tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/democracy-futures-crossroads-europe-15109/articlesDemocracy Futures: Crossroads Europe – The Conversation2018-02-22T02:03:54Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/900102018-02-22T02:03:54Z2018-02-22T02:03:54ZCrimes of solidarity: liberté, égalité and France’s crisis of fraternité<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204502/original/file-20180202-123829-1jsq304.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">'I am a migrant' solidarity signs were displayed during the European Parliament debate on immigration and asylum in the Strasbourg plenary.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/european_parliament/16688394004/">European Parliament/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/revolutions-and-counter-revolutions-49124">Revolutions and Counter-Revolutions</a> series, curated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> as a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a> and The Conversation. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
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<p>The French republican ideals of freedom and equality – indeed of all modern democracies – crystallised in the late 18th century. This was when revolutionary forces combined and fought to abolish two hallmarks of the <em>Ancien Régime</em>: absolutism (unrestricted government power) and privilege (aristocratic rights and status).</p>
<p>Freedom and equality are assumed to be reinforced, brought into harmony by the republic’s third principle – fraternity. Yet, while liberty relates to government, and equality to the law, fraternity is the domain of society. And as France today struggles with its changing social fabric, fraternity is in crisis.</p>
<p>To understand this, and importantly the growing dissidence of citizens who refuse a fraternalism that diminishes human solidarity, we need to spend a moment covering the workings of French republicanism.</p>
<p>The 1789 revolutionaries’ aim of destroying feudal privilege, and ultimately the monarchy, had its roots in republican “anti-particularism”. The concept endures in French democracy today to describe a political and social system opposed to any exclusive or special devotion to the interests of particular groups, whether based on ethnicity, religion or gender, to name but a few.</p>
<p>Anti-particularism is enacted through a variant of Enlightenment universalism that positions human nature as a “rational” universal that is capable of resisting cultural and historical differences. That is, reasoned deliberation would underpin France’s universal republican values: a secular public sphere, equality, freedom, and autonomy.</p>
<p>France’s republicanism laid further claim to universality by offering citizenship to all those willing to belong to the nation on the basis of their active participation as citizens. The “citizen” is defined solely through the notion of equal political rights and duties, and not, for example, through ethnic or territorial ties.</p>
<p>So, in France, the citizen is a purely political concept, and an abstract one, to comply with its demands of universalism. Abstract universalism establishes France as a political nation, through its body of equal citizens, whose aim is to integrate diverse populations. </p>
<p>In this way, abstract universalism functions to prevent particularism, or the division of the republic into individual and multiple identity groups. Their demands for recognition are seen as threatening republican unity and equality.</p>
<h2>Are some people more equal than others?</h2>
<p>A key challenge of equality, in establishing the public sphere as primarily one in which individual interests are subjugated to the common interest, is whether particular groups are able to recognise themselves, and are recognised, as belonging to a wider whole, as equitable contributors to common societal goals.</p>
<p>In post-revolutionary France, the obsession has always been with equality. <em>Laïcité</em>, its distinctive take on secularism, is an extended exercise in equality. </p>
<p><em>Laïcité</em> implies in its varying dimensions: freedom of conscience for all, thereby ensuring the republic’s commitment to individual autonomy; state neutrality toward religious difference to allow for the cohabitation of all religions in the name of equality; and the fostering of civic bonds and allegiance to a particular historical community, the republic’s public culture.</p>
<p>This third dimension, which <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/critical-republicanism-9780199550210?cc=au&lang=en&">Cécile Laborde</a> terms the “laic” civic bond, is what encourages feelings of republican fraternity. </p>
<p>Particularist nationalism rounds out, in a sense, France’s political culture and model of citizenship. But does a strong sense of <a href="https://theconversation.com/modis-polarising-populism-makes-a-fiction-of-a-secular-democratic-india-80605">national</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/everyday-makers-defy-populists-false-promise-to-embody-your-voice-78762">identity</a> not inspire feelings of suspicion towards the politics of diversity?</p>
<h2>The impossible and the ‘unassimilable’</h2>
<p>Historically, and to this day, it is not arbitrary groups that have been denied access to the public sphere, or deemed “unassimilable” – that is, incapable of becoming a part of the <em>res publica</em>. </p>
<p>Women, Jews, gays and more recently Muslims have all been <a href="http://www.eurozine.com/universalist-politics-and-its-crises/">excluded</a>, not as abstract citizens, but on the very basis of their difference. </p>
<p>In other words, the content of the abstraction continues to resurface. It’s a sign that not everyone’s particular identities – whether gendered, ethnic or religious and so on – can be so easily abstracted.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204528/original/file-20180202-162082-1atit5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204528/original/file-20180202-162082-1atit5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204528/original/file-20180202-162082-1atit5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204528/original/file-20180202-162082-1atit5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204528/original/file-20180202-162082-1atit5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204528/original/file-20180202-162082-1atit5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204528/original/file-20180202-162082-1atit5k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Not everyone’s particular identity can be so easily abstracted and assimilated by French republican ideology.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/khalidalbaih/5631903720">Khalid Albaih/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Yet, paradoxically, those excluded by French republican ideology and its politics are unable to petition the state for political recognition or inclusion on the basis of their difference. </p>
<p>Where recognition and rights have been achieved, excluded groups had to write themselves into the logic and reach of universalism. The women’s rights movement, for example, succeeded in erasing sexual difference from the list of categories that carried weight in French politics.</p>
<p>Likewise, the more recent success of the marriage equality movement wasn’t attributed to activists’ demands for “gay rights”. This would have been viewed as too particularistic or individualist – not republican enough. </p>
<p>Instead, equality was achieved by petitioning for <a href="https://theconversation.com/liberte-egalite-fraternite-france-and-the-gay-marriage-debate-14852"><em>mariage pour tous</em></a>, “marriage for all”. The language of republicanism was used to point out that a universal – the right to marriage – was not truly universal if it excluded certain groups. </p>
<p>All manner of activists have <a href="http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=11923">succeeded</a> in shattering the hypocrisy of formal equality by drawing attention to ways in which the French model creates “impossible subjects” who do not neatly fit into its republican categories.</p>
<p>Universalism holds within it a paradox: its need to be reconciled with the particularism of states, without which promises like <em>liberté</em>, <em>égalité</em> and <em>fraternité</em> could never be reality. </p>
<p>While these tensions and paradoxes are not isolated to the French case, France is often held up as the model (in Europe) for the political integration of culturally diverse populations. Yet its citizenship requirement that outsiders be “culturally fit” to fully integrate French values shows that certain ideas of a secular public sphere, or republican national identity, can result in speculation about the “unassimilable” nature of some populations.</p>
<p>What’s more, the French Republic has long sacralised human rights and the right to asylum in political and ideological presentations of itself. </p>
<p>In holding dear its image of a nation as simultaneously a strong supporter of societal and national sovereignty and a land of asylum, France is arguably the most glaring demonstration of the tension between the universal and the particular.</p>
<h2>Solidarity delinquents</h2>
<p>France actively pursues the criminalisation of its citizens for acts of solidarity and fraternity toward vulnerable refugees. At best this is puzzling. It is even more so when citizens refer to their civil disobedience as restaking a claim on the values upon which the republic was founded. </p>
<p>In their specific understanding of what it means to be French, fraternity and its modern equivalent, solidarity, are wedged between particularist politics of closure and ethical considerations of universal obligation. This has very real consequences for citizens and non-citizens alike.</p>
<p>On January 4, 2017, <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/cedric-herrou-convicted-helping-refugees-border-170808082804597.html">Cédric Herrou</a>, a farmer from the Roya valley (a key crossing point for migrants into France from Italy), was placed on trial for helping some 200 asylum seekers to enter and pass through France. He had provided many of them with shelter, first in his home and later a disused railway building.</p>
<p>His initial penalty (a suspended fine of €3,000) was increased to a suspended four-month prison sentence after an appeal by the prosecution.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/LyN6TxpjB90?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Cédric Herrou is a farmer who defies French authorities by helping African refugees.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On October 17, 2016, <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/01/23/good-samaritans-or-criminals-france-wrestles-with-fate-of-those-helping-migrants.html">Pierre-Alain Mannoni</a>, a 45-year-old geography professor at Nice University, was arrested while driving three badly injured Eritrean girls to seek medical attention. Following his acquittal, the prosecutor appealed and continued to press for a six-month suspended prison term. The appeals court imposed a suspended sentence of two months in September 2017.</p>
<p>In 2015, Education Without Borders Network volunteer <a href="https://www.humanite.fr/denis-lambert-un-juste-solidaire-des-sans-papiers-579512">Denis Lambert</a> was arrested for receiving direct “compensation”, in the form of domestic chores, while lodging a family of undocumented Armenians at his Perpignan home following their failed asylum claim.</p>
<p>French immigration law, the Code on the Entry and Sojourn of Foreigners and Right to Asylum (<a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=1A9342280202A01546C2D310267E0825.tpdila19v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006147789&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158&dateTexte=20170731">CESEDA</a>) punishes persons found guilty of “assisting the entry, travel or undocumented stay” of irregular status foreigners. The offence carries a five-year prison sentence and €30,000 fine.</p>
<p>Since 2012, the law does exempt from prosecution anyone providing aid in the form of “legal advice, food, accommodation or medical care to ensure the foreigner with dignified and decent living conditions”, provided no benefit is received in return. On the other hand, transporting irregular foreigners and assisting their safe passage across or around border zones are punishable offences.</p>
<p>But the law operates on an ambiguity. Although intended to combat organised networks of illegal immigration (human trafficking and people smugglers), its wording lends itself to associating “disinterested” humanitarian assistance with the profit motives of human trafficking. </p>
<p>This has led to numerous arrests and prosecutions of French citizens who have received direct or indirect “benefits” or “compensation” for their humanitarian assistance of vulnerable people. The ongoing <a href="http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article1399">intimidation, prosecutions and convictions</a> have sparked a collective movement of “<a href="http://www.delinquantssolidaires.org/">solidarity delinquency</a>”, or “<a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/france-prosecuting-citizens-crimes-solidarity-170122064151841.html">crimes of solidarity</a>”. The movement asserts:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If solidarity with foreigners is a crime, then we are all delinquents. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>How did France come to this?</h2>
<p>How is it that universalist France punishes citizens for helping vulnerable refugees? One explanation is found in the way that France’s republican ideals meet state rationalities. </p>
<p>The state invokes universalism and secularism to reserve the right not simply to determine who can become a member of French society, but more generally to maintain a stronghold on symbolising Frenchness. And so the state defends the republic’s indivisibility, unity and social and moral order – no more so than when the nation perceives itself plagued by insecurity.</p>
<p>Themes of insecurity, national identity and immigration have <a href="https://theconversation.com/le-pen-vs-macron-after-an-acrimonious-debate-the-french-will-now-choose-their-next-president-76995">featured heavily in French election campaigns</a> since 2002. Asylum and immigration have become increasingly regulated and politicised within a security framework. This is because there is electoral capital in making both so central to anxieties about national identity, safety and order, and the public purse.</p>
<p>For <a href="http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520271173">Didier Fassin</a>, insecurity takes three forms: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>public insecurity is used to legitimate stricter border policing and limits on immigration to secure the nation from external (terrorist) threats</p></li>
<li><p>identity insecurity, apparent in growing mistrust and hostility towards Islam, seeks to reinforce republican belonging and insists upon more secularism in the public sphere</p></li>
<li><p>social insecurity lies in the threat that unwelcome outsiders pose to the welfare and medical systems, as well as the nation’s capacity to provide citizens with jobs.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The “tough on crime”, securitarian approach to asylum, immigration and borders began in earnest under Interior Minister <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/pasqua-in-new-war-on-immigrants-1398372.html">Charles Pasqua</a> in 1993. It gained momentum under <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/sarkozy-intensifies-anti-immigration-rhetoric/a-15703843">Nicolas Sarkozy</a> as interior minister from 2002 and president from 2007. </p>
<p>Sarkozy’s “<a href="http://www.editionsladecouverte.fr/catalogue/index-La_fr__n__sie_s__curitaire-9782707154323.html">securitarian frenzy</a>” and subsequent focus on immigration policy – which included prolonged detention, performance targets, deportations, high-tech police checks and surveillance – was intended to “fix” the issues of republican integration. It is perhaps better understood as the systemisation of a logic of suspicion toward all foreigners.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204532/original/file-20180202-162077-13a8f6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204532/original/file-20180202-162077-13a8f6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/204532/original/file-20180202-162077-13a8f6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204532/original/file-20180202-162077-13a8f6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204532/original/file-20180202-162077-13a8f6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204532/original/file-20180202-162077-13a8f6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204532/original/file-20180202-162077-13a8f6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/204532/original/file-20180202-162077-13a8f6m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protests did little to reverse the state’s ‘securitarian frenzy’ under the presidency of Nicholas Sarkozy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/alainbachellier/257074889/">Alain Bachellier/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The significance of this reconfiguring of relations between citizens and foreigners is that the state’s desire to monopolise what it means to “be French” also brings about dissidence.</p>
<p>We see this in the collective movement of “solidarity delinquency” and in individual crimes of solidarity. Ethico-political acts of civil disobedience call attention to the inhospitable treatment of vulnerable refugees. Solidarity delinquents demand that, in extolling the virtues of fraternity, their public institutions act more hospitably toward refugees and asylum seekers. They also seek to overturn laws so that a minimum of their fellow humans’ fundamental interests can be met. </p>
<p>These acts are a democratic refusal of the blackmail of universals. They attempt to revive and recover a vanishing dimension of French values, namely solidarity and fraternity.</p>
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<p><em>Read other articles in the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/revolutions-and-counter-revolutions-49124">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/90010/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abigail Taylor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Fraternity is one of the three pillars of the French Republic, but social solidarity is fraying as citizens are criminalised for acting on their beliefs in the human rights of asylum seekers.Abigail Taylor, PhD Researcher in Political Theory and Government, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/697142017-01-02T20:20:52Z2017-01-02T20:20:52ZCinema opens a dialogue about coming to terms with Balkans’ past<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148394/original/image-20161202-25656-1wjixkl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">By engaging a broad base of people on a popular level, film has a much more immediate and visceral impact than formal lustration proceedings.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHBQ4VsQaic">Before the Rain (1994)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
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<p>The transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy is never easy. Countries and their people must find ways to deal with traumatic and damaging histories. One of these ways has come to be known as “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/09/what-is-lustration-and-is-it-a-good-idea-for-ukraine-to-adopt-it/?utm_term=.8d3d04f340bc">lustration</a>”.</p>
<p>In its narrowest sense, lustration aims to identify individuals responsible for human rights abuses and purge them from public office. Usually, this involves high-profile criminal trials. </p>
<p>Lustration also encompasses truth-seeking and reconciliation. These processes aim to repair the profound damage that periods of trauma and injustice do to civic traditions, social cohesion and intergenerational relationships.</p>
<p>The broader social function of lustration in “<a href="http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/cpworkshop/papers/Kunicova.pdf">coming to terms with the past</a>”, then, is to rebuild trust and bring about changes in community behaviour following times of collective trauma.</p>
<p>After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many former communist regimes had to face painful truths about their past. Twenty-seven years later, this quest continues.</p>
<p>The transition from communist authoritarianism to democracy has been framed primarily by judicial and political procedures of lustration. Unfortunately, lustration efforts have been instituted very unevenly across the former Eastern Bloc – if at all. <a href="http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.21550/">National differences</a> in political will, objectives and legal frameworks have made it difficult for the region to find a sustainable way forward. </p>
<h2>The Balkan case and the role of film</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149756/original/image-20161213-25521-1jg3m8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149756/original/image-20161213-25521-1jg3m8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149756/original/image-20161213-25521-1jg3m8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149756/original/image-20161213-25521-1jg3m8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149756/original/image-20161213-25521-1jg3m8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149756/original/image-20161213-25521-1jg3m8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149756/original/image-20161213-25521-1jg3m8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149756/original/image-20161213-25521-1jg3m8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A portrait of Tito watches over a Serbian restaurant along the Belgrade-Nis Motorway.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">chat des Balkans/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These problems are perhaps most pronounced in the Balkan countries of the former Yugoslavia. Here, memories of the <a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230227798_2">authoritarian past</a> under Josip Broz Tito endure. Yet there is also ongoing disagreement over the <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/1995-96/96rp14.pdf">ethno-nationalist wars</a> following the break-up of the Yugoslav state.</p>
<p>In other environments where formal lustration procedures have stalled or failed, alternative cultural forms of expression have explored aspects of witnessing and memory that could not be contained within legal frameworks.</p>
<p>In post-war Europe, for instance, literature was a powerful truth-seeking agent in breaking silences over traumatic pasts. This was especially so in Germany after the Holocaust.</p>
<p>Since the Cold War, film too has taken on this role. By engaging a broad base of people on a popular level, film has a much more immediate and visceral impact than formal lustration proceedings.</p>
<p>Many films have been made about the 1990s wars of the former Yugoslavia. Cinema itself cannot resolve issues of ethno-national conflict, nor can it tell us who was right and who was wrong: it cannot communicate a single, absolute “Truth” with a capital T. Yet films can open up dialogue on highly contentious issues. </p>
<p>Two well-known Balkan films, Milcho Manchevski’s Before the Rain (1994) and Theo Angelopoulos’ Ulysses’ Gaze (1995), are perfect examples of this. Both express a contested, contradictory pre-Yugoslav Balkan history that is crucial to understanding why the ethno-national question in the region is yet to be resolved.</p>
<h2>The paradox of Balkan identity</h2>
<p>The tension between ethno-national difference on the one hand and a shared “Balkan” heritage on the other has shaped history in this region for centuries. The attempt to resolve this contradiction through the multi-ethnic socialist state of Yugoslavia merely exacerbated its cleavages.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149760/original/image-20161213-25510-1odbl50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149760/original/image-20161213-25510-1odbl50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149760/original/image-20161213-25510-1odbl50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=875&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149760/original/image-20161213-25510-1odbl50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=875&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149760/original/image-20161213-25510-1odbl50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=875&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149760/original/image-20161213-25510-1odbl50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1100&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149760/original/image-20161213-25510-1odbl50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1100&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149760/original/image-20161213-25510-1odbl50.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1100&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Yugoslav wars (1991-2001).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Peter Denton, Peter Božič, Paul Katzenberger & Paalso/Wikipedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Under Tito, the “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=oCqWFQ1WKlkC&pg=PA180&dq=tito+benevolent+dictator&hl=en&sa=X&ei=eZiVT8u1Io_NswahzJyVBA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=tito%20benevolent%20dictator&f=false">benevolent dictator</a>”, ethno-national co-existence through the ideology of <a href="http://europe.unc.edu/background-titos-yugoslavia/">Brotherhood and Unity</a> was promulgated. This was an uneasy accord, premised on the notion that all subsidiary national identities would wither away, leaving Yugoslav socialism to prevail.</p>
<p>Also, Tito’s state-endorsed “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3234278.pdf">partisan myth</a>” of Yugoslav unity whitewashed the lived reality of ethno-national warfare and Nazi collaboration during the second world war. Yugoslav modernity could therefore succeed only by disallowing any real articulation of ethnic difference. </p>
<p>When the Yugoslav state collapsed, “difference”, subsequently, found expression in grotesque and perverted forms. The ethno-nationalist wars of the 1990s were marked by a particularly grisly “intimate” violence between long-time neighbours and friends.</p>
<p>That Yugoslav modernity failed to resolve the paradox of Balkan identity is implicit within Manchevski’s and Angelopoulos’ films. Both directors re-articulate the “<a href="http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/8720/">quest</a>” narrative, which has traditionally been used in cinema to combine visual explorations of travelled space with psychological processes of change, transformation and revelation.</p>
<h2>A cinematic ‘vision of survival’</h2>
<p>Angelopoulos’ Ulysses’ Gaze depicts the epic journey of a successful yet existentially adrift filmmaker. “A” travels across the crumbling post-Cold War Balkan landscape in search of three lost reels of film shot by the <a href="https://monoskop.org/Yanaki_and_Milton_Manaki">Manaki brothers</a>, the filmmakers who introduced cinema into the region at the beginning of the 20th century.</p>
<p>A’s journey is traced cinematically as a historical and cyclical “odyssey”. Within a single “gaze” it takes in the entirety of <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/map/yugoslavia/">20th-century Balkan history</a> up to the ongoing tragedy in Bosnia, where the <a href="https://www.srebrenica.org.uk/">Srebrenica massacre</a> occurred just weeks before the first screening of Ulysses’ Gaze in Athens, August 1995.</p>
<p>Although the lost reels are eventually found and processed in Sarajevo, they are not watched, and the war continues around A. The great irony, then, is the seeker’s belief in the possibility of finding a single solution to the present conflict in the past; it is a search for a Balkan utopia that never existed.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/QB7RUwZuDZc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">From Ulysses’ Gaze, the pieces of a toppled Lenin statue are transported down the Danube.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And yet the quest for these films does offer the protagonist <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41661146?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">“a vision of survival”</a>.</p>
<p>Although A’s journey does not lead to the discovery and restitution of a particular Balkan idyll, the self-knowledge and understanding he gains about the contradictions of Balkan history suggest that these societies can only move forward by accepting their multiplicity, not by trying to resolve it.</p>
<p>A’s belief that this paradox is to be realised through film itself – that is, through the search for the lost Manaki reels – draws attention to the power of cinema in post-Yugoslav truth-seeking processes.</p>
<h2>Opening up the dialogue</h2>
<p>Manchevski’s Before the Rain corresponds to the same traditional “epic” understandings of Balkan history that are expressed in Ulysses’ Gaze. </p>
<p>When Aleks, an award-winning war photographer, returns to Macedonia after a 16-year absence, he discovers that “home” no longer exists. The bucolic village he left behind, where Orthodox Macedonians and Albanian Muslims once lived together peacefully, has descended into sectarian violence.</p>
<p>The cinematic trope of the “frontier”, so central to the Western genre and a foundational myth for the <a href="http://yalebooks.com/book/9780300078350/american-west">American nation</a>, traditionally narrates the merging of different peoples and cultures at civilisational boundaries through colonial expansion. </p>
<p>The frontiers in Before the Rain do not articulate this narrative of national realisation. Instead, these frontiers reify the impact of the Balkan region’s geographical nexus at major civilisational fault lines, and its long history of domination by successive empires.</p>
<p>The “frontiers” in this film are temporal, not geographical. They are defined violently by each individual group seeking distinction from the other, but with reference, ironically, to events within a shared history of imperial occupation.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/wHBQ4VsQaic?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The repeated line “time never dies, the circle is never round” communicates director Milcho Manchevski’s message about temporal frontiers.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The paradox of frontiers in Before the Rain, therefore, is that temporal frontiers of ethno-nationality operate in a geographical space that different nations have historically shared. Manchevski plays out this irony in a final archetypal “Western” shoot-out, which results in intra-ethnic, not inter-ethnic, bloodshed.</p>
<p>The absurdity of this ending is that each side must kill one of their own to uphold the imagined frontiers of ethnically homogeneous spaces where they have historically never existed. This conveys that “difference” is an implicit and ineradicable component of Balkan identity.</p>
<p>As the history of Yugoslavia’s break-up shows, any ideological attempt to suppress this difference will merely result in perverted articulations of nationhood.</p>
<p>Yet the ending’s even-handedness, its implication that “all sides are equally guilty” of warfare, in turn raises important questions about collective guilt and responsibility that formal lustration processes cannot encompass. This suggests that film has the capacity to prepare the ground for the understanding of collective culpability that is required to “come to terms with past”.</p>
<p>Before the Rain and Ulysses’ Gaze both demonstrate that cinema does not play a substitutive role for the failures of lustration in the post-Yugoslav environment. Rather, it has a <em>pre</em>-lustrative role.</p>
<p>Cinema fulfils this role by opening up dialogues on ethno-national difference and contested understandings of nationhood. These dialogues communicate the level of self-knowledge and participation required of the broader social and national community if it wishes to atone for past wrongdoings and become more stable and democratic in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69714/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Danica Jenkins does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Cinema can be instrumental in opening up dialogue on collective culpability for the past. Manchevski’s Before the Rain and Angelopoulos’ Ulysses’ Gaze are perfect examples of this.Danica Jenkins, PhD Candidate in European Studies, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/697712016-12-15T02:57:37Z2016-12-15T02:57:37ZPodemos find itself caught between the battle lines of Spanish politics<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148781/original/image-20161206-25742-utfxq4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Podemos must reconsider who is above and who is below – who are the people and who are the people's enemy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/podemosuvieu/13967966118/">Podemos Uviéu/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Podemos has shaken up Spanish politics in ways <a href="https://theconversation.com/postcard-from-spain-where-now-for-the-quiet-revolution-43779">unimaginable</a> when it was created in early 2014. Other political parties and the media have been forced to adjust to the populist, left-wing Podemos as it became an established part of Spanish politics. </p>
