tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/kurds-10387/articlesKurds – The Conversation2024-03-05T14:01:07Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2231382024-03-05T14:01:07Z2024-03-05T14:01:07ZDespite UN warnings, Iran’s execution of Kurds and political dissidents continues unchecked<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578993/original/file-20240229-20-8v75py.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=57%2C173%2C7571%2C4955&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Human rights activists gather in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 27, 2024, to condemn executions of political dissidents in Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/washington-dc-united-states-iranian-members-of-the-diaspora-news-photo/1963642261?adppopup=true">Ali Khaligh/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the 2022 death of Jîna Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman held in police custody for wearing her hijab inappropriately, Iranian demonstrators have protested against the repressive regime and the surge of executions of ethnic and religious political dissidents. </p>
<p>In the first 11 months of 2023, Iran <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/iran">had executed 746 people</a>, prompting United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to observe that Iran was carrying them out “<a href="https://thehill.com/policy/international/4289500-united-nations-iran-carrying-out-executions-at-alarming-rate/">at an alarming rate</a>.”</p>
<p>So far in 2024, Iran <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/01/iran-executions-of-protester-with-mental-disability-and-kurdish-man-mark-plunge-into-new-realms-of-cruelty/">has executed</a> at least eight Kurdish political prisoners, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-executes-four-people-it-says-are-linked-israeli-intelligence-state-media-2024-01-29/">including four</a> on Jan. 29, 2024, who were convicted on dubious charges such as <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-executes-3-protests-mahsa-amini-death/">waging war against God</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-executions-the-role-of-the-revolutionary-courts-in-breaching-human-rights-197534">corruption on Earth</a>.</p>
<p>As a Kurdish-born scholar and <a href="https://cah.ucf.edu/languages/faculty-staff/profile/414">a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Central Florida</a>, I have previously written about the <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-across-iran-continues-under-states-extreme-gender-apartheid-183766">“Women, Life, Freedom” movement</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/kurds-targeted-in-turkish-attack-include-thousands-of-female-fighters-who-battled-islamic-state-125100">the Kurdish female fighters</a> who focus on the protection of women’s rights and <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-in-iran-will-continue-until-religious-rule-ends-90352">protests by the Iranian people against</a> their government.</p>
<p>Those demonstrations includes protests against Iran’s use of the death penalty that, according to a 2022 the U.S. Department of State report, “<a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran/">disproportionately affected religious and ethnic minorities</a>.”</p>
<p>With hardliners maintaining their grip on parliament after the election held on March 1, 2024, the plight of ethnic and religious minorities remains <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/23/iran-2-detainees-executed-11-await-imminent-execution">an ongoing tragedy</a> with no end in sight. Because of a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/01/iran-elections-low-turnout-and-boycott-expected.html">nationwide boycott of the election</a>, voter turnout was estimated <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/04/middleeast/iran-low-turnout-election-intl/index.html">at less than 41%</a>, the lowest since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.</p>
<p>As human rights organization Amnesty International <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/03/iran-chilling-execution-spree-with-escalating-use-of-death-penalty-against-persecuted-ethnic-minorities/">warned in 2023</a>, the Iranian authorities had embarked on an “execution spree.” </p>
<h2>Separate and unequal</h2>
<p>In late November 2023, human rights groups reported intense crackdowns on protesters in two Kurdish cities. In one of them, Mahabad, authorities have declared <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202211206594">martial law</a>. In another, Javanrud, people have been found massacred and the government accused of ethnic cleansing, according to <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Massacre-in-Javanrud-Iran-Violations-Report.pdf">the Center for Human Rights in Iran and Kurdistan Human Rights Network</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Several cars are unable to move through thousands of demonstrators." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486368/original/file-20220924-15747-3pw3xm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Thousands of demonstrators stop traffic in Iran on Sept. 19, 2022, to protest the death of Jîna Mahsa Amini while in police custody.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-in-protest-against-the-death-of-mahsa-amini-news-photo/1426271257?adppopup=true">Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>This Kurdish region of Iran has been the epicenter for <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/middleeast/iran-mahsa-amini-death-widespread-protests-intl-hnk/index.html">nationwide protests</a> that erupted in September 2022 since Amini’s death.</p>
<p>Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini established <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34550377">the Revolutionary Courts</a>
which have supreme power over the general courts and were designed to protect the revolution from any and all perceived enemies of the state. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of men with rifles kneel in front of several men who are wearing blindfolds." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578070/original/file-20240226-30-ji0y3a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 1979 image, an Iranian government firing squad executes 11 Kurdish men.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/government-firing-squad-executed-nine-kurdish-rebels-and-news-photo/1155287072?adppopup=true">Jahangir Razmi/ Bettmann Archive/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Most death sentences of the regime’s opponents have been carried out by these courts. The executions are often based on vague charges and forced confessions, many of which are broadcast on state-owned national television. A study by <a href="https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/iran/iran-new-report-demands-end-to-the-rampant-use-of-forced-confessions">the International Federation for Human Rights</a> revealed that between 2009 and 2019, Iranian media broadcast 355 such forced confessions.</p>
<h2>Ethnic and religious persecutions</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, the discrimination against the Kurds and other minorities in Iran remains overlooked, and it is even enshrined in the constitution. </p>
<p>In Iran, where people of non-Persian ethnicities constitute more than half of the population and speak nearly <a href="https://iranatlas.net/index.html">100 different languages and dialects</a>, <a href="https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">Article 15</a> of the Iranian Constitution recognizes only Persian/Farsi as “the official language” and script of Iran. </p>
<p>As a result, ethnic minorities like the Kurds are prohibited from learning or teaching their own languages. </p>
<p>The law is strictly enforced. In 2020, for instance, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Courts sentenced <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/iran-how-kill-language/">Zara Mohammadi</a> to 10 years in prison for teaching Kurdish, her native tongue. </p>
<p>Ten years earlier, Kurdish primary school teacher <a href="https://barricadejournal.org/volume-5/heirs-of-poetry-and-rain/?fbclid=IwAR2Ef4eDZXNn1351sSIiIfvc3gMMv8M5uyBxz6Wnp2SJ1oFA7o01f8wpobI">Farzad Kamangar</a> was executed for advocating for greater cultural and political self-determination for the Kurds. </p>
<p>Criminalizing religious minorities is also permitted in the constitution of the Islamic republic. </p>
<p>Iran’s <a href="http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html">Constitution names</a> the Twelver Ja’fari School of Shi’a Islam as the state religion. This excludes the Sunni Kurds, Baha’is and other religious minorities from the minimal protections granted by Iran’s Constitution. Not surprisingly, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/iran">Baha’is and Sunnis</a> remain <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/uscirf-releases-report-religious-freedom-iran#:%7E:text=In%20its%202023%20Annual%20Report,and%20egregious%20religious%20freedom%20violations">the most persecuted</a> religious minorities in Iran. </p>
<h2>Ending ‘hell on earth’</h2>
<p>Jîna Mahsa Amini’s death unleashed a wave of nationwide protests in Iran that <a href="https://theconversation.com/unrest-across-iran-continues-under-states-extreme-gender-apartheid-183766">called for dismantling the state’s gender apartheid</a> as well as systemic ethnic, racial and religious discrimination, particularly in Sunni- and Kurdish-dominated cities.</p>
<p>Human rights organizations <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-execution-gaza-war-hamas-b2457548.html">have accused Iran</a> of exploiting the current international focus on Gaza to exact revenge on dissidents.</p>
<p>“Since the start of the war, there has been little international focus on the human rights situation in Iran, and there has been no substantial response to the significant increase in executions,” said <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/dec/02/iran-using-gaza-conflict-as-cover-to-step-up-executions-of-protesters">Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam</a>, the director of Iran Human Rights, a nonprofit human rights organization. </p>
<p>Amiry-Moghaddam explained that his organization <a href="https://www.iranhr.net/en/articles/5594/">has compiled data</a> that shows the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown has disproportionately targeted ethnic and religious minorities.</p>
<p>In my view, the current “killing spree” defies the demands of the Iranian people and the Kurds to end the executions and to expel Iran from the U.N. under <a href="https://legal.un.org/repertory/art6.shtml">Article 6, Chapter II</a> of the U.N. charter for the regime’s persistent violation of human rights principles since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. </p>
<p>As former U.N. Secretary-General <a href="https://www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/dealing-crimes-humanity/">Dag Hammarskjöld</a> once said, the U.N. “was created not to lead mankind to heaven but to save humanity from hell.” </p>
<p>For the long-suffering, stateless Kurdish nation, the U.N. has so far failed to rescue them from their hell on earth.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223138/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Haidar Khezri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In the wake of the death of Jîna Mahsa Amini in police custody in 2022, Iranian authorities have executed political dissenters at what the UN chief described as ‘an alarming rate.’Haidar Khezri, Assistant Professor of Modern Languages, University of Central FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116992023-08-17T15:17:25Z2023-08-17T15:17:25ZAmid growing tension between Russia, Iran and the US, Syria’s Kurds have been sidelined<p>In north-east Syria, the 12-year conflict is <a href="https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and-emergencies/world/coronavirus-the-conflict-continues-in-syria-what-can-be-done">far from over</a>. Russian fighter jets buzz US surveillance drones, threatening to bring them down. Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets at US positions. The Assad regime maintains that it will “regain every inch” of Syria, ending Kurdish autonomy in the north-east. </p>
<p>Meanwhile Turkey — considering the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) to be part of the Turkish Kurdish insurgency PKK — carries out periodic strikes, following its seizure of part of the border area in October 2019. And the Islamic State, expelled from its last village is March 2019, is still present. Its cells attack civilians and the Assad regime’s military buses, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/attack-bus-kills-23-syrian-troops-war-monitor-2023-08-11/">killing at least 23 troops on August 11</a>.</p>
<p>In a multi-sided confrontation where — amid the regime’s deadly repression — no one has “won”, the headline is of a possible Russian-Iranian-US showdown. But that is a diversion from a local story where Syria’s Kurds could be the biggest losers in the north-east.</p>
<p>On July 16, a Russian Su-35 fighter jet <a href="https://eaworldview.com/2023/07/syria-russia-harassing-us-military-aircraft/">flew close to a US MC-12 turboprop surveillance aircraft</a>, flying in support of operations against Islamic State cells. American officials said the MC-12’s four crew members were endangered, and added that Russian harassment had complicated strike against an IS leader earlier in July. Moscow disregarded the message. </p>
<p>On July 23, another Russian fighter jet damaged a US MQ-9 Reaper drone, carrying our surveillance over northern Syria, when it flew within a few metres and one of its flares struck the Reaper’s propeller. A drone operator kept the Reaper in the air and guided it home.</p>
<p>Lt. General Alex Grynkewich, commander of the 9th Air Force, said: “We call upon the Russian forces in Syria to put an immediate end to this reckless, unprovoked, and unprofessional behaviour.” Some analysts seized on the incidents to declare imminent confrontation. Citing movements of Iranian-backed militia and Assad regime troops and equipment as well as Russian harassment, the Washington-based <a href="https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-russia-and-syrian-regime-are-coordinating-expel-us-forces-syria">Institute for the Study of War declared</a>: “Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime are coordinating to expel US forces from Syria.” </p>
<p>Despite a de facto “deconfliction” arrangement with US forces, Russia has discussed operations with Iran to prop up the Assad regime throughout the Syrian conflict. But ISW’s assessment is hyperbolic. The chair of the US Joint Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, said in July that additional military deployments <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/07/top-us-general-pumps-brakes-sending-more-forces-confront-russia-syria">were not needed</a> to fend off Russian harassment: “There’s been an uptick, but I wouldn’t overstate it too much. We’ve got adequate capabilities to defend ourselves.”</p>
<p>Equally important, assessments such as ISW’s play down – or even ignore completely – what is actually happening on the ground in Syria in favour of focusing on the interplay between foreign powers. Specifically, attention to a US-Russian-Iranian confrontation ignores the group at greatest risk in any showdown: Syria’s Kurdish population.</p>
<h2>A people without a home</h2>
<p>In 2015, the prospect was of an Islamic State caliphate across northern Syria. IS controlled about one-third of the country, with the prospect of further gains. But the Kurds, backed by US military assistance, held out. They repelled a four-month siege of Kobane by IS in January 2015, at the cost of thousands of lives, and then began the fightback to reclaim territory. </p>
<p>Raqqa, Syria’s seventh-largest city and the centre of the caliphate, was liberated in October 2017. The following September, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council declared the establishment of a statelet, the <a href="https://aanesgov.org/">Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)</a>.</p>
<p>But autonomy would inevitably be tenuous for a Kurdish population — estimated at between 30 and 45 million — struggling for decades for a state in Syria, Iran, Iraq or Turkey. The Assad regime, which suppressed Kurdish protests in 2004-05, was anxious to regain authority that it had lost after nationwide demonstrations began in March 2011. </p>
<p>Tehran’s regime not only chafed at US-supported Kurdish forces but also had its own problematic relations with Kurds in northwest Iran. Turkey’s Erdoğan government, because of its internal fight with the PKK, was also dedicated to breaking the Kurdish areas.</p>
<p>Ankara came close to doing so. Having already <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75419">overrun the Afrin canton in north-west Syria in 2016</a>, Erdoğan sought an opening to advance in the north and north-east. He got it from Donald Trump, who offered in phone calls in December 2018 and October 2019 to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/politics/mark-esper-syria-kurds-turkey.html#:%7E:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%20Defense%20Secretary%20Mark%20T,resurgence%20of%20the%20Islamic%20State.">withdraw all US troops</a>. The Pentagon checked Trump on the first occasion, but Erdoğan seized on the second “green light” to launch a cross-border invasion, occupying a strip along the border.</p>
<p></p><h2>Do “The Kurds Always Lose in the End”?</h2><p></p>
<p>In April 2013, at an international gathering in Oxford in the UK, a US military officer told me: “I can’t see us maintaining a presence. The Kurds always lose in the end.”</p>
<p>More than a decade later, about <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/6/15/23669622/syria-900-us-troops-forever-war-isis-assad">900 US troops remain in Syria</a>, many of them working with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. But Erdoğan is watching, waiting, and saying that the Kurds must capitulate. Assad still insists that he should be the leader of the north-east. </p>
<p>As Iran fences with the US over sanctions and Tehran’s nuclear program, Iranian-backed militias occasionally fire rockets at US positions. And Russia — entangled in what appears to be Vladimir Putin’s losing gamble in Ukraine — pursues Syrian “pinpricks” against the Americans, hoping that Washington will finally abandon the Kurds.</p>
<p>On August 4, as political and military analysts were watching Russia and the US, there was another statement from northeast Syria. A day earlier, a <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/syrian-kurds-urge-us-led-coalition-stands-turkish-102018755">Turkish drone strike</a> on a car killed four members of the Syrian Democratic Forces and wounded two.</p>
<p>The Kurdish-led AANES called on the US to take a public position over the Turkish attacks which have killed dozens of Syrian Kurdish fighters this year. Washington must “have a clear stance … regarding the targeting of our people and fighters”.</p>
<p>There was no immediate reaction from either the US military or the Biden administration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While analysts fret over what Iran and Russia are up to in Syria, Kurdish aspirations continue to be overlooked.Scott Lucas, Professor, Clinton Institute, University College DublinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2063562023-05-29T17:46:23Z2023-05-29T17:46:23ZWhat Erdoğan’s reelection means for Turkey’s political system, economy and foreign policy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/528911/original/file-20230529-8428-5q7g5p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=33%2C109%2C5573%2C3623&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrate in Istanbul on May 28, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TurkeyElection/7ccdfea232cc4bebb7071e84ed681682/photo?Query=erdogan&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=23036&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo/Emrah Gurel, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65743031">reelected as president</a>, ensuring that his term as leader of Turkey will extend to a quarter century.</p>
<p>The electorate returned Erdoğan to power in a runoff vote on May 28, 2023, with 52% of votes. But with 48% of voters siding with opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Erdoğan will have to govern a divided nation <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-centennial-year-turkish-voters-will-choose-between-erdogans-conservative-path-and-the-founders-modernist-vision-202554">in its centennial year</a>.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ABctik8AAAAJ&hl=en">professor of political science</a>, I have <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/democracy-islam-and-secularism-in-turkey/9780231159326">analyzed Turkish politics for many years</a>. The election provided a stark choice for Turkey’s voters: To end or extend Erdogan’s <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">two-decade-long creep toward authoritarian-style governance</a>. The decision to opt for the latter will dictate the country’s future in key ways, both domestically and in terms of its relationships with Western countries.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Turkey’s political system?</h2>
<p>Turkey had its first <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/made-by-history/2023/05/12/turkey-election-erdoan/">democratic election in May 1950</a>. Since then it has had a multiparty competitive system, albeit one that has been sporadically interrupted by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/16/timeline-a-history-of-turkish-coups">several military coups</a>.</p>
<p>In the last 10 years, Erdoğan has taken Turkey down a more <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/07/how-erdogan-made-turkey-authoritarian-again/492374/">autocratic, one-man-rule style</a> of governance. This has included restrictions on <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/10/18/turkeys-new-media-law-is-bad-news-but-dont-report-it/">freedom of speech</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/turkey-erdogan-media">freedom of the press</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/07/turkey-end-abuse-criminal-proceedings-against-selahattin-demirtas">free assembly</a>.</p>
<p>There is a little reason to believe that Erdoğan, enboldened by a fresh mandate, will reverse this trajectory.</p>
<p>Erdoğan won the election without making any promises about restoring or expanding rights and freedoms. Rather, his campaign signaled an intention to continue Turkey’s path toward being a conservative, religious state – a far cry from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-centennial-year-turkish-voters-will-choose-between-erdogans-conservative-path-and-the-founders-modernist-vision-202554">vision of a modern, secular nation</a> of founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the election, Erdoğan presented himself as the leader of religious conservatives – <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnyuFMVZ2N8">reciting the Quran in Hagia Sophia</a> and <a href="https://t24.com.tr/video/erdogan-camlica-camii-icinde-cemaate-fetih-cagrisi-yapti,54253">addressing the people in another mosque following the Friday prayer</a>. He also presented himself as a militarist leader, using <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqsshbA3WEA">battleships, drones and other weapons</a> as campaign instruments and uploading a new Twitter profile photo with an <a href="https://twitter.com/RTErdogan">air force pilot jacket</a>. This posturing combined with his accusations that the opposition <a href="https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkeys-erdogan-accuses-opposition-of-acting-together-with-pkk-amid-dwindling-support-for-govt-news-59442">was collaborating with the PKK</a> – a Kurdish separatist organization designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey – suggests that Erdoğan continues to promote Turkish nationalism and militarism.</p>
<p>The runoff victory for Erdoğan comes just two weeks after his Justice and Development Party and coalition partners <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/15/erdogans-ak-party-wins-parliamentary-majority-state-media">won a parliamentary majority</a>. It means that the opposition will have no executive or legislative power to restrict Erdoğan’s agenda.</p>
<h2>Future relations with the U.S. and the West</h2>
<p>Another important and consistent characteristic of Erdoğan’s presidential campaign was his <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/turkeys-erdogan-says-wests-provocative-policies-towards-russia-not-correct-2022-09-07/">criticism of the West</a> in general and <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-738657">the United States</a> in particular. </p>
<p>Erdoğan has accused the U.S. of a variety of perceived slights and Washington’s stance on issues affecting Turkey. In the past year, the Turkish leader has criticized over Washington’s <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/us-ignores-turkiyes-concerns-over-ypg-support-in-syria-erdogan">support of the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdish PKK</a> and protested the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/26/turkey-files-protest-with-greece-and-us-as-aegean-tensions-rise">deployment of U.S. armored vehicles</a> on two Greek Islands. Meanwhile, he has pointedly distanced himself from NATO allies on the issue of Russian sanctions, and instead <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/19/middleeast/turkey-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-interview-mime-intl/index.html">talked up Turkey’s “special relationship”</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>In mid-April, Erdoğan framed the election <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turkiye-bu-secimle-birlikte-batiya-bir-mesaj-verecek">as a chance for voters to “send a message to the West”</a> which, he claimed, was supporting the opposition candidate. “This country does not look at what the West says, neither when fighting terrorism nor in determining its economic policies,” <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkiye-to-give-message-to-west-on-may-14-president-erdogan-/2870668">he said</a>.</p>
<p>Some of this was campaign rhetoric. And Erdoğan may make some attempts to heal rifts with Western countries, such as approving <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/27/erdogans-problem-is-not-with-sweden-and-finland-but-with-turkeys-western-vocation/">Sweden’s NATO membership bid</a> – something he has to date refused to do over what <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-says-turkey-start-ratifying-finlands-nato-bid-2023-03-17/">Turkey sees as the Nordic country’s harboring</a> of Kurdish terrorists.</p>
<p>But even such a concession would not amount to a transformation of Erdoğan’s deeply critical attitude to Western countries overall.</p>
<p>Indeed, the only factor that may force Erdoğan to <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040128-3.html">return Turkey to a pro-Western position</a> is Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis – which might necessitate the support of wealthy Western states and institutions.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Turkey’s shaky economy?</h2>
<p>Since 2018, the Turkish economy has <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/how-erdogans-pseudoscience-ruining-turkish-economy-1">shown symptoms of a crisis</a>. Turkey’s currency, the lira, has fallen in value precipitously. In March, it <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/turkish-lira-falls-record-low-near-19-dollar-2023-03-09/">fell to a new low</a> of 19 to the dollar. Moreover, in 2022, the annual <a href="https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Consumer-Price-Index-November-2022-45800&dil=2">inflation rate surpassed 80%</a>.</p>
<p>In order to win the elections, Erdoğan pursued several policies that appealed to voters but may further stress the economy and bleed national reserves. They include <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-eliminates-age-requirement-retirement-2022-12-28/">dropping the retirement age</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/erdogan-gives-civil-servants-45-percent-pay-rise-in-turkeys-tight-election-race/">giving a 45% pay raise to public workers</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, economic crisis and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/07/world/asia/turkey-inflation-doctors.html">authoritarian policies</a> have resulted in a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42433668">brain drain</a>” with many educated young people moving to Western European countries.</p>
<p>If the election result leads to a further exodus of skilled, educated workers, then it will only weaken Turkey’s capability of confronting its economic crisis. Such thinking could nudge Erdoğan towards a rethink over policies that alienate younger, secular Turks.</p>
<p>It could also force Erdoğan to reevaluate his foreign policy. At present, the Turkish leader has looked to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f7I54Dj6Clw">Qatar, Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d1b33e56-2835-4d04-8387-ba1d8dc55646">Russia</a> for financial support. If this appears to be insufficient, Erdoğan may be forced to seek stronger relations with the United States to facilitate financial aid from the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations.</p>
<p>Erdoğan won the election without making any promises of change regarding domestic or foreign policy. But if the economic crisis he faces fails to abate, change may be forced upon him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206356/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Long-term Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was reelected with 52% of the vote. Will he push the country further down an autocratic, anti-West path?Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2023112023-04-24T16:07:41Z2023-04-24T16:07:41ZGenocide resisters, long overlooked by history, step into the spotlight<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522625/original/file-20230424-26-lc5hws.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C7%2C5187%2C3176&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A minaret from which Turks fired upon Christians in 1909 in Adana stands amid the town's ruins.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.loc.gov/item/2014696599">Bain News Service via Library of Congress</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The anniversary of the <a href="https://www.armenian-genocide.org/">Armenian Genocide</a> is marked every year on April 24. That was the date in 1915 when hundreds of Armenian community leaders were arrested by the government of the Ottoman Empire in the capital Constantinople, now known as Istanbul.</p>
<p>At the time, Armenians lived throughout what is modern-day Turkey. <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674251434">Modern scholars estimate</a> up to <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/armenian-genocide-9780857719300/">1.5 million Armenians were killed</a> by the Turkish government, and around 800,000 to 1.2 million were deported during World War I. Most ended up in the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia, Europe and the Americas. <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691147307/they-can-live-in-the-desert-but-nowhere-else">During that period</a>, Greek, Assyrian and Yezidi communities were also massacred and forced to flee into exile.</p>
<p>April is also <a href="https://sfi.usc.edu/genocide-awareness-month">Genocide Awareness Month</a>. Holocaust Remembrance Day takes place this month every year, as do commemorations for genocides in Cambodia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur.</p>
<p>For much of the 20th century, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-04-24/hundreds-protest-outside-turkish-consulate-in-beverly-hills-on-107th-anniversary-of-armenian-genocide">commemorations of mass killings and genocide</a> have focused on remembering the dead as victims and condemning the perpetrators. </p>
<p>But recent research has taken a broader view, recognizing that mass violence takes place because of many complex factors. Besides political, economic and cultural currents, the resistance and resilience of the people who were targeted are coming to the fore of scholarly work and public understanding.</p>
<h2>1909 before 1915</h2>
<p>The 1915 Armenian Genocide was not the first attack on Armenians in what is now Turkey. In the 1890s, hundreds of thousands of Armenians were targeted by the government of the Ottoman Empire in what came to be called the <a href="https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1812&context=gsp">Hamidian Massacres</a>, as they took place during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II.</p>
<p>And in 1909 – again, in April – there was a separate such episode. Those massacres took place in the region historically known as Cilicia, on the Mediterranean coast of southeastern Turkey today. In two waves of violence at the end of April 1909, more than 20,000 Armenians and other Christians were killed by Turks connected with the government. The violence happened in and around the city of Adana and extended into neighboring areas. Muslim populations suffered as well, with an estimated 2,000 killed in retaliation for the massacres.</p>
<p>Some present the Hamidian and Adana massacres as dress rehearsals for the Ottoman Turkish government’s plan, decades in the making, to implement the all-out elimination of the Armenians in 1915, dispossessing them of their millennia-old historical homeland. Among Armenians, this is the prevalent nationalist reading of Armenian history. </p>
