tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/terrorism-518/articlesTerrorism – The Conversation2024-03-28T12:58:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265702024-03-28T12:58:02Z2024-03-28T12:58:02ZMoscow terror attack showed growing reach of ISIS-K – could the US be next?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584987/original/file-20240328-18-qt434b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C270%2C5115%2C3160&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 140 people died in the Crocus City Hall assualt in Moscow on March 22, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-shows-the-burning-crocus-city-hall-concert-hall-news-photo/2097708778?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">deadly attack in Moscow</a> on March 22, 2024, exposed the vulnerability of the Russian capital to the threat of the Islamic State group and its affiliate ISIS-K. But it also displayed the reach of the network, leading some <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2024/03/26/isis-k-moscow-attack/">terror experts to ponder</a>: Could a U.S. city be next?</p>
<p>There has not been a mass casualty assault in the U.S. carried out in the name of the Islamic State group since 2017, when a truck <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/sayfullo-saipov-be-sentenced-life-prison-2017-truck-attack-isis">mowed down cyclists and pedestrians on a New York City bikeway</a>, leaving eight dead.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-islamic-state-five-years-later-persistent-threats-u-s-options/">five years after the Islamic State group’s territorial defeat</a> in Baghuz, Syria, had prompted hopes that the terrorist network was in terminal decline, a recent spate of attacks has thrust the group back into the spotlight. On the same day as the Moscow atrocity, an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/21/at-least-three-killed-in-suicide-bombing-in-afghan-city-of-kandahar">ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kandahar, Afghanistan</a>, resulted in the deaths of at least 21 people.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">terrorism expert and a scholar</a> specializing in radical Islamist militant groups and the geographical scope of their attacks, I believe these incidents underscore the growing threat of ISIS-K both within the region it draws support from and on an international scale. </p>
<h2>Amplifying influence</h2>
<p>A successful terror attack on a Western capital is certainly something ISIS-K, or Islamic State Khorasan Province, aspires to. The intent behind the group’s activities is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">bolster its position among jihadist factions</a> by means of audacious and sophisticated attacks.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man sits looking at screens with Tome, Madrid and London on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An image released by pro-Islamic State media outlet Al Battar Foundation reads ‘After Moscow, who is next?’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.memri.org/jttm/posters-pro-islamic-state-isis-media-groups-celebrate-moscow-attack-threaten-and-incite-further">Al-Battar Foundation</a></span>
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<p>It is a strategy that showcases ISIS-K’s capabilities for spectacular operations, distinguishing it from potential rival groups. But it also enhances ISIS-K’s appeal, attracting both supporters and resources in the shape of funding and fighters.</p>
<p>By establishing a unique identity in a crowded extremist landscape, ISIS-K aims to undercut its competitors’ influence and assert its dominance in the jihadist sphere of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/25/the-strange-story-behind-the-khorasan-groups-name/">Khorasan region</a> it targets, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other Central Asian countries.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s ambition <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/moscow-concert-hall-attack-will-have-far-reaching-impact">extends</a> beyond territorial control, engaging in a broader contest for ideological supremacy and resource acquisition globally.</p>
<h2>An expanding threat</h2>
<p>This global reach and ambition are evident in ISIS-K’s recent planned operations.</p>
<p>These include a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kerman-us-warning-isisk-bombings-bcb47f04165b3eb7b9bc7b4868c8399c">suicide bombing in Iran</a> in January 2024 and thwarted attacks across Europe, notably <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/world/4418496-germany-netherlands-arrest-9-over-alleged-plan-attacks-line-isis">the foiled plots</a> in Germany and the Netherlands in July 2023.</p>
<p>And without a doubt, a successful attack in the United States is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-khorasan-could-be-first-afghan-terror-group-to-put-us-in-its-sights/6241617.html">seen within ISIS-K’s hierarchy as a major goal</a>.</p>
<p>Since the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/25/1240780292/us-officials-warn-of-isis-k-threat">officials in the Biden administration have repeatedly</a> warned of ISIS-K’s escalating danger to American interests, both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-khurasan-mocks-us-hysteria">propaganda has persistently framed</a> the U.S. as its principal enemy – a narrative that is fueled by America’s <a href="https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/">extensive</a> military and economic efforts to dismantle Islamic State operations since 2014.</p>
<p>The United States’ involvement, especially in <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">collaboration</a> with the Taliban — ISIS-K’s primary regional adversary — has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/event/115th-congress/house-event/108344/text">placed America firmly</a> in the group’s crosshairs. </p>
<p>Employing <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CTC-Beyond-the-Caliphate-Belgium.pdf">tactics refined during</a> the period that the Islamic State group was most active, ISIS-K seeks to inspire lone-wolf attacks and radicalize individuals in the U.S.</p>
<p>The 2015 mass shooting in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/05/us/san-bernardino-shooting/index.html">San Bernardino</a>, California, which left 14 dead, and the 2016 shooting at a nightclub in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/index.html">Orlando</a>, Florida, that resulted in at least 49 deaths, were both attacks inspired by the Islamic State group.</p>
<h2>Targeting major powers</h2>
<p>Taking its lead from the Islamic State group, ISIS-K in 2022 <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/09/islamic-state-afghanistan-khorasan-propaganda-russia-ukraine-war/">publicly condemned</a> America, calling it an enemy of Islam.</p>
<p>Of course, ISIS-K had by then already demonstrated its intention to harm U.S. interests, notably in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/us-to-conduct-new-interviews-into-the-deadly-2021-bombing-at-kabul-airport">2021 Kabul airport attack</a> in which 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans were killed.</p>
<p>ISIS-K views the U.S. in much the same way as it does Russia: both as a military and an ideological foe.</p>
<p>Russia became a prime target due in part to its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">partnering with the Bashar al-Assad government</a> in Syria in operations against Islamic State group affiliates. Similarly, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/22/taliban-isis-drones-afghanistan/">Washington has worked with the Taliban</a> in Afghanistan in countering ISIS-K operations.</p>
<p>While it is easier for ISIS-K to penetrate Russian territory, given the country’s geographical proximity to major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/islamic-state-recruiting-militants-from-tajikistan-and-other-central-asian-countries">Islamist recruitment centers, such as Tajikistan</a>, the potential for strikes in the United States remains significant. </p>
<p>In 2023, U.S. authorities <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/29/politics/migrants-us-southern-border-smuggler-isis-ties/index.html">investigated</a> a group of Uzbek nationals suspected of entering the country from Mexico with the assistance of traffickers linked to the Islamic State group, underscoring the group’s threat.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The wreckage of a truck under a blue sheet is seen being towed away." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C2314%2C1367&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Eight people died in a truck attack in New York City in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BikePathAttack/c09a4360d6b74c0c968a3897dbfa37f0/photo?Query=hudson%20bike%20%20attack&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=38&currentItemNo=27">AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews</a></span>
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<p>Targeting American interests serve multiple purposes for ISIS-K. By striking against the U.S., ISIS-K not only retaliates against Washington’s counterterrorism efforts but also aims to deter U.S. involvement in regions of interest to ISIS-K.</p>
<p>It also taps into historical grievances against the U.S. and Western interventions in Muslim countries – from the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to the stationing of U.S. troops in significant Islamic centers in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/osama-bin-laden">notably Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<h2>Countering a persistent threat</h2>
<p>In response to the growing threat of Islamic State group affiliates, the United States has <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf">adopted a comprehensive strategy</a> combining military, intelligence and law enforcement efforts. </p>
<p>Military operations have targeted ISIS-K leaders and infrastructure in Afghanistan, while security cooperation with regional and international <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-uzbekistan-relations/">partners such as Uzbekistan</a> continues to monitor and counter the group’s activities. </p>
<p>On the home front, law enforcement and homeland security agencies remain vigilant, <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023-03-28%20-%20Testimony%20-%20Mayorkas.pdf">working to identify</a> and thwart potential ISIS-K plots.</p>
<p>But as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-cia-terrorism-government-and-politics-87fb25aa94f4e4a8a46d82368f907be9">many experts had warned</a>, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has posed new challenges, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/al-qaeda-a-defeated-threat-think-again/">inadvertently transforming</a> that country once again into a safe haven and operational base for terrorist groups.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">retreat has also resulted</a> in a significant loss of on-the-ground intelligence amid <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html">doubts</a> over the efficacy of relying on the Taliban for counterterrorism operations.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">Taliban are struggling</a> to prevent or counteract ISIS-K attacks within their own borders.</p>
<p>The successful ISIS-K plots against Iran and Russia also reveal another vulnerability: When a country is distracted or <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-k-allowed-slipped-into-moscow-massacre-because-war-zelenskyy-2024-3#:%7E:text=The%20war%20in%20Ukraine%20distracted,in%20his%20Saturday%20night%20address.">preoccupied with other security concerns or conflicts</a>, it can potentially compromise the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts.</p>
<p>Recent years have witnessed a decrease in high-profile attacks by groups like the Islamic State, leading many to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-sees-islamic-state-effectiveness-decreasing-but-analysts-warn-resurgence-still-possible-/7238289.html">conclude</a> that the threat was waning. As a result, global attention — and with it, intelligence and security resources — has shifted toward escalating power rivalries and conflicts across the Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.</p>
<p>Yet, this shift risks underestimating the enduring threat terrorist groups pose, laying bare the dangers of complacency.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack emphasizes ISIS-K’s resolve to expand its influence, raising concerns about the potential threat to Western nations, including the United States. Considering ISIS-K’s track record and clear aspirations, it would be naive to dismiss the possibility of an attack on American soil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spate of terror operations carried out by the Islamic State group affiliate has raised concerns over a potential attack on US soil.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265592024-03-25T18:55:03Z2024-03-25T18:55:03ZWhy Russia fears the emergence of Tajik terrorists<p>It has emerged that the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68652380">four gunmen charged</a> in the murder of at least 139 concert-goers at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall theatre <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68652380">were all citizens</a> of the small post-Soviet nation of Tajikistan in Central Asia. </p>
<p>Does their nationality have anything to do with their alleged terrorism? Many Russians probably think so.</p>
<p>Tajikistan, a landlocked country of 10 million sandwiched between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and China, is the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/tajikistan/">most impoverished</a> of the former Soviet republics. Known for its corruption and political repression, it has chafed under the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tajikistans-eternal-ruler-emomali-rakhmon/a-55234401">iron-fisted rule</a> of President Emomali Rahmon since 1994. </p>
<p>There are estimated to be well over <a href="https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220214/more-than-3-million-tajik-citizens-reportedly-officially-registered-in-russia-last-year">three million Tajiks</a> living in Russia, about one-third of the total Tajik population. Most of them hold the precarious status of “<a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/pressure-central-asian-migrants-russia-grows">guest workers</a>,” holding low-paying jobs in construction, produce markets or even cleaning public toilets. </p>
<p>While Russia’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/04/russias-population-nightmare-is-going-to-get-even-worse">declining population</a> has led to increasing reliance on foreign workers to fill such needs within its labour force, the attitude of Russians towards natives of Central Asia and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Caucasus">the Caucasus region</a> is generally negative. </p>
<p>It’s similar to the American stereotype about Mexicans so infamously expressed by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/">Donald Trump</a> in 2015: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.” </p>
<p>Non-Slavs are systematically <a href="https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/resource/online-russian-language-hate-and-discrimination-against-central-asian-migrants/">discriminated against</a> in Russia, and since 2022 they have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/1/is-russia-recruiting-muslim-migrants-to-fight-its-war-in-ukraine">disproportionately conscripted</a> and sent to Ukraine to serve as cannon fodder at the front.</p>
<h2>Tajik exclusion</h2>
<p>As I have described in a <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/history-of-the-tajiks-9780755649655/">recent book</a>, few nations in history have seen their standing so dramatically reduced as the Tajiks have over the past 100 years. </p>
<p>For more than a millennium, the <a href="https://sogdians.si.edu/introduction/">Tajiks — Persian-speaking descendants of the ancient Sogdians who dominated the Silk Road</a> — were Central Asia’s cultural elite. </p>
<p>Beginning with what’s known as the <a href="https://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Geography/samanid.htm">New Persian Renaissance of the 10th century</a> when their capital, Bukhara, came to rival Baghdad as a centre of Islamic learning and high culture, Tajiks were the principal scholars and bureaucrats of Central Asia’s major cities right up to the time of the Russian Revolution. </p>
<p>The famous medieval polymath Avicenna was an ethnic Tajik, as were the hadith collector Bukhari, the Sufi poet Rumi, and many others.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/avicenna-the-persian-polymath-who-shaped-modern-science-medicine-and-philosophy-142667">Avicenna: the Persian polymath who shaped modern science, medicine and philosophy</a>
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<p>But as the most significant purveyors of Central Asia’s Islamic civilization, Tajiks were seen by the Bolsheviks as representing an obsolete legacy that socialism aimed to overcome. </p>
<p>The Tajiks were virtually excluded from the massive social and political restructuring imposed on Central Asia during the early years of the Soviet Union, with most of their historical territory, including the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03068377608729816">fabled cities of Samarkand and Bukhara</a>, being awarded to the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks who were seen as being more malleable. </p>
<p>Only as late as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Tajikistan">1929 were the Tajiks given their own republic</a>, consisting mostly of marginal, mountainous territory and deprived of any major urban centres.</p>
<h2>Impoverished</h2>
<p>Throughout the 20th century, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/tajikistan/tajikistan-poverty-biggest-threat-peace">Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was the most impoverished and underdeveloped</a> region of the former Soviet Union, and it has retained that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-post-soviet-world-need-to-know-tajikistan">unfortunate status</a> since independence in 1991. </p>
<p>From 1992-1997, the country was plunged into a devastating civil war that destroyed what infrastructure remained from the Soviet period. Since that time, Rahmon has used the threat of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/25/how-tajikistans-president-extended-his-term-for-life-rahmon-isis-migrant-imf/">renewed civil conflict</a> to vindicate his absolute rule. </p>
<p>The spectre of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/rahmon-tajikistan-taliban/31476036.html">radical Islam</a> emanating from neighbouring Afghanistan — <a href="https://minorityrights.org/communities/tajiks/">where the Tajik population considerably outnumbers that of Tajikistan</a> — has provided additional justification for Rahmon’s repressive policies.</p>
<p>In today’s Tajikistan even those with a university education find it almost <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11398444">impossible to earn a salary</a> that would enable them to build a normal family life. </p>
<p>Disempowered and humiliated by the system, they are easy prey for radical Islamic preachers who give them a sense of value and purpose. </p>
<p>The added backdrop of financial desperation makes for an explosive cocktail: one of the suspects in the recent Moscow attacks reportedly told his Russian interrogators that he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/25/four-men-showing-signs-of-severe-beating-charged-over-moscow-concert-attack">was promised a cash reward of half a million Russian rubles (about US$5,300) to carry out his alleged atrocities.</a>.</p>
<h2>Terrorism as desperation?</h2>
<p>Normal, sane human beings everywhere are horrified by terrorist acts regardless of how they are justified by their perpetrators, and the long-suffering people of Tajikistan are no exception.</p>
<p>But unfortunately, the conditions under which a small number of extremists can perceive the psychopathic murder of innocent civilians for cash or ideology as an attractive option show no signs of abating. </p>
<p>Russia’s laughable attempt to somehow link the Moscow attacks <a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-ks-attack-in-moscow-risks-escalating-the-russia-ukraine-war-226472">to Ukraine</a> is a clumsy diversion from the consequences of its relations with Central Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Foltz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>News that four of the suspects in the Moscow terror attacks are Tajik will likely result in further demonization against people already facing poverty and discrimination, despite a glorious history.Richard Foltz, Professor of Religions and Cultures, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264692024-03-24T22:20:44Z2024-03-24T22:20:44ZHow Moscow terror attack fits ISIS-K strategy to widen agenda, take fight to its perceived enemies<p><em>Russia is reeling from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/23/world/moscow-shooting">worst terror strike on its soil in a generation</a> following an attack on March 22, 2024, that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-islamic-state-753291d25dad26a840459ee8f448d59e">killed at least 137 concertgoers</a> in Moscow.</em></p>
<p><em>The attack has been <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/23/islamic-state-khorasan-isis-moscow-explainer/">claimed by the Islamic State group</a>. And <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/24/vladimir-putin-terror-attack-russia/">despite Russian authorities expressing doubt</a> over the claim, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-moscow-concert-hall-attack-islamic-state-753291d25dad26a840459ee8f448d59e">U.S. officials told The Associated Press</a> that they believed ISIS-K, a South and Central Asian affiliate of the terrorist organization, was behind the assault.</em></p>
<p><em>It comes amid heightened concern over the scope of ISIS-K activities following recent terrorist operations in countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">including Iran</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/asia/pakistan-bombing-isis.html">and Pakistan</a>. The Conversation turned to <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/cbshs/about/profiles/index.html?userid=ajadoon">Clemson University’s Amira Jadoon</a> and <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">Sara Harmouch of American University</a> – terrorism experts who have tracked the activities of ISIS-K – to explain what this latest deadly attack tells us about the organization’s strengths and agenda.</em></p>
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<h2>What is ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K, short for Islamic State Khorasan Province, is a <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">regional affiliate</a> of the larger Islamic State group.</p>
<p>The affiliate group <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">operates primarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region</a>, although it has presence throughout the historical “Khorasan” – a region that includes parts of the modern-day nations of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, along with other Central Asian countries. </p>
<p>Established in 2015, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K aims to establish</a> a physical “caliphate” – a system of governing a society under strict Islamic Sharia law and under religious leadership – in the South and Central Asian region.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s beliefs follow the ideology of its parent organization, the Islamic State group, which promotes an extreme interpretation of Islam and sees secular government actors, as well as non-Muslim and Muslim minority civilian populations, as legitimate targets.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in fatigues stands on rubble, broken walls are behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583877/original/file-20240324-18-svv0x3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter checks a destroyed ISIS-K safehouse on Feb. 14, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/699c02b437504085a34732c9264ae1d9?ext=true">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
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<p>The group is known for its extreme brutality and for targeting both government institutions and civilians, including mosques, educational institutions and public spaces.</p>
<p>Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, ISIS-K’s key objectives <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-k-resurgence">have been to diminish</a> the <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">now-ruling Taliban’s legitimacy</a> in the war-ravaged nation, assert itself as the rightful leader of the Muslim community and emerge as the principal regional adversary to regimes it deems oppressive. </p>
<p>Moreover, the Taliban’s transition from an insurgency group to a governing entity left numerous militant factions in Afghanistan without a unifying force – a gap that ISIS-K has aimed to fill.</p>
<h2>Why was Russia targeted by ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K has <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-islamic-states-anti-russia-propaganda-campaign-and-criticism-of-taliban-russian-relations/">long framed</a> Russia as one of its main adversaries. It has heavily featured anti-Russian rhetoric in its propaganda and <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">has attacked</a> Russia’s presence within Afghanistan. This includes a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blast-in-kabul-kills-2-russian-embassy-staff-/6731342.html">suicide attack</a> on Russia’s embassy in Kabul in 2022 that left two Russian Embassy staff and six Afghans dead.</p>
<p>The broader Islamic State group has targeted Russia for several reasons.</p>
<p>They include <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">long-standing grievances</a> relating to Moscow’s historical interventions in Muslim-majority regions like Chechnya and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia’s partnerships with regimes opposed by the Islamic State group, notably Syria and Iran, have <a href="https://doi.org//10.1080/09546553.2019.1657097?journalCode=ftpv20">positioned Russia as a primary adversary</a> in the eyes of the terrorist organization and its affiliates. </p>
<p>In particular, Russia has been a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">key ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad</a> since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, providing military support to the Assad regime against various opposition groups, including the Islamic State group.</p>
<p>This direct opposition to the terrorist group and its caliphate ambitions has rendered Russia as a prime target for retaliation.</p>
<p>Moreover, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90584">Russia’s cooperation</a> with the Taliban – ISIS-K’s key nemesis in Afghanistan – adds another layer of animosity. The Islamic State group views countries and groups that oppose its ideology or military objectives <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/Criezis_CreateConnectDeceive_09222022_0.pdf">as enemies</a> of Islam, including actors who seek to establish relations with the Taliban.</p>
<p>By attacking Russian targets, ISIS-K in part seeks to deter further Russian involvement in the Middle East. But also, such attacks provide high publicity for its cause and aim to inspire its supporters worldwide.</p>
<p>As such, for the Islamic State brand, the Moscow attack serves as retribution for perceived grievances held against Russia, while also projecting global reach. This approach can provide significant dividends, especially for its South and Central Asian affiliate, in the form of increased recruitment, funding and influence across the jihadist spectrum.</p>
<h2>What does the attack tell us about ISIS-K capabilities?</h2>
<p>The mere association of ISIS-K with this attack, whether it was directly or indirectly involved, bolsters the group’s reputation.</p>
<p>Overall, the attack signals ISIS-K’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">growing influence</a> and its determination to make its presence felt on the global stage.</p>
<p>Being linked to a high-profile attack in a major city far from its base in Afghanistan indicates that ISIS-K can extend its operational reach either directly or through collaboration with like-minded militant factions.</p>
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<img alt="People gather around a stretcher with an injured person lying on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583878/original/file-20240324-16-ajuqor.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">More than 100 people were killed in a blast in Kerman, Iran, on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kerman-iran-iranian-emergency-services-arrive-at-the-scene-news-photo/1898125916?adppopup=true">Mahdi/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>The scale and sophistication of the attack reflect advanced planning, coordination and execution capabilities. This only reaffirms unequivocally ISIS-K’s intent, adaptability and determination to internationalize its agenda. </p>
<p>Similar to ISIS-K’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">attack in Iran</a> in January 2024 that left over 100 dead, this latest atrocity serves to reinforce ISIS-K’s stated commitment to the broader global jihadist agenda of the Islamic State group, and helps broaden the appeal of its ideology and recruitment campaign.</p>
<h2>How does this fit ISIS-K’s strategy?</h2>
<p>The attack in Moscow serves as a powerful recruitment and propaganda tool by attracting international media attention to the group. This allows it to remain politically relevant to its audiences across South and Central Asia, and beyond. </p>
