tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/ghana-11294/articlesGhana – The Conversation2024-03-25T15:02:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250002024-03-25T15:02:22Z2024-03-25T15:02:22ZGhana’s decades-old ambition to build an integrated aluminium industry faces a new hurdle: the clean energy transition<p>It has been more than 60 years since Ghana’s first post-independence leader Kwame Nkrumah first <a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Living_in_the_Shadow_of_the_Large_Dams/4IVSEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=volta+river+project+in+ghana&pg=PR3&printsec=frontcover">mooted</a> the idea that Ghana should produce aluminium from the country’s ample supply of bauxite.</p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40567076">Volta River Project</a>, Nkrumah’s vision was to construct a dam on Ghana’s Volta River to provide dedicated electricity to a newly built smelter. The smelter was to be run by the <a href="https://thebftonline.com/2023/07/18/valco-needs-us600m-to-modernise-aging-smelter/">Volta Aluminium Company (Valco)</a> in the new industrial city of Tema. </p>
<p>The smelter would be linked to a refinery to process Ghana’s bauxite, currently estimated at <a href="https://www.mining.com/web/ghana-signs-1-2-billion-deal-to-develop-its-bauxite-resources/">900 million tonnes</a>. Ghana has the second largest reserves in Africa after <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/bauxite-and-alumina-statistics-and-information">Guinea</a>.</p>
<p>Successive Ghanaian governments have pursued this strategy over the decades. The most recent push came in 2017 when the government embarked on its <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwDpGcigkac">latest drive</a> to develop an aluminium producing capacity. </p>
<p>Since then, the Ghana Integrated Aluminium Development Corporation (Giadec) has <a href="https://thebftonline.com/2022/08/25/giadec-seeks-us6bn-for-integrated-aluminium-industry/">invested</a> in <a href="https://giadec.com/giadec-selects-mytilineos-s-a-as-partner-for-project-3a-development-of-bauxite-mine-alumina-refinery/">new mines</a> and is looking to partner with foreign and domestic companies to actualise a harmonised aluminium industry, including an alumina refinery.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-about-housing-from-ghanas-volta-river-project-50-years-on-123920">Lessons about housing from Ghana's Volta River project 50 years on</a>
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<p>The logic has always been that <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1808850">heavy industries</a> that turn natural resources into useful products are critical for structural transformation. That is, <a href="https://unhabitat.org/structural-transformation-in-developing-countries-cross-regional-analysis">moving an economy</a> “from low productivity and labour-intensive activities to higher productivity and skill-intensive ones”. </p>
<p>Such transformation is also <a href="https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/10.1596/978-1-4648-1448-8_ch1">associated</a> with rising wages and living standards. Heavy industries can also reduce reliance on imports. </p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629622001426">works</a> have identified gaps in geography-specific research on industrial decarbonisation in developing economies. Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly under-researched, with research only really examining the case of <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/62f92860408b4b366da8a572/1660495974819/IDTT+5+WP5_Climate+change+policies+and+trade_202208.pdf">South Africa</a>.</p>
<p>We <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2023.103337">examined</a> Ghana’s long-standing challenges to the dream of a fully developed aluminium industry. We also assessed the most recent attempts to realise these plans against the backdrop of the energy transition and <a href="https://netzeroclimate.org/sectors/heavy_industry/">industrial decarbonisation</a>. </p>
<p>We found that new uncertainties and challenges stand in the way of Ghana’s latest efforts to develop an integrated aluminium industry. These are linked to the unfolding global energy transition agenda and shifts towards “green” manufacturing. </p>
<h2>Why aluminium</h2>
<p>Aluminium is both a constraint to and an enabler of a <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/mckinsey-explainers/what-is-net-zero">net zero</a> future. </p>
<p>On the one hand, it has numerous energy transition <a href="https://european-aluminium.eu/about-aluminium/aluminium-in-use">applications</a>, from solar panels and wind turbines to electricity cables and batteries. </p>
<p>But aluminium is also the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.118004">second most</a> carbon-intensive industry, after steel. It accounts for <a href="https://www.carbonchain.com/blog/understand-your-aluminum-emissions">about 4%</a> of global emissions. Emission-reduction technologies are costly and, in many cases, still being developed. </p>
<h2>Challenges – old and new</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Theophilus-Acheampong/publication/333834250_Towards_an_Integrated_Aluminium_Industry_in_Ghana_Some_Policy_Considerations/links/5d0832ce299bf1f539cb8c66/Towards-an-Integrated-Aluminium-Industry-in-Ghana-Some-Policy-Considerations.pdf">obstacles</a> Ghana has faced in its aluminium industry over the decades have included a lack of investments in new mines, lack of refinery, limited <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-7660.1987.tb00278.x">electricity</a> for smelting, and a lack of investments to upgrade the existing Valco smelter.</p>
<p>More recently, other constraints have come into play that make it hard for peripheral economies like Ghana to develop and sustain competitive aluminium industries.</p>
<p>Firstly, they are not financially in a position to use the latest sustainable production technologies, such as <a href="https://www.iea.org/energy-system/carbon-capture-utilisation-and-storage">carbon capture, use and storage</a> and <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/01/aluminium-green-transition-technologies-decarbonization/">green hydrogen</a>. These are needed to improve energy intensity and reduce emissions.</p>
<p>Secondly, Ghana faces tough new conditions, known as <a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en">“green taxonomies”</a>, being set by key export markets in the global north. Countries or trading blocs like the <a href="https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en">European Union</a> are demanding that importers in targeted heavy industrial sectors monitor and declare emissions embedded in products. They are also required to buy <a href="https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/Questions%20and%20Answers_Carbon%20Border%20Adjustment%20Mechanism%20%28CBAM%29.pdf">Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism certificates</a> to offset such emissions. The mechanism, which has already been introduced on a trial basis, will charge levies from January 2026.</p>
<p>There are strong critics of these mechanisms, with some <a href="https://www.energymonitor.ai/carbon-markets/how-cbam-threatens-africas-sustainable-development/">arguing</a> that they <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/News/Latest-news-from-LSE/2023/e-May-2023/Africa-could-lose-up-to-25-billion-per-annum-as-a-direct-result-of-the-EUs-CBAM">threaten</a> Africa’s sustainable development. These arguments are unlikely to see the EU dropping these measures. </p>
<p>The third obstacle that Ghana faces revolves around how to make its refineries and smelters produce competitively priced aluminium. The cost of power is a sticking point as it has been in prior years.</p>
<p>According to Ghana’s recently published <a href="https://www.energymin.gov.gh/sites/default/files/2023-09/FINAL%20GHANA%27S%20NATIONAL%20ENERGY%20TRANSITION%20FRAMEWORK_2023_compressed%20%281%29_compressed%20%282%29.pdf">National Energy Transition Framework</a>, natural gas will serve as Ghana’s primary transition fuel. The government argues that it can provide the base load electricity that Ghana requires for industrialisation. </p>
<p>But choosing gas as the energy solution for Ghana’s aluminium chain could jeopardise the export potential of the aluminium it produces. About <a href="https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs02/export/gha/show/157601/2019">80%</a> of Ghana’s aluminium is exported to Europe and could be subjected to carbon taxes if production is powered by gas.</p>
<p>Hydro electricity would, in many respects, be the ideal solution. It is Ghana’s cheapest and greenest energy source. And it would allow the country to compete in markets regulated by carbon considerations. </p>
<p>But this isn’t as straightforward as it may seem. If Valco and a new smelter were to operate at envisaged levels of production it would remove almost all the hydropower output of Akosombo Dam from Ghana’s broader electricity mix. The hydropower also plays a key role in bringing down overall <a href="https://rgu-repository.worktribe.com/preview/1721654/ACHEAMPONG%202021%20Ghanas%20changing%20electricity%20%28VOR%29.pdf">electricity prices</a>. </p>
<p>Thus, while hydro electricity may be a technically good solution, it may not be politically acceptable in a country where electricity prices are a key <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68236869">electoral issue</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-electricity-crisis-is-holding-the-country-back-how-it-got-here-217606">Ghana's electricity crisis is holding the country back - how it got here</a>
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<p>Finally, other concerns are emerging around plans to mine bauxite in some of Ghana’s last remaining green forests, including the <a href="https://www.clientearth.org/latest/news/protecting-ghana-s-atewa-range-forest-reserve-from-bauxite-mining">Atewa Forest Reserve</a>. </p>
<p>National and international civil society organisations and environmental activists are resisting the move. Many local businesses support it, however, because of the potential economic gains a mine and refinery would bring. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-pact-with-china-to-explore-bauxite-threatens-a-unique-forest-120815">Ghana's pact with China to explore bauxite threatens a unique forest</a>
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<p>These are some of the trade-offs that policymakers must consider.</p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>Collectively, these issues may frustrate Ghana’s ambitions once more. </p>
<p>At an international level, peripheral economies like Ghana need clarity about how particular energy technologies will be classified. </p>
<p>Lastly, climate financing and green technology transfer pledges from developed to developing economies need to be honoured. </p>
<p>We suggest the Ghanaian government can overcome some of these issues through dialogue with stakeholders and being frank about the trade-offs involved. But a national discussion about benefits and costs is only possible if it’s clearer what choices around energy will be made.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225000/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theophilus Acheampong is affiliated with the IMANI Centre for Policy and Education in Accra, Ghana. He has consulted in a private capacity for the Government of Ghana on the aluminium industry.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Tyce does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana has spent over 60 years trying to build an aluminium industry.Theophilus Acheampong, Associate Lecturer, University of AberdeenMatthew Tyce, Lecturer in International Political Economy, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2263452024-03-22T16:20:44Z2024-03-22T16:20:44ZFood prices will climb everywhere as temperatures rise due to climate change – new research<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583725/original/file-20240322-30-xfqo14.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C0%2C3249%2C1685&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A food market in Ghana, where many already don't have access to a healthy and varied diet.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Lauren Huddleston / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Climate change, and specifically rising temperatures, may cause food prices to increase by 3.2% per year, according to a <a href="https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpress.springernature.com%2Fresource%2Fcontent%2FFull%2520text%2520article.pdf%2F26871100&data=05%7C02%7CJ.L.Boxall%40soton.ac.uk%7C8d7c521279cc43e8292c08dc48356216%7C4a5378f929f44d3ebe89669d03ada9d8%7C0%7C0%7C638464642051145176%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=vaLG3ZuI77iJgx%2Fa3EUUqdGIhXYetv37lV44p%2BcgUVM%3D&reserved=0">new study</a> by researchers in Germany. As climate change continues to worsen, this price inflation will mean more and more people around the world don’t have a varied and healthy diet, or simply don’t have enough food.</p>
<p>The new analysis shows that global warming could cause food price inflation to increase by between 0.9 and 3.2 percentage points per year by 2035. The same warming will cause a smaller rise in overall inflation (between 0.3 and 1.2 percentage points), so a greater proportion of household income would need to be spent on buying food.</p>
<p>This effect will be felt worldwide, by high and low-income countries alike, but nowhere more so than in the global south. As with various other consequences of climate change, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10171450/">Africa will be worst affected</a> despite contributing little to its causes.</p>
<p>Our own research on food security in Ghana, west Africa, gives a sense of what price inflation might mean in practice. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change describes west Africa as a <a href="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0171921">“hotspot”</a> of climate change, with models predicting <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf">extreme rising temperatures</a> and reduced <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844021010318">rainfall</a>. With more than half of the <a href="https://opencontentghana.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/census-final-results-2010.pdf">population</a> being directly dependent on rain-fed agriculture, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666154321001071">Ghana</a> is particularly vulnerable to climate change.</p>
<p>We recently carried out a <a href="https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.25245082.v1">study</a> in Mion, a rural district in the north of the country. We spoke to almost 400 people, and every single one of them told us they had experienced some level of food insecurity in the previous 12 months. Some 99% said climate change was at least partly to blame.</p>
<p>Additionally, 62% were moderately or severely food insecure, with 26% experiencing severe food insecurity (going without food for an entire day). These percentages are much worse than Ghana’s <a href="https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en?details=cc3017en">national averages</a> (39% and 6% respectively), but similar to some of the poorest countries in west Africa such as Togo, Burkina Faso and Benin. </p>
<p>We also carried out a similar study among refugees from neighbouring Burkina Faso who fled across the border to the upper east region of Ghana. Again, <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2023.07.31.23293476v1">100%</a> had experienced food insecurity.</p>
<p>Mion isn’t suffering from a sudden famine, and nothing particularly unusual has happened to cause this food insecurity. This situation is considered to be a <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2021.706721">“normal phenomenon”</a> due to the effects of climate change.</p>
<p>Climate-related food inflation can be broken down into two interlinked problems.</p>
<h2>Shifting seasons, pests and diseases</h2>
<p>The first is that the same climate change effects that are causing the inflation are already making food harder to get hold of. For instance, higher temperatures can cause long-established and predictable farming seasons to shift and so may <a href="https://theconversation.com/climate-change-alarming-africa-wide-report-predicts-30-drop-in-crop-revenue-50-million-without-water-224543">hinder crop production</a>. </p>
<p>Other consequences can include more pest and disease outbreaks that deplete livestock and food reserves, and heat stress to already-poor roads which makes it harder to access rural communities. </p>
<p>All of these <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11027-010-9263-9">factors</a> push prices higher and reduce the purchasing power of affected households. The drivers of food inflation are already worsening food insecurity.</p>
<p>The second part of this problem is the rise in inflation itself. A 3% annual price increase would mean households are less able to purchase what they need. </p>
<p>They would likely need to compromise on quality or perhaps even culturally important foods. This in turn makes people more vulnerable to disease and other health issues. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8910702/#:%7E:text=Worldwide%2C%20malnutrition%20is%20the%20main,against%20viral%20proliferation%20%5B135%5D.">Malnutrition</a> is the leading cause of immunodeficiency globally. </p>
<p>In Ghana, we found that those who reported more knowledge of climate change were more likely to be food secure. This is despite few people having any formal education. This is evidence that affected populations are very aware of the changing temperatures and unpredictability of the climate, and are perhaps engaging in proactive mitigation practices. </p>
<p>Those without any schooling are more likely to engage in a climate-sensitive occupations such as farming, and so would be more immediately exposed. Teaching people about climate change might provide some capacity to adapt to it, and therefore increase food security.</p>
<p>Alterations in the climate are a <a href="https://www.ajol.info/index.php/gjas/article/view/179661">hunger-risk multiplier</a> for those populations with entrenched vulnerability. In light of this, 134 countries at COP28 signed a <a href="https://www.wri.org/news/statement-134-countries-sign-emirates-declaration-sustainable-agriculture-and-put-food-high-0#:%7E:text=Following%20is%20a%20statement%20from,millions%20of%20others%20are%20starving">declaration</a> to incorporate food systems into their climate action, to ensure everyone has enough to eat in light of climate change.</p>
<p>The researchers behind the new study suggest that reducing greenhouse gas emissions could limit any impacts on the global economy. We also suggest that diversifying economies would serve as some protection for those communities reliant on agriculture for both their food and income. </p>
<p>Government intervention could also ensure financial protection and nutritional aid for those vulnerable to becoming trapped in the poverty cycle by inflation and diminished accessibility to food. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Head has previously received funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the UK Department for International Development, and currently receives funding from the UK Medical Research Foundation. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jessica Boxall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Poorer countries will be hit hardest, as a new study shows.Jessica Boxall, Public Health & Nutrition Research Fellow, University of SouthamptonMichael Head, Senior Research Fellow in Global Health, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2249822024-03-21T14:40:43Z2024-03-21T14:40:43ZGhana’s free high school policy is getting more girls to complete secondary education – study<p>Education drives economic growth and individual well-being. Secondary education, in particular, plays a crucial role. In recent decades, this recognition has encouraged several <a href="https://theconversation.com/free-secondary-education-in-african-countries-is-on-the-rise-but-is-it-the-best-policy-what-the-evidence-says-204924">African countries to make secondary education free</a>. One example is Ghana’s Free Public Senior High School (<a href="https://moe.gov.gh/index.php/free-shs-policy/">FreeSHS</a>) policy, initiated in 2017. </p>
<p>The policy aimed to remove cost barriers to secondary education, including fees, textbooks, boarding and meals. </p>
<p>As scholars of public policy, we conducted <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059324000439#bib4">research</a> into the impact of the policy, particularly its effect on the number of girls completing secondary school. We emphasised the educational outcomes of girls because they are at a disadvantage when accessing higher education in Ghana. The enrolment and retention of girls in school <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13603124.2019.1613565">decrease with each educational level</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/01443581211274647/full/html">Socio-culturally,</a> if a family has limited resources, they tend to spend more on boys’ education than on girls’ education and this is reinforced by the belief that girls’ labour around the house is more valuable.</p>
<p>The results highlighted that the state’s absorption of education costs had served as a critical incentive for students to complete secondary education – and more so for girls.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059324000439#bib4">Our paper</a> is the first to quantitatively evaluate the policy’s impact on education outcomes. Also, by focusing on the policy’s impact on schoolgirls, our findings show how removing cost barriers to education significantly enhances the chances of girls in completing secondary education. This is important because aside from female education having individual benefits, “to educate girls is to reduce poverty”, as former UN secretary-general <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2003/sgsm8662.doc.htm">Kofi Annan</a> said.</p>
<p>Our findings contribute to the call for greater schooling access for girls.</p>
<h2>Weighing up the pros and cons</h2>
<p>Ghana’s Free Public Senior High School policy arose from an <a href="https://www.codeoghana.org/assets/downloadables/2012%20NPP%20Manifesto.pdf">election campaign promise</a> made by President <a href="https://citifmonline.com/2017/09/from-2008-to-2017-the-free-shs-journey/">Nana Akufo-Addo during campaign trails in 2008, 2012 and 2016</a>.</p>
<p>Between 2017 and 2021 the government spent <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/gh-5-12bn-spent-on-free-shs-minister.html">GH¢5.12 billion</a> (US$392 million) on implementing the policy. </p>
<p>There has been controversy. Critics have questioned the policy’s financial sustainability and raised concerns about <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18146627.2023.2225754?casa_token=ghjM4EjR7LQAAAAA:Fh511M9k6kARILla_omwarRwRI8r_PA130k9DRvHDmJYvyCIIYDZb4u0FwqbmXuO3hD_3VL51CF6eA">deteriorating education quality</a>, given the rising enrolment rates since the policy’s inception.</p>
<p>Still, public opinion remains largely favourable. According to the <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/summary_of_results-ghana_r8-19feb20-updated.pdf">Afrobarometer survey in 2020</a>, 23.5% agreed and 63.1% strongly agreed that it had created opportunities for those who otherwise would not have been able to afford secondary education. </p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>Our study set out to estimate the impact of the policy on education attainment. We emphasised how it had affected, in particular, the completion rate of girls. We did this by estimating the change in secondary school completion rates without the policy (2013 to 2016) and with it (2017 to 2020). </p>
<p>These rates will have been influenced by a number of factors, not just free education. But they were the starting point of our nuanced analysis.</p>
<p>Because all students benefited from the policy from 2017 we couldn’t simply estimate its impact by looking at the completion rate of those who benefited and those who had not. </p>
<p>So we compared districts where more students took advantage of the policy. That is, where more students had previously been unable to afford schooling to districts where fewer did so. This helped us see if the change in completion rates between these groups was bigger after the policy started. Basically, it’s like comparing two gardens. Both get extra water (free schooling) and experience an increase in growth. However, one garden grew more than the other.</p>
<p>That difference in “gardens” (school districts) allowed us to estimate the impact of the “water” (the policy) on education completion. </p>
<p>We found that the policy positively affected the educational attainment of both girls and boys. For girls and boys together, the policy increased the completion of senior high school by 14.9 percentage points. </p>
<p>There was a 14 percentage point increase in the rate of girls completing senior high school after the new policy. We did not estimate the increase for boys but the combined rate shows it will be higher than 14 percentage points.</p>
<p>We also found that after the policy was in place, girls enrolled in secondary high school at rates equal to or exceeding those of boys across all regions. However, this has not yet translated into full gender parity in completion rates. </p>
<p>The short-term impact suggests that the policy alone does not erase all gendered constraints to education (for example, social and cultural), but it has contributed to reducing them. </p>
<p>We did not find evidence that the policy improved the quality of education. However, we found that quality was statistically insignificant in driving completion rates.</p>
<p><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10780-022-09459-3">Reports</a> of inadequate infrastructure and overcrowding hint at an <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18146627.2023.2225754">unchanged and even declining quality of schooling</a>. </p>
<h2>Policy implications</h2>
<p>Our findings have four policy implications. To maximise the benefits of increased enrolment and completion rates, Ghana must:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Address education quality concerns</strong>: An increase in secondary high school completion rates should not be mistaken for quality. Quality must be enhanced to improve labour market competitiveness and long-term gains.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Implement complementary policies</strong>: Increasing enrolment and completion rates will lead to a larger pool of educated youth. Labour market and tertiary education opportunities must be boosted to match the new demand.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Develop interventions to address specific needs of deprived districts</strong>: Some regions, for instance, the northern and western regions, had among the lowest uptake rates for the free senior high school policy. There are underlying barriers to education in these regions other than fees. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059321000237">Lessons from Uganda</a> have shown that, despite universal fee-free secondary education, the probability of enrolling in secondary education was reduced by greater distance to the nearest school, especially in rural compared to urban areas. </p></li>
<li><p><strong>Make FreeSHS a targeted intervention rather than universal</strong>: The government must do more to systematically identify those who cannot pay and make secondary education free for them. The policy can also be used to provide incentives for the uptake of technical and vocational education and training. This can yield savings, generate resources for quality education investments and increase employment opportunities. </p></li>
</ul>
<p><em>This article and the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059324000439#bib4">research</a> it is based upon was led by <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/alicia-stenzel/?originalSubdomain=de">Alicia Stenzel</a> (Education Policy Advisor at GIZ).</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Free secondary educational policy in Ghana is worthwhile but struggles to keep up with quality.Victor Osei Kwadwo, Lecturer, Maastricht University (UNU-MERIT), United Nations UniversityRose Vincent, Assistant Professor, Utrecht UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259922024-03-19T14:03:12Z2024-03-19T14:03:12ZCocoa beans are in short supply: what this means for farmers, businesses and chocolate lovers<p><em>A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/african-cocoa-plants-run-out-beans-global-chocolate-crisis-deepens-2024-03-13/">shortage</a> of cocoa beans has led to a near shutdown of processing plants in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, the two countries responsible for <a href="https://theconversation.com/cocoa-prices-are-surging-west-african-countries-should-seize-the-moment-to-negotiate-a-better-deal-for-farmers-214305">60% of global production</a>. With chocolate makers around the world reliant on west Africa for cocoa, there is significant concern about the impact on the prices of chocolate and the livelihood of farmers. Cocoa researcher Michael Odijie explains the reasons for the shortage.</em></p>
<h2>Why has cocoa production declined sharply in west Africa?</h2>
<p>Three factors are at play: environmental, economic cycle related and human. </p>