<h2>Survivors on their own terms</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A portrait of a woman in a dress" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=774&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522627/original/file-20230424-18-fg1dpi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=973&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Author Zabel Yessayan helped lead relief efforts after the 1909 massacres.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zabelle_Yesayan.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>Recent scholarship has taken a closer look at the details of these massacres. In particular, scholars are beginning to highlight the fact that, despite facing mass violence, Armenians and others organized resistance activities and put together relief work in the aftermath of killings. Sometimes resistance was armed, and sometimes it consisted of putting together protest campaigns or publishing newspaper articles and books in the Ottoman Empire and beyond.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=26239">The Horrors of Adana</a>” by Bedross Der Matossian is the first in-depth work on the Adana Massacres. Der Matossian writes about the actions of a prominent literary figure, Zabel Yessayan, who was among the leaders of relief efforts following the 1909 massacres, bringing in food, clothing and other necessities for the survivors. Yessayan also wrote “<a href="https://aiwa.wildapricot.org/Sys/Store/Products/266950">In The Ruins</a>,” published in 1911, specifically to document the aftermath of the killings and to support humanitarian aid, media outreach and legal efforts.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://msupress.org/9781611863949/the-resistance-network/">The Resistance Network</a>” by Khatchig Mouradian documents the work of Armenian community leaders such as <a href="https://armenianweekly.com/2023/04/19/ahari-hosts-dr-khatchig-mouradian-a-story-of-resistance-and-revival/">Rev. Aharon Shirajian</a> to support the survivors of death marches and deportations. Shirajian himself cared for a number of orphaned genocide survivors in Syria.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Armed fighters stand together for a portrait." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=390&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/522362/original/file-20230421-16-528nad.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Armenian freedom fighters at Musa Dagh in 1915.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Musadagh.jpg">The New Armenia Publishing Company via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
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<p>These stories are not only powerful on their own but can also have lasting effects in the global effort to end genocide. Fiction can play a role, too. “<a href="https://worldcat.org/title/607574173">The Forty Days of Musa Dagh</a>” by Franz Werfel is a gripping novel that recounts the armed defense by a group of Armenians in one corner of the Ottoman Empire in 1915. </p>
<p>The book, which was published in 1933, the year Hitler took power, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/how-armenias-1915-musa-dagh-fighters-inspired-jews-to-resist-nazi-genocide/">served as an inspiration</a> for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/defying-the-holocaust-didnt-just-mean-uprising-and-revolt-remembering-jews-everyday-resistance-on-yom-hashoah-and-year-round-198722">anti-Nazi resistance</a> in the Jewish ghettos of Warsaw, Bialystok, Vilnius and elsewhere in the 1940s.</p>
<p>Jewish resistance to the Nazi genocide is another topic being given due attention by historians. The forthcoming “<a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300267198/resisters/">Resisters</a>” by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/wolf-gruner-829895">Wolf Gruner</a> is a work along these lines, focusing on the actions of five Jewish individuals during the Holocaust.</p>
<p>These efforts are beginning to shift how scholars and the public understand genocide. Those horrific actions were not carried out against passive victims, but rather were aggressions which, in many cases, faced intense and organized resistance. The perpetrators killed many but did not destroy the spirit of their victims. The survivors and their descendants have good reason to celebrate that spirit of resilience in the face of immense suffering.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202311/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>I am personally acquainted with two of the authors I mention in this piece. We are simply friends and colleagues. There is no financial relationship among us or any other relevant interest.</span></em></p>Recent studies on mass violence have turned the spotlight on the resilience of targeted individuals and communities.Nareg Seferian, Ph.D. Candidate, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia TechLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2015432023-03-16T19:26:48Z2023-03-16T19:26:48ZIranian protesters are making demands in charters and bills of rights<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514973/original/file-20230313-14-6aoztl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C540%2C3031%2C2001&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An Iranian woman protests the death of Mahsa Amini, who died after being detained by the morality police in Tehran in September 2022. This photo was taken by an individual not employed by the Associated Press and obtained by the AP outside Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Middle East Images)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It’s been six months since the latest spark ignited mass protests in Iran — the <a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-on-fire-once-again-women-are-on-the-vanguard-of-transformative-change-191297">death of 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian Mahsa (Jina) Amini</a> in morality police custody after she was arrested for allegedly failing to wear her hijab properly.</p>
<p>The outrage over her killing resulted in women-led protests. <a href="https://www.historytoday.com/archive/history-matters/women-life-freedom">Their slogan “woman, life, freedom,”</a> originally a Kurdish manifesto, has helped fuel the Iranian protesters’ demands for radical change. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-women-keep-up-the-pressure-for-real-change-but-will-broad-public-support-continue-191631">Iranian women keep up the pressure for real change – but will broad public support continue?</a>
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<p>The perseverance, bravery and determination of the Iranian protesters, particularly women and girls, have been heroic. Despite risks to their lives and freedoms due to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/12/iran-brute-force-used-crackdown-dissent">a brutal government crackdown</a>, many remain active in publicly articulating their grievances in a variety of ways.</p>
<p>In recent months, while some street presence has continued in Iran — for example, in response to the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/world/middleeast/iran-poison-schoolgirls-protests.html">poisonings of schoolgirls</a> in cities across the country — protesters are also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-executes-four-individuals-convicted-cooperating-with-israel-fars-2022-12-04/">organizing strikes</a>, sit-ins, boycotts and publicizing their demands in the form of manifestos, charters and bills of rights. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-poisoning-of-thousands-of-schoolgirls-piles-more-pressure-on-islamic-republic-struggling-for-survival-201310">Iran: poisoning of thousands of schoolgirls piles more pressure on Islamic Republic struggling for survival</a>
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<p>In fact, a key distinguishing factor between the recent protests and the previous ones is that Iranians have been forming coalitions to advocate for important structural and institutional changes in support of equality, human rights, democracy and freedom. </p>
<h2>Demands for substantial change</h2>
<p>Disillusioned with efforts to democratize and liberalize aspects of Iranian politics and society while working within the confines of the theocratic state, today’s protesters are demanding substantial political and social change that is markedly secular. </p>
<p>The woman, life, freedom protests are calling for basic rights and opportunities that have rarely been recognized throughout the 44-year rule of the Islamic Republic, even after <a href="https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/40788">landslide elections of reform-minded figures</a> who promised reforms. In doing so, the protesters are challenging the core tenets of the theocratic regime.</p>
<p>The leaderless nature of the demonstrations, which <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/meet-iran-s-dissident-rapper-helping-youth-circumvent-regime-internet-crackdown-1.6625351">some key protesters</a> compare <a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/yara-shahidi-iran-protests_n_5a4dad12e4b025f99e1fddf0">to other social justice movements like Black Lives Matter</a>, has also fuelled democratic sentiments in Iran <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2023/03/13/1157657246/iran-hijab-protest-regime-politics-religion-mahsa-amini">that have empowered ordinary Iranians</a> to protest decades of unresponsive and unrepresentative government. </p>
<p>Protesters are now shifting to more concerted efforts involving charters or bills of rights that outline their specific demands — yet another indication that Iranians are politicized, organized and mobilized as they push for change. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">Iran: unions and civil rights groups demand democracy and social justice</a>
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<h2>Calls for a humane society</h2>
<p>In mid-February, coinciding with the 44th anniversary of the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, several civil society groups — including labour unions, student organizations and women’s and human rights groups — collectively publicized <a href="https://iranwire.com/en/politics/113866-iranian-trade-unions-civic-groups-issue-charter-of-minimum-demands/">a joint charter outlining their minimum demands</a> for a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-new-political-system/32276451.html">“new, modern, and humane society.”</a> </p>
<p>The charter focuses on the core demands <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-women-life-freedom-revolution-has-a-manifesto-here-are-the-next-steps/">of large sections of the Iranian population</a>.</p>
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<p>It advocates for a secular state in which “religion is a private matter … and should not interfere in the political, economic, social, and cultural destiny and laws of the country.”</p>
<p>The charter also includes demands for the release of all political prisoners, abolishing discriminatory laws against ethnic and religious minorities and ending environmental destruction. </p>
<p>Soon after the charter’s publication, many Iranian scholars, activists and notable opposition leaders outside of Iran <a href="https://free-them-now.com/?p=4622">expressed their support.</a></p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/iran-unions-and-civil-rights-groups-demand-democracy-and-social-justice-201422">Iran: unions and civil rights groups demand democracy and social justice</a>
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<p>The rallying cry of “woman, life, freedom” has also inspired many women’s and human rights groups to capitalize on the gendered and ethnic aspects of the protests and highlight the interests of historically marginalized populations. </p>
<h2>Solidarity among Iranian feminists</h2>
<p>In February 2023, a group of feminists republished the <a href="https://bidarzani.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Kurdish-Womens-Charter.pdf">Kurdish Women’s Charter</a> that was originally drafted in 2004, but is still relevant given the ongoing systemic discrimination faced by ethnic Kurds in Iran. </p>
<p>One of the biggest successes of the protest movement has been the expressions of solidarity and collaboration among feminist groups, both inside and outside Iran. </p>
<p>After months of collaborative work, a collective of Iranian feminists announced their proposed <a href="https://www.iwbr.org/copy-of-persian-home">Iran Women’s Bill of Rights</a> on March 8, 2023 — International Women’s Day — outlining their key demands for gender equality, non-discrimination and social justice to be included in the future constitution of Iran. </p>
<p>Building on decades-long activism inside Iran, the mostly exiled group of Iranian feminists summarized some of these demands in 20 articles and invited feedback from the general Iranian public on each of them.</p>
<p>The document emphasizes the need for a bill of rights that addresses the historical and systemic discrimination women and other minority populations have long faced in Iran.</p>
<p>It also demands a secular form of government that prioritizes pluralism and egalitarianism, gender parity in political decision-making and immediate abolition of all discriminatory laws against women, ethnic and religious minorities and all other marginalized groups.</p>
<p>It outlines mechanisms for how to achieve each human right, building on feminist thought and the work of the global human rights movements. First, however, the living document will be presented to the Iranian public, initiating discussion and dialogue on its evolution and improvement. </p>
<p>In another historic move, the <a href="https://bidarzani.com/44419">LGBTQ+ community in Iran also published its manifesto</a> in early 2023, outlining its central demands.</p>
<p>This document in particular marked an important moment for Iran in that it publicly addressed assumed taboo topics such as recognition of non-binary gender identities and ways to concretely address systemic violence and discrimination against marginalized populations. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman in white with a beige headscarf and dark sunglasses flashes a victory sign as she walks along a a street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514983/original/file-20230313-21-k6d9l4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514983/original/file-20230313-21-k6d9l4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514983/original/file-20230313-21-k6d9l4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514983/original/file-20230313-21-k6d9l4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514983/original/file-20230313-21-k6d9l4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514983/original/file-20230313-21-k6d9l4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514983/original/file-20230313-21-k6d9l4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A woman flashes a victory sign as she walks around in the old main bazaar of Tehran, Iran, in October 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To address the historical and systemic discrimination and injustice that has limited women’s and minorities’ rights, Iran’s protesters and feminists are actively preparing for substantial change.</p>
<p>These types of coalitions and solidarity among diverse populations are important steps towards the realization of fundamental human rights in the democratic, pluralist and just Iran of the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201543/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mona Tajali is affiliated with the transnational feminist solidarity network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Homa Hoodfar is on the executive board of the Women Living Under Muslim Laws network.
</span></em></p>Following a brutal government crackdown, Iranian protesters are organizing strikes, sit-ins, boycotts and publicizing their demands in the form of manifestos, charters and bills of rights.Mona Tajali, Associate Professor of International Relations and Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Agnes Scott CollegeHoma Hoodfar, Professor of Anthropology, Emerita, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1993292023-02-07T13:18:46Z2023-02-07T13:18:46ZTurkey-Syria earthquake: how disaster diplomacy can bring warring countries together to save lives<p>The death toll of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/64533954">massive earthquakes</a> that have rocked the Turkey-Syria border region has now exceeded 5,000 people and the World Health Organization has suggested it could rise as high as <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/turkey-syria-earthquake-death-toll-increase_uk_63e20fdae4b04d4d18eec4a5#">20,000</a>. The catastrophe has led to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-quake-international-support-offers-aid-2023-02-06/">an international outpouring of support</a>. Numerous international rescue, medical, and other teams are arriving and on their way.</p>
<p>As ever, local emergency services were first on the front line to pull survivors from the collapsed buildings. We know from <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002398">researching previous earthquake responses</a> that most survivors are pulled out of the rubble by local residents and workers in the immediate aftermath.</p>
<p>But rescue attempts are ongoing and reports are continuing to emerge of people being found alive under the rubble, despite freezing temperatures at night and poor weather in many earthquake-affected areas.</p>
<p>Having <a href="https://www.disasterdiplomacy.org">researched disasters in conflict zones</a> for more than 20 years, I’m acutely aware of how difficult the task will be in Turkey and Syria. This border region is riven with conflict which not only impedes the response to the disaster, but also often prevents or inhibits work to reduce the risk of earthquake impacts. Yet effective diplomacy and a willingness for countries to work together despite their tensions can make a huge difference.</p>
<p>The area over which shocks continue to be felt has suffered long-term violent conflict. Kurds in the region have been <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2021.1909285">fighting for a homeland for years</a> in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Syria has been <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/destroying-a-nation-9781784537975/">shattered by civil war</a> since 2011, so the area around Turkey’s border with Syria is packed with refugees from the fighting and is a crossing point for terrorists.</p>
<p>Reports <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/07/syria-earthquake-aftermath-aid-politics">are emerging</a> that Damascus is demanding control of aid crossing into Syria and is allowing relief supplies to enter the region through only one border crossing. There have been calls for more crossing points to be opened to allow aid to get to disaster-affected people in Turkish areas affected by the quakes but so far there is no confirmation that Syria will allow this.</p>
<p>However, past experience tells us that if countries who are seemingly at loggerheads can pull together after a catastrophe such as this, it can sometimes yield dividends. </p>
<p>Turkey itself provides an instructive example. For several decades, Turkey has had a fraught relationship with its neighbour Greece, including over Cyprus since Turkish forces <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_invasion_of_Cyprus">invaded the north</a> in 1974 in response to a coup supported by the Greek military government of the time.</p>
<p>And yet two earthquakes in 1999 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570008400339">challenged this picture</a> of mutual enmity and distrust. On August 17, more than 17,000 people died in an earthquake in north-west Turkey. Greece offered extensive assistance and Turkey accepted.</p>
<p>Then on September 7, Turkey’s main search-and-rescue team phoned the Greek ambassador to Turkey to explain that they had heard that Athens had been rocked by a tremor and to offer assistance. The quake killed over 140 people. A Turkish team pulled at least one trapped person from the rubble.</p>
<p>Since then, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2016.03.004">collaboration between Greece and Turkey</a> on preventing disasters – involving wildfires, earthquakes and other hazards – has endured despite the shifting status of their diplomatic relationship.</p>
<p>Now, less than two months after <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-mevlut-cavusoglu-threat-war-greece-territorial-sea-dispute/">threats of war</a> over disputed territory in the Aegean Sea, Greece is once again <a href="https://greekreporter.com/2023/02/06/turkey-earthquake-greece-sends-help/">offering disaster aid</a> to help Turkey in the wake of the latest earthquakes.</p>
<h2>Stopping earthquake disasters</h2>
<p>However, measures to help prevent disasters are always more useful than international post-disaster aid, which is notoriously inefficient. It usually takes <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002398">at least 24 hours</a> for an international search-and-rescue team to be on site and active.</p>
<p>It’s expensive, too. As part of our research, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002398">we calculated</a> that the approximate cost per post-earthquake life saved by international search-and-rescue teams is US$1 million (£830,000).</p>
<p>Research has shown that “<a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/soc13010008">informal disaster diplomacy</a>” aimed at preventing or mitigating disaster impacts, such as those seen in these earthquakes, tends to be more successful than cooperation after the event. Long-term pre-earthquake actions are certainly far more effective for saving lives and helping people than waiting until the ground has shaken and infrastructure has collapsed.</p>
<p>From the <a href="https://mitigate.be.uw.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/37/2014/11/The-Impact-of-Project-Impact-on-the-Nisqually-Earthquake.pdf">US</a> to <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.11.025">Japan</a>, many lives have been saved by building codes and planning regulations – not to mention a population that knows what to do before and during an earthquake. It’s eminently possible these days to build structures that can <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-gb/Why+Do+Buildings+Collapse+in+Earthquakes%3F+Building+for+Safety+in+Seismic+Areas-p-9781119619420">withstand seismic shaking</a>.</p>
<p>Because of our ability to mitigate the effects of hazards such as earthquakes, researchers <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/disaster-by-choice-9780198841357">avoid the phrase “natural disaster”</a>. Earthquakes will always happen as the earth’s tectonic plates can and do shift. But it doesn’t follow that this must always mean a disaster. And we can make ourselves less vulnerable to tremors by working together – even with our political enemies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/199329/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ilan Kelman receives funding from research councils in the UK and Norway, as well as from the Wellcome Trust and internal UCL funding. He is also Professor II at the University of Agder in Norway and co-directs the non-profit organisation Risk RED (Risk Reduction Education for Disasters).</span></em></p>Disasters such as the earthquake affecting Turkey and Syria are always worse when there is bad blood between the countries involved.Ilan Kelman, Professor of Disasters and Health, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1912972022-09-26T17:47:58Z2022-09-26T17:47:58ZIran on fire: Once again, women are on the vanguard of transformative change<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486510/original/file-20220926-21-vlyodu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4031%2C3024&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In this Monday, Sept. 19, 2022, photo obtained by The Associated Press, a police motorcycle burns during a protest over the death of a young woman who had been detained for violating the country's conservative dress code in downtown Tehran, Iran.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/iran-on-fire--once-again--women-are-on-the-vanguard-of-transformative-change" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>On Sept. 16, 2022, Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, died in Tehran, Iran, while in police custody. Amini was arrested by the Guidance Patrol, the morality squad of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran that oversees public implementation of hijab regulations, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/23/opinions/mahsa-amini-iran-protests-hair-women-nemat/index.html">for not wearing a hijab properly</a>.</p>
<p>Soon after the news of her death was broadcast and a photograph emerged on social media of her lying in a Tehran hospital in a coma, people throughout the country became enraged. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1571264656810905606"}"></div></p>
<p>Amini’s death starkly illustrated the systematic violence of police and highlighted particularly the brutality of the regime towards women and minorities. She was Kurdish, <a href="https://dckurd.org/2020/09/15/overlooked-by-the-inter/">a member of one of the most oppressed minority ethnic groups in Iran.</a> </p>
<p>All Iranian women who are routinely humiliated because of their gender can empathize with her. But Kurds and Kurdish women in particular understood the political message of her death at the hands of police and the state’s subsequent violent response to the protests.</p>
<p>The huge wave of protests in Iran following Amini’s death represents a historic moment in Iran. People have taken to the streets shouting slogans against the compulsory hijab and denouncing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/23/how-iran-erupted-after-mahsa-amini-death-protests">Protests have raged</a> in 31 provinces, including Kurdistan and Tehran as well as cities such as Rasht, Isfahan and Qom, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/23/mahsa-amini-death-could-be-spark-broader-political-action-iran">among Iran’s most conservative communities</a>. Dozens of people <a href="https://bbc.in/3LFqH9N">have been killed by security forces and hundreds more have been arrested.</a> </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A large crowd and cars are seen on a tree-lined city street, smoke billowing in places." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3000%2C1998&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486507/original/file-20220926-27-3rh4qw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this photo taken by an individual not employed by the Associated Press and obtained by the AP outside Iran, protesters chant slogans during a protest over the death of Mahsa Amini, who was detained by the morality police, in downtown Tehran, Iran, on Sept. 21, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Girls of Revolution Street</h2>
<p>Although the current uprising may seem unprecedented, it is in fact part of a deep-rooted and longstanding resistance movement by women in Iran. </p>
<p>In what is widely seen as a punishment to the hundreds of women who participated in the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/">anti-regime protests leading to the Iranian Revolution of 1979</a>, the hijab became compulsory two years later in 1981.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/iranian-women-risk-arrest-daughters-of-the-revolution-92880">Iranian women risk arrest: Daughters of the revolution</a>
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</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Consequently, publicly removing hijabs <a href="https://www.radiofarda.com/a/29998175.html">became a challenge to the regime in Iran</a>.</p>
<p>Decades later, in 2017, Vida Movahed climbed onto a platform on Enghelab (Revolution) Street in the centre of Tehran, <a href="https://iranhumanrights.org/2019/05/icon-of-irans-hijab-protest-movement-vida-movahedi-released-from-prison/">took off her headscarf and waved it in the air</a> as a sign of opposition to compulsory hijab. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1572001541472817153"}"></div></p>
<p>She was followed by other women and the movement quickly became known <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/the-girls-of-revolution-street-waving-their-veils/">as The Girls of Revolution Street</a> or <em>Dokhtaran-e Khiaban-e Enghelab</em>. </p>
<p>The Girls of Revolution Street represented a fundamental challenge by younger women to Iran’s compulsory veiling laws. Their actions resulted in an <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-protest-against-hijab-veil/29011931.html">increase in the number of women who braved the streets without hijab</a> in defiance of the state.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, when religious hardliner <a href="https://msmagazine.com/2021/06/18/iran-presidential-election-feminist-womens-rights/">Ebrahim Raisi became president in the contested 2020 election</a>, the message was clear: Women would be further oppressed.</p>
<h2>Zan, Zendegi, Azadi: Woman, life, freedom</h2>
<p>This recent uprising is a link in a chain of protests that together have the potential to bring about fundamental change in Iran. </p>
<p>It began with the pro-democracy <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/6/12/what-happened-to-the-green-movement-in-iran">Green Movement in 2009</a> followed by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/24/world/middleeast/iran-protests-raisi-khamenei-hijab.html">popular uprisings in 2018 and 2019</a>. The Green Movement was largely peaceful, but the uprisings grew increasingly more confrontational with each wave of repression.</p>
<p>Women have been in the lead in all these protests, posing a real challenge to the regime. They’re the leaders of transformative change, the vanguard of a potential revolution, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/23/mahsa-amini-death-could-be-spark-broader-political-action-iran">challenging the legitimacy of the current government.</a>. </p>
<p>The current protests are focused on two main demands: dignity and freedom. Both have been absent from political life in Iran, and both have a prominent presence in almost all slogans during this uprising, particularly “Woman, Life, Freedom.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman holds a sign that reads Women, Life, Freedom at a protest march." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/486525/original/file-20220926-25-diz3bl.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Iranian community and their supporters rally in solidarity with protesters in Iran in Ottawa on Sept. 25, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">THE CANADIAN PRESS/Justin Tang</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The recent uprising makes it clear that the demand for radical change in Iran today is strong and significant. </p>
<p>With every wave of protest, the desire for freedom gets stronger, the voices get louder and success is within reach. Once again, Iranian women are at the forefront of demanding transformative change. </p>
<p>With the strong support this time of men, political and ethnic minorities and other disenfranchised groups, they may be leading their country closer to a freer and more just society.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191297/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vrinda Narain is a Board Member of the research organization, Women Living Under Muslim Laws.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fatemeh Sadeghi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Women have long demanded change in Iran. In the aftermath of the death of a woman for a hijab violation, women protesters may be leading their country to a freer and more just society.Vrinda Narain, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism; Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill UniversityFatemeh Sadeghi, Research associate, Politics, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881212022-08-18T12:39:57Z2022-08-18T12:39:57ZUkrainian people are resisting the centuries-old force of Russian imperialism – Ukraine war at 6 months<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479479/original/file-20220816-16068-oq2vva.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C28%2C4763%2C3130&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People attend an exhibition of Russian equipment destroyed by the armed forces of Ukraine, in Lviv, Ukraine, Aug. 11, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-attend-the-opening-of-the-exhibition-of-russian-news-photo/1242453575?adppopup=true">Olena Znak/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war being waged by Russia in Ukraine has been described in many ways – an attempt to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26769481">recreate the USSR</a>, a militant <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/22/opinion/russia-ukraine-putin-eurasianism.html">attempt to create a new Eurasia civilization</a>, or a <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/ukraine-russia-us-proxy-war-b2073399.html">proxy war between Russia and the West</a>. But whatever Russian President <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/putins-ambitions-seriously-set-back-failures-ukraine-ex-cia-chief-1692236">Vladimir Putin’s ambitions and aspirations</a> were in the past, they have become ever more blatantly imperial and colonial as the fighting continues. </p>
<p>A colonial war, like Russia’s in Ukraine, is one in which a self-styled superior people believes it has the right, even the duty, to do what it feels is good for its inferiors – which conveniently conforms to its own self-interest. </p>
<p>“Colonial” or “imperial” are not just epithets thrown around casually, as are the now-familiar accusations of <a href="https://theconversation.com/yes-putin-and-russia-are-fascist-a-political-scientist-shows-how-they-meet-the-textbook-definition-179063">fascism and genocide, most recently used against Russia</a>.</p>
<p>As polemical as their usage can be, colonialism and imperialism have explanatory power. </p>
