development, and their projects often focus on youth, education, disability or health support. Despite, or perhaps because of their small scale and apparent non-professionalism, many leverage enthusiastic support through their social networks. </p>
<p>Because of the scarcity of quantitative data, we do not know the exact size of these private funding streams, but it may be substantial. So are we witnessing a new era of development assistance, one that is not dominated by the “big players”, such as international NGOs or large private foundations? Is citizen aid the future of development, as ordinary citizens take matters into their own hands? And what, if anything, makes citizen aid different from more established forms of development? </p>
<h2>Grassroots</h2>
<p>From what we know so far, a hallmark of citizen aid is its grassroots, decentralised nature. That means that no higher-level institution, such as a government body or charity, is responsible for making policy or disbursing funds. Instead, citizen aid is carried out by individuals, who are part of, or come across a community or particular cause while travelling. </p>
<p>They often decide on the spur of the moment to get involved. For example, a Swedish tourist, visiting the temples of Angkor Wat in Cambodia, might get talking with her tour guide. As a result, she might decide to support their scheme to provide bicycles to local kids, enabling them to attend high school. An example is the <a href="http://www.theplf.org/wp2/history-2/">Ponheary Ly Foundation</a>, which aims to get more Cambodian children into education.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187021/original/file-20170921-8179-1c0d9ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/187021/original/file-20170921-8179-1c0d9ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187021/original/file-20170921-8179-1c0d9ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187021/original/file-20170921-8179-1c0d9ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187021/original/file-20170921-8179-1c0d9ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187021/original/file-20170921-8179-1c0d9ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/187021/original/file-20170921-8179-1c0d9ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Big things can have humble beginnings.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/download/success?src=skiB2Z_yHi07y9BYFndNsw-1-14">Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These initiatives are often in flux. In some cases, a one-off donation is all that happens; in others, the Swedish tourist might raise awareness and funds among their friends, family and colleagues, and in due course return to Cambodia to offer their time and assistance. Over time, some initiatives, such as the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-37775173">Eco Soap Bank</a>, which offers poor communities a safe and ecologically sound way to wash, grow large, and become established NGOs. Others, such as <a href="http://www.touchalife.org.my/">Touch A Life</a>, which provides weekly meals to poor neighbourhoods, thrive on their intimate nature and remain small, involving only a few volunteers or staff on the ground. Yet others still are short-lived, and dissolve when the founder runs out of time or money to sustain the project. </p>
<p>A key feature that sets these projects apart from “mainstream” development practice is the personal relationships at their heart. They involve committed and sometimes charismatic founders, including, for example, a European and a Cambodian who share a vision for a project, such as an after-school club for children from poor families. The personal connections that are made between founders and those they support, and the immediate, visible rewards of their efforts, are key motivators for those doing citizen aid. </p>
<p>This also holds for their supporters overseas, who feel that they know where their money is going, and the individuals who benefit. Such closeness is not always available for “professional” aid workers, who may direct large budgets, but lack contact with the people at the receiving end. Citizen aid also offers scope for agency, and attracts those with an entrepreneurial streak – a reason why such initiatives have also been dubbed <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/magazine/24volunteerism-t.html">“DIY foreign aid”</a>. </p>
<p>So is citizen aid the new development? It is certainly growing in importance. It offers ordinary citizens the possibility to intervene, when world politics can make them feel angry but unable to make a difference. Rather than dismissing it outright as short-lived amateurism, citizen aid may be one to watch.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83665/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>
This research was supported by a grant from the Leverhulme Foundation (2013-2015). </span></em></p>
We can all play a direct role.
Anne-Meike Fechter, Reader in Anthropology, University of Sussex
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/73712
2017-03-14T10:58:38Z
2017-03-14T10:58:38Z
Fleeing for freedom, Eritrean refugees are being abandoned by Europe
<p>Regardless of international concerns, Eritrea continues to pursue a policy of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/23/eritrea-conscription-repression-and-poverty-recipe-for-mass-emigration">indefinite military conscription</a> that compels the young and the old to serve their country while paying them a pittance. Eritreans are continuing to leave in large numbers to find work to support their families and to find a greater degree of freedom than is possible at home. </p>
<p>In October 2016, a UN inquiry into human rights abuses in Eritrea <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/A_HRC_32_CRP.1_read-only.pdf">reported</a> that crimes against humanity have been committed in the country since 1991. Sheila Keetharuth, presenting the findings of the inquiry, <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20779&LangID=E#sthash.xotKHi30.dpufA">appealed</a> for UN member states to “grant Eritreans access to their territory and asylum procedures” and to “refrain from any forced repatriation to Eritrea or to third party countries where they may still be at risk or unwelcomed”. </p>
<p>The EU acknowledges that the reliance of the Eritrean regime, run by President Isaias Afwerki, on indefinite military conscription and authoritarian policies has led tens of thousands of Eritreans to flee. Yet, it is still working with Eritrea to find ways to stop Eritreans from entering Europe. In 2016, Eritreans were the <a href="https://www.easo.europa.eu/news-events/easo-newsletter-december-2016">seventh largest group</a> of asylum seekers entering Europe.</p>
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<h2>Co-operation with Aferwerki’s regime</h2>
<p>The failure of the EU to agree a common policy approach to the migrant crisis has been coupled with efforts to work with refugee-producing countries to stop the flow of new migrants entering Europe. In July 2014, the Italian deputy foreign minister <a href="http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/20140702_eritrea.html">went to</a> Eritrea to negotiate on behalf of the EU. These talks were rapidly followed by visits to the capital Asmara in late 2014 by <a href="http://the-migrant.co.il/en/node/44">Danish</a>, <a href="https://www.tesfanews.net/norwegian-government-delegation-returned-after-3-days-eritrea-visit/">Norwegian</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jan/22/home-office-eritrea-guidance-softened-to-reduce-asylum-seeker-numbers">British</a> officials whose principle concern was to stop Eritreans from leaving their country and to return Eritreans who had applied for asylum in Europe. </p>
<p>Officials in Asmara welcomed these European initiatives by promising to end indefinite military conscription and to pay conscripts a living wage. In return, Eritrea was given an <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-eritrea-idUKKCN0RH1MU20150917">EU grant of €200m</a> in January 2015. However, it soon became apparent that Eritrea had <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-eritrea-politics-insight-idUKKCN0VY0M5">no intention</a> of introducing the promised reforms. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, European officials continue to rely on the assurances provided by senior Eritrean politicians that if its nationals were returned to Eritrea they would not be subject to human rights abuses and would not be conscripted into the military. On this basis, in 2014 the <a href="https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/B28905F5-5C3F-409B-8A22-0DF0DACBDAEF/0/EritreareportEndeligversion.pdf">Danes</a>, followed quickly in early 2015 by the <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/552779c34.html">British</a>, revised their asylum policies and abruptly refused all Eritrean asylum applications. </p>
<p>A remarkable fight back occurred in the UK against this policy. This culminated in October 2016 when an immigration tribunal <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/552779c34.html">overturned Home Office policy</a>, which forced the government back to its 2014 position granting status to most Eritrean asylum applicants. Few Eritreans had actually been deported back to Eritrea during the period of the change in policy, but many were living in destitution awaiting a decision on whether they would be deported. Other countries, such as Switzerland, have also begun <a href="http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/asylum-politics_automatic-open-door-for-eritreans-is-shut/42932580">changing their policies towards</a> protecting Eritrean refugees. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160576/original/image-20170313-9628-wfucei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160576/original/image-20170313-9628-wfucei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160576/original/image-20170313-9628-wfucei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160576/original/image-20170313-9628-wfucei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160576/original/image-20170313-9628-wfucei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160576/original/image-20170313-9628-wfucei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160576/original/image-20170313-9628-wfucei.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Waiting for the bus in Asmara.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/bandytam/15989963161/sizes/l">Andrea Moroni/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>EU efforts to stop journeys beginning</h2>
<p>The EU has funded <a href="https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process">several initiatives</a> aimed at stopping African migration into Europe, focused on developing co-operation in order to “fight irregular migration and criminal networks”. High-level <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/">meetings</a> in recent years with African partners, including Eritrea, have also sought to address the migration issue. Up for grabs are funds from a €2.5 billion <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en">EU Emergency Trust Fund</a> to address the root causes of irregular migration in Africa, intended to promote economic development, migration management, stability and governance. </p>
<p>In the meantime, irregular migration to Europe continues apace, fed in no small measure by the repressive policies pursued by Eritrea, Sudan and Libya and by a failure of other “partners” such as Nigeria to reduce conflict and promote more inclusive development. While the EU <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-369_en.htm">thinks</a> the partnership deals are having some “success”, it measures that “success” in terms of border management. However, without substantial improvements in regional economic development coupled with conflict resolution these “successess” will prove to be ephemeral. </p>
<h2>Dismal track record</h2>
<p>All this raises the question of whether the EU is simply throwing money at the problem in an attempt to make it go away. Given Eritrea’s track record on human rights and political reform it is doubtful whether this approach will achieve its objectives. Assisting repressive African states to erect efficient border controls that would prevent genuine refugees from fleeing clearly violates the basic tenets of European law. EU member states are also bound by the 1951 <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/1951-refugee-convention.html">Refugee Convention</a> to offer protection to genuine refugees. </p>
<p>UK migration policy is also confused. Despite setbacks in the courts, the Home Office continues to refuse asylum to genuine applicants and return some so-called “failed” asylum applicants to possible harm in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/feb/25/afghanistan-gay-asylum-seekers-home-office-illegal-homosexuality">Afghanistan</a> and elsewhere. A policy of granting humanitarian visas which offer temporary protection to people fleeing violence and persecution is a positive first step, but the UK must pursue other measures to bring an end to violence and human rights abuses <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/09/refugees-applying-to-live-in-uk-face-being-sent-home-after-five-years">before</a> sending people back to their country of origin.</p>
<p>The British Foreign & Commonwealth Office is in the middle of a major review of its policy on Eritrea, but it is not informed by a considered analysis of Eritrean domestic politics or its <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/books/archive/view/63394">destabilising activities</a> in the Horn of Africa. With its asylum and foreign policy in something of a shambles, the British government lacks a coherent approach to the Horn of Africa or towards forced migration in Africa – and as a result it is dependent on EU migration policy initiatives to reduce migration. But as the British government leaves the EU, its influence in Africa and on migration will wane and it will be increasingly dependent on EU policies to improve border management in Africa and migration into the UK.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John R Campbell receives funding from the UK's Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>
Should the EU be giving money to repressive regimes to stop the flow of migrants?
John R Campbell, Reader in the Anthropology of Africa and Law, SOAS, University of London
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/74404
2017-03-14T09:51:00Z
2017-03-14T09:51:00Z
Academics collaborate with artists to ask: who are we to fear refugees and migrants?
