tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/counter-terrorism-2717/articlesCounter-terrorism – The Conversation2024-02-28T16:52:40Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244192024-02-28T16:52:40Z2024-02-28T16:52:40ZBy not repatriating Shamima Begum, the UK is washing its hands of continuing Islamic State terror<p>Shamima Begum is <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Begum-v-SSHD-CA-2023-000900-2024-EWCA-Civ-152.pdf">not coming home</a>. The Islamic State (IS) poster girl <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-68372112">lost her latest appeal</a> against the British government’s 2019 decision to strip her of her citizenship on grounds of national security. </p>
<p>The ruling meant a brief return to the British headlines for both Begum and the jihadist terrorist group. When the then 15-year-old and two friends ran away from London for IS in 2015, the group held land <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/12/heres-how-the-islamic-state-compares-to-real-states/">almost the size of Britain</a> in Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>Now, IS has no territory in the region. Begum is the only one of the young women left alive. And there is neither the public nor political will to bring Begum or others like her home. IS is yesterday’s news – at least in Europe.</p>
<p>Islamic State’s newsletter al-Naba tells a different story. Each week it reports on successes in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Africa</a>, the centre of its global activities. The <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf">Global Terrorism Index report</a>, published annually by the Institute for Economics and Peace, a thinktank, noted that IS was the world’s most deadly terror group in 2022, and 43% of deaths from terrorism were in the Sahel. Both IS and rival jihadist factions are thought to be responsible. </p>
<p>War between IS and rivals al-Qaeda blazes across sub-Saharan Africa. In Mozambique, thousands of civilians <a href="https://www.opendoorsuk.org/news/latest-news/africa-jihadist-violence/">are on the move</a>, forced from their homes by an IS affiliate. As in Iraq and Syria, women are often targets. In one brutal incident in Mozambique, fighters reportedly <a href="https://www.opendoorsuk.org/news/latest-news/africa-jihadist-violence/">trapped Christian women in a house</a> and set it ablaze. </p>
<h2>Trafficking, violence and IS women</h2>
<p>Jihadist targeting of women, such as the rape and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/jan/24/yazidi-women-islamic-state-slaves-appeal-to-un-to-intervene-in-their-fight-for-compensation">enslavement</a> of Yazidi women in Iraq and Syria, or the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines_Chapter-2.pdf">abductions of women in Nigeria</a>, are central to their violence. Recognising this, the UN security council in 2019 passed a resolution emphasising the need to see gender-based violence <a href="https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/press-release/landmark-un-security-council-resolution-2467-2019-strengthens-justice-and-accountability-and-calls-for-a-survivor-centered-approach-in-the-prevention-and-response-to-conflict-related-sexual-violence/">“as a tactic of war and terrorism”</a>. In Nigeria, IS west Africa fighters have <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45876440">explicitly targeted women</a> working with humanitarian organisations, even executing them on video. </p>
<p>Trafficking has been an important IS tactic. At its height, IS <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30671634.pdf">propaganda techniques</a> resembled those of organised child sexual exploitation. Recruiters, <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol1/iss1/4/">like predators</a>, sought out the vulnerable to gain their trust, encouraging them to keep this secret. </p>
<p>The group needed women. Without them, there was no one to birth the next generation, no one for the “heroic” jihadists of IS propaganda videos to fight to protect. Women were at the heart of the IS governance project, its recruitment and trafficking, and of its violence.</p>
<p>Lawyers for Shamima Begum have argued she was a minor who was trafficked to Syria, and was therefore a victim of IS, lacking agency. A UN special representative stated in a 2018 report (the year before Begum’s citizenship was stripped) that armed groups’ “recruitment and use of children nearly always constitutes trafficking”. </p>
<p>By removing Begum’s citizenship, the UK has essentially <a href="https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/humanrights/Huckerby-Opinion-Appeal-July2022.pdf">blocked any attempt</a> to understand if and how that trafficking took place. </p>
<h2>Repatriation and justice</h2>
<p>The UK’s stance on repatriating IS women is one of <a href="https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/KCL-Speech-final1.pdf">“strategic distance”</a>. In the words of former Met police counterterrorism chief <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/shamima-begum-threat-neil-basu-antiterrorism-b320306.html">Neil Basu</a>, “if you have chosen to go … you shouldn’t be allowed to come back”. This approach <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/dec/12/britain-to-repatriate-woman-and-five-children-from-syrian-camps">sets the UK apart</a> from other western countries.</p>
<p>In 2023, according to US state department data, <a href="https://www.state.gov/progress-in-repatriations-how-foreign-assistance-is-addressing-the-humanitarian-and-security-crises-in-northeast-syria-part-1-of-2/">14 countries repatriated more than 3,500 of their nationals</a> from north-east Syria. In France and Germany, some IS women have gone through the domestic courts. </p>
<p>While IS women were mainly not permitted to fight, not all violence took place on the battlefield. France has prosecuted female jihadis for <a href="https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2024-01/Female%20Jihadis%20Facing%20Justice.pdf">association with “terrorist wrongdoers”</a>. </p>
<p>Germany has prosecuted some IS women under war crimes and genocide legislation. In one case, a woman was sentenced for her role in the <a href="https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/german-court-delivers-third-genocide-verdict-against-isis-member-enslavement-and-abuse-yazidi">enslavement of a Yazidi woman</a>. In another, for the death of a Yazidi child, <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12456659/German-ISIS-bride-jailed-14-years-crimes-against-humanity.html">left in the sun to die</a>. Repatriation and trials go some way not just to punishing wrongdoing, but providing the Yazidi people with justice. </p>
<p>Returned to countries of origin, IS members can be managed. <a href="https://www.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2024-02/Female%20Jihadis%20Facing%20Justice.pdf">A new report</a> published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism found that in Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands, most imprisoned women do not appear to pose a threat.</p>
<p>The 2023 <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63e26a08d3bf7f172f6ce87f/Independent_Review_of_Prevent__print_.pdf">Shawcross report</a> into the British counter-radicalisation strategy Prevent concluded that Islamism terrorism is the largest terrorist threat facing the UK. British Islamism is not isolated, it is influenced by wider trends of transnational jihad. </p>
<p>In leaving Shamima Begum stateless in Syria, the British government sends a message, not just to a <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/shamima-begum-78-of-britons-support-revoking-is-brides-uk-citizenship-sky-data-poll-11643068">Britain that does not want her</a>, but to the Middle East and Africa: Islamic State is no longer our problem.</p>
<p>The truth is, <a href="https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/">IS violence is not over</a>, even if the theatre of conflict has shifted. Begum has become a symbol of British unwillingness to take this seriously. Her lawyers say <a href="https://www.eastlondonlines.co.uk/2024/02/shamima-begums-lawyers-will-keep-fighting-after-judges-reject-citizenship-appeal/">they will fight on</a>. Perhaps next time Britain will recognise that IS violence remains a global threat.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224419/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Elizabeth Pearson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Islamic State has fallen out of the public attention in the UK and Europe but remains active in Africa.Elizabeth Pearson, Programme Lead MSc Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228652024-02-11T23:12:15Z2024-02-11T23:12:15Z‘America is the mother of terrorism’: why the Houthis’ new slogan is important for understanding the Middle East<p>Yemen’s Houthi militants <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-07/apn-houthis-attack-more-ships/103434850">continue to disrupt shipping</a> in the Red Sea, undeterred by the intensifying Western airstrikes or the group’s re-designation as a “<a href="https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/">global terrorist</a>” organisation. As their attacks have intensified, the group’s slogan (or <em>sarkha</em>, meaning “scream”) has also gained notoriety.</p>
<p>Banners bearing the <em>sarkha</em> dot the streets in areas of Yemen under Houthi control and are brandished by supporters at their rallies. It declares: “God is Great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam.” (The mentions of the Houthis’ enemies appear in a red font resembling <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slogan_of_the_Houthi_movement#/media/File:Slogan_of_the_Houthi_Movement.svg">barbed wire</a>).</p>
<p>Many commentators are quick to point out the origins of the <em>sarkha</em> can be traced to a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slogan_of_the_Houthi_movement#:%7E:text=The%2520slogan%2520of%2520the%2520Houthi,%252C%2520%D9%B1%D9%84%D9%92%D9%85%D9%8E%D9%88%D9%92%D8%AA%D9%8F%2520%D9%84%25D9%2590%D8%A3%D9%8E%D9%85%D9%92%D8%B1%25D9%2590%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8E%D8%A7%252C%2520%D9%B1%D9%84%D9%92%D9%85%D9%8E%D9%88%D9%92%D8%AA%D9%8F%2520%D9%84%25D9%2590%D8%A5%25D9%2590%D8%B3%D9%92%D8%B1%D9%8E%D8%A7%D8%A6%25D9%2590%D9%8A%D9%84%25D9%2590%252C">motto from the Iranian revolution</a>. The link reveals the longstanding relationship between the Houthis and their principal regional backer, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-houthi-jihad-council-command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/">Iran</a>.</p>
<p>The <em>sarkha</em> also carries an anti-imperialist message, which has caused some outside analysts to <a href="https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2024/01/18/war-us-israel-yemen-iraq-syria-iran/">overestimate</a> the Houthis’ local legitimacy and diminish the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/yemen">suffering</a> of ordinary Yemenis living under their <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-us-strikes-will-only-embolden-the-houthis-not-stop-their-attacks-on-ships-in-the-red-sea-221588">brutal and exclusionary</a> rule. </p>
<p>Since the Houthis’ re-designation as a global terrorist organisation, another slogan has become prevalent on placards at their rallies. Set against a red background, it reads: “<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-us-strikes-will-only-embolden-the-houthis-not-stop-their-attacks-on-ships-in-the-red-sea-221588">America is the mother of terrorism</a>.” </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1750936349438349352"}"></div></p>
<p>At first glance, this appears to be an extension of the ideological sentiments conveyed in the <em>sarkha</em>.</p>
<p>However, this slogan also reflects the complexity of Yemeni views about US counterterrorism interventions and the widespread belief that these have provided terrorist groups with the oxygen they need to <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-08-30/assisting-al-qaeda">survive</a>.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-us-strikes-will-only-embolden-the-houthis-not-stop-their-attacks-on-ships-in-the-red-sea-221588">Why US strikes will only embolden the Houthis, not stop their attacks on ships in the Red Sea</a>
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<h2>Terror groups as a tool of the state</h2>
<p>The US has long been criticised for <a href="https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/">disproportionately</a> killing <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/opinion/how-drones-help-al-qaeda.html">civilians</a> in counterterrorism strikes. Some experts argue this may <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00502.x">create</a> more “terrorists” than it kills. </p>
<p>Another critique: it was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that originally supported <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/29768089?seq=2">Osama bin Laden</a> and the mujahideen in Afghanistan in an attempt to trap the Soviet Union in an unwinnable war, making the US at least somewhat responsible for what followed.</p>
<p>However, there are other layers to these slogans that are less intuitively understood by a Western audience. </p>
<p>The West’s reflexive support for authoritarian leaders who claim to be targeting terrorism is widely seen in Yemen (and throughout the Middle East) as fuelling a symbiotic relationship between oppressive regimes, terrorist groups and <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-middle-east-crisis-factory/">Western-led military interventions</a>.</p>
<p>For many in the region, groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State function, in part, as “tools” that Western-backed authoritarian leaders use to maintain their power. They provide plausible deniability for the violence these leaders use against civilians, or support their pitch that “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2023.2250253">if I’m gone, terrorists will take over the country</a>”.</p>
<p>In Yemen, there is a long history of allegations that Western-backed leaders have: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-yemenis-are-still-joining-al-qaeda">released</a><a href="https://www.newsweek.com/tunnel-rats-terror-113197">al-Qaeda prisoners</a> so they could regroup</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/6/4/informant-says-yemens-saleh-helped-direct-al-qaeda">facilitated</a> al-Qaeda attacks against local and foreign targets</p></li>
<li><p>misdirected US strikes to kill <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203899504577126883574284126.html">political opponents</a> rather than al-Qaeda leaders. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The West’s regional partners, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have also been accused of <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-recruited-alqaeda-assassinations-yemen-report">recruiting</a> al-Qaeda members to <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-arabian-peninsula/">fight</a> in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67945137">paramilitary</a> forces against Yemeni opponents.</p>
<p>As a result, many Yemenis wouldn’t view al-Qaeda or Islamic State as being completely separate from those in charge of the country. Rather, they often see these terrorist groups as helping to reinforce the status quo. </p>
<p>This view is, of course, diametrically opposed to Western understandings of al-Qaeda or Islamic State. In the West, these groups are framed as rebels seeking to overturn the state. But across the region, many believe these relationships defy simple categories like “state versus insurgent” or “friend versus enemy” because terror groups can be both at once.</p>
<p>One Yemeni analyst articulated the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2023.2250253">frustration</a> of trying to explain the symbiotic relationship between terrorist groups and authoritarian leaders in the Middle East:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s easier to tell a kid that Santa Claus isn’t real than to get foreigners to see what al-Qaeda in Yemen really is.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Why the West’s policies are backfiring</h2>
<p>For the Houthis, America’s alleged role in helping to fuel terrorist groups has been a longstanding part of the group’s messaging. </p>
<p>Over a decade ago – two years before the Houthis seized the Yemeni capital and sparked a lengthy war – I visited a northern town where there were several large, freshly painted murals bearing the statement “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066119837335">al-Qaeda is American made</a>”.</p>
<p>When I asked residents about the this, they appeared to see the statement as a banal declaration of fact. They were more impressed by the “nice handwriting” than the message. (Like the banners bearing the <em>sarkha</em>, the murals used a red barbed-wire font for the word “America”.)</p>
<p>The Houthis’ message about American complicity in terrorism resonates because it works at several levels. </p>
<p>It gestures to the violence unleashed by the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/25/as-us-resists-ceasefire-calls-what-is-bidens-endgame-in-gaza">near-unconditional</a> support the US provides to Israel, and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/05/britain-let-weapons-be-used-for-repression">military</a>, <a href="https://jacobin.com/2020/03/egypt-prison-state-client-mubarak-al-sisi">carceral</a> and <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2013/07/halting-aid-to-egypt-over-military-coup-would-hurt.html">political</a> support the US and its Western partners provide authoritarian leaders in the region. </p>
<p>It also gets at the profound sense within Yemen (and across the region) that the political status quo is sustained by violent regimes. And that terrorist groups like al-Qaeda – and the counterterrorism interventions they invite – are part of how those regimes maintain their power.</p>
<p>Of course, the violence the Houthis use to sustain their own power is an irony that should not be lost. The Houthis are widely despised by Yemenis who live under their rule. Even so, their messaging taps into widespread views about the drivers of regional violence that some Western observers have long dismissed. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-us-strikes-will-only-embolden-the-houthis-not-stop-their-attacks-on-ships-in-the-red-sea-221588">Why US strikes will only embolden the Houthis, not stop their attacks on ships in the Red Sea</a>
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<p>Indeed, the complexities that underpin the Houthis’ new slogan help explain why Western policy across the region will continue to backfire. </p>
<p>Put bluntly, people in the region see Western policymakers as blind to their historical record of strengthening the enemies they come to fight. The fact that Western airstrikes are giving the Houthis a legitimacy that was previously unimaginable is ominous.</p>
<p>Unfortunately for Yemeni civilians, the Houthis’ stance against Israel will increase their appeal to those who know little of what it is like to live with them. It will also make it even harder for Yemenis to dislodge them from power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah G. Phillips receives funding from the Australian Research Council (FT200100539). She is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies (Yemen).</span></em></p>Many people in Yemen and throughout the Middle East believe terror groups are a tool that Western-backed oppressive regimes have long used to maintain power.Sarah G. Phillips, Non-Resident Fellow at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, Yemen; Professor of Global Conflict and Development, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2224082024-02-07T12:03:02Z2024-02-07T12:03:02ZUsing AI to monitor the internet for terror content is inescapable – but also fraught with pitfalls<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573450/original/file-20240205-17-4tssh6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C0%2C3693%2C2460&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/technology-security-concept-personal-authentication-system-709257292">metamorworks/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Every minute, millions of social media posts, photos and videos flood the internet. <a href="https://www.socialpilot.co/blog/social-media-statistics">On average</a>, Facebook users share 694,000 stories, X (formerly Twitter) users post 360,000 posts, Snapchat users send 2.7 million snaps and YouTube users upload more than 500 hours of video. </p>
<p>This vast ocean of online material needs to be constantly monitored for harmful or illegal content, like promoting terrorism and violence. </p>
<p>The sheer volume of content means that it’s not possible for people to inspect and check all of it manually, which is why automated tools, including artificial intelligence (AI), are essential. But such tools also have their limitations. </p>
<p>The concerted effort in recent years to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2222901">develop tools</a> for the identification and removal of online terrorist content has, in part, been fuelled by the emergence of new laws and regulations. This includes the EU’s terrorist content online <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0784">regulation</a>, which requires hosting service providers to remove terrorist content from their platform within one hour of receiving a removal order from a competent national authority.</p>
<h2>Behaviour and content-based tools</h2>
<p>In broad terms, there are two types of tools used to root out terrorist content. The first looks at certain account and message behaviour. This includes how old the account is, the use of trending or unrelated hashtags and abnormal posting volume. </p>
<p>In many ways, this is similar to spam detection, in that it does not pay attention to content, and is <a href="https://www.resolvenet.org/research/remove-impede-disrupt-redirect-understanding-combating-pro-islamic-state-use-file-sharing">valuable for detecting</a> the rapid dissemination of large volumes of content, which are often bot-driven. </p>
<p>The second type of tool is content-based. It focuses on linguistic characteristics, word use, images and web addresses. Automated content-based tools take <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">one of two approaches</a>. </p>
<p><strong>1. Matching</strong></p>
<p>The first approach is based on comparing new images or videos to an existing database of images and videos that have previously been identified as terrorist in nature. One challenge here is that terror groups are known to try and evade such methods by producing subtle variants of the same piece of content. </p>
<p>After the Christchurch terror attack in New Zealand in 2019, for example, hundreds of visually distinct versions of the livestream video of the atrocity <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/technical-update-on-new-zealand/">were in circulation</a>. </p>
<p>So, to combat this, matching-based tools generally use <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/open-source-photo-video-matching/">perceptual hashing</a> rather than cryptographic hashing. Hashes are a bit like digital fingerprints, and cryptographic hashing acts like a secure, unique identity tag. Even changing a single pixel in an image drastically alters its fingerprint, preventing false matches. </p>
<p>Perceptual hashing, on the other hand, focuses on similarity. It overlooks minor changes like pixel colour adjustments, but identifies images with the same core content. This makes perceptual hashing more resilient to tiny alterations to a piece of content. But it also means that the hashes are not entirely random, and so could potentially be used to try and <a href="https://towardsdatascience.com/black-box-attacks-on-perceptual-image-hashes-with-gans-cc1be11f277">recreate</a> the original image.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A close up of a mobile phone screen displaying several social media apps." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573540/original/file-20240205-25-jovm4l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Millions of posts, images and videos are uploaded to social media platforms every minute.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/moscow-russia-29072023-new-elon-musks-2339442245">Viktollio/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p><strong>2. Classification</strong></p>
<p>The second approach relies on classifying content. It <a href="https://www.cambridgeconsultants.com/insights/whitepaper/ofcom-use-ai-online-content-moderation">uses</a> machine learning and other forms of AI, such as natural language processing. To achieve this, the AI needs a lot of examples like texts labelled as terrorist content or not by human content moderators. By analysing these examples, the AI learns which features distinguish different types of content, allowing it to categorise new content on its own. </p>
<p>Once trained, the algorithms are then able to predict whether a new item of content belongs to one of the specified categories. These items may then be removed or flagged for human review. </p>
<p>This approach also <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">faces challenges</a>, however. Collecting and preparing a large dataset of terrorist content to train the algorithms is time-consuming and <a href="https://oro.open.ac.uk/69799/">resource-intensive</a>. </p>
<p>The training data may also become dated quickly, as terrorists make use of new terms and discuss new world events and current affairs. Algorithms also have difficulty understanding context, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951719897945">subtlety and irony</a>. They also <a href="https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf">lack</a> cultural sensitivity, including variations in dialect and language use across different groups. </p>
<p>These limitations can have important offline effects. There have been documented failures to remove hate speech in countries such as <a href="https://restofworld.org/2021/why-facebook-keeps-failing-in-ethiopia/">Ethiopia</a> and <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/the-thread/facebooks-content-moderation-language-barrier/">Romania</a>, while free speech activists in countries such as <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-seven-years-later-how-facebook-shuts-down-free-speech-egypt">Egypt</a>, <a href="https://syrianobserver.com/news/58430/facebook-deletes-accounts-of-assad-opponents.html">Syria</a> and <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-required-is-facebooks-effort-to-clean-up-operation-carthage-damaging-free-expression-in-tunisia/">Tunisia</a> have reported having their content removed.</p>
<h2>We still need human moderators</h2>
<p>So, in spite of advances in AI, human input remains essential. It is important for maintaining databases and datasets, assessing content flagged for review and operating appeals processes for when decisions are challenged. </p>
<p>But this is demanding and draining work, and there have been <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/facebook-content-moderators-ireland">damning reports</a> regarding the working conditions of moderators, with many tech companies such as Meta <a href="https://www.stern.nyu.edu/experience-stern/faculty-research/who-moderates-social-media-giants-call-end-outsourcing">outsourcing</a> this work to third-party vendors. </p>
<p>To address this, we <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/news/tcoaireport">recommend</a> the development of a set of minimum standards for those employing content moderators, including mental health provision. There is also potential to develop AI tools to safeguard the wellbeing of moderators. This would work, for example, by blurring out areas of images so that moderators can reach a decision without viewing disturbing content directly. </p>
<p>But at the same time, few, if any, platforms have the resources needed to develop automated content moderation tools and employ a sufficient number of human reviewers with the required expertise. </p>
<p>Many platforms have turned to off-the-shelf products. It is estimated that the content moderation solutions market will be <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/content-moderation-solutions-market-to-cross-us-32-bn-by-2031-tmr-report-301514155.html">worth $32bn by 2031</a>. </p>
<p>But caution is needed here. Third-party providers are not currently subject to the same level of oversight as tech platforms themselves. They may rely disproportionately on automated tools, with insufficient human input and a lack of transparency regarding the datasets used to train their algorithms.</p>
<p>So, collaborative initiatives between governments and the private sector are essential. For example, the EU-funded <a href="https://tate.techagainstterrorism.org/">Tech Against Terrorism Europe</a> project has developed valuable resources for tech companies. There are also examples of automated content moderation tools being made openly available like Meta’s <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2022/12/meta-launches-new-content-moderation-tool/">Hasher-Matcher-Actioner</a>, which companies can use to build their own database of hashed terrorist content. </p>
<p>International organisations, governments and tech platforms must prioritise the development of such collaborative resources. Without this, effectively addressing online terror content will remain elusive.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222408/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stuart Macdonald receives funding from the EU Internal Security Fund for the project Tech Against Terrorism Europe (ISF-2021-AG-TCO-101080101). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ashley A. Mattheis receives funding from the EU Internal Security Fund for the project Tech Against Terrorism Europe (ISF-2021-AG-TCO-101080101).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Wells receives funding from the Council of Europe to conduct an analysis of emerging patterns of misuse of technology by terrorist actors (ongoing)</span></em></p>The complex task of tackling online terror needs human eyes as well as artificial intelligence.Stuart Macdonald, Professor of Law, Swansea UniversityAshley A. Mattheis, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of Law and Government, Dublin City UniversityDavid Wells, Honorary Research Associate at the Cyber Threats Research Centre, Swansea UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168962023-11-02T03:48:42Z2023-11-02T03:48:42ZIs a terrorist’s win in the High Court bad for national security? Not necessarily<p>Yesterday, Abdul Nacer Benbrika, perhaps Australia’s most notorious convicted terrorist, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/nov/01/abdul-nacer-benbrika-australian-citizenship-convicted-terrorist-wins-high-court-battle">won in the High Court</a>. </p>
<p>A six-one majority of the court <a href="https://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/showCase/2023/HCA/33">struck down</a> a ministerial power to revoke the Australian citizenship of certain terrorist offenders. </p>
<p>Benbrika’s citizenship had been revoked as a result of his <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/vic/VSC/2009/21.html">conviction</a> in 2008 of a range of terrorism offences, including directing the activities of a terrorist organisation for which he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. </p>
<p>Following the court’s decision, Benbrika remains an Australian citizen. So will he go free? And what does this mean for national security?</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/should-new-australians-have-to-pass-an-english-test-to-become-citizens-175324">Should new Australians have to pass an English test to become citizens?</a>
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<h2>Unconstitutional punishment</h2>
<p>This was not the first time the High Court had stopped the minister for home affairs revoking the citizenship of someone involved in terrorism. </p>
<p>Delil Alexander was a dual citizen of Australia (by birth) and Turkey (by descent) when he entered Syria in 2013 with the terrorist organisation ISIS. </p>
<p>In 2021, the minister revoked Alexander’s Australian citizenship because Alexander had engaged in certain terrorist conduct which demonstrated he had “repudiated his allegiance to Australia”.</p>
<p>Revoking his citizenship was, the minister reasoned, in the public interest. </p>
<p>At that time, Alexander was in prison in Syria and could not be contacted by his family or lawyers. His sister, Berivan, challenged the citizenship-stripping law on his behalf and <a href="https://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case_s103-2021">won the case</a>. </p>