<p>Imperialism was an <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/russias-empires-9780199924394?cc=us&lang=en&">antiquated system of domination</a> that attempted to include diverse peoples within a single state under the authority of a purportedly superior institution – emperors, nobles or Übermenschen – or in overseas empires under the control of a foreign master who promised to “civilize” – as they put it – the benighted natives. </p>
<p>Think of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/British-raj">British in India</a> – white men lording it over millions of Indians in the name of a higher civilization. Or the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/summary/House-of-Habsburg">Habsburg dynasty ruling peoples</a> from Spain to the Netherlands to Austria and Hungary via strategic marriage and military conquest. </p>
<p>If empires were diverse and inegalitarian, modern nation-states were supposedly intended by their creators to be relatively homogeneous and egalitarian. <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/books/2259-imagined-communities">Nation-makers recognized popular sovereignty</a> rather than dynastic rule. They operated democratically. The right to rule rose up from the people. </p>
<p>Consider the earliest capitalist states of the 17th and 18th centuries – England, the Netherlands and France – that practiced nation-making at home in Europe. By the time of the French Revolution of 1789, their <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo81816822.html">people were dealt with as equal citizens under the law</a>, not as a monarch’s subjects. </p>
<p>But in their colonies – like the Dutch East Indies or French Indochina – <a href="https://academic.oup.com/california-scholarship-online/book/18905">the locals were subjects of imperial authorities from afar</a>, bereft of rights and sovereignty.</p>
<p>In the historical stories told by nationalists, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/14/empires-with-expiration-dates/">nation-states were supposed to be the legitimate successors of empires</a>. Relatively homogeneous culturally, with rulers chosen by the people, they were products of the modern world, while empires were seen as archaic and doomed to collapse. </p>
<p>But it has not quite worked out that way in the past century. And Russia’s war on Ukraine is a reflection of that.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479478/original/file-20220816-9774-fdxygk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men, one in a suit, the other in a uniform, talking across a table." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479478/original/file-20220816-9774-fdxygk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479478/original/file-20220816-9774-fdxygk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479478/original/file-20220816-9774-fdxygk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479478/original/file-20220816-9774-fdxygk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=368&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479478/original/file-20220816-9774-fdxygk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479478/original/file-20220816-9774-fdxygk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479478/original/file-20220816-9774-fdxygk.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=463&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, listens to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s report in the Kremlin in Moscow on July 4, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraine/209b825923bd40ecaa5b3d85c8a86c26/photo?Query=(persons.person_featured:(Vladimir%20AND%20Putin))%20AND%20%20(Putin%20Ukraine)%20&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1175&currentItemNo=0">Mikhail Klimentyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>21st-century imperialists</h2>
<p>Over the past century, those who believed egalitarian and democratic nation-states would logically and naturally succeed empires have gotten a reeducation in political theory. </p>
<p>Nation-states can be imperialist and seek to envelop other nationalities within their territory or dominate their neighbors militarily or economically. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s <a href="https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/kurdish-repression-turkey">Turkey treats its tens of millions of Kurds like a colonized people</a>. A nation-state privileging one ethno-religious people, like Israel, <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/palestinians-in-israel-then-and-now">subjects millions of Palestinians to inequitable domination</a>. </p>
<p>Large diverse states, like the United States and India, swing between multicultural egalitarianism, recognizing the rights of minorities, and bouts of xenophobic hostility to those <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trumps-immigration-rule-is-cruel-and-racistbut-its-nothing-new">differing from the majority, white</a> or <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/mass-movement-or-elite-conspiracy-the-puzzle-of-hindu-nationalism/oclc/847441763">Hindu</a>. </p>
<p>Within such states some people are treated more favorably than others. Minorities often experience not only discrimination, but violence. Other large, diverse states, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/world/europe/putin-war-ukraine-recolonization.html">like Putin’s Russia</a>, also vacillate between a multinational nation-state – about 80% are ethnic Russians – and imperial treatment of various subordinate peoples. </p>
<p>The Kremlin elite has promoted a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/russias-road-to-autocracy/">virulent nationalism to rally the population</a> in its war against Ukraine, which represents a turn toward neocolonialism.</p>
<p>Take Putin’s opportunistic and disingenuous use of the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/putin-vows-that-as-in-1945-ukraine-will-be-liberated-from-nazi-filth/">language of liberation</a>, of <a href="https://theconversation.com/putins-claims-that-ukraine-is-committing-genocide-are-baseless-but-not-unprecedented-177511">preventing genocide</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/decrying-nazism-even-when-its-not-there-has-been-russias-invade-country-for-free-card-183695">removal of Nazis</a> as justification for his invasion of Ukraine. He uses that language in the way 19th-century imperialists did when they invaded, dominated and exploited other countries, claiming they were reluctantly undertaking the <a href="http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5478">burden that white men had to bear to defend</a> against barbarians and savages. </p>
<p>Having failed to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/nato-sees-russia-war-entering-stalemate-neither-side-can-win-rcna20877">decapitate the Ukrainian government</a>, the Kremlin retreated to <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/renewed-russian-attacks-strike-areas-ukraine-86927182">taking territory savagely in the east and south of the country</a>. The <a href="https://uacrisis.org/en/russkiy-mir-as-the-kremlin-s-quasi-ideology">mythology of the Russkiy Mir</a> – the supposed unity of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian peoples – has been instrumentally deployed by Russia to justify the brutal attack on the very people who were supposed to be the brothers and sisters of the Russians. </p>
<h2>‘Threatened by dangerous inferiors’</h2>
<p>Contrary to Russia’s plans, Kyiv did not surrender. Ukrainians instead <a href="https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2022/0802/1313587-ukraine-russia-resistance-movement/">flocked to the struggle</a> against alien rule. The result of the invasion has been the strengthened resolve of Ukrainians to resist a new colonialism, which they remember having experienced for hundreds of years under the czars and the Soviets. </p>
<p>As a historian <a href="https://www.dartmouth.edu/%7Ecrn/crn_papers/Suny4.pdf">who has studied</a> <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/history/people/emeritus/rgsuny.html">empires and nations</a>, I believe that once a government like Putin’s has concluded that its existence is threatened by dangerous inferiors, it is motivated to use its greater power and its own righteous sense of historical superiority to bring its enemies under control. </p>
<p>If indirect rule by pliant native rulers or satraps are not sufficient to remove the perceived danger, territorial acquisition is likely to follow. The option left to Moscow as the war grinds into stalemate is direct rule over Ukrainian territory. </p>
<p>Lands under the fragile and contested control of the Russians are already being <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">consolidated into a newly named territory</a>. A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/luhansk-governor-says-russia-will-shift-main-focus-donetsk-region-2022-07-04/">governor has been appointed</a>, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-starts-giving-passports-to-ukrainians-from-donetsk-luhansk/a-49207353">passports issued</a>; the <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/02/27/ukraines-breakaway-luhansk-republic-adopts-russian-ruble-a57280">ruble imposed</a> as the official currency. Russia’s maximal goals appear to be to <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/07/19/putin-russia-annex-ukraine-kherson-donetsk-luhansk">take possession of the whole crescent</a> in eastern Ukraine, from Kharkiv to Kherson/Nikolaev as well as Crimea, <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russia-annex-crimea-why-putin-invaded-2014-what-happened-nato-annexation-explained-1424682">annexed already by Russia</a> in 2014.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479487/original/file-20220816-9595-6ekrue.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young woman and a girl stand together amid destroyed homes, looking sad." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479487/original/file-20220816-9595-6ekrue.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479487/original/file-20220816-9595-6ekrue.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479487/original/file-20220816-9595-6ekrue.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479487/original/file-20220816-9595-6ekrue.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479487/original/file-20220816-9595-6ekrue.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479487/original/file-20220816-9595-6ekrue.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479487/original/file-20220816-9595-6ekrue.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Residents look at damaged homes from a Russian rocket attack, Aug. 16, 2022, in Kramatorsk, eastern Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXRussiaUkraineWar/332b1ea4b75f49c48a1a4b05c886f0c1/photo?Query=war%20ukraine&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=26850&currentItemNo=1">AP Photo/David Goldman</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Reality bites back</h2>
<p>As a nation-state engaged in consolidating its <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-democracy-separating-fact-fiction-russia-1690505">identity as democratic and Western</a>, Ukraine faces an implacable foe whose current sense of self is embedded in its imperial past and its distinction from the West. </p>
<p>Torn for 30 years of independence <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/22/ukraine-east-west-war-narrows-divide/">between East and West</a>, thanks to Russia’s aggression Ukraine has decisively chosen the West. The imperialist war has given rise to an effective, if desperate, anti-colonial resistance. Ukrainians are more united than ever before. </p>
<p>For Ukrainians, compromise between independence and sovereignty on one hand and subjugation to imperialism <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/russias-war-ukraine-how-get-negotiations">on the other appears impossible</a>. Surrendering land to the aggressor, it is widely believed, will only feed his appetite.</p>
<p>Almost six months into the war, the Russians have their own cruel calculus. Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, has issued a dire warning: The <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/84c4beae-fbd6-4d1e-aeb5-5d147b9621a4">longer the war goes on, the more territory</a> will be seized by Russia and brought into the expanding Russian state. The West’s continued arming of Ukraine, he claims, only <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/sergey-lavrov-russia-expand-ukraine-war-goal/">prolongs the war</a>. </p>
<p>There is, at the moment, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/08/01/russia-ukraine-and-the-decision-to-negotiate/">little appetite on either side for a negotiated settlement</a>. </p>
<p>But in this war of attrition, time and the weight of geography and population <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/21/world/europe/ukraine-russia-weapons-war.html">are on the side of the aggressor</a>. Russia can <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d60ef086-a252-4d6d-8534-e39ccd541926">outlast its opponents and the West</a>. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-japan-asia-middle-east-14350d5bd6d036c68159d02c2db79698">Overshadowing everything is the nuclear threat</a>.</p>
<p>War is a failure of reason, diplomacy and compromise. The <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-middle-east-global-trade-a2c89d94a0f8473b40a1fcde5710bda8">negotiations that allowed Ukrainian grain exports to resume</a> demonstrate that some compromise, however fragile, might be reached. </p>
<p>As difficult and unsavory as it is to negotiate with Putin, some end must ultimately be discussed. This is a tragic choice. Yet even empires have their limits, and when faced with determined opposition, they learn the harsh lesson of imperial overreach.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188121/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Democratic nation-states were supposed to be the legitimate successors of empires. It hasn’t quite worked out that way in the past century, and Russia’s war on Ukraine is a reflection of that.Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1837572022-05-26T15:09:35Z2022-05-26T15:09:35ZUkraine war: crisis between the west and Russia gives Turkey a chance to strengthen its hand at home and abroad<p>The longstanding neutrality of Sweden and Finland was abandoned when both states <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_195468.htm">submitted formal applications to Nato</a>. But they are facing an unexpected obstacle on the way to membership: <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/05/22/why-turkey-is-blocking-bids-by-sweden-and-finland-to-join-nato">Turkey</a>. While Turkey supports the alliance’s “open door” policy, Ankara’s veto reflects its aims to change the status quo and make gains in three areas: the eastern Mediterranean, Syria – and in its own domestic politics.</p>
<p>Turkey has always had bumpy relations with Nato. In 2009, Ankara <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/05/nato-eu-denmark-turkey">blocked the appointment</a> of the former Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as Nato secretary-general, because of his defence of free speech during the Danish cartoons crisis in 2006. He also allowed a rebel Kurdish TV station to broadcast from Denmark into Turkey. Another low point was in 2019, when Turkey started a military campaign against the Kurdish forces in Syria. This led to Nato secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, criticising Ankara for “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/10/14/turkeys-relationship-with-nato-tested-over-syria-operation">jeopardising</a>” the fight against Islamic State. </p>
<p>The current crisis is in some ways a hangover from previous episodes particularly in relation to the Kurdish region in Syria. But it is unfolding against the backdrop of different geopolitical realities, including the deterioration of relations between the west and Russia, as well as a new domestic political context in Turkey.</p>
<h2>Turkey vs Greece</h2>
<p>There is an interesting backstory to the recent confrontation between Greece and Turkey involving tensions between the US and Turkey – which have been <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/13/europe/turkey-russia-missiles-nato-analysis-intl/index.html">building up for some time</a>. When, in 2017, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian leader Vladimir Putin agreed on a deal for the purchase of Russian S-400 missile system, the US retaliated with the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/17/us-cuts-turkey-from-f-35-program-after-russian-missile-deal.html">exclusion of Turkey</a> from the F35 jet fighters development programme, banning Turkey from the purchase of the jets. The Biden administration has reportedly been considering dropping this ban in recent months, prompting the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61562305">to urge the US Congress</a> to reconsider.</p>
<p>There’s a complex background to all this. Athens is a key player in eastern Mediterranean energy politics, and the exploration of energy sources in the contested waters of the eastern Mediterranean as well as Egypt’s need to transport its natural gas exports to Europe has forged an alliance between Greece, Israel, Egypt and Cyprus – a bloc which excludes Turkey. Meanwhile, the EU has sanctioned two executives of Turkish Petroleum Incorporated Company for <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/11/11/unauthorised-drilling-activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-council-prolongs-the-sanctions-regime-by-one-year/">“illegal drilling activities”</a>, because they were unauthorised by the Republic of Cyprus, which claims sovereignty in the area.</p>
<p>But as the search for alternative energy sources for Europe continues against the backdrop of the breakdown of relations with Russia over the war in Ukraine, Ankara sees an opportunity to break its isolation by becoming an energy hub for the west. However it believes Sweden and Finland’s prospective Nato membership could increase opposition to Turkey’s energy interests within the alliance in favour of Greece and Cyprus. </p>
<h2>Turkey vs YPG</h2>
<p>Meanwhile Sweden and Finland have operated an arms embargo against Turkey since 2019, prompted by Turkish military operations against Kurdish People’s Defence Forces (YPG) in northern Syria. Turkey sees the YPG as the offshoot of the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer">Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)</a>, which is recognised as a <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/866092/Turkey_country_policy_and_information_note_Kurdistan_workers_party__PKK__February_2020.pdf">terrorist organisation</a> by Turkey, the US and the EU. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1528687754254630913"}"></div></p>
<p>Sweden is home to a huge number of Kurdish refugees, estimated at <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/sweden-finland-nato-turkey-erdogan-magdalena-anderssonkurdish-rights/">more than 100,000</a> and Ankara has long been uneasy about the relationship between the Swedish leadership and the the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD – the political wing of YPG). These concerns deepened after Magdalena Andersson was elected as prime minister in 2021, partly as a result of the support of a Kurdish member of parliament. It has been reported that the support was secured <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-18/why-sweden-s-stance-on-kurds-riles-turkey-s-erdogan-quicktake">in exchange for increasing cooperation</a> between Andersson’s Social Democrats and the PYD, including better treatment of the supporters of YPG in Sweden and not giving in to Turkey’s demands. </p>
<p>Turkey also claims that Sweden provides military equipment to the Kurds, something it has criticised as against “<a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/directorate-of-communications-posts-on-swedens-application-for-nato-membership">the spirit of the alliance</a>”. </p>
<p>Like in the eastern Mediterranean, the new geopolitical context offers Ankara an opportunity to change the status quo in favour of Turkey. If Ankara were to secure Swedish and Finnish concessions on reducing support to the Kurds in Syria, it would be seen as an important victory for Turkey. Assurances that Sweden and Finland would not block the military equipment transfer to Turkey or veto the trigger of Article 5 of the Nato treaty in case Turkey is attacked by an aggressor, would also be significant gains.</p>
<h2>Domestic politics</h2>
<p>Domestic politics is also playing an important part in Turkey’s diplomatic manoeuvrings. According to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/turkeys-economic-woes-are-hurting-erdogan-polls-2022-01-11/">latest polls</a>, Erdoğan faces stiff opposition in the 2023 presidential elections and his Justice and Development Party could lose its parliamentary majority to a united opposition alliance, thanks to a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/apr/16/turkeys-war-with-inflation-prices-change-daily-and-everyone-is-scared">deepening economic crisis</a>, high inflation and devalued Turkish lira. </p>
<p>Erdoğan, like any populist politician, knows how to manipulate voters by presenting himself as a strong hand against perceived enemies at home or abroad. Presenting a tough stance against Sweden and Finland’s support for the Kurdish forces in Syria, plays well to domestic audiences in Turkey. As does <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61562305">hitting back against Greece</a>. It all adds up to a “siege mentality” strategy, which is likely to be the backbone of the government’s election campaign in coming months. The government is likely to make strong associations between the opposition parties and internal and external threats to help shift the focus from the deep economic crisis besetting the country.</p>
<p>Turkey cannot postpone Swedish and Finnish membership forever – but it’s possible that Ankara will receive some of the assurances it seeks. After all, Erdoğan has got away with using international crises for its own domestic and foreign policy ends. But in the context of a new cold war between the west and Russia, Turkey’s manoeuvrings might play into the hands of those questioning Turkey’s commitment to the alliance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183757/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Bilgic does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey’s veto on Finland and Sweden joining the alliance is part of a complex political game being played by Ankara.Ali Bilgic, Reader in International Relations and Security, Loughborough UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1721082021-11-18T13:10:53Z2021-11-18T13:10:53ZTrouble on the Belarus-Poland border: What you need to know about the migrant crisis manufactured by Belarus’ leader<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/432493/original/file-20211117-13-lknwzf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C19%2C3278%2C2114&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hopes for a better future?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/migrants-aiming-to-cross-into-poland-camp-near-the-bruzgi-news-photo/1236622809?adppopup=true">Maxim Guchek/BELTA/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Using migrants as pawns is perhaps nothing new. But rarely do you have a situation in which one country encourages a migrant crisis on its own border for nakedly geopolitical reasons.</em></p>
<p><em>That is what appears to be happening at the Poland-Belarus border, where <a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2021/11/16/poland-belarus-migrants-border-crisis-chance-intl-ldn-vpx.cnn">violence has broken out</a> between Polish border guards and Middle Eastern migrants who traveled there via Belarus, and who are set on reaching the European Union. Meanwhile, there is growing concern over those <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/16/world/europe/poland-belarus-border-crisis.html">camped out in freezing conditions</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation asked Tatsiana Kulakevich, a <a href="https://www.usf.edu/arts-sciences/departments/school-of-interdisciplinary-global-studies/people/tkulakevich.aspx">specialist on Eastern European politics at the University of South Florida</a>, to break down how the migrant crisis came about and what the fallout might be.</em></p>
<h2>What is going on at the Belarus-Polish border?</h2>
<p>Images of migrants – many of them families with children – <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2021/11/16/1051199592/photos-belarus-poland-border-migrants">camped at the Belarus-Poland border</a>, trying to force their way into Poland and being <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/poland-uses-water-hoses-on-migrants-condemns-belarus-for-attack">deterred by water hoses</a>, have gained international attention in recent days. On Nov. 18, it was reported that many of the migrants were <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/11/18/world/belarus-poland-border-migrants?partner=slack&smid=sl-share">being moved back from the border</a>, to a government-run facility. But it is not clear what the long-term plan is for those who have gathered in Belarus with no intention of returning to their countries of origin.</p>
<p>The crisis has been months in the making.</p>
<p>The influx of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/immigration-business-belarus-poland-middle-east-e3debda6f6f8cbc9ba6b59fa8aa322d8">migrants to Belarus from the Middle East began in early summer 2021</a>. But they didn’t come to stay in Belarus. Their ultimate destination was Western Europe. Now, there are thousands of people spending nights near the barbed-wire fence separating Belarus from EU member Poland.</p>
<p>The situation took a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-fears-major-incident-migrants-belarus-head-border-2021-11-08/">dramatic turn on Nov. 8</a> when thousands of new arrivals showed up at the Belarus-Poland border and tried to break through makeshift fences on the border, with the goal to crossing into the European Union.</p>
<p>This migrant crisis has a twist – it appears to be encouraged by Alexander Lukashenko, Belarus’ leader, who’s at the center of the border conflict as part of a ploy to flood the EU members that border Belarus – Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – with large numbers of migrants in retaliation for a series of sanctions against the Lukashenko government.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/immigration-business-belarus-poland-middle-east-e3debda6f6f8cbc9ba6b59fa8aa322d8">denied encouraging migrants</a> into Europe. The evidence suggests otherwise.</p>
<p>Belavia, the Belarus state airline, increased the number of flights from the Middle East – including Iraq, Lebanon and Syria – in recent months to enable more migrants to come. For example, <a href="https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/11/12/bilet-v-belorusskii-kontslager">flightradar24.com</a>, which monitors global air traffic, reported 27 flights from Beirut to Minsk from August to November 2021, compared to only five in the whole of 2020.</p>
<p>And according to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/13/world/middleeast/belarus-migrants-iraq-kurds.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur">some of the migrants from Iraq</a>, Belarusian officials arranged for their stay in hotels and helped them reach the border with Poland. Belarusian border guards, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/59233244">it has been reported</a>, led migrants to a gap which had been cut in the border fence, allowing them to bypass the official checkpoint. Meanwhile, other migrants say they were provided axes and wire cutters by Belarusian border guards to cut through fences.</p>
<p>In response, the Polish government has closed its border with Belarus.</p>
<h2>What is the background to the crisis?</h2>
<p>The actions of the Belarusian government appear to be in retaliation for economic sanctions imposed by the international community in response to Lukashenko’s increasingly autocratic rule.</p>
<p>In August 2020, Belarusian authorities cracked down on protesters demanding the resignation of Lukashenko following a disputed – many say <a href="https://apnews.com/article/international-news-ap-top-news-europe-72e43a8b9e4c56362d4c1d6393bd54fb">rigged</a> – election. Opposition leaders say as many as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/belarus-election-protests/more-than-130-anti-lukashenko-protesters-detained-in-belarus-rights-group-idUSKBN28N0FK">30,000 people were detained</a> in efforts to suppress demonstrations.</p>
<p>The United States and the European Union <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-eu/eu-says-lukashenko-is-not-legitimate-belarus-president-idUSKCN26F0ZE">refused to recognize Lukashenko’s legitimacy</a> as president and, in September 2020, imposed a series of sanctions targeting Belarusian officials with asset freezes and travel bans. </p>
<p>The EU followed that up with two further rounds of sanctions in November and December of that year.</p>
<p>A fourth packet of EU sanctions came after Belarus <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2021/05/23/belarus-intercepts-ryanair-flight-and-detains-journalist-sparking-international-outrage/?sh=6e1a91634e6f">intercepted a Ryanair flight</a> carrying Raman Pratasevich, an opposition journalist and a former editor-in-chief of the Telegram Nexta news channel, along with 132 other passengers in May 2021. Belarusian authorities arrested the journalist and his partner before allowing the plane to continue to its destination. In June 2021, Pratasevich was moved under house arrest.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has sought to suppress any signs of protest activities. Since the beginning of the presidential election campaign in May 2020, the number of political prisoners in Belarus has increased from three to <a href="https://prisoners.spring96.org/en">868 as of November 18, 2021</a>.</p>
<h2>Where are these refugees coming from, and why?</h2>
<p>The asylum seekers are mostly Kurds from Iraq, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-11-17/why-iraqi-kurds-are-fleeing-their-peaceful-homeland">fleeing persecution and poverty</a>. But there are also migrants from Lebanon, Syria and Afghanistan. They are trying to cross into EU member states Lithuania, Latvia and Poland.</p>
<p>Previously, Middle Eastern migrants mainly crossed the Turkish border with the EU, and from Africa via the Mediterranean Sea.</p>
<p>These crossings can be treacherous, so the prospect of flying straight into Belarus instead of risking drowning proved an attractive option.</p>
<p>But now thousands are stuck or hiding along the Belarusian-Polish border, facing freezing temperatures. The cold and lack of humanitarian support have caused multiple cases of hypothermia and at least <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/16/poland-belarus-border-crisis-eu-refugees">nine deaths</a>.</p>
<h2>What chances are there for a resolution to the crisis?</h2>
<p>Lukashenko is using the border issues as leverage against the EU. He wants the lifting or easing of existing sanctions and recognition that he is the legitimate ruler of Belarus. </p>
<p>The EU, meanwhile, has announced plans for more sanctions against Belarus. But it has also held out the possibility of negotiations on resolving the migration crisis.</p>
<p>Lukashenko and Germany’s acting Chancellor, Angela Merkel, have held <a href="https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/germanys-merkel-belarus-lukashenko-hold-another-phone-call-belta">two phone calls</a> since the escalation of the border crisis on Nov. 8. They represented Lukashenko’s first conversations with a European leader since the 2020 presidential election. </p>
<p>The phone calls happened after Russian President Vladimir Putin, an ally of Lukashenko and the Belarusian regime, <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-merkel-hold-2nd-phone-talk-in-2-days-about-migration-crisis-on-belarusian-polish-border/2418512">called on EU leaders</a> to talk directly with Lukashenko. </p>
<h2>What could be the fallout?</h2>
<p>The EU, the U.S. and NATO have strongly condemned <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-23/belarus-accused-of-using-migrants-in-hybrid-attack-against-eu">Lukashenko’s ushering</a> migrants to the EU border. The EU recently announced plans for a fifth round of sanctions against Belarus, targeting airlines, travel agencies and individuals believed to be facilitating the push of migrants. </p>
<p>Lukashenko, in turn, has threatened to retaliate against further sanctions, including <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/belarus-threaten-europe-gas/2021/11/11/970c725c-42df-11ec-9404-50a28a88b9cd_story.html">cutting off natural gas transit</a> from Russia to EU countries through Belarus.</p>
<p>Setting the stage for this, on Nov. 17, Belarus <a href="https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/17/belarus-limits-oil-flow-to-poland-due-to-pipeline-repairs-amid-growing-tensions-on-border/">restricted the pumping of oil</a> through the Druzhba pipeline to Poland, saying it was the result of “unscheduled repair work” that would last approximately three days. </p>
<p>[<em>More than 140,000 readers get one of The Conversation’s informative newsletters.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140K">Join the list today</a>.]</p>
<p>But cutting off the gas supply to Europe would likely only be a short-term measure for Lukashenko. Anything more than a few days would go against Russia’s interests and could cause a rift with Putin – and keeping Putin on his side is crucial for Lukashenko.</p>
