tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/kobane-12726/articlesKobanê – The Conversation2015-08-03T01:28:34Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/454882015-08-03T01:28:34Z2015-08-03T01:28:34ZTurkey strikes back: the political ploy behind attacking both Kurdish and Islamic State forces<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/90383/original/image-20150731-18709-134979i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The use of Incirlik airbase by Turkish warplanes launching attacks across the border and its re-opening to the US Airforce reflect the domestic and international goals of Turkey's campaign. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/usairforce/5574429597/in/photolist-9uApH8-7kv283-gnehHS-gnex1a-9uCEFy-qdh4xo-gneVvi-h9Rojj-a2Gaha-a2K5Ad-a2K7mN-a2G9gM-a2K3Lf-a2GbE6-a2GebB-a2Gdqe-a2Gci6-9fHfqB-gnd8iH-odnnt1-odnFfc-h9SDfi-h9Rn2k-pejaGK-p81B5p-oNbhqm-p5pa6x-pei4Vi-peiVBw-peimkd-p8f8xJ-p5Cri7-gnd8GZ-a3ihMJ-9dRzfW-a3ihwm-q17YWE-psdJNV-q1fiPB-oDLU2M-oDLTZc-oWg4ng-oWg4ja-dPt3e6-8vM8va-cVcK59-6nuF2p-6nya65-6nuEqz-6nyG9f">FlickrUS Airforce</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Stemming from a presumed Islamic State (IS) <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33615239">suicide bombing</a> killing 32 leftist Kurdish university students in Suruc and the <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/kurdish-group-claims-revenge-murder-turkish-police-150722132945249.html">killing of several Turkish policeman</a> claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Turkey has begun <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-joining-islamic-state-offensive-so-why-is-it-targeting-the-kurds-45199">bombarding</a> both IS forces in Syria and PKK bases located in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq. </p>
<p>But what has provoked this punishing campaign? It’s a sharp reversal of policy given the considerable political capital that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has expended in: a) attempting to remain above the fray in Syria; and b) the peace process with the PKK, which angered many Turkish nationalists.</p>
<p>Although Turkey’s actions can be viewed on multiple levels, one could do worse than invoke Clausewitz’s maxim:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The most obvious answer is that this is a security issue. Both IS and the PKK have attacked Turkish citizens and members of the security services so it is unsurprising that the Turkish government has retaliated. Like all governments, its priority is to protect its citizens.</p>
<h2>Strong leadership as an election pitch</h2>
<p>However, a number of other considerations are at play. A more cynical interpretation would look to Turkey’s domestic politics. Since June’s elections, when the AKP <a href="http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2015/06/07/turkeys-ruling-akp-loses-majority">failed to win an outright majority</a> for the first time in 13 years, Turkish political parties have been unable to form a coalition government. This means the possibility of fresh elections in the near future is very real.</p>
<p>By embarking on a course of armed conflict, the AKP may be positioning itself with an eye to elections by invoking a garrison nationalism. The AKP will claim that now, more than ever, Turkey needs a strong majority government. Armed conflict is a tried and tested method to persuade nationalists and conservatives alike to “circle the wagons” and support the incumbent power.</p>
<p>At the last elections, the AKP also lost some of its traditional base, conservative Kurds, to the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP). The HDP won 80 seats, a gain of 51, as the AKP was left 18 seats short of a majority. This was largely due to anger over the government’s inaction during the siege of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane.</p>
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<p>Many Kurds believe that the Turkish government is in cahoots with IS. Opposition figures have gone so far as to label government officials <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkey-syria-kobane-suruc-bombing-boomerang-hits-volunteers.html">“accomplices”</a> to the Suruc bombing. </p>
<p>The specific targeting of Kurdish university students planning a reconstruction trip to Kobane is noteworthy for several reasons. </p>
<p>First, this recalled both the siege of the town and the subsequent IS suicide mission there in June, which <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/kurdish-forces-have-besieged-isis-fighters-in-kobani-say-activists">massacred more than 150</a>.</p>
<p>Second, IS has <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/christian-foreign-fighters-deserting-kurdish-ypg-syria-because-theyre-damned-reds-1976493133">denounced</a> the PKK and its affiliates in Syria as “atheists”. This highlights the diametrically opposed visions that contending movements have for the future of the region.</p>
<p>Third, the bombing may have been intended to sow distrust and create a further rift between Turkish Kurds and the government. By responding strongly, the Turkish government is attempting to dispel the theory that it has been collaborating with IS, and thereby win back the conservative Kurd vote. The notionally progressive agenda of the newly elected HDP, for instance on LGBT rights, does not necessarily sit well with conservative Kurds.</p>
<p>The AKP similarly lost votes to the far right because Turkish nationalists were angry about the peace process with the PKK inaugurated by President Recep Erdogan in 2013. As such, the Turkish government’s attacks on the PKK can be viewed as a similar ploy to win back the nationalist vote.</p>
<p>The attacks will also wedge the pro-Kurdish HDP, which ran on a Turkey-wide agenda to win over the non-Kurdish progressive protest vote against Erdogan’s plans to centralise power with the presidency. In short, the HDP will be asked:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Are you pro-Turkey or pro-PKK?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As a result, the HDP could lose non-Kurdish votes in particular and fall back below the 10% threshold required for representation in parliament. Should this happen, the AKP will be the main beneficiary under Turkey’s system of proportional representation as it is still by far the highest-polling party.</p>
<h2>Exploiting Kurdish divisions</h2>
<p>It is also worth noting that the PKK is not all that popular with many Kurds, especially conservatives. They see the PKK as rigid doctrinaire Marxists and atheists. </p>
<p>Turkish actions <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-opens-up-old-wounds-with-a-new-campaign-against-the-pkk-45397">against the PKK</a>, in addition, afford the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq a variety of opportunities. The turmoil allows the KRG to capitalise on the situation in its ongoing turf war with the PKK. </p>
<p>The KRG has accused the PKK of encroaching on its territory and there has been notable tension <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_tension-between-pkk-and-krg-escalates-due-to-strategic-value-of-sinjar_378588.html">over the city of Sinjar</a>. KRG president Masoud Barzani has also cleverly moved to <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/260720155">position himself</a> as peacemaker between Turkey and the PKK to enhance his prestige within both Turkey and the wider Kurdish national movement.</p>
<h2>Mending relations with the US and NATO</h2>
<p>Finally, Turkey has been welcomed <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-turkey-cooperation-on-isis-is-bad-news-for-kurds-45220">back into the US and NATO fold</a> following a year of tension arising from the Turkish government’s perceived inaction on IS. </p>
<p>The US-Turkish deal allowing the US to use the Turkish airbase at Incirlik not only cements Washington’s support of Ankara’s security concerns, but also fulfils Turkey’s long-held desire to create a buffer, or “safe”, zone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-us-turkey-plan-amounts-to-a-safe-zone-in-northwest-syria/2015/07/26/0a533345-ff2e-4b40-858a-c1b36541e156_story.html">in Syria</a>.</p>
<p>Extending west of the Euphrates to Aleppo province, such a zone will, in turn, prevent the cantons of Syrian Kurdistan from uniting. That is a scenario that the Turkish government views as a potential existential threat to the Turkish state. </p>
<p>Presumably establishing this safe zone will also help stem the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-urgently-needs-to-integrate-its-syrian-refugees-35984">flow of Syrian refugees to Turkey</a>, which already accommodates more than 1.5 million.</p>
<p>Blowback from both IS and the PKK is possible, but if and when this occurs such reprisals will be used to validate the Turkish government’s nationalist/security-orientated agenda. In purely political terms (as opposed to ethical considerations and potential death tolls), the Turkish government has deftly taken the tragedy at Suruc and translated it into both domestic and international political gains.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/45488/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tristan Dunning does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What prompted Turkey’s punishing campaign against both Islamic State and Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria? The explanation for this sharp reversal of policy may lie in calculations for fresh elections.Tristan Dunning, Honorary Research Fellow, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/439642015-06-27T16:30:12Z2015-06-27T16:30:12ZDay of terror reminds us that extremism must be a problem shared<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/86616/original/image-20150627-1431-xy3ig8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> </figcaption></figure><p>Nearly 100 people are dead and many more injured after three <a href="https://theconversation.com/terror-in-tunisia-tourist-deaths-on-the-beaches-of-sousse-will-kick-start-a-crisis-43957">terrorist attacks that unfolded within hours of each other</a> on June 26. Among the victims were Shi'a worshippers at the Imam Sadiq Mosque in <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-islamic-state-attacked-a-kuwait-mosque-during-ramadan-43973">Kuwait</a>, tourists at a beach resort in <a href="https://theconversation.com/terror-in-tunisia-tourist-deaths-on-the-beaches-of-sousse-will-kick-start-a-crisis-43957">Tunisia</a> and employees at a gas plant in [Lyon](<a href="https://theconversation.com/shoestring-surveillance-and-a-shattered-social-model-latest-france-attack-puts-hollande-in-a-bind-43950">http://www.voanews.com/content/terror-attack-france-gas-factory/2838039.html</a>, France. </p>