<p>In Benbrika’s case, the situation was a little different. </p>
<p>Unlike Alexander, Benbrika (a dual national with Algeria) had actually been convicted of terrorism offences, which gave the minister a basis on which to strip his Australian citizenship. </p>
<p>Yet the court’s reasons for striking down the citizenship-stripping powers were similar in the two cases. </p>
<p>First, the court acknowledged that loss of one’s citizenship is at least as serious as detention. </p>
<p>Second, the court interpreted the law as being designed to punish the person for their conduct. </p>
<p>Under the separation of powers, which the Constitution protects, imposing punishments for wrongdoing is generally the work of courts and should follow a criminal trial and finding of guilt. </p>
<p>In this case, the minister was essentially – and unconstitutionally – trying to go around the courts by punishing these individuals outside the criminal process. </p>
<h2>What now for Benbrika?</h2>
<p>The consequence of Alexander remaining an Australian citizen is that it remained Australia’s responsibility to, for instance, take steps to find out where he was, re-establish contact with him, and provide consular assistance. </p>
<p>Alexander may even need to be brought back to Australia where he would be dealt with under our own laws and justice system (it is, after all, a serious federal offence to join ISIS). </p>
<p>Benbrika, on the other hand, has served his sentence for terrorism offences and won his fight to maintain his Australian citizenship. </p>
<p>So will he walk free? Is it only a matter of time before he is radicalising more young people and inciting further hatred and violence?</p>
<p>Whatever lies ahead for Benbrika, it is unlikely to be any sense of freedom. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-new-aussie-citizenship-rules-kick-in-the-fair-go-finally-returns-to-trans-tasman-relations-208739">As new Aussie citizenship rules kick in, the ‘fair go’ finally returns to trans-Tasman relations</a>
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<p>Australia has more extensive counterterrorism law than anywhere else in the world. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/before-9-11-australia-had-no-counter-terrorism-laws-now-we-have-92-but-are-we-safer-166273">recent count</a> put the tally at almost 100 laws enacted since the 9/11 attacks in 2001.</p>
<p>Many of those laws tweak the usual rights given to people as they move through the criminal justice system. </p>
<p>This includes the option of post-sentence imprisonment – “continuing detention orders” – for those who are assessed to pose an unacceptable risk of committing national security offences. </p>
<p>Such an order can be made for up to three years and there are no limits on renewal. </p>
<p>Not only has Benbrika already been subject to those orders but, in 2021, he lodged an unsuccessful High Court <a href="https://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2021/4.html?context=0;query=benbrika;mask_path=au/cases/cth/HCA">challenge</a> to those laws. </p>
<p>For as long as Benbrika is assessed to pose an “unacceptable risk” to the community, he will remain in prison. </p>
<p>But what if he satisfies a court that his release no longer poses an unacceptable risk? </p>
<p>Under Victorian law, Benbrika could be subject to an extended “supervision order”, which can be made for up to 15 years (with a possibility of being renewed for a further 15 years). </p>
<p>On top of this are federal “control orders”. </p>
<p>This is the kind of order imposed on <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-12-21/hicks-control-order-granted/994358">David Hicks</a> on his return from Guantanamo Bay, and on <a href="https://fedcourt.gov.au/digital-law-library/judges-speeches/speeches-former-judges/justice-marshall/marshall-j-20070906#:%7E:text=Issuing%20of%20the%20Control%20Order,on%20Mr%20Thomas'%20personal%20liberty.">Joseph “Jihad Jack” Thomas</a> after his acquittal for terrorism offences. </p>
<p>Control orders allow for an extremely wide range of restrictions and obligations to be imposed on a person if those conditions are “reasonably necessary, appropriate and adapted” to protecting the community from terrorism. </p>
<p>Control orders last for up to 12 months, but there are no limits on their renewal.</p>
<p>Under a supervision order or control order, Benbrika could be required to:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>stay at a certain address</p></li>
<li><p>be subject to curfews (even amounting to home detention) </p></li>
<li><p>wear a tracking device</p></li>
<li><p>not use the internet, a phone or other devices</p></li>
<li><p>not contact certain people or go to certain places </p></li>
<li><p>undertake education, counselling or drug testing </p></li>
<li><p>or any number of other restrictions or obligations deemed necessary for community protection. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Breaching one of these orders is punishable by five years imprisonment. </p>
<h2>But wouldn’t it be better to deport him?</h2>
<p>There is a symbolic attraction to taking away the citizenship of someone who has acted in a way that shows no allegiance to – and even a violent disregard for – Australia and basic community values. </p>
<p>Indeed, the one judge who upheld the citizenship-stripping laws, Justice Simon Steward, did so on the basis that citizenship-stripping was not designed to punish. </p>
<p>Instead, he argued it was merely an acknowledgement that the person themselves had severed their ties to Australia.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-does-being-australian-mean-under-the-constitution-38889">What does 'being Australian' mean under the Constitution?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>A <a href="https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/2771452/11-Pillai-and-Williams.pdf">study</a> looking at counterterrorism citizenship-stripping in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia found the laws were serving this symbolic role. </p>
<p>But symbolism is a thin shield for national security. </p>
<p>When it comes to actually protecting security, the evidence shows that citizenship-stripping comes up short. </p>
<p>People have been stripped of their citizenship and committed terrorist acts elsewhere. Khaled Sharrouf, Australia’s most notorious foreign fighter, is one such person. </p>
<p>In a globalised world, people stripped of citizenship can still serve a pivotal role in recruitment and radicalisation, especially on the internet. </p>
<p>Kept in Australia, as an Australian, the full weight of our vast security laws can be brought to bear on Benbrika. </p>
<p>Stripped of his citizenship, Benbrika would have been beyond the reach of those laws, and it would be naïve to think that simply making him not-Australian would negate the risks he may present.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Ananian-Welsh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Convicted terrorist Abdul Nacer Benbrika yesterday won the right to remain an Australian citizen. So will he go free? And what does this mean for national security?Rebecca Ananian-Welsh, Associate Professor, TC Beirne School of Law, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2154102023-10-11T20:01:27Z2023-10-11T20:01:27ZHow did Israeli intelligence miss Hamas’ preparations to attack? A US counterterrorism expert explains how Israeli intelligence works<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553317/original/file-20231011-21-3o0xk2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli soldiers move past a military medical vehicle on Oct. 10, 2023, at Kfar Aza, a kibbutz where Hamas militants killed Israelis days before.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/soldiers-move-past-a-medical-idf-vehicle-at-kibbutz-kfar-news-photo/1728299509?adppopup=true">Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Israel is widely recognized as having highly sophisticated intelligence capabilities, both in terms of its ability to collect information about potential threats within its own country and outside of it. And so as details unfold about the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-war-hamas-deaths-killings.html">full extent of Hamas’</a> <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-rockets-airstrikes-tel-aviv-11fb98655c256d54ecb5329284fc37d2">unprecedented and surprise attack</a> on 20 Israeli towns and several army bases on Oct. 7, 2023, the question lingers: How did <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/israels-intelligence-disaster">Israel fail to piece together</a> clues about this large-scale and highly complex plot in advance?</em> </p>
<p><em>Israeli intelligence <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67082047">did detect some suspicious</a> activity on Hamas militant networks before the attack, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-security-failure.html">The New York Times reported</a> on Oct. 10, 2023. But the warning wasn’t acted upon or fully understood in its entirety – similar to what happened in the United States <a href="https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/s0606/chapter6.htm#:%7E:text=The%20FBI%20did%20little%20with,intelligence%20information%2C%20and%20the%20lack">shortly before the terrorist attacks</a> on Sept. 11, 2001.</em> </p>
<p><em>“Intelligence analysis is like putting a thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle together from individual pieces of intelligence every day and trying to make judgments for policymakers to actually do something with those insights,” said <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">Javed Ali</a>, a counterterrorism and intelligence scholar who spent years working in U.S. intelligence.</em> </p>
<p><em>We spoke with Ali to try to better understand how Israeli intelligence works and the potential gaps in the system that paved the way for the Hamas incursion.</em> </p>
<h2>1. What questions did you have as you watched the attacks unfold?</h2>
<p>This took an enormous amount of deliberate and careful planning, and Hamas must have gone to great lengths to conceal the plotting from Israeli intelligence. This plotting <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-security-failure.html">may indeed have been hidden</a> as the plot was being coordinated. </p>
<p>Because of the attack’s advanced features, I also thought that Iran almost certainly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/11/us/politics/iran-israel-gaza-hamas-us-intelligence.html">played a role in supporting the operation</a> – although some U.S. officials have so far said <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-israel-iranian-officials-surprised-by-hamas-attack-israel/#textThe20US20has20intelligence20indicatingthe20deadly20Oct20720assault">they do not have intelligence evidence of that happening</a>. </p>
<p>Finally, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS/MAPS/movajdladpa/">Hamas is on Israel’s doorstep</a>. One would think Israel could better understand what is happening in Gaza and the West Bank, as opposed to 1,000 miles away in Iran. How did Israel not see something this advanced right next door? Some Israeli officials have said <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-security-failure.html">they believed Hamas was already deterred</a> by recent Israeli counterterrorism operations, and that the group lacked the capability to launch an attack on the scope and scale of what occurred. </p>
<h2>2. How does Israeli intelligence work, and how is it regarded internationally?</h2>
<p>Israel has one of the most capable and sophisticated intelligence enterprises at the international level. The current design and functioning of Israel’s intelligence system broadly mirrors that in the U.S., with respect to roles and responsibilities. </p>
<p>In Israel, Shin Bet is the Israeli domestic security service, so the equivalent of the FBI, which monitors threats within the country. On the foreign security side, <a href="https://spyscape.com/article/inside-mossad">Israel has Mossad</a>, which is equivalent to the CIA. Third, there is an Israeli military intelligence agency, similar to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency – and there are other, smaller organizations within military intelligence that are focused on different intelligence issues. </p>
<p>Like most Western countries, Israel relies on a combination of different intelligence sources. This includes recruiting people to provide intelligence agencies with the sensitive information they have direct access to, which is known as human intelligence – think spies. There is what is called signals intelligence, which can be different forms of electronic communications like phone calls, emails or texts that the Israelis gain access to. Then there is imagery intelligence, which could be a satellite, for example, that captures photos of, say, militant training camps or equipment. </p>
<p>A fourth kind of intelligence is open source, or publicly available information that is already out there for anyone to get, such as internet chat forums. While I was winding down my work in intelligence a few years ago, there was a shift to seeing much more publicly available intelligence than other kinds of traditional intelligence.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553315/original/file-20231011-17-kjoqg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man with a suit stands at a podium that says 'ICT's 22nd world summit on counter-terrorism' and next to a large screen that shows headshots of people" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553315/original/file-20231011-17-kjoqg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553315/original/file-20231011-17-kjoqg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553315/original/file-20231011-17-kjoqg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553315/original/file-20231011-17-kjoqg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553315/original/file-20231011-17-kjoqg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553315/original/file-20231011-17-kjoqg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553315/original/file-20231011-17-kjoqg2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">David Barnea, the director of Israel’s Mossad, shows a video that depicts Iranian intelligence operatives during a counterterrorism summit in September 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israels-mossad-director-david-barnea-speaks-on-the-backdrop-news-photo/1656972994?adppopup=true">Gil Cohen-Magen/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. How does Israel’s intelligence system differ from the US system?</h2>
<p>Unlike the U.S., one thing that Israel doesn’t have is an overall intelligence coordinator, a single representative who knows about and oversees all of the different intelligence components. </p>
<p>The U.S. system has a director of national intelligence position, who runs the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/history">Office of the Director of National Intelligence</a>, which was created in 2004. These were both recommendations of the <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/implementing-911-commission-recommendations">9/11 Commission</a>, after it found that the U.S. approach to intelligence was too fragmented across different agencies and offices. </p>
<p>So, when there are tough issues that no one agency could resolve on its own, or analytic differences in intelligence, you need an independent office of experts to help work through those issues. That’s what this office does.</p>
<p>I spent several years working within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In one of my jobs there, I reported to the director of national intelligence. </p>
<p>There is no equivalent to that central office and function in Israel. In my opinion, Israel might consider down the road how a comprehensive intelligence coordinator could help avoid this challenge in the future. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553320/original/file-20231011-15-o1rjo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several bodies covered in white cloths are seen on the ground." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553320/original/file-20231011-15-o1rjo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553320/original/file-20231011-15-o1rjo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553320/original/file-20231011-15-o1rjo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553320/original/file-20231011-15-o1rjo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553320/original/file-20231011-15-o1rjo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553320/original/file-20231011-15-o1rjo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553320/original/file-20231011-15-o1rjo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bodies of Israelis lie on the ground following Hamas’ attack in Sderot, Israel, on Oct. 7, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/october-2023-israel-sderot-bodies-of-dead-israelis-lie-on-news-photo/1711934608?adppopup=true">Ilia Yefimovich/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>4. What role does the US have in monitoring threats to Israel, if any?</h2>
<p>The U.S. and Israel have a very strong intelligence relationship. That partnership is bilateral, meaning it is just between the two countries. It is not part of a <a href="https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we-work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc">larger international group</a> of countries that share intelligence. </p>
<p>The U.S. also has a broader intelligence partnership, <a href="https://theconversation.com/nato-isnt-the-only-alliance-that-countries-are-eager-to-join-a-brief-history-of-the-five-eyes-209763">known as “Five Eyes,”</a> with Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Nevertheless, the general rule in these strong bilateral relationships is that when one side picks up intelligence about threats to the other, it should automatically get passed on. </p>
<p>This may be a case where the U.S. is shifting its intelligence priorities to other parts of the world, like Ukraine, Russia and China. As a result, we may not have had significant intelligence on this particular Hamas plot, and so there was nothing to pass to Israel to warn them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Israel’s intelligence capacities are considered some of the best in the world – but unlike the US, it does not have a central organization coordinating all intelligence.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice in Counterterrorism, Domestic Terrorrism, Cybersecurity and National Security Law and Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122732023-08-29T13:33:47Z2023-08-29T13:33:47ZBrics: African countries face opportunities and risks in alienating China or the US - an expert weighs in<p><em>South Africa recently hosted a <a href="https://brics2023.gov.za/">Brics summit</a>. The event attracted international attention because the group has recently begun to emerge as a possible rival against US dominance of world affairs. The US and China lie at the heart of this debate. They are the two biggest trading partners of most African countries and both have strategic interests that they are determined to protect. The Conversation Africa’s politics editor, Thabo Leshilo, asked international relations expert Christopher Isike to explain.</em></p>
<h2>How might Brics affect US-African ties?</h2>
<p>Altering diplomatic relations between African countries and the US on account of Brics would have its pros and cons for the continent. Some potential gains from alienating the US would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Increased autonomy for African countries in their foreign policy decisions. They might be able to align more closely with their own interests and priorities without the perceived influence of a major global power. </p></li>
<li><p>The potential of diversifying partnerships and alliances with other countries or regional blocs that Brics presents. This could lead to more economic, political and security relationships, reducing reliance on any single nation. </p></li>
<li><p>Stronger regional cooperation and integration. This could unify efforts to address common challenges such as security, infrastructure development and economic growth. Such regional cooperation offers more fertile ground for the <a href="https://au-afcfta.org/">African Continental Free Trade Area</a>to thrive. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>However, a strained relationship with the US could also come at a cost. Some of the losses would include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Reduced trade opportunities, foreign direct investment and economic aid, potentially leading to economic setbacks for the continent. Beneficiaries of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (<a href="https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html">Agoa</a>), which provides preferential access to the US market, would be hit the hardest. </p></li>
<li><p>The US has been accused of militarising the continent to advance its own interests. But it plays a significant role in <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/io/pkpg/c10834.htm">supporting peacekeeping efforts</a> and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-who-thinks-wins-how-smarter-u-s-counterterrorism-in-the-sahel-can-pay-dividends-for-great-power-competition/">counterterrorism initiatives</a> in various African regions. Alienation could therefore affect security and stability, leaving a void in terms of resources, expertise, and coordination in these critical areas. </p></li>
<li><p>Alienating a major global player like the US could also lead to diplomatic isolation for many African countries on the international stage. This could weaken their influence in international organisations, negotiations and decision-making processes.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What if African countries alienated China?</h2>
<p>On gains, African countries would be able to diversify their economic and political partnerships by reducing dependence on China. This could lead to increased engagement with other countries and regions, potentially resulting in a more balanced and varied international relations portfolio.</p>
<p>African countries could also enhance their bargaining power in negotiations. This could lead to more favourable terms in trade deals, investment agreements and development projects. Other countries including the US, EU members and Australia might see an opportunity to fill the void. </p>
<p>Some Africans see China’s influence as overly dominant, potentially leading to <a href="https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwik_ufxrv-AAxX3YPEDHanLDBcQFnoECDUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theelephant.info%2Ffeatures%2F2021%2F05%2F10%2Fwhat-africans-think-of-china-and-america%2F&usg=AOvVaw27sl28dalUXdGrayDchrvJ&opi=89978449">concerns about sovereignty and autonomy</a>. Alienating China could be seen as a way to assert national interests and prevent over-reliance on a single foreign partner.</p>
<p>That said, African countries can ill afford to alienate China. </p>
<p>China is a major economic partner for many African countries, providing investments, trade opportunities and infrastructure projects. Alienating it could lead to economic setbacks, including reduced trade and foreign direct investment. </p>
<p>Second, China is involved in various <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/183370/china-is-delivering-over-30-of-africas-big-construction-projects-heres-why/">infrastructure development projects across Africa</a>. These include roads, railways, ports and energy facilities. A strained relationship with China might hinder the completion of these projects or slow down future infrastructure development, potentially affecting economic growth and connectivity.</p>
<p>Third, China is a significant player in international diplomacy and geopolitics. So, alienating it could lead to reduced influence in global forums where China has a presence. These include the United Nations and various other international organisations. This might limit African countries’ ability to advance their interests on the global stage.</p>
<p>However, it must be noted these gains and losses from alienating either the US or China are speculative and would depend on a wide range of factors. For example, the relationship between African countries and both of these superpowers is multifaceted and complex. Any decision to alienate either of them should involve careful assessment of both the short-term and long-term consequences, and the evolving geopolitical landscape. The trick is for Africa to articulate its own interests and pursue them consistently. </p>
<h2>Is there a common African position on the US and China?</h2>
<p>African countries have diverse foreign policy priorities and alliances. Their responses to international conflicts can vary widely. Some might choose to align with major powers like the US, China, the European Union or Russia. Others might opt for neutrality or noninterference in the conflicts of other regions.</p>
<p>These strands have played out in the voting patterns on the three UN General Assembly votes to <a href="https://theconversation.com/african-countries-showed-disunity-in-un-votes-on-russia-south-africas-role-was-pivotal-180799">condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent. They should act consistently in line with that common position. They could also have a common position on Brics instead of leaving it entirely to South Africa to define an African agenda for Brics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christopher Isike does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It would help African countries to have a common position on the Ukraine war. This should be based on its impact on food and energy security in the continent.Christopher Isike, Director, African Centre for the Study of the United States, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2069912023-06-09T11:04:40Z2023-06-09T11:04:40ZKenya’s new spy chief will lead the national intelligence service – what the job is all about<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530379/original/file-20230606-21-9adq4m.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kenya’s President William Ruto recently nominated a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/return-to-spy-roots-ruto-nominates-noordin-haji-for-top-nis-role-4237026">new national intelligence chief</a>. Breaking with tradition, the president picked a <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/weekly-review/noordin-haji-the-kenyan-spy-who-came-from-the-cold-4260316">career intelligence officer</a>, Noordin Haji. </p>
<p>But what is national intelligence and what work does it do, particularly in Kenya? Since <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20071222015716/http://www.nsis.go.ke/about.php">1999</a>, the country’s spy chiefs have been picked from <a href="https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000132285/major-general-philip-wachira-kameru-is-president-uhuru-choice-for-gichangi-successor-at-nis">the military</a>. Haji was previously the director of public prosecutions. </p>
<p>Parliament vetted Haji, in keeping with the <a href="http://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2017-05/PublicAppointmentsParliamentaryApprovalAct_No33of2011.pdf#page=6">law on public appointments</a>. Legislators <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/former-dpp-noordin-haji-sworn-in-as-nis-director-general-4269530">approved</a> his nomination to the <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/index.html">National Intelligence Service</a> as director-general. </p>
<p>Ruto’s choice reflects his <a href="https://africacheck.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2022-08/Kenya%20Kwanza%20UDA%20Manifesto%202022.pdf#page=62">election pledges</a> on security sector reforms. He said he would end political interference, extrajudicial killings, ineffective oversight and poor accountability in the sector. </p>
<p>In my view as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=6iQ6w3MAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">political scientist</a> who has studied Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies and strategies, Haji could improve civilian oversight and accountability in the intelligence service. Civilian leadership could also help establish a service that adheres to the law and respects human rights. Its covert operations <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/24/investigation-highlights-transparency-need-us-uk-roles-kenyan-counterterrorism">haven’t always</a> fallen within the law.</p>
<h2>What is intelligence?</h2>
<p>Intelligence is information that can avert threats to national security or promote national interests. </p>
<p>Intelligence services are state agencies that <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_12_Intelligence%20Services.pdf#page=2">produce</a> reports to help maintain national security. These reports also provide strategic information relevant to a country’s economic growth. </p>
<p>By providing <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">reliable information</a> about potential threats to national security, intelligence agencies contribute to peace and stability. This supports a country’s social, economic and political development.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">Kenya terror alerts: political scientist unpacks the intelligence behind them</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>The information such agencies gather is classified as counter-intelligence, domestic intelligence or external intelligence. Kenya’s <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/structure.html">National Intelligence Service</a> has three primary divisions responsible for these different kinds of information. </p>
<p>In the Kenyan context, <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=7">counter-intelligence</a> aims to prevent attacks from foreign powers. It also counters subversion, sabotage and espionage. This covers any hostile activity that targets Kenya’s people, institutions, installations or resources. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=7">Domestic intelligence</a> is information about internal threats to national security. <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=8">External intelligence</a> covers any threats to national security from foreign powers.</p>
<p>In Kenya, credible intelligence has foiled several Al-Shabaab <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">terror attacks</a>.</p>
<h2>What are the functions of intelligence?</h2>
<p>The National Intelligence Service <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=13">functions</a> to detect actual and potential national security threats. </p>
<p>It then advises Kenya’s president and government on these threats. It also recommends security intelligence measures for other state agencies to adopt. It advises Kenya’s 47 county governments on security matters. </p>
<p>The intelligence service provides confidential security reports on people who apply for state positions that require vetting. It promotes national interests within and outside Kenya. It supports law enforcement agencies in detecting and preventing serious crimes. </p>
<p>By law, the National Intelligence Service <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=16">isn’t allowed</a> to undertake paramilitary activities. It can’t commit acts of violence against individuals or take part in activities that promote a political organisation. The service falls under the office of the presidency.</p>
<p>It’s a <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/faqs.html">civilian agency</a>. This means it is not legally permitted to carry out police functions, such as <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/faqs.html">search, arrest and prosecution</a>. </p>
<p>Some of the threats it detects, for example terrorism, have criminal implications. In such cases, the <a href="https://www.cid.go.ke/index.php/aboutus/our-functions.html">Directorate of Criminal Investigations</a>, which falls under the National Police Service, investigates and sets the appropriate charge. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-intelligence-agency-needs-speedy-reform-or-it-must-be-shut-down-200386">South Africa's intelligence agency needs speedy reform - or it must be shut down</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>There’s an important <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/intelligence-failures-france-complex-reality-information-sharing">difference</a> between collecting intelligence for national security and gathering evidence for criminal investigations. </p>
<p>For intelligence services, <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/intelligence-failures-france-complex-reality-information-sharing">the secrecy of sources</a> is essential. In criminal investigations, there must be <a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/intelligence-failures-france-complex-reality-information-sharing">public access to the evidence</a> to deliver a fair trial. </p>