<p>One environmental factor is the impact of the El Niño weather phenomenon, which has caused drier weather in west Africa. It has contributed to problems on farms, such as the swollen shoot virus disease. As a result, Ghana has lost harvests from nearly <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/ghana-loses-over-500000-hectares-of-cocoa-farms-to-swollen-shoot-disease/">500,000 hectares</a> of land in recent years.</p>
<p>The economic cycle of cocoa production refers to the inherent patterns of expansion and contraction in cocoa farming. For example, as cocoa trees age, they become susceptible to diseases, requiring high maintenance costs. Historically, farmers have tended to abandon old farms and start anew in fresh forests. Unfortunately, finding new forests is now increasingly difficult. Perhaps the most severe issue of all is the lack of fair compensation for sustainable cocoa production</p>
<p>The human factor includes challenges such as illegal mining, which has overtaken numerous farms in Ghana. Sometimes, farmers lease their land to illegal miners in exchange for payment. These mining activities degrade the quality of the land, making it unsuitable for cocoa cultivation. </p>
<p>The global market for chocolate and chocolate products is on the <a href="https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/industry-reports/cocoa-and-chocolate-market-100075">rise</a>. It is projected to grow faster than <a href="https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/chocolate-market#:%7E:text=The%20global%20chocolate%20market%20size,key%20driver%20of%20the%20market.">4% annually</a> over the next few years. This growing demand for cocoa underscores the urgency in addressing the intertwined issues that relate to the industry’s sustainability.</p>
<h2>Have west African governments intervened to help cocoa farmers?</h2>
<p>In February 2024, the Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod), regulator of the country’s cocoa sector, secured a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ghanas-cocobod-taps-200-mln-world-bank-loan-rebuild-disease-hit-cocoa-farms-2024-02-16/">World Bank loan</a> of US$200 million to rehabilitate plantations affected by the cocoa swollen shoot virus. The board will take over the disease-ridden farms, remove and replace the afflicted cocoa trees, and nurture the new plantings to the fruiting stage before returning them to the farmers.</p>
<p>This practice of Cocobod taking out loans to assist farmers is a longstanding one in Ghana. For instance, in 2018, Cocobod <a href="https://thecocoapost.com/cocobod-afdb-loan/">used part</a> of a $600 million loan from the African Development Bank to rehabilitate aging plantations and those hit by diseases. And at the start of the current harvest season in October, the <a href="https://www.cighci.org/ghana-announces-cocoa-producer-price-for-2023-24-crop-season/">producer price was raised</a>: farmers are paid more, a move made inevitable by the surge in global prices. Also, Ghana Cocobod has established a <a href="https://starrfm.com.gh/2024/03/cocobod-taskforce-arrests-illegal-mining-gang-leaders-in-atobrakrom/">task force</a> to shield cocoa farms from the harmful impacts of mining. It has cooperated with police to stem the smuggling of cocoa to neighbouring countries, particularly those that offer a stronger currency.</p>
<p>In Côte d'Ivoire, relatively little action has been taken. It appears the government is still assessing the situation. But there have been <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-02-16/ivory-coast-seizes-100-tons-of-cocoa-at-the-border-with-guinea">measures</a> to curb smuggling of cocoa, prompted by the fact that the shortage is driving up prices in neighbouring countries. Côte d'Ivoire does benefit from numerous sustainability programmes initiated by multinational corporations. The current shortage has accelerated these initiatives. Regrettably, some of the programmes do not disclose their data, making it difficult for academics to access and analyse their information.</p>
<p>African governments have yet to address significant structural issues in their interventions.</p>
<h2>How have cocoa farmers and cocoa-producing countries’ economies been affected?</h2>
<p>At the farm level, although the rise in prices may initially appear beneficial to farmers, the reality is not straightforward. A decrease in output leads to fewer harvests on average, which means that, overall, farmers are not earning more. This issue is compounded by recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-economic-crisis-expert-insights-into-how-things-got-so-bad-and-what-the-fixes-are-193153">economic challenges in west Africa</a>, such as high inflation and currency devaluation, particularly in Ghana. These factors have resulted in farmers becoming poorer.</p>
<p>Another impact of the output decline is a reduction in local processing. Major African processing facilities in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have either ceased operations or reduced their processing capacity because they cannot afford to purchase beans. This likely means that chocolate prices worldwide will surge. This, in turn, adversely affects the local production units that have been emerging in recent years. </p>
<p>However, the bargaining power of west African cocoa-producing countries seems to have increased. Now is an opportune moment for these nations to unite and negotiate more favourable terms for their cocoa farmers. </p>
<h2>Will chocolate makers eventually turn to cocoa alternatives?</h2>
<p>It’s inevitable because continuing to cultivate cocoa under current conditions is unsustainable. I don’t perceive this negatively; I hope it occurs sooner rather than later. In fact, it is already underway with the rise of cocoa butter equivalents, cocoa extenders and artificial flavours (synthetic or nature-identical flavours that mimic the taste of chocolate without the need for cocoa). </p>
<p>The German company Planet A Foods is a leader in this area. It produces cocoa-free chocolate, using technology to transform ingredients such as oats and sunflower seeds into substitutes for cocoa mass and butter. </p>
<p>Overall, this is beneficial for everyone. The demand for cocoa has <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-real-cost-of-your-chocolate-habit-new-research-reveals-the-bittersweet-truth-of-cocoa-farming-in-africas-forests-206082">resulted</a> in mass deforestation and significant carbon emissions, issues that are likely to worsen due to climate change. Moreover, the push for cultivation has led to various forms of labour abuses. Exploring cocoa alternatives is certainly part of the solution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225992/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael E Odijie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Major African cocoa plants in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana have stopped or cut processing because they cannot afford to buy beans.Michael E Odijie, Research associate, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259122024-03-15T13:28:50Z2024-03-15T13:28:50ZUndersea cables for Africa’s internet retrace history and leave digital gaps as they connect continents<p><em>Large parts of west and central Africa, as well as some countries in the south of the continent, were <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/mar/14/much-of-west-and-central-africa-without-internet-after-undersea-cable-failures">left without internet services</a> on 14 March because of failures on four of the fibre optic cables that run below the world’s oceans. Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ghana, Burkina Faso and South Africa were among the worst affected. By midday on 15 March the problem had not been resolved. Microsoft <a href="https://mybroadband.co.za/news/internet/528961-massive-undersea-cable-outage-fix-delayed-says-microsoft.html">warned its customers</a> that there was a delay in repairing the cables. South Africa’s News24 <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/nine-undersea-cables-make-the-internet-work-in-sa-four-are-currently-damaged-20240315">reported</a> that, while the cause of the damage had not been confirmed, it was believed that “the cables snapped in shallow waters near the Ivory Coast, where fishing vessels are likely to operate”.</em></p>
<p><em>Jess Auerbach Jahajeeah, an associate professor at the University of Cape Town’s Graduate School of Business, is currently writing a book on fibre optic cables and digital connectivity. She spent time in late 2023 aboard the ship whose crew is responsible for maintaining most of Africa’s undersea network. She spoke to The Conversation Africa about the importance of these cables.</em></p>
<h2>1. What’s the geographical extent of Africa’s current undersea network?</h2>
<p>Fibre optic cables now literally encircle Africa, though some parts of the continent are far better connected than others. This is because both public and private organisations have made major investments in the past ten years. </p>
<p>Based on <a href="https://www.submarinecablemap.com/">an interactive map</a> of fibre optic cables, it’s clear that South Africa is in a relatively good position. When the breakages happened, the network was affected for a few hours before the internet traffic was rerouted; a technical process that depends both on there being alternative routes available and corporate agreements in place to enable the rerouting. It’s the same as driving using a tool like Google Maps. If there’s an accident on the road it finds another way to get you to your destination. </p>
<p>But, in several African countries – including Sierra Leone and Liberia – most of the cables don’t have spurs (the equivalent of off-ramps on the road), so only one fibre optic cable actually comes into the country. Internet traffic from these countries basically <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/undersea-cable-failures-cause-internet-disruptions-across-africa-march-14-2024">stops when the cable breaks</a>. </p>
<p>Naturally that has huge implications for every aspect of life, business and even politics. Whilst some communication can be rerouted via satellites, satellite traffic accounts for <a href="https://blog.telegeography.com/2023-mythbusting-part-3">only about 1% of digital transmissions globally</a>. Even with interventions such as satellite-internet distribution service <a href="https://www.starlink.com/">Starlink</a> it’s still much slower and much more expensive than the connection provided by undersea cables. </p>
<p>Basically all internet for regular people relies on fibre optic cables. Even landlocked countries rely on the network, because they have agreements with countries with landing stations – highly-secured buildings close to the ocean where the cable comes up from underground and is plugged into terrestrial systems. For example southern Africa’s internet comes largely through connections in Melkbosstrand, just outside Cape Town, and <a href="https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/stations/africa/south-africa/mtunzini-cls">Mtunzini</a> in northern KwaZulu-Natal, both in South Africa. Then it’s routed overland to various neighbours. </p>
<p>Each fibre optic cable is extremely expensive to build and to maintain. Depending on the technical specifications (cables can have more or fewer fibre threads and enable different speeds for digital traffic) there are complex legal agreements in place for who is responsible for which aspects of maintenance.</p>
<h2>2. What prompted you to write a book about the social history of fibre optic cables in Africa?</h2>
<p>I first visited Angola in 2011 to start work for <a href="https://utorontopress.com/9781487524333/from-water-to-wine/">my PhD project</a>. The internet was all but non-existent – sending an email took several minutes at the time. Then I went back in 2013, after the <a href="https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/brazil-africa/sacs">South Atlantic Cable System</a> went into operation. It made an incredible difference: suddenly Angola’s digital ecosystem was up and running and everybody was online. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/in-our-wi-fi-world-the-internet-still-depends-on-undersea-cables-49936">In our Wi-Fi world, the internet still depends on undersea cables</a>
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<p>At the time I was working on social mobility and how people in Angola were improving their lives after <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/angolan-civil-war-1975-2002-brief-history">a long war</a>. Unsurprisingly, having digital access made all sorts of things possible that simply weren’t imaginable before. I picked up my interest again once I was professionally established, and am now writing it up as a book, <a href="https://stias.ac.za/2022/03/when-a-cable-is-not-just-a-cable-fellows-seminar-by-jess-auerbach/">Capricious Connections</a>. The title refers to the fact that the cables wouldn’t do anything if it wasn’t for the infrastructure that they plug into at various points. </p>
<p>Landing centres such as Sangano in Angola are fascinating both because of what they do technically (connecting and routing internet traffic all over the country) and because they often highlight the complexities of <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad582-digital-divide-who-in-africa-is-connected-and-who-is-not/">the digital divide</a>. </p>
<p>For example, Sangano is a remarkable high tech facility run by an incredibly competent and socially engaged company, Angola Cables. Yet the school a few hundred metres from the landing station still doesn’t have electricity. </p>
<p>When we think about the digital divide in Africa, that’s often <a href="https://www.bmz-digital.global/en/datacolonialism-double-interview/">still the reality</a>: you can bring internet everywhere but if there’s no infrastructure, skills or frameworks to make it accessible, it can remain something abstract even for those who live right beside it.</p>
<p>In terms of history, fibre optic cables follow all sorts of fascinating global precedents. The 2012 cable that connected one side of the Atlantic Ocean to the other is laid almost exactly <a href="https://www.slavevoyages.org/blog/volume-and-direction-trans-atlantic-slave-trade">over the route of the transatlantic slave trade</a>, for example. Much of the basic cable map is layered over the routes of the <a href="https://notevenpast.org/to-rule-the-waves-britains-cable-empire-and-the-birth-of-global-communications/">copper telegraph network</a> that was essential for the British empire in the 1800s.</p>
<p>Most of Africa’s cables are maintained at sea by the remarkable crew of the ship Léon Thévenin. I <a href="https://mg.co.za/africa/2023-11-27-down-to-the-wire-the-ship-fixing-our-internet/">joined them</a> in late 2023 during a repair operation off the coast of Ghana. These are uniquely skilled artisans and technicians who retrieve and repair cables, sometimes from depths of multiple kilometres under the ocean. </p>
<p>When I spent time with the crew last year, they recounted once accidentally retrieving a section of Victorian-era cable when they were trying to “catch” a much more recent fibre optic line. (Cables are retrieved in many ways; one way is with a grapnel-like hook that is dragged along the ocean bed in roughly the right location until it snags the cable.)</p>
<p>There are some very interesting questions emerging now about what is commonly called <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo216184200.html?trk=public_post_comment-text">digital colonialism</a>. In an environment where data is often referred to with terms like “<a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishatalagala/2022/03/02/data-as-the-new-oil-is-not-enough-four-principles-for-avoiding-data-fires/?sh=23be1821c208">the new oil</a>”, we’re seeing an important change in digital infrastructure. </p>
<p>Previously cables were usually financed by a combination of public and private sector partnerships, but now big private companies such as Alphabet, Meta and Huawei are increasingly financing cable infrastructure. That has serious implications for control and monitoring of digital infrastructure. </p>
<p>Given we all depend so much on digital tools, poorer countries often have little choice but to accept the terms and conditions of wealthy corporate entities. That’s potentially incredibly dangerous for African digital sovereignty, and is something we should be seeing a lot more public conversation about.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225912/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jess Auerbach Jahajeeah receives funding from the Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Study where she is an Iso Lomso Fellow, the National Research Foundation of South Africa and the UCT Vice Chancellor’s Future Leaders Program. </span></em></p>Fibre optic cables now literally encircle Africa, though some parts of the continent are far better connected than others.Jess Auerbach Jahajeeah, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228032024-03-06T13:25:54Z2024-03-06T13:25:54ZWest Africa’s coast was a haven for piracy and illegal fishing - how technology is changing the picture<p>The <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en">Gulf of Guinea</a> – a coastal region that stretches from Senegal to Angola – is endowed with vast reserves of hydrocarbon, mineral and fisheries resources. It is also an important route for international commerce, making it critical to the development of countries in the region.</p>
<p>For a long time, however, countries in the Gulf of Guinea haven’t properly monitored what’s happening in their waters. This has allowed <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-maritime-security-factsheet-gulf-guinea_en">security threats</a> at sea to flourish. The threats include illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery, and toxic waste dumping.</p>
<iframe title="" aria-label="Locator maps" id="datawrapper-chart-0uP9R" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0uP9R/2/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="650" data-external="1" width="100%"></iframe>
<p>For instance, in 2020, the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/icc_test/index.php/1305-latest-gulf-of-guinea-piracy-attack-alarming-warns-imb#:%7E:text=IMB%20data%20shows%20that%20the,in%202019%20from%2017%20incidents.">International Maritime Bureau</a> reported that the region had experienced the highest number of crew kidnappings ever recorded: 130 crew members taken in 22 incidents. In 2019, 121 crew members were kidnapped in 17 incidents.</p>
<p>Regional action to address these threats is being taken. In 2013, heads of state signed the <a href="https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/Declaration%20of%20the%20Heads%20of%20State%20and%20Government%20on%20Maritime%20Safety%20and%20Security.pdf">Yaoundé Code of Conduct</a> – a declaration to work together and address the threats. This also involved setting up a large hub, known as the <a href="https://icc-gog.org/?page_id=1575">Yaoundé Architecture</a> (made up of different divisions), which coordinates and shares information on what’s happening at sea. </p>
<p>Since the Yaoundé Code of Conduct was signed in 2013, there has been some progress. As we found in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23005092?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=848184a42c0160f6">a new study</a>, tech-driven tools have been playing a vital role in addressing security threats at sea in west and central African countries. </p>
<p>For instance, Nigeria was once designated a piracy hotspot but, in 2022, was <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2022/05/nigeria-exits-nations-of-high-piracy-risks-robbery-in-international-waters-imu/#:%7E:text=For%20fighting%20Sea%20Piracy%20headlong%20through%20the%20Nigerian,has%20exited%20Nigeria%20from%20the%20IMB%20Piracy%20List.">delisted</a>. This was in large part due to the use of <a href="https://guardian.ng/business-services/maritime/nigeria-delisted-from-sea-piracy-list-says-navy/">technology</a>.</p>
<p>Tech tools have helped countries to more efficiently manage and monitor the marine environment. They also support information sharing among law enforcement agencies. This has led to successful interdictions and enabled the prosecution of pirates in the region.</p>
<h2>The tech tools</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Pages/AIS.aspx">Cargo</a> and <a href="https://www.fao.org/3/w9633e/w9633e.pdf">fishing</a> vessels are required, under international law, to be fitted with systems that transmit data showing where they are. </p>
<p>Since the signing of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, we <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23005092">found</a> that new technology is now using this location data to help countries in the Gulf of Guinea monitor their waters. </p>
<p>Tools and systems – like Radar, Yaoundé Architecture Regional Information System (<a href="https://www.gogin.eu/plateforme-yaris/">Yaris</a>), <a href="https://info.seavision.volpe.dot.gov/">Sea-Vision</a>, <a href="https://www.skylight.global/">Skylight</a> and <a href="https://globalfishingwatch.org/">Global Fishing Watch</a> – are integrating information from various surveillance and location monitoring systems and satellite data to identify suspicious behaviour. This has significantly helped to improve efforts to combat security threats. </p>
<p>Countries in the Gulf now have increased awareness of vessel activity in their waters and are able to make more informed responses in emergencies, like piracy or armed robbery and oil theft. </p>
<p>For instance, in 2022 the <a href="https://shipsandports.com.ng/mt-heroic-idun-captain-issued-false-piracy-alert-says-gambo/">Heroic Idun tanker</a>, evaded arrest in Nigeria for suspicious behaviour, then travelled on to Equatorial Guinea. Using the Yaoundé Architecture system, Equatorial Guinea held the vessel at Nigeria’s request and it was later <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/detained-oiltanker-equatorial-guinea-return-nigeria-officials-2022-11-11/">fined</a>. </p>
<p>Without the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, and the new tech that it has introduced, the sharing of information, capture of evidence and cooperation between countries would not have been possible. </p>
<h2>Nigeria’s tech advancements</h2>
<p>Nigeria is a prime example of a country where investment in technology-based infrastructure has helped it to tackle threats to security and development. </p>
<p>Over the past three years, Nigeria has deployed a range of tech tools. For instance, the navy deployed the <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/regional-maritime-awareness-capability-rmac-programme-rolling-out-across-africa/">Regional Maritime Awareness Capability facility</a>, which receives, records and distributes data and the
mass surveillance <a href="https://www.defenceweb.co.za/sea/sea-sea/nigeria-commissions-falcon-eye-maritime-domain-awareness-system/#:%7E:text=Nigeria%20has%20commissioned%20the%20Israeli-designed%20Falcon%20Eye%20maritime,July%20at%20the%20Nigerian%20Naval%20Headquarters%20in%20Abuja">FALCON EYE system</a>.</p>
<p>The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency has also made advancements through its <a href="https://nimasa.gov.ng/president-buhari-launches-deep-blue-project-in-lagos/#:%7E:text=The%20Project%2C%20which%20was%20initiated%20by%20the%20Federal,Nigerian%20waters%20up%20to%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.">Deep Blue Project</a>. This includes a central intelligence and data collection centre which works with special mission vessels (like unmanned aerial vehicles) to take action against threats. </p>
<p>Nigeria has since had <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1342-new-imb-report-reveals-concerning-rise-in-maritime-piracy-incidents-in-2023#:%7E:text=Despite%20the%20continued%20restraint%20in,two%20injured%20crew%20in%202023">a reduction</a> in piracy and armed robbery at sea. Once designated a piracy hotspot, the country was <a href="https://nimasa.gov.ng/piracy-nigeria-removed-from-ibf-unsafe-waters-list/">delisted as a hotspot</a> in 2022. </p>
<h2>Cautious optimism</h2>
<p>Evidently, technology has an important role to play in enhancing safety and security at sea. But it’s not without it’s challenges, as we identified in our study.</p>
<p>First, an over-reliance on external tech tools has resulted in a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23005092?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=848184a42c0160f6#sec0035">lack of ownership</a> of the technology. This affects the sustainability of the projects. For instance, once EU funding for YARIS expires, the operating costs will be transferred from the EU to Yaoundé Architecture states. But there are still no clear plans from regional states on how to sustain YARIS.</p>
<p>Second, people with specific expertise are needed to use the tech. But many countries can’t afford to hire them, or aren’t producing human resources with this expertise. Even when personnel have received training, they may not have access to the tools (which aren’t available at the country level) to apply what they have learnt. </p>
<p>Third, existing monitoring systems such as AIS and VMS can be switched off, a vulnerability that criminals continue to exploit. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9286260/pdf/pone.0269490.pdf">Radar systems</a> can fill these gaps, but there’s a lack of RADAR coverage along coastlines. Related to this, the scarcity of national <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/data-center">data centres</a> for long range vessel identification and tracking (due to lack of investment) makes using existing technology difficult.</p>
<p>Fifth, there are <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X23005092?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=848184a42c0160f6#sec0025">challenges</a> related to communication difficulties, the absence of internet connections onboard some vessels or low internet speed. </p>
<p>Finally, private operators like the shipping industry aren’t using the services provided by the Yaoundé Architecture. This smacks of politics and lack of trust in the regional solutions. </p>
<p>Vessel operators report incidents instead to agencies outside the region, such as <a href="https://www.mica-center.org/en/agreements-supporting-the-action-of-the-mica-center/">Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade - Gulf of Guinea</a> (based in France) or the <a href="https://www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb">International Maritime Bureau</a> in Malaysia and these agencies often broadcast the information without confirming with the regional architecture. This undermines the ability of regional agencies to do their work effectively.</p>
<p>It’s in the best interests of Atlantic nations to cooperate and coordinate on meeting maritime security challenges. </p>
<p>Technology can play a key role in this. But it’s vital that countries enhance technological know-how, and ensure that external partners and businesses use the available technological services. This will be a big step towards a secure and collaborative maritime environment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222803/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood receives funding from the Scottish Funding Council and PEW Charitable Trust. </span></em></p>Tech tools are playing a vital role in addressing security threats at sea in various west and central African countries.Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Lecturer, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248882024-03-01T18:33:43Z2024-03-01T18:33:43ZGhana’s new anti-homosexuality bill violates everyone’s rights, not just LGBTIQ+ people - expert<p>Ghana’s new <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/28/africa/ghana-passes-anti-homosexuality-bill-intl/index.html">anti-homosexuality bill</a> infringes several rights and freedoms, not only of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) people but of heterosexuals too. The bill has been in the works since 2021 when it was tabled in parliament as a <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/features/opinion/private-member-s-bill-key-to-parliamentary-effectiveness.html">private member’s bill</a>.</p>
<p>The objective of the <a href="https://cdn.modernghana.com/files/722202192224-0h830n4ayt-lgbt-bill.pdf">Human Sexual Rights and Family Values Bill</a> is</p>
<blockquote>
<p>to provide for human sexual rights and family values and for related matters.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>At the heart of the contention about the proposed law is the question of discrimination, its purpose and its effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.</p>
<p>The title of the bill, obviously, is ironic because the law rather sets out to deny the right to sexuality and related rights to LGBTIQ+ people and to criminalise their actions. The key action which is criminalised is consensual sexual relations between two homosexual adults.</p>
<p>The bill defines such practices, linking them to similar provisions in the <a href="https://ir.parliament.gh/bitstream/handle/123456789/2433/ACT%2030.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">Criminal and Other Offences Act of Ghana</a>. Interestingly, it also criminalises and denies other acts, such as oral sex, which heterosexual couples also do to homosexuals and lesbians. The LGBTIQ+ community is also prohibited from marriage and from adopting or fostering.</p>