<p><a href="http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/workshop/tate-exchange/who-are-we">Who Are We</a>? This is the question that London’s Tate is asking at its free six day cross-platform event spanning the visual arts, film, photography, design, architecture, the spoken and written word and live art. The aim of the programme is to foster collaboration and exchange between artists and researchers, with a view to exploring what is becoming of the UK and Europe. How can “another we” be created, one less susceptible to the fear and suspicion currently dominating the continent? </p>
<p>The projects vary in scope and topic, from theatre to digital visualisation and from interventions such as redesigning the Union Jack to partaking in local acts of kindness. I myself am involved in a collaboration with the artist Bern O’Donoghue. Together, we have created an installation looking at the question of the “refugee crisis” and the question of migration.</p>
<p>Hostility to new arrivals and longer-standing immigrant communities is now rampant across Europe – not only in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/mood-around-immigration-has-made-britain-a-nastier-place-61234">UK</a>, but also in <a href="https://euobserver.com/tickers/137031">Germany</a>, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-hungary-border-police-guards-fence-beating-asylum-seekers-migrants-serbia-push-back-a7610411.html">Hungary</a> and elsewhere. Fear predominates. People on the move are often viewed with suspicion on the part of “host” communities. Despite a broad range of political and social responses to the so-called European refugee “crisis”, a security-orientated concern with “foreigners” <a href="https://theconversation.com/mood-around-immigration-has-made-britain-a-nastier-place-61234">dominates</a> public and political debate.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160545/original/image-20170313-9628-1t8vdfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160545/original/image-20170313-9628-1t8vdfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160545/original/image-20170313-9628-1t8vdfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160545/original/image-20170313-9628-1t8vdfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160545/original/image-20170313-9628-1t8vdfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160545/original/image-20170313-9628-1t8vdfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160545/original/image-20170313-9628-1t8vdfq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lampedusa, ‘boat cemetery’, September 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vicki Squire</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, efforts to construct different ways of talking about the issue appear to have failed to capture public imaginations. A humanitarian approach has been <a href="http://bordercriminologies.law.ox.ac.uk/humanitarian-policing-of-our-sea/">co-opted</a> by the security agenda, such as when humanitarian organisations rescue people at sea only to deliver them to a detention regime.</p>
<p>Indeed, humanitarianism has been reproached from various angles as either “<a href="https://theconversation.com/tolerance-and-humanitarianism-will-not-solve-europes-migration-crisis-67400">too soft</a>” and idealistic, or as <a href="http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ff159d32.pdf">victimising people</a> on the move in precarious conditions. Just consider Germany’s “open door” approach and you will see the difficulties of humanitarianism, particularly one that is so evidently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/06/refugee-crisis-germany-response-heartwarming-will-pressures-show">pragmatic and self-interested</a>.</p>
<p>As Miriam Ticktin has <a href="http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/faculty/?id=4d54-6379-4e44-4d35">argued</a>, humanitarianism is not simply compassionate. It also “hurts” people who don’t qualify as innocent and who are left at the whims of a compassion that <a href="http://www.publicseminar.org/2015/09/the-problem-with-humanitarian-borders/#.WMZyzxh0dsN">can be fleeting</a>. Alternative responses and ways of thinking about migration that are grounded in respect for each person or the dignity of all lives, including those rendered precarious through movement, need to be forged.</p>
<h2>So who are we?</h2>
<p>Many have tried to address the question of how to create such alternative approaches to migration or mobility in a theoretical manner. For example, the appeal to people on the move simply as human, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/28/migrants-humans-drowning-suffocating-safety-statistics">as their European counterparts are</a>, is one that has frequented debates in the midst of hostility over recent months and years.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160542/original/image-20170313-9600-b9eb10.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160542/original/image-20170313-9600-b9eb10.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160542/original/image-20170313-9600-b9eb10.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160542/original/image-20170313-9600-b9eb10.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=801&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160542/original/image-20170313-9600-b9eb10.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160542/original/image-20170313-9600-b9eb10.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160542/original/image-20170313-9600-b9eb10.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1006&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Athens, Piraeus Port camp, May 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vicki Squire, Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Such debates are important, but how they can capture public imaginations in the midst of times dominated by fear and hostility is unclear. So O’Donoghue and I have taken a different tack, working together in this installation to provide tools for people to explore “who we are” and our relation to a “crisis” that has left many dead after seeking to travel to Europe by boat across the dangerous Mediterranean Sea.</p>
<p>Our installation and <a href="https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/dead-reckoning-crossing-the-med-thinking-and-feeling-migration-differently-tickets-32255381715">symposium</a> is designed to provide opportunities to explore how different creative mediums and tools of interaction can enable a transformation in the ways that people respond to migration. Specifically, we want to explore the power of artistic creativity, dialogue, and story-sharing in opening up new ways for host communities to relate to people on the move in precarious situations.</p>
<p>Our projects – O’Donoghue’s art installation, <a href="http://www.bernodonoghue.com/dead-reckoning/">Dead Reckoning</a>, and my story map, <a href="http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/crossingthemed/">Crossing the Med</a>, provide a new perspective on the journeys and experiences of people seeking to cross the Mediterranean sea by boat. While the projects are independent from one another, we have worked together to bring different tools by which people can reflect upon and have dialogue about a “migration crisis” that is characterised by many deaths at sea.</p>
<h2>Dead reckoning/crossing the Med</h2>
<p>I am also involved in a collaborative <a href="http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/crossingthemed/">research project</a> involving scholars from <a href="http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/">University of Warwick</a>, <a href="http://www.um.edu.mt/">University of Malta</a>, and <a href="http://www.eliamep.gr/en/">ELIAMEP</a>, Greece. We carried out over 250 in-depth qualitative interviews with people who have attempted – or who have planned to attempt – the dangerous boat journey across the eastern and central Mediterranean sea routes.</p>
<p>The primary aim of this project is to assess policy effects on people on the move and to inform policy makers. But we are also concerned to inform wider public perceptions of migration, and to challenge the tendencies that are driven by fear and hostility.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160574/original/image-20170313-9606-k1uw34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160574/original/image-20170313-9606-k1uw34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160574/original/image-20170313-9606-k1uw34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160574/original/image-20170313-9606-k1uw34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160574/original/image-20170313-9606-k1uw34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160574/original/image-20170313-9606-k1uw34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160574/original/image-20170313-9606-k1uw34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160574/original/image-20170313-9606-k1uw34.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=591&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Crossing the Med story map: Rome.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">University of Warwick 2017</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Acknowledging the importance of <a href="http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/83576/">sharing stories</a> with people on the move, the story map we created for the Tate event enables people to follow individual journeys in order to understand more about the complexity and challenges of migratory experiences.</p>
<p>This is where O’Donoghue’s work resonates strongly with my own. Her <a href="http://www.bernodonoghue.com/dead-reckoning/">installation</a> is composed of multicoloured paper boats, each of which represents a person who was recorded as drowned in the Mediterranean during 2016. She aims to depict the monthly loss of life by using 12 different colour combinations to marble the paper. This helps her to highlight the ways that changes in the weather, season or policies surrounding migration in Europe can affect the number of people who have died.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160541/original/image-20170313-9641-1hlikfq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/160541/original/image-20170313-9641-1hlikfq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160541/original/image-20170313-9641-1hlikfq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160541/original/image-20170313-9641-1hlikfq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160541/original/image-20170313-9641-1hlikfq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160541/original/image-20170313-9641-1hlikfq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/160541/original/image-20170313-9641-1hlikfq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dead Reckoning, October 2016, Attenborough Centre, University of Sussex.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Bern O’Donoghue</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>O’Donoghue draws on data on the deceased collected by the IOM <a href="https://missingmigrants.iom.int/">Missing Migrants Project</a>, yet importantly seeks to emphasise the people behind the statistics. “Every one of the 5,083 paper boats symbolises a loss of someone significant: a daughter, son, neighbour or friend,” she <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/vicki-squire-bern-o-donoghue/5083-boats-dead-reckoning">explains</a>. By handwriting titles such as “mother”, “friend”, “baby” on each boat, O’Donoghue seeks to humanise people on the move rather than rendering them inhuman as “numbers” associated with the fear of migration.</p>
<p>Academic Lilie Chouliaraki has <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/Experts/profile.aspx?KeyValue=l.chouliaraki@lse.ac.uk">argued</a> that humanitarianism today has been reduced to a mere <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44959/">spectatorship</a> of the victimhood of others. By contrast, our installation invites visitors to become more intimate with the details of people who make the risky journey across the Mediterreanean Sea. This involvement refuses the role of passive spectator in the face of the violence of contemporary bordering practices. And we hope it will encourage people to take home stories and ideas of what they can do to make a difference wherever – and whoever – they are.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/74404/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vicki Squire receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council as well as from The Leverhulme Trust.</span></em></p>
A more intimate connection with the details of migrants crossing the Mediterranean can happen through art.
Vicki Squire, Reader in International Security, University of Warwick
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/72250
2017-02-03T11:04:53Z
2017-02-03T11:04:53Z
More pathways for migrants to Europe can foil people smugglers – border clampdowns will not
<p>The ongoing migration and refugee crisis <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/02/03-informal-meeting/">tops the agenda</a> at a meeting of EU political leaders in the Maltese capital, Valletta. Malta’s prime minister, Joseph Muscat, captured the urgency of the situation when he <a href="http://www.audiovisual.europarl.europa.eu/Assetdetail.aspx?id=4eebc5e8-039d-4a8b-9f85-a6ff00de8697">told the European Parliament</a> in late January: “The European Union will be seriously tested unless we act now.”</p>
<p>The backdrop to this meeting is a dystopian image of Europe threatened by a migrant invasion of epic proportions managed by a criminal cartel of smugglers and traffickers. This nightmare vision continues to fuel resurgent populist and extreme right political parties. Containment and prevention of migrants reaching the EU plus efforts to strengthen cooperation with neighbouring countries <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-134_en.htm">such as Libya</a> are widely seen as necessary political responses.</p>
<p>But there’s a risk that the EU could be going about this all wrong. Closing the EU’s borders endangers those migrants determined to travel who are left with little option but to use people smugglers. In turn, this is strengthening smuggling networks rather than weakening them. A more durable response to the current crisis could be to widen existing channels for entry by migrants and refugees. Greater openness <a href="http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/43667">can reduce migration pressures</a>, save lives and undercut the people smugglers.</p>
<h2>The smuggling business</h2>
<p>Increased migration flows are widely seen as a threat to Europe’s borders. But if this belief is based on the view that a strong, functioning border is there only to limit cross-border flows, then it is mistaken. Creating some openings in borders does not necessarily mean the abandonment of controls. Pathways for regular migration can strengthen border controls because they move migrants from disorderly and irregular routes to more orderly ones. </p>
<p>The EU’s own <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/mobility-partnerships-visa-facilitation-and-readmission-agreements_en">mobility partnerships</a> – bilateral deals between EU member states and some of its neighbours over migration – are recognition of this. They aim to balance efforts at control with some opening for regular migration, although EU member states have been very reluctant to open new pathways.</p>
<p>The challenge is enormous and there are no easy solutions. People smuggling is a big, diverse and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/24/libyas-people-smugglers-how-will-they-catch-us-theyll-soon-move-on">highly creative “business”</a>, often profiting from human misery. It’s also a business that adapts swiftly to changed circumstances. In 2014 and 2015, attention focused on an Eastern Mediterranean route through Turkey and then on to Greece.</p>
<p>Then in 2016, the direction of travel for migrants crossing the Mediterranean towards Europe changed. Tighter controls were introduced in Greece and Turkey. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-europes-refugee-deal-with-turkey-is-it-legal-and-can-it-work-56054">EU reached a deal</a> with Turkey to try to stem the flows. One effect was to <a href="https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-top-363348-2016-deaths-sea-5079">send more than 181,000 people</a> via a central Mediterranean route through Libya towards Italy in 2016. The cost was high. More than 4,500 men, women and children were <a href="https://missingmigrants.iom.int">reported dead or missing</a> that year. </p>
<p>In late January 2017, the <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017JC0004">EU Commission called for</a> action to be taken rapidly to fight smuggling and “stem the flows” of migrants and refugees. EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherhini, <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/19755/opening-remarks-hrvp-federica-mogherini-debate-managing-migration-along-central-mediterranean_en">said additional action was needed</a> to break the business model of the smuggler. This would include assistance to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-the-eu-wants-to-be-the-bastion-of-liberal-democracy-it-too-must-stop-demonising-refugees-and-migrants-72327">fragile Libyan government</a>. </p>
<p>EU leaders want to stop migrants from embarking on hazardous journeys. Ideally, migrants would be persuaded not to leave their countries of origin. This approach is not new. Back in 2004, the European border and coast guard agency, <a href="http://frontex.europa.eu/">Frontex</a>, was set up to promote cooperation between national border authorities. In 2015, the EU’s heads of government <a href="http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/158861/eu-to-triple-funding-for-mediterranean-crisis/">tripled the budget</a> for Frontex’s joint-operations – called Triton and Poseidon – in the Mediterranean. In the same year, the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eunavfor-med_en">EUNAVFOR MED operation</a> – or Sophia – was set up to disrupt the business model of smugglers by seizing their boats and confiscating their assets. </p>
<h2>Show of force on borders could backfire</h2>
<p>All agree that saving lives at sea is a humanitarian imperative, but a policy focused only on containment and prevention of migration can be counterproductive. Sea border operations are often inefficient as the evolution of smuggling across the Mediterranean demonstrates with dramatic clarity. Not only has the huge area to be patrolled hindered the extent of these operations and prompted spiralling financial costs, but blocking smuggling networks in one area <a href="http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/339501">has redirected</a> unauthorised migration flows to different routes.</p>
<p>The tightening of border control also exposes migrants to greater dangers. As smugglers are aware of the risks of their own business, they seek to limit the chances of apprehension by employing a variety of strategies. These <a href="https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/migrant-smuggling.html">include</a> making longer and therefore more dangerous journeys, choosing unsafe points of embarkation and disembarkation, adopting riskier manoeuvres to escape authorities, and abandoning their “cargo” on vessels in rough seas.</p>
<p>Tougher border controls may trigger a vicious dynamic. Efforts to disrupt smugglers can lead to increased sophistication by the smuggling gangs. <a href="https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/People-smuggling">Social media is used</a> both to advertise their services and, during crossings, alert the smugglers to border guard movements and potential arrest. </p>
<p>The EU does urgently need a more effective response to the growing numbers of people moving along the central Mediterranean route, as well as to the migration and refugee crisis more generally. To save lives and undercut the smugglers this response needs to strike a new balance. Regular pathways for people to move across the Mediterranean to Europe are a necessary component of this response. Opening such pathways is not politically popular. But keeping things as they are means continued loss of life and fuels the people smuggling business. The wider risk is that the longer this drags on, the EU itself is damaged in the eyes of its own citizens and the wider world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72250/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Geddes receives funding from the European Research Council </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Luigi Achilli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A military option will be a lucrative one for smugglers.
Andrew Geddes, Director of the Migration Policy Centre and Professor of Politics, University of Sheffield
Luigi Achilli, Research Associate to Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/69017
2016-12-09T02:08:32Z
2016-12-09T02:08:32Z
Will Trump victory make Angela Merkel leader of the free world?
