tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/pacific-island-states-54349/articlesPacific island states – The Conversation2023-12-07T11:32:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2193992023-12-07T11:32:49Z2023-12-07T11:32:49ZHelping the Pacific financially is a great start – but Australia must act on the root cause of the climate crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564147/original/file-20231207-27-ums72m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=29%2C49%2C3216%2C2144&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Fiji was flooded by a severe cyclone in 2016.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/indigenous-fijian-girl-walking-on-flooded-561184597">ChameleonsEye/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The federal government has announced an extra <a href="https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/media-releases/joint-media-release-supporting-pacific-family-cop28-respond-climate-change">A$150 million for climate finance</a> – including $100 million for the Pacific to help protect its people, housing and infrastructure from the escalating impacts of global warming. </p>
<p>It comes as Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen lands in Dubai for international negotiations at the <a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/">28th United Nations climate summit</a>. At the end of the hottest year on record, these talks focus on accelerating climate action in line with the Paris Agreement. </p>
<p>While new funding is undoubtedly important and can go a long way to supporting community-led resilience-building efforts in the region, Australia will be under growing pressure to do more.</p>
<p>A growing number of countries, including the European Union and Pacific island nations, want to see global agreement at COP28 for a managed phase-out of fossil fuels.</p>
<p>Many observers are sceptical that COP28 can deliver consensus on shifting away from coal, oil and gas, because host nation the United Arab Emirates is a major oil exporter. This is a problem Australia also faces – having volunteered to host UN climate talks in 2026, in partnership with Pacific island countries. Today, Australia exports almost <a href="https://productiongap.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/PGR2023_web_rev.pdf">three times as much fossil fuels</a> as the UAE. Dozens of new coal and gas projects are lining up for approval. </p>
<p>Today’s announcement must not be a substitute for addressing the root causes of the climate crisis. Australia must stop approving new coal, oil and gas projects. And we must back agreement at COP28 for the phase-out of fossil fuels.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/after-decades-putting-the-brakes-on-global-action-does-australia-deserve-to-host-un-climate-talks-with-pacific-nations-194055">After decades putting the brakes on global action, does Australia deserve to host UN climate talks with Pacific nations?</a>
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<h2>What’s in today’s announcement?</h2>
<p>Australia will kickstart the Pacific’s first resilience financing facility with $100 million, and rejoin the Green Climate Fund with a $50 million contribution. As the government says in today’s joint statement: </p>
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<p>Climate change is the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of climate vulnerable countries and regions, including the peoples of the Pacific.</p>
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<p>Sea-level rise, stronger cyclones, marine heatwaves and increasingly acidic oceans pose existential threats to many Pacific islands. Low-lying atoll nations such as Kiribati and Tuvalu are especially vulnerable. </p>
<p>Australia certainly has a responsibility to help Pacific communities adapt. Supporting the Pacific-led, owned and managed Pacific Resilience Facility is an important step. </p>
<p>The facility was proposed by island leaders as a regional fund that would help island communities build resilience to climate impacts, and would be driven by Pacific priorities. </p>
<p>It was established partly in response to concerns that other large multilateral funds are difficult for Pacific island countries to access, and are not geared to support community-scale projects. These locally driven solutions and community projects deserve our support. </p>
<p>The Australian government says it will support locally led, small-scale projects: </p>
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<p>This includes grants for climate adaptation, disaster preparedness, nature-based solutions and projects which respond to loss and damage.</p>
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<p>Note the words “loss and damage” – the sole mention of those words in today’s announcement. Bowen has so far been <a href="https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/transcripts/interview-sabra-lane-abc-am-4">hesitant to make any commitment</a> to the new global Loss and Damage Fund, to be administered by the World Bank. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-chris-bowens-struggle-to-promote-consensus-on-climate-action-at-cop28-219008">Politics with Michelle Grattan: Chris Bowen's struggle to promote consensus on climate action at COP28</a>
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<h2>Rejoining the Green Climate Fund</h2>
<p>The world’s largest global climate fund, the Green Climate Fund, was set up in 2015 as part of the Paris Agreement. It has approved projects across 128 countries.</p>
<p>Australian diplomat Howard Bamsey was <a href="https://www.greenclimate.fund/news/gcf-board-selects-howard-bamsey-as-executive-director-of-the-secretari-1">previously Executive Director of the Green Climate Fund</a> and Australia was able to direct the multilateral fund to support initiatives in our region. </p>
<p>But the Morrison government withdrew Australia from the fund in 2018. We should never have left. It was a rash decision, <a href="https://archive.is/0GIN8">announced by the then Prime Minister Scott Morrison live on air</a> while talking to radio host Alan Jones.</p>
<p>Rejoining the Green Climate Fund makes good sense for Australian diplomacy and relations with countries in our region. By rejoining the fund, Australia can effectively advocate for funding to meet Pacific needs.</p>
<h2>Australia should contribute to the new Loss and Damage Fund</h2>
<p>Providing finance to help Pacific communities deal with growing climate impacts is a positive step, but Australia also needs to contribute to the newly established fund to address loss and damage that is now unavoidable.</p>
<p>The establishment of the global Loss and Damage Fund at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cop28-climate-summit-just-approved-a-loss-and-damage-fund-what%20-does-this-mean-218999">beginning of COP28 last week</a> was a major breakthrough, and a real win for Pacific island countries. </p>
<p>Vanuatu first proposed a global fund in the early 1990s. The idea was polluters would pay for the damage they were causing. </p>
<p>This is different to climate finance for adaptation. It is meant to deal with things you really can’t adapt to, such as loss of lives after a major cyclone, or damage to crucial infrastructure after coastal inundation. </p>
<p>Finalising such a fund means wealthy nations and major emitters must now allocate funds to address these forms of loss and damage in the Pacific. </p>
<p>With other nations – including the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, the UAE and Germany – already making announcements to contribute to this new Loss and Damage Fund, Australia must also do its part. </p>
<p>Australia should be supporting our Pacific neighbours by actively contributing to this global fund and recognising our responsibilities as a major fossil fuel producer.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cop28-climate-summit-just-approved-a-loss-and-damage-fund-what-does-this-mean-218999">COP28 climate summit just approved a 'loss and damage' fund. What does this mean?</a>
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<h2>Committing to fossil fuel phase out key to winning Pacific support</h2>
<p>The only way to actually stop harming communities in the Pacific is to stop adding fuel to the fire. That means stopping the approval of new coal, oil and gas projects and committing to a managed phase-out of fossil fuels.</p>
<p>Australia has put up its hand to host COP31 with Pacific island countries in 2026.