<p>As a former director of public prosecutions, Haji gained experience in gathering information for criminal investigations. This adds to his experience as an intelligence officer. This background could have a positive impact on the service’s intelligence-gathering role. </p>
<h2>How is intelligence gathered?</h2>
<p>This is done through a process known as the <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_12_Intelligence%20Services.pdf#page=4">intelligence cycle</a>. It includes: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>planning and allocation of resources based on threat assessments</p></li>
<li><p>collecting information on individuals, places, events and activities</p></li>
<li><p>processing and analysing this information</p></li>
<li><p>sharing information with decision-makers </p></li>
<li><p>feedback to intelligence agencies. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The <a href="https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/DCAF_BG_12_Intelligence%20Services.pdf#page=4">feedback</a> begins a new cycle.</p>
<p>Kenya’s National Intelligence Service gathers information by working with individuals and organisations. It also cooperates with foreign governments and intelligence agencies, such as the <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/">MI5</a> in the UK. </p>
<p>During his vetting, Haji <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-06-01-haji-outlines-vision-to-reform-nis-bolster-security/">spoke</a> about the value of information from agents, informers and diplomatic attachés.</p>
<p>The service also <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=14">monitors and records</a> data <a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">transmitted</a> electronically. This could be via email, instant messaging and mobile phones. </p>
<p>It uses physical tapping or eavesdropping, but must have a <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf#page=44">warrant</a> issued by a judge to do so.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>During his vetting, Haji listed <a href="https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/realtime/2023-06-01-haji-outlines-vision-to-reform-nis-bolster-security/">several proposals</a> to make the service more accountable and efficient. They included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>revising recruitment policies to represent the country’s social diversity, particularly gender</p></li>
<li><p>using modern technology</p></li>
<li><p>improving public relations and employee welfare</p></li>
<li><p>strengthening regional partnerships to address transnational crimes. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>In my view, such efforts could succeed if the country’s leadership commits to them. The state needs to give the service the financial, technological and human resources it requires to be more autonomous.</p>
<p><em>Note: the article was updated to reflect Noordin Haji’s confirmation as director-general of the National Intelligence Service.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Intelligence reports offer information that can avert threats to national security or promote national interests.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of RwandaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2053692023-05-24T12:18:30Z2023-05-24T12:18:30ZTurkey’s Erdoğan took a page from US presidents and boosted reelection campaign by claiming to have killed a terrorist<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527549/original/file-20230522-4578-qb5exw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C12%2C8013%2C5314&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Man on track: Turkish President Erdoğan, center, did better in his reelection campaign than predicted.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-attends-the-debut-of-news-photo/1252478070?adppopup=true">Emin Sansar/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed credit on April 30, 2023, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/erdogan-says-turkey-has-killed-suspected-isil-leader">for killing</a> Islamic State group leader Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi in Syria, it may not have been simply a straightforward announcement of victory over the leader of a terrorist group. </p>
<p>History suggests the operation against al-Qurashi could have been an effort to boost Erdoğan’s reelection campaign.</p>
<p>When the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2023/5/15/turkey-election-results-live-run-off-likely-with-erdogan-leading">results from Turkey’s presidential election</a> on May 14, 2023, came in, they showed no clear winner. Neither long-serving President Erdoğan nor the main challenger, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, won 50% of the votes. But Erdoğan came close and did better than predicted. Polls leading up to the election <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/14/turkey-opinion-poll-tracker-erdogan-vs-kilicdaroglu">had shown Kılıçdaroğlu consistently leading by 5 to 10 percentage points</a>. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-election-runoff-2023-what-you-need-know-2023-05-18/">A runoff is scheduled</a> for May 28.</p>
<p>So what changed and how did Erdoğan make up so much ground so quickly?</p>
<p>One answer is Erdoğan’s <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2380151">political use of counterterrorism</a>. </p>
<h2>Tough conditions for reelection</h2>
<p>Leading up to the election, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview">Turkey’s domestic economy was in decline</a>. Erdoğan’s tenure appeared uncertain because of a series of political missteps. It was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/14/erdogans-grip-on-power-tested-as-turkey-goes-to-the-polls">a difficult path to reelection</a>. </p>
<p>Adding to these hurdles, Erdoğan <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/04/28/1172836561/turkeys-erdogan-cancels-election-appearances-after-falling-ill">had to demonstrate he was healthy enough</a> to continue in office. He had <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65409951">fallen ill when he was on TV</a> on April 27 and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/29/erdogan-returns-from-three-day-campaign-absence-due-to-illness">suspended his campaign for three days</a>. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=mX4CH8cAAAAJ&hl=en">political scientists</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=g0xQ--gAAAAJ&hl=en">who study</a> foreign policy decision-making, we know that, faced with such scenarios, elected leaders are often motivated to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111408">gamble for resurrection</a> by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3693556">demonstrating strength</a>, resolve and capability. They do this through a kind of aggressive foreign policy known in our field as <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1958273">political use of force</a>, or <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111653">diversionary use of force</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large white building with rubble near it and farm fields behind it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527552/original/file-20230522-25-ua8yux.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The building in Syria where Turkey claims it killed the so-called leader of the Daesh/ISIS terrorist organization, al-Qurashi, in an operation carried out by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-aerial-view-of-the-building-where-the-so-called-leader-news-photo/1252469437?adppopup=true">Bekir Kasim/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Ultimate diversion</h2>
<p>Leaders who undertake this kind of action hope a successful military endeavor will divert the public’s attention from the administration’s domestic shortcomings. </p>
<p>Such shortcomings come in a variety of forms – high unemployment, high inflation, a stalled legislative agenda or even political scandal. These leaders have little power to rectify the problems alone, and the incentive to use military force is heightened further by the uncertainty of an approaching election. </p>
<p>This is not only a theoretical argument. In the U.S., presidents are more likely to break covert mission protocol and claim credit from <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2380151">successful drone strikes</a> when they have political incentives to distract the public from a weak economy or negative domestic debates.</p>
<p>Historically – and routinely – national leaders have attempted to garner political support through the use of military force that predictably boosts domestic sentiments of nationalism and patriotism. For example, President George H.W. Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama aimed to “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48608710">cure his political image problems at home</a>,” as political scientist Jane Kellett Cramer wrote. </p>
<p>At the height of his impeachment scandal in 1998, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346926">President Bill Clinton ordered counterterrorism airstrikes</a> against al-Qaida. The 2011 U.S. <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/19/barack-obama-libya-airstrikes-1224550">airstrikes on Libya were ordered</a> by President Barack Obama in the depths of economic turmoil – high unemployment and a negative economic growth rate.</p>
<p>This phenomenon extends beyond the U.S. In May 1978, Belgium faced an economic crisis. Uniformed soldiers were protesting on the streets. Government was gridlocked. Prime Minister Leo Tindermans <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4621715">tried to overcome those problems by deploying soldiers</a> to evacuate Europeans threatened by fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo, then called Zaire. </p>
<p>In 1982, Argentina’s military junta was <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601028354">facing escalating public disorder and declining support</a>. President Leopoldo Galtieri announced the country’s invasion of the Falkland Islands and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804784931-006">crowds cheered on the streets</a>. </p>
<p>But the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1693618">junta overlooked</a> British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s own domestic political turmoil. The British military quickly responded and retook the islands. Thatcher flaunted the successful operation, rallying the British public behind her government.</p>
<h2>A new frontier</h2>
<p>Studying political use of force is notoriously difficult for a variety of reasons. Not all presidents have the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299604900306">opportunity</a> to use force abroad. And when political leaders are under pressure and most likely to seek a diversion with an attack, potential targets often de-escalate to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00123">avoid confrontation</a>.</p>
<p>But counterterrorism efforts have created a unique scenario in which there is always opportunity to strike. Successful operations against terrorist targets produce a comparatively pronounced increase in public support.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211019904">Our research</a> investigates modern-day counterterrorism tactics, which we find can generate a larger bump in approval than traditional military operations. </p>
<p>In an experiment, we asked a sample of Americans to evaluate their support for a president in office during a declining economy and increasing unemployment. The approval ratings were predictably quite low. </p>
<p>Approval ratings increased under those same domestic conditions when respondents were also informed that a successful counterterrorism operation had just occurred. And when the counterterrorism operation involved a drone strike, and thus little risk to service members, support was at its highest and changed from disapproval to approval of the president’s performance.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A huge crowd, with many carrying red flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/527553/original/file-20230522-14734-sl0ado.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters wave flags and chant slogans while waiting for CHP Party presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to arrive at a campaign rally on April 30, 2023, in Izmir, Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-wave-flags-and-chant-slogans-while-waiting-for-news-photo/1486600794?adppopup=true">Burak Kara/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>For Erdoğan, favorable timing and conditions</h2>
<p>Erdoğan’s claim of the targeted killing of the Islamic State’s al-Qurashi fits the profile of political use of counterterrorism in two important ways: Turkey’s domestic economic and political conditions and the strike’s timing. </p>
<p>In the lead-up to the 2023 presidential election, with the domestic economy in decline, his physical health questioned and a credible challenger, Erdoğan was faced with an extraordinarily tough reelection environment. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Recep-Tayyip-Erdogan">Erdoğan was first elected in 2014</a>. Since then, Turkey has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-election-runoff-2023-what-you-need-know-2023-05-18/">seesawed between economic expansion and decline</a>. Erdoğan championed Turkish nationalism and religious identity and escalated ethnic <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups">tensions with the Kurdish minority</a> – including conflict with and counterterrorism against the Kurdish groups known as PKK. Erdoğan has sometimes played an <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/13/turkey-erdogan-nato-crucial-corrosive-ally/">oversize role in international politics</a> and at others times has been a political pariah, particularly after <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/15/turkeys-failed-coup-attempt-all-you-need-to-know">his response to the 2016 coup</a> attempt.</p>
<p>Since May 2022, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/we-cant-afford-anything-turkeys-cost-of-living-crisis-threatens-erdogans-re-2023-05-08/">currency devaluation</a> has created a significant cost-of-living problem in Turkey. The Turkish lira has declined by nearly 27% against the euro and slightly over 22% against the U.S. dollar. The weak economy and socioeconomic struggles were <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/10/turkey-erdogan-economy-election-earthquake-recovery/">exacerbated by earthquakes in February 2023</a> that caused extraordinary human and physical destruction. </p>
<p>Erdoğan is the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/13/turkey-syria-earthquake-erdogan-elections-negligence/">face of government corruption</a> and inadequate oversight and regulation of construction contracts blamed for the devastation. </p>
<p>And the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-president-erdogans-grip-on-power-threatened-by-devastating-earthquake-200033">government is criticized</a> for <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/01/turkey-erdogan-earthquake-apk-strongman-authoritarianism-democracy-military-disaster-relief/">slow and insufficient disaster response</a> and relief operations. </p>
<p>While Erdoğan is <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-20-year-rule-of-recep-tayyip-erdogan-has-transformed-turkey-188211">criticized and lauded</a> for many <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-elections-issues-erdogan-947c641990cb6a88d9c332fca184e062">domestic</a> and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/turkeys-growing-foreign-policy-ambitions">international policies</a>, the domestic issues are potentially insurmountable and are difficult to solve through standard policymaking.</p>
<p>The targeted killing of al-Qurashi was announced three days after Erdoğan fell sick on national TV and the same day he returned to the campaign trail. The counterterrorism strike created an opportunity for Erdoğan to focus domestic attention on his national security credentials, his role in the anti-Islamic State coalition, and his abilities to be an authoritative and strong leader. </p>
<p>Counterterrorism has long played a pivotal role in Turkish politics. An <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1940457">analysis of Turkey-PKK conflict data</a> from 2004 to 2018 shows that when the Turkish government was challenged by domestic economic decline and needed to generate political support, the number of Turkish Armed Forces operations against the PKK increased. </p>
<p><a href="https://dronewars.net/tag/turkey/">Turkey’s</a> <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2020.1743488">rapid proliferation</a> and <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/the-future-of-drone-warfare-striking-at-home/">use of weaponized drone technology</a> could usher in more political uses of counterterrorism. Indeed, al-Qurashi’s targeted killing in the midst of a looming, uncertain election fits this model perfectly. Erdoğan’s gambit could very well secure his reelection. And the May 14 election suggests it almost worked.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205369/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Invading, attacking and killing adversaries abroad can boost the political prospects of leaders doing poorly at home.Graig Klein, Assistant Professor of Terrorism & Political Violence, Leiden UniversityScott Boddery, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Law, Gettysburg CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2042182023-04-21T12:02:03Z2023-04-21T12:02:03ZHow can a French protester be arrested under British terrorism laws in London? The alarming ‘schedule 7’ power explained<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522145/original/file-20230420-1202-2cdcbh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=107%2C98%2C2887%2C1895&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Moret was arrested after arriving at St Pancras International station. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The arrest and charging of a French publisher as he arrived in London has raised serious questions about the use and abuse of power in the UK. </p>
<p>Ernest Moret was detained and questioned by police at St Pancras station under counter-terrorist powers, allegedly because of his involvement in the anti-government protests that have swept France in recent weeks. Moret was stopped under <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/schedule/7">schedule 7</a> of the Terrorism Act 2000, one of the most controversial counter-terrorist powers in the UK.</p>
<h2>What is schedule 7?</h2>
<p>Schedule 7 gives police the power to examine and detain anybody at an airport or port (or in this case, an international train station) for up to six hours, even if they don’t have reasonable suspicion that they’ve done anything wrong. </p>
<p>In contrast, ordinary powers of <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/24">arrest</a> or <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/1">stop and search</a> do require that police have reasonable suspicion first before they exercise these powers.</p>
<p>If you are stopped under schedule 7, you must comply with an examination, which includes handing over documents and any other information requested. Failure to do so is a criminal offence, which is apparently why Moret was arrested – according to a statement released by his publisher, he <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/blogs/news/joint-press-release-by-editions-la-fabrique-paris-and-verso-books-london">refused to disclose the passcodes to his phone and computer</a>.</p>
<p>While schedule 7 can be exercised without reasonable suspicion, the power must only be used for the specific purpose of assessing whether a person “is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”. It would not be lawful to use it to stop someone for another type of crime, say, possessing drugs or trespassing.</p>
<p>Therefore, if, as it is alleged, Moret was stopped because the police said “they had the right to ask him about demonstrations in France” this raises the question of whether the power was exercised for the correct purpose – assessing whether he was a person concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. </p>
<h2>What is terrorism?</h2>
<p>Ultimately, this all depends upon the meaning of “acts of terrorism” and the UK’s definition of terrorism contained in <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1">British law</a> is very broad. Essentially, the UK defines terrorism as an act (or threat of action) that is designed to influence the government or an international organisation, or to intimidate the public or section of the public for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.</p>
<p>Not all actions, however, are captured. The law defines acts as involving serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, endangering people’s lives, creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or designed to seriously interfere with or disrupt an electronic system. </p>
<p>On the face of it, this definition seems reasonable. We all imagine terrorist attacks as hurting or killing people. Perhaps we also imagine them seriously damaging property too. It would be perverse to say a bomb that killed people was a terrorist attack but the bomb that only damaged a building was not. </p>
<p>However, not all examples are so clear-cut. What must the level of damage to property be? The definition of terrorism is silent as to how this damage can occur. In other words, damage doesn’t have to be inflicted using bombs or firearms to amount to terrorism. </p>
<p>Would protesters <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/03/extinction-rebellion-protesters-spray-fake-blood-treasury-london">spraying a building with fake blood</a> be causing “serious damage to property”? What about <a href="https://theconversation.com/public-sculpture-expert-why-i-welcome-the-decision-to-throw-bristols-edward-colston-statue-in-the-river-140285">cutting off the head of a statue</a> in protest at the UK’s public institutions’ failure to grapple with its slave-trading legacy? Controversial, perhaps, but terrorism? What about disrupting a sporting event and causing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2023/apr/17/world-snooker-championship-disrupted-just-stop-oil-protestors-crucible-theatre-sheffield">damage to property in the process</a>?</p>
<p>Most people would probably think that we know terrorism when we see it but trying to legally define terrorism is notoriously difficult. For this reason, the UK defines terrorism in broad strokes and then places immense trust in decision-makers such as the police to ensure that the definition is not applied in a perverse way. </p>
<p>This means that it is not the wording of laws that is preventing terrorist powers from being applied to the above examples of political protest. Rather, it is how they are being interpreted and applied. </p>
<h2>Freedom of expression</h2>
<p>This delegation to law enforcement and prosecutors on the ground is what makes the detention of the French publisher so worrying. Schedule 7 has a troublesome and controversial history in this regard. </p>
<p>In 2013 David Miranda, husband of journalist Glenn Greenwald, was detained at Heathrow airport carrying files related to information obtained by US whistleblower Edward Snowden. While the <a href="https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/miranda-v-home-sec-judgment.pdf">Court of Appeal</a> did find that he had been lawfully detained, it also found that schedule 7 failed to adequately protect journalists’ right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights.</p>
<p>Rather than amend the law on schedule 7 to rectify this, the UK took the much narrower approach and amended the officer <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/draft-code-of-practice-for-schedule-7-to-the-terrorism-act-2000">code of practice</a> that officers should follow when exercising the powers to provide additional safeguards for journalists. However, this seems not to have been sufficient to protect Moret from being detained and then arrested for non-compliance with schedule 7. </p>
<p>While certain elements of the protests in France have turned violent, protest is, nevertheless, fundamental to a democracy. French MPs are even participating.</p>
<p>So if the police are now interpreting the UK’s definition of terrorism to capture French citizens for protesting in France, this is deeply concerning. This definition is also not limited to actions that occur within the UK so a person engaging in such conduct abroad could still be subject to British counter-terorrist powers once they arrive in the UK. </p>
<p>This may make sense to us when considering people who have returned to the UK after travelling to Syria or Iraq to join Islamic State but are the French protests in a democratic country really the same? What about if similar protests against an anti-democratic or authoritarian regime turned violent? These too are potentially captured by a British definition of terrorism which makes no distinction between whether the government which the activity is directed against is democratic or not. </p>
<p>Overall, the UK has decided on a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-and-comparative-law-quarterly/article/defining-terrorism-one-size-fits-all/0E707CD33E7F656573C777BE23C27168">very broad definition of terrorism</a> to suit the need to capture the lowest common denominator. Any attempt to amend this definition, or to replace it with different definitions for different powers and criminal offences would require substantial time and political effort and is unlikely to occur any time soon. </p>
<p>Until such a time as there is the political will to change the law, British transport hubs will remain a precarious place because of schedule 7 and the discretion it bestows on police officers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/204218/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Greene does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Publisher Ernest Moret was detained under terrorism powers for taking part in protests against Emmanuel Macron’s pension reforms.Alan Greene, Reader in Constitutional Law and Human Rights, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2024712023-04-11T15:05:06Z2023-04-11T15:05:06ZWhy some terror campaigns escalate to civil war and others don’t – study reveals surprising new answers<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/520257/original/file-20230411-602-1a1qsx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Guerillas from the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) pictured in 1990. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Richard Hoffmann/Sygma via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most terrorist campaigns are short-lived. But some aren’t. In some cases, terror campaigns (low-intensity violence) turn into civil wars (high-intensity violence) where militants fight the government for control of the state. </p>
<p>Mozambique and Angola provide examples of countries in which low-level attacks eventually escalated into protracted armed rebellions. But in Spain, the First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group remained just that – a resistance group. Similarly, Front De Liberation Du Quebec was unable to turn its campaign into a civil war in Canada. </p>
<p>These contrasting examples inspired our <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17467586.2023.2182446?j=4586542">recent study</a>. We examined what makes terrorist attacks more likely to turn into a civil war. </p>
<p>We explored the impacts of three factors:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>how the state responds to a terror campaign</p></li>
<li><p>how the terrorist group responds to the state’s counterterrorism strategies</p></li>
<li><p>the state’s relations with other states. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>We found that a terror campaign is more likely to escalate when the state <a href="https://repository.essex.ac.uk/17284/1/PG_full.pdf">uses repression</a> to stop the terror group and when the group diversifies its <a href="https://personal.utdallas.edu/%7Etsandler/website/Demise%20of%20Terrorist%20Organizations.pdf">attack tactics</a>. </p>
<p>Conversely, we found that a civil war is less likely if the state responds with higher spending on health, education and social welfare. Policies that reduce poverty, inequality and socioeconomic insecurity reduce the incentive to engage in or tolerate terrorism.</p>
<p>We also found, surprisingly, that states that engage in some form of rivalry with other countries are more likely to prevent the escalation of a terror campaign into a long-running insurgency.</p>
<h2>How we did it</h2>
<p>We reviewed past research on the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Sambuddha-Ghatak/publication/341143687_Terrorists_as_Rebels_Territorial_Goals_Oil_Resources_and_Civil_War_Onset_in_Terrorist_Campaigns/links/5eb4a60c92851cd50da12705/Terrorists-as-Rebels-Territorial-Goals-Oil-Resources-and-Civil-War-Onset-in-Terrorist-Campaigns.pdf">escalation of violent</a> and <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/225561475.pdf">non-violent conflicts</a> into civil wars. We found that research focused more on non-violent movements that turned into civil wars, but didn’t pay due attention to terrorist campaigns doing the same. </p>
<p>Against this backdrop, we developed our theory on the three influencing factors listed above. We tested several hypotheses with data, including statistics on <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002719857145">terrorist groups from across the world between 1970 and 2007</a>. </p>
<p>We focused on these three factors because the ability of a terrorist group to sustain a long insurgency depends on surviving the initial stage of conflict with the government. About <a href="https://ccjs.umd.edu/sites/ccjs.umd.edu/files/pubs/COMPLIANT-Survival%20of%20the%20Fittest%20%20Why%20Terrorist%20Groups%20Endure%2C%20Joseph%20K.%20Young%20and%20Laura%20Dugan.pdf">70% of terrorist groups end their campaigns within a year</a> of their first attack. </p>
<p>To survive this initial vulnerability, a terrorist group needs to be able to mobilise its forces for a more systematic form of warfare. Terrorism doesn’t require mobilisation, but insurgency does. </p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>Our research led to four major findings. </p>
<p>First, we found that there’s a higher likelihood of an insurgency when a state violently represses a terrorist group. Violent repression helps terrorist groups convince moderate members to wage a rebellion. It also makes recruitment easier by increasing grievances against the state. </p>
<p>This was seen with the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Renamo">Mozambican National Resistance</a> (Renamo) rebel group. It escalated its violent campaign into a protracted armed rebellion against the country’s ruling party between <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-46636-7_18">1975 and 1992</a>. The group initially emerged in response to the marginalisation of Mozambique’s rural population in the 1970s. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/UNITA">National Union for Total Independence of Angola</a> (UNITA) similarly turned its violent campaign for Angola’s independence from the Portuguese into a long and brutal civil war against the ruling party between 1975 and 2002. </p>
<p>In contrast, Spain and Canada put policies in place that addressed grievances and gave people less incentive to support rebellions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/first-october-anti-fascist-resistance-group-grapo">First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group</a> in Spain started its terrorist campaign in 1975 with anti-capitalist motivations. Its last attack was in 2006. The government pursued a policy of negotiation to persuade the group to lay down its arms, and enhanced security measures and anti-terrorism laws. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/flq-front-de-liberation-du-quebec-seven-years-terrorism">Front De Liberation Du Quebec</a> in Canada launched a violent campaign with the goal of establishing an independent Quebec. It conducted terror attacks between 1963 and 1970. Similar to the reaction in Spain, Canada used negotiation to quell the rebellion. The government also adopted reforms, including establishing bilingualism and multiculturalism policies. </p>
