tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/safety-technology-117/articlesSafety technology – The Conversation2014-12-19T14:06:35Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/355722014-12-19T14:06:35Z2014-12-19T14:06:35ZAir traffic control system failure is too complex to fix in a day<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/67808/original/image-20141219-31542-1u9cvmf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could air traffic control's ageing, 20-year-old components be to blame?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PCB_corrosion.jpg">Binarysequence</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent computer systems failure at the <a href="http://www.nats.aero/about-us/what-we-do/our-control-centres/">National Air Traffic Services’ en-route control centre</a> (known as NERC) at Swanwick in Hampshire <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30454240">led to an airspace slowdown</a> over England and Wales, delaying or grounding hundreds of flights. </p>
<p>The failure lasted 45 minutes – and of around 6,000 flights passing through the affected region that day 120 were cancelled and 500 delayed for an average of 45 minutes. Inconvenient, maybe, but no one was endangered, let alone injured or killed.</p>
<p>Called before the parliamentary Transport Committee, the secretary of state for transport, Patrick McLoughlin, said the failure was “unacceptable”. Also appearing at a later session was NATS chief executive, Richard Deakin, who spent some time debating whether “unacceptable” was a term that could be correctly applied in the situation, and if so to whom. </p>
<p>Discussion continued concerning salaries, bonuses, organisational performance measures, the “independence” or not of potential inquiries and how much Deakin worked over the weekend.</p>
<p>I’m a systems person. Calling such a systems failure “unacceptable” is like calling the weather “unacceptable” – nobody wanted it to rain but complaining ain’t going to stop it. My questions aren’t about salaries or working hours, they are rather: why did the system fall over? Can we expect such things to happen again? Is there is anything anyone can do about it? If so, what?</p>
<h2>Inside the problem</h2>
<p>The primary failure appeared to be in <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/12/iregi_confirms_it_was_dodgy_flight_server_that_took_down_uk_air_traffic_control">flight-plan processing</a>, the committee heard, run on a system dating from the mid-1990s. Deakin said the <a href="http://www.nats.aero/news/swanwick-technical-failure-update-2145/">root cause had been identified</a> and a fix put in place to ensure it couldn’t happen again. </p>
<p>Now – contrary to worries I expressed to the Transport Sub-committee in 1997-8 during <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7636426.stm">NERC’s troubled development</a> – NERC has turned out pretty well, having fallen over only a few times in 13 years of service. It’s inevitable that big, complex, resilient, highly-interconnected programmable-electronic systems such as NERC will fall over eventually.</p>
<p>Some 20-year-old subsystem falls prey to a vulnerability never triggered before, and NATS claims to have discovered the root cause and put in a permanent fix, <a href="http://www.nats.aero/news/swanwick-technical-failure-update-2145/">in just over a day</a>. But hang on a minute. That analyse-and-fix is astonishingly fast for a complex, highly-interconnected system. It suggests to me that the vulnerability was obvious. When aircraft on-board systems suffer such failures, it takes weeks to months to years to analyse – even emergency measures take days to devise. That’s because they are subtle; obvious points of failure have already been identified and selected out. Compare: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We were driving down the road, and a wheel fell off. That hasn’t happened before. We put it right back on and tightened up all the bolts on all the wheels. It won’t happen again.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>with:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The air data computer sent a burst of erroneous airspeed spikes to the flight control computer. The flight control computer treated them as true and autonomously commanded pitch excursions [roller-coaster ups and downs], which injured some passengers who were not belted in. We have no idea why those spikes occurred. The flight control computer now filters such bursts out.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This second description is from the inquiry into <a href="http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/3532398/ao2008070.pdf">Qantas Flight 72</a>, conclusions which took years to reach.</p>
<h2>No easy solutions</h2>