<p>Moscow has provided a financial lifeline to Lukashenko’s regime and promised to protect Belarus from external military threats. As long as Lukashenko retains Putin’s support, he will be able to continue to suppress dissent internally and ignore international pressure to respect borders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172108/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Belarus has created a migrant crisis at its border in an apparent move to punish the European Union for its opposition to the country’s leader.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor of Instruction at SIGS, Research Fellow, Affiliate Faculty at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1689052021-10-01T15:26:28Z2021-10-01T15:26:28ZJoe Biden’s pledge of support reassures Syria’s embattled Kurds<p>The hasty and badly organised <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-107386">US withdrawal from Afghanistan</a> in August prompted fears among Washington’s other allies about the durability of US friendship. Kurdish troops in northeastern Syria, facing multi-pronged opposition from Islamic State fighters as well as the Assad regime and the prospect of Turkish incursion, have felt particularly vulnerable.</p>
<p>So recent meetings between senior US officials and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which resulted in a pledge by US president, Joe Biden, that the <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/biden-wont-abandon-us-like-he-did-the-afghans-says-syrian-rebel-leader-mazloum-abdi-qms57f6gf">US would not abandon them</a> have gone a long way to allaying those fears.</p>
<p>There are about 35 million ethnic Kurds living in Kurdistan, an area comprising parts of northeastern Syria, northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey and western Iran. At various times groups in different parts of this area have pressed for independent statehood, but on the whole the majority – at present, at least – are relatively content to occupy autonomous regions. In Syria this is the <a href="https://rojavainformationcenter.com/background/key-facts/">Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)</a> otherwise known as Rojava.</p>
<p>US involvement in Syria and military support for the Kurdish-led forces has paid significant dividends for both sides. Supported by around 2,000 US troops on the ground and an air campaign, the SDF has proved to be an most effective buffer against Islamic State in Syria and played a decisive role in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-47678157">ending its territorial control in March 2019</a>.</p>
<p>But there has been an ever-present fear that the US will pull out, leaving them at the mercy of their enemies. This fear was stoked in October 2019 when former president Donald Trump <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/08/donald-trump-afghanistan-us-troops-taliban">ordered US troops to withdraw from the region</a>, effectively giving the green light to a Turkish invasion and capture of a large area of AANES territory. In the event, Russia brokered an agreement between Turkey and SDF. Turkey got a safe zone along the border and SDF <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/27/sdf-begins-withdrawal-from-syria-turkey-border">agreed to withdraw 20 miles south of the border</a>. The US, meanwhile, maintained enough of a military force to continue supporting the Kurds’ efforts to stabilise the region. But the possibility of an abrupt US withdrawal has been shaping Kurdish actions ever since.</p>
<p>The election of Joe Biden in November 2020 raised the hopes that the US would adopt a steadier approach in its dealings with the Kurds in Syria. And it seems that, on appearances at least, the US is willing to do so. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1443093157701464067"}"></div></p>
<p>Meetings between US state department officials and the SDF leadership in August and September 2021 ended with <a href="https://twitter.com/USEmbassySyria/status/1443093157701464067">the US emphasising</a> its “commitment to the campaign against ISIS and stability in the region” and assuring the SDF that “there will be no changes in Syria” in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>What’s in it for America</h2>
<p>The US military support and security umbrella it provides may have been a critical factor behind the Kurds’ success, but safeguarding Kurdish gains is not the reason behind the Biden administration’s decision. There are several other factors at play. Firstly, the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria continues, despite the group’s loss of its territorial control. Iraq’s short and medium-term security and stability remains a <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICS-Iraq_UNCLASS_508.pdf">key US priority</a> and an abrupt withdrawal from Syria would aid the resurgence of IS in Iraq. </p>
<p>The US military presence in Syria is also needed to curb Iran’s influence in both Iraq and Syria and address the security concerns many US allies – particularly Israel – in the region feel as a result.</p>
<p>The continuation of the US military support and financial aid is crucial to the region’s stability and could act as a springboard for accommodating Kurdish rights and the inclusion of the AANES into Syria if political pluralism and a <a href="https://rojavainformationcenter.com/storage/2021/06/Beyond-the-frontlines-The-building-of-the-democratic-system-in-North-and-East-Syria-Report-Rojava-Information-Center-December-2019-Web-version.pdf">decentralised governance model</a> is accepted.</p>
<p>AANES’s prospects are closely tied to its inclusion in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/28/analysis-syrias-peace-process-and-the-russian-and-us-role">UN-led peace process</a> for ending the civil war in Syria. So far, its efforts have <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-peace-talks-why-were-some-nations-invited-others-not-n710791">not managed a seat at the table</a>. A more concrete commitment from the US in the form of political support for the inclusion of AANES representatives at the UN peace talks could change the situation in its favour.</p>
<h2>Thwarting Turkey’s plan</h2>
<p>But AANES has more urgent concerns. Turkey continues to threaten, seeing the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas that it has been battling in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan since 1984. Turkey invaded the Kurdish-controlled regions of Syria in 2018 and 2019, and small-scale attacks by Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian groups on the rural areas of AANES territory continue daily, as do the human rights violations committed against the Kurdish civilians in the areas under the control of the Turkish-backed Syrian groups. On August 19, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_reported-turkish-drone-attacks-over-syria-raise-kurdish-concerns/6209939.html">drone attacks by Turkey</a> killed three SDF commanders and two fighters.</p>
<p>Eliminating the influence of the SDF in Syria remains a key objective for the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. But the US presence, and its commitment to the region’s stability, will act as a deterrent against a new large-scale Turkish military operation. Previous Turkish attacks in the AANES territory were made with Russia’s tacit support and encouragement, something which is thought less likely to be granted now the US has clearly stated its support for the SDF. And US troops on the ground in eastern Syria will also deter the Assad regime from destabilising AANES in a bid to take its territory back under full control.</p>
<p>US military support means Turkey’s attempts to label the SDF as “terrorists” are less likely to succeed. Erdoğan has used Turkey’s military operations against the Kurds in Syria as a sop to his strongly nationalist base – and he has repeatedly used western support for the Kurds as an example of the west’s antipathy towards Turkey. </p>
<p>With the likelihood of a Turkish military operation lessened, Erdoğan’s ability to please nationalists with an easy victory against the Kurds is less likely. Erdoğan retains a firm grip on power in Turkey, but there are reports that Turkey’s opposition parties are <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/09/turkeys-opposition-parties-drop-hints-future-cooperation">working with Kurdish groups</a>. If a united opposition can inflict defeat on Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party in the next election in 2023, then this would be one more step towards a peaceful future for the Kurds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/168905/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cengiz Gunes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Joe Biden has been quick to calm Kurdish fears that the US will abandon them to their fate.Cengiz Gunes, Associate Lecturer, Faculty of Social Science, The Open UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1524212021-03-03T13:26:27Z2021-03-03T13:26:27ZPope’s upcoming visit brings attention to the dwindling population of Christians in Iraq<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387332/original/file-20210302-17-1vpkmh2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C45%2C5073%2C3235&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A mural depicting Pope Francis on a concrete wall around the Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad, in preparation for the pontiff's visit, </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/APTOPIXIraqPopeVisit/800ec1c86d184458b1826db881ecd25e/photo?Query=pope%20AND%20iraq&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=437&currentItemNo=5">AP/Photo/Khalid Mohammed</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Pope Francis <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210301-francis-prepares-first-ever-papal-visit-to-iraq">will arrive in Iraq on Friday</a> in a first-ever papal visit to the country that is expected to raise awareness about the challenges facing Iraqi Christians – a majority of whom are Catholic.</p>
<p>In the past two decades, the Christian population in Iraq has <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/iraq/">fallen by over 80%</a>. The 1987 Iraqi census reported that there were 1.4 million Christians in <a href="https://merip.org/2013/06/iraqi-christians-a-primer/">Iraq</a>, and today it is estimated that the Christian population is less than 250,000. Spurred by political instability and war, many Christians have immigrated to other regions, including North America, Western Europe and <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/05/iraqi-christians-nineveh-plain/589819/">Australia</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="iQDLA" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/iQDLA/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>My recent book, “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/alien-citizens/BF353EC932B7A72B61239484061FD4E8">Alien Citizens: The State and Religious Minorities in Turkey and France</a>,” examines how international factors influence the status of religious minorities. I argue that in Iraq’s case, it was a series of international interventions that eventually led to the dwindling of the Christian minority. </p>
<h2>Who are Iraq’s Christians?</h2>
<p>Most Iraqi Christians are ethnically Assyrian, <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/ic/10/1/article-p113_9.xml">and they belong to the historic Church of the East</a>, one of the three major branches of Eastern Christianity. The language of worship is a dialect of Aramaic, the language that <a href="https://www.manchesterhive.com/view/journals/bjrl/53/1/article-p9.xml">Jesus is said to have spoken</a>. </p>
<p>The largest of these Assyrian communities belongs to the Chaldean Catholic Church, making up <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Chaldean_Catholic_Church/NIY8DwAAQBAJ?hl=&gbpv=1">more than two-thirds of all Christians living in Iraq</a>. </p>
<p>The Assyrian Church of the East and the Ancient Church of the East are other smaller Assyrian communities that constitute about 5% of Iraqi <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=UhiWDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=">Christians</a>. </p>
<p>Syriacs, who constitute somewhere between 10% to 15% of Iraqi Christians, are organized around the Syriac Catholic Church and the Syriac Orthodox Church, which are headquartered in Lebanon and Syria <a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fWp9JA3aBvcC&oi=fnd&pg=PA249&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false">respectively</a>. </p>
<p>Armenians and Arab Christians, along with other small groups, constitute the rest of the Christians living in Iraq. </p>
<h2>Christians flee Iraq after war</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10669920701616443">events that followed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq</a> led to a large-scale persecution of the Christian population.</p>
<p>While Saddam Hussein repressed ethnic and religious groups such as Kurds and Shiites, Christians fared relatively better under his rule. As religion scholar <a href="https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/theology/pdf/Boston%20College_Girling_2017%20(1).pdf">Kristian Girling</a> wrote, in return for their acquiescence to Saddam’s authoritarianism, Christians were given protections and gained <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/studies-in-church-history/article/abs/to-live-within-islam-the-chaldean-catholic-church-in-modern-iraq-19582003/8D946AC66D94B2D93B9724F6CD2E51F2">prominence in business and cultural life</a>. </p>
<p>Tariq Aziz, who was the deputy prime minister in Saddam’s Cabinet between 1979 and 2003, was <a href="https://www.cairn-int.info/revue-les-champs-de-mars-ldm-2011-1-page-55.htm?contenu=resume#">affiliated with the Chaldean Catholic Church</a>. </p>
<p>The ousting of Saddam by U.S. troops led to a power vacuum in which sectarianism and instability helped create the conditions for the rise of extremist groups such as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546550902765565">al-Qaida in Iraq</a> from 2004.</p>
<p>Violence against Christians in the form of <a href="http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=9442">killings</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/world/middleeast/02iraq.html">attacks</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/14/world/middleeast/14iraq.html">kidnappings</a> soared. </p>
<p>As a result, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html">many Christians fled Iraq</a>. According to data compiled from U.S. International Religious Freedom reports, by 2013, a decade after the invasion, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43554880?casa_token=7WY66SFXwkcAAAAA%3AWekhVGck7KEgFIC0BCzy9Va1LN_hxT0smpjD2ekk07RPpb7PDBqz4au2_tAj1CnebLpDXgtZjScBc424I9OtXOS7SkMAn01iUqG6pFQHvF64sTT1PIJt&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">more than half the Christian population had left the country</a>. </p>
<h2>The destruction by Islamic State group</h2>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="About two dozen photographs displayed on a table with lit candles." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387330/original/file-20210302-15-1f828ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C0%2C5473%2C3682&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/387330/original/file-20210302-15-1f828ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387330/original/file-20210302-15-1f828ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387330/original/file-20210302-15-1f828ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387330/original/file-20210302-15-1f828ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387330/original/file-20210302-15-1f828ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/387330/original/file-20210302-15-1f828ze.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pictures of slain Iraqi Christians displayed at Our Lady of Salvation church in Baghdad in 2010.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IraqChristians/a172baa341d246f8bf39a69e3792921e/photo?Query=iraq%20AND%20christians&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1717&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Khalid Mohammed</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The plight of Iraq’s Christians became more precarious as the Islamic State group took hold of swaths of the country. </p>
<p>In 2014, IS controlled the territories around Mosul in Northern Iraq and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28686998">expelled Christians from Nineveh Plains</a>. According to some estimates, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/20/middleeast/iraq-christianity-peril/index.html">more than 100,000 Christians fled</a> from Nineveh Plains to the autonomous Kurdish regions. </p>
<p>Many never returned after the defeat of IS in 2017. Those who did <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/05/iraqi-christians-nineveh-plain/589819/">had to face the Shiite militant groups</a> who helped the Iraqi government defeat IS and controlled some Christian territories. </p>
<p>Until the Iraqi government had tamed these militias and had political control over them, Christians had <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/christianity-in-iraq-is-finished/2014/09/19/21feaa7c-3f2f-11e4-b0ea-8141703bbf6f_story.html">skirmishes with them over properties and lands</a>. According to media reports, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48333923">many more Christians left Iraq in this period</a>. </p>
<p>In short, the U.S. invasion of Iraq started a cycle of violence that put Christianity under threat. As foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer <a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/2019/12/24/opinion/among-casualties-us-wars-middle-east-christianity/">wrote in a piece for The Boston Globe</a>: “By overthrowing Hussein, we hastened the end of Christianity in a land to which Saint John is said to have brought it soon after the Crucifixion.”</p>
<p>[<em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=experts">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get expert takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em>]</p>
<h2>Is there hope?</h2>
<p>Between 2017 and 2019, the Trump administration provided over US$300 million in aid to support the rebuilding of the Christian cities and villages of Nineveh Plains destroyed by IS in <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/oct-16-2018-fact-sheet-us-assistance-ethnic-and-religious-minorities-iraq">Northern Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>However, a long-lasting solution to improving Christians’ status is maintaining the rule of law in Iraq. The Iraqi constitution, drafted in 2005, <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en">declares Islam as the country’s official religion</a>. Singling out one religion at the expense of others can put religious minorities at risk unless clear protections are provided. Iraq needs a legal framework for equal citizenship to create a safe environment for religious minorities. </p>
<p>The Iraqi government invited Pope Francis to visit. The president of Iraq, <a href="https://twitter.com/BarhamSalih/status/1335912196228993024">Barham Salih,</a> described the visit as “a message of peace to Iraqis of all religions.” Media reports have quoted a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-pope-iraq/pope-francis-to-make-risky-trip-to-iraq-in-early-march-idUKKBN28H17E">Vatican source as saying the pope aims</a> “to comfort Christians who, amid wars and conflicts, have been forced to flee from Iraq.” </p>
<p>One cannot know if the pope’s visit will help Iraqi Christians heal from many years of suffering, but it will definitely bring public attention to their situation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/152421/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Opinions are the author's and do not represent the views of the University of Nebraska at Omaha</span></em></p>The events that followed the 2003 US invasion of Iraq started a cycle of violence against the country’s minority Christian population. The pope’s visit is meant to bring some ‘healing and comfort.’Ramazan Kılınç, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska OmahaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1477042020-11-02T10:58:03Z2020-11-02T10:58:03ZIn Turkey, life for Syrian refugees and Kurds is becoming increasingly violent<p>A spate of attacks in Turkey on Syrian refugees and Kurdish internal migrants and displaced people in recent months have put both communities on edge. In July, a Syrian teenager working as a market seller in Bursa, northwestern Turkey, died <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/refugees/voice-voiceless-refugees-voice-hamza-ajan">after he was attacked</a> by a group of men. </p>
<p>Another Syrian teenager who worked in a bakery in Samsun, another northern province, was <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/homicide/sixteen-year-old-syrian-refugee-murdered-northern-turkey">killed during a fight</a> in a street in September. His brother, who witnessed it, <a href="https://bianet.org/english/migration/230838-syrian-child-killed-in-samsun-province">said it was a racist attack</a>.</p>
<p>The same weekend, a young <a href="http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/230803-armed-attack-on-kurdish-workers-claims-one-life-wounds-two-others">Kurdish man</a> from Van working in construction in western Turkey was shot dead and two of his friends were wounded. A week earlier, members of a Kurdish family from Mardin employed as seasonal agricultural workers in Sakarya, a Turkish province where Kurds are <a href="http://bianet.org/english/male-violence/230419-the-moment-when-they-attacked-us-still-haunts-me">frequently targeted</a>, told reporters they had been verbally <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LA3KjN4Mqog&ab_channel=MezopotamyaAjans%C4%B1">humiliated and physically attacked</a> by a group of local Turkish men. </p>
<p>These recent attacks against both Syrian refugees and Kurds reveal how the nationalist policies of Turkey’s authoritarian and aggressive regime are influencing perceptions and attitudes towards non-Turkish minorities – with devastating consequences.</p>
<h2>Syrians remain stuck</h2>
<p>It’s been nine years since Syrians started taking refuge in Turkey, and there are now <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113">3.6 million</a> Syrian refugees registered as “foreigners under temporary protection” in the country. As the conflict in Syria has turned into a protracted one, hopes that their stay would be temporary have been replaced with anxiety of a more <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/09/SB2019-TR-04092020.pdf">permanent situation</a>. </p>
<p>The ongoing civil war and instability in Syria, as well as <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/">a 2016 EU-Turkey deal</a> which largely stopped people crossing the Aegean from Turkey to Greece, have made it almost impossible for refugees to consider moving anywhere else. The deal recognises Turkey as a safe country for Syrian refugees. Yet Syrian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-syria-refugees-idUSKCN1U40X8">refugees</a> and their <a href="https://observers.france24.com/en/20200304-racism-syrian-turkey-violence-soldier-die-syria">property</a> are often attacked by Turkish citizens.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1234400569382424577"}"></div></p>
<h2>Kurds displaced</h2>
<p>Kurds make up around <a href="https://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/the-kurdish-population-1232551004">20%-25%</a> of Turkey’s population of 82 million. Over the past century, millions of Kurds have become internally displaced in Turkey due to the conflicts in southeast Turkey (northern Kurdistan) between the Turkish state forces and Kurdish armed groups. Northern Kurdistan – “Bakur” in Kurdish – is a reference used by the <a href="https://hezenparastin.info/eng/">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a>(PKK) and other Kurdish political parties for the Kurdish-populated region in east and southeast Turkey.</p>
<p>A first wave of displacement happened in the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14718800108405092">1920s and 1930s</a> followed by another in the <a href="http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/bcelik/files/2015/06/Bradley-book-chapter.pdf">1990s</a>. The most recent wave of forced migration happened after <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/turkeys-pkk-conflict-visual-explainer">conflict</a> erupted in July 2015 between Turkish security forces and the PKK in southeast Turkey, particularly in the provinces of Diyarbakır, Mardin, Şırnak and Hakkâri. </p>
<p>Some Kurds built up optimistic expectations that they would be able to safely return to their homeland during the 40-year conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK, including in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/turkey/Turkey1002.pdf">1990s</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/turkish/reports/turkey0305/turkey0305trweb.pdf">2000s</a>. But the majority of displaced Kurds did not want to return due to protracted conflict and socioeconomic instability in their home regions. Government policies focusing on economic growth, rather than <a href="http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/bcelik/files/2015/06/Bradley-book-chapter.pdf">reconciliation and compensation</a> for people who had been displaced, also played an important role in their hesitancy.</p>
<p>Aggressive and anti-democratic policies introduced since 2016 targeting Kurdish politicians and Kurdish political and cultural <a href="https://www.hdp.org.tr/images/UserFiles/Documents/Editor/12%20Trustee%20report%202019.pdf">organisations</a> have worsened <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/kurds-in-turkey-increasingly-subject-to-violent-hate-crimes/a-50940046">anti-Kurdish sentiments</a> in the country. So has Turkey’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2019.1642662">deepening authoritarianism</a>.</p>
<p>Syrian refugees and displaced Kurds have both been victims of <a href="http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3433%28199008%2927%3A3%3C291%3ACV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6">post-conflict violence</a>. This has included direct violence, as well as marginalisation, discrimination and cultural violence against their identity and heritage. </p>
<p>A <a href="http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/231364-280-racist-attacks-in-turkey-in-10-years?bia_source=rss">report</a> by the Human Rights Association, a Turkish-Kurdish group which monitors human rights in the country, shows how racist and hate crime against minorities, including Syrians and Kurds, have left dozens of people dead and hundreds wounded in the past decade. Four key factors appear to have led to this violence: nationalist policies, othering, polarisation and impunity.</p>
<h2>Identity politics</h2>
<p>Since the beginning of the 20th century, nationalist identity politics have played a critical role in systematic violence against minorities in Turkey, particularly Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks and Kurds. This violent, assimilationist approach is borne out of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683849.2018.1514494">Turkification policies</a> which promote a Sunni-Turkish identity while denying minority rights.</p>
<p>Political and armed resistance by minorities such as the Kurds against Turkification have resulted in <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/43701">violence</a> and widespread discrimination from Turkey against those who don’t want to assimilate. The current Justice and Development Party (AKP) of the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, emphasises a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1497755">“one state, one nation, one flag, one language”</a> agenda. By ignoring diversity, this is exacerbating the existing anti-minority sentiments even further.</p>
<p>A process of othering, dividing people into “us” and “them”, characterised by mistrust, group-based inequality and marginalisation, is also rife in Turkey. It leads to stereotypes, discrimination and social exclusion of particular ethnic groups. </p>
<p>Like the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1250382">Kurds</a> before them, Syrians have become <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/new-perspectives-on-turkey/article/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-from-guests-to-enemies/29536558EBF6E27022769A7B858F29E7/core-reader#">the new “others”</a> in Turkey due to the public and political debate and <a href="https://bianet.org/english/media/231141-media-in-turkey-5-thousand-515-instances-of-hate-speech-in-a-year">mass media representations of Syrians</a> as <a href="http://suriyelilersuriyeye.com/">a threat to security and economy</a>. </p>
<h2>Polarisation and impunity</h2>
<p>Polarisation along ethnic and ideological lines also contribute to the violence, particularly when violence by both Turkish citizens and the state is not <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2018.1451035">properly investigated</a>. This encourages those who conduct attacks against refugees and displaced people, because they can easily <a href="http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/230448-detained-over-attack-on-kurdish-workers-two-people-released">avoid prosecution</a>. </p>
<p>Both the government policies and people’s perceptions and attitudes towards Syrian refugees and displaced Kurds feed public hostility. The coalition government formed in February 2018 by the AKP and the <a href="https://www.mhp.org.tr/mhp_dil.php?dil=en">Nationalist Movement Party</a> – which has a remarkable ability to foment domestic, regional and international enemies – is increasingly <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17448689.2019.1668627">oppressing</a> civil society organisations and opposition parties. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/04/10/lawyers-trial/abusive-prosecutions-and-erosion-fair-trial-rights-turkey">abusive prosecutions and the erosion of fair trials</a>, particularly since a <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-coup-erdogans-tightening-grip-will-test-relations-with-the-west-62706">failed coup</a> attempt against the Erdoğan government in July 2016, are trying to silence journalists, human rights defenders and opposition politicians. There is little chance the violence will be remedied soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147704/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yasin Duman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What are the drivers behind violent attacks against minorities in Turkey?Yasin Duman, PhD Candidate, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1364662020-04-23T12:09:58Z2020-04-23T12:09:58ZTurkey releasing murderers – but not political opponents – from prison amid coronavirus pandemic<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329270/original/file-20200420-152591-1m88gyk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Released prisoners sit in a bus outside Ankara, Turkey -- while government critics remain behind bars due to Turkey's sweeping terror laws.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Virus-Outbreak-Turkey-Prisons/e5c80285419b44eca27fe42a7e5d05f9/3/0">AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkey has begun to release about <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/penal-reform/war-words-between-turkish-mafia-leaders-escalates-following-legal-reform-bill">90,000 prison inmates</a>, half of them temporarily and the other <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-coronavirus/turkeys-coronavirus-death-toll-reaches-1518-prisoner-releases-begin-live-blog">half permanently</a>, to prevent COVID-19’s spread and to ease overcrowding. </p>
<p>President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his AK Party and their ruling coalition partner have excluded those who are charged with terrorism from the law allowing the releases.</p>
<p>In other words, the Erdogan regime is determined to keep in prison tens of thousands of academics, journalists, politicians, civil servants and others who did not commit any crime other than being affiliated with groups the regime sees as political threats. </p>
<p>Out of the total of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/turkey-should-protect-all-prisoners-pandemic">300,000 prisoners in the country</a>, around <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-prisoners/turkish-parliament-passes-bill-to-release-thousands-from-prison-amid-coronavirus-idUSKCN21V241">50,000</a> are charged with terrorism. </p>
<p>Terrorism charges have been used to suppress the opposition in Turkey, particularly since the 2016 failed coup attempt against Erdogan and <a href="https://hrf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Turkey-ECtHR-Report_April-2019.pdf">his subsequent purge</a> against perceived political enemies. </p>
<p>Among those imprisoned on terrorism charges are <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/coronavirus-turkey-law-release-thousands-prisoners-pandemic">Selahattin Demirtas</a>, the previous leader of Turkey’s pro-Kurdish political party; <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/12/outrage-after-turkish-journalist-re-arrested-a-week-after-his-release">Ahmet Altan</a>, a world-renowned journalist and author; and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/world/middleeast/osman-kavala-turkey.html">Osman Kavala</a>, a philanthropist and businessperson. </p>
<p>Some of those charged with terrorism have indeed perpetrated violent acts as members of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.html">the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</a> (often called ISIS), the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20971100">Kurdish militant group PKK</a> or the junta who attempted the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/world/asia/turkey-mass-trials-coup.html">2016 coup</a>. </p>
<p>But most of those imprisoned for terrorism are not even charged with a single violent act; they are accused of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/05/turkey-academics-trial-signing-petition">enabling the PKK</a>, or being <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-two-islamic-groups-fell-from-power-to-persecution-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-and-turkeys-gulenists-120800">Gulenists</a>, followers of the U.S.-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom Erdogan blames for masterminding the 2016 coup attempt.</p>