<p>If the president signs the legislation, Ghana will join <a href="http://www.globalequality.org/component/content/article/166">36 African countries</a> where homosexuality is illegal. It’s punishable by death in <a href="https://www.fairplanet.org/story/death-penalty-homosexualty-illegal/">some countries </a>, including Nigeria and Mauritania. So, Africa remains a tough place for LGBTIQ+ people. But there has been some progress in countries like South Africa and <a href="https://healthpolicy-watch.news/mauritius-supreme-court-throws-out-colonial-anti-gay-law/">Mauritius </a> where colonial era laws have been repealed.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/mauritius-is-the-latest-nation-to-decriminalise-same-sex-relations-in-a-divided-continent-215270">Mauritius is the latest nation to decriminalise same-sex relations in a divided continent</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>As a scholar of international human rights law, I believe this bill will infringe the right to privacy, right to health, freedom of association and expression, and press freedom. It will also impinge on the rights of teachers, lecturers, civil society activists and citizens who share content on social media platforms that the bill deems illegal. </p>
<h2>Compromising key freedoms</h2>
<p>The bill’s criminalisation of consensual sexual relations between two homosexual adults and imposition of sentence of three years on violators of that provision of the law is prohibitive and disproportionate. The practice should not be criminalised, but if at all, violation should at best attract a non-custodial sentence, for example a fine or community work. The LGBTIQ+ community has the right to be treated with dignity. The fact that someone is gay should not lead to a loss of his/her humanity.</p>
<p>Moreover, since the only way the criminalisation of consensual sex can be enforced is by “peeking through the window”, this will infringe on the right to privacy.</p>
<p>There has been many instances where members of the LGBTIQ+ community, and even those who the society consider as such but are not, have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jul/13/arrested-abused-and-accused-wave-of-repression-targets-lgbt-ghanaians">arrested </a>and subjected to acts of molestation, abuse, torture and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/20/ghana-lgbt-activists-face-hardships-after-detention">other forms of violence</a> and <a href="https://www.losangelesblade.com/2024/02/05/man-in-ghana-assaulted-for-being-gay/">extrajudicial measures</a> which constitute a violation of their right to dignity. Some are even killed. The vigilante groups that effect these arrests also have the habit of extorting money from the alleged perpetrators of LGBTIQ+ practices. Where the “suspects” end up at the police station, the police have also resorted to extortion of large sums of money from the suspects before letting them go. </p>
<p>The law seeks to avert such occurrences by imposing a term of imprisonment of between six months to three years for anyone who harasses someone accused of being LGBTIQ+. However, this is a feeble attempt by the sponsors of the bill to appease or assure the LGBTIQ+ community. </p>
<p>The forced disbandment of LGBTIQ+ associations in Ghana, will constitute a violation of the right to freedom of association and freedom of expression, among others. It has been abused in a number of instances and is likely to be further abused even more. The provision that seeks to make owners of digital platforms or physical premises in which LGBTIQ+ groups organise guilty of promoting LGBTIQ+ activities violates the right to freedom of association and expression, among others. </p>
<p>Also, the provision on imposing harsh sentences on teachers and other educators who talk about LGBTIQ+ in the classroom is likely to infringe on the right to academic freedom and the right to education. Further, the imposition of six to 10 years of imprisonment for anyone who produces, procures, or distributes material deemed to be promoting LGBTIQ+ activities is likely to lead to the abuse of the right to freedom of expression, information and education and even press freedom. The same goes with the provision on criminalising the “public show of romantic relations” between people of the same sex, even including cross-dressing.</p>
<p>What is important to also note is that the law is not made to restrict or violate the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community only. Teachers, lecturers, media personnel and civil society activists, people who share content over social media platforms, or broadcast content on LGBTIQ+ are also going to be held criminally responsible.</p>
<h2>Presidential or constitutional challenge</h2>
<p>I propose that President Nana Akufo-Addo should not assent to the law as it is, relying on <a href="https://lawsghana.com/constitution/Republic/constitution_content/113">article 108</a> of the 1992 Constitution since, being a private members bill, it has likely financial implications for the state. Thus, relying on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/20/ghana-lgbt-activists-face-hardships-after-detention">article 106</a>, he can refer the bill to his highest advisory body (<a href="https://cos.gov.gh/">Council of State</a>) for its advice. Otherwise, he has the power to state in a memo to the Speaker of Parliament any specific provisions of the bill which in his opinion should be reconsidered by Parliament. </p>
<p>If he does not, the matter can be taken to a Human Rights Court by a citizen, relying on <a href="https://lawsghana.com/constitution/Republic/constitution_content/38#:%7E:text=(5)%20The%20rights%2C%20duties,freedom%20and%20dignity%20of%20man.">article 33(5)</a>of the Constitution, which provides that “the rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental human rights and freedoms specifically mentioned in this Chapter shall not be regarded as excluding others not specifically mentioned which are considered to be inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man.” </p>
<p>The other option is to go straight to the Supreme Court to challenge the constitutionality of the bill.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224888/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana’s anti-gay bill will affect heterosexual’s tooKwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Associate Professor of Law, University of GhanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2238692024-02-28T14:41:38Z2024-02-28T14:41:38ZGhana: Street vending helps migrants to survive in Accra, but it’s illegal – a solution for all is needed<p>Moving to the city is a common strategy for the rural poor in the global south. Economic hardship pushes individuals out of their rural communities in search of opportunities. These tend to be found in urban centres, where facilities and services are concentrated. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2020-interactive/">World Migration Report</a> indicated that 740 million people were migrants in their own country in 2009. </p>
<p>Even in the city, there’s no guarantee of finding a job. Many people therefore resort to informal ways of making a living, like street vending. In Ghana, about <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/10496.pdf">80% of the workforce</a> are employed in the informal sector.</p>
<p>We were among a group of urban planning researchers who recently <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43545-023-00698-4">studied</a> the role of street vending in the lives of migrants in Ghana’s capital, Accra. In most <a href="https://www.wiego.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/IEMS-Sector-Report-Street-Vendors-Exec-Summary.pdf">African cities</a>, between 2% and 24% of informal workers are street vendors. </p>
<p>Our study showed that street sales were a source of jobs, income and survival for the urban poor in Ghana. This is even though street vending is illegal in the country.</p>
<p>We also assessed the effects of street vending from the lens of city authorities. Over the years, city authorities have failed to manage the activities of street vendors. Understanding all the relevant perspectives may help to find ways to meet people’s various needs in Ghanaian cities.</p>
<h2>Street vendors in Accra</h2>
<p>The study focused on street vending activities in the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-Accra-Central-Business-Area-Showing-the-Study-Area-Source-Survey-Dept_fig2_330913282">central business district</a> of Accra Metropolis. The area was selected due to the concentration of street vending activities such as the sale of hardware goods, electrical appliances, cosmetics, clothing, food and beverages, and the activities of financial institutions. </p>
<p>We interviewed 80 migrant street vendors and some city authorities. In assessing the socio-economic effects of street vending on the livelihoods of migrants, we monitored key livelihood indicators:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>income</p></li>
<li><p>access to social services (education and healthcare)</p></li>
<li><p>asset acquisition (property such as land)</p></li>
<li><p>social ties </p></li>
<li><p>educational assistance (helping relatives in their education) </p></li>
<li><p>family relationships. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>We found that a majority (60%) of the participants used to earn a monthly income of less than GH₵50.00 (US$4) before they took up street vending. After moving to Accra and entering into street vending, 72% of the respondents indicated that they earned over GH₵200 (US$16). </p>
<p>Over a third (68%) of the respondents indicated that their access to social services such as education, healthcare and recreational facilities had improved since migrating from their place of origin and starting street vending. This could be a result of the increased income coupled with the presence of social facilities and services in urban centres. </p>
<p>Half (50%) of the respondents had not acquired any assets for their family members since they started street vending. However, the other 50% had been able to acquire assets for their family members in their home of origin. These assets included land for residential and agricultural purposes. </p>
<p>Also, 58% of the respondents indicated that street vending enabled them to support family members’ education back home. </p>
<p>Most of the vendors said they were selling on the streets because they had limited skills. And the cost of living was high in the city. </p>
<p>The challenges they faced included: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>limited access to shelter</p></li>
<li><p>risk of arrest by city authorities (street vending is illegal in the capital)</p></li>
<li><p>limited access to food and related consumer items </p></li>
<li><p>inability to access social services by some street vendors</p></li>
<li><p>cultural shock and cultural difference.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The city’s view</h2>
<p>City officials who took part in the research highlighted the challenges street vendors posed. These included: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>getting in the way of pedestrians and vehicles </p></li>
<li><p>forcing pedestrians to walk on the streets, increasing their chances of accidents </p></li>
<li><p>littering, which has environmental consequences and increases the cost of waste management.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The city authorities indicated that the most sustainable approach to managing the activities of street vendors was to allot portions of the pavements to them. One strategy suggested was to block specific roads on specified days to allow street vendors to sell their wares. </p>
<p>The Metropolitan Assembly <a href="https://ama.gov.gh/doc/bye-laws.pdf">bye-law</a> states that there should be no hawking by street vendors. The assembly monitors their activities and sometimes evicts them.</p>
<p>These management strategies are expensive and ineffective. Authorities lack political will to enforce them. Most mayors allow street vendors to operate without restrictions during election years. </p>
<h2>Next steps</h2>
<p>Street vendors believe their activities are legitimate and present social and economic opportunities. For example, they believe they can make a living and support their families by vending. They say relocating to Accra has strengthened their livelihoods and improved their access to healthcare services and other social facilities. </p>
<p>On the contrary, city authorities see street vending as an illegal activity that poses environmental threats to the city. They associate it with problems such as obstruction to pedestrians and vehicles, littering and petty crime. </p>
<p>Our study concludes that halting street vending without alternative livelihoods will mean denying thousands of people their livelihood. </p>
<p>Over the years, government skills training and growth <a href="https://thebftonline.com/2023/08/15/yea-exceeds-2023-youth-employment-target-by-16/">interventions</a> have excluded informal sector actors such as street vendors. The only way to get the vendors off the streets is to offer alternative sources of livelihood that will provide competitive income. </p>
<p>We propose that policymakers design skills training programmes for street vendors that will offer them sustainable and improved livelihoods. These programmes should be designed and carried out in a politically neutral way.</p>
<p>Also, institutions such as the Ministry of Roads and Highways, Transport Ministry, <a href="https://mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/pbb-estimates/2022/2022-PBB-NDPC.pdf">National Development Planning Commission</a> and local authorities should incorporate the activities of street vendors in the design of layouts, roads, plans and policies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223869/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Street sales are a source of jobs, income and survival for the urban poor in Ghana.Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)Owusu Amponsah, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230482024-02-27T14:07:04Z2024-02-27T14:07:04ZBenefits of using cleaner cooking fuels are blunted in urban areas where outdoor air is polluted: findings from Ghana, Cameroon and Kenya<p>Household air pollution from cooking, heating and lighting with fuels like wood, charcoal and kerosene poses a substantial global health problem. </p>
<p>Globally, <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/20-01-2022-who-publishes-new-global-data-on-the-use-of-clean-and-polluting-fuels-for-cooking-by-fuel-type">2 billion</a> people cook with polluting fuels and are exposed to high levels of household air pollution. The highest proportion live in sub-Saharan Africa, where <a href="https://www.nihr.ac.uk/news/new-research-could-help-boost-growth-of-clean-cooking-in-sub-saharan-africa/29340#:%7E:text=Approximately%20900%20million%20people%20cook,health%2Ddamaging%20and%20climate%20pollutants">about 900 million</a> people cook with polluting fuels.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(20)30197-2/fulltext">Studies</a> have shown that use of cleaner cooking fuels, like electricity, ethanol and liquefied petroleum gas, reduces exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5), a damaging pollutant. But <a href="https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12940-021-00756-5">other studies</a> have also shown that the use of cleaner cooking fuels doesn’t necessarily reduce PM2.5 levels in people’s homes.</p>
<p>To understand why, our research looked at three rapidly urbanising communities in Cameroon (Mbalmayo), Ghana (Obuasi) and Kenya (Eldoret). We looked at differences in air pollutant levels across cooking fuel types as well as other environmental factors. We measured levels of PM2.5 as well as carbon monoxide (CO), another damaging air pollutant. </p>
<p>Half of the households that were part of our study were mostly cooking with LPG, which is considered a cleaner cooking fuel. The other half were cooking only with polluting fuels, including wood and charcoal.</p>
<p>Our findings showed that the type of cooking fuel households used did indeed affect levels of pollution inside people’s homes. But we found wide disparities between the three communities. For example, there was hardly any difference in average PM2.5 exposures between LPG and charcoal users in the Ghanaian setting. However, in the Kenyan and Cameroonian communities, women’s average PM2.5 levels were much higher among those cooking with wood, compared with those cooking with LPG. In Eldoret, Kenya, women cooking with charcoal were also exposed to substantially higher levels than those cooking with LPG. </p>
<p>We concluded from our results that this could be explained by the fact that environmental factors were also at play – air pollution levels outside people’s homes. In the Ghanaian area, outdoor air pollution levels were around double the levels in the other two communities. This difference is likely due in part to <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1352231099002964?via%3Dihub">increased levels</a> of Saharan dust in Ghana during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/harmattan">harmattan</a> season. </p>
<p>In addition, most women in the Ghanaian setting usually cooked outdoors on a veranda. This increased their exposure to outdoor air pollution. In contrast, women in Kenya and Cameroon typically cooked indoors.</p>
<p>We also found that women, regardless of the cooking fuel they used, had higher exposure to PM2.5 if they lived closer to a busy road (less than a five minute walk away) and travelled outdoors during the day. This suggested that traffic emissions probably made up a substantial proportion of the air pollution that women were breathing in these urban areas. And emissions generated from cooking might have contributed less to overall PM2.5 exposures. </p>
<p>This may explain why there were minimal differences between PM2.5 exposures among women using LPG and charcoal stoves in the Ghanaian community, despite LPG stoves generally emitting lower levels of PM2.5. It follows that, in some areas with rapid urbanisation, outdoor air pollution is probably lowering the ability of clean cooking fuels to reduce PM2.5 exposures. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>As cities continue to urbanise and the African population increasingly migrates to cities, <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-023-01311-2">evidence</a> points to the fact that localised levels of air pollution from industrial sources, traffic, and trash burning are likely to increase. This means that people will become increasingly exposed to air pollutants outdoors and that reductions in PM2.5 exposure that happens when people switch from polluting fuels to LPG may be lower. </p>
<p>Our findings show that clean cooking fuels can reduce indoor air pollution. However, a focus on reducing indoor pollution by switching cooking fuels may only have a limited effect on people’s exposure to damaging air pollutants. Our findings point to the need for developing strategies for reducing both indoor and outdoor air pollution levels. Lower outdoor PM2.5 concentrations can be achieved through stricter regulations on traffic emissions and limiting or eliminating trash burning in favour of less polluting methods for solid waste disposal.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, efforts to encourage a transition towards clean cooking fuels should remain an important policy priority, particularly in communities that are exposed to lower levels of outdoor PM2.5. The transition to clean cooking fuels can potentially have a greater health benefit in these settings. </p>
<p>A more targeted approach and prioritising certain areas in the drive for access to cleaner cooking fuels makes sense. As the <a href="https://cleancooking.org/">Clean Cooking Alliance</a> has pointed out, there are limited resources and funding to tackle the move towards cleaner cooking fuels. Targeting specific areas for clean cooking transitions may therefore be a useful strategy. </p>
<p>In the meantime, the global health community must devote more resources to providing universal access to clean cooking by 2030 <a href="https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/sustainable-development-goals/why-do-sustainable-development-goals-matter/goal-7">(United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 7)</a>].</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Shupler is also a researcher in the Department of Public Health, Policy and Systems at the University of Liverpool. This research was funded by the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) (ref: 17/63/155) using UK aid from
the UK Government to support global health research. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the UK government.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Esong Miranda Baame and Theresa Tawiah do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Dust and traffic pollution add to the health hazard posed by some cooking fuels.Matthew Shupler, Postdoctoral Research Associate in Environmental Public Health, Harvard UniversityEsong Miranda Baame, PhD Candidate, Université de DschangTheresa Tawiah, Health Economist ,Department of Environmental Health, Kintampo Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2172532024-02-26T13:39:14Z2024-02-26T13:39:14ZWhat ancient farmers can really teach us about adapting to climate change – and how political power influences success or failure<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576820/original/file-20240220-22-4dkk2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C15%2C5160%2C3391&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A farmer paddles to his fields on an artificial island among canals, part of an ancient Aztec system known as chinampas, in 2021. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ae1d688be96145e38f16681367992bca?ext=true">AP Photo /Marco Ugarte</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In dozens of archaeological discoveries around the world, from the once-successful reservoirs and canals of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaa.2020.101166">Angkor Wat</a> in Cambodia to the deserted <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2209615120">Viking colonies</a> of Greenland, new evidence paints pictures of civilizations struggling with unforeseen climate changes and the reality that their farming practices had become unsustainable.</p>
<p>Among these discoveries are also success stories, where ancient farming practices helped civilizations survive the hard times. </p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2209615120">Zuni farmers</a> in the southwestern United States made it through long stretches of extremely low rainfall between A.D. 1200 and 1400 by embracing small-scale, decentralized irrigation systems. <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520343757/the-scarcity-slot">Farmers in Ghana</a> coped with severe droughts from 1450 to 1650 by planting indigenous African grains, like drought-tolerant pearl millet. </p>
<p>Ancient practices like these are gaining new interest today. As countries face unprecedented heat waves, storms and melting glaciers, some farmers and international development organizations are reaching deep into the agricultural archives to revive these ancient solutions.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A canal running through a mountain side with snowy peaks in the background." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576825/original/file-20240220-18-dywyn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576825/original/file-20240220-18-dywyn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576825/original/file-20240220-18-dywyn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576825/original/file-20240220-18-dywyn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576825/original/file-20240220-18-dywyn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576825/original/file-20240220-18-dywyn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576825/original/file-20240220-18-dywyn0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An ancient irrigation method used by the Moors involving water channels is being revisited in Spain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/water-channel-for-irrigation-known-as-an-acequia-sierra-news-photo/525482563?adppopup=true">Geography Photos/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Drought-stricken farmers in Spain have reclaimed medieval <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/19/world/europe/spain-drought-acequias.html">Moorish irrigation</a> technology. International companies hungry for carbon offsets have paid big money for <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/ancient-farming-practice-draws-cash-from-carbon-credits-a803aee1">biochar made using pre-Columbian</a> Amazonian production techniques. Texas ranchers have turned to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/may/29/rio-grande-valley-farmers-study-ancient-technique-cover-cropping-climate-crisis">ancient cover cropping</a> methods to buffer against unpredictable weather patterns.</p>
<p>But grasping for ancient technologies and techniques without paying attention to historical context misses one of the most important lessons ancient farmers can reveal: Agricultural sustainability is as much about power and sovereignty as it is about soil, water and crops.</p>
<p>I’m an archaeologist who studies <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10814-019-09138-5">agricultural sustainability</a> in the past. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1914211117">Discoveries in recent years</a> have shown how <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2015.07.022">the human past</a> is <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092611-145941">full of people</a> who <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03190-2">dealt with climate change</a> in both sustainable and unsustainable ways. Archaeologists are finding that ancient sustainability was tethered closely to politics. However, these dynamics are often forgotten in discussions of sustainability today.</p>
<h2>Maya milpa farming: Forest access is essential</h2>
<p>In the tropical lowlands of Mexico and Central America, Indigenous Maya farmers have been practicing milpa agriculture for thousands of years. Milpa farmers adapted to drought by gently steering forest ecology through <a href="https://doi.org/10.1890/120344">controlled burns</a> and careful <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gVyTDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Maya+milpa+forest+garden&ots=1ozG6sVYyg&sig=KZNXSDWX2ZR_Em7qGY37CqdeIG0#v=onepage&q=Maya%20milpa%20forest%20garden&f=false">woodland conservation</a>.</p>
<p>The knowledge of milpa farming empowered many <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=cX7SEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=chan+Cynthia+robin&ots=yErzYIWFsz&sig=vNrtsYW7IC0X2UnieHxor4Hiiiw#v=onepage&q=chan%20Cynthia%20robin&f=false">rural farmers</a> to navigate climate changes during the notorious <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1114838109">Maya Collapse</a> – two centuries of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1419133112">political disintegration and urban depopulation</a> between A.D. 800 to 1000. Importantly, later Maya political leaders worked with farmers to keep this flexibility. Their light-handed approach is still legible in the artifacts and settlement patterns of <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Political_Geography_of_the_Yucatan_M.html?id=52BlAAAAMAAJ">post-Collapse farming communities</a> and preserved in the flexible <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-020-00134-8">tribute schedules</a> for Maya farmers documented by 16th century Spanish monks.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/96rIEVptFwo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Maya farmers and researchers explain milpa farming.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520395879/rooting-in-a-useless-land">my book</a>, “Rooting in a Useless Land: Ancient Farmers, Celebrity Chefs, and Environmental Justice in Yucatán,” I trace the deep history of the Maya milpa. Using archaeology, I show how ancient farmers adapted milpa agriculture in response to centuries of drought and political upheaval.</p>
<p>Modern Maya milpa practices began drawing public attention a few years ago as <a href="https://www.cimmyt.org/news/helping-farming-families-thrive-while-fighting-climate-change-in-mexico/">international development organizations</a> partnered with celebrity chefs, like <a href="https://www.cimmyt.org/es/noticias/el-restaurante-noma-llega-a-tulum-y-utilizara-maices-sustentables-de-yaxunah-2/">Noma’s René Redzepi</a>, and embraced the concept. </p>
<p>However, these groups condemned the traditional milpa practice of burning new areas of forest as unsustainable. They instead promoted a “no-burn” version to grow certified <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/dining/noma-tulum-pete-wells-mexico-rene-redzepi.html">organic maize for high-end restaurants</a>. Their no-burn version of milpa relies on fertilizers to grow maize in a fixed location, rather than using controlled fire ecology to manage soil fertility across vast forests.</p>
<p>The result restricted the traditional practices Maya farmers have used for centuries. It also fed into a modern political threat to traditional Maya milpa farming: land grabs. </p>
<p>Traditional milpa agriculture requires a lot of forested land, since farmers need to relocate their fields every couple of years. But that need for forest is at odds with hotel companies, industrial cattle ranches and green energy developers who want cheap land and see Maya milpa forest management practices as inefficient. No-burn milpa eases this conflict by locking maize agriculture into one small space indefinitely, instead of spreading it out through the forest over generations. But it also changes tradition. </p>