<p>I wonder, is this really a problem solved? It’s not easy to devise lasting solutions to problems that don’t potentially bring new problems with them. And if everything is fixed, why is the first item on the terms of reference of the <a href="http://www.nats.aero/news/independent-inquiry-air-traffic-control-failure-announced/">proposed joint CAA/NATS inquiry</a> to review the “root cause”? If, implausibly, there is just one. Almost invariably there are many causes which can be called “root causes”, which is part of what makes devising solutions tricky.</p>
<p>When a wheel falls off, in hindsight it’s obvious that checking the bolts would have been a good idea. There are engineering methods that prompt us to think of such things in advance which work well for obvious vulnerabilities, but poorly for subtle ones. If Friday’s system vulnerability was so quick to analyse and fix, it was likely obvious. So why wasn’t it anticipated? What other obvious vulnerabilities are still lying around after two decades? Is anyone looking for them? </p>
<p>I bet NATS has a log of system anomalies which they are working through. How’s that going? Are there any gotchas on it which might cause the system to fall over next month? And why didn’t anybody at the Transport Committee ask NATS any of this?</p>
<p>Deakin also told the committee that: “We have never seen a repeat occurrence once a fix has been made.” That isn’t as reassuring as one might think. An <a href="http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5390362">investigation by IBM 30 years ago</a> into failures in a big software system estimated that about a third of observed failures would not be expected to arise ever again in the life of the system. That means that, statistically speaking, in about a third of cases doing nothing would be the best solution. By the same token, the same statistics would suggest that, even with perfect interventions, it is only possible to reduce the failure rate by, at most, two thirds.</p>
<p>As Benjamin Franklin might have said, in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes and complex-system failure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/35572/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Bernard Ladkin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The recent computer systems failure at the National Air Traffic Services’ en-route control centre (known as NERC) at Swanwick in Hampshire led to an airspace slowdown over England and Wales, delaying or…Peter Bernard Ladkin, Professor of Computer Networks and Distributed Systems, Bielefeld UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/185762013-11-26T06:25:20Z2013-11-26T06:25:20ZStuxnet is scary, but human safety should come first<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/36059/original/6ch5v2xt-1385382843.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Safety first, but which kind of safety?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">peretzp</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Critical national infrastructure keeps our water and electricity flowing, our payments running and our manufacturing and distribution moving. This infrastructure faces a new threat in the form of cyber-attacks, but in seeking to protect power stations from computer attacks, we may be taking our eye off the ball when it comes to more traditional safety concerns.</p>
<p>Much infrastructure relies on automated technology typically referred to as industrial control systems (ICS). These systems allow our physical environment to be affected by computers. They open valves, generate power, and sort parcels for delivery; all to meet our demands.</p>
<p>As the computers controlling these systems are becoming increasingly connected with other computer networks, and more importantly, the internet. These new connections provide access routes for attackers to probe and enter systems, potentially causing large scale disruption to the services we depend so heavily on. </p>
<p>This situation is made more severe by the long lifespan of industrial equipment. Many legacy devices are still in use which lack protection for the modern era. The recent <a href="http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-10/17/holes-that-open-power-stations-to-hacking">discovery of 25 vulnerabilities</a> on the devices that interconnect legacy and modern equipment in power stations is testament to this.</p>
<p>Fortunately, we have not yet seen significant disruption, but one particularly high profile case has shown all industries that use control systems that they might be a target in the future and that they need to prepare for potential attacks.</p>
<h2>The Stuxnet legacy</h2>
<p>In 2010, a piece of malicious software called Stuxnet was used to attack and disrupt the operation of uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, causing millions of pounds worth of damage and delaying the enrichment programme by several years.</p>
<p>It worked by spreading itself over the internet, infecting ordinary Microsoft Windows computers, as it searched for its target - a specific type of industrial control system component that was only produced in Iran and Finland. Once it found its targets, Stuxnet was then able to modify their operating parameters to dangerous conditions, while hiding this behaviour from the operators that supported the system. While Stuxnet has not been attributed to a specific attacker, there are numerous <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/07/edward-snowden-u-s-israel-co-wrote-cyber-super-weapon-stuxnet/">suspicions</a> as to where the malware was developed.</p>