<p>The initial draft of the law would have released <a href="https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-52011385">rapists and drug dealers</a>. They were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-52113167">later excluded</a> from release after public criticism surfaced. But the regime’s critics charged with terrorism were never considered for release, even in the drafts.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C5%2C3946%2C2461&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329269/original/file-20200420-152585-hr677t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-speaks-during-a-news-photo/1207621179?adppopup=true">Getty/Adem Altan/AFP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The state versus individuals</h2>
<p>This policy is based on a historically <a href="https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yazarlar/2020/01/25/polat-alpman-turkiyede-tek-ideoloji-var-o-da-devletcilik/">consistent ideology</a>, which has been embraced by most governments and even a <a href="https://www.maviyorum.com/turk-ilahiyatina-giris-devlet-dinimdir-millet-mezhebimdir-gokhan-bacik/">large segment of society</a> – that the Turkish state is much more important than individuals.</p>
<p>Using the risk of COVID-19 as an opportunity, the Turkish state with this move underlines the main purpose of prisons: They are meant to primarily punish the designated enemies of the state. Those who violate rights of individuals (by murdering or robbing them) can be regarded as less dangerous and even pardoned.</p>
<p>My 2019 book, “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment</a>,” traces the origins of this state-centric ideology in the history of the Seljuk (1040-1194), Mamluk (1250-1517) and Ottoman (1299-1922) states, which left an ideological legacy to contemporary Turkey and most Arab countries.</p>
<p>Even late Ottoman reformists, who tried to import Western European ideas, did not challenge state-centricism and restrictions over individual liberties. The famous <a href="http://kitaptarih.com/tanzimat-fermani-pdf.html">Reorganization Edict</a> of 1839, issued by the Ottoman sultan and bureaucrats, guaranteed the protection of their subjects’ life, honor and property. But it did not even refer to their liberty.</p>
<p>The laws of modern Turkey have generally guaranteed individual liberties. Yet, its governments have constantly violated the citizens’ freedoms, especially those of religious (<a href="https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=P7qKDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Turkey+Wealth+Tax&ots=H_YjGG3-6V&sig=KCes4ULaTPhhGtasSj-Yoff_BiM#v=onepage&q=Wealth%20Tax&f=false">non-Muslim</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/world/europe/alevi-minority-turkey-recep-tayyip-erdogan.html">Alevi</a>) minorities and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/turkey#8e519f">Kurds</a>.</p>
<h2>Erdogan and his changing allies</h2>
<p>President Erdogan has dominated Turkish politics for the last 17 years. Since 2011, he has been powerful enough to define the citizens of his country as either friends or enemies of the state. </p>
<p>During the early part of his rule, Erdogan cooperated with followers of Gulen, certain Kurds and various intellectuals against secularist forces in the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32136809">military</a> and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23581891">judiciary</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/329272/original/file-20200420-152576-dcr4ry.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Erdogan had his signature put on the coronavirus care packages distributed to 1.15 million people aged 65 and over, containing five masks and some cologne.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/woman-poses-for-a-photo-with-a-gift-package-containing-news-photo/1209451691?adppopup=true">Getty/Elif Ozturk/Anadolu Agency</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>During the Erdogan-Gulen alliance, prosecutors launched investigations against hundreds of this alliance’s political targets. And the courts played along with these probes, stretching the definition of terrorism so far that they even declared Turkey’s retired armed forces chief of staff, <a href="https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2012/03/10/basbugu-terleten-sorular">Ilker Basbug</a>, a terrorist.</p>
<p>In the last six years, Erdogan gradually changed his allies because of his tug-of-war with Gulen and the popularity of being tougher against Kurds. Erdogan embraced <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/why-turkey-torn-between-united-states-and-russia/">ultranationalist secularists</a> as political partners – the very group he had targeted earlier. This new partnership labeled all Gulenists, many Kurdish nationalists and numerous intellectuals as terrorists.</p>
<p>After the 2016 failed coup against Erdogan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/30/despite-odds-turkeys-academic-activists-keep-defying-erdogan/">500,000 citizens</a> were investigated for being members of terrorist organizations. Most of these investigations aimed to sentence Gulenists. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/turkey#8e519f">Tens of thousands</a> were imprisoned with such evidence as downloading a smartphone application used by Gulenists and having an account in a bank affiliated with Gulen. In <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/hundreds-of-young-turkish-children-jailed-alongside-their-moms-as-part-of-a-post-coup-crackdown">650 cases</a>, imprisoned women are parents of children under 6 years old, so they live in jail together.</p>
<p>Turkey was particularly unprepared for COVID-19 due to the post-coup purge of about <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/08/the-coronavirus-will-destroy-turkeys-economy/">150,000 civil servants</a>, and specifically, <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-coronavirus/turkeys-most-knowledgeable-coronavirus-expert-sidelined">15,000 health care professionals</a>. One of Turkey’s rare coronavirus experts, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=r6fD_noAAAAJ&hl=en">Dr. Mustafa Ulasli</a>, was among those who were purged with the accusation of being a Gulenist. <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/purged-coronavirus-expert-sidelined-in-turkey-1.997333">He lost his job</a> and remains unemployed, despite <a href="https://tr.euronews.com/2020/03/21/docent-mustafa-ulasli-koronavirus-covid-tavsiye-asi-turkiye-bulabilir-khk-goreve-hazirim">his offers to help</a> the Health Ministry with the crisis.</p>
<h2>COVID-19 and authoritarians</h2>
<p>Globally, analysts have tried to explain possible political <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/19/coronavirus-effect-economy-life-society-analysis-covid-135579">effects of COVID-19</a>. One of the main questions is: Will it weaken or empower autocrats? The case of Turkey shows the complexity of COVID-19’s political consequences.</p>
<p>On the one hand, COVID-19 has deepened the Erdogan regime’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/15/coronavirus-in-turkey-economy-in-trouble-as-case-numbers-shoot-up.html">financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkish-lira/turkish-lira-plumbs-2018-crisis-lows-virus-hits-budget-finances">Turkish lira</a> has been losing its value against the U.S. dollar since 2018, and that trend continues. </p>
<p>Erdogan declared a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-18/turkey-announces-15-4-billion-plan-to-counter-virus-outbreak">US$15 billion stimulus plan</a> on March 18. Because <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/08/the-coronavirus-will-destroy-turkeys-economy/">this was insufficient</a>, he asked citizens to donate to <a href="https://t24.com.tr/haber/meral-aksener-bilim-kurulu-tam-karantina-istedi-erdogan-reddetti,871842">a state-run aid campaign</a>, which will financially help those who are affected by the measures against the pandemic, <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/turkey-coronavirus-offers-money-companies-donations-for-poor.html">especially daily wage workers</a>.</p>
<p>An important pillar of Erdogan’s regime is Diyanet – the government agency that controls all of the country’s 85,000 mosques and pay salaries to their imams. COVID-19 is further weakening the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/26/turkey-political-islam-is-getting-way-rational-health-policy/">public reputation of the Diyanet</a>, reflected in discussions on social media about why taxpayers’ money is still going to imams’ salaries though the mosques are closed.</p>
<p>On the other hand, a <a href="https://twitter.com/metropoll/status/1248290597930242048?s=20">recent survey</a> indicated that Erdogan’s approval rate has lately increased. During the COVID-19 crisis, many people may want to rally around <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/approval-rating/erdogans-approval-rating-bolstered-coronavirus-pandemic-metropoll">the leader</a> – in Turkey and across the globe.</p>
<p>In fact, Erdogan has tried to unify the nation around <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-coronavirus-meets-authoritarianism-in-turkey">his personality</a> during the crisis. He put his <a href="https://tr.euronews.com/2020/04/08/erdogan-65-yas-ustu-vatandaslara-mektup-yazd-sizlere-koruyucu-maske-ve-kolonya-hediye-ediy">personal signature</a> on the Turkish state’s COVID-19 care packages distributed nationwide. He also declared that only the central government was authorized to collect money for COVID-19 aid purposes; the interior ministry blocked the charity drives of <a href="https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-opposition/erdogan-says-opposition-aid-drives-attempt-create-parallel-state">opposition-run municipalities</a>.</p>
<p>During the COVID-19 crisis, it is crucial for Erdogan to control the media in order to minimize criticisms of his policies. Otherwise, his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/20/world/middleeast/coronavirus-turkey-deaths.html">ineffective responses to the crisis</a> may lead to a growing opposition. Hence, Erdogan wants to keep many journalists and other critics in prison. </p>
<p>When faced with COVID-19, the Turkish state repeats what it knows best – the state is more important than individuals. Erdogan and his allies have even created new ways to demonstrate this: For them, the regime’s critics are more dangerous than violent criminals.</p>
<p>[<em>Get facts about coronavirus and the latest research.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=upper-coronavirus-facts">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter.</a>]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/136466/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>To stem the spread of COVID-19, Turkey is releasing 90,000 prison inmates. Not on the list for release: tens of thousands of academics, journalists and others the regime sees as political threats.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1301032020-01-27T13:57:49Z2020-01-27T13:57:49ZHow Kurdish diaspora groups are pushing for unity over their divided homeland<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/310977/original/file-20200120-69555-1pv1uco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C36%2C1599%2C999&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A concert for Kurdish unity held in Germany in early January. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">K.Sido/GfBV-archiv</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When more than a hundred well known singers from the Kurdish diaspora took part in a large concert in the German city of Leverkusen in early January they had one key goal: putting on a united front. </p>
<p>The concert brought together thousands of members of the Kurdish diaspora under the motto “<em>Em Bibin Yek</em>”, or “Let us unite”. The aim was also to show solidarity for Kurds in northern Syria after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-donald-trumps-decision-to-abandon-kurdish-fighters-in-syria-means-for-the-kurds-assad-and-russia-124815">withdrawal of US troops</a> from the region and subsequent Turkish invasion in October 2019. </p>
<p>The artists came from across the four Kurdish regions of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran, and all sang separate renditions of patriotic Kurdish songs. At the end, the singers dressed in traditional Kurdish costumes and came back on stage together to sing the Kurdish political anthem “<em>Herne Peş</em>”, which means “forward”. </p>
<p>Since the Turkish invasion of the largely Kurdish-held region of northern Syria, Kurdish diaspora groups have been vocal in European cities, raising awareness about the betrayal and suffering of the Kurds. They’ve held demonstrations, rallies and solemn vigils; and lobbied MPs to ask for solidarity with the Kurdish population. In early December, a group <a href="https://anfenglish.com/features/march-for-kurdish-national-unity-from-lausanne-to-geneva-39872">marched from Lausanne to Geneva</a> in Switzerland in a call for Kurdish unity. </p>
<p>Many Kurdish leaders, intellectuals and artists in the diaspora, who I’ve interviewed as part of my <a href="https://soas-uk.academia.edu/VeysiDag">ongoing research</a> on the diaspora movement, are now coming together to push this unified message. But this requires Kurdish groups on the ground in the Middle East – who have traditionally been split among a diverse set of ideological agendas – to unite behind a set of common political goals. </p>
<h2>Growth of a diaspora</h2>
<p>Kurds don’t possess their own state and are wedged between four Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. They are often defenceless and permanently subjected to the threat of repression and violent conflict, particularly from Iranian-backed Shia militias and Turkish-Sunni expansionism in the Middle East.</p>
<p>The repressive <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YECIAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false">politics in the region</a> means Kurds have been subject to aggressive assimilation processes, forced to deny their own cultural heritage and identity. In response, they have staged several rebellions, including the ongoing uprising in Turkey under the leadership of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Such conflicts led to the widespread <a href="http://elibrary.bsu.az/books_400/N_35.pdf">displacement and migration of Kurds</a>, mainly towards Europe in the 1980s and 1990s when violence escalated between the Kurdish groups and Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian and Turkish regimes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-kurdish-conflict-in-turkey-is-so-intractable-125101">Why the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is so intractable</a>
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<p><a href="https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17477&lang=en">More than one million</a> Kurds are estimated to live in Europe, more than half of them in Germany. The growth of a Kurdish diaspora has only <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/713766482?needAccess=true">strengthened the push</a> for a free and secular Kurdish homeland. The Kurdish homeland is like a placenta which sustains the Kurdish diaspora movement, and the links between the two act as a sort of umbilical cord that feeds the diaspora with emotional, mental and spiritual support and a sense of belonging. </p>
<p>Diaspora groups may be free from direct violent conflict and its consequences, but they are not immune from suffering. During my research interviews and at Kurdish demonstrations, I’ve seen members of the diaspora cry when they see images and read social media posts about Kurds who have been displaced, killed or tortured in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Their helplessness at preventing atrocities is an integral part of the relationship they have with their homeland and other Kurds.</p>
<h2>Divisions among Kurdish groups</h2>
<p>Because the Kurds lack their own nation state and the recognition, legitimacy and alliances that come with it, they find themselves excluded from the international community. But the major issue holding back the Kurdish voice is an internal one: the lack of a single cohesive narrative that articulates their demands. </p>
<p>This is largely because of the ideological differences and political agendas between different political groups. In Syria, for example, the Movement for a Democratic Society aims to establish a <a href="https://internationalistcommune.com/social-contract/">decentralised, democratic, confederal system</a> in the country based on ethnic and religious diversity and gender equality. But the Kurdish National Council is pushing for <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48502">Kurdish autonomy</a> in Syria. </p>
<p>The dominant Kurdish political parties in the Middle East also have diverging political and ideological agendas. The PKK and its affiliated groups across the Middle East are critical of Kurdish nationalism, promoting the idea of a democratic, confederal, multi-ethnic project instead. They don’t question the borders of the national states ruling the Kurdish regions, but rather push for grassroots democracy, recognition of cultural rights and self-adminstration within the borders of these states. </p>
<p>In contrast, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and its affiliated groups adopt a more nationalist rhetoric and aspire to carve out an independent Kurdish state. These two rivals dominate contemporary Kurdish groups in the homeland, pushing out more inclusive political principles. While these internal divisions weaken the Kurdish cause, they also unite states such as Turkey and Syria who rule the Kurdish homeland. </p>
<h2>Pushing for unity</h2>
<p>It’s in light of these splits that Kurdish diaspora artists are pushing for Kurds to unite behind a single demand for the recognition of Kurdish status for administrative, cultural and political rights in the Middle East. These efforts could lead to the intervention and mediation efforts of Western countries to help end the Kurdish predicament. Events such as the concert in Leverkusen and the march in Switzerland are part of <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:RYSO.0000038603.34963.de">a wider strategy</a> aimed at communicating the political desire for a Kurdish homeland to politicians and governments in Europe. </p>
<p>By transcending ideological differences of the Kurdish political groups in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, and pressing for the movement to push its agenda with a collective voice, the Kurdish diaspora could play a leading role in uniting political leaders in the homeland in an unprecedented success.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Veysi Dag does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Different ideologies and agendas among Kurdish political groups means they don’t push a single narrative about the Kurdish homeland. Diaspora groups are trying to change that.Veysi Dag, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1255212019-11-26T13:35:47Z2019-11-26T13:35:47ZSyria military presence risks US credibility with world community<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300346/original/file-20191105-88378-2myyy0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=34%2C0%2C3885%2C2587&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President Donald Trump has rapidly, and without warning to allies or even his own officials, shifted U.S. foreign policy in Syria.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump/138b7ee2945843d6bc5a6b921d511ac4/28/0">AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Donald Trump’s decisions to withdraw U.S. troops from northern Syria – and then to send them back into action – has raised new concerns around the world about the reliability of U.S. promises.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of Trump’s presidency, <a href="https://time.com/4574466/donald-trump-international-order-stability/">I and other</a> foreign policy scholars have worried that Trump’s tendencies toward <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-claims-database/">hyperbole, exaggeration and outright lying</a> could disrupt a relatively stable international community. </p>
<p>For the last several years, I was relieved to find that didn’t happen. Some of the president’s public statements about <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/11/politics/trump-nato-diplomats-reaction/index.html">NATO</a>, trade and nuclear weapons were concerning, but largely didn’t result in major shifts in U.S. policy or changing courses of American action.</p>
<p>However, by announcing that the U.S. military in northern Syria would leave positions they occupied between Turkish and Kurdish forces – two U.S. allies who viewed each other as enemies – and then <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/us/politics/us-syria-isis.html">apparently reversing that decision</a>, Trump has likely caused U.S. allies and rivals to view American commitments in a new, uncertain light.</p>
<p>Other countries have seen how quickly the U.S. can reverse longstanding commitments. They may now adjust their own diplomatic and military strategies to depend less on the U.S. That, in turn, may reduce the power and influence the U.S. has in the international community, increasing global instability.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=404&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300347/original/file-20191105-88414-snuzej.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=508&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, left, long a U.S. ally, has made a new agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Russia-Turkey-Syria/b8152e099cd14229805c8a2159f4da5e/10/0">Presidential Press Service via AP, Pool</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Slow-moving bureaucracy</h2>
<p>In the first several years of the Trump presidency, bureaucratic lack of action in the Pentagon and the State Department meant that statements from the president didn’t actually change what U.S. troops and diplomats did in other countries. </p>
<p>The message other nations took from that was that they couldn’t totally ignore the president’s words, but they <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-twitter-japan-us-foreign-policy-shinzo-abe-military-a8988211.html">did not need to worry</a> about their implications very much. Despite what Trump said, they felt they could continue to depend on the U.S. for assistance, aid and support.</p>
<p>For instance, a Japanese foreign ministry official told the Japan Times newspaper, “<a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-twitter-japan-us-foreign-policy-shinzo-abe-military-a8988211.html">The Japanese government shouldn’t react to a tweet</a> by the president each time … If it’s their official position, we need to deal with it, but the president says various things.”</p>
<p>Put another way, Trump’s statements were hurting the reputation of the U.S., but not damaging the country’s credibility about its commitments.</p>
<p>To many scholars of foreign policy, this might be surprising. The <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691171609/resolve-in-international-politics">behavior of a country’s leader</a> is expected to <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501747717/reputation-for-resolve/">affect that country’s global reputation</a>, which is usually key to international credibility. Developing consistent positions deters <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300050615/extended-deterrence-and-prevention-war">would-be challengers</a> of U.S. allies or interests. </p>
<p>That’s why national officials in the U.S. and around the world are typically quite careful with <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/theatre-of-power-the-art-of-diplomatic-signalling/oclc/1119404991">what they say and how they say it</a>.</p>
<h2>Sticking with the message</h2>
<p>In general, the U.S. and other countries do best if they clearly state their positions and follow up on them. Saying one thing one day and doing something contradictory the next scrambles observers’ perceptions. The uncertainty could embolden rivals and make allies nervous.</p>
<p>For instance, in 2012, President Barack Obama declared that using chemical weapons would be a “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story.html">red line</a>” Syrian leader Bashar Assad should not cross. When Assad did attack his own people with chemical weapons, Obama did not order a military response, and was <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-obamas-red-line-a-green-light/">widely</a> <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/robert-gates-syria-red-line-obama-2016-1">criticized</a> by politicians and foreign policy elites <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-obama-syria-requires-more-than-words/2013/09/09/3c98ec46-1724-11e3-804b-d3a1a3a18f2c_story.html">for not</a> matching his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/04/10/politicians-who-were-wrong-on-the-red-line-should-just-admit-it/">words with actions</a>. Obama’s vacillation was blamed for <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/how-obamas-chemical-weapons-deal-fell-apart/522549/">Assad’s subsequent use</a> of chemical weapons. </p>
<p>However, many observers exaggerate the importance of reputation. As political scientist <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/reputation-and-international-politics/oclc/32894358">Jonathan Mercer notes</a>, when one government tries to predict another’s behavior, it is more likely to consider the opposing leader’s immediate strategic circumstances rather than his or her past behavior. </p>
<p>For instance, rather than interpret Obama as weak and irresolute for not responding to Syria’s use of chemical weapons, Assad may have seen the excoriation that Obama suffered for failing to respond to their use, but also seen Congress’ reluctance to endorse military measures.</p>
<p>Thus, rather than become more emboldened by Obama’s irresolution, Assad may have recognized that Obama’s hesitation to strike Syria was due to other factors beyond his own character and reputation.</p>
<h2>A focus on credibility</h2>
<p>U.S. credibility may have survived well into Trump’s presidency because it’s not just simply based on reputation. </p>
<p>Rather, as scholar <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410591001474">Shiping Tang notes</a>, what the president says isn’t necessarily the only thing that determines a country’s credibility. Its interests and what it can actually do are also important factors.</p>
<p>While Trump’s erratic leadership style chipped away at the U.S.’s reputation, the other two pillars of its international credibility appeared solid. And even though Trump expressed skepticism about U.S. commitments to NATO, for instance, the steady behavior of institutions such as Pentagon and the State Department suggested U.S. capabilities and interests had not changed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300349/original/file-20191105-88382-130ohke.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces troops counted on U.S. support in the fight against the Islamic State group.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Syria-Defying-Kurds/20d183920bde4037a3189ae3871fe5e3/171/0">AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, the president’s decision to abandon longtime Kurdish allies in Syria showed that U.S. strategic interests may seem predictable, but actually can change very suddenly. </p>
<p>Indeed, the fact that Trump’s move <a href="https://time.com/5521419/syria-withdrawal-donald-trump-joseph-votel/">surprised officials in the Pentagon and the State Department</a> – who had no warning of the decision – means that foreign allies cannot be sure what U.S. interests are. </p>
<p>These uncertainties are further compounded by the president’s refusal to share with Congress or the American public the details of his discussions with world leaders. Nor will he reveal whether he has any potential private conflicts of interest that might be influencing him. All that U.S. allies and rivals can ascertain from the Syria decision is that the country’s security interests shifted without warning.</p>
<p>Until this recent decision about Syria, when the world struggled to decode the president’s confusing statements, foreign leaders could still count on core U.S. interests remaining constant. However, the prospect that U.S. foreign policy could change significantly, without warning or explanation, means other countries can’t trust what the U.S. says – and they’ll act accordingly.</p>
<p>The Kurds, for instance, quickly <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-invasion-isis.html">allied with the Assad regime</a> they had been fighting against. Allies like Afghanistan might feel pressure to negotiate settlements with potential U.S. enemies or rivals, to protect them if American support ends suddenly. Closer allies, like Japan and the European Union, may also feel the need to deepen ties with U.S. rivals to guard against the day America turns away from them, too.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125521/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Banks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In northern Syria, Trump has caused U.S. allies and rivals to view American commitments in a new, uncertain light. Other countries may now shift to depend less on the U.S., weakening national power.David Banks, Professorial Lecturer of International Politics, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1256362019-11-21T20:15:55Z2019-11-21T20:15:55ZBroken trust: How Iraqis lost their faith in Washington, long before the Kurds did<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302762/original/file-20191120-479-15lbg25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A mass grave is excavated in Khan Al-Rubea in 2003 that witnesses say is filled with the remains of Shia whom Saddam executed in 1991. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iraq-IRAQ-M-/7ad839139fe5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/8/0">AP/Hasan Sarbakhshian</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In all the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/trump-betray-kurds-support/599737/">hand-wringing</a> that critics and commentators have done since President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria, one of the common refrains emphasizes the breach of trust between Washington and its Kurdish militia partners.</p>
<p>Some scholars of <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/foreign_pol_walt.pdf">international relations</a> put little stock in trust. Countries are selfish, after all. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.princeton.edu/%7Eamoravcs/library/liberalism_working.pdf">Others</a> see trust in impersonal terms, embedded in the rules, norms, institutions and alliances that bind countries to each other. </p>
<p>It turns out, though, that trust does matter in international relations. And in the Middle East, trust is often seen in personal terms. </p>
<p>For the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/opinion/trump-turkey-kurds-syria.html">American personnel</a> who worked, ate and lived with the Syrian Kurds, trust-building was also a deeply personal experience. Trust underpinned the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/world/middleeast/isis-kurds-baghdadi.html">crucial intelligence cooperation</a> between the U.S. and its Kurdish partners. That cooperation helped plan and execute the raid that led to the capture killing of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.</p>
<p>As one former American special operator has <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/11/abandoning-kurds-america-hurt-itself/161201/">written</a>, “Trust is a powerful commodity that has saved many lives in shadowy battlefields across the Middle East. But it takes a long time to build and can be gone in an instant.”</p>
<p>By contrast, mistrust, even if it is based on perception alone, can linger for decades, thwarting Washington’s foreign policy goals.</p>
<h2>Defeating the Islamic State</h2>
<p>I observed the long-term consequences of broken trust next door to Syria, in Iraq. </p>
<p>I served as a U.S. diplomat in the southern Iraqi city of Basrah during 2015 and 2016, the height of the war against the Islamic State group, also known as IS.</p>
<p>At the time, after years of sectarian strife, dishonest governments and their broken promises, Iraqis seemed united around the common purpose of defeating IS. The <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/what-we-left-behind">corrupt and sectarian regime</a> of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had been ousted. And the U.S. was leading an international coalition to help the Iraqi government in the fight against IS, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-13-2017-united-states-announces-additional-humanitarian-assistance-iraqi-people">humanitarian assistance</a>. </p>
<p>You might think that a war that the U.S. was fighting on behalf of the Iraqi people, a war that was truly an existential one for the majority Iraqi Shia, would have produced at least some goodwill toward the United States.</p>
<p>Instead, when I arrived in Basrah in 2015, I discovered that many Iraqis, including the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-27945271/iraq-crisis-the-sunni-shia-divide-explained">majority Shia Muslim</a> population among whom I lived, believed that the United States was somehow in cahoots with the Islamic State. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. tacit support for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s made Iraqis cynical about U.S. trustworthiness after Hussein was deposed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iraq-SADDAM-/3b22e19e04f2da11af9f0014c2589dfb/42/0">AP photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mistrust for decades</h2>
