tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/nana-akufo-addo-34869/articlesNana Akufo-Addo – The Conversation2021-04-26T15:29:49Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1595792021-04-26T15:29:49Z2021-04-26T15:29:49ZGhana’s COVID-19 vaccine rollout is struggling to keep up with its great start<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/396626/original/file-20210422-17-1wp18al.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Covid-19 vaccination strategies have been affected by supply woes</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pfizer-BioNTech_COVID-19_vaccine_(2020)_C.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Ghana became the <a href="https://www.unicef.org/supply/stories/first-shipment-covax-vaccines#:%7E:text=Ghana%20is%20the%20first%20recipient,India%20arrived%20in%20Accra%2C%20Ghana.">first country</a> globally to receive a vaccine shipment from the COVAX facility – a global initiative that’s trying to ensure equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines – when 600,000 Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine doses were delivered in February 2021. The country also received a total of about 360,000 doses from India and telecom giant MTN as donations. Ghana’s initial plan was to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-ghana-vaccination-idUSKBN2AU18W">vaccinate 20 million residents</a>, about two-thirds of the population, by the end of October 2021. But, like many other countries in the world, Ghana’s strategy has faced challenges. Godfred Boafo spoke to public health researcher Nana Kofi Quakyi to unpack some of these.</em></p>
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<h2>What’s been the progress of the country’s roll out plan?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/covid-19-vaccination-plan-govt-estimates-gh-295m-for-20-million-people.html">Distribution</a> was to start with a priority group. This includes frontline healthcare workers and security personnel, people aged over 60, those with <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/covid-19-vaccination-plan-govt-estimates-gh-295m-for-20-million-people.html">known comorbidities</a>, and some government officials. </p>
<p>This was one of four population “segments” that would be vaccinated in priority order. Pregnant women and children under 16 years would be excluded due to limited data from vaccine trials.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization">Emergency use authorisation</a> was granted for the <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/FDA-authorises-two-coronavirus-vaccines-for-use-in-Ghana-FDA-Boss-1184194">Oxford-AstraZeneca and Sputnik V vaccines</a> in February. These remain the only ones approved for use in Ghana at this time. The Ministry of Health is expected to procure <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1070581/ghana-on-course-to-procure-42-million-more-covid.html">42 million COVID-19 vaccine doses</a>. Ghana’s President Akufo-Addo <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-ghana-idUSKBN2A11KB">stated </a> that 17.6 million of those would be delivered by June 2021.</p>
<p>The nation has been administering doses of the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine since March 1st, when <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/02/c_139776187.htm">Phase 1</a> of the immunisation drive began. As of April 20th, Ghana’s health service reports that <a href="https://www.ghanahealthservice.org/covid19/">787,180 Ghanaians</a> had received a first dose.</p>
<p>Some 16,000 doses of the Sputnik V vaccine were also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=39NsYjCAoFc">delivered</a> in March, but none have been administered so far. The <a href="https://rdif.ru/Eng_About/">Russian Direct Investment Fund</a>, which markets the Sputnik V vaccine globally, also <a href="https://rdif.ru/Eng_fullNews/6454/">announced</a> Ghana’s participation in Phase 3 clinical trials of the single-dose Sputnik Light vaccine in March. However, the Presidential Advisor on Health <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=39NsYjCAoFc">recently stated</a> that no conversations have been had to that effect. </p>
<h2>What have been some of the challenges?</h2>
<p>To meet the end-of-year coverage target of 20 million people, Ghana needed to administer first doses to about 65,000 citizens each day. Per my calculations, the current average pace of about <a href="https://www.ghanahealthservice.org/covid19/">16,000 per day</a> is well short of that and has been declining steadily since the end of Phase 1 on April 15.</p>
<p>The relatively slow pace of progress is largely attributable to the limited availability of vaccines as deliveries expected in March and April have not materialised. </p>
<p>The immediate cause of this is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56513371">India’s decision</a> to temporarily ban the export of COVID-19 vaccines in order to meet local demand as that country contends with a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/04/21/world/covid-vaccine-coronavirus-cases">dramatic surge</a> in infections. </p>
<p>The export ban has left Ghana’s principal sources unable to meet their <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-55571793">indicative delivery timelines</a>. The African Union – via the <a href="https://archive.uneca.org/stories/showcasing-african-medical-supplies-platform-amsp-engaging-ecowas-member-states">African Medical Supplies Platform </a> – is the single largest source of COVID-19 vaccines for Ghana, with the <a href="https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/act-accelerator/covax/covax-interim-distribution-forecast.pdf?sfvrsn=7889475d_5">COVAX facility in second place</a>. Together, these constitute about 72% of Ghana’s total projected supply for 2021.</p>
<p>Both facilities rely heavily on vaccines manufactured at the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-india-covax-idUSKBN2BW0R2">Serum Institute of India,</a> whose entire production capacity has been focused on meeting local demand since late March. That situation is likely to persist for at least <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-55571793">two more months</a>. But it is worth noting, too, that similar export bans on vaccine manufacturing supplies by some wealthy nations are limiting production capacity at Serum Institute of India . This is part of a wider pattern of vaccine nationalism by such nations, most prominently characterised by their continued blocking of knowledge-sharing that could help to boost global production.</p>