<p>After the election of Donald Trump, commentators have argued that German Chancellor Angela Merkel may become the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/21/how-angela-merkel-a-conservative-became-the-leader-of-the-liberal-free-world/?utm_term=.86d4379189ac">leader</a> of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/17/germany-daunted-by-great-expectations-as-obama-passes-baton-to-merkel">free world</a>, a role typically played by the president of the United States.</p>
<p>After 11 years as chancellor and as the leader of the largest economy in Europe, Merkel is certainly one of the most experienced heads of state in office. On Nov. 20, after a long wait, Merkel finally announced that she would seek <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/europe/angela-merkel-germany.html?_r=0">a fourth term</a> in the federal elections next fall.</p>
<p>In the upcoming campaign, Merkel is in a difficult position. She must both live up to her reputation as a defender of liberal democracy, and also contain the right-wing populist streaks in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-did-the-far-right-gain-so-much-ground-in-germany-56314">Alternative for Germany</a> party in order to win reelection. </p>
<p>As an American scholar of German studies, I have blogged about how Merkel’s <a href="http://blog.feministische-studien.de/2015/10/angela-merkel-on-anne-will/">public appearances</a> function as <a href="http://jschustercraig.com/2015/12/17/merkels-speech-at-the-cdu-party-meeting/">political theater</a>. The chancellor changes her message depending on her audience. At home, she is much more likely to appear conservative. </p>
<p>But in anticipation of Trump taking office in 2017, Merkel is publicly setting clear boundaries. Trump not only criticized her <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/08/17/trump-goes-after-merkel-and-germany-takes-note/">open-doors refugee policy</a>, but also may represent a threat to close international collaboration between Germany and the United States.</p>
<h2>In between Trump and the German far right</h2>
<p>Merkel is most likely to present herself as a defender of liberal values when appearing on the international stage. On Nov. 9, Merkel congratulated Trump on his new office at a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7xe3GROSjA">press conference</a>. In contrast to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-elections/putin-donald-trump-wins-russia-congratulates-us-president-2016-a7406741.html">celebratory statements</a> or Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2016/nov/09/mexico-president-congratulates-trump-during-friendly-conversation-video">cautious well wishes</a>, Merkel issued <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/merkel-congratulates-trump-as-politicians-express-shock/a-36318866">a warning</a>: If Trump cannot respect “democracy, freedom, respect for the law and for human dignity independent of background, skin color, religion, gender, sexual orientation or political beliefs,” Merkel <a href="https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2016/11/2016-11-09-statement-merkel-us-wahlen.html">implied</a> that Germany will need to reevaluate the terms of its partnership with the United States. </p>
<p>This warning to Trump has been praised by some in the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/opinion/election-night-2016/angela-merkels-warning-to-trump">American press</a> for its defense of liberal, democratic values.</p>
<p>Many Germans see Trump’s racist and xenophobic comments as statements that <a href="http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/08/after-uk-germans-call-for-trump-ban.html">would be illegal</a> under current German law. His rhetoric echoes not only the racism and anti-Semitism of the Holocaust, but also shares similarities with the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/24/the-ugly-history-of-luegenpresse-a-nazi-slur-shouted-at-a-trump-rally/?utm_term=.34299bd2a36c">authoritarian doublespeak</a> of East German communist politics.</p>
<p>However, in domestic appearances, Merkel is at times illiberal, choosing to accent her conservativism to pander to the xenophobic right wing. On Nov. 6, Merkel gave an acceptance speech after receiving the nomination of her party. The speech garnered widespread attention in the U.S., mostly for the moment when Merkel stated support for <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/12/06/merkels-call-for-burqa-ban-in-germany-draws-backlash.html">banning burqas</a> – a move designed to attract voters on the right.</p>
<h2>Merkel’s campaign begins</h2>
<p>As the German public was anxiously awaiting Merkel’s decision to run for office, German journalists Matthias Geis, Tina Hildebrandt and Bernd Ulrich published a full-page article in the German newspaper <a href="http://www.zeit.de/2016/48/angela-merkel-westliche-welt-us-wahl-donald-trump">Die Zeit</a> about Merkel titled “Leader of the free world? Not that, too!”</p>
<p>In this article, they explain the difficulties facing Merkel’s reelection campaign. Merkel, they say, has never faced more pressure to lead. Europe isn’t pulling its weight. She doesn’t have unified support from her party. Finally, she doesn’t have the same polling numbers she used to. Despite these obstacles, they write:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Merkel can sense that the arguments she could bring against her candidacy get weaker and weaker as the global situation becomes more and more dramatic.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Merkel couches her decision to seek reelection in similar terms. When she announced her candidacy, Merkel said she needed to run because – after the U.S. election and in relationship to Russia – the world needed to be <a href="http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-11/presse-konferenz-angela-merkel-kanzlerkandidatur-cdu-chefin">“sorted out.”</a> Merkel repeated this phrase in <a href="https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/bericht-cdu-vorsitzende-merkel-2016.pdf?file=1">her nomination speech</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“We are dealing with a world – especially after the American election – which first needs to be sorted out, especially with respect to things like NATO and the relationship to Russia. This poses the question: What is actually to be done?” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>By standing for reelection, Merkel answered her own question. Merkel sees herself as the person to “sort out” the new world order. In this narrative, the first thing to do is support her campaign. The second thing, visible in her comments about refugees and burqa bans, is to pander to voters who might abandon her party to vote for the right-wing Alternative for Germany party. </p>
<p>The Alternative for Germany party, which criticizes Merkel’s every move, later <a href="https://twitter.com/AfD_Support/status/806134480570355712">joked</a> on social media that the CDU (Merkel’s party) had stolen their campaign platform. </p>
<p>The Alternative for Germany party was founded in 2013 and is a xenophobic, nationalist, right-wing party critical of the European Union. The AfD has been successful in gaining representation in <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/german-state-elections-success-for-right-wing-afd-losses-for-merkels-cdu/a-19113604">local German elections</a>. They will likely enter the <a href="https://theconversation.com/merkels-party-slumps-in-berlin-election-but-dont-count-her-out-for-2017-65639">national German parliament</a> in the fall of 2017.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69017/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Johanna Schuster-Craig received funding from the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. </span></em></p>
In reelection bid, Merkel’s not just up against a xenophobic, nationalist party in Germany. In the wake of Trump’s election, liberal democracies around the world hope she’ll defend them, too.
Johanna Schuster-Craig, Assistant Professor of German and Global Studies, Michigan State University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/67956
2016-11-03T08:16:53Z
2016-11-03T08:16:53Z
As long as people are pushed to flee their homes for Europe, smuggling networks will remain a necessity
<p>Over a million women, men and children crossed the Mediterranean into Europe in 2015. <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php">Hundreds of thousands</a> climbed, or were pushed and shoved, into rickety boats in Libya to reach Italy and Malta. Many more did the same in Turkey to reach Greece. In 2016, although fewer people have made the journey, <a href="http://missingmigrants.iom.int/">more have died</a> on the way. </p>
<p>According to European leaders, it is smugglers operating within vast transnational criminal networks who are responsible for these movements and ultimately for the loss of life at sea. The answer, many have repeatedly <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34793258">said</a>, is to “smash the trafficking gangs” by increasing surveillance, arresting the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/it-is-our-antipathy-towards-migrants-that-kills-in-the-mediterranean">“ruthless traffickers”</a> and engaging in <a href="http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/">military action</a> at points of departure. </p>
<p>Our new <a href="http://www.medmig.info/research-brief-destination-europe">research</a>, based on interviews with 500 refugees and migrants in Italy, Greece, Turkey and Malta, fundamentally challenges this approach. Rather than stopping migration and breaking the smuggler networks, it is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hidden-costs-of-closed-borders-for-migrants-stuck-in-serbia-65591">closure of borders</a> within and beyond Europe that has increased both the demand and use of smugglers. </p>
<h2>No choice but to turn to smugglers</h2>
<p>The crossing of the Mediterranean is often the culmination of a <a href="http://theconversation.com/no-direct-flight-new-maps-show-the-fragmented-journeys-of-migrants-and-refugees-to-europe-67955">long and protracted journey</a> which has begun months or even years earlier. Smugglers are used at different stages of these journeys, and for differing reasons. Every single one of the 500 refugees and migrants that we interviewed had engaged the services of a smuggler at least once. This is a higher proportion of those who crossed the Mediterranean <a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/EMSC_launch">than has been previously documented</a>.</p>
<p>For many of the people we met, smugglers had provided the only opportunity to leave a place of danger or to enter countries in which protection might potentially be available to them. For fees of up to US$15,000, smugglers helped people arrange the logistics of their journeys, from countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Nigeria, Iraq, Yemen and Morocco. </p>
<p>Of the people we interviewed in Greece, 43% had needed to use a smuggler to flee their homes. Nearly everyone (91%) explicitly mentioned factors that could be described as “forced migration” which had played a key role in their decision to leave their home country. These included persecution, conflict or human rights abuses. </p>
<p>In these circumstances, smugglers offered personal security in addition to logistical assistance. For instance, they enabled people to escape from the conflict frontline in Aleppo, Daraa and Homs, or from Islamic State in Deir Al-Zor, Raqqa and Mosul. For those travelling through <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/09/on-the-road-in-agadez-desperation-and-death-along-a-saharan-smuggling-route">Niger towards Libya</a>, making it across the Sahara alive would be almost impossible without a robust vehicle organised by smugglers and a driver who knew the way. And once in Libya, a chaotic land of conflict and violence in which a third of the people we spoke to had witnessed death, paying a smuggler to get onto a boat was seen as the only opportunity to leave danger behind. </p>
<p>Many of those we interviewed told us that they had no choice other than to use a smuggler to avoid border controls because there was no way for them to travel legally. One in ten of those arriving in Greece had tried but failed to find a way of migrating legally through applying for a visa, a UN resettlement programme or family reunification. And many more travelling across both the central and eastern Mediterranean routes had considered applying for a visa but decided an attempt would likely be unsuccessful, was too expensive or would be impossible due to the lack of a functioning embassy at which they could apply for a visa close to their home. </p>
<h2>Heroes or villains?</h2>
<p>At least some of the smugglers who facilitated the journeys across the Mediterranean came across in our interviews as dangerous and unscrupulous individuals seeking to make money from the desperation of refugees and migrants. This was especially the case for those travelling through Libya. The people we met were only too aware that they had placed their lives – and sometimes those of their children – in the hands of a smuggler. But they saw little alternative. </p>
<p>Yet, far from being coerced by vast criminal networks, people who crossed the Mediterranean to Greece often knew well in advance how much they would have to pay for the different services offered by smugglers. They could bargain over prices, the number of people on the boat, the time of the journey, and what the nationalities of fellow travellers would be. Two of the people we met even received refunds from their smuggler after an unsuccessful attempt at crossing from Turkey to Greece. </p>
<p>Despite much greater levels of violence at the hands of smugglers for those arriving in Italy from Libya, trust and reputation had a role in the choices people had made. On both routes, if the journey was a success and the people arrived safely, then that smuggler could develop a good reputation among those still waiting to depart. </p>
<p>The people we met described smugglers who were generally not part of extensive international criminal networks. Some refugees and migrants drive the boats from Libya and Turkey in return for free or discounted passage to their destination. Others generate new “clients” for smugglers in return for the same end, or to earn money to fund their onward passage. A broad spectrum of other individuals, including shopkeepers, shepherds and taxi drivers also participate in smuggling. Several refugees also referred to paying bribes to border guards, police and soldiers to facilitate their journeys. So the distinction between evil criminal and helpful smuggler is not always an easy one to make. </p>
<p>For those with greater urgency to escape, less money to pay or no personal recommendations, the risks of violence and kidnapping at the hands of smugglers were much greater. Rather than bargaining over how much they would pay, some of our respondents were forced to work in Libya by their smugglers for no pay, sometimes in sex work, or were even “sold” onto others. </p>
<p>But ultimately, they believed that engaging with a smuggler vastly increased the likelihood of getting out of danger and arriving at their destination. This means that current approaches aimed at using military might or the courts to smash smuggling networks are based on flawed assumptions about smuggling – and are doomed to failure. Smuggling will continue as long as the demand and need to reach a place of safety and protection is there.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Katharine Jones is a Board member of the Scottish Refugee Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon McMahon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Smugglers who transport migrants and refugees into the EU are both heroes and villains.