<p>Maya milpa farmers are now fighting to practice their ancient agricultural techniques, not because they’ve forgotten or lost those techniques, but because <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12520">neocolonial</a> land <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1215305">privatization policies</a> actively undermine farmers’ ability to manage woodlands as their ancestors did. </p>
<p>Milpa farmers are increasingly left to either adopt a rebranded version of their heritage or quit farming all together – as many have done.</p>
<h2>Mexico’s fragile artificial islands: Threats from development</h2>
<p>When I look to the work of other archaeologists investigating ancient agricultural practices, I see these same entanglements of power and sustainability.</p>
<p>In central Mexico, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24931564?casa_token=Mnjg8lpMxdEAAAAA:xtiTRUNdJVlBTAR3voVS3IszoyqO-VSb8MSohjUlxpYEdNtVKu0QPefJMjiSyvobBMO94-zcDj2E6DOXbNoUl1d-MNm3UO6TDKVsG4JLVxpWkHtFIg">chinampas</a> are ancient systems of artificial islands and canals. They have enabled farmers to cultivate food in wetlands for centuries. </p>
<p>The continuing existence of chinampas is a legacy of deep ecological knowledge and a resource enabling communities to feed themselves.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571516/original/file-20240125-21-sq17hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571516/original/file-20240125-21-sq17hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571516/original/file-20240125-21-sq17hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571516/original/file-20240125-21-sq17hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571516/original/file-20240125-21-sq17hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571516/original/file-20240125-21-sq17hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571516/original/file-20240125-21-sq17hw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=529&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Chinampa techniques use canals and artificial islands. This photo shows one in 1912.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Chinampas.jpg">Karl Weule, Leitfaden der Voelkerkunde via Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A well-maintained farming island among canals near Mexico City." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571517/original/file-20240125-19-ug1yul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571517/original/file-20240125-19-ug1yul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571517/original/file-20240125-19-ug1yul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571517/original/file-20240125-19-ug1yul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571517/original/file-20240125-19-ug1yul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571517/original/file-20240125-19-ug1yul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571517/original/file-20240125-19-ug1yul.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The chinampas of Xochimilco are a UNESCO world heritage site today, but development expanding from Mexico City has put their survival in danger.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/sergiosf/12546098673">Sergei Saint via Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But archaeology has revealed that generations of sustainable chinampa management could be overturned almost overnight. That happened when the expansionist Aztec Empire decided to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003598X00101164">re-engineer Lake Xaltocan</a> for salt production in the 14th century and rendered its chinampas unusable.</p>
<p>Today, the future of chinampa agriculture hinges on a pocket of protected fields <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/history-and-civilisation/2022/07/in-mexico-city-the-pandemic-revived-aztec-era-island-farms">stewarded by local farmers</a> in the marshy outskirts of Mexico City. These fields are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2021.07.018">now at risk</a> as demand for housing drives informal settlements into the chinampa zone.</p>
<h2>Andean raised fields: A story of labor exploitation</h2>
<p>Traditional Andean agriculture in South America incorporates a diverse range of ancient cultivation techniques. One in particular has a complicated history of attracting revival efforts.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, government agencies, <a href="https://www.penn.museum/documents/publications/expedition/30-3/Raised.pdf">archaeologists</a> and development organizations spent a fortune trying to persuade Andean farmers to <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315810997/inventing-indigenous-knowledge-lynn-swartley">revive raised field farming</a>. Ancient raised fields had been found around Lake Titicaca, on the border of Peru and Bolivia. These groups became convinced that this relic technology could curb hunger in the Andes by enabling back-to-back potato harvests with no need for fallowing.</p>
<p>But Andean farmers had no connection to the labor-intensive raised fields. The practice had been abandoned even before the rise of Inca civilization in the 13th century. The effort to revive ancient raised field agriculture collapsed.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A view from a plane shows the outlines where fields were raised." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571518/original/file-20240125-21-4uobzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571518/original/file-20240125-21-4uobzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571518/original/file-20240125-21-4uobzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571518/original/file-20240125-21-4uobzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=439&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571518/original/file-20240125-21-4uobzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571518/original/file-20240125-21-4uobzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571518/original/file-20240125-21-4uobzz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An aerial photograph shows pre-Colombian raised fields in Bolivia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.eurekalert.org/multimedia/861590">Umberto Lombardo, University of Bern, Switzerland</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since then, more <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaa.2005.03.002">archaeological discoveries</a> around Lake Titicaca have suggested that ancient farmers were forced to work the raised fields <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaa.2004.08.001">by the expansionist Tiwanaku empire</a> during its peak between AD 500 and 1100. Far from the politically neutral narrative promoted by development organizations, the raised fields were not there to help farmers feed themselves. They were a technology for exploiting labor and extracting surplus crops from ancient Andean farmers.</p>
<h2>Respecting ancient practices’ histories</h2>
<p>Reclaiming <a href="https://www.soulfirefarm.org/media/farming-while-black/">ancestral farming</a> techniques can be a <a href="https://www.icollectiveinc.org/">step toward sustainable food systems</a>, especially when descendant communities lead their reclamation. The world can, and I think should, reach back to recover agricultural practices from our collective past.</p>
<p>But we can’t pretend that those practices are apolitical.</p>
<p>The Maya milpa farmers who continue to practice controlled burns in defiance of land privatizers understand the value of ancient techniques and the threat posed by political power. So do the Mexican chinampa farmers working to restore local food to disenfranchised urban communities. And so do the Andean farmers refusing to participate in once-exploitive raised field rehabilitation projects. </p>
<p>Depending on how they are used, ancient agricultural practices can either reinforce social inequalities or create more equitable food systems. Ancient practices aren’t inherently good – it takes a deeper commitment to just and equitable food systems to make them sustainable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chelsea Fisher has received research funding from the National Science Foundation, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, and the Fulbright-Hays Program.</span></em></p>Agricultural sustainability is as much about power and sovereignty as it is about soil, water and crops.Chelsea Fisher, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, University of South CarolinaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2230472024-02-15T13:43:44Z2024-02-15T13:43:44ZGhana’s new vehicle tax aims to tackle pollution – expert unpacks how it’ll work and suggests reforms<p><em>Ghana has introduced an <a href="https://gra.gov.gh/implementation-of-new-tax-laws-and-amendments/">annual carbon levy on vehicles and industrial emissions</a>. It’s only the third <a href="https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/">African country</a> to introduce an explicit carbon tax, after <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/0376835X.2023.2171366">South Africa and Mauritius</a>. The tax is intended to address <a href="https://mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/budget-statements/2024%20Budget%20Statement_v2.pdf">harm</a> associated with vehicle emissions. But it has prompted a <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Inconsiderate-vehicle-emissions-tax-won-t-prevent-carbon-emission-Ben-Boakye-1914538">pushback</a> from various citizens, civic and consumer groups.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo spoke to Theophilus Acheampong, an energy economist who has consulted for Ghana’s finance ministry on environmental fiscal reform, about the impact and implementation of this kind of levy.</em></p>
<h2>Why is the government taxing emissions?</h2>
<p>The proposed vehicle emissions tax under the <a href="https://gra.gov.gh/implementation-of-new-tax-laws-and-amendments/">Emissions Levy Act, 2023</a> is one of several environmental fiscal reform measures being introduced by the government. I am among several consultants who have worked on these proposed reforms since 2010. </p>
<p>Environmental tax reform <a href="https://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/environmental-tax-reform-increasing-individual">aims</a> to shift the burden of taxation to environmentally damaging activities, such as pollution. </p>
<p>Reforms like this can help raise domestic revenue, protect the environment by meeting country climate targets under the <a href="https://www.ciwf.org.uk/research/environment/paris-climate-agreement-2030-sustainable-development-goals/#:%7E:text=Paris%20Climate%20Agreement%20%26%202030%20Sustainable%20Development%20Goals,-Implementing%20the%20Paris&text=The%20goals%20include%20zero%20hunger,lifestyles%20in%20harmony%20with%20nature">Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals</a>, and reduce poverty. These benefits have been confirmed in many <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/su10020501">studies</a> but with mixed results.</p>
<p>Ghana’s government believes the vehicle emissions tax is a more cost-effective and equitable way to make sure the <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/polluter-pays-principle">polluter pays</a>, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environmental-principles-policy-statement/environmental-principles-policy-statement#:%7E:text=Description%3A%20The%20prevention%20principle%20means,%5Bfootnote%206%5D%20is%20avoided.">prevent harm</a> and <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/precautionary-principle.html">protect the public</a>. </p>
<p>Ghana’s energy sector is the <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/gh_nir5_15052022_final.pdf">major source</a> (46%) of the country’s greenhouse emissions. Within this, mobile combustion emissions <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/gh_nir5_15052022_final.pdf">accounted</a> for 34% of the total energy emissions and 15% of the total national emissions in 2019. Transportation emissions, predominantly from road transport, have <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/gh_nir5_15052022_final.pdf">increased</a> by 47% compared to 2016 levels due to growing vehicle ownership and the associated traffic congestion in cities and peri-urban areas.</p>
<p>Lower respiratory <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/countries/ghana/default.htm#death">infections</a>, which are linked to air pollution, are among the top five causes of <a href="https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/themes/mortality-and-global-health-estimates/ghe-leading-causes-of-death">death</a> in the country. Some <a href="https://www.cleanairfund.org/geography/ghana/">28,000</a> Ghanaians died prematurely from air pollution in 2020. Air pollution-related deaths cost Ghana 0.95% of gross domestic product, according to a <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(22)00090-0/fulltext">2021 Lancet study</a>.</p>
<h2>What has been done so far to reduce air pollution?</h2>
<p>In 2021, the government introduced a sanitation and pollution levy on petrol and diesel under the <a href="https://atugubaassociates.com/file/Energy%20Sector%20Levies%20(Amendment)%20Act.pdf">Energy Sector Levies Act</a> to raise revenue to improve air quality, among other goals. The levy accrued <a href="https://mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/economic/Final_%202022-Annual-ESLA-Report.pdf">GHS452 million</a> (US$55 million) in 2022. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ghana-wants-fewer-polluting-old-cars-on-the-road-but-its-going-about-it-the-wrong-way-198805">Ghana wants fewer polluting old cars on the road. But it’s going about it the wrong way</a>
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<p>In 2018, the government also <a href="https://mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/news/Notice-Luxury-Vehicle.pdf">introduced</a> a luxury vehicle tax on vehicles with engine capacities of three litres or more, except for commercial vehicles. However, following a public outcry, the government <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/business/business-news/govt-withdraws-vehicle-luxury-tax.html">suspended</a> the tax in July 2019. There were <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/bring-back-luxury-vehicle-tax-upsa-to-government.html">subsequent calls</a> for it to be reintroduced. </p>
<p>These measures weren’t well designed from a tax policy point of view as they were not tied to actual vehicular emissions. Hence the need for an vehicle emissions tax. </p>
<h2>How should an emissions tax work and how does the new tax work?</h2>
<p>Ghana’s <a href="https://gra.gov.gh/implementation-of-new-tax-laws-and-amendments/">proposed</a> emissions tax is based on internal combustion engine capacities. Charges range from GHS75 (US$6) for motorcycles and tricycles to GHS150 (US$12) for motor vehicles, buses and coaches up to 3 litre engine. A higher threshold of GHS300 (US$24) applies for motor vehicles, buses and coaches above 3 litre engine capacity, and cargo trucks and articulated trucks. </p>
<p>Ideally, the tax should be based on the actual carbon dioxide and other pollutant emissions from a vehicle, measured in grams of carbon dioxide per kilometre. A threshold of tailpipe CO₂ is set. Each car owner would pay an annual tax for the amount of CO₂ their car emits above that threshold.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://caura.com/blog/why-does-an-mot-include-an-exhaust-emissions-test#:%7E:text=An%20exhaust%20emissions%20test%20ensures,a%20visual%20test%20is%20applied">tailpipe emissions test</a> would be done during the annual roadworthiness check by Ghana’s <a href="https://www.dvla.gov.gh/">Driver Vehicle and Licensing Authority</a>. It would also collect the amounts and then remit them to the Treasury. </p>
<p>There is scope in Ghana’s case to tie it to actual tailpipe emissions and also revise the upper end of the tax as it is prohibitive. This would make the tax more equitable and better reflect the “polluter pays” principle. </p>
<h2>What are the objections to the tax and can they be accommodated?</h2>
<p>The main objection is that it amounts to double taxation. Critics point to the existing pollution levy. There is also no clear plan for what the tax will be used for after it is collected. </p>
<p>Several critics, especially in the<a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/emissions-levy-premature-antibusiness-food-and-beverage-association.html"> manufacturing</a> and <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2024/02/emissions-levy-well-increase-our-fares-accordingly-gprtu/">transport sector</a>, say there are already too many taxes. A new one adds to the cost of operating a business. This cost will be passed on to consumers in an already struggling economy. </p>
<p>Some have <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2024/02/withdraw-emissions-levy-itll-worsen-already-acidic-business-environment-fabag-to-govt/">urged </a>the government to develop environmentally friendly power sources like nuclear and solar energy.</p>
<p>But the government is under pressure to <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghana-and-the-imf-have-struck-a-deal-but-hard-choices-lie-ahead-206240">raise domestic revenue</a> as part of its International Monetary Fund conditionalities. It is therefore difficult to predict whether it will accommodate the concerns that have been raised.</p>
<h2>How does Ghana’s tax compare with others in Africa?</h2>
<p>Ghana, Zambia, South Africa and Namibia have various environmental taxes covering energy, transport, air pollution and waste. </p>
<p>For example South Africa <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-carbontax-idUSKCN1SW0K6/">introduced</a> a carbon emissions tax on vehicles in 2010. This was updated in 2019 and 2022. The tax applies when cars have emissions above 120g CO₂ per km as well as 3litre engine capacity. The former is about the typical emission from a Ford Fiesta 1.0T EcoBoost or KiaPicanto 1.0. The rate is adjusted for inflation every year. The tax rate ranges from R132 (US$7; GHS86) to R176(US$9; GHS115) for every gram of carbon dioxide per kilometre above the threshold. A 2018 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10291954.2018.1505265">study</a> indicated that South Africa’s CO₂ emissions tax had failed to influence which new cars consumers were buying. This is understandable given <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15473">low income levels</a> and that <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14063">35% of households</a> used public transport, according to the 2020 National Household Travel Survey.</p>
<p>Ghana’s proposed emissions tax for vehicles up to 3 litre engine capacity is not unreasonable when benchmarked to South Africa’s. </p>
<p>However, the tax for engines above 3 litres is steep. It targets the main means of transport for many citizens. The 2012 Ghana National Transport Household Survey showed that <a href="https://www2.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/publications/Second%20National%20Household%20Transport%20Survey%20Report%202012.pdf">90%</a> of commuters used shared public transport (known locally as “tro-tro”); this figure may have declined in recent times. </p>
<h2>Can the tax be implemented and will it meet its objectives?</h2>
<p>Ghana is already implementing several environment tax reforms across different sectors, with varying degrees of success. There is the potential to harmonise these instruments to improve environmental outcomes and behavioural incentives. </p>
<p>The existing sanitation and pollution levy must first be scrapped and replaced with the vehicle emissions tax. This should be based on actual carbon dioxide, nitric oxide and other tailpipe emissions to maximise efficiency. The tax bands should conform to emission standards set by the <a href="https://www.gsa.gov.gh/">Ghana Standards Authority</a> and the vehicle licensing authority. </p>
<p>Having both the sanitation and pollution levy and vehicle emissions tax operating at the same time amounts to double taxation. </p>
<p>Ghana must also agree to earmark and allocate an agreed proportion of the proceeds to address environmental issues. </p>
<h2>What is the tax collection picture in Ghana?</h2>
<p>Ghana tax collection is currently <a href="https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-africa-ghana.pdf">around</a> 14% of GDP. Its aim is to get to 18% by 2028, comparable with its <a href="https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/brochure-revenue-statistics-africa.pdf">peers</a> such as Senegal, Namibia, Togo and Rwanda. Other revenue generation avenues have been met with stiff resistance. A recent value added tax on electricity has just been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68236869?ns_mchannel=social&ns_source=twitter&ns_campaign=bbc_live&ns_linkname=68236869%26Ghana%20suspends%20controversial%20power%20tax%20after%20uproar%262024-02-08T17%3A42%3A01.000Z&ns_fee=0&pinned_post_locator=urn:bbc:cps:curie:asset:af7380e7-a5ab-4afb-9364-57740148921b&pinned_post_asset_id=68236869&pinned_post_type=share">suspended</a>. </p>
<p>In 2024, Ghana plans to improve revenue performance through <a href="https://mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/budget-statements/2024%20Budget%20Statement_v2.pdf">extending</a> the electronic VAT system to cover 600 large taxpayers and more than 2,000 small and medium-sized taxpayers, as well as taxing industrial and vehicle emissions, among others.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223047/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Theophilus Acheampong is affiliated with the IMANI Centre for Policy and Education in Accra, Ghana. He has also consulted for the Government of Ghana on environmental fiscal reform in a private capacity. </span></em></p>Critics have described Ghana’s emissions tax as premature.Theophilus Acheampong, Associate Lecturer, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2208322024-02-07T20:46:33Z2024-02-07T20:46:33ZDemography and reproductive rights are environmental issues: Insights from sub-Saharan Africa<p>Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf">three times faster</a> than the rest of the world with an average of 4.6 births per woman in 2021. By comparison, <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/91f0015m/91f0015m2024001-eng.htm">the fertility rate in Canada was 1.3 births per woman in 2022</a>. </p>
<p>The region is projected to continue to be the fastest growing in the world, with a population increasing from 1.2 billion in 2021 to 2.1 billion in 2050. </p>
<p>Sustained and rapid population growth has deep implications for development, <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/undesa_pd_2022_policy_brief_population_growth.pdf">exacerbating social, economic and environmental challenges</a> from food insecurity and gender inequity to environmental degradation. </p>
<p>At the same time, Sub-Saharan Africa also has a <a href="https://www.populationinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Population-and-Climate-Change-Vulnerability.pdf">disproportionate vulnerability to climate change and environmental degradation</a>. </p>
<p>It is critical that population dynamics and reproductive health be at the forefront of ongoing environmental discussions.</p>
<h2>Population dynamics and environment</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat8680">many just and humane ways to slow the pace of rapid population growth while also respecting human rights and the need for economic development</a>. Key to this goal is advancing reproductive rights, gender equity and education. </p>
<p>Advancing reproductive autonomy by ensuring that individuals have the means to choose the timing and frequency of childbearing carries significant benefits for climate change resilience and environmental sustainability. </p>
<p>As individuals are given the means to choose the number, timing and spacing of their children, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.2470">they tend to have fewer children</a>. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/africas-groundbreaking-womens-rights-treaty-turns-20-the-hits-and-misses-of-the-maputo-protocol-209607">Africa's groundbreaking women's rights treaty turns 20 - the hits and misses of the Maputo protocol</a>
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</em>
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<p>It is estimated that if the United Nations’ <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/">Sustainable Development Goals</a> target for contraceptive use and education are met, global population size would decline from today’s 8 billion to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(20)30677-2">6.29 billion in 2100</a>. If not, then the United Nations medium <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf">projection of 10.3 billion appears more likely</a>. </p>
<p>Yet, despite their far-ranging implications for environmental sustainability, demographic trajectories are largely omitted or regarded as set in stone by the development and environmental communities. This makes for a missed opportunity for transformative change. </p>
<p>Discussions that highlight the negative impacts of global population growth are also often marginalized and perceived as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10042857.2016.1149296">unwarranted, alarmist, coercive and racist</a>. At the same time, it is important to remember that high birth rates should not carry the stigma of blame but instead be seen within the lens of wider socio-economic issues.</p>
<p>We live in a demographically divided world. Some regions of the planet are experiencing sustained population growth, while others are witnessing relative stability and even decline. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/drc-has-one-of-the-fastest-growing-populations-in-the-world-why-this-isnt-good-news-209420">DRC has one of the fastest growing populations in the world – why this isn't good news</a>
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</em>
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<p>In this context concerns about population growth can appear to have limited global application, making it more challenging to express alarm over increasing human numbers in relation to population declines elsewhere </p>
<p>However, this does not mean that exponential human growth cannot pose concerns in some regions.</p>
<h2>Sub-Saharan perspectives</h2>
<p>As a <a href="https://uniweb.uottawa.ca/members/4481">researcher</a> in the emerging field of planetary health, I study the nexus of reproductive rights, population dynamics and environmental sustainability. </p>
<p>In collaboration with <a href="https://www.ug.edu.gh/economics/people/staff-faculty/nkechi-s-owoo">Nkechi S. Owoo</a>, from the University of Ghana, we set out to <a href="https://doi.org/10.3197/JPS.63772236595233">explore stakeholder perceptions</a> around these issues. We were surprised to learn that sub-Saharan Africans perspectives had not been individually documented, despite their unique relevance. </p>
<p>Our study included a survey and follow-up interviews with 402 participants from 42 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The results would surprise many observers who may doubt that population growth is a concern in Africa.</p>
<p>While there were geographic and gender limitations in our sample size — and more research will be required to further explore this topic — we nevertheless feel that <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/world4040048">our findings</a> provide useful insights into wide-ranging public concern for population growth. Respondents overwhelmingly perceived population growth as a phenomenon representing challenges to environmental sustainability, economic and social goals, peace and security. </p>
<p>Many participants expressed the view that population dynamics ought to be integrated in policies and discussions aimed at improving or preserving the quality of the environment. One respondent in particular stated that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“population dynamics should always be put at the forefront whenever climate and the environment are being discussed”. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A small number of participants argued that population growth was not a driver of environmental degradation and climate change, which was attributed to the excessive consumption habits and disproportionate responsibility of the Global North.</p>
<p>The large majority of our respondents, however, held a different view. They felt that the disproportionate role of consumption did not preclude acknowledging the role of population growth in generating environmental degradation. </p>
<p>A survey participant from South Africa, for example, stated that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“The cumulative impact of 1 billion low per-capita footprints still equals a high impact. This is not to discount the high impact of people that may have lower fertility rates and higher per-capita footprints — who are as important to address.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Participants overwhelmingly felt reproductive health and rights, alongside education and women empowerment considerations, ought to be integrated in environmental sustainability discussions and policies. </p>
<p>They agreed with the notion that contraception and family planning services can have a positive impact on environmental sustainability. They also agreed that integrating family planning as an environmental policy would contribute to accelerating much needed progress on reproductive rights and sustainability. </p>
<h2>It is time to discuss demography</h2>