<p>Second, we found that when a state prioritises the provision of public goods over repressive counterterrorism policies, a terrorist group is less likely to turn its campaign into an insurgency. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/islamist-terrorism-is-rising-in-the-sahel-but-not-in-chad-whats-different-199628">Islamist terrorism is rising in the Sahel, but not in Chad – what's different?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>We found that the chances of a group conducting a terror campaign decrease by 57% when a state increases government spending per person by 2%. This indicates that better redistributive policies are more likely to prevent organised rebellions. </p>
<p>Fewer terrorist attacks occur in nations with more generous welfare policies. Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, managed to avoid conflict between several ethnic groups for two decades after its independence in 1960 by <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01047691">redistributing a substantial portion of the government’s budget between regions</a>. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424895">Tuaregs of Mali</a> in the early 1990s led an insurrection after realising that they had been poorly educated and economically marginalised. This developed into a civil war, with the last attack happening in 2012. There have been sporadic clashes since. </p>
<p>Third, we found that groups with diversified attack strategies are more likely to escalate their campaigns into organised insurgencies against the state. This has important implications for policymakers looking at counterterrorism efforts. </p>
<p>A terrorist group that uses a wide range of tactical strategies – such as assassinations, armed assaults, bombings and hostage taking – could sound an early warning that it’s capable of waging an organised insurgency. </p>
<p>Both UNITA in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique used a <a href="https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/intorgz72&div=9&g_sent=1&casa_token=zvve5kXRRlUAAAAA:z6zH2eSzo1LsvUCClZkg-tqW_Lez9VVYsrBlLFX3PC_o_dNVi_ZJyqwAdENCXsQ9tubM0E9ZVQ&collection=journals">wide range of attack strategies</a>. On average, 53% of UNITA’s tactical portfolio included three or more attacks, as did 63% of Renamo’s portfolio. </p>
<p>Our fourth major finding highlights the role of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002716645656?journalCode=jcrb">interstate relations</a> on escalation dynamics. It suggests that a country’s involvement in a rivalry with another state reduces the chances of a terror group escalating its campaign into an armed rebellion. Turkey and Greece have had <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/despite-rhetoric-greek-turkish-armed-conflict-seen-remote-/6899227.html">strained relations</a> and last came <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/01/world/charges-fly-as-the-greeks-and-turks-avert-a-war.html">close to war in 1996</a>. This interstate dynamic helped Turkey <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343314531003">unite its citizens</a> against early efforts by the Islamic State to turn its terror attacks into a civil war. </p>
<p>A government facing an interstate rival and a terrorist threat at the same time can use the external conflict to consolidate public support. This can shift public opinion against the terrorist group. </p>
<p>Understanding the effect of interstate rivalry on escalation dynamics is important in Africa. It would help explain why some terrorist campaigns in the continent turn into long and brutal rebellions as <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Civil-Wars-Africa-Guide/dp/0810868857/">external states historically affect</a> the tide of African civil conflicts.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Isa Haskologlu is affiliated with Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies Group. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ibrahim Kocaman and Mustafa Kirisci do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Policies that reduce poverty, inequality and socioeconomic insecurity lower the incentive to engage in or tolerate terrorism.Ibrahim Kocaman, Assistant Professor, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical UniversityIsa Haskologlu, Lecturer, American UniversityMustafa Kirisci, Assistant Professor of Homeland Security, DeSales UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2010372023-03-03T13:19:51Z2023-03-03T13:19:51ZInquiries differ on why the 2017 Manchester bombing wasn’t prevented – here’s why<p>How can you hold the intelligence and security services accountable, when what they do is secret? The third and final report from the public inquiry into the 2017 Manchester arena bombing is a useful guide. </p>
<p>Sir John Saunders, the retired judge in charge of the inquiry, has given a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/manchester-arena-inquiry-volume-3-radicalisation-and-preventability">damning verdict</a> on how government agencies handled the case of Salman Abedi, the man who set off a bomb at an Ariana Grande concert. His conclusions differed significantly from earlier reviews and the reasons why are important. </p>
<p>Abedi had been known to the authorities for years before he went on to kill 22 people and injure over 800 more. So the question must be why he was not prevented from carrying out the atrocity. Saunders highlighted individual failings that other reviews appear to have missed.</p>
<h2>Past reports</h2>
<p>There have been multiple investigations into the Manchester attack. The security service (MI5) and counter-terrorism police reviewed their own work soon after the atrocity. Further investigations were carried out by <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/attacks-in-london-and-manchester-between-march-and-june-2017">David Anderson</a>, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and parliament’s <a href="https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/20181122_ISC_2017_Attacks_Report_Press_Notice.pdf">Intelligence and Security Committee</a>.</p>
<p>These reports noted that officials could have made different decisions and recommended various actions to change future practice. The Intelligence and Security Committee argued that Abedi should have been referred to Prevent, the government’s deradicalisation programme. </p>
<p>Anderson suggested the decision to end his designation as a “subject of interest” – which would have involved more intense investigation – was wrong but ultimately concluded the mistake was understandable. The failure to thwart the attack was portrayed as a matter of bad luck. Anderson concluded: “MI5 and CT [counter-terrorism] Policing got a great deal right … they could have succeeded had the cards fallen differently.”</p>
<p>Such conclusions are typical of many reviews of the intelligence and security agencies. Too often, failures are portrayed as largely down to chance, the difficulties of intelligence gathering are emphasised, and individual mistakes are glossed over.</p>
<p>Saunders gives a very different version of events and it’s important to understand how that came about. A key difference lies in the evidence Saunders gathered. Previous reviews relied upon accounts from senior figures, summarising the position of their organisations from a high level. By contrast, the Saunders inquiry interviewed junior officers, the people actually making decisions on the ground. Their perspective differed significantly.</p>
<h2>Who gives evidence?</h2>
<p>In his 2017 review, Anderson had accepted MI5’s narrative that intelligence related to Abedi was mistakenly “interpreted … as to do probably with drugs or organised crime and not something to do with terrorism or national security”. After interviewing the relevant officers, Saunders disagreed, saying: “I do not consider that these statements present an accurate picture.”</p>
<p>He found that officers had identified two pieces of intelligence about Abedi which were of concern on national security grounds. The first was not shared with counter-terrorism police. The second was not dealt with promptly.</p>
<p>As Saunders puts it, the officer reviewing the intelligence “should have discussed it with other Security Service officers straight away. Moreover, s/he should have written the report on the same day, but in fact did not do so.” Furthermore, the report the officer produced on the second piece of intelligence was said to lack sufficient context.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Abedi had collected material for the bomb and stored it in a car, where it sat for over a month while he travelled to Libya (presumably for training on preparing the device). Although there is no certainty about what difference these errors made, Saunders argues that had security services followed Abedi to the car, the bombing might have been prevented.</p>
<p>As such, individual as well as systemic failings were in play. What this underscores is the need to speak to officials at all levels of these agencies.</p>
<h2>Identifying failures is not scapegoating</h2>
<p>Senior officials can give a useful sense of the overall environment in which decisions are made. One witness for the inquiry notes that at the time they were running around 500 investigations into Islamist terrorism, about 3,000 people were designated subjects of interest and 40,000 were closed subjects. This context should be borne in mind but we now know that errors of judgement were made by individuals and addressing these is important.</p>
<p>Organisations can learn from individual mistakes. Was the officer who failed to share vital information underperforming across the board and it wasn’t picked up? Did they wrongly interpret guidance? Were there personal or interpersonal issues affecting their decisions? Were they overstretched? How did the individual and their managers respond when errors came to light? The answers to these questions could have vital implications for recruitment, training, operational decision making and management.</p>
<p>For too long apportioning blame has been associated with scapegoating. In reality, people doing immensely challenging jobs will make errors. GPs, surgeons, social workers, police officers, regularly have to make decisions with potentially life-changing consequences. Intelligence and security agencies are no different.</p>
<p>The Saunders inquiry underscores the need for oversight bodies like the Intelligence and Security Committee, as well as ad-hoc reviews, to be able to speak freely with all those involved, including frontline officers, so as to gain a full picture of what happened and how they can learn for the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jamie Gaskarth received funding from the British Academy Small Research Grants scheme which resulted in his book, Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability after Iraq and Snowdon (Chatham House, 2020).</span></em></p>The public inquiry exposes key individual failings while previous findings suggested bad luck was at play. This shows that talking to officers on the ground is vital if lessons are to be learnt.Jamie Gaskarth, Professor of Foreign Policy and International Relations, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1962192022-12-09T01:02:35Z2022-12-09T01:02:35ZDoes Australia need new laws to combat right-wing extremism?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499895/original/file-20221208-13117-t8ib8t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lukas Coch/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EH2IUKaWXKw">National Press Club</a> this week, Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil flagged that Labor would propose <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/dec/08/clare-oneill-warns-counter-terror-laws-may-need-to-change-to-better-handle-rightwing-extremism">changes to Australia’s counter-terrorism laws</a>. She cited an increase in diverse threats beyond religious fundamentalism, a trend towards lone-actor, low-sophistication attacks, and more <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/asio-chief-flags-alarming-increase-in-children-lured-to-extremism/">younger people being radicalised</a>. </p>
<p>Specifically, she referred to the threat of right-wing extremism, which in 2021 was <a href="https://www.canberratimes.com.au/story/7269257/ideologically-motivated-terror-now-taking-up-half-of-asio-work/">approaching 50% of ASIO’s caseload</a>. She did not suggest the laws will be “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/dec/08/clare-oneill-warns-counter-terror-laws-may-need-to-change-to-better-handle-rightwing-extremism">overhauled</a>”. </p>
<p>However, O'Neil hinted that changes to criminal law could target specific ways that extreme right-wing groups organise themselves compared to groups such as al-Qaeda or Islamic State.</p>
<p>Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, Australia has enacted at least 96 counter-terrorism laws, amounting to <a href="https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/4287735/02-Hardy-and-Williams-34.pdf">more than 5,500 pages of legislation</a>. So do we need any more laws, or changes to existing laws, to combat right-wing terrorism?</p>
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<h2>Australia’s counter-terrorism laws</h2>
<p>Australia has the <a href="https://theconversation.com/before-9-11-australia-had-no-counter-terrorism-laws-now-we-have-92-but-are-we-safer-166273">largest collection of counter-terrorism laws</a> in the world. This reflects a strong belief in legality: that powers and offences should be written into the statute books and not be left to arbitrary executive power. But it also shows how readily Australian governments have responded to evolving threats with ever-increasing powers.</p>
<p>Our counter-terrorism laws contain countless criminal offences and powers of surveillance, interrogation and detention. As an example, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/control-orders-for-kids-wont-make-us-any-safer-49074">control order</a> can require a child as young as 14 to obey a curfew and wear an electronic monitoring bracelet to protect the public from a terrorist act or prevent support for terrorism.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/before-9-11-australia-had-no-counter-terrorism-laws-now-we-have-92-but-are-we-safer-166273">Before 9/11, Australia had no counter-terrorism laws, now we have 92 — but are we safer?</a>
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<p>Most of the offences and powers rely on a broad statutory definition of terrorism. A “terrorist act” means harmful conduct or a threat that aims to: (1) advance a political, religious or ideological cause; and (2) intimidate a government or section of the public.</p>
<p>Importantly, this definition is ideologically neutral – as are all the laws. They do not mention Islamist or right-wing terrorism. </p>
<p>The laws apply equally to these and other terror threats, no matter the ideology. A white supremacist who prepares or commits a terrorist act faces life imprisonment in the same way as a religious fundamentalist.</p>
<h2>What changes might be made?</h2>
<p>We won’t know the details of Labor’s proposed changes until next year. </p>
<p>The government might ask parliament to tweak the definition of a “terrorist organisation” in Division 102 of the federal <a href="http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html">Criminal Code</a>. A terrorist organisation is one that is directly or indirectly preparing a terrorist act (or that advocates a terrorist act). </p>
<p>Various offences stem from this definition. It is a crime, for example, to recruit for a terrorist organisation or be a member of one.</p>
<p>The Australian government maintains a <a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations">list of proscribed (banned) terrorist organisations</a>. Of the 29 currently listed, only three adhere to far-right ideology. </p>
<p>This reflects a longer history of Islamist terrorism, though Australia has also <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/176216-australia-catching-up-with-proscription-of-far-right-groups/">lagged our closest allies</a> in banning right-wing extremist groups.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/its-almost-like-grooming-how-anti-vaxxers-conspiracy-theorists-and-the-far-right-came-together-over-covid-168383">'It's almost like grooming': how anti-vaxxers, conspiracy theorists, and the far-right came together over COVID</a>
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<p>Some features of these groups can make banning them difficult. Their membership structures, ideological demands and support for violence can be less clear compared to groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State, which have committed and encouraged terrorist acts all around the world. </p>
<p>Right-wing extremist groups <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/jan/05/far-right-and-anti-racism-groups-face-off-in-melbourne-flashpoint">hold divisive rallies</a>, <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/the-far-right-are-capable-recruiters-and-have-found-fertile-ground-thanks-to-covid-20210921-p58tn7.html">exploit protests</a>, spread racist sentiment and encourage hatred against minorities – but most of these acts do not constitute terrorism. </p>
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<span class="caption">Far-right groups hold rallies and inflame racism, but most of these acts do not constitute terrorism.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Crosling/AAP</span></span>
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<p>Expanding the definition of a terrorist organisation could capture right-wing extremist groups that are dangerous to society but do not obviously engage in or support terrorist acts. </p>
<p>Another possibility is that Labor could seek to ban Nazi and other hate symbols that such groups commonly use. New legislation in Victoria, which comes into force at the end of this month, makes it an <a href="https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-06/591323bs1.pdf">offence</a> punishable by 12 months’ imprisonment to publicly display the Nazi swastika (Hakenkreuz).</p>
<p>The state offence will not apply to the <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbols/search">hundreds of hate symbols used by right-wing extremists</a>, but it sends an important message that neo-Nazi ideology holds no place in Australian society. It provides a legal mechanism to counter threats of right-wing extremism in a way that the federal counter-terrorism laws currently do not. </p>
<h2>Are changes needed?</h2>
<p>Australia’s counter-terrorism laws are already extensive and apply to all types of terrorism, so no obvious strategic gaps need to be filled. If a criminal offence or power is needed to combat terrorism, Australia already has it and more.</p>
<p>Minor changes to Division 102 could target specific features of right-wing extremism compared to Islamist terrorism. Federal laws could supplement emerging state laws by outlawing hateful symbols used by right-wing extremists and other terrorist groups.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-03-28/banned-neo-nazi-groups-set-sights-on-australia/100030072">more right-wing groups</a> could be proscribed under the laws as they currently stand. Decisive action to ban internationally recognised right-wing extremist groups, combined with a national inquiry into hate crime law and its <a href="https://tacklinghate.org/blogs/new-research-defining-and-identifying-hate-motives-bias-indicators-for-the-australian-context/">reporting</a>, would send a strong message. Australia’s extensive counter-terrorism laws need not be further expanded.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keiran Hardy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Australia already has extensive counter-terrorism laws and does not need more. However, the government could more specifically target far-right groups in its list of proscribed organisations.Keiran Hardy, Senior Lecturer, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1933332022-10-28T22:44:56Z2022-10-28T22:44:56ZAbuja terror alert: Nigerian government should not downplay the threat<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492292/original/file-20221028-36977-xcxwfu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Members of security forces during an anti-terrorism simulation exercise in Abuja, Nigeria.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Peter Oba/Xinhua via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Terrorism is one of the world’s greatest security challenges. Trying to predict it is an important part of the effort to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjF-8WN7fv6AhWHyIUKHWuiBqsQFnoECCEQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.coe.int%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fcounter-terrorism&usg=AOvVaw3H6JbYQuVT9UMGtNFmwFek">counter terrorism</a>. </p>
<p>Intelligence and security agencies around the world occasionally issue warnings about the likelihood of terrorist attacks in certain places.</p>
<p>On 23 October 2022, the US Embassy in Nigeria <a href="https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2022/10/24/us-embassy-alerts-on-imminent-terror-attacks-in-abuja-reduces-services/">released an advisory</a> to alert US nationals in the country of possible terrorist attacks in Abuja, Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory. The alert led to widespread <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/nigerians-panic-over-us-uk-terror-attack-alerts-in-capital/2720831">public anxiety</a>. </p>
<p>The level of concern is not surprising. Terrorist violence has worsened in Nigeria in recent years. The latest <a href="https://www.thecable.ng/shekaus-death-fgs-efforts-nigeria-makes-progress-on-global-terrorism-index">Global Terrorist Index</a> ranks Nigeria as the sixth most terrorised country in the world. Abuja has been targeted for terrorist attacks in the past, including the tragic 2011 Police Headquarters and United Nations Building <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957">incidents</a>.</p>
<p>I’m a political science lecturer who has researched terrorism defence strategies, and I’m uneasy about the Nigerian government’s handling of the latest terror alert. </p>
<p>The government appears to have downplayed the latest threat. It <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221024-nigeria-calls-for-calm-after-us-uk-warn-of-terror-threat">called for calm</a>. But this is likely because it feels it needs to assert itself politically. No country likes to let a foreign entity define its national security situation.</p>
<p>However, terror alerts should be taken seriously – and there are several measures that can be taken to protect citizens.</p>
<h2>What are terror alerts?</h2>
<p>Predicting terrorism entails forecasts based on intelligence gathering and risk assessment. </p>
<p>The process involves issuing and publicising classified threat alerts to notify the public of the possibility of a terror attack on a certain target in a particular location.</p>
<p>Such alerts enable government and its security agencies to be poised for the eventuality of an attack. They also enable the public to be vigilant so as to avoid being a victim. </p>
<p>More importantly, alerts enable the security agencies to put measures in place to avert incidents.</p>
<p>Some threats won’t be noticed by the intelligence and security communities. The <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/089533005775196723">9/11 attacks</a> in the US evaded the forecasting prowess of the country’s sophisticated military and intelligence sectors.</p>
<p>Terror alerts are as reliable as the validity and objectivity of their sources and procedures. But no matter how controversial or disputable a terror alert may seem to be, the best thing to do is to take proper precautions. After all precaution is not cowardice.</p>
<h2>Nigeria’s latest alert</h2>
<p>The Abuja threat alert was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-uk-warn-possible-attack-nigerias-capital-2022-10-23/">corroborated</a> by the authorities of the UK’s High Commission in Nigeria.</p>
<p>The Nigerian principal intelligence agency, the <a href="https://www.dss.gov.ng/">Department of State Service</a>, reacted to the terror alert by asking the public to <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221024-nigeria-calls-for-calm-after-us-uk-warn-of-terror-threat">exercise calm</a>. It said there was no serious cause for alarm. </p>
<p>The agency’s stance seemed to be that the threat alert was not worth the public tension and anxiety it provoked. Apparently, the agency had superior intelligence about the threat.</p>
<p>Although it did not dismiss the threat entirely, this reaction seems like an effort to save face. The Department of State Service would not want to be seen as lacking control of the situation. It would look like professional ineptitude to allow a foreign entity to lead in a critical matter of national security. </p>
<p>Also, it is unnecessary to create panic where there is probably no basis for it. In November 2017, police and emergency responders in London mobilised to a commercial area after a <a href="https://punchng.com/false-terror-alert-sparks-fear-in-london-shopping-district/">terror alarm that turned out to be false</a>. But it would be a great risk to simply dismiss or downplay the threat alert. </p>
<p>The Nigerian government and citizens should take the alert seriously. It is strategic intelligence that must be carefully processed and acted on to avert danger. </p>
<p>In intelligence science and practice, even a rumour matters. So, whether the basis of the terror alert is real or not, and regardless of the legitimacy or otherwise of its sources, the ultimate concern of the Nigerian government should be to put pragmatic measures in place to prevent any threat happening.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/kenya-terror-alerts-political-scientist-unpacks-the-intelligence-behind-them-176072">Kenya terror alerts: political scientist unpacks the intelligence behind them</a>
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<h2>How to handle threats</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s intelligence systems and institutions are struggling amid operational challenges and complex national security threats. The intelligence community should work closely with relevant foreign and local stakeholders to set up a collaborative intelligence regime that can address terrorist threats more robustly and proactively.</p>
<p>There is a need for a contingency intelligence framework that can preempt and predict threats more precisely and comprehensively.</p>
<p>Citizens should take personal precautions to reduce their exposure to terrorist attacks. They should avoid crowded public places as much as possible. Being with the whole household in a big public gathering may not be advisable.</p>
<p>Social, religious and political gatherings should be planned and hosted in a way that guarantees maximum event security. Relevant security agencies should be involved and safety measures must be taken. </p>
<p>Providing a first aid point in an event arena is one simple measure to take.</p>
<p>Leaders in churches and mosques should provide for security and crowd management concerns in their places of worship.</p>
<p>Similarly, managers of markets, parks, event centres, shopping malls, schools, and recreational facilities should put measures in place to detect and prevent threats. Public spaces should have CCTV cameras, scanning devices, and so on. </p>
<p>The best way to respond to a terror alert is to take measures to avert it, or mitigate its impact. These measures need to be taken with all seriousness regardless of whether the source or substance of the alert is credible or not.</p>
<p>Apart from harming people and property, terrorism destabilises systems and makes it harder for societies to develop and sustain progress.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/193333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Al Chukwuma Okoli is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at Federal University of Lafia. He consults for the Center for Democracy and Development in Nigeria. He is a Member of Conflict Research Network in West Africa (CORN West Africa). </span></em></p>Terror alerts, such as the one recently issued by the US and UK embassies in Abuja, should be taken seriously by the Nigerian government as well as citizens.Al Chukwuma Okoli, Reader (Associate Professor), Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria, Federal University LafiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1874842022-08-24T12:25:14Z2022-08-24T12:25:14ZHuman nature can steer people away from new things – and that can blind them to novel threats<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480147/original/file-20220819-13569-67fm5m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=233%2C8%2C2761%2C1886&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">When you don't know what you're looking for, it's easier to miss it.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/navy-aviation-warfare-systems-operator-scans-the-horizon-news-photo/1168216">U.S. Navy via Getty Images News</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s a military aphorism that generals are always fighting the last war. It’s a natural human tendency to focus on the kinds of threats you’re used to while playing down the likelihood or importance of some new sort of attack. </p>
<p>Of course novel threats can crop up anytime and anywhere. An assassin killed former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe with an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/shinzo-abe-japan-crime-tokyo-gun-politics-6ef3aa271e147bf2426363448ecd9f1b">improvised firearm</a> in a country largely <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/08/asia/japan-gun-laws-abe-shooting-intl-hnk/index.html">unfamiliar</a> with gun violence. Dozens of cases of <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/havana-syndrome-symptoms-11626882951">Havana Syndrome</a>, a health condition some have speculated is caused by <a href="https://theconversation.com/directed-energy-weapons-shoot-painful-but-non-lethal-beams-are-similar-weapons-behind-the-havana-syndrome-167318">directed energy</a> or <a href="https://theconversation.com/experts-suggest-us-embassies-were-hit-with-high-power-microwaves-heres-how-the-weapons-work-151730">microwave weapons</a>, remain unexplained. Unless you are a science fiction fan or obsess over spy novels, these kinds of attacks aren’t top of mind when anticipating what dangers are out there.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=uJpT238AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">As psychologists and</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=CciaJu4AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">counterterrorism scholars</a>, we’re <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/jocb.420">interested in</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10400419.2021.1987735">malevolent</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/jocb.28">creativity</a>. Novelty is not solely the purview of the “good guys” – those who <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10400419.2021.1987735">seek to cause harm are as capable</a> of generating creative ideas as everyone else. </p>
<p>So why do people tend to dismiss these types of novel threats, leaving themselves less protected? What social scientists call “the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1384">originality bias</a>” provides insight into why it’s so easy to forget that adversaries may be developing new tactics in pursuit of their malevolent goals.</p>
<h2>What makes a novel threat easy to miss</h2>
<p>Although many people report a desire for new things and fresh ideas, studies find most are surprisingly <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-014-9386-1">resistant to novel thinking</a>. </p>
<p>People often show a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2162-6057.2007.tb01288.x">preference for the unoriginal</a>. You can see it in the popularity of entertainment options like the ninth “Fast and Furious” movie or the latest Marvel Cinematic Universe offering. Gadgets are often designated by variant numbers – think iPhone 13 – emphasizing they’re an iteration of the familiar. And people tend to <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/1706712/timeline-failed-predictions-part-1">make mistakes</a> when assessing the most novel ideas.</p>
<p>Such biases may have served humans well over the course of evolution, limiting the inclination to grab an unknown berry or trudge off into an ominous, freshly discovered cave. Although neutral or even helpful in many scenarios, this originality bias also has more worrisome implications if it means missing novel threats. Here’s how it can happen.</p>
<p>To start, novel ideas by definition are difficult for people to assess based on previous experience. A bullet, for example, causes a wound. But a novel weapon may not leave as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/02/us/politics/havana-syndrome.html">clear an indicator</a> of harm. The impact of novel ideas can be harder to see and so easier to dismiss.</p>
