tag:theconversation.com,2011:/africa/topics/zimbabwe-army-46486/articlesZimbabwe army – The Conversation2020-08-04T15:24:33Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1438472020-08-04T15:24:33Z2020-08-04T15:24:33ZHow artists have preserved the memory of Zimbabwe’s 1980s massacres<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/350897/original/file-20200803-14-1vcb9b8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A scene from a play about the Gukurahundi genocide, 1983 The Dark Years, performed in Harare in 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">JEKESAI NJIKIZANA/AFP/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“Let people vent,” lamented performing artist and television personality <a href="http://almasiartsalliance.org/category/kudzai-sevenzo/">Kudzai Sevenzo</a> in a <a href="https://twitter.com/KudzaiSevenzo/status/1288407558097641472?s=20">tweet</a> as Zimbabweans on social media reacted to the death of <a href="https://apnews.com/7afe3ad83057f11f793dd54228e8e8d9">Perence Shiri</a>. Shiri was the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/profile/zenzele-ndebele">Zenzele Ndebele</a>, an investigative journalist, also spoke out in a <a href="https://twitter.com/zenzele/status/1289075563236413441?s=20">tweet</a>: “Shiri gets to be buried like a hero. We never got a chance to mourn our relatives who were killed by the 5th Brigade.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/zimbabwe/who-is-perrance-shiri-black-jesus-dead-29-july-2020/">Shiri</a> was a military man who commandeered a praetorian army that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">killed</a> over 20,000 civilians in the provinces of Matabeleland and the Midlands between 1983 and 1987. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2b5iVGCDs0">Gukurahundi</a> saw his North Korean-trained unit, the <a href="https://gijn.org/2018/12/03/digging-up-zimbabwes-gukurahundi-massacre-dossier/">Fifth Brigade</a>, descend on provinces inhabited by the Ndebele people to quell dissent. <a href="https://bit.ly/2Po03WA"><em>Gukurahundi</em></a> is a Shona term referring to the early summer rains that remove chaff and dirt from the fields.</p>
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<p>The death of Shiri on 29 July 2020 has kindled flames of debate that the ruling party has tried to shut down for many years. </p>
<p>I argue, in a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021989415615646">paper</a> on Gukurahundi, that writers and artists have left behind a richly textured memory on what writer <a href="https://www.novuyotshuma.com/">Novuyo Rosa Tshuma</a> has called the country’s “<a href="https://www.theelephant.info/features/2018/12/06/old-faces-new-masks-zimbabwe-one-year-after-the-coup/">original sin</a>”.</p>
<h2>Enforced ‘collective amnesia’</h2>
<p>In the aftermath of Gukurahundi, <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">former president</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Mugabe</a> enforced collective forgetting of this period in Zimbabwe’s history. He referred to it simply as a “<a href="https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/mugabes-moments-of-madness">moment of madness</a>” and suggested that discussing the events would undermine attempts to nurture national unity. </p>
<p>His successor, <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, Minister of State Security at the time of the Gukurahundi <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml">genocide</a>, has also implored Zimbabweans to “let bygones be bygones”. At his 2017 <a href="https://bit.ly/2PqhhSY">inauguration</a> he said that the past cannot be changed, but “there is a lot we can do in the present and the future to give our nation a different positive direction”.</p>
<p>However, as l contend in another <a href="https://journals.assaf.org.za/index.php/tvl/article/view/1548">paper</a>, silence on Gukurahundi has not led to any national cohesion. Instead, it has been a part of what’s responsible for the culture of state violence and impunity in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980. </p>
<h2>Writing against forgetting</h2>
<p>Yet, a rich body of literary and visual artworks has emerged thematising the genocide. There have been books in indigenous languages such as <em><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Uyangisinda_lumhlaba.html?id=U80JAQAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Uyangisinda Lumhlaba</a></em> (This world is unbearable) in Ndebele by Ezekiel Hleza and <em><a href="https://books.google.co.za/books/about/Mhandu_dzorusununguko.html?id=jBAkAQAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y">Mhandu Dzorusununguko</a></em> (Enemies of independence) in Shona by Edward Masundire. </p>
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<p>There has been an even bigger corpus of texts written in English. Among them is the late Yvonne Vera’s 2002 novel <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781466806061"><em>The Stone Virgins</em></a>. It details the horrors faced by villagers from a ruthless army. In <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/zimbabwe-running-with-mother-robert-mugabe"><em>Running with Mother</em></a>, a 2012 novel by Christopher Mlalazi, a child narrator, Rudo, recounts the arrival of the Fifth Brigade in her village.</p>
<p>Peter Godwin’s largely autobiographical <a href="https://www.orwellfoundation.com/book-title/mukiwa-a-white-boy-in-africa/"><em>Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa</em></a>
in 1996 gives a picture of Gukurahundi from the eyes of a young white journalist. And <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/books/review/house-of-stone-novuyo-rosa-tshuma.html"><em>House of Stone</em></a>, the 2018 novel by Novuyo Rosa Tshuma, tells the story of an orphaned young man trying to explore his past. He’ll find out that his father is Black Jesus (a name by which Shiri was known). Tshuma’s descriptions of the genocide are detailed, graphic and ghastly. </p>