To be a successful host of the UN climate talks, Australia will need to actively support the Pacific’s fight for survival. We can’t just keep throwing money at the problem. We need to be part of the solution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219399/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Wesley Morgan is a senior researcher with the Climate Council</span></em></p>As Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen lands in Dubai for COP28, Australia has announced an extra A$150 in climate finance with a focus on the Pacific region.Wesley Morgan, Research Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1841472022-06-03T02:17:38Z2022-06-03T02:17:38ZWhat does China want in the Pacific? Diplomatic allies and strategic footholds<p>By the time Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s ten-day tour of the Pacific is over in early June, he will have met with leaders from all ten Pacific island countries that have diplomatic relations with China. </p>
<p>This tour is the second of its kind since 2006 (his predecessor Li Zhaoxing visited the region that year). It follows a meeting of Pacific foreign ministers with China <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202110/t20211021_9604831.html">last year</a>.</p>
<p>But what does China want from the region and why is it showing such strong interest in the Pacific?</p>
<h2>China wants two main things</h2>
<p>China seeks two main things from the region – one diplomatic and one strategic.</p>
<p>Diplomatically, it needs the voting support of Pacific islands at the United Nations. These countries, most of which are small, have an equal vote at the UN. </p>
<p>Their support – on <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26457717?seq=1%22%22">issues</a> such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, South and East China Seas, and human rights – matters to China. </p>
<p>For example, during Wang’s visit, Pacific leaders pledged to stick to the “One China” policy. This means they will recognise the People’s Republic of China over the Republic of China (Taiwan).</p>
<p>However, the China-Taiwan diplomatic battle is far from over. In the Pacific, Palau, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru still recognise Taiwan.</p>
<p>Strategically, China sees Pacific islands as a target of what’s known as “<a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/intergovernmental-coordination/south-south-cooperation-2019.html">South-South co-operation</a>” – partnerships between developing countries. </p>
<p>China’s mistrust of developed countries is deep rooted and has persisted since the founding of the communist regime in 1949. To reduce the strategic pressure from developed countries, China strives to forge close ties with the developing world.</p>
<p>In this sense, Wang’s Pacific visit is largely prompted by recent heightened competition between China and the US-led traditional powers. </p>
<p>The Quad countries (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) recently released a <a href="https://www.pm.gov.au/media/quad-joint-leaders-statement">joint leaders statement</a> promising to increase their support to countries in the Indo-Pacific region.</p>
<p>It is hardly a coincidence that on the same day, China’s ministry of foreign affairs revealed the <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202205/t20220524_10692075.html">itinerary</a> for Wang’s Pacific visit. Details of concrete <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202205/t20220525_10692550.html">achievements</a> arising from the provinces of Chinese Guangdong, Fujian and Shandong’s engagement with Pacific islands were released the following day.</p>
<p>China is signalling it will not recede in its competition with traditional powers. It also wants to send a message that a closer relationship with China will benefit Pacific islands.</p>
<h2>Security significance for China</h2>
<p>In the long run, the Pacific islands have great security significance for China. </p>
<p>China’s People’s Liberation Army, especially the navy, has aimed to break the “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/barriers-springboards-and-benchmarks-china-conceptualizes-the-pacific-island-chains/B46A212145EB9D920616650669C697F0">island chains</a>” (in particular, there are a series of military bases on islands near China and in the Pacific, which Beijing believes the US and its allies are using to encircle China). </p>
<p>The Pacific islands sit along one of these island chains. Little wonder, then, the Chinese military is keen to gain a foothold in the Pacific in the long run – this would be crucial if competition between China and the US deteriorates into rivalry and even military conflict. </p>
<p>This is why traditional powers are alarmed by the China-Solomon Islands security pact – despite clarification from <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220526_10693195.html">Beijing</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/solomon-islands-tells-japan-it-will-not-allow-china-military-bases-2022-04-26/">Honiara</a> China will not establish a military base in Solomon Islands.</p>
<p>To achieve these objectives, China has worked hard to foster a closer relationship with Pacific islands. In particular, it has highlighted its respect of Pacific islands as equal partners, economic opportunities for Pacific commodities to enter the massive Chinese market, and the benefits of Chinese aid for the region.</p>
<h2>Proposed agreements</h2>
<p>In this context, China proposed two broad <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-25/china-seeks-pacific-islands-policing-security-cooperation/101099978">agreements</a> to be signed by all its Pacific partner countries during Wang’s visit. </p>
<p>However, this plan was shelved due to the lack of consensus among Pacific leaders on the nature of these agreements and potential negative implications for regional security.</p>
<p>For example, prior to Wang’s visit, President of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/467955/fsm-president-warns-pacific-leaders-over-china-documents">wrote</a> to leaders of all Pacific island countries and territories warning that signing these agreements may drag Pacific islands into conflicts between China and the US in future.</p>
<p>This may have taken China by surprise; President Panuelo paid a successful <a href="https://gov.fm/index.php/component/content/article/35-pio-articles/news-and-updates/229-great-friendship-taken-to-a-new-high-president-panuelo-meets-president-xi-jinping-premier-li-china-state-visit-day-two">state visit</a> to China in 2019 and lauded his country’s relationship with China as “great friendship taken to a new high”.</p>
<p>This was a clear setback for China. As a suboptimal solution, China’s ministry of foreign affairs turned the two agreements into a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202205/t20220531_10694923.html">position paper</a> and published it on May 30. </p>
<p>A main difference is that in the position paper, China only briefly states its readiness to co-operate with Pacific islands to promote regional security, combat transnational crimes and tackle non-traditional security threats. </p>
<p>By contrast, the original two agreements had more details on security co-operation such as providing police training for the region and strengthening co-operation on cyber security.</p>
<p>Apparently, China has learnt to downplay its planned co-operation with Pacific islands on security, an increasingly sensitive area amid the competition.</p>
<p>Looking into the near future, it is likely China will be more cautious in expanding its engagement with the Pacific region.</p>
<p>It will likely focus on pragmatic co-operation in less sensitive areas like climate change, poverty reduction, agriculture and disaster relief. </p>
<p>China will lobby for more support from Pacific islands before it is willing to reintroduce the broad agreements.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/184147/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denghua Zhang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China seeks two main things from the region – one diplomatic and one strategic.Denghua Zhang, Research fellow, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1800202022-03-25T03:32:36Z2022-03-25T03:32:36ZSaying China ‘bought’ a military base in the Solomons is simplistic and shows how little Australia understands power in the Pacific<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-24/draft-leak-chinese-military-base-solomon-islands/100937632?s=03">draft security agreement</a> between China and Solomon Islands circulating on social media raises important questions about how the Australian government and national security community understand power dynamics in the Pacific Islands.</p>
<p>In Australian debates, the term “<a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publications/2020-defence-strategic-update">influence</a>” is <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7227988/australia-losing-influence-in-south-pacific-to-china-report/">often</a> <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/chinese-influence-pacific-islands">used</a> to characterise the assumed consequences of China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific.</p>
<p>There’s an assumption China generates influence primarily from its economic statecraft. This includes its concessional loans, aid and investment by state-owned enterprises (which partly manifests in Beijing’s involvement of Pacific Islands in its Belt and Road Initiative).</p>
<p>On its face, the leaked draft seemingly proves Chinese spending “bought” enough influence to get the Solomon Islands government to consider this agreement. But such an interpretation misses two key issues.</p>
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<h2>The role of domestic politics</h2>