Katharine Jones, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University
Simon McMahon, Research Fellow, Coventry University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/67573
2016-10-24T14:09:19Z
2016-10-24T14:09:19Z
As the Calais camp is demolished, a hidden crisis continues for refugees living in squalor
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142894/original/image-20161024-28423-1t82nce.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A tear gas cannister on the outskirts of the Calais camp. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thom Davies</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Among the detritus of the squalid Calais camp lie empty tear gas shells, recently fired by the police. They signify the physical violence that some refugees will suffer in the coming days as the so-called “Jungle” is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37745386">forcibly dismantled</a>. </p>
<p>“It’s a big problem, the gas gets into the tent”, explains an Afghan resident who lives on the edge of Europe’s largest makeshift encampment. But beyond the cuts and bruises that residents of the camp have <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/calais-jungle-refugees-camp-police-violence-report-data-rights-a6968096.html">suffered at the hands of the police</a> and racist thugs, other <a href="https://www.academia.edu/15673535/Geography_Migration_and_Abandonment_in_the_Calais_Refugee_Camp">hidden forms of violence</a> have slowly brutalised refugees since the camp was created in early 2015. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.doctorsoftheworld.org.uk/files/Calais_Health_Report.pdf">Our research</a> and visits to the camp have revealed the invisible public health dangers that refugees have suffered, and the microbiological threats of living in such squalid conditions – conditions that the state could easily have chosen to improve. For months now, French authorities have failed to provide enough hygiene facilities, food and toilets. They have even failed to meet the minimum standards for refugee camps set out by the <a href="http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/95884/D.01.03.%20Handbook%20for%20Emergencies_UNHCR.pdf">UNHCR</a> and the <a href="http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/excreta-disposal-standard-2-appropriate-and-adequate-toilet-facilities/">Sphere Project</a>, which works to set basic standards for humanitarian emergencies. A failure to meet such public health requirements thereby deliberately enforced squalor and misery for the camp’s inhabitants.</p>
<p>In 2015, a fifth of the camp’s residents seen by health-related NGOs presented with scabies, and many of its population was suffering from various <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/02/calais-refugee-camp-conditions-diabolical-report-jungle-bacteria-hygiene">gastrointestinal illnesses</a> as a result of a lack of access to adequate sanitation, and safe storage of food or water. As one resident of the Calais camp who had lived there for several months reflected: “A quick bullet through the head in Afghanistan would be better than this slow death here.” A testament to how miserable things had become. </p>
<h2>Security over sanitation</h2>
<p>In the 18 months that this camp has existed on the French-UK border, both governments have consistently done the <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-this-really-europe-refugees-in-calais-speak-of-desperate-conditions-45414">bare minimum</a> to protect the lives of refugees in Calais – from a failure to ensure minimum health standards, to the lack of food and shelter provision. Meanwhile, millions of pounds have been spent by the UK to enforce the border, with <a href="https://theconversation.com/fences-in-calais-protect-ministers-not-refugees-46366">elaborate security architecture</a>. Yet the evident humanitarian crisis in Calais has been met with state indifference.</p>
<p>These decisions to do as little as possible in the face of an unfolding crisis now also extend to the British commitment to only rehouse a small fraction of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/child-migrants-taken-to-britain-now-they-need-support-and-psychological-care-67075">children living in the camp</a>. The British government is currently relocating a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/22/lone-child-refugees-unaccompanied-dubs-amendment-arrive-uk-calais">small group of child refugees</a> – six months after a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/21/house-of-lords-votes-to-let-lone-child-refugees-come-to-britain">parliamentary amendment</a> to bring them to the UK. This amounts to the weakest of political actions at the eleventh hour of an 18-month long emergency.</p>
<p>This state negligence also stands in stark contrast to the efforts of volunteers, <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-political-movement-is-rising-from-the-mud-in-calais-53758">aid agencies and activists</a> working tirelessly in the face of government inertia, including MSF, Help Refugees, Care 4 Calais, Doctors of the World, Secours Catholique and the Kitchen In Calais among many others, who have worked hard to ensure some level of humanitarian support.</p>
<p>The informal Calais camp will now gradually be dismantled by French authorities, and refugees are being relocated to asylum centres in other parts of France. This is to be welcomed to the extent that it may provide shelter, food and access to asylum processes for migrants who have previously been denied these material and political provisions. But with many camp residents reluctant to give up on their desire to reach the UK, and with more than a thousand riot police having been drafted into Calais for the dismantlement, it is inconceivable that this operation will be completed without the sustained use of force. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142893/original/image-20161024-28380-rhlpbx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142893/original/image-20161024-28380-rhlpbx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142893/original/image-20161024-28380-rhlpbx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142893/original/image-20161024-28380-rhlpbx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142893/original/image-20161024-28380-rhlpbx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142893/original/image-20161024-28380-rhlpbx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142893/original/image-20161024-28380-rhlpbx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A violent place to call home.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thom Davies</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Too little, too late</h2>
<p>As British authorities are unwilling to take all but small numbers of <a href="https://theconversation.com/child-migrants-taken-to-britain-now-they-need-support-and-psychological-care-67075">child refugees with family connections</a> in the UK, many adult asylum seekers with similar connections will seek to remain in northern France, living informally in smaller sub-camps to sustain their chances of making it across the Channel. Some refugees left before the dismantlement started on October 24 for other informal encampments, or simply to sleep on the streets, but others simply have no Plan B, so determined are they to reach the UK. </p>
<p>Research by the <a href="https://t.co/Xg3zveSvGa">Refugee Rights Data Project</a> in Calais indicates that <a href="http://refugeerights.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/RRDP_TheLongWait.pdf">40% of the Calais camp</a> residents want to get to the UK principally to reunite with friends or family. “It is the UK or back to Afghanistan,” said one resident in his 40s who has lived in the camp for a full year.</p>
<p>If the current French response amounts to too little, too late, the UK’s response has been weaker still. It is telling that rather than a debate about the extent to which Britain should be assisting in the resettlement of refugees, such is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/questions-over-age-of-refugee-children-show-how-ugly-britain-has-become-67335">popular mood and toxic political landscape</a>, that even the rehousing of minors from war-zones – with close relatives in the UK – is attacked by the political right and tabloid press.</p>
<p>As the media covers the overt violence of the camp’s demolition, the persistence of less visible forms of violence will continue to threaten the lives of refugees. As long as <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-the-calais-jungle-is-there-a-long-term-solution-views-from-france-and-britain-67352">European states cannot agree</a> a more systematic, equitable and just method of distributing displaced populations, informal camps will remain a constant fixture on the European landscape.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67573/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Arshad Isakjee receives funding from the ESRC</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thom Davies receives funding from the ESRC and the ERC.</span></em></p>
The French and British governments have prioritised security over humanity for refugees in the Calais Jungle.
Arshad Isakjee, Research Fellow in Migration, Identity and Belonging, University of Birmingham
Thom Davies, Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology, University of Warwick
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/67352
2016-10-24T10:44:06Z
2016-10-24T10:44:06Z
After the Calais Jungle: is there a long-term solution? Views from France and Britain
<p><em>Ever since the French president François Hollande <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/26/calais-migrant-camp-must-go-by-end-of-year-francois-hollande">went to Calais</a> in late September 2016 and promised that the migrant camp on its outskirts, known as “the Jungle”, would be dismantled, its residents have been preparing to be moved. On October 24, queues of people who had been living in the camp in hope of crossing to Britain, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37745386">waited to be registered</a> before being transported on buses to refugee centres in other parts of France. However, it’s feared there are some residents who do not want to leave.</em> </p>
<p><em>The camp is to be demolished. But will this police operation bring an end to people heading for Calais? Conversation editors in London and Paris asked two academics from either side of the English Channel who work on migration for their views.</em> </p>
<h2>We’ve been here before</h2>
<p><em>Heaven Crawley, research professor at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University</em></p>
<p>In August 2002 I was working in the UK Home Office. Labour was in power and the talk was of evidence-based policy making. I had recently finished my PhD and like the other new employees sitting on the 14th floor of Apollo House in Croydon, south London, there was a sense that we could make a difference to the way things were done. Our role was to make sure that ministers were fully informed about the factors underlying the sharp rise in asylum claims to <a href="http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migration-to-the-uk-asylum/">more than 84,000 that year</a>, a figure that has not been surpassed in the period since.</p>
<p>And then came Sangatte, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/may/23/immigration.immigrationandpublicservices1">Red Cross centre close to Calais</a> which was established in 1999 but became the focus of the British media over the slow news days that summer. So much has changed since then – and yet so little.</p>
<p>Then, as now, the front pages of the daily newspapers were filled with images of people trying to cross the channel accompanied by headlines of “flood” and “invasion”. Ministers were called away from their holidays to discuss the “crisis”. It was clear that most of those at Sangatte were fleeing conflict and persecution. Quietly, and without too much fuss, <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2533415.stm">around 2,000 refugees, mostly Afghans and Iraqi Kurds were brought to the UK</a> and given work permits and a chance to rebuild their lives.</p>
<p>The Red Cross Centre at Sangatte <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1412258/Sangatte-refugee-camp-closes-early.html">was dismantled</a>, the kids went back to school, normal life resumed. A few months later the refugees and migrants who had been living at the centre relocated to a makeshift camp in the woods near an industrial area that was known as “the Jungle”. The area was subsequently cleared in 2009, forcing migrants to settle in squats and makeshift shelters scattered throughout Calais – or sleep in the streets.</p>
<p>Fifteen years later and here we are again. As images of more than a million refugees and migrants making the desperate journey across the Mediterranean filled our newspapers and social media feeds over the summer of 2015, for those living in the UK the story of the Jungle became a potent symbol of the crisis gripping Europe. The numbers in the camp were tiny, never reaching more than 10,000 people in total, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics">around 0.07% of those seeking protection in Europe</a>. But that didn’t matter. The British public were told, repeatedly, that this was just the tip of the iceberg, that everyone coming to Europe wanted to come to the UK and that given half a chance they would.</p>
<p>There is virtually no evidence that this is the case.</p>
<h2>Links to the UK won’t disappear</h2>
<p>Back in 2002, just before Sangatte was closed, the Home Office <a href="http://www.ners-sunderland.org.uk/content/hors243.pdf">published a report</a> which showed that those claiming asylum in the UK were attracted far more by the presence of family, language, culture and history than the prospects of accessing jobs or Britain’s far from generous welfare benefits. It made no difference. Just a few weeks later the Home Office <a href="http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2RighttoWork.pdf">removed the right to work</a> for those waiting for their asylum claims to be decided, a policy that had no impact on arrivals but fundamentally undermined the ability of refugees to integrate.</p>
<p>In 2010, I looked again at the factors shaping the decision to come to the UK, <a href="https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0001/5702/rcchance.pdf">this time working with the Refugee Council</a>. Again we found that existing connections to the UK mattered more than any policy measure ever would.</p>
<p>Now, in 2016, our research, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council <a href="http://www.medmig.info">on the dynamics of migration across the Mediterranean</a> has shown clearly that it is the drivers of migration that have propelled people towards Europe. This is primarily conflict, persecution and human rights abuse in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea, together with escalating violence in Libya and a lack of rights and opportunities in countries such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Very few of the 500 refugees and migrants <a href="http://www.medmig.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/research-brief-02-Understanding-the-dynamics-of-migration-to-Greece-and-the-EU.pdf">we spoke to had a specific country in mind when they left their homes</a>. Of those that did, only 6% mentioned the UK and most either had family already living here or could speak English and believed, rightly, that it would be easier for them to integrate.</p>
<h2>The solution is political</h2>
<p>So will there be another camp like the Jungle? The short answer is yes, almost certainly. As long as the factors that continue to drive people from their homes and prevent them from rebuilding their lives elsewhere continue and as long as EU member states, including the UK, fail to provide safe and legal routes for protection and work, people will make their own way to the countries in which they have friends, family and that they feel offer the best chance to rebuild a life.</p>
<p>There is no obligation under international refugee law for a person to claim asylum in the first country they get to. This has simply been a mechanism introduced by the politically more powerful and richer countries of northern Europe to take full advantage of their lack of geographical proximity to the epicentres of conflict and violence.</p>
<p>The Jungle may not return to Calais – where the fence that has already been built to prevent people accessing the trains and lorries crossing the English Channel is now being <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/06/work-to-begin-on-big-wall-at-calais-to-block-migrants/">extended and reinforced with concrete at the expense of the British taxpayer</a>. But all of the evidence from 25 years of research on this issue tells me that people who are sufficiently desperate or motivated to move, who have no sense of a future or an alternative, will always find a way around the barriers that are put in place to stop them. It’s possible, if expensive, to build a wall around a port, less so a country.</p>
<p>But a long-term solution is possible. Europe, and all of its member states, need to listen to the evidence about why people are on the move in such large numbers and devise policy solutions which tackle the drivers of primary and secondary migration rather than expending huge resources and political energy on keeping people out. They have a huge range of policy tools at their disposal – <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/6/575e69044/unhcr-report-puts-projected-resettlement-needs-2017-119-million.html">refugee resettlement</a>, <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2016/8/57aca60a4/right-reunion-eludes-refugee-families-europe.html">family reunification</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/flights-to-italy-for-refugees-offer-a-humanitarian-way-forward-for-europe-66451">humanitarian visas</a>, temporary work permits, educational visa – most of which have stayed firmly in the box. It’s time they were taken out and put to work.</p>
<h2>Calais: the show of force continues</h2>
<p><em>Olivier Clochard, researcher at the CNRS (Migrinter), Université de Poitiers</em></p>
<p>History is repeating itself. The biggest camp that the Calais region has seen in 20 years is going to be dismantled in the same way as those that preceded it. But once again, the destruction of this living space will not resolve the region’s migration situation. </p>
<p>Whether it was during the destruction of the Sangatte camp in 2002, squats and encampments in Calais in the winter of 2015 or the Jungle this winter, the French and British governments continue trying to persuade the public that police operations will resolve the migration situation.</p>
<p>Each of these operations has sent people away from the Calais area, to other French regions, other EU member states or even back to their home countries – so temporarily reducing migration pressure. But the Calais area remains a transit zone, where people trying to find better living conditions face obsessively increasing migration controls. </p>
<p>In Calais and its surroundings, women, men and children continue to arrive for the same reasons which brought the refugees before them – and which <a href="http://refugeerights.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/RRDP_TheLongWait.pdf">numerous</a> <a href="http://www.secours-catholique.org/sites/scinternet/files/publications/rapport_calaisbd1.pdf">studies</a> have relayed: they speak English, or have members of their family or friends living in the UK. </p>
<p>The members of the current French government, <a href="http://www.slate.fr/story/10547/au-dela-de-la-%C2%ABjungle%C2%BB">very critical</a> when they were in opposition, have adopted the restrictive methods of their predecessors. With the help of the UK, France is reinforcing its migration controls by building walls and deploying sniffer dogs. But this is exacerbating the tensions in the region, where the presence of the French police is already very consequential. And all this has not stopped people from <a href="http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/eritrean-migrant-killed-by-british-driver-motorway-near-calais-jungle-1585711">attempting to cross</a> into the UK via the Channel Tunnel in recent months, despite a statement to the <a href="http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Le-ministre/Interventions-du-ministre/Situation-migratoire-a-Calais">contrary in early September</a> by the French minister of the interior, Bernand Cazeneuve. </p>
<p>This ministerial artifice is also playing out through the process of moving migrants to special centres, known as <em>centres d’accueil et d’orienation</em> (CAO), spread across France. A year ago, the French government promised that it would not apply the EU’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-how-european-states-shift-responsibility-for-asylum-claims-45743">Dublin regulations</a> to the Calais migrants, meaning it said it would not expel them back to the first European country they arrived in to submit their claim for asylum. This promise was made to persuade people to start leaving the camp and to claim asylum in France – but it has not been respected and associations close to the CAO have reported a number of examples of people who have been deported or threatened with it. </p>
<p>And despite a <a href="http://www.lacimade.org/a-norrent-fontes-pas-de-calais-mettre-a-labri-les-refugies-est-un-delit/">promise in October 2015</a> from the French prime minister, Manuel Valls, that those who provide support to the refugees would not be arrested and criminalised, this has continued. Volunteers have also been regularly subject to reprisals – they have been searched, questioned, arrested, and faced courts summons. This is despite the fact that since the early 1990s, the majority of the food supplies and legal support for migrants living in and around Calais has been provided by these volunteers. The activists from the No Borders movement – among others – are regularly targeted by the authorities, despite the fact that their work defending human rights <a href="http://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/decisions/ddd/DDD_DEC_MDS-2011-113.pdf">has been recognised</a> in France and internationally. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.migreurop.org/article2521.html">Two years ago</a> a number of organisations wrote a letter to Valls and Cazeneuve, reminding them that the French government lacks courage by refusing to take into account what the refugees and those associations <a href="http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article1205">offering alternative solutions</a> are saying about the situation. These <a href="http://cfda.rezo.net/download/The%20law%20of%20Jungles%20recommendations%2009%2008.pdf">include reform</a> of the EU refugee rules, better information for migrants upon arrival, and the provision of better state support for migrants and refugees living on the streets. </p>
<p>Misinformation is to democracy what propaganda agencies are to totalitarian states. In the face of these government manipulations, the rupture between those volunteer organisations who have a good understanding of the migrant situation in Calais and the government has never been so serious.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67352/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Heaven Crawley receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). She is currently serving as a Trustee of Migrant Voice. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olivier Clochard is a member of the Migreurop network. </span></em></p>
As the camp for migrants and refugees outside Calais is dismantled, two academics from either side of the Channel look at what will happen next.