<p>Literary creativity has made it possible to remember, commemorate and document experiences that otherwise would have been forgotten or dispersed through wilful omission. In doing so, literary texts create narratives of Zimbabwe’s history and national identity. </p>
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<p>“To write is to banish silence,” writes Vera in her 1995 <a href="https://ocul-yor.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/01OCUL_YOR/q36jf8/alma991010694059705164">doctoral thesis</a> on colonialism and narratives of resistance. “As a writer, you don’t want to suppress history, you want to be one of the people liberating stories.” </p>
<p>She explains that “to write is to engage possibilities for triumphant and repeated exits, inversion and recuperation of identity”. In this line of thinking, writing can offer victims of Gukurahundi a voice which the state continues to deny them. </p>
<h2>Art of torture</h2>
<p>Visual artworks have also engaged with Gukurahundi, such as in the exhibition <em>Sibathontisele</em> by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/04/zimbabwe-artist-arrest-mugabe-censorship">Owen Maseko</a>, which has stood for years as a material text-under-erasure in Zimbabwe. <em>Sibathontisele</em> is a Ndebele word meaning “we drip it on them”. It refers to an infamous torture technique used by the Fifth Brigade in which they dripped hot and melted plastic on victims.</p>
<p>Unlike literary texts, which have remained unbanned and uncensored, Maseko’s 2010 exhibition was banned by state security a day after its opening at the <a href="http://www.nationalgallerybyo.com/">National Arts Gallery</a> in Bulawayo and the artist was arrested. Visual art, it appears, is deemed more subversive than written texts. In spite of such restrictions, Maseko’s exhibition has been hosted outside Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The artist explains in this <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/artcul/osisa_trials_tribulatn_of_artist_110630.pdf">article</a> that art, justice and human rights are intricately interrelated. Visual art plays a role in bringing to the surface narratives on Gukurahundi, which have been buried for almost three decades.</p>
<h2>The rich memory</h2>
<p>Writers and visual artists are able to create alternative spaces for marginalised and forgotten stories. And Zimbabwe’s artists have created a rich memory and archive that counters the culture of forgetting and criminalising open discussion of Gukurahundi. </p>
<p>Through their works, histories are revisited so that they can be better understood and can be accorded their rightful recognition. They have opened new spaces of discussion and have gestured towards the importance of remembering and learning from the past.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/143847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gibson Ncube does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Artists are filling the state’s silence by revisiting history so that it can be discussed.Gibson Ncube, Associate Professor, University of ZimbabweLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1271382019-11-20T09:23:28Z2019-11-20T09:23:28ZFrom Zimbabwe to Bolivia: what makes a military coup?<p>Evo Morales, president of Bolivia since 2006, <a href="https://theconversation.com/bolivia-in-crisis-how-evo-morales-was-forced-out-126859">resigned</a> on November 10 following weeks of demonstrations triggered by a disputed election in October. Morales won the election amid allegations that the result was rigged in his favour. </p>
<p>The turning point in Morales’s departure from office was the intervention of Williams Kaliman, commander of the Bolivian armed forces. Speaking at a press conference, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-50369591">Kaliman urged Morales</a> to resign “for the good of our Bolivia”. Morales has since gone into exile in Mexico and the manner of his departure has sparked <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/world/americas/bolivia-evo-morales-coup.html">passionate debate</a> about whether it was tantamount to a military coup.</p>
<p>Two years ago this month, the Zimbabwean military placed former President Robert Mugabe under house arrest. Subsequently, SB Moyo, a major general in the army, accompanied by a high-ranking air force officer, <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/full-statement-by-zim-army-on-state-broadcaster">publicly broadcast the message</a>: </p>
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<p>This is not a military takeover of government. What the Zimbabwe Defence Forces is doing is to pacify a degenerating social, political and economic situation in our country. </p>
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<p>The military insisted it was only targeting criminals around Mugabe who were perpetrating “crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country”. The officers vowed that the situation would return to normal, once they brought the “criminals” to justice. The “criminals” were never brought to justice, but Mugabe resigned from office a week later. </p>
<p>Like the recent case in Bolivia, the Zimbabwean military’s intervention generated animated discussion about whether it was actually a military coup. Some Zimbabwean ruling political elites, international media and political commentators described it as a <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/b134-zimbabwes-military-assisted-transition-and-prospects-recovery">“military-assisted transition”</a>, “<a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-20-zimbabwe-when-is-a-coup-not-a-coup/">non-coup-coup</a>”, and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/21/zimbabwes-strange-crisis-is-a-very-modern-kind-of-coup">“modern”</a> intervention, among other names.</p>
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<h2>Call it by its name</h2>
<p>My <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adz024/5607894?searchresult=1">new research</a> provides some clarity on how to understand the Zimbabwean military’s action in November 2017: the intervention was a coup bearing substantial commonalities with historical coups in Africa. </p>