<p>The attacks coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which started on June 18, and the anniversary of the establishment of Islamic State’s caliphate, which was proclaimed on June 29 2014 – the first day of Ramadan that year.</p>
<p>While there is <a href="http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/us-says-tunisia-france-and-kuwait-terror-attacks-not-coordinated/ar-AAcc4ra">no evidence</a> that the attacks were closely coordinated, Islamic State has <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/26/africa/tunisia-terror-attack/index.html">claimed responsibility</a> for those in Kuwait and Tunisia. The third, in France, appeared to have been inspired by the fundamentalist group, not least because an IS <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/473e1866-1be5-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.html#axzz3eEzTxIKp">flag</a> was found near the body of the man who died.</p>
<p>They exemplify the two categories of terrorism connected to IS and al-Qaeda – the increasingly rival, main international terrorist franchises of our age. </p>
<p>One is the so-called “lone-wolf” attack, carried out predominantly in Western countries. There is a recent <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33288542">history</a> of such attacks in France, including the killings at the offices of Charlie Hebdo. But lone-wolf attacks have also occurred elsewhere – the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/boston-marathon-bombing/">Boston Marathon bombing</a> in 2013, the shooting at an exhibition in <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f90ea896-f316-11e4-b98f-00144feab7de.html#axzz3eEzTxIKp">Garland, Texas</a> in 2015, the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/29/drummer-lee-rigby-woolwich-postmortem">murder of Lee Rigby</a> in the UK in 2013, and the hostage crisis at a <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sydney-hostages-police-raid-downtown-cafe/">Sydney cafe</a> in 2014 also fall into this category.</p>
<p>The other type are attacks carried out by so-called affiliated groups or local branches. These predominantly take place across the Middle East and North Africa. They are variably aimed at Western targets, Shi'a communities, or local governments. Examples include the attack on an <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/16/world/africa/algeria-attack/index.html">Algerian gas field</a> in 2013, the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24191606">Westgate Shopping Mall</a> attack in Kenya in 2013, and the bombing of an African Union military base in Somalia by <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/suicide-bomber-attacks-african-union-base-somalia/2837996.html">al-Shabaab</a> on the same day as the killings in Tunisia, France and Kuwait.</p>
<h2>Rival groups</h2>
<p>As the terror unfolded across Africa, Asia, and Europe, Islamic State forces re-entered <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/isil-24-hour-killing-rampage-kobane-150626144824173.html">Kobane</a> at the Syrian-Turkish border, massacring more than 100 civilians before being forced to retreat by Syrian Kurdish fighters a day later.</p>
<p>A US-led coalition carries out <a href="http://www.centcom.mil/en/news/articles/june-26-military-airstrikes-continue-against-isil-terrorists-in-syria-and-i">airstrikes</a> on an almost daily basis in the area and an unlikely alliance of Iraqi government troops, Iran-backed Shi'a militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, and a range of insurgent groups and government loyalists in Syria are fighting the extremists on the ground. Neither, though, has managed to push Islamic State back territorially or significantly degraded its capabilities. </p>
<p>Al-Qaeda continues to operate mostly through affiliate groups, such as al-Shabaab, AQAP, AQIM, al-Nusrah and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. But it has generally seen its claim to leadership in the global jihad weakened. This is both as a result of counter-terrorism measures, including, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/drones">drone strikes</a> and because of the rising appeal of IS. </p>
<p>This appeal, in part facilitated by a sophisticated <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/isil-wages-skilled-social-media-war/1939505.html">social media campaign</a>, has enabled Islamic State to attract <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-onley/why-foreign-fighters-are-_b_5953066.html">followers</a> from abroad and locally. It has created its own branches outside areas it controls, which have carried out attacks, for example in <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/11485080/Dozens-killed-in-Yemen-Shia-mosque-bombings.html">Yemen</a> and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/11186153/Libya-has-become-the-latest-Isil-conquest.html">Libya</a>. But it has also proved adept at inspiring lone-wolf attacks. </p>
<h2>One global problem</h2>
<p>While it is important to note differences, and rivalries, between al-Qaeda and Islamic State, it is equally important to consider the cumulative nature of the threat that their activities pose locally, regionally and globally.</p>
<p>Terrorist attacks increased by <a href="http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239403.htm">35%</a> between 2013 and 2014, and fatalities by 81%. By far the largest number of these attacks and fatalities were caused by Islamic State and two al-Qaeda affiliates, the Taliban and al-Shabaab. The fourth most deadly terror group was Nigeria-based Boko Haram, and the only non-Islamist terror group in the top-five were India’s Maoists.</p>
<p>While there was an increase in activity by the Taliban and al-Shabaab, the surge by Islamic State was of a different magnitude: its total attacks rose from 429 in 2013 to 1,083 in 2014, resulting fatalities increased from 1,752 to 6,286. </p>
<p>One obvious conclusion from all this is that current strategies to counter the threat from Islamist terror groups are simply not working.</p>
<p>These outrages may have been striking in the sense that they occurred simultaneously across Tunisia, Kuwait, France, Somalia, and Syria, but they are, more worryingly, part of a broader trend.</p>
<p>We are witnessing more attacks that occur across more countries and kill more people (and, importantly, more Muslims than non-Muslims). In that sense, the terrorism espoused by the likes of Islamic State, al-Qaeda and Boko Haram and grounded in their extremist interpretation of Islam is a truly global problem that requires a global response. It is pointless for world leaders to issue shared statements of condemnation while continuing to pursue otherwise nationally-centred responses to the problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/43964/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. He is a past recipient of grants from the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme and the EU's Jean Monnet Programme.</span></em></p>Attacks in France, Kuwait and Tunisia come against a backdrop of increasing extremist violence across the world.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/366192015-01-23T14:09:06Z2015-01-23T14:09:06ZWhy the fight against Islamic State is not the success we’re told it is<p>Ministers from 21 countries <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/isils-advance-has-been-halted-kerry-tells-coalition">gathered in London on January 22</a> to discuss the fight against <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/islamic-state">Islamic State</a> (IS). They had their photo opportunity and issued their statements. US secretary of state, John Kerry, told them that <a href="http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/190376">almost 6,000</a> jihadists had been killed, and almost 700 square kilometres of Iraqi territory retaken.</p>
<p>But at the end of the day, all of this had precious little to do with the issue of how to confront IS’s political, military, and social expansion.</p>
<p>None of the officials from the 21 countries would state the obvious: without a determined strategy to challenge IS on the ground as well as from the air in Syria and in Iraq, the best that can be achieved is “containment” of the jihadists. </p>
<p>And none acknowledged that, without a long-term approach to deal with deep-set political grievances in both countries, IS will continue to appeal to – and recruit – many more people.</p>
<h2>Credit where it’s due</h2>
<p>The US-led aerial intervention in Iraq, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/air-strikes-could-keep-hope-alive-for-syria-and-middle-east-17660">began</a> in August 2014, has certainly checked IS’s advance. It bolstered Kurdish forces as IS neared the Iraqi Kurdistan capital of Erbil; it has helped those same forces retake some key positions, such as the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/18/iraqi-kurdish-forces-recapture-mosul-dam-isis">Mosul Dam</a>, and to <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/kurds-retake-ground-from-isil-iraq-20141218171223624837.html">recapture</a> some areas of north-west Iraq.</p>
<p>However, the Iraqi military’s success in the east, west, and south after its <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2014/6/28/how-did-iraq-s-armycollapsesoquickly.html">near-collapse</a> in summer 2014 owes more to Iranian support and the rise of Shia militias than to any American efforts. </p>
<p>At best, Washington has tacitly accepted that Baghdad’s security depends more on Tehran and the Shia groups than on US strategy. Kerry’s boast about the thousands of IS bodies – almost half of the estimated jihadist force – was a simple attempt to kick dust over this reality. Indeed, even before the statement was made, former US defense secretary, Chuck Hagel, was <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/22/politics/us-officials-say-6000-isis-fighters-killed-in-battles/">trying to temper it</a>: “I was in a war [in Vietnam] where we did body counts and we lost that one.”</p>