<p>First, the draft agreement is primarily about Solomon Islands domestic politics – not just geopolitics. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/radio-australia/programs/pacificbeat/analyst-absolutely-certain-australia-not-interfering-solomons/13656652">explained by Dr Tarcisius Kabutaulaka</a> after the November 2021 riots in Honiara, geopolitical considerations intersect with, and can be used to, advance longstanding domestic issues.</p>
<p>These include uneven and unequal development, frustrated decentralisation, and unresolved grievances arising from prior conflicts.</p>
<p>Power in the Pacific is complex. It is not just politicians in the national government who matter in domestic and foreign policy-making.</p>
<p>Take, for example, the <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/behind-the-scenes-in-the-solomons-local-leader-has-leveraged-china-issue-to-his-advantage-20211126-p59cks.html">activism of Malaita provincial governor</a> Derek Suidani, who pursued relations with Taiwan after Solomon Islands switched diplomatic recognition to China in 2019. This highlights the <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-United-States-Subnational-Relations-with-Divided-China-A-Constructivist/Tubilewicz-Omond/p/book/9780367763190">important role sub-national actors</a> can play in the both domestic and foreign policy arenas.</p>
<p>Neither Solomon Islanders (nor other Pacific peoples) are “<a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/chinese-whispers-and-pacific-agency">passive dupes</a>” to Chinese influence or unaware of geopolitical challenges – and opportunities. Some do, however, face resource and constitutional constraints when resisting influence attempts.</p>
<h2>Australia’s current policy settings are not working</h2>
<p>The second key issue is that Australia’s current policy settings are not working – if their success is measured by advancing Australia’s strategic interests.</p>
<p>Australia is by far the Pacific’s largest aid donor and has been on a spending spree under its “<a href="https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific">Pacific Step-up</a>” initiative. </p>
<p>Australia spent <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australias-costly-investment-solomon-islands-lessons-ramsi">billions</a> leading the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as well as significant bilateral programs to the country. Yet Australia has not been able to head off Honiara considering the security agreement with China.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-australia-deploys-troops-and-police-what-now-for-solomon-islands-172678">As Australia deploys troops and police, what now for Solomon Islands?</a>
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<p>Perhaps Canberra has not sought to influence Solomon Islands on this matter. But given Australia’s <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/pacific-power-paperback-softback">longstanding anxieties</a> about potentially hostile powers establishing a presence in the region, this is unlikely.</p>
<p>Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews has already <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-24/draft-leak-chinese-military-base-solomon-islands/100937632">commented</a> in response to the leaked draft that: </p>
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<p>This is our neighbourhood and we are very concerned of any activity that is taking place in the Pacific Islands. </p>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-10/china-military-base-in-vanuatu-report-of-concern-turnbull-says/9635742">rumours</a> (subsequently denied) that China was in talks to establish a military base in Vanuatu, and China’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/25/solomons-government-vetoes-chinese-attempt-to-lease-an-island">attempt to lease</a> Tulagi Island in Solomon Islands had already intensified Australia’s anxieties. Such concerns partly motivated the government’s investment in the Pacific Step-up.</p>
<h2>A closer look at the draft security agreement</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://twitter.com/AnnaPowles/status/1506845794728837120">terms of the draft</a> security agreement should make Australia anxious. It goes significantly beyond the bilateral security <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ATS/2018/14.html">treaty between Solomon Islands and Australia</a>.</p>
<p>Article 1 provides that Solomon Islands may request China to “send police, police, military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces to Solomon Islands” in circumstances ranging from maintaining social order to unspecified “other tasks agreed upon by the Parties”.</p>
<p>Even more concerningly for Solomon Islands’ sovereignty, Article 1 also provides that </p>
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<p>relevant forces of China can be used to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands. </p>
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<p>It remains unclear what authority the Solomon Islands government would maintain once it consents to Beijing’s deployment of “relevant forces” to protect Chinese nationals.</p>
<p>Article 4 is equally vague. It states specific details regarding Chinese missions, including “jurisdiction, privilege and immunity […] shall be negotiated separately”.</p>
<p>The agreement also raises questions about the transparency of agreements Beijing makes and their consequences for democracy in its partner states. </p>
<p>According to Article 5, </p>
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<p>without the written consent of the other party, neither party shall disclose the cooperation information to a third party. </p>
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<p>This implies the Solomon Islands government is legally bound not to inform its own people and their democratically elected representatives about activities under the agreement without the Chinese approval.</p>
<p>The version circulating on social media may prove to be an early draft. Its leak is likely a bargaining tactic aimed at pursuing multiple agendas with multiple actors – including Australia.</p>
<p>Australian High Commissioner Lachlan Strahan met yesterday with Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australian-defence-minister-says-china-base-solomons-would-be-concerning-2022-03-25/">announced</a> Australia will extend its assistance force until December 2023. It will build a national radio network, construct a second patrol boat outpost, and provide SI$130 million (A$21.5 million) in budget support. </p>
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<h2>Playing whack-a-mole</h2>
<p>While the timing was likely coincidental, it highlights an emerging dynamic in Australia’s Pacific policy: playing <a href="https://www.9dashline.com/article/pushing-the-limits-of-australias-strategic-imagination-in-the-pacific-islands">whack-a-mole</a> by seeking to directly counter Chinese moves through economic statecraft. Think of <a href="https://exchange.telstra.com.au/expanding-the-telstra-family-with-digicel-pacific/">Telstra’s recent purchase of Digicel Pacific, headquartered in PNG</a> – a move <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australias-telstra-digicel-deal-about-shutting-china-out-of-pacific-analysts-say/7pbq85euv">seen by some analysts</a> as really an attempt to shut China out of the Pacific.</p>
<p>That China has been able to persuade Solomon Islands to consider an intrusive security agreement raises questions about our understanding of how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-push-into-png-has-been-surprisingly-slow-and-ineffective-why-has-beijing-found-the-going-so-tough-140073">China's push into PNG has been surprisingly slow and ineffective. Why has Beijing found the going so tough?</a>
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<p>If influence is taken to result in concrete behavioural changes (such as entering into a bilateral security agreement), and if Australia is going to “<a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-will-compete-with-china-to-save-pacific-sovereignty-says-bishop-20180617-p4zm1h.html">compete</a>” with China on spending, you’d need to ask, for example: how much “influence” does an infrastructure project buy? </p>
<p>This understanding of power, however, is insufficient. Instead, a more nuanced approach is required.</p>
<p>Influence is exercised not only by national governments, but also by a variety of non-state actors, including sub-national and community groups. </p>
<p>And targets of influence-seekers can exercise their agency. See, for example, how various actors in Solomon Islands are leveraging Australia, China and Taiwan’s overtures to the country.</p>
<p>We must also consider how power affects the political norms and values guiding governing elites and non-state actors, potentially reshaping their identities and interests.</p>
<p>The draft security agreement may come to nothing – but it should provide a wake-up call to Australia and its partners.</p>
<p>Old assumptions about how power and influence are exercised in the Pacific need urgent re-examination – as does our assumption that explicitly “competing” with China advances either our interests or those of the Pacific.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180020/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joanne Wallis receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Czeslaw Tubilewicz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A leaked draft security agreement seemingly proves Chinese spending ‘bought’ enough influence to get the Solomon Islands government. But such an interpretation misses two key issues.Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, University of AdelaideCzeslaw Tubilewicz, Senior Lecturer, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1476532020-10-11T18:58:26Z2020-10-11T18:58:26ZHow patent law and medicine regulations could affect New Zealand’s access to a COVID-19 vaccine<p>New Zealand has allocated an undisclosed sum, in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars, to <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/progress-covid-19-vaccine-strategy">access COVID-19 vaccines</a> when they become available.</p>