<p>The coup happened because Zimbabwe’s generals were dissatisfied with Mugabe’s demotion of those who had fought in the country’s 1970s liberation struggle within the structures of the ruling ZANU PF party. Mugabe’s waning authority also coincided with growing political ambitions of some generals and insecurity in the military’s higher ranks caused by job insecurity and fear of criminal prosecution.</p>
<p>The way the military justified its political manoeuvres were similar to justifications used by other military forces in Africa since the 1960s. Crucially, the military also violated <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe’s constitution</a> by deploying without the president’s authorisation. </p>
<p>These and other indicators that the military’s action was a coup went largely unrecognised at the time by many commentators and journalists. Mugabe was also <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2014.933646?journalCode=cjss20">a demonised politician</a>, particularly by sections of the Western media and diplomats, who were keen to see him leave political office.</p>
<p>The more coups have <a href="http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/8211%7Ev%7EThe_African_Union_as_a_norm_entrepreneur_on_militarycoups_detat_in_Africa__19522012___an_empirical_assessment.pdf">become widely unacceptable</a> in Africa since the early 2000s, the more pervasive strategic uses and misuses of the term coup have become. Mugabe’s international adversaries chose not to call the military’s intervention a coup, lest that saved him from an ignominious fall from power. In a volte-face, when <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Mugabe died in September 2019</a>, Western media and diplomats often described him, in their <a href="https://theconversation.com/mugabe-is-dead-but-old-men-still-run-southern-africa-123611">obituaries and commentaries</a> on his political career, as having lost power in a military coup. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Gabriel Mugabe: a man whose list of failures is legion</a>
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<p>Subjective uses of the word coup risk banalising and misrepresenting a term that has a clear meaning. Patrick McGowan, an accomplished researcher on coups in Africa, has offered a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/african-military-coups-detat-19562001-frequency-trends-and-distribution/C7E923CE86B78DD099FDEFAF89F1F88E">usefully precise definition</a>. Coups are ejections from power of political leaders, through unmistakably unconstitutional means, mainly by part of the army: “Either on their own or in conjunction with civilian elites such as civil servants, politicians and monarchs.” Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup played out along the lines of McGowan’s definition. </p>
<p>Whether events in Bolivia constitute a military coup will become clearer in the coming weeks and months as researchers and investigative journalists uncover the elite politics at play behind the scenes and the exact motivations of Kaliman and his fellow military commanders. </p>
<h2>In the aftermath</h2>
<p>In Zimbabwe today, the state of affairs looks much like the aftermath of first-time coups seen in African countries such as Benin in 1963 or Uganda in 1971. First-time coups are often extremely popular, so a government that emerges as a result of such a “maiden” coup commands significant legitimacy early on. </p>
<p>But that legitimacy soon fades when pledges to deliver a credible post-coup election and to conduct substantive political, social and economic reforms do not materialise. As legitimacy wanes, authoritarianism re-emerges. </p>
<p>This is a key part of the post-coup situation in Zimbabwe today. Two years on, reforms are cosmetic and proceed slowly. And an election held in July 2018 was not deemed credible by <a href="https://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/zimbabwe-election-commonwealth-releases-observer-group-report">Commonwealth</a>, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">EU</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/e460f71c3e7b477cbff3cf58484370d9/The-Latest:-US-based-election-observers-criticize-Zimbabwe">American</a> election observers. Legitimacy has dwindled and authoritarianism returned, as demonstrated by the military’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ffd8b486-1b45-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21">strong repression of protests</a> against fuel price increases in January 2019.</p>
<p>In 1970, the South African scholar and anti-apartheid activist <a href="https://www.ruthfirstpapers.org.uk/term/cluster/barrel-gun">Ruth First warned</a> that:</p>
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<p>Once the army breaks the first commandment of its training – that armies do not act against their own governments – the initial coup sets off a process… the coup spawns other coups. </p>
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<p>Perhaps First is wrong and Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup was simply an aberration, a never-to-be-repeated occurrence now consigned to the history books. But one can never be too certain. The quip by American historian <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/advance-article/doi/10.1093/afraf/adz024/5607894?searchresult=1#165697513">Walter Laqueur</a> rings true: “Coups d’état are annoying not only for practising politicians but also from the point of view of the political scientist”, because they are capricious.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/127138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blessing-Miles Tendi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>When the military intervened against Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 2017, it wasn’t widely called a military coup. New research shows that’s exactly what it was.Blessing-Miles Tendi, Associate Professor in the Politics of Africa, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011962018-08-07T11:31:17Z2018-08-07T11:31:17ZWill Zimbabwe’s messy election get messier – or will a new path be taken?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230868/original/file-20180807-191019-1v7huj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's "The NewsDay" after violent protests in Harare.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This is no way to end an election that promised to bring a bright new post-coup and post Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/24/emmerson-mnangagwa-sworn-in-as-zimbabwes-president">dawn</a> to a blighted Zimbabwe – 50.8% for Zanu-PF’s Emmerson Mnangagwa to 44.3% for the contending Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance’s (MDC-Alliance) Nelson Chamisa. </p>