<p>However, this has created challenges for the party itself. Initially formulated as an assault against the establishment, Podemos is now part of the political system that it set out to fight.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149354/original/image-20161209-31383-1gok6yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149354/original/image-20161209-31383-1gok6yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/149354/original/image-20161209-31383-1gok6yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=647&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149354/original/image-20161209-31383-1gok6yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=647&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149354/original/image-20161209-31383-1gok6yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=647&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149354/original/image-20161209-31383-1gok6yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=813&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149354/original/image-20161209-31383-1gok6yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=813&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/149354/original/image-20161209-31383-1gok6yb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=813&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Podemos has been influenced by Argentinian political theorist Ernesto Laclau.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/dgcomsoc/7223711286/in/photolist-bZMgey-bZMi7u-bZAsdA-cf73oY-cf71ey-mhHx8h-cf728m-cf6ZFm-cf6YPS-r8r2W8-cf7bGU-cf6X5w-mkuD5M-cf6W79-mkvt1e-mkuGwM-mkwxmY-mkuQ14-c1kpGj-mhJbQw-bZMgD3-mhFVuM-mhGmdH-mhJ5Rs-mhFr8g-z2Xrx8-c1kpkw-yD3Vqt-mhG6Er-mhGQ5z-mhGDxx-mhHBMY-n5wMpR-c1kpYG-bZEBSL-c1kp5u-z2Xvnx-yZDVwy-yKs2BR-y65SzM-y5W83d-yKmTfE-yKs42z-yKs2Z4-y65Q3c-y5W9k3-z1X57W-bZAssE-HWqd4p-HWqYbx">Cancillería del Ecuador/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Podemos does not refer to itself as populist, but by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/09/ernesto-laclau-intellectual-figurehead-syriza-podemos">Ernesto Laclau’s standards</a> the party is, or at least used to be. Laclau developed a theory of populism with three simple, if highly abstract, components: a chain of equivalence, an empty signifier and an antagonistic frontier.</p>
<p>Imagine a country in crisis. Unemployment is high, youth unemployment even higher, and the middle class is squeezed. The financial and economic institutions have lost their legitimacy, and so have the legal and political institutions.</p>
<p>In this country, old and new demands can no longer be channelled through the usual institutions. A big part of the population no longer feels represented. Society has been dislocated, with the different demands left floating around.</p>
<p>This sort of situation is ripe for populist intervention. What populist discourse does, according to Laclau, is connect different demands together in a chain of equivalence. Those demands – cheaper <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/08/barcelona-en-comu-ada-colau-podemos-catalonia-housing/">housing</a>, get rid of corrupt politicians, and so on – become equivalent because they are represented by the same empty signifier. </p>
<p>An empty signifier could be a populist leader – say, Pablo Iglesias, the leader of Podemos – or it could be a slogan – for instance, “enough is enough”. From the perspective of the different demands, the signifier becomes the solution to every one of them: if Podemos comes to power, they’ll stop the eviction of people from their homes, corrupt politicians will be a thing of the past etc.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148777/original/image-20161206-25753-ka06cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148777/original/image-20161206-25753-ka06cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148777/original/image-20161206-25753-ka06cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148777/original/image-20161206-25753-ka06cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148777/original/image-20161206-25753-ka06cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148777/original/image-20161206-25753-ka06cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148777/original/image-20161206-25753-ka06cd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In 2013, thousands demonstrated in Madrid against corruption in government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adolfo Lujan/Wikipedia Commons</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The empty signifier has to be understood in tandem with the third element of Laclau’s theory of populism: <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569310500244313?journalCode=cjpi20">antagonism</a>. Populist discourse divides society in two: those below and those above. This is precisely what Podemos did from the beginning: those below (the people – <em>la gente</em>) were pitted against those above (the establishment – <em>la casta</em>).</p>
<p>Laclau refers to this division as an antagonistic frontier: you are either on the side of the people, or on the side of the people’s enemy. And if getting rid of the people’s enemy is the solution to all of the people’s problems, it follows that all the different demands of the people can only be met if we get rid of the old establishment.</p>
<h2>Redrawing the antagonistic frontier</h2>
<p>Iglesias recently said that Podemos must decide whether to continue being populist or not. After the December 2015 general <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/peoples-party-wins-spanish-election-absolute-majority">elections</a>, the question became urgent.</p>
<p>Since then, Spanish politics has been in a stalemate: the conservative Partido Popular (PP) <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21711525-mariano-rajoy-having-learn-negotiate-opposition-spains-uncertain-experiment">lacked the numbers</a> to form a majority government, and the centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and Podemos were unable to reach any agreement on forming an alternative government.</p>
<p>PSOE is part of the political establishment, and so ought to be an antagonistic enemy of Podemos. But Podemos is torn between two antagonistic enemies: the establishment as a whole (including PSOE) and the conservative wing of the establishment (foremost PP). </p>
<p>In aiming to overtake PSOE to become the second-largest party in Spain, Podemos has portrayed PSOE as part of the establishment. But the electoral reality is that Podemos remain smaller than PSOE. Podemos can only oust PP from power by entering into an alliance with PSOE.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/iPxeaEQDdDA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">‘Alone we cannot change Europe,’ says Podemos councillor Rita Maestre.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For Podemos the problem lies in how the party wishes to draw the antagonistic frontier. They must decide, in other words, who to conceive of as the antagonistic enemy of the people. Is PSOE an antagonistic enemy or an agonistic adversary for Podemos?</p>
<p>Chantal Mouffe uses the term <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-defence-of-left-wing-populism-55869">“agonism”</a> to characterise a form of democracy where antagonism is not suppressed, but rather translated into agonistic struggles between agonistic adversaries. The latter disagree, but they agree to respect one another’s right to be part of the political space.</p>
<p>Some members of Podemos – including Íñigo Errejón, the party’s number two – believe that Podemos must think of itself as engaged in agonistic struggles within and outside the political system. Others, like Iglesias, lean towards a more antagonistic attitude.</p>
<p>The problem with the strategy of agonism is that you are forced to accept some of the rules of the game, even as you try to subvert them. The problem with the strategy of antagonism, on the other hand, is that it is difficult to change government policy in the short and even medium term.</p>
<p>Hence, it is not just a matter of how Podemos acts towards PSOE, but of how the party relates to the whole political system, which it is now part of.</p>
<h2>Divided over strategy</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148780/original/image-20161206-25727-dy9u0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148780/original/image-20161206-25727-dy9u0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148780/original/image-20161206-25727-dy9u0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148780/original/image-20161206-25727-dy9u0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=698&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148780/original/image-20161206-25727-dy9u0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148780/original/image-20161206-25727-dy9u0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148780/original/image-20161206-25727-dy9u0e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=877&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias during the 2015 campaign.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ahora Madrid/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Podemos has been divided over these questions since spring, and the divide is personified in Pablo Iglesias and Íñigo Errejón. It extends to the symbols they use: Iglesias uses a raised fist, Errejón a V sign. Although there may be subtle ideological divisions, the divide is first and foremost a strategic one.</p>
<p>This became apparent when Podemos formed an electoral alliance with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/12/unidos-podemos-spain-election-leftwing-alliance-united-left">Izquierda Unida</a> (United Left) during the re-run of the general elections in June this year. The thinking was that, by uniting the two parties, the new list – called Unidos Podemos – would pick up more seats because the electoral system is biased against smaller parties.</p>
<p>The result, however, was that many of Podemos’ and Izquierda Unida’s voters either stayed at home or went elsewhere.</p>
<p>Introducing the new opposition between below and above allowed Podemos to position itself as representative of those below and of the new, thereby appealing to voters across the political spectrum. This <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/juan-antonio-gil-de-los-santos/understanding-transversality">transversality</a>, or the ability to introduce new signifiers into the political and social space, was supposed to realign forces and pave the way for a new majority – and a new hegemony.</p>
<p>Instead, the alliance with Izquierda Unida placed Podemos even more firmly on the left of the old political spectrum. Indeed, it robbed Podemos of some of its transversal force.</p>
<p>Even though Errejón self-identifies as someone of the left, he pushed transversality the most, arguing that it was necessary to create a new majority. But in an interesting twist to this debate, Mouffe argues – against Errejón – that Podemos ought not to shed itself of the “left” label. The “left” is connected to equality and social justice, and this is what distinguishes left-wing from right-wing populism.</p>
<p>In short, it is not enough to speak in the name of the people – Marine le Pen <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-marine-le-pen-could-become-the-next-french-president-68765">does that too</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148773/original/image-20161206-25749-jrozkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148773/original/image-20161206-25749-jrozkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148773/original/image-20161206-25749-jrozkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148773/original/image-20161206-25749-jrozkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148773/original/image-20161206-25749-jrozkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148773/original/image-20161206-25749-jrozkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148773/original/image-20161206-25749-jrozkg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Íñigo Errejón believes that Podemos must broaden its appeal to capture a larger portion of the electorate – not just those on the left.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ministerio de Cultura de la Nación Argentina/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Blurring the antagonistic frontier</h2>
<p>The other parties, along with the mainstream media, have tried to break the antagonism that Podemos articulates between the people and the establishment. Open shirts have even become fashionable among PSOE members who now understand that they have to look less like men and women in suits and more like ordinary people.</p>
<p>At the same time, PSOE (which has most to fear from Podemos) has been quick to cast a dark cloud over what it characterises as Podemos’ populism (a word with very negative connotations in Spanish society) by associating this with <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/what-hugo-chavez-built-the-legacy-of-latin-american-chavismo/267149/">Chavismo</a> in Venezuela. Right-wing politicians and media outlets did the same, branding Podemos as just another political elite interested in power.</p>
<p>All of this compromised Podemos’s transversal appeal. By rebranding Podemos as a threat to ordinary Spanish people (not unlike the old communist threat), PSOE and the right pushed Podemos closer to the establishment and further away from the people. </p>
<p>In doing so, PSOE and the right are trying to blur the antagonistic frontier and break the chain of equivalence established by Podemos. This is precisely what hegemony á la Laclau and Mouffe is about: the creation of new meanings and new chains of equivalence.</p>
<h2>What does the future hold for Podemos?</h2>
<p>Given all of the drawing, redrawing and blurring of boundaries from all sides of politics, Podemos faces major challenges over the next couple of years. </p>
<p>Should the party opt for a more transversal strategy, or present itself as a party of the left? How can Podemos maximise support: go for a thin slice of the whole electorate, or a big slice of the left?</p>
<p>These challenges are more like tensions than anything that can be wholly overcome. Podemos will have to negotiate them carefully, fully aware that, whatever it does, it can’t have it all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69771/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lasse Thomassen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Podemos positioned itself as leading a revolt by the people against the political system. Now, as Spain’s third-largest party, it is part of that system and has some difficult decisions to make.Lasse Thomassen, Senior Lecturer, Queen Mary University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/698982016-12-06T01:22:55Z2016-12-06T01:22:55ZWhat’s next for Italy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148590/original/image-20161205-19388-1yr2r7i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Italians voted "No" by a convincing margin in the referendum on constitutional change.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>A referendum is not (and should not be comparable to) a general election; they are two different kinds of electoral instruments. The former asks the people to express their opinion on one or more issues (usually by means of a yes or no option). The latter instead allows them to choose which leader or political party should govern the country. </p>
<p>Yet the line between the two is often blurred. Especially when the people are asked to vote on particularly controversial issues, and after a hard-fought campaign, it is not uncommon for the outcome of a referendum to be interpreted as a de facto vote of confidence for or against the incumbent government. It happened last June with Brexit in the UK, and it has happened now in Italy.</p>
<p>On Sunday, over 19 million Italians, about 59% of the voters, rejected <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-italys-referendum-trigger-the-next-crisis-69849">a controversial package</a> of constitutional reforms supported by the incumbent government. The “Yes” camp did much worse than expected, barely breaking over 40%. It received 7 million fewer votes than the “No” supporters.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=625&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148591/original/image-20161205-19407-1bf6ile.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=785&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Italy: Green (Yes victory) Dark (No victory); Orange (even)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The turnout was over 65%, 10 points down on the 2013 general election, but more than enough to make the vote legitimate.</p>
<p>The people have spoken, loud and clear. So must the government resign?</p>
<p>For Prime Minister Matteo Renzi the answer to the question seemed clear. As promised, soon after the outcome of the referendum was announced, he resigned. Standing before the press, “with a lump in his throat” because, as he admitted, “we are not robots”, he took full responsibility for the unequivocal defeat.</p>
<p>Renzi’s strategic mistake, his insistence during the whole campaign on making the result personal, has effectively reduced the possibility of the current government staying on to almost nil.</p>
<p>The crisis is officially open. What comes now is difficult to say.</p>
<h2>Three scenarios</h2>
<p>There are three possible scenarios, all involving Italian President Sergio Mattarella. The constitution grants him the power to do one of the following: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>ask Renzi to stay on, with a new mandate;</p></li>
<li><p>appoint a new prime minister who needs then to secure a majority in the parliament to carry on until the current term ends (January 2018);</p></li>
<li><p>dissolve the parliament and call for a general election (to be held in a few months, most likely between February and April).</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The most unlikely scenario is a second mandate for Renzi. Though he has now agreed to stay on a little longer until the new budget is approved, his resignation is final. It would make little sense for him to carry on without a full electoral mandate. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=695&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148592/original/image-20161205-19362-1hefi93.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=874&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Sergio Mattarella.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The second scenario, however, as I hinted in <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-italys-referendum-trigger-the-next-crisis-69849">my last article</a>, would not surprise anyone. The only problem might be to agree on the choice of the new prime minister. At the moment, there seems to be no one with enough credibility and bipartisan support to be able to govern for the next 16 months, let alone pass some much-needed reforms.</p>
<p>Someone from the existing coalition might be the easiest choice (though not the most popular). Among the favourites are Pier Carlo Padoan (the incumbent minister for economy), Graziano Delrio (minister for infrastructure), Piero Grasso (Senate president), or even Laura Boldrini (president of the Chamber of Deputies) – though it is unlikely, the moment might be right for Italy’s first woman prime minister.</p>
<p>The third scenario is for Mattarella to call the election, one year ahead of time. But facing an election with the current electoral law is a gamble not many in the parliament would want to take. Though the current parliament approved the new law in 2015, it was mostly the product of Renzi’s government and many MPs still think it needs to be amended or, worse, replaced with a brand new one. Or the existing law might be the harbinger of disaster at the next election.</p>
<h2>Who will win the next election?</h2>
<p>Before the referendum result, voting intention polls showed the Five Star Movement and Renzi’s Democratic Party locked in a virtual tie, more or less, at 30%. While, the centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi lagged few percentage points behind. Some polls indicated the Five Star as favourite, others the Democratic Party.</p>
<p>In any case, none of the existing forces seems strong enough to reach the 40% threshold needed to win under the new electoral law. This means the two parties with the most votes will face off in a second round. Second rounds are never easy to predict; the results often depend on how the supporters of the excluded parties vote. And with the new law the winner takes it all.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=361&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148594/original/image-20161205-19399-1f360uw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=454&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Beppe Grillo wants you.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Facebook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the moment, many in the establishment fear that the populist appeal of the Five Star Movement makes it the most likely winner. Since it <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-internet-politics-comes-of-age-67521">reached 25% at the last general election</a>, the movement’s electoral results (and the polls) have been rather consistent. Last May <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-brexit-keep-a-close-watch-on-italy-and-its-five-star-movement-61589">it captured two major cities</a>, Rome and Turin (along with 17 others).</p>
<p>With Renzi’s aura fading, the Democratic Party is potentially without a winning leader and might need some time to recover. Should Renzi remain as party leader or should the party find someone else? It is not an easy choice to make right before an election. Change will send the wrong signal to the electorate: the party is in disarray.</p>
<p>On the other hand, to stay with Renzi will mean the party doesn’t listen. Either way, going to the ballot next February with the current law and in the current climate might mean a political debacle for the party, which attracted 40% of the vote at the last European elections only two years ago.</p>
<p>The centre-right is not in better shape. Elections will certainly represent a gamble for Berlusconi and his Forza Italia party, not long ago <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-rise-and-fall-of-king-midas-66740">the leading force in the country</a>.</p>
<p>Despite unceremoniously stepping down from government in 2011 and then being <a href="https://theconversation.com/enough-of-the-failed-fable-of-the-martyr-silvio-berlusconi-20885">barred from running for office by law in 2012</a>, Berlusconi is still very much an active and influential player in Italian politics. However, his many troubles with the law, his failing health and his age (he recently turned 80) have all taken a toll on his charismatic leadership.</p>
<p>The controversial entrepreneur’s political demise has sent the shaky remains of its past coalition into a frenzy (especially now, after Renzi’s resignation and the possibility of a new election in the air). Leadership is up for grabs, but it is far from clear who the chosen one will be.</p>
<p>The new leader could be a woman, but will most likely be a man. After more than two decades of <em>Berlusconismo</em> (with its unapologetic defence of male chauvinism), it is unlikely that the centre-right is ready to respect a woman enough to appoint her as a leader – unless of course the woman is very close to Berlusconi.</p>
<p>For a very short time this year, Berlusconi’s eldest daughter, Marina, seemed poised to take the reins of Forza Italia. Still, the idea never really took root. Marina Berlusconi seems much more at ease with running the family’s large business empire than following her father’s political endeavour.</p>
<p>On the other hand, within Forza Italia’s ranks (let alone within its wider, wobbly coalition), there seems to be no viable successor to the flamboyant leader with the winning smile who defined Italian politics for so long. The situation, however, is no longer as static as it might have appeared a few months ago.</p>
<p>Matteo Salvini, the provocative leader of the right-wing Northern League and one of the strongest advocates for new elections after Renzi’s resignation, has recently <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-vote-idUSKBN1370JR">put forward his candidacy</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148593/original/image-20161205-19401-1gq1u1q.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Matteo Salvini and his campaign to leave the euro.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Facebook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2016/11/09/salvini-hails-trump-election-as-revenge-of-the-people-3_e5b17b7b-819f-481c-808c-92fe742baa81.html">Inspired by Donald Trump’s victory</a> in the United States and a fervent admirer of Marine Le Pen in France, Salvini thinks Italy is ready to finally shift decidedly towards the right and elect a leader with strong (some would say extreme) views on immigration, the European Union and the economy. However, with the Northern League polling at just over 12%, Salvini will need the full support of the centre-right if he wants to have any chance to become Italy’s next prime minister.</p>
<p>Though this is not an unthinkable scenario, it is unlikely. Stirred by the success of right-wing populists across Europe and the US, the centre-right might eventually decide to bet on a leader like Salvini. But this would be a complete change of direction, which might ultimately alienate the larger part of the centre-right electorate. The Catholic and middle-class voters will likely migrate towards the more moderate Democratic Party.</p>
<p>Salvini’s greatest strength is also his ultimate weakness: he is not Berlusconi. He is not charming. He doesn’t have a winning smile. He is not a great salesman. The media don’t love him as much as they loved Berlusconi. </p>
<p>And Salvini’s policies, especially on immigration, are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/26/donald-trump-gets-my-backing-says-italys-matteo-salvini">not unlike Trump’s</a>: they are truly borderline, if not wholly, racist. Italy’s permanence in the EU would certainly be <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-referendum-salvini-idUSKBN13Q4JA">at risk with someone like Salvini</a> at the helm.</p>
<p>Ironically, as I pointed out in my <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-italys-referendum-trigger-the-next-crisis-69849">previous article</a>, the ideal candidate for the centre-right would be another Matteo, as in Matteo Renzi. Unfortunately for Berlusconi and his coalition, Renzi has chosen the opposite side, the Democratic Party. </p>
<p>But as Renzi might soon resign from his party as well, perhaps Berlusconi will be wise to approach him. It might well be in the realm of fantasy politics, but Renzi might be willing to listen and become the leader of a strong and wider centre. After all, for over two years <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-a-country-stuck-in-the-centre-in-2016-68717">he has governed the country</a>, also thanks to Berlusconi and with some of the entrepreneur’s former allies.</p>
<h2>The unlikely prime minister</h2>
<p>Before anything is decided, however, President Mattarella must consult with all forces in parliament. At the end of the consultations, the result might be an election, a known name as prime minister, or a true surprise.</p>
<p>The surprising name pulled from the hat might be that of Luigi di Maio (Laura Boldrini’s deputy in the lower house). Di Maio is the most popular representative of the Five Star Movement (after its founder, Beppe Grillo).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148595/original/image-20161205-19362-dqt5xl.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Luigi Di Maio votes.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Facebook</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The choice of Di Maio might be quite tempting for all parties involved. It would finally give the chance to the movement to govern, to pass some important reforms and, most importantly for the other parties, to avoid the spectre of elections for the time being. The Five Star Movement, in fact, along with the right-wing Northern League, is among the loudest voices calling for new elections.</p>
<p>Though the choice of Di Maio is not that unlikely, the possibility that he (or for that matter, anyone else from the movement) actually becomes prime minister is rather thin. This would be a risky proposition to accept without a true majority. As things stand at the moment, Grillo would most likely reject the offer. He would consider the compromise with the establishment a strategic mistake, as he did in 2013 when he turned down the offer from Pierluigi Bersani, then Democratic Party secretary, who was in desperate need of an ally to govern.</p>
<p>If a temporary solution cannot be found and an election is called, under the current electoral law, the election might lead to political bloodshed. In a climate of widespread discontent with the country’s political establishment, the new law and its proportional mechanism that gives the winner an automatic majority in parliament, most of the parties in the current government coalition might be erased from the electoral map. Though that might provide some sweet schadenfreude to many disgruntled voters, it might eventually cost Italy dearly. </p>
<p>The ultimate winners of the coming electoral melee are likely to be untested populist forces with a strong anti-European sentiment and some more questionable political ideas. When <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">something similar last happened</a>, Italy ended up with two decades of Berlusconi. The ride was far from fun and the bruises are still there for everyone to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
In a climate of widespread discontent with Italy’s political establishment, a new election might wipe out most of the parties in the current government coalition.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/698492016-12-03T10:53:39Z2016-12-03T10:53:39ZWill Italy’s referendum trigger the next crisis?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148475/original/image-20161203-25645-152le88.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Yes or no? Italian voters decide on December 4.</span> </figcaption></figure><p>2016 has been a year of political surprises. June gave us Brexit, November US-President elect Donald Trump and December might give us a government crisis in Italy.</p>
<p>On December 4, Italians go to the polls to approve or reject a series of constitutional changes supported by the incumbent government.</p>
<p>If approved, the reform will amend 47 articles of the Constitution. Some of the changes will be minimal, others are more significant. The stated aim of the reforms, the government claims, is to reduce the size of the parliament and simplify its legislative procedures; cut red tape, reduce costs and improve both the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e3b4ba7e-b59a-11e6-961e-a1acd97f622d">stability and efficiency of government</a>.</p>
<p>If the reform is rejected, Italy might plunge into a period of political uncertainty.</p>
<p>With only hours left before the vote, the outcome is anything but certain. Italian media, the parties and the public are all significantly divided between the “Yes” and “No” camps, though <a href="http://www.corriere.it/referendum-costituzionale-2016/notizie/referendum-costituzionale-2016-sondaggio-pagnoncelli-ipsos-no-testa-ma-13percento-ancora-incerto-cf00023e-acf6-11e6-afa8-97993a4ef10f.shtml">some polls</a> put “No” slightly ahead (but with at least 13% of the electorate undecided).</p>
<p>Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has staked his leadership on winning the referendum. A “No” vote, <a href="http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2016/11/20/news/renzi_se_perdo_il_referendum_questo_governo_cade_-152373164/">he has warned</a>, might trigger a government reshuffle at best and at worst a general election one year early.</p>
<p>For many, a government crisis in Italy would hardly qualify as a surprise. It would certainly not be in the same league as a Trump presidency or the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. After all, Italy has never been known for its political stability.</p>
<p>Since becoming a republic in 1946, there have been 17 legislatures, 27 prime ministers and 63 governments. That’s almost one a year. Bizarrely, the most stable political period the country has known was under the controversial leadership of Silvio Berlusconi. The media tycoon holds the record as the longest-serving prime minister of the republican era.</p>
<p>Yet, for some observers, the new crisis would come at the worst of times and might have grim repercussions not only on the country’s future but also on Europe.</p>
<p>The country is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Its economy is in deep stagnation, while financial observers regard its banking sector as a ticking time-bomb.</p>
<p>The outlook is not helped by the fact that the country seems like a ship without a captain. From left to right, the political class is in a state of turmoil, with new leaders gaining support, while old ones fight to remain in power.</p>
<p>Are the doomsayers right? The short answer is possibly yes, but most likely not.</p>
<p>To understand why the crisis might or might not precipitate the predicted doom we need to unpack the problem to its three essential components: the reform; the Renzi factor; and the economy.</p>
<h2>The crux of the matter</h2>
<p>For the government, but also for some international observers, the reform is crucial to stop the rickety trawler called Italy from capsizing. There is very little disagreement about the fact that constitutional reform is overdue, but it is increasingly evident that the one the Renzi government proposes might not be the right one.</p>
<p>Both the reform and the referendum campaign have ignited a fierce debate and spawned a long list of grievances, not only from the opposition parties but also from within the ranks of Renzi’s Democratic Party.</p>
<p>The text of the referendum question was challenged in the courts for being both too simple and biased in favour of the “Yes” campaign. Who wouldn’t want to cut the costs of politics, reduce the number of politicians in parliament and make government more effective? The challenge was rejected, but the criticisms lingered.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148476/original/image-20161203-25667-1mk6ym3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148476/original/image-20161203-25667-1mk6ym3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148476/original/image-20161203-25667-1mk6ym3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148476/original/image-20161203-25667-1mk6ym3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148476/original/image-20161203-25667-1mk6ym3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148476/original/image-20161203-25667-1mk6ym3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148476/original/image-20161203-25667-1mk6ym3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The referendum question.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The whole campaign – a mix of daily doomsday scenarios and biased messages – has not always been as successful as the government hoped. Not unlike in the UK before Brexit, in fact, some of it has backfired. It has left the electorate suspicious of the government’s real intentions. At times, the “Yes” camp’s approach reminded people of a crooked salesman who desperately needs to close a deal, regardless of the customer’s real needs.</p>