<p>The funding is on top of a NZ$37 million <a href="https://www.health.govt.nz/our-work/diseases-and-conditions/covid-19-novel-coronavirus/covid-19-current-situation/covid-19-vaccine-strategy">vaccine strategy</a>, but the government has not released specifics because of commercial sensitivities that “could prevent the best possible deal for New Zealanders”.</p>
<p>Apart from the intricacies of global efforts to develop, test and distribute a vaccine, there are also domestic legal issues the government might need to consider, particularly in patent law and the regulatory review of medicines. </p>
<p>Legislative changes to future-proof the law could avoid delays and lower access costs. </p>
<h2>Patent law and access</h2>
<p>Some <a href="https://blogs.bmj.com/medical-ethics/2020/08/04/patents-private-governance-access-to-vaccines-and-treatments-for-covid-19/">fear</a> pharmaceutical companies could <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/09/10/could-university-patents-stand-in-the-way-of-universal-global-access-to-a-covid-19-vaccine/">patent a COVID-19 vaccine</a> and hold the world hostage, demanding monopoly prices. </p>
<p>But to get a patent the invention has to be novel and non-obvious. There is possibly enough <a href="https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/journals-open-access-to-coronavirus-resources--67105">public information</a> about vaccines currently under investigation or in trials to make it difficult for a company to prove novelty or non-obviousness.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/whoever-invents-a-coronavirus-vaccine-will-control-the-patent-and-importantly-who-gets-to-use-it-138121">Whoever invents a coronavirus vaccine will control the patent – and, importantly, who gets to use it</a>
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<p>Even if a vaccine were in some way patent-protected in New Zealand, the government is already <a href="https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/424556/covid-19-government-allocates-significant-extra-funding-towards-vaccine">negotiating for access</a>. </p>
<p>If the negotiations fail or the prices demanded are too high, New Zealand law allows for <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0068/latest/DLM2193523.html">compulsory licensing</a> and <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0068/latest/DLM2193530.html">Crown use</a> of patented inventions. Both are also allowed under <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm#5">international trade law</a>.</p>
<p>At the moment, an application for a <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0068/latest/DLM2193523.html">compulsory licence</a> is only possible after negotiations with a patent owner have failed and if three years have lapsed since the patent was granted (or four years since the patent application was filed). But international trade law states that any requirement to negotiate with the patent owner may be waived in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.</p>
<p>Parliament should consider amending New Zealand patent law to be clear that, in a national emergency, anyone can apply for a compulsory licence at any point, without the requirement to negotiate with the patent owner first.</p>
<p>Both international and New Zealand law allow pharmaceutical products manufactured under a compulsory licence to be exported to address a serious public health problem in another country. This might prove important for Pacific nations. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-vaccine-nationalism-could-doom-plan-for-global-access-to-a-covid-19-vaccine-145056">Why 'vaccine nationalism' could doom plan for global access to a COVID-19 vaccine</a>
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<h2>Government emergency access</h2>
<p>Government departments can use patented inventions <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2013/0068/latest/DLM2193531.html">for the services of the Crown</a>. This can be delegated, for example, to a local pharmaceutical manufacturing company. </p>
<p>In an emergency, there is no requirement for the Crown to negotiate a licence with the patent owner first. Nor does the Crown need to wait for a certain period of time to lapse. </p>
<p>This currently covers protecting New Zealand’s security or defence, or managing a state of emergency. A global pandemic can trigger a state of emergency, as <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/state-national-emergency-declared-fight-covid-19">happened in New Zealand</a> in March 2020. But to future-proof the law, parliament should consider amending the definition of “emergency” to specifically include health emergencies.</p>
<p>Crown use provisions would allow the government to make and use any patented vaccine or medicine, and to sell any product in excess to its requirements. This would allow sale to a Pacific nation for a nominal amount.</p>
<h2>A vaccine must be safe</h2>
<p>In contrast to patent protection, there are no exceptions to the regulatory review of medicines. Anyone who wants to distribute, sell or advertise a medicine in New Zealand must have regulatory approval from <a href="https://www.medsafe.govt.nz/">Medsafe</a>. </p>
<p>Applicants must submit <a href="http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1981/0118/latest/DLM55057.html">information and data</a> about the pharmaceutical and the proposed on-label uses. This includes reports on any tests and clinical trials, and data on safety and efficacy. Medsafe decides whether to approve a medicine based on this information. </p>
<p>The process can be lengthy and could delay access to a vaccine. But parliament could legislate a narrow regulatory review “highway” — if regulatory approval for a vaccine is granted elsewhere, such as the European Union, Australia or Canada, it could automatically get approval in New Zealand. </p>
<p>Other aspects of the regulatory process will determine the cost of a vaccine.</p>
<p>Generic medicines — essentially imitations — make the price of pharmaceuticals competitive. Generic pharmaceutical companies don’t usually generate data or run clinical trials. Instead, they show their product is <a href="https://www.pharmac.govt.nz/medicines/medicines-information/generic-medicines/">equivalent to the original medicine</a> and ask Medsafe to use the original data to determine safety. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/creating-a-covid-19-vaccine-is-only-the-first-step-itll-take-years-to-manufacture-and-distribute-144352">Creating a COVID-19 vaccine is only the first step. It'll take years to manufacture and distribute</a>
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<p>But Medsafe is not allowed to use any data it receives for one application for the assessment of another for five years. Any vaccine could become obsolete within five years.</p>
<p>There is an exception allowing Medsafe to use data if it is “necessary to protect the health or safety of members of the public”. One can argue that having competition, lower prices and wide distribution of a COVID-19 vaccine meets this requirement. Parliament should amend the legislation to make this clear. </p>
<p>If we allow generic companies to rely on the data of original innovator companies, there would be at least two entities in the market competing with the same vaccine. </p>
<p>We don’t know what’s coming but that shouldn’t stop us from future-proofing our laws and regulatory processes for the different possibilities. New Zealand needs to take advantage of the flexibilities in international trade law to get a COVID-19 vaccine, possibly even two or three, to New Zealanders as quickly and cheaply as possible.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica C Lai does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New Zealand has entered several international agreements to access COVID-19 vaccines, but it should also amend domestic patent law and regulatory processes to prevent delays and costly negotiations.Jessica C Lai, Associate Professor in Commercial Law, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of WellingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1134732019-04-17T02:20:22Z2019-04-17T02:20:22ZPacific island cities call for a rethink of climate resilience for the most vulnerable<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264505/original/file-20190318-28499-5tis7r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Looking out from Ontong Java settlement at the mouth of the Mataniko River, Honiara. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Trundle (2017)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The impacts of climate change are already being felt across the Pacific, considered to be one of the world’s most-at-risk regions. Small island developing states are <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10113-017-1247-9">mandated extra support</a> under the Paris Agreement. Many are classified as <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/tag/least-developed-countries/">least developed countries</a>, allowing them special access to development funding and loans.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/sites/default/files/downloads/resource/SEI-WP-2017-04-Pacific-climate-finance-flows.pdf">Analysis</a> of climate change adaptation projects in the Pacific shows most focus on rural areas, heavy infrastructure and policy development. Climate change planning for the cities and towns has been limited, despite their <a href="http://ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2016-07/ib2015.64_keen_and_barbara.pdf">rapid growth</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/for-pacific-island-nations-rising-sea-levels-are-a-bigger-security-concern-than-rising-chinese-influence-102403">For Pacific Island nations, rising sea levels are a bigger security concern than rising Chinese influence</a>