<p>After a drawn out count for the last constituency, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-tense-zimbabwe-awaits-vote-results-after-troops-fire-on-protesters-20180802">a suspect tally</a> for the supreme ruler. As for the Zanu-PF MPs’ sweeps across the rural areas resulting in a more than two thirds majority in the lower house of assembly (155 to 53), fears triggered by memories <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008eom.htm">of the violent 2008 run-off</a> remain real. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa has been making gestures to Chamisa <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-mnangagwa-calls-for-unity-as-chamisa-cries-foul-16400187">for “unity”</a> <a href="https://harareblitz.com/2018/08/06/watch-video-ed-laughs-at-idea-of-gnu-with-chamisa/">or to</a> play a </p>
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<p>crucial role in Zimbabwe’s present and in its unfolding future. </p>
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<p>He seemed furious when the police converged on journalists attending Chamisa’s presser at the subtly luxurious Bronte Hotel: the police <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkjOG-xFcEk">apologised</a> on Twitter very quickly.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/05/zimbabwean-opposition-reports-human-rights-abuses">dozens or more MDC-Alliance supporters</a> are running for their lives, or hiding in safe houses. This, just days after <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">soldiers</a> – not police – <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/three-victims-zimbabwe-post-election-violence-buried">shot and killed</a> at least six protesters and innocent bystanders. Some were shot in the back.</p>
<p>What start is this for a regime promising <a href="http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/life-lessons-for-a-man/">Lazarus-like</a> revival for the ruling party and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-16-00-lord-hains-zimbabwe-hypocrisy">its friends</a> around the world – not to mention ordinary Zimbabweans?</p>
<p>Yet there is an alternative: if Mnangagwa actually has the power he could call off the attack dogs and let the courts decide the merits, or not, of Chamisa’s case that the poll was rigged. This might not itself result in a peaceful resolution, given rumblings that a coup is in the making led by Vice-President and (unconstitutionally) Minister of Defence, Constantino Chiwenga. But it would be better than allowing the soldiers out onto the streets in force. </p>
<p>And it just could be that this is the tack. The MDC-Alliance’s lawyers will present their case <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-lawyers-to-challenge-zim-presidential-poll-results-16408858">on August 10</a>. Mnangagwa is facing a sharp fork in the road. One hope he takes the right one.</p>
<h2>The crackdown</h2>
<p>The crackdown’s current phase started on August 2. As the election results were trickling in, drunken soldiers beat up equally inebriated MDC-Alliance supporters in the “high density suburbs” (poverty-riddled townships or locations) <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/soldiers-go-berserk-beat-up-revellers-in-harare-chitungwiza/">around Harare</a>, where the opposition party did <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/vimbayi-tsvangirai-java-a-chip-off-the-old-block/">overwhelmingly well</a>. </p>
<p>So much for the hypothesis that the poor soldiers would support their <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/27/So-what%E2%80%99s-a-post-coup-pre-election-like-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-Democracy-after-Mugabe-%E2%80%93-Phase-I">equally suffering</a> brothers and sisters with the long-struggling opposition, poised to take the chalice only a few months after <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai’s death</a>.</p>
<p>The crackdown continued the next day. An MDC-Alliance candidate in Chegutu challenged his loss, won on the recount, and proceeded to run away <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/28995-just-in-zanu-pf-chegutu-west-candidate-dexter-ndunas-win-reversed.html">from rabid soldiers</a>. Many more <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mnangagwa-opponents-disappear-after-election-h079sksf7">were chased</a> in Harare’s townships, Marondera, and Manicaland. The Financial Times <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7c3463b8-98bf-11e8-ab77-f854c65a4465">reported</a> over 60 arrests, pointing to Chiwenga as the leader of the shakedown. It hinted at a coup – no surprise to many Zimbabweans.</p>
<h2>A vice-president’s coup?</h2>
<p>Chiwenga has been the elephant in the room for a very long time. Many Zimbabweans say that Mnangagwa lives in fear of him. Lower ranking members of Zanu-PF in propaganda and intelligence don’t dare challenge this mercurial man <a href="http://www.kentonline.co.uk/sittingbourne/news/zimbabwe-takeovers-kent-connection-135528/">with a history of suicide attempts</a>, and <a href="https://robertrotberg.wordpress.com/2012/02/14/who-killed-solomon-mujuru-the-mystery-in-zimbabwe-deepens/">more</a>. </p>
<p>Promoted to armed forces head by Mugabe well beyond his seniority and capability, but kept to one-year contracts to ensure his fealty, he waited until Grace Mugabe pushed her doddering husband into firing his long-time ally <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVxZ-DAsDZY">Mnangagwa</a> – who was then vice-president – in early November last year. </p>