<p>On the other hand, much of the text of the reform is an example of excruciating bureaucratic verbosity. At between 300 and 439 words, some of the proposed amended articles read like a linguist’s worst nightmare. The old articles were intentionally written with simple and short sentences.</p>
<p>Take article 70, which, as <a href="http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/07/26/referendum-costituzionale-la-legge-oscura-che-puo-diventare-la-nuova-carta-rigonfia-di-parole-e-di-frasi-infinite/2921236/">Diego Petrini pointedly notes</a> in Il Fatto Quotidiano, is a perfect example of the linguistic differences between the old and the new Constitution. The original article, which deals with the role of the two houses of parliament, comprises only nine words: “La funzione legislativa è esercitata collettivamente dalle due Camere.” (The legislative function is exercised collectively by both Houses [of Parliament].) The new article will be 439 words. So much for simplification and clarity.</p>
<p>The modification of Article 70 (along with the text of several other related articles) is the proverbial crux of the matter.</p>
<p>Italy is a “perfect” bicameral system – where the term “perfect” does not refer to the quality of the system, but to the balance between its parts. All laws are discussed and approved by both houses: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic.</p>
<p>Italy’s bicameralism is the product of its era. The Constitution was drafted in the aftermath of World War II. The country was recovering from two decades of fascist dictatorship and had just repudiated monarchy for democracy. Between 1946 and 1947, the spectre of Il Duce Mussolini played an important role in the discussion of what shape should the new-born republic should take. </p>
<p>It wasn’t only that. Though still in its early stages, the icy air of the Cold War had already reached the southern shores of Europe by the time the constituent assembly was in full session in Rome. The growing <a href="http://bpr.camera.it/bpr/allegati/show/CDBPR17-1263">distrust and fear of the spread of communism</a> was also part of the reasons for bicameralism. </p>
<p>The solution to the problem was <a href="http://ojs.uniurb.it/index.php/studi-A/article/viewFile/142/134">a flawed compromise</a>. Though it stalled the possibility of Italy ever joining the Soviet Union or again falling prey to a dictator, the new Constitution created a system that made governing and law-making the very opposite of simple and effective.</p>
<p>If Italians vote “Yes” on Sunday, they will de-facto abolish Italy’s bicameralism.</p>
<p>The Senate will not disappear, but it will no longer serve its original function. The system of parliamentary checks and balances will change radically. Essentially, if the reform is approved, all the legislative power becomes concentrated in one house.</p>
<p>Laws will only be passed by the Chamber of Deputies (there are, however, some exceptions where the Senate’s vote counts as equal – such as with laws that impact the Constitution, the legal framework of the local authorities, or the European Union).</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148478/original/image-20161203-25677-g50pcw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148478/original/image-20161203-25677-g50pcw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148478/original/image-20161203-25677-g50pcw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148478/original/image-20161203-25677-g50pcw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148478/original/image-20161203-25677-g50pcw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148478/original/image-20161203-25677-g50pcw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148478/original/image-20161203-25677-g50pcw.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Italian Senate.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Senate will be able to suggest modifications to the text of new laws, but the Chamber of Deputies will have the right to reject any proposed amendment. Also, only MPs of the lower house will have the right to vote in a confidence motion.</p>
<p>The number of senators will be reduced to 100, from 315. Most importantly, the new senators will no longer be elected by the people. Five are to be appointed by the President of the Republic, while the remaining 95 are chosen through a proportional system by local authorities via the elected representatives of the regions and the city halls.</p>
<p>No one really disagrees that the Italian Parliament needs to be reformed. As the two houses often carry out the same tasks, they seem redundant. Undeniably, the system makes the law-making process slow and cumbersome. Months can go by without much happening. And the country is in desperate need of new laws to tackle many of the unresolved quandaries that have developed in decades of bad governance.</p>
<p>Reducing the Senate to a mere extra in the political process is, however, not the kind of change the system needs. If it is true that Italy hasn’t had a Mussolini for quite a while, it nevertheless endured two destructive decades of Berlusconismo. Though one could argue that the system did not prevent Berlusconi from staying in power, his tenure could have been much worse with the new parliament proposed by Renzi.</p>
<p>The reform of the Senate, in fact, needs to be put in context. If paired with the new electoral law the government has recently passed, it opens the door to a dangerous concentration of power in the hands of one party (thus, given Italy’s highly corrupt party system, in the hands of one leader.)</p>
<p>In the name of stability, the new electoral law guarantees an automatic majority for whichever party gets over 40% of the vote. If the first electoral round produces no clear winner, there will be a face-off between the two top parties. The winner will be able to govern the country for the next five years pretty much unchallenged.</p>
<p>Any reduction of check and balances in a democracy never bodes well for the future. Wasn’t that the main lesson we learnt from the global financial crisis in 2008?</p>
<p>The list of objections and problems with the proposed constitutional reform is even longer and a lot has been said already in recent months. It is worth remembering that many of the points touched by the reform are not trivial. Law-making needs to be more effective and swifter.</p>
<p>The Senate should indeed not be a redundant mirror of the Chamber of Deputies. But the new text of the Constitution, the many complaints and the last-minute flip-flopping of the government (Renzi has now hinted that the senators will be directly elected by the people) suggest the reform, to say the least, was not ready to be put to the electorate and needs some more tinkering, especially with regard to its main tenets.</p>
<p>At the very least, the approval of a complex reform like this should not hinge on the answer to a simple –some would say wilfully biased – question. A wiser, more democratic (and indeed less open to criticism) option would have offered the people a question with multiple choices.</p>
<h2>A crucial moment for Renzi</h2>
<p>The referendum is not just a about the reform, it has become a confidence vote on the government, and especially on its leader.</p>
<p>Not unlike <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/12/david-cameron-to-stand-down-as-mp-for-witney">David Cameron with Brexit</a>, Renzi has made the strategic mistake of binding the future of his leadership to the outcome of Sunday’s vote. If the reform is approved, he carries on until the next election; if the answer is “No”, he will step down. Sunday might be the end of Renzi, the unravelling of his Democratic Party and open the door of government to new forces, such as Beppe Grillo’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-internet-politics-comes-of-age-67521">Five Star Movement</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148477/original/image-20161203-25689-9jw8jf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/148477/original/image-20161203-25689-9jw8jf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148477/original/image-20161203-25689-9jw8jf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148477/original/image-20161203-25689-9jw8jf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=347&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148477/original/image-20161203-25689-9jw8jf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148477/original/image-20161203-25689-9jw8jf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/148477/original/image-20161203-25689-9jw8jf.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yes or no? Matteo Renzi’s fate may depend on the answer.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Youtube</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Though not without controversies, Renzi and his government have been quite successful thus far (at least from a centrist perspective). The government has produced several reforms and enacted a conspicuous number of new laws. Yet it has been accused, especially by the opposition, of carrying on without the people’s mandate. There is some truth in the accusation, but the issue is not as straightforward as the government’s critics claim.</p>
<p>The current parliament is not unlawful, but its mandate is ethically questionable, as is Renzi’s.</p>
<p>For the parliament, the crux of the matter is the legitimacy of the law that elected it. After the 2013 election, the High Court ruled the electoral law unconstitutional. By law, however, the new parliament, once sworn in, must carry on at least until a new electoral law is passed.</p>
<p>The ruling makes perfect legalistic sense, otherwise the issue of legitimacy will never be solved. To dissolve the parliament without a new electoral law would mean to go to the elections once again with an unconstitutional law and hence elect a new illegitimate parliament.</p>
<p>Ethically, Renzi’s position is also rather questionable.</p>
<p>Coming to power by means of <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-a-country-stuck-in-the-centre-in-2016-68717">an internal party coup</a>, Renzi has never actually been elected to parliament. To make matters worse, Renzi’s predicament is not unique. He was preceded by Mario Monti and Enrico Letta, both unelected.</p>
<p>The prolonged recurrence of unelected prime ministers and the unconstitutionality of the electoral law, coupled with the stubborn attitude (one could call it hubris) of the government in trying to reform the country’s legal system without a proper mandate has left a bitter taste in the Italian electorate. The widespread feeling is that elections are pointless and people have no power.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, since the beginning of his tenure, many suggested (others demanded more forcefully) that Renzi call a general election to secure a legitimate mandate from the people. He has been hesitant to do this.</p>
<p>The problem is that he has never led his coalition to victory in a general election. And elections are never easy to predict, especially when there is widespread discontent (ask the Americans). If he had called the elections during his first year, when he had a high approval rating, he would probably have won (his party scored over 40% at the European elections in 2014).</p>
<p>But in the past year, though Berlusconi’s ragtag coalition no longer represents a credible challenge, the electoral appeal of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-internet-politics-comes-of-age-67521">Five Star Movement</a> has put Renzi ill at ease.</p>
<p>In 2013 the Movement came within a whisker of winning the election. Only the controversial electoral law denied it victory. Some attack the Renzi government’s new electoral law as an attempt to prevent the Five Star Movement from gaining even more support at the next general election.</p>
<p>And Renzi has more than a few reasons to worry. Recent polls confirm that <a href="http://www.corriere.it/politica/16_novembre_06/i-5-stelle-punto-sopra-pd-b8bf83c4-a395-11e6-b242-6c6c02e892ab.shtml">Italians are more likely</a> to vote for the Movement over Renzi’s party.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, his approval rating is half of what it was at its peak in 2014. <a href="http://www.corriere.it/politica/16_novembre_05/sondaggio-intenzione-voto-175517aa-a396-11e6-b242-6c6c02e892ab.shtml">Only 38% of the Italian people declare their faith in him</a>, compared to the 70% of two years ago.</p>
<h2>Doomsday</h2>
<p>Renzi’s main problem is Italy’s economy, which is also the European Union’s worst nightmare. Many observers have warned the country is on the brink of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/009468b0-3b89-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0">economic collapse</a>. </p>
<p>Despite Renzi <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2016/02/04/ue-matteo-renzi_n_9160410.html">denying the crisis</a>, the hard truth remains: the country is far from healthy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145643/original/image-20161113-9048-kbmz4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145643/original/image-20161113-9048-kbmz4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145643/original/image-20161113-9048-kbmz4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145643/original/image-20161113-9048-kbmz4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145643/original/image-20161113-9048-kbmz4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145643/original/image-20161113-9048-kbmz4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145643/original/image-20161113-9048-kbmz4e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Italy’s debt:GDP ratio is second only to Greece’s.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Public debt has skyrocketed to 135% of the GDP, the overall unemployment rate is 11.45% (only Greece has a higher rate than Italy in the EU). If we consider youth unemployment (between 15 and 24 years old), the rate <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/italy/unemployment-rate">is over 38%</a>. True, that’s 2% better than it was before Renzi, but far from ideal.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145640/original/image-20161113-9048-19jd1tb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145640/original/image-20161113-9048-19jd1tb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145640/original/image-20161113-9048-19jd1tb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145640/original/image-20161113-9048-19jd1tb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=309&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145640/original/image-20161113-9048-19jd1tb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145640/original/image-20161113-9048-19jd1tb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145640/original/image-20161113-9048-19jd1tb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">IMF</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The IMF considers Italy to be in the middle of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/11/imf-warns-italy-of-two-decade-long-recession">two-decade-long recession</a>. Though it barely survived the 2008 global financial crisis, the country’s banking system, burdened by overexposure to loans (<a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21701756-italys-teetering-banks-will-be-europes-next-crisis-italian-job">€360 billion or a fifth of Italy’s GDP</a>) is ready to bust. The shockwave not only will influence the country’s growth for years to come, but Europe as well.</p>
<p>And now the referendum is seen as the last opportunity to guarantee stability and avoid the country’s collapse.</p>
<p>Even the authoritative Financial Times has described Sunday’s referendum as a moment of truth, not only for Italy, but for all Europe. The paper <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e588ea6a-b49f-11e6-961e-a1acd97f622d">warned</a> of “multiple bank failures if Renzi loses referendum”. It is the Brexit syndrome all over again.</p>
<p>The ripple effects of Italy’s implosion on Europe will certainly dwarf those of Greece and might plunge the whole continent back into the recessionary levels of the GFC. However, the implosion will not be the result of the referendum. If it happens, it will happen because the system has been hiding its flaws for far too long. </p>
<p>After all, the current government does not have a solid majority to guarantee the reforms that are needed. Crisis might happen with or without the referendum.</p>
<p>Whatever happens on Sunday, Monday will not be Italy’s doomsday (if that day comes, it will come much later). Renzi might well lose his job (though I doubt it), but if instability is what really worries the markets, it is unlikely the parliament will be dissolved. The legislature will probably carry on until its natural deadline in 2018 (the only way for many MPs to secure a pension). What might happen in 2018 is at this stage really hard to predict.</p>
<p>If by Monday, Matteo Renzi is gone or on his way out, the Democratic Party and the centre-right might not be eager to gamble on new elections. The Five Star Movement might end up being the preferred choice for the largest part of the electorate, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-brexit-keep-a-close-watch-on-italy-and-its-five-star-movement-61589">happened during local elections last May</a>.</p>
<p>The most conservative and likely scenario is one that has repeated itself many times before. As the Constitution allows, the president, Sergio Mattarella, has the power to appoint someone else, without calling new elections. If the chosen one can convince enough MPs, after Sunday, it is more likely that for the fourth time in a row there will be a non-elected prime minister in Rome.</p>
<p>If that were to happen, the Italian Parliament would once again remind its people of the timeless wisdom of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s wonderful novel, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/arts/29iht-booktue.1.14826755.html">The Leopard</a>. In one of the novel’s most iconic passages, the young Tancredi Falconieri explains to his old uncle Don Fabrizio, Prince of Salina, why their family must pledge allegiance to the new rulers: </p>
<blockquote>“If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.”</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69849/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
To understand whether the referendum will plunge Italy into a crisis, we need to unpack the problem in its three essential components: the reform; the Renzi’s factor; and the country’s economy.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/687172016-12-02T03:48:19Z2016-12-02T03:48:19ZLooking back at Italy 1992: a country stuck in the centre in 2016<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145636/original/image-20161113-9045-1bm7ol5.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Matteo Renzi selfie</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matteo_Renzi">Wikipedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the fifth of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Inspired by the SBS Network’s premiere of the political drama Italy 1992, this series of articles has been an attempt to rethink Italy’s recent history through the prism of that pivotal year. This fifth and last part comes intentionally hours before the country votes on a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/italy-votes-on-constitutional-reform-but-it-may-not-be-enough-to-save-the-economy-69409">important constitutional reforms</a>. Depending on the referendum outcome, 2016 might turn out to be a year as crucial as 1992. </p>
<p>I will dedicate tomorrow’s column to Sunday’s referendum. Today’s article, however, focuses on the status of the country’s left, how it has changed in the last two decades and why its long-term demise matters, especially at a time when Italy is on the verge of a long and disruptive economic crisis. </p>
<p>As I argued in <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">part one</a>, 1992 was an <em>annus horribilis</em>. The Mafia’s strategy of terror and the country-wide corruption scandal known as <em>Tangentopoli</em> (Bribesville) rocked Italy’s democratic foundations. The scandals brought down the so-called First Republic, and set in motion a series of events that had several unintended consequences. </p>
<p>Silvio Berlusconi’s ascent to power was probably the most obvious and to some extent paradoxical effect of the scandal. As I discussed in <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-rise-and-fall-of-king-midas-66740">part 2</a>, the media tycoon was a remedy far worse than the disease. </p>
<p>The events of 1992, however, also had a much more unexpected impact on the country’s political sphere: they triggered a long and at times tortured weakening of the Italian left — the main representative of which (the Communist Party) had been, ironically, the only major parliamentary force to survive the Bribesville earthquake unscathed. </p>
<p>Though, unlike Berlusconi’s ascendance to power, the transformation of the Italian left was slow and rather subtle, it was by no means less detrimental to the quality of the country’s democratic system. </p>
<h2>The death of the left</h2>
<p>If the <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-sudden-spring-of-civil-society-67520">sudden spring of civil society</a> in 2002 and the electoral victories of the Five Star Movement (first in <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-internet-politics-comes-of-age-67521">2013</a> and then <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-brexit-keep-a-close-watch-on-italy-and-its-five-star-movement-61589">earlier this year</a>) are, to a certain extent, welcome by-products of Berlusconi’s legacy, the chronic decline of the Italian left came about after a long period of self-inflicted political martyrdom.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145637/original/image-20161113-9077-1mph9kr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">From PCI to PD.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It began in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Fearing a backlash from its association with the tainted ideology of communism, the Italian Communist Party changed its name to the Democratic Party of the Left. It was the first of many subsequent iterations. </p>
<p>In 1994, the shocking electoral defeat by Berlusconi’s coalition convinced the party to join forces with the political centre at the next general election and support Romano Prodi (a respected politician, yet a former member of the disgraced Christian Democracy party). The move produced two electoral victories (in 1996 and 2006) but pushed the party further away from the leftist political soul that had defined it for decades. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8T32EyDrMmM?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Nanni: Say something vaguely left-wing.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The core of the electorate that had identified itself for years with the party’s left-wing ideology was both excited by the chance of finally governing the country (a goal the old Communist Party had never achieved), but also increasingly puzzled by this series of ideological makeovers, compromises with former rivals and the marked inability (some would call it wilful reluctance) of its representatives to deal effectively with the political anomaly called Silvio Berlusconi. </p>
<p>The electorate’s growing frustration was perfectly captured by the 1998 film April. One of the most iconic scenes depicts the party secretary, Massimo D’Alema (a former member of the old Communist Party), remaining awkwardly silent during an election debate on a TV talk-show while Berlusconi attacks the judiciary. Exasperated, Nanni, the main character in the film, screams: <em>D’Alema di’ qualcosa di sinistra!</em> - I beg you, say something, anything, vaguely left-wing! </p>
<p>The final stage of the Italian left’s journey towards the centre was marked by the birth of the Democratic Party in 2007. The party is mishmash of former communists, but also Christian Democrats and socialists, all of whom are now in government, together with former members of Berlusconi’s coalition. </p>
<p>Berlusconi’s electoral decline has made the Democratic Party the natural port of call for many of those centrist forces that would once have gravitated towards Berlusconi’s centre-right. The party’s appeal for these forces has been strengthened further by the election of a new leader. Elected party secretary in 2013, Matteo Renzi, the young politician who came to be known as <em>Il Rottamatore</em> (The Scrapper) for his willingness to scrap the old political machine for a new one (his own), is at the same time the party’s most valuable asset, because of his alleged appeal to both the younger generations and the centre, but also the living evidence of how far the Italian left has shifted its axis since 1992. </p>
<h2>The new kid on the block</h2>
<p>Renzi’s rise to power was swift and had more than a touch of Machiavellianism. After a decade spent in Florence, first as president of the county and then mayor of the city, he won the leadership contest for his party at the end of 2013 with 68% of the preferences (nearly 2 million votes). Only a few months later, not yet 40, exactly 20 years after Berlusconi’s first electoral success, Renzi became Italy’s youngest prime minister after what many called an internal “coup”.</p>
<p>In February 2014, despite continuing reassurances that he was not after Enrico Letta’s job, Renzi outmanoeuvred the then prime minister and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/13/italian-pm-enrico-letta-to-resign">forced him to resign</a>. Letta had been in the job for less than a year, but his leadership had been harshly contested from the beginning.</p>
<p>In the post-election stalemate caused by the failure to form a government by the then Democratic Party leader, Pier-Luigi Bersani (a moderate member of the old Communist Party), <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22285883">Letta succeeded</a> in the task only with the support of a much-criticised large multi-party coalition in the parliament. This included the Democratic Party but also members of Berlusconi’s former alliance – the same ones the party had vigorously campaigned against prior to the election.</p>
<p>While Bersani’s victory at the 2012 national primaries for prime minister was seen as confirmation that the old leftist heritage was still alive within the party, Renzi’s ascendance was hailed as a radical change of direction. The press anointed him as the new hope for a country that many still consider to be the <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/3987219">sick man of Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Renzi was young, driven but, overall, despite his attacks against the old caste, a moderate at heart. He was neither as tainted as Berlusconi, nor was he as revolutionary (some would say crazy) as Beppe Grillo, the populist leader of the anti-establishment Five-Star Movement. </p>
<p>Finally, Italy had a clean, respectable and likeable leader with enough stamina and vision to stir the country out of the last decade’s swamp. All Renzi needed to do was to shift further the axis of Democratic Party politics from the left to the centre in order to appease the European Union’s request for austerity, the banks and the global market, hence guaranteeing some breathing space for the country. </p>
<h2>More Berlusconi, than Berlinguer</h2>
<p>Renzi’s new political direction should not come as a surprise. Despite nominally being the leader of the country’s left, he is a centrist who grew up in the ranks of The Daisy (La Margherita), a party whose political roots are the same as the old Christian Democracy party. </p>
<p>Renzi, after all, is not (and does not aspire to be) a new Enrico Berlinguer, the historic leader of the Communist Party who inspired a generation. His funeral in Rome on June 13 1984 was, <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v06/n18/paul-ginsborg/berlinguers-legacy">in the words of the historian Paul Ginsborg</a>, “the greatest spontaneous civic demonstration in the history of the post-war Italian Republic”.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/pI5jKV8Smao?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Berlinguer’s funeral, 1984.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As a leader, Berlinguer was the opposite of what Renzi is now: he disliked the cult of personality, the use of rhetoric, and any excess. He was shy and modest. And yet he was known as <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/12/obituaries/enrico-berlinguer-dies-at-62-leader-of-italy-s-communists.html?pagewanted=all">the great compromiser</a>, the kind of leader who wasn’t afraid of negotiating with his opponents or making dramatic choices.</p>
<p>During the terrorism crisis in the 1970s, the so-called Years of Lead, he cooperated with the Christian Democrats; and when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan he did what his predecessors could have not imagined: he firmly broke away from the Russians, <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v06/n18/paul-ginsborg/berlinguers-legacy">denouncing</a> the USSR as “a system that does not permit real democratic participation in the sphere of production or of politics”.</p>
<p>Berlinguer’s leadership was instrumental in bringing the Communist Party out of the dark shadows of Stalinism without destroying it. In fact, without betraying the party’s core ideology, he succeeded in strengthening its political credentials and transformed it into a viable candidate for governing the country. </p>
<p>Renzi’s leadership, his politics and public demeanour are, on the other hand, closer to that of Berlusconi than a leader of the left. Berlusconi himself, half in jest, half in earnest, has called him his natural political heir. </p>
<p>Very much like Berlusconi, Renzi is a charismatic leader, ruthless with his foes, and wise enough to surround himself with a large cohort of faithful lackeys who would never betray him. </p>
<p>He understands the importance of media and knows how to deal with them. TV networks love him. But, unlike Berlusconi, Renzi is also a social media enthusiast with a large personal following online. He uses Twitter and Facebook to reach out directly to the people, to answer their questions and defend himself from their criticism (see <a href="https://twitter.com/matteorenzi?lang=en">#matteorisponde</a> on Twitter). </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=296&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/145639/original/image-20161113-9048-1pvahqe.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Renzi Twitter.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Twitter</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Renzi is also a skilful salesman of captivating ideas. He has a winning smile that can turn what some would consider insignificant statistics into dazzling feats of statecraft. Half-a-percent growth in GDP can easily become a clear sign of the rebirth of Italy’s economy and, in the process, evidence of the <a href="http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/11/15/pil-la-variazione-del-2016-torna-a-08-in-linea-con-le-stime-ribassate-del-governo-renzi-esulta-con-le-riforme-dati-migliori/3193433/.%22%22">government’s policy successes</a></p>
<h2>Alienating the left</h2>
<p>Overall, as prime minister, the 41-year-old former mayor of Florence has certainly been successful in rekindling the hopes of the political centre, but has alienated much of the core left. His policies and reforms have attracted criticism because, as some critics have pointed out, these are either a populist nod to the electorate or share very little with left-wing politics. </p>
<p>The government’s controversial <a href="http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/06/03/bonus-80-euro-renzi-una-mancia-elettorale-qualcuno-dice-dallo-a-me/2792175/">80-euro bonus</a> for those who earn less than 1,500 euros per month was attacked as electoral bribery, rather than a true, significant help for families in need.</p>
<p>Renzi’s main reforms have attracted no less criticism. </p>
<p>Take, for instance, Article 18 of the Workers Statute (the protection of which was once a proud domain of the left). Renzi’s “Jobs Act” (the name is a nod to President Obama’s 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act), which passed in 2015, was praised by the European Central Bank, the IMF and many other international bodies. But it was highly criticised by the workers’ unions, by the parliamentary opposition and even by some of Renzi’s party members as an attack on worker rights.</p>
<p>Though the act makes it easier for companies to hire people, it has a neoliberal soul that greatly simplifies dismissal procedures without providing much of a safety net for the newly unemployed. As such, despite Renzi’s defence, many have pointed out that the Jobs Act is not a left-wing policy. It defends the rights of the wealthy, but does little to solve the growing unemployment crisis among young people. In fact, it condemns them only to an eternity of <a href="http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2016/06/10/jobs-act-avvocati-giuslavoristi-piu-facili-i-licenziamenti-e-meno-risarcimenti-per-quelli-illegittimi/3137318/">precarious work</a>.</p>
<h2>Stuck in the centre</h2>
<p>Renzi and his Democratic Party are the symbol of a country stuck in the centre. </p>
<p>While the right, following Berlsuconi’s decline, is undergoing an identity crisis, and the anti-establishment Five Stars Movement is yet to pick a side (happily pillaging votes across the spectrum), the left (and its politics against social inequality) has all but disappeared. It has been mainly cannibalised by a renewed centre that has, rather alarmingly, increasingly come to resemble the infamous Christian Democracy party of old, which ruled Italy for four decades before the 1992 scandal erased it from the electoral map. </p>
<p>During the past two decades, while the communists appeared to be a dying breed, the Italian Christian Democrats, like the mythical Phoenix, have gradually re-emerged from the Bribesville bonfire stronger than ever.</p>