<p>This study presents surprising evidence that rebuts common assumptions about the sensitivity of discussing population trends in developing countries. </p>
<p>Our survey suggests that a majority of those working in a field that is related to economic, social, or environmental development in sub-Saharan Africa consider the topic of population growth important. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘What will it take to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals?’ Produced by the United Nations.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Our study also supports the importance of amplifying the voices of people among those most exposed to rapid population growth and most vulnerable to climate change and environmental degradation. These individuals, more often than not, live in places where gender equity and access to family planning face <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/s40834-022-00198-5">significant challenges</a>.</p>
<p>Most of our research respondents are concerned by population growth because of its negative environmental and social implications, and wish to integrate demographic and reproductive rights and gender equity considerations in environmental discourses and policies. </p>
<p><a href="https://mahb.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/biad080.pdf">Similar calls to stabilize and gradually decrease the human population by supporting reproductive autonomy and gender equity</a> are regularly issued by leading environmental scientists, and must be prioritized to achieve the transformative change needed for sustainability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Céline Delacroix is a Senior Fellow with the Population Institute (USA), which provided financial support to pursue this research project by offering a fellowship to its authors.</span></em></p>Environmental policymakers and scholars must listen to sub-Saharan Africans’ voices and recognize the importance of population for achieving sustainable development goals.Céline Delacroix, Adjunct Professor and Senior Fellow, School of Health Sciences, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of OttawaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2207402024-02-07T13:26:16Z2024-02-07T13:26:16ZGhana: Kumasi city’s unplanned boom is destroying two rivers – sewage, heavy metals and chemical pollution detected<p>Ghana’s urban population has <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2015/05/14/rising-through-cities-in-ghana-the-time-for-action-is-now-to-fully-benefit-from-the-gains-of-urbanization">more than tripled</a> in the past three decades, from 4 million to nearly 14 million people. Competition for land in cities has increased among various land uses. These trends have led to encroachment in ecologically sensitive areas such as wetlands.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Kumasi">Kumasi</a>, Ghana’s second largest city, has a high level of encroachment and this has led to the pollution of water bodies. Kumasi’s population growth has been rapid because of its central and strategic location and its functions as a major commercial, traditional and administrative centre. In 2022, the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/kumasi-population">population of Kumasi</a> was 3,630,326 with a growth rate of 4.02%. The city’s growth puts pressure on its natural assets.</p>
<p>As scholars of urban planning and chemistry, we conducted a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19463138.2022.2146121">study</a> in the <a href="https://www.luspa.gov.gh/media/plan/EIJR13206_Greater_Kumasi_01.pdf">greater Kumasi metropolis</a> to understand the extent of encroachment and pollution of two rivers, Subin and Wiwi. We wanted to understand how cities can be developed and functional without destroying natural resources. We also wanted to know more about the extent of water pollution, land-use dynamics and water resources regulations, and how they influence the quality of water resources. </p>
<p>We found that people were building homes in informal settlements along the rivers. Liquid and solid waste was being dumped into the rivers. People were using land on the river banks for agriculture and industrial activities, which had a negative effect on water quality. </p>
<p>We recommend that the city authorities monitor what is happening better and do more to prevent degradation of Kumasi’s water bodies.</p>
<h2>Effects of land use on the quality of water bodies</h2>
<p>We discovered that, in the greater Kumasi metropolis, more land alongside the rivers was being used for industrial, residential and commercial purposes than for green spaces. City authorities were ineffective in controlling development in these areas despite the fact that <a href="https://www.luspa.gov.gh/media/document/ZONING_GUIDELINES_final_DESIGN.pdf">Ghana’s zoning guidelines</a> say there should be a buffer of 100 feet (30 metres) along water bodies. </p>
<p>Land values in Kumasi are increasing due to rapid urban growth, but values are lower for wetlands. This difference has contributed to city residents building in wetlands. Also, the intense pressure of urbanisation on the available land has resulted in a <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/483045/wetlands-in-kumasi-metropolis-under-siege.html">high level of encroachment</a> in wetlands. The study revealed that 35.4% of the land uses within the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/River-Wiwi-and-some-other-streams-that-drain-the-Kumasi-Metropolis-Department-of_fig2_257939998">River Wiwi</a> buffers were residential development. </p>
<p>This research further confirmed that the Wiwi and Subin rivers had been heavily polluted with faecal coliforms over the years. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/nursing-and-health-professions/fecal-coliform">Coliform counts</a> are an indicator of possible faecal contamination, and reflect hygiene standards. </p>
<p>The mean of the coliform counts surpassed the limits of 400 total coliforms/100ml and 10 faecal coliforms/100ml allowed by the <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9241546743">World Health Organization standard</a>. The two rivers are extremely polluted with faecal matter. </p>
<p>The research also confirmed that heavy metals in the water bodies were above the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK535301/table/ch8.tab2/">WHO’s recommended standard</a> of 0.01mg/litre. For example, the average concentration of lead (Pb) recorded in the Wiwi and Subin rivers was 0.018–0.031 mg/l and 0.035–0.055, respectively. Exposure to lead is <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/lead-poisoning-and-health">dangerous</a> to health. </p>
<p>As a result of limited investment in sewage plants, most of the city’s untreated waste water is discharged into the surface water bodies. This has implications for the quality and sustainability of these water bodies. </p>
<p>The study also showed that some city residents dump their <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Resolving-dying-water-bodies-Dealing-with-waste-pollutants-through-lucrative-means-569358">waste near the city’s wetlands</a>. During heavy rains, the refuse runs off into the water, affecting water quality and flow. </p>
<p>The inability of city authorities to enforce land-use regulations and legislation has allowed people to carry out agricultural activities close to the rivers. The use of agrochemicals threatens aquatic habitats. Chemicals such as pesticides, herbicides and fertilisers are likely to seep or be washed into the rivers. The use of polluted water from the rivers for irrigation also poses a threat to human health. </p>
<p>The industrial activities along the water bodies include washing bays, auto-mechanical activities, welding and wood processing. These pose a threat of chemical pollution due to likely seepage of petroleum products into the water.</p>
<h2>Time for Kumasi to wake up</h2>
<p>The development of sustainable cities relies on the ability of city authorities to plan for social, environmental and economic growth. Urban growth can coexist with natural resources if human activities located near water bodies don’t threaten their quality and continued existence. </p>
<p>Our study shows that Kumasi has developed with little regard for its natural assets. This is a threat to the city’s sustainability. City authorities ought to put in place measures to clean the water bodies and convert buffer areas into parks and green spaces. Environmentally friendly urban agriculture can also be promoted along the water bodies. </p>
<p>Activities such as disposal of liquid and solid waste must be stopped. <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/explainers/what-is-the-polluter-pays-principle/#:%7E:text=The%20%27polluter%20pays%27%20principle%20is,human%20health%20or%20the%20environment">The “polluter must pay” principle</a> must be applied to people who contravene environmental regulations. </p>
<p>Urban centres in Ghana need a water resource management policy. Regulatory institutions such as the Physical Planning Department and the <a href="https://www.epa.gov.gh/epa/">Environmental Protection Agency</a> should be restructured and equipped to respond to emerging complex environmental problems in cities. There should be continuous environmental monitoring and regulations must be strictly enforced. The <a href="https://westindiacommittee.org/historyheritageculture/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Contents-and-Introduction.pdf">River Thames Policing model</a> in the UK can be adopted to ensure the continuous monitoring of the water bodies. To monitor and enforce the zoning regulations, city authorities and policy-makers must invest in technologies such as drones. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.luspa.gov.gh/media/document/ZONING_GUIDELINES_final_DESIGN.pdf">Zoning Guideline and Planning Standards</a> provide standard setback average distances for a buffer zone of 50–100 feet from the water bodies. We recommend that the buffer should rather be 100 feet (30 metres) away from the wetland. The wetlands are an important <a href="https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/library/services_00_e.pdf">ecosystem service</a> that needs to be protected. Ecologically sensitive areas that are 100 feet away from wetlands should be compulsorily acquired as natural assets for the public interest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220740/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The inability of city authorities to enforce land-use regulations has allowed people to carry out ecologically unfriendly activities along the water bodies.Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)Owusu Amponsah, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216142024-01-31T15:25:32Z2024-01-31T15:25:32ZAfrican countries are struggling with high debt, demands to spend more and collapsing currencies: the policy fixes that could help<p>Highly indebted African countries are facing stark trade-offs between servicing expensive debt, supporting high and growing development needs, and stabilising domestic currencies.</p>
<p>Government debt has risen in at least <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/04/14/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2023">40 African countries</a> over the past decade. As a result, some are experiencing a bad combination of high debt, elevated development spending needs amid budget shortfalls, and unfavourable exchange rate pressures. </p>
<p>These issues have become more pressing since 2022, when persistently high inflation prompted major central banks around the world to embark on the most aggressive <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">monetary tightening campaign</a> in decades. Monetary policy tightens when central banks raise interest rates. </p>
<p>Since then, global interest rates have climbed even <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/04/14/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2023">higher</a>, triggering a jump in repayments on external loans and adding to debt burdens accumulated over the last decade. In addition, some countries with worsening debt situations have endured large exchange rate depreciations and struggled to stabilise the value of their domestic currencies. </p>
<p>My perspective, shaped by years of researching Africa’s development challenges, is that this presents many countries with a triple set of dilemmas that’s not easy to navigate. Tackling any of one of these issues imperils the others.</p>
<p>Here are some examples:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>stemming the rise in public debt and containing exchange rate decreases would make it more difficult to meet bigger public spending needs </p></li>
<li><p>pushing for lower public debt while supporting extra spending risks putting more strain on domestic currencies </p></li>
<li><p>prioritising higher spending needs and easing currency strains runs the risk of inviting extra government debt. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>Steps can be taken to expand the policy space to tackle these challenges while easing difficult trade-offs. These steps include prioritising public spending measures that raise growth, fixing the revenue collection problem facing all African countries, and restructuring unsustainable government debt.</p>
<h2>Rising government debt and policy dilemmas</h2>
<p>The triple dilemma unfolded as government debts rose substantially over the last decade. As shown in Figure 1, median government debt has more than doubled since 2012 and amounted to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">61% of GDP</a> as of 2023. </p>
<p>At first, <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/11/02/markets-think-interest-rates-could-stay-high-for-a-decade-or-more">historically low global interest rates</a> in the decade after the global financial crisis in 2008 contributed powerfully to burgeoning debt by making it easy to borrow large amounts of cheap money. </p>
<p>The debt trends of countries have worsened sharply since then. Factors have included the COVID-19 pandemic, which triggered a cost-of-living crisis, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which contributed to a rapid rise in global interest rates. </p>
<p>In Africa, the pain from higher borrowing costs is particularly acute for governments, given that public debt represented <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">nearly 60%</a> of the region’s total external debt in 2022 (Figure 1). <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/04/14/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2023">Nineteen countries</a>, including Ghana and Zambia, are already in debt distress (meaning they are unable to meet financial obligations) or at high risk of debt distress.</p>
<p>Ghana’s public debt has more than doubled since 2012 and amounts to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">85%</a> of GDP. Zambia’s went up much higher and stood at <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">98%</a> as of 2022. </p>
<p>Both <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-11/ethiopia-is-about-to-become-africa-s-next-debt-defaulter">Ghana</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-11/ethiopia-is-about-to-become-africa-s-next-debt-defaulter">Zambia</a>, along with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-11/ethiopia-is-about-to-become-africa-s-next-debt-defaulter">Ethiopia</a>, have defaulted on their foreign debt, sparking fears about a broader sovereign debt crisis on the continent if more countries fall into debt distress. </p>
<p>Others face high risk of debt distress. Kenya is on the edge of financial distress after its debt increased steadily to <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">70%</a> of GDP. South Africa also faces elevated public debt, which has almost doubled over the last decade and currently stands at <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">74%</a> of GDP. </p>
<p>And yet trimming high debts won’t be easy. Development needs are high after coffers were drained by higher spending tied to the pandemic and fallout from Ukraine. </p>
<p>The International Monetary Fund estimates that the median sub-Saharan African country needs to increase spending by at <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2023/09/15/Navigating-Fiscal-Challenges-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-Resilient-Strategies-and-Credible-529230">least 20% of GDP</a> to meet sustainable development goals on health, education and infrastructure by 2030. Climate change adaptation is expected to add <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2023/09/15/Navigating-Fiscal-Challenges-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-Resilient-Strategies-and-Credible-529230">billions of dollars</a> each year for the continent.</p>
<p>Coffers are also being depleted by more money being spent repaying expensive loans. This has the additional effect of depleting foreign exchange reserves, which means countries overburdened by debt also have to contend with weakening currencies. </p>
<p>Kenya’s debt interest payment as a share of revenue rose from <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">11% in 2014</a> to more than <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">20%</a> after 2020. This depleted its reserves as a share of external debt from 47% to less than 20% over the same period. This has pressured the Kenyan shilling, which lost more than <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-28/-paramilitary-tax-agents-deployed-in-kenya-budget-revenue-drive">19%</a> against the US dollar last year.</p>
<p>In the cases of Ghana and Zambia, debt interest payments climbed even higher. For Ghana they were around <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">45%</a> of revenue. For Zambia, around <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">39%</a>. By 2022 reserves had dwindled to <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">22%</a> in Ghana and to <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">10%</a> in Zambia. </p>
<p>This precipitated large depreciations of Ghana’s cedi and Zambia’s kwacha. </p>
<p>South Africa’s debt interest payments increased at a relatively slower pace to about <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">15%</a> of revenue after 2021 and it kept a higher reserve share of about <a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators">35%</a>. This was why the decline in the rand was not as steep as in the other three countries. </p>
<p>Weakening currencies also make foreign debt servicing costlier. Consequently, reasonable debt can quickly turn into unmanageable debt.</p>
<p>Lower government revenue collection has also intensified debt risks.</p>
<p>In 2023, revenue collected was <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">16%</a> of GDP in Ghana, <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">17%</a> in Kenya and <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/October">21%</a> in Zambia. This is significantly below the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/10/16/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-october-2023">27%</a> median level seen in other developing economies. Although this median level is matched by South Africa, rising costs of social transfers including welfare grants and subsidies to state-owned enterprises such as the power utility Eskom and transport utility Transnet have added upward pressure on <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects">public debt amid slowing growth</a>. </p>
<h2>What can be done</h2>
<p>A number of steps can be taken to alleviate the trade-offs countries are having to make.</p>
<p>Firstly, governments should prioritise public spending measures that raise growth. </p>
<p>These include critical spending on education, health, infrastructure and other high-quality growth enhancing investments. As economic growth picks up, it is likely to generate more government revenue to pay down the debt.</p>
<p>It also means allocating more spending on first generation reforms. These are structural reforms that alleviate major growth constraints. For example, long-standing reforms in governance remain critical in African countries which generally lag behind countries in other regions on various measures of governance quality such as rule of law, control of corruption and government accountability. </p>
<p>Secondly, countries need to fix their revenue collection problems. While growth leads to a larger economy that generates additional revenue, low levels of domestic revenue collection constrain the ability of governments to pay down debt and fund vital social and growth sectors.</p>
<p>Across Africa, several countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya and Ethiopia, have mobilised efforts to spur gains in revenue collection. These include new levies, higher taxes, registering more shops on the tax roll, broadening tax bases, strengthening tax administration and other revenue enhancing measures.</p>
<p>Lastly, governments need to restructure their debt portfolios. When a debt crisis cannot be avoided, restructuring debt can reduce the amount owed to creditors by revising the amount and timing of future principal and interest payments. Chad reached an agreement to restructure its external debt under the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2023/10/16/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-october-2023">G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment in 2022</a>. This is an initiative designed to support low income developing countries with unsustainable debt. Since then, Ghana and Zambia have also launched debt restructuring negotiations under the <a href="https://clubdeparis.org/sites/default/files/annex_common_framework_for_debt_treatments_beyond_the_dssi.pdf">G20 Common Framework</a>. </p>
<p>Other highly indebted countries struggling to service their liabilities may have to do the same amid rising concerns about slow progress of the Common Framework.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221614/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Munemo is affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations. He was appointed as an International Affairs Fellow for Tenured International Relations Scholars for the 2023-24 academic year.</span></em></p>Many African countries face a triple set of dilemmas that are not easy to navigate.Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223122024-01-30T17:26:36Z2024-01-30T17:26:36ZV&A’s decision to loan looted Asante gold back to Ghana has implications for other British museums<p>The Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) has announced a loan agreement with the Manhyia Palace Museum in the Asante region of Ghana to return gold and silver royal regalia that were looted from the country by the British in 1874 and 1895. The decision <a href="https://www.museumsassociation.org/museums-journal/news/2024/01/va-and-british-museum-to-loan-asante-gold-to-ghana/#">was announced</a> on the 150th anniversary of a sequence of wars of aggression, waged by the British empire against the Asante kingdom in Africa’s Gold Coast (modern day Ghana).</p>
<p>This agreement is part of a renewable framework of exchanges agreed not with the Ghanian government but with the current monarch of the Asante kingdom, a constitutionally protected region of the state of Ghana. The exact length of the agreement is unclear but <a href="https://www.artnews.com/art-news/news/british-museum-and-va-to-loan-asante-gold-looted-from-ghana-1234694073/#:%7E:text=The%20British%20Museum%20and%20the,collection%20of%20the%20Asante%20king.">most accounts suggest</a> that this is a three-year deal. </p>
<p>The agreement concerns <a href="https://vanda-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/2024/01/25/10/35/55/e42169b6-3bd9-4ed0-b409-d344609a4688/GHANA%20RELEASE%20FINAL.pdf">17 objects held at the V&A</a> and <a href="https://www.britishmuseum.org/about-us/british-museum-story/contested-objects-collection/asante-gold-regalia">15 objects from the British Museum collection</a>. These include a sword of state and a gold peace pipe. </p>
<p>British forces took the treasures when plundering the Asante capital Kumasi during the third and fouth <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/anglo-ashanti-wars-1823-1900/">Anglo-Ashanti wars</a> (1873–74 and 1895-96). The looting was an act of opportunism but also served a political function to humiliate the residents of the Asante kingdom. </p>
<p>Today, these artefacts are seen in Ghana as <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/334763/ghana-uk-returning-looted-gold-artefacts-to-asante-king-on-loan/">missing parts of the country’s national heritage</a>. They bear great spiritual value for the Asante people.</p>
<p>The director of the V&A, historian Tristram Hunt, presented this loan deal as a template for <a href="https://amp.theguardian.com/culture/2024/jan/27/vas-return-of-looted-ghana-gold-is-a-new-way-to-tackle-britains-painful-past">the solution</a> to the “contested colonial heritage” of items in European museums. Hunt suggested that contemporary Asante goldsmiths could be commissioned to create artworks that would “fill the gap” left in the collection by the loaned artefacts.</p>
<p>The V&A has been at pains to argue that this deal and other similar initiatives <a href="https://www.vam.ac.uk/info/restitution-and-repatriation">do not constitute repatriation agreements</a>. This is important because such an agreement would contradict <a href="https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/reviewing-the-national-heritage-act-1983/">the National Heritage Act of 1983</a>, which prohibits national museums from repatriating antiquities in their collection.</p>
<p>The agreed framework of exchange allows the state of Ghana to reap the benefits of the temporary return of the Asante treasures without having to make concessions on the question of legal ownership of the artefacts. In short, having the treasures return to Ghana on a loan deal with a regional partner allows the Ghana state authorities to continue arguing for repatriation and restitution.</p>
<p>This is perhaps why Hunt argued that this partnership “<a href="https://amp.theguardian.com/culture/2024/jan/27/vas-return-of-looted-ghana-gold-is-a-new-way-to-tackle-britains-painful-past">allows us to move beyond the Parthenon sculptures debate</a> – a reference to the requested repatriation of several sculptures extracted from the Parthenon in Greece in the early 1800s. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-parthenon-marbles-george-osborne-wants-to-return-the-statues-to-athens-but-can-he-a-legal-expert-explains-197364">The Parthenon marbles: George Osborne wants to return the statues to Athens, but can he? A legal expert explains</a>
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<h2>How the agreement might impact other cases</h2>
<p>This agreement suggests that since national museums in the UK are banned from returning controversial cultural artefacts to their places of origin, loan deals and dynamic exchanges are the way forward. </p>
<p>The British Museum and the Greek government currently pursue this line of thinking. Despite the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-67551732">recent diplomatic episode</a> in which Rishi Sunak cancelled a scheduled meeting with the Greek prime minister in response to the latter’s comments about the Parthenon sculptures, the Greek government has changed its approach on the Parthenon marbles question. </p>
<p>Officials are now presenting the problem not as one of ownership and restitution but as one of reunification. This means that they are open to solutions along the lines of the Asante case. But the key difference is that in the Greek case the agreement would have to be between two national museums – the British museum and the Parthenon Museum – with the involvement of the Greek state. The extent to which such a solution would be popular with the Greek public remains to be seen.</p>
<p>This deal may have implications for other cases around the world. The other obvious example is that of the <a href="https://www.britishmuseum.org/about-us/british-museum-story/contested-objects-collection/benin-bronzes">Benin bronzes</a> – a cluster of 16th century statues looted in 1897 from the west African kingdom of Benin, now part of the Nigerian state – currently held in the British Museum. Despite the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/04/arts/design/benin-bronzes-nigeria-ownership.html">complex Nigerian cultural politics</a> the Asante loan agreement will impact the debate on the status of these artefacts. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.vam.ac.uk/info/restitution-and-repatriation">"Renewable cultural partnerships”</a> – an elegant term to describe loans – are by no means enough. The elephant in the room is the existing legal framework, forged in period of decolonisation and diminishing western influence, that forbids the repatriation of antiquities. </p>
<p>Over 60 years on from when a ban on repatriation was <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1963/24/contents">first introduced</a>, the world is a different place. Big European museums have nothing to fear from repatriation requests and agreements. The enormity of their collection guarantees that there will almost never be a void to fill.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Georgios Giannakopoulos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The elephant in the room is the existing legal framework, forged in period of decolonisation and diminishing western influence, that forbids the repatriation of antiquities.Georgios Giannakopoulos, Visiting Research Fellow, Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College London/ Lecturer in Modern History, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220252024-01-30T09:51:37Z2024-01-30T09:51:37ZGhana’s looted Asante gold comes home (for now) – Asante ruler’s advisor tells us about the deal<p><em>After 150 years, 39 artefacts that form part of Asante’s royal regalia are due to return to the <a href="https://manhyiapalace.org/">Asantehene</a> (ruler of the Asante people) in Kumasi, Ghana, in February and April this year. The Asante empire was the largest and most powerful in the region in the 18th century and controlled an area that was rich in gold. Many of the gold royal artefacts were looted by British troops during the third Anglo-Asante war of 1874 (<a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/5/0z9u3mtcn3ra21uwolkj7rgpr8jai7">Sagrenti War</a>).</em></p>