<p>But it also helps divert attention from local setbacks for ISIS-K. Like its parent organization Islamic State group, ISIS-K has been confronted with military defeats, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/25/politics/isis-k-leader-killed-taliban-kabul-airport-bombing/index.html">loss of territory and leadership</a> and diminishing resources.</p>
<p>In the face of such challenges, ISIS-K’s potential links to the attack in Moscow remind observers of its persistent threat and adaptability.</p>
<p>By targeting a major power like Russia, ISIS-K aims to project a broader message of intimidation aimed at other states involved in anti-Islamic State group operations and undermine the public’s sense of security.</p>
<p>Additionally, operations such as the Moscow attack seek to solidify ISIS-K’s position within the broader Islamic State group network, potentially securing more support and resources.</p>
<p>More broadly, the strategy follows a process of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">internationalizing” ISIS-K’s agenda</a> – something it has pursued with renewed vigor since 2021 by targeting the countries with a presence in Afghanistan, including Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China and Russia, marking a deliberate expansion of its operational focus beyond local borders.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack, following the January assault in Iran, suggests that ISIS-K is intensifying efforts to export its ideological fight directly to the territories of sovereign nations.</p>
<p>It is a calculated strategy and, as the Moscow attack has exemplified, one that has the potential to strike fear in capitals far beyond ISIS-K’s traditional base.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226469/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>At least 137 people were killed in the Moscow attack – the latest in a a series of ISIS-K operations outside its traditional stronghold.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264722024-03-24T12:06:44Z2024-03-24T12:06:44ZISIS-K’s attack in Moscow risks escalating the Russia-Ukraine war<p>A music concert in suburban Moscow became the scene of a bloody terrorist attack on March 22 as gunmen with automatic weapons and Molotov cocktails <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/moscow-russia-shooting-03-23-24/index.html">killed more than 130 people</a> and injured dozens more. </p>
<p>Immediately after the attack, speculation emerged about who was responsible.</p>
<p>Although Ukraine was quick <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/ukraine-denies-involvement-in-moscow-terrorist-attack-as-putin-presses-upon-us-for-information/ar-BB1knhBz">to deny any involvement</a>, Russian President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-attack-putin.html">Vladimir Putin used a short televised statement</a> to his nation to suggest, without evidence, that Ukraine was prepared to help the terrorists escape.</p>
<p>However, ISIS — and specifically its Afghanistan subsidiary ISIS-K — later <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoniopequenoiv/2024/03/22/isis-claims-responsibility-for-moscow-shooting-that-left-40-dead/?sh=1edfabbc7d0d">claimed credit</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464">Why would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?</a>
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<p>Russia has yet to acknowledge ISIS was responsible. But regardless of who the terrorists were representing, the Moscow attack demonstrates two key concerns.</p>
<p>First, terrorist organizations — meaning those who use violence for political purposes without the specific backing of a government — can use pre-existing conflicts and the resulting media attention to advance their interests. Second, the actions of these organizations have the potential to further exacerbate ongoing conflicts.</p>
<h2>The use of sub-state paramilitaries</h2>
<p>Many countries find it useful to employ sub-state entities and paramilitaries to achieve their objectives. <a href="https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441">Both Russia and Ukraine have used and continue to employ such groups</a> to conduct acts their soldiers are ill-suited to carry out or where plausible deniability is needed. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/paramilitaries-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-could-escalate-and-expand-the-conflict-206441">Paramilitaries in the Russia-Ukraine war could escalate and expand the conflict</a>
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<p>While using these forces has certain <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003193227/serbian-paramilitaries-breakup-yugoslavia-iva-vuku%C5%A1i%C4%87">advantages for a country</a>, it’s simultaneously problematic because it leads to questions over who is actually behind the actions.</p>
<p>Attacks earlier this year by Yemen-based Houthi groups on ships in the Red Sea are an example of this issue. The Houthi are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/irans-support-houthis-what-know">commonly seen</a> as an Iranian proxy group. Even though there are close ties between the Houthi and the Iranian state, the Houthi <a href="https://theconversation.com/yemens-houthis-and-why-theyre-not-simply-a-proxy-of-iran-123708">are not controlled by Iran</a>. Assuming Iran is directly behind the attack on Red Sea shipping is at best questionable and at worst outright false.</p>
<p>While assessing the role that a state has in <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/five-myths-about-sponsor-proxy-relationships">directing its proxies and paramilitaries</a> is difficult, this pales in comparison to the difficulty in linking states to international terrorist organizations. It is an ambiguity that terrorist groups can exploit.</p>
<h2>Media attention: Oxygen for terrorists</h2>
<p>Defining terrorism is an exercise fraught with peril. The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/disciplining-terror/terrorism-fever-the-first-war-on-terror-and-the-politicization-of-expertise/12E123D58AA0437750CB882B066E2B6B">politicization of the term</a> since the post-9/11 war on terror has given new meaning to the expression that “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/is-one-mans-terrorist-another-mans-freedom-fighter/257245/">one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter</a>.”</p>
<p>Typically, however, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/defining-terrorism">policymakers</a> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/is-terrorism-necessarily-violent-public-perceptions-of-nonviolence-and-terrorism-in-conflict-settings/9BA6C161346EEE1563A7DC2639066A02">and academics</a> define terrorist groups as non-state organizations that seek to use violence or the threat of violence against civilians to achieve political objectives, with some ambiguity on which entities can perform it.</p>
<p>In the 21st century, the diffusion of <a href="https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/scales-dynamics-outsourcing/14566">communication technologies</a> and the <a href="https://archive.org/details/whatsnextproblem0000unse/page/82/mode/2up">24-hour news cycle</a> has provided terrorist groups with newfound means to capture international attention.</p>
<p>Video can be uploaded in real time by terrorist groups, and international attention can soon follow. The news media, however, is <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/7/9/the-problem-is-not-negative-western-media-coverage-of-africa/">highly selective</a> in what it covers.</p>
<p>Due to media selectivity, terrorist organizations seek <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272717301214">to maximize their audience</a>. One way to do so is by linking their activities to ongoing events. ISIS-K’s attack in Moscow demonstrates this trend.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s decision to attack the Moscow music venue was not purely opportunistic. ISIS and its subsidiary organizations <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-23/what-is-isis-k-moscow-terror-attack/103623852">blame Russia</a> for its role in destroying ISIS in Syria and Iraq.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s strike against Moscow therefore fits its own agenda, while also advancing its goals. The problem is the potential for escalation.</p>
<h2>Escalating the Russia-Ukraine conflict</h2>
<p>There is still much that is unknown about the attack. One can, however, draw out some of the potential consequences.</p>
<p>American authorities had <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/23/europe/us-had-warned-russia-isis-was-determined-to-attack-intl-hnk/index.html">previously warned Russia</a> that an attack was imminent. The Russian authorities dismissed the warning.</p>
<p>Putin even stated before the attack that American <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-dismissed-us-warnings-about-a-potential-terror-incident-as-blackmail-just-3-days-before-concert-hall-attack/ar-BB1knpXu">warnings to that effect</a> were a form of blackmail. So even a genuine warning from the United States was seen by Russian authorities in the light of the broader Russia-Ukraine conflict.</p>
<p>The aftermath of the attack has the potential to magnify these concerns. Putin claimed that four people involved in the conflict were captured <a href="https://uk.news.yahoo.com/moscow-attackers-were-helped-ukraine-180044785.html?guccounter=1">attempting to flee</a> to Ukraine.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-would-islamic-state-attack-russia-and-what-does-this-mean-for-the-terrorism-threat-globally-226464">Why would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?</a>
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<p>That seems questionable: the Russia-Ukraine border is one of the most militarized locations in the country due to the war. The result, however, is that the alleged escape attempt has allowed Russian politicians <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/prominent-russians-blame-ukraine-for-moscow-shooting-amid-fears-of-war-with-west/ar-BB1kpnj8">to link the attack</a> to Ukrainian authorities, despite Ukrainian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-not-involved-moscow-attack-says-kyiv-military-intelligence-spokesman-2024-03-23/">protests to the contrary</a>.</p>
<p>Russian authorities will have to act; any state would in the aftermath of such an assault. But retaliation is all the more likely given <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/putin-russia-moscow-attack.html">Putin’s consistent messaging</a> as a protector of the Russian people.</p>
<p>Eliminating terrorism, however, is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">incredibly difficult if not impossible</a> task, as demonstrated by the American experience. The Russia-Ukraine war, however, is providing a convenient arena for Russian authorities to redirect the grief and outrage in the aftermath of the tragic attack.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226472/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ukraine has denied any involvement in the terrorist attack that killed dozens of people in Moscow, but that doesn’t mean Russia won’t try to use the event as a way to escalate its war with Ukraine.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264642024-03-23T23:29:15Z2024-03-23T23:29:15ZWhy would Islamic State attack Russia and what does this mean for the terrorism threat globally?<p>It appears almost certain the brutal assault on a Russian crowd settling down to watch a rock concert in Moscow on Friday night was an Islamist terrorist <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow-attack-islamic-state-russia-terror-crocus/32874123.html">attack</a>. </p>
<p>At least 133 people were left dead and scores more were injured after gunmen with automatic weapons <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/moscow-concert-attack-live-updates-rcna144768">stormed</a> the Crocus City Hall in Moscow and opened fire, triggering a stampede.</p>
<p>Islamic State <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/22/europe/crocus-moscow-shooting/index.html">claimed responsibility</a> for the attack, <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">initially</a> through its Amaq media channel and then directly. The modus operandi of the attack also fits with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/world/europe/isis-moscow-attack-concert-hall.html?smid=url-share">previous</a> Islamic State attacks. </p>
<p>It has been widely reported the attack was the work of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/23/world/moscow-shooting">Islamic State Khorasan</a> (ISIS-K), a <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/gunmen-open-fire-on-moscow-concert-hall-crowd-set-building-on-fire-20240323-p5feng.html">branch</a> established in 2015 in Afghanistan. </p>
<p>So who is this group, why would they attack Russia and what does this mean for the broader terrorism threat?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-terror-blast-highlights-success-and-growing-risk-of-isis-k-regional-strategy-220586">Iran terror blast highlights success – and growing risk – of ISIS-K regional strategy</a>
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<h2>What is ISIS-K?</h2>
<p>ISIS-K is the Islamic State branch that has most consistently and energetically attempted terrorist attacks across Europe, including in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/theres-little-reason-to-doubt-attack-on-moscow-venue-was-by-islamic-state">Russia</a>. ISIS-K has <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">planned</a> some 21 <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/one-year-islamic-state-worldwide-activity-map">attacks</a> in nine countries in the past year, up from eight the previous year. </p>
<p>ISIS-K had been under tremendous pressure from the Afghan Special Forces and American troops before the United States full withdrew from the country in 2021. Although that pressure has continued under Taliban rule, ISIS-K has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/us/politics/isis-k-moscow-attack.html?action=click&pgtype=Article&module=&state=default&region=footer&context=breakout_link_back_to_briefing">grown in strength</a> in recent years, with several thousand fighters now operating in almost <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/islamic-state-khorasan-province-is-a-growing-threat-in-afghanistan-and-beyond/">every</a> one of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. </p>
<p>If ISIS-K is indeed responsible for the Moscow attack, we should prepare for further attempted attacks – not just in Russia but across Europe.</p>
<p>European authorities have arrested ISIS-K operatives on multiple occasions. After years of warnings that Islamic State was rebuilding the capacity and resolve to resume an international terrorist campaign, Friday’s attack shows the threat is immediate and substantial.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-string-of-assassinations-in-afghanistan-point-to-isis-k-resurgence-and-us-officials-warn-of-possible-attacks-on-american-interests-in-next-6-months-201852">A string of assassinations in Afghanistan point to ISIS-K resurgence – and US officials warn of possible attacks on American interests in next 6 months</a>
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<p>Earlier this month, the US, together with five other nations, had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/world/europe/isis-moscow-attack-concert-hall.html?smid=url-share">shared</a> intelligence they had of ISIS-K planning for attacks in Moscow. But these warnings were, as recently as last week, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/22/europe/crocus-moscow-shooting/index.html">rejected</a> by President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin as being part of an attempt to discredit Russia. </p>
<p>The attack comes at the worst possible moment for Russia’s despotic leader, in the wake of his successful “election campaign” to claim a mandate for a further six years in power. </p>
<p>And it is perhaps for this reason that Putin’s five-minute televised <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-attack-putin.html">address</a> on Saturday, in which he directed blame toward Ukraine, came so late.</p>
<p>We don’t yet know whether the Kremlin will continue to <a href="https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1771461905053360366">blame</a> Ukraine or the West for the attack, or if it will pivot to accept Islamic State was responsible. </p>
<p>Either way, it’s likely to respond with a wave of violence, cracking down on Russia’s Muslim minority communities in the North Caucasus region and beyond.</p>
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<h2>Why would they target Russia?</h2>
<p>Both Islamic State in general, and ISIS-K in particular, have long proclaimed their intention of striking Russia. </p>
<p>They have <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-23/what-is-isis-k-moscow-terror-attack/103623852">cited</a> Russia’s earlier military occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and its long history of crackdowns on Muslim communities in Russia, particularly in the North Caucasus. They have also cited Russia’s role in providing a lifeline to the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.</p>
<p>But it was also likely <a href="https://www.aymennaltamimi.com/p/islamic-state-claims-moscow-attacks">opportunity and personnel</a> that led the group to select a soft target in Moscow, as much as anything else. </p>
<p>Islamic State carried out multiple <a href="https://twitter.com/azelin/status/1771276860237709441">attacks</a> in Russia from 2016–19, while several more plots were disrupted from 2021–23. </p>
<p>Many of the ISIS-K militants <a href="https://eurasianet.org/iran-attack-signals-growing-central-asian-role-in-iskps-external-ops">arrested</a> across Europe, including in Russia, over the past two years have been Russian nationals and people from Central Asia with links to Russia.</p>
<p>The most recent arrests occurred this month when Russian authorities claimed they prevented a planned attack on a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-it-neutralized-isis-cell-plotting-attack-moscow-synagogue-2024-03-07/">synagogue</a> in Moscow.</p>
<p>And last month, a Russian national accused of having Islamic State links was arrested in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-detains-russian-citizen-accused-being-member-islamic-state-2024-02-29/">Poland</a>, while another was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-arrests-russian-nuclear-plant-islamic-state-probe-sources-say-2024-02-13/">arrested</a> working at a nuclear facility under construction in Turkey. </p>
<p>In recent years, the vast majority of successful ISIS-K <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-expainer/31431763.html">attacks</a> have been in Afghanistan, with many targeting the minority Shia Muslim Hazara community. </p>
<p>For instance, the group launched a massive suicide bombing outside the <a href="https://theconversation.com/kabul-bombings-a-dark-day-for-afghanistan-and-joe-biden-and-a-harbinger-of-worse-to-come-166883">Kabul airport</a> in August 2021, in the midst of the chaotic evacuation of Kabul, which resulted in around 170 civilians and 13 US military personnel being killed. </p>
<p>ISIS-K also carried out a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/blast-in-kabul-kills-2-russian-embassy-staff-/6731342.html">bombing of the Russian Embassy</a> in Kabul in September 2022, killing at least six.</p>
<p>In January of this year, ISIS-K <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-explosions-soleimani-death-anniversary/32758522.html">launched</a> a massive suicide bombing in Kerman, Iran, killing nearly 100 people at a ceremony to mark the fourth anniversary of the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. </p>
<h2>What next for Putin and the broader terrorism threat?</h2>
<p>Terrorist attacks, including those in brutal regimes like Iran or Russia, are tragic assaults on ordinary people who are not to blame for the politics of policies of the governments they are forced to live under.</p>
<p>When attacked, authoritarian regimes tend to respond with brutal reprisals that are likely to lead to cycles of violence, with less restraint and accountability than is typically the case with counter-terrorism operations in open societies. </p>
<p>Friday night’s attack in Moscow was nightmarish, but sadly the horror is likely to be just the beginning.</p>
<p>Regardless of how Putin and the Kremlin choose to respond, the attack comes as a reminder that the threat of terrorism posed by groups like Islamic State and al-Qaeda is now on the rise again. After five years of mostly operating in western Asia, the Middle East and Africa, these groups now pose a renewed threat to the West.</p>
<p>The continued <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/23/theres-little-reason-to-doubt-attack-on-moscow-venue-was-by-islamic-state">growth</a> of both ISIS-K and al-Qaeda under Taliban rule in Afghanistan should concern us much more than we have been acknowledging.</p>
<p>Friday’s attack is a clear reminder we should not look away and continue to wash our hands of any attempt to improve things in Afghanistan. There are no easy answers, but turning away and doing nothing will only make the situation worse.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-can-we-expect-from-six-more-years-of-vladimir-putin-an-increasingly-weak-and-dysfunctional-russia-224259">What can we expect from six more years of Vladimir Putin? An increasingly weak and dysfunctional Russia</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226464/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Barton receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is engaged in a range of projects funded by the Australian government that aim to understand and counter violent extremism in Australia and in Southeast Asia and Africa.</span></em></p>After five years of operating mostly in western Asia, the Middle East and Africa, Islamist terror groups are again growing in strength in the West.Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation; Scholar -In-Residence Asia Society Australia, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262192024-03-20T04:06:40Z2024-03-20T04:06:40ZTerrorist content lurks all over the internet – regulating only 6 major platforms won’t be nearly enough<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583026/original/file-20240320-17-wn83c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=4%2C241%2C2619%2C1761&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/burning-car-unrest-antigovernment-crime-581564755">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Australia’s eSafety commissioner <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-19/social-media-esafety-commissioner-terrorist-violent-extremist/103603518">has sent legal notices</a> to Google, Meta, Telegram, WhatsApp, Reddit and X (formerly Twitter) asking them to show what they’re doing to protect Australians from online extremism. The six companies <a href="https://www.esafety.gov.au/newsroom/media-releases/tech-companies-grilled-on-how-they-are-tackling-terror-and-violent-extremism">have 49 days to respond</a>.</p>
<p>The notice comes at a time when governments are increasingly cracking down on major tech companies to address online harms like <a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-has-fined-x-australia-over-child-sex-abuse-material-concerns-how-severe-is-the-issue-and-what-happens-now-215696">child sexual abuse material</a> or <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mark-zuckerberg-apologizes-parents-victims-online-exploitation-senate-hearing/">bullying</a>.</p>
<p>Combating online extremism presents unique challenges different from other content moderation problems. Regulators wanting to establish effective and meaningful change must take into account what research has shown us about extremism and terrorism.</p>
<h2>Extremists are everywhere</h2>
<p>Online extremism and terrorism have been pressing concerns for some time. A stand-out example was the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack on two mosques in Aotearoa New Zealand, which was live streamed on Facebook. It led to the <a href="https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-and-france-seek-end-use-social-media-acts-terrorism">“Christchurch Call” to action</a>, aimed at countering extremism through collaborations between countries and tech companies.</p>
<p>But despite such efforts, <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1458-2.html">extremists still use online platforms</a> for networking and coordination, recruitment and radicalisation, knowledge transfer, financing and mobilisation to action.</p>
<p>In fact, extremists use the same online infrastructure as everyday users: marketplaces, dating platforms, gaming sites, music streaming sites and social networks. Therefore, all regulation to counter extremism needs to consider the rights of regular users, as well.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/christchurch-attacks-5-years-on-terrorists-online-history-gives-clues-to-preventing-future-atrocities-225273">Christchurch attacks 5 years on: terrorist’s online history gives clues to preventing future atrocities</a>
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<h2>The rise of ‘swarmcasting’</h2>
<p>Tech companies have responded with initiatives like the <a href="https://gifct.org/membership">Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism</a>. It shares information on terrorist online content among its members (such as Facebook, Microsoft, YouTube, X and others) so they can take it down on their platforms. These approaches aim to <a href="https://gifct.org/hsdb/">automatically identify and remove</a> terrorist or extremist content.</p>
<p>However, a moderation policy focused on individual pieces of content on individual platforms fails to capture much of what’s out there.</p>
<p>Terrorist groups commonly use a <a href="https://static.rusi.org/20190716_grntt_paper_06.pdf">“swarmcasting” multiplatform approach</a>, leveraging 700 platforms or more to distribute their content.</p>
<p>Swarmcasting involves using “beacons” on major platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Telegram to direct people to locations with terrorist material. This beacon can be a hyperlink to a blog post on a website like Wordpress or Tumblr that then contains further links to the content, perhaps hosted on Google Drive, JustPaste.It, BitChute and other places where users can download it.</p>
<p>So, while extremist content may be flagged and removed from social media, it remains accessible online thanks to swarmcasting. </p>
<h2>Putting up filters isn’t enough</h2>
<p>The process of identifying and removing extremist content is far from simple. For example, at a recent US Supreme Court hearing over internet regulations, <a href="https://law.stanford.edu/podcasts/the-netchoice-cases-reach-the-supreme-court/">a lawyer argued</a> platforms could moderate terrorist content by simply removing anything that mentioned “al Qaeda”.</p>
<p>However, internationally recognised terrorist organisations, their members and supporters do not solely distribute policy-violating extremist content. Some may be discussing non-terrorist activities, such as those who engage in humanitarian efforts.</p>
<p>Other times their content is borderline (awful but lawful), such as misogynistic dog whistles, or even “hidden” <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/isj.12454">in a different format</a>, such as memes.</p>
<p>Accordingly, platforms can’t always cite policy violations and are compelled to use other methods to counter such content. They report using various content moderation techniques such as redirecting users, <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/google-to-expand-misinformation-prebunking-initiative-in-europe">pre-bunking misinformation</a>, promoting counterspeech and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-57697779">offering warnings</a>, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-shadowbanning-how-do-i-know-if-it-has-happened-to-me-and-what-can-i-do-about-it-192735">implementing shadow bans</a>. Despite these efforts, online extremism continues to persist.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disinformation-threatens-global-elections-heres-how-to-fight-back-223392">Disinformation threatens global elections – here's how to fight back</a>
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<h2>What is extremism, anyway?</h2>
<p>All these problems are further compounded by the fact we lack a <a href="https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-4/key-issues/defining-terrorism.html">commonly accepted definition</a> for terrorism or extremism. All definitions currently in place are contentious.</p>
<p>Academics attempt to seek clarity by using <a href="https://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/view/3809">relativistic definitions</a>, such as</p>
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<p>extremism itself is context-dependent in the sense that it is an inherently relative term that describes a deviation from something that is (more) ‘ordinary’, ‘mainstream’ or ‘normal’. </p>
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<p>However, what is something we can accept as a universal normal? Democracy is not the global norm, nor are equal rights. Not even our understanding of <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2016/09/14/are-human-rights-really-universal-inalienable-and-indivisible/">central tenets of human rights</a> is globally established.</p>
<h2>What should regulators do, then?</h2>
<p>As the eSafety commissioner attempts to shed light on how major platforms counter terrorism, we offer several recommendations for the commissioner to consider.</p>
<p>1. Extremists rely on more than just the major platforms to disseminate information. This highlights the importance of expanding the current inquiries beyond just the major tech players.</p>
<p>2. Regulators need to consider the differences between platforms that resist compliance, those that comply halfheartedly, and those that struggle to comply, such as small content storage providers. Each type of platform <a href="https://ksp.techagainstterrorism.org/">requires different regulatory approaches</a> or assistance. </p>