<p>Though the resurgence of the centre is not bad news per se, the prolonged decline of the left deprives the country of a strong, socially conscious political voice, which, especially in time of crisis, is much needed to safeguard the rights of the many against the invasive power of the wealthy few.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68717/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
After 1992, the transformation of the Italian left was slow and subtle, but by no means less detrimental to the quality of the country’s democratic system.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/675212016-10-25T19:39:54Z2016-10-25T19:39:54ZLooking back at Italy 1992: internet politics comes of age<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142791/original/image-20161023-15930-1m0435n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">grillo vday</span> </figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the fourth of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Television networks played such a major role in shaping public opinion in <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-rise-and-fall-of-king-midas-66740">Berlusconi’s Italy</a> that dissent rarely found its way into the limelight. This is not to say that it didn’t exist. But in such a heavily mediated state traditional means of resistance employed by civil society, such as public gatherings, picketing, or even strikes all but <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-sudden-spring-of-civil-society-67520">lost their effectiveness</a> because television networks refused to report them properly.</p>
<p>Consequently, civil society actors were forced to find new ways to connect with each other; to operate and manifest their dissent; to infiltrate the system with the information it censored; and ultimately, if parties kept ignoring them, enter the political fray directly. The Internet provided the ideal space for this new course of action.</p>
<p>Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power, hand in hand with his monopoly of mainstream media, had the unintended consequence of “forgetting” the Internet. Berlusconi and his coalition were exclusively interested in silencing the mainstream media. For them, the voters that counted watched television (most of them) and some (very few) read newspapers. Capturing the Internet was not essential to winning elections. Such rare freedom from Berlusconi’s tight grip on national media subsequently made the Internet the favourite harbour for nonaligned audiences and dissident voices.</p>
<h2>Just a blog</h2>
<p>In 2005, renowned comedian Beppe Grillo exploited the government’s apparent lack of interest in the Internet in his own favour. He used his personal blog (beppegrillo.it) to openly challenge the status quo. The blog’s appeal grew very quickly among the dispersed members of a fragmented and disillusioned civil society that had been pushed to the fringes by the setbacks of the past years. It took only a few months for the blog to establish itself as a new fertile ground through which to defy the government’s monopoly of the media and cultivate viable political alternatives in the process.</p>
<p>Both Grillo’s charisma and following were key to the blog’s swift success. He was already widely popular when he first began blogging. In fact, for many years he was one of the most beloved and most controversial stand-up comedians to ever appear on Italian television. His career began at the end of the 1970s, but it was during the second half of the 1980s that high audience ratings and critical acclaim made him a national TV celebrity. Grillo was not afraid to defy censorship. His satire cut deep into the corrupt practices of prominent Italian politicians and big corporations. Grillo appeared to be uncompromising, and eventually he ended paying for it. Mounting pressure from politicians and advertisers against him forced TV producers to send Grillo into unofficial TV exile. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/qsiqLCGSBaI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Grillo on national TV calls the Socialist Party a party of crooks.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By the end of the 1980s, the comedian was no longer welcome on mainstream media. He shrugged, laughed and, apparently without much regret or economic damage, he moved on. He began touring Italy from north to south, consolidating both a very lucrative career of paid shows and a special bond with the public, who for many years could only see him perform live in theatres, sports arenas, and public squares.</p>
<p>When he began blogging in 2005, Grillo’s long-standing popularity with the public as an outspoken, vociferous critic of political and economic corruption made him an instant Internet celebrity. The fact that Casaleggio Associates, one of the most prominent Italian public relations firms, was behind Grillo’s Internet foray was also of no little significance. Grillo, Casaleggio, the Internet and Berlusconi’s weakness for mainstream media were the perfect ingredients to breed new life into Italian civil society and set forth a new radical counter-hegemonic strategy.</p>
<p>Grillo was a fervent critic of the lack of democratic openness in contemporary Italian politics and quickly his blog became the repository of all the information and issues that rarely appeared on mainstream media. The people who read his posts saw in him someone who spoke truth to power. Some of Grillo’s main ideas were the product of the blog’s active discussion. Each post received thousands of comments. The line seemed clear: politicians (and high rank civil servants) should be held accountable for their actions; these actions should be fully transparent; and civil society and the parties should once again be able to talk with each other, openly and constructively.</p>
<h2>Empowering the grassroots</h2>
<p>In 2004, against all odds, Howard Dean, a rather anonymous former Governor of the state of Vermont, became the frontrunner of the US Democratic Party’s primaries for that year’s presidential election, and in turn, an international phenomenon. For a few months during that campaign, Dean and his strategists showed the world that the <a href="https://www.wired.com/2004/01/dean/">combination of Internet media and grassroots</a> could be a game changer in politics. Grillo and his followers mimicked and expanded the strategies adopted by the Dean’s campaign.</p>
<p>Like Dean, Grillo’s community produced a hybrid of offline and online activities. In an age yet to be marked by Facebook and Twitter, the group relied on other tools to organise events and to make their presence known. The offline work and organising framework of the community was (and still is to some extent) strongly facilitated by a direct link with Meetup.com, the online portal that had become the defining tool of Dean’s successful grassroots campaign. The website’s main function is to facilitate social networking by helping people with similar interests find each other through regular face-to-face meetings.</p>
<p>To date, the Meetup.com category “<a href="https://www.meetup.com/topics/beppegrillo/">Friends of Beppe Grillo</a>” is still very active. It has around 160,000 members, with another 60,000 declaring their interest in joining if a group opens in their city. There are over 1,300 groups organising regular meetings in 1,000 cities worldwide. Nowadays, they also use Facebook and Twitter. Back then they relied mainly on Meetup, Skype and YouTube.</p>
<p>The multitude of Meetup groups helped to shape a self-aware and committed grassroots network of activists capable of organising itself beyond geographical boundaries and independently from the blog.</p>
<h2>From Civil to Political society</h2>
<p>From the beginning, Grillo and his followers were very active. Their aim seemed clear: to inject new life in the political parties of the left by rebuilding the communication link between parties and civil society. To achieve their goal, the hybrid community of citizens that followed Grillo started a number of grassroots campaigns, the focus of which ranged from protecting and sustaining scientific research to economic and political issues. By forcing to the fore an open discussion on matters that had been long underrepresented or misrepresented by the partisan mainstream media, the campaigns sought to reinvigorate the public sphere and make the politics of the state more representative of civil society demands.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=587&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142792/original/image-20161023-15936-1sev16w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=738&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of cities participating to V-day.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Of the many campaigns they initiated in those early years, the 2007 V-Day or Vaffanculo Day protest arguably marked the watershed moment that attracted the most public attention. <em>Vaffanculo</em>, the Italian equivalent of the English “fuck off”, was directed at the politicians in Parliament, who were guilty of ignoring people’s grievances.</p>
<p>Organised on the day commemorating the Italian armistice in World Word II (September 8, 1943), the protest aimed to gather enough signatures in a petition to propose a new law to the Parliament.</p>
<p>The proposed law had three different components: candidates convicted by courts of law should be forbidden from running for public office; political careers should be limited to only two terms; and that the members of Parliament should be directly chosen by the people (and not by political parties, as is routinely done).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142796/original/image-20161023-15946-1bohrq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">V day bologna.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>V-day was a success both in terms of numbers and media exposure: over two million people gathered in more than 200 cities worldwide, though the final signature tally was only about 350 thousand (apparently the organisation ran out of forms as they had based their calculations on the legal required number to submit a proposal – 50,000 signatures).</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142795/original/image-20161023-15950-1fqvdds.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">V-day Signing.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The meetings were set up through the blog and through Meetup.com. In the aftermath of the event, the issue was debated in <a href="http://www2.beppegrillo.it/vaffanculoday/">the pages of the Italian newspapers</a> and on television. It sparked harsh reactions from politicians from both sides of Parliament. Grillo himself was surprised. He hadn’t expected such a big turn-out. “What happened out there” <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/world/europe/12iht-italy.4.7483565.html?_r=0">he commented</a> “was the release of a virus that’s about to attack the political class. But in this case there’s no vaccine”.</p>
<p>V-day was an important step in the gestation process of the civil society that was inspired by Grillo. It showed that the political strength of the movement transcended the limits of cyberspace. The people who gathered in the squares shouting vaffanculo against the political establishment were real, they were citizens with the ability to vote in an election and influence others.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142794/original/image-20161023-15969-1wr2u44.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Grillo and Prodi.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The protesters’ demands, however, (together with the thousands of signatures that had supported the petition) fell on deaf ears. Beginning with the then Prime Minister Romano Prodi (of the centre-left coalition that had won the 2006 general election), the old political class showed some mild amusement, but largely ignored Grillo and his followers.</p>
<p>The struggle for recognition continued in the following years, through other protests and campaigns. However, the outcome did not change. The Democratic Party (which by the end of 2007 had brought together most of the centre-left parties under one symbol) was not interested. Far from seeing Grillo’s people as part of their core constituency , the Party’s leadership saw them as a nuisance. So Grillo and his nameless movement decided to change tack. If the leaders don’t listen, let’s replace them.</p>
<p>In 2009, after Berlusconi won another election (2008), Grillo decided to run as a candidate for the leadership of the Democratic Party (which many indicated as the main culprit of the Party’s electoral defeat). His candidacy however was scorned and deemed illegal by the Party’s bureaucrats. Grillo was ruled ineligible because he had previously been a member of another party, not to mention because he was too critical towards the Democratic Party.</p>
<p>Neither the Right nor the Left fully understood Grillo’s nameless crowd. They failed to realise that the millions of people following Grillo were not a fluke, and that they were in fact representative of a large section of the electorate that cut across the entire political spectrum. These citizens felt deeply disconnected from the political elites ruling the country. The politicians in Parliament were not their representatives.</p>
<p>Piero Fassino, a former secretary of the Democratic Party of the Left (one of the many iterations of the old Communist party) succinctly summarised the attitude of the country’s official Left towards this new civil society. When asked about Grillo’s intention to stand as a candidate for the Secretary of the Democratic Party, Fassino replied with a dismissive smirk: Grillo’s candidacy is a comical stunt, he is not a serious person. A party is a serious endeavor; it needs committed people. “If he really wants to lead a party, he should leave us in peace and form his own party, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BYtLXILmyhI">let’s see how many votes he gets at the election</a>?”</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/BYtLXILmyhI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Fassino on Grillo.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Fassino’s words were a turning point. They confirmed that dialogue with the Left was impossible. To change the country, the informal civil society organisation grown out of Grillo’s blog must abandon the failed tactic and enter the political fray from the front door, with a bang.</p>
<p>Following a strategy that has since become the norm for most anti-establishment movements <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-movements-could-mark-the-end-of-representative-politics-42369">throughout Europe</a>, (see for instance the Indignados and Podemos in Spain), Grillo and his entourage formed a new political entity, the <a href="http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/">Five Star Movement</a>, to directly compete at elections.</p>
<p>The movement started from the local grassroots level in 2009, concentrating mostly on cities and small constituencies. It won its first but <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/giovanni-navarria/move-aside-now-its-up-to-us-italy%e2%80%99s-political-quake">significant victories</a> in the 2012 round of local elections. But it was in 2013 that the movement really came of age. In the aftermath of that year’s general election, many indicated the Five Star as the virtual winner with over 26% of the national preferences, which translated to 54 Senators and 109 Chamber of Deputies representatives. It was an unprecedented feat for a first timer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=190&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142793/original/image-20161023-15955-7fdbyn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=238&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Election Results 2013.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The movement’s grassroots work and its use of new communication media played a significant role in its unanticipated success. The new MPs’ experience in Parliament has not been free from controversy. Grillo and other members of Casaleggio Associates have been accused of ruling the movement undemocratically, of dubious selection practices and of political naivety. The movement’s imminent implosion has been predicted many times, but so far, despite a number of important defections, all doomsayers have been proven wrong.</p>
<p>The electoral trend has continued. In 2016, especially, the movement scored another <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-brexit-keep-a-close-watch-on-italy-and-its-five-star-movement-61589">major electoral success</a>. It won 19 out of the 20 Mayoral contests against that very same Democratic Party that had rejected it. Unsurprisingly, recent polls indicate Grillo’s movement as a strong contender to win the next general election in 2018. The results (which include the capital city, Rome) confirm, one more time, that this politicised civil society (inspired by a controversial comedian’s blog) is here to stay.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67521/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power, hand in hand with his monopoly of mainstream media, made the Internet the favourite harbour for nonaligned audiences and dissident voices.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/675202016-10-24T03:27:03Z2016-10-24T03:27:03ZLooking back at Italy 1992: the sudden spring of civil society<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142779/original/image-20161023-15963-1k7p36g.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">cgil manifestazione cgil</span> </figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the third of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Italy is a land of many contradictions. Throughout its characteristic boot-shaped length, the beauty of its innumerable artworks coexists with the ugliness of the many architectural monstrosities. These are often the product of a complex system built on bribes and corruption. The same can be said of its political scene.</p>
<p>The country’s recent history, after all, has witnessed the rise and fall of a number of indigenous monstrosities.</p>
<p>In the first half of the 20th century it was fascism, Benito Mussolini and his two decades of dictatorship. Then, at least since the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portella_della_Ginestra_massacre">Portella della Ginestra massacre</a> in 1947, the Mafia began wreaking havoc throughout the country, both covertly and overtly. Later, the 1970s saw the Red Brigades and their <a href="http://mondediplo.com/1998/09/11negri">politics of terror</a> dominate the front pages of the national newspapers. And, of course, <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-italy-1992-the-rise-and-fall-of-king-midas-66740">Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power</a> in 1994 represented, arguably, the most comical, contradictory and paradoxical aspect of Italy’s weakness for political anomalies.</p>
<p>However, it seems that the country always manages to produce effective antidotes against its own maladies. This is true from the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ruth-benghiat/post_9362_b_7148902.html">Resistance</a> that fought against fascism, to the anti-Mafia movement that in the city of Palermo, during the 80s and 90s, dared to say no to the racket of organised crime. And from <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">the Magistrates of Clean Hands</a> that shed light on the country’s endemic corruption system to the civil society movements of the early 2000s that publicly rejected Berlusconi’s abuse of power.</p>
<p>Certainly, the strengthening of civil society during the last two decades is probably one of the most unpredicted consequences of Berlusconi’s legacy.</p>
<h2>Civil society</h2>
<p>Civil society is one of those concepts that is not easy to explain. The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio <a href="http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/16437012">argued</a> that one way to define it is through comparison, by coupling it with its antithesis: the state. The former doesn’t exist without the latter. Civil society, therefore, is always represented negatively as “the realm of social relations not regulated by the state” (where the state is defined “narrowly and nearly always polemically as the complex of apparatuses that exercise coercive power within an organised social system”).</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=423&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142780/original/image-20161023-15969-yomrmw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=531&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Norberto Bobbio.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This negative definition is, in Bobbio’s view, a legacy of the legalistic language of the Engel/Marxist tradition that used the same term (burgerliche Gesellschaft in German) to indicate both civil and bourgeois society, thus distinguishing the sphere of civil society from the sphere of the political (the state). Civil society is therefore seen as the residual echo, or what remains “once the realm in which state power is exercised has been well defined”.</p>
<p>Bobbio, however, differentiates the term into three different connotations depending on whether the realm of the “non-state” is identified with “the pre-state, the anti-state or the post-state”.</p>
<p>In the first instance, civil society is “the pre-condition of the state”. It is made up of “various forms of association formed by individuals among themselves” to “satisfy” their interests. The state, in this case, serves as a “superstructure” that regulates the “infrastructure” without “hampering” or “preventing” the further development of these organisations.</p>
<p>In the anti-state realm, civil society is understood as the antithesis of or alternative to the state. It becomes the ideal place that breeds and strengthens contestations of power. The state sees it as negative, because civil society’s challenges can force the status quo to collapse.</p>
<p>These two distinctions remind us that civil society is also a critical breeding ground for conflict. The list of possible struggles is long. They can be economic, social, ideological or even religious. Trade unions, community based groups, charities, religious congregations, non-governmental organisations and other advocacy groups are all examples of civil society associations that either work with or against the state. To maintain social harmony, the state and its institutions must always be vigilant and aim to solve possible conflicts originating within the sphere of civil society before they reach breaking point.</p>
<p>However, if the emphasis of the relationship between the two antagonists is on the “post-state”, then civil society is seen as “the dissolution and end of the state”. It embodies, in fact, “the ideal of a society without a state which will spring from the dissolution of political power”. Echoing the neo-Marxist theories of Antonio Gramsci, Bobbio suggests that it is in this stage that “political society” (usually the realm of the state or of political parties) is reabsorbed “into civil society”. This process of reabsorption is not without important consequences. Society is no longer ruled by domination, but by hegemony. Gramsci’s re-interpretation of the concept of hegemony illustrates the inner and often invisible mechanisms through which, in a capitalist state, consent is manufactured and class hierarchies are not only maintained, but also strengthened, all without the use of force.</p>
<p>“Political society” and “civil society” are, in Gramsci’s view, the two constituent and overlapping spheres of the modern state. The first rules by domination (force) while the second exercises power through consent. Hence, Gramsci’s notion of civil society goes beyond the standard understanding that only see it as a cluster of civic organisations whose most important function is to monitor the exercise of power and its excesses. Beyond this view lies a much more complicated picture.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=916&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142781/original/image-20161023-15958-1ntm4gb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1151&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Gramsci’s Book Cover.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For Gramsci, civil society is also an ideal place, a public sphere where both negotiations of power with the state (in the form of concessions) and more subtly between competing classes (through the media and all other institutions that shape social life, including universities and religious congregations) are articulated in order to legitimise the cultural hegemony of one class over another (for instance, the bourgeoisie over the working class).</p>
<p>This is a form of power that is invisible to the naked eye. It runs through a complex and often concealed web of interconnected spheres of influence that make up society as whole. By ruling via consent rather than strength, the dominant class eliminates the risk of revolution. Thus, Gramsci argued in <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/prison-notebooks/9780231060820">Prison Notebooks</a> that a “counter-hegemonic” strategy is required to provide powerful alternative readings of society that, in turn, can reveal (or replace) the knowledge-based social hegemonic structures that continuously legitimise the status quo.</p>
<p>Gramsci’s re-conceptualisation of civil society makes it not only the sphere where hegemony is exercised, but also the sphere where the power of the state and the dominant class is held accountable and challenged. This role has become more important than ever in Italy in the last two decades.</p>
<h2>A sudden spring</h2>
<p>Traditionally a country with a much weaker inclination towards civic associations (at least when compared to other European countries), Italian civil society found new strength during the Berlusconi era. There are two intertwined reasons that help explain this relatively sudden spring: one has to do with the role of political parties, and the other with that of the state.</p>
<p>One of the main functions of political parties is to be the dialectical link between civil society and the state. They help transform (but also shape and influence) the demands of civil society into the politics of the state. This essential function of parties, however, is not incorruptible. In the case of Italy, the political class’ historical proclivity towards nepotistic and clientelistic practices, coupled with the widespread culture of kickbacks (as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">Bribesville scandal demonstrated</a>), made parties the exclusive delegates of either select interest groups or traditional hierarchies of power.</p>
<p>Indeed, after 1992, the link between political parties and civil society wore past breaking point. Later, especially after the 2001 surprise victory of Berlusconi’s coalition, the situation became worse. Not only did Berlusconi’s monopolistic seizure of the state and its media apparatuses make its government much less responsive to the demands of civil society; but the long series of controversial new policies and constitutional reforms that it proposed were clear threats to the very existence of civil society.</p>
<p>Paradoxically however, as a result of Berlusconi’s anti-democratic clout on Italian politics, along with the weak (and at times almost pathetically condescending) parliamentary opposition of the parties on the Left, civil society was forced to take action. Starting from 2002, civil society movements, more than ever before, became an active presence in Italy’s public sphere.</p>
<p>The catalyst that triggered this resurgence of civic activism was a speech delivered in February of 2002 by Francesco Saverio Borrelli, the General Prosecutor of Milan and one of the leading magistrates of the Clean Hands investigation. In his public address, which officially opened the year’s proceedings for the Court of Justice of Milan, Borelli vigorously criticised the controversial reforms of the judicial system proposed by Berlusconi’s government, which included, among other things, more power for the Ministry of Justice to interfere with court cases, as well as new assessment criteria and disciplinary measures for assessing magistrates’ performances.</p>
<p>The reform was part of a larger attempt to interfere with the Italian justice system. Since taking office, the government had already been very active in proposing and passing a series of laws that directly impacted (delayed or even annulled) many of the ongoing legal proceedings which saw Berlusconi as defendant.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142782/original/image-20161023-15966-1msxaha.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Francesco Saverio Borelli.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Borelli attacked the reforms as lethal attacks on the country’s democratic foundations. He also denounced the Minister of Justice’s controversial decision to withdraw the security details assigned to two judges (who were investigating Berlusconi) as a blatant attempt to pervert the course of justice through the use of tactics that could potentially endanger the lives of the magistrates.</p>
<p>Borelli ended with an impassioned appeal to the people to “<a href="https://youtu.be/SbWoEGaE21A?t=39">resist, resist, resist”</a>. He declared the people’s resistance a collective civic duty, the last bulwark between democracy and the abyss of despotism.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, the magistrate’s words attracted a series of venomous attacks from Berlusconi’s media. They called him and his colleagues a “politicised, corrupt clique” willfully attempting to distort the democratic process by investigating Berlusconi. Like many populists before him, the media tycoon’s retort repeatedly blurred the lines between politics and justice, claiming that he was only accountable to (and therefore could only be judged by) the sovereign Italian people who had elected him, not by a radical faction of “communist” magistrates. Still, Borelli’s appeal injected new vigour into the country’s civil society.</p>
<p>Consequently, in February, several thousand people from all walks of life marched through the city of Florence in defence of the judges. The protest gave birth to a new civil society initiative called the Laboratory for Democracy – Liberty and Justice. This wasn’t an isolated case.</p>
<p>Throughout the year, many more thousands of people joined the <em>Girotondi</em> movement. Taking its name from the Italian equivalent of the children’s game ring-around-the rosie, the movement organised a series of peaceful protests all over Italy. People would join hands in a circle and ring-around courts of justice, the senate, the house of representatives and other important institutional buildings. The idea was very simple, but the symbolism was strong and clear: democracy and its institutions are under attack, and the people must protect them.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142778/original/image-20161023-15966-lbz70p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Girotondi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The hundreds of thousands who joined the movement were disappointed voters (from both the left and the right) and members of the middle class. Usually highly educated, they felt betrayed by their political representatives who seemed unwilling to defend people’ rights in Parliament and in the country’s Constitution.</p>
<p>The <em>Girotondi</em> movement culminated with roughly a million people gathering in Rome to protest Berlusconi’s controversial reforms that threatened not only the independence of the judiciary but also, among others things, the national education system and workers’ rights.</p>
<h2>We don’t hear, they don’t see</h2>
<p>Yet, despite the flourishing of many new initiatives, civil society seemed powerless. In most cases, the reforms proposed by Berlusconi and his government either succeeded or failed regardless of the protests. In fact, the situation revealed the actual political limits of Italian civil society. It was, on the one hand, overwhelmed by the strength of the existing hegemonic structure; and, on the other hand, its efforts were rendered invisible by the heavily politicised media.</p>
<p>The civil society experience in the early years of the new millennium made even clearer that <em>girotondi</em>, mass mobilisation and strikes, though all fine and noble “tricks of the trade”, were virtually meaningless when the parties and their representatives in parliament were not afraid to ignore them. The power of influencing the ‘political society’ remained firmly into the hands of the parties who seemed to have no fear of losing the next election. Any fear would have been unwarranted anyway, since the system offered no real alternatives. And so, unfortunately, civil society’s bite lacked any teeth.</p>
<p>But even more troubling was the issue of relative invisibility.</p>
<p>Between 2001 and 2005, civil society organisations were instrumental in occupying streets, creating movements and proposing new political platforms. Yet, these attempts never really made it to the fore. Instead, they were ignored or only partially reported by the majority of mainstream media (unless they reached “such mass proportions, as with the European Social Forum’s peace march in Florence in November 2002, that they cannot be ignored” as the historian <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/109-silvio-berlusconi">Paul Ginsborg remarks</a>).</p>
<p>But even when they made the news, information could be twisted or repackaged in line with the government’s strict guidelines. The partial reporting of the 2003 campaign against the Iraq War exemplifies the issue.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=388&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/142777/original/image-20161023-15969-1py5e2j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=488&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Anti-Iraq War Protest in Rome, 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In February of that year, about 3 million people gathered in Rome to protest the war. However, reports of the march were heavily censored. According to <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/the-prime-minister-and-the-press/introduction/?p=913">Roberto Natale</a>, head of the RAI Journalists Union (at the time), RAI’s journalists were instructed not to show the pacifist flag, to downplay the size of the protest and to refer to the protesters not as <em>pacifisti</em> (pacifists) but as the much more negative <em>disobbedienti</em> (disobedient people).</p>