<p>Stuxnet was scary for anyone using control systems. For the first time significant physical damage happened as a result of malware. </p>
<p>Since Stuxnet, industries producing and relying on control systems to automate their business have invested heavily in cyber defence, developing new technologies to protect these important infrastructures. Work so far has almost wholly been directed towards managing risks surrounding the protection of information, in a process known as information assurance. But that has implications for protecting infrastructure in other ways.</p>
<h2>Fail-safe vs fail-secure</h2>
<p>Industrial control systems have traditionally used a “fail-safe” design. If a system stops operating correctly, it shuts down to minimise damage to the environment and loss of life. Operations at a water treatment facility will shut down when water tankers reach dangerous capacity limits, for example. </p>
<p>Most information assurance approaches, on the other hand, advocate a “fail-secure” design methodology. When a system is attacked, mechanisms spring into action to prevent your information from falling into the wrong hands.</p>
<p>But these security goals are potentially at odds with one another. If a system fails and the first priority is to protect information, the shut down may cause the system to go into a dangerous state. If a wind turbine begins rotating dangerously fast and an automated system moves to shut it down, a fail-secure system may see this as anomalous or malicious behaviour, preventing the shutdown with potentially catastrophic consequences.</p>
<p>While you do need to protect the information held in control systems, in the event of an attack this should always be secondary to the protection of life and the environment.</p>
<h2>Safe and secure</h2>
<p>A counter-movement is emerging to try to reconcile the two approaches, ensuring that both people and information are protected if an attack occurs. Advocates would like to see industry taking a “functional assurance” approach. In the event of an attack, a system would enter both fail-safe and fail-secure modes. </p>
<p>The functional assurance concept goes beyond a simple concept of “on” or “off” in the face of an attack. Internet connected systems are under constant attack and must still carry on functioning. If an internet connected control system were to shut down every time it were attacked, it would never be on, so we need to start thinking about how to keep the systems running in the face of concentrated digital onslaught.</p>
<p>The aftermath of Stuxnet led to the development of security standards and guidance documents that specifically target industrial control systems. However, a survey has found that these documents are probably inadequate for helping operators to achieve functional assurance. The importance of safety was frequently highlighted, but is largely treated as a separate issue. Little attention is devoted to their complex inter-dependency, in particular the capability of failing both safely and securely.</p>
<p>Industry and governments are yet to work out how to deliver functional assurance, but they need to make progress. Industrial control system technologies are increasingly found not only in critical infrastructure, but in our personal environments, as we move towards living in smart cities. That means anything from traffic lights to home security could be attacked. Personal safety is at stake but we want to make our infrastructure work more efficiently, which makes the balance between protecting data and protecting people more important than ever.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/18576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Daniel Prince does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Critical national infrastructure keeps our water and electricity flowing, our payments running and our manufacturing and distribution moving. This infrastructure faces a new threat in the form of cyber-attacks…Daniel Prince, Associate Director Security Lancaster, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/43132011-11-16T02:57:00Z2011-11-16T02:57:00ZA great day for Western Australia’s sharks, and for public safety<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/5559/original/cottesloe_autumn_leaf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Western Australia's new dedication to shark research is good news for sharks, and for beachgoers.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">autumn_leaf</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Public concern following the <a href="http://theconversation.com/cull-or-be-killed-is-this-really-the-solution-to-stop-shark-attacks-3961">recent wave of shark attacks</a> in WA