<p>3. Future regulations should encourage platforms to transparently collaborate with academia. The global research community is well positioned <a href="https://gifct.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/GIFCT-TaxonomyReport-2021.pdf">to address these challenges</a>, such as by developing actionable definitions of extremism and novel countermeasures.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marten Risius is the recipient of an Australian Research Council Australian Discovery Early Career Award funded by the Australian Government. Marten Risius has received project funding from the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stan Karanasios has received funding from Emergency Management Victoria, Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, and the International Telecommunications Union. Stan is a Distinguished Member of the Association for Information Systems.</span></em></p>Online extremism is a unique challenge – terrorists use methods that can’t be captured by standard content moderation. So, what can we do about it?Marten Risius, Senior Lecturer in Business Information Systems, The University of QueenslandStan Karanasios, Associate Professor, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2252732024-03-13T19:15:21Z2024-03-13T19:15:21ZChristchurch attacks 5 years on: terrorist’s online history gives clues to preventing future atrocities<p>As our <a href="https://theconversation.com/christchurch-terrorist-discussed-attacks-online-a-year-before-carrying-them-out-new-research-reveals-223955">research has previously revealed</a>, the man who attacked two mosques in Christchurch in 2019, killing 51 people, posted publicly online for five years before his terrorist atrocity.</p>
<p>Here we provide further information about Brenton Tarrant’s posting. This article has two main goals. </p>
<p>First, by placing his online posting against his other online and offline activities, we gain a far more complete picture of the path to his attack. </p>
<p>Second, we want to show how his online community played a role in his radicalisation. This is important, as the same can happen to others immersed in that community.</p>
<p>In combining his online and offline activity here we do not seek to attribute blame to those who might have been expected to detect this behaviour. It is exceptionally difficult to identify terrorists online. </p>
<p>And yet, history is full of difficult problems that have been overcome. We use the benefit of hindsight to provide greater understanding of Tarrant’s pathway than has previously been available. </p>
<p>The aim is to prevent similar attacks by better understanding how such people act and how they might be detected.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/christchurch-terrorist-discussed-attacks-online-a-year-before-carrying-them-out-new-research-reveals-223955">Christchurch terrorist discussed attacks online a year before carrying them out, new research reveals</a>
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<h2>Words and deeds</h2>
<p>In the timeline below, we focus on Tarrant’s activity in 2018, following his first visit to Dunedin’s Bruce Rifle Club on December 14 2017, until his final overseas trip in October. It is for this period that we have the most comprehensive online posting history. </p>
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<img alt="A timeline of Brenton Tarrant's activities in 2018" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581223/original/file-20240312-16-xx9u35.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581223/original/file-20240312-16-xx9u35.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1200&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581223/original/file-20240312-16-xx9u35.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1200&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581223/original/file-20240312-16-xx9u35.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1200&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581223/original/file-20240312-16-xx9u35.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581223/original/file-20240312-16-xx9u35.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581223/original/file-20240312-16-xx9u35.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>In 2024, we have both the benefit of hindsight and the accumulation of information relating to the attack. However, this triangulation of online and offline activities illustrates the ways those contemplating terrorist violence might act.</p>
<p>We can now see, for example, that Tarrant bought high-powered firearms on three occasions over a six-week period in March and April 2018. And he posted publicly twice on the online imageboard 4chan about his plans for racially motivated violence, and his veneration of a perpetrator of a similar attack. </p>
<p>Tarrant therefore not only “leaked” his plans for violence, he did so at the very moment he was buying weapons for it.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-road-to-march-15-networked-white-rage-and-the-christchurch-terror-attacks-201285">The road to March 15: 'networked white rage' and the Christchurch terror attacks</a>
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<p>Over 20 days in July and August, Tarrant presented to hospital with gunshot wounds, and began selling weapons online under the username Mannerheim (the name of a Finnish nationalist leader revered for defeating the communists in the country’s civil war).</p>
<p>He also posted publicly about his anger at the presence of mosques in South Island cities (claiming one had replaced a church). He wrote “soon” when another poster suggested setting fire to these places of worship. </p>
<p>A month later he attempted to sell weapons on online marketplace TradeMe, using a prominent white nationalist slogan – “<a href="https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/david-lane">14 Words</a>” – in his username. (Strangely, this clear red flag was mentioned only once in the <a href="https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/the-report/">royal commission report</a> on the attacks.) </p>
<p>TradeMe removed one of these advertisements for violating its terms of use. That caused Tarrant to move to another forum – NZ Hunting and Shooting Forums – to complain.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-ideology-detecting-algorithms-catch-online-extremism-before-it-takes-hold-200629">Can ideology-detecting algorithms catch online extremism before it takes hold?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Extremist community</h2>
<p>Our study has also revealed how important the 4chan community is to the radicalisation of individuals like Tarrant. In contrast to the fleeting human interaction he had with others as he travelled the world, 4chan was Tarrant’s community. </p>
<p>4chan’s /pol/ (politically incorrect) board became his home. Here he interacted with others over long periods, imagining he was speaking to the same people over months and years, and assuming many of them had become his friends. </p>
<p>We have found that, while creating a sense of belonging and community, /pol/ also works to create extremists in both direct and indirect ways. </p>
<p>Its anonymous nature (users are assigned a unique ID number for each thread, rather than a username) has two effects. One is well known, the other identified in our study. </p>
<p>First, anonymity encourages behaviour that would be absent if the poster’s identity was known. Second, anonymity is frustrating for those who wish to “be someone”, who crave respect and notoriety. </p>
<p>We have documented the way Tarrant (and others) strive to gain status in a discussion, only to have to start again when they move to a new thread and are given a new ID. This lack of ongoing recognition is agonising for some individuals, who go to lengths to obtain respect.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/violent-extremists-are-not-lone-wolves-dispelling-this-myth-could-help-reduce-violence-200434">Violent extremists are not lone wolves – dispelling this myth could help reduce violence</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Anonymity and peer respect</h2>
<p>And just like a real-world fascist movement, /pol/ venerates violent action as necessary for the vitality and regeneration of the community. </p>
<p>When a terrorist attack, school shooting or other violent event occurs, users celebrate these events in so-called “happening” threads. These threads are longer, more emotional and excited than any other discussions. Participants often claim the individual at the centre of the event is “/ourguy/” (a reference to the /pol/ board).</p>
<p>The threads are also highly anticipatory: many users believe this event will finally push society into violent chaos and race war. </p>
<p>These dynamics are closely connected. For those who seek recognition and status on the bulletin board, such as Tarrant, the excited attention and adoration given to those who perpetrate high-profile violence is the clearest path to the peer respect that the anonymity of the board otherwise denies them. </p>
<p>As harrowing as this finding is, we contend that gaining respect from their online community is in itself a crucial motivation for some perpetrators of far-right terrorism. </p>
<p>The nature of this extreme but easily accessible corner of the internet means any hope Tarrant was a one-off – and that this won’t happen again – is misguided.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>The authors acknowledge the expert contribution of tactical and forensic linguist and independent researcher <a href="https://juliakupper.com/">Julia Kupper</a>. More information about our study will be released at <a href="https://www.heiaglobal.com/">heiaglobal.com</a>. Our research was approved by the University of Auckland Human Participant Ethics Committee. A paper based on this study has been submitted for peer review and publication.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Wilson is the director and co-founder of Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa (HEIA).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ethan Renner, Jack Smylie, and Michal Dziwulski do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New research mapping the online and real-world activity of the Christchurch attacker provides insights into his radicalisation and the ways others contemplating terrorist violence might act.Chris Wilson, Co-founder and director of Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa (HEIA) and director, Master of Conflict and Terrorism Studies, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauEthan Renner, Researcher, Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauJack Smylie, Research Analyst, Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauMichal Dziwulski, Researcher, Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245572024-03-10T13:17:48Z2024-03-10T13:17:48ZGaza war: The displaced survivors of the Oct. 7 attack remain in need of support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580809/original/file-20240309-29-vprdfs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Evidence of arson during the attack on Kibbutz Be’eri, Israel on Oct. 7, 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the morning of Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas orchestrated <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-rockets-airstrikes-tel-aviv-11fb98655c256d54ecb5329284fc37d2">a series of attacks on Israeli communities</a>. This was the deadliest attack Israel had experienced since the state was established in 1948. An <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:%7E:text=Hamas's%20October%207%20terrorist%20attack,years%20of%20the%20Second%20Intifada">estimated 1,200 people</a> were killed, hundreds were taken hostage and approximately <a href="https://unwatch.org/report-un-silent-on-israeli-idps/">30,000 displaced</a>.</p>
<p>As an associate professor of disaster and emergency management who studies terrorism, I travelled to Kibbutz Be'eri in February, where I had the opportunity to bear witness to survivors of the atrocity.</p>
<p>As a matter of respect for Israel’s dead, survivors <a href="https://stories.bringthemhomenow.net/">and remaining hostages</a>, a certain moral obligation seems clear: <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/religion/representing-evil-the-moral-paradoxes-of-bearing-witness-to-atro/10098410">atrocity requires representation</a>. Bearing witness means taking on a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276418776366">burden of responsibility</a> to observe and document.</p>
<p>Bearing witness can <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/syria/syria">serve multiple purposes</a>. Attempting to understand the toll of the conflict on survivors of violence and documenting atrocity to call attention to the criminality of terrorism can all be results of bearing witness.</p>
<p>I was embedded in an environment that was still in disaster response mode. Conducting research in communities affected by the attack required delicate manoeuvreing due to the precarious security situation and general unpredictability. </p>
<p>To navigate such challenges, my co-ordination with organizations having intimate local knowledge of ground conditions was of utmost importance. Arrangements for bearing witness were facilitated by the <a href="https://apfmed.org/">American Healthcare Professionals and Friends for Medicine in Israel (APF)</a>, who organized the Israel Solidarity Mission, which I participated in.</p>
<p>I made field observations at Kibbutz Be’eri at a point in time 130 days after the massacre. When <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">Hamas attacked</a>, the ensuing <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-devastation-of-beeri">devastation at Be'eri</a> resulted in <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/israels-ground-zero-beeri-kibbutz-bloodiest-scenes-hamas/story?id=103936668">112 residents of the kibbutz</a> being murdered.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="two photographs showing damage caused by weapons and fire to a wall and a window" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Detail showing damages to structures in Kibbutz Be’eri, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Among those <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/vivian-silver-thought-to-be-taken-captive-from-beeri-confirmed-killed-by-hamas/">killed</a> at Be'eri was <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/vivian-silver-friends-mourn-israel-death-manitoba-1.7027813">Vivian Silver</a>, a prominent Canadian Jewish humanitarian originally from Winnipeg.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-will-the-murder-of-peace-activists-mean-the-end-of-the-peace-movement-215973">Israel-Hamas war: will the murder of peace activists mean the end of the peace movement?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Physical ruins</h2>
<p>One observation that repeatedly stood out was arson. Observable burn scorch marks surrounding windows of bedrooms and safe rooms were apparent. Exterior walls of dwellings were pockmarked by automatic weapon fire. Interior walls of dwellings were scarred with blast effects from anti-personnel grenades.</p>
<p>The locations and characteristics of physical evidence of ruins, directly corresponded with descriptions of deaths as remembered by survivors and other <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/22/world/europe/beeri-massacre.html">third-party analysis</a> describing the mechanics of how the massacre took place.</p>
<p>Overall, my observations — made on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis in Be'eri — indicated the attackers had no apparent tactical objectives to their <a href="https://doi.org/10.4088/pcc.v01n0302">running amok</a>, other than killing and taking hostages.</p>
<h2>The fate of evacuees</h2>
<p>Intertwined with the sites of atrocity are locations where response is taking place. Hotels serve as shelters for those who cannot yet return. Approximately five months after the Oct. 7 attacks, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-makes-the-plight-of-israels-displaced-citizens-different/0000018d-ea95-d1e0-a1dd-fbf529ed0000">135,000 Israelis</a> remain displaced. </p>
<p>In meeting with emergency management officials at the city of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ramat-Gan">Ramat Gan</a>, east of Tel Aviv, I learned that providing emergency social social services to evacuees has become a new responsibility for the city’s disaster workers. In late February, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-makes-the-plight-of-israels-displaced-citizens-different/0000018d-ea95-d1e0-a1dd-fbf529ed0000">15,100 evacuees</a> still reside in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="shiny blue hotel building in a city" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hotels in Ramat Gan continue to temporarily house persons who evacuated cities in southern Israel after the Oct. 7 attacks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For evacuees, their sense of security has been shattered, and their responses to the trauma they witnessed on Oct. 7 stretches their capacity to cope. Whether and how they can return to their homes in the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gaza-envelope-communities-case-study-societal-resilience-israel-2006-2016/">Gaza Envelope</a> is a decision fraught with emotion.</p>
<p>The coming months will be a pivotal point for evacuees. The government has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/government-says-evacuees-from-south-can-return-march-1-or-stay-in-subsidized-hotels-through-july/">announced two options</a>. As of March 1, evacuees may start to return home with the approval of the Israel Defense Forces. Or, if they are not ready to return, they can receive funding to remain in hotels until July 7.</p>
<h2>The suffering of others</h2>
<p>On the five-month anniversary of the attacks, attempting to digest and analyze recent events in Israel remains challenging, given the depth of the tragedy. Relevant questions are raised in <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780312422196/regarding-the-pain-of-others"><em>Regarding the Pain of Others</em></a>, in which American writer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/dec/29/guardianobituaries.booksobituaries">Susan Sontag</a> asks: “What does it mean to care about the sufferings of others far away?” </p>
<p>After the visceral experience of bearing witness to atrocity by setting two feet on the ground at Be'eri, I am left with more questions than answers concerning what it means to care about far away suffering. After the more mundane experience of witnessing evacuees having an uncertain future living in hotels, I am thinking about how local disaster response actions play into national crises. </p>
<p>For survivors in Israel, the displacement and trauma are ongoing and it will take the time that it takes for their lives to normalize. A timeline cannot be put on the social and psychological repair of their lives. Experiences of survivors and evacuees should inform emergency measures by suggesting the timeline for evacuees to return home should remain as flexible as possible.</p>
<p><em>Edward Snowden, a graduate of the Master’s in Disaster and Emergency Management Program at York University who specializes in mass casualty management, contributed his observations from Israel.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224557/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jack L. Rozdilsky receives support for research communication and public scholarship from York University. He also has received research support from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research.</span></em></p>Bearing witness to the displaced victims of the Oct. 7 attack on Kibbutz Be'eri carries a burden of responsibility to observe and documentJack L. Rozdilsky, Associate Professor of Disaster and Emergency Management, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248332024-03-04T13:37:27Z2024-03-04T13:37:27ZCommander of Iran’s elite Quds Force is expanding predecessor’s vision of chaos in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579281/original/file-20240301-50192-65mwly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2966%2C1853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani, head of Iran's expeditionary Quds Force, speaks at a ceremony in Tehran on April 14, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranIsrael/7769f2ccb99244898fcb9149111c664d/photo?Query=quds%20force&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=200&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Americans have likely never heard of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-esmail-ghaani-the-successor-to-slain-iranian-general-soleimani/">Esmail Ghaani</a>, despite his fingerprints being over a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">slew of recent attacks</a> on U.S. targets.</p>
<p>As the powerful chief of the Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a>, Ghaani is charged with overseeing Tehran’s network of allied and proxy groups across the Middle East.</p>
<p>But despite <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/esmail-qaani-commander-of-the-axis/article67808742.ece">recent media attention</a> following a significant increase in attacks by Quds-backed militants since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel, Ghaani remains a figure who largely shuns the public spotlight.</p>
<p>This is both like and unlike his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, who died in a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/airport-informants-overhead-drones-how-u-s-killed-soleimani-n1113726">controversial 2020 U.S. strike in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>For the first decade of his stint as Quds Force commander, which began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190925041643/http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/suleimani.pdf">in the late 1990s</a>, Soleimani also kept a low profile. But in the years leading up to his death in 2020, he promoted his accomplishments <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/esmail-ghaani-iran-announces-new-military-leader-after-commander-killed-in-us-airstrike-11901047">openly on social media</a>.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s loss was seen as a massive blow to the Quds Force and Iran’s national security agenda overall given his popularity in Iran and his achievements, making the task of replacing him daunting. Ghaani had been <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/profile-the-canny-general-quds-force-commander-ghasem-soleimani.html">Soleimani’s deputy</a>, and the two had known each other since the early 1980s during their <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">military service in the Iran-Iraq War.</a> </p>
<p>In the initial aftermath of Soleimani’s death, experts questioned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/1/20/esmaii-qaani-new-shadow-commander-of-irans-quds-force">whether Ghaani would be a capable replacement</a>.</p>
<p>But despite differing from Soleimani in both personality and attitude toward publicity, Ghaani has managed to expand upon the foundation that Soleimani carefully cultivated over a 20-year period.</p>
<p>Under Ghaani, the Quds Force has doubled down on the strategy of supporting, arming and funding terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Building from Soleimani’s legacy, Ghaani is responsible for developing the network into what Iranian officials call the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">Axis of Resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>It is a coalition that cuts across ethnic and religious divides in the region, despite Iran itself remaining a hard-line theocracy with an ethnic Persian and Shia Muslim identity. In cultivating the network, first Soleimani and now Ghaani have displayed a degree of pragmatism and flexibility at odds with the extreme ideological position of Iran’s ruling ayatollahs. And Ghaani, like Soleimani before him, appears to have done this with the full trust and support of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<h2>Pressuring Iran’s enemies</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">an expert in national security issues</a> with a focus on counterterrorism, I have observed how the Quds Force’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/07/iran-unleashed-forces-that-it-can-no-longer-control/">unconventional warfare strategy</a> has changed the security landscape in the region. It is premised on creating pressure against Iran’s enemies — Israel, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — through partnering with groups within the axis.</p>
<p>As Quds Force commander, Ghaani has to manage his organization’s relationships with each of these groups. This is made all the more tricky as each maintains its own agendas, decision-making calculations and, at times, independence despite Iran’s influence and largesse.</p>
<p>Take the Quds Force’s relationship with Hamas. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/hamas-drew-detailed-attack-plans-for-years-with-help-of-spies-idf-says">long planning involved</a> with the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel in October 2023, the Quds Force <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/28/Iran-s-IRGC-retracts-statement-on-Oct-7-attacks-after-rare-public-spat-with-Hamas">does not appear to have had a direct role</a>.</p>
<p>Not that the assault wasn’t welcomed by Ghaani, in public at least. In late December 2023, he <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-780069">was reported as saying</a> on Iran’s official news agency that, “Due to the extensive crimes committed by the Zionist regime against the Muslim people of Palestine, [Hamas] themselves took action. … Everything they did was beautifully planned and executed.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man speaking in front of image of two men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani speaks at event commemorating the death of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/commander-esmail-qaani-of-the-islamic-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1898123764?adppopup=true">Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With other militant groups in the region, Ghaani appears to have a more hands-on approach. The deadly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack</a> against a U.S. military outpost in Jordan, launched by the Iraq-based and Iran-supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> network, significantly escalated tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It provoked a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">significant U.S. and British response</a> in Iraq and Syria. After the incident, it was reported that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/">Ghaani spent considerable effort</a> getting the Iraqi groups responsible to temporarily pause anti-U.S. attacks. </p>
<p>Whether that pause lasts for an extended period or if attacks resume will be a test of Ghaani’s ability to wield his influence in Iraq.</p>
<p>Ghaani’s calculus in regard to Yemen, where the Houthis have emerged as a dangerous insurgent group, looks less clear.</p>
<p>Having been armed throughout a decadelong civil war by Iran, the Houthis responded to Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf">by launching hundreds of rocket, missile and drone attacks</a> against commercial and military shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and other coalition members <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/24/politics/us-uk-strikes-houthi-targets-yemen/index.html">on Houthi targets</a> have destroyed a significant amount of the capability that Iran had provided. Yet the Houthis seem undeterred and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea">have continued anti-shipping operations</a>. </p>
<p>It is unclear if Ghaani has attempted to dial those operations back or if he has encouraged the Houthis to maintain their pace, given the shared goals between Iran and the Houthis to keep pressure on the United States and Israel.</p>
<h2>Relationship with Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Beyond Israel, Iraq and Yemen, Ghaani is also likely attempting to manage the Quds Force’s relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hizballah-and-the-qods-force-in-irans-shadow-war-with-the-west">arguably Iran’s strongest partner</a> in the Axis of Resistance. The partnership stretches back to the early 1980s and has transformed Hezbollah into a powerful force in Lebanon and a serious security concern in the region.</p>
<p>Since Oct. 7, the group has engaged in near daily conflict with Israel, with both sides conducting cross-border strikes. Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, seems wary of engaging in a broader war with Israel, but at the same time he has not reined in the attacks and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/hezbollah-warns-that-israel-will-pay-in-blood-for-killing-civilians">has vowed to retaliate against Israel</a> for the death of civilians in Lebanon. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three Iranian leaders, two in military fatigues stand and talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, left, meets with Esmail Ghaani, right, and Revolutionary Guards General Commander Hossein Salami, center, on Dec. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/iranian-leader-ali-khamenei-iranian-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1883329738?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Although Iran may well welcome Hezbollah becoming a persistent irritant to Israel, Tehran is also wary of a full-blown conflict. In such a scenario, Nasrallah, Ghaani and Supreme Leader Khamenei would have to worry about whether the United States would get directly involved – as, reportedly, the White House <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/17/israel-news-us-military-hezbollah-attacks">had been considering</a> in the days after the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.</p>