Heaven Crawley, Research Professor, Coventry University
Olivier Clochard, Chargé de recherches à Migrinter (CNRS), Université de Poitiers
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/66623
2016-10-14T09:33:02Z
2016-10-14T09:33:02Z
The ability to enforce mandatory migrant quotas is slipping out of the EU’s grasp
<p>Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban seems to have mastered the art of creating controversy. On October 2, Hungarians voted in a referendum on the European Union’s planned relocation of refugees around the bloc, a move described in Brussels as a way to offer solidarity in the wake of an unprecedented number of people reaching Europe by sea.</p>
<p>While not enough people voted in the referendum <a href="https://theconversation.com/hungarys-invalid-refugee-referendum-dents-viktor-orbans-anti-eu-revolution-66424">for the result to be valid</a>, 98% of those who did supported the rejection of the quotas, representing a significant moral win for Orban’s “cultural counter-revolution”. At the same time, the referendum showed that the migration issue is merely a tool in a much wider battle about the future of where power lies between Brussels and EU member states.</p>
<p>There’s no doubt that the migration crisis has had a visible impact on Hungary. At the height of the crisis in summer 2015, some 10,000 refugees and migrants traversed Hungary daily, sleeping en masse at Budapest’s Kelety train station as they waited for transport to Western Europe. Day and night, streams of people seeking a new life in Europe passed through homogenous towns and villages of Western Hungary. Since then, however, the Western Balkans route and Hungary’s southern border with Serbia (where the majority of the crossings took place) have <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-hidden-costs-of-closed-borders-for-migrants-stuck-in-serbia-65591">been sealed</a>. Only a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36786438">handful of asylum seekers</a> are processed every day despite a capacity to process around 100 applications. </p>
<p>The EU’s controversial deal with Turkey on a “refugee swap” has now also come into effect, leading to <a href="http://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-2016-191134-deaths-1370">both a significant drop</a> in crossings across the Aegean Sea, and the number of lives lost at sea. The average number of daily crossings since the deal came into effect on March 18 fell from <a href="http://www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/6500/eu-gains-time-to-reach-agreement-on-visa-liberalisation-with-turkey-while-anti-terrorism-law-continues-to-be-applied-against-turkish-journalists">1,740 to 94 by mid-September</a>. </p>
<p>But despite the question Orban put to Hungarians in the referendum, there are two reasons why it was irrelevant to the migration debate. First, the EU’s relocation scheme has so far been very slow, and shows no short or medium-term capacity for expanding. At the moment there are <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160713/fifth_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_-_annex_1_en.pdf">more than 63,000 refugees waiting for relocation</a> from Greece alone, with an additional 100,000 people awaiting relocation. Under the quota scheme Hungary was obliged to take 1,294 asylum seekers, which is actually slightly lower <a href="http://www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/6500/eu-gains-time-to-reach-agreement-on-visa-liberalisation-with-turkey-while-anti-terrorism-law-continues-to-be-applied-against-turkish-journalists">than the 1,583</a> the EU had managed to relocate across the EU under the EU-Turkey deal by mid-September. Safe to say, at the current rate, it would take years for Hungary to receive all 1,294 refugees.</p>
<p>Second, the debate in Brussels and across Europe’s capitals has already moved beyond mandatory quotas. The European Commission has actually shown surprising willingness to negotiate on the issue. </p>
<p>From conversations I’ve had in Brussels, it appears the commission has been silently dropping the “mandatory” aspect of the relocation quotas, while proposing more flexible forms of solidarity between the member states, including providing financial support for the maintenance of refugees in other EU states or lowering the quota numbers. Even the commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/news/president-juncker-state-union-address-2016_en">recently stated</a> that solidarity must be given voluntarily, rather than being uniformly imposed from Brussels. To this end, in the wake of the referendum, the commission has tried to “appease” Hungary, <a href="http://www.eif.org/what_we_do/guarantees/news/2016/efsi_cosme_avhga.htm">increasing</a> European Investment Fund support for small Hungarian rural firms by €160m. </p>
<h2>Poland and Hungary on their own</h2>
<p>But petty cash is hardly sufficient for Orban, nor is he willing to negotiate. Formerly a staunch liberal, he has become a crusader for a new form of Europe based on, in his own words, a “system of national cooperation” – in contrast to a more federalist view of Europe. Orban positions himself as a defender of Christendom, protecting its borders against foreign invaders, much as the Hungarian kings of the 16th and 17th century did against the Ottomans. </p>
<p>It is a mythical image, but one that also has the ears of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the grey cardinal of Polish politics who is chairman of its ruling Law and Justice party. In the eyes of both men, Europe’s Brussels-centric liberal era is over, and it’s time gravity was shifted back to European capitals. This conveniently ignores the fact that in Brussels it is essentially the member states that ultimately call the shots, not the supranational European Commission.</p>
<p>Orban’s and Kaczynski’s “cultural counter-revolution” is more defined by what it stands against, than what it stands for. Ultimately, it is battling against two Bs: Brussels and Berlin. Falsely or not, in their eyes, Brussels represents “an ever closer union” that may one day lead to a federal EU that will eat away the sovereignty of its member states. Berlin, on the other hand, means Merkel to Orban (his staunch critic and one blamed for the migration crisis) and Germany to Kaczynski – Poland’s old nemesis whose tremendous economic power he ultimately fears. So Merkel’s open-door policy on refugees and calls for solidarity and burden-sharing among member states merely made the mandatory quotas a perfect target for these two reactionaries.</p>
<h2>Visegrad grumbles</h2>
<p>Such world views do not sit comfortably with the other two members of the Visegrad Group: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. While all four countries voted against the mandatory quotas in the Council of Ministers, and both Prague and Bratislava criticised the proposals, they trod a much more careful line. For example, while the Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, was very quick to <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/robert-fico-islam-no-place-news-slovakia-muslim-refugee/">tell a domestic audience</a> that Slovakia was no place for Muslims, the country is silently implementing voluntary relocation for refugees. Given that the current Slovak EU presidency sought European <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160701IPR34486/slovak-presidency-debate-eu-must-unite-to-regain-trust-and-fight-nationalism">unity of action</a> as one of its top priorities, the Hungarian referendum is merely an additional headache rather than an opportunity.</p>
<p>This means that while Hungary’s referendum may have a wider <em>raison d’etre</em>, it does nevertheless also have more indirect consequences. By holding the referendum, Orban narrowed the parameters for dialogue on possible alternatives for how to relocate refugees. The referendum will merely add further divisions to an already fractured EU.</p>
<p>So in terms of providing an instrument for Orban’s counter-revolution, the referendum has succeeded. Rather than a humiliating defeat, it ensures that the spectre of Orban will haunt Europe for years to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66623/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Igor Merheim-Eyre does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
After the Hungarian referendum, a new spectre is haunting the EU: Victor Orban.