<p><em>The first collection of seven objects is expected from the Fowler Museum at the University of California in Los Angeles. The second collection of 32 will arrive from the British Museum and the Victoria & Albert Museum in the UK. These artefacts are being loaned to the Asante people for six years. Archaeologist and <a href="https://www.theafricainstitute.org/institute-team/rachel-ama-asaa-engmann/">Ghana heritage specialist</a> Rachel Ama Asaa Engmann spoke to the Asantehene’s technical advisor for the project, historian and museum economist Ivor Agyeman-Duah, about the journey to return the items and its implications for cultural restitution, repatriation and the decolonisation of museums.</em></p>
<h2>What are these objects and how did they leave Asante?</h2>
<p>They were royal regalia that was looted in 1874 from the palace in Kumasi after the sacking of the city by British colonial military troops. There was another a punitive expedition in 1896 which led to further looting. They included ceremonial swords and ceremonial cups, some of them very important in terms of a palace’s measurement of royalty. For instance, the Mponponsuo sword, created 300 years ago, dates back to the legendary Okomfo (spiritual leader) linked with the founding of the empire, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Okomfo-Anokye">Okomfo Anokye</a>. This sword is what the Asantehene used to swear the oath of allegiance to his people. Chiefs used the same sword to swear their oaths to the Asantehene. </p>
<p>Some of the items were sold at auction on the open market in London; art collectors bought them and eventually donated some of them to museums (some were kept in private collections). The British Museum and the <a href="https://www.vam.ac.uk/">Victoria & Albert Museum</a> also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/10/12/stealing-africa-how-britain-looted-the-continents-art">bought</a> some of them.</p>
<p>However, not every item you see at the British Museum was looted. For instance, there were cultural exchanges between the <a href="https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/term/BIOG205733">Asantehene Osei Bonsu</a> and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Edward-Bowdich">T.E. Bowdich</a>, an emissary of the African Company of Merchants who travelled to Kumasi in 1817 to negotiate trade. Some gifts were given to Bowdich, who deposited them at the British Museum later on. There were 14 of these items.</p>
<h2>How was the agreement reached?</h2>
<p>The issue has been on the drawing board for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-65614490">half a century</a>. It’s not just an immediate concern of the current Asantehene. It has been a concern of the last three occupants of the stool (throne). But this year is critical because it marks 150 years since the Sagrenti War. It also marks 100 years since the return of the <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2017/11/11/9q292hoy7x0uyv4ibm38vghy7mmax1">Asantehene Agyeman Prempeh</a> after his <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2017/11/11/9q292hoy7x0uyv4ibm38vghy7mmax1">exile in Seychelles</a> and 25 years since the <a href="https://manhyiapalace.org/profile-of-otumfuo-osei-tutu-ii-asantehene/">current Asantehene</a>, Oseu Tutu II, ascended the stool. </p>
<p>So, while in London in May 2023, after having official discussions with directors of these museums, he reopened discussions and negotiations. He asked me and <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Asante-M-D-McLeod/dp/0714115630">Malcolm McLeod</a>, former curator and scholar at the British Museum
and <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/asantehene-leads-discussions-with-british-museum-over-regalia-taken-from-ashantis/">vice-principal</a> at the University of Glasgow, to help in the technical decisions that would be made. We’ve been working on this for the past nine months.</p>
<h2>Why is it a six year loan and not an outright return?</h2>
<p>The moral right to ownership does exist. But there are also the laws of antiquity in the UK. The Victoria & Albert and the British Museum are national museums. They are governed by very <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharyfolk/2024/01/25/british-museum-lends-ghana-looted-gold-artifacts-heres-why-it-wont-fully-return-them/?sh=60ccee735c7c">strict laws</a> which do not permit <a href="https://www.uaf.edu/museum/collections/ethno/policies/deaccessioning/">de-accessioning</a> or permanently removing a work of art or other object from a museum’s collection to sell it or otherwise dispose of it.</p>
<p>That had always been the constraining factor over the last 50 years. But there was also a way that we could have these items for a maximum of six years. Not all the objects are being exhibited at the British Museum. Many have never been exhibited and lie in storage in a warehouse.</p>
<p>Based on the circumstances and the trinity of anniversaries, we came to an agreement. Discussions will however continue between us and these museums to find a lasting agreement.</p>
<p>Of course, the Ghana experience will be important for restitution claims from other countries in Africa.</p>
<h2>What does this mean to the Asante people – and Ghana?</h2>
<p>The fact that over the last couple of months we were able to reach some form of agreement for this to happen is testimony of the interest in multicultural agreements.</p>
<p>Any set of objects that is 150 years old (or older) will be of interest to many people. Such artefacts help us to connect the past with the present. They are significant for how our people were, in terms of creativity and technology, how they were able to use gold and other artistic properties. They are also something that will inspire those who are in the craft of gold production today. </p>
<p>Manhiya Palace Museum reopens this year in April. The exhibition of these objects is going to increase visitor attendance at the <a href="https://ashantiobjects.commons.gc.cuny.edu/the-new-manhyia-palace-museum/">museum</a>. It receives about 80,000 visitors a year and we estimate that it could rise to 200,000 a year with the return of these objects. This will generate revenue and allow us to expand and develop our own museums.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222025/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Ama Asaa Engmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A loan deal for the Asante artefacts offers an opportunity for these objects to return home.Rachel Ama Asaa Engmann, Director of Christiansborg Archaeological Heritage Project, Associate Professor at Africa Institute Sharjah & Associate Graduate Faculty, Rutgers UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2219532024-01-29T19:11:13Z2024-01-29T19:11:13ZAfcon 2023: Africa’s diaspora footballers are boosting the continent’s game – but they are also creating challenges<p>The Africa Cup of Nations (Afcon) is approaching its conclusion in Ivory Coast and speculation is rife about which team will be the ultimate winner. It could be one of the continent’s footballing heavyweights such as Morocco or Senegal. Alternatively, a relative minnow like Angola or Cape Verde may emerge as the unexpected victor.</p>
<p>Last time out, at the 2021 edition in Algeria, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2022/feb/06/senegal-egypt-africa-cup-of-nations-final-match-report">Senegal captain</a> Kalidou Koulibaly lifted the trophy. Before that, Algeria’s 2019 triumph in Egypt saw Riyad Mahrez become the victorious captain. Significantly, neither player was born in Africa and there is a distinct possibility that the winning captain of this year’s tournament will also have been born elsewhere.</p>
<p>Of the <a href="https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/sports/the-allure-of-the-diaspora-at-afcon-2024-4491490#:%7E:text=2%20hours%20ago-,The%20number%20of%20Diaspora%20players%20in%20the%202024%20AFCON%20is,in%20the%20tournament%20this%20year">630 players</a> who were registered to play by teams competing in the 2023 edition, 200 weren’t born in Africa. The non-African country with the most players at the tournament is France, with 104. Second is Spain with 24, then England with 15. Even players born in Ireland and Saudi Arabia are competing in this year’s tournament. </p>
<p>The Moroccan national team has the largest number of diaspora players. Eighteen of its squad members were born outside of Morocco, with only nine born in the country. Equatorial Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo have 17 and 16 diaspora squad members, respectively.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map of Africa showing the contribution of non-African countries to this year's Afcon." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=426&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/571856/original/file-20240129-21-d2jfov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=536&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The birthplaces of the African diaspora playing at 2023 Africa Cup of Nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Paul Widdop</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The phenomenon seems to be on the rise and has allowed some African teams (and several with very limited footballing history) to rise up the footballing ranks in recent years. But some people argue that diasporas are undermining the progression of African football, principally by engendering a culture of complacency.</p>
<h2>Bolstering their ranks</h2>
<p>The fact that African teams are increasingly relying on players born elsewhere is not a surprise. After all, there’s an <a href="https://football-observatory.com/Inflation-in-the-football-players-transfer-market">intense talent battle</a> taking place in world football. This often involves the <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/international-athletes-world-cup-nationality">naturalisation of individuals</a> who find themselves playing for one national team even though they may already have played for another, and the <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/fifa-world-cup-2022/2022/12/07/every-moroccan-is-moroccan-regraguis-fight-to-include-foreign-born-players-vindicated/">targeted recruitment</a> of players in countries around the world.</p>
<p>However, the case of Africa is particularly distinctive. It’s a reflection of both the continent’s <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2019/02/20/diaspora-diaries-and-football-politics/">colonial past and its global diasporas</a>. </p>
<p>For instance, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/sep/12/leicester-city-riyad-mahrez-father-dream-algeria-world-cup">Mahrez was born</a> in Paris to parents of Algerian and Moroccan origin. The French capital is home to 331,000 Algerians and 254,000 Moroccans. <a href="https://onefootball.com/en/news/chelsea-defender-koulibaly-explains-choosing-senegal-over-france-35927795">Koulibaly</a> was also born in France to parents originally from Senegal. Figures suggest there are more than 100,000 Senegalese in France.</p>
<p>But this is not just a story about France. Nigeria’s <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/02/09/no-regrets-choosing-nigeria-over-england-lookman/">Ademola Lookman</a> was born in London, Ghana’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/africa/62549049">Iñaki Williams</a> comes from Bilbao in Spain, and Morocco’s <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2023/01/16/the-political-dimension-of-moroccos-success-in-the-world-cup/#:%7E:text=Similarly%2C%20Sofian%20Amrabat%20is%20known,from%20them%20and%20preferred%20Morocco.">Sofyan Amrabat and Hakim Ziyech</a> are of Dutch origin. </p>
<p>Self-identity and family dynamics are a couple of reasons why players choose to play for teams from the birthplaces of their parents rather than their own. In 2022, Ziyech <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/sport/soccer/2022/12/10/hakim-ziyech-a-magician-at-the-heart-of-moroccan-love-story/">explained it thus</a>: “Choosing one’s national team is not done with the brain but with the heart. I have always felt Moroccan even though I was born in the Netherlands. Lots of people will never understand.” </p>
<p>Williams has <a href="https://www.goal.com/en-gb/news/inaki-williams-made-right-choice-ghana-over-spain/blt005c8219a89b044e">spoken</a> of his grandparents’ influence, claiming that a decision is “easier when you see the [Ghanaian] people and your family support you to be a Black Star”. Such instances reveal a multidimensional sense of place. </p>
<p>Yet cynics argue that other such players are simply not good enough to play for the European nations in which they were born or in which they have been naturalised. For instance, former Arsenal starlet <a href="https://www.completesports.com/ex-everton-star-ball-iwobi-not-good-enough-to-play-for-toffees/">Alex Iwobi</a> has gone from being a potential future England star to a sometimes criticised Fulham midfielder and Nigerian international.</p>
<h2>But at what cost?</h2>
<p>Others express concerns about how diasporas are undermining African football. One concern is that bringing talent in from Europe and elsewhere is simply a fast-track strategy to success that is <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/09/11/is-africas-football-talent-finally-coming-back-home-football-planet/">eroding the long-term health</a> of football across the continent.</p>
<p>Even so, the approach seems to be working. At the Qatar World Cup in 2022, Morocco became the <a href="https://theconversation.com/morocco-at-the-2022-world-cup-6-forces-behind-a-history-making-performance-196359">first African nation</a> to reach the tournament’s semi-final stage. This has helped the country become the current highest-ranked team in Africa and the 13th-best team worldwide. </p>
<p>Senegal is also in the world’s top 20, while <a href="https://www.3addedminutes.com/international/cape-verde-mauritania-fairytale-afcon-match-stories-behind-it-4493235">Cape Verde’s</a> recent performance shows that even Africa’s traditionally less successful footballing nations can prosper. Cape Verde, a string of ten islands in the Atlantic Ocean with a population smaller than the city of Bristol, just finished top of a tough group, including Egypt and Ghana at the 2023 Afcon.</p>
<p>The likes of former Cameroon goalkeeper <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/sports/article/2022/11/25/world-cup-2022-the-problem-with-african-football-is-the-leaders_6005649_9.html">Joseph-Antoine Bell</a> remain less positive about such achievements. Bell claims that diaspora players make the job of African football’s leaders, managers and coaches too easy, which is engendering a culture of complacency. He also thinks it demotivates players born, brought up and living in Africa.</p>
<p>Though the practice of <a href="https://www.versus.uk.com/articles/diaspora-fc-why-its-time-for-this-generation-to-go-back-to-their-motherlands">diasporic talent recruitment</a> appears to be increasing (the effect of <a href="https://sports-chair.essec.edu/resources/research-reports/sport-and-national-eligibility-criteria-in-the-era-of-globalization">globalisation</a> must also be acknowledged as an influence), there are still some countries that rely more on players born and brought up domestically - Namibia and South Africa are examples of this.</p>
<p>Bell would no doubt approve, having previously called for Africa to develop its own solutions to talent identification and development. The problem is, this takes time, money and patience – precious commodities in football generally, not just in Africa.</p>
<p>Whatever happens when the tournament’s final game is staged at the <a href="https://theconversation.com/africa-cup-of-nations-showcases-the-continents-finest-footballers-and-chinas-economic-clout-220313">Alassane Ouattara Stadium</a> in Abidjan, it will be a proud moment for and a big celebration of African football. However, the birthplace of the captain who eventually lifts the trophy will probably fuel further debate about the importance of African football’s diasporas.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Around one-third of the players that have been called up to the 2023 Africa Cup of Nations were born outside of Africa.Simon Chadwick, Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy, SKEMA Business SchoolPaul Widdop, Associate Professor, Manchester Metropolitan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176062024-01-09T14:03:52Z2024-01-09T14:03:52ZGhana’s electricity crisis is holding the country back - how it got here<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567865/original/file-20240104-21-yyooez.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Akosombo Dam is an important source of power in Ghana.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jbdodane/10021680456">jbdodane/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>For well over a decade Ghana was exalted as one of the most promising and <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/ghana-is-set-to-be-the-worlds-fastest-growing-economy-this-year-according-to-the-imf/">fastest growing</a> economies on the continent. </p>
<p>But <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/27/africa/ghana-plunged-into-darkness-amid-country-economic-woes/index.html">recent reports</a> of the country’s steep <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2023/ghanas-second-quarter-economic-growth-dips-vs-revised-first-quarter/">economic dip</a>, high <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-11/ghana-inflation-hits-record-54-1-as-food-costs-surge">inflation</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67236078">rolling blackouts</a>, popularly referred to as “dumsor”, suggest the era of inconsistent electricity between 2012 and 2016 is back. </p>
<p>The west African nation is experiencing power rationing and electricity cuts. It has <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67236078">lost 10%</a> of its total electricity generation capacity. Not only is the supply of clean energy insufficient in Ghana: access is also uneven. The rural poor rely on other forms of energy such as firewood or biomass to meet their needs. Biomass accounts for over <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666052022000152">46%</a> of energy use in Ghana’s rural areas. </p>
<p>The correlation between energy, economic growth and development is widely recognised. The ability of energy to power economies is also well known. </p>
<p>The gaps in electricity delivery in a nation typically lauded for its economic success and political stability are at odds with energy abundance that I note in <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-60122-9">my book</a> on Ghana’s energy politics. </p>
<p>This latest crisis could upend Ghana’s previously notable economic gains. </p>
<p>The current energy paralysis is particularly worrying for two reasons. Ghana is frequently touted as a hub for foreign investment and tourism. Neither of these can flourish without energy. Secondly, it could prompt Ghanaians to leave the country and discourage people in the diaspora from returning. </p>
<h2>Some history</h2>
<p>Understanding Ghana’s electricity conundrum requires a look at past policies. In less than a decade following independence in 1957, the country could boast of having one of the continent’s largest dams and hydroelectric projects, the Akosombo and Volta River Project. </p>
<p>Political upheaval in the following decades destroyed the vision of progress. A rapid succession of regimes and the ravages of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s and 1990s challenged the ability of Ghana to clean up decrepit energy institutions. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lessons-to-be-learnt-from-ghanas-excess-electricity-shambles-121257">Lessons to be learnt from Ghana's excess electricity shambles</a>
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<p>Poor energy supply and demand chain dynamics or forecasting produced deeply disparate outcomes. Energy institutions did not adequately capture heightened demand in urban and rural areas. This happened amid international financial institutional pressure to liberalise the energy sector as a condition for support. Utility sector reform inadvertently made it harder to supply energy to those who needed it the most. Added to this were insufficient funds and budgetary constraints which limited generation and transmission capacity. </p>
<h2>Energy capacity</h2>
<p>In 2019, an International Energy Association <a href="https://www.iea.org/articles/ghana-energy-outlook">report</a> noted that half of Ghana’s electricity came from hydropower, 30% from domestically produced gas and 23% from oil. </p>
<p>Ghana’s hydro-wealth includes an installed capacity of 1,580 megawatts of energy from three dams: Akosombo, Kpong and Bui, which account for roughly 54% of its total electricity generating capacity. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-bui-dam-set-up-chinas-future-engagement-strategy-with-ghana-164970">How the Bui Dam set up China's future engagement strategy with Ghana</a>
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<p>The completion of the Bui Dam by Chinese contractors <a href="https://www.water-technology.net/projects/bui-dam-hydro-power-ghana/">in 2013</a> was intended to offset poor access. Additional thermal plants constructed since 2017 should have improved disparities in electricity delivery. <a href="https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/hd/about/facilities/thermal-e.html">Thermal plants</a> draw from steam power that is generated by burning oil, liquid natural gas and coal.</p>
<h2>The rural poor</h2>
<p>But <a href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-60122-9">less than 60% of the population</a> has access to electricity. This energy poverty has been acute since the 1990s. It’s especially alarming for a country that boasts a resource of <a href="https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/15-Billion-Barrels-Of-Oil-Discovered-Offshore-Ghana.html">a billion barrels of offshore oil</a>. </p>
<p>The connections between rural development and electrification were noted in a Ministry of Energy <a href="https://www.greenpolicyplatform.org/sites/default/files/downloads/policy-database/GHANA%20%20National%20Energy%20Policy.pdf">report</a> over a decade ago.</p>
<p>In my view, the use of electricity as a tool for political parties is incompatible with addressing provision to the rural poor. Around <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1245342/number-of-people-living-in-extreme-poverty-in-ghana-by-area/#:%7E:text=In%202023%2C%20around%202.99%20million,were%20located%20in%20urban%20areas.">2.99 million people</a> in Ghana live in extreme poverty, the majority in rural areas. </p>
<p>The country’s energy “futures” appear tethered to donor-driven aid and investment. The political wherewithal or impetus to develop a framework that meets differing energy needs remains absent, as I demonstrate in my work. </p>
<h2>Other implications</h2>
<p>Ghanaians and international observers are asking what is to be done. Regional power sharing arrangements like the <a href="https://www.ecowapp.org/en/content/creation-wapp">West Africa Power Pool</a>, intended to boost long term energy security, have yielded little thus far. </p>
<p>In my view, a key step is to ask what kind of sustainable energy future the country wants.</p>
<p>Calling for donor-led and international financial assistance is not the answer. It is time to change expectations about grid connection, the preferred way of electricity delivery in Ghana, as previous <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2214629619300647?casa_token=kh1WaQ8Tbq0AAAAA:Bp4xLAyaOjH1s-m8te2e9gG7i1rxa00vTHO1c2u5B4SASGLYy3EVbhLIpegNPmNAz-fj6VaEPQk">studies have shown</a>. </p>
<p>For Ghana, harnessing renewable energies that are sustainable, dependable and affordable, especially for the rural poor, is a key step. </p>
<p>Another strategy is to encourage public dialogue about the country’s energy futures.</p>
<p>Ghana must deploy a just and inclusive energy framework that attends to its rural populations just as much as its urbanites.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217606/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Naaborle Sackeyfio does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ghana’s power generation mix is still not meeting national needs.Naaborle Sackeyfio, Associate Professor of Global and Intercultural Studies, Miami UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2184852024-01-07T15:35:53Z2024-01-07T15:35:53ZWhy traditional cooking isn’t always healthier: the case of Ghanaians in Manchester and in Accra<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/567995/original/file-20240105-20-wdtvse.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C17%2C2000%2C1365&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Analysis of participants' photos demonstrated hybrid cooking practices, with a combination of ingredients and cooking methods and/or techniques.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In popular discussions of healthy eating, including political rhetoric and nutrition counselling, women are often blamed for a lack of nutrition knowledge or cooking skills, leading to the assumption that a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2796.2008.01922">decline in cooking skills is connected with unhealthy diets and obesity</a>. This has been called a <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Evolution-of-Deficit-Thinking-Educational-Thought-and-Practice/Valencia/p/book/9780750706650">“deficit approach”</a> and my research with Ghanaian women set out to <a href="https://axa-research.org/funded-projects/health/towards-healthier-culinary-practices-among-overweight-and-obese-ghanaian-women">challenge some of its assumptions</a>.</p>
<p>Previous studies on Ghanaian immigrants showed that following their arrival in the United Kingdom, most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03014460.2017.1333148">maintained their dietary traditions</a>. This cuts against the perception that they, like others, would <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48710190">quickly succumb to fast-food culture in high-income countries</a>. We also know that traditional diets, while seemingly healthy, can also contain <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912420301061">excess calories and fat</a> and thus cause a range of health issues such as type 2 diabetes, cancer, and hypertension. The reason for this may lie in the way the home-cooked food is prepared, cooked, or served.</p>
<h2>Seeing versus telling</h2>
<p>We asked Ghanaian women living in Manchester, England, and in Accra, Ghana, to take photographs of their own cooking experience. We then used the photographs as a prompt to allow participants to tell the “stories” of their everyday cooking.</p>
<p>In both countries, the women said that they viewed their practices as a distinct subtype of home cooking, characterised by raw ingredients and/or whole foods, locally produced ingredients and specialised equipment. They also saw themselves as cooking with love and care and adhering to culturally acceptable ways of feeding their families.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I have introduced my kids to the local dishes, and they love them, and one of my boy’s favourites is yam. Every now and then I tend to cook spinach or what is called ‘nkontomire’.” (Manchester resident)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Analysis of participants’ photos demonstrated hybrid cooking practices, with a combination of ingredients and cooking methods and/or techniques. In some cases, the hybrid methods contributed to unhealthy food practices, including the excessive use of oil and processed foods/flavourings; extended periods of stewing and frying. Many women continued to cherish their <em>asanka</em>, an earthenware grinding pot central to Ghanaian cooking.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“[An ‘asanka’] is very important in every Ghanaian home, because there are some foods that you cannot prepare using the blender, as it will not taste nice.” (Manchester resident)</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=711&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563713/original/file-20231205-21-rie53f.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=894&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">The <em>asanka</em> is a traditional Ghanian grinding pot, a key tool of Ghanaian kitchens.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
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<p>Not surprisingly, the adoption of newer ways of cooking has been linked to the “nutrition transition”, where populations across the world are embracing a food revolution. Studies have shown that many in Britain have abandoned traditional ways of cooking and turned to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2013.12.014">new ways of cooking and eating</a>.</p>