<p>Chiwenga returned from a China trip and then helped Mnangagwa in what the American Jesuit magazine <a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2017/12/14/interview-zimbabwean-jesuit-who-mediated-mugabes-fall-power">called the</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>unexpected, but peaceful, transition </p>
</blockquote>
<p>away from the <a href="http://transformationjournal.org.za/">nonagenarian ruler</a>.</p>
<p>Chiwenga has kicked out a good number of Central Intelligence Organisation operatives, suspected of loyalty to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-g40-factbox/factbox-key-figures-in-zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-mugabes-g40-faction-idUSKBN1DF1DX?il=0">“Generation-40”</a> faction, which lost out with the coup. So too with the police, pared down through the year, That’s why the soldiers <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/chamisa-divides-police-military/">were called in last week</a>.</p>
<p>He’s been awaiting his due – the presidency – ever since, and he might be in a hurry. A demotion could ensue if Mnangagwa takes the royal road to respectability via a pleasant deal with the MDC-Alliance, whom the recalcitrant “war-vets” consider a cabal of <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/running-to-america-mdc-t-exposes-its-puppet-nature/">imperialist puppets</a>. </p>
<p>It’s surprising that the local and international cheerleaders for the “military assisted transition”, with a lot riding on peace and goodwill after the election, seemed blissfully unaware of the power behind the already tarnished throne. </p>
<p>South African military intelligence are supposed to be well-connected with their counterparts to the north, and should not be prone to think like the British. The defenders of diminishing empire are more likely to think like Lord Soames, temporary governor of Rhodesia as Zimbabwe was on the cusp. His comments as Robert Mugabe came to power on the wave of a violent election in 1980 included the fact that he wasn’t surprised <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-zim-parliament-begins-session-to-remove-mugabe-20171121">at bit of bloodshed</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This isn’t Puddleton-on-the-Marsh. Africans think nothing of sticking poles up each others whatnot and doing filthy things. It’s a very wild thing an (African) election.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>British officials, and their global compatriots, presumably don’t think like that anymore. But even if they don’t, they should have known that coups are prone to eat their own children.</p>
<p>Yet there could be another road to take.</p>
<h2>The other fork</h2>
<p>There is still time for Mnangagwa to change tack. The MDC-Alliance’s contention that the election was cooked will be tested in the courts. </p>
<p>This, say Zimbabweans on the run, is what the soldiers are after: they are chasing copies of the V11 forms. These are the results of every polling station that were posted after the local count: they can be captured by anyone on site but are also transported to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s headquarters for the final count. The V11s might be Chamisa’s ace: he claims to possess a tally that will invalidate Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1988993/nelson-chamisa-claims-zecs-results-are-unverified-and-fake/">slim victory</a>. </p>
<p>If the presidential praetorians are sure their man has won, why didn’t they allow Chamisa to present the papers to the constitutional court – <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/legal-ramifications-of-the-july-30-elections/">stacked with Zanu-PF judges as it is</a>? In any case this will happen at the end of the week and the presidential inauguration should be postponed.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa is used to waiting for the right moment. He will have to move faster against Chiwenga than he did against Mugabe.</p>
<p>If he’s too slow there could be a real coup, soldiers running rampant again. Or an electoral rerun? The choice might be Mnangagwa’s. Or it could be Chiwenga’s. No matter: it will be a game-changer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What start is this for a regime promising Lazarus-like revival for the ruling party and its friends around the world – not to mention ordinary Zimbabweans?David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1001002018-07-20T11:06:31Z2018-07-20T11:06:31ZZimbabwe poll: the bar for success is low, the stakes are high and it’s a close race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228455/original/file-20180719-142432-1pyjir6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the opposition MDC Alliance in Unity Square before marching to protest outside the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Moore</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the ruling Zanu-PF hope a credible victory in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/top-africa-stories-zim-election-date-set-kagame-on-chamisa-20180531">July 30 election</a> will legitimise the power (both party and state) they gained from the “soft coup” that toppled his predecessor Robert Mugabe <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabweans-must-draw-on-years-of-democratic-struggle-to-stop-a-repeat-of-mugabes-militarism-87961">last November</a>.</p>
<p>With victory, they say, the <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2018/07/14/infighting-between-mnangagwa-and-chiwenga-factions-frustrating-eager-investors/">donors and dollars</a> will flood in to the country they have resurrected from <a href="http://country.eiu.com/zimbabwe">nearly two moribund decades</a>. Zimbabwe is now <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">“open for business”</a> and will thrive. Zanu-PF’s resurrection will thus be complete.</p>