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<p>Port Vila, for example, has far outgrown the municipal boundary <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781134810833/chapters/10.4324/9781315174815-9">set out when Vanuatu became independent</a> in 1980. Migration to the urban fringe has resulted in the wider metropolitan area <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247818816654">accounting for 26.8% of Vanuatu’s population</a>. These areas are growing at an <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781134810833/chapters/10.4324/9781315174815-3">average rate of 6.6% a year</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="moDOj" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/moDOj/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The capital of Solomon Islands, Honiara, is experiencing similarly rapid growth. <a href="http://www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/programmes/ccci/pdf/HURCAP_final_Endorsed.pdf">More than a third</a> of its residents live in informal settlements on the city fringes, without legal tenure. </p>
<p>There are few rural economic opportunities and climate change is threatening outer island subsistence crops and fisheries. This means Pacific cities are likely to keep growing for many years to come. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266284/original/file-20190328-139377-at5sog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266284/original/file-20190328-139377-at5sog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266284/original/file-20190328-139377-at5sog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266284/original/file-20190328-139377-at5sog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266284/original/file-20190328-139377-at5sog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266284/original/file-20190328-139377-at5sog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266284/original/file-20190328-139377-at5sog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266284/original/file-20190328-139377-at5sog.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Koa Hill informal settlement in central Honiara is prone to landslips and flash flooding.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Trundle (2017)</span></span>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sea-level-rise-has-claimed-five-whole-islands-in-the-pacific-first-scientific-evidence-58511">Sea-level rise has claimed five whole islands in the Pacific: first scientific evidence</a>
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<h2>‘Not drowning, fighting’</h2>
<p>Despite being exposed to extreme weather and rising seas, many inhabitants of <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sids/list">Small Island Developing States</a> resist being framed as “climate vulnerable”.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/06/04/acting-today-for-tomorrow-a-policy-and-practice-note-for-climate-and-disaster-resilient-development-in-the-pacific-islands-region">High exposure</a> to extreme weather and <a href="https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/cc_sids.pdf">little responsibility</a> for the emissions that are making such events worse mean these states often regard characterisations of fragility and weakness as counterproductive. Pacific leaders regularly avoid describing their citizens as vulnerable to climate change, even during international negotiations.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pacific-islands-are-not-passive-victims-of-climate-change-but-will-need-help-47207">Pacific islands are not passive victims of climate change, but will need help</a>
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<p>As president of the <a href="https://cop23.com.fj/">23rd UN Climate Conference</a>, Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/PMstatementatHighLevelSegment.pdf">emphasised</a> that Pacific vulnerability was recognised “not to present our people as victims but to emphasise that their interests are your interests”. </p>
<p>Kiribati’s former president, Anote Tong, recently in Australia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/not-happy-australia-must-act-on-climate-says-former-kiribati-leader">advocating</a> for stronger climate action, similarly <a href="https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/361172/anote-tong-backs-climate-change-documentary-anote-s-ark-despite-kiribati-criticism">insists</a> that I-Kiribati “must not relocate as climate refugees but as people who would migrate with dignity”. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265759/original/file-20190326-36244-12df4jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265759/original/file-20190326-36244-12df4jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265759/original/file-20190326-36244-12df4jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265759/original/file-20190326-36244-12df4jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265759/original/file-20190326-36244-12df4jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265759/original/file-20190326-36244-12df4jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265759/original/file-20190326-36244-12df4jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265759/original/file-20190326-36244-12df4jk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=479&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Graffiti on the fence of a damaged house in Blacksands, Port Vila, two years after Tropical Cyclone Pam.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Trundle (2017)</span></span>
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<p>Communities also focus on their strengths in the face of natural disasters. In March 2015 Tropical <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/cyclone-pam-15513">Cyclone Pam</a> devastated Vanuatu. In the capital, Port Vila, it <a href="https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/reach_vut_factsheets_shelter_and_settlements_assessment_key_findings_may_2015.pdf">destroyed 30% of dwellings</a>. The losses were equivalent to <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/post-disaster-needs-assessment-cyclone-pam.pdf">64.1% of national GDP</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cyclone-pam-shows-why-more-people-means-more-havoc-38841">Cyclone Pam shows why more people means more havoc</a>
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<p>In the aftermath local musician Bobby Shing released a single titled “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LmXAlmU4qqg">Resilience</a>”. The song relates the roles of culture, religion and “standing strong”.</p>
<p>“Resilience” echoed a national mood to rebuild and move forward. It also acknowledged the wealth of traditional knowledge for dealing with natural hazards in the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/exposed-why-vanuatu-is-the-worlds-most-at-risk-country-for-natural-hazards/a-18319825">world’s most disaster-prone country</a>. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/LmXAlmU4qqg?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Artists Tujah (Bobby Shing), KC and ALA of Port Vila express their views on resilience following Tropical Cyclone Pam.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Rethinking climate resilience</h2>
<p>Climate change adaptation in Pacific island cities is challenging for a number of reasons. </p>
<p>The United Nations Human Settlements Program, <a href="https://unhabitat.org">UN-Habitat</a>, focuses specifically on adapting developing cities to climate change. As the UN’s peak body for cities it is responsible for implementing the <a href="http://habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda/">New Urban Agenda</a>. It is also spearheading <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11">Sustainable Development Goal 11</a>, the “urban” SDG.</p>
<p>Working with Australian academics, local government and civil society, UN-Habitat is developing urban resilience and climate adaptation plans in Honiara and Port Vila. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266617/original/file-20190330-71016-1u8pfk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266617/original/file-20190330-71016-1u8pfk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266617/original/file-20190330-71016-1u8pfk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266617/original/file-20190330-71016-1u8pfk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266617/original/file-20190330-71016-1u8pfk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=332&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266617/original/file-20190330-71016-1u8pfk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266617/original/file-20190330-71016-1u8pfk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266617/original/file-20190330-71016-1u8pfk5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=418&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">UN-Habitat adaptation planning workshops in Port Vila, Vanuatu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Trundle (2016)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247818816654">Recently published research</a> reflecting on these two projects sheds light on the ways that “climate-resilient development” in Pacific cities needs to be done differently.</p>
<p><strong>1) Target those who need help most</strong></p>
<p>Informal settlements are the most vulnerable parts of Pacific cities. These vulnerability hotspots often occupy hazardous land such as floodplains where formal development is prohibited. They usually lack basic services such as piped water and electricity. When disaster strikes, the impacts are worst for these communities.</p>