<p>In the early years of the new century, the Italian civil society had finally found the courage to wake up and resist the dangerous direction that their country was being taken. Yet, sadly, thanks’ to the government’s monopoly of media, most Italians weren’t even aware of it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The strengthening of civil society during the last two decades is probably one of the most unpredicted consequences of Berlusconi’s legacy.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667402016-10-09T09:32:42Z2016-10-09T09:32:42ZLooking back at Italy 1992: the rise and fall of King Midas<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140964/original/image-20161008-21423-icoxwi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the second of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The constitutive elements that built the system of <a href="https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-horrible-year-66739">Tangentopoli</a> and paved the way for the subsequent rise of Silvio Berlusconi in 1994 did not simply emerge from the corrupted Italian political leadership’s lack of integrity.</p>
<p>Italy 1992 was the product of several different factors, three of which definitely warrant a mention: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the role of the family;</p></li>
<li><p>the practice of clientelism; and </p></li>
<li><p>the politicisation of the media. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>To a large extent, these three factors still play a significant role in contemporary Italy.</p>
<p>The historical role of the family as the centre of individual lives and interests in Italian society was key in the formation of Tangentopoli’s political system. </p>
<p>“Strong and cohesive family units”, as historian Paul Ginsborg <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VEhQd3uzBVsC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">reminds us</a>, have the tendency to look after their own interests, hence developing:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… defensive, cynical and even predatory attitudes towards much of the outside world, [and] towards the institutions of the state. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Families often despise public authorities and consider the public sphere simply as a “plundering ground” for their own private interests. Their political choices are not driven by a selfless democratic spirit. They tend to choose what is best for them and for the family over what is best for the many and for the country.</p>
<p>Another important founding element of Italy 1992 was the diffuse political culture of clientelism – that is, as anthropologist Amalia Signorelli puts it, a well-oiled system:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… of interpersonal relations in which private ties of a kinship, ritual kinship, or friendship type are used inside public structures, with the intent of making public resources serve private ends.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Clientelism was at the roots of the development of the Sicilian mafia in the 19th century. And, since the birth of the Republic in 1948, the political class made the mafia’s peculiar practice of clientelism and corruption the rule of the politics of everyday life of the country, rather than the exception.</p>
<p>By 1992, Italy’s rule of law and political ethics had long been bent to accommodate the will of many patrons and the needs of many clients.</p>
<p>Emulating the modus operandi of mafia dons, Italian politicians and civil servants often acted “<a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VEhQd3uzBVsC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false">as a sort of gatekeeper</a>’ of the public good. They were instrumental in allocating favours (such as jobs, contracts, pensions) to "clients, friends and relations in return for fidelity, both personal and electoral”, or money.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140965/original/image-20161008-21423-o32o92.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=660&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mayor Gianni Alemanno.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Contemporary Italian politics is still fraught with widespread practices of clientelism and nepotism. In 2015, to name just one of the many recent scandals, an investigation of the district attorney of Rome uncovered a series of irregularities in the employment procedures used by the mayor, Gianni Alemanno, while he was in office between 2008 and 2013. </p>
<p>Soon after being sworn in, Alemanno, a former minister of agriculture in Berlusconi’s cabinet and a proud fascist, with the city’s finances on the cusp of bankruptcy, decided to appoint in various positions, and by direct nomination, a staggering army of <a href="http://www.ilmessaggero.it/roma/cronaca/atac_parenti_amici_ex_cubista_854_assunzioni_chiamata_diretta-180094.html">850 people</a> – most of which were family members of the mayor or of his allies.</p>
<h2>The role of media</h2>
<p>The presence of a heavily politicised public-service media and the progressive deregulation of the system in the 1980s were also indispensable cogs of the mechanism that sustained both the pre-1992 system and the post-Bribesville Italy.</p>
<p>Berlusconi’s rise to power was firmly anchored in his strategic use of his TV networks, newspapers, and publishing houses in the pursuit of his own personal agenda. His exploitation of the country’s public-service broadcaster, Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), was by no means less significant.</p>
<p>During his tenure, Berlusconi virtually controlled all of Italy’s TV networks. He owned Mediaset (the largest commercial broadcaster in the country), and, serving as prime minister, effectively wielded decisional power over RAI.</p>
<p>Founded (in its current incarnation) in 1954, RAI has developed into a complex state-owned media company comprised of three terrestrial nationwide networks, along with radio stations and satellite and internet TV. Its main revenue is based on a national TV license fee and is governed by a board of administrators elected by the parliament and, after the <a href="http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2015/12/22/news/rai_la_riforma_e_legge_cosa_cambia_e_come-130002293/">2015 reform</a>, by the government.</p>
<p>Historically, RAI’s editorial policy has always reflected the power hierarchies of the political sphere. During the 50s and 60s, it was controlled by the ruling Christian Democracy Party. But since the late 70s it has been subject to the so-called system of lottizzazione: the political partition of the public broadcasting system between the major political parties.</p>
<p>The term lottizzazione was originally used to indicate the “parcelling out” of land, but in contemporary Italy it has become:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… <a href="https://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjG9dbmvsTPAhWCopQKHZl3B74QFghKMAc&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.opensocietyfoundations.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fvoltwo_20051011_0.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHv1wSz5ctHx">shorthand</a> for the way that hiring for executive posts, journalists and producers is determined by the political parties, especially the ruling coalition.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Before the political earthquake caused by the corruption scandal of Tangentopoli, RAI 1 was usually the media bedrock of the Christian Democrats. After 1994 Berlusconi’s party Forza Italia kept firm control of the network for many years, even when Berlusconi was technically in opposition in parliament.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=458&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140966/original/image-20161008-21443-wa31e0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=576&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">RAI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">RAI</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>RAI 2, on the other hand, has always been the official mouthpiece for the “secular parties”. During the Bettino Craxi era, in the 80s, it was typically the network of the Socialist Party, the Republicans, and the Liberals. During the Berlusconi era it was home to right-wing parties such as National Alliance and the Northern League.</p>
<p>RAI 3, then, has always been the defined garrison of the government’s opposition. For many decades it was represented by the Communist Party (historically the second party in the country for number of votes). Nowadays, regardless of which coalition is governing, RAI 3 is allocated to the Democratic Party and other smaller parties that emerged from the post-1989 transformation of the old Communist Party.</p>
<p>With Berlusconi in power the practice of lottizzazione continued, albeit in a less-democratic fashion. Now the balance often tilted towards Berlusconi’s coalition, while the opposition found itself with less airtime and budget.</p>
<p>So not only did Berlusconi essentially have exclusive access to RAI, he could count also on the support of Mediaset.</p>
<p>During the early 2000s, Mediaset and RAI together accounted, on average, for more than 87% of the daily share of the entire Italian TV audience. This virtual monopoly, coupled with the silencing of the centre-left press via means of political and economic pressure, effectively allowed Berlusconi to establish a firm <a href="http://www.ibs.it/code/9788817002462/travaglio-marco/regime.html">media regime</a> in Italy.</p>
<h2>A shiny and smiley regime</h2>
<p>The regime was instrumental in distributing wealth, granting favours, and helping secure the career of many working in the media sector (such as journalists, directors, editors, actors and publishers). Those who supported Berlusconi and his allies were rewarded with a steady presence in his TV empire (RAI networks included).</p>
<p>On the other hand, the regime was merciless with those daring to oppose it openly. Yet it didn’t have much in common with the infamous regimes of the past. It wasn’t Stalinist; nor was it fascist. The term regime, in fact, should not deceive the reader. </p>
<p>Unlike Mussolini’s, Berlusconi’s new type of regime employed a gentler touch. It wasn’t shrouded in darkness. It prided itself on being shiny and smiley, like its leader. It didn’t even need massive public mobilisation.</p>
<p>To impose his will, the entrepreneur and his cronies did not need force – certainly not of the kind that requires the use of physical violence. Iron clubs or terror were never part of its repertoire. Foes weren’t sent into exile on prison islands, as fascism did regularly.</p>
<p>Unlike Stalin’s, Berlusconi’s regime did not need to carry out pogroms. Punishment was sometimes used, but, ironically for such a staunch anti-communist like Berlusconi, the regime’s style was somewhat Maoist. It didn’t need to be too direct. </p>
<p>Rather than carrying out extended purges of all dissenting voices, it preferred to “educate the many” by shaming publicly only a handful of opponents. It was more productive to “inform” potential critics that toeing the party line was actually in their careers’ best interest.</p>
<p>The regime appeared to follow mainly one simple rule, as perfectly put by talkshow host <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/109-silvio-berlusconi">Maurizio Costanzo</a>, that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Power does not belong to those who talk on television. It belongs to those who permit you to talk on television.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The most notorious application of this rule involved two well-known journalists, the late Enzo Biagi and Michele Santoro, and a stand-up comedian, Daniele Luttazzi. </p>
<p>Not only did their shows attract millions of viewers every week, but also lucrative sponsors (who preferred spending their advertisement budget with RAI than with Mediaset). And yet, despite being an indisputable source of revenue and high ratings, in 2002 the three were unceremoniously sacked by RAI’s management, only weeks after Berlusconi had publicly labelled them “criminals” for using their state-funded shows to criticise openly the government’s policies and his image. </p>
<p>Their dismissal was retribution for covering in their shows the shady roots of Berlusconi’s business empire and fact-checking his many preposterous claims on the eve of the 2001 general election (which Berlusconi won nevertheless).</p>
<p>Throughout this era, Berlusconi actively abused his position to muzzle any attempt at in-depth analysis of a series of judicial investigations that threatened to uncover inconvenient truths about him, his businesses and his questionable lifestyle.</p>
<p>But his grip on media (especially on RAI) was not only useful in silencing dissenting voices, it was also chiefly instrumental in manufacturing consent by manipulating information broadcast by mainstream media. </p>
<p>It wasn’t just about censorship. Stories were not entirely swept away under the rug. Usually, they appeared on primetime news, but repackaged to make Berlusconi look good, or blame someone else.</p>
<p>The way in which news programs dealt with the state of Italy’s economy during Berlusconi’s governments is a perfect example of this particular method of tailored broadcast. In 2004, news programs would still attribute the country’s growing economy crisis to the economic repercussions of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001.</p>
<p>A similar approach was used when in the summer of 2009, a professional female escort, Patrizia D’Addario, revealed that Berlusconi had paid her about 2000 euros to spend the night with him at Palazzo Grazioli, the prime minister’s official institutional residence in Rome.</p>
<p>The story was likely to trigger a government crisis. Berlusconi, then a married man, had built his political victories by also capitalising on the support of the Roman Catholic Church. His political platform openly defended the unity of the family and the ban on immoral sexual behaviour.</p>
<p>Supported by strong credible evidences (pictures, videos, and recording of the voice of Berlusconi taken with a mobile phone inside Palazzo Grazioli) the vast majority of the Italian newspapers such as La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera, not controlled by Berlusconi or linked to his allies, gave intense coverage to D’Addario’s revelations.</p>
<p>Similarly, most of the international press (such as The New York Times, The Times of London, and the Spanish El Pais) dedicated ample space to the story. Yet the news went almost unnoticed on the Italian national TV networks. And, when reported, the handling of the story was intentionally deceptive.</p>
<p>RAI 1’s evening news program, for instance, allocated very little time to the story. Instead of opening its broadcast with it, the news editors decided to slot it between other items. The reporter downplayed the importance of D’Addario’s testimony, while hinting the whole story was a fabrication of Berlusconi’s adversaries.</p>
<p>Without giving proper context to the story, the piece began directly from Berlusconi’s defence:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>One more time newspapers are filled with rubbish and lies about me. I will not be influenced by these attacks. And I will continue working, as always, for the good of the country.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The journalist then continued by parroting Berlusconi’s own words and by using a very dismissive tone. He described the investigation as “one of the many … about the health system”; it was simply about “things of ordinary Italian life”. He then briefly mentioned parties in Berlusconi’s villa, but never acknowledged that D’Addario’s allegations directly involved Berlusconi in the story.</p>
<p>He also suggested obliquely that the instigator of the whole affair might have been Massimo D’Alema, one of the historical leaders of the left, who had hinted to the media some days earlier about a possible political earthquake approaching.</p>
<p>Two members of the opposition were quoted, probably to make the report sound more pluralistic. And then, to reinforce the original point, the journalist concluded with two exponents of Berlusconi’s coalition, who barked out the party line one more time.</p>
<p>In such a regime, information is often twisted by those in power with a candid reassuring smile before an audience of millions, while journalists do not even attempt to mediate or confront the truthfulness of the information given.</p>
<p>For members of Berlusconi’s coalition it was normal to exploit RAI news programs (but also others) to falsely accuse the centre-left coalition of all that was wrong with the country – for instance of causing a 60-billion euros deficit in the national budget, as then-finance minister Giulio Tremonti did.</p>
<p>The system was also instrumental for dictating the government’s agenda to the electors/audience. What types of news were important; what needed packaging; what item came first; what came last – all was dictated from above.</p>
<p>For the 2001 general election, immigration and criminality, for instance, were two of the key issues of Berlusconi’s platform. In the months preceding the election, Tg5, the primetime evening news program of Mediaset’s Channel 5, each night compiled a “war bulletin”. </p>
<p>The program was filled with numerous images of illegal immigrants landing on the coast of Sicily, or with disturbing reports about the rising rate of hideous crimes against middle-class families.</p>
<p>The so-called “crime emergency” was a fixed feature of the evening news before the general election, but it suddenly (almost entirely) disappeared as soon as Berlusconi took office.</p>
<p>The build-up to the 2008 general election followed a similar path. </p>
<p>Even though Berlusconi was officially the leader of the opposition, therefore supposedly with less clout over RAI’s management, the incumbent government of Prime Minister Romano Prodi was <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4f321fd2-6232-11dd-9ff9-000077b07658">constantly damaged</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… by negative reporting that played up savage crimes allegedly committed by foreigners.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In fact, contrary to what the Italian media reported daily:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Italy’s crime rates [were] below the European average. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Yet any attempt by Prodi and his cabinet to reassure Italians that crime rates were declining went unheard.</p>
<p>The regime also worked hard toward demonising anyone who dared disputing the truthfulness of Berlusconi’s “facts”. No-one was spared. Not just political opponents, but many of those individuals and institutions that in a democratic environment exist to guarantee justice and fairness fell victim of the system. </p>
<p>Day after day, in Berlusconi’s Italy, the term magistrate became synonym of “deplorable individuals” whose actions were not inspired by the letter of the law, but by their ideological creed. </p>
<p>Judges were portrayed as the “<a href="https://youtu.be/dBDd-O3w1Kk?t=57">metastatic cancer of a democratic society</a>”; the evil demons guilty of attempting to overturn the will of the people by dragging their democratically elected leader, Berlusconi, endlessly and pointlessly from court to court.</p>
<p>The judges’ legal rights and duties, let alone the considerable array of evidence to put Berlusconi on trial, played no part in the story.</p>
<p>During those years, Berlusconi’s grip on power was so strong that Italy was routinely considered the least-democratic country in Europe. In 2006, Freedom House ranked it 80th in the world, immediately after Tonga and Botswana and just before Antigua and Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>Commenting on Berlusconi’s media monopoly, the late Indro Montanelli – one of the most respected Italian journalists of the 20th century – remarked bitterly:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If Mussolini could have counted on television networks, he would be still around.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Ciao, ciao Silvio</h2>
<p>That the very same politician who would later claim Clean Hands was a coup orchestrated by communist judges and the finest embodiment of the political archetype the magistrates in Milan had fought against for many years went on to win three of the six general elections held between 1994 and 2013 was indeed an ironic turn of history.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=372&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140967/original/image-20161008-21451-o84g0k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=467&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Silvio Berlusconi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Forza Italia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Portrayed by his own media as a God-send, a saviour against the satanic spectre of “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vrop7qhLKj0">kid-eating Communists</a>”, Italy’s very own King Midas, capable of turning everything he touched in gold (even a failing football club like AC Milan), but relentlessly attacked by others as <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/1939979">being unfit to lead</a>, for years Berlusconi was the expression of a unique – at least for democratic countries – political anomaly.</p>
<p>The 1994 election, but moreso the 2001 and 2008 victories, concentrated in his hands the power of politics, wealth, and media.</p>
<p>It was a quasi-monopolistic power that he exploited, almost exclusively, to his own advantage. During the years, Berlusconi’s faithful lackeys in parliament passed numerous laws (for instance, for reducing the statute of limitations on the crimes he was tried for, or for the decriminalisation of fraudulent bankruptcy) and used many other legal subterfuges to save him from prison and his empire from financial collapse.</p>
<p>His monopoly of the media, his firm grip on the parliament, and his wealth kept Berlusconi in power longer than anyone else before him. He still holds the <a href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governi_italiani_per_durata">record</a> for the longest-serving prime minister since Benito Mussolini. </p>
<p>Yet he couldn’t hold onto power indefinitely. In 2011, amid a worrying growing debt crisis, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/berlusconi-poised-to-step-down/2011/11/12/gIQAMJuZFN_story.html">he was forced to resign</a> as prime mminister.</p>
<p>Despite escaping the initial shockwaves of the global economic crisis in 2008, Berlusconi’s leadership had failed to steady Italy’s economy – though the same could not be said about the status of his finally <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/research/do-firms-lobby-politicians-by-patronizing">healthy</a> business empire.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140968/original/image-20161008-21443-dc0sps.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">No Berlusconi Day.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Web</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>He left behind a country whose disease was “chronic rather than acute”, as shown by the <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/18780831">decade-long insignificant growth of its GDP</a>, barely above 0.25% a year. Only Zimbabwe and Haiti did worse than Italy in the decade to 2010.</p>
<p>Berlusconi’s policies, his monopolistic abuse of the media and his attitude towards the institutions of the state had changed the country radically, but certainly not for the better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
This article is part of the Democracy Futures series, a joint global initiative with the Sydney Democracy Network. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies…Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667392016-10-08T04:09:22Z2016-10-08T04:09:22ZLooking back at 1992: Italy’s horrible year<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140962/original/image-20161008-21439-160ikpz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Tangentopoli</span> </figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em> </p>
<p><em>This essay is the first of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/italy-after-1992-33890">five-part series</a> dedicated to Italy’s recent political history and how much the country has changed since the corruption scandals in 1992.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Last week, the political drama <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_(TV_series)"><em>Italy 1992</em></a> premiered on Australian TV. All ten episodes of the first season are available online on <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/ondemand/program/italy-1992">SBS on Demand</a>. </p>
<p>Following the stories of six fictional characters, the Italian series dramatises the events surrounding the country-wide corruption scandal known as Tangentopoli (Bribesville).</p>
<p>Italy 1992 is a well-crafted, mostly well-acted and rather entertaining drama that manages to capture, quite successfully, the bewilderment of a country on the verge of nervous breakdown.</p>
<p>Beyond its high cinematic values, Italy 1992 principally serves as an eerie and timely reminder of the abysmal lows politicians can reach, as well as the long-term damage populist propaganda, people’s anger, and a compliant media (among other factors) can wreak on a country’s fragile democratic system. </p>
<p>Certainly, the events narrated in the series offer us key insights for understanding contemporary Italy. More than two decades later, is the country really in better shape?</p>
<h2>Annus horribilis</h2>
<p>1992 was one of the worst years in Italy’s recent history. </p>
<p>The country’s spirit hit its nadir between May and July, when the two leading magistrates in the fight against the mafia and their entire security detail <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sicilian-tragedy-world-problem-first-falcone-now-borsellino-two-leading-judges-have-been-murdered-1534567.html">were killed</a> by two separate bombs in Sicily. </p>
<p>The bomb that killed Giovanni Falcone exploded on May 23 near the small town of Capaci, on the highway connecting the cities of Palermo and Trapani. Two months later, on July 19, Falcone’s friend and closest collaborator <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sicilian-tragedy-world-problem-first-falcone-now-borsellino-two-leading-judges-have-been-murdered-1534567.html">Paolo Borsellino</a> died when a car packed with 90kg of <a href="https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semtex">Semtex-H</a> exploded in Via d‘Amelio, in the centre of Palermo. </p>
<p>Under their leadership, the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antimafia_Pool">Anti-Mafia Pool</a> had achieved what many believed impossible: not only bringing hundreds of mafia affiliates to stand trial, but also convicting them to lengthy jail sentences.</p>
<p>While these weren’t the first instances of the Sicilian mob murdering a representative of the state, the scale of the killings of the summer of ‘92 had never been seen before. </p>
<p>Millions were in shock as they saw the images coming from Sicily on TV. There was something deeply unsettling about them; they didn’t fit the picture of a country at peace. Instead, the devastation caused by the two earth-shattering blasts reminded many of a warzone.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=652&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=819&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=819&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140960/original/image-20161008-21447-xb6u9g.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=819&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Bombs in Capaci and Palermo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikipedia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The assassinations of Falcone and Borsellino were unequivocal acts of ruthless defiance of state authority. The message <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sicilian_Mafia">Cosa Nostra</a> had sent out was loud and clear: you are not untouchable. </p>
<p>Amid growing criticism, the state reacted by deploying an initial contingent of 9000 soldiers to Sicily. This was the start of a massive operation of homeland security that would last for six years and eventually involve more than <a href="http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA414124">150,000 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers</a>. </p>
<p>Democracy in Italy, many thought, was at risk. </p>
<p>Others, however, believed the greatest threat to Italy’s political status quo did not come from the mafia’s reaction to the state, but rather from the work of another group of judges in the country’s north. </p>
<p>That year, Mani Pulite (Clean hands), an investigation of the District Attorney of Milan, brought to light a deeply corrupt nationwide system that had, for decades, made bribery and kickbacks the tacit code binding together politics and businesses. It showed politicians’ thirst for money and power had no moral compass. The welfare of the people played no part in their decisions. </p>
<p>There were no rules that could not be bent; no controllers that could not be bought. Slip an envelope full of cash into the right person’s pocket (especially if that pocket is a secret Swiss bank account) and you could achieve the impossible: build block of flats on lands subject to landslides; sell contaminated blood supplies to hospitals; pay a judge to turn a blind eye.</p>
<p>The scandal, known as Tangentopoli (Bribesville), caused an earthquake of unprecedented force. It was so powerful and – to a certain degree – so unexpected that the foundations of Italy’s political establishment were (mostly) reduced to rubble, having to be rebuilt from scratch.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the scandal was instrumental in reshaping the electoral map from north to south. Parties that, for half a century, had played a very dominant role in Italian politics were wiped out. </p>
<p>The Christian Democracy Party and the Socialist Party were the most-notable casualties. The two had come, respectively, first and third in the general election of April 1992 (in between them only the Communists). But two years later, when a new general election was called, the Christian Democrats disappeared and the Socialists became irrelevant.</p>
<p>For many, 1992 marked the end of an era. It was a watershed moment. The somewhat glorious past – that had seen the country renounce fascism, abdicate monarchy, embrace democracy and quickly turn the post-second-world-war wreckage into a social and economic miracle (becoming one of the largest economies of the world in the process) – was over.</p>
<p>The Milan magistrates had opened Italian politics’ very own Pandora’s box – only to find out that it contained worse evils than most had imagined, and no apparent trace of hope.</p>
<h2>The Second Republic</h2>
<p>One main character in Italy 1992’s fictionalised story is Leonardo Notte, a slick and cynical ad man who believes his job’s principal duty is understanding how people think and act. </p>
<p>In the third episode of the series, Notte (played by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stefano_Accorsi">Stefano Accorsi</a>) describes the widespread feeling that runs through Italy during that year as an “irresistible wave of schadenfreude”.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/140961/original/image-20161008-21443-ku3io.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1087&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Stefano Accorsi as Leonardo Notte.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">SBS</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The German word perfectly captures the pleasure the common people derived from seeing corrupt politicians and businessmen publicly shamed. Italians wanted revenge against a crooked political class that had let them down. </p>
<p>The daily scandals unearthed by the Milan prosecutors, the violent shockwave of the bomb blasts in Sicily, and the plunging economy enraged the electorate and cleared the way for a new era – the so-called Second Republic – to begin.</p>
<p>At the 1994 general election, two years after the magistrates began their investigation, Italy found itself at a political crossroad. People had the option to either hand power over (for the first time) to the Communist Party, the only major political force that had survived Bribesville’s earthquake unscathed; or choose someone (supposedly) new. </p>
<p>The result revealed history’s quirky sense of humour. The Communists and their ideology, whose disastrous failures were epitomised by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union, lost. </p>
<p>The winner was a newcomer, at least in the political arena: Silvio Berlusconi, the media-tycoon-turned-politician, who has since become more renowned for his many trials (for fraud, false accounting and bribery), his unrepentant philandering and his Bunga Bunga sex parties than for the enlightened value and financial acumen of his neoliberal policies.</p>
<p>For years Berlusconi had been the protégé of Bettino Craxi, the two-time prime minister and the leader of the Socialist Party. But the tycoon’s luck ran out when Craxi became the biggest fish caught in the net of Clean Hands. </p>
<p>Unquestionably, one the most-memorable moments of that period involved Craxi. On April 30, 1993, the day after the House of Representatives had vetoed his indictment, Craxi was confronted while leaving the Hotel Raphael in Rome by a mob of angry people waiving 1000-lire bills and tossing coins at him while mockingly chanting: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Bettino, why don’t you take these ones too?</p>
</blockquote>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/pjihW2gtDTE?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Bettino Craxi Leaving Hotel Raphael.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Socialists’ leader’s rapid fall from grace (he eventually fled to Tunisia to avoid jail, where he remained under the protection of his friend Ben Ali’s government until his death in 2000) forced Berlusconi to take action. </p>