initially prompted the government to respond with <a href="http://au.prime7.yahoo.com/n3/news/a/-/odd/10743976/wa-mulls-shark-culls-after-fatal-attack/">suggestions of a shark cull</a> to reduce numbers in a misguided attempt to improve public safety in the water.</p>
<p>Outraged by this news, myself and a colleague, <a href="http://theconversation.com/profiles/barbara-wueringer-5314">Barbara Wueringer</a>, gathered the support of <a href="http://theconversation.com/dont-kill-the-sharks-an-open-letter-to-western-australian-politicians-4172">over 120 scientists</a>, who work with sharks on a regular basis, to back a petition advising the WA government to adopt non-lethal shark mitigation measures. </p>
<p>In addition, we also set up a public <a href="http://www.thepetitionsite.com/4/stop-the-shark-cull/">petition</a>, sponsored by <a href="http://www.supportoursharks.com">Support Our Sharks</a>, which gathered over 19,000 names of people opposed to the culling of WA’s sharks.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/health-science/no-shark-cull-as-state-sets-up-research-unit/story-e6frg8y6-1226196063425">announcement this week</a> by WA Fisheries Minister Norman Moore, that the State Government will invest more than $13.65 million into non-lethal shark mitigation strategies, came as welcome news. </p>
<p>The State Government has ruled out:</p>
<ul>
<li>a major cull of white sharks to reduce numbers</li>
<li>any seal culling or relocation program</li>
<li>the creation of beach pools as a shark mitigation strategy</li>
<li>drum line programs to control white shark numbers.</li>
</ul>
<p>The new proposal will include increased Surf Lifesaving WA (SLWA) <a href="http://www.mybeach.com.au/node/126">helicopter surveillance patrols</a> along Perth beaches and Rottnest Island, with additional services to begin soon in the southwest. </p>
<p>A text message alert system, similar to the one used by the Fire and Emergency Services Authority, will warn people in at-risk areas that sharks are around. </p>
<p>A dedicated Shark Response Unit will be established to tag sharks resident near popular swimming beaches. It would also assess technologies like shark repellent devices. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/5562/original/shark_net_Luke_Redmond.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/5562/original/shark_net_Luke_Redmond.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5562/original/shark_net_Luke_Redmond.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5562/original/shark_net_Luke_Redmond.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5562/original/shark_net_Luke_Redmond.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5562/original/shark_net_Luke_Redmond.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/5562/original/shark_net_Luke_Redmond.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The WA Government will investigate whether shark nets are an option.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Luke Redmond</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In addition, the <a href="http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/">WA Department of Fisheries</a> will implement a community engagement strategy and media campaign to provide information about avoiding shark hazards.</p>
<p>While the WA Government does not currently support <a href="http://theconversation.com/the-untold-story-of-shark-nets-in-australia-3748">shark nets</a>, the Department of Fisheries say that they will evaluate the effectiveness of shark nets used in the eastern states. We will keep a close eye on any proposals for shark net installations in WA, as there is no scientific evidence that they are an effective measure to improve public safety. </p>
<p>Shark nets give the public a false sense of safety when in reality sharks are free to swim around the nets, often getting caught as they leave the shallow “protected” areas. Shark nets are indiscriminate and catch any and all marine life that come in to contact with them, including dolphins, turtles, whales, manta ray, dugongs and <a href="http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/boy-15-drowns-in-shark-net/story-e6frg12c-1111113167964">even humans</a>.</p>
<p>The WA State Government proposal for non-lethal shark mitigation measures is a great outcome for public safety and shark conservation. The shark mitigation measures outlined by WA Fisheries Minister Moore set a benchmark for other Australian states and will place WA as a national leader in beach safety and shark conservation. </p>
<p>On behalf of the 19,000 who signed the petition I would like to extend our sincere thanks to Norman Moore and members of the WA cabinet for reaching such a landmark decision. This is a great day for WA sharks and shark conservation worldwide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/4313/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryan Kempster is affiliated with Support Our Sharks (<a href="http://www.supportoursharks.com">www.supportoursharks.com</a>), an educational website aimed at improving the understanding and conservation of sharks and their relatives.