<p>Nor did Kerry admit that his proclamation had little to do with the prospects of long-term stability in Iraq. There is still no sign of a truly stable government that could deal with rampant <a href="http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iraq-corruption-impunity-goes-unpunished.html">corruption</a> and the Sunni minority’s suspicions of a Shia-led system. And, if anything, the rise of the anti-IS militias Kerry credits the US with helping – themselves accused of perpetrating abuses against the population – is likely only to add to the real challenge.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the situation in Syria is even more fraught.</p>
<h2>Grasp the nettle</h2>
<p>Kerry could brag that US-led bombing has helped the Kurdish town of Kobanê, near Syria’s border with Turkey, hold out against three months of IS attacks. But at the same time, IS has expanded its hold on territory in much of northern and eastern Syria, taking on both the Assad regime and Syrian opposition forces. It is still secure in its Syrian centre, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/raqqa-isis-capital-crucifixions-civilians-suffer-jihadis-red-bull">Raqqa</a>, the largest city outside the Damascus regime’s control; it has established a local government and economy, and from that base it now controls most of Syria’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/-sp-islamic-state-oil-empire-iraq-isis">oil</a> and <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/11/03/mideast-crisis-homs-idINKBN0IN0ET20141103">gas</a> fields.</p>
<p>The blunt reality is that with the exception of Kobanê, there can be no effective campaign against the IS without the <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/12/syria-special-proposal-crisis-safe-havens-internal-containment/">support of a local ground force</a>. </p>
<p>But the Obama administration has stopped short of giving that support. Aside from air strikes, it has done little more but drip-feed limited supplies to a handful of “moderate” insurgents, refusing to take essential measures even after the Assad regime’s chemical weapons attacks of August 2013 (Obama’s initial “<a href="https://theconversation.com/syrias-chemical-weapons-have-become-a-smokescreen-amid-wider-bloody-conflict-33998">red line</a>”).</p>
<p>Instead of grasping the nettle, Washington <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/26/obama-seeking-500m-training-moderate-syrian-rebels">authorised US$500m</a> to fund a token program to train and equip 5,000 moderate fighters to face IS on the ground. The training will not begin until late March 2015 at the earliest, and the first batch of fighters will not be ready for the battlefield before the end of the year.</p>
<p>Indeed, the biggest recent shift in the US’s Syria policy has more to do with the Assad regime than IS: Kerry has now at last <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2015/01/syria-daily-russias-peace-proposal-failed-us-government-embraces-assads-stay-power/">reneged</a> on America’s long-held position that Assad must eventually give up power to a transitional government. </p>
<p>With that retraction, the dim prospect of any allied ground effort – unless the US decides to ally with the regime’s forces – has all but vanished.</p>
<h2>The war at home</h2>
<p>Meanwhile, instead of confronting the difficulties in Iraq and Syria without reservation, the Euro-American allies are fixating on the problem of “<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-very-french-jihad-hundreds-head-to-syria-and-paris-fears-their-return-26077">jihadists over here</a>”. Instead of focusing on dealing with the political, economic and social situation that has fostered the rise of IS and taking the measures that are really needed to deal with it, Western governments are fixated on their own extremists, who will supposedly return from fighting in the Middle East to wreak havoc in Europe and the US.</p>
<p>To be sure, the threat of attacks “over here” is serious and is not to be dismissed, as events in <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/charlie-hebdo-attack">France</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/much-soul-searching-as-belgium-confronts-terror-at-home-36406">Belgium</a> have shown. But those attacks cannot be separated from the turmoil in areas such as (<a href="https://theconversation.com/al-qaedas-yemen-branch-adds-paris-attacks-to-list-of-successes-36308">but not limited to</a>) Iraq and Syria – and by extension, the West’s failure to help put a stop to it. </p>
<p>This is not just testament to the dangers of Islamic extremism around the world; it also proves it’s far easier for the West to tell tales of “foreign fighters” and “jihadology” than to work hard on the deeper causes and broader consequences of the Iraqi and Syrian disasters. </p>
<p>There are alternatives that could really challenge the IS: an Iraqi Kurdistan with real international recognition and support, an Iraqi government answering to all communities, a Syrian opposition supported in a political vision that overcomes not only the jihadists but the Assad regime. </p>
<p>But the London summit proved these things are still out of reach – or at least too much for the allies to openly contemplate.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/36619/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ministers from 21 countries gathered in London on January 22 to discuss the fight against Islamic State (IS). They had their photo opportunity and issued their statements. US secretary of state, John Kerry…Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/338962014-11-13T00:43:29Z2014-11-13T00:43:29ZTurkey has its own good reasons for not intervening in Kobane<p>As the Kurdish town of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29902405">Kobane</a> continues to defy Islamic State (IS) forces, many pundits have condemned Turkey’s unwillingness to help the People’s Protection Units (<a href="http://www.janes.com/article/43030/analysis-ypg-the-islamic-state-s-worst-enemy">YPG)</a> keep the forces of “evil” at bay. </p>
<p>In a dichotomy characteristic of mainstream reporting on the Middle East, the Kurds, one of the region’s perennial victims, have largely been cast as the “good guys”. The YPG and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdistan_Workers'_Party">PKK</a> (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) lived up to that image by helping to rescue <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-who-are-the-yazidis-30280">Yazidis</a> trapped on Mount Sinjar. </p>
<p>Turkey, in possession of NATO’s second-largest army, has been thrown in with the “bad guys”. This perception was heightened when protests in Kurdish majority areas of Turkey <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11203100/Thousands-rally-in-Turkey-to-support-of-Kurdish-fighters-battling-Isil.html">against government inaction</a> resulted in more than 40 deaths. But is this “bad guy” label a fair representation of Turkey’s reluctance to intervene in Kobane?</p>
<p>The Turkish government has valid reasons not to become embroiled in the defence of Kobane against IS. It would be a breach of Syrian sovereignty and <a href="https://theconversation.com/legal-case-for-striking-islamic-state-is-shifting-to-fit-strategy-32309">international law</a>.</p>
<p>Also, the YPG is the military wing of the Democratic Union Party (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Union_Party_(Syria)">PYD</a>, the predominant faction of three non-contiguous self-declared Kurdish autonomous regions of Rojava (Western/Syrian Kurdistan), which is linked to the PKK. This is a movement that waged a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkey%E2%80%93PKK_conflict">decades-long guerrilla war</a>, at a cost of more than 40,000 lives, in pursuit of independent state at the expense of Turkish territorial integrity. </p>
<p>The PKK is now more committed to Kurdish self-determination than separatism. A ceasefire has been in effect since March 2013. The PKK, and the PYD by association, is still listed as a proscribed terrorist organisation by Turkey and much of the west, including Australia and the US.</p>
<h2>Territorial integrity comes first for Turkey</h2>
<p>Turkish sovereignty, and in particular territorial integrity, has been an extremely prickly subject since the First World War. This didn’t just lead to the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire – which contributed to many of the problems in the region today – but also the Allied invasion of Turkish Anatolia. A Kurdish state was proposed, which would have included vast tracts of land ceded from what is today recognised as Turkey.</p>
<p>In effect, the war didn’t finish for Turkey until 1923. Turkey’s borders today are the result of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_War_of_Independence">nationalist resistance</a> led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Merely referring to “Kurdistan” can trigger an angry response, as I experienced while travelling in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cappadocia">Capadoccia</a> in October 2013 when I mentioned working in Iraqi Kurdistan.</p>
<p>Turkey, in essence, is being asked to risk its soldiers to save a “terrorist” organisation that has been trying to dismember the Turkish state for decades. The government couldn’t sell this to the wider Turkish public even if it wanted to.</p>
<p>More to the point, it suits Turkey that IS and the YPG/PKK are slugging it out: not only are two of its primary enemies otherwise occupied, but they are weakening each other.</p>
<h2>Kobane is not a strategic priority</h2>
<p>If Kobane falls, it will be a blow to PKK prestige. The Turkish government is calculating that a PKK threat to end <a href="http://online.wsj.com/articles/kurdish-politician-victim-of-stabbing-in-turkey-1415107394">the peace process</a> if Kobane falls is a bluff; the Kurds are too weak to fight both IS and Turkey at once.</p>
<p>Turks are not entirely unwilling to help. The country is hosting some 1.5 million refugees, including around 200,000 from the Kobane area. Given Australia’s reaction to asylum seekers, and the pitiful numbers taken in by Turkey’s NATO allies, it’s a bit rich to criticise Turkey as being unhelpful.</p>
<p>While the resistance in Kobane has been impressive and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-battle-for-kobane-offers-a-glimpse-of-kurds-new-model-democracy-34027">political organisation</a> of Rojava is regionally unique in terms of its inclusiveness of women and minorities, US Secretary of State John Kerry’s <a href="http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/23/Whats-so-strategic-about-Kobane.aspx?COLLCC=684079767&">declaration</a> that Kobane is not of strategic importance is apt. </p>