<p>After an unsuccessful search for a suitable candidate to support at the 1994 election, and fearing the worst (the Communists in power while the judges start digging into his dealings with Craxi), Berlusconi had no other choice but to enter the political arena himself. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/3OlQ762Qh-A?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Berlusconi announces his candidacy for the 1994 election.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Winning the election was his only hope of avoiding jail and protecting his collapsing economic empire. Once elected, Berlusconi brought to government a coalition comprising his own personal party Forza Italia (founded with the spoils of the Christian Democracy Party and the Socialists’ diaspora) and two right-wing parties, the xenophobe Northern League and the fascist National Alliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
1992 was one of the worst years in Italy’s recent history: mafia’s bombs, corruption scandals and the rise of Berlusconi to power.Giovanni Navarria, Associate, Sydney Democracy Network, School of Social and Political Sciences (SSPS), University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/611512016-08-11T00:40:16Z2016-08-11T00:40:16ZWill Chinese investment sacrifice Ukraine’s dreams of democracy to economic needs?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129628/original/image-20160707-12750-10zts4a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Some fear that Chinese investment will lead to a painful trade-off between Ukraine's desperate economic needs and its long-standing democratic dream.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/112078056@N07/11877887686/">Sasha Maksymenko/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>After years of rapid economic growth, bold policymaking and shrewd business tactics, China has become a global player. With its business interests expanding at every opportunity, China’s power now rivals that of the US. In Eastern Europe, China’s strategic engagement is focused on Ukraine.</p>
<p>Beijing sees Kiev as an attractive partner in the so-called <a href="http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1978396/chinas-one-belt-one-road-plan-covers-more-half-population-75">One Belt One Road</a>, or <a href="https://theconversation.com/xi-jinpings-new-silk-road-chinese-foreign-policy-energy-security-and-ideology-17994">New Silk Road</a>, plan to unite West and East into a Eurasian market. The attraction is mutual. Ukraine’s economy desperately needs foreign investment, but many foreign investors see its highly volatile political situation as an insurmountable liability.</p>
<p>Despite continuing economic crisis, corruption and war in Ukraine, Chinese investment has been slowly rising over the past three years. While this has been to Ukraine’s economic advantage, it would be remiss of the nation’s leaders not to consider the potential destabilising effects of investment from authoritarian economic powers on Ukraine’s fragile democracy.</p>
<p>Recent Chinese investments driven by resource-seeking motives in Southern Africa (Zambia, Angola and Mozambique) and Latin America (Brazil and Venezuela) confirm such concerns. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-the-shadow-of-colonialism-still-looming-over-africa-8941">investments in Africa</a> have led to a stream of allegations concerning <a href="http://www.diplomaticourier.com/china-s-dangerous-game-resource-investment-and-the-future-of-africa/">the quality of Chinese infrastructure</a>, <a href="http://www.diplomaticourier.com/2013/01/11/china-s-dangerous-game-resource-investment-and-the-future-of-africa/">labour abuses</a> and human rights violations. </p>
<p>African partners (like many other states in similar circumstances) continue to tolerate <a href="http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf">lower levels of democratic development</a> – equality, human rights and political freedoms – in exchange for economic progress.</p>
<p>China’s latest target in Europe is Greece. Torn by a long economic crisis, Athens <a href="https://www.rt.com/business/338949-greece-china-port-sale/">sold its largest port</a> to Chinese shipping group COSCO for €368.5 million (about $A550 million) in April. </p>
<p>This privatisation gives China a significant stake in Greece’s economy, which relies heavily on shipping. The Chinese-owned port of Piraeus is a gateway to Asia, Eastern Europe and North Africa. Greece will not be the last country to trade its resources and strategically important industrial assets to China for economic survival.</p>
<p>Only a handful of dissenting voices in Ukraine’s political leadership worry about the country’s democratic future. They would prefer to look for economic partners with a less chequered record than China’s. These critics understand that successful businesses must align with their investors in terms of values and cultural choices. </p>
<p>Ukraine must consider carefully at least two concerns before opening up to more Chinese investment. How will China’s growing stake in Ukraine’s economy affect Kiev’s relations with Russia? And will there be a painful trade-off between the country’s desperate economic needs and its long-standing democratic dream?</p>
<h2>Where does Russia fit in?</h2>
<p>China has never been Ukraine’s political ally, nor of any other state that aims for democracy and all that comes with it (freedom of speech, free trade, political pluralism, fair elections and the protection of human rights). </p>
<p>Even in China’s closest <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-winner-of-the-ukraine-crisis-could-be-china-37574">relationship with Russia</a>, elements of distrust and historical suspicion percolate beneath the apparent harmony.</p>
<p>In the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, China has not shown firm support for Ukraine. Diplomacy between Beijing and Moscow has always been primarily led by trade relations, energy resources and military weaponry. Far from condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine, China has called simply for restraint and a negotiated solution based on international law.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=370&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/129300/original/image-20160705-19124-evf55m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=465&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">China’s closest relationship with Russia is driven more by trade and resources than shared political goals.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">President of Russia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Still, regardless of this fence-sitting, China has supported Ukraine’s weakened economy through investment and trade. This has played a significant role in reviving the once strong agricultural sector. Since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the volume of agricultural trade between Ukraine and China <a href="http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/12426.pdf">has increased</a> by 56%.</p>
<p>Evidently, Beijing’s strategy in the post-Soviet region is driven by pragmatism. Chinese leaders are aware of the benefits of balancing trade relations with Russia and Ukraine. Economic co-operation with Ukraine loosens China’s long-standing economic dependence on Russia while compensating for the West’s unwillingness to grant Ukraine large-scale economic assistance.</p>
<p>Given the economic opportunities for co-operation, it is important not to overlook the serious political differences between Beijing and Kiev. As in other developing states, the economy is tightly intertwined with politics. Most of Ukraine’s political elites have vested interests in the path to development. Resulting inconsistencies in economic policy could lead to unforeseen democratic challenges.</p>
<h2>A disconnect between economic needs and political dreams</h2>
<p>We must also consider the different political ideals that drive democracy-thirsty Ukraine and communist China. </p>
<p>Certainly, China’s communism has long departed from Maoist-style authoritarianism. Co-operation with the West proves its ability to adjust and operate very well within the regulatory frameworks of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.</p>
<p>However, as an alternative to Western-style capitalist democracy, China’s politics and economy remain very much driven by communist features such as pragmatism, restrictions on information, a deficit of human rights, Soviet-style five-year state planning and a large and disciplined workforce.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=636&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/132710/original/image-20160802-17180-pliyyv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=800&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Maidan protesters, concerned about abuses of power and human rights violations, demanded closer European integration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/112078056@N07/12159238525/in/album-72157644491995781/">Sasha Maksymenko/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>On the other hand, the last three years of political development in Ukraine clearly indicate a desire to move towards a Western democratic approach. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ 2015 <a href="http://www.ifes.org/surveys/september-2015-public-opinion-survey-ukraine">public opinion survey</a> in Ukraine found that the 2013-14 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/21/-sp-ukraine-maidan-protest-kiev">Maidan movement</a> supported liberal sociopolitical values and Ukraine’s decision to shake off a Soviet legacy of paternalism and conformity. </p>
<p>Committed to democratic ideals and the rule of law, Ukraine now looks to the developed West for inspiration. In May 2015, decommunisation laws were passed to remove communist monuments and rename public places to erase communist themes. By December, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Ukraine">Communist Party of Ukraine</a>, <a href="https://goo.gl/J2LkgB">Communist Party of Ukraine (renewed)</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Workers_and_Peasants">Communist Party of Workers and Peasants</a> were banned.</p>
<p>This is an interesting and dangerous dance between Ukraine’s economic needs and political dreams. Many observers see this also in other states receiving Chinese investment. Ukraine can draw lessons from Latin America, South Africa and countries in Europe that are seeking better ways to conduct mutually beneficial relations with China. </p>
<p>Certainly, the vigour and dynamism of Chinese engagement with Ukraine means that, given proper strategic planning, its economy has many possibilities to advance. However, to protect its democracy, Ukraine must also tackle a number of challenges. As the proverb goes, “enter the mill and you will come out floury”. </p>
<p>Before opening Ukraine’s doors, the government will do well to protect the country’s positive but still fledgling transformation from being exploited by foreign authoritarian investors.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61151/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olga Oleinikova is a founder and co-ordinator of the Ukraine Democracy Initiative.</span></em></p>Ukraine desperately needs Chinese investment but, like many other countries in this position, this is giving rise to concerns about the consequences for its fragile democracy.Olga Oleinikova, Postdoctoral Fellow, Sydney Democracy Network, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/558702016-07-07T20:05:21Z2016-07-07T20:05:21ZUK and EU both need major democratic reform to survive Brexit fallout<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128107/original/image-20160625-28366-1sh2u59.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=597%2C313%2C4394%2C2839&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Without democratic reform, the time ahead for both Britain and the EU looks bleak indeed. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/garryknight/27695343075/in/photostream/">Gary Knight/flickr</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887">Brexit referendum vote</a> on June 23 was the outcome of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sheffield-what-happened-in-this-city-explains-why-britain-voted-for-brexit-61623">disillusionment and disengagement</a> that permeated the UK for <a href="https://he.palgrave.com/page/detail/Why-Politics-Matters/?K=9781403997395">much of the 2000s</a>. Sections of the British public (<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-geography-of-brexit-what-the-vote-reveals-about-the-disunited-kingdom-61633">predominantly English and Welsh</a>) voted resoundingly to leave the European Union, a basic pillar of Britain’s economic successes for the past 40 years. </p>
<p>With the weight of expert opinion, geopolitical leaders and the major political parties stacked against them, these voters’ disengagement turned into anger. Rather than being repelled, the voters were driven to the polls in defiance and revolt. </p>
<p>The immediate impact is <a href="https://theconversation.com/brexit-impact-will-be-worse-than-the-2008-crash-61648">clearly economic</a>, but this is only the symptom of a deeper democratic crisis. Resolving this crisis will go hand in hand with mitigating the economic fallout of the referendum result.</p>
<h2>Economic solutions include political reform</h2>
<p>Economically, the time ahead looks bleak. If anything, the immediate shock of Brexit may be less important than the long-run cultural and social fallout that will drag inward investment away from the UK. </p>
<p>Perhaps even more worryingly for the EU, stockmarkets have tumbled throughout the member states. The eurozone will not be immune from this shock and other members, goaded by a belligerent far right, may seek to trigger exit votes.</p>
<p>There is a temptation in the face of financial crisis to focus on steering the economic ship through choppy waters. Brexit itself will take many years to negotiate, and the UK parliament (the majority of whom were for Remain) may well block any law to enable <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-article-50-the-law-that-governs-exiting-the-eu-and-how-does-it-work-60262">Article 50</a> to be triggered. </p>
<p>Brussels may become more accommodating to a nuanced resolution, depending on the strength of economic shock felt through the EU and their patience with the UK’s negotiators. It may well end up with the UK being given an intermediary status of some sort, but the years of uncertainty are likely to leave growth, taxes and inflation extremely volatile.</p>
<p>This volatility is hard enough to manage without the UK’s underlying sociopolitical divisions opening up even further. Perhaps clearest in the referendum result is the UK’s remarkably dislocated ideological landscape. Northern Labour heartlands like Rotherham, Doncaster, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland and Wigan gave thumping majorities for Leave. Scotland, Northern Ireland and the metropolitan cities of London, Manchester and Liverpool voted the other way, albeit with less enthusiastic turnouts. </p>
<p>These divisions are complex, yet stark. With immigration the number one grievance for Leave voters, there is a clear feeling of cultural, alongside economic, injustice.</p>
<p>Worryingly, these tensions appear to be spreading throughout Europe. We see far-right movements in <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-new-era-may-be-dawning-again-for-radical-right-populists-in-austria-and-europe-61662">countries like Italy, France, Austria and Germany</a>, and worrying signs of racially driven attacks. </p>
<p>These problems must be tackled alongside attempts to stabilise economic growth. This can only be done by political leaders genuinely reforming. This needs to happen in UK parties and parliamentary democracy, but also in the EU.</p>
<h2>Britain needs a representative Labour Party</h2>
<p>Aside from the future of the United Kingdom as a “whole”, the breakdown in party-political allegiances poses a monumental challenge for British parties. How can they realign themselves to represent the desires of their traditional supporters? </p>
<p>Given that any strong democracy requires a strong opposition, how might Labour in particular deal, ideologically, with issues close to the hearts of working-class communities? </p>
<p>While some <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/53094-2/">“blue labour”</a> advocates have highlighted for a while the dangers of ignoring local community and identity, the party has struggled with being pulled in different directions over the immigration issue. Should social democratic thinkers pay more attention to community cohesion and identity as well as economic inequality? Would reforms to address the latter necessarily ameliorate the former? </p>
<p>As former Labour leader Ed Miliband <a href="https://theconversation.com/if-it-is-sensible-labour-wont-erase-ed-miliband-from-its-collective-memory-42792">found out</a>, this connection cannot be engineered. It must grow from the bottom up and inform the very heart of a party and its ideas.</p>
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<h2>We need a constitutional convention</h2>
<p>In Westminster, MPs from both major parties have turned against their leaders. Really, they should be looking at the country’s democratic system. In the 2015 general election, the first-past-the-post system <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-case-for-proportional-representation-in-the-uk-just-became-clearer-41544">gave UKIP one seat</a> for its 3.9 million votes – 12.7% of the total. This built up even more resentment from UKIP voters that the “elite” was rallying against them. </p>
<p>Now Scotland may well seek independence. Pro-Remain London may want special dispensation in protest against this savagely majoritarian referendum result. </p>
<p>The splits in British society are becoming reminiscent of countries wracked by historic internal divisions, like Belgium or Spain. These tend to be kept together by proportional electoral systems and highly decentralised, federalist structures. We should consider adopting similar arrangements.</p>
<p>All major parties need to hold a joint constitutional convention to look at ways of reforming our broken system. They need to set up a coherent <a href="http://www.democraticaudit.com/?p=22508">federal constitution</a>. This should give each part of the country clear autonomy from Westminster and enshrine explicit responsibilities to appropriate levels of government. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-strange-resurrection-of-the-british-political-tradition/">British “political tradition”</a> of parliamentary sovereignty can no longer be allowed to get in the way when the country’s politics have fragmented so dramatically and dangerously.</p>
<h2>We need a democratic Europe</h2>
<p>In the European Union more generally, there will be a temptation to close ranks, get the negotiations over with, and proceed with business as usual. However, the UK’s vote not only reflects domestic political dynamics, but is the culmination of a more long-term democratic deficit in the EU’s governance structures. A range of possible reforms can be made, all of which have knocked around for some time. </p>
<p>Potentially, more extensive, transparent and (crucially) well-resourced <a href="http://fpc.org.uk/publications/eudemocratic">stakeholder engagement</a> with a broader range of groups in European society could improve EU legitimacy. This “incremental” democratisation is necessary to bring a far greater range of citizens to the table and to ensure EU governance has tangible meaning for them. </p>
<p>In the wake of Brexit, however, reform must be far broader. The European Parliament, for example, must become recognised by countries beyond the most “Europhile” ones as a legitimate centre of political debate and decision-making. </p>
<p>Also, countries from across the EU need to find a way of getting citizens talking to each other about common European problems and ways to solve them collectively. Fostering and enabling a <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12163/abstract?userIsAuthenticated=false&deniedAccessCustomisedMessage=">European public sphere</a> is not simply a fanciful wish of political theory; it is now a political and economic necessity.</p>
<h2>Why we need democratic reform</h2>
<p>At a national and transnational level, democratic reform is desperately needed in both Britain and the EU to prevent the tensions in this referendum becoming more protracted or even violent. </p>
<p>In his post-referendum speech, Leave campaign leader Boris Johnson claimed Britain still had a place in Europe and British people were “proud Europeans”. I suspect many voting Leave and some politicians within touching distance of power disagree with him profoundly. </p>
<p>Whatever happens in coming months and years, the negotiations to come should be used as a crucial turning point for democratising both national and transnational politics.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55870/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Wood receives funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council, for research informing his contribution to the Foreign Policy Centre's recent report Europe and the People: Examining the EU's Democratic Legitimacy.</span></em></p>The Brexit vote was the outcome of the disillusionment and disengagement that have permeated the UK. Many Europeans share that mood, which is why both the UK and EU need radical democratic surgery.Matthew Wood, Postdoctoral Research Associate, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/616622016-07-04T00:36:49Z2016-07-04T00:36:49ZA new era may be dawning again for radical right populists in Austria and Europe<p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>After Brexit, last week delivered another potentially far-reaching result for radical right populists in Europe. On Friday, Austria’s Constitutional Court <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36681475">upheld a challenge</a> brought by the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) against the outcome of the May 22 presidential election. The run-off, in which the Green-backed Alexander Van der Bellen finished narrowly ahead of the FPÖ’s Norbert Hofer, will have to be run again.</p>
<p>Although Hofer <a href="https://theconversation.com/austrian-election-a-country-turns-its-back-on-a-political-cartel-59647">lost the second round</a>, his 49.7% result was still an important landmark. It showed that voting for such parties may no longer be the preserve of a clear minority. Another 30,000 or so votes and Western Europe would have had its first radical right populist president. After the successful court challenge, it still might.</p>
<p>If Hofer is eventually elected, it won’t be the first time Austria witnesses the dawn of a new era for the far right. At the beginning of the century, in January 2000, all of Austria’s European Union (EU) partners <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/625728.stm">issued an ultimatum</a>: if the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) went ahead with plans to form a governing coalition with the FPÖ – whose values were considered in conflict with the EU’s – sanctions would be imposed.</p>
<p>The ÖVP did not back down. The FPÖ took its place in a government led by the ÖVP’s Wolfgang Schüssel and Austria became a pariah within the EU. Sanctions lasted until September 2000, when an <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/917099.stm">expert report</a> found no problems with Austria’s human rights record and concluded that the FPÖ ministers had behaved themselves so far.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128939/original/image-20160701-30638-1ik6m8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128939/original/image-20160701-30638-1ik6m8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128939/original/image-20160701-30638-1ik6m8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128939/original/image-20160701-30638-1ik6m8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128939/original/image-20160701-30638-1ik6m8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=633&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128939/original/image-20160701-30638-1ik6m8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128939/original/image-20160701-30638-1ik6m8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128939/original/image-20160701-30638-1ik6m8p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A lot has changed since 2000 when Wolfgang Schüssel faced EU sanctions for including the Austrian Freedom Party in his government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.kremlin.ru/events/photos/2003/05/46482.shtml">Russian Presidential Press</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Thinking back to the international controversy Austria aroused 16 years ago reminds us how much has changed in Western Europe. Since then, radical right populist parties have participated as junior coalition partners in <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2010.508911">Italy</a>, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/16/eu.thefarright">Netherlands</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/finland-election-anti-eu-right-marches-onto-centre-stage-40504">Finland</a> and <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/takis-s-pappas/not-so-strange-bedfellows-making-sense-of-coalition-between-syriza">Greece</a>. </p>
<p>Radical right populist parties have also provided centre-right governments with essential parliamentary support in exchange for policy concessions in <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/opinion/denmarks-far-right-kingmakers.html">Denmark</a> and, again, the <a href="http://new.www.huffingtonpost.com/cas-mudde/the-pvv-at-10-writing-dut_b_9292590.html">Netherlands</a>. They have increasingly become, to use the German term, <em>koalitionsfähig</em>: “coalitionable”.</p>
<h2>Learning to manage power</h2>
<p>Back in the early years of the last decade, moderates consoled themselves with the fact that the FPÖ’s time in coalition government turned out to be a very damaging shambles for the party. It lost votes and ministers at an alarming rate. Eventually, the party split. </p>
<p>Since then, academics have <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380312331280608">cited the case of the FPÖ</a> as exemplifying why power is bad for populists. Inclusion in government will either tame or break them. It might even do both.</p>
<p>However, while the Austrian case may have been a key moment in the history of Western European radical right populist parties, the negative experience of the FPÖ in government has not been shared by all Western European radical right populists.</p>
<p>In our 2015 book <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Populists-in-Power/Albertazzi-McDonnell/p/book/9780415600972">Populists in Power</a>, Daniele Albertazzi and I looked at what happened when right-wing populists in Italy and Switzerland entered into government. In the case of the Northern League (LN) in Italy and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), we found that – unlike the FPÖ – these parties were able to achieve key policy victories and survive the experience of government without toning down their rhetoric or losing the support of voters and party members.</p>
<p>Notably, in our interviews and surveys with representatives and grassroots members of the two parties, we found that they were not radical hotheads with unrealistic expectations. Instead, they were generally pragmatic about the policy gains that could be achieved and the compromises that being in power with other parties entails.</p>
<h2>Building parties to last</h2>
<p>The ability to keep their members on board was due not only to the successes on their main issues achieved by the LN and SVP in government, but also to the attention devoted by both parties to their grassroots. </p>
<p>Whether they were in large cities or small provincial towns, members told us they felt that their party cared about them. They also believed they were part of an important mission to protect their communities from the threats that a series of distant elites and dangerous “others” (especially immigrants) posed to their wellbeing and identity.</p>
<p>The importance most radical right populists attach to party organisation, in addition to their key issues like immigration, also helps explain why the FPÖ was able to survive many setbacks in the last decade and bounce back to enjoy electoral successes under its new leader, Heinz-Christian Strache.</p>
<p>With the exception of Geert Wilders’ <a href="http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/01/22/1354068815627398.abstract">“memberless party”</a>, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, radical right populist parties in 21st-century Western Europe are being built to last. They are not dependent on a single leader like personal parties such as Silvio Berlusconi’s <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.01007.x/abstract">Forza Italia</a>. </p>
<p>Long-established parties like the French Front National, the Italian Northern League and the Danish People’s Party have all seen their founder-leaders step down in recent years and are doing better than ever in the polls.</p>
<p>The next challenge for radical right populists in Western Europe, if and when one of them becomes the leading party in government, will be coping with the new pressures of being in power. Given <a href="https://neuwal.com/wahlumfragen/index.php?cid=1">current opinion polls</a> in Austria, which show the FPÖ well ahead of both the traditional major parties, the next general election – to be held by 2018 – could well deliver a coalition featuring the FPÖ as the lead party with a mainstream junior partner. </p>
<p>Austria may therefore find itself in a few years’ time with both a radical right president and chancellor.</p>
<p>If the European Union’s silence about <a href="https://theconversation.com/stranded-on-a-platform-refugees-feel-the-force-of-hostility-in-hungary-47047">Viktor Orbán’s illiberal democracy in Hungary</a> is anything to go by, the EU’s leading lights are unlikely to raise much more than a murmur of protest if we do enter a new era of radical right populists in power in Austria or elsewhere in Western Europe. </p>
<p>And, this time around, don’t necessarily expect the populists to fail at it either.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61662/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Duncan McDonnell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Radical right populists are on the brink of power in Austria and making gains across the region. And the European leaders who once were willing to publicly condemn them are silent now.Duncan McDonnell, Senior Lecturer, School of Government and International Relations, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/558692016-04-29T22:44:48Z2016-04-29T22:44:48ZIn defence of left-wing populism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114819/original/image-20160311-11277-ap5ubd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">There is no better alternative than the rise of the populist left for Europe and beyond.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.thepeoplesassembly.org.uk/graphics_photography">The People's Assembly Against Austerity</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> between The Conversation and the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>We are witnessing a crisis of representative democracy in most European countries. As I argued in <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Political-Thinking-Action-Chantal-Mouffe/dp/0415305217">“On the Political”</a>, this is the outcome of the “consensus at the centre” established under the neoliberal hegemony between centre-right and centre-left parties. </p>
<p>This post-political situation has led to the disappearance from political discourse of the idea that there is an alternative to neoliberal globalisation. This forecloses the possibility of agonistic debate and drastically reduces the choice offered to citizens through elections.</p>
<p>There are people who celebrate this consensus. They offer it as a sign that adversarial politics has finally become obsolete so that democracy can mature. I disagree.</p>
<h2>A vote but not a voice</h2>
<p>The “post-political” situation has created a favourable terrain for populist parties that claim to represent all who feel unheard and ignored in the existing representative system. Their appeal is to “the people” against the uncaring “political establishment” that, having abandoned the popular sectors, concerns itself exclusively with the interests of the elites.</p>
<p>The problem, however, is that in general the populism of those parties has a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/world/europe/voter-insecurities-feed-rise-of-right-leaning-populist-politicians.html?_r=0">right-wing character</a>. Often, the way they bring together a series of heterogeneous social demands is by using a xenophobic rhetoric. This constructs the unity of “the people” through the exclusion of immigrants.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114814/original/image-20160311-11285-7tdfo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114814/original/image-20160311-11285-7tdfo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114814/original/image-20160311-11285-7tdfo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114814/original/image-20160311-11285-7tdfo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114814/original/image-20160311-11285-7tdfo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114814/original/image-20160311-11285-7tdfo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114814/original/image-20160311-11285-7tdfo6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the People’s Assembly Against Austerity in the UK protest against the right’s marginalisation of immigrants.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Holt/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So, the crisis of representative democracy is not a crisis of representative democracy per se but a crisis of its current post-democratic incarnation. As Spain’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/spain-dispatches-from-the-frontline-of-the-indignados-movement-7091">Indignados</a> protest:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We have a vote but we do not have a voice.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>On face value, it seems the best way to restore the partisan nature of politics and thereby remedy the lack of agonistic debate is by reviving the adversarial dimension of the left-right opposition that “third way” politics has evacuated. However, this is simply not going to be possible in most countries. Another strategy is needed.</p>