<p>While a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1749975518791431">general decline in cooking skills has also been reported</a> in many western societies over the past decades, this was not the case for Ghanaian women both in Ghana and the UK. Our findings showed that they love to cook, and saw maintaining traditional foods as being a central part of their cultural heritage. While they made use of freezers and microwaves, these were used as tools to help them maintain their cultural heritage – for example, cooking in bulk to create food stocks that would last days or weeks.</p>
<h2>When tradition doesn’t rhyme with safety</h2>
<p>While traditional Ghanaian cooking was perceived as being healthier, this is not always the case. In Ghana, disease risks included foodborne illnesses, and both there and in the UK, the risk of obesity, high cholesterol and heart disease were highlighted. In Ghana, those interviewed strongly emphasised the need for clean water, sanitation, and hygiene, while concerns about the adulteration of packaged and/or processed ethnic foods were highlighted in both settings.</p>
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<p>“The ingredients make the food healthy.” (Accra resident)</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563706/original/file-20231205-27-759nes.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=692&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>To better understand the willingness of Ghanaian women in Manchester to change unhealthy lifestyle behaviours, in another study we assessed their readiness to engage in healthier dietary practices and <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10389-022-01777-1">reduce the risk of obesity</a>. We found that despite the women recognising that obesity was an important health issue, it was not seen as a priority for targeting change. Our research suggests sociocultural rules and structural determinants often specify which foods are considered preferable, cooking choices as well as the differences in habitual intake for different people.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563708/original/file-20231205-27-pz9rq2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Fourni par l'auteur</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<blockquote>
<p>“It takes a lot of time to cook over a fire and it produces a lot of smoke, which ends up making the food reek.” (Accra resident)</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Like <a href="https://www.uclpress.co.uk/products/126956">many others around the world</a>, cooking for Ghanaian women has a range of dimensions. Perceptions of “good” cooking were linked to nutrition and health but also had social, cultural, and emotional associations. There is therefore the need to continue to challenge the idea that women lack knowledge or the will to cook healthy foods.</p>
<p>Instead, health promotion interventions need to emphasise social, cultural, and emotional connotations of cooking in addition to the usual emphasis on physical health, for recommendations to resonate with women’s realities.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=158&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/310261/original/file-20200115-134768-1tax26b.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=198&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
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<p><em>Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the Axa Research Fund has supported nearly 700 projects around the world conducted by researchers in 38 countries. To learn more, visit the site of the Axa Research Fund or follow on Twitter @AXAResearchFund.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>To better understand Ghanaian women in Manchester, England, we asked them to tell the “stories” of their everyday cooking through photographs.Hibbah Araba Osei-Kwasi, Lecturer, Loughborough UniversitySawudatu Zakariah-Akoto, Research fellow in nutrition, University of GhanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2166742023-12-06T13:43:37Z2023-12-06T13:43:37ZGhana’s media treats terrorism as a threat from outside – it overlooks violence at home<p>In 2022, 43% of all <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/global-terrorism-index-2023-key-findings-in-5-charts/">global terrorism deaths</a> occurred in the Sahel – the region south of the Sahara Desert and stretching east-west across the African continent. West Africa had recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/26/over-1800-terrorist-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2023-ecowas">1,800 terrorism attacks</a> as of June 2023, resulting in nearly 4,600 deaths.</p>
<p>The region has also seen a series of <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">coups</a>, making countries more vulnerable.</p>
<p>Coastal west African countries worry about terrorism in the Sahel spilling over into their territories. It is against this backdrop that discussions and commentary about terrorism are taking place in Ghana.</p>
<p>I have researched and analysed security and militancy in Africa for a decade. My most <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2023.2250142">recent research</a> examined how terrorism is viewed in Ghana in light of insecurity across the Sahel and the country’s reputation as an oasis of peace in the sub-region.</p>
<p>There has been <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526130921/9781526130921.xml">criticism</a> of the way terrorism is spoken of globally, due to its potential to be divisive and serve as justification for violence by security agencies and the abuse of citizens’ rights.</p>
<p>For this reason, my aim was to assess whether these global perceptions influenced views in Ghana. I also aimed to understand the security implications of the nature of the terrorism discourse.</p>
<p>I found the discourse to be contradictory, dangerous and simplistic. It lacked a coherent theme, except for repeating problematic narratives and platitudes.</p>
<p>One of these narratives was the mistaken idea that terrorism was foreign to Ghana, and now entering the country. Secondly, the discussion equated terrorism with violence involving jihadist groups. While jihadist forms of violence are present in the region, there are <a href="https://prezi.com/j5cptnaaxcsf/the-four-waves-of-terrorism-by-david-c-rapoport-2004/">other types of terrorism</a> too – including <a href="https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/state-terrorism-even-worse-than-the-sub-state-variety/">terrorism by states</a> and their agents.</p>
<h2>Analysing news articles</h2>
<p>I brought a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x">sceptical attitude</a> to the discussion of terrorism in Ghana by critically analysing the titles of 60 online news articles published between 2015 and 2022. </p>
<p>The titles were sampled from a Ghanaweb.com dossier captioned “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=661">Terror attack on Ghana</a>” and accessed between July and September 2022. Ghanaweb.com is the most widely used online news source in Ghana and has existed since the late 1990s.</p>
<p>The titles were selected using two criteria. The first was the use of threat and risk language. Here, I looked for titles that communicated space or place (for example, Sahel, Togo, Burkina Faso), vulnerability (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Porous-borders-fuelling-insecurity-as-Immigration-grapples-with-serious-logistical-constraints-627387">porous borders</a>”), pre-emption (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Terrorist-threat-Be-vigilant-don-t-be-scared-Christian-Council-1549604">be vigilant</a>”), othering (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Citizens-cautioned-against-hosting-strangers-1545251">strangers</a>”) and assurance (“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Don-t-panic-over-ISIS-infiltration-Irbard-Ibrahim-617645?gallery=1">don’t panic</a>”). </p>
<p>The other criterion was the assumed authority of the source. I selected titles that cited security officials, analysts with significant media presence, politicians and religious leaders.</p>
<p>The analysis revealed that the character of the discourse was lopsided and gave an incomplete picture of the state of security in Ghana. </p>
<h2>Ghana’s overlooked culture of violence</h2>
<p>The discourse overlooked Ghana’s endemic culture of violence, including acts by militia groups, political assassinations and police brutality.</p>
<p>Recently, several militia groups have been involved in violent events in Ghana, including election violence in 2019 that led to two fatalities and 18 injuries. A security analyst has named <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/security-analyst-names-24-violent-groups-in-ghana/">24 violent groups</a> in the country, with names like Kandahar Boys, Aluta Boys, Al Qaeda, Invincible Forces and Delta Forces.</p>
<p>On 16 January 2019, an investigative journalist was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47002878">shot dead</a> in front of his home in an alleged act of political assassination. </p>
<p>In 2020, a sitting MP and government minister fired gunshots during a voter registration exercise – an act <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/hawa-koomson-minister-fires-gun-at-registration-centre-4-arrested.html">she explained</a> was for her protection. In the same year, another MP threatened to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXJ0uzTZkEY">burn down</a> the house of a former president of Ghana.</p>
<p>There are many cases of violence by security agents, including the police <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/seven-shot-dead-by-police-not-armed-robbers.html">killing</a> of seven Muslim youths mistaken for armed robbers. </p>
<p>Ghana’s 2020 elections – its eighth since 1992 – recorded <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/9/five-killed-in-ghana-election-violence-as-accusations-continue">five deaths</a> and scores of injuries. </p>
<p>Some <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford-Gyampo/publication/331152559_Proportional_Representation_as_Solution_to_Winner-Takes-All_Politics/links/5c6815eb92851c1c9de5ab39/Proportional-Representation-as-Solution-to-Winner-Takes-All-Politics.pdf">scholars</a> argue that extra-legal uses of force and violence in Ghana are due to a culture of impunity resulting from a “systemic decapitation of the police by the political elite”.</p>
<h2>Blaming the Sahel</h2>
<p>Despite the above terrorising acts of violence, the terrorism discourse in Ghana creates the predominant impression that terrorism and political violence are now heading towards Ghana from the Sahel.</p>
<p>The fear of the coming terrorists has united “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Everybody-needs-to-be-involved-in-the-fight-against-terrorism-Security-analyst-751355">everybody</a>” in Ghana to protect the country. The list includes community vigilantes, civil society organisations, political parties, business organisations, churches and traditional leaders. The measures to safeguard Ghana include <a href="https://ghanaguardian.com/brief-mps-anti-terrorism-drill-ablakwa">counter-terrorism drills</a>, vigilance, border security, prophecies and prayers.</p>
<p>This collective national effort presents political violence from other countries in the region as if terror events do not exist within Ghana. Commentators say that terrorism is now heading towards Ghana, causing Ghanaians to panic and grow apprehensive. </p>
<p>Three examples show how the terrorism discourse is contradictory and simplistic – hence deceptive.</p>
<ol>
<li><p>“<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Accra-safe-but-Ghana-not-out-of-the-woods-ACP-Eklu-753641">Accra safe but Ghana not out of the woods – ACP Eklu</a>” and “<a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-ready-for-terrorist-attack-National-Security-ministry-661540">Government ready for terrorist attack – National Security ministry</a>”. These claims are contradictory. They mean Accra and Ghana are safe and unsafe simultaneously. </p></li>
<li><p>The “terrorists are in our communities, they are our neighbours, they are our siblings, they are our fathers, they are our mothers”, claims an <a href="https://www.facebook.com/adibsaani1/">analyst</a>. This claim is dangerous as it could create unnecessary social and communal tension.</p></li>
<li><p>Ghana is the only country bordering Burkina Faso that has not <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-risk-of-violent-extremism-and-terrorism-in-the-coastal-states-of-west-africa/">experienced a terrorist attack</a>. This claim is simplistic and it is only true if terrorism is defined to mean “jihadist” political violence.</p></li>
</ol>
<p>My conclusion is that any future acts of terrorism and political violence in Ghana will not be anything new. Shooting to kill during elections and firing a warning shot at a polling station are acts of terrorism. Police brutality, election violence and assassinations are also acts of political violence. </p>
<h2>Implications of the discourse</h2>
<p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the so-called global war on terror shape how we think about security, even when those views create dire consequences such as <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_15">Islamophobia and more violence</a>.</p>
<p>These lopsided narratives can alienate some communities and threaten social cohesion. Worse, they undermine Ghana’s responsibility to address insecurity within the country. </p>
<p>To avoid such problems, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.988452">some</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.976011">scholars</a> have argued that terrorism should be defined to suit specific contexts. I have made a <a href="https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.321567836600468">similar argument</a> elsewhere that terrorism is a process rather than an event. </p>
<p>This avoids the <a href="https://ombuds.umich.edu/article/danger-single-story">dangers of a single story</a> about terrorism and political violence in general. In particular, it creates a conducive environment for solutions that sustainably secure Ghana and its citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216674/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Muhammad Dan Suleiman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The terrorism discourse in Ghana shows how flawed views of the war on terror continue to shape thinking about security.Muhammad Dan Suleiman, Research associate, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164882023-11-30T12:20:37Z2023-11-30T12:20:37ZGhana’s shea industry is not taking care of the women behind its growth<p>Ghana’s shea industry has a rich history. Shea – <em>nkuto</em>, <em>karite</em>, <em>galam</em> in some west African languages – is deeply embedded in the culture and tradition of the country’s northern regions. It is often considered a woman’s crop – women pick the fruit and extract its “butter” – and has acquired the name “woman’s gold” because rural women earn income from its sale. </p>
<p>The crop is not just locally important, though. Shea butter, derived from the nuts of the shea tree, has become a global commodity. It is used widely as an ingredient in the confectionery, cosmetics and pharmaceutical industries.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.futuremarketinsights.com/reports/shea-butter-market">report</a> by Future Markets Insights values the global shea butter market at US$2.75 billion. It’s expected to reach US$5.58 billion in 2033. In Ghana, shea is one of the <a href="https://www.gepaghana.org/export-statistic/non-traditional-export-statistics-2022/">top</a> export commodities. According to the Ghana Export Promotion Authority, the export of shea butter was <a href="https://www.gepaghana.org/export-statistic/non-traditional-export-statistics-2022/">estimated</a> to be worth US$92.6 million (38,792 tonnes) in 2022 and kernels US$20 million (36,162 tonnes) in 2021. </p>
<p>In spite of shea’s global prominence, primary actors in this sector aren’t reaping the benefits from these exports. Rural women, who are the primary producers, are also the <a href="https://sun.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma998897791203436&context=L&vid=27US_INST:27US_V1&lang=en&search_scope=Combined&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=Everything&query=any,contains,shea%20butter&offset=0">lowest earners</a> in the shea value chain, with an annual income of about US$234 per capita.</p>
<p>The reasons behind this were the subject of my <a href="https://sun.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma998897791203436&context=L&vid=27US_INST:27US_V1&lang=en&search_scope=Combined&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=Everything&query=any,contains,shea%20butter&offset=0">PhD dissertation</a>. I discovered that the shea environment was poorly regulated and “empowerment” policies had actually enabled poverty. </p>
<h2>Importance of shea</h2>
<p>Economically, shea has gained international prominence stemming from its properties and value. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Specifications-of-whole-and-processed-shea-butters_tbl1_272022836">Stearin</a>, a creamy fat, is used industrially as a cocoa butter equivalent in chocolate production and confectionery. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Specifications-of-whole-and-processed-shea-butters_tbl1_272022836">Olein</a> is used to make cosmetics.</p>
<p>Socially, activities in the shea industry confer on women a level of respect and power that they do not possess in other economic sectors. It’s also an area where women pass on indigenous knowledge from one generation to another by observing and participating in shea activities.</p>
<p>Shea trees also <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1999-4907/12/12/1740">provide</a> carbon sinks and storage, improve soil fertility and promote better yields in agroforestry systems. </p>
<p>The shea industry is potentially a vehicle for economic development, environmental sustainability, gender empowerment and social progress.</p>
<h2>Shea policies</h2>
<p>These benefits are not all being realised, however.</p>
<p>Structural adjustment reforms were implemented in Ghana in the late 1980s and early 1990s to address economic woes. The shea export policy devised within that framework has been <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/market-reforms-and-the-state-the-case-of-shea-in-ghana/E0584FCC3B95AF6A2026A14F7840C4F8">identified</a> as a watershed moment for the problems inherent in the industry. The state’s involvement in the economy was reduced, and this created the conditions for continued gender inequality and exploitation. The plight of women in the shea industry was not helped, either, by long-held gender norms and cultural underpinnings in northern Ghana.</p>
<p>Successive governments and institutions over the years have sought to revamp the industry through regulatory policies and interventions. A chapter of my <a href="https://sun.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma998897791203436&context=L&vid=27US_INST:27US_V1&lang=en&search_scope=Combined&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=Everything&query=any,contains,shea%20butter&offset=0">PhD thesis</a> conducted in 2017 analysing the yearly budget statements from 2002 to 2017 noted the government’s knowledge of the persistent challenges of rural women. </p>
<p>These challenges relate to quality control and standardisation. Others are the lack of fair-trade practices, limited access to direct markets and resources, and challenges in land tenure and resource management. </p>
<p>Liberalising the shea market was expected to promote economic growth through reducing trade barriers and encouraging foreign investment. However, a downside was the breakdown of social contracts, leading to a “gold rush” mentality that prevails when there are no structures and regulations.</p>
<p>The 2008 <a href="http://gis4agricgh.net/POLICIES/GHANA'S%20TREE%20CROPS%20POLICY.pdf">Tree Crops Policy</a> was supposed to support agricultural growth, rural development and food security. A <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/COCOBOD-opens-Shea-office-amale-676131">Shea Unit</a> under the <a href="https://cocobod.gh/">Ghana Cocoa Board</a> was formed in 2011 to develop strategy for the sector. This unit was expected to become a Shea Development Board, responsible for introducing effective production, post-production and marketing initiatives. But it remains under the cocoa board. </p>
<p>The shea industry over time has been a niche where middlemen and women buy shea from rural women at low prices. Price negotiations are done on behalf of rural women on a mostly informal contractual basis. A chapter of my <a href="https://sun.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=alma998897791203436&context=L&vid=27US_INST:27US_V1&lang=en&search_scope=Combined&adaptor=Local%20Search%20Engine&tab=Everything&query=any,contains,shea%20butter&offset=0">PhD thesis</a> analysing the cost structure and assigning a value to the unpaid labour of rural women reported the profit margin of a shea nut picker as Gh₵ 8.82 (66 US cents) while a middleman earned Gh₵ 49.5 (US$4) on a 100kg bag of shea nuts. Similarly, a shea butter extractor earned Gh₵ 1.92 (8 cents) while a middleman earned Gh₵ 63.42 (US$6) on a 25kg box of shea butter.</p>
<p>This is aptly captured in an interview:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are always here and we see people troop in for them (shea butter). Because
we don’t understand the English language they always request for Madam. She
directs us to sell to them at a certain amount. We don’t know the buyers. They
are those bringing them, we will just be sitting, and they will tell you that they are to buy shea, there is a buyer in, we will not even see the person. She is going to negotiate with the buyer till they finish buying.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Shea business model</h2>
<p>Even with the best of intentions, desired policy objectives can’t always be reached. It’s necessary to analyse why.</p>
<p>Empowering rural women shea actors to make choices and to transform those choices to desired outcomes must start by recognising them as knowledge producers and involve them as knowledge contributors in policies. Ghana needs to bring all the players in the shea industry together to develop a business model. Primary producers, middlemen, sourcing companies and government should collaborate. </p>
<p>Drawing from <a href="https://www.scirp.org/%28S%28351jmbntvnsjt1aadkposzje%29%29/reference/referencespapers.aspx?referenceid=2591801">lessons</a> on the marketing of cocoa in Ghana, this model should focus on:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>regulation of ceiling and floor prices of shea nuts and butter</p></li>
<li><p>promoting community-based rural producer groups</p></li>
<li><p>capacity building</p></li>
<li><p>quality improvement</p></li>
<li><p>preserving the shea landscape. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>There is also a need for a government instituted shea body to enforce a regulatory framework on the licensing and registration of activities and the promotion of partnerships between actors in the shea supply chain. It’s very important for the various stakeholders to keep working together to minimise undesirable effects of proposed interventions.</p>
<p>Shea is indeed golden. But there are real people living with the impact of weak institutional structures and policy frameworks. The most affected are rural women.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Abiba Yayah was previously funded by the Trans-disciplinary Training for Resource Efficiency and Climate Change Adaptation in Africa II INTRA-ACP (TRECCAFRICA II). She is currently being funded for a Postdoctoral Fellowship by The Mark Grosjean Post-doctoral Fellow in Political Science at the University of Calgary.</span></em></p>Shea is a key economic crop for poor women in the northern parts of Ghana.Abiba Yayah, Postdoctoral Associate, University of CalgaryLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2185852023-11-29T10:00:24Z2023-11-29T10:00:24ZGhana wants to restrict imports on 22 products – an economist explains how, why and what else must be done<p><em>Ghana’s Ministry of Trade and Industry has <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1275386/licensing-regime-for-import-restrictions-archaic.html">tabled</a> in parliament a proposed ban or restrictions on imports of certain goods, including rice, sugar, poultry, fruit juices and animal intestines (tripe). The proposed legislation empowers the trade minister to issue licences to potential importers of goods. Critics of the policy say it will give too much power to the minister and create room for corruption. The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo spoke to development economist <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/adu-owusu-sarkodie-774216">Adu Owusu Sarkodie</a> about the policy.</em></p>
<h2>What are import restrictions?</h2>
<p>These refer to the various schemes, mechanisms and regulations that a government can impose to restrict or limit the importation of goods and services. They come in different forms.</p>
<p><strong>Tariffs</strong>: These are taxes imposed on imported goods and services. They can be specific taxes (a fixed amount per unit) or ad valorem (a percentage of the value) or both. </p>
<p><strong>Quotas</strong>: This means a direct restriction on the quantity of a particular good that can be imported at a specified period of time. It is enforced by issuing licences to individuals or firms.</p>
<p><strong>Embargos and sanctions</strong>: This involves a ban on the importation of a particular good. Importing a banned good is illegal. </p>
<p><strong>Quality standards and technical barriers</strong>: A country can set stringent requirements that imported goods must meet.</p>
<p><strong>Local content requirements</strong>: In terms of this regulation a specified fraction of a final good must be produced domestically, either in physical units or in value terms.</p>
<p>The choice of a particular form of import restriction depends on the geopolitical, economic and social characteristics of the country.</p>
<h2>What role does it play as an economic strategy?</h2>
<p><strong>Protection of domestic and infant industries</strong>: Restrictions such as tariffs and quotas can raise the prices of imported goods and make domestic goods more <a href="https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/economics/protectionism/">competitive</a>. This can stimulate local producers to produce more, grow and develop.</p>
<p><strong>Revenue to the government</strong>: Import restrictions such as tariffs are a source of revenue for the government. </p>
<p><strong>Balance of payments and trade deficits management</strong>: Import restrictions help in correcting balance of payment issues and can reduce <a href="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2018/08/do-import-tariffs-help-reduce-trade-deficits/">trade deficits</a>. This can help countries achieve <a href="https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2018/08/do-import-tariffs-help-reduce-trade-deficits/">economic gains</a> needed for long term growth and development.</p>
<p><strong>Environmental and health considerations</strong>: These restrictions can also help address <a href="https://idrc-crdi.ca/en/news/taxation-sugar-sweetened-beverages-win-win-ghanas-public-health-strategy#:%7E:text=The%20tax%20bill%20was%20approved,tea%2C%20sodas%20and%20energy%20drinks">environmental and health concerns</a>. </p>
<p>Excessive import restrictions can backfire, however, if foreign countries retaliate.</p>
<h2>Why is Ghana considering import restrictions?</h2>
<p>A number of reasons have led to this.</p>
<p><strong>Health concerns</strong>: There have been concerns about the <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Government-to-restrict-the-importation-of-rice-yemuadie-and-other-products-1884650">quality</a> of some of the imported food items and pharmaceuticals. </p>
<p><strong>Protection of domestic and infant industries</strong>: Cheap imports are leading to the collapse of <a href="https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/117982/1/Performan">domestic firms</a>. They are suffering from <a href="https://thebftonline.com/2023/11/27/govt-borrowing-risks-choking-private-sector/">high borrowing costs</a> and eroding capital as a result of inflation. The government can protect them by placing restrictions on some of these cheap imports. That will make them competitive, and save foreign exchange.</p>
<p><strong>Trade deficits and balance of payments support</strong>: These restrictions will reduce imports. All else being equal, they will improve the country’s trade balance and balance of payments. The government will have enough foreign exchange reserves and be able to finance its developmental agenda. </p>
<p><strong>Revenue to the government</strong>: One of the International Monetary Fund <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-14/imf-director-says-ghana-has-taken-enough-pain-to-unlock-aid?embedded-checkout=true">conditions</a> for financial assistance to Ghana is that government must increase tax revenues. It can do this through tariffs. </p>
<p><strong>Stabilise the currency</strong>: These restrictions will reduce the amount of <a href="https://theconversation.com/ghanas-cedi-is-under-stress-some-long-medium-and-short-term-solutions-178063">foreign currency used for imports</a>. This increases the forex supply and helps to stabilise the currency.</p>