<p>Hard up on the Turkish border, Kobane is otherwise surrounded by IS forces. As high-ranking members of Turkey’s ruling AK Party note, the vast majority of those left in the town are fighters and others who have chosen to remain.</p>
<h2>On what conditions might Turkey intervene?</h2>
<p>Turkey has not ruled out intervening, but it has a <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-strategic-meltdown-in-syria-2014-10?IR=T">list of conditions</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey demands a renewed focus on toppling the Assad regime, which entails renewed training of the seemingly mythical “moderates” of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Syrian_Army">Free Syrian Army</a> (FSA). Turkey points out that whatever happens in Kobane pales in comparison to the <a href="http://www.shrc.org/en/?cat=9">ongoing bloodshed</a> in Syria. This three-and-a-half-year conflict has cost <a href="http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/ML_SYRIA?SITE=AP">more than 200,000 lives</a>.</p>
<p>Turkey also demands a buffer zone in Syrian territory to shield Turkey from IS retaliation should it intervene. The Turkish-Syrian border is some 900 kilometres long, porous and hard to defend. It is also unclear on what terms Turkey secured the release of consular staff held by IS after capturing the Iraqi city of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-has-iraq-lost-a-third-of-its-territory-to-isis-in-three-days-27933">Mosul</a> in June.</p>
<p>It is true that Turkey has, until recently, done little to stop foreign fighters entering Syria to fight the Assad regime. Before the ascendancy of Islamist radicals, however, supporting anti-Assad rebels was the de facto policy of many regional states, the Obama administration and other western governments. It wasn’t until the Islamist monster created by the proverbial Dr Frankensteins of the region escaped that this policy <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com.au/the-us-has-officially-given-up-on-the-free-syrian-army-2014-10">began to shift</a>.</p>
<p>Finally, Turkey demands that the PYD renounce its territorial ambitions. Unsurprisingly, the PYD refuses to do this in light of its strong position in the two other self-declared autonomous regions of Rojava. The PYD has been accused of collaborating with the Assad regime – the Syrian army withdrew from Kurdish areas without a fight, yet officials were subsequently on hand to assist with Yazidis rescued from Sinjar – and Turkey has no intention of allowing another PKK haven to be set up along its borders.</p>
<h2>Kurds are not a united force</h2>
<p>The PKK already operates from the Qandil mountains in <a href="https://theconversation.com/independent-kurds-need-baghdad-more-than-theyd-like-29534">Kurdish Regional Government</a> (KRG) territory in Iraq. There is, however, no love lost between the dominant party of the KRG – the Kurdish Democratic Party – and the PKK as they vie for leadership of the wider Kurdish national movement.</p>
<p>The KRG has even, in the past, allowed the Turkish army into the autonomous region to conduct operations against the PKK. While travelling in the mountains near Turkey I was surprised to drive past a Turkish army base on Iraqi soil, before being shown a valley desolated by Turkish bombs years earlier.</p>
<p>The KRG has also refused to recognise the autonomous cantons of Rojava. The KRG says a ditch it has dug along the KRG-Syria border is to keep IS out, but Syrian Kurds see it as a “betrayal” with the purpose of keeping them out. In short, the KRG is often seen as a Turkish lackey and Kurdish political unity is a myth.</p>
<p>This explains why Turkey agreed to help transfer Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga and FSA reinforcements in the defence of Kobane. Only 150 Peshmerga and 50 FSA fighters have been allowed to enter Kobane. Despite an ostensible <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-kurdish-factions-unite-over-islamic-state-threat-2082220315">unity agreement</a> recently signed by the KRG and PYD, the latter sees a large, Turkish-assisted influx of these fighters as a means of weakening PYD, and by extension PKK, influence in Rojava. The PYD thus refused the much higher numbers originally touted.</p>
<p>Given all these factors, it’s unsurprising that Turkey refuses to intervene with boots of the ground. Other US-aligned “coalition” members haven’t volunteered to do much more than engage in what often appears to be an elaborate and exceptionally expensive way to destroy empty buildings.</p>
<p>The PYD-YPG resistance is testimony to their courage, but the western public’s fleeting emotional investment in Kobane isn’t going to flick a magic switch in the Turkish majority’s collective consciousness after decades of separatist conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tristan Dunning does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the Kurdish town of Kobane continues to defy Islamic State (IS) forces, many pundits have condemned Turkey’s unwillingness to help the People’s Protection Units (YPG) keep the forces of “evil” at bay…Tristan Dunning, Honorary Research Fellow in the School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, The University of QueenslandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/340272014-11-11T05:52:40Z2014-11-11T05:52:40ZThe battle for Kobane offers a glimpse of Kurds’ new model democracy<p>As the battle against Islamic State fighters draws in viewers across the world, there has been some attention given to the men and women resisting them in northern Syria. The Syrian part of Kurdistan, or Rojava, as the Kurds would like to call it, has been fighting Islamists for well over two years now but only recently has the battle for the border town of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/kobane">Kobane</a> brought them to light.</p>
<p>And while it’s easy to portray the Kurdish people as pitted against this new terrorist threat, they are actually involved in something far more profound. Kobane is symbolic and the conflict there carries a universal significance. Not only are the Kurds battling the Islamists, but they are also attempting to create a model of democracy that might actually bring stability to a war-torn region. </p>
<p>The Kurdish political vision is not founded on any particular racial, ethnic, regional or religious belief but rather on an idea, or a set of ideas, that should resonate with people everywhere.</p>
<p>Fighters in Kobane <a href="http://rojavareport.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/interview-with-ypj-commander-in-kobane-kobane-will-not-fall/">claim</a> to be standing up for the freedom of everyone in the region, be they Kurds, Turks, Arabs or anyone else. The way the fighters in Kobane have <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/houzan-mahmoud/kurdish-female-fighters-_b_5944382.html">challenged</a> stereotypical gender roles is just one example.</p>
<p>As far as religious difference goes, Kobane disproves both Islamophobes who believe the Middle East to be incapable of progress and politically correct Islamophiles who push the patronising idea that religious identity is a top priority for Muslims the world over. In their readiness to defend the Yazidi minority against persecution from IS, the Kurds have essentially been promoting a radical secularism and a vision of tolerance in a region torn by religious strife.</p>
<p>What is novel about the Kurdish struggle for self-determination is its very definition of self-determination. The concept, when applied to nations, is generally taken to mean the right of nations to secede and form states of their own, but the Kurds see it differently. Many believe an experiment in <a href="http://www.freeocalan.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Ocalan-Democratic-Confederalism.pdf">democratic confederalism</a> is what the region really needs.</p>
<p>This is an idea espoused by PKK founder <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21314776">Abdullah Ocalan</a>, who is a central intellectual and moral figure for Kurds. The PKK, or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has been fighting Turkey for greater autonomy since 1978 and has also trained Kurdish fighters in Kobane. Ocalan’s writing, compiled from within the confines of a Turkish prison where he has languished for about 15 years, has provided a solid ideological plank for the Kurdish struggle. He believes nation states are inherently oppressive. While oppressed groups might have a legitimate desire to form states of their own, even such newly formed states only serve to replace one form of domination with another. For him, the nation state is linked to xenophobic nationalism, sexism and religious fundamentalism.</p>
<p>Democratic confederalism is a system of governance that would be based on greater collective consensus and voluntary participation. Ecology and feminism are seen as central pillars for local self-governance. It calls for an economic system that should be based neither on exploiting human labour nor the unsound use of natural resources.</p>
<p>Kobane has essentially implemented this theory in practice. The ideas might seem utopian and realists may, quite legitimately, question the sustainability of autonomous communes that do not have the political or military backing of a centralised state. But as Oscar Wilde said, progress is the realisation of Utopia. Maybe Kobane’s progress is just that.</p>
<p>The struggle for Kobane is an event of global significance on a par with the Declaration of Independence, the Storming of the Bastille, the Paris Commune, or the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu. Success for the Kurds would challenge established intellectual, ethical and political horizons.</p>
<p>At a time when right-wing parties are growing in Europe and elsewhere, and minority fundamentalism is growing in parallel, the Kurds are offering something different and it should not be ignored. In that sense, they are fighting for everyone.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/34027/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Karthick Manoharan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As the battle against Islamic State fighters draws in viewers across the world, there has been some attention given to the men and women resisting them in northern Syria. The Syrian part of Kurdistan…Karthick Manoharan, Phd Student and Graduate Teaching Assistant in Politics, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/337012014-11-03T06:00:27Z2014-11-03T06:00:27ZKobanê resists Islamic State – but Turkey still can’t get the Kurdish question right<p>The biggest new development in the ongoing conflict between the Kurds and Islamic State has been the growing co-operation between the Kurdish movements in Iraq and Syria – a phase change that forces to upend the whole question of Kurdish politics. </p>