<p>But a new <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno223_zimbabwe_presidential_race_tightens.pdf">survey</a> suggests Zanu-PF should stall any premature celebration plans. The latest one showed that, in the space of one month, Nelson Chamisa’s MDC-Alliance has closed the gap with Zanu-PF. The surveys are conducted by Afrobarometer, an independent research network that conducts public attitude surveys across Africa and its Zimbabwean partner, Mass Public Opinion Institute, a non-profit, non-governmental research organisation.</p>
<p>If the respondents were to cast their ballot now Mnangagwa would take 40% of the votes and opposition leader Nelson Chamisa would take 37%. The still undecided or not-saying potential voters are at 20%. Split that and you get a 50/47 race. </p>
<p>The numbers are very close indeed. If not a victory for the MDC-Alliance, this looks like a presidential runoff. The MDC-Allaince has a 49% to 26% lead in the cities and towns and in the countryside the figures are 30% for the opposition to Zanu-PF’s 48%. In parliament Zanu-PF would get 41% to the MDC-Alliance’s 36. This is a big change from <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/media-briefings/findings-pre-election-baseline-survey-zimbabwe-aprilmay-2018">May’s survey</a>.</p>
<p>Given the MDC-Alliance momentum, the post-Mugabe Zanu-PF’s hopes of a resurrection may be dashed. A great deal hangs on both parties’ ability to manage this interregnum.</p>
<p>Big trade-offs will be negotiated, ranging from coalition governments, which the poll shows has the backing from 60% of respondents, to amnesties for the chief crooks and killers.</p>
<p>Striking deals might indeed lie at the centre of whether or not the election is a success. That’s because this election is about grabbing back the core of hardwon democracy from a military dominated regime. It’s about cleansing out <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">generations of fear</a>. </p>
<p>That is a hard task at any time. It’s harder still when it took a coup to retire its prime source.</p>
<h2>A divided Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has been spectacularly unsuccessful at winning past elections in <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2015/05/26/mnangagwa-cannot-win-elections">his own constituencies</a>, standing for parliament three times and losing twice. </p>
<p>The factions in Zanu-PF that squared up against one another prior to the coup - the <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation-40 group</a> that supported Grace Mugabe for the party and state president and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste</a>, which supported Mnangagwa – are <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-says-zanu-pf-legislators-plotting-to-impeach-him-15237903">still battling</a> along lines more ethnically drawn <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/02/19/ethnicity-zanu-pfs-messy-predicament/">than ever</a>. Some of the losers in the Generation-40 group have left the party to form the <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2018/07/14/mugabes-offered-24-million-12-cars-for-chamisas-campaign-in-exchange-of-82-parliamentary-seats-vice-presidents-post/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p>
<p>Although the perpetrators have not been found, the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/zimbabwe-blast-feared-to-herald-pre-election-violence-1.3543607">blast</a> at Zanu-PF’s Bulawayo rally in late June that killed two people and only narrowly missed a whole stage of luminaries, could suggest that the party’s wounds have yet to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/06/29/bulawayo-bomb-blast-escalates-mnangagwa-chiwenga-tensions/">heal</a>. </p>
<p>And the soldiers are not of one mind. </p>
<p>If the military side of the somewhat shaky post-coup pact in Zanu-PF fears losing an election, and thus access to more of the wealth more power can bring, the free and fair dimensions of the electoral contest would be <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-05-23-fears-of-armys-readiness-to-influence-zimbabwes-elections/">drastically diminished</a>. Would a repeat of <a href="https://public.tableau.com/profile/acled6590#!/vizhome/Zimbabwe_1/ProportionZiminTotal">mid-2008’s post-electoral mayhem</a>, when at least 170 people were killed and nearly 800 beaten or raped, ensue?</p>
<p>To make matters more complex, there are no guarantees that <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/15/military-pay-hike-angers-teachers">hungry and angry junior army officers</a> would follow their seniors’ attempts to alter the peoples’ will.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa could be at some of the soldier’s mercy. Some suggest that Constantino Chiwenga, the <a href="https://minbane.wordpress.com/2018/04/19/https-wp-me-p1xtjg-6lv/">mercurial vice-president</a> and – unconstitutionally – defence minister <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chiwenga-exposes-mnangagwas-great-escape-yarn/">might be among them</a>. </p>
<p>Others argue that the two leaders need each other if the régime is going to deliver on promises of a clean <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/05/zim-2018-election-trading-democracy-for-neoliberal-foreign-policy/">election</a> </p>
<p>And as George Charamba, Zimbabwe’s permanent secretary for information, put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This election is about restoring international re-engagement and legitimacy …. It must be flawless, it must be transparent, it must be free, it must be fair, it must meet international standards, it must be violence free and therefore it must be universally endorsed because it is an instrument of foreign policy … It’s about re-engagement and legitimacy; we are playing politics at a higher level.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a clarion call for a free and fair poll. If the election fails to meet these expectations and its results are tight, legitimacy could be maintained with carefully calculated deals. Perhaps the unity government widely expected during the coup could <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1DG1RL-OZATP">reappear</a>. </p>