<p>Any future statements by Ghaani regarding Hezbollah will be a strong indicator of Iran’s intent in regard to how it sees this volatile aspect of tensions in the Middle East developing.</p>
<h2>Walking a tightrope</h2>
<p>To date, Ghaani seems to have successfully navigated the transition between replacing the charismatic figure of Qassem Soleimani and advancing Iran’s interests through Quds Force operations with the full backing of Khameini.</p>
<p>He may never be as revered in Iran as Soleimani, but by managing the Quds Force’s relationship with Axis of Resistance groups, Ghaani has proved to be a formidable and capable adversary who should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The recent escalation of multifaceted tensions across the Middle East has provided both opportunities and potential pitfalls for Ghaani’s strategy – how to encourage the activities of its Axis of Rrsistance while insulating Iran from any direct blowback from the United States.</p>
<p>But one thing is becoming clear: Reversing the Quds Force’s influence while bolstering U.S. interests is likely to be a top policy priority for Washington as it attempts to manage the developing conflict in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Esmail Ghaani took control of the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following the killing of predecessor Qassem Soleimani.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248502024-03-04T02:54:09Z2024-03-04T02:54:09ZOver-emphasising some things, underplaying others: ASIO’s threat assessment is underpinned by confusing logic<p>Recently, Australia’s internal security agency <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2024">declared</a> there is a greater threat to Australian security than new terrorist attacks. Instead, it’s systemic and existential. The report read:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In 2024, threats to our way of life have surpassed terrorism as Australia’s principle security concern.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So, what is the principle security concern? It’s foreign interference.</p>
<p>In its <a href="https://www.transparency.gov.au/publications/home-affairs/australian-security-intelligence-organisation/asio-annual-report-2022-23/asio-annual-report-2022-23">last annual report</a>, the agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), reported 2016 was its busiest year in the past decade for disrupting terrorist attacks. 2022 was its peak year for disrupting foreign spies. </p>
<p>Amid ongoing worldwide conflicts and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/28/australian-politician-sold-out-to-foreign-regime-after-being-recruited-by-spies-asio-boss-says">former politician</a> collaborating with a foreign country, is this assessment adequately capturing what Australians need to know about all the possible threats?</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-sabotage-and-why-is-the-asio-chief-worried-about-it-224731">Explainer: what is sabotage and why is the ASIO chief worried about it?</a>
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<h2>Terrorism only ‘possible’</h2>
<p>In the latest annual threat assessment, ASIO is still assessing the terror threat as lower than in earlier years. In 2022, it was changed from a “probable” likelihood (where it sat for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/nov/28/australias-terrorism-threat-level-changes-to-possible-after-eight-years-as-probable">eight years</a>), and it’s now rated as “possible”. </p>
<p>This is against the backdrop of growing community unrest since October 7 last year, when Hamas launched the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">third-deadliest</a> terrorist attack in the world since 1970, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. </p>
<p>Israel’s response has been a war on Hamas in Gaza, which has resulted in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/29/gaza-death-toll-surpasses-30000-with-no-let-up-in-israeli-bombardment">tens of thousands</a> of Palestinian fatalities, many of them women and children, though it’s difficult to verify the exact figure. Regardless of the precise numbers, the rage and hatred prompted by these deaths can fuel extremism, both here and overseas.</p>
<p>Two leading US Middle East security specialists have flagged the danger of <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/anticipating-the-gaza-driven-terrorism-surge">new attacks</a> both in the Middle East and beyond in response to these events. They also outlined the actual incidents that have happened since October 7, attesting to the new heightened risk. In ASIO’s view, we should not discount the risk at home even while keeping the terrorist threat level unchanged.</p>
<h2>Threat concern reveals mixed logic</h2>
<p>The most pertinent threat to Australia is foreign espionage and foreign interference. The agency says it’s “deeper and broader than you may think”. </p>
<p>Moreover, ASIO says, the threat level is “certain” (not merely “possible” or “probable”, as the terrorist threat had been).</p>
<p>This latest threat assessment, issued personally by the director general, Mike Burgess, calls out one country in particular, but doesn’t name it. He sketches a foreign espionage and influence-seeking campaign that is pervasive and well-resourced. He mentioned the specific case of an Australian politician (way back before 2018) who was, he says, collaborating with the foreign spies and selling out Australia in the process. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-warnings-of-spy-hives-why-isnt-australia-using-its-tough-counter-espionage-laws-more-200440">Amid warnings of 'spy hives', why isn't Australia using its tough counter-espionage laws more?</a>
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<p>Interestingly, Burgess says that ASIO foiled the plans of the foreign county and neutralised the threat from this politician.</p>
<p>In fact, Burgess went on to say the tradecraft of this adversary (how its spies do their business) has been good, but not good enough to defeat ASIO, supported by its intelligence partners.</p>
<p>This is just one of several points where the logic of the 2024 threat assessment begins to break down. Can the unnamed foreign country really be an existential threat if ASIO has cracked its espionage operations and disrupted its efforts at political influence? Is Australia’s security more threatened by these failed spies than by terrorists who may achieve a mass casualty attack involving Australian victims? </p>
<h2>Far-right extremism downplayed</h2>
<p>We don’t know which country is the source of this alleged threat to Australia’s way of life, but if it is China, there is room to question the ASIO line of thinking. </p>
<p>In the decade of its expansion of espionage and covert influence operations, China’s overall level of influence in major liberal democracies has <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/09/28/how-global-public-opinion-of-china-has-shifted-in-the-xi-era/">radically declined</a>, not increased. This is largely because of China’s anti-democratic or aggressive actions on the world stage.</p>
<p>In fact, as Burgess notes, ASIO faces dilemmas in prioritising the threats it follows and how to present them publicly. He’s limited by what can be revealed publicly, so omission may be distorting how the general public understands what he is saying.</p>
<p>He says terrorism remains a pervasive threat “even with a lower national threat level”. Well at that point, while we can agree with him, we might be forgiven for being a little confused. </p>
<p>The confusion is compounded by the way in which the annual threat assessment and other ASIO reporting appear to downplay right-wing extremism. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/asios-language-shift-on-terrorism-is-a-welcome-acknowledgment-of-the-power-of-words-157400">ASIO's language shift on terrorism is a welcome acknowledgment of the power of words</a>
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<p>The language on this issue in the 2024 threat assessment is defensible to a point (it says “the threat persists”), but the significance of this appears to be softened. Now, ASIO says right-wing extremists are “primarily focused on recruitment and radicalistaion”. </p>
<p>The future threats to internal security implied by the intimidating behaviour of neo-Nazis on Australia Day in Sydney this year, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/jan/26/balaclava-clad-neo-nazis-held-by-police-after-swarming-sydney-train">condemned by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese</a>, do not appear to be adequately captured by the assessment of focusing on recruitment and radicalisation, even if that is true. </p>
<p>We can commend ASIO for its transparency under the directorship of Burgess and for its obvious operational successes. </p>
<p>On the other hand, we have now had five annual threat assessments from him. As a body of work meant to inform, reassure and even alert Australians, there are several reasons to question the effectiveness of its current format and guiding logic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224850/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Greg Austin is a co-founder of the Social Cyber Institute.</span></em></p>ASIO is effective in defeating threats and being transparent in reporting on them, but its latest annual threat assessment leaves room to question its strategic priorities.Greg Austin, Adjunct Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247312024-02-29T05:42:43Z2024-02-29T05:42:43ZExplainer: what is sabotage and why is the ASIO chief worried about it?<p>Last night, ASIO boss Mike Burgess made another powerful public statement in delivering the <a href="https://www.asio.gov.au/director-generals-annual-threat-assessment-2024">Annual Threat Assessment for 2024</a>. Burgess stated that ASIO has seen “terrorists and spies […] talking about sabotage, researching sabotage, sometimes conducting reconnaissance for sabotage”.</p>
<p>He also highlighted the increasing focus on cyber (online methods) as a way that sabotage might be conducted. <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-28/asio-reveals-plot-by-retired-politician/103513926">He said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>ASIO is aware of one nation state conducting multiple attempts to scan critical infrastructure in Australia and other countries, targeting water, transport and energy networks.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This would seem to align with recent reports of <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/chinese-attackers-camped-on-us-networks-for-five-years-604887">Chinese hackers spending up to five years in US computer networks</a> before being detected.</p>
<p>But what exactly is sabotage, and should we be worried?</p>
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<h2>The legal definition</h2>
<p>“Sabotage” is a French term originally used to refer to <a href="https://www.etymonline.com/word/sabotage">deliberate acts by workmen to destroy machinery</a> during the Industrial Revolution. Since then, “sabotage” has been used to describe acts that undermine military power without a battle – <a href="https://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/wartime-acts-of-sabotage/">such as</a> destroying train lines, cutting telephone wires, or setting fuel dumps on fire.</p>
<p>However, the legal definition is a bit bigger than that.</p>
<p>In Australia, sabotage is both a <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">federal crime</a> under the Criminal Code and also a crime under state and territory laws. At the federal level, sabotage has three key elements:</p>
<ol>
<li> engaging in conduct that results in “damage to public infrastructure”</li>
<li>intending to or risking the act will “prejudice Australia’s national security” or “advantage the national security of a foreign country”</li>
<li> an act on behalf of, in collaboration with, or with funding from a “foreign principal” (that is, a foreign government or one of its authorities, such as their intelligence service).</li>
</ol>
<p>“Public infrastructure” is a broad concept, and includes anything belonging to the Commonwealth, defence and military bases and equipment, and telecommunications. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/research-espionage-is-a-real-threat-but-a-drastic-crackdown-could-stifle-vital-international-collaboration-223555">Research espionage is a real threat – but a drastic crackdown could stifle vital international collaboration</a>
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<p>In some circumstances, it could also include banks, supermarkets, food, farms and other services provided to the public. Essentially, pretty much anything needed to run the country could be “public infrastructure”. </p>
<p>These are already <a href="https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/insights/2023-03/demystifying-australias-recent-security-of-critical-infrastructure-act-reforms">considered “critical infrastructure”</a>, and must meet strict physical security and cybersecurity guidelines.</p>
<p>New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, the ACT and the Northern Territory also have specific sabotage offences. Those offences capture deliberate acts to damage or destroy public facilities, where the person intends to cause <a href="https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au/criminal/legislation/crimes-act/sabotage/">major disruption</a> to “government functions”, major disruption to the “use of services by the public” or major “economic loss”. </p>
<h2>So what is ASIO doing?</h2>
<p>ASIO’s annual threat assessment mentioned that sabotage has increasingly been discussed between <a href="https://www.itnews.com.au/news/asio-boss-warns-of-crack-cyber-teams-scanning-critical-networks-605594">agents of foreign countries, spies and would-be terrorists</a>. While Burgess did not name which countries have been involved, ASIO has been watching China, perhaps because a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-disabled-chinese-hacking-network-targeting-critical-infrastructure-sources-2024-01-29/">hacking group called “Volt Typhoon”</a> has been named as allegedly working on behalf of the Chinese government. </p>
<p>It also appears ASIO is watching “nationalist and racist violent extremists advocating sabotage”. This would also fit with recent increases in <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/australian-far-right-terrorism-investigations-have-increased-by-750-per-cent-in-18-months/rsowz6fnt">counter-extremist investigations by the AFP</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/nov/01/australian-defence-force-strengthens-vetting-procedures-to-prevent-extremists-from-joining">changes to Defence vetting procedures</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, there have been very few cases of sabotage pursued in the courts. </p>
<p>Unfortunately, <a href="https://theconversation.com/amid-warnings-of-spy-hives-why-isnt-australia-using-its-tough-counter-espionage-laws-more-200440">there can be several barriers to prosecuting foreign agents</a> who engage in espionage, foreign interference and/or sabotage. These include gathering the necessary evidence that might reveal how the spies were detected, in turn potentially compromising ASIO’s ability to operate in the future. </p>
<p>However, foreign agents can still be deterred from engaging in this kind of activity. Just last year, Burgess <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/fake-russian-diplomats-revealed-as-heart-of-hive-spy-ring-in-australia-20230223-p5cmxz.html">detailed how a Russian spy ring was expelled rather than prosecuted</a>. In this year’s threat assessment, Burgess also said ASIO often puts foreign agents on notice – that ASIO knows what they’re up to – or it shines a “disinfecting light” on Australia’s adversaries so the public is aware of what they’re up to.</p>
<p>However, one of the cases mentioned by Burgess in the assessment – <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-68420795">a politician alleged to have “sold out Australia” for a foreign nation</a> – probably won’t be identified. That’s strange on its own, as Burgess’ usual approach in these cases seems to be to “name names” – in going public, ASIO removes the one thing foreign agents need to operate: anonymity.</p>
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<h2>What more is needed?</h2>
<p>ASIO will need to continue (and possibly even ramp up) its surveillance operations in Australia. That in turn will require the attorney-general <a href="https://www.ag.gov.au/crime/telecommunications-interception-and-surveillance/reform-australias-electronic-surveillance-framework">to step up the review of Australia’s surveillance laws</a>, which is yet to get started. </p>
<p>That said, the Albanese government has started consultation on its <a href="https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-strategy">2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy</a>, which will make sure our cybersecurity laws are up to scratch. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has also already put boards and chief executives on notice that they will <a href="https://www.afr.com/technology/asic-to-target-boards-execs-for-cyber-failures-20230913-p5e4bf">prosecute companies for cybersecurity failures</a>. </p>
<p>There are some niche areas in the law that might need some tweaking. Last year, we <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4257292">published research</a> that demonstrated Australia’s laws might not protect an act of sabotage that was aimed at our natural environmental assets such as the Great Barrier Reef. </p>
<p>However, we may not need more laws – we just need to better use the ones we have. As <a href="https://theconversation.com/does-australia-need-new-laws-to-combat-right-wing-extremism-196219">Keiran Hardy argues</a> in the context of counter-terrorism laws: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia’s counter-terrorism laws are already extensive […] If a criminal offence or power is needed to combat terrorism, Australia already has it and more. </p>
</blockquote>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/does-australia-need-new-laws-to-combat-right-wing-extremism-196219">Does Australia need new laws to combat right-wing extremism?</a>
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<p>More broadly, Australia needs to confront its “this won’t happen to us” attitude to national security. Chris Taylor, head of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Statecraft and Intelligence Program, <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-evolution-of-australian-intelligence-revisiting-harvey-barnetts-tale-of-the-scorpion/">recently revived the words of Harvey Barnett</a> (a former boss of ASIO) when he said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>With the simple self-confidence which living in an island state breeds, Australians are sometimes doubtful that their country might be of interest to foreign intelligence services. “It can’t really happen here” is a stock attitude. It has, it does, it will.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Those words should resonate with us all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224731/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views contained in this article are those of the individual author, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation, department or agency with which the author may be affiliated.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article was written in Sarah Kendall's personal capacity as a PhD candidate at the University of Queensland School of Law. It does not reflect the views of any organisation with which the author is affiliated.</span></em></p>In its annual threat assessment, the spy agency has named sabotage by foreign actors as an increasing concern - and we too, should take it seriously.Brendan Walker-Munro, Senior Lecturer (Law), Southern Cross UniversitySarah Kendall, PhD Candidate in Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2242092024-02-28T16:56:15Z2024-02-28T16:56:15ZEcowas: west African trade bloc shaken as three member states withdraw and form their own alliance<p>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">announced</a> their immediate withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on January 27. Ecowas, which was formed in 1975, is a regional political and economic union of 15 mainly former British and French colonies located in west Africa. </p>
<p>The withdrawals come as no surprise. Throughout west Africa, there is growing frustration with Ecowas over its struggle to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">ensure security</a> in the region. Coups have become commonplace and west Africa has seen a dramatic increase in terrorist activity over recent years. Two west African states, Mali and Burkina Faso, are now among the the world’s five countries <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/sahel-now-accounts-43-global-terrorism-deaths">most affected</a> by terrorism. </p>
<p>The bloc’s <a href="https://www.liberationnews.org/what-is-the-new-alliance-of-sahel-states-challenging-neo-colonialism-in-west-africa/">perceived support</a> for leaders aligned with former colonial powers is also seen as contributing to the persistent poverty experienced by their populations. The leaders of several Ecowas member states have been accused of being <a href="https://www.newarab.com/analysis/domino-effect-frances-disintegrating-influence-africa">“puppets”</a> under the influence of France, which critics <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">say</a> never really let go of its former colonies.</p>
<p>In Niger, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66406137">allegations</a> that the country’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, was a puppet for French interests were used to legitimise his removal from power in a military coup in July 2023. French colonial rule (1895–1958) established political systems designed to extract natural resources from African states.</p>
<p>The response to the coup marked a significant political shift in the region. Ecowas imposed economic sanctions on Niger and issued a seven-day <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/08/niger-ecowas-bazoum-nigeria-tinubu-military-intervention/">ultimatum</a>, vowing to use force to dislodge the military junta (a government led by a council of military officers) should it not restore Bazoum to power. But the junta refused to back down and Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">pledged</a> to counter any action by Ecowas troops in Niger.</p>
<p>The agreement of these leaders and their readiness to take military action against Ecowas revealed the extent of their animosity towards the organisation and its leaders. These three countries, which are also governed by military rulers who have ousted democratically elected leaders in recent years, have all been hit with punitive sanctions since 2021.</p>
<p>On September 16 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger signed a new <a href="https://theconversation.com/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-have-a-new-defence-alliance-an-expert-view-of-its-chances-of-success-215863">mutual defence pact</a> named the Alliance of Sahel States. Ecowas is encouraging these countries to return to the bloc by <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">lifting its sanctions</a>. But new partners like Russia, which is looking to <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">increase its influence</a> across the continent, are at the same time supporting their efforts to form a united front. </p>
<p>African governments have increasingly welcomed economic, diplomatic and security <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-growing-footprint-africa">ties</a> with Russia, facilitated in part by the state-backed <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">Wagner Group</a> (now called the “Expeditionary Corps”). The group is known for deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders.</p>
<h2>The company of the old guards</h2>
<p>Ecowas has a patchy track record when it comes to ensuring cooperation and security across west Africa. In 1990, the military arm of Ecowas was deployed in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">peacekeeping role</a> in Liberia. Despite some initial success, Ecowas was unable to prevent an escalation of hostilities that lasted for the best part of a decade. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite efforts by Ecowas to restore peace in Sierra Leone after a coup in 1997, a brutal civil war broke out, requiring the intervention of UN peacekeepers. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">Niger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters</a>
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<p>Ecowas has been instrumental in safeguarding democracy within the region as well. In 2016, Gambia’s incumbent leader, Yahya Jammeh, refused to leave office after losing a presidential vote to Adama Barrow. But, with Ecowas troops poised to march on the capital, Banjul, Jammeh <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ousted-gambia-president-jammeh-to-stand-down-adama-barrow-takes-power/a-37217907">relinquished power</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map showing the 15 member states of Ecowas." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578259/original/file-20240227-22-ng0qz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Ecowas is a regional political and economic union of 15 countries in west Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/ecowas-economic-community-west-african-states-2341602777">Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>However, Ecowas has been inconsistent in its condemnation of military and civilian coups. And it has also been criticised for overlooking unlawful term extensions, a common practice among many entrenched leaders in the region. </p>
<p>In 2015, Ecowas leaders <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">dropped a proposal</a> to limit west African presidents to a maximum of two terms in office. As a result, there is no established protocol for penalising leaders from member states who seek to remain in power indefinitely.</p>
<p>This paved the way for the presidents of both Ivory Coast and Guinea (<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201103-ivory-coast-president-ouattara-wins-re-election-to-third-term">Alassane Ouattara</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-54657359">Alpha Condé</a> respectively) to secure controversial third terms in 2020. The failure of Ecowas to intervene resulted in Condé being <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/09/09/alpha-conde-the-president-of-guinea-is-ousted-in-a-coup">ousted from power</a> by a military coup one year later.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/mali-niger-burkina-faso-ecowas-west-africa-5a5dc2180e39223c91b1820067db4011">Oge Onubogu</a>, the director of the Africa Program, a Washington-based think tank: “Ecowas is fast losing its effectiveness and support among citizens, who see it as representing only the interests of the leaders and not that of the masses.” </p>
<h2>The challenger group</h2>
<p>The loss of any member from Ecowas will affect <a href="https://theconversation.com/mali-burkina-faso-and-niger-want-to-leave-ecowas-a-political-scientist-explains-the-fallout-222388">trade</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/west-africa-trade-will-take-a-hit-as-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-leave-ecowas-223098">economic development</a> and the movement of citizens within the bloc. But the decision by Ecowas to lift post-coup sanctions signals its readiness to negotiate and cultivate relationships with these countries, regardless of whether they rejoin the organisation. </p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">says</a> that the decision to lift sanctions was based on considering their impact on citizens and the need to maintain regional unity and security. Ecowas also <a href="https://punchng.com/why-sanction-was-lifted-on-niger-mali-burkina-faso-ecowas/">noted</a> the period of Lent and the approaching month of Ramadan as factors influencing their decisions. </p>
<p>Millions of young Africans are being <a href="https://www.trtafrika.com/insight/ibrahim-traore-why-burkina-fasos-leader-attracts-attention-14479334">drawn</a> to the Alliance of Sahel States, signalling discontent with the ineffectiveness of Ecowas and disillusionment with the west. Russia has capitalised on this trend. The Wagner Group is reportedly <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/20/putin-wagner-mercenaries-regime-survival-package-africa/">offering</a> military support to willing African leaders in the form of “regime survival packages”.</p>
<p>A competitor to Ecowas appears to have emerged in west Africa, and this alliance is not backing down. Only time will tell whether the new alliance will favour the citizens of west Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ecowas has a patchy track record when it comes to ensuring cooperation and security across west Africa – member states are now starting to leave.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonOlayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2239552024-02-20T18:00:04Z2024-02-20T18:00:04ZChristchurch terrorist discussed attacks online a year before carrying them out, new research reveals<p>In March and August 2018, up to a year before he attacked two Christchurch mosques, Brenton Tarrant posted publicly online that he planned to do so. Until now, these statements have not been identified.</p>
<p>In fact, for four years before his attack, Tarrant had been posting anonymously but publicly on the online message board 4chan about the need to attack people of colour in locations of “significance”, including places of worship.</p>
<p>In its final report in 2020, the <a href="https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/">royal commission of inquiry</a> into the terror attacks wrote: </p>
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<p>The individual claimed that he was not a frequent commenter on extreme right-wing sites and that YouTube was, for him, a far more significant source of information and inspiration.