<p>The link-up between Kurdish movements across borders has been a major security coup. It first paved the way for a US airdrop of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11173564/US-airdrops-arms-to-Kurds-in-Syrian-town-of-Kobane.html">weapons, ammunition and medical supplies</a> on October 20, resources which were sent to defend the town of Kobanê, which has been under siege from IS for seven weeks. We’ve also seen the deployment of Iraqi-Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, armed with heavy weapons such as <a href="http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0IH1SD20141028?irpc=932">artillery and anti-tank missiles</a>.</p>
<p>These events have run contrary to many analysts’ initial expectation that Kobanê’s fall to IS was a foregone conclusion – and the exemplary resistance of Kurdish forces has drawn the support of both the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-arab-partners-will-get-in-return-for-strikes-on-syria-32061">international coalition</a> and the <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/world/turkeys-u-turn-boosts-peshmerga-in-kobani">Peshmerga forces</a>.</p>
<p>But winning the support of the international coalition is a major development for the Kurds’ entire political cause, not just for their fight against IS.</p>
<p>Previously, the US authorities <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/19102014">rejected</a> the idea of working with the Kurds in Syria at all, on the grounds that the main Kurdish political party in Syria – Democratic Union Party (PYD) – has links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is on the US’s list of terrorist organisations. </p>
<p>But the Kurds’ response was astute and effective – and has forced the US’s hand. The Syrian Kurdish political parties met in Duhok, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, to establish a <a href="http://kurdishquestion.com/kurdistan/west-kurdistan/the-duhok-agreement-an-interview-with-aldar-xelil/358-the-duhok-agreement-an-interview-with-aldar-xelil.html">joint administration</a> for Syria’s Kurdish-controlled areas. The Kurds of Syria and Iraq knew that closer co-operation could make them an important force in the international fight against IS – which in turn is likely to increase their clout in regional politics in general. </p>
<p>But even with this new-found solidarity, any effort to properly integrate the Kurds into the existing regional power equation will have to clear significant hurdles.</p>
<h2>Heels dug in</h2>
<p>Better Kurdish co-operation in the fight against IS has not led to a significant change in Turkey’s attitude. Ankara still refuses to develop constructive and co-operative relations with the PYD, a strong indication that the same old ideas of what security entails still govern Turkey’s approach to its Kurdish question.</p>
<p>True, Turkey’s ongoing attempts to restart the peace process have at least gestured to the possibility of co-operative, mutualistic relations – but that still demands, not just an end to the recent rise of violence in Turkey, but a sea change in Turkey’s whole approach to the Kurdish conflict. Ankara needs to stop framing the Kurdish question as a security problem, and start taking measures to genuinely accommodate the Kurds’ demands. </p>
<p>Depressingly, statements made by Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, indicate a <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/erdogan-us-airdrops-kobane-wrong-929392597">hardening attitude</a>.</p>
<p>Previously, the PKK’s unilateral ceasefires and cessation of violence was interpreted by Turkey as the end of the Kurdish conflict, rather than an opportunity for major reforms that could meet the Kurds’ demands. The recent escalation of violence, and the ensuing war of words over whose fault it is and how to stop it, reveals how delicate the situation is – and exposes the lack of trust that still defines <a href="http://theconversation.com/turkey-is-paying-for-decades-of-divisive-politics-as-it-fights-to-end-its-civil-war-33197">Turkey’s approach to peace with the Kurds</a>.</p>
<h2>Open up</h2>
<p>Unfortunately for the Turkish government, the sympathy that the Kurdish forces continue to win as a result of their resistance in Kobanê is translating into growing popularity and a change of attitude internationally. </p>
<p>The US and its allies are beginning to accept that Syria’s Kurds cannot be excluded from the campaign against IS, or from any eventual post-conflict settlement in Syria. This is in stark contrast to their refusal to engage with the Kurdish representatives in the built-up to the <a href="http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/features/kurds-in-syria-answer-geneva-ii-with-selfrule-and-coexistence_21450">Geneva II Conference on Syria</a> earlier this year, and it’s making Turkey’s hitherto intransigent position more and more uncomfortable.</p>
<p>At the heart of Turkey’s reaction to the Kobanê resistance is the fight over the Kurdish question in Turkey itself, as well in Syria. Turkish attempts to “outflank” the Kurds in Syria have so far not produced the desired outcome, and under severe pressure from the US, Ankara has reluctantly agreed to let Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces <a href="http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0IH1SD20141028?irpc=932">cross its territory to reach Kobanê</a>.</p>
<p>Given that many of the PKK’s guerrillas are now fighting IS in Iraq, it’s hard to imagine the PKK fully restarting its insurgency in Turkey in the short run. But as long as Turkey’s approach to the conflict is shaped by its own narrow security priorities, the escalation of violence is likely to continue.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/33701/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The biggest new development in the ongoing conflict between the Kurds and Islamic State has been the growing co-operation between the Kurdish movements in Iraq and Syria – a phase change that forces to…Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/327892014-10-14T05:19:24Z2014-10-14T05:19:24ZUS ups pressure on allies as strategy for fighting Islamic State falls apart<p>Less than a month since Barack Obama went to the American public with his <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/isis-obama-speech/">strategy</a> for defeating the Islamic State (IS), expectations of a successful outcome are already being <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/08/air-strikes-isis-white-house-syrian-rebel-force">significantly lowered</a>.</p>
<p>This is worrying, since Obama likened IS to cancer; a harbinger of death requiring immediate surgery. IS’s malignance was so horrifically self-evident that the move to cut it out won near-total acceptance across the political spectrum; in a matter of weeks, the group’s brutality had rendered opposition to military inaction politically and morally untenable.</p>
<p>Military action has repeatedly been presented as a <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/10/07/general-david-richards_n_5944676.html">no-brainer</a>; opinion polls, which <a href="http://images.politico.com/global/2014/07/18/140718_politico_topline_july_2014_survey_t_142watermark.pdf">just three months</a> ago showed active resistance to military intervention in Syria and Iraq, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/27/isis-uk-attacks-support-protesters-warn-threat">more recently showed</a> that almost 70% of Americans and Britons were convinced of the need. </p>
<h2>Stop and think</h2>
<p>One theory of <a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3176265?uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104311785601">how foreign policy is made</a> views it as a two-stage decision making process. In the first stage, leaders first discount all options that threaten them politically or fundamentally clash with their belief system; only in a subsequent phase of strategising do they actually use more analytical, cost-benefit strategies to figure out the best course of action.</p>
<p>This broadly seems to explain how the decision to attack IS was made. The first stage of decision-making was driven not by careful calculation, but by moral outrage at the brazen atrocities of a group <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10614037/Al-Qaeda-cuts-links-with-Syrian-group-too-extreme-even-for-them.html">more extreme than al-Qaeda</a>, in particular the beheading of Western hostages.</p>
<p>The result is that assessments of capabilities and threat, the traditional benchmarks for sensible foreign policy, were barely present at the conceptual stage. The strategy is instead the outgrowth of a moral, emotional logic. </p>
<p>And as Kobanê has showed, this emotional transition from inaction to military engagement was inadequately informed; it still lacks a clear understanding of how IS has come to rule 8m Iraqis and Syrians, sometimes secured millions of dollars of funding a day, and exploited all manner of regional security weaknesses.</p>
<p>But along with those strategic issues, one of the main obstacles to a coherent strategy is that the US and its allies have very different interests and capabilities in the two theatres where IS poses a threat.</p>
<h2>Last stand</h2>
<p>In Iraq, there are ground troops to work with and a central government with substantial international (if not domestic) legitimacy. The aims of perennially squabbling regional actors, so poorly aligned in Syria, are far more reconcilable in Iraq; all are willing to work with the central government, and several have significant influence there. True, the Kurds have taken advantage of the Iraqi army’s disastrous performances to advance their interests, but the long-trumpeted <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/aug/14/western-intervention-isis-iraq-muslim">break-up of Iraq</a> remains an unlikely scenario.</p>