<h2>A rising opposition</h2>
<p>Chamisa and the MDC (the alliance is made up of seven parties, most having split from the late Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC), appear to be building on the <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/nelson-chamisa-threatens-to-take-zec-headon-elections-zimbabwe/4486127.html">momentum</a> they seem to have gained by challenging the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s management of the contest. The alliance has challenged the commission’s neutrality and raised concerns over the accuracy of the voters’ <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-07-19-new-rules-and-ghost-voters-threaten-zimbabwes-vote">roll</a>.</p>
<p>Not all its allegations necessarily stand up to scrutiny. The 250,000 alleged ghosts may be a canard, but as Derek Matyszak, the Institute for Security Studies man in Harare, argues, the roll was not released in time for the primaries so none of the candidates are constitutionally valid. </p>
<p>Emboldened by the lack of police, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwe-opposition-marches-on-electoral-agency-to-demand-reforms-idUSKBN1K11FW">thousands of protesters</a> led by the MDC-Alliance marched to the commission’s headquarters on July 11, showing no fear. </p>
<p>If this impetus keeps building over the next week, a victory is conceivable. So is a presidential run-off. To be sure, the ruling party might win fairly, but the opposition will have to be convinced of that. The mode of politics for the next round should be peacemaking, not war. </p>
<h2>Low bars, high stakes</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/zimbabwes-elections-a-turning-point/">bars are low</a> – ‘the west’, led in this case by the UK, seemed to be happy with the winners of the coup, perhaps hoping for a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/zimbabwes-future-rests-on-a-free-and-fair-election-speech-by-ambassador-catriona-laing">renewed Zanu-PF</a>. <a href="https://www.newdawnmagazine.com/articles/perfidious-albion-an-introduction-to-the-secret-history-of-the-british-empire">Perfidious Albion</a> (Treacherous England) could end its schizophrenic career in Zimbabwe with a whimper about the <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597">end of a liberal democratic dream</a>. But the stakes are high for Zimbabweans: much higher than the reputation of a minor global power past its glory. </p>
<p>The people of Zimbabwe face a lot more than reputational damage: maybe the former colonial power will have a Plan B that helps more than hinders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new survey suggests opposition Zimbabwean leader Nelson Chamisa is closing in on the ruling Zanu-PF’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880852017-12-03T10:19:57Z2017-12-03T10:19:57ZA clean break with Mugabe’s past will have to wait - even beyond elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196676/original/file-20171128-7447-t1w0v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa has officially been sworn in as interim Zimbabwean President.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Who would have thought that this year would end with <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a> having lost the presidency of both the governing Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe? None could have foreseen such a development being the work of his ruling party’s inner circle.</p>
<p>The whole development is clearly a product of internal Zanu-PF tensions and actions. The military top brass involved are old standing Zanu-PF cadres that have <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">propped Mugabe up</a> for decades. Emerson Mnangagwa, who has been sworn in as his successor, has been Mugabe’s right hand man for <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/profile-zimbabwe-president-robert-mugabe-20171115">37 years</a>. </p>
<p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems. The same Zanu-PF leadership has taken control of this transition, making it an intra-party matter rather than a national opportunity for deepening democracy as many hope. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s first priority will be to ensure consolidation of Zanu-PF power. He may do so by positioning Zanu-PF as a born again party committed to change. He may seize the opportunity to introduce real changes in the conduct of Zanu-PF and government leadership, in economic policies and in rebuilding the social compact by showing greater maturity in relations with other political parties and civil society.</p>
<p>But, as reports surface about the harassment of some of Mugabe appointed ministers and their families at the hands of <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/zimbabwe-judge-military-action-mugabe-legal-51375327">men in uniform</a>, we are reminded that the military should never be encouraged to manage political problems because they are likely to cross the line of civil-military relations. Excessive use of military power is likely to follow.</p>
<h2>Mugabe the survivor</h2>
<p>Mugabe has survived many attempts to get rid of him before. These include the efforts of the previous opposition Zimbabwean African People’s Union <a href="http://africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/How-intellectuals-made-history-in-zimbabwe.pdf">(Zapu)</a> under Joshua Nkomo in the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Joshua_Nkomo">1980s</a>, through to the <a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Laakso-Vol-7-Issues-23.pdf">Zimbabwe Unity Movement in the 1990s</a> and to Movement for Democratic Change <a href="http://www.mdc.co.zw">(MDC) in the 2000s</a>. All these efforts failed because Mugabe has, at times, been popular, at times cunning and at times ruthless in preserving power – for himself and the Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>At times reliance on patronage of <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/mdc-t-says-chiefs-not-zanu-pf-political-commissars/">indigenous systems of leadership</a> helped Mugabe and the party ward off challenges. Over the past 15 years, Zanu-PF has relied on the crude use of state power, <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/01/securitization-will-be-an-ill/">draconian security measures</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">brutality on the streets</a>.</p>