<p>When we examine the state of the “centre-left” parties in Europe we realise they have become too complicit in the workings of neoliberal hegemony to offer an alternative. This became evident during the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_debt_crisis">crisis of 2008</a>. Even in their window of opportunity, these parties were unable to regain initiative and use the power of the state to put forward a more progressive politics. </p>
<p>Since then, the centre-left’s compromise with the system has deepened. These parties have not only accepted but also contributed to the politics of austerity. The resulting disastrous measures have brought misery and unemployment in Europe.</p>
<p>If the “centre-left” advocates what Stuart Hall calls “<a href="http://www.mas.org.uk/uploads/100flowers/The%20neo-liberal%20revolution%20by%20Stuart%20Hall.pdf">a social liberal version of neoliberalism</a>”, it is no surprise that resistance to those measures, when it finally came from the progressive side, could only be expressed through protest movements like the Indignados and <a href="https://theconversation.com/rethinking-the-occupy-movement-7121">Occupy</a>, which called for the rejection of representative institutions. </p>
<p>While these movements brought to the fore the widespread potential of dissatisfaction with the neoliberal order, their refusal to engage with political institutions limited their impact. Without any articulation with parliamentary politics, they soon began to lose their dynamism.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114816/original/image-20160311-11302-1khl2z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114816/original/image-20160311-11302-1khl2z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114816/original/image-20160311-11302-1khl2z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114816/original/image-20160311-11302-1khl2z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114816/original/image-20160311-11302-1khl2z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114816/original/image-20160311-11302-1khl2z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114816/original/image-20160311-11302-1khl2z2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The left’s recent refusal to engage with political institutions has left it struggling for long-term representation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hernán Piñera/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Progressive politics finds a new way</h2>
<p>Fortunately, two exceptions stand out. They indicate how a new progressive politics <a href="https://theconversation.com/are-you-ready-for-a-new-kind-of-left-wing-politics-33511">can be envisaged</a>. </p>
<p>In Greece, <a href="https://theconversation.com/syrizas-not-so-radical-politics-and-europes-economic-choice-36229">Syriza</a>, born of a coalition of different left movements around <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synaspismos">Synaspismos</a>, the former eurocommunist party of the interior, succeeded in creating a new type of radical party. Its objective was to challenge neoliberal hegemony through parliamentary politics. The aim was clearly not the demise of liberal democratic institutions but rather their transformation into vehicles for the expression of popular demands.</p>
<p>In Spain, the meteoric rise of <a href="https://theconversation.com/postcard-from-spain-where-now-for-the-quiet-revolution-43779">Podemos in 2014</a> was due to the capacity of a group of young intellectuals to take advantage of the terrain created by the Indignados to organise a party-movement. The group intended to break the stalemate of the consensual politics established through the transition to democracy but whose exhaustion was now evident. Their strategy was to create a popular collective will by constructing a frontier between the establishment elites (la Casta) and “the people”.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118298/original/image-20160412-15861-spkp45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118298/original/image-20160412-15861-spkp45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118298/original/image-20160412-15861-spkp45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118298/original/image-20160412-15861-spkp45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118298/original/image-20160412-15861-spkp45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=704&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118298/original/image-20160412-15861-spkp45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118298/original/image-20160412-15861-spkp45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118298/original/image-20160412-15861-spkp45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=884&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pablo Iglesias, Podemos secretary-general since 2014, was a lecturer in political science.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/culturaargentina/16104083334/in/photolist-qx4CVd-pcF8Mt-qrN4rU-rcGTCz-okacrN-qrNH4u-pRSMxA-tjRT13-nYGgcE-pcrH9Y-pcrGoQ-p7aX3o-pRZEBM-pRZFaa-oBDN7K-pRRWwC-oBDJuf-oBnPwB-pcrGGf-pS1T9X-q9r6Fz-oBDCyX-oncJQx-oDtaCu-oFqxJ6-oncDNi-onb3Es-onc2eN-oDFBye-oBDY7q-onbYAo-oDoWAT-oDs6Bf-oDoZWR-onbFLD-oDsV6U-onb3hU-oDp1Q4-onbNMc-onbdFt-pRZF3X-pcrHku-pS1TP4-q9fND4-q9r7s4-pRZEKx-q79CMu-onbLmk-onbkoW-oFqzo8">flickr/Ministerio de Cultura de la Nación Argentina</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In many European countries we now encounter what can be called “a populist situation”. A vibrant democratic politics can no longer be conceived in terms of the traditional left-right axis. </p>
<p>This is due not only to the post-political blurring of this type of frontier, but also to the fact that the transformations of capitalism brought about by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-Fordism">post-Fordism</a> and the dominance of financial capital are at the origin of a multiplicity of new democratic demands. These can no longer be addressed by simply reactivating the left-right confrontation: they require the establishment of a different type of frontier.</p>
<p>What is at stake is the connection of a variety of democratic demands with the potential to create a “collective will” struggling for another hegemony. It is clear that the democratic demands in our society cannot all be expressed through a “verticalist” party form that subordinates mass movements. </p>
<p>Even if it was reformed, it is not always possible or desirable to force democratic demands expressed through horizontal social movements into the hierarchical verticalist mode.</p>
<p>We need a new form of political organisation that can articulate both modes, where the unity of progressive people will be constituted not, as in the case of right-wing populism, by the exclusion of immigrants, but by the determination of an adversary represented by neoliberal forces. This is what I understand by “<a href="https://theconversation.com/populism-and-democracy-friend-or-foe-rising-stars-deepen-dilemma-39695">left-wing populism</a>”.</p>
<h2>Reclaiming populism for the left</h2>
<p>“Populist” is usually used in a negative way. This is a mistake, because populism represents an important dimension of democracy. Democracy understood as “power of the people” requires the existence of a “demos” – a “people”. Instead of rejecting the term populist, we should reclaim it.</p>
<p>The agonistic struggle is more than a struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects. It is a struggle about the construction of the people.</p>
<p>It is important for the left to grasp the nature of this struggle. Seen in terms of a “collective will”, “the people” are always a political construct.</p>
<p>There is no “we” without a “they”. It is how the adversary is defined that will determine the identity of the people. In this relationship lies one of the main differences between right-wing and left-wing populism. </p>
<p>Many of the demands that exist in a society do not have an essentialist reactionary or progressive character. It is how they are to be articulated that determines their identity.</p>
<p>This brings to the fore the role that representation plays in the constitution of a political force. Representation is not a one-way process going from the represented to the representative, because it is the very identity of the represented that is at stake in the process. </p>
<p>This is the central flaw of those who argue that representative democracy is an oxymoron and that a real democracy should be direct or “presentist”. What needs to be challenged is the lack of alternatives offered to the citizens, not the idea of representation itself.</p>
<p>A pluralist democratic society cannot exist without representation. To begin with, identities are never already given. They are always produced through identification; this process of identification is a process of representation. </p>
<p>Collective political subjects are created through representation. They do not exist beforehand. Every assertion of a political identity is thereby interior, not exterior, to the process of representation.</p>
<p>Second, in a democratic society where pluralism is not envisaged in the harmonious anti-political form and where the ever-present possibility of antagonism is taken into account, representative institutions, by giving form to the division of society, play a crucial role in allowing for the institutionalisation of this conflictual dimension.</p>
<p>Such a role can only be fulfilled through the availability of an agonistic confrontation. The central problem with our current post-political model is the absence of such confrontation. This is not going to be remedied through “horizontalist” practices of local autonomy, self-management and direct democracy that turn away from institutions and the state.</p>
<h2>The place of passion in politics</h2>
<p>Another important aspect of left-wing populism is that it acknowledges the central role played by affects and passions in politics. I use “passions” to refer to the common affects at play in the collective forms of identification that constitute political identities. Passions perform a central role in the construction of a collective will at the core of any left-wing populist project.</p>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118300/original/image-20160412-15895-3qrai2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118300/original/image-20160412-15895-3qrai2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118300/original/image-20160412-15895-3qrai2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118300/original/image-20160412-15895-3qrai2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118300/original/image-20160412-15895-3qrai2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=773&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118300/original/image-20160412-15895-3qrai2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=972&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118300/original/image-20160412-15895-3qrai2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=972&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/118300/original/image-20160412-15895-3qrai2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=972&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Marine Le Pen has harnessed political passions to establish her right-wing National Front as a political force in France.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/68651617@N07/7421302448">flickr/Blandine Le Cain</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The attempt by so many liberal-democratic political theorists to eliminate passion from politics – they refuse to accept its crucial role – is no doubt one of the reasons for their hostility to populism. This is a serious mistake. Only because this terrain has been abandoned to right-wing populists have they been able to make such progress in recent years.</p>
<p>Fortunately, thanks to the development of left-wing populist movements, this could change. It is urgent to understand that the only way to counter right-wing populism is through left-wing populism. </p>
<p>I am convinced we are witnessing a profound transformation of the political frontiers that used to be dominant in Europe. The crucial confrontation is going to be between left-wing populism and right-wing populism.</p>
<h2>Crisis and opportunity in Europe</h2>
<p>The future of democracy depends on the development of a left-wing populism that could revive interest in politics by mobilising passions and fomenting an agonistic debate about the availability of an alternative to the neoliberal order driving de-democratisation. This mobilisation should take place at the European level. To be victorious, a left-wing populist project needs to foster a left-wing populist movement fighting for a democratic refoundation of Europe.</p>
<p>We urgently need an agonistic confrontation about the future of the European Union. Many people on the left are beginning to doubt the possibility of constructing, within the EU framework, an alternative to the neoliberal model of globalisation. </p>
<p>The EU is increasingly perceived as being an intrinsically neoliberal project that cannot be reformed. It seems vain to try transforming its institutions; the only solution is to exit. Such a pessimistic view is no doubt the result of the fact that all attempts to challenge the prevalent neoliberal rules are constantly presented as anti-European attacks against the EU’s very existence.</p>
<p>Without the possibility of making legitimate criticisms of current neoliberal policies, it is unsurprising that a growing number of people are <a href="https://theconversation.com/rise-of-euroscepticism-masks-general-apathy-about-eu-vote-25984">turning to Euroscepticism</a>. They believe the European project itself is the cause of our predicament. They fear more European integration can only mean a reinforcement of neoliberal hegemony.</p>
<p>Such a position endangers the survival of the European project. The only way to counter it is by creating the conditions for a democratic contestation within the EU.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114812/original/image-20160311-11274-hds1pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/114812/original/image-20160311-11274-hds1pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114812/original/image-20160311-11274-hds1pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114812/original/image-20160311-11274-hds1pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114812/original/image-20160311-11274-hds1pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114812/original/image-20160311-11274-hds1pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/114812/original/image-20160311-11274-hds1pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rather than surrender to Euroscepticism, it’s possible to rebuild popular support for the European project by taking it in a new democratic direction.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dave Kellam/flickr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>At the root of the disaffection with the EU is the absence of a project that could foster a strong identification among the citizens of Europe and provide an objective to mobilise their political passions in a democratic direction. </p>
<p>The EU is currently composed of consumers, not of citizens. It has been mainly constructed around a common market and has never really created an European common will. So it is no wonder that, in times of economic crisis and austerity, some people will begin to question its utility. They forget its important achievement of bringing peace to the continent.</p>
<p>It is a mistake to present this crisis as a crisis of the European project. It is a crisis of its neoliberal incarnation. This is why current attempts to solve it with more neoliberal policies cannot succeed.</p>
<p>A better approach would be to foster popular allegiance to the EU by developing a sociopolitical project that offers an alternative to the prevailing neoliberal model of recent decades. This model is in crisis but a different one is not yet available. We could say, following Gramsci, that we are witnessing an “organic crisis” where the old model cannot continue but the new one is not yet born.</p>
<p>The only way to counter the rise of anti-European sentiments and stop the growth of right-wing populist parties that excite them is to unite European citizens around a political project that gives them hope for a different, more democratic future. </p>
<p>Establishing a synergy between left parties and social movements at the European level would enable the emergence of a collective will that aims to radically transform the existing order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chantal Mouffe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The future of democracy depends on developing a left-wing populism that can revive public interest by mobilising political passions in the fight for an alternative to neoliberal de-democratisation.Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/577232016-04-22T03:53:20Z2016-04-22T03:53:20ZBetrayal and guilt: past and future collide in Easter Rising commemorations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/118646/original/image-20160414-4670-w8paqv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Irish government is presented with a difficult task of how to commemorate the Easter Rising, 100 years on.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Clodagh Kilcoyne</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> series, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Easter Monday, April 24, 1916. A schoolteacher (also sometime poet and short-story writer) in improvised military uniform stands on the steps of Dublin’s GPO and reads aloud a <a href="http://www.firstdail.com/?page_id=75">single-page document</a>. Addressed to “Irishmen and Irishwomen”, the document proclaims the:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Irish republic as a sovereign independent state. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The proclamation’s audacious present tense claims its authority from a deep past:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the name of God and the dead generations. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Betrayed rebels of the past would be vindicated. Ireland’s potential would be realised – finally. </p>
<p>The teacher, Patrick Pearse, then steps inside the post office accompanied by other leaders of what comes to be known as the <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/british-history/easter-rising">Easter Rising</a>. Together with about 1,200 nationalists and republican trade unionists they barricade the doors and wait for the outbreak of the future. </p>
<p>By mid-May the seven men who had signed the proclamation are dead, executed along with eight other rebel leaders. Also among the dead are 132 police and soldiers, 64 insurgents and about 230 ordinary citizens of Dublin. </p>
<p>The future that unfolded was more violence, extending to the various betrayals that followed in the war of independence and the subsequent civil war.</p>
<h2>A new Ireland?</h2>
<p>In this centenary year, the Irish government is presented with a difficult task of commemoration: blending pride in the modern nation-state with uneasy feelings about the legacy of foundational violence and political hope. </p>
<p>The government <a href="http://www.decadeofcentenaries.com/initial-statement-by-advisory-group-on-centenary-commemorations/">claims</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The commemoration will be measured and reflective, and will be informed by a full acknowledgement of the complexity of historical events and their legacy, of the multiple readings of history, and of the multiple identities and traditions that are part of the Irish historical experience.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This even-handed and pluralistic tone reflects the liberal-minded modern Ireland that <a href="https://theconversation.com/another-ireland-is-born-its-a-big-yes-to-marriage-equality-42298">endorsed same-sex marriage</a> by plebiscite. It is a language that also accommodates Ireland’s own history wars of the 1990s, in which the legacy of nationalism was critically re-evaluated by public intellectuals such as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/01/easter-rising-century-ireland-1916">Fintan O’Toole</a> and “revisionist” historians such as <a href="http://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/04/pitfalls-on-the-road-to-the-rising/">Roy Foster</a>. </p>
<p>This critique was not merely the concern of Irish Times journalists or Oxford dons. It was part of a popular change running through Irish culture. Remember The Cranberries song from 1994 that transposed Pearse’s “dead generations” to “zombies”? It spoke of “the same old theme since 1916”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Cranberries’ Zombie.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Betrayal and guilt called out</h2>
<p>Often it has been Ireland’s writers and artists who have called out the hopes and failures of national politics, holding the polity to account in the culture.</p>
<p>The critique of nationalism gained particular momentum in the 1990s, largely in response to the seemingly intractable violence in Northern Ireland. But the cultural response directly after 1916 started a process of reappraisal even at the point of origin.</p>
<p>Mythologising the revolution was always accompanied by a vigorous de-mythologising. Through the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, writers like Sean O’Casey, Frank O’Connor and Francis Stuart kept a critical eye on 1916’s legacy. </p>
<p>O’Connor, who fought in the Irish war of independence, presents the terrible ambivalence of national identity, hospitality and violence in his 1931 short story <a href="http://www.csus.edu/indiv/m/maddendw/The-Oxford-Book-of-Short-Stories_29GuestsoftheNation.pdf">Guests of the Nation</a>. The story provides such a rich exploration of betrayal that it was able to be reinterpreted to include questions of sexual secrecy and gender identity in Neil Jordan’s film adaptation, <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104036/">The Crying Game</a>.</p>
<figure>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The Crying Game was in part based on a short story by Frank O'Connor.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The motif of betrayal that runs between the writers of the early 20th century and those of the 1990s continues into the present. Gerry Smyth <a href="http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9780719088537/">argues</a> that by the second decade of the 21st century:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… the words ‘Irish’ and ‘betrayal’ had become closely linked – one never too far from the other when questions of identity, meaning or value were at issue. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Smyth follows the Irish cultural traces of betrayal in the works of key novelists from James Joyce to Anne Enright. The manifestations of betrayal shift through political and personal duplicities, arriving at Enright’s presentation of child abuse in her 2007 novel <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/apr/28/featuresreviews.guardianreview17">The Gathering</a>. </p>
<p>The state, the Catholic Church and the postcolonial national ideal are all indicted in the betrayal Enright narrates. As Smyth concludes:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The abused child […] stands as the archetypical figure for a society in which past, present and future are entered in a seemingly unbreakable cycle of betrayal and guilt.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since 2008, Irish betrayal and guilt have also resided in the financial and state institutions that precipitated the economic crisis, which continues to mar life in Ireland. Paul Murray has, with dark humour, chronicled the rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger in his novels <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/feb/06/skippy-dies-paul-murray">Skippy Dies</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/22/the-mark-and-the-void-by-paul-murray-review">The Mark and the Void</a>. </p>
<p>The latter, set in post-crisis Dublin, contains a Joycean page-long list of descriptors for “the Irish”:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… their books, saints, tickets to Australia, their building-site countryside, their radioactive sea, their crisps, bars, Lucozade, their tattoos, their overpriced wine and mediocre restaurants, their dreams, their children, their mistakes, their punching-bag history, their bankrupt state and their inveterate difference.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>After the promise of a couple of decades of prosperity at the end of the 20th century, the disappointment of a return to austerity and emigration casts Ireland’s current betrayal as a weary historical repetition.</p>
<p>So, the 1916 commemorations are attempting to reconcile an assortment of historical betrayals and contemporary disappointments, alongside the state-sponsored celebration of national achievements. The national memory is being manoeuvred around the current sense that both church and state betrayed the Irish people. </p>
<p>Likewise, the Republic’s violent birth is difficult to square with a liberal 21st-century Ireland, bemused by the fervour of early-20th-century ideology and afraid that the violence, after 100 years, is even now not quite locked safely in the past. </p>
<p>These old and recent betrayals combine in the commemorations of 1916, inevitably pointing to so many unrealised futures. On the post-office steps in 1916, Pearse proclaimed the Republic’s resolve to:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation […] cherishing all the children of the nation equally.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As Ireland’s writers continue to show, Ireland in 2016 is not yet in the future Pearse thought had arrived a century ago.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57723/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Ryan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Often it has been Ireland’s writers and artists that have called out the hopes and failures of national politics, holding the polity to account in the culture.Matthew Ryan, Lecturer in Literature, Australian Catholic UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/396952015-04-23T06:44:02Z2015-04-23T06:44:02ZPopulism and democracy: friend or foe? Rising stars deepen dilemma<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78337/original/image-20150417-20751-j09gnx.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras and Pablo Iglesias of Podemos have taken their populist parties to victory in Greece and a lead in the polls in Spain. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/fanis_x/16158814657/">Flickr/Fanis Xouryas</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>This article is part of a series on <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures-crossroads-europe">Crossroads Europe</a> for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures">Democracy Futures</a> project, a <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/shortcodes/images-videos/articles-democracy-futures/">joint global initiative</a> with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. The project aims to stimulate fresh thinking about the many challenges facing democracies in the 21st century.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>Over the past two decades, populism in Europe, the US and the Antipodes has been almost exclusively associated with the radical right. When populism is mentioned, figures linked with anti-immigrant sentiment or xenophobia like <a href="https://theconversation.com/hanson-gets-the-band-back-together-can-she-make-an-impact-34747">Pauline Hanson</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/geert-wilders-is-back-and-he-has-european-domination-on-his-mind-15775">Geert Wilders</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/could-the-le-pen-family-feud-be-a-cunning-political-ploy-39980">Marine Le Pen</a> come to mind. </p>
<p>Due to their inclination for polarised, uncompromising politics and aggressive targeting of vulnerable minorities, these public figures are are often viewed as a dangerous threat to democracy.</p>
<p>However, a shift has been taking place in recent months. The election of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/syriza-sweeps-to-victory-in-greek-election-promising-an-end-to-humiliation-36680">Syriza</a> government in Greece and the rise of <a href="https://theconversation.com/meet-podemos-the-party-revolutionising-spanish-politics-33802">Podemos</a> in Spain – which is <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_Spanish_general_election,_2015">polling strongly</a> in the lead-up to the national election later in 2015 – have drawn attention to the rise of left-wing populism in Europe. </p>
<p>This has led previous naysayers to reconsider their position. If not all populists are interested in targeting immigrants and demonising Muslims – instead, some seem to be genuinely interested in recuperating the power of “the people” – is populism so bad? Do emerging populist groups around the world have the potential to bring about more inclusive versions of democracy?</p>
<p>The short answer is a little bit of both. Whether on the left or the right, populism has both democratic and anti-democratic tendencies. These often manifest simultaneously, making populism quite difficult to assess.</p>
<h2>Democratic tendencies</h2>
<p>One important democratic tendency of populism is that it can make politics more accessible, comprehensible and “popular”. When people talk about politics being boring, they are definitely not talking about populism. Populism can offer an important corrective to the dry, technocratic nature of much contemporary politics by making it far more interesting and relatable to everyday citizens. </p>
<p>Critics often regard populists’ embrace of the language of “the common man” as demagogy. The flipside of this is that engaging people with politics – especially those who might otherwise be disenchanted or uninterested – is vital to a healthy democracy. </p>
<p>Populism acknowledges that modern politics is not just a matter of putting forward policies for voters to deliberate rationally upon as some kind of <em>Homo politicus</em>. Rather, it appeals to the people with a full performative “package” that is both attractive and relevant.</p>
<p>Populist actors also have the ability to include previously excluded identities within their performances of “the people”. This symbolically transforms these identities and associated sites of contestation into “legitimate” political actors and sites. </p>
<p>In the recent past of Venezuela, Bolivia and Thailand, populists such as Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and Thaksin Shinawatra have dramatically increased the inclusion of the poor by including them in their conception of “the people”. This has proven to be democratic beyond the mere symbolic level. The poor in each of these countries subsequently experienced a strong increase in material and political inclusion.</p>
<p>Supporters of Syriza and Podemos likely hope that these parties might similarly return more political and economic power to those who have been on the receiving end of some of the Eurocrisis’ worst outcomes.</p>
<p>More controversially, even populists on the right of the political spectrum can include previously marginalised voices in their conception of “the people”. Katter’s Australian Party leader <a href="http://www.themorningbulletin.com.au/news/politicans-radio-jocks-call-assistance-farmers/2481981/">Bob Katter</a> has proven to be one of the most vocal representatives of rural Australians, who are often ignored by the mainstream parties.</p>
<p>Similarly, federal senator <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-31/jacqui-lambie-launches-political-party-jacqui-lambie-network/6360840">Jacqui Lambie</a> has certainly demonstrated a dedication to raising issues pertinent to Tasmania, which are often left off the political agenda. Even Hanson has shown a relatively democratic streak at times – her One Nation Party advocates a system of <a href="http://www.onenation.com.au/hot-topics-voting/citizens-initiated-referendum">Citizen Initiated Referenda</a>.</p>
<p>A third democratic tendency of populism is its ability to expose the dysfunctions of today’s democratic systems. The most obvious way it does this is by revealing corruption or elite collusion, and by calling for the increased sovereignty of “the people” in the name of democracy. </p>
<p>This has certainly been the case in Latin America. There, populism has often been an understandable reaction to hollowed-out, corrupt and exclusionary “democratic” systems. In Europe, many populist actors’ opposition to the European Union has effectively brought to light the “democratic deficit” at the heart of elite projects.</p>
<p>Populists can also offer effective critiques of the structural shortcomings and inefficiencies of democratic systems. Figures like Clive Palmer and Ross Perot have publicised the deficiency of political vision and lack of choice offered to voters in the Australian and US two-party systems. One of the key drivers of Beppe Grillo’s <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/giovanni-navarria/move-aside-now-its-up-to-us-italy%E2%80%99s-political-quake">MoVimento 5 Stelle</a> has been voters’ disaffection with the entire Italian political system. </p>
<p>In such environments, populists can shine a light on democratic systems not living up to their full potential and demand increased accountability of representatives to their constituents.</p>
<p>This is not to say that contemporary populism delivers on its promise to reclaim democracy from the elites by returning power to “the people”. It is impossible to ignore that populism’s foundational schema can too easily reduce complex political problems into simple solutions. These are just as – if not more – exclusive and undemocratic than the status quo.</p>
<h2>Anti-democratic tendencies</h2>
<p>Populism’s most problematic anti-democratic aspect is its strong inclination to target minorities and those labelled “others” as enemies of “the people”. </p>
<p>Populists’ invocation of “the people” relies on elevating one part of the community to the role of embodying the whole community. Consequently, those who do not fit into the category of “the people” are deemed illegitimate. So, while populist invocations of “the people” can sometimes open spaces for new democratic subjects, this inclusivity always comes at the price of the – sometimes virulent and violent – exclusion of the “other”.</p>