<p>Evaluating novel ideas is also more cognitively demanding. There’s a lot more to figure out around an emerging or even theoretical technology like a microwave weapon compared with a well-known explosive compound.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480148/original/file-20220819-22-laus25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="shadow with devil horns against pink background projected past a person" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480148/original/file-20220819-22-laus25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/480148/original/file-20220819-22-laus25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480148/original/file-20220819-22-laus25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480148/original/file-20220819-22-laus25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480148/original/file-20220819-22-laus25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480148/original/file-20220819-22-laus25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/480148/original/file-20220819-22-laus25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It can be hard to decipher the danger of something you haven’t encountered before.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/young-woman-making-devil-shadow-royalty-free-image/1301342989">Klaus Vedfelt/DigitalVision via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And because a novel threat is by definition unknown, no one is scanning the horizon for it specifically. Before the terrorist attacks on 9/11, for example, there were fewer <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/09/10/1035131619/911-travel-timeline-tsa">security checkpoints</a>. Before Abe’s assassination, most in his circle were not scanning for makeshift guns, since Japan has few firearms and makeshift guns were often <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/31/3d-printed-guns-danger-problems-plastic">dismissed</a> as a viable threat. </p>
<p>There are also <a href="https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1384">social</a> or interpersonal reasons for ignoring or missing original ideas. Fresh ideas often threaten the status quo and may put some people at a disadvantage. Consider a security company that sells bulletproof glass. If a novel threat can travel through the glass, that company may be reluctant to tell others that their product is of limited use against it. People may prefer to set aside the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00163-015-0212-1">risk</a> from a novel threat to protect the current way of operating.</p>
<p>Finally, it can be uncomfortable or embarrassing to discuss novel ideas and your views of them. A researcher may be reluctant to write about Havana Syndrome because of a fear of losing credibility if their take on what’s going on turns out to be wrong. Being wrong can diminish your view of yourself as well as how others see you, and it’s more common with novel ideas precisely because less is known about them.</p>
<h2>Seeing past the originality bias</h2>
<p>For all these reasons, people are often less well defended against novel threats, even though such threats have the potential to do great harm. How can those who work in law enforcement and the broader homeland security enterprise guard against the originality bias while guarding against threats? Work in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S1475-9144(05)04001-4">organizational psychology</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.destud.2016.08.003">design thinking</a> offers a few potential avenues to support breaking natural tendencies toward the predictable. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Support a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10400410709336883">climate</a> that seeks creative solutions.</p></li>
<li><p>Promote <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1523422311424263">leadership</a> that supports and encourages viewing things differently.</p></li>
<li><p>Seek <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190222093.003.0010">diversity</a> of expertise and a range of ways to frame problems.</p></li>
<li><p>Conduct <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-374714-3.00020-3">after-action discussions</a> when a novel threat was missed and make changes to address weaknesses.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>These ideas are aimed in particular at organizations and people who focus on countering violent extremism. But they provide some guidance for anyone else who also wants to work on the cognitive blind spot created by the originality bias.</p>
<p>And remember, it’s important not to equate novelty with danger. New ideas may be boring and rightly dismissed. They can also be first steps toward amazing innovations that should be pursued. In many respects, failure to grapple with the originality bias can come <a href="https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm">at significant cost</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187484/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Hunter receives funding from the Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate - Office of University Programs</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gina Scott Ligon receives funding from the Department of Homeland Security, Science & Technology Directorate - Office of University Programs.</span></em></p>Those who seek to cause harm are as capable of generating creative ideas as anyone else. Two psychologists and counterterrorism scholars suggest how not to overlook a new danger.Sam Hunter, Professor of Organizational Psychology, University of Nebraska OmahaGina Scott Ligon, Director the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technolology, and Education (NCITE) Center, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881322022-08-15T12:38:00Z2022-08-15T12:38:00ZA year after the fall of Kabul, Taliban’s false commitments on terrorism have been fully exposed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478925/original/file-20220812-6128-xe8uwy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C48%2C5377%2C3531&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Taliban's success in taking control in Afghanistan has encouraged other militant groups.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/this-photo-taken-on-july-8-2022-shows-taliban-fighters-news-photo/1241790455?adppopup=true">Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the Taliban <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-kabul-bagram-e1ed33fe0c665ee67ba132c51b8e32a5">returned to power in Afghanistan</a> on Aug. 15, 2021, there were faint hopes that this time would be different.</p>
<p>The Taliban promised to <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/afghanistan-taliban-women-school-1.6219358">respect girls’ education and women’s rights</a>, and to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-17/taliban-say-women-can-work-shifting-from-stance-before-9-11">not allow the country to become a breeding ground</a> for terrorism, <a href="https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm">as it had been</a> in the Taliban’s previous stint in government before the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/key-dates-us-involvement-afghanistan-since-911-2021-07-02/">2001 U.S. intervention</a>.</p>
<p>But a year after the fall of Kabul, the Taliban has failed to deliver on these promises and <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-taliban-one-year-on/">gradually become more repressive</a> as it tries to consolidate power in the country.</p>
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<p>Its <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1122892">record on women’s rights</a> has been abysmal, as has its <a href="https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/rest-of-the-world-news/afghanistan-kabul-residents-complain-about-unfair-distribution-of-humanitarian-aid-articleshow.html">distribution of much-needed humanitarian aid</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the view that the Taliban could meaningfully mitigate the counterterrorism concerns of the West has only grown more absurd since it first <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">made such promises</a> as part of 2020’s Doha agreement to secure a U.S. exit. The Taliban’s leading political ranks remain dominated by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/haqqanis-afghanistan-taliban/2021/09/10/71f82620-123b-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html">wanted terrorists</a>, including members of the influential terrorist group the <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/haqqani_network.html">Haqqani Network</a>. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=IpUS-O4AAAAJ&hl=en">scholars who monitor</a> <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/andrew-mines">extremist groups in the region</a>, we believe terrorists in Afghanistan have only become more emboldened in the first year of Taliban rule. And despite isolated successful operations by the U.S., including the recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">drone strike</a> that killed al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahri, we are still concerned that U.S.’s current counterterrorism policies are insufficient to contain the growing threat.</p>
<h2>False promises</h2>
<p>Taliban statements both before they took power and after suggested that the group – publicly, at least – was shunning <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-claim-unaware-al-qaida-leader-afghanistan-87919025">terrorist groups</a> and <a href="https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-tells-members-to-avoid-recruiting-foreign-fighters/31119080.html">foreign fighters</a>.</p>
<p>But the most recent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/333/77/PDF/N2233377.pdf?OpenElement">United Nations security monitoring reports warned</a> that the Taliban are simply relocating some terrorist groups and individuals to make them more inconspicuous. Moreover, the Taliban are allowing the continued functioning of terrorist training camps, and potentially even awarding citizenship to some foreign fighters, the <a href="http://theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/03/al-qaida-enjoying-a-haven-in-afghanistan-under-taliban-un-warns">monitoring team reported in May 2022</a>. Their assessments suggests that al-Qaida “has a safe haven under the Taliban” while casting doubt over the Taliban’s intent to restrain other terrorist groups, including <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K, an offshoot of the Islamic State group</a>.</p>
<p>The Taliban’s disdain for its Doha commitment not to allow “individuals or groups, including al-Qaida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies” was exposed most recently in the case of al-Zawahri. Prior to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">terrorist leader’s death</a>, al-Zawahri was residing in downtown Kabul apparently under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/08/02/what-ayman-al-zawahris-death-says-about-terrorism-in-taliban-run-afghanistan/">permission, invitation and protection</a> of top Taliban officials.</p>
<p>The accommodation of al-Qaida is not isolated. The Taliban has similarly been reluctant to crack down on the <a href="https://southasianvoices.org/the-untenable-ttp-pakistan-negotiations">Tehrik–e-Taliban Pakistan</a>, the Afghan Taliban’s deadly terrorist ally in Pakistan that has increased cross-border attacks on Pakistan following the U.S. withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Sheltering terrorists</h2>
<p>The circumstances of al-Zawahri’s death have <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-al-qaeda-chief-ayman-al-zawahiri-is-dead-whats-next-for-us-counterterrorism/">left many unknowns</a>. It is not clear who among the Taliban was aware of al-Zawahiri’s presence – the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-claim-unaware-al-qaida-leader-afghanistan-87919025">group’s initial statement</a> on the U.S. strike suggested that it had “no knowledge of his arrival and residence.” Nor is it immediately apparent how the targeted killing <a href="https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/war-and-peace/al-qaeda-leader-killed-in-kabul-what-might-be-the-repercussions-for-the-taleban-and-afghanistan/">will affect</a> intra-Taliban dynamics, including for <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/after-al-zawahiris-killing-whats-next-us-afghanistan">younger</a> and more hard-line members who may push senior leadership to respond aggressively.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A still from a video shows the bearded former al-Qaida leader dressed in white address the camera." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478926/original/file-20220812-6089-whppmy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=565&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayman al-Zawahri was found sheltering in Kabul.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/this-still-image-obtained-september-10-2012-from-news-photo/151856346?adppopup=true">IntelCenter/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Counterterrorism experts have also voiced concerns over <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/08/02/zawahris-death-and-afghanistans-future-00049239">which other</a> al-Qaida members the Taliban might be sheltering.</p>
<p>What is apparent is that at least some high-ranking Taliban felt <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/opinion/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaeda-afghanistan.html">comfortable enough</a>, despite public commitments, to host a terrorist leader who continued to incite violence against the West until his death.</p>
<p>The repercussions of this decision could further hamper the stability and well-being of Afghanistan. If the Taliban continue to fail on their commitments to steer clear of harboring militants, the country is likely to remain an international <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/02/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban.html?smid=tw-share">pariah</a>, which will only worsen its rampant problems and potentially steer Afghanistan toward <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/afghanistans-future-after-the-taliban-takeover/">another civil war</a>.</p>
<h2>Resistance to Taliban rule</h2>
<p>Despite their seemingly rapid takeover of the country in August 2021, the Taliban have yet to exert full control over all of Afghanistan. </p>
<p>In addition to the <a href="https://www.usip.org/events/state-afghanistans-economy-and-private-sector#:%7E:text=Afghanistan's%20economy%20and%20people%20have,of%20Afghan%20foreign%20exchange%20reserves.">severe economic crisis</a>, pockets of resistance persist, and in some areas appear to be growing. Reports suggest that by spring 2022, the number of armed groups challenging the Taliban’s authority had <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-fighting-season-ushers-in-new-anti-taliban-groups/6542148.html">grown significantly</a>. Among them is a breakaway Taliban faction led by an ethnic Hazara commander named <a href="https://8am.af/eng/mawlawi-mehdi-coherences-his-forces-in-balkhab-sar-e-pol/">Mawlawi Mehdi</a> and the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/08/afghanistan-panjshir-valley-taliban-resistance/">National Resistance Front</a> led by the son of Ahmad Shah Mahsud, the deceased former leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.</p>
<p>The Taliban have since deployed tens of thousands of their fighters to suppress <a href="https://8am.af/eng/taliban-deploys-30000-special-fighters-in-panjshir-baghlan-and-takhar/">both</a> <a href="https://8am.af/eng/mawlawi-mehdi-coherences-his-forces-in-balkhab-sar-e-pol/">groups</a>.</p>
<p>What’s more, in May 2022, dozens of exiled warlords who fled the country rallied together to form the High Council of National Resistance. The <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/14/afghanistan-warlords-taliban-authority-comeback/">leaders of the council are demanding</a> a stake in their country’s future or else, in the <a href="https://www.wionews.com/south-asia/exiled-afghan-warlord-organising-group-in-turkey-against-taliban-481388">words</a> of the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, “Afghanistan will experience civil war once again.”</p>
<p>And then there is the challenge posed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a>. We <a href="https://newlinesinstitute.org/governance/smaller-and-smarter-defining-a-narrower-u-s-counterterrorism-mission-in-the-afghanistan-pakistan-region/">warned</a> back in February 2021 and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">again</a> in October that American drones and the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/evolving-taliban-isk-rivalry">Taliban’s animosity</a> for ISIS-K wouldn’t be enough to stop the group’s revival and violence. Indeed, in January 2022, we <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">traced</a> ISIS-K’s resurgence under its <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-new-leader-islamic-state-khorasan-province">new leader</a>, from its depletion following years of <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Broken-but-Not-Defeated.pdf">personnel and territorial losses</a> due to military operations, to the revived threat that the group poses today. The deadly consequences of that resurgence were seen on Aug. 26, 2021, in an <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">attack that left at least 100 people dead</a>, including 13 U.S. troops.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A Taliban fighter holding a gun stands in front of a fence. On the floor is bloodstained clothing and debris." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478929/original/file-20220812-22-katarp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">A Taliban fighter stands guard at the site of a 2021 ISIS-K suicide bombing.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/taliban-fighter-stands-guard-at-the-site-of-the-august-26-news-photo/1234889168?adppopup=true">Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>At present, ISIS-K is in the middle of two key campaigns. The first is aimed at building a wide militant base that draws on <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/ISK-poses-indigenous-threat-to-Afghan-Taliban">local populations</a> and <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">regional militant groups</a>. The second is a campaign to delegitimize the Taliban through attacks and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">propaganda designed to highlight</a> Taliban incompetence, and <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/iskp-criticizes-talibans-acceptance?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email">frame the Taliban government</a> as illegitimate. </p>
<p>Over time – and with the backing of the core <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/isil.html">Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria</a> and other resistance groups draining the Taliban’s resources – we believe ISIS-K has the potential to chip away at the Taliban’s governance while expanding its own influence.</p>
<h2>A global threat?</h2>
<p>Emboldened militant groups in Afghanistan pose a threat not just to the country itself, but also to the region and potentially the global community.</p>
<p>The Taliban’s success in retaking Afghanistan encouraged an already-resurgent <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/evolution-and-potential-resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan">Pakistani Taliban</a> to pursue a campaign of violence and push for <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/five-things-watch-islamabad-pakistani-taliban-talks">political concessions</a> from the Pakistani government. </p>
<p>Similarly, al-Qaida’s global network of affiliates has drawn inspiration from the Taliban’s victory. And despite the symbolic blow of <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056">al-Zawahri’s death</a>, many of those affiliates in the Middle East and Africa <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">remain operationally unaffected</a> by any fallout from the U.S. strike.</p>
<p>In spite of the success of that operation, <a href="https://mwi.usma.edu/over-the-horizon-counterterrorism-new-name-same-old-challenges/">debate continues</a> over the effectiveness of the United States’ <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism/">over-the-horizon counterterrorism strategy</a>, which involves the launching of surgical strikes and special operations raids from outside the country.</p>
<p>The al-Zawahri operation demonstrated that sound intelligence can result in effective targeting of high-profile terrorists. But <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/05/politics/us-counterrorism-afghanistan/index.html">counterterrorism experts</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-leader-killed-in-us-raid-where-does-this-leave-the-terrorist-group-176410">including ourselves</a> remain concerned over whether such strikes can be effective in targeting less prominent militants who nevertheless play a critical role in the day-to-day operations.</p>
<p>To bolster the strategy, <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-al-qaeda-chief-ayman-al-zawahiri-is-dead-whats-next-for-us-counterterrorism/">the U.S.</a> could seek out more robust relationships with resistance groups hostile to the Taliban, as well as with neighboring <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/21/us-central-asia-counterterrorism/">Central Asian countries</a>, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in order to bolster the intelligence needed to conduct over-the-horizon strikes. But such partnerships would not come without their downsides, including further isolating the Taliban. </p>
<p>International diplomatic efforts and U.S. counterterrorism operations, along with internal pressure from resistance groups and jihadist rivalries, may encourage the Taliban to reform its ways.</p>
<p>But if the second year of Taliban rule fails to produce meaningful changes, the outlook for the country and its citizens will likely only turn for the worse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188132/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Taliban promised not to allow Afghanistan to be used by groups seeking to attack the US, yet terrorist groups have only become more emboldened under its rule.Andrew Mines, Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clemson UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1880562022-08-02T13:16:52Z2022-08-02T13:16:52ZWho was Ayman al-Zawahri? Where does his death leave al-Qaida and what does it say about US counterterrorism?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477165/original/file-20220802-19-5lqhr3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C85%2C2986%2C2250&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Who will replace the man who replaced bin Laden?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/osama-bin-laden-sits-with-his-adviser-ayman-al-zawahiri-an-news-photo/681898?adppopup=true">Visual News/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Ayman al-Zawahri, leader of al-Qaida and a plotter of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">has been killed in a drone strike</a> in the Afghan city of Kabul, according to the U.S. government.</em></p>
<p><em>Al-Zawahri was the the successor to Osama bin Laden and his death marked “one more measure of closure” to the families of those killed in the 2001 atrocities, U.S. President Joe Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/08/01/remarks-by-president-biden-on-a-successful-counterterrorism-operation-in-afghanistan/">said during televised remarks</a> on Aug. 1, 2022.</em></p>
<p><em>The operation came almost a year after <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/30/politics/us-military-withdraws-afghanistan/index.html">American troops exited Afghanistan</a> after decades of fighting there. The Conversation asked <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/team/dr-daniel-milton/">Daniel Milton</a>, a terrorism expert at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/dr-haroro-ingram">Haroro J. Ingram</a> and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/andrew-mines">Andrew Mines</a>, research fellows at the George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, to explain the significance of the strike on al-Zawahri and what it says about U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan under the Taliban.</em></p>
<h2>Who was Ayman al-Zawahri?</h2>
<p>Ayman al-Zawahri was an Egyptian-born jihadist who became al-Qaida’s top leader in 2011 after his predecessor, Osama bin Laden, was <a href="https://www.npr.org/series/135908383/osama-bin-laden-dead">killed by a U.S. operation</a>. Al-Zawahri’s ascent followed years in which al-Qaida’s leadership had been devastated by <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/43/2/45/12208/What-Explains-Counterterrorism-Effectiveness?redirectedFrom=fulltext">U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan</a>. Bin Laden had himself been <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined/">struggling</a> in the years leading up to his death to exert control and unity across al-Qaida’s global network of affiliates. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A laptop screen shows Ayman al-Zawahri speaking with the English translation below reading 'Bush do you know where I am. I am in the midst.'" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C11%2C1982%2C1341&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477151/original/file-20220802-14-ulv6x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayman al-Zawahri challenging then-president George W. Bush.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BidenAfghanistan/32481436d03047e8892fd3cef111ea9b/photo?Query=Zawahri&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=67&currentItemNo=23">AP Photo/B.K.Bangash</a></span>
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<p>Al-Zawahri succeeded bin Laden despite a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/01/al-qaeda-leader-ayman-al-zawahiri-killed-drone-strike-afghanistan/">mixed reputation</a>. While he had a long history of involvement in the jihadist struggle, he was viewed by many <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/08/opinions/where-is-bin-ladens-partner-in-crime-ayman-al-zawahiri">observers</a> and even jihadists as a languid orator without formal religious credentials or battlefield reputation.</p>
<p>Lacking the charisma of his predecessor, al-Zawahri’s <a href="https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2017/issue-1/0620171-deciphering-ayman-al-zawahiri-and-al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-strategic-and-ideological-imperatives-by-sajjan-m.-gohel.pdf">image</a> as a leader was not helped by a tendency to embark on long, meandering and often outdated speeches. Al-Zawahri also struggled to shake rumors that he was a <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/lawrence-wright">prison informer</a> while detained in Egypt and, as author and journalist Lawrence Wright <a href="https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/lawrence-wright">detailed</a>, acted as a wedge between the young bin Laden and his mentor, Abdullah Azzam.</p>
<p>Al-Zawahri’s influence further waned during a series of popular uprisings known as the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start">Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East</a>, when it seemed that al-Qaida had been sidelined and unable to effectively exploit the outbreak of war in Syria and Iraq. To analysts and supporters alike, al-Zawahiri appeared symbolic of an al-Qaida that was outdated and rapidly being eclipsed by other groups that it had <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/isis-origins-anbari-zarqawi/577030/">once helped onto the global stage</a>, most notably the Islamic State.</p>
<p>But with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/23/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-isis-caliphate">collapse of the Islamic State group’s caliphate</a> in 2019, the return to power in Afghanistan of al-Qaida ally the Taliban and the persistence of al-Qaida affiliates <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/islamic-state-and-al-qaeda-linked-african-insurgencies">especially in Africa</a>, some experts <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">argue</a> that al-Zawahri guided al-Qaida through its most challenging period and that the group remains a potent threat. Indeed, one senior Biden administration official <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">told the Associated Press</a> that at the time of his death, al-Zawahri continued to provide “strategic direction” and was considered a dangerous figure.</p>
<h2>Where does his death leave al-Qaida?</h2>
<p>Killing or capturing top terrorist leaders has been a key counterterrorism tool for decades. Such operations remove terrorist leaders from the battlefield and force <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/terror-in-transition/9780231192255">succession struggles</a> that disrupt group cohesion and can expose security vulnerabilities. Unlike the Islamic State, which has clear <a href="https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-leader-killed-in-us-raid-where-does-this-leave-the-terrorist-group-176410">leadership succession practices</a> that it has showcased four times since the 2006 death of its founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida’s are less clear. Al-Zawahri’s successor will only be the movement’s third leader <a href="https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/al-qaeda-international">since forming</a> in 1988.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">top contender</a> is another Egyptian. A former colonel in the Egyptian army and, like al-Zawahri, a member of the al-Qaida affiliate Egyptian Islamic Jihad, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/saif-al-adel">Saif al-Adel is connected to</a> the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya that launched al-Qaida as a global jihadist threat. His reputation as an explosives expert and military strategist has won him strong standing within the al-Qaida movement. A number of other possibilities are behind al-Adel, with a recent <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">U.N. Security Council report</a> identifying several possible successors. </p>
<p>Either way, we’d argue that al-Qaida is at a crossroads. If al-Zawahri’s successor is broadly recognized as legitimate by both al-Qaida’s core and its affiliates, it could help to stabilize the movement. But any ambiguity surrounding al-Qaida’s succession plan could see the new leader’s authority challenged, which in turn could fracture the movement further.</p>
<p>Evidence suggests al-Qaida’s presence as a global movement will survive al-Zawahri’s death, just as it did bin Laden’s. The network has seen <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">a number of recent successes</a>. Longtime allies the Taliban successfully took control of Afghanistan with help from <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/al-qaeda-indian-subcontinent-aqis">al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent</a> – an affiliate which is now <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/">expanding its operations in Pakistan and India</a>. Meanwhile, affiliates across the African continent – from Mali and the Lake Chad region to Somalia – remain a threat, with some <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">expanding beyond their traditional areas of operation</a>.</p>
<p>Other affiliates, like the group’s Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, remain loyal to the core and, according to the U.N. monitoring team, <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202022%20547.pdf">are keen to revive</a> overseas attacks against the U.S. and its allies.</p>
<p>Now, al-Zawahri’s successor will be looking to retain the allegiance of al-Qaida’s affiliates as it strives to remain a potent threat.</p>
<h2>What does this tell us about US operations in Afghanistan under the Taliban?</h2>
<p>The American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 prompted questions over whether the U.S. could keep pressure on al-Qaida, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a> and other militants in the country.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/11/20/sof-leader-calls-over-the-horizon-ops-in-afghanistan-hard-but-doable">U.S. officials explained</a> that an “over-the-horizon” strategy – launching surgical strikes and special operations raids from outside any given state – would allow the U.S. to deal with problems that emerged, such as terrorist attacks and the resurgence of groups.</p>