<p>A lack of formal recognition can also stand in the way of disaster relief, voting rights and access to facilities such as health clinics. This further reduces the capacity of these communities to recover from disaster.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266253/original/file-20190328-139371-1vijr4o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266253/original/file-20190328-139371-1vijr4o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266253/original/file-20190328-139371-1vijr4o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266253/original/file-20190328-139371-1vijr4o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266253/original/file-20190328-139371-1vijr4o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=350&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266253/original/file-20190328-139371-1vijr4o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266253/original/file-20190328-139371-1vijr4o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266253/original/file-20190328-139371-1vijr4o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A spatial assessment of Honiara’s climate vulnerability shows the overlap between ‘hotspots’ and informal settlements.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Honiara Urban Resilience & Climate Action Plan (UN-Habitat 2016)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Climate change planning should therefore prioritise the most vulnerable settlements at a sub-city scale. Initial efforts to understand the most vulnerable can then provide a baseline for wider city planning. This can ensure scarce adaptation resources are distributed more equitably.</p>
<p><strong>2) Take land tenure into account</strong></p>
<p>“Informal” encompasses many different ways of urban living beyond the renter/owner norms of developed nations. </p>
<p>Some households informally subdivide their land for extended family members. Other communities hold collective leasehold. Some have arrangements with traditional owners, renting through cash or <a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/state-society-and-governance-melanesia/kastom-property-and-ideology">customary payments</a>.</p>
<p>Each type of informality modifies which climate adaptation options are feasible. For instance, communities might share sanitation facilities or water sources, making communal infrastructure preferable. Customary owners might restrict the “permanence” of structures built in an area.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266618/original/file-20190330-70999-1fmx36y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266618/original/file-20190330-70999-1fmx36y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266618/original/file-20190330-70999-1fmx36y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266618/original/file-20190330-70999-1fmx36y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266618/original/file-20190330-70999-1fmx36y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=303&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266618/original/file-20190330-70999-1fmx36y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266618/original/file-20190330-70999-1fmx36y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266618/original/file-20190330-70999-1fmx36y.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=381&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Informal settlement areas in Blacksands, a large peri-urban community on customary land in Port Vila, Vanuatu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Trundle (2017)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>3) Allow for ‘bottom-up’ resilience</strong></p>
<p>Formal and informal communities in the Pacific often rely heavily on their own networks and capabilities when hit by a natural disaster. Without understanding these systems, international development efforts can undermine “bottom-up” resilience. </p>
<p>Participatory approaches ensure communities can determine their own adaptation needs. This also prevents outside actors from imposing their own assumptions and worldviews about how Pacific cities work. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266657/original/file-20190331-71003-apzuop.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266657/original/file-20190331-71003-apzuop.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266657/original/file-20190331-71003-apzuop.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266657/original/file-20190331-71003-apzuop.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266657/original/file-20190331-71003-apzuop.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266657/original/file-20190331-71003-apzuop.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266657/original/file-20190331-71003-apzuop.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266657/original/file-20190331-71003-apzuop.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An informal water supply in Koa Hill, Honiara. Church-based community structures manage the pipes that distribute drinking water to subgroups of households.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alexei Trundle (2017)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Sovereignty, agency and aid</h2>
<p>Much has been made of <a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-morrison-showed-up-in-the-pacific-but-what-did-he-actually-achieve-109792">Australia’s Pacific “step up”</a>, with a bipartisan commitment to supporting the region’s adaptation efforts. Nonetheless climate change remains a major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/06/australia-signs-declaration-climate-change-greatest-threat-pacific-islands">point of tension</a> between Pacific island states and the region’s largest fossil fuel exporter.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pacific-pariah-how-australias-love-of-coal-has-left-it-out-in-the-diplomatic-cold-64963">Pacific pariah: how Australia’s love of coal has left it out in the diplomatic cold</a>
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<p>A starting point for development partners like Australia should be recognising the importance of sovereignty and identity to Pacific Islanders. Calls for “<a href="http://kevinrudd.com/2019/02/04/the-complacent-country/">constitutional condominiums</a>” with low-lying countries serve only as reminders of Australia’s <a href="http://books.publishing.monash.edu/apps/bookworm/view/Australia%27s+Northern+Shield%3F/197/Text/15_chapter-title-6.html">20th-century colonial past</a>.</p>
<p>Helping communities with engineering, geographic information systems (GIS) and climate analysis can enable them to make their own informed adaptation decisions. </p>
<p>Support to train construction specialists, urban planners and climate scientists will provide a platform for resilience building.</p>
<p>The cities of the Pacific are sometimes referred to as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00223344.2015.1110869">hybrid spaces</a>. They blur traditional culture and customs with the global opportunities that lie beyond the “<a href="http://archives.anu.edu.au/exhibitions/people-pacific-resources/our-sea-islands">Sea of Islands</a>”.</p>
<p>As Pacific Islanders urbanise, so too should adaptation efforts and finance. But, first, climate resilience must be understood as the most vulnerable understand it.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The authors’ research, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247818816654">Leveraging endogenous climate resilience: urban adaptation in Pacific Small Island Developing States</a>, was published as part of a Special IPCC Cities Edition of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/home/eau">Environment and Urbanization</a>, which will be open access from April 15 to May 15 2019.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexei Trundle receives research funding from, and has consulted to, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). He receives Research Training Program funding from the Australian Government through the University of Melbourne.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Darryn McEvoy receives funding from UN-Habitat. </span></em></p>Pacific island nations are often framed as remote atolls facing rising seas and cyclones. But their cities are growing fast, so are efforts to help the most climate-vulnerable people hitting the mark?Alexei Trundle, PhD Candidate, Australian-German Climate & Energy College, The University of MelbourneDarryn McEvoy, Research professor, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1052192018-10-21T19:17:19Z2018-10-21T19:17:19ZClimate change: Nauru’s life on the frontlines<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241404/original/file-20181019-105748-11n8jxi.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C40%2C5447%2C3596&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nauru's people are struggling in the face of environmental change.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anja Kanngieser</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>International perceptions of the Pacific Island nation of Nauru are dominated by two interrelated stories. Until the turn of the century, it was the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-rise-of-nauru-can-the-island-bounce-back-from-its-mining-boom-and-bust-62419">dramatic boom and bust of Nauru’s phosphate mine</a>, and the mismanagement of its considerable wealth, that captured global attention. </p>
<p>Then, in 2001, Nauru become one of two Pacific sites for Australia’s offshore incarceration of asylum seekers and refugees. As <a href="https://technosphere-magazine.hkw.de/p/4-Islands-Colonialism-and-Geopolitics-dsR2t6QSVYLFyV3hHA4jHV">money from the extraction of phosphate began to wane</a>, Nauru became increasingly reliant on the income generated through the detention industry.</p>
<p>There is a third story that is often overlooked, one that will heavily determine the island’s future. Everyone on Nauru – Indigenous Nauruans and refugees alike – is experiencing the impacts of one the greatest social, economic and political threats faced by the world today: global environmental change.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-new-rise-of-nauru-can-the-island-bounce-back-from-its-mining-boom-and-bust-62419">The new rise of Nauru: can the island bounce back from its mining boom and bust?</a>