<p>Yet even though the US has more options in Iraq than it does in Syria, the <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/10/02/kurdish-peshmerga-defeat-islamic-state-in-rabia/16610563/">recapture of Rabia by Kurdish Peshmerga</a> showed how hard it will be to dislodge IS fighters. In a desperate last stand, a force of just 30 jihadists held out for 2 days against 1,500 Peshmerga fighters, who were supported by coalition air power. When the Peshmerga finally entered the town, they found that up to 20 of the ISIS rear-guard had managed to slip away. No sooner had they taken the town than IS killed scores of people with seven suicide vehicle attacks.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, IS fighters are fighting a largely successful campaign to consolidate their power in Iraq’s Anbar province. Last week they <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/10/isil-sunni-militias-battle-iraqi-town-201410281343980744.html">closed in on the city of Heet</a>, which hosts close to 100,000 internally displaced people. In a region that contains half a million such refugees, aid workers and medical staff warn of chronic shortages of food, medicine, hospital beds, shelter and clean water. </p>
<p>The government’s reliance on artillery and airstrikes to check IS’s advance in Anbar has reduced urban areas to rubble and killed many civilians. Without committed forces fighting on the ground, <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2014/10/youll-believe-population.html">airstrikes are not working</a>. The Sunnis of Anbar feel abandoned; the critical battle for hearts and minds in the Sunni heartlands is being lost. As a priority, a massive humanitarian mission is needed to avert an impending disaster in Anbar.</p>
<p>Persuading disillusioned Sunnis that the central government will protect them and give them a stake in the county is the only viable strategy for defeating IS in Iraq. Success will ultimately come down to whether the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/03/us-iraq-crisis-abadi-idUSKCN0HS1Q220141003">promising signs</a> that new prime minister Haider al-Abadi intends to build a more inclusive political process are fulfilled.</p>
<h2>Worse and worse</h2>
<p>The situation in Syria looks far more dire. The Obama administration <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29546714">insists</a> its bombing campaign was never expected to have much impact, with support from ground troops it <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/08/air-strikes-isis-white-house-syrian-rebel-force">freely admits</a> effectively do not exist. The upshot is that the strategic town of Kobanê, on the Turkish border, <a href="http://www.juancole.com/2014/10/kobani-syrian-murder.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook">could fall any day</a>.</p>
<p>Washington’s strategy appears to rest on persuading Turkey to provide the boots on the ground that could actually make a difference. The situation in Kobanê is further complicated by the politics of the Kurds fighting there, who do not share <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/world/middleeast/isis-syria-turkey-border-us.html?action=click&contentCollection=Middle%20East&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article">Turkey’s belief</a> that ousting President Assad is as important as defeating IS. To make things even more delicate, they are also allied to the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20971100">PKK</a>, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/everythings-at-stake-for-the-kurds-in-the-battle-for-kobane-32646">fought a long-running war</a> against the Turkish state. </p>
<p>Turkish president <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-erdogan-pledges-to-bring-vandals-to-account.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72872&NewsCatID=338">Recep Erdogan</a> is unwilling to rescue a force he believes has given up on removing Assad, and intends only to carve out an autonomous region that will exasperate Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. In this context, the back channel talks that have been happening between the US and the Syrian Kurds – which diplomats from both sides are <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/10/syria-feature-kobane-washingtons-back-channel-talks-syrian-kurds/">now admitting</a> have been ongoing for several years – will be watched warily in Ankara.</p>
<p>At a minimum, Erdogan will surely make any Turkish intervention contingent upon Washington directing its firepower against Assad’s forces. This is a deeply unattractive option. Unlike IS, Syria has an air force and air defence system that could feasibly shoot down US pilots. Strikes against Assad would plunge relations with Russia to an even further low, and the reaction in Iran would be hysterical, jeopardising the chance of a successful deal on the critical <a href="https://theconversation.com/frozen-out-of-anti-is-effort-iran-is-losing-patience-with-the-west-31864">nuclear issue</a>.</p>
<p>Erdogan may also insist that Washington police a “buffer zone” to be declared in the northern part of Syria – a demand the Obama administration has long resisted because of its cost and complications. </p>
<p>Given all this, and strong domestic opposition to a ground intervention, it seems unlikely that Turkish soldiers will take on IS on the ground – at least without increased US pressure.</p>
<h2>Getting it together</h2>
<p>But Washington is at last starting to put that pressure on. On October 12, secretary of state John Kerry deliberately <a href="http://eaworldview.com/2014/10/syria-daily-us-secretary-state-kerry-surrenders-kobane-islamic-state/">downplayed the chances of saving Kobanê</a> from IS as Washington positioned itself to blame Turkey for the town’s loss. Perhaps in response, Turkey has <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29591916">finally agreed</a> to allow US access to some of its military bases. The allies’ longer-term plan to <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/26/us-mideast-crisis-usa-rebels-idUSKCN0HL24E20140926">train about 5,000 opposition fighters</a> will demand not only patience, but the further lowering of expectations; according to the Pentagon, it will take up to five months just to set up the facilities.</p>
<p>Washington’s belief that its Sunni allies are <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/biden-apologizes-to-turkeys-erdogan/2014/10/04/b3b5dc84-d97d-4381-ab7f-1754d495f84a_story.html">largely to blame for the rise of IS</a> in Syria has long influenced its strongly regionalist approach; only by cobbling together a “coalition of the willing” can Obama retain the distance he needs between this mission and the Iraq war he would like to be remembered for ending. </p>
<p>But America’s disgruntled allies are now complain that the main benefactor of US airstrikes is President Assad of Syria. They may be right: Syria has recently <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/world/middleeast/us-focus-on-isis-frees-syria-to-battle-rebels.html?smid=fb-share">stepped up its attacks</a> on rebellious parts of the country. </p>
<p>The obvious and depressing conclusion is that the strategy as it stands now is entirely dependent on the actions of actors who are clearly far beyond Washington’s capability to influence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32789/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christian Emery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Less than a month since Barack Obama went to the American public with his strategy for defeating the Islamic State (IS), expectations of a successful outcome are already being significantly lowered. This…Christian Emery, Lecturer in International Relations, University of PlymouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/326462014-10-12T08:56:44Z2014-10-12T08:56:44ZEverything’s at stake for the Kurds in the battle for Kobanê<p>In recent weeks, the Kurdish town of Kobanê on the Turkey-Syria border has become centre stage in the struggle against IS (Islamic State). The latest round of attacks on the town and its surrounding areas began in July 2014 – but IS has been intensifying its attacks on Kobanê since September 15. </p>
<p>It has been so far met with <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29556005">fierce Kurdish resistance</a>. However, the main Kurdish military force – the People’s Protection Units, or YPG in its Kurdish acronym – has been <a href="http://time.com/3476929/isis-syria-kobani-is-isil/">unable to prevent IS entering the town</a>. The subsequent <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/09/turkey-isis-syria-kobani-control-jack-kirby">intensification of US air strikes</a> against IS positions around Kobanê seems to have helped in slowing IS advances, but without immediate support in the form of heavy weapons and ammunition for the YPG, as well as continuing air strikes, it could be just a matter of time before the town falls to IS control.</p>
<p>To escape the IS onslaught, thousands of Kurds have <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29508811">taken refuge in Turkey</a> – but according to Kurdish sources, the lives of an estimated 10,000 civilians who remain in Kobanê are <a href="http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/10/09/fall-of-kobani-risks-security-of-whole-region-says-syrian-kurdish-leader/">still in danger</a>.</p>
<h2>Flashpoint</h2>
<p>Kobanê’s strategic importance for IS is supposedly the main motive behind its <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/oct/09/why-is-kobani-so-important-isis-video-report">attacks</a>, but underlying ideological reasons and antagonisms based on ethnic difference are also playing a part.</p>
<p>IS’s goal of establishing a state run according to Islamist fundamentalist ideology is in stark contrast with the Kurds’ vision of a democratic, secular, gender-egalitarian and plural <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/other-kurds-fighting-islamic-stat-2014928753566705.html">Syria</a>, and the rise of IS and its attacks against the Kurds are dragging the Kurds into a much larger regional sectarian conflict. </p>
<p>In recent months, the Kurdish movements in Iraq, Turkey and Syria have begun to <a href="http://theconversation.com/kurds-face-challenge-of-unity-in-face-of-islamic-state-assault-30572">co-operate more closely</a> against IS. This sort of pan-Kurdish mobilisation is not new; ever since the early 1980s, the Kurds in Syria have been active in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (<a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/08/11/a-u-s-designated-terrorist-group-is-saving-yazidis-and-battling-the-islamic-state/">PKK</a>) and its insurgency against Turkey, which began in August 1984.</p>