<p>This is most evident in the cases of radical right-wing populism – for example Hanson’s <a href="http://australianpolitics.com/1996/09/10/pauline-hanson-maiden-speech.html">targeting</a> of Asian immigrants, Wilders’ <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/2015/01/30/geert-wilders-prophet-who-hates-muhammad-300266.html">war against Islam</a> and Marine Le Pen’s <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-french-front-national-leader-marine-le-pen-a-972925-2.html">hatred of migrants</a>. Yet even the “inclusive” populists mentioned earlier also demonstrate a worrying tendency to target their favoured “other”. Chávez allegedly withheld social insurance from those who offered political support to opposition parties and compared his enemies – such as then-US president George W. Bush – to the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/world/americas/20cnd-chavez.html?_r=0">“devil”</a>. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13891650">Thaksin</a> has been accused of intimidating the opposition, bullying non-governmental organisations, shutting down media outlets and even carrying out extra-judicial killings. </p>
<p>None of these actions can be considered democratic in the least.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78087/original/image-20150415-31678-644bqp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78087/original/image-20150415-31678-644bqp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78087/original/image-20150415-31678-644bqp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78087/original/image-20150415-31678-644bqp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78087/original/image-20150415-31678-644bqp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78087/original/image-20150415-31678-644bqp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78087/original/image-20150415-31678-644bqp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez revealed an authoritarian streak as he targeted his political enemies.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Fernando Bizerra Jr</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These undemocratic and antagonistic tactics are indicative of another dangerous tendency of populism. Its simple vision of politics is one of an ongoing war between “the people” and their enemies (“the elite” and associated “others”). </p>
<p>Unfortunately, populism’s view of “the people” as unified and homogenous simply does not square with the complex reality. The contemporary political landscape is criss-crossed by difference and heterogeneity. The flows of global capital, migration, cross-border and transnational bodies and identities have made political communities ever more diverse, and identities more complex. </p>
<p>As such, the nostalgic view of the unified “people” of the past – or what political scientist Paul Taggart <a href="http://aei.pitt.edu/2962/1/165.pdf">calls</a> the populist “heartland” – makes little sense.</p>
<p>Equally problematic is the populists’ tendency to offer simplistic solutions to complex problems. The basic logic behind Hanson’s calls for less immigration, Wilders’ calls to repatriate Muslims or even Chávez’s constant accusations of attacks from the US is this: remove or eradicate “the people’s” enemy and the problem will be solved. </p>
<p>Such scapegoating is not conducive to tackling the multifaceted and often international dimensions of the political, economic and cultural pressures facing political communities across the globe.</p>
<p>A last crucial anti-democratic tendency of populism is its drive towards extreme personalisation. Populism tends to rely on a strong charismatic leader to speak for, represent and embody the hopes, desires and voice of “the people”. This attitude is dangerous for democracy because by symbolically conflating a leader with an entire population, they become infallible. </p>
<p>Simply put, if the leader represents or embodies “the people’s” will, and “the people” are always right, then the leader is always right. Therefore, the granting of more power to the populist leader is not seen as a problem, as this is ultimately giving more power to “the people”.</p>
<p>Understandably, this trajectory worries many analysts of populism. A number of prominent populist actors have gone on to abuse their powers by utilising this logic to monopolise power and shift towards authoritarianism.</p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>So, what can we expect from populist movements today? Will they prove to be democratic or anti-democratic? Unsurprisingly, it is not that simple.</p>
<p>Populism can appear as a democratic force in some contexts and anti-democratic in others. Additionally, these tendencies are often simultaneously at play and in tension with one another. Populists can flaunt their democratic tendencies at the same time as undoing democratic guarantees.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the answer to the question of whether populism is democratic or not really depends on our view of what kind of democracy is best. Is it liberal democracy? If so, we probably see populism as problematic, given the targeting of minorities, the ignorance of procedures and the lack of acknowledgement of heterogeneity. </p>
<p>Or do we favour “radical” or “grassroots” democracy? In that case, we probably consider populism to be a democratic force, returning power to “the people” by removing it from the hands of “the elite” who never deserved their power in the first place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39695/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Moffitt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The rise of left-wing populism challenges those who flatly denounced right-wing populism as undemocratic. Populism can appear as a democratic force in some contexts and anti-democratic in others.Benjamin Moffitt, Postdoctoral Fellow, Stockholm UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/318722014-09-24T16:31:02Z2014-09-24T16:31:02ZEuropean governments play their part in driving young Muslims to extremism<p>Governments in Europe have been horrified to see their young nationals turning to extremist groups and committing terrible acts in their name, but few have stopped to think about how their own policies have contributed to the problem.</p>
<p>For decades, European countries have made it difficult for young people to be pious Muslims and feel European at the same time. But that hasn’t stopped them, it has simply taught them that their new-found faith may not be compatible with their European life. That in turn makes them all the more vulnerable to people <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-very-french-jihad-hundreds-head-to-syria-and-paris-fears-their-return-26077">recruiting for extremist groups</a>.</p>
<p>Islam is now a significant part of the young, racially-mixed urban culture that exists all over Europe and, to some extent, North America. Thousands of Europeans convert to Islam and many ethnic Muslims who did not grow up in religious homes find Islam through friends.</p>
<h2>Making new friends</h2>
<p>Converted or born-again newcomers to Islam who find religion on their own often don’t fully understand that there are many different interpretations of Islam. They try to learn about the faith either on the internet or through neighbourhood mosques.</p>
<p>Many of them often end up in puritan <a href="http://www.theweek.co.uk/politics/6073/what-salafism-and-should-we-be-worried">Salafi mosques</a>, which promote the idea of leaving all Western traditions behind and strictly emulating the life of Prophet Muhammad. Salafism is at heart a particularly conservative branch of Sunni Islam.</p>
<p>Salafis in Europe reach out to young people and converts more than other branches of Islam. Most Sunni mosques in Western Europe often have ties to countries such as Turkey or Morocco, where national mosque communities are less welcoming of converts, which makes them less approachable to Europeans. Mosques in the west that depend on financial support and other resources from these countries tend to function in the language of the immigrant community and are not welcoming to third or fourth-generation Muslims who do not speak these languages. </p>
<p>Salafi mosques operate quite differently in European cities. They are among the few Islamic centres to use the local European language as their main mode of communication rather than Arabic and their communities tend to reflect the national and racial diversity of their surrounding neighbourhoods. Most Salafi communities across Europe are not jihadist, and even stay away from political engagement. Most converts or born-again Muslims, especially those with a criminal, find their lives are significantly improved by joining Salafi communities. They finish school, get married, establish businesses, and start a new life.</p>
<p>The problem can be that the isolationist nature of Salafi communities also provides a context for jihadists to recruit young and impressionable new Muslims. Because Salafi communities prize leading a lifestyle cut off from non-Muslims and other branches of Islam, newcomers to religion often turn their back on their families and friends and are more easily impressed by the new people they meet, even when they promote radical ideas. </p>
<p>European Muslim converts are an excellent opportunity for jihadists, as they come with valuable resources such as money, mobility, linguistic ability and access to technology.</p>
<h2>No direction</h2>
<p>For decades, many European governments have made life difficult for European Muslims. They have treated individuals or groups that promoted Islam among, say, French or German nationals, with suspicion. They have instead supported mosques that centre around one or another distinct national group. Rather than making it possible for people to receive Islamic education in their local context and local language, governments have enabled Imams who do not speak the local language and know nothing of local culture or issues to carry on as they were, rather than adapting.</p>
<p>These policies have ensured that most mosques do not speak to the realities of young people in their areas. Despite their isolation from other branches of Islam and Western culture, Salafi mosques have stood apart in this respect. They reject the Western way of life but are keen to recruit more people away from it at the same time. They are streets ahead of national mosques in tuning into European culture and life and are an appealing option as a result.</p>
<h2>Changing times</h2>
<p>European conversion to Islam is part and parcel of the immigration process. As Muslims become more European, more Europeans will become Muslims and children of non-religious Muslim immigrants will become more involved in Islam independently of their families. </p>
<p>The solution to the integration of Muslims is also an answer to radicalisation. European governments should trust and support individuals and organisations who promote being both Europeans and pious Muslims. They should encourage Islamic education in the local language and stop treating converts as threats to the nation.</p>
<p>Being European and a pious Muslim should not feel like a devious act that can be practised only away from mainstream society. That will only reinforce the equation of being a European Muslim with being radical. It will make it easier for jihadists to appeal to young Muslim converts and born-again Muslims.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/31872/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Esra Özyürek received funding from German Academic Exchange Program, Fulbright Foundation, and Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to do research on this issue.</span></em></p>Governments in Europe have been horrified to see their young nationals turning to extremist groups and committing terrible acts in their name, but few have stopped to think about how their own policies…Esra Özyürek, Associate Professor in Contemporary Turkish Studies, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/275022014-06-06T04:22:48Z2014-06-06T04:22:48ZEnd of the dream: how Europe lost its way between Rome and Kiev<p>European integration has been an enormous success since its inception in the <a href="http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_eec_en.htm">Treaty of Rome</a> in 1957. For the next five decades European Union (EU) member states enjoyed unprecedented peace and prosperity.</p>
<p>But now this legacy is being questioned. The EU has fallen out of grace with the public. At the recent elections for the European parliament, <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-right-rises-in-european-parliament-elections-but-is-it-a-euroquake-27157">parties determined to curb EU powers</a> came clearly on top in several member states. What went wrong and why?</p>
<p>Some commentators point to misguided policies for handling <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/interactive/2012/oct/17/eurozone-crisis-interactive-timeline-three-years">the Eurozone crisis</a>; they made the EU look stingy, rigid and oppressive. Other pundits complain about the EU’s imperfect institutions; they are complex, sluggish and hostage to member states’ veto.</p>
<p>Yet others point to poor leadership. <a href="http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/eu-presidents/index_en.htm">Presidents of European bodies</a> are particularly uncharismatic figures. Leaders of the most powerful member states are chiefly interested in enhancing their parochial national interests.</p>
<p>These are all important factors, but the roots of the EU’s downfall go much deeper. The EU has been unable to cope with the impact of three “revolutions” that have shaken the foundations of the European system in the past 25 years.</p>
<h2>The geopolitical revolution</h2>
<p>The geopolitical revolution began with the fall of the Berlin Wall. This spawned a resurgence of territorial power politics. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have disintegrated, Germany has been reunited, while France and Great Britain have found themselves in limbo.</p>
<p>Territorial reshuffling produced new states, autonomous enclaves, semi-protectorates and “shared” neighbourhoods. The politics of recrimination and violent conflict was part of this process as manifested by the horrors of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sarajevo">Sarajevo</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18101028">Srebrenica</a>.</p>
<p>The EU tried to grapple with the geopolitical revolution by making <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/index_en.htm">enlargement one of its core policies</a>. In the last decade, 11 post-communist states <a href="http://humanscience.wikia.com/wiki/Soviet_Republic_and_EU">have been admitted</a>. Membership brought important benefits to these countries: it generated economic growth and helped strengthen their young democracies.</p>
<p>However, admitting numerous new and often poor states increased pressure on EU labour markets and institutions. Enlargement has been halted, leaving many unstable EU neighbours at the mercy of local and external predators. The EU was unable to respond to the European aspirations of either <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moldova%E2%80%93European_Union_relations">Moldova</a> or <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia%E2%80%93European_Union_relations">Georgia</a>, making them easy targets for Russian nationalists.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275">developments in Ukraine</a> should be seen in the same context. The EU lacks the military means to engage in the <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/789b7110-e67b-11e3-9a20-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33dtTGtuQ">“hybrid war”</a> instigated by Russia and the political will and institutional capacity to make Ukraine safe through EU membership.</p>
<p>Instability on the Union’s borders causes not only political anxieties, but also crucially undermines business confidence. The effects on the economic well-being of EU citizens are dire.</p>
<h2>The economic revolution</h2>
<p>The rise of global firms imposing <a href="https://theconversation.com/failing-union-of-capitalism-and-democracy-fuels-rise-in-inequality-27217">significant constraints</a> on governments’ ability to run their social policies triggered an economic revolution. Some experts talk about globalisation or Americanisation, while others speak of a neoliberal ideological turn.</p>
<p>Empirically, the revolution manifested itself in a surge of deregulation, marketisation, privatisation and cuts to public schools, hospitals and environmental protection. Governments contemplating taxing financial transactions or defending certain workers’ rights were threatened with mass migration of businesses to less-regulated countries. They were urged to promote competitiveness and leave redistribution to the markets. National governments’ priority was to facilitate growth of the private sector and reduce the public sector.</p>
<p>This could not but create a legitimacy problem for the EU. European integration was not only intended to create the <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm">most competitive economy in the world</a>; it was also to make the “Stockholm consensus” prevail in Europe over the <a href="http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html">“Washington consensus”</a>. A functional and generous welfare state was Europe’s global brand to be defended against unregulated, unpredictable and greedy markets.</p>
<p>The EU failed to live up to these expectations. Instead, it embraced the neoliberal agenda of deregulation, marketisation and privatisation. The EU was given extensive powers in the field of business competition, but only symbolic ones in social policy.</p>
<p>The EU is in charge of implementing a harsh <a href="http://www.europeaninstitute.org/Special-G-20-Issue-on-Financial-Reform/austerity-measures-in-the-eu.html">austerity policy</a> but has no means to alleviate the social impacts. No wonder that large numbers of Europeans, especially the unemployed, see the EU as an agent of multinational banks or German industrialists and vote for <a href="http://time.com/114625/far-right-euroskeptics-make-big-gains-in-eu-vote/">anti-European xenophobes and populists</a>.</p>
<h2>The internet revolution</h2>
<p>The advent of the internet prompted the third revolution. Digital forms of networked communication have undoubtedly created a wealth of opportunities, yet access to them is unevenly distributed.</p>
<p>The EU was slow in adjusting to the digital world and unable to benefit from it. For instance, the EU employed the internet unimaginatively as a traditional propaganda tool, not as a means of empowering citizens. Social networks spread outside the EU, leaving Brussels increasingly isolated and exposed to criticism.</p>
<p>Despite the internet’s potential to improve transparency, the EU has remained largely a non-transparent organisation. Deals are made secretly by unidentified people unwilling to engage in a meaningful online democratic discourse with the electorate. Failure to use the internet for testing new forms of democracy is particularly puzzling given the EU’s opaque parliamentary representation.</p>
<p>The EU also sided with corporate interests trying to curb citizens’ internet access. The European Commission pushed through the so-called ACTA (the <a href="http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf">Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement</a>) only to be faced with public protests. Eventually, the EU parliament rejected the agreement and the commission quietly shelved it.</p>
<p>The EU also failed to embrace the greatest winners of the digital revolution, namely European mega-cities, or the Informational Cities, to use <a href="http://www.manuelcastells.info/en/">Manuel Castells’</a> term. Cities such as Paris, Hamburg, London, Milan and Stockholm successfully created trans-border networks of financial, technological and intellectual flows. These cities have not been given access to EU decision-making and resources. States, however small and dysfunctional, still run the EU.</p>
<h2>Is this the end of the European dream?</h2>
<p>The status quo in Europe is not sustainable. The EU insists that traditional nation-states (with their armies) control Brussels, but when confronted with a resurgent Russia the EU appears cumbersomely inadequate to guarantee the security of citizens.</p>
<p>The EU demands austerity and prohibits central bank interventions but, in an age of economic uncertainty, is unable to shield citizens from the risks of unregulated markets and the rise of inequality within and across member states.</p>
<p>The EU prevents parliaments from taking sovereign decisions and ejects democratically elected politicians, but is blindingly short-sighted when it comes to finding novel ways of involving citizens in its deliberations and decisions.</p>
<p>One does not need much imagination to conclude that the European dream is teetering on the brink of an abyss. The EU must re-invent itself or perish. Reforming it will not do.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Jan Zielonka is a visiting fellow at the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>, at the University of Sydney. He will discuss the End of the European Dream on June 12 at an event organised by the Sydney Democracy Network with <a href="http://sydney.edu.au/sydney_ideas/index.shtml">Sydney Ideas</a> to launch the Australian edition of his book, <a href="https://www.polity.co.uk/book.asp?ref=9780745683966">Is the EU Doomed?</a> To register please <a href="http://whatson.sydney.edu.au/events/published/sydney-ideas-professor-jan-zielonka">click here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> In 2009-2013 Jan Zielonka was a principal investigator of a research project sponsored by the European Research Council on the Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe</span></em></p>European integration has been an enormous success since its inception in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. For the next five decades European Union (EU) member states enjoyed unprecedented peace and prosperity…Jan Zielonka, Professor of European Politics, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/271932014-05-26T17:49:50Z2014-05-26T17:49:50ZThis election was to be different, but once again democracy in Europe is the big loser<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/49461/original/77zp27zy-1401119817.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=78%2C110%2C921%2C573&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">One of the attempts made by the parliament to engage young voters. Oddly, it doesn't appear to have been a roaring success.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/european_parliament/">European Parliament</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>“This time it’s different,” <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UslDVJ2QSVM">promised</a> the European Parliament in an awareness campaign ahead of the May 2014 elections. And, judging by the headlines, it certainly has been different. Many in the media have termed the results a right-wing Eurosceptic “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27559714">earthquake</a>”, copying the <a href="http://www.ft.com/home/uk">metaphor</a> used by the French prime minister, Manuel Valls, to describe the performance of the Front National (FN).</p>
<p>In some countries, the populist and Eurosceptic radical right have indeed managed to make the ground shake beneath mainstream politicians’ feet. Although the circa <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-fr-2014.html">25%</a> gained by the FN wasn’t a surprise to anyone who has read an opinion poll from France recently, it is still striking to see this (former?) pariah party in first place for the first time. Its result represented not only a huge improvement on the 6.3% it received at the 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections, but was also well beyond Marine Le Pen’s very impressive 17.9% in the 2012 presidential election. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, across the Channel, UKIP’s result of around 27-28% – again, not a surprise to those following the polls – makes it the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/26/ukip-rise-no-flash-in-pan">first party</a> other than Labour and the Conservatives to come out on top in a national election in over a century. Of course, the acid test of its capacity to change the shape of the British party system will be next year at the general election (having received 16.1% in 2009, it crashed with just 3.1% and still no MPs at the 2010 general election). Nonetheless, as the <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Revolt-Right-Explaining-Extremism-Democracy-ebook/dp/B00J0A11IQ/ref=tmm_kin_title_0/277-9379085-4899461">recent book</a> by Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin shows, it is time to accept UKIP as much more than the “flash-in-the-pan” single-issue party we used to think it was.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/49463/original/ymh8s84r-1401120683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/49463/original/ymh8s84r-1401120683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49463/original/ymh8s84r-1401120683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49463/original/ymh8s84r-1401120683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49463/original/ymh8s84r-1401120683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49463/original/ymh8s84r-1401120683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49463/original/ymh8s84r-1401120683.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Le Pen: first, but no surprise.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/remijdn/">Remi Noyon</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Other standout results for similar parties were in Denmark, where the Danish People’s Party led the way with <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-dk-2014.html">26.6%</a> of the vote – more than 10 points higher than its result in 2009 and double its 2011 general election performance – and in Sweden, where the Sweden Democrats (SD) saw its share of the vote rise from 3.3% in 2009 and 5.7% at the 2010 general election to <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-se-2014.html">9.7%</a> this time around.</p>
<p>Elsewhere, however, tales of a radical right “earthquake” are exaggerated. In the Netherlands, <a href="https://theconversation.com/geert-wilders-is-back-and-he-has-european-domination-on-his-mind-15775">Geert Wilders</a>’s Party for Freedom (PVV), took roughly <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-nl-2014.html">13.4%</a> – an increase on its 10.1% at the 2012 general election, but less than the 17% it received at the 2009 EP election. In Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) appears to have scored <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-at-2014.html">just under 20%</a> - a lot more than its 12.7% in 2009, but slightly below the 20.5% it received at the 2013 general election. Similarly, in Finland, the Finns Party with <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-fi-2014.html">12.9%</a> improved on its 9.8% in 2009, but slipped a fair distance back from its 2011 general election result of 19.1%. In all three cases, these parties are in opposition and, given that mainstream governing parties have struggled more than usual in second-order elections during the post-2008 crisis, one might have expected radical right Eurosceptics to do better in these countries.</p>
<h2>Exaggerated earthquake</h2>
<p>In fact, despite the talk of a <a href="http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/eurosceptics-and-far-right-surge-in-euro-elections-1.1808438">far-right surge</a>, it’s worth bearing in mind that – of the six parties that were considered guaranteed members of the much talked-about Alliance for Freedom (EAF) created by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders last year – only two (the FN and FPÖ) saw their vote rise compared to 2009, while the other four (the PVV, the Slovak National party, Italy’s <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/05/06/lega-nords-euroscepticism-represents-political-opportunism-rather-than-a-deeply-held-ideological-stance-similar-to-ukip/">Northern League</a>, and Belgium’s Vlaams Belang) all lost votes. </p>
<p>And given that the Slovak party seems to have failed to secure any MEPs, this means the EAF will be looking for two other likeminded European parties to enable it to form an official group in the European Parliament (the regulations stipulate you must have at least 25 MEPs from at least 7 member states to do so). Sweden’s SD may be one of these, but other parties such as UKIP, the Finns Party and the Danish People’s Party have ruled out any formal alliance with the EAF. So, the EAF will probably have to go fishing for partners among some of the smaller right-wing Eurosceptic parties from Central and Eastern Europe.</p>
<p>The results by Eurosceptic parties further to the right (with whom the EAF won’t do business) are also a mixed bag. For example, while some newspapers <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/26/10-key-lessons-european-election-results">are claiming</a> that Jobbik did well in Hungary, in reality its <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-hu-2014.html">14.7%</a> share is well below the 20.8% they received in the recent general election and also slightly less than the 14.8% they scored in 2009. In Greece, it was a different story, with Golden Dawn improving on its 2012 general election result of 7% with <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-el-2014.html">9.4%</a> in their debut EP election. If <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nte1UtRww_k">this incident</a> is anything to go by, how its three new MEPs seek to capture the limelight in the parliament should be one of the more unsavoury sideshows of the next few years.</p>
<p>As I explained in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/rise-of-euroscepticism-masks-general-apathy-about-eu-vote-25984">recent column</a>, Euroscepticism does not denote a homogenous ideological category or a single party family. Despite the tendency to associate it with the right, it also includes parties of the Left and several of these did well in the elections. In Greece, Syriza topped the poll with <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-el-2014.html">26.6%</a>, while in Ireland Sinn Féin scored <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-ie-2014.html">17%</a> – placing it firmly in third place, more than 10 points ahead of the Irish Labour Party which continues to pay a high price for its participation in an austerity-promoting coalition government led by the centre-right Fine Gael.</p>
<h2>Rising star</h2>
<p>Moving onto a more ideologically fluid Eurosceptic party which was expected to do well, Italy’s M5S got <a href="http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-it-2014.html">21.1%</a> of the vote. This has been cast by the Italian media (which has a strong anti-M5S bias) as a failure for the party. However, while its result is less than its stunning 2013 debut general election total of 25.6%, it is still a good performance from a party that has <a href="https://theconversation.com/on-italys-streets-five-star-still-twinkles-14825">struggled with growing pains</a> due to its sudden success and whose demise was being (gleefully) predicted by many Italian commentators this time last year. That said, a star of these elections has to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/springtime-for-matteo-renzi-italys-untested-political-tyro-23323">Matteo Renzi</a>, who led the governing pro-EU Democratic Party to more than 40% - the best ever performance in a national election by a centre-left Italian party.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/49464/original/j8rpvmps-1401120875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/49464/original/j8rpvmps-1401120875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=705&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49464/original/j8rpvmps-1401120875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=705&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49464/original/j8rpvmps-1401120875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=705&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49464/original/j8rpvmps-1401120875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=886&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49464/original/j8rpvmps-1401120875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=886&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/49464/original/j8rpvmps-1401120875.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=886&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Renzi: new kid on the bike.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/palazzochigi/">Palazzochigi</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>While Renzi may be the star in Italy, however, the real winner (or, perhaps, loser, depending on your viewpoint) of these elections across the continent is not the Eurosceptic or the Europhile, but – once again – the Euro-abstainer. The “this time it’s different” slogan had been devised to encourage people to vote, with the promise that the candidate of the winning coalition of parties in the EP would be the next President of the European Commission. </p>
<p>However, in terms of participation, this time hasn’t really been very different at all. Sure, for the first time since EP elections began in 1979, turnout did not decline. But its increase by around 0.1% to 43.1% is hardly – to use the term in vogue – “an earthquake”. And the real problem for the legitimacy of the European Parliament is that while journalists and people like me might be getting very excited about the changes in vote shares for parties, the majority of our fellow Europeans simply don’t care.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/27193/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Duncan McDonnell receives funding from the European Union's Marie Curie Fellowship.</span></em></p>“This time it’s different,” promised the European Parliament in an awareness campaign ahead of the May 2014 elections. And, judging by the headlines, it certainly has been different. Many in the media…Duncan McDonnell, Marie Curie Fellow, European University InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.