Although he did frequent extreme right-wing discussion boards such as those on 4chan and 8chan, the evidence we have seen is indicative of more substantial use of YouTube and is therefore consistent with what he told us.</p>
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<p>Given the importance of online environments in radicalising lone actor terrorists, we questioned this and set out to investigate whether right-wing websites were important in Tarrant’s radicalisation.</p>
<p>What we found overturns a great deal of what we thought we knew about him. It also raises serious questions, not only about why this posting was not detected before the attack, but also why it has not been discovered in the five years since the March 15 attacks. </p>
<h2>Beyond the manifesto</h2>
<p>Having the opportunity to see Tarrant interact candidly with his online community, we see that much of what he stated in his manifesto was propaganda.</p>
<p>When he wrote in his manifesto that he was driven to violence by the lack of a political solution – a realisation that came to him in 2017 – we now know he had been calling for attacks against civilians at least as early as 2015.</p>
<p>Where he claimed he was not driven by antisemitism, we found hatred and conspiratorial distrust of Jews were central to his entire worldview.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/when-life-means-life-why-the-court-had-to-deliver-an-unprecedented-sentence-for-the-christchurch-terrorist-145091">When life means life: why the court had to deliver an unprecedented sentence for the Christchurch terrorist</a>
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<p>Although he claimed in his manifesto that he carried out his attack to preserve diversity and respect for all cultures, the violent racism and Islamophobia in his posting sets him apart, even in the darkest corners of 4chan.</p>
<p>We will be publishing more about Tarrant’s online history, including what radicalised him and what lessons can be learned. Here we introduce some of our initial findings. </p>
<p>Among other revelations, we show that there were numerous opportunities for the public and New Zealand and Australian security services to observe him making very threatening statements online. </p>
<p>We’ve chosen to repeat only a small number of Tarrant’s statements, given their highly offensive nature. However, we still advise caution before reading further.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/out-of-the-shadows-why-making-nzs-security-threat-assessment-public-for-the-first-time-is-the-right-move-211183">Out of the shadows: why making NZ’s security threat assessment public for the first time is the right move</a>
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<h2>How we found the posts</h2>
<p>Because 4chan posts are anonymous, we used a combination of indicators to identify Tarrant. 4chan’s “politically incorrect” board – referred to as /pol/ – provides the time, date and location of each post, allowing us to match this against Tarrant’s travel to numerous countries over five years.</p>
<p>Tarrant also frequently provided personal information in his posts, and he used the same distinctive language. In some cases, he repeated points we know he made elsewhere. He openly and proudly stated his Australian identity, even as he called for violence.</p>
<p>He also often made specific grammatical errors which make his posting stand out. He uses this style in online writing samples as early as 2011, in his 2019 manifesto, and in a great deal of online posting in between. In combination, these indicators identify Tarrant. </p>
<p>Our team of four researchers reviewed thousands of anonymous posts and hundreds of threads on /pol/. We used the platform’s search function for particular words, phrases and images. As a team we carefully evaluated all posts which included several of the above indicators.</p>
<p>We maintained a very high evidence threshold for including posts in our analysis. We excluded some important statements that were almost certainly written by him, but for which only one or two of the above indicators were present.</p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>By 2015, Tarrant was calling for mass violence against people of colour. Inspired by Dylann Roof’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/06/17/878828088/5-years-after-charleston-church-massacre-what-have-we-learned">massacre of nine Black worshippers</a> in a church in Charleston, South Carolina, Tarrant excitedly claimed “violence is the last resort of a cornered animal”, and “it was always going to come to this”.</p>
<p>It was here Tarrant made clear that white nationalist extremists should target innocent victims in locations of “significance”, such as places of worship.</p>
<p>When other posters claimed Roof should have targeted a “ghetto”, Tarrant became frustrated. He explained that attacking unarmed people in a church is a “very simple tactic” necessary to provoke people of colour into retaliating. He used a highly racist phrase common on the /pol/ board to refer to this strategy.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/using-ai-to-monitor-the-internet-for-terror-content-is-inescapable-but-also-fraught-with-pitfalls-222408">Using AI to monitor the internet for terror content is inescapable – but also fraught with pitfalls</a>
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<p>For at least four years, then, Tarrant contemplated and planned on killing people in a location of emotional importance such as a school or place of worship. </p>
<p>In fact, he glorified a wide range of violence, including school and public shootings, the perpetrators of which were driven by psychological or other motives rather than white nationalist ideology.</p>
<p>He advocated for and praised the sadistic and brutal killing of innocent civilians. The key for Tarrant was that this violence was perpetrated by white men. For him, any white violence might trigger the race war and segregation he desired.</p>
<p>As he travelled the world between 2014 and 2018, Tarrant became increasingly focused on Muslims. His hatred persisted after arriving in New Zealand. Sometimes it spiralled into unhinged tirades.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-ideology-detecting-algorithms-catch-online-extremism-before-it-takes-hold-200629">Can ideology-detecting algorithms catch online extremism before it takes hold?</a>
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<p>In one thread, he claimed he would form and fund an armed band of 4chan users to conduct ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Some of his posting is unusually violent even within the extremism of /pol/. With hindsight at least, it suggests potential opportunities for detection, most obviously by Australian authorities. </p>
<p>For example, in that same thread, he identified himself as Australian four times, and brazenly wrote there was nothing the Australian government could do to stop him. </p>
<p>At the moment of this violent fantasy, he emailed a gun club in Dunedin stating his plans to move to New Zealand. In the same week, he made donations to international far-right leaders.</p>
<h2>Operational Security?</h2>
<p>The royal commission into the Christchurch terror attacks concluded Tarrant made only “limited lapses” in operational security during his time in New Zealand between late 2017 and March 2019.</p>
<p>This is not the case. He posted regularly on /pol/, which is freely and publicly accessible. His posting was visible to numerous others whose identities he could not possibly know.</p>
<p>Two threads in March and August of 2018 in particular show his hatred of and plans to attack the Muslim community. As such, they presented opportunities for his detection.</p>
<p>In these threads, Tarrant and other users posted angrily about the spread of immigrants in New Zealand, and particularly the presence of mosques in small towns. Very soon, a group of anonymous posters, including Tarrant, discussed violence against the buildings (and the communities that gather in them).</p>
<p>When another user posted an image of a box of matches in reference to the mosques, Tarrant wrote “Soon”.</p>
<p>Revealing he was in Dunedin, Tarrant expressed his anger at the presence of mosques in that city, and in Christchurch and Ashburton to the north, using highly abusive language. When other users called on him to act, he wrote: “I have a plan to stop it. Just hold on.”</p>
<p>Far from maintaining tight operational security as he planned his attack, Tarrant openly (albeit anonymously) discussed violence against mosques in the South Island while in New Zealand.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-royal-commission-report-on-the-christchurch-atrocity-is-a-beginning-not-an-end-151663">The royal commission report on the Christchurch atrocity is a beginning, not an end</a>
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<h2>Preventing it happening again</h2>
<p>The 4chan community was crucial in Tarrant’s radicalisation (and the examples given here are just a portion of what we have found). </p>
<p>Given what we know about the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19434472.2020.1862274">importance of online environments in the radicalisation</a> of other white nationalist terrorists, it is disturbing this aspect of Tarrant’s path to March 15 has not been investigated more thoroughly.</p>
<p>After all, his final words before the attack were released on the imageboard 8chan, but also intended for 4chan: “It’s been a long ride […] you are all top blokes and the best bunch of cobbers a man could ask for”.</p>
<p>It is hard to imagine a clearer signpost that the real nature of his radicalisation could be found on those forums.</p>
<p>Five years later, it seems we are only beginning to understand why he committed the atrocity, what might have been done to stop it, and how government agencies can work together with specialist extremism researchers to prevent it happening again.</p>
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<p><em>More information about our study will be released at <a href="https://www.heiaglobal.com/">heiaglobal.com</a>. Our research was approved by the University of Auckland Human Participant Ethics Committee. A paper based on this study has been submitted for peer review and publication.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Wilson is the co-founder and director of Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa (HEIA). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ethan Renner, Jack Smylie, and Michal Dziwulski do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Five years on from the attacks, a detailed investigation of the shooter’s online radicalisation shows he was openly posting about his plans. Why was it missed and what can we learn?Chris Wilson, Co-founder and director of Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa (HEIA) and director, Master of Conflict and Terrorism Studies, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauEthan Renner, Researcher, Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauJack Smylie, Research Analyst, Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauMichal Dziwulski, Researcher, Hate & Extremism Insights Aotearoa, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata RauLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230302024-02-12T15:58:31Z2024-02-12T15:58:31ZPakistan election results in political instability when the country needed it least<p>Shock results in Pakistan’s national election threaten to see the country free-fall into political crisis. Days after the election, it remains unclear which party (or parties) will form a government and who the next prime minister will be.</p>
<p>Independent candidates affiliated to Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice/PTI), the party of former prime minister, Imran Khan, won 95 of 264 seats. This puts it in the lead, ahead of Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) in second place. However, with 75 seats, PML-N is the largest single party in the national assembly.</p>
<p>It’s fair to say Pakistan doesn’t have a brilliant track record when it comes to putting democracy into action. No elected prime minister has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/9/factbox-no-pakistani-prime-minister-has-completed-a-full-tenure">completed</a> a full term in office. The country has been under military rule for nearly as much time as it has been under a civilian government. And the <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-a-historical-trail-of-pakistans-powerful-military-enterprise-205749">military</a> has long directed the country’s politics from behind the scenes. </p>
<p>Allegations that the election was likely to be <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/12/election-engineering-is-pakistans-february-vote-already-rigged">rigged</a> were rife months before voters headed to the polls on February 8. Khan, who remains widely popular, was <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20231231-imprisoned-former-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-barred-from-election-candidacy">barred from running</a> in the election and is currently in prison having been sentenced on three separate occasions in recent weeks. Many candidates for his party were imprisoned or otherwise <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/07/harassed-constantly-imran-khans-party-fights-state-pressure-in-pakistan-election#:%7E:text=Dozens%20of%20senior%20PTI%20leaders,posters%20are%20systematically%20torn%20down.">harassed</a> and hounded out of politics. </p>
<p>The Election Commission of Pakistan also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-imran-khans-party-loses-cricket-bat-electoral-symbol-2024-01-14/">banned</a> PTI candidates from using the electoral symbol of a cricket bat. They had to stand as independents with individual symbols, a sure impediment in a country of large rural constituencies where high numbers of voters <a href="https://mofept.gov.pk/ProjectDetail/NjQ4ZTg2NjItOWM2NC00Y2IxLTkzMDgtMjU2OTFhMjA4NzNh#:%7E:text=The%20current%20literacy%20rate%20of,is%20illiterate%20in%20the%20country.">cannot read</a>.</p>
<p>As voting got underway, the interior ministry <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68226228">suspended</a> mobile calls and data services – a move it said was essential to “maintain law and order” after a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68226516">string of terrorist attacks</a> in the days leading up to the election. The internet blackout meant it was not possible for many urban voters to book taxis to go and cast their vote or coordinate plans with other family members. Violence on election day itself left <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-vote-counts-drags-after-election-marred-by-attacks-outages-2024-02-09/">28 people dead</a>.</p>
<h2>Close contest</h2>
<p>Once the results started trickling in, independent candidates aligned to PTI were out ahead. There were then significant delays in the processing and announcing of further results, leading to fears that the outcome would be <a href="https://twitter.com/MichaelKugelman/status/1755704058155765903">manipulated by the military</a> who PTI supporters feared were intent on suppressing Khan’s party. </p>
<p>Despite the military’s interference, the elections have resulted in political uncertainty. Behind the scenes, Sharif and his PML-N is negotiating power-sharing with Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s Pakistan People Party (PPP). He is also hoping to co-opt some of Khan’s PTI-backed candidates, and is showing some <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2456138/pti-backed-independent-defects-to-pml-n">success</a>.</p>
<p>If he manages to put together a coalition, Sharif will come to power with much baggage. He was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/28/pakistani-court-disqualifies-pm-nawaz-sharif-from-office">dismissed as prime minister</a> in 2017 over corruption allegations – and accusations of nepotism have, in the past, landed both he and his daughter Maryam in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/06/former-pakistani-leader-nawaz-sharif-sentenced-to-10-years-in-jail">prison</a>. </p>
<p>The army, who many believe selected Sharif as their man, seem to have weighed the baggage and decided to hedge their bet – a wager they may be coming to regret. The Pakistan military is often referred to as the army that has never won a war and never lost an election: 2024 may have disrupted that.</p>
<h2>Stability is unlikely</h2>
<p>Pakistan has precedence for not honouring the will of the electorate. In December 1970, at the country’s first direct national election, the Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan, while The PPP won 87 out of 138 seats in West Pakistan. These results meant the Awami League had won an outright majority to govern the whole of Pakistan. </p>
<p>However, the national assembly was postponed, leading to protests, a civil war and eventually to a national split and the end of the bifurcated era. East Pakistan became Bangladesh and West Pakistan simply became Pakistan. </p>
<p>Over half a century later, it is unlikely that Khan will stay quiet if his party is denied power. He enjoys, for now, the enduring popular support of Pakistan’s 128 million voters. And Khan has managed to shift the zeitgeist, leading to the unprecedented open criticism of Pakistan’s all-powerful military. </p>
<p>But the country’s political uncertainty comes at a time of severe economic crisis. Strong and stable leadership is required to steer Pakistan’s struggling economy. </p>
<h2>Pakistan’s economy is in crisis</h2>
<p>Figures released by Pakistan’s <a href="https://www.pbs.gov.pk/">Bureau of Statistics</a> in January 2024 revealed that inflation was nearly 30% higher than at the same point the previous year. The <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1797445">cost of essentials</a> such as wheat, sugar and vegetables are now unaffordable for many ordinary people whose wages are being stretched to breaking point. </p>
<p>The number of people living in poverty in Pakistan has climbed to <a href="https://pakistanaffairs.pk/2023/10/03/the-world-bank-estimates-that-the-poverty-rate-in-pakistan-will-reach-39-4-in-fy23/">nearly 40%</a>. And price hikes for electricity and fuel in September 2023 led to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/sep/05/pakistan-uproar-violent-protests-soaring-fuel-electricity-prices">protests</a>, with thousands taking to the streets and burning their electricity bills. </p>
<p>On top of this, Pakistan will have to repay its <a href="https://indiafirstepaper.com/2023/04/07/pakistan-must-repay-external-debt-of-us77-5-billion-within-3-years/">substantial external debt</a> – US$77.5 billion (£61.4 billion) over the next three years, with a currency that is depleted of value. In August 2023, Pakistan’s rupee fell to a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-22/pakistan-rupee-slumps-to-record-low-amid-growing-headwinds">record low</a> of 299 to the dollar.</p>
<p>With increased economic hardship and little opportunity at home, many Pakistanis are making perilous journeys out of Pakistan. Young people especially are being driven to find a better life elsewhere, sometimes with deadly consequences. In June 2023, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/18/pakistanis-were-forced-below-deck-on-refugee-boat-in-greece-disaster">more than 300</a> Pakistani migrants died when an overcrowded fishing vessel sank off the coast of Greece.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s new leader will need new ideas on how to get their country out of economic trouble and improve the lives of his countrymen. Whoever it may be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223030/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Parveen Akhtar has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the British Academy.</span></em></p>Days after the election, it remains unclear who the the next prime minister will be.Parveen Akhtar, Senior Lecturer: Politics, History and International Relations, Aston UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224082024-02-07T12:03:02Z2024-02-07T12:03:02ZUsing AI to monitor the internet for terror content is inescapable – but also fraught with pitfalls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573450/original/file-20240205-17-4tssh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C0%2C3693%2C2460&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/technology-security-concept-personal-authentication-system-709257292">metamorworks/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every minute, millions of social media posts, photos and videos flood the internet. <a href="https://www.socialpilot.co/blog/social-media-statistics">On average</a>, Facebook users share 694,000 stories, X (formerly Twitter) users post 360,000 posts, Snapchat users send 2.7 million snaps and YouTube users upload more than 500 hours of video. </p>
<p>This vast ocean of online material needs to be constantly monitored for harmful or illegal content, like promoting terrorism and violence. </p>
<p>The sheer volume of content means that it’s not possible for people to inspect and check all of it manually, which is why automated tools, including artificial intelligence (AI), are essential. But such tools also have their limitations. </p>
<p>The concerted effort in recent years to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2222901">develop tools</a> for the identification and removal of online terrorist content has, in part, been fuelled by the emergence of new laws and regulations. This includes the EU’s terrorist content online <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0784">regulation</a>, which requires hosting service providers to remove terrorist content from their platform within one hour of receiving a removal order from a competent national authority.</p>
<h2>Behaviour and content-based tools</h2>
<p>In broad terms, there are two types of tools used to root out terrorist content. The first looks at certain account and message behaviour. This includes how old the account is, the use of trending or unrelated hashtags and abnormal posting volume. </p>
<p>In many ways, this is similar to spam detection, in that it does not pay attention to content, and is <a href="https://www.resolvenet.org/research/remove-impede-disrupt-redirect-understanding-combating-pro-islamic-state-use-file-sharing">valuable for detecting</a> the rapid dissemination of large volumes of content, which are often bot-driven. </p>
<p>The second type of tool is content-based. It focuses on linguistic characteristics, word use, images and web addresses. Automated content-based tools take <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">one of two approaches</a>. </p>
<p><strong>1. Matching</strong></p>
<p>The first approach is based on comparing new images or videos to an existing database of images and videos that have previously been identified as terrorist in nature. One challenge here is that terror groups are known to try and evade such methods by producing subtle variants of the same piece of content. </p>
<p>After the Christchurch terror attack in New Zealand in 2019, for example, hundreds of visually distinct versions of the livestream video of the atrocity <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/technical-update-on-new-zealand/">were in circulation</a>. </p>
<p>So, to combat this, matching-based tools generally use <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/open-source-photo-video-matching/">perceptual hashing</a> rather than cryptographic hashing. Hashes are a bit like digital fingerprints, and cryptographic hashing acts like a secure, unique identity tag. Even changing a single pixel in an image drastically alters its fingerprint, preventing false matches. </p>
<p>Perceptual hashing, on the other hand, focuses on similarity. It overlooks minor changes like pixel colour adjustments, but identifies images with the same core content. This makes perceptual hashing more resilient to tiny alterations to a piece of content. But it also means that the hashes are not entirely random, and so could potentially be used to try and <a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/black-box-attacks-on-perceptual-image-hashes-with-gans-cc1be11f277">recreate</a> the original image.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A close up of a mobile phone screen displaying several social media apps." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Millions of posts, images and videos are uploaded to social media platforms every minute.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/moscow-russia-29072023-new-elon-musks-2339442245">Viktollio/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>2. Classification</strong></p>
<p>The second approach relies on classifying content. It <a href="https://www.cambridgeconsultants.com/insights/whitepaper/ofcom-use-ai-online-content-moderation">uses</a> machine learning and other forms of AI, such as natural language processing. To achieve this, the AI needs a lot of examples like texts labelled as terrorist content or not by human content moderators. By analysing these examples, the AI learns which features distinguish different types of content, allowing it to categorise new content on its own. </p>
<p>Once trained, the algorithms are then able to predict whether a new item of content belongs to one of the specified categories. These items may then be removed or flagged for human review. </p>
<p>This approach also <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">faces challenges</a>, however. Collecting and preparing a large dataset of terrorist content to train the algorithms is time-consuming and <a href="https://oro.open.ac.uk/69799/">resource-intensive</a>. </p>
<p>The training data may also become dated quickly, as terrorists make use of new terms and discuss new world events and current affairs. Algorithms also have difficulty understanding context, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951719897945">subtlety and irony</a>. They also <a href="https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf">lack</a> cultural sensitivity, including variations in dialect and language use across different groups. </p>
<p>These limitations can have important offline effects. There have been documented failures to remove hate speech in countries such as <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/why-facebook-keeps-failing-in-ethiopia/">Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/the-thread/facebooks-content-moderation-language-barrier/">Romania</a>, while free speech activists in countries such as <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-seven-years-later-how-facebook-shuts-down-free-speech-egypt">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://syrianobserver.com/news/58430/facebook-deletes-accounts-of-assad-opponents.html">Syria</a> and <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-required-is-facebooks-effort-to-clean-up-operation-carthage-damaging-free-expression-in-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> have reported having their content removed.</p>
<h2>We still need human moderators</h2>
<p>So, in spite of advances in AI, human input remains essential. It is important for maintaining databases and datasets, assessing content flagged for review and operating appeals processes for when decisions are challenged. </p>
<p>But this is demanding and draining work, and there have been <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/facebook-content-moderators-ireland">damning reports</a> regarding the working conditions of moderators, with many tech companies such as Meta <a href="https://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/faculty-research/who-moderates-social-media-giants-call-end-outsourcing">outsourcing</a> this work to third-party vendors. </p>
<p>To address this, we <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">recommend</a> the development of a set of minimum standards for those employing content moderators, including mental health provision. There is also potential to develop AI tools to safeguard the wellbeing of moderators. This would work, for example, by blurring out areas of images so that moderators can reach a decision without viewing disturbing content directly. </p>
<p>But at the same time, few, if any, platforms have the resources needed to develop automated content moderation tools and employ a sufficient number of human reviewers with the required expertise. </p>
<p>Many platforms have turned to off-the-shelf products. It is estimated that the content moderation solutions market will be <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/content-moderation-solutions-market-to-cross-us-32-bn-by-2031-tmr-report-301514155.html">worth $32bn by 2031</a>. </p>
<p>But caution is needed here. Third-party providers are not currently subject to the same level of oversight as tech platforms themselves. They may rely disproportionately on automated tools, with insufficient human input and a lack of transparency regarding the datasets used to train their algorithms.</p>
<p>So, collaborative initiatives between governments and the private sector are essential. For example, the EU-funded <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/">Tech Against Terrorism Europe</a> project has developed valuable resources for tech companies. There are also examples of automated content moderation tools being made openly available like Meta’s <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2022/12/meta-launches-new-content-moderation-tool/">Hasher-Matcher-Actioner</a>, which companies can use to build their own database of hashed terrorist content. </p>
<p>International organisations, governments and tech platforms must prioritise the development of such collaborative resources. Without this, effectively addressing online terror content will remain elusive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222408/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Macdonald receives funding from the EU Internal Security Fund for the project Tech Against Terrorism Europe (ISF-2021-AG-TCO-101080101). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ashley A. Mattheis receives funding from the EU Internal Security Fund for the project Tech Against Terrorism Europe (ISF-2021-AG-TCO-101080101).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Wells receives funding from the Council of Europe to conduct an analysis of emerging patterns of misuse of technology by terrorist actors (ongoing)</span></em></p>The complex task of tackling online terror needs human eyes as well as artificial intelligence.Stuart Macdonald, Professor of Law, Swansea UniversityAshley A. Mattheis, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of Law and Government, Dublin City UniversityDavid Wells, Honorary Research Associate at the Cyber Threats Research Centre, Swansea UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223882024-02-05T09:27:55Z2024-02-05T09:27:55ZMali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout<p><em>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sent Ecowas, west Africa’s main political union of 15 countries, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">formal notice</a> of their withdrawal from the bloc. The three countries are governed by military rulers who <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/coups-africa-even-ecowas">have overthrown</a> democratically elected leaders since 2021.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo asked political scientist <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">Olayinka Ajala</a> about the implications of the withdrawal.</em></p>
<h2>Why are Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdrawing?</h2>
<p>The three countries have given <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240129-mali-and-burkina-faso-withdraw-from-ecowas">three main reasons</a>.</p>
<p>First is what they call the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions</a>” imposed on them for truncating their democracies. </p>
<p>Second is the failure of Ecowas to assist them in their “existential fight against terrorism and insecurity”. </p>
<p>The juntas have also argued that Ecowas has deviated from the founding principles of the organisation and is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">controlled by foreign powers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2001, Ecowas adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance which included a mechanism for unconstitutional changes of government. <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ecowas2001protocol.pdf">Article 1a</a> of the protocol maintains a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. </p>
<p>Ecowas cited this clause as its reason for suspending the three countries and for imposing sanctions against them.</p>