<p>The Middle East is rife with conspiracy theories. But this one was particularly jarring given that the United States was then engaged in a costly and very public effort to defeat the Islamic State, a terrorist group which declared the Shia apostates and said they must be killed.</p>
<p>Over time, I began to understand the roots of these attitudes. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT">Disinformation</a> and propaganda, especially from Iran, fueled them to some extent. </p>
<p>But there were deeper issues at play. </p>
<p>“The United States defeated Saddam’s armies in a matter of weeks,” incredulous Iraqis I met would say to me. “So how is it that you can’t defeat a ragtag army of jihadists in two years?” </p>
<p>Iranian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT">disinformation campaigns</a> blaming the U.S. for the Islamic State were effective because of a deep gulf of mistrust between the U.S. and Iraqis, which led to widespread cynicism among ordinary Iraqis about U.S. motives. </p>
<p>The origins of this mistrust go back decades, from tacit U.S. support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, when Washington turned a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/14/books/turning-a-blind-eye.html">blind eye</a> to the dictatorship’s atrocities against Iraqi Kurds. </p>
<p>The lack of trust helps explain why the U.S. had such a hard time stabilizing Iraq after 2003, despite toppling a feared despot and despite investing billions of dollars in the country. </p>
<h2>Roots in betrayal</h2>
<p>Iraqi Shia are the largest Muslim sect in the country, but have less political power than Sunni Muslims. The Shia in particular have painful memories of an event that they see as a massive breach of trust between them and the U.S. </p>
<p>In 1991, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago">encouraged</a> by then-President George H.W. Bush, the Shia rose up against Saddam, only to be abandoned by the U.S. </p>
<p>Tens of thousands of Iraqi Shia were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2888989.stm">slaughtered</a>. </p>
<p>I visited a memorial to the victims of Saddam’s suppression of the uprising, where I saw a leaflet displayed that was dropped by U.S. and coalition aircraft calling on Iraqi soldiers and civilians to “fill the streets and alleys and bring down Saddam Hussein and his aides.” </p>
<p>“We thought this meant that the Americans would help us,” my guide at the museum told me.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Trump visited U.S. troops at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, Dec. 26, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump-Iraq/0c7bb5c680f7487b954c45e5c87a1d5d/11/0">AP/Andrew Harnik</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many Iraqis I met also recalled the devastating 1990s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/were-sanctions-right.html">sanctions</a> on their country that were championed by the United States. Others talked of Washington’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan/">failure to stabilize</a> the country after 2003. Then there was the perception that the Obama administration came late to the war against the Islamic State. </p>
<p>Other Iraqis I met – young ones – told me of their resentment at U.S. support for a political class in Baghdad that is seen as deeply corrupt. Some of them are no doubt <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/protesters-tahrir-square-iraq-191111195848776.html">protesting</a> in the streets and squares of Iraqi cities today. </p>
<p>I attended lots of meetings with Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders in the south. They saw the Obama administration’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/12/19/459850716/fact-check-did-obama-withdraw-from-iraq-too-soon-allowing-isis-to-grow">2011 withdrawal of U.S. troops</a> and general disengagement from Iraq as a betrayal of trust. They saw it as handing over Iraq to Iranian influence, which they fear. </p>
<p>Ultimately, Iraqis did not see the U.S. as a credible, consistent or committed partner. Some <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/18/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-spy-cables.html">turned to Iran for assistance</a>, while turning against the United States. Perhaps it is no surprise that <a href="https://www.ndi.org/Poll_Points_Path_Forward_Iraq_Reconciliation">polls taken</a> at the time I worked in Basrah showed that Iraqis saw Iran and Russia as more favorable security partners.</p>
<h2>Can’t escape the past</h2>
<p>Iraq is by no means a perfect analogy for the shattered trust between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/world/middleeast/kurds-sense-of-betrayal-compounded-by-empowerment-of-unsavory-rivals.html">Washington and its Syrian Kurdish allies</a>. Yet the the Iraqi experience shows that distrust of the United States has deep roots in past U.S. actions. </p>
<p>In Syria, too, the U.S. has left a legacy of mistrust since 2011, from <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-line-incident/">Obama’s failure</a> to follow through on his call for Assad to step down, to his <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/4/15/17238568/syria-bomb-trump-obama-russia">failure to impose meaningful costs</a> on the Syrian regime for its use of chemical weapons. Trump’s withdrawal is just one episode in a longer story.</p>
<p>Despite breaches of trust, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/iraqi-official-us-support-vital-lasting-defeat">Iraqis continued to need U.S. support</a>. But that need paired with a lack of trust makes things difficult for American diplomats in Iraq. For me, it was often overwhelming to be at the receiving end of the immense disappointment, frustration and more rarely, hope, that the Iraqis have in the United States. </p>
<p>The Syrian Kurds, like the Iraqis, will still need the United States and continue to work with Washington. But the breach of trust will complicate cooperation, as it did in Iraq.</p>
<p>Not everything that Iraqis blame the United States for is fair. And it would be impossible for even the best-crafted U.S. policies to satisfy all of Iraq’s diverse people. </p>
<p>At times I tried to remind my unfailingly hospitable Iraqi interlocutors, especially those in the government, to be a bit more introspective about their own failings and responsibility for Iraq’s post-Saddam ills. I tried to remind them that the United States invested a lot in Iraq, with limited results. </p>
<p>In the end, the credibility of the message was undercut by a lack of trust in the messenger.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski has previously received funding from the United States government through a Fulbright grant.</span></em></p>Distrust of the US – even if misplaced – can linger for decades, thwarting Washington’s foreign policy goals. A former US diplomat in Iraq reflects on that country’s skepticism of US aid efforts.Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, Assistant Professor of Politics, Pomona CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1262432019-11-06T12:35:24Z2019-11-06T12:35:24ZWhy there is no Kurdish nation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299710/original/file-20191031-187898-pz3i3z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Flag of Kurdistan on military uniform.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/flag-kurdistan-on-military-uniform-army-1526586782?src=B46gTBmBxrGRFwPXbXMYVA-1-5">Bumble Dee/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since U.S. troops left their region, roughly <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1049761">180,000 Kurds of northeastern Syria</a> have been displaced, and <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/10/23/this-is-ethnic-cleansing-a-dispatch-from-kurdish-syria/">over 200</a> have been killed. </p>
<p>Those Kurds, soldiers who’d battled the Islamic State and families, had hoped to secure a future Kurdistan state in areas <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-mercenaries-seize-abandoned-us-base-syria-video-2019-10">now targeted by Turkish warplanes and patrolled by Russian mercenaries</a>.</p>
<p>This is only the latest reversal for the Kurds, a group of around 40 million who identify with a regional homeland and common historical background, but are now divided between four countries. Despite their many attempts, there’ve never won and kept a Kurdish nation.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299728/original/file-20191031-187942-nsgg37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299728/original/file-20191031-187942-nsgg37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299728/original/file-20191031-187942-nsgg37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299728/original/file-20191031-187942-nsgg37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299728/original/file-20191031-187942-nsgg37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=490&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299728/original/file-20191031-187942-nsgg37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299728/original/file-20191031-187942-nsgg37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299728/original/file-20191031-187942-nsgg37.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=615&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 1992 map of Kurdish inhabited areas, made by the CIA.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kurdish-inhabited_area_by_CIA_(1992).jpg">Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at The University of Texas at Austin</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Drawing borders after WWI</h2>
<p>The most decisive reversal came at the end of the first World War. That’s when the Allies, victors over Germany and the Ottoman Empire, divided their geographical spoils of war. </p>
<p>In a series of conferences in a succession of European palaces, Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau of France, Woodrow Wilson and dozens of other leaders conspired, harangued and horse-traded from 1919 to 1921. Under clouds of cigar smoke, between servings of foie gras and champagne, they <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/files/14477/14477-h/14477-h.htm">redrew a large swath of the globe’s map</a>. </p>
<p>Besides doling out spoils to themselves, such as far-flung German imperial holdings, their aims were to replace the Austro-Hungarian Empire, punish Germany in Europe and – the biggest task – <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/empires-at-war-9780198702511?cc=us&lang=en&">fill the vacuum</a> left by the demise of the sprawling Ottoman Empire, which before the war covered territory from the edge of Bulgaria to Yemen. </p>
<p>Their guiding principle for redrawing the map, at least in most cases, was the <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374282455">reigning concept of race nationalism</a>, what’s often called today ethno-nationalism.</p>
<p>Simply put, the Allies’ delegates assumed that nation states should be composed as much as possible by <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=lwJpdYLvc1EC&pg=PA166&dq=erez+%22meant+that+it+was+in+fact+one+nation%22&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiw4aqnmsnlAhVOF6wKHUmmCEoQ6AEwAHoECAAQAg#v=onepage&q=erez%20%22meant%20that%20it%20was%20in%20fact%20one%20nation%22&f=false">single “races,”</a> single ethnic and linguistic populations. So, they defined, in some ways created, new races – like, for example, Hungarians or Austrians – and drew borders around them.</p>
<h2>Who should receive an ethno-state?</h2>
<p>What to do in the big, central zone of the defeated Ottoman Empire, stretching between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf? </p>
<p>Should there be one big, <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4967572">Greater Arabia</a> or Arab federation, <a href="http://www1.udel.edu/History-old/figal/Hist104/assets/pdf/readings/13mcmahonhussein.pdf">as some British officials promised</a> their Arab allies who revolted against the Ottomans? Should there be many little nations, with borders around Christian Arabs, Muslim Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds? (Following their <a href="https://books.google.com/books?newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&id=H41tAAAAMAAJ&dq=james+renton+zionist+masquerade+%22race+nationalism%22&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=%22race+nationalism%22">race-nation instinct</a>, the British did support what they called a new “National Home for the Jewish people” in former Ottoman Palestine.)</p>
<p>That, too, is what President Woodrow Wilson’s <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=lwJpdYLvc1EC&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22The+wilsonian+moment%22+%22principle+of+self-determination%22+kurds&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiGzb71t8nlAhUNcq0KHZnMArwQ6AEwAHoECAQQAg#v=onepage&q=%22The%20wilsonian%20moment%22%20kurds&f=false">call</a> for self-determination dictated. Wilson himself was explicit in calling for a new, broadly encompassing Kurdistan.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299709/original/file-20191031-187894-2of9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299709/original/file-20191031-187894-2of9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299709/original/file-20191031-187894-2of9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=857&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299709/original/file-20191031-187894-2of9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=857&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299709/original/file-20191031-187894-2of9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=857&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299709/original/file-20191031-187894-2of9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1077&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299709/original/file-20191031-187894-2of9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1077&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299709/original/file-20191031-187894-2of9z5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1077&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Contemporary image showing Wilson’s Kurdistan shaded in solid green.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_President_of_The_United_States_of_America_Woodrow_Wilson_Arbitration_Decision_Of_Boundaries_Between_Armenia_And_Turkey.JPG">Ara Papian/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They took for granted that Kurds were a race and that Kurdistan was a place. In fact, it was already <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ffJOAAAAYAAJ">depicted in pre-WWI atlases</a>. The problem of drawing its borders fell, British Parliamentarians told themselves, <a href="https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1920-06-25/debates/f9e783f3-a3b8-4a10-bdc4-f369a9d31cc2/Mesopotamia?highlight=kurds%20kurdistan#contribution-265a0573-7b0e-4686-aec0-52a0f0a81e7a">to them</a> in immediate postwar years. And it’s what some powerful people in British officialdom <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780805088090">assumed would happen</a>.</p>
<p>Not only did it fit British race thinking to create Kurdistan – <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/29738266.pdf">to be heavily staffed by British “advisers”</a> like the other new states, of course – but they believed the Kurds truculent and independent, unlikely to accede to domination by a neighbor. </p>
<p>They would “never accept an Arab ruler,” in the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2pOe5HeFpE0C">words of one British Colonial Office official</a>, if they were embedded in an Arab nation.</p>
<h2>A missed opportunity</h2>
<p>But the Allies and the League of Nations never created Kurdistan. Why not?</p>
<p>British imperial self-interest in this case overruled ethnonational thinking. By the terms of <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp">the Sykes-Picot agreement</a>, the secret French and British understanding of roughly who would get what after the war, the French claimed dominance of the northern Levant, what’s today Lebanon and Syria. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/the-sykes-picot-agreement-and-the-making-of-the-modern-middle-east-58780">The British wanted</a> a big geographical bloc in the region to match that of the French, to act as a counterweight. They formalized this by inventing a large country soon dubbed “Iraq.” </p>
<p>The line dividing Sykes-Picot’s French sphere and British sphere <a href="https://www.routledge.com/The-Kurdish-Spring-A-New-Map-of-the-Middle-East-1st-Edition/Phillips/p/book/9781412856805">already cut straight through Kurdish areas</a>. That partition was part of the reason why the British could not simply carve out a new, large Kurdistan (that they’d dominate like Iraq).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299727/original/file-20191031-187925-r7terv.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299727/original/file-20191031-187925-r7terv.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299727/original/file-20191031-187925-r7terv.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=776&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299727/original/file-20191031-187925-r7terv.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=776&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299727/original/file-20191031-187925-r7terv.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=776&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299727/original/file-20191031-187925-r7terv.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=975&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299727/original/file-20191031-187925-r7terv.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=975&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299727/original/file-20191031-187925-r7terv.gif?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=975&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The map, according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sykes-Picot-1916.gif">Mahmoud Abu Rumieleh, Webmaster/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For another, British colonial officials, like the famous writer-turned-colonial administrator <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/battle-in-iraq-9780857710727/">Gertrude Bell, wanted</a> a Kurdish population retained in the new Iraq as a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/making-of-peace/6B4B8E1A0BF98A803589D6214279AF2F">counterbalance to its large Shiite population</a>, which was deemed seditious. </p>
<p>This represented classic British imperial thinking long employed in places like India: divide and conquer. The Kurds might not be particularly docile or loyal to the British, but they could be counted on not to unite with the Arabs or Assyrians, either, and throw off British meddling.</p>
<p>The British, too, <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780805088090">suspected there were large oilfields</a> under the important Kurdish capital of Mosul. Better to keep the Mosul region securely within Iraq, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=hiWXVjTIIucC&pg=PA60&dq=%22woodrow+wilson%22+and+the+kurds&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi_rsK4usnlAhUJSq0KHYUjCbM4ChDoATAFegQIAxAC#v=onepage&q=%22exploit%20the%20oilfields%22&f=false">some leaders judged</a>. </p>
<p>That colonial-era behavior had a recent analog, when President Donald Trump said that the Kurds could <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-defense-secretary-mark-esper-says-us-will-leave-forces-in-syria-to-defend-oil-fields-from-islamic-state/2019/10/25/fd131f1a-f723-11e9-829d-87b12c2f85dd_story.html">be allowed to remain near oilfields</a> in far eastern Syria to protect them against the Islamic State. They’re still useful, it seems, for maintaining order above oil.</p>
<h2>The roots of the trouble with Turkey</h2>
<p>The Allies’ last, half-hearted attempt to create at least a small Kurdistan took place during yet another conference of the Allies in the Paris suburb of Sèvres in 1920. </p>
<p>Planned for eastern Anatolia, or Asia Minor, squeezed into borders to which the Kurds <a href="https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3229m63b">objected</a> as too little, this Kurdistan came to naught. The new, revolutionary nationalists in Turkey <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=XSw2AAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=turkish+ethnonationalism+turkey+race+kurds+armenia&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiAlu-15cflAhVSS6wKHfv2CBMQ6AEwAHoECAAQAg#v=snippet&q=ethnocultural&f=false">wanted</a> their own race-nation of Turks. And they did not want Anatolia chopped up for the sake of Kurds or Armenians. They’d simply have to become Turks, too, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=EHzgiYw0kegC&printsec=frontcover&dq=british+allies+versailles+%22race+nationalism%22&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjss-OHvcflAhUBRK0KHUo2C08Q6AEwA3oECAkQAg#v=onepage&q=%22had%20no%20place%22&f=false">or face the consequences</a>.</p>
<p>From 1920, the new Turkish Army occupied what was to become the little Kurdistan, and the Allies had <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/10/sykes-picot-treaty-of-sevres-modern-turkey-middle-east-borders-turkey/">no will to challenge them</a>. The last hope that WWI’s victors would create even a fractional Kurdistan disappeared without fanfare.</p>
<p>But the Kurds didn’t stop – have never stopped – resisting. When the British lumped them into their invented country of Iraq, the Kurds naturally revolted in 1919. When a delegation of British colonial authorities arrived to parley with the Kurdish leader, Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji, <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=2pOe5HeFpE0C&pg=PA14&dq=%22invisible+nation%22+quoted+President+Woodrow+Wilson%27s&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj-67nagL3lAhVJXKwKHYHSDSsQ6AEwAHoECAIQAg#v=onepage&q=%22invisible%20nation%22%20quoted%20President%20Woodrow%20Wilson's&f=false">the man calmly quoted</a> Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, with its call for the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourteen_Points">“autonomous development”</a> of the peoples formerly dominated by the Ottoman Empire. The British responded with two brigades.</p>
<p>Now, as then, it seems world powers support Kurd’s self-determination only until it’s no longer expedient. </p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126243/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Broich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Despite many attempts, the Kurds have never won and kept their own nation – though, after World War I, they came close.John Broich, Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1254762019-10-30T19:55:56Z2019-10-30T19:55:56ZCould Congress reverse Trump’s decision to pull troops out of Syria?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299337/original/file-20191029-183132-zu4i35.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C0%2C5439%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. forces are still in Syria, but their role has changed substantially in recent weeks.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Syria/e5fa624e79a546629ecf551dcd5a8365/2/0">AP Photo/Baderkhan Ahmad</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The political and humanitarian outcry condemning President Donald Trump’s decision to pull U.S. troops out of Syria came soon after he made the announcement. </p>
<p>Trump’s actions paved the way for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/turkey-syria-attack-latest-news-kurds-trump">Turkish troops to attack U.S.-allied Kurdish forces</a> that had been fighting the Islamic State group. In reaction, on Oct. 15, the U.S. House of Representatives <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-joint-resolution/77/text">passed a nonbinding resolution opposing his move</a>, with strong bipartisan support.</p>
<p>This resolution, like many attempts to articulate a collective view on foreign policy, lets members of Congress seem like they’re holding the president accountable without actually doing so.</p>
<p>Constitutional scholars know there are several ways Congress can express disagreement with a president. In addition to public critiques, they can vote on nonbinding resolutions, hold hearings, restrict military spending for particular purposes or – if presidents commit the worst offenses – <a href="https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript">impeach him</a>.</p>
<p>Already, several proposals are taking shape in the House and Senate that would <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-to-the-kurdish-rescue-11571353573">impose financial sanctions on Turkish officials</a>, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2019/10/23/20924848/house-senate-trump-syria-turkey-sanctions">restrict weapons sales to Turkey</a> and <a href="https://www.rollcall.com/news/sanctions-on-turkey-go-front-and-center-as-congress-returns">otherwise punish Turkey</a> for its actions.</p>
<p>But some legislators worry these sanctions would go too far. Democratic Sen. Chris Murphy of Connecticut notes that it’s complicated to consider condemning Turkey “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/22/mitch-mcconnell-syria-resolution-054327">for doing something</a> that the president is actively helping them do.” </p>
<p>Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky said that some of the actions being considered are reserved for “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/22/mitch-mcconnell-syria-resolution-054327">the worst rogue states</a>” – not fellow NATO members like Turkey.</p>
<p>These various parallel discussions demonstrate how hard it can be for Congress to pass a piece of legislation that effectively constrains presidents in the realm of foreign policy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299339/original/file-20191029-183142-12saym5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299339/original/file-20191029-183142-12saym5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299339/original/file-20191029-183142-12saym5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299339/original/file-20191029-183142-12saym5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299339/original/file-20191029-183142-12saym5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299339/original/file-20191029-183142-12saym5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299339/original/file-20191029-183142-12saym5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299339/original/file-20191029-183142-12saym5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Turkish troops prepare to cross the border into Syria on Oct. 15, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Syria/d2a571ff40004722a96acc6cbd442987/14/0">AP Photo/Emrah Gurel</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Checks and balances</h2>
<p>The Constitution declares that the president is <a href="https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript#toc-section-1--2">chief executive</a> and <a href="https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript#toc-section-2--2">commander-in-chief</a> of the military. It says <a href="https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript#toc-section-9-">Congress controls what taxpayer money is spent on</a> – including being able to block spending on specific military operations. Congress also has the <a href="https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript#toc-section-8-">power to declare war</a>, and a more obscure power, to issue “<a href="https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript#toc-section-8-">letters of marque and reprisal</a>,” which many scholars interpret as giving <a href="https://kansaspress.ku.edu/978-0-7006-1930-6.html">Congress control over small conflicts</a> as well as large ones.</p>
<p>In 1973, after the unprecedented abuses of power in the Johnson and Nixon administrations, Congress passed the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/war-powers-act">War Powers Resolution</a>, with the intention of eliminating presidential unilateralism. However, Congress created a loophole by allowing presidents the ability to initiate military hostilities on their own authority for 60 to 90 days. When Congress has provided authorizations, they use broad and vague language. For instance, Barack Obama argued that he could use a <a href="https://time.com/3328080/isis-syria-aumf-obama-law/">2001 congressional authorization – designed to sanction catching those associated with the 9/11 attack</a> – as the legal basis for his bombing campaign against the Islamic State group in 2014.</p>
<h2>Presidents are solo decision-makers</h2>
<p>Since the U.S. joined the U.N. and NATO in the 1940s, Congress has ceded power to the president. For the last 70 years, presidents have been the predominant decision-maker in foreign affairs, collecting and digesting the information provided by advisers. In contrast, members of the House and Senate endorse or condemn those actions from the sidelines. </p>
<p>Harry Truman, for instance, used a U.N. Security Council resolution as <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1950/06/27/Trumans-Korea-statement/4140241835962/">justification for sending the U.S. military to Korea</a> in the summer of 1950. Congress never declared war, nor authorized military force; they did, however, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/congress-war">allocate funding</a> to continue the conflict.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299338/original/file-20191029-183116-m57s7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299338/original/file-20191029-183116-m57s7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299338/original/file-20191029-183116-m57s7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299338/original/file-20191029-183116-m57s7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299338/original/file-20191029-183116-m57s7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=396&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299338/original/file-20191029-183116-m57s7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299338/original/file-20191029-183116-m57s7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299338/original/file-20191029-183116-m57s7o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=498&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The SS Mayaguez arrives in Singapore in May 1975, after three days being held by the Cambodian Navy.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Watchf-AP-I-SGP-APHS114188-SS-Mayaguez/93d5945b5be1412799656293d1353ce2/28/0">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since the War Powers Resolution was passed, presidents of both parties have <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/american-ship-mayaguez-seized">deployed troops or ordered bombings</a> without authorization and suffered very few consequences. While members of Congress complain, they have yet to force presidents to seek authorization – even when the president ignores the rules. George H.W. Bush sent troops to Saudi Arabia in the lead-up to the first Gulf War <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/08/world/bush-sends-us-force-saudi-arabia-kingdom-agrees-confront-iraq-bush-s-aim-s-deter.html">prior to congressional authorization</a>. <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/clinton-wars-the-constitution-congress-and-war-powers/oclc/49332567">Bill Clinton acted without authorization</a> in Bosnia and Kosovo. Obama continued operations <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-administration-libya-action-does-not-require-congressional-approval/2011/06/15/AGLttOWH_story.html">past the 90-day time limit in Libya</a>.</p>
<p>Generally, the hands-off approach by Congress has not completely derailed foreign policy, because presidents have tended to engage in discussion, including with Cabinet members, foreign partners and sometimes congressional leaders, before making decisions or taking decisive action. </p>
<p>Decisions about whether and how to act typically involve members of the executive branch, perhaps with some input from Congress, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/addressing-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-recommendations-for-the-next-administration/">weighing a variety of factors</a> against one another, thinking in both the short and long terms.</p>
<p>The situation in <a href="https://theforum.sph.harvard.edu/events/the-humanitarian-crisis-in-syria/">northern Syria</a> is one of the most complex issues currently facing the president. There are two U.S. allies who are opposed to each other. Any move by the U.S. raises the possibility of increasing instability, or worsening a humanitarian crisis. </p>
<p>Typically, after weighing many options, presidents use their first mover advantage to take clear and decisive action, often informing Congress after the fact. In this instance, however, while Trump has discussed withdrawing troops from Syria for <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/19/trump-us-troops-in-syria-1068734">almost a year</a>, he seemed to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/trump-turkey-syria.html">impulsively make a decision</a> in mid-October. </p>
<p>Furthermore, Trump has, in this and other instances, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/10/11/769049036/trumps-fights-with-gop-over-syria-come-at-the-worst-possible-moment">surprised his advisers</a> and political allies with <a href="https://slate.com/transcripts/WTA3V3dOUUphQS9qbUZzNEZhL1JxdENlUm9GRm9tY04ycEphbHJEc014MD0=">sudden shifts</a> in policy. Due to the incredible unilateral power housed in the executive branch, Trump can conduct foreign policy in this manner. </p>
<h2>Congress is designed to debate and talk</h2>
<p>Congress, by contrast, is made up of 535 voting members – 435 in the House and 100 in the Senate – who answer to roughly 330 million constituents. They are the deliberative bodies that can act only through discussion. That’s by design: it <a href="https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers">slows down decision-making</a> by incorporating public opinion into government policy.</p>