Igor Merheim-Eyre, Doctoral Researcher, University of Kent
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/66424
2016-10-03T12:00:14Z
2016-10-03T12:00:14Z
Hungary’s invalid refugee referendum dents Viktor Orbán’s anti-EU ‘revolution’
<p>Although 98% of Hungarians who voted in a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-referendum-idUSKCN1213Q3">referendum on October 2 rejected</a> a European Union plan for the country to accept a mandatory quota of refugees, the result is invalid as not enough people turned out to vote.</p>
<p>The primary purpose of the referendum was for Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz Party to show that Hungarians rejected an EU agreement through which the country is supposed to accept 1,294 refugees relocated from Greece and Italy. But Orbán also wanted to stoke a cultural and political counter-revolution throughout the European Union. </p>
<p>He proudly sees <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-28/orban-says-he-seeks-to-end-liberal-democracy-in-hungary">himself as a pioneer</a> of “illiberal democracy”, which he hopes will spread throughout the European continent and will subvert the liberal values of Brussels. Before the referendum, ruling-party politicians repeatedly emphasised how proud they were that Hungary was the first European country to fight back against what they perceive as an invasion of foreign hordes.</p>
<p>It is a constitutional condition in Hungary that 50% of citizens have to vote for a referendum to be valid. Although 45% of Hungarian citizens came to the polling booths, a high number of votes <a href="http://index.hu/belfold/2016/10/02/kvotareferendum_ervenytelen_szavazatok">spoiled by voters</a> – often in various original ways using doodles or by cutting the ballot paper <a href="https://twitter.com/LydsG/status/782635735203581952">into lewd shapes</a> – meant that only 39.4% of the Hungarian population cast valid votes in the referendum. Orbán had <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-cynical-thinking-behind-hungarys-bizarre-referendum-64403">asked Hungarians</a> a vague and wordy question which the Hungarian opposition <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/01/hungarian-referendum-slam-door-migrants-new-era-europe">complained was unconstitutional</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of parliament?</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Nasty campaign</h2>
<p>Over recent months, the Hungarian public has been subjected to an intensive, brutally <a href="http://www.politics.hu/20160722/democratic-coalition-condemns-govts-anti-migrant-referendum-billboards/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter">racist, anti-refugee campaign</a> disseminated by the media, much of it owned by <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/50488256-60af-11e6-ae3f-77baadeb1c93">Orbán’s allies</a>. During the campaign, the Hungarian government openly lied to the Hungarian public, asserting that due to culturally incompatible, criminal immigration, there are now dozens of “no-go zones” in Western Europe. The government then spent €16m <a href="https://twitter.com/LydsG/status/782624903556104192">on a booklet</a> with a map showing where these no-go zones allegedly were. The Hungarian foreign minister Peter Szijjarto was <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TA_hQ6XBRpE&feature=youtu.be">rightly chastised</a> by the BBC for propagating these lies. </p>
<p>In an attempt to achieve 50% participation in the referendum, Orbán <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/orban-ropes-hungarian-roma-into-anti-refugee-campaign/a-35944193?maca=en-Facebook-sharing">even courted</a> the Hungarian Romany population, an ethnic minority normally ostracised and discriminated against in Hungary. A number of Romany voices were heard in Orbán’s referendum propaganda campaign warning against refugees “who are raping young Hungarian girls in Budapest”. </p>
<p>The brutal anti-refugee government propaganda did have some effect and of those who voted in the referendum, 98% supported the government’s position. Despite the invalidity of the vote, Orbán’s government hailed the result as a great success, pointing out that a huge majority of those voters who did vote rejected the refugee quotas, “imposed on us from Brussels”. Fireworks in Hungarian national colours took place <a href="https://twitter.com/balintbardi/status/782670936453578752">over the Danube in Budapest</a>.</p>
<p>Orbán <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-referendum-idUSKCN1213Q3">celebrated</a> the fact that more voters rejected the refugee quotas in this referendum than voted yes in the 2003 referendum about Hungary’s accession to the EU. The Orbán government proclaimed: “We sent a message to Brussels! 98% No!” </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"782826966525280256"}"></div></p>
<p>The Hungarian prime minister now says he will change the country’s constitution to remove the necessity for 50% of the country’s voters to participate in a referendum for it to be valid. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/01/hungarian-referendum-slam-door-migrants-new-era-europe">commentators have pointed out</a>, much of the reason behind the referendum was to influence internal Hungarian politics. There are rising levels of xenophobia in most European countries, but Hungary seems to be the only European country spending large amounts of taxpayers’ money to officially disseminate hate speech against refugees. The result has been to deflect the attention of its citizens from many of the country’s unsolved internal political and economic problems. </p>
<h2>Lost ground</h2>
<p>It is well known that the post-communist member states of the EU, known as the Visegrád group, are <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1823495766&Country=Poland&topic=Politics_1">extremely hostile</a> to the EU’s planned imposition of refugee quotas. Through their rejection of the plans, it looked as though Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland would become a subversive group of nations within the EU, aiming to reduce the influence of Western European liberal values in the EU bloc.</p>
<p>The Czech Republic has a strongly xenophobic and highly popular president, Miloš Zeman, who has made shocking anti-refugee statements. On the same weekend as the Hungarian referendum, Zeman proposed that Muslim economic migrants to Europe should be deported to empty Greek islands or somewhere to Africa, in an interview which the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8bae2ec6-8725-11e6-bbbe-2a4dcea95797#ixzz4Lv5PxvmN">Financial Times rated</a> as more extreme than anything the Hungarian prime minister has said to date. Nevertheless, the Czech government of Bohuslav Sobotka (the prime minister) <a href="http://zpravy.idnes.cz/milos-zeman-rozhovor-financial-times-uprchlici-f5u-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A161002_111538_zahranicni_pku">immediately distanced itself from</a> Zeman saying that the president’s public statements are not consistent with Czech official policy. </p>
<p>Slovakia and the Czech Republic have already been quietly dissociating themselves from the more extreme regimes of Poland and Hungary. With the failed Hungarian referendum, it now looks as though Orbán’s illiberal revolution will not be as successful across Europe as he would wish.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jan Culik does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The prime minister has claimed victory in the referendum, despite the low turnout.
Jan Culik, Senior Lecturer in Czech Studies, University of Glasgow
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/65550
2016-09-20T02:03:04Z
2016-09-20T02:03:04Z
Perspectives on migrants distorted by politics of prejudice
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138359/original/image-20160920-11123-1gobwfi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One Nation senator Pauline Hanson wants a ban on further Muslim immigration to Australia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/Mick Tsikas</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Global migration is experiencing turbulent times.</p>
<p>There are 120 million immigrants living in OECD countries; Australia has one of the <a href="http://www.compareyourcountry.org/migration?cr=oecd&lg=en&page=2&visited=1">highest immigrant populations</a> (28.1% in 2014) of all OECD countries.</p>
<p>Launching the <a href="http://www.oecd.org/migration/international-migration-outlook-1999124x.htm">International Migration Outlook 2016</a> at the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Monday, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría <a href="http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/governments-must-address-anti-immigration-backlash.htm">was worried that</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Too many people in too many countries are losing faith in how we manage migration, and the refugee crisis has exacerbated this.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Gurría warned about “the rising tide of anti-immigration voices” and urged OECD governments to develop more effective migration and integration policies.</p>
<h2>A driver of political instability</h2>
<p>The aftershocks of the immigration issue are reverberating strongly through Europe. Brexit, in part a response to UK public opposition to immigrants, threatens both the UK’s economic prosperity and the viability of the European Union. </p>
<p>European OECD countries are experiencing a refugee crisis of record proportions due to the Syrian crisis. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/germany-on-course-to-accept-one-million-refugees-in-2015">Germany received</a> more than 1 million refugees in 2015. In relative terms, Sweden received the most refugees, the <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-03-17/too-generous-for-its-own-good-sweden-s-welcome-mat-in-tatters">equivalent of 1.6% of its population</a>.</p>
<p>These immigration shocks have led to the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/04/29/closed-borders-will-make-europe-collapse/">re-erecting of borders</a> that have been dormant for decades. This has serious political repercussions across Europe, where anti-immigrant, anti-refugee, right-wing parties are receiving increased support.</p>
<p>At the same time in the US – insulated from Europe’s refugee crisis – Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump promises to <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/pay-for-the-wall">build a wall</a> to stop Mexican immigration and to deport those already in the US illegally.</p>
<p>In Australia, One Nation senator Pauline Hanson <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-14/one-nation-senator-pauline-hanson-makes-first-speech-to-senate/7845150">wants a ban</a> on further Muslim immigration. Meanwhile, the government’s controversial policy of turning back asylum-seeker boats and depositing boat people – including children – into detention on Manus Island and Nauru continues to be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/turnbull-should-drive-a-regional-refugee-solution-65634">key political issue</a> on the national and international stage.</p>
<p>In the 12 months after the Abbott government said Australia would <a href="https://theconversation.com/heat-on-abbott-to-expand-overall-refugee-intake-in-syrian-response-47159">take in</a> 12,000 refugees from the conflict in the Middle East, only 3,532 <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-09/australian-settlement-of-refugees-too-slow-says-world-vision/7828156">have been resettled</a>. Canada settled 30,000 in four months. And yet many OECD nations now look to Australia as a model for migration and integration policies.</p>
<p>In some ways the controversy and turmoil associated with global migration are disproportionate to the fact that, as the International Migration Outlook report notes, new migrants moving to OECD countries represent less than 0.5% of their total population. Even in 2015 refugees were still a relatively small part of the estimated 4.8 million people who moved to OECD countries.</p>
<h2>Attitudes to immigration</h2>
<p>Clearly, public attitudes toward migration are a key driver of political instability and controversy across Europe and North America.</p>
<p>The most recent insights into attitudes to migration in Australia - the <a href="http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/australians-today/">2016 Scanlon Foundation report</a> – concluded:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>While the majority [of people] support current [immigration and multiculturalism] policy … the level of entrenched opposition … has grown, with a relatively high proportion (almost 20%) of the Australia-born considering that the least favourable aspect of life in Australia is the high level of immigration.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It is ironic that public opposition to immigration <a href="http://www.monash.edu/mapping-population/public-opinion/immigration-intake-fact-sheet">has been highest</a> when immigration intake levels were the lowest – and vice versa. </p>
<p>Public support for immigration in Australia has increased considerably as immigration levels have risen. When <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1516/Quick_Guides/MigrationStatistics#_Table_3:_Net">immigration intakes</a> in the early 1990s were the lowest since the post-war immigration program began (net overseas migration was 34,822 in 1993), between two-thirds and three-quarters of Australians surveyed in the years 1990 to 1995 reported that they thought immigration was “too high”. </p>
<p>Curiously, as immigration levels rose, so did public support. Net overseas migration peaked in 2008 at 315,700. While it subsequently fell to 177,100 in 2015, temporary migration has risen spectacularly to annual intakes of more than 700,000. This gives an annual migration intake today of just under 1 million people.</p>
<p>Yet, by 2015, 60% thought that immigration intake levels were “just right”. This is a doubling of support over the past two decades.</p>
<p>Public opposition to particular cohorts of immigrants is a different matter. In 1981 Macquarie University political scientist Murray Goot reported that 48% of Australians thought too many Asians were arriving in Australia.</p>
<p>Attitudes to immigrants from Vietnam and China have since softened dramatically, though attitudes to those from Iraq and Lebanon are <a href="http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/australians-today/">much more negative</a>. One <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/community-under-siege/only-one-in-10-of-us-fears-or-dreads-muslims/news-story/1f821c2f8ea983e6a51689effdd10910">recent study</a> found one in ten Australians are “highly Islamophobic” and have a fear or dread of Muslims.</p>
<p>It is from this well of anti-Muslim sentiment that Hanson and her equivalents in Europe and North America draw their politics of prejudice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65550/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jock Collins receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>
Public attitudes toward migration are a key driver of political instability and controversy across Europe and North America.
Jock Collins, Professor of Social Economics, UTS Business School, University of Technology Sydney
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/65591
2016-09-19T13:18:12Z
2016-09-19T13:18:12Z
The hidden costs of closed borders for migrants stuck in Serbia
<p>In Spring 2016, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/slovenia-croatia-close-borders-to-migrants-refugees-serbia-macedonia-eu-deal-turkey/">“closed” their borders</a> to migrants who had been transiting these countries via the “Balkan route” on their way further into the European Union. The closures follow other attempts at shutting EU borders: Hungary built a <a href="https://theconversation.com/fencing-off-the-east-how-the-refugee-crisis-is-dividing-the-european-union-47586">fence</a> along its border with Serbia, while the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-europes-refugee-deal-with-turkey-is-it-legal-and-can-it-work-56054">“EU-Turkey” deal</a> was intended to prevent people from reaching EU borders by sending those who had crossed the Mediterranean back to Turkey. </p>
<p>Despite the border closures, the Balkan route is still active – a problem recognised at an <a href="http://www.politico.eu/interactive/western-balkans-route-map-migration-refugees-crisis-europe-asylum/">EU leaders’ meeting in July</a>. Now those refugees not able to get any further are stuck in limbo. Non-governmental organisatons (NGOs) and the UNHCR estimate there are at least <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=502">200 arrivals per day</a> in Serbia, with around 5,000 people stuck <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=1926">in Serbia alone</a>. </p>
<p>Even though the number of people stuck in Serbia is comparatively small, our interviews throughout the summer of 2016 showed that a lack of resources and attention is precipitating a secondary humanitarian crisis: a growing refugee population is living in increasingly precarious conditions and is almost wholly reliant on smugglers to leave. The <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2016/7/5790d5e64/hundreds-suffer-hungary-serbia-border.html">UNHCR believes</a> that border closures divert problems and aggravate living conditions, while Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) told us they see a correlation between the closures and increased levels of violence against refugees – both by smugglers and border authorities. </p>
<h2>The situation in Serbia</h2>
<p>Serbia became a focal point of the refugee crisis in the summer of 2015, when an unprecedented number of new arrivals crossed into the country on their way to Western Europe via Hungary and Croatia. Typically, most people stayed in Serbia for only a few days before moving towards the EU. In contrast to measures employed by its neighbours, the Serbian government adopted an official policy stating that it would not erect fences and would respect international laws on human rights by <a href="http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/1952095/Vu%C4%8Di%C4%87%3A+Srbija+ne%C4%87e+podizati+zidove+prema+susedima.html?tts=yes">not restricting movement of people searching protection</a>. This changed dramatically a year later, and although Serbia has not completely sealed its own borders, policy has shifted from protecting rights to <a href="http://www.danas.rs/drustvo.55.html?news_id=327641&title=%20Vulin:%20Vreme%20je%20za%20drasti%C4%8Dnije%20mere%20protiv%20migranata">protecting borders</a>. </p>