<p>Ecowas has made it clear that it won’t work with the regimes. Its statements make it clear that it has taken a strong stance because it wishes to deter military coups in other countries within the bloc. </p>
<p>The regional bloc is also clearly frustrated at the lack of interest the three countries have shown in returning to democratic rule. It has asked for a clear and definite transition timetable, especially for Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<h2>What impact will the withdrawal have on Ecowas?</h2>
<p>The main impact will be on trade and economic development. Ecowas is primarily an economic community and the loss of any member will affect trade and economic development.</p>
<p>The three countries collectively account for 8% of the <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/economic-community-west-african-states">US$761 billion</a> Ecowas gross domestic product (GDP). In 2022, the total trade volume from the Ecowas region totalled <a href="https://punchng.com/mali-b-faso-niger-exit-may-weaken-277bn-ecowas-trade-report/">US$277.22 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The concern is that the exit of these countries could affect the flow of goods and services in the bloc. </p>
<p>Leaving the bloc could have other knock-on effects too:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The economic collapse of the countries. These countries have strategic importance, especially in food security. Niger is a key source of onions while Burkina Faso exports tomatoes to the sub-region.</p></li>
<li><p>This would lead to an exodus of citizens to other Ecowas countries, further threatening the stability of the bloc. </p></li>
<li><p>Concerns that the three countries will enter into bilateral relationships with countries that might not be favourable to other Ecowas countries. For example, there are already concerns about Niger’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">alliance with Russia</a> after it severed ties with France. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What impact will it have on each of the countries?</h2>
<p>The main impact on the countries will be on the movement of people, goods and services. </p>
<p>Under Ecowas, members enjoy unrestricted movement of citizens within the bloc. Citizens of Ecowas countries can live and work in any country in the bloc. For instance, there are more than 5 million citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger living and working in Côte d'Ivoire alone. Ghana, Togo and Republic of Benin also host large numbers of Nigeriens. </p>
<p>The citizens of all three landlocked countries would no longer be able to travel to other Ecowas states without impediments. Niger also shares a border of over 1,600km with seven states in Nigeria and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-30/analysis-west-africas-brexit-moment-spells-trouble-for-the-region">80% of its trade</a> is done with Nigeria. </p>
<p>The sanctions imposed on Niger by Ecowas are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">already affecting</a> citizens of the country. Hardship is likely to increase after the exit if Nigeria decides to police its borders. </p>
<p>Also, depending on how Ecowas agrees to relate to the countries in future, there could be restrictions on goods and services which would further affect the economies of these countries. </p>
<h2>What impact will it have on security in the region?</h2>
<p>The security arrangement might not be affected in the short term. But it could be in the long term. There is already limited security cooperation between the three countries and other Ecowas members. For instance, they have all withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, resulting in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/6/chad-mauritania-pave-way-to-dissolve-g5-anti-rebel-alliance#:%7E:text=The%20G5%20was%20created%20in,major%20issue%20across%20the%20Sahel.&text=The%20two%20remaining%20members%20of,other%20three%20founding%20countries%20left.">collapse of the organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Although the lack of security support from Ecowas was stated as one of the reasons for exiting Ecowas, a total collapse of existing security infrastructure would affect not only the three countries but also other relatively stable states such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. The three states have joined forces to form the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/military-led-sahel-states-rally-thousands-support-alliance-2023-12-30/">Alliance of Sahel States</a>, but without support from regional groups such as Ecowas, they will struggle to curtail insurgencies. </p>
<p>Currently, Mali has over 1,000 members of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group), supported by Russia. There are <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso">100 in Burkina Faso</a>. After months of Burkina Faso insisting it would not engage foreign mercenaries, the first contingent arrived in January 2024 and more are expected soon. Niger also recently agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">military cooperation</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>This indicates the three countries still require external assistance to combat insecurity. The problem is that Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine and might not be able to support the three countries as much as they would require. If the three countries fail to combat insurgence through the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States, the threat will spread to other countries in the bloc and beyond. </p>
<p>Ecowas leaders have indicated that they are willing to have a dialogue with the three countries. I think Ecowas granting some concessions to prevent them from exiting would be in the interest of the bloc and all the citizens of Ecowas countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision by the three countries could change the dynamics of Ecowas.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2096502024-01-31T13:36:11Z2024-01-31T13:36:11ZMore than a year after the death of an environmental activist, questions remain on the dangerousness of the Stop Cop City movement near Atlanta<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557576/original/file-20231104-15-nnpdt7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=872%2C136%2C4832%2C3532&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A makeshift memorial in the South River Forest for environmental activist Manuel Terán. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/makeshift-memorial-for-environmental-activist-manuel-teran-news-photo/1246854231?adppopup=true">Cheney Orr/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Manuel Terán was one of a few dozen environmentalist activists who joined a protest nearly three years ago against the clearing of about 300 acres of woodlands near Atlanta to construct a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/protests-against-atlantas-cop-city-continue-despite-crackdown-demonstrations">proposed police and firefighter training center</a> that critics fear would lead to greater “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/04/us/cop-city-atlanta-police-training.html">police militirization</a>.” </p>
<p>Since 2021, some of the activists that include civil rights advocates and Indigenous tribes have called themselves “<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/atlanta-protests-cop-city-georgia-state-of-emergency-forest-defenders/">forest defenders</a>” and rallied under the mantra of “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-the-south/the-new-fight-over-an-old-forest-in-atlanta">Stop Cop City</a>” to block construction workers by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/may/26/tree-sitters-appalachian-oil-pipeline-virginia-west">sitting in trees</a> and, in some cases, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/fire-breaks-out-atlanta-police-training-center-after-protest-media-2023-03-06/">setting fires</a> and damaging construction vehicles.</p>
<p>Local police have responded in force with batons and riot shields to subdue demonstrators who <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/11/15/cop-city-protest-police-atlanta-tear-gas/#:%7E:text=By%209%20a.m.%2C%20over%20400,a%20vast%20police%20training%20facility%2C">on one march</a> in November 2023 were armed with tree saplings that they wanted to plant in cleared sections of the South River Forest. </p>
<p>But those protests turned deadly on Jan. 18, 2023, when <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/cop-city-protestor-manuel-paez-teran-was-shot-least-57-autopsy-reveals-rcna80624">Terán was shot and killed</a> during a police raid at one of the makeshift camps set up by activists.</p>
<p>Local police claim Terán fired the first shot. But some <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-03-15/stop-cop-city-forest-camp-atlanta">activists dispute</a> the official version and argue that Terán was surrendering when he was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65340456">shot 57 times</a> by six different police officers. </p>
<p>Either way, one thing is indisputable: Terán was the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/apr/20/manuel-paez-teran-autopsy-cop-city">first environmental activist</a> to be <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/environmental-protests-long-history-us-police-never-killed-activist-no-rcna68255">killed by police</a> in U.S. history.</p>
<p>A little more than a year later, his death has brought renewed questions about the dangerousness of environmental extremism.</p>
<h2>The threat of ecoterrorism</h2>
<p>Since Terán’s death, multiple waves of raids by police have largely cleared the area of protesters. </p>
<p>More than 40 Stop Cop City movement protesters face <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/atlanta-police-arrest-3-organizers-behind-bail-fund-supporting-protests-against-cop-city">domestic terrorism charges</a> and another <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/dozens-indicted-on-georgia-racketeering-charges-related-to-stop-cop-city-movement-appear-in-court">61 protesters</a> face Georgia <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/crime/stop-city-indictment-rico-atlanta-b2405393.html">racketeering charges</a> for actions related to their involvement in the movement. </p>
<p>Those criminal actions, exceptions to the majority of nonviolent demonstrations organized by environmental activists, included damaging buildings, setting fires to police cars, and vandalism.</p>
<p>Although the radical environmental movement did not emerge in the U.S. until the 1970s, it has been considered by the FBI to be a <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-report.pdf/view">domestic terrorist threat</a> since the 1990s.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protestors carrying large posters are marching through smoke and underneath a neon Coke sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557577/original/file-20231104-29-f2tfza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/557577/original/file-20231104-29-f2tfza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557577/original/file-20231104-29-f2tfza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557577/original/file-20231104-29-f2tfza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557577/original/file-20231104-29-f2tfza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557577/original/file-20231104-29-f2tfza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/557577/original/file-20231104-29-f2tfza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Demonstrators protest the death of environmental activist Manuel Terán on Jan. 21, 2023 in Atlanta.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-protest-the-death-of-environmental-activist-news-photo/1246436202?adppopup=true">Elijah Nouvelage for The Washington Post via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Two, often overlapping, schools of thought formed the cornerstones of the radical environmental movement. Championed by <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/deep-ecology">Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess</a>, the first is known as deep ecology and holds that everything in nature is of equal value. The second, championed by <a href="https://e360.yale.edu/features/peter-singer-interview">philosopher Peter Singer</a>, holds that animals have inherent value and deserve moral equality on par with humans.</p>
<p>Some radical environmentalists believe that because nature and animals have equal value to humans, they are justified in destroying property to protect nature and wilderness from human-made harm. But as a whole, environmental activists, like American writer <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Abbey">Edward Abbey</a>, do not support violence as a tactic and instead prefer peaceful acts of civil disobedience. </p>
<p>As defined by the FBI, <a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-terrorism">ecoterrorism</a> is “the use or threatened use of violence” against innocent victims or property for environmental and political reasons. </p>
<p>In May 2004, for instance, <a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/animal-rights-extremism-and-ecoterrorism">John E. Lewis</a>, the FBI deputy assistant director, testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee that radical environmentalists, such as the <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/supremacy/animal-liberation-front">Animal Liberation Front</a> and <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/publication/st-frg-overview-bombing-and-arson-attacks-environmental-and-animal-rights-extremists">Earth Liberation Front</a>, were among the “most serious domestic terrorism threats.” </p>
<p>Lewis estimated that since 1976 both groups and other splinter organizations were responsible for committing more than 1,100 criminal acts in the U.S., which resulted in about US$110 million in damages.</p>
<p>However, our research has consistently shown that the majority of crimes committed by radical environmentalists were aimed at property rather than people and are not as dangerous as they once were in the 1990s.</p>
<p>Of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.639416">1,069 criminal incidents</a> between 1970 and 2007 that were motivated to protest the destruction of the environment, the mistreatment of animals, or both, nearly 72% of such crimes targeted businesses, such as food retailers, restaurants and fur or leather processors. Though the attacks could have hurt people or endangered their livelihoods, only 7% were aimed at politicians and business people.</p>
<p>An <a href="https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/z4b32">August 2023 assessment</a> of the 896 criminal incidents committed between 1995 and 2022 by members of a radical environmental group indicated that the most common tactic used was smashing windows. According to the assessment, <a href="https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/z4b32">78% of these incidents</a> did not involve a weapon. But of the 22% that did, the weapon of choice appeared to be some sort of incendiary device, the assessment showed.</p>
<p>But the actions of radical environmentalists and motivation to protect the environment and animals from harm are not without victims, as damages to property may mean a business is forced to close or lay off some of its workers. Our research has shown that their actions in the time period between 1970 and 2007 resulted in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.639416">an estimated $194 million</a> in damages to businesses and government property. </p>
<h2>Effectiveness of criminal justice policies</h2>
<p>For the most part, today’s radical environmental movement has moved away from tactics using property destruction and threats of sabotage and is now characterized by forms of civil resistance, such as <a href="https://www.kiro7.com/news/kiro-7-looks-history-tree-sitting-protest/81984813/">tree-sitting</a> and <a href="https://www.vox.com/23892818/climate-change-activism-radical-protest-civil-disobedience">blockading roads</a>. </p>
<p>Although a number of factors, such as burnout and post-9/11 security measures, are cited by criminologists as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/26/magazine/earth-liberation-front-joseph-mahmoud-dibee.html">reasons for the changes in tactics</a>, government actions have been one important factor. </p>
<p>For example, <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_EffectivenessofLECountermeasuresOperationBackfire_Sept2012.pdf">Operation Backfire</a>, a 2004 police crackdown in Portland, Oregon, was credited for the disbandment of “the Family,” a group of environmental extremists that included members of the <a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/animal-rights-extremism-and-ecoterrorism">Animal Liberation Front</a> and the <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/supremacy/earth-liberation-front">Earth Liberation Front</a> that were active in the late 1990s and early 2000s. </p>
<p>In their assessment, criminologists <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-017-9367-4">Sue-Ming Yang and I-Chin Jen</a> determined that Operation Backfire was successful because the numbers of crimes committed in the name of the group <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-017-9367-4">were reduced</a> as the FBI arrested members of the group under federal anti-terrorism laws. </p>
<p>The crackdown ultimately resulted in the arrest of more than a dozen people on charges ranging from arson and possession of a destructive device to destruction of an energy facility.</p>
<p>In addition, research further <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-013-9211-4">shows</a> that enforcement of federal legislation targeting specific acts, such as the <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-109publ374/html/PLAW-109publ374.htm">Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act</a>, also helped <a href="https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-state-animal-terrorismanimal-enterprise-interference-laws">decrease the number</a> of criminal attacks against animal research facilities, processing plants and other agricultural operations. </p>
<p>But not all government actions have been good. In 2016, for instance, peaceful protests against the <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-fight">Dakota Access pipeline</a> were confronted by North Dakota law enforcement officers who used water cannons and tear gas to stop unarmed activists. More than <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/dakota-access-pipeline-water-cannon-police-standing-rock-protest">300 people were injured</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-013-9211-4">Research suggests</a> that targeted law enforcement policies and the general threat of imprisonment <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/00224278231152439">are effective</a> at deterring criminal acts committed by extremist environmentalists. </p>
<p>But whether those law enforcement efforts can deter the self-proclaimed forest defenders from continuing their nearly three-year demonstration at the South River Forest remains an open question.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael K. Logan receives funding from the National Institute of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Counterterrorism, Innovation and Technology Center. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Varriale Carson receives funding from the National Institute of Justice.</span></em></p>The death of a protester in 2023 at the site of the proposed Atlanta Public Safety Training Center has brought renewed attention to radical environmentalism in the United States.Michael K. Logan, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Kennesaw State UniversityJennifer Carson, Professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of Central MissouriLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2211052024-01-18T20:22:40Z2024-01-18T20:22:40ZHow economics can shed light on the motivations of extremist groups like Hamas<iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/how-economics-can-shed-light-on-the-motivations-of-extremist-groups-like-hamas" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>A lot of political analysis is available on Israel’s indiscriminate bombing of Gaza. But economic analysis based on supply and demand also helps shed light on why conflict should be viewed systematically and structurally. </p>
<p>Such an analysis is at odds with the Israeli stance that ties its ongoing war in Gaza solely to the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas, rationalizing the deaths of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/01/14/israel-gaza-low-intensity/#:%7E:text=According%20to%20the%20Gaza%20Health,of%20them%20women%20and%20children.">almost 24,000 Gazan civilians.</a></p>
<p>Research from the <a href="https://j-etr.org/2021/08/30/teaching-the-economics-of-religion-to-undergraduate-economics-students/">economics of religion</a> allows us to cut through rationalizations and rhetoric to look at the issue systemically and structurally. </p>
<p>It helps us recognize the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancialmarkets/51677">positive feedback loop</a> that exists when state-sanctioned discrimination and persecution leads to perceived grievances and violence/terrorism, which in turn elicits more state repression, causing the vicious circle to continue unabated. </p>
<p>This seems to have been the case through the years of Israeli military campaigns against Gaza through <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9975.html">various operations</a> like Cast Lead, Protective Edge, Pillar of Defence and so on. These operations are interlinked with Hamas firing indiscriminate rockets in a seemingly endless cycle of violence. </p>
<h2>Economics, not religion, fuels terrorism</h2>
<p>American economist Laurence Iannaccone has written several papers on the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40752990">economic theory of fundamentalism</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2012.00803.x">religious extremism</a> and what he calls the <a href="https://www.religjournal.com/pdf/ijrr02004.pdf">market for martyrs</a>. </p>
<p>According to Iannaccone, the market for martyrs is an economic model that helps us understand the origin of violent extremism based on economic principles like rational choice. </p>
<p>In this market, the killers are suppliers and those who recruit them are demanders. </p>
<p>Based on his work, a typical terrorist, suicide bomber or extremist is neither poor, ignorant nor mentally unstable. This is because poor, ignorant or enraged people can be incompetent and risky; well-educated and mentally composed terrorists are required to carry out successful terrorist missions. </p>
<p>This is consistent with <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/089533003772034925">economic literature</a> that shows there’s little direct connection between poverty or poor education and terrorism. In fact, Palestinian suicide bombers have had <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.487467">higher education and economic status</a> than the average Palestinian. </p>
<p>According to Iannaccone, militancy is a consequence of the social and political environment, not religion. Fundamentalism becomes more appealing when people have been displaced or ill-served by secular governments. </p>
<h2>Filling the void</h2>
<p>That void is filled by groups like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/8/what-is-the-group-hamas-a-simple-guide-tothe-palestinian-group">Hamas that offer public services and welfare programs</a>. These violent groups also arise when basic civil liberties are undermined and economic opportunities are stifled. </p>
<p>According to another American economist, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00287.x">Michael Intriligator</a>, terrorism is used by the weaker party in asymmetric warfare. That party usually has real or perceived grievances, and its motivation is not rooted in poverty or ignorance but in humiliation and retribution for past actions. </p>
<p>This resonates given the observation that <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2020.00004">Hamas perpetrators of Oct. 7 may have been children or minors</a> throughout various Israeli operations in Gaza over the last two decades. The current bombing will likely instigate the same cycle, creating future militants.</p>
<h2>Rational extremists</h2>
<p>Israel’s far-right government has made its sentiments clear. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2023/11/benjamin-netanyahu-amalek-israel-palestine-gaza-saul-samuel-old-testament/">evoked Amalek</a>, described in the Hebrew Bible as an avid persecutor of Israelites. A former Israel envoy to the United Nations referred to Palestinians as “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fr24GcCDgyM">inhuman animals</a>” and a right-wing Israeli lawmaker once called Palestinian children “<a href="https://mondoweiss.net/2015/10/refreshing-bluntness-shaked/">little snakes</a>.” </p>
<p>However, it’s important to note that the economic approach views extremists as rational, not psychopathic or animalistic. It also rejects the flawed argument that suicide bombers cannot be deterred because they have nothing to lose and nothing to live for. </p>
<p>It acknowledges that terrorists do have something to lose — and that they can be deterred. </p>
<p>An example amid the current conflict is the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/five-extremely-excruciating-weeks-talks-led-hamas-hostage-deal-rcna126422">successful negotiations with Hamas that allowed the release of some Israeli hostages.</a></p>
<p>A pathologically nihilist, psychopathic organization would have perpetuated random mayhem amid the negotiations and subsequent hostage releases, but instead Hamas had political objectives. This suggests the group can be reasoned with — and deterred. </p>
<p>Further negotiations and addressing economic disparities and grievances would therefore be a much more fruitful strategy for Israel than indiscriminate bombing that will simply perpetuate the cycle of violence and shift the violence to the next generation. </p>
<p>In short, the economic approach would call for a ceasefire.</p>
<h2>Supply and demand</h2>
<p>Iannaccone argues that the market for martyrs is undermined not by inhibiting the supply of martyrs, but by checking demand.</p>
<p>This is because there are many sources of supply; kill some terrorists and others can be recruited. Imprisonment and execution have minimal impact. </p>
<p>What is needed to choke off the market for martyrs is to check demand by changing the political and economic environment through civil liberties, social services, political representation and economic freedom, all of which would inhibit religious radicals from embracing violence. </p>
<p>Look at Christian extremists in the United States for evidence. Social, legal, economic and political reasons would make religiously sponsored violence unprofitable for American Christian radicals, who would suffer loss to reputation, influence, membership and funding. </p>
<p>In short, the best way to tackle terrorism is not through military might but by ensuring that political grievances are heard and addressed. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/history-repeats-itself-from-the-new-testament-to-qanon-156915">History repeats itself: From the New Testament to QAnon</a>
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<h2>Market for drugs and arms</h2>
<p>The market for martyrs can be tackled the same way as the market for illicit drugs by focusing on demand rather than supply — in other words, by addressing human needs, which is much cheaper than the costly spending on police and judiciary in the case of the war against drugs. </p>
<p>However, <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/5360.html">economic research</a> indicates that focusing on supply is lucrative, since it has a significantly positive impact on defence and security industries in Israel.</p>
<p>In fact, <a href="https://aoav.org.uk/2023/stock-prices-of-major-defence-companies-surge-in-wake-of-october-7th-attacks-in-israel/">weapons manufacturers have gained in share prices in the aftermath of the Hamas attack of Oct. 7</a>. In short, the indiscriminate bombing of Gaza is profitable for war corporations even if the economic approach views it as counter-productive. </p>
<p>Tackling terrorism therefore requires not military aggression but providing public goods, respecting civil liberties and addressing political grievances, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/report-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/">which for Palestinians is the long-festering Israeli occupation of their territory.</a></p>
<p>A ceasefire and eventually an end to the structural and systemic occupation will end the conflict. It’s not the supply of extremists, but demands, that must be addressed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221105/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Junaid B. Jahangir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Real and perceived economic grievances often fuel extremist groups like Hamas. Here’s how the economic basics of supply provide a way to tackle terrorism.Junaid B. Jahangir, Associate Professor, Economics, MacEwan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2204732024-01-11T15:54:30Z2024-01-11T15:54:30ZSouth Africa’s new intelligence bill is meant to stem abuses – what’s good and bad about it<p>When South Africa became a constitutional democracy <a href="https://www.britannica.com/question/How-did-apartheid-end">in 1994</a>, it replaced its apartheid-era intelligence apparatus with a new one aimed at serving the country’s new democratic dispensation. However, the regime of former president Jacob Zuma, 2009-2018, deviated from this path. It <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">abused</a> the intelligence services to serve his political and allegdly corrupt ends. Now the country is taking steps to remedy the situation.</p>
<p>In November 2023, the presidency published the <a href="https://pmg.org.za/bill/1197/">General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill</a>. It proposes overhauling the civilian intelligence agency, the <a href="http://www.ssa.gov.za/">State Security Agency</a>, to address the <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">abuses</a>.</p>
<p>The bill is extremely broad in scope. It intends to amend 12 laws – including the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/act39of1994.pdf">main</a> <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a65-020.pdf">intelligence</a> <a href="https://static.pmg.org.za/docs/120224oversight_0.PDF">laws</a> of the democratic era. </p>
<p>Parliament has set itself a <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/38063/">1 March deadline</a> to complete work on the bill before it dissolves for the national election expected between <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/elections/whats-new-in-the-2024-elections-electoral-amendment-act">May and August</a>. </p>
<p>I have researched intelligence and surveillance for over a decade and also served on the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">2018 High Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency</a>.</p>
<p>In my view, some of the proposals in the bill risk replacing the old abuses with new ones. The bill seeks to broaden intelligence powers drastically but fails to address <a href="https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/38207/">longstanding weaknesses in their oversight</a>. </p>
<h2>Ending abuse</h2>
<p>The bill is meant to respond to major criticisms of the State Security Agency during Zuma’s presidency. The critics include the <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">High Level Review Panel</a> and the <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">Commission of Inquiry into State Capture</a>. </p>
<p>The main criticism of the panel appointed by Zuma’s successor Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018 was that under Zuma, the executive <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201903/high-level-review-panel-state-security-agency.pdf">repurposed</a> the agency to keep him in power, along with his supporters and others dependent on his patronage. In 2009, he merged the erstwhile domestic intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Agency, and the foreign agency, the <a href="https://www.ssa.gov.za/AboutUs/Branches">South African Secret Service</a>, by <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/national-security/ssa-takes-shape-legislation-to-follow/">presidential proclamation</a>, to centralise intelligence. This made it easier for his regime to control intelligence to achieve nefarious ends. The state capture commission made <a href="https://www.saflii.org/images/state-capture-commission-report-part-5-vol1.pdf">similar findings</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-surveillance-law-is-changing-but-citizens-privacy-is-still-at-risk-214508">South Africa’s surveillance law is changing but citizens’ privacy is still at risk</a>