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<p>I visited Nauru earlier this month as part of my project <a href="https://scholars.uow.edu.au/display/anja_kanngieser">Climates of Listening</a>, which amplifies Pacific calls for climate and environmental justice. I spoke with public servants, community leaders, and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) about their climate mitigation and adaptation strategies. I wanted to document the changes to the island’s reefs, lagoons and landscape, and also the community initiatives to cope with these changes.</p>
<h2>Colonial legacy</h2>
<p>Nauru was first colonised in the late 1800s by Germany, which aimed to exploit the island’s plentiful reserves of phosphate, a prized ingredient of fertiliser and munitions. In the early 1900s Britain brokered a deal with the German government and the Pacific Phosphate Company to begin large-scale mining, which became <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1031461X.2015.1082609">crucial for Australia</a> and New Zealand, who were building up agricultural and military capacity. </p>
<p>After the first world war, Australia, Britain and New Zealand took over full trusteeship of the island, which served as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/remember-the-pacifics-people-when-we-remember-the-war-in-the-pacific-46130">strategic military site</a> and was successively occupied, costing many Indigenous lives. It was not until the late 1960s that Nauru finally regained independence and took over mining activities.</p>
<p>By this time there were already signs that accessible land would become an issue. Nauru is small, covering just 21 square km. The mine has taken over more than 80% of Nauru’s land, and although primary production is drawing to a close, the government is considering plans for secondary mining. That would extend extraction by around 20 years before phosphate is fully depleted and Nauru’s only exportable commodity is completely exhausted, although a possible new avenue has appeared in the form of <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/09/19/cait-storr/deep-water/">deep seabed mining</a>.</p>
<p>The mine area, called “topside” by Nauruans, is like a moonscape. Huge limestone pinnacles reach skywards, punctuated by steep gullies into which, I was warned, people have fallen to their deaths. It is unbearably hot, humid and inhospitable.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241402/original/file-20181019-105773-nl8zo7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C8%2C5472%2C2883&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241402/original/file-20181019-105773-nl8zo7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=49%2C8%2C5472%2C2883&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241402/original/file-20181019-105773-nl8zo7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241402/original/file-20181019-105773-nl8zo7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241402/original/file-20181019-105773-nl8zo7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241402/original/file-20181019-105773-nl8zo7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241402/original/file-20181019-105773-nl8zo7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241402/original/file-20181019-105773-nl8zo7.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nauru’s ‘topside’ is an inhospitable moonscape after decades of phosphate mining.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anja Kanngieser</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Shrinking habitable land means that most of Nauru’s growing population is clustered along the edges of the island. Around the north, coastal erosion eats away at the beach, leaving families with nowhere to go. While sea walls protect some areas, they push the waves onto others, meaning homes are flooded either way. Periodic king tides cover the only road running around the island, limiting accesses to services and resources.</p>
<p>Salt from the sea leaches into the groundwater supply. The water table is already contaminated with rubbish, mining effluent, and even leaks from cemeteries. While most of Nauru gets its water from the desalination plant, the delivery of the water can take a long time and when something goes wrong, experts have to be flown in to fix it. Rainwater is another option, but not everyone has a tank to catch it, and severe droughts are increasingly common.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-entire-nation-of-nauru-almost-moved-to-queensland-63833">How the entire nation of Nauru almost moved to Queensland</a>
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<p>Despite the successful establishment of kitchen gardens, which feed several families, many people on the coast feel their soil is not adequate for growing food. Food is largely <a href="http://www.wansolwaranews.com/2017/05/29/import-dependence-in-nauru/">imported</a> and I was told that there are long queues whenever a shipment of rice is due to arrive. In one supermarket, cucumbers sell for A$13 each, and a punnet of cherry tomatoes costs A$20. Most Nauruans cannot afford to buy fresh produce.</p>
<p>Compounding food insecurity are the depleting reef fish stocks, which the government is hoping to address through the eventual establishment of <a href="https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/pa/wspapac-01/other/wspapac-01-status-marine-en.pdf">locally managed marine areas</a>. There is a plan to rebuild milkfish supplies in people’s home ponds, a species endemic to the island. However, as the groundwater is contaminated, the fish will also become contaminated. If people use the fish to feed livestock, the contamination is passed up the food chain.</p>
<p>Dust from the mine still causes major respiratory issues. It covers houses near the harbour, where the phosphate is processed and shipped. Locals refer to it as “snow”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241403/original/file-20181019-105761-rzian3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241403/original/file-20181019-105761-rzian3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/241403/original/file-20181019-105761-rzian3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241403/original/file-20181019-105761-rzian3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241403/original/file-20181019-105761-rzian3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241403/original/file-20181019-105761-rzian3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241403/original/file-20181019-105761-rzian3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/241403/original/file-20181019-105761-rzian3.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A monument to boom and bust.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Anja Kanngieser</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many people commented to me about how much hotter Nauru seems to be now, and fondly recalled the more clement weather they remembered from childhood. Today’s children don’t want to walk to school in the heat, and when they arrive their classrooms are not air-conditioned.</p>
<p>I was also told that the combination of mining, heat and erosion, as well as possible coral bleaching, is taking a toll on the island’s wildlife diversity. Usually, in the tropics, there is a cacophony of birdsong at dusk. But at one mine site I heard a single bird, despite an abundance of trees and shrubs. </p>
<p>Environmental officers further recounted that in early 2018 the reef was littered with sick fish, and that Nauru’s noddy birds – a popular food source – had contracted a mysterious and deadly virus. Curiously, there have also been recent sightings of orcas and a beached dugong, despite Nauru not being on any known migratory path.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pacific-nations-arent-cash-hungry-minister-they-just-want-action-on-climate-change-105206">Pacific nations aren't cash-hungry, minister, they just want action on climate change</a>
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<p>The many issues on Nauru add up to a grave threat to the island’s land, water and food security. While the idea of rehabilitating topside has been broached many times, there are no firm plans in place. This rehabilitation may be Nauru’s lifeline, given its precarious economic situation.</p>
<p>In order to fully understand the situation in Nauru, the climate impacts that everyone on the island is facing need to be addressed. The environmental disregard of wealthy nations hits frontline communities like Nauru first and, oftentimes, hardest. </p>
<p>The lives of those incarcerated on Nauru and of Indigenous Nauruans are all being detrimentally affected by choices that we, in Australia, make. This is true both in terms of allowing for human rights violations against asylum seekers and refugees, and in our continuing support for our national fossil fuel industry which is a massive contributor to global warming. </p>
<p>Australia plays a major role in the ongoing colonisation of the Pacific through aid, economics and security policies. It is our responsibility to push our governments to change Australia’s activities, and to support regional calls for self-determination and environmental justice. </p>
<p>We need to remember that Nauru wasn’t always like this. We helped make it what it is today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/105219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anja Kanngieser does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Nauru is best known as a site of Australian offshore asylum detention. But everyone on the island - not just refugees - is struggling with the issue of environmental change that threatens their lives and homes.Anja Kanngieser, Vice Chancellor's Research Fellow, University of WollongongLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/971742018-06-01T02:11:09Z2018-06-01T02:11:09ZNew Zealand’s Pacific reset: strategic anxieties about rising China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/220873/original/file-20180529-80633-82w0rq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">As China is extending its influence in the South Pacific, New Zealand has responded with increased aid for the region.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">from www.shutterstock.com</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China’s expanding influence is complicating strategic calculations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. </p>