<p>It has also resorted to buying popularity through measures such as the violent land restitution process between <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE13.2Magure.pdf">2001 and 2007</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabweans at the inauguration of Emmerson Mnangagwa in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After 2007, Zanu-PF and Mugabe had to contend with a regional mediation process by the Southern African Development Community after an election they lost, but which the MDC did not win by margins needed to <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">form its own government</a>. Zanu-PF responded by unleashing violence and <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008postd.htm">brutality on opponents</a>. Power sharing, which gave the MDC and its leader <a href="https://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPOLISJ/TOPOLISJ-5-28.pdf">Morgan Tsvangarai</a> an opportunity to position themselves as alternatives, saw Mugabe and Zanu-PF play every trick in the book to preserve power.</p>
<p>After Zanu-PF narrowly won the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf">2013 elections</a>, it seemed that Mugabe and his party had finally prevailed. But the power battles turned inward, as party factions jostled over who would succeed Mugabe. </p>
<h2>Zanu-PF power struggles</h2>
<p>Various factions in the Zanu-PF have crystallised into two main camps. </p>
<p>The first is Mugabe and his henchmen of the so-called <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-122610.html">Zezuru group</a>, including top heads of security forces who had wanted Mugabe to continue for a long time. They favoured Solomon Mujuru before he died and later Mnangagwa as a successor. </p>
<p>The second was made up of younger, rather flamboyant group of mainly men around Mugabe Zanu-PF politicians who had gained power and influence in the civil service. This group was known as the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/17/unpacking-the-g40">G-40</a>. In the past few years this group backed Grace Mugabe as her husband’s successor. </p>
<p>Things have hung in the balance with the G40 gaining momentum because they could influence Mugabe’s judgement and decisions through his wife and nephews. This group could make a call who needed to be fired or isolated – and the president would act accordingly. </p>
<p>For example, when moderates in the Zanu-PF and war veterans touted Vice President Joice Mujuru as possible successor to Mugabe, the G40 aimed a barrage of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/11241242/Grace-Mugabe-claims-Joice-Mujuru-plans-to-kill-her-Gaddafi-style.html">insults against her</a> and publicly declared that her time was up. Shortly afterwards Mugabe fired her and got her <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/i-was-a-clear-successor-to-mugabe-says-former-vp-joice-mujuru-20170309">expelled from the party</a>. This deepened divisions within Zanu-PF and intensified concern about the G40 and Grace Mugabe. </p>
<p>The last straw was the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/06/mugabe-fires-deputy-mnangagwa">firing of Mnangagwa</a> and threats against chiefs of armed forces.</p>
<p>Believing that Mugabe was being manipulated by the G40, the military stepped in to weed out those around the president. What they wanted was to persuade Mugabe to go and for Mnangagwa to replace him in as peaceful a process as possible so as not to destabilise Zanu-PF’s hold on power. The military showed great patience as it set about achieving this outcome. </p>
<p>In the end – and after citizens had taken to the streets calling for Mugabe, and the G40, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-19-today-we-have-won-zimbabweans-cheer-during-mass-rally">to go</a> – the old man <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">resigned</a>, thus avoiding an embarrassing impeachment process. </p>
<h2>New forces versus old</h2>
<p>Mugabe is gone. A faction of the Zanu-PF that had gained currency around him is being squeezed out of every space in Zimbabwe. A new faction under Mnangagwa is in place. </p>
<p>Mugabe stands as a shadow of continuity behind leaders who have been around him for decades and who have now been entrusted with the renewal agenda. Mugabe has left, but what’s been called <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">Mugabeism</a> remains: both the positive side of vehemently defending the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the negative side of the brutality of state power. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa and the military have lavished him with generous post-retirement packages, honoured with a <a href="http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/life/happy-sunset-awaits-mugabe-with-sh1billion-golden-handshake/">holiday in his name and praise</a>. The interim president has warned the deposed G-40 faction of Zanu-PF to return stolen state monies or <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/three-month-zimbabwe-amnesty-for-cash-stashed-abroad-12183516">face the law</a>. </p>
<p>A clean break with Mugabe’s heritage of violence and crude dominance will have to wait even beyond <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">elections next year</a>. Zimbabwean citizens have been energised by their role in removing Mugabe. They would do well to remain vigilant, to press for more fundamental changes in the way the state behaves and insisting on democratic processes in economic policies. Otherwise they will continue to live under one Zanu-PF faction to another without real change in their lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Robert Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems.Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.