<p>But the current wave of Kurdish protests in Turkey, a release of tension that has been building for years, shows how serious things have become. The government has failed to deliver a comprehensive plan to end the conflict through peaceful means and to broaden Kurdish rights; with that failure, it has left millions of Kurds deeply frustrated.</p>
<p>The disaster in Kobanê was the last straw. The unrest in towns and cities across Turkey is continuing, especially in the majority Kurdish regions, despite a curfew and a harsh police response. The death toll in the protests has <a href="http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/10/08/three-dead-36-hurt-in-kobani-protests-in-turkey">already passed 30</a>. </p>
<p>The Kurds are enraged at Turkey’s reluctance to allow help and supplies to cross the border to Kobanê to reach Kurdish fighters, who have been encircled by IS for more than three weeks now. They suspect that Turkey’s intended <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/middleeast/turkish-support-of-coalition-fighting-isis-centers-on-border-buffer-zone-.html?_r=0">buffer zone</a> in Northern Syria would simply serve what they see as Ankara’s broader objective: an attempt to stifle the Kurdish movement in both Syria and Turkey.</p>
<h2>New Steps Needed</h2>
<p>Despite the peace talks between Turkey and the PKK that have been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/31/turkish-peace-talks-kurdish-militants-pkk">rumbling along</a> since March 2012, Turkey continues to view the Kurdish movement – both in Syria and Turkey – with suspicion. Consequently Turkey has been alarmed by the rising influence of the PYD (Democratic Union Party) since July 2012, which is seen by Turkey as the PKK’s extension in Syria. </p>
<p>The dialogue only came about in the first place because of positive developments in the conflict, in particular a significant decrease in violence on both sides. But these positive developments have so far failed to bring about a notable shift in Turkish public debate, or a coherent new policy – which will be essential if the deep-rooted conflict is ever to be resolved.</p>
<p>Things were already moving fast before Kobanê came under attack. Earlier this year, the PYD has taken a key role in establishing three Kurdish Cantons in Syria, which are now <a href="http://www.movements.manchester.ac.uk/the-alternative-in-syria/">managing their own affairs</a>. Turkey has long opposed the idea of any Kurdish self-rule in Syria on the grounds that it could fuel demands for similar structures in Turkey. That is now translating into a lack of Turkish assistance in the face of the IS attacks and very harsh measures to quell Kurdish protests.</p>
<p>And the sudden escalation in anti-Kurd violence within Turkey, which has been exacerbated by nationalist <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/07032014">lynching attempts</a> targeting Kurds, shows how fragile the situation is and how it is ready to spiral into a major social conflict, torpedoing the fragile negotiations and erupting into a full-blown ethnic battle.</p>
<p>Decisive Turkish action, including facilitating military assistance, is urgently needed not just to stop IS, but to safeguard what few positive gains have been made in recent years. Without it, a resolution to Turkey and Syria’s Kurdish crisis could be set back decades.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32646/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In recent weeks, the Kurdish town of Kobanê on the Turkey-Syria border has become centre stage in the struggle against IS (Islamic State). The latest round of attacks on the town and its surrounding areas…Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/326132014-10-07T01:41:47Z2014-10-07T01:41:47ZKobanê teeters on the brink in a fight to the end against ISIS<p>The black flag of ISIS has been sighted in the Syrian city of <a href="http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/world/islamic-state-militants-raise-flag-over-kobane-as-fighting-intensifies-20141007-10r3gm.html">Kobanê</a>. For three weeks, heavily armed ISIS gangs have advanced on Kobanê – also known as Ayn al-Arab – steadily pushing back the local YPG militia.</p>
<p>With their backs against the border with Turkey, the militia, mostly comprising local Kurds, but also Syriac Christians, are significantly outgunned. Such are the dire straits that Kobanê finds itself in that almost the entire population has been mobilised. </p>
<p>Amid reports of <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-07/islamic-state-militants-raise-flag-in-eastern-kobane/5794394">street battles</a>, Kobanê Defence Authority leader Esmat al-Sheikh <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/06/us-mideast-crisis-idUSKCN0HV0NS20141006">told Reuters</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We either die or win. No fighter is leaving. The world is watching, just watching and leaving these monsters to kill everyone, even children … but we will fight to the end with what weapons we have.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=623&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=623&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=623&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayn al-Arab, known by its predominantly Kurdish residents as Kobanê, is a district on the Syrian and Turkish border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">European Commission DG ECHO/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Social media is peppered with images of AK47-touting grandmothers, of fathers and sons and sometimes grandfathers joining together to man the front lines. The female members of the militia have achieved significant media attention, too, even making the pages of <a href="http://www.marieclaire.com/world-reports/inspirational-women/these-are-the-women-battling-isis">glossy fashion magazines</a>.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"518341128840830976"}"></div></p>
<p>But for all the tenacity of their fight, local militia have not been able to match the heavy weaponry of ISIS, most of it pilfered when the Iraqi army abandoned Mosul in June. </p>
<p>Kobanê officials have now ordered civilians to <a href="http://www.france24.com/en/20141006-kurds-order-all-civilians-out-kobane-amid-advance/?aef_campaign_date=2014-10-06&aef_campaign_ref=partage_aef&ns_campaign=reseaux_sociaux&ns_linkname=editorial&ns_mchannel=social&ns_source=twitter">evacuate</a> the city. Those who go will join more than 160,000 who have already fled across the Turkish border in recent weeks. Many plan to stay, however, to fight to the last. </p>
<h2>What they’re fighting for</h2>
<p>The Kurdish-populated towns of the Syrian-Turkish border area are not attractive.</p>
<p>Dust-blown conglomerations of concrete tower blocks, they have little aesthetic appeal, but it can be expected that locals will defend them desperately. Intense clashes are being reported from within the city, with YPG units inflicting <a href="http://en.firatnews.com/news/news/fierce-clashes-continue-in-kobane-2.htm">heavy losses</a> on ISIS gangs.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"519287750437376000"}"></div></p>
<p>The episode of Kobanê has unfurled gruesomely slowly. For weeks, Kurdish activists have been calling for support. There have been <a href="http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/fails-take-kobane-airstrikes-kill-more-five-fighters-371060255">some US airstrikes</a> against ISIS targets around the city, but locals say they have been few and largely ineffective.</p>
<p>In the last few days, as the situation has deteriorated, Salih Muslim, the leader of the Syrian Democratic Unity Party (PYD), visited Turkey to appeal for support. </p>
<p>Ankara <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-urges-pyd-leader-to-join-ranks-of-free-syrian-army-against-al-assad.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72545&NewsCatID=510">told him</a> that to attract the support of Turkey he must cast in his lot with the Free Syrian Army.</p>
<p>Turkey, which has only recently pledged its support for the coalition against ISIS, appears more intent on toppling <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a0da17d2-4d71-11e4-bf60-00144feab7de.html#axzz3FPU7NqNu">Bashar al-Assad</a> in Damascus than on defeating ISIS.</p>
<p>Turkey has been assured of <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/nato-says-will-take-action-to-protect-turkey-if-needed.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72600&NewsCatID=359">NATO support</a> should ISIS make any move to cross into Turkey. </p>
<p>Kurds, meanwhile, remain very distrustful of Turkey, whose military is ensconced on the border overlooking Kobanê within full view of the hostilities as they occur. </p>
<p>Kurds are also concerned that some grand bargain has been reached in which Kobanê is to be allowed to fall. They are understandably bemused that such a large contingent of ISIS fighters and heavy weaponry gathered in one spot has attracted such paltry and ineffectual international military action.</p>
<h2>Muslims and Christians fighting ISIS</h2>
<p>The campaign against Kobanê and nearby Kurdish towns gives the lie to any claim ISIS may have about waging a campaign on behalf of Islam. </p>
<p>The Kurds against whom ISIS fighters are <a href="http://nydailynews.com/news/national/twin-explosions-syria-kill-17-including-10-children-article-1.1959106%5D(http://nydailynews.com/news/national/twin-explosions-syria-kill-17-including-10-children-article-1.1959106">committing atrocities</a> are largely Sunni Muslims, fighting alongside local Syriac Christians.</p>
<p>That the US-led coalition could not lend sufficient support to these Kurdish forces is likely to result in a humanitarian catastrophe. The coalition has also missed a vital opportunity to demonstrate that its campaign is not anti-Muslim, but is focused on a group that perpetrates outrages even against fellow Muslims.</p>
<p>A further irony here is that the brave fight of the PYD has demonstrated the military shortcomings of ISIS. </p>
<h2>What Kobanê has revealed about ISIS</h2>
<p>That local militias – with only light arms and little outside support – can hold off a major ISIS offensive, including a great deal of heavy weaponry of US and Russian origin, indicates that ISIS’s military prowess is vastly overstated. </p>