<p>But many experts <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism/">disagreed</a>. And when an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-kabul-taliban-strikes-islamic-state-group-b8bd9b0c805c610758bd1d3e20090c2c">errant U.S. drone strike</a> killed seven children, a U.S.-employed humanitarian worker and other civilians last fall, that strategy came under sharp scrutiny.</p>
<p>But for those who doubted whether the U.S. still had the desire to go after key terrorists in Afghanistan, the killing of al-Zawahri gives a clear answer. This strike <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">reportedly involved</a> long-term surveillance of Zawahri and his family and robust discussion within the U.S. government before receiving presidential approval. Biden claims it was carried out without civilian casualties.</p>
<p>At the same time, it took the U.S. 11 months to strike its first high-value target in Afghanistan under the Taliban. This contrasts with the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-military-significantly-reduced-global-airstrikes-in-2021-/6392771.html">hundreds of airstrikes</a> executed in the years before the U.S. withdrawal.</p>
<p>The strike occurred in a Kabul neighborhood populated by senior Taliban figures. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ayman-al-zawahri-al-qaida-terrorism-biden-36e5f10256c9bc9972b252849eda91f2">The safehouse itself belonged</a> to a senior aide to Sirajuddin Haqqani, a terrorist <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorinfo/sirajuddin-haqqani">wanted by the U.S.</a> and a top Taliban leader. </p>
<p>Aiding and abetting al-Zawahri was a violation of the <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf">Doha agreement</a>, under which the Taliban agreed “not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies.” The circumstances of the strike suggest that if the U.S. wants to do effective over-the-horizon operations in Afghanistan, it cannot <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/26/how-to-partner-with-the-taliban/">count on</a> the Taliban for support. </p>
<p>The strike on al-Zawahri also tells us little about whether the U.S. strategy post-pullout can contain other jihadist groups in the region like <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-isis-k-two-terrorism-experts-on-the-group-behind-the-deadly-kabul-airport-attack-and-its-rivalry-with-the-taliban-166873">ISIS-K</a>, which is vehemently opposed to the Taliban and <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">expanding in Afghanistan</a>. </p>
<p>Indeed, we believe that if more jihadists perceive the Taliban to be too weak to protect the top leaders of al-Qaida and its affiliates, while at the same time unable to govern Afghanistan without U.S. aid, many may consider <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/the-taliban-cant-take-on-the-islamic-state-alone/">ISIS-K to be the best choice</a>.</p>
<p>These and other dynamics speak to the many challenges of pursuing an over-the-horizon counterterrorism in Afghanistan today, ones that are unlikely to be solved by occasional high-profile drone strikes and assassinations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188056/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The views expressed by Dr. Milton are his own and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Mines and Haroro J. Ingram do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US strike against al-Zawahri leaves the future of al-Qaida at a crossroads as the terrorist movement looks for a new leader.Haroro J. Ingram, Senior Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityAndrew Mines, Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityDaniel Milton, Director of Research, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1785112022-05-06T12:32:38Z2022-05-06T12:32:38ZBillions spent on overseas counterterrorism would be better spent by involving ex-terrorists<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/461093/original/file-20220503-28209-o2b2fh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Machmudi 'Yusuf' Hariono, left, a former Indonesian terrorist, holds a book about former terrorists with an Islamic jihadist.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Courtesy of Yusuf Hariono</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the U.S. government has sent aid to countries plagued by terrorism, believing that the money could help other nations tackle extremism. Money matters, but it alone isn’t enough to prevent terrorism.</p>
<p>An explosion <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/22/world/asia/afghanistan-mosque-attack.html">at a mosque</a> in northern Afghanistan killed more than 30 people on April 22, 2022, just days after blasts at schools in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/19/world/asia/afghanistan-kabul-schools-attacked.html">Kabul killed six</a>.</p>
<p>These were the latest in a long string of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-tops-2021-global-survey-of-islamic-state-casualties-/6415735.html">Islamic State conducted</a> 365 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan that caused 2,210 casualties in 2021 alone.</p>
<p>The United States, meanwhile, has spent approximately <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-did-the-us-spend-in-aid-to-afghanistan/">US$91.4 billion</a> on foreign aid to Afghanistan since 2001, while other countries gave <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-did-billions-in-aid-to-afghanistan-accomplish-5-questions-answered-166804">billions more</a>. Most of this money went toward Afghanistan’s military. </p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.foreignassistance.gov">spent more than</a> $1.1 billion on Afghanistan in fiscal 2021, and $1 billion on aid in fiscal 2020.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://jsis.washington.edu/people/frederick-bernard-loesi/">a doctoral candidate</a> researching how to get militants to adopt more moderate positions and stop committing violence, I have spoken with 23 former Indonesian terrorist detainees since October 2020 to study their experiences. These people planned, facilitated or otherwise took part in bombings and attacks on civilians. </p>
<p>My research shows that international aid does not stop terrorists from carrying out violent acts, because most counterterrorism projects do not directly involve or appeal to detained and released terrorists. </p>
<h2>Speaking with terrorists</h2>
<p>I have found that listening to ex-terrorists is the best approach to understanding how and why they walk away from terrorism.</p>
<p>When I spoke with former Indonesian terrorists through video meetings and calls, they all told me that they once cared only about exterminating America and its allies. This is because they thought these countries were trying to repress Muslims worldwide. </p>
<p>They also justified their violent jihad as a way to enforce a caliphate, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/10/5884593/9-questions-about-the-caliphate-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask">a term</a> that refers to an all-encompassing Muslim state. </p>
<p>Less than half of the 23 former terrorists that I spoke with participated in <a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf">deradicalization programs</a>, designed to move people away from extremism, while they were in prison. But all of them were part of such programs, sponsored by nonprofit organizations and the Indonesian government, after their release. </p>
<p>All of the former terrorists also went on to receive vocational training, and some also got money from the Indonesian government and nonprofits to start small businesses. </p>
<p>Others received psychological counseling, or participated in talks on religion. Some participated in outdoor retreats organized by the Indonesian police, with hiking and other recreational activities. </p>
<p>A few of the ex-terrorists I spoke with acknowledged that the government helped them pay for their children’s school tuition. </p>
<p>These people began to shift their views, and move away from extremism, after they developed a strong sense of community support and respect for government and police authorities. </p>
<p>“I started to change when the police treated me well, and my community accepted me for who I am,” explained one female former terrorist who was a “bride” – a term used to describe a suicide bomber. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/04/indonesian-women-being-radicalised-into-would-be-suicide-bombers-report">The police captured her</a> just before she could carry out an attack in Bali in 2016. </p>
<h2>Terrorism funding</h2>
<p>Parts of Indonesia, a Southeast Asian country with the world’s largest Muslim population, are considered a <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorism-havens-indonesia">haven for terrorism</a> – though the number of terrorist attacks <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/indonesia-becomes-sixth-member-state-brief-ctc-developments-july-2019-follow-visit">has recently declined</a> there. It remains a transit and destination hub for Islamic militants. </p>
<p>Indonesia received <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1881/FY-2020-CBJ-State-and-USAID-Supplementary-Tables.pdf">almost $5 million in 2020</a> from U.S. Agency for International Development alone to contain violent extremism. It received the third largest amount of money from the U.S. for this kind of programming after Somalia and Bangladesh. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf">spent an estimated</a> $2.8 trillion on counterterrorism from fiscal 2002 through 2017, according to the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank in Washington, D.C. </p>
<p>But even extensive international aid isn’t a sure fix for ending terrorism. </p>
<p>Afghanistan and <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-announces-humanitarian-assistance-for-iraq/">Iraq are</a> two examples of countries that receive big donations from the U.S. and other countries each year but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/world/europe/war-on-terror-bush-biden-qaeda.html">still struggle with violent radicalism</a>.</p>
<p>Most of this money and work focuses on helping governments and local organizations carry out programs to fight extremism. These might include workshops for government officials focused on addressing terrorism and training sessions for women on how to start small businesses. </p>
<p>However, these programs typically do not directly involve former terrorist inmates and their families. This matters, because it mattered to the individuals I spoke with when they were included in counterterrorism projects. This is one of the big reasons they changed their ways, they told me. </p>
<h2>Aid doesn’t reach former terrorists</h2>
<p>Major donor countries like the U.S. have increasingly acknowledged <a href="https://institute.global/policy/role-aid-and-development-fight-against-extremism">the role of foreign aid</a> in fighting against extremism. Many countries, including the U.S., see that extremism can be politically destabilizing and pose international security concerns. </p>
<p>But at the same time, <a href="https://www.polisci.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/Foreign%20Aid%20as%20Counterterrorism.pdf">the incidence of terrorism in countries</a> that get large amounts of international funding, including Afghanistan, Indonesia, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/aswp.12184">Pakistan</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.738263">Mali</a>, shows that international aid is an insufficient counterterrorism measure.</p>
<p>In Indonesia, for example, the USAID gave $24 million from 2018 to 2023 for an anti-extremism project called Harmoni. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sfcg.org/harmoni-towards-inclusion-and-resilience/">This project</a> carries out workshops for state officials about prison management and handling terrorist detainees, among other programs. </p>
<p>But Harmoni does not include a key constituency – <a href="https://kemlu.go.id/download/L3NpdGVzL3B1c2F0L0RvY3VtZW50cy9KdXJuYWwvSnVybmFsJTIwSHVidW5nYW4lMjBMdWFyJTIwTmVnZXJpLyhGSU5BTCklMjBKVVJOQUwlMjBWT0wlMjA2JTIwTk8lMjAyLnBkZg==">detained or released terrorists</a> and their families – in their work. </p>
<p>This kind of strategy makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to actually reform extremists.</p>
<p>This model, according to my research, is common in counterextremism projects funded by international aid. </p>
<h2>Involving terrorists</h2>
<p>Donor countries, governments and partner organizations working to prevent extremism can involve released terrorists and their families in various ways – including providing vocational, financial, psychological, religious, educational and even recreational programs. </p>
<p>Many countries still need international aid to fight terrorism, but it will work more effectively only when also embracing former terrorist convicts and their families. </p>
<p>Without targeted, inclusive interventions in extremism, I believe the world will continue to see more wasted aid when addressing terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/178511/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bernard Loesi receives funding from Southeast Center, the University of Washington. </span></em></p>The US gives money to help Indonesia and other countries fight terrorism. But research shows that this money might not be effective, unless it directly reaches former extremists.Bernard Loesi, PhD Candidate, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1812052022-04-18T13:04:41Z2022-04-18T13:04:41ZToxic mix of bandits, arms, drugs and terrorism is alarming Nigerians: what now?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/457959/original/file-20220413-18289-crnq6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Residents fleeing their homes in Plateau State, north central Nigeria, on April 12, 2022 after their houses were burnt during an attack by bandits. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AFP via GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Banditry in Nigeria emerged as an isolated rural phenomenon <a href="https://punchng.com/banditry-in-nigeria-a-brief-history-of-a-long-war/">in the late 2000s</a>. It’s now evolved into sophisticated violent criminality, characterised by syndicates with immense reach across regions and countries.</p>
<p>The trend of <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/civil-security/iss-kadunas-train-attacks-add-to-nigerias-deep-security-problems/">recent attacks</a> in northern Nigeria suggest it has now become an aggravated threat, driven by a nexus of banditry, arms, drugs and terrorism.</p>
<p>There is <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00219096211069650">evidence</a> of a tacit synergy between terrorist elements and bandits in northern Nigeria, a synergy based on tactical opportunism or pragmatism.</p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=Okoli+and+Ugwu&rlz=1C1CHBD_enNG889NG889&oq=Okoli+and+Ugwu&aqs=chrome..69i57.8191j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">early 2010s,</a> bandits were largely roving brigands that marauded communities in the hinterlands. They engaged in cattle rustling, high-way and market routes robbery, localised village raids and mercenary militancy.</p>
<p>By the late 2010s, they had developed into organised tribes of semi-sedentary criminals that maintained pockets of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909621990856?journalCode=jasa">underworld fiefdoms</a>. This was particularly the case in parts of Zamfara and Katsina states in northwestern Nigeria. The transformation of banditry into a sophisticated pattern of organised criminality has been enabled by a number of factors, including its nexus with arms, drugs and jihadi extremism. </p>
<p>Currently, bandits operate in many states of northwestern and north-central Nigeria. The critical hotbeds are Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi, Kaduna, Sokoto, Nasarawa and Niger. The Kaduna-Katsina-Zamfara axis, with its epicentre at the Birinin Gwari area, has been particularly deadly in terms of fatal incidents.</p>
<iframe title="Critical Hotbeds" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-K8Ms7" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/K8Ms7/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="700" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>In these states, notorious crimelords and clans of bandits affiliated to them control swathes of rural enclaves. There they’ve foisted a regime of brigandage, and an <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909621990856?journalCode=jasa">underground economy</a> based on illicit franchise.</p>
<p>The bandits are getting more audacious and virulent by the day. And they appear to be buoyed by their apparent criminal impunity in the context of a <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00219096211069650">receding state</a>. </p>
<p>They have engaged in <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=Okoli+and+Ugwu&rlz=1C1CHBD_enNG889NG889&oq=Okoli+and+Ugwu&aqs=chrome..69i57.8191j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8">mass abduction</a> of villagers and school children, attacked markets and raided mines, kidnapped for ransom, as well as carried out highway robberies. </p>
<p>They have graduated from attacking vulnerable communities and commuters in the countryside to targeting critical national infrastructures and military facilities in peri-urban areas.</p>
<p>On March 28, 2022 bandits succeeded in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/4/more-than-150-still-missing-after-nigeria-train-attack">demobilising and attacking</a> a Kaduna-Abuja train after bombing its tracks. The attack underscored not only the intractability of the banditry crisis but also its <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-04-07-nigeria-train-attacks-amplify-deep-security-issues-in-dealing-with-terrorism-and-banditry/">deteriorating dynamics</a>.</p>
<p>Central and regional governments have responded through a variety of strategies. These have ranged from militarised to non-militarised operations. For example, governments of the affected states have sought to assuage the bandits through <a href="https://njps.nileuniversity.edu.ng/wp-content/uploads/sites/68/2021/12/Buying-Peace-Or-Building-Peace-27-51.pdf">peace initiatives and amnesty deals</a>. This has been to no avail. </p>
<p>How can authorities in Nigeria reposition its fight against banditry in order to ensure greater efficiency? What were the challenges of the previously implemented strategies and measures? What needs to be done differently? Is there any prospects for a more effective counter-banditry regime in Nigeria?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358398187_Of_Banditry_and_'Human_Rustling'_The_Scourge_of_Kidnapping_in_Northern_Nigeria">My research</a> has focused on the incidence and implications of banditry in northern Nigeria. Based on my insights, I would argue that the banditry crisis has festered owing to the continued decline in the coercive capabilities of the Nigerian state. The crisis has prevailed largely because of the complacency and lethargy with which the Nigerian government has responded to it.</p>
<p>Breaking the vicious cycle will only happen if the right and enabling strategies are developed. These need to be pragmatic, efficient and designed to tackle the multiple factors that underline the political economy of banditry in the country. </p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>In November 2021, the Federal Government of Nigeria designated the bandits as terrorists. This enabled it to reposition its counter-banditry and terrorism drive. The military can now deploy maximum military force in confronting the bandits. But this is just one of a series of woefully reactive steps taken by the central government. </p>
<p>Here’s what’s been missing and crucially needed in its response.</p>
<p>Firstly, the banditry crisis is a situation of warfare, and ought to be understood and treated as such. It is a dire national emergency. The response to it should therefore bear the seriousness of wartime. </p>
<p>The complacent attitude of the Nigerian state to the crisis should be substituted with pragmatic aggressiveness. Exceptional military and non-military measures should be deployed urgently to put the bandits on the run. For example, urgent steps must be taken to confront the bandits head on. Such steps could include degrading their enabling structures as well as plugging their critical supplies.</p>
<p>Secondly, there is a need to change the prevailing posture of being reactive to one of being proactive. The bandits have taken the lead in the battle while the government security forces have simply <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/07/boko-haram-banditry-wake-up-from-your-lethargy-unite-stop-politicising-fight-against-terrorism-matawalle-challenges-northern-leaders-elites/">reacted</a>, often lethargically and in an uncoordinated way.</p>
<p>A more proactive and pragmatic approach is needed. This will entail ensuring a combat-ready attitude. And putting in place procedures that are driven by intelligence-driven, supported by communities and are well funded. </p>
<p>A specialised, consolidated, community-based combat squad comprising members of the intelligence, defence, policing, and vigilante services capable of preemptive and rapid response is a desideratum in this regard.</p>
<p>Thirdly, the entrenched militarised approach to counter-banditry should be substituted for something more pragmatic. Military operations have resulted in the destruction of a number of bandits’ enclaves and hideouts. These have included such as localised reconnaissance, air and land raids, as well as armed patrols.</p>
<p>But they haven’t succeeded. In fact, they have led to the dispersal of bandits across the northern states. This has occasioned the need to fight bandits on multiple fronts.</p>
<p>There is also a need to coordinate operations in the affected states. Focal priorities should include: concerns about drugs and arms trafficking, illicit mining, smuggling, cattle rustling, as well as forestland and borderland policing.</p>
<p>Finally, there is a need to rethink the country’s internal and national security architectures. Originally, the public security forces in Nigeria were designed to respond to conventional threats. But the banditry challenge is an unconventional threat. Its dynamics have exposed the inadequacies of the public security agencies in the country.</p>
<p>Addressing this challenge will require a consolidated approach to counter-banditry that stresses inter-agency collaboration, community policing and strategic volunteering. </p>
<p>The security agencies must work in close and functional synergy. And they must enlist community goodwill, support and participation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/181205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Al Chukwuma Okoli consults for Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja. I have received collaborative research grant from Tertiary Education Fund, Nigeria. I am a member of Amnesty International (AI)</span></em></p>The Nigerian government needs to understand that banditry is an act of warfare and should be treated as such.Al Chukwuma Okoli, Senior Lecturer and Consultant-researcher, Department of Political Science, Federal University LafiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1760722022-02-08T07:28:12Z2022-02-08T07:28:12ZKenya terror alerts: political scientist unpacks the intelligence behind them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443436/original/file-20220131-13-73ocyj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Special forces arrive at the scene of a terrorist attack at the DusitD2 hotel complex in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2019.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Simon Maina/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Terror alerts are issued in Kenya periodically by foreign governments and international institutions due to the threat posed by the Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab. Kenya has, over the years, suffered several deadly terror attacks which have been claimed by the group. Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, who has studied Kenya’s counter-terrorism policies and strategies, unpacks the intelligence behind terror alerts and what you need to know about them.</em></p>
<h2>How is intelligence on impending terrorist attacks gathered?</h2>
<p>Cooperation between governments and security agencies is a crucial element in combating terrorism. This is more so for transnational terrorism. Effective <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2016.1264436">inter-agency cooperation</a> depends on the timely and accurate sharing of intelligence through established channels. </p>
<p>Kenya cooperates with various western countries to arrive at the conclusion that a terror attack is imminent. For instance Kenya and the UK have a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-kenya-sign-new-defence-cooperation-agreement-to-tackle-shared-threat-from-al-shabaab">mutual agreement</a> to counter Al-Shabaab’s threat. The two countries share information and identify new ways to disrupt the group’s operations in east Africa and beyond. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/gathering-intelligence">UK</a> and <a href="https://www.nis.go.ke/downloads/THE%20NATIONAL%20INTELLIGENCE%20SERVICE%20ACT,%202012.pdf">Kenya</a> gather information in a number of ways. These include covert human intelligence sources, directed surveillance, intercepting communications, data obtained from communications service providers, bulk personal data, intrusive surveillance and equipment interference. </p>
<p>The National Counter Terrorism Centre also provides <a href="https://counterterrorism.go.ke/countering-terrorism/">online channels</a> where the public can, anonymously, report terrorism-related activities.</p>
<p>Kenya’s government also <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Country_Reports_on_Terrorism_2020.pdf">cooperates</a> with the US. For instance the General Service Unit counterterorrism response team is funded by the US.</p>
<p>In addition, information on imminent attacks is also provided by terrorist groups themselves. As part of its publicity, Al-Shabaab provides <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/addressing-enemy-al-shabaabs-psyops-media-warfare/">information on imminent attacks</a> through its media outlet, Al-Kaitab Media Foundation. </p>
<p>Individual states are responsible for providing travel advisories to their citizens based on the information shared. </p>
<h2>How reliable is the intelligence prompting alerts?</h2>
<p>Sound intelligence research and analysis identifies trends and specific terrorist groups’ strategies and tactics. </p>
<p>For the most part this means that sufficiently reliable data on imminent attacks is produced.</p>
<p>However, it’s not a perfect science. <a href="https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/03/Handbook-Ch-20-Duncan-Role-of-Intelligence-in-the-Prevention-of-Terrorism.pdf">Intelligence sources</a> sometimes offer opinions rather than hard evidence. Hence the analysis can at times be subjective rather than objective.</p>
<p>The reliability of the intelligence is determined by how correct or true the information is. The UK’s MI5, for example, records <a href="https://www.mi5.gov.uk/gathering-intelligence">credible intelligence</a> correctly by recording its origin and validity. Assessments of valid threats are regularly adjusted in view of new intelligence. </p>
<p>But terrorist groups behave in unpredictable ways. Some terrorist attacks are <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">commemorative</a>, that is to celebrate prior successful attacks. Attacks can be <a href="https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-785">symbolic</a>, intended to advance ideological aims and objectives. They can also be carried out in response to the target state’s counterterrorism interventions. </p>
<p>Diplomatic advisories or alerts are adjusted frequently as they are based on security information that is <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/ReiseUndSicherheit/10.2.8Reisewarnungen#content_3">constantly changing</a>. </p>
<p>In the case of Kenya, terror threat warnings have been vindicated time and again. Between January 2019 and December 2021, the US government <a href="https://ke.usembassy.gov/category/messages-for-citizens/">published</a> nine travel advisories and alerts warning of terrorist attacks around the Kenya-Somalia border and the country’s coastal areas. During this period, five attacks and two foiled attacks were reported in these areas. </p>
<p>On 5 January 2022, the US embassy in Nairobi issued a <a href="https://ke.usembassy.gov/january-5-2022-travel-advisory-for-u-s-citizens-kenya-level-3-reconsider-travel/">travel advisory</a> to US citizens warning them not to travel to some coastal areas because of terrorism. Kenya has since <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220103-several-people-killed-in-suspected-al-shabaab-attack-in-kenya">witnessed attacks</a> conducted by Al-Shabaab in the coastal county of Lamu. </p>
<h2>Why are alerts usually general, rather than specific?</h2>
<p>It is often difficult to predict an imminent terrorist attack in a place or time. Terrorism, as a special form of political violence, is a <a href="https://www.language-and-society.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/7-Mwangi-_-Mwangi-For-Publication.pdf">complex and dynamic</a> phenomenon. Its strategies and tactics keep mutating rapidly to adapt to changing local-level, national, regional and international circumstances. </p>
<p>The tactics have been described as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344530">asymmetric warfare</a> – they are both ideological and military. The unconventional tactics aim at winning over marginalised local-level communities. Asymmetric warfare is therefore long-term and more sustainable than conventional warfare.</p>
<p>The unpredictability of this type of warfare based on ideological motives is a key defining feature of terrorism as a special form of political violence. Hence forecasting terrorism is problematic. </p>
<p>The more complex a terrorist group is in terms of organisation and ideology, the more difficult it is to predict its strategies and tactics. </p>
<h2>What steps should the public and security forces take?</h2>
<p>The public, once aware of the threats, are supposed to take precautions. These include avoiding crowded public spaces and avoiding specific areas where prior attacks have occurred. </p>
<p>The public should perceive these alerts and react to them in a positive rather than negative way. The primary responsibility of securing oneself begins with the individual. </p>
<p>It is also the responsibility of the state to provide basic security. The government should take additional security measures. Measures include additional installation of surveillance cameras, scanners, security barriers, and enhancing visible policing. </p>
<p>But a robust security response risks unintended consequences. For example, certain areas can become viewed as hotspots of terrorism. Communities in these areas can be unfairly profiled as “suspects”. This has a tendency of increasing suspicion and distrust, including intolerance between communities.</p>
<p>Security actors should also avoid employing repressive counterterrorism operations that target specific individuals and communities who live in volatile areas. Such operations only serve to entrench perceptions about human rights violations committed by the state. </p>