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<p>The most important proposal in the bill is to abolish the <a href="https://nationalgovernment.co.za/units/view/42/state-security-agency-ssa">State Security Agency</a>. It is to be replaced by two separate agencies: one for foreign intelligence, and the other for domestic. The proposed new South African Intelligence Service (foreign) and the South African Intelligence Agency (domestic) will have separate mandates.</p>
<p>Abolishing the State Security Agency would be an important step towards accountability, as set out in the 1994 <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/white-papers/intelligence-white-paper-01-jan-1995#:%7E:text=The%20goal%20of%20this%20White,relevant%2C%20credible%20and%20reliable%20intelligence.">White Paper on Intelligence</a>. </p>
<p>The proposed names of the envisioned new agencies have symbolic importance. They suggest a shift away from a focus on state security, or protection of those in positions of power. Instead, it puts the focus back on human security. This is the protection of broader society, as <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/white-papers/intelligence-white-paper-01-jan-1995#:%7E:text=The%20goal%20of%20this%20White,relevant%2C%20credible%20and%20reliable%20intelligence.">required</a> by the 1994 White Paper.</p>
<h2>The dangers of over-broad definitions</h2>
<p>However, the new mandates given to the two new agencies, and the definitions they rely on, are so broad that abuse of their powerful spying capabilities is almost a foregone conclusion.</p>
<p>The bill says the new agencies will be responsible for collecting and analysing intelligence relating to threats or potential threats to national security in accordance with <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/chp11.html#:%7E:text=198.,to%20seek%20a%20better%20life.">the constitution</a>.</p>
<p>The bill defines national security as</p>
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<p>the capabilities, measures and activities of the state to pursue or advance any threat, any potential threat, any opportunity, any potential opportunity or the security of the Republic and its people …</p>
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<p>This definition is extremely expansive. It allows the intelligence services to undertake any activity that could advance South Africa’s interests. This is regardless of whether there are actual national security threats. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-watchdog-is-failing-civil-society-how-to-restore-its-credibility-195121">South Africa's intelligence watchdog is failing civil society. How to restore its credibility</a>
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<p>This creates the potential for overlap with the mandates of other state entities. However, unlike these, the intelligence agencies will be able to work secretly, using their extremely invasive <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-21-00-spy-wars-south-africa-is-not-innocent/">surveillance</a> <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-07-28-the-awful-state-of-lawful-interception-in-sa-part-two-surveillance-technology-thats-above-the-law/">capabilities</a>.</p>
<p>Such capabilities should only be used in exceptional circumstances when the country is under legitimate threat. To normalise their use in everyday government functions threatens democracy.</p>
<p>Intelligence overreach has happened elsewhere. Governments are increasingly requiring intelligence agencies to ensure that policymakers enjoy <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/national-security-surveillance-in-southern-africa-9780755640225/">decision advantages</a> in a range of areas. These include bolstering trade advantages over other countries.</p>
<p>For example, whistleblower <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance">Edward Snowden’s</a> leaks of classified US and UK intelligence documents showed how the countries misused broad interpretations of national security to engage in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/25907502">industrial espionage</a>.</p>
<p>The UK government used its powerful <a href="https://www.gchq.gov.uk/">signals intelligence capability</a> to <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/12/08/british-spying-tentacles-reach-across-africa-s-heads-of-states-and-business-leaders_5045668_3212.html">spy on</a> African politicians, diplomats and business people during trade negotiations. These abuses mean intelligence mandates should be narrowed and state intelligence power should be reduced.</p>
<h2>Human security definition of national security</h2>
<p>The State Security Agency used its presentation to parliament on the bill to seek broad mandates. Its <a href="https://pmg.org.za/files/231129Presentation_of_GILAB_Final.pptx">presentation</a> says it seeks to give effect to the national security principles in <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/chp11.html#:%7E:text=198.,to%20seek%20a%20better%20life.">section 198</a> of the constitution. The section states that:</p>
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<p>national security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This principle is actually based on the human security definition of national security. The <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/">United Nations General Assembly</a> calls this freedom from fear and freedom from want. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/surveillance-laws-are-failing-to-protect-privacy-rights-what-we-found-in-six-african-countries-170373">Surveillance laws are failing to protect privacy rights: what we found in six African countries</a>
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<p>In its broadest sense, human security protects individuals from a wide range of threats and addresses their underlying drivers. These include <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231962570_Critical_Human_Security_Studies">poverty, underdevelopment and deprivation</a>. State security, on the other hand, is about protecting the state from threats. </p>
<p>If social issues are <a href="https://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/assets/pdf/Waever-Securitization.pdf">securitised</a> – or treated as national security issues requiring intervention by the state’s security services – it becomes difficult to distinguish the work of these agencies from the social welfare arms of the state.</p>
<h2>What needs to happen</h2>
<p>International relations scholar Neil MacFarlane and political scientist Yuen Foong Khong <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000147585">suggested</a> in 2006 that it was possible to address this conundrum by maintaining the focus on broader society as the entity that needs protection, rather than the state. </p>
<p>Legislators need to take a <a href="https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000147585">similar approach</a> when debating the bill. They should narrow the focus of the envisaged two new agencies to domestic and foreign threats of organised violence against society, such as genocide or terrorism. By doing so, they would still be recognising the best of what human security has to offer as an intelligence doctrine, while providing a much more appropriate focus for civilian intelligence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220473/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jane Duncan receives funding from the British Academy and is a director of Intelwatch, a non-governmental organisation devoted to strengthening democratic oversight of state and private intelligence. </span></em></p>The bill seeks greater intelligence powers but neglects oversight.Jane Duncan, Professor of Digital Society, University of GlasgowLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2205862024-01-11T13:25:21Z2024-01-11T13:25:21ZIran terror blast highlights success – and growing risk – of ISIS-K regional strategy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568725/original/file-20240110-15-hzt6wg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=60%2C160%2C6720%2C4285&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 100 people were killed in the blast in Kerman, Iran, on Jan. 3, 2024.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/kerman-iran-people-disperse-near-the-scene-where-explosions-news-photo/1898126156?adppopup=true">Mahdi/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-taliban-is-crucial-in-understanding-their-success-now-and-also-what-might-happen-next-166630">Taliban takeover of Afghanistan</a> in 2021, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">terror group Islamic State Khorasan Province</a>, or ISIS-K, has sought to internationalize its operational and recruitment campaign. Utilizing a sweeping propaganda campaign to appeal to audiences across South and Central Asia, the group has tried to position itself as the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/growing-threat-islamic-state-afghanistan-and-south-asia">dominant regional challenger</a> to what it perceives to be repressive regimes.</p>
<p>On Jan. 3, 2024, ISIS-K demonstrated just how far it had progressed toward these goals. In a brutal demonstration of its capability to align actions with extreme rhetoric, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in Kerman, Iran, which resulted in the deaths of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-leaders-vow-revenge-funeral-bomb-attack-victims-state-media-2024-01-05/">over 100 people</a>.</p>
<p>The blast, which was reportedly carried out by two <a href="https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1743236790591324604">Tajik ISIS-K members</a>, occurred during a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/04/iran-kerman-attack-islamic-state-suspicion-border-afghanistan-pakistan">memorial service</a> for Qassem Soleimani, a Lieutenant General in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was <a href="https://theconversation.com/qassem-soleimani-air-strike-why-this-is-a-dangerous-escalation-of-us-assassination-policy-129300">killed in a U.S. drone strike</a> in 2020. ISIS-K claimed the attack as an <a href="https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1742948108697252211">act of revenge</a> against Soleimani, who <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">spearheaded</a> Iran’s fight against the Islamic State group and its affiliates prior to his death.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.clemson.edu/cbshs/about/profiles/index.html?userid=ajadoon">experts in ISIS-K</a> <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/team/dr-nakissa-jahanbani/">and Iran</a>, we believe the attack highlights the success of ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies and its growing ability to strike declared enemies and undermine regional stability.</p>
<h2>A growing threat</h2>
<p>The attack in Iran was not completely unexpected to those monitoring ISIS-K. A paper <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">one of us co-wrote</a> in 2023 noted that that despite setbacks, including <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-envoy-taliban-kill-8-key-islamic-state-leaders-in-afghanistan/7266218.html">the loss of key personnel</a>, ISIS-K was expanding and intensifying its regional influence. It was achieving this by leveraging its ethnically and nationally diverse membership base and <a href="https://www.rienner.com/title/The_Islamic_State_in_Afghanistan_and_Pakistan_Strategic_Alliances_and_Rivalries">ties to other militant groups</a>.</p>
<p>The Kerman blast <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/14/iran-blames-isil-for-shrine-attack-arrests-foreign-nationals">follows two other recent</a> attacks on the <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202308146240">Shahcheragh shrine in Shiraz</a>, Iran, in October 2022 and August 2023 – both purportedly involving Tajik perpetrators.</p>
<p><iframe id="CNUqY" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/CNUqY/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The involvement of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-national-attack-iran-shrine/32547498.html">Tajik</a> nationals in the Kerman attack underscores Iran’s <a href="https://www.mei.edu/events/irans-isis-challenge-afghanistan">long-standing concerns</a> over ISIS-K’s recruitment strategies, which have seen the group swell its members by reaching out to discontented Muslim populations across South and Central Asian countries and consolidating diverse grievances into a single narrative.</p>
<h2>Strategic diversity</h2>
<p>This strategy of “<a href="https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/islamic-states-central-asian-contingents-their-international-threat">internationalizing</a>” ISIS-K’s agenda – its aim is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">establishment of an Islamic caliphate</a> in Central and South Asia – has been pursued with <a href="https://eurasianet.org/islamic-state-threatens-central-asian-and-chinese-ventures-in-afghanistan">renewed</a> vigor since 2021. This is in part due to a more permissive environment following the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan government.</p>
<p>This process of internationalizing ISIS-K’s agenda involves the group <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">targeting</a> regional countries directly, or their presence within Afghanistan. To date, this has seen interests from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/asia/pakistan-bombing-isis.html">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/20/indias-cautious-return-to-afghanistan/">India</a>, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ISIS-K-threat-to-Uzbek-railway-dream-opens-doors-for-Taliban">Uzbekistan</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/tajikistan/">Tajikistan</a>, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/China-s-mining-ambitions-in-Afghanistan-haunted-by-militants#:%7E:text=In%20December%2C%20ISIS%2DK%20claimed,independent%20verification%20of%20this%20claim.">China</a> <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/Russia-s-ISIS-K-problem-intensifies-after-Kabul-embassy-bombing">and Russia</a> targeted by terrorist attacks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, strikes against <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-in-afghanistan-promises">Iran</a> have long been foreshadowed in ISIS-K propaganda.</p>
<p>In parallel, the group’s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/islamic-state-khorasans-expanded-vision-in-south-and-central-asia/">multilingual propaganda campaign</a> interwove a tapestry of local, regional and global grievances to recruit and mobilize supporters from a vast demographic spectrum, and potentially <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-birmingham-66113791">inspire supporters from afar</a>.</p>
<p>In other instances, this has seen the terror group <a href="https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.clemson.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2023.2173581">partnering with</a> anti-government and sectarian militant networks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, collaborating with groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. </p>
<p>But moreover, ISIS-K is attempting to capture <a href="https://gnet-research.org/2023/05/22/the-state-of-play-islamic-state-khorasan-provinces-anti-india-propaganda-efforts/">the South</a> and <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/islamic-state-in-afghanistan-looks-to-recruit-regional-tajiks-inflict-violence-against-tajikistan/">Central Asian</a> militant market for itself. By utilizing fighters representative of regional religious and ethnic populations and publicizing their attacks, ISIS-K is signaling its commitment to a comprehensive jihadist agenda.</p>
<h2>The Tajik connection</h2>
<p>The involvement of Tajik recruits in the Kerman attack can be understood within this broader context of ISIS-K’s intentional strategic diversification.</p>
<p>Concerns around Tajik nationals’ recruitment into ISIS-K have <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/expeditionary-inspired-situating-external-operations-within-islamic-states-insurgency">existed</a> for a while, with the Taliban’s draconian treatment of Afghanistan’s minorities, including Tajiks, likely creating an unwitting <a href="https://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2022/11/17/human-rights-defenders-and-the-future-of-multi-ethnic-democracy-in-afghanistan/">recruitment boon</a> for the terror group.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/expeditionary-inspired-situating-external-operations-within-islamic-states-insurgency">Several Tajik nationals</a> were arrested in relation to a <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-april-2020-islamic-state-terror-plot-against-u-s-and-nato-military-bases-in-germany-the-tajik-connection/">plot against U.S. and NATO</a> targets in Germany in April 2020. More Tajik ISIS-K members were arrested by German and Dutch authorities in <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/german-dutch-authorities-arrest-9-suspected-of-planning-terror-attacks/7169306.html">July 2023</a> as part of an operation to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-netherlands-terror-group-arrests-20856495d2f7530df8cf4635b26d3fb6">disrupt a plot and ISIS-K fundraising</a>.</p>
<p>The attack in Iran represents a continuation of this process of <a href="https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/islamic-states-central-asian-contingents-their-international-threat">internationalizing</a> ISIS-K’s violent campaign.</p>
<p>But the bombing is significant for another reason: It takes ISIS-K’s fight directly to a symbol of Shia leadership.</p>
<p>A deadly attack against Iran, a formidable Shia state, lends ideological credence to ISIS-K’s words in the eyes of its followers. It also potentially facilitates the recruitment of individuals who are proponents of anti-Shia ideologies in the Muslim world.</p>
<p>More than any other Islamic State affiliate, ISIS-K is uniquely positioned to <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/terrorism-and-counterterrorism/islamic-state-in-khorasan-attempting-to-absorb-rival-groups/">exploit the vestiges</a> of the deeply embedded, decades-old Sunni-Shia divide in the region. </p>
<h2>Iran’s proxies and the Taliban</h2>
<p>This isn’t to say that the attack on Iran was purely opportunistic. ISIS-K has deep-rooted antipathy toward Iran due to Tehran’s religious, social and political involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. </p>
<p>Iran’s involvement has been multifold, from <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/sectarian-violence-and-intolerance-pakistan">supporting political and militant groups</a> such as <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/marriage-of-convenience-the-evolution-of-iran-and-al-qaidas-tactical-cooperation/">al-Qaida</a> and the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/06/iran-and-afghanistans-long-complicated-history">Taliban</a> to <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/03/fatemiyoun-army-reintegration-afghan-society">recruiting fighters</a> from <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-proxies-syria-and-beyond">Afghanistan and Pakistan</a> for operations against Sunni militants.</p>
<p>Additionally, during the two decades of war in Afghanistan, several Taliban factions reportedly <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf">received weapons and funding</a> through Iran’s Quds Force, which carries out missions outside Iran as an arm of the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards/">paramilitary security institution</a> Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. By 2018, leaders in Tehran <a href="https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/12/16/1667788/">viewed the Taliban</a> as a buffer against ISIS-K.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in fatigues stands on rubble, broken walls are behind him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568726/original/file-20240110-29-obe6yi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter checks a destroyed ISIS-K safehouse on Feb. 14, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/699c02b437504085a34732c9264ae1d9?ext=true">AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran’s strategic interest in Afghanistan is also reflected in the career trajectories of the Quds Force’s top brass. Soleimani was the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/beyond-soleimani-implications-irans-proxy-network-iraq-syria/">chief architect</a> behind Iran’s network of proxies, some of which were leveraged against ISIS.</p>
<p>His successor, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, spent part of <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">his career</a> managing proxies in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia.</p>
<p>Iran’s recruitment and encouragement of Shia proxies has exacerbated tensions with ISIS-K.</p>
<p>During the Syrian civil war, the Quds Force <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Iran-Entangled.pdf">recruited, trained and deployed</a> the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/how-the-return-of-iranian-backed-militias-from-syria-complicates-u-s-strategy/">Fatemiyoun and</a> <a href="https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Zeynabiyoun.pdf">Zeinabiyoun brigades</a>, composed of Afghan and Pakistani Shia fighters, respectively. There were <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/death-qassem-soleimani-what-expect-afghanistan-and-pakistan">concerns</a> among international observers that the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/afghans-fear-irgc-may-deploy-fatemiyoun-fighters-afghanistan">Fatemiyoun Brigade</a> may be deployed to Afghanistan after the U.S.’s withdrawal. Thus far, Iran appears to leverage the two brigades to <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4231.html">stabilize its partners</a> in areas <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/whither-irgc-2020s/">outside of Iran’s immediate vicinity</a>. Nevertheless, the Fatemiyoun Brigade retains the potential to be mobilized as a mobile force within Afghanistan, contingent upon Iran’s evolving strategic calculus.</p>
<h2>The perfect storm?</h2>
<p>The attack in Iran raises two critical issues with grave security implications: the growing regional reputation and capability of ISIS-K, and the extent to which Iran’s use of militant proxies in Afghanistan may encourage a regional backlash among Sunni extremists.</p>
<p>Improving <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/looking-legitimacy-taliban-diplomacy-fall-kabul">relations</a> between the Taliban and Tehran suggests that a collaborative stance against ISIS-K may be possible, driven by a mutual desire for stability.</p>
<p>But intervention in Afghanistan, or Iranian deployment of proxy militant forces in the region, could have widespread security repercussions, the type of which we have seen play out in the Iranian attack.</p>
<p>For Pakistan, too, it may fester a renewed cycle of <a href="https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1743275054119497797">sectarian violence</a>, creating opportunities for militant groups active in the country like ISIS-K, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-after-the-talibans-afghanistan-takeover/">Tehrik-e-Taliban</a> and fighters involved in <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/pakistan-faces-rising-separatist-insurgency-in-balochistan/">the Baloch insurgency</a>.</p>
<p>For the U.S., Iran’s increased involvement in Afghanistan and the violent attack by ISIS-K likewise poses a strategic concern. It risks destabilizing the region and undermining <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/27/isis-islamic-state-al-qaeda-terrorism-strength-threat-afghanistan-africa-syria-iraq-biden/">efforts to constrain transnational</a> terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220586/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views, conclusions, and recommendations in this article are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Amira Jadoon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorist attack in Iran follows a concerted effort by the Islamic State affiliate to ‘internationalize’ its strategy.Amira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityNakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2191302024-01-08T13:58:09Z2024-01-08T13:58:09ZScramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region<p>The Sahel, a region <a href="https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569">3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert</a> and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently. </p>
<p>In the last decade, issues such as <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15365.doc.htm#:%7E:text=drivers%20of%20insecurity.-,From%201%20January%20to%2030%20June%202023%2C%20the%20region%20recorded,displaced%20persons%20exceeding%206%20million.">terrorism</a>, <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1132332#:%7E:text=%E2%80%9CIndeed%2C%20the%20central%20Sahel%20continues,in%20Ukraine%2C%E2%80%9D%20she%20added.">insecurity</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137072">trafficking</a> have characterised the region. </p>
<p>Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had <a href="https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/understanding-crisis-democracy-west-africa-and-sahel">four successful coup d’états</a> and three failed ones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://acleddata.com/2023/08/03/fact-sheet-military-coup-in-niger/">coup in Niger</a> particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “<a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/west-africa/nigers-coup-and-americas-choice">darling of the west</a>” and a model for democratic governance in the region. </p>
<p>Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense. </p>
<p>The main actors in this scramble are the <a href="https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en">European Union</a>, France, Russia, China and the United States.</p>
<p>The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/niger-ends-security-and-defence-partnerships-with-the-eu/">country unilaterally cancelled the deals</a>. This is a source of concern to the EU. </p>
<p>Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">scholar</a> in international relations and having <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/scientific-contributions/Olayinka-Ajala-2181806326">researched</a> the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>availability of natural resources</p></li>
<li><p>strategic location of the region in Africa</p></li>
<li><p>economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble</p></li>
<li><p>defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.</p>
<h2>France</h2>
<p>Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas. </p>
<p>France has the <a href="https://www.ieri.be/en/publications/wp/2019/f-vrier/france-still-exploiting-africa">first right</a> to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and <a href="https://theconversation.com/france-in-africa-why-macrons-policies-increased-distrust-and-anger-212022">anti-France sentiments</a> across Africa have revealed the opposite. </p>
<p>The coups have been followed by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/huge-protests-niger-call-french-forces-leave-after-coup-2023-09-02/">large demonstrations</a> against France and in support of the putschists. </p>
<p>Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.</p>
<h2>Russia</h2>
<p>The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on <a href="https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorism-measures-on-muslim-communities.pdf">human rights</a>, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.</p>
<p>While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine">invasion</a> of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa. </p>
<p>Russia has <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">openly backed</a> military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231204-niger-s-junta-ends-key-security-agreements-with-eu-turns-to-russia-for-defence-deal">cancelled defence agreement with the EU</a> and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel. </p>
<h2>China</h2>
<p>Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “<a href="https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx?paperid=94683">non-interference</a>” and “<a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/praxis/files/2020/05/1.-Condon.pdf">respecting sovereignty</a>”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel. </p>
<p>The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">operate</a> in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<p>For instance, Mali potentially has <a href="https://www.mining-technology.com/features/top-ten-biggest-lithium-mines/?cf-view">one of the largest</a> lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has <a href="https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/the-future-of-strategic-competition">invested</a> heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_93_Rajosefa_The_Future_of_Strategic_Competition_in_the_Sahel_Region.pdf">test</a> its arms products. </p>
<h2>The United States</h2>
<p>In 2019, the US opened its <a href="https://intellinews.com/us-in-danger-of-losing-control-of-its-extensive-drone-base-in-niger-289069/#:%7E:text=The%20Agadez%20drone%20base%2C%20officially,by%20the%20US%20Air%20Force.">largest drone base</a> in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">written</a> about the security implications of the base for the region. </p>
<p>Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa. </p>
<p>As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence. </p>
<p>The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance. </p>
<p>The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up. </p>
<p>The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219130/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Foreign powers’ interest in the Sahel is driven by its natural resources and strategic location for security and illegal migration control.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2196172023-12-26T20:29:23Z2023-12-26T20:29:23ZNZ report card 2023: near the top of the class in some areas, room for improvement elsewhere<p>End-of-year results aren’t only for school and university students. Countries, too, can be measured for their progress – or lack of it – across numerous categories and subject areas. </p>
<p>This report card provides a snapshot of how New Zealand has fared in 2023. Given the change of government, it will be a useful benchmark for future progress reports. (Somewhat appropriately, the coalition seems keen on standardised testing in education.)</p>
<p>It’s important to remember that this exercise is for fun and debate. International and domestic indices and rankings should be read with a degree of caution – measurements, metrics and numbers from 2023 tell us only so much. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, it’s still possible to trace the nation’s ups and downs. As the year draws to an end, we can use these statistics and rankings to decide whether New Zealand really is the best country in the world – or whether we need to make some additional new year’s resolutions.</p>
<h2>International pass marks</h2>
<p>Overall, the country held its own internationally when it came to democratic values, freedoms and standards. But there was a little slippage.</p>
<p>Despite falling a spot, Transparency International ranked New Zealand <a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022">second-equal</a> (next to Finland) for being relatively corruption-free. </p>
<p>In the Global Peace Index, New Zealand dropped two places, now <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/">fourth-best</a> for safety and security, low domestic and international conflict, and degree of militarisation.</p>