The University of Western Australia is a Founding Partner of The Conversation. </span></em></p>Public concern following the recent wave of shark attacks in WA initially prompted the government to respond with suggestions of a shark cull to reduce numbers in a misguided attempt to improve public…Ryan Kempster, Marine Neuroecologist, The University of Western AustraliaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/37482011-10-12T22:39:13Z2011-10-12T22:39:13ZThe untold story of shark nets in Australia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4389/original/shark_aap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Shark nets have been proven to hurt sharks, but does that help humans?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Western Australia’s Cottesloe Beach <a href="http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/10447317/tragic-undercurrent-to-a-perfect-cottesloe-day/">has been closed</a> due to concerns a swimmer there was taken by a great white shark. </p>
<p>The public is understandably worried, but the local mayor says <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/nets-ruled-out-as-the-shark-toll-keeps-rising/story-e6frg6nf-1226164299195">no shark nets</a> will be installed. Is this the right decision? Do shark nets work?</p>
<h2>How did all this netting get started?</h2>
<p>Along 51 beaches and 250 kilometers of New South Wales coastline, beach nets line the surf. </p>
<p>Beach nets were approved in 1935, but only as a two-year experiment. However, by 1937 there had been no shark bites and no Government funding. </p>
<p>The reason the state financed netting that year was NSW’s imminent 150th Anniversary: state politicians were worried there would be a shark attack during the celebration. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4393/original/sharknet_elektrik98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4393/original/sharknet_elektrik98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4393/original/sharknet_elektrik98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4393/original/sharknet_elektrik98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4393/original/sharknet_elektrik98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4393/original/sharknet_elektrik98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4393/original/sharknet_elektrik98.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1005&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Does the shark net make Balmoral safer, or is it just good politics?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">elektrik98</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the Second World War, beach nets were removed from ocean beaches so fisheries ships could be used by the Americans. For three years, between 1943 and 1946, there were no fatal shark bites at these un-netted beaches. </p>
<p>At the end of the war, New South Wales Premier William McKell announced in the Sydney Morning Herald that beach nets were “quite valueless”, noting that “since meshing ceased in January 1943, there had been no shark fatality on our beaches.” </p>
<p>However, instead of abandoning shark nets, the Premier announced plans to use them in combination with experimental shark repellents because: “if meshing alone were used, I fear it would prove to be of little value. Worse, it would possibly lull the public into a sense of false security, leading to diminished watchfulness and possibly to tragedy.” </p>
<p>With no shark bites and little threat in these locations, the nets were put back and expanded to the Illawarra and Hunter under this new plan of action.</p>
<p>Most recently, beach nets were re-endorsed in a <a href="http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/276029/Report-into-the-NSW-Shark-Meshing-Program.pdf">Department of Primary Industries Report</a> in 2009. </p>
<h2>What really stops shark fatalities?</h2>
<p>The DPI’s 2009 review provided a contemporary view of shark nets. Then Environment Minister Ian Macdonald called the nets “highly successful.” Yet the report of shark bite incidents from 1937-2008 showed that of the 38 shark attacks recorded in the state, 24 of them (63%) took place at netted beaches, with 14 injuries.</p>
<p>The Minister and Department correctly point out that there has been only one fatality at a netted beach (1951) under this program. </p>
<p>But attributing low fatality rates to beach nets is questionable. Internationally, fatality rates from shark bites have declined dramatically for all shark control methods, including doing nothing. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4391/original/shark_attack_aap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4391/original/shark_attack_aap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4391/original/shark_attack_aap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4391/original/shark_attack_aap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4391/original/shark_attack_aap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4391/original/shark_attack_aap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4391/original/shark_attack_aap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shark attacks cause terror, but are we using evidence to stop them?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Irish trauma researcher David Caldicott published <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0020138301000419">a study in 2001</a> showing the survival rate for shark bites is 80%, due to better on-scene treatment and antibiotics. The leading reason for fatalities was blood loss. </p>