<p>The state and its security agencies should react to alerts using alternative methods. These include preventing and countering violent extremism and employing soft approaches. These are often ideological, communicative and social. They are based on trust not fear.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Oscar Gakuo Mwangi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>It is often difficult to place an imminent terrorist attack in a location or time.Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Associate Professor, Political Science, National University of LesothoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1764102022-02-03T20:59:43Z2022-02-03T20:59:43ZIslamic State leader killed in US raid – where does this leave the terrorist group?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444351/original/file-20220203-23-1daxavq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C107%2C5991%2C3880&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The rubble after the raid on Islamic State group leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UnitedStateSyriaMilitaryRaid/ab9af6833f5946e8aa8ac8f619a4ea28/photo?Query=Idlib&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1858&currentItemNo=2">AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An overnight raid conducted by U.S. special forces in Syria has resulted in the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-says-us-raid-syria-targeted-leader-isis-2022-02-03/">death of the leader of the terrorist Islamic State group</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi was killed as he exploded a bomb at his compound in the country’s northwestern Idlib province. The blast also caused the death of members of his family, including children, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-says-us-raid-syria-targeted-leader-isis-2022-02-03/">U.S. officials said</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>This isn’t the first time that American forces have targeted the head of terrorist organizations, nor the first time they have been successful. The Conversation asked <a href="https://www.westpoint.edu/social-sciences/profile/amira_jadoon">Amira Jadoon</a>, a terrorism expert at the U.S. Military Academy, and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/dr-haroro-j-ingram">Haroro J. Ingram</a> and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/andrew-mines">Andrew Mines</a>, research fellows at the George Washington University’s Program on Extremism, to explain how this raid fits the U.S.’s counterterrorism strategy, and where it leaves the Islamic State.</em></p>
<h2>1. Who was Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi?</h2>
<p>Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/02/03/world/us-raid-syria-isis">the alias adopted</a> by Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla, who became leader of the Islamic State in 2019 following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-50200339">death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a U.S. raid</a>.</p>
<p>He was born in 1976 in Mosul, northern Iraq. But very little was known about al-Qurayshi until September 2020, when it emerged that he had been detained and interrogated by U.S. forces in Iraq in early 2008.</p>
<p>Declassified <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/al-mawla-interrogation-reports/">tactical interrogation reports</a> from that period <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-al-mawla-tirs-an-analytical-discussion-with-cole-bunzel-haroro-ingram-gina-ligon-and-craig-whiteside/">depict al-Qurayshi</a> as a recently graduated scholar who experienced a meteoric rise through the Islamic State group’s ranks.</p>
<p>Al-Qurayshi <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/stepping-out-from-the-shadows-the-interrogation-of-the-islamic-states-future-caliph/">claimed that he joined</a> the group in 2007, having finished a master’s degree in Quranic studies from Mosul University.</p>
<p>Soon after joining, al-Qurayshi became the group’s Shariah adviser, a major religious figure, in Mosul and later the deputy “wali,” or shadow governor, of the city before his capture in early 2008.</p>
<p>The interrogation reports show that al-Qurayshi revealed the names of at least 20 alleged members of the Islamic State of Iraq, as the group was known at the time. <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/19/isis-islamic-state-leader-hypocrite-traitor-mawla-quraishi/">His betrayal</a> came at a time when group members were being killed or captured in large numbers by U.S. and coalition forces. </p>
<p>Relatively little is known about al-Qurayshi’s activities for the next decade after he was released. But he reportedly <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/29/politics/un-terror-report-isis/index.html">oversaw the Islamic State group’s attempted genocide</a> of Iraq’s minority Yazidis and had <a href="https://www.aymennjawad.org/22273/advice-to-the-deputy-of-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi">served as deputy to al-Baghdadi</a> since at least 2018.</p>
<p>His rise to “caliph” was <a href="http://www.jihadica.com/caliph-incognito/">controversial in jihadist circles</a>, not helped by the release of his interrogation records after becoming leader.</p>
<h2>2. Where does his death leave Islamic State operationally?</h2>
<p>The operation against al-Qurayshi arrives at a precarious time for the Islamic State group. The <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/16798-the-routinization-of-the-islamic-state-s-global-enterprise">organization’s transition</a> from an Iraq-centric movement to a <a href="https://theconversation.com/despite-defeats-the-islamic-state-remains-unbroken-and-defiant-around-the-world-128971">global insurgency with affiliates</a> dotted across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia is still relatively fresh.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A window at the back of a dark room shines a light on a blood-soaked floor." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444361/original/file-20220203-13-2w8eh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/444361/original/file-20220203-13-2w8eh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444361/original/file-20220203-13-2w8eh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444361/original/file-20220203-13-2w8eh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444361/original/file-20220203-13-2w8eh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444361/original/file-20220203-13-2w8eh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/444361/original/file-20220203-13-2w8eh3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Blood covers the floor of a destroyed house after the raid by U.S. military.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/UnitedStateSyriaMilitaryRaid/26811d206afc44ab9782e68d1156e04a/photo?Query=Idlib&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1858&currentItemNo=9">AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Recent Islamic State <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/03/syria-hasakah-isis-prison-attack/">attacks on Hasakah prison</a> in northeast Syria and elsewhere <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/isis-gunmen-launch-major-attacks-iraq-syria-dozens-killed-rcna13105">across Iraq</a> have hinted that the group is more advanced in rebuilding its capabilities across traditional heartlands than perhaps expected. But the death of al-Qurayshi just two years after that of his predecessor raises uncertainty over who will succeed him. </p>
<p>The fact that the Islamic State group couldn’t protect its top leader shows the continued pressure the group faces from U.S. and allied forces.</p>
<p>Al-Qurayshi’s rapid demise – his predecessor led for almost a decade – may also indicate internal rifts. After he took over as leader, al-Qurayshi was mockingly described by <a href="http://www.jihadica.com/caliph-incognito/">dissenters within the terrorist group</a> as “an unknown nobody” while others <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/caliph-abu-unknown-succession-and-legitimacy-in-the-islamic-state/">questioned his suitability as leader</a>, especially after the release of his interrogation reports in September 2020.</p>
<p>It may be that al-Qurayshi was himself betrayed, ultimately contributing to the circumstances that led to the U.S. raid. If so, it could indicate a split within the group between al-Qurayshi and those who wanted him gone.</p>
<p>Now, the Islamic State is likely to <a href="http://www.jihadica.com/how-did-the-islamic-state-pick/">appoint al-Qurayshi’s successor</a> based on the deliberation of its shura council, its senior leadership panel, as it has done previously. </p>
<p>If it happens as it has in the past, al-Qurayshi’s successor could be appointed in the next few days or weeks. He’ll be given an alias to conceal his identity. Group members and leaders of Islamic State global affiliates will be asked to pledge allegiance to him, but he may not make a public appearance for months or years – if ever.</p>
<h2>3. What effect has killing the heads of terrorist groups had in the past?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26351373?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Leadership decapitation</a> – or the targeted killing of militant groups’ top leaders – is a key component of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. It is widely used by many nations, <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/cite/?id=30621">including the United States</a>. </p>
<p>But terrorism experts don’t agree on how effective killing top leaders is. Some have argued that <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2006-03-01/do-targeted-killings-work">taking out a terrorist leader constrains</a> the operational capacity of groups and disrupts their organizational routines, making it harder for them to carry out attacks. </p>
<p>It may, it has been argued, also <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/targeting-top-terrorists/9780231188234">contribute to organizational collapse</a>. Research shows that under the right circumstances, the targeting of top leaders can result in <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/does-decapitation-work-assessing-effectiveness-leadership-targeting-counterinsurgency">fewer violent attacks</a> by a militant group and increase the chances of defeating an insurgency.</p>
<p>Yet other counterterrorism experts highlight problems with targeted killings. They argue that they can result in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903369068">decentralization of the group</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1069671">increase indiscriminate violence</a> by targeted groups.</p>
<p>The tactic is also generally considered to be less effective against groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaida that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2014.935229">have well-managed leadership structures and succession protocols</a>. </p>
<p>The Islamic State group has survived multiple deaths within its leadership precisely because of its bureaucratic approach to succession, and because it still enjoys pockets of strong local support.</p>
<p>In the short term, the death of al-Qurayshi may cause the Islamic State group to lie low. But this will not indicate the demise of the organization. The loss of al-Qurayshi could also trigger retaliation attacks as a signal of resolve among members and to stay relevant in the global jihadist landscape.</p>
<h2>4. How much of a global and regional threat is Islamic State group?</h2>
<p>Back in early 2019, the U.S. and allied forces <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157">successfully beat back</a> the Islamic State group from its height in 2014-16, when it controlled larges parts of Iraq and Syria. </p>
<p>The group has <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-states-strategic-trajectory-in-africa-key-takeaways-from-its-attack-claims/">recently shifted attention</a> to prominent affiliates, like those in sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan.</p>
<p>This shift <a href="https://www.hudson.org/research/16798-the-routinization-of-the-islamic-state-s-global-enterprise">highlights how</a> the Islamic State has maintained its relevance: If it experiences decline in its strongholds of Iraq and Syria, affiliates elsewhere are able to keep the vision of the global caliphate alive. </p>
<p>The recent terrorist attacks in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/03/syria-hasakah-isis-prison-attack/">Syria</a> and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/isis-gunmen-launch-major-attacks-iraq-syria-dozens-killed-rcna13105">Iraq</a> suggest that the Islamic State’s resurgence strategy is much further along than many observers may have expected. </p>
<p>Elsewhere, affiliates are engaged in intense insurgencies against local governments and rival militant groups. This includes persistent threats from <a href="https://institute.global/sites/default/files/inline-files/Tony%20Blair%20Institute%2C%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20Sub-Saharan%20Africa%2C%20July%202021.pdf">IS-West Africa Province</a> in the Lake Chad region, and <a href="https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/The%20Islamic%20State%20in%20Congo%20English.pdf">IS-Central Africa Province</a> in the Congo and Mozambique. Indeed, Africa is poised to be a key <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/the-islamic-state-in-africa/">Islamic State battleground</a> going forward.</p>
<p>Meanwhile in Afghanistan, ISIS-K has pursued a <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/the-islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-islamic-state-khorasan/">relatively successful strategy</a> to rally after years of <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Broken-but-Not-Defeated.pdf">losses at the hands of the U.S.-led coalition</a>, challenging the new Taliban government and competing for control of provinces in the country’s northeast.</p>
<p>The death of al-Qurayshi is unlikely to affect the operations of Islamic State group’s affiliates in any meaningful way. Many have strategies that draw heavily on local resources and alliances with other groups. While the latest U.S. raid may result in temporary uncertainty for the broader movement, history suggests the Islamic State movement will be able to push forward with regional attacks and reestablish the support of affiliates around the world.</p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176410/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi had led the terrorist group since 2019. His death may lead to uncertainty over who will replace him but may not signal the group’s demise.Haroro J. Ingram, Senior Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityAmira Jadoon, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West PointAndrew Mines, Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism, George Washington UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1759912022-01-31T13:47:53Z2022-01-31T13:47:53ZAfter a fourth coup in West Africa, it’s time to rethink international response<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443253/original/file-20220129-27-1tm5acm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Demonstrators hold a picture of Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba who led the coup against Burkina Faso president Roch Kabore.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Olympia De Maismont/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-president-kabore-detained-military-camp-sources-tell-reuters-2022-01-24/">latest coup</a> in Burkina Faso is the fourth in Africa’s Sahel region in less than 18 months. The other three were carried out in August 2020 in Mali, in April 2021 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/24/chads-military-ruler-mahamat-deby-names-transitional-parliament">in Chad</a>, and Mali’s “<a href="https://theconversation.com/inside-malis-coup-within-a-coup-161621">coup within a coup</a>” last May.</p>
<p>Yet, European and American leaders currently appear <a href="https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-africa-chad-niger-europe-64a6e0e36a6a7753325446aa209dea90">more concerned</a> with the presence of Russian-linked Wagner Group mercenaries than with the region’s core political problems.</p>
<p>All of these coups illustrate the dangers of regional and international actors prioritising counter-terrorism (and competition with Russia) while ignoring other warning signs. These include flawed, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-burkina-election/burkina-faso-president-kabore-secures-re-election-preliminary-results-show-idUKKBN2861JZ">low-turnout elections</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/burkina-faso-why-citizens-are-disenchanted-with-president-kabore/a-60540479">out-of-touch rulers</a>, and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-25/burkina-faso-extends-internet-shutdown-before-nov-27-protests">crackdowns on free expression</a>. </p>
<p>There’s also grinding poverty (even <a href="https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/10-Burkina-Faso-growth-without-poverty-reduction.pdf">before</a>the current crisis) and astonishing levels of <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109772#:%7E:text=In%20Burkina%20Faso%20alone%2C%20the,in%20the%20last%2012%20months.">internal displacement</a>. In addition, there’s <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/11/22/burkina-faso-us-relations/">overemphasis on counterterrorism</a>.</p>
<p>The Burkina Faso coup was the subject of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/burkina-faso-africa-chad-niger-europe-64a6e0e36a6a7753325446aa209dea90">urgent regional coordination meetings</a> and an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/w-african-bloc-ecowas-suspends-burkina-faso-after-military-coup-sources-2022-01-28/">emergency virtual summit</a> of the Economic Community of West African States on January 28 which resolved to suspend Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>I have studied Islam and politics in northwest Africa for the past sixteen years, with a focus on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. My most recent book – <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/jihadists-of-north-africa-and-the-sahel/C1C391EC226A65858CCF45322879ED1B">Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel Groups</a> – draws on case studies from Algeria, Libya, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. The study examines jihadist movements from the inside, uncovering their activities and internal struggles over the past three decades.</p>
<p>It’s my view that the latest coup presents a fork in the road for West African, French, and American policymakers. They can decide to let the coup stand and thus confirm de facto military dominance across the Sahel. Or they can draw a red line and demand that it be reversed.</p>
<h2>From revolution to failure</h2>
<p>The overthrow of Burkina Faso’s President Roch Kabore has domestic precedents as well, including a series of coups dating back to 1966. Out of the tumultuous 1980s, the ultimate victor was a military dictator named Blaise Compaore. Compaore closed the door on the revolutionary promise of his flawed but admirable predecessor, Thomas Sankara, by installing himself as de facto president for life. </p>
<p>Compaore was overthrown in a 2014 popular revolution.</p>
<p>The revolution survived its first major challenge — a 2015 coup attempt by Compaore loyalists. But it then floundered thanks to Kabore, who was elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2020. Kabore, who was close to Compaore until the early 2010s, came late to the opposition and proved a poor vehicle for the aspirations of the youth-led revolution. </p>
<p>The mainstream alternatives were little better. In both 2015 and 2020, the runners-up were politicians with ties to Compaore. These include former Finance minister Zephirin Diabre. During his first and second terms, Kabore drifted along without much of a programme.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, security collapsed across much of Burkina Faso. The easy — far too easy — explanation one sometimes hears is that Compaore had maintained an <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-jihadist-terrorism-threatens-to-destabilize-burkina-faso-and-its-neighbors/">unofficial deal with jihadists</a> in Mali and beyond. This ostensibly kept Burkina Faso free of their attacks. But once he fell, the argument goes, jihadists crowded in. </p>
<p>Another simplistic explanation is that West African jihadists, flush with cash and tactical know-how <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/west-africa-must-confront-its-foreign-terrorist-fighters">from abroad</a>, are strategic masterminds bulldozing their way across the region.</p>
<p>The reality is substantially more complex. Sahelian jihadists have had ups and downs. And it has taken the confluence of many factors —- beyond just Compaore’s fall or whatever strategic acumen jihadists may possess -— to make the central Sahel into one of the world’s worst conflict zones. </p>
<p>In central Mali, a renewed wave of jihadist mobilisation starting in 2015 drew on longstanding grievances connected to inequitable land access, ossified social hierarchies, and the brutal, knee-jerk reactions of the Malian security forces.</p>
<p>Across the border in northern Burkina Faso, similar developments set in by 2016. They drew on <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/254-social-roots-jihadist-violence-burkina-fasos-north">ultra-local grievances</a>, the exchange of personnel and ideas across the Mali-Burkina Faso border, and the deteriorating picture throughout the sub-region.</p>
<h2>Military corruption and coups</h2>
<p>As Mali’s crisis grew into a Sahelian crisis, the region’s militaries have been simultaneously and collectively pressed to deliver more results. In other words, more dead jihadists. From Paris, Washington, and Brussels, patronising language about <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2019/08/28/sahel-a-new-partnership-for-the-g5-the-morning-call/">“partnerships</a>” and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20210603-counter-terrorism-in-the-sahel-a-training-session-with-french-special-forces">“training”</a> barely camouflages contempt. European and even American ground troops, helicopters, and drones crisscross the region, leaving Sahelian armies as supporting actors or bypassing them altogether. </p>
<p>Litanies about “good governance” decry corruption in generic terms but rarely focus on specific targets, leaving little accountability for militaries or civilians. Military corruption scandals have been routinely <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220107-niger-le-gouvernement-s-exprime-sur-l-affaire-des-d%C3%A9tournements-de-fonds-%C3%A0-la-d%C3%A9fense">swept under the rug</a>. These include the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-arms-audit/niger-lost-120-million-in-arms-deals-over-three-years-government-audit-idUSKBN233215">one</a> in Niger – now the next country where coup fears are rising.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Sahelian security forces take casualties from enemies who melt into the countryside. This leaves rank-and-file soldiers and gendarmes fearful and quick to pull the trigger against civilians, compounding insecurity.</p>
<p>All of these dynamics leave colonels -— the key movers in recent coups —- caught between ineffective presidents, complacent generals, and their own disgruntled troops. Elections bring no substantive changes, major opposition leaders offer vague alternatives, and Sahelian capitals periodically erupt into massive protests demanding an alternative to a broken status quo. </p>
<p>One can understand why the colonels react. And also why many civilians often initially support coups. But the coups make the overall situation even worse by layering new political crises over existing crises of insecurity, humanitarian emergencies, and civilian politicians’ own inability to address fundamental problems.</p>
<h2>Drawing the line in the sand</h2>
<p>The general reaction by France, the United States, and ECOWAS to the latest round of Sahelian and West African coups has been to decry them while quietly accepting them as done deals. </p>
<p>A “political reality” sets in the moment the ousted leader reluctantly agrees to resign under clear duress. This “reality” dictates that such leaders are never coming back. The “international community,” with the Economic Community of West African States as the lead negotiator, then haggles with each junta over the parameters of a transition back to civilian rule.</p>
<p>That template bogs regional diplomacy down in extended negotiations with juntas that are clearly willing to play outside the rules. Such a situation has increasingly affected Mali. </p>
<p>Paris and Washington, meanwhile, routinely appear overeager to get back to business as usual with whoever is in charge. In this case, business as usual means counter-terrorism campaigns. Such campaigns are supposedly a means of boosting political stability, but in reality they constrain effective diplomatic responses to coups, corruption, electoral irregularities, and human rights abuses.</p>
<p>Why should it be considered politically fanciful to try to reverse coups? Examples of coups being reversed are few, but that does not mean Washington shouldn’t try. At a minimum, Washington can take the lead rhetorically by not just “expressing concern” or “calling for the release” of detained, overthrown presidents, but also by demanding the reinstatement of overthrown leaders. </p>
<p>Any concerns about “losing credibility” should be tempered by the fact that Washington already appears weak and deeply hypocritical on the issue of democracy promotion and respect for human rights.</p>
<p>It is never too late to attempt consistency, including on cases now assumed to be completely settled. The Chadian junta’s rule is as unconstitutional today as it was in April 2021 when it began, for example. Beyond the rhetorical level, meanwhile, there are plenty of options for pressuring juntas through sanctions, aid suspensions, withdrawal of ambassadors, suspensions from regional and international organisations, and more.</p>
<p>ECOWAS pulled back from draconian economic sanctions in the immediate aftermath of the August 2020 coup in Mali. It has now ended up imposing them some 17 months later. This is after realising that the junta was essentially ignoring the dictates of the regional grouping all along. </p>
<p>To not use these tools when they would be most effective -— immediately following each coup —- is to become complicit in the region’s militarisation. This is true of the far-flung peripheries where jihadists gravitate, but also of other capitals across the Sahel.</p>
<p><em>This article was first published as a blog in <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/01/27/another-west-african-coup-after-burkina-faso-time-to-rethink-military-aid/">Responsible Statecraft</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander John Thurston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest coup now presents a fork in the road for West African, French, and American policymakers.Alexander John Thurston, Asst Professor, Political Science, University of Cincinnati Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1756972022-01-28T13:13:05Z2022-01-28T13:13:05ZLack of data on citizenship-stripping goes against the Home Office’s duty of transparency<p>A group of lawyers found that <a href="https://www.freemovement.org.uk/how-many-people-have-been-stripped-of-their-british-citizenship-home-office-deprivation/">at least 464 people</a> have had their citizenship removed by the government over the last 15 years. They pieced together the data using freedom of information requests and other publications – a challenge, because the Home Office does not publish the information regularly.</p>
<p>Citizenship-stripping for conduct – when a person’s citizenship is removed because of their behaviour – has been a government power <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/40">for decades</a>. Previously, citizenship could only be removed if the individual had done something “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests” of the UK. But the power was expanded in 2006, allowing the government to remove citizenship if the secretary of state believes the deprivation is “conducive to the public good”. </p>
<p>The nationality and borders bill, which is currently going through parliament, expands this further. It would allow the government to strip people of their British citizenship <a href="https://theconversation.com/stripping-british-citizenship-the-governments-new-bill-explained-173547">without notice</a>.</p>
<p>Knowing how often, and in what manner, these decisions are made is important because citizenship-stripping affects the lives of individuals, their families and their communities. The decision to strip people of British citizenship is based wholly on <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/40">ministerial discretion</a> – the satisfaction of the minister. Like decisions by all public bodies, ministerial decisions cannot be arbitrary, must operate within reasoned parameters and be just and fair in application.</p>
<p>Citizenship deprivation is ordinarily done for national security or counter-terrorism reasons, so it is possible that lack of transparency is due to a need to protect sources and details of operations. However, operational details are different from providing bare statistics on the use of power. </p>
<p>While it is true that the law recognises the need for some use of exceptional state powers in the area of counter-terrorism, it still requires fairness. For example, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, which hears appeals from citizenship cancellation orders, has provision for extraordinary <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/1034/contents/made">closed court sessions</a> which are not open to the public. Yet there is still a process in place for sharing information and providing legal representation to those who appeal, for the sake of fairness. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jan/21/hundreds-stripped-british-citizenship-last-15-years-study-finds">In response</a> to this article, a Home Office spokesperson said: “The Home Office is committed to publishing its transparency report into the use of disruptive powers and will do so in due course. Removing British citizenship has been possible for over a century, and is used against those who have acquired citizenship by fraud, and against the most dangerous people, such as terrorists, extremists and serious organised criminals.”</p>
<p>Without more information from the government, it is impossible to evaluate whether the citizenship-stripping decisions have been objectively reasonable and based on evidence. This is also rarely scrutinised in appeals cases, as most citizenship deprivations occur when someone is outside the country. As has been seen in the <a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2020-0157.html">Shamima Begum case,</a> it is nearly impossible for people to adequately represent their situation in court from conflict areas.</p>
<p>There is legal precedent for government transparency in immigration cases. Courts <a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1996/946.html">have directed</a> that people should be told the reason why their naturalisation applications were denied. And more generally, courts have <a href="https://vlex.co.uk/vid/r-v-secretary-of-806937757">directed</a> that Home Office decision-makers must record their reasoning at the time decisions are made.</p>
<p>Secrecy can also prevent courts from clarifying less clear aspects of the law. Well-reasoned decisions help public bodies withstand legal challenge if they are robust and easily explained.</p>
<h2>Duty of care</h2>
<p>Public authorities generally owe the public a <a href="https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/publiclaw/document/393870/55KG-FP91-F18H-K2Y7-00000-00/Claims_against_public_authorities_overview">duty of care</a> to protect individuals from harm.</p>
<p>The government owes a heightened duty of care towards children who are in conflict areas such as Syria and unable to leave because their British parents have had their citizenship cancelled. The <a href="https://globalcit.eu/repatriating-the-forgotten-children-of-isis-fighters-a-matter-of-urgency/">duty towards children</a> is based on their welfare in national laws, as well as best interests in international human rights conventions. Yet, the lack of transparency on citizenship-stripping means not much is known about how many children are affected or what, if anything, is being done to bring them to safety.</p>
<p>Ministerial power should only be exercised for the public good, and negligence can put lives at risk. Public officers acting in bad faith, knowing it would probably cause harm, could be committing <a href="https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/guidance/misfeasance-in-public-office">misfeasance in public office</a>. Actions for misfeasance require proving intentional misbehaviour and would be difficult to establish for cancellation of citizenship. Nevertheless, it shows that there are limits to ministerial power and discretion. </p>
<p>Given these serious consequences, ministerial discretion must be exercised objectively and with transparency. Oversight bodies, parliament and the public must be able to scrutinise their actions.</p>