<p>These attempts at sealing borders have been accompanied with a complex and fragmented regional regime of asylum registrations and so called “push backs”, where people crossing the border into Hungary, for instance, are intercepted and returned to Serbia. The official and “legal” way to cross into Hungary is via one of the waiting lists operated by local authorities. But one local NGO working with refugees in Serbia said the information about how these waiting lists operate is unclear and contradictory.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138243/original/image-20160919-11100-ipz41j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138243/original/image-20160919-11100-ipz41j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138243/original/image-20160919-11100-ipz41j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138243/original/image-20160919-11100-ipz41j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138243/original/image-20160919-11100-ipz41j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138243/original/image-20160919-11100-ipz41j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138243/original/image-20160919-11100-ipz41j.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In a Belgrade park, fenced off so migrants can’t camp there, people wait for free meals provided by a local NGO.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Only <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2016/7/5790d5e64/hundreds-suffer-hungary-serbia-border.html">30 people are admitted </a> into Hungary legally each day via two border points with Serbia, but the number of people arriving in Serbia each day far exceeds the number “allowed” to leave, so people are staying for longer periods of time (in some cases, several months). Refugees are also reporting to aid workers that they are facing increasing violence against them by Hungarian border police. <a href="http://www.migszol.com/blog/greetings-from-belgrade-from-the-other-side-of-the-fence">Similar reports</a> are also being collated by <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hungary-serbia-border-refugees-beatings-violence-human-rights-watch-1.3676608">activists</a> working with refugees in Belgrade. </p>
<p>Crossing borders into Hungary or Croatia now takes several attempts, both for people attempting to cross legally and illegally. The prices paid to smugglers have, according to our informants, increased dramatically: crossing the Serbia-Croatia border with a smuggler, we were told, now costs €1,500 per person. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-bulgaria-iraq-idUSKCN11J1DV">Deaths have also occurred</a> along the Bulgaria-Romania border, as refugees try to find alternative routes, following the “closure” of the Macedonian border. </p>
<h2>Pressures on resources</h2>
<p>The Serbian state is partly unwilling and partly unable to provide adequate support and welfare for the growing number of refugees. Politically, its policy has shifted away from supporting refugees towards controlling borders in an effort to appease voters who are no longer sympathetic to the refugees’ stay in the country. In practical terms, the state has a support system in place – a state-run <a href="http://www.kirs.gov.rs/articles/index.php?lang=ENG">Commissariat for Refugees and Asylum</a>, which oversees distribution of aid and runs “asylum reception centres”. But the infrastructure in place is not wholly adequate in meeting the actual needs of the refugees. </p>
<p><a href="http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=1926">UNHCR reports that 87% of refugees</a> are housed in official centres. But the need for shelter far outstrips supply, and homelessness – particularly among single men – is growing. The state-run “asylum reception centres” are located near Belgrade, the Hungarian-Serbian border, the Croatian-Serbian border and in Presevo, near the Macedonian border. Information on the centres is contradictory. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138246/original/image-20160919-11134-wjl3u3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/138246/original/image-20160919-11134-wjl3u3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138246/original/image-20160919-11134-wjl3u3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138246/original/image-20160919-11134-wjl3u3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138246/original/image-20160919-11134-wjl3u3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138246/original/image-20160919-11134-wjl3u3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/138246/original/image-20160919-11134-wjl3u3.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An informal camp near the Hungarian border, June 2 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marta Stojic Mitrovic</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The government claims that reception centres with a capacity for 2,000 people <a href="http://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/broj-migranata-u-srbiji-se-ne-povecava-i-dalje-ih-ima-oko-tri-hiljade/89yqsm3">are not full</a>. But during our visits to the centres between June and August 2016, it was clear that in at least four of them, people were being accommodated in tents pitched outside of the centres themselves, suggesting overcrowding. </p>
<p>It’s also possible that refugees are choosing not to go the official camps, as it is unclear to most people – including aid workers – whether refugees staying there would be allowed to leave Serbia later. Informal camps and settlements along the Hungarian border have also sprung up, and we saw families with small children living in these settlements. </p>
<h2>Pushed out of public places</h2>
<p>In places like Belgrade, people, mainly single men unable or unwilling to access official camps, are sleeping rough in parks and squats. Ever since the crisis unfolded, public parks have been important hubs for sharing information about the route, and establishing contacts with other refugees and activists. Parks have free public wifi, free meals distributed by the NGO Refugee Aid Serbia, and various activists – some who speak Arabic and Farsi – who help refugees access information, answer questions and provide free tea. </p>
<p>This summer, the local authorities started to clear the city of refugees by discouraging people from sleeping in the two centrally located parks – the Luka Celovic Park and Bristol Park – both located near the central bus station, via which many refugees arrived into Belgrade. In July 2016, all the grass in the central parks populated by refugees was dug up, and the parks fenced off, which precipitated <a href="http://www.b92.net/eng/news/society.php?yyyy=2016&mm=07&dd=29&nav_id=98765">a hunger strike by them</a>. </p>
<p>For a while, people sleeping rough in the park relocated to decrepit buildings in a nearby derelict storage yard, living in a squat with no facilities, except for a single hosepipe. But on September 16 2016, local authorities evicted refugees as some of the buildings were <a href="http://www.blic.rs/vesti/beograd/nova-drama-u-savamali-migranti-koce-izgradnju-beograda-na-vodi/tpx7hb9">being demolished</a> to make way for a controversial development scheme, Belgrade Waterfront. </p>
<p>Refugees living in squats and parks rely on food donations by Refugee Aid Serbia for survival, and wait for a chance to cross the borders. Longer stays mean that many are running out of money and must either wait for money to arrive from family abroad, or seek increasingly desperate means of procuring it. </p>
<p>The fencing off of the parks has led to vocal protests by activists who see this as an attempt to break up the refugee communities, push them to the margins of the city and disable them from contacting smugglers, who use the parks as places to establish contact with refugees.</p>
<p>The support networks to help refugees are continually under threat: all NGOs must register with the commissariat in order to operate, but the official policy towards them is becoming increasingly hostile. Volunteers are also starting to report police harassment of activists aiding refugees in the park, particularly those not officially affiliated to NGOs. </p>
<h2>Local tensions</h2>
<p>Another perceptible change has been the shift in public mood. While outright xenophobic attacks against refugees are rare in Serbia, there have been some local anti-refugee protests.</p>
<p>In the border town of Sid, residents are petitioning for the <a href="http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/vojvodina/sid-peticija-za-izmestanje-prihvatnih-centara_752274.html">removal of the refugee camp</a>, and in Belgrade, a group of residents carried out a <a href="http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/beograd.74.html:620931-Protest-zitelja-Savamale-zbog-bahatosti-migranata-Napali-su-devojcicu-decu-necemo-slati-u-skolu">daily protest</a> throughout August 2016 against refugees living in the park. This marks a drastic departure from a broadly sympathetic public attitude in 2015 and the emergence of solidarity networks. The change in mood can partly be attributed to the population’s own economic woes, mass unemployment and generally poor welfare provision, and the feeling that refugees have now overstayed their welcome. </p>
<p>Our interviews this summer show how the border closures around transit countries come with hidden costs. Politicians are able to claim that specific routes are “closed”, so giving the impression that all problems pertaining to these routes have been dealt with. In reality, border closures simply mean that attention is diverted from the increasingly precarious living conditions in which refugees stuck in transit zones find themselves. The EU border closures have left a significant population reliant on volunteers, donations, aid organisations and smugglers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65591/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Blocked from crossing borders further into Europe, migrants are turning to smugglers.
Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations & Deputy Director Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University
Mаrtа Stojić Mitrović, Researcher, Ethnography Institute, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/65439
2016-09-19T11:41:39Z
2016-09-19T11:41:39Z
Heading for a fall? With summer over, Europe must face up to its mounting crises
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/137930/original/image-20160915-30587-z9opnf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C8%2C2811%2C1656&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Clouds are gathering.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/patrickmuller/4125496170/in/photolist-7hyfhj-bftn7K-bftozc-bftnVi-bftnmv-bftoiP-bftmbM-bftk1F-bftmAz-bftiNr-7hyfLd-73f2Fs-aC2Zd6-dZhXDq-bftoZx-bftj24-5WM517-bftpeP-qRyckW-6hyFg-r97UKz-7hyfDm-7UVyCP-bftr64-nk4Dsz-r97UJc-5E3BsU-91CGkF-7Njp9W-r8Y1fB-26MQu-9Bjzti-7UVznn-bftnJv-7NjoZQ-aDd9ge-dRvspN-91FNnb-7NfqRX-dRpPDK-3pCy18-guRyXa-dRpQUP-bftmmH-7UYNpm-bfto7k-91FNPL-7NfqWx-fbRb1s-dRvv4f">Patrick Müller</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Europe is about to experience a hectic start to the political season. It has more problems on its hands than at any time in recent memory.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/eurozone-crisis-11464">eurozone crisis</a> created difficulties in 2009-2013, but they came in waves. Autumn 2016 brings three major challenges that all need attention at the same time. The aftermath of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/eu-referendum-2016">Brexit</a> vote, the migration crisis and discontent among some of the remaining EU member states are all problems that threaten to destabilise the union. </p>
<p>Add to these the prospect of a rudderless Spain, where various attempts to form a government over eight months have failed, and the coming presidential elections in France, where <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/marine-le-pen-2938">Marine Le Pen</a>, leader of the far-right National Front, leads in many polls.</p>
<p>This is certain to be, at best, a difficult few months for the EU. At worst it could be the start of splintered Europe, with a number of new member states calling for a total re-think of the responsibilities of EU institutions.</p>
<h2>Head in the sand</h2>
<p>Europe has, so far, done a very bad job of dealing with Britain’s vote to leave. At first, Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, insisted Brexit negotiations should <a href="http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/07/jean-claude-juncker-comes-fighting-brexit/">begin immediately</a>. He was snubbed by the British and unceremoniously told to pipe down by other EU member states. One senior EU official said Juncker “wanted Britain to leave the parking lot before setting the navigation system”.</p>
<p>The European Council was charged with handling the politics and public relations of the separation. Just when things returned to normal, Michel Barnier, who barely speaks English and is known for <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brexit-negotiator-michel-barnier-eu-referendum-result-leave-europe-european-commission-a7158301.html">unfriendly relations</a> with the City of London, was appointed chief Brexit negotiator.</p>
<p>We know by now that Brexit is going to be a drawn-out affair and that many people in the EU want as amicable a divorce as possible, which leaves lots of options on the table. What we don’t know, however, is how important Barnier will be or whether the process will ultimately be handled by Germany, just as many of the eurozone crisis decisions were.</p>
<p>Most of all, we don’t know what the new British government has in mind as a successful outcome. It is clear, however, that utmost care is needed – something that European institutions have yet to show.</p>
<h2>Neighbourhood watch</h2>
<p>The second thorny challenge is migration. Turkey is the EU’s most important partner in dealing with this problem but its behaviour has been erratic of late. The Turkish government <a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-europes-refugee-deal-with-turkey-is-it-legal-and-can-it-work-56054">agreed in May</a> to help stem the immigration flow in return for visa-free travel for its citizens. But the recent failed coup has thrown the deal into turmoil.</p>
<p>President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has imprisoned tens of thousands of alleged <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/turkey-coup-29363">coup plotters</a> in recent weeks. With the flagrant violations of human rights going on in Turkey, visa-free travel hardly seems feasible any more. And Turkey does not seem to be the safe destination for refugees it once was.</p>
<p>That said, Turkey is currently sheltering around twice as many refugees as the number who entered Europe in 2015. Erdoğan could, if he wanted, toy with European leaders by opening the border temporarily to ramp up the stakes. He <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/turkish-president-threatens-to-send-millions-of-syrian-refugees-to-eu">already threatened as much</a> in February, before the coup. If he sees through on the threat, it’s not clear how Europe would respond.</p>
<p>Eastern European heads of state have already called for a <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-wants-an-eu-military-force/">joint European army</a> and border police – and Berlin and Brussels were quick to respond. In his September <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm">State of the Union Address</a> Juncker appeared to acquiesce to the demand.</p>
<h2>Reputation management</h2>
<p>The third challenge is to restore the European Commission’s reputation after its poor handling of both Brexit and migration.</p>
<p>There are increasingly vocal complaints coming from Eastern Europe about the failure of Brussels to manage crises and calls for Juncker to <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/eus-juncker-under-pressure-to-resign-after-brexit-vote/">resign</a>. Several countries, mostly from Central Europe, <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/07/13/hungarys-orban-urges-remaining-eu-members-claw-back-powers-brussels/">have asked</a> for powers to be shifted away from Juncker’s commission and handed to the European Council of national leaders. </p>
<p>It looks like Juncker will survive this storm but that his status will be weakened by it. The fact that <a href="http://qz.com/763022/angela-merkels-post-brexit-european-tour-mapped/">Merkel</a>, and not he, was meeting with heads of state to discuss Brexit and immigration shows how little the political elite trusts him.</p>
<p>Beyond his own failings, however, lie the apparent weaknesses in the Commission itself. It was slow to deal with the eurozone crisis, with the result of prolonged economic recession in Greece and high youth unemployment in most of southern Europe. The main lessons from this poor performance have not been learnt and the weakenesses continue to manifest themselves.</p>
<p>To recover from its current crises, the EU needs to take action. That means listening to Eastern Europe about protecting its external borders and investing more money in joint border control and in dealing with the root causes of the refugee flow.</p>
<p>And when it comes to Brexit negotiations, the task must be entrusted to politicians who truly believe in an amicable solution and are not after revenge. Finally, to re-energise and regain the trust of member states, the European Commission has to make real progress on important projects, such as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-european-banking-union-as-a-matter-of-equality-15495">banking union</a>, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en">energy union</a> and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/europes-digital-single-market-needs-to-foster-tech-startups-and-a-global-view-41589">single digital market</a>.</p>
<p>More than just tinkering is needed if the union is to survive the difficult months ahead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/65439/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simeon Djankov is affiliated with the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington DC. </span></em></p>
The European Union has faced crises before but not this many at the same time.