<p>Senators and members of Congress have a wide range of opinions about foreign policy, based on how they evaluate and weigh the various factors – national security, human rights, military action and foreign aid. The <a href="https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/">partisan divide between the political parties</a> makes reconciliation between differing viewpoints even more onerous. In these circumstances, even passing a nonbinding resolution in one house of Congress is impressive. Unable or unwilling to do more, lawmakers are leaving an opening for members of the executive branch to act without a lot of oversight or strong counterbalancing measures from their branch.</p>
<h2>The role of popularity</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299340/original/file-20191029-183112-1xj2l32.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299340/original/file-20191029-183112-1xj2l32.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/299340/original/file-20191029-183112-1xj2l32.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299340/original/file-20191029-183112-1xj2l32.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299340/original/file-20191029-183112-1xj2l32.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=903&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299340/original/file-20191029-183112-1xj2l32.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299340/original/file-20191029-183112-1xj2l32.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/299340/original/file-20191029-183112-1xj2l32.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1135&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A U.S. warship fires a missile into Libya in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USS_Barry_fires_Tomahawk_missile_Libya.png">U.S. Navy</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Historically, presidents who have faced strong opposition in Congress have tended to launch <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo10156999.html">smaller military operations with shorter durations</a>. </p>
<p>For example, Obama launched a very limited strike against Libya in 2011, emphasizing there would be “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-usa-troops/no-u-s-boots-on-the-ground-in-post-gaddafi-libya-idUSTRE77L3U220110822">no boots on the ground</a>.” His decision to ask Congress for an authorization of military force against Syria in 2013 may have been a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html">political means of avoiding action</a> because he knew a Republican Congress would never give him one. </p>
<p>Similarly, Clinton’s efforts to address the continuing crisis in Kosovo occurred while he faced impeachment proceedings in the Senate, which <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html">likely affected how much force he committed</a> to the operation. </p>
<p>Though Trump may think his base will <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/14/if-trump-shot-someone-dead-fifth-avenue-many-supporters-would-call-his-murder-trial-biased/">remain loyal no matter what</a>, presidents are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002784028002002">all too aware</a> that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002706291054">unsuccessful military operations</a> will <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.7">decrease their popularity</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894616">among the American people</a>.</p>
<p>Congress can help tip the balance of public opinion through hearings. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/africa/09iht-insider.4.5202860.html">Shedding light</a> on the actions of the president can <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/109165/nearly-half-us-adults-now-applaud-iraq-surge.aspx">alter public perception</a> about military or diplomatic action. </p>
<p>The Trump presidency has changed this balance, however. Previous presidents grudgingly complied with congressional investigations, but Trump’s White House has <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-defiance-of-oversight-presents-new-challenge-to-congresss-ability-to-rein-in-the-executive-branch/2019/10/06/59fb7cc0-e6c3-11e9-a331-2df12d56a80b_story.html">resisted scrutiny at almost every turn</a>. In addition, Trump is less interested in the opinions of the entire American populace, and much more <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/opinion/trump-2020.html">focused on pleasing his base</a>.</p>
<p>As a result of this new dynamic, congressional condemnations of his actions regarding the Kurds and Turkey may not have the effect they would have on other presidents. But Congress can take stronger steps, if it wishes to – and if members can overcome the institutional limitations that often stop them.</p>
<p>[ <em>Get the best of The Conversation, every weekend.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/weekly-highlights-61?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=weeklybest">Sign up for our weekly newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125476/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Burns receives funding from The Institute for Humane Studies. She is affiliated with The Institute for Humane Studies. </span></em></p>Since the 1940s, Congress has largely let the president make decisions, while members of the House and Senate endorse or condemn those actions from the sidelines.Sarah Burns, Associate Professor of Political Science, Rochester Institute of TechnologyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1254772019-10-23T20:35:18Z2019-10-23T20:35:18ZWhy the US has nuclear weapons in Turkey – and may try to put the bombs away<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298409/original/file-20191023-119405-1e0opx3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A B-61 bomb, like the ones stored at the US Incirlik Airbase in Turkey. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rocbolt/40276834965/in/photolist-24n8iP4-dhoKtF-HAjmmG-dL7Tcq-dL2q1e-rSaJDa-ruu1mt-rsivrG-rbgXkg-dL86wY-rd27Kh-HAjvh7-HAjqAJ-nnMxP5-hpsT2L-nnMVHK-nnMuCB-nnMWo2-d5V8km-hpsafk-amcyYF-hpsmnv-dsWHoC-ruuTUu-rzEvWh-somHzH-dL2A3D-qVsDRH-ruuS7m-qxAJmG-u8t3DP-ruufir-ruAjhR-soitsR-ruuHP9-ruu2ge-2eZCa8t-2eZC8x4-rzN6L8-2dAPgaB-24DjhFo-rd22yW-qxAJiA-22YiTCC-nG4JqR-rd1PeA-rd1YvS-25JiGxT-22YiR5w-efi8X1">Flickr/Kelly Michals</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the Syrian crisis pits Turkish troops against former U.S.-allied Kurdish forces, Pentagon officials have been reviewing plans to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/trump-turkey-syria.html">remove 50 nuclear bombs stored at a U.S air base in Turkey</a>. </p>
<p>A congressional directive to the Pentagon to quickly assess alternative homes for U.S. “<a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/congress-calls-us-scout-nuclear-alternatives-turkey-base.html">personnel and assets</a>” currently stationed at Incirlik Air Base is part of a broader bipartisan bill, still being debated, that proposes sanctions against Turkey. President Donald Trump has been forced to issue <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/10/18/us/politics/ap-us-united-states-turkey-nukes.html">public reassurances that the weapons are secure</a>.</p>
<p>During the Cold War, the U.S. stationed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nuclear_bomb">B-61 nuclear bombs</a> in Turkey, among other NATO countries. Formally, the U.S. controlled the weapons during peacetime, but the host countries’ <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf">forces trained and equipped planes</a> so <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/18/americas-nukes-arent-safe-in-turkey-anymore/">they could drop the bombs</a> with U.S. support in the case of war. The idea was to deter Soviet ground forces and reassure U.S. allies by making clear that the U.S. would be willing to risk nuclear war to block a Soviet invasion of a country hosting the bombs. </p>
<p>In addition, in the years before the U.S. developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, they presented a way for NATO to demonstrate it could act quickly to respond to a Soviet attack.</p>
<p>The 50 bombs still at Incirlik Air Base, in southern Turkey – and others in <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/155381/us-nuclear-bombs-still-turkey">Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands</a> – are the last nuclear remnants of that <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis">Cold War strategy</a>. The U.S. began <a href="https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf">pulling nuclear bombs out of NATO countries</a> after the Cold War ended, and since 2000 has <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/">removed 40 bombs from Turkey</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades ago, the <a href="https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/05-06/larsen.pdf">Turkish Air Force stopped equipping its planes</a> to drop B-61s. Now the bombs at Incirlik could only be used if <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/">U.S. pilots first flew nuclear-weapon-capable planes there</a> to load them up. The bombs were left in Turkey even after a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36815476">2016 coup attempt</a> raised serious concerns about their safety. After that event, the U.S. Defense and Energy departments began <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/20/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey-nuclear-weapons-trump.html">planning how to remove them</a> – but didn’t actually bring them back to the U.S.</p>
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<h2>How secure are they?</h2>
<p>U.S. nuclear weapons are stored in hardened bunkers, protected by electronic systems and <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4873/leaving-nuclear-weapons-in-turkey-is-just-poor-strategy">heavily armed U.S. troops</a>. The Pentagon has <a href="https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/">recently reinforced</a> both of those methods of defense.</p>
<p>The bombs themselves also require 12-digit codes to activate them, However, those protections are <a href="https://twitter.com/b_radzinsky/status/1186654541917413376">only strong enough to delay unauthorized use</a>, rather than actually prevent it. If those barriers were overcome, U.S forces could disable the weapons by destroying electrical components or detonating their chemical high explosive without causing a nuclear release. In the worst case, they could blow up the weapons or the facilities at Incirlik. </p>
<p>Still the U.S. procedures are not designed to prevent skilled attacks or sabotage, especially from an ally. With enough time, Turkey could make use of the nuclear material – if not to detonate in an actual nuclear explosion, then to “<a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/155381/us-nuclear-bombs-still-turkey7">release disastrous and deadly radiation</a>.”</p>
<h2>What’s wrong with removing them?</h2>
<p>Taking the weapons out of Turkey carries some physical risks. The bombs aren’t terribly heavy – <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/19263/get-to-know-americas-long-serving-b61-family-of-nuclear-bombs">roughly 700 pounds</a> each – but moving nuclear material requires significant security. In addition, the Turkish government would have to help – or at least not stand in the way – of <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/30417/u-s-reviewing-options-for-pulling-nuclear-bombs-out-of-turkey-heres-how-they-might-do-it">landing transport planes or sending cargo convoys by land or sea</a>. </p>
<p>The greater risks are likely to be political. Those concerns have discouraged previous U.S. administrations from removing the bombs, even though <a href="http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Ensuring-Deterrence-against-Russia.pdf">Turkey’s defense community isn’t particularly interested in using them</a>.</p>
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<p>One U.S. concern is that Turkey could perceive the move as a push away from NATO. That could lead to Turkey seeking closer ties with Russia. </p>
<p>In addition, pulling the nuclear weapons out of Turkey could prompt requests to remove other bombs from Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, where they are <a href="https://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/polls-public-opinion-in-eu-host-states-firmly-opposes-nuclear-weapons">publicly unpopular</a>.</p>
<p>A new worry just arose, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently mused whether <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/20/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey-nuclear-weapons-trump.html">perhaps Turkey should leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</a> and develop its own nuclear arsenal. U.S. officials have long feared that pulling the American nuclear bombs out could encourage Ergodan to try to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/some-worries-about-nuclear-weapons-at-turkey-base/2019/10/19/88f8ca0e-f231-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story.html">turn that bluster into reality</a>.</p>
<p>Unintentionally, Trump’s efforts to provide reassurance may have made this challenge more difficult. The presence of B-61s in the five countries <a href="https://www.apnews.com/182a2170a1d24ac6b4f0c7242d8ff514">is an open secret</a>, confirmed by independent observers. But it has nonetheless been NATO policy not to acknowledge the deployments, giving local politicians and the U.S. a shield from parliamentary and public oversight.</p>
<p>By publicly confirming that the weapons were in Turkey, Trump has raised the political stakes should he try to remove them, and made it more difficult for the United States and Turkey to strike a quiet deal to that effect.</p>
<p>[ <em>You respect facts and expertise. So do The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=yourespect">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125477/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Miles A. Pomper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has 50 nuclear bombs stored in Turkey. As tensions rise between the two countries, a look at how they got there and what might happen next.Miles A. Pomper, Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, MiddleburyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251762019-10-23T16:23:57Z2019-10-23T16:23:57ZSyrian refugees in Turkey are there to stay, at least for now<p>Turkey’s <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkeys-syria-incursion-what-spurred-it-and-whats-next">recent military incursion into northern Syria </a> is aimed at weakening Syrian Kurdish forces along its border. Turkey believes those forces are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/09/us-downplayed-turkeys-concerns-about-syrian-kurdish-fighters-that-couldnt-last/">linked to the insurgent Kurdish militia inside Turkey</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/the-kurds-facts-history.html">whom Turkey and the U.S. have labeled terrorists</a>. </p>
<p>But that’s not the only goal.</p>
<p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s long-term plan is to create <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/turkey-syria-untied-states-three-phase-of-ankara-plan.html">a safe zone</a> in the region for the return of <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/turkey-syria-safe-zone-resettlement-plan-is-not-viable.html">millions of Syrian refugees</a>. </p>
<p>Erdogan has used strong rhetoric about returning refugees. <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/turkey-syria-safe-zone-resettlement-plan-is-not-viable.html">He claims that</a> Syrian refugees will be resettled “into 140 villages with 5,000 inhabitants and 50 districts of 30,000 inhabitants.” </p>
<p>But the Turkish government has also taken noteworthy, and in some cases highly unusual, steps to integrate Syrians into the country during the past five years. </p>
<h2>Largest number of refugees</h2>
<p>Since the start of the conflict in Syria more than seven years ago, Turkey has hosted a steadily increasing number of refugees from that civil war. </p>
<p>The country is now home to the largest number of refugees worldwide, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/01.-UNHCR-Turkey-Fact-Sheet-August-2018.pdf">reaching around 4 million people today</a>. Syrians make up about <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113">3.7 million of them, 44% of whom are children</a>. </p>
<p>To put this in perspective, Pakistan hosts the second-largest population of refugees at a little <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/">less than 1.5 million</a>; most of those <a href="http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Pakistan%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20June%202019.pdf">refugees are Afghans and Somalis</a>. Germany, which started with an open door policy for Syrian refugees in 2015, hosts just over 1 million refugees, <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2019/02/2019_02_Factsheet_GermanyQ12.pdf">just over half of whom are Syrians</a>. The United States has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/sep/26/trump-to-allow-just-18000-refugees-in-historically-low-cap-of-asylum-program">increasingly limited its numbers</a> for refugee resettlement, with the strongest impact on Syrians. </p>
<p>While I am currently <a href="https://udayton.edu/directory/artssciences/hrc/inglis-shelley.php">a professor of international law</a>, in 2015 I was an official at the United Nations, based in Turkey, when the world’s attention was drawn to the plight of Syrian refugees.</p>
<p>Along with migrants from other countries, streams of Syrian refugees made their way from Turkey to Greece and across the Balkans into Europe. Called a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911">“migrant crisis” by many commentators</a>, European Union, or EU, countries split on how to handle the challenge of unprecedented numbers of refugees and migrants <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-seekers-are-welcome-to-remain-as-britain-is-10470062.html">traveling into Europe at one time,</a> culminating in an EU-Turkey agreement in spring 2016. </p>
<h2>The plan</h2>
<p>Though complex, the agreement lays the burden of hosting the majority of Syrian refugees and migrants on Turkey <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan">in return for financial and other incentives</a> from the EU, such as visa liberalization for Turkish citizens to travel to the EU. </p>
<p>All those Syrian refugees or other migrants who arrive in Greece – an EU country – from Turkey would be returned to Turkey. One Syrian would be resettled in the EU for every one returned from Greece to Turkey. </p>
<p>For those who had already entered the EU, many made it to Germany or other destinations; others have been stranded in limbo without a specific status in non-EU countries along the migrant route: for example, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/serbia/unhcr-serbia-factsheet-march-2019">in the Republic of Serbia</a>. </p>
<p>While implementation of the deal is not without its problems, the number of Syrians and others seeking asylum in the EU has fallen significantly <a href="https://www.apnews.com/2eb94ba9aee14272bd99909be2325e2b">since the height of the crisis</a>. Since January 2019, <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179">only about 9,000 Syrians have arrived in Greece</a> as compared to <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2015/10/560e63626/refugee-sea-arrivals-greece-year-approach-400000.html">over 400,000 refugees and migrants – the majority from Syria – entering Greece in 2015</a>. </p>
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<h2>Integrated into Turkish life</h2>
<p><a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unhcr-turkey-fact-sheet-july-2019">Ninety-eight percent of the Syrian population in Turkey live in local communities</a>, not in refugee camps or temporary protection settlements. The situation of Syria’s refugee population is <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/">considered by the U.N. as “protracted,” or long-term</a>, which means the refugee group has been exiled for five or more years in a country that has given them asylum. </p>
<p>Turkey does not officially recognize Syrians as refugees <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/turkey.php">under international refugee law</a>; the country recognizes only asylum seekers fleeing persecution in Europe. Turkey has put in place a temporary protective status which allows all Syrians and other asylum seekers <a href="https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/introduction-asylum-context-turkey">to receive public services</a>, including health care and education. <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-spends-45-billion-on-syrian-refugees/104908">Turkey claims it has spent US$45 billion</a> supporting the refugees.</p>
<p>Turkey also now allows this population to be employed legally, including seasonal agricultural work and animal husbandry. According to the U.N., since 2016 when the relevant law came into effect, <a href="http://www.tr.undp.org/content/turkey/en/home/library/syria_programme/3rp-outcome-monitoring-report.html">more than 60,000 work permits</a> have been issued to Syrians. It is estimated that between 500,000 and 1 million Syrian refugees with protected status currently work <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/18/syrian-refugees-in-turkey-need-better-access-to-formal-jobs/">in informal or irregular employment</a>. Some Syrians have received resident or <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-granted-citizenship-to-over-92-000-syrians-145480">even citizenship status</a>.</p>
<p>The United Nations and hundreds of international nongovernmental organizations, such as Save the Children, <a href="https://reliefweb.int/country/tur">also provide assistance</a> to Turkey and local municipalities as well as directly to refugees and their host communities. Turkish nongovernmental organizations are also very active.</p>
<p>Programs offered to refugees cover basic food needs, education, Turkish language training, health care and legal support, including for domestic violence victims. </p>
<p>The EU alone has invested <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/europe/turkey_en">more than 2 billion euro in humanitarian funding for</a> Turkey’s Syrian refugees along with other forms of financial assistance to the country. </p>
<h2>Poverty persists</h2>
<p>Yet the situation of many Syrian refugees in Turkey is not easy. The United Nations estimates that <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70022.pdf">over 64% of Syrian households in cities live close to or below the poverty line</a>.</p>
<p>The challenge to Turkey in hosting such a large refugee population goes beyond temporary humanitarian assistance, to the <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/583841468185391586/pdf/102184-WP-P151079-Box394822B-PUBLIC-FINAL-TurkeysResponseToSyrianRefugees-eng-12-17-15.pdf">social and economic future of the country</a>. Many municipalities in Turkey have embraced programs that seek to integrate rather than isolate the refugees, improving the urban environment for all inhabitants. There are risks to social, political and economic stability for the country if refugees are marginalized and grievances of host communities <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/opinion/turkey-syrian-refugees.html">are not addressed.</a></p>
<p>Some analysis indicates that many Turks expect large portions of Syrians <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/">to remain in the country,</a> even if the conflict in Syria comes to an end. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297997/original/file-20191021-56198-164hg0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297997/original/file-20191021-56198-164hg0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297997/original/file-20191021-56198-164hg0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297997/original/file-20191021-56198-164hg0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297997/original/file-20191021-56198-164hg0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297997/original/file-20191021-56198-164hg0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297997/original/file-20191021-56198-164hg0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297997/original/file-20191021-56198-164hg0w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Syrian refugees living in Akcakale, southeastern Turkey, wait for bread distribution by the local municipality, Oct. 20, 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Syria/b35a047850364daa9a335f7cfb7695e9/4/0">AP/Mehmet Guzel</a></span>
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<h2>To return – or not</h2>
<p>Turkey has a responsibility under international law not to return Syrians to Syria if they would face torture, violence or persecution. This rule of nonreturn – <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html">called “non-refoulement”</a> – is a core principle of international law related to refugees and incorporated into human rights standards prohibiting torture and other inhuman treatment. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/protection-refoulement">The principle was integrated into domestic law by Turkey</a> in 2011. </p>
<p>Despite not recognizing the Syrians as refugees, Turkey is obligated to uphold <a href="https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1366&context=faculty_articles">the rule of nonreturn, which is generally accepted by all countries</a>. This means that any concrete move by Erdogan to forcefully return large numbers of Syrians to Syria would be met with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-refugees-graphi/turkeys-plan-to-settle-refugees-in-northeast-syria-alarms-allies-idUSKBN1WN28J">considerable resistance by Turkey’s allies</a>. </p>
<p>According to the U.N. refugees agency, the majority of Syrians living in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq hope to <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/68443.pdf">return to Syria one day</a>. At the same time, some studies on Syrians in Turkey specifically indicate that many have positive feelings about integration and <a href="https://mmuraterdogan.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/syrians-barometer-executive-summary.pdf">want to remain in Turkey</a>. </p>
<p>While Turkey still faces <a href="https://www.vox.com/2019/10/17/20919566/turkey-syria-us-ceasefire-erdogan-pence-kurds">the prospect of U.S. sanctions</a> over the invasion of Syria and military operation against the Kurds, the current cease-fire agreement with the U.S. keeps Turkey’s goal intact of a safe zone on its border <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/world/middleeast/trump-pence-syria-turkey-ceasefire.html#">free of Kurdish fighters</a>. The current situation in northern Syria isn’t <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/3-000-syrian-refugees-arrive-northern-iraq-191019114737599.html">peaceful and is reportedly creating new refugees</a> who are fleeing to Iraq. </p>
<p>According to the U.N., returning home under safe conditions continues to be the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/">solution of choice for refugees</a>. This would require an internationally accepted peace process in Syria and a voluntary system of refugee return. This is the scenario in which Syrian refugees would probably prefer to return to their homes. </p>
<p>Even then, it seems likely that many Syrians will remain in Turkey forever.</p>
<p>[ <em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125176/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shelley Inglis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Almost 4 million Syrian refugees live in Turkey, which has taken noteworthy steps to integrate them into the country in the past five years. Will Turkey now try to force those refugees back to Syria?Shelley Inglis, Executive Director, University of Dayton Human Rights Center, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1254922019-10-22T19:00:31Z2019-10-22T19:00:31ZThe ‘ceasefire’ in Syria is ending – here’s what’s likely to happen now<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/298017/original/file-20191022-56238-1h5x1rz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Syrian troops deployed near Aleppo. The likely winner from the latest conflict in Syria is the Assad government.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AAP/EPA/SANA handout</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The five-day <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/17/us-delegation-seeks-syria-ceasefire-after-trump-undercuts-mission-turkey-mike-pence">ceasefire</a> negotiated by US Vice President Mike Pence and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan ends today.</p>
<p>Despite the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/18/middleeast/syria-turkey-ceasefire-violations-intl/index.html">shaky</a> ceasefire, the risk of economic sanctions from the US and worldwide condemnation, Turkey is likely to stay in Syria for a long time.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">As Turkish troops move in to Syria, the risks are great – including for Turkey itself</a>
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<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/syrian-troops-enter-kurdish-fight-against-turkish-forces">anticipated clash</a> between Turkey and Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian government is also unlikely to eventuate, for three three reasons:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Erdogan’s main aims require the army to stay in Syria for the long term</p></li>
<li><p>Assad’s and Erdogan’s goals in northeastern Syria strangely overlap</p></li>
<li><p>The coordinating role of Russia in Syria prevents the need for Erdogan and Assad to clash in open warfare. </p></li>
</ol>
<h2>Has Turkey achieved its objectives?</h2>
<p>Even though Turkey has been building its forces on the border for some time, the US-allied Kurdish YPG (which Turkey considers a terrorist group) was caught by surprise. They were busy fighting Islamic State and not expecting the US to allow Turkish forces across the border. Battle-weary YPG forces were no match for the powerful Turkish army. </p>
<p>As a result, Kurdish commanders begged the Trump administration to intervene. The ceasefire deal was struck to allow YPG forces to withdraw beyond what Turkey calls a “safe zone”. Trump declared the ceasefire to be a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqgVunYCTIk">validation</a> of his erratic Syrian policy.</p>
<p>Turkey’s immediate objective of establishing a 32-kilometre deep and 444-kilometre wide safe zone across its border with Syria will likely be achieved.</p>
<p>Yet establishing this zone is just the precursor to Erdogan’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">three primary objectives</a>. Those are to resettle millions of Syrian Arab refugees in northeastern Syria, as a result helping to prevent the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish administration and, finally, to ensure his political survival by maintaining his alliance with the Turkish nationalist party (MHP). </p>
<p>The June 2019 political loss of the important city of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/erdogan-loses-istanbul-reasons-and-implications">Istanbul</a> to the main Turkish opposition party, primarily due to Syrian refugee debates, has been an important trigger for Erdogan to act on his Syria plans.</p>
<p>These objectives require Turkey to remain in Syria at least until the end of the Syrian civil war. This would mean the status of northeastern Syria and its Kurdish population were clearly determined in line with Turkey’s goals. These outcomes could take many years to eventuate.</p>
<p>So, any withdrawal before the primary objectives are met will be seen as a defeat within Turkey. Erdogan wants to enter the 2023 presidential elections claiming victory in Syria. </p>
<h2>Erdogan’s and Assad’s goals overlap</h2>
<p>With the US no longer a serious contender in Syrian politics, Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin are the only leaders capable of stymieing Erdogan’s objectives. </p>
<p>Prior to Turkey’s military intervention, the relationship between the Kurdish leadership and Assad administration was one of mutual avoidance of conflict. Since the beginning of the civil war in 2011, they have never clashed militarily. </p>
<p>The expected outcome of this policy was that the Kurds would have an autonomous region in northeastern Syria and an important role in post-civil war negotiations. Assad had no choice but to agree to this in order to stay in power.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-syrian-war-is-not-over-its-just-on-a-new-trajectory-heres-what-you-need-to-know-110292">The Syrian war is not over, it's just on a new trajectory: here's what you need to know</a>
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<p>The Turkish intervention opens new possibilities for the Assad government. The speed of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/kurds-reach-deal-with-damascus-in-face-of-turkish-offensive">alliance between the YPG and Assad</a> indicates the Syrian government senses an opportunity.</p>
<p>The Kurdish-Assad alliance allows Assad’s forces and administration to enter areas they could not enter before. Assad wasted no time in wedging his forces in the safe zone by <a href="https://time.com/5703009/syrian-forces-border-town-turkish-plans/">seizing the major Kurdish town of Kobani</a> in the middle of the Syrian-Turkish border.</p>
<p>Despite the Kurdish-Assad alliance, resettling Syrian Arab refugees in Kurdish regions will weaken Kurdish claims to the region and suit Assad’s goal of a unified Syria that he totally controls.</p>