<p>It is possible that the lack of available data is just poor recordkeeping or delay on the part of the government. But this secrecy hampers wider public responses to human rights abuses which may take place during counter-terrorism operations. NGOs and investigative journalists can only go so far to bring about accountability while relying on freedom of information requests, personal contacts and anecdotal evidence for data.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175697/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Devyani Prabhat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Knowing the number of people who have had their citizenship removed is crucial to holding a powerful government to account.Devyani Prabhat, Professor in Law, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1736222022-01-07T13:30:38Z2022-01-07T13:30:38ZThe metaverse offers a future full of potential – for terrorists and extremists, too<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439732/original/file-20220106-17-gsik0f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6016%2C3998&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Violent extremists could find the metaverse a useful recruiting and organizing tool – and a target-rich environment.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/hacker-royalty-free-image/1301604781">D-Keine/E+ via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The metaverse is coming. Like all technological innovation, it brings new opportunities and new risks.</p>
<p>The metaverse is an <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-metaverse-2-media-and-information-experts-explain-165731">immersive virtual reality version of the internet</a> where people can interact with digital objects and digital representations of themselves and others, and can move more or less freely from one virtual environment to another. It can also involve augmented reality, a blending of virtual and physical realities, both by representing people and objects from the physical world in the virtual and conversely by bringing the virtual into people’s perceptions of physical spaces. </p>
<p>By donning virtual reality headsets or augmented reality glasses, people will be able to socialize, worship and work in environments where the boundaries between environments and between the digital and physical are permeable. In the metaverse, people will be able to find meaning and have experiences in concert with their offline lives.</p>
<p>Therein lies the rub. When people learn to love something, whether it is digital, physical or a combination, taking that thing from them can cause emotional pain and suffering. To put a finer point on it, the things people hold dear become vulnerabilities that can be exploited by those seeking to cause harm. People with malicious intent are already noting that the <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/164497/facebook-metaverse-cybercrime-marc-zuckerberg">metaverse is a potential tool</a> in their arsenal. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439554/original/file-20220105-19-1ktsb17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman wearing virtual reality goggles sits in a trade show booth" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439554/original/file-20220105-19-1ktsb17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439554/original/file-20220105-19-1ktsb17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439554/original/file-20220105-19-1ktsb17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439554/original/file-20220105-19-1ktsb17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439554/original/file-20220105-19-1ktsb17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439554/original/file-20220105-19-1ktsb17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439554/original/file-20220105-19-1ktsb17.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A trade show attendee tries out a taste of the metaverse: virtual reality shopping.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/GadgetShowLOTTEDataCommunication/48965f1a65304927a6fcf7ef74375fdb/photo">AP Photo/Joe Buglewicz</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=6GAUpO8AAAAJ&hl=en">As</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=CH2XK2wAAAAJ&hl=en">terrorism</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=uJpT238AAAAJ&hl=en">researchers</a> at the <a href="https://www.unomaha.edu/ncite/index.php">National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center</a> in Omaha, Nebraska, we see a potential dark side to the metaverse. Although it is still under construction, its evolution promises new ways for extremists to exert influence through fear, threat and coercion. Considering our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10400419.2021.1987735">research on malevolent creativity and innovation</a>, there is potential for the metaverse to become a new domain for terrorist activity.</p>
<p>To be clear, we do not oppose the metaverse as a concept and, indeed, are excited about its potential for human advancement. But we believe that the rise of the metaverse will open new vulnerabilities and present novel opportunities to exploit them. Although not exhaustive, here are three ways the metaverse will complicate efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism. </p>
<h2>Recruitment</h2>
<p>First, online recruitment and engagement are hallmarks of modern extremism, and the metaverse threatens to expand this capacity by making it easier for people to meet up. Today, someone interested in hearing what Oath Keepers founder <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/us/politics/stewart-rhodes-oath-keepers-fbi.html">Stewart Rhodes</a> has to say might read an article about his anti-government ideology or watch a video of him speaking to followers about impending martial law. Tomorrow, by blending <a href="https://venturebeat.com/2021/08/04/sensorium-demos-ai-driven-avatars-as-latest-virtual-beings/">artificial intelligence and augmented reality in the metaverse</a>, Rhodes or his AI stand-in will be able to sit on a virtual park bench with any number of potential followers and entice them with visions of the future. </p>
<p>Similarly, a resurrected bin Laden could meet with would-be followers in a virtual rose garden or lecture hall. The emerging metaverse affords extremist leaders a new ability to forge and maintain virtual ideological and social communities and powerful, difficult-to-disrupt ways of expanding their ranks and spheres of influence.</p>
<h2>Coordination</h2>
<p>Second, the metaverse offers new ways to coordinate, plan and execute acts of destruction across a diffuse membership. An assault on the Capitol? With sufficient reconnaissance and information gathering, extremist leaders could create virtual environments with representations of any physical building, which would allow them to walk members through routes leading to key objectives. </p>
<p>Members could learn viable and efficient paths, coordinate alternative routes if some are blocked, and establish multiple contingency plans if surprises arise. When executing an attack in the physical world, augmented reality objects like virtual arrows can help guide violent extremists and identify marked targets. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439556/original/file-20220105-15-wds4yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a corridor in a marble-floored ornate building" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439556/original/file-20220105-15-wds4yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/439556/original/file-20220105-15-wds4yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439556/original/file-20220105-15-wds4yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439556/original/file-20220105-15-wds4yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439556/original/file-20220105-15-wds4yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439556/original/file-20220105-15-wds4yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/439556/original/file-20220105-15-wds4yc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Training in virtual representations of real buildings could help terrorists plan attack and escape routes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-us-capitol-building-ahead-of-the-debate-on-impeachment-news-photo/1230570351">Dmitry Kirsanov\TASS via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Violent extremists can plot from their living rooms, basements or backyards – all while building social connections and trust in their peers, and all while appearing to others in the <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2021/11/2/22758974/microsoft-teams-metaverse-mesh-3d-avatars-meetings-features">digital avatar form of their choosing</a>. When extremist leaders give orders for action in the physical world, these groups are likely to be more prepared than today’s extremist groups because of their time in the metaverse.</p>
<h2>New targets</h2>
<p>Finally, with new virtual and mixed reality spaces comes the potential for new targets. Just as buildings, events and people can be harmed in the real world, so too can the same be attacked in the virtual world. Imagine swastikas on synagogues, disruptions of real-life activities like banking, shopping and work, and the spoiling of public events. </p>
<p>A 9/11 memorial service created and hosted in the virtual domain would be, for example, a tempting target for violent extremists who could reenact the falling of the twin towers. A <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/fashion/metaverse-virtual-wedding.html">metaverse wedding</a> could be disrupted by attackers who disapprove of the religious or gendered pairing of the couple. These acts would take a psychological toll and result in real-world harm. </p>
<p>It may be easy to dismiss the threats of this blended virtual and physical world by claiming it isn’t real and is therefore <a href="https://www.pcgamer.com/the-metaverse-is-bullshit/">inconsequential</a>. But as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/02/nike-is-quietly-preparing-for-the-metaverse-.html">Nike prepares to sell</a> virtual shoes, it is critical to recognize the <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/sandbox-decentraland-virtual-land-sales-soar-metaverse-nfts-1267740/">very real money</a> that will be spent in the metaverse. With actual money <a href="https://hackernoon.com/5-futuristic-jobs-of-the-metaverse">come real jobs</a>, and with real jobs comes the potential for losing very real livelihoods. </p>
<p>Destroying an augmented or virtual reality business means an individual suffers genuine financial loss. Like physical places, virtual spaces can be designed and crafted with care, subsequently carrying the significance people afford things in which they have invested time and creativity building. Further, as technology becomes smaller and <a href="https://bigthink.com/the-future/augmented-reality-metaverse/">more integrated</a> in people’s daily lives, the ability to simply turn off the metaverse and ignore the harm could become more challenging. </p>
<h2>Preparing for the new (virtual) reality</h2>
<p>How then to face these emerging threats and vulnerabilities? It is reasonable for corporations to suggest that hate or violence will not be allowed or that individuals engaging in extremism will be identified and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-28/wallstreetbets-banned-from-discord-for-allowing-hateful-speech">banned</a> from their virtual spaces. We are supportive of such commitments but are skeptical that these are credible, especially in light of <a href="https://theconversation.com/facebook-became-meta-and-the-companys-dangerous-behavior-came-into-sharp-focus-in-2021-4-essential-reads-173417">revelations about Meta’s dangerous behavior</a> on its Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp platforms. There is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54086598">profit</a> to be had in hate and division.</p>
<p>If corporations cannot serve as reliable sole guardians of the metaverse, then who can, and how? </p>
<p>Although the arrival of a full-fledged metaverse is still some years in the future, the potential threats posed by the metaverse require attention today from a diverse range of people and organizations, including academic researchers, those developing the metaverse and those tasked with protecting society. The threats call for thinking as much or more creatively about the metaverse as those with malevolent intent are likely to do. Everyone needs to be ready for this new reality.</p>
<p>[<em>Get our best science, health and technology stories.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?nl=science&source=inline-science-best">Sign up for The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/173622/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joel S. Elson receives funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Austin C. Doctor receives funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sam Hunter receives or has received funding from the Department of Homeland Security, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research, and the UK Home Office.</span></em></p>People may think of the metaverse as virtual, but the harm terrorists and extremists could do is very real.Joel S. Elson, Assistant Professor of IT Innovation, University of Nebraska OmahaAustin C. Doctor, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska OmahaSam Hunter, Professor of Psychology, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1710102021-11-17T14:21:43Z2021-11-17T14:21:43ZMilitary expenditure reduces the negative effect of terrorism on economic growth<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/431279/original/file-20211110-21-15hrpg4.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Economic growth is affected by military expenditure</span> </figcaption></figure><p>In a number of African countries, terrorism has become a major challenge to socioeconomic development. This has spurred <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=impact+of+terrorism+on+economic+growth&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5">research</a> on the extent to which terrorism affects economic growth. But an area that’s been less examined is the influence of military expenditure on the relationship between terrorism and economic growth in Africa.</p>
<p>Let’s take two examples: Nigeria and Somalia. These two countries are among the most prominent cases of insurgencies and acts of terrorism on the continent. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, insurgent groups such as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/tag/boko-haram/">Boko Haram</a> and the <a href="https://issat.dcaf.ch/fre/layout/set/fullscreen/Apprendre/La-bibliotheque-des-ressources/Recherches-et-documents-strategiques/Facing-the-Challenge-of-the-Islamic-State-in-West-Africa-Province">Islamic State of West Africa Province</a> have been waging war in the north-eastern zone of the country. This has led to the destruction of economic infrastructure, a reduction in domestic investment and a fall in economic activity. This has, in turn, influenced the growth rate of the country’s GDP. </p>
<p>In Somalia, <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/8476">conflict among clans</a> has enhanced terrorism which has destroyed the Somalian economy. This has led to <a href="https://www.unicef.org/somalia/nutrition">severe malnutrition</a>, particularly among children.</p>
<p>The default response to increased insurgency and acts of terrorism is to up military spending. This is a longstanding defence policy for counter-terrorism. For instance, since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009, military expenditure in Nigeria has increased significantly. There was <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=NG">a 36% increase when comparing 2009 and 2018</a>. </p>
<p>In Somalia, there has been a more than 100% increase in military expenditure when comparing <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=SO">2013 to 2018 figures</a>. </p>
<p>But the effectiveness of higher military spending in mitigating the impact of terrorism on economic growth has not been tested. This is the gap <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19434472.2021.1987967">our study</a> sought to fill.</p>
<h2>The search for answers</h2>
<p>We set out to test the hypothesis that military expenditure mitigates the negative effect of terrorism on economic growth. The study was based on a panel of 24 African countries that had high levels of terrorist activities and for which data on terrorism was available. The data coverage spanned 18 years (2001 to 2018).</p>
<p>The study used two variables for terrorism – incidents and fatalities. Data for these was sourced from the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2020-measuring-impact-terrorism">2019 Global Terrorism Database</a>. Economic growth, as measured by the growth rate in the gross domestic product (GDP), was sourced from the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG">2020 World Development Indicator</a>. </p>
<p>The study proxied military expenditure with the percentage of military expenditure in GDP, sourced from the <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS">World Development Indicators</a>.</p>
<p>We also used five control variables in the modelling. They included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>gross capital formation as a measure of capital</p></li>
<li><p>population (15 to 64) to capture labour force </p></li>
<li><p>primary school enrolment as a proxy for education </p></li>
<li><p>the <a href="https://competitivite.ferdi.fr/en/indicators/polity2-polity-iv">POLITY2 index</a>, which captures regime type and has been used to measure democracy</p></li>
<li><p>government effectiveness to proxy the quality of governance.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our main findings were that: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>terrorism has a detrimental effect on economic growth in the selected African countries </p></li>
<li><p>the interactive effect of military expenditure and terrorism on economic growth is significantly positive </p></li>
<li><p>the net effect of the interaction between military expenditure and terrorism on economic growth is positive when the number of terrorism incidents acts as a proxy for terrorism. But it’s negative when the number of terrorism fatalities acts as a proxy for terrorism. The negative effect is substantially lower when compared to the unconditional effect of terrorism on economic growth in Africa. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The effect of military expenditure</h2>
<p>In an effort to mitigate the impact of terrorism on the economy, African countries have increased military spending. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336374953_Military_expenditure_and_security_outcome_convergence_in_African_regional_economic_communities_Evidence_from_the_convergence_club_algorithm">A 2019 study showed that</a> military expenditure in Africa had increased by 91% since 2005.</p>
<p>There are two ways in which the increase in military expenditure can mitigate terrorism’s negative effect on economic growth. </p>
<p>The first is via the effect of counter-terrorism. This improves security and leads to the reduction in economic uncertainty, the restoration of economic activity and ultimately increased investment.</p>
<p>The second is the impact of increased military expenditure on economic activity. This happens via a boost to aggregate demand. Four major components affect it. These are consumption, investment, government expenditure and net export. Increased government expenditure on the military would therefore have an impact. But this can be less effective if the capital components of military expenditure are import oriented.</p>
<p>Some academics <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pa.2253">caution</a> that increased military expenditure can have negative consequences. This includes the risk of the abuse of power and human rights. This can, in turn, also lead to a further deterioration of peace in a country.</p>
<p>Intuitively, it is expected that military expenditure mitigates the negative influence of terrorism on the economy.</p>
<p>However, a study by economists <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690903568884">Mete Feridun and Muhammad Shahbaz</a> showed that military expenditure might not necessarily influence terrorism. This would mean that military expenditure might not be able to offset the negative influence of terrorism on the economy. The difference in findings in their study and ours is largely due to regional differences. And it suggests that the influence of military expenditure for counter-terrorism is heterogeneous.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>We established three core findings. </p>
<p>The first is that there is an unconditional negative effect of terrorism on economic growth. </p>
<p>The second is that when terrorism interacts with military expenditure, the negative impact on economic growth fizzles out. </p>
<p>The third is that the net effect of the interaction of military expenditure and terrorism on economic growth depends on the proxy for terrorism. However, in both cases, the importance of military expenditure is established. </p>
<p>This means that, overall, military expenditure is a relevant policy variable in reducing the negative effect of terrorism on economic growth in Africa. </p>
<p>But there is also a need for an inclusive growth policies for African economies to increase the opportunity cost of terrorism.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/171010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chimere Iheonu is a final year PhD Candidate in Economics at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka and is affiliated with the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa, Abuja, Nigeria </span></em></p>Military expenditure is a relevant policy option in reducing the negative effect of terrorism on economic growth in Africa.Chimere Iheonu, PhD Candidate in Economics at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1687662021-09-30T15:01:26Z2021-09-30T15:01:26ZNigeria has a plan to de-radicalise and reintegrate ex-terrorists. But it’s flawed and needs fixing<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/423585/original/file-20210928-18-1wp6hx7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Freed inmates prepare for rehabilitation and integration.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/freed-inmates-stand-in-line-after-they-were-released-and-news-photo/1185034797?adppopup=true">Audu Marte/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2008/RAND_CT314.pdf">Studies</a> have shown that terrorism does not end with only a military approach. A coercive counter-terrorism strategy has <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf">often</a> produced negative outcomes by promoting more violence and creating humanitarian crisis. </p>
<p>Non-military approaches are increasingly being embraced as a more practical route to eliminating the root cause of terrorism and producing a long-term peaceful outcome. The approach is characterised by political negotiations and grassroots development. De-radicalisation, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are also included. </p>
<p>In 2015 Nigeria <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Stakeholders__Dialogue_on_Government_Approaches.pdf">adopted</a> a non-military approach to its counter-terrorism efforts. This followed criticisms of its predominantly military-based approach. The idea was to complement its overused firepower in the north-eastern region. </p>
<p>I conducted a <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hakeem-Onapajo/publication/339343161_Non-military_approach_against_terrorism_in_Nigeria_deradicalization_strategies_and_challenges_in_countering_Boko_Haram/links/5e5b9d00a6fdccbeba0f5f8a/Non-military-approach-against-terrorism-in-Nigeria-deradicalization-strategies-and-challenges-in-countering-Boko-Haram.pdf">study</a> as part of the growing debate on the adoption of a non-military approach to counter terrorism in Nigeria. </p>
<p>In particular I focused on the de-radicalisation programme adopted by the Nigerian government in countering <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria">Boko Haram</a>.</p>
<p>The design and implementation of the programme has been heavily criticised for being structurally weak and for contributing to the problem of violent extremism.</p>
<p>In my paper, I recommend measures that can be taken to strengthen the de-radicalisation process. I also highlight the problems and challenges in the de-radicalisation and reintegration programmes for ex-terrorists in the north-eastern region of the country. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s counter-terrorism programme</h2>
<p>Nigeria’s soft approach to address the conflict in the north-eastern region started in 2013. The <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerias-president-launches-amnesty-committee-boko-haram">Goodluck Jonathan administration</a> negotiated with Boko Haram leaders and create a framework for amnesty and disarmament. </p>
<p>But the move was frustrated because leaders of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-11-nigeria-boko-haram-leader-rejects-potential-amnesty-deal/">the group rejected the amnesty</a>. Notwithstanding the refusal, a new agency, called “Countering Violent Extremism” was set up. It was code-named “National Security Corridor”. It’s aim was to tackle the root-causes of recruitment into Boko Haram and create a process of rehabilitating defectors of the group. </p>
<p>In an effort to deliver on its <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/01/nigerian-election-winner-muhammadu-buhari-boko-haram">promise</a> to eliminate terrorists in the north-eastern region, the Buhari-led administration made changes to the country’s security architecture. These included redesigning the national security corridor. It also led to a <a href="https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Stakeholders__Dialogue_on_Government_Approaches.pdf">new</a> de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programme. </p>
<p>Code-named “Operation Safe Corridor”, the programme identified two categories of defectors: “high-risk” and “low-risk”. High-risk defectors, considered to be the most hardened fighters, would be prosecuted even after defecting. The low-risk were categorised as those with a less vicious record. The plan was that they should undergo an intensive de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programme. </p>
<p>The exercise mapped out was a 52-week programme. It included de-radicalisation therapies, vocational training and basic education. Religious re-education before reintegration into the society was also included. </p>
<p>The programme is undertaken in two different rehabilitation camps: a camp in Mallam Sidi, Gombe State and the Bulumkutu Rehabilitation Centre in Maiduguri, Borno State. </p>
<p>The Mallam Sidi camp has male defectors. The camp in Maiduguri is for women and children. </p>
<p>Available data at the time of the research (2019-2020) shows that 601 repentant terrorists have so far graduated from the Mallam Sidi camp, while 1,935 have been released at the female camp in Bulumkutu. </p>
<h2>Challenges of Nigeria’s DRR programme</h2>
<p>Our research identified a number of major challenges in reintegrating Boko Haram ex-combatants.</p>
<p>The first was a lack of community engagement. The people affected in the conflict-ridden region are not significantly involved in the programme. This has led to a deepening of the negative perceptions communities have about the programme.</p>
<p>This has led to a total rejection of the rehabilitated defectors. We observed that the reintegrated former terrorists were still perceived as dangerous and unfit for the society by the people around them.</p>
<p><a href="https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/NSI-Reachback_B2_Common-Characteristics-of-Successful-Deradicalization-Programs-of-the-Past_Feb2020_Final.pdf">Experiences</a> in Germany, United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden have shown that a successful de-radicalisation programme should be inclusive and, in particular, that it should consider the community. </p>
<p>Secondly, we found there weren’t enough structures for genuine reconciliation and forgiveness. For example, the programme does not address the horrendous experiences of victims at the hands of the individuals who have repented. This has led to a growing belief that the government is paying more attention to the repentant terrorists than their victims. </p>
<p>Failure to address this concern has frustrated attempts for true reconciliation and forgiveness. These are needed for the programme to be successful. </p>
<p>Thirdly, we found that there was a lack of preemptive measures to prevent radicalisation. </p>
<p>Many de-radicalisation programmes include preemptive strategies to discourage easy recruitment into terrorism by targeting potential recruits and not only the fighters. The United Kingdom’s <a href="https://www.westminster.gov.uk/businesses/major-incidents-and-contingency-planning/counter-terrorism-contest">CONTEST (Counter-terrorism Strategy)</a> has four strategies one of which is the prevention of people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. </p>
<p>The Nigerian programme does not target people who are not terrorists yet, but may have been exposed to terrorists’ ideologies.</p>
<p>The fourth issue was a lack of public trust. A continental <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_dispatchno112_trustworthy_institutions_and_development_in_africa.pdf">survey</a> of public trust in 37 African countries showed that Nigerians trust state institutions the least. This means that new state programmes are looked at with a great deal of suspicion. </p>
<p>This mistrust extended to the outcomes of the programme. People didn’t trust the claim that the ex-terrorists have been rehabilitated and were fit for reintegration. </p>
<p>For their part, willing defectors are cautious about the government’s promises. This makes them reluctant to drop their weapons and embrace a new life. </p>
<p>The fifth issue we identified was weak post-reintegration engagement plan. An <a href="https://www.osapnd.gov.ng/">amnesty programme</a> set up in the Niger Delta, includes a plan to economically engage the defectors after rehabilitation. This was not provided in this programme. </p>
<p>This is a major shortcoming, considering the state of the economy. Nigeria’s economy is suffering from <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-15/nigeria-unemployment-rate-rises-to-second-highest-on-global-list">increasing unemployment</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-economy-poverty/forty-percent-of-nigerians-live-in-poverty-stats-office-idUSKBN22G19A">high poverty rates</a>. Rising insecurity has further compounded the problem in the informal sector where the rehabilitated individuals are expected to fit in. </p>
<p>Reintegration without a substantial economic empowerment plan might render the whole effort useless. It could also lead the ex-terrorists back to the armed groups. </p>
<p>Lastly, we identified a lack of surveillance as an issue. Similar <a href="https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2013/03/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013_2.pdf">programmes</a> have shown the possibility of recidivism by supposedly rehabilitated individuals. This has led to sophisticated monitoring systems being put in place to keep those individuals under surveillance after reintegration. While Nigeria is currently trying to update its national database, lack of a reliable one presently makes keeping tabs of ex-terrorists difficult. </p>
<h2>Way forward</h2>
<p>De-radicalisation and reintegration programmes are globally recognised as a useful way of addressing terrorism. They can also produce sustainable peace. However, they must be genuinely implemented to be effective. </p>
<p>The identified problems in the current programme must be seriously addressed. While the government does its part, citizens should also embrace the programme. No major wars ended without negotiations and concessions. Examples are the <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1459254/liberias-civil-war-in-photos-child-soldiers-rape-then-peace/">Liberian</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/armed-conflict-sierra-leone">Sierra Leonean</a> wars. They ended with <a href="https://www.ictj.org/publication/negotiating-peace-sierra-leone-confronting-justice-challenge">political negotiations</a> and reintegration programmes for rebel leaders and their soldiers.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168766/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hakeem Onapajo receives funding from the American Council of Learned Societies through the African Humanities Program. </span></em></p>Nigeria’s plan of de-radicalising and integrating former Boko Haram terrorists should be fine-tuned to achieve more.Hakeem Onapajo, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nile University of NigeriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.