Simeon Djankov, Executive Director of the Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/64985
2016-09-07T07:13:41Z
2016-09-07T07:13:41Z
Any detention of migrant children is a violation of their rights and must end
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136801/original/image-20160906-25249-xrauon.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Unicef</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Children represent around a quarter of all migrants worldwide. While in June 2015, one in ten migrants reaching the Macedonian border from Greece was a child, in October 2015 <a href="http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/IOM-UNICEF-Data-Brief-Refugee-and-Migrant-Crisis-in-Europe-30.11.15.pdf">it was one in three</a>. </p>
<p>Without regular status and the protection that comes with it, children on the move are <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-to-help-refugee-children-get-through-the-trauma-of-whats-happened-to-them-64335">particularly vulnerable</a> to exploitation, violence and abuse. The unknown social and cultural environment, as well as their age and level of development, often make it impossible for them to be aware of and assert their rights.</p>
<p>Rather than opening regular, safe and cheap channels for migration, states continue to erect walls, use barbed wire fences and systemically detain migrants, including children. For too many children, their experience is all too often linked to their status as immigrants, rather than their age. While there is <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CMW/Discussions/2013/DGDMigrationData_PICUM_2013.pdf">little reliable data</a> on how many migrant children are being detained, there is evidence that <a href="http://www.unicef.org/protection/Administrative_detention_discussion_paper_April2011.pdf">it is happening</a> around the world.</p>
<h2>Detention is rarely justified</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a> as well as the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx">International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</a> proclaim the right to the liberty and security of persons. This applies to everyone subject to the jurisdiction of a state and to all forms of detention, including for immigration purposes. </p>
<p>States use a wide range of reasons to justify detention of migrants: health and security screening, identity checks, preventing absconding and facilitating removal. But freedom should be the default position for these migrants, as it is for citizens and legal residents. Detention should only occur when a person represents a demonstrated individualised risk to public security or may abscond from mandatory proceedings. In most cases, such a risk cannot be individually demonstrated and detention cannot be justified as necessary, reasonable or proportionate.</p>
<p>Children are also entitled to the protection afforded to them by the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx">Convention on the Rights of the Child</a> (CRC), which is the most ratified UN human rights treaty, lacking only one ratification in the whole of UN membership – the United States. The CRC proclaims that “no child shall be deprived of his liberty arbitrarily” and asserts that all institutions should ensure that “the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136803/original/image-20160906-25260-164z9s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/136803/original/image-20160906-25260-164z9s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136803/original/image-20160906-25260-164z9s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136803/original/image-20160906-25260-164z9s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136803/original/image-20160906-25260-164z9s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136803/original/image-20160906-25260-164z9s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/136803/original/image-20160906-25260-164z9s6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A quarter of today’s migrants are children.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Unicef</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Detention for administrative purposes can never ever be in the best interests of a child. It harms their physical and psychological well-being and has adverse effects on their development. It might aggravate trauma experienced before arriving in the transit or destination country. The constant control and surveillance may be very disturbing for a child, increasing already high levels of mental distress. Children deprived of their liberty often have difficulties understanding why they are being “punished” despite having committed no crime.</p>
<p>Separation from community and from the outside world can make a child feel isolated and decrease their confidence. The often <a href="http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/46/Add.2">poor hygienic conditions</a> and unbalanced diet will have <a href="http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/23/46/Add.4">negative consequences</a> on physical well-being and development. Often children and adults are detained together, which puts children at further risk. Housing migrant children and adults in the same detention structure <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/aug/10/the-nauru-files-2000-leaked-reports-reveal-scale-of-abuse-of-children-in-australian-offshore-detention">can lead to</a> physical and sexual violence and abuse, while disrespectful staff may further exacerbate a child’s feelings of humiliation and so further impact their development.</p>
<h2>How to protect lone children</h2>
<p>Children can make migratory journeys on their own, sometimes having been separated from their parents or other adult relatives en route. These unaccompanied minors or separated children are vulnerable to becoming victims of human rights violations, such as sexual and economic exploitation and trafficking, and their situation requires special attention.</p>
<p>Unaccompanied children should never be detained purely on the basis of their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof, <a href="http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/GC6.pdf">nor should they be criminalised</a> solely for reasons of irregular entry or presence in the country. They should be treated as children first and placed in the alternative care system, either with a family or under institutional care. Under no circumstances should they be left on their own, as this leaves them vulnerable to violence.</p>
<p>States should systematically appoint an independent and competent guardian as soon as the unaccompanied or separated child is identified, and maintain such guardianship arrangements until the child has either reached the age of majority or has permanently left the jurisdiction of the state. The guardian must not only take care of administrative processes related to the immigration status, but ensure that he or she advocates for the child’s rights and best interests. </p>
<p>The guardian should be independent of the immigration authorities and should have the authority and means to appoint a lawyer to represent the child in all proceedings affecting their rights. States should undertake every effort to quickly reunite children with other family members, if considered in their best interests, taking into account their own opinion and how they see their future.</p>
<h2>Provide alternatives</h2>
<p>The detention of children with their parents is often justified by states using Article 9 of the CRC, which affirms that children shall not be separated from their parents against their will. Yet, Article 2 of the CRC provides that “children [shall] not to be punished for the acts of their parents, legal guardians or family members”. Absurdly, I have personally observed families detained in the same detention centre, but separated in three groups (women, girls and infants, male teenagers, adult males), with only one daily hour of common family time.</p>
<p>A decision to detain migrants who are accompanied by their children should therefore only be taken in very exceptional circumstances: the vast majority of families with children should be offered alternatives to detention. Such non-custodial measures may include registration or reporting requirements, deposit of documents, a reasonable bond or a guarantor, and supervised release.</p>
<p>When applying alternatives to detention, states need to make sure they respect children’s rights, including to education, to the enjoyment of the highest possible standard of health, to an adequate standard of living, to rest, leisure and play, to practice their own religion and to use their own language.</p>
<p>Detaining children because they or their parents are migrants can never be in their best interests. Irregular migration is not a crime and very few of those children present any danger to society. Children should be treated as children first and non-custodial alternatives to detention should be offered to all such unaccompanied children and to families with children.</p>
<p><em>A longer version of this article was co-published with Unicef as part of the <a href="https://www.unicef-irc.org/research-watch/Children%20on%20the%20move/">Children on the Move</a> research watch project.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64985/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>François Crépeau is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, U.N. Human Rights Council (2011-2017) and the Oppenheimer Professor of Public International Law at McGill University. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He is a Member of the Advisory Board of the International Migration Initiative of the Open Society Foundations. He is an Honorary Board Member, Equitas – International Centre for Human Rights Education, Montreal.</span></em></p>
States need to think of alternatives instead of locking up children on the move.
François Crépeau, Full Professor Director, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism; Hans & Tamar Oppenheimer Chair in Public International Law, McGill University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/64769
2016-09-02T12:01:18Z
2016-09-02T12:01:18Z
What next for British border controls in Calais?
<p>During the EU referendum campaign, David Cameron <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/12145781/David-Cameron-warns-of-migrant-camps-in-southern-England-if-Brexit-vote.html">suggested</a> that Britain’s border control in France might not survive Brexit. Now, with an upturn in the number of irregular migrants in the Calais area, there is growing impatience in France at the situation there. </p>
<p>This summer, two leading presidential candidates within the centre-right Republicans party in France – <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-freedom-of-movement-eu-referendum-uk-france-border-french-presidential-election-alain-juppe-a7118511.html">Alain Juppé</a>, and <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nicolas-sarkozy-calais-jungle-camp-refugee-crisis-move-to-uk-french-presidential-election-a7214156.html">Nicolas Sarkozy</a> – have argued that immigration control should return to British territory.</p>
<p>An alternative centre-right proposal, put forward by the current president of the Hauts-de-France region which covers Calais, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37211267">Xavier Bertrand</a>, suggests the current arrangements should be reformed. His idea is that UK border control could remain in France, but there would be one or more processing centres, or “hotspots”, in France, where claims could be lodged with the UK authorities.</p>
<h2>The Le Touquet treaty</h2>
<p>These recent statements all concern the <a href="http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http:/fco.gov.uk/files/kfile/cm6172.pdf">Le Touquet Treaty</a>, agreed by France and the UK in February 2003. The Le Touquet Treaty drew upon the precedent of the pre-departure control zone arrangements for the Channel Tunnel. It provides for each state to operate immigration control zone in the channel ports of the other and currently provides the basis for British controls in Calais and Dunkerque, and French controls in Dover. </p>
<p>In practice, the British authorities have the primary interest in this arrangement, as it enables them to block irregular migration from the continent. If a person is refused entry to the UK, or is found seeking to enter Britain clandestinely, they are handed over to the French authorities, to be processed under French law. The treaty also specifically provides that asylum claims are the responsibility of the state of departure, not the state running the control zone – so France is responsible for all asylum claims made in Calais, even to UK officials.</p>
<p>The story of the Le Touquet Treaty starts with the development of Europe’s Schengen border-free zone between 1995 and 2000. Its emergence made it far easier for migrants wishing to claim asylum in Britain, or to enter it in an irregular manner, to reach the French side of the channel. The first significant group of such arrivals to the Calais region came from Kosovo in 1998-1999, and were soon followed by others from Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.</p>
<p>The initial response of the French authorities to the humanitarian problems presented by these migrants was to authorise a Red Cross accommodation centre at Sangatte in 1999. The existence of that centre became politically controversial, however, as numbers increased, and after attempts by migrants to board freight trains bound for the nearby Channel Tunnel.</p>
<p>In 2002, after the centre-right came to power in France, with Nicolas Sarkozy appointed as interior minister, the British and French governments agreed a strategy of actively discouraging arrivals to the Calais region. The Sangatte centre was closed and British immigration controls were put in place in Calais, under the Le Touquet Treaty.</p>
<h2>New problems</h2>
<p>The 2002 deal succeeded in reducing the scale of irregular migration to the Calais region for many years. But the downside was that the lack of assistance for migrants led them to sleep rough, which over time led to the emergence of large tent cities in Calais and nearby.</p>
<p>The number of such migrants in Calais have grown markedly over the past three summers, from 1,000 in Spring 2014 to an estimated <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/29/calais-a-no-go-zone-for-police-as-population-reaches-10000/">10,000 in August 2016</a>. It appears that the largest groups among today’s migrants are from Afghanistan and Sudan. </p>
<p>The current situation is <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-this-really-europe-refugees-in-calais-speak-of-desperate-conditions-45414">dire in humanitarian terms</a>: there is inadequate shelter, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/02/calais-refugee-camp-running-out-of-food-as-donor-fatigue-sees-donations-dry-up">food</a> and hygiene, and there are many risks to personal safety. It also poses significant problems from the perspective of immigration control, with ongoing attempts by migrants to conceal themselves on board UK-bound HGVs and other vehicles.</p>
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<h2>Ending the status quo</h2>
<p>Over the past two summers, the two governments have reaffirmed an approach based on deterrence. After incidents at the Channel Tunnel in the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-ukfrench-ministerial-declaration-on-calais">summer of 2015</a>, the response of both governments was to agree that the UK would provide funding for enhanced security. After a meeting on August 30 between the French interior minister Bernard Cazeneuve and Britain’s new home secretary, Amber Rudd, a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-by-the-governments-of-france-and-the-united-kingdom">joint statement</a> reaffirmed the goal of “working together to strengthen the security of our shared border.” </p>
<p>Consistently with that logic, parts of the “Jungle” camp in Calais were demolished earlier this year. Now, Cazeneuve <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/02/france-vows-to-dismantle-jungle-refugee-camp-calais">has vowed</a> to dismantle the rest of the camp, and to provide the migrants there with accommodation elsewhere in France. </p>
<p>But the recent political interventions from the centre-right are a sign that the ongoing situation may prompt a rethink by France, especially if the Republicans take the presidency and control of the French parliament in 2017 elections. So it is significant that <a href="http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http:/fco.gov.uk/files/kfile/cm6172.pdf">Article 25 of the Le Touquet Treaty</a> permits either state to terminate the agreement by giving two years’ notice. Faced with this possibility, the British government may yet find it attractive to adopt a more flexible approach towards the migrants in Calais, in order to preserve the principle of control at French ports.</p>
<p>There are some precedents for admission of migrants from the Calais region to Britain. In 2002, as part of the Sangatte closure, Britain agreed to take 1,200 Iraqi Kurds and Afghan nationals. More recently – under pressure in the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/02/uk-home-office-wins-appeal-against-ruling-four-syrian-refugees-calais-camp">courts</a>, in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/04/david-cameron-concessions-syrian-child-refugees">parliament</a> and from <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37249847">campaign groups</a> – Britain has begun to co-operate closely with the French asylum authorities, to assist children and others who have a right to apply for asylum in the UK as family members. </p>
<p>Any move by Britain to accept more migrants from Calais would be compatible with the <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-04-25/debates/16042535000002/ImmigrationBill#contribution-16042535000083">logic of co-operation</a> with France. But such a step would undoubtedly face the criticism that any act of generosity is a pull-factor for more migrants and asylum seekers. </p>
<p>One way forward might be to adopt a version of Xavier Bertrand’s “hotspot” idea, focusing on greater access to Britain for those recognised as refugees. This would not only be a significant humanitarian step, it would also show Britain’s willingness to help resolve a crisis for which it unavoidably shares responsibility.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64769/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bernard Ryan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Calls to amend the Le Touquet treaty between Britain and France are growing louder.
Bernard Ryan, Professor of Migration Law, University of Leicester
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