<p>The PYD militias are tenacious and are fighting to hold their homeland, to be sure, but one can only wonder how easily ISIS may have been defeated in this arena if the might of the US-led coalition had been effectively brought to bear.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, as news of Kobanê’s fate has spread, Kurds around the globe have rallied in massive numbers in support of Kobanê. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.businessinsider.com.au/kurds-protesting-as-kobane-about-to-fall-2014-10">Protests</a> have sprung up across European capitals, in the US, in Australia and in many Turkish cities including Istanbul. It should be noted that it is <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/200-turkish-intellectuals-call-for-help-to-kobane-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72250&NewsCatID=338">not only Kurds</a> who are protesting; concerned observers of all stripes are crying out in support of Kobanê.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"519258712180264960"}"></div></p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"519275603464163329"}"></div></p>
<p>As it stands, prevarication – or perhaps backroom deals – have meant there has been dangerously inadequate international support for a local, secular, non-sectarian force fighting valiantly to quell ISIS gangs.</p>
<p>A Kurdish proverb states that they have “no friends but the mountains”. Protests across the globe and a whirlwind of social media activity in support of Kobanê indicate that this is not the case, at least amongst people on the street.</p>
<p>Those in power who might have been able to prevent the catastrophe at Kobanê appear to be sitting on their hands. If Kobanê falls, as it appears it may, no Kurd will ever count them as a friend.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32613/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Gourlay does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The black flag of ISIS has been sighted in the Syrian city of Kobanê. For three weeks, heavily armed ISIS gangs have advanced on Kobanê – also known as Ayn al-Arab – steadily pushing back the local YPG…William Gourlay, PhD candidate in Middle Eastern Politics at the School of Social Sciences, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/324272014-10-02T04:55:34Z2014-10-02T04:55:34ZSaving Kobanê: the town that the world can’t afford to lose to ISIS<p>Few people had heard of the Syrian town of Kobanê until recently. But since coming <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-02/islamic-state-fighters-advance-to-the-syrian-town-of-ain-al-arab/5784518?section=world">under sustained attack in the last fortnight</a> by Islamic State (ISIS) militants, the town has attracted <a href="http://linkis.com/www.bbc.co.uk/news/jR4cq">international attention</a> as at least 160,000 people have fled across the border to Turkey. Kobanê now stands as a barometer of the success – or possible failure – of the campaign to counter ISIS.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=496&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=623&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=623&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/60601/original/m8v44spk-1412216908.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=623&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ayn al-Arab, known by its predominantly Kurdish residents as Kobanê, is a district on the Syrian and Turkish border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">European Commission DG ECHO/Flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>Pressed hard against the Turkish border, Kobanê (also known as Ayn al-Arab) is one of several autonomous Kurdish territories within Syria. The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia of Kobanê have been defending their homeland doggedly, but, significantly outnumbered and outgunned, they have steadily conceded territory. </p>
<p>ISIS gangs are <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-news-update-kurdish-city-syria-turkey-border-kobane-might-fall-islamic-state-1698145">within kilometres</a> of the town centre and thousands of Kobanê Kurds have <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2014/oct/01/syrian-kurds-fleeing-isis-arrive-at-the-turkish-border-in-pictures">fled</a> into Turkey. </p>
<p>Kobanê, valiantly resisting ISIS thuggery, has become a rallying point for Kurds across the Middle East, Europe, the US and Australia. Many Turkish Kurds have attempted to cross the border to join to the fight against ISIS. Others maintain a <a href="http://en.firatnews.com/news/news/vigil-along-the-border-continues.htm">vigil</a> from the uplands around the Turkish border town of Suruç. </p>
<p>Turkish armed forces have not taken part in the hostilities, but after several stray ISIS shells landed in Turkish territory, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-tanks-take-up-position-on-syrian-border-next-to-besieged-kurdish-town.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72319&NewsCatID=352">tanks</a> were brought into position at a vantage point overlooking Kobanê. </p>
<p>In the meantime, in a call for international help for the besieged Kurdish forces, activists have initiated a <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Kobane?src=hash">social media campaign</a> and <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/kurds-hunger-strike-downing-street-isis-uk?CMP=twt_gu">sit-ins</a> in European capitals.</p>
<p>Saleh Muslim, leader of Syria’s Kurdish Democratic Union Party, has <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/30/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds-idUSKCN0HP1HM20140930">appealed</a> for military aid, warning that if it is not forthcoming genocide is at hand. </p>
<p>The US has undertaken some <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/29/us-mideast-crisis-idUSKCN0HO12G20140929">air strikes</a> in defence of Kobanê, but these have not stopped ISIS’s advance. </p>
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<p>Despite being significantly outgunned, the Kurdish YPG militia have proven <a href="http://www.janes.com/article/43030/analysis-ypg-the-islamic-state-s-worst-enemy#.VBLYaWB773I.twitter">highly effective</a> in their fight against ISIS, a struggle they have carried on for almost two years without outside support. It was YPG brigades that crossed the Iraq border in August to come to the aid of the <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/syrian-kurdish-fighters-rescue-stranded-yazidis">Yazidis</a> stranded and at the mercy of ISIS on Mt Sinjar. </p>
<p>In fact, the YPG appear to be tailor-made to be part of the military counterbalance to ISIS that President Barack Obama speaks of: indigenous, secular and non-sectarian. </p>
<p>While most Syrian Kurds are Sunni Muslims, amongst their ranks the YPG count local <a href="http://aina.org/news/20140708161401.htm">Syriac Christian</a> units. They also include significant numbers of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29085242">female fighters</a>, some of whom have attracted the attention of Western media.</p>
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<p>That the US-led coalition is not making a concerted effort to relieve Kobanê is puzzling to say the least. It appears that the PYD, which represents Syrian Kurds, has little direct contact with Western powers, so its appeals are not reaching appropriate ears. </p>
<p>The International Crisis Group also notes that there are <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/151-flight-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarious-rise-in-syria.aspx">concerns</a> that the PYD was, at least initially, in a de-facto alliance with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. PYD representatives strongly deny this.</p>
<p>Concerns are also raised about the PYD’s links with the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK initiated a terror campaign to establish a Kurdish state in Turkey in the 1980s. The Turkish government has been in negotiations with the PKK since late 2012, but still classifies the group as terrorist. The US, EU and Australia also list the PKK as a terrorist organisation, largely at the behest of Turkey.</p>
<p>However, the PKK has played a significant role in the fight against ISIS in northern Iraq, coming to the aid of the Kurdistan regional government, which is regarded as a staunch ally of the US and other Western powers. The military advances of PKK units against ISIS and the important role they played in the rescue of Yazidi refugees has cast them in a much more <a href="http://www.voanews.com/content/pkk-success-in-battling-islamic-state-could-boost-image/2446815.html">positive light</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in a region prone to conspiracy theories, Kurdish activists see Turkey as being behind the failure of the US-led coalition to come to the aid of Kobanê. They accuse Turkey of wanting the PYD to be defeated due to its links with the PKK. In turn, PKK officials remark that if Kobanê falls, negotiations with Ankara will cease.</p>
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<p>In fact, Turkey has only recently agreed to participate in the coalition against ISIS, previously demurring on the basis that ISIS held as hostage 49 Turkish diplomatic staff from Mosul. With the hostages released, Turkey is now <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/government-seeks-support-for-action-against-isil.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72420&NewsCatID=338">debating</a> what role it will play. </p>
<p>All the while, the ISIS noose tightens around Kobanê. If it falls it is hardly an auspicious start for Obama’s campaign to encourage local forces to confront the barbarity of ISIS. It is likely to result in a massacre of the local Kurdish population or, at best, a mass exodus of refugees across the Turkish border.</p>
<p>Kurdish populations across the Middle East have been sold out by Western powers before, and many a horror has befallen them – but never before in such plain sight.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32427/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Gourlay does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Few people had heard of the Syrian town of Kobanê until recently. But since coming under sustained attack in the last fortnight by Islamic State (ISIS) militants, the town has attracted international attention…William Gourlay, PhD candidate in Middle Eastern Politics at the School of Social Sciences, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.