<p>The country held its ground in two categories. Freedom House underlined New Zealand’s near-perfect score of <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">99 out of 100</a> for political and civil liberties – but three Scandinavian countries scored a perfect 100. The <a href="https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2023/">Global Gender Gap Report</a> recorded New Zealand as steady, the fourth-most-gender-equal country. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-winston-peters-right-to-call-state-funded-journalism-bribery-or-is-there-a-bigger-threat-to-democracy-218782">Is Winston Peters right to call state-funded journalism ‘bribery’ – or is there a bigger threat to democracy?</a>
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<p>Supplementary work by the United Nations Development Programme shows New Zealand making impressive strides in breaking down <a href="https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-06/gsni202302pdf_0.pdf">gender bias</a>.</p>
<p>The Index for Economic Freedom, which covers everything from property rights to financial freedom, again placed New Zealand <a href="https://www.heritage.org/index/">fifth</a>, but our grade average is falling. We also dropped a place in the World Justice Project’s <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/">Rule of Law Index</a> to eighth.</p>
<p>New Zealanders are about as happy as they were last year, still the tenth-most-cheery nation, according to the <a href="https://worldhappiness.report/">World Happiness Report</a>.</p>
<p>The Human Development Index did not report this year (New Zealand was 13th in 2022). But the <a href="https://www.prosperity.com/rankings">Legatum Prosperity Index</a>, another broad measure covering everything from social capital to living conditions, put New Zealand tenth overall – reflecting a slow decline from seventh in 2011.</p>
<p>The Economist’s <a href="https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-liveability-index-2023/">Global Liveability Index</a> has Auckland at equal tenth, with Wellington racing up the charts to 23rd. (Hamilton, my home, is yet to register.)</p>
<p>While New Zealand registered a gradual slide in the Reporters Without Borders <a href="https://rsf.org/en/index">Press Freedom Index</a>, at 13th position it still ranks highly by comparison with other nations.</p>
<h2>Could do better</h2>
<p>New Zealand has seen some progress around assessment of terror risk. While the national terror threat level has remained at “<a href="https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/national-security/counter-terrorism#:%7E:text=New%2520Zealand's%2520current%2520national%2520terrorism,Zealanders%2520both%2520here%2520and%2520overseas.">low</a>”, the <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/">Global Terrorism Index</a> ranked the country 46th – lower than the US, UK and Russia, but higher than Australia at 69th.</p>
<p>The country’s previous drop to 31st in the <a href="https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-competitiveness-ranking/">Global Competitiveness Report</a> has stabilised, staying the same in 2023. </p>
<p>On the <a href="https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/Home">Global Innovation Index</a>, we came in 27th out of 132 economies – three spots worse than last year. <a href="https://kof.ethz.ch/en/news-and-events/media/press-releases/2022/12/globalisation-index.html#:%7E:text=The%2520KOF%2520Globalisation%2520Index%2520measures,a%2520long%2520period%2520of%2520time.">The Globalisation Index</a>, which looks at economic, social and political contexts, ranks New Zealand only 42nd.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/cop28-the-climate-summits-first-health-day-points-to-what-needs-to-change-in-nz-218809">COP28: the climate summit’s first Health Day points to what needs to change in NZ</a>
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<p>But the country’s response to climate change is still considered “highly insufficient” by the <a href="https://climateactiontracker.org/">Climate Action Tracker</a>, which measures progress on meeting agreed global warming targets. The <a href="https://ccpi.org/">Climate Change Performance Index</a> is a little more generous, pegging New Zealand at 34th, still down one spot on last year.</p>
<p>New Zealand’s overseas development assistance – low as a percentage of GDP compared to other <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm">OECD countries</a> – had mixed reviews. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://odi.org/en/insights/principled-aid-index-2023-in-a-weaponised-world-smart-development-power-is-not-dead/">Principled Aid Index</a> – which looks at the purposes of aid for global co-operation, public spiritedness and addressing critical development goals – ranks New Zealand a lowly 22 out of 29. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/cdi#/">Commitment to Development Index</a>, which measures aid as well as other policies (from health to trade) of 40 of the world’s most powerful countries, has New Zealand in 19th place.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nicola-willis-warns-of-fiscal-snakes-and-snails-her-first-mini-budget-will-be-a-test-of-nzs-no-surprises-finance-rules-218920">Nicola Willis warns of fiscal ‘snakes and snails’ – her first mini-budget will be a test of NZ’s no-surprises finance rules</a>
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<h2>Decent economic grades</h2>
<p>The economic numbers at home still tell a generally encouraging story:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>unemployment <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/indicators/unemployment-rate/">remains low at 3.9%</a>, still below the <a href="https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/unemployment-rates-oecd-updated-november-2023.htm#:%7E:text=14%2520Nov%25202023%2520%252D%2520The%2520OECD,Figure%25202%2520and%2520Table%25201">OECD average of 4.8%.</a></p></li>
<li><p>median weekly earnings from wages and salaries <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/income-growth-for-wage-and-salary-earners-remains-strong/">continued to rise</a>, by NZ$84 (7.1%) to $1,273 in the year to June</p></li>
<li><p>inflation is rising, but the rate is slowing, <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/annual-inflation-at-5-6-percent/#:%7E:text=New%2520Zealand's%2520consumers%2520price%2520index,to%2520the%2520June%25202023%2520quarter.">falling to 5.6%</a> in the 12 months to September</p></li>
<li><p>and good or bad news according to one’s perspective, annual house price growth appears to be slowly recovering, with the <a href="https://www.qv.co.nz/price-index/">average price now $907,387</a> – still considerably down from the peak at the turn of 2022.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>It’s worth noting, too, that record net migration gain is boosting economic measurements. In the year to October 2023, 245,600 people arrived, with 116,700 departing, for an <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/international-migration-october-2023/">annual net gain</a> of 128,900 people.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-government-hopes-private-investors-will-fund-social-services-the-evidence-isnt-so-optimistic-218512">The government hopes private investors will fund social services – the evidence isn't so optimistic</a>
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<h2>Room for social improvement</h2>
<p>In the year to June, <a href="https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2023/10/new-zealand-s-suicide-rate-increases-for-first-time-in-years.html">recorded suicides increased</a> to 565, or 10.6 people per 100,000. While an increase from 10.2 in 2022, this is still lower than the average rate over the past 14 years.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/statistics/quarterly_prison_statistics/prison_stats_september_2023">Incarceration rates</a> began to rise again, climbing to 8,893 by the end of September, moving back towards the 10,000 figure from 2020.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/maori-suicide-rates-remain-too-high-involving-whanau-more-in-coronial-inquiries-should-be-a-priority-217254">Māori suicide rates remain too high – involving whānau more in coronial inquiries should be a priority</a>
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<p>Child poverty appears to be <a href="https://www.stats.govt.nz/news/child-poverty-statistics-show-no-annual-change-in-the-year-ended-june-2022/">stabilising</a>, with some reports suggesting improvements in longer-term trends. While commendable, this needs to be seen in perspective: one in ten children still live in households experiencing material hardship.</p>
<p>The stock of <a href="https://www.hud.govt.nz/stats-and-insights/the-government-housing-dashboard/public-homes/">public housing</a> continues to increase. As of October, there were 80,211 public houses, an increase of 3,940 from June 2022.</p>
<p>In short, New Zealand retains some bragging rights in important areas and is making modest progress in others, but that’s far from the whole picture. The final verdict has to be: a satisfactory to good effort, but considerable room for improvement.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219617/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Gillespie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>New Zealand was mostly stable in key international rankings and domestic socio-economic measures. But there are signs of slippage in some areas and not enough progress in others.Alexander Gillespie, Professor of Law, University of WaikatoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2196822023-12-14T23:53:02Z2023-12-14T23:53:02ZThe Israeli-Palestinian conflict is putting Canadian multiculturalism to the test<p>In popular thinking, and according to its general image, Canada is considered to be open and welcoming to ethnocultural and religious diversity. </p>
<p>Immigration is perceived as an <a href="https://journals.library.ualberta.ca/af/index.php/af/article/view/29376">asset for Canada</a>, and over the decades, multiculturalism has come to be considered a value to be protected and cherished. This can be seen in <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/221026/dq221026b-eng.htm">the 2020 General Social Survey</a>, where 92 per cent of the population endorsed multiculturalism. <a href="https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-18.7/page-1.html">The Canadian Multiculturalism Act</a> states that multiculturalism is a “fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada’s future.” </p>
<p>However, since the Hamas attacks on Israel on Oct. 7 and the Israeli bombardment of Gaza, the demonstrations that have followed — both in favour of, and against Israel or in support of Palestine — have revealed many tensions linked to immigration. Hate crimes are also on the rise; in Toronto alone, there are reports of a <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/hate-crime-rise-israel-gaza-1.7001288">132 per cent increase since the start of the conflict</a>.</p>
<p>So it is imperative to consider the potential for conflict within Canada’s various communities. The issue is particularly concerning for those who are simultaneously facing racism and the repercussions of ongoing conflicts in their countries of origin. For example, the <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/sikh-separtist-movement-punjab-1.6981041">historical conflict between Hindus and Sikhs</a> is raising concern among Sikhs in Canada, particularly since one of their leaders was murdered in British Columbia.</p>
<p>As a sociologist who specializes in inclusive education, I quickly observed that racism and discrimination are significant issues in our society. I recently wrote an article entitled <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/trema/6042#:%7E:text=L'%C3%A9ducation%20inclusive%20englobe%20et,n%C3%A9gliger%20for%20all%20the%20worst">“Thinking about inclusive education in a context of discrimination and diversity in Canada,”</a> which explains, among other things, the limits of Canadian multiculturalism in the fight against discrimination. In line with the perspective <a href="https://www.ehess.fr/fr/personne/serge-paugam">of French sociologist Serge Paugam</a>, who maintains that the sociologist’s role includes speaking out <a href="https://www.puf.com/content/La_pratique_de_la_sociologie">“against all forms of domination,”</a> I will analyze how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is undermining this multiculturalism.</p>
<h2>Increase in hate crimes</h2>
<p>Statistics on hate crimes show that tensions do exist, in spite of the results of the 2020 survey. For example, from <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/230322/cg-a004-eng.htm">2019 to 2021</a>, the Jewish community was the group most frequently targeted by hate crimes, and there was a significant increase in reports made to the police. In 2019, 306 antisemitic crimes were reported nationally. A year later this figure rose to 331 and by 2021, it had risen significantly to 492. <a href="https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rd16-rr16/p1.html">A further rise was recorded in 2022, with 502 incidents reported</a>. </p>
<p>Muslim communities have also been heavily affected by hate crime: in 2019, 182 incidents were reported. In 2020, this number fell to 84, but increased to 144 in 2021. Finally, Catholics have also been the target of hate crimes, with a significant increase in reports: in 2019, 51 cases were recorded compared with 43 in 2020 and 155 in 2021.</p>
<p>Ontario, the province with the highest number of immigrants in Canada, seems to have the highest percentage of hate crimes per capita. According to Statistics Canada data for 2021, Ottawa is the city with the highest rate of hate crime. <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510019101">Among the top 10 Canadian cities most affected by the phenomenon, there are more than eight Ontario cities</a>.</p>
<h2>A switch in public opinion</h2>
<p>To put it bluntly, not all Canadians see multiculturalism as an asset, and this change is exacerbated by the ongoing conflict between two of the country’s most discriminated communities. All this is taking place in a context where Canada’s capacity to welcome immigrant populations is being questioned.</p>
<p>According to an <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/there-s-going-to-be-friction-two-thirds-of-canadians-say-immigration-target-is-too/article_7740ecbd-0aed-5d36-b5da-b67bda4a13c5.html">Abacus poll published on Nov. 29</a>, more than 67 per cent of the population believes that there will be tensions between communities, principally because of the federal government’s immigration threshold, which is considered excessive. The government is still aiming to welcome <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-immigration-500000-2025-1.6636661">more than 500,000 immigrants a year over the next few years</a>. On the other hand, Ottawa rejected the Century Initiative, led by a former McKinsey executive, which aimed to <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-immigration-public-opinion/">increase Canada’s population to 100 million by 2100</a>. </p>
<p>According to <a href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-diversity-poll">another poll</a>, by Leger-Postmedia, more than 78 per cent of Canadians express concern about the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the country. With respect to pro-Palestine demonstrations, more than three-quarters of those polled believe that the government should expel non-citizens who are guilty of hate speech or who have demonstrated support for Hamas from the country. </p>
<p>These figures show a major shift in public opinion about the value of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is no longer seen simply as making citizens aware of the richness of the country’s ethnocultural and religious diversity. It is also seen as supporting the various communities that live in, or want to immigrate to Canada. <a href="https://nationalpost.com/opinion/canada-diversity-poll">According to the same survey</a>, more than half say that the Canadian government should do more to ensure that newcomers accept Canadian values, and more than 55 per cent think that Canada’s immigration policy should encourage newcomers to adopt these values, in particular by abandoning any beliefs that are incompatible with Canada.</p>
<h2>An increasingly complex world</h2>
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems to have shaken the foundations of multiculturalism. </p>
<p>It is striking to note how a value once considered fundamental — one that in 2020 was supported by more than 92 per cent of the population — can be questioned to this extent just three years later. On the other hand, it is important to remember that hate crimes existed before this conflict and that indicated multiculturalism was not as much of a “Canadian value” as it was believed to be. </p>
<p>Sociologist Edgar Morin maintains that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/095715589700802401?download=true&journalCode=frca">“diversity creates complexity and complexity creates richness</a>.” Of course, Canadian multiculturalism rightly relies upon the richness of diversity, but it’s now being called upon to renew itself in an increasingly complex society and world. </p>
<p>At times, Canadian multiculturalism gives the impression that communities are living side by side, tolerant of ‘the Other,’ without actually co-constructing a society in which everyone belongs. The social situation must not be allowed to deteriorate, because we do not want to live in a state of confrontation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219682/count.gif" alt="La Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian J. Y. Bergeron ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas has exacerbated hate crimes in Canada and put Canadian multiculturalism to the test.Christian J. Y. Bergeron, Professeur en sociologie de l’éducation, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2188622023-12-13T12:41:17Z2023-12-13T12:41:17ZDie Hard is a Christmas (terrorism) movie<p><em>The following article contains spoilers for Die Hard.</em></p>
<p>‘Tis the season – for office holiday parties, being jolly and the annual battle over whether Die Hard is a <a href="https://www.radiox.co.uk/news/tv-film/is-die-hard-a-christmas-film/">Christmas movie</a>. For years, a tongue-in-cheek debate has swirled around the violent action film, which was released in the US in July 1988, 35 years ago this year.</p>
<p>The movie is set on Christmas Eve at a skyscraper in Los Angeles, where Japanese conglomerate the Nakatomi Corporation is holding an office party for its staff and their family members. Detective John McClane (Bruce Willis) is a New York City cop whose spouse, Holly Gennaro, works for Nakatomi. </p>
<p>A group of apparent terrorists takes over the building and seizes the partygoers as hostages. Their leader, Hans Gruber (Alan Rickman), demands the release of several members of terrorist groups held prisoner around the world and safe passage from the US. </p>
<p>The twist that soon emerges is that Gruber, an East German and one-time terrorist himself, is really leading a group of thieves. They are using the hostage taking as cover to carry out a heist of several hundred million dollars in bearer bonds, intending to make off with the bonds while sacrificing the hostages in the process. McClane intervenes to save the day.</p>
<p>Forgotten in the “is it a Christmas film?” debate is the terrorism angle in the movie’s plot and what it has to say about the subject. </p>
<h2>Fact and fiction</h2>
<p>In 1988, the cold war was still on, although on the wane. It was years before September 11 2001, after which terrorism would dominate international agendas, as well as receive greater attention in films. </p>
<p>In Die Hard, Gruber demands that prisoners from the New Provo Front, Liberte de Quebec and the Asian Dawn Movement be released in exchange for the hostages. Although the three terrorist groups are fictional, all are clearly modelled after real entities. </p>
<p>The New Provo Front is the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-49299060">Provisional Irish Republican Army</a>, Liberte de Quebec is a stand in for <a href="https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/fr/article/front-de-liberation-du-quebec">Front de libération du Québec</a> and the Asian Dawn Movement resembles the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, often referred to as the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/death-of-the-tiger">Tamil Tigers</a>. Gruber himself is mentioned as having once been a member of the Volksfrei, an apparent allusion to the Red Army Faction also known as the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35354812">Baader-Meinhof Group</a>. </p>
<p>While the pretend terrorists in Die Hard are clearly versions of real ones, they were somewhat out-of-date depictions. The film’s terrorists more readily resemble those active in the 1960s and 1970s, at least in relation to their motivation. </p>
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<p>Political scientist David C. Rapoport, in his <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2015.1112277">frequently challenged</a> article <a href="https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/import/publication/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf">The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism</a> referred to international terrorism in this era as the New Left wave, because of the far-left ideological motivation of many of those engaged in political violence. </p>
<p>In that sense, Die Hard in 1988 served up one last taste of the 1970s. But why? The answer lies in the source material. The screenplay is based on a 1979 novel by Roderick Thorp called <a href="https://www.amazon.co.uk/Nothing-Lasts-Forever-inspired-movie-ebook/dp/B006NZWXO2">Nothing Lasts Forever</a>.</p>
<p>In the novel, the terrorists, whose ranks include (in 1970s fashion) several women, are targeting a large corporate headquarters not because of greed but to expose the fictional Klaxon oil company’s support for the right-wing dictatorship in Chile, damaging the company in the process. These themes clearly had less resonance by the late 1980s when Die Hard was made, and the plot changed to transform the villains from far-left terrorists to an all-male collection of thieves. </p>
<h2>Terrorism of the 1980s</h2>
<p>By the time Die Hard first appeared in July 1988, the international terrorism landscape had become more varied and deadlier compared to the 1970s. Groups such as Shining Path and Hezbollah appeared earlier in the decade, and several high-profile and high-casualty attacks would occur throughout the 1980s. </p>
<p>The year Die Hard premiered, a terrorist group that would eventually become known as al-Qaeda was being organised in Afghanistan. This was part of what Rapoport viewed as a fourth terrorism wave connected to a religious motivation. Adding to the diverse and violent mix was state terrorism – political and ideological violence carried out by state agencies and often ignored in the focus on violence by non-state actors. </p>
<p>Indeed, just four days before Christmas 1988, a horrendous act of terrorism occurred: the bombing by Libyan government agents of <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pan-am-flight-103-terrorist-suspect-custody-1988-bombing-over-lockerbie-scotland">Pan American Flight 103</a> over <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jPZVoHt5nTc">Lockerbie, Scotland</a> in which 270 people, including 11 on the ground, died.</p>
<p>Actual terrorism may not have been present in the film, but it was in the world outside of the cinema at the time. In that sense, it is somewhat confounding that the film is now considered by many to be a Christmas classic. More than reminding viewers of the meaning of Christmas, Die Hard and the book it is based on remind us that political violence was enough of an ongoing reality to influence popular culture well before 9/11.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218862/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Hewitt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While the film’s terrorists may have been fake, the message about the political climate of the time is real.Steve Hewitt, Associate Professor in North American History, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2186282023-12-07T14:15:45Z2023-12-07T14:15:45ZTerror in Uganda: what’s driving the Islamic State-linked rebels<p>The Islamic State Central Africa Province recently <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/suspected-adf-rebels-kill-foreign-tourists-in-western-uganda-4404976">attacked</a> and killed two foreign tourists and a citizen in a Ugandan nature park. Located in the country’s west near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Queen Elizabeth National Park is about 400km from the Ugandan capital Kampala. </p>
<p>The attack was aimed at Uganda’s most important source of foreign currency, the tourism sector. The sector generated <a href="https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/uganda-targets-52b-earnings-from-tourism-annu-NV_163086">7.7% of Uganda’s gross national product</a> before a slump linked to the Covid pandemic. </p>
<p>The attack highlights a departure from previous attacks by the armed group towards new targets: western tourists in Uganda. It also highlights how regional rivalries in the border areas of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conflicts-intertwined-over-time-and-destabilised-the-drc-and-the-region-185432">Congo-Uganda-Rwanda</a> function as oxygen that has enabled the organisation to survive and grow. </p>
<h2>The evolution</h2>
<p>The group, originally known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), was <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Horn-Sahel-Rift-Fault-lines-African/dp/1849044147">formed and financed</a> by the rulers of the DRC (then Zaire) Mobutu Sese Seko, and Sudan Omar al Bashir to launch insurgent attacks on their common enemy in the mid-1990s – Uganda. The ADF was thus initially used by Mobutu and Bashir as a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Horn-Sahel-Rift-Fault-lines-African/dp/1849044147">weapon</a> in regional rivalries to check Yoweri Museveni’s influence. </p>
<p>At the time of its formation in 1995, ADF was a rather weird merger of <a href="https://theconversation.com/tracking-the-drcs-allied-democratic-forces-and-its-links-to-isis-116439">two vastly different organisations</a>. </p>
<p>The first consisted of former members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda that had been based around the mainly Christian Bakonjo-Baamba people of the Rwenzori region in western Uganda, and near the border with DRC. </p>
<p>The second part of the organisation consisted of fighters from the Ugandan Islamic Salafi Foundation, an organisation with roots going back to protests against Uganda’s <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf#page=14">attempts to control</a> its Muslim congregations in the early 1990s. </p>
<p>Uganda forced the new group into the eastern provinces of Congo where it was supported by the Mobutu regime before its <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mobutu-Sese-Seko">overthrow in 1997</a>. It survived the fall of Mobutu by withdrawing deep into the forests and mountains in the border areas between Uganda and Congo.</p>
<p>Over time, ADF grew more Islamic, partly due to Ugandan amnesties that convinced several of the more moderate leaders of the ADF to defect. Signs of a more radical organisation emerging could be seen from 2011. The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-Levant">Islamic State</a> accepted the organisation as a province in 2019. When the ADF leader <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf#page=22">swore allegiance to the Islamic State</a>, there were some defections from the few remaining commanders who had National Army roots. </p>
<h2>Change in strategy</h2>
<p>Since 2021, the Islamic State Central Africa Province has launched two different types of attacks against Uganda. First, terror attacks and assassinations far from the Congolese border in places like Kampala. Second, heavy, more military-style attacks against civilians in Uganda’s border with the DRC. </p>
<p>It’s increasingly using more <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-rising-threat-to-central-africa-the-2021-transformation-of-the-islamic-states-congolese-branch/">traditional terror tools</a> and has introduced new propaganda material, such as videos with beheadings. Suicide bombings have also become part of its repertoire. The group even <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-links-islamist-rebels-attempted-murder-minister-2021-07-01/">attempted to assassinate</a> Ugandan government leaders. </p>
<p>From 2022, the group has carried out heavier raids into Uganda, including attacking a school in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65937484">June 2023</a> in a town near the Uganda-Congolese border. It has also launched several attacks against <a href="https://www.voaafrica.com/a/un-adf-backed-by-islamic-state/7143149.html">businesses in the border zone</a>. </p>
<h2>Uganda’s response</h2>
<p>The increase in the Islamic State Central Africa Province attacks led to a Congolese-approved <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/deal-devil-heart-great-lakes">Ugandan intervention in Congo</a> that began in December 2021. The rebel group initially withdrew into the deep forests of the Rwenzori mountains and the Ituri rainforest in the north-eastern parts of Congo. These are close to the DRC’s Virunga National Park, another large area of wilderness and mountains that’s perfect to hide in. </p>
<p>This renewed pressure might have led parts of the rebel group into Ugandan territory in the Rwenzori Mountains National Park. This isn’t too far from Queen Elizabeth National Park where the recent terror attacks occurred. </p>
<p>This latest intervention continues a pattern of Ugandan and Congolese offensives that lead to temporary withdrawals of the rebel group into the forest and mountains around the Uganda-Congo border. These offensives usually end with the rebels returning into towns and cities upon Ugandan and Congolese withdrawals. </p>
<p>Importantly, the current offensive has failed to end terror attacks inside Uganda.</p>
<p>Adding to the complexity of the intervention are ongoing attacks from the largest guerilla group in eastern Congo, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/m23-four-things-you-should-know-about-the-rebel-groups-campaign-in-rwanda-drc-conflict-195020">March 23 Movement</a> (M23). M23 has had <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/14/drc-m23-rebels-recapture-kishishe-where-they-are-accused-of-a-massacre-in-2022/">recent success</a> on the battlefield, recapturing towns from government forces. </p>
<p>The M23 offensive takes place to the south and west of the area where the Islamic State in Central Africa Province is operating, but has repercussions for the group. First, the recent round of warfare in eastern DRC has created a record <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/renewed-fighting-raises-fears-for-peace-in-dr-congo-wider-region/3051713">6.9 million</a> refugees due to escalating violence, creating chaos that the group can take advantage of. </p>
<p>Second, the ongoing fighting has drawn the Congolese army away from its campaign against the Islamic State in Central Africa Province, and hinders Congolese-Rwandese cooperation against it. This is due to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo">Rwandan support for the M23</a>, which Kigali officially denies providing. </p>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>The Islamic State in Central Africa Province thrives on <a href="https://theconversation.com/rwanda-and-drcs-turbulent-past-continues-to-fuel-their-torrid-relationship-188405">Congolese-Rwandese</a> rivalry, as well as regional mistrust dating back decades. Creating real regional cooperation and trust would be the first step toward ensuring that the Islamic State’s local outfit is stopped. It would also help address nearly three decades of fighting in the Congo. </p>
<p>For this to happen, however, African – as well as other international actors – need to stay focused on the conflict in Congo and the unrest in the Uganda-Rwanda-DRC border areas. It’s also important to actively strive for dialogue, especially <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/us-pressure-on-drc-rwanda-paying-off-4445108">between Rwanda and Congo</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I would like to thank journalist Adolph Basengezi for his comments on the situation in Congo's north-east, aiding my analysis on the current conflict.</span></em></p>Regional rivalries have functioned as oxygen, allowing the rebel group to survive and grow.Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.