<p>There is another immediate benefit for Assad. Idlib is a strategic city in northwestern Syria and the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition to Assad. Resistance groups defeated elsewhere were allowed to gather in Idlib. Careful negotiations took place in the past few years to avoid an all-out bloodbath in Idlib.</p>
<p>Assad will almost certainly ask Turkey to abandon its patronage of Idlib and opposition forces l
ocated there. In return, Assad will allow a temporary Turkish presence in northern Syria.</p>
<p>So, although Kurdish forces signed a deal with Assad, it is highly unlikely this will evolve into active warfare between Turkey and Syria. Instead, the situation will be kept tense – by Assad forces remaining in Kobani – to allow Erdogan and Assad to get what they want.</p>
<h2>Russia will prevent a Turkey-Syria clash</h2>
<p>This is where Russia and Putin come in. Russia is an ally of both the Turkish and Syrian governments. To save face, Erdogan is unlikely to sit in open negotiations with Assad. Negotiations will be done through Putin.</p>
<p>When <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/turkey-erdogan-travel-russia-talks-putin-191016204628625.html">Putin and Erdogan meet</a> on October 22, the main negotiating points will be to prevent a war between Turkey and the Russian-armed Assad forces. Erdogan will ask the Russian and Assad governments to allow Turkey to stay in the zone it established. In return, Russia will request further concessions on Idlib and perhaps more arms deals similar to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48620087">S-400 missile deal</a>.</p>
<p>A deal between Erdogan and Assad suits Russia because it serves the its main objectives in Syria – keep Assad in power to ensure Russian access to the Mediterranean Sea and weaken NATO by moving Turkey away from the alliance.</p>
<p>If the Kurds realise Assad has no intention of fighting Turkey, they may decide to take matters into their own hands and engage in guerrilla warfare with Turkish forces in northern Syria. While this may deliver a blow to Turkish forces, Erdogan will use it to back his claim they are terrorists.</p>
<p>Regardless of what happens, Turkey will stay in northern Syria for the foreseeable future, no matter the cost to both countries.</p>
<p>The eventual winner in Syria is looking to be the Assad government, which is moving to control the entire country just as it did before the 2011 uprising.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125492/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mehmet Ozalp is affiliated with Islamic Sciences and Research Academy of Australia.</span></em></p>With so much politics at play, Turkey is likely to be in Syria for a long time to come – and the real winner from it all is likely to be the Assad government.Mehmet Ozalp, Associate Professor in Islamic Studies, Director of The Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation and Executive Member of Public and Contextual Theology, Charles Sturt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1254512019-10-22T15:34:25Z2019-10-22T15:34:25ZTurkey’s invasion of Syria a stark warning of how irrelevant NATO could become<p>As NATO struggles to deal with the fallout from Turkey’s military offensive in northeastern Syria, the crisis could be another nail in the alliance’s coffin. </p>
<p>Since the end of the Cold War, it has been argued that the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or NATO, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/out-of-area-ops-are-out-reassessing-the-nato-mission/">will be determined by its ability to act</a> outside of its traditional sphere of influence in Europe. When this has been tested so far in the 21st century – in Afghanistan and Libya – the Western alliance was not as successful at bringing peace and stability as it was in the Balkans. </p>
<p>NATO doesn’t have much leverage in the current Syria crisis – something Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appears well aware of. From the start of the incursion, he has made it clear he won’t stop the military operation unless Kurdish forces move to the edge of a 30km safe zone along the Syrian border. </p>
<p>On October 11, two days after Turkish troops started attacking Kurdish-led forces in northeastern Syria, NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169576.htm">met with Turkish officials</a>, including Erdoğan, in Istanbul. During the meeting, Stoltenberg stopped short of telling Turkey to halt its military action, instead urging it to act “with restraint”. He added that: “Turkey is a great power in this great region” and that “with great power comes great responsibility.” </p>
<p>Stoltenberg also welcomed the temporary ceasefire agreed by the US and Turkey on October 17 <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169666.htm">in northeastern Syria</a>, saying it could provide a good base for de-escalating the situation. </p>
<p>The US secretary of defense, Mark Esper, is due at a meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels on October 24. Esper said he would call on the allies to take “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1988372/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-dr-mark-t-esper-regarding-turkey-syria-border/">collective and individual actions</a>” against Turkey if it decided to continue its offensive after the end of the temporary ceasefire. </p>
<p>It’s likely some European countries will push for a full ceasefire. Meanwhile the German defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, said she would discuss a proposal to establish an internationally <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/german-defense-minister-pushes-for-international-security-zone-in-syria/">patrolled security zone</a> along the Syria-Turkey border, in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. </p>
<h2>Difficult allegiances</h2>
<p>Turkey was granted membership of NATO in 1952 alongside Greece, but it has never been an easy alliance. The question for NATO now is whether the political and strategic cost of keeping Turkey inside the alliance is worthwhile. </p>
<p>Recent Turkish moves have raised concerns among NATO members. Turkey has angered NATO allies by developing closer military ties with Russia, particular with its <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48962886">purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia</a> earlier in 2019. European countries have also accused <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/12/turkeys-double-isis-standard/">Ankara of doing little to help fight</a> Islamic State (IS) and of not acting as a sufficient block to IS members who passed through Turkey on their way to Europe. <a href="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7x5x3q/greece-and-turkey-are-playing-dangerous-war-games-on-the-aegean-sea">Tensions also continue</a> in a dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegan sea. </p>
<p>But Turkey has the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/584286/number-of-military-personnel-in-nato-countries/">second-largest military</a> in the alliance behind the US. Its strategic importance – sitting as it does at a crossroads between Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East – is undeniable. It also hosts more than 3m Syrian refugees, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/05/erdogan-ill-let-syrian-refugees-leave-turkey-for-west-unless-safe-zone-set-up">Erdoğan hasn’t hesitated</a> to use as bargaining chips. </p>
<p>Western NATO allies also rely on the <a href="https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/10/14/with-turkeys-invasion-of-syria-concerns-mount-over-nukes-at-incirlik/">Incirlik base,</a> located 110km from Turkey’s border with Syria. Home to a stockpile of US nuclear weapons, the base has traditionally been used as a NATO access point to the Middle East. </p>
<h2>‘Unexpected gift’ for Russia</h2>
<p>With the West already alarmed at the growing power of Moscow in the Middle East, any decision by NATO to punish Turkey for its incursion in Syria could <a href="https://twitter.com/IISS_org/status/1183718345952108544">risk Ankara moving further</a> into Russia’s orbit. </p>
<p>Russia quickly took advantage of the decision by the US president, Donald Trump, decision to withdraw US troops from Syria and moved to entrench its position in the region. The Kurds, who felt betrayed by the American withdrawal, had <a href="https://theconversation.com/syria-why-the-kurds-had-little-option-but-to-do-a-deal-with-bashar-al-assad-125333">little alternative but to make a deal</a> with Syria’s president, Bashar Al-Asaad, for their protection. </p>
<p>After the deal, Russian-backed Syrian government forces headed <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAe6HcrCgcY">deep towards Manbij</a> in northeastern Syria and other territories recently held by US-backed Kurdish forces. This will empower Russia to play an even more pivotal role in the crisis as a broker between the Kurds and the Assad regime, as well as between Turkey and the Kurds. </p>
<h2>Lost leverage</h2>
<p>NATO will have little leverage to act in northern Syria without US backing – and Trump has clearly given up on playing a role in the conflict. This fits with his general disdain for NATO partners not pulling their weight, and his persistent lament that the US carries <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/trump-nato.html">the brunt of the burden of NATO</a>. Trump and Esper reiterated that the US would not go to war against Turkey over its military operation in Syria, and <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181172462291243008">Trump took to Twitter</a> to call European NATO members to take responsibility for foreign IS fighters in the region. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1183702529403695104"}"></div></p>
<p>The Turkish offensive is changing the alliances in the Middle East. It’s also possible that Russia and the US will find themselves aligned against attempts from other European countries to take a harder line against Turkey. This was clear when Russia and the US <a href="https://euobserver.com/foreign/146242">vetoed a UN Security Council statement on October 11</a> by five European NATO members – Britain, Germany, France, Poland and Belgium – condemning the Turkish operation in Syria. </p>
<p>Still, the chance of Turkey’s eviction from the NATO is very slim. There is no mechanism in the treaty to end Turkey’s membership. And fundamentally, it’s in NATO interests to keep Turkey within the membership. </p>
<p>But the crisis has consolidated the rift among NATO allies over Syria. It’s become clear that Europeans don’t share the same threat perception nor the same idea about the policy to deal with those threats as their American allies. It will be this inability to develop collective policy, especially if US backing continues to wane, that will help define NATO’s future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125451/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marwa Wasfy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Why NATO has lost its leverage to do anything about Turkey’s offensive in northern Syria.Marwa Wasfy, PhD Candidate and Assistant Lecturer, School of Politics & International Relations, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251952019-10-22T11:39:17Z2019-10-22T11:39:17ZDeportation to Syria could mean death for women, children and LGBTQ refugees in Turkey<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297977/original/file-20191021-56203-159jer0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3960%2C2855&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Refugees awaiting municipal bread distribution in Akcakale, Turkey, Oct. 20, 2019. Three-quarters of the Syrian refugees in Turkey are women and children. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Syria/b35a047850364daa9a335f7cfb7695e9/4/0">AP Photo/Mehmet Guzel</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan isn’t limiting his assault on neighboring Syria to attacking Kurdish troops that run the <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkish-attack-on-syria-endangers-a-remarkable-democratic-experiment-by-the-kurds-125105">country’s northern region</a>. He says the 3.6 million Syrians <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-europe/turkeys-erdogan-threatens-to-send-syrian-refugees-to-europe-idUSKBN1WP1ED">now living as war refugees in Turkey may also be returned</a> “to their own homes” once northern Syria is wrenched from Kurdish control. </p>
<p>This could be an empty threat. After eight years of welcoming people fleeing Syria’s civil war, the Turkish public is <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/why-turkey-pushing-refugees-return-syria">beginning to turn against Syrian refugees</a>. Erdogan may see anti-refugee rhetoric as a way to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-politics-akparty/erdogans-ak-party-membership-seen-sliding-further-as-dissent-grows-idUSKBN1WC1CR">boost his popularity</a>, which is slumping due to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/europe/turkey-election-erdogan.html">recession in Turkey and years of controversial power grabs</a>.</p>
<p>But if the Turkish president does deport Syrian refugees, he won’t be sending them to a “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50064546">safe zone</a>,” as promised. These extremely vulnerable people would be deported into the lines of combat in this <a href="https://www.apnews.com/a66bf441fdfb43ca80d200dcbfb5d09d">contested, oil-rich zone</a>.</p>
<h2>The forgotten half: Women Syrian refugees</h2>
<p>In my experience <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601151?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">researching minorities at risk in the Middle East</a>, governments dealing with mass migration often overlook the particular challenges facing the most vulnerable refugees: women, children and LGBTQ people. </p>
<p>The Syrian refugees in Turkey are majorly Sunni Muslim – the same faith that predominates in both Turkey and <a href="https://cpa.ca/docs/File/Cultural/EN%20Syrian%20Population%20Profile.pdf">Syria</a>. However, Syrians are <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/">ethnically and linguistically different</a> than Turks.</p>
<p>Syrian refugees differ from the broader Turkish and Syrian public in another way, too: <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/thinking-outside-camp-syrian-refugees-istanbul">75% of them are women and children</a>, according to the global nonprofit Migration Policy Institute. Between 2011 and 2017, more than 224,000 babies were <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/thinking-outside-camp-syrian-refugees-istanbul">born in Turkey to Syrian refugee families</a>. Those children are now stateless, granted neither Turkish nor Syrian citizenship at birth. </p>
<p>Syrian women refugees suffer more discrimination and racism in Turkey than their male counterparts, <a href="https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Turkey/The-fragility-of-Syrian-refugee-women-in-Turkey-191805">research shows</a>. </p>
<p>This is partially due to a big gap in Turkish language acquisition: 20% of Syrian refugee women complained that lack of language causes exclusion and discrimination, <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/54518">U.N. survey data from 2016 shows</a>, compared to 13% of men.</p>
<p>Even so, 73% of Syrian refugee women told the U.N. that they feel safe in Turkey. That may be related to their resettlement in <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unhcr-turkey-fact-sheet-july-2019">cities and towns</a> across Turkey, <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/thinking-outside-camp-syrian-refugees-istanbul">primarily in Istanbul</a>, where they usually live in poor neighborhoods. </p>
<p>Those areas surely feel secure compared to war-torn Syria. They are safer, too, than refugee camps along the Turkish-Syrian border, where <a href="https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Turkey/The-fragility-of-Syrian-refugee-women-in-Turkey-191805">rape, human trafficking, prostitution and child marriages have all been reported</a>, according to OBC Transeuropa, a think tank.</p>
<p>Half of all Syrian female refugees were <a href="https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Turkey/The-fragility-of-Syrian-refugee-women-in-Turkey-191805">under the age of 18</a> when they were displaced by war to the Turkish border area. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297985/original/file-20191021-56228-qrzkfd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=533&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Children in al-Bab, northern Syria, which was seized from the Islamic State by Turkey and Syrian opposition fighters last year, May 29, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Syria-Turkey/f225f44b72194f7abb8aa7f251e49c00/57/0">AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>LGBTQ Syrian refugees: An untold story</h2>
<p>Turkey’s Syrian refugee community includes other marginalized groups that would face unique dangers back home, including <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/lgbtq-syrian-refugees-forced-chose-between-their-families-identity-n1062446">gay, lesbian and trans people</a>. </p>
<p>The exact number of LGBTQ Syrian refugees displaced across the region is unknown, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/lgbtq-syrian-refugees-forced-chose-between-their-families-identity-n1062446">human rights groups say</a>. But Syria – like much of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/16/audacity-adversity/lgbt-activism-middle-east-and-north-africa">the Middle East and North Africa region</a> – is a dangerous place to be gay.</p>
<p>Homosexuality <a href="http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/syria-lgbti-resources">is illegal in Syria</a>, and both the government and terror groups like the Islamic State <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/it-cant-get-any-worse-than-being-gay-in-syria-today-20151001-gjze4o.html">persecute sexual minorities</a>. Being gay is culturally unacceptable <a href="https://www.hrc.org/resources/stances-of-faiths-on-lgbt-issues-islam">according to traditional Islamic mores</a>.</p>
<p>Though Turkey does not criminalize homosexuality, it is not always safe for LGBTQ Syrian refugees, either. Gay Syrians have suffered <a href="https://journo.com.tr/syrian-lgbti-refugees-struggle-in-turkey">physical and verbal attacks</a>, often with little response from law enforcement or the government.</p>
<p>In August 2016, Muhammed Wisam Sankari was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/04/body-missing-gay-syrian-refugee-muhammed-wisam-sankari-found-beheaded-istanbul">found mutilated and killed</a> in Istanbul, two days after he went missing. Sankari had told police he feared for his life after having previously been abducted, tortured and raped by unknown attackers, according to reports. </p>
<p>Recent crackdowns by the Turkish police in Syrian refugee communities, have been <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/23/its-not-legal-un-stands-by-as-turkey-deports-vulnerable-syrians">detaining and deporting thousands of Syrian refugees, including LGBTQ people</a>. </p>
<p>The Turkish government <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-08-06/turkey-denies-deporting-refugees-syria-activists-say-they-ve-sent-back-thousands">denies</a> that it is forcibly returning refugees to a war zone, which would be <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html">illegal</a> under Turkish and international law.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297987/original/file-20191021-56198-6dmql5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fighting continues in northeast Syria near the Turkish border despite a U.S.-brokered ceasefire.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Turkey-Syria/40fdde21f6f24994bb9d2523b7dd9024/108/0">AP Photo/Emrah Gurel</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For LGBTQ Syrians, going home may be a death sentence.</p>
<p>In August 2019 a transgender Syrian woman named Ward <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/23/its-not-legal-un-stands-by-as-turkey-deports-vulnerable-syrians">told The Guardian newspaper</a> that she feared being deported to the Turkey-Syria border because the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-nusra-front-al-qaedas-affiliate-syria">al-Nusra terrorist group</a>, a branch of al-Qaida with 5,000 to 10,000 fighters in western Syria, would kill her. </p>
<p>Ward was deported days later. She was last seen in late August being forced into the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/23/its-not-legal-un-stands-by-as-turkey-deports-vulnerable-syrians">trunk of a car by militants in Syria</a>, according to the Guardian report.</p>
<h2>Collateral damage</h2>
<p>Erdogan’s stated purpose in invading Syria is to <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkey-claim-syrian-kurds-terrorists-not-isis-ypg-pkk-sdf/">rid its northern region of the Kurdish Worker’s Party</a> – an armed militia and political party known as the PKK – and create a “buffer zone” between the two countries. </p>
<p>The PKK has been a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-kurdish-conflict-in-turkey-is-so-intractable-125101">thorn in Turkey’s side</a> for the past 41 years.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.mar.umd.edu">With Syrian government support</a>, PKK leader Abdallah Ocallan has been threatening the Turkish government with a Kurdish separatist insurgency long before Erdogan’s presidency. </p>
<p>The United States, like Turkey, considers the PKK to be a <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-foreign-terrorist-designation-is-more-punishment-than-threat-detector-116049">terrorist organization</a>. </p>
<p>But in Syria the U.S. had, until its recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-turkish-troops-move-in-to-syria-the-risks-are-great-including-for-turkey-itself-124782">military withdrawal</a>, allied itself with other secular and progressive Syrian groups, namely the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/who-are-the-syrian-kurds-the-us-has-abandoned/2019/10/17/24759880-f0f8-11e9-bb7e-d2026ee0c199_story.html">Syrian Democratic Forces</a>.</p>
<p>The Kurdish minority in northern Syria, as in nearby Iraq, has long been stuck between Ocallan’s armed militia, the Turkish government and their own authoritarian leaders – used and abused, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601151?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">my research finds</a>, by politicians seeking to further their own regional agenda in the Mideast. </p>
<p>Returning Syrian refugees to this battleground would make them the “buffer” between these warring forces, turning more vulnerable people into collateral damage of a greater geopolitical war. </p>
<p>[ <em>Insight, in your inbox each day.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=insight">You can get it with The Conversation’s email newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125195/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Deina Abdelkader does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Turkey is threatening to send 3.6 million refugees back to the Syrian territory it just invaded. Deporting these vulnerable people would make them the collateral damage of a chaotic, many-sided war.Deina Abdelkader, Associate Professor of Political Science, UMass LowellLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1251012019-10-18T09:12:00Z2019-10-18T09:12:00ZWhy the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is so intractable<p>The ramifications of Donald Trump’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-donald-trumps-decision-to-abandon-kurdish-fighters-in-syria-means-for-the-kurds-assad-and-russia-124815">decision to withdraw US troops</a> from the Turkish-Syrian border continues to have a seismic effect on the situation in northern Syria. </p>
<p>Faced with the Turkish invasion of northern Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who controlled the area were forced to make compromises. On October 13, they <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50039106">announced a deal with the Syrian army</a>, which began moving troops towards the Turkish border. A <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-ceasefire/turkey-u-s-agree-ceasefire-in-northeast-syria-pence-idUSKBN1WW2KL">five-day ceasefire</a> was brokered by the US on October 18, during which Turkey agreed to pause its offensive to allow Kurdish forces to withdraw. </p>
<p>For many, the SDF proved itself to be the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/military-leaders-warn-trump-abandoning-ally-grave-mistake-2019-10?r=US&IR=T">most effective</a> force in the fight against Islamic State (IS). Turkey, however, considers the SDF as an extension of the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-49963649">Kurdistan Workers’ Party</a> (PKK), which it, the US and EU label as a terrorist organisation.</p>
<p>But behind this lies a long history of Turkey denying the very existence of the Kurdish conflict, and the political and cultural rights of its Kurdish population. Understanding this history helps explain why the conflict is so intractable, and the impact it continues to have on Turkey’s foreign policy choices.</p>
<h2>No room in the nation state</h2>
<p>The Kurdish conflict cannot be understood without considering the question of power and exclusion. Its origins go back to the mid-19th century when the Ottomans attempted to end the 300-year-old autonomy of <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19436149.2016.1218162?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=ccri20%5D(https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19436149.2016.1218162?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=ccri20">the Kurdish principalities in Kurdistan</a>. This struggle for <a href="https://www.sunypress.edu/p-3887-kurdish-notables-and-the-ottoma.aspx">autonomy</a> wasn’t resolved during the rule of the Ottoman era, and when it collapsed, all of the new nation states that eventually emerged – Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran – inherited their own Kurdish conflict. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nationbuilding-in-turkey-and-morocco/8647BB17BC02282D5E370376AA436F87">Turks and the Kurds</a> fought a successful war of <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191835278.001.0001/acref-9780191835278-e-299">independence</a> together in 1919 against the Allied forces. Nevertheless, when the new Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, Turkish identity was presented as its unifying force, at the expense of the society’s political, social and cultural differences.</p>
<p>Not only was political power further centralised in Ankara, but the domination of the ethnic, Turkish and Sunni majority became the norm. The decision to create <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/a-modern-history-of-the-kurds-9780857714824/">a centralised and homogeneous nation state</a> was implemented in a top-down and violent fashion. The seeds of the long-term problems that Turkish and Kurdish communities confront today were created by this decision. </p>
<p>Various Kurdish groups challenged this new social and political order with different <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/871c10c2-e9c3-11e9-85f4-d00e5018f061">revolts, uprisings, and resistance</a>, but these were violently suppressed. <a href="http://www.markuswiener.com/books/the-kurds-a-modern-history/">Repressive policies of assimilation</a> were later implemented to transform the Kurds into <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nationbuilding-in-turkey-and-morocco/8647BB17BC02282D5E370376AA436F87">civilised and secular Turks</a>.</p>
<h2>A conflict buried</h2>
<p>The Kurdish conflict laid buried for many years. Then, the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329023">most serious challenge</a> to Turkey’s nation state project was initiated by the PKK in 1984, which embraced a political agenda called <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030005382">democratic autonomy</a>. The violent struggle between Ankara and the PKK has resulted in a huge <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/09/29/economic-cost-pkk-conflict-turkey/">economic</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-s-pkk-conflict-death-toll">human cost</a>. </p>
<p>Peace talks which began in 2013 with the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan were widely considered to be the best chance for ending the conflict, but these collapsed in 2015. This led to <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-opens-up-old-wounds-with-a-new-campaign-against-the-pkk-45397">increasing violence</a> in the form of a destructive armed conflict in southeastern Turkey and a wave of bombings, including in <a href="https://theconversation.com/bombing-in-ankara-who-is-fighting-who-in-turkey-56223">Ankara</a> and Istanbul.</p>
<p>The resolution of intractable conflicts is only possible when conflicted parties can confront their past and learn from it. In 2015, amid attempts by Turkish opposition parties to reopen peace negotiations with the Kurds, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-seeks-strong-restart-for-peace-process-85385">insisted</a>: “There is no Kurdish conflict”. Such positioning, which continues today, keeps the political dimension of the conflict in the background. </p>
<p>The state carefully controls what can and cannot be said about the conflict. Typically, words such as “terror” and “traitor” are used to criminalise those who criticise government policy towards the Kurds. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/11/erdogan-turkey-academics-terrorism-violence-kurdish-people">A group of academics</a> who signed a petition in 2016 calling for the resumption of peace talks were charged with making “terrorism propaganda”. The non-violent wing of the Kurdish movement – activists, politicians, political parties – has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/turkey-arrests-pro-kurdish-party-leaders-mps">also been criminalised</a>.</p>
<h2>Blame game</h2>
<p>Instead of confronting their failure to bring about peace, Turkish political elites have tried to apportion <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Transformation_of_Turkey.html?id=hPUUbI_uoGsC&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">blame</a> elsewhere. Erdoğan, for example, repeatedly refers to an invisible “<a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/10/26/erdogan-there-is-a-superior-mind-in-pyds-kobani-plots">mastermind</a>” who orchestrates the PKK. Such rhetoric is deployed to play on the collective fear and anxiety about national security felt by parts of Turkish society. </p>
<p>Some have called this the “Sèvres syndrome” – referring to the 1920 <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100457377">Treaty of Sèvres</a> that marked the end of the Ottoman empire and proposed to divide it <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp092.pdf">into small states and occupation zones</a>. The treaty was never implemented, and superseded by the 1923 <a href="https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100054128">Lausanne Treaty</a> which recognised the Republic of Turkey.</p>
<p>This syndrome – also referred to as “Sèvres <a href="https://www.persee.fr/docAsPDF/cemot_0764-9878_2003_num_36_1_1702.pdf">Paranoia</a>” – in essence reflects the collective fear that the Treaty of Sèvres <a href="https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/cp092.pdf">will be revived</a> and that the Turkish state is encircled by enemies who want to <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Oil_and_Water.html?id=ZF5uAAAAMAAJ&source=kp_cover&redir_esc=y">divide</a> and weaken the country. </p>
<p>Today, this line of thinking is an integral part of Turkish political life and continues to influence public <a href="https://www.bookdepository.com/Transformation-Turkey-Fatma-Muge-Gocek/9781780764863">perception</a> towards the external world. In a 2006 public opinion survey, for example, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Transformation_of_Turkey.html?id=hPUUbI_uoGsC&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">78% of participants</a> agreed that “the West wants to divide and break up Turkey like they broke up the Ottoman Empire”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/297194/original/file-20191015-98648-1noaz16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=571&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Driving Turkey’s choices.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">By kmlmtz66/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In this way, the Kurdish conflict has been used to mobilise Turkish society to act against its own collective interest: a peaceful and just society. Policies aimed at managing the conflict have been implemented mostly within a state of emergency, in ways that continue to undermine <a href="https://stockholmcf.org/turkey-ranks-110th-among-160-countries-in-the-economists-democracy-index/">Turkish democracy</a>. Not only has the tremendous economic and human cost of the conflict become a “normal” part of Turkish life, but the state has also been successful in actively keeping the political dimension of the conflict at bay.</p>
<p>For a long time, Turkey refrained from talking about the Kurdish issue by assuming that it would eventually fade away. But it didn’t and instead, the conflict has become more deeply entrenched. Time will tell whether the Turkish state will ultimately gain or lose by its latest military intervention in Syria. However, what’s clear is that the Kurdish conflict will get more complicated with this latest move, and both the Turkish state and Turkish society will no longer be able to ignore it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125101/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Recep Onursal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By burying the Kurdish conflict, Turkey has made it that much more difficult to resolve.Recep Onursal, Assistant Lecturer and PhD candidate in International Conflict Analysis, University of KentLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.