<p>Small states, dependent on maintaining high levels of trade with China to secure their prosperity, are loathe to criticise or take actions that Beijing could find objectionable. This is creating a dilemma over how small states can protect their national interests at a time when China’s growing influence threatens the status quo. </p>
<p>New Zealand illustrates this dynamic. It watches China extend its influence into the microstates of the South Pacific, a region where New Zealand (and its ally Australia) have long enjoyed a position of prominent influence.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-debt-book-diplomacy-in-the-pacific-shouldnt-ring-alarm-bells-just-yet-96709">Why China's 'debt-book diplomacy' in the Pacific shouldn't ring alarm bells just yet</a>
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<h2>New Zealand’s Pacific reset</h2>
<p>The South Pacific is a geographic region encompassing 16 independent nations (and a number of associate nations and dependencies). The majority of these are microstates that face an array of economic, social and governance challenges and are vulnerable to natural disasters. </p>
<p>The two largest and most prosperous states by a fair margin are Australia and New Zealand. Historically, they have been the most dominant and influential players in the South Pacific. </p>
<p>Earlier this month, New Zealand’s minister of foreign affairs and trade, <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/minister/rt-hon-winston-peters">Winston Peters</a>, announced his government would <a href="https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/356903/714m-to-be-pumped-into-govt-s-pacific-reset-plan">spend an additional NZ$714 million over four years on international aid</a>, with the majority going to South Pacific nations. Peters explained that New Zealand’s interests in the region stem from its common Pacific identity, the desire to forge a path of shared prosperity and to uphold New Zealand’s national security that, he added, “is directly affected by the Pacific’s stability.”</p>
<p>Peter’s announcement of increased funding added substance to a <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/winston-peters-new-zealand-pacific">speech</a> he delivered to the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/">Lowy Institute</a> in Sydney in early March where he committed New Zealand to “shifting the dial” on its foreign policy approach towards the South Pacific. What went unstated – but was made unmistakably clear in Peter’s speech – was the increased role China is playing in the South Pacific and how this is “changing New Zealand’s relative influence”. </p>
<h2>Rising China, growing anxieties</h2>
<p>Long overdue, the New Zealand government’s renewed push is a soft-power response to a mounting dilemma that small states face in the Asia-Pacific region. In essence, as China’s power grows, it is leading Beijing to extend its influence into virtually every corner of the wider Asia-Pacific region. In the South Pacific, this influence is being secured through <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/bad-and-good-china-aid-pacific">aid</a>, loans (<a href="https://pcf.org.nz/news/2018-03-05/pacific-nations-drowning-in-chinese-debt">creating debt</a> South Pacific states may be unable to pay off) and <a href="https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2017/05/15/23681/chinese-money-is-changing-the-face-of-the-south-pacific">building projects</a>. </p>
<p>For a region comprised of fragile economies, China’s aid and loans can help bolster economic prospects. Yet, at the same time, China’s engagement is not selfless. A number of <a href="https://www.victoria.ac.nz/chinaresearchcentre/programmes-and-projects/china-symposiums/china-and-the-pacific-the-view-from-oceania/10-Yu-Changsen-The-Pacific-Islands-in-Chinese-Geo-strategic-Thinking.pdf">strategic interests drive it</a>. As China builds out its <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/going-blue-the-transformation-of-chinas-navy/">blue-water naval capabilities</a>, there are concerns that it may seek a military foothold in the region. </p>
<p>In March, reporting in Australia cited unnamed sources claiming that China was seeking an access agreement to dock its <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/09/china-is-reportedly-proposing-a-military-base-in-the-south-pacific.html">naval ships in Vanuatu</a> in lieu of establishing a permanent military presence. Both <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/10/concerns-china-in-talks-with-vanuatu-about-south-pacific-military-base">China</a> and <a href="https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12029582">Vanuatu</a> denied this claim. True or not, reporting such as this taps into a heightened level of strategic anxiety New Zealand and Australian officials are experiencing.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/response-to-rumours-of-a-chinese-military-base-in-vanuatu-speaks-volumes-about-australian-foreign-policy-94813">Response to rumours of a Chinese military base in Vanuatu speaks volumes about Australian foreign policy</a>
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<p>Given China’s ongoing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/06/photos-beijings-militarisation-south-china-sea-philippines">militarisation of the South China Sea</a> and Beijing’s rejection of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china">Hague Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling</a> in July 2016 against China’s expansive nine-dash-line territorial claims, New Zealand officials could be forgiven for raising questions over China’s long-term intentions in the South Pacific. </p>
<h2>Dilemma facing New Zealand</h2>
<p>The New Zealand government does not seek to exclude China from the South Pacific. In fact, it has looked to collaborate with Beijing where it can. The <a href="https://www.victoria.ac.nz/chinaresearchcentre/programmes-and-projects/china-symposiums/china-and-the-pacific-the-view-from-oceania/27-Pete-Zwart-The-Tripartite-China,-NZ,-Cook-Islands-A-NZ-Perspective.pdf">Tripartite Cook Islands/China/New Zealand Water Project </a>is an example of this, but the reset is clear evidence of Wellington’s desire to secure a role in the region as Beijing increases its influence. Yet, at this stage, New Zealand’s decision makers are acting as if there is very little they can do beyond responding with soft power in the form of increased aid and appeals to a common identity. </p>
<p>Ultimately, the constraints facing small states like New Zealand stem from their structural position relative to China, defined by an immense discrepancy in material resources. In short, China is an economic behemoth that, except for the United States, dwarfs every other country in the Asia-Pacific region. </p>
<p>While China is extremely important to the continued economic growth of small states in the Asia-Pacific, for Beijing these small states are relatively insignificant to its own economic fortunes. This gives China a potent lever to influence, compel and coerce states that draw its ire. </p>
<p>Larger economies such as the US and Japan have more room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis China’s increasing influence. Small states like New Zealand are walking a tight rope, lest they adopt positions Beijing finds regrettable and reduces or interferes with its trade. </p>
<p>For example, in 2010, Beijing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-china/norway-china-normalize-ties-after-nobel-peace-prize-row-idUSKBN1480R4">froze political ties with Norway</a> for awarding Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize. Negotiations over a free trade deal restarted only in 2016. South Korean companies were punished when their government agreed to <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/30/news/economy/china-hyundai-south-korea-thaad/index.html">purchase US missile defence systems</a>. </p>
<h2>What now for New Zealand?</h2>
<p>Recognising New Zealand’s structural position is not to suggest it is powerless in the face of China’s expanding influence in the South Pacific. However, it is all but certain that China’s regional influence will continue to grow at the expense of the influence New Zealand and Australia hold. Decisions will need to be made as to how New Zealand calibrates its foreign policy with this in mind.</p>
<p>One option would be to consider how great New Zealand’s dependence on China truly is. How resilient would New Zealand’s economy be if trade with China were to decrease? According to <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2299221/ey-oe-china-new-zealand-report-20150-may-2015.pdf">one report</a>, New Zealand’s economy would be vulnerable but more resilient than others in the region. </p>
<p>Ultimately, balancing China in the South Pacific will require greater coordination with Australia – still the Pacific’s largest donor – and reaching out to other states. Japan, South Korea and the US share concerns about China chipping away at their relative influence. However, Beijing could interpret increased collaboration with larger powers as a sign of regional containment of its growing influence. New Zealand could find itself punished in such a scenario, but running that risk may eventually become unavoidable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/97174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Reuben Steff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New Zealand’s foreign minister announced a NZ$714 million increase in aid for Pacific nations in a soft-power response to China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region.Reuben Steff, Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.