<p>(In fact, when <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/01/27/1075088010711.html">Marcia Hathaway’s tragedy</a> took place in Sydney Harbour in 1963 the ambulance broke down.)</p>
<p>The Government’s shark bite data suggest a number of possibilities. It could be that the nets are vitally needed since there were clearly sharks in those regions. But the 63% failure rate raises fundamental questions about their effectiveness. </p>
<p>To be fair, beach nets aren’t just installed to prevent sharks and people interacting. Nets were originally used, in 1935, to cull populations so there would be fewer sharks and therefore fewer shark alarms. In the 2009 DPI report, it was argued that, although culling is indiscriminate, the goal is to kill larger sharks to reduce the risk of a fatal shark bite incident. And killing sharks (and other marine species) is one thing <a href="http://www.saveoursharks.com.au/Save_Our_Sharks_-_Shark_Nets.html">nets do very well</a>.</p>
<h2>Is there an alternative?</h2>
<p>At this point, I think it is important to recap the central elements.</p>
<p>First, shark nets were nearly left out of the report in 1935 and were only funded in 1937 as a precaution ahead of the state’s anniversary. </p>
<p>Second, there were no fatal shark bite incidents when the nets were removed for three years. </p>
<p>And third, nets have been deemed very successful even though 63% of shark attacks at ocean beaches in New South Wales have occurred at netted beaches. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4396/original/shark_net_Justin_Gaurav_Murgai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/4396/original/shark_net_Justin_Gaurav_Murgai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4396/original/shark_net_Justin_Gaurav_Murgai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4396/original/shark_net_Justin_Gaurav_Murgai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4396/original/shark_net_Justin_Gaurav_Murgai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4396/original/shark_net_Justin_Gaurav_Murgai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/4396/original/shark_net_Justin_Gaurav_Murgai.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">There must be alternatives.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Justin Gaurav Murgai</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In all, I suggest that at key points in the history of shark nets this has proven itself to be a story about people and politics rather than shark behaviour.</p>
<p>So what do we do instead? It is not a simple matter.</p>
<p>Beach nets are unique political dynamite. Indeed, the twitter post writes itself: “16 yr -old killed by shark at previously netted beach #bloodonourhands”. </p>
<p>Internationally, shark nets have been labeled a “<a href="http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/determinations/SharkControlKtp.htm">key threatening process</a>” for killing endangered species. </p>
<p>In 2011, killing endangered species to boost public confidence or to show government action is not workable. It is a disservice to the public. To restore an objective critique of this emotive issue we need a workable alternative.</p>
<h2>Time for Australia to catch up</h2>
<p>If killing sharks is taken off the table, then other innovative beach safety options are possible. In Cape Town, Florida, New Zealand and Hawaii, lethal shark control methods have been replaced by more modern beach safety tactics. </p>
<p>These tactics include greater uses of signs and flags to educate the public about marine hazards and using tracking devices on sharks to determine seasonal movements. This has begun in Sydney Harbour, but could be expanded. A fundamental question is whether shark safety should be based on decisions that governments make, with policies determining our personal level of risk in the water, or whether the public should be empowered and educated to make its own determinations?</p>
<p>This analysis is not intended to minimize the terrible consequences from shark bite incidents. Sharks do bite people and public safety measures should be taken. </p>
<p>It is not clear; however, if the status quo is actually working. </p>
<p>The truth about shark nets is also about “truth in government”. Government action and the public’s role cannot be obscured by the dreaded nature of these events. </p>
<p>The time has come for a new public dialogue about public education and beach safety regarding sharks, not simply because beach nets harm the environment, or because there are questions about whether they work, but because these 70-year-old tactics mean Australia is being left behind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/3748/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Neff gets a small grant from the Sydney Aquarium Conservation Fund.</span></em></p>Western Australia’s Cottesloe Beach has been closed due to concerns a swimmer there was taken by a great white shark. The public is understandably worried, but the local mayor says no shark nets will be…Christopher Pepin-Neff, PhD Scholar, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1432011-04-06T11:40:31Z2011-04-06T11:40:31ZBaby, can you drive my car?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/384/original/Dummies.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dummies</span> </figcaption></figure><figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129/original/800px-Google_Street_View_Car_in_Girraween.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129/original/800px-Google_Street_View_Car_in_Girraween.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129/original/800px-Google_Street_View_Car_in_Girraween.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129/original/800px-Google_Street_View_Car_in_Girraween.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129/original/800px-Google_Street_View_Car_in_Girraween.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129/original/800px-Google_Street_View_Car_in_Girraween.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129/original/800px-Google_Street_View_Car_in_Girraween.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Google’s driverless cars have clocked up more than 225,000km so far.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Timothy Swinson/Wikimedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since 1950, more than 150,000 people have died in motor vehicle crashes in Australia. The worst year was 1970, when 3,798 people lost their lives – more than 10 deaths each day. </p>