<h2>Have other African countries done this?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.eac.int/">East African Community</a>, comprising Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan and the Democractic Republic of Congo, has numerous import restrictions. These countries have a common external tariff on the cost, insurance and freight value of imports. And they ban some goods such as some pharmaceuticals, narcotic drugs, firearms and ammunition, explosives, pornography, genetically modified products and plastic bags.</p>
<p>South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Eswatini and Namibia as part of the <a href="https://www.sacu.int/">Southern African Customs Union</a> also administer a common external tariff on imports from other countries. They ban or have quotas on some goods such as narcotics and habit-forming drugs.</p>
<p>Nigeria has its own <a href="https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/nigeria-prohibited-and-restricted-imports">restrictions</a> on some products. These include rice, pork, beef, live or dead birds including frozen poultry, cocoa butter, spaghetti and some pharmaceuticals.</p>
<h2>What is the way forward?</h2>
<p>In addition to the import restrictions, the following recommendations could assist Ghana.</p>
<p><strong>Diversification of the economy</strong>: Ghana must support industries beyond traditional sectors like agriculture and mining. Investing in technology, innovation and value-added production can contribute to a more resilient economy. </p>
<p><strong>Investment in education and skills development</strong>: This can involve investments in science, technology, engineering and mathematics education to meet the demands of a modern and diverse economy.</p>
<p><strong>Infrastructure development</strong>: Invest in critical infrastructure such as roads, ports and energy to reduce transportation costs, enhance connectivity and attract investment.</p>
<p><strong>Promotion of export-oriented industries</strong>: By focusing on products and services that have demand in the international market, Ghana can boost its export earnings and improve its trade balance.</p>
<p><strong>Trade facilitation and ease of doing business</strong>: Simplify trade processes and make it easier to do business. Streamlining customs procedures, reducing bureaucratic hurdles, and enhancing the overall business environment can attract investments and promote economic growth.</p>
<p><strong>Enhanced agricultural productivity</strong>: Invest in research and development. Promote sustainable farming practices, introduce modern technologies and improve access to markets for farmers.</p>
<p><strong>Corruption mitigation</strong>: An environment of good governance can attract investments and build confidence in the business community.</p>
<p><strong>Continuous policy review</strong>: Economic policies must adapt to changing circumstances. Flexibility and responsiveness to economic conditions are crucial for effective governance.</p>
<p>Inward looking or import substitution strategies have been adopted by many countries at the early stages of their development. The critical question is how much to produce to meet demand, and what quality. All stakeholders must ensure production to meet demand while ensuring quality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218585/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adu Owusu Sarkodie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The policy is the latest strategy to grow Ghana’s weak industrial base.Adu Owusu Sarkodie, Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of GhanaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2168382023-11-22T14:35:36Z2023-11-22T14:35:36ZPatients’ beliefs about illness matter: the case of elephantiasis in rural Ghana<p>Would you take medication for an illness you didn’t believe you had? Or if you disagreed with healthcare workers about the cause of your condition? </p>
<p>This is the dilemma of many people who live in areas of Ghana where a mosquito-borne disease called <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/lymphatic-filariasis#:%7E:text=Lymphatic%20filariasis%2C%20commonly%20known%20as,damage%20to%20the%20lymphatic%20system">lymphatic filariasis</a>, often referred to as elephantiasis, continues to spread. </p>
<p>Lymphatic filariasis, or LF as it is commonly known, is a neglected tropical disease which spreads through repeated bites by parasite-carrying mosquitoes. This infection results in the painful and debilitating swelling of legs, arms and genitals, and increases vulnerability to injury and secondary infections. </p>
<p>Although little known, lymphatic filariasis is a <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3246437">significant</a>
and <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(20)30323-5/fulltext">under-addressed</a> global cause of disability. According to the World Health Organization at least<a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/lymphatic-filariasis"> 51 million</a> people are infected with lymphatic filariasis. </p>
<p>The World Health Organization’s <a href="https://www.who.int/teams/control-of-neglected-tropical-diseases/lymphatic-filariasis/global-programme-to-eliminate-lymphatic-filariasis">Global Programme for Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis</a> has greatly reduced the burden of the disease through preventive mass drug campaigns, mosquito control, veterinary public health and sanitation and hygiene measures.</p>
<p>Despite this concerted effort, however, lymphatic filariasis continues to be endemic and require mass drug administration in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/inthealth/article/13/Supplement_1/S22/6043665">31</a> African countries. The challenges to eradicating it are not well understood, and may hinge on better understanding how people with this disease view their condition. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-hard-to-end-elephantiasis-a-debilitating-disease-spread-by-mosquitoes-166627">Why it's hard to end elephantiasis, a debilitating disease spread by mosquitoes</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Our research team brings together specialists in epidemiology, public health and human rights. In our recently published paper in <a href="https://journals.plos.org/globalpublichealth/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgph.0002476">PLOS Global Public Health</a> we take a different approach to the conventional medical focus that dominates research and interventions for this disease. </p>
<p>We examined the local perceptions and beliefs about the disease
and the personal experiences of those living with it in three rural communities in Ghana’s Ahanta West district. This coastal district in Ghana’s Western Region has a high rate of lymphatic filariasis infection and many people living with advanced stages of the disease. </p>
<p>Members of our research team had worked in this area for more than a decade, establishing the trust relationships that made this research possible.</p>
<p>Our findings may help provide insight into why lymphatic filariasis persists in certain settings and how best to tackle it.</p>
<h2>Cold, rain and curses</h2>
<p>We found that only <a href="https://journals.plos.org/globalpublichealth/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgph.0002476">18%</a> of respondents understood lymphatic filariasis as a disease. Fewer than 7% believed it to be a disease spread by mosquitoes. </p>
<p>Instead, people held a range of alternative beliefs attributing the condition to other sources, including spiritual causes (curses, witchcraft, evil spirits), cold or rainy weather, and other illnesses. In subsequent interviews, people described how, from their perspective, they encountered the disease. </p>
<p>One person explained, “When you are cold, then your leg gets swollen.” </p>
<p>Another noted, “There are some who just get jealous of and develop hatred for people for just walking and going about their normal duties and decide that they do not want this person or that person to progress, hence they buy the disease for them spiritually.” They added, “I strongly believe and have the conviction that someone bought mine for me spiritually.”</p>
<p>In contrast with these beliefs, which show very limited overlap with medical explanations, nearly half (<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6709921">45.8%</a>) of respondents reported receiving information about the disease from healthcare workers or drug campaigns. </p>
<p>These findings suggest we need to learn more about local beliefs in health and wellbeing in order to achieve more effective communication with patients. </p>
<p>Our research also demonstrates lymphatic filariasis is not only a medical condition, but also a social and economic one. </p>
<h2>Ashamed and stigmatised</h2>
<p>Almost <a href="https://journals.plos.org/globalpublichealth/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgph.0002476">80%</a> of respondents reported feeling ashamed or stigmatised by their condition. Some said it restricted their social lives and their willingness to go out in public. </p>
<p>Infection also limited the ability to earn a living. More than a third (<a href="https://journals.plos.org/globalpublichealth/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgph.0002476">36.2%</a>) said they could no longer work due to their condition. Many reported a need to depend on others for financial support. </p>
<p>Among those surveyed less than 3% reported that they were “doing well”. </p>
<p>These findings show an urgent need to address the unmet social, mental health and economic impacts of lymphatic filariasis.</p>
<h2>What needs to be done</h2>
<p>Drug campaigns are important but cannot be done in isolation. Existing research shows us that these <a href="https://academic.oup.com/inthealth/article/13/Supplement_1/S55/6043672">are more successful when offered in a broader context of care</a>. </p>
<p>Healthcare workers must be trained to avoid stigmatising patients. But eliminating stigma is not a simple task, nor can it be left to healthcare workers alone.</p>
<p>Further research is needed to better understand local beliefs about lymphatic filariasis, and to understand how stigma affects patients’ access to treatment and quality of life. This must include the strong links between the disease and poverty. </p>
<p>Lymphatic filariasis follows <a href="https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-IER-CSDH-08.1">the “social gradient”</a>. Those who are poorest are most likely to be affected. Factors associated with poverty increase the chances of being infected and of developing complications. These factors include poor quality housing, limited access to methods of prevention (mosquito nets, good quality footwear), difficulty getting medical care, living in remote rural communities, and working as subsistence farmers.</p>
<p>The disease also pushes poor people <a href="https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-021-10170-8">further into poverty</a> as it progresses.</p>
<p>As the number of people affected by it decreases, those who are left behind are more and more likely to be isolated, marginalised, stigmatised and impoverished. </p>
<p>As we argue in a <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003207672-15/examining-research-positionality-understanding-self-first-step-transnational-research-colleen-mcmillan-alexander-kwarteng-kristi-kenyon-mary-asirifi">recent book chapter</a>, these factors underscore the need for interdisciplinary research teams who are able to address lymphatic filariasis holistically. We need an approach that merges healthcare, health promotion, health systems, spiritual beliefs, social and cultural context, gender dynamics and economic impact. </p>
<p>We must put people with lymphatic filariasis – and their dignity – at the centre of research.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216838/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristi Heather Kenyon receives funding from the Canadian Institutes for Health Research.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexander Kwarteng receives funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Colleen McMillan receives funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary Asirifi works for MacEwan University. She receives funding from CIHR. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Regiane Garcia receives funding from Canadian Health Institutes Research</span></em></p>In rural Ghana, only 18% of patients believe elephantiasis is a disease. Some others think it is caused by curses or even rain. Only by understanding local beliefs can it be treated effectively.Kristi Heather Kenyon, Associate Professor, Human Rights, University of WinnipegAlexander Kwarteng, Senior Lecturer in Immunology of Infectious Diseases, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)Colleen McMillan, Scientific Co-Director and Associate Professor, University of WaterlooMary Asirifi, Assistant Professor, Department of Nursing Foundations, MacEwan UniversityRegiane Garcia, Research Associate, focus on health rights, laws and policies, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2175982023-11-21T15:13:18Z2023-11-21T15:13:18ZGhana: Akosombo Dam disaster reveals a history of negligence that continues to this day<p>Recent <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/akosombo-dam-spillage-evidence-climate-pressures-ghana-thecophq-9ceye/">heavy downpours </a>in the Lower Volta area of Ghana led to the <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/akosombo-dam-spillage-we-didnt-sleep-on-duty-vra-absolves-itself-of-blame/">worst flooding</a> in the region’s history. The flooding was caused by a <a href="https://www.vra.com/media/2023/Controlled-Spillage-from-the-Akosombo-Dam-and-Kpong-Dam.php">spillage</a> (a deliberate release of water) from the Akosombo Dam, the country’s biggest hydroelectric dam. Over <a href="https://www.ghanaiantimes.com.gh/akosombo-spillage-26000-residents-displaced-by-floods-8000-victims-rescued-inter-ministerial-cttee-tours-affected-areas/">26,000 people</a> were displaced. No deaths have been officially announced. The last recorded spillage was in 2010.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.vra.com/about_us/profile.php">Volta River Authority</a>, the state agency that manages the Akosombo Dam, opened the flood gates to release pressure on the dam after unusually high rainfall. By September, Volta Lake, the vast, 400km-long reservoir behind Akosombo Dam, had been filled to capacity. A month after the spillage started, communities along the Volta River were severely affected by the excess water. </p>
<p>Local residents fled to safety, leaving behind most of their belongings. Farms were submerged and crops destroyed. The inventory of stores and businesses in low-lying areas suffered extensive damage. </p>
<p>The director of the disaster management organisation was <a href="https://gna.org.gh/2023/10/flood-in-most-districts-not-due-to-vra-spillage-nadmo/">quoted</a> as saying that the floods were caused by heavy rains in the Volta catchment basin. Climate change and global warming, he explained, were responsible for all the water coming down the Volta. </p>
<p>Other factors are relevant too to understand this crisis. Based on my <a href="https://iupress.org/9780253059956/a-dam-for-africa/">knowledge of the area</a> as a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=FY41aRUAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">historian</a> who has studied the Akosombo Dam and its impact on the lives of the people in the Lower Volta, I would attribute the extent of the calamity to two additional factors. </p>
<p>One is the ecological and economic changes brought by the construction of the Akosombo Dam. The areas affected by the flooding have been populated by farmers who settled there after they could no longer farm and fish elsewhere in the Lower Volta once the dam was built. The second is the failings of the Volta River Authority which manages the dam.</p>
<h2>The history</h2>
<p>The Lower Volta lies below the country’s two large hydroelectric dams, Akosombo, <a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/16321/">completed</a> in 1965, and <a href="https://dbpedia.org/page/Kpong_Dam">Kpong</a>, completed in 1982.</p>
<p>The Volta River Project was Ghana’s largest development project. It included Akosombo Dam and an aluminum smelter as the dam’s main beneficiary. Even in the 1950s the planners of the project recognised that damming the Volta would have severe economic effects on the Lower Volta. There was also recognition that the project would lead to major ecological changes.</p>
<p>In its <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Volta_River_Project_Engineering_repo.html?id=cJSGAAAAIAAJ">1956 report</a>, the preparatory commission, which closely studied the Volta River Project, detailed the changes that were to come. </p>
<p>The first was that the construction of the dam would put an end to the ecological cycle that had nourished the Lower Volta for centuries. The area was accustomed to substantial annual floods that filled hundreds of small creeks, fertilised agricultural lands and created large fisheries. The cycle of annual floods enabled a prosperous agricultural society with farming, fishing and clam picking (which was largely done by women.)</p>
<p>During the dry season, men migrated upstream to fish, hunt, farm and build boats. </p>
<p>Once Akosombo was built, the annual floods stopped. The dam created a regulated river downstream.</p>
<p>The preparatory commission warned about the radical changes the dam would bring downstream. But policymakers and Ghana’s governments ignored them. </p>
<p>The impact on communities of the Lower Volta has been examined by researcher <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/dzodzi-tsikata-365479">Dzodzi Tsikata</a> in her study <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Living-Shadow-Large-Dams-Communities/dp/9004141448">Living in the Shadow of the Large Dams</a>. In response to the dam being built many people migrated upstream and formed the fishing communities that now populate the shores of Volta Lake. Those who stayed and continued farming had to adapt their agricultural practices by planting in low-lying areas closer to the Volta River. </p>
<p>Subsequently, settlements expanded into the former flood plains along the river. These areas have now been inundated by the flooding caused by the spillage at Akosombo. </p>
<h2>Woeful response</h2>
<p>The current flooding raises the question of who is responsible and who must compensate those who have been affected. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://ghanalegal.com/laws_subdomain/acts/id/72/volta-river-development-act/">1961 Volta River Development Act (Act 46)</a>, the Volta River Authority has a statutory responsibility to prevent Volta Lake from rising to a height of 85.3 metres above sea level and cresting the dam. </p>
<p>In addition, the Volta River Authority should prevent the “flow of water past the dam” from causing “flooding downstream from dam above the levels which were normal” prior to the construction of Akosombo. </p>
<p>Finally, the authority has to “take reasonable measures to give warning of possible flooding from the lake or from the River Volta downstream from the dam.” </p>
<p>The Volta River Authority preserved the integrity of the Akosombo Dam by opening the floodgates and spilling the lake’s excess water. But it failed in its other tasks. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>It did not maintain an unoccupied flood zone which could absorb the excess water. </p></li>
<li><p>It failed to give people a timely warning to evacuate. The managers of the dam organised a simulation exercise for surrounding communities in May 2023.</p></li>
<li><p>It did not help people in the flood zones to move out of danger with their belongings.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>In my view, the Volta River Authority, and by extension the Ghanaian state, have a moral obligation to compensate the people affected by the spillage and the subsequent floods. </p>
<p>Although the authority has income through the sale of electricity, it <a href="https://www.vra.com/resources/annual_reports/2022%20VRA%20Group%20Audited%20Annual%20Reports%20and%20Financial%20Statements.pdf">operated at a loss</a> in 2022, due to increased administrative expenses triggered by inflation. The Ghanaian state is also <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/5/lack-of-safety-nets-hurt-ghanas-most-vulnerable-as-economic-woes-deepen">facing deficits</a>. So there is little certainty about whether the residents of the Lower Volta will receive compensation. </p>
<p>One would hope that the Volta River Authority and the Ghanaian state would finally address some of the historical injustice experienced by the communities in the Lower Volta since the early 1960s.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217598/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephan Miescher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Communities along the bank of the dam have been victims of injustice since the early 1960s.Stephan Miescher, Professor of History, University of California, Santa BarbaraLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2164502023-11-15T14:30:06Z2023-11-15T14:30:06ZHealth risks at home: a study in six African countries shows how healthy housing saves children’s lives<p>Housing is a critical social determinant of health. The World Health Organization (WHO) <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=22">defines healthy housing</a> as a shelter that supports physical, mental and social wellbeing. </p>
<p>The WHO has developed <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=1">guidelines</a> outlining the attributes of healthy housing. These include structural soundness, as well as access to a local community that enables social interactions. Healthy housing protects inhabitants from the effects of disasters, pollution, waste and extreme heat or cold. It provides a feeling of home, including a sense of belonging, security and privacy. </p>
<p>Health risks in the home environment are important to think about because of the amount of time people spend there. In countries where unemployment levels are high or where most work is home based, people spend <a href="https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/276001/9789241550376-eng.pdf?sequence=23">more than 70% of their time indoors</a>. Children especially spend a large amount of time at home, which exposes them to any health risks in the home environment.</p>
<p>We are researchers from the African Population and Health Research Center with an interest in urbanisation and population dynamics. We recently set out to <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5">study the link between housing and children’s health</a>. We found that healthy housing generally lowered the chances of children falling ill with three diseases that we tracked: diarrhoea, acute respiratory illnesses and fever. </p>
<p>The impacts of housing quality extend beyond health and can have significant implications for education and subsequent economic outcomes, particularly for children. </p>
<h2>The research</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-rapid-urbanization-in-africa-reduce-poverty-causes-opportunities-and-policy-recommendations/">Rapid urbanisation and population growth</a> in Africa have pushed many people into informal settlements. Sub-Saharan Africa has <a href="https://blogs.afdb.org/fr/inclusive-growth/urbanization-africa-191">65%</a> of the world’s slum dwellers. This population generally lives in poor housing that lacks access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene services. The structures are overcrowded. They tend to have leaking roofs and damp walls, floors and foundations. They may also have indoor pollution, compromising the health of millions of people.</p>
<p>We set out to <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5">evaluate</a> the relationship between healthy housing and the likelihood of children falling sick across six African countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.</p>
<p>We studied the incidence of diarrhoea, acute respiratory illness and fever among children under the age of five. These three conditions can have severe consequences for child health and wellbeing. </p>
<p>Diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections are <a href="https://academic.oup.com/inthealth/advance-article/doi/10.1093/inthealth/ihad046/7210800">leading causes</a> of disease and deaths in children aged below five worldwide. Diarrhoea accounted for <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/diarrhoeal-disease/">9%</a> of all deaths among children under five in 2019. Acute respiratory illnesses caused about <a href="https://www.who.int/data/gho/indicator-metadata-registry/imr-details/3147">20%</a> of deaths among children in this age group. The burden of under-five deaths linked to diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses like pneumonia is <a href="https://childmortality.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/UN-IGME-Child-Mortality-Report-2022.pdf#page=4">higher</a> for children in developing countries than those in developed regions. </p>
<p>We selected the six countries in our study because they provided data on the three diseases we tracked. They also allow for a comparative analysis across African countries. Our study used the latest available demographic and health survey data at the time of our research: Burkina Faso (2010), Cameroon (2011), Ghana (2014), Kenya (2014), Nigeria (2018) and South Africa (2016). We sampled data on 91,096 children aged under five.</p>
<h2>The findings</h2>
<p>Our study found that healthy housing was <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5/tables/2">generally associated with reduced odds</a> of contracting the three illnesses we considered: diarrhoea, acute respiratory illness and fever. Our definition of healthy housing considered several attributes, including sanitation, drinking water sources and housing characteristics. </p>
<p>Homes that protect occupants from the elements, ensure access to adequate space and reduce overcrowding help keep children healthy. Homes that use cleaner cooking and lighting fuels reduce household air pollution, which leads to lower chances of respiratory infections.</p>
<p>Children living in healthy housing had fewer incidences of fever in all countries apart from South Africa. Here, children living in the healthiest homes are twice as likely to have fever than those living in unhealthy homes.</p>
<p>Fever is an indication of an underlying infection that could be viral or bacterial. Such infections are common in South Africa. In addition, the main causes of fevers among children under five are <a href="https://www.hindawi.com/journals/grp/2023/1906782/">diarrhoea and acute respiratory illnesses</a>. Among the countries included in the analysis, South Africa had the highest proportion of young mothers (aged below 25) and never-married mothers. This increases the chances that these mothers are engaged in work outside the home, leading to the early introduction of complementary feeding. This has been shown to increase the incidence of diarrhoea. These results call for addressing the causes of diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses by, for instance, ensuring South African homes have access to clean drinking water, adequate sanitation and clean energy for cooking.</p>
<p>While healthy housing is crucial, it’s not the sole determinant of a child’s health. Other factors, such as a sense of community, environmental exposure, parental education, income levels, healthcare access, and maternal and child-level factors <a href="https://bmcpediatr.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12887-023-03992-5/tables/3">also contribute to the overall health status of children</a>. For instance, we found that children in Burkina Faso who were not breastfed had higher chances of getting diarrhoea than those who were breastfed despite the condition of their housing. This tracks with studies that have documented that breastfeeding has a <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fped.2023.1086999">protective role</a> over gastrointestinal and respiratory tract infections among children. </p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>From our findings, parents can improve the wellbeing of their children by implementing simple strategies. This includes ensuring they use clean energy for cooking to reduce indoor air pollution and consequently reduce the incidence of acute respiratory illnesses. Similarly, using clean drinking water, hand washing and improving sanitation can help reduce cases of diarrhoea. </p>
<p>Bold but nuanced policy and programme government-level interventions can also help address the incidence of diseases affecting children under five in Africa. This requires efforts that go beyond just addressing the issue of housing to working with complementary sectors, like health, urban planning, environment and education.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/216450/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hellen Gitau received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Blessing Mberu received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kanyiva Muindi received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Samuel Iddi received funding from Wellcome Trust for this Complex Urban System for Sustainability and Health study.</span></em></p>The impact of housing quality extends beyond health to education and subsequent economic outcomes, particularly for children.Hellen Gitau, Research officer, African Population and Health Research CenterBlessing Mberu, Head of Urbanisation and Wellbeing, African Population and Health Research Center, African Population and Health Research CenterKanyiva Muindi, Associate Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterSamuel Iddi, Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research CenterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.