<p>Annual deaths are now below 1,400, despite the population almost doubling.</p>
<p>Significant progress has been made in the safety of roads and vehicles, and through the education and policing of road users, but there is clearly a long way to go. </p>
<h2>Who’s to blame?</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://www.rospa.com/events/pastevents/roadsafetycongress2010/Info/hillard-peter.pdf">Enhanced Crash Investigation study</a> conducted by the Monash University Accident Research Centre (MUARC) found that in the majority of crashes that resulted in serious injury, the driver was a contributing factor.</p>
<p>Fatigue, distraction/inattention, inexperience, excessive speed and driver error were most often to blame.</p>
<p>So, given that humans are fundamentally fallible, is the next step to take control from the driver and allow technology to take over?</p>
<h2>Self-driving cars</h2>
<p><a href="http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html">Google reported in September last year</a> that it was developing self-driving cars and that a test vehicle had logged over 225,000km on the west coast of the US. </p>
<p>The only crash that occurred during the trial was a rear-end collision to one of the test vehicles while it was stopped at a set of traffic signals. </p>
<p>Although the trials involved a human driver and software specialist, who were there to provide assistance whenever necessary, the vehicles will soon develop to the point where the driver may not be required.</p>
<h2>Implementation</h2>
<p>With this in mind, should we turn our attention to optimising the road system to accommodate autonomous vehicles that travel in close-knit “platoons”? </p>
<p>There would certainly be benefits to safety and efficiency if we went down this route.</p>
<p>Travel speeds could be managed automatically to minimise both crash occurrence and the risk of injury if a (very rare) crash was to occur. </p>
<p>Smoother traffic flows would also come about, meaning improved fuel consumption and reduced emissions.</p>
<p>That said, it seems unlikely that we will give up our control of our cars without a fight: the automobile is firmly entrenched as a symbol of personal identity and freedom. </p>
<p>It’s difficult to imagine an autonomous vehicle inspiring the same passion if the only control we have is in selecting where we want the car to drive us.</p>
<h2>A compromise?</h2>
<p>One <a href="https://www.onlinepublications.austroads.com.au/items/AP-R375-11">recent study</a> by MUARC has found that the figure of 29,000 people killed and seriously injured on the roads each year in Australia could be reduced by 25-35% by implementing collision-avoidance technologies using Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC). </p>
<p>The system would equip vehicles with GPS and a high-speed radio unit to broadcast location information to surrounding vehicles. </p>
<p>A system of this kind has already been trialled in Australia and around the world in an attempt to reduce intersection crashes.</p>
<p>Crashes between vehicles at intersections cause up to 31% of serious casualties across Australia and closer to 50% in urban areas. </p>
<p>The in-vehicle DSRC application detects the approach speed and location of surrounding vehicles and determines whether a collision is likely to occur. </p>
<p>A mix of audio and visual warnings are provided to the driver, increasing in intensity as the time to collision becomes shorter. </p>
<p>These alarms allow the driver to brake and avoid a crash that would otherwise be inevitable due to obscured sight lines, driver distraction or red light-running by the other driver. </p>
<p>We think these measures could prevent about 9,000 serious casualties a year in Australia and could result in direct and indirect savings of around $3 billion annually. </p>
<h2>At a crossroads</h2>
<p>There is a way, then, to help eliminate a sizeable proportion of road trauma without having to give up control of our cars. </p>
<p>It will take a number of years and substantial commitment by vehicle manufacturers, government and research and commercial organisations before full benefits are realised.</p>
<p>But if we do go down this road it will be another step towards eliminating the enormous cost of road trauma that has been with us since the invention of the automobile.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Logan, through the Monash University Accident Research Centre, is affiliated with the AusDSRC industry cluster.</span></em></p>Since 1950, more than 150,000 people have died in motor vehicle crashes in Australia. The worst year was 1970, when 3,798 people lost their lives – more than 10 deaths each day. Annual deaths are now below…David Logan, Senior Research Fellow, Monash University Accident Research Centre, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.