<p>The resulting delays in vaccine supply have compelled COVAX to <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/25-03-2021-covax-updates-participants-on-delivery-delays-for-vaccines-from-serum-institute-of-india-(sii)-and-astrazeneca">notify</a> participating nations that next deliveries may not arrive until June 2021. The African Union appears less optimistic and has shifted its focus to the Johnson and Johnson vaccine made in the Netherlands, but that means it will not be able to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-j-j-vaccine-idUSKBN2BL1V4">fulfil orders until the third quarter</a> of this year at the earliest. Ghana has already used up over 80% of its stock and will likely <a href="https://www.ghanahealthservice.org/covid19/">run out</a> in the next few weeks, stirring public concern about vaccine access and the <a href="https://www.myjoyonline.com/second-dose-of-covid-19-vaccine-can-be-taken-4-weeks-after-the-deadline-stated-ghs/">timing of second doses</a>. </p>
<p>But there are demand-side issues too. Anxieties and uncertainties about the safety of vaccines underlie <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.03.11.21253374v1.full">considerable scepticism</a> in Ghana, and the proliferation of misinformation on social media and irresponsible reportage in certain quarters of the popular press are fanning the embers. <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.03.11.21253374v1.full">Slow uptake</a> by healthcare workers at some institutions has been directly attributed to the <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic#tab=tab_1">infodemic</a>. This is too much information – including false or misleading information – during a disease outbreak. This is a worrying signal about vaccine perceptions and acceptance in the wider community.</p>
<h2>What should be done?</h2>
<p>Widespread COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy must be addressed urgently, and messaging to that effect should be informed by continuous data collection on public knowledge and attitudes. </p>
<p>There has also been some effort to tackle vaccine hesitancy. The President and senior government officials took their <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/ghanas-president-receives-first-shot-historic-covax-vaccine-launch-vaccination-campaign">shots publicly</a> to help allay fears and apprehensions about COVID-19 vaccines, as did the former President and other national figures.</p>
<p>A series of nationally and regionally representative public surveys to assess the evolving landscape of knowledge and attitudes of COVID-19 vaccines may be useful. But health officials still need to confront the role of social and digital media in the ongoing infodemic and must be proactive in monitoring and countering digital misinformation.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/159579/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nana Kofi Quakyi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The COVID-19 vaccination programme requires stringent data collection and transparency.Nana Kofi Quakyi, Research Fellow, New York UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1584582021-04-15T13:29:07Z2021-04-15T13:29:07ZGhana needs to rethink its small scale mining strategy. Here’s how<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/394772/original/file-20210413-15-1d5f4t7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Gold is key to the economic survival of millions of Ghanaians</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/deepeco/15681310707">Knut-Erik Helle/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ghana is among the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/18245/ghana-now-africas-largest-gold-producer-but-reforms-await/">top two gold producers</a> in Africa. What has caught little attention, however, is the fact that more than <a href="https://theconversation.com/lifting-the-lid-on-ghanas-illegal-small-scale-mining-problem-123292">35% of total gold output</a> in Ghana comes from artisanal and small-scale miners. Artisanal and small-scale mining is estimated to support the livelihoods of some <a href="https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/16618IIED.pdf">4.5 million Ghanaians</a>, about 12% of the population. They account for more than <a href="https://www.miningreview.com/west-africa/galamsey-in-ghana-a-policy-impasse/">60% of the country’s mining sector labour force.</a></p>
<p>Artisanal and small-scale mining is a low-tech, indigenous and often informal. It occurs in over 80 mineral-rich developing countries. Up to <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/artisanal-and-small-scale-mining#:%7E:text=There%20are%20approximately%20100%20million,and%20Central%20and%20South%20America.">100 million people</a> globally work in this sector.</p>
<p>Artisanal and small-scale mining has a long history in Ghana. It was only in 1989, however, that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/106/424/413/46886">government recognised</a> its legitimacy through the Small-scale Mining Act (PNDCL 218), later integrated into the current <a href="https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/Minerals%20and%20Mining%20Act%20703%20Ghana.pdf">Mining Act 703 (2006)</a>. The act provides a blueprint for its formalisation. It also reserves small-scale mining for Ghanaians. The law requires prospective local miners to apply for a licence to mine up to 25 acres of land in designated areas.</p>
<p>Government’s intention to formalise the sector has had very little success. <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2019/07/15/ghana-illegal-asm-artisanal-mining/">More than 85% </a>of all small-scale mining operations in Ghana are carried out by unlicensed operators. </p>
<p>Due to the sector’s evolving nature, the distinction between artisanal and small-scale mining has become contentious and blurred. To avoid any complications, most scholars now use them interchangeably. Some use the level of sophistication employed to make a distinction. But in Ghana today one sees rudimentary tools (traditional artisanal mining) and modern tools (small-scale mining) being used on a single mining site.</p>
<h2>Jackboot approach</h2>
<p>Government’s response to illegal mining has been to use the military to raid small-scale miners. There is a long history to such a combative approach in Ghana. It dates as far back as the British colonial administration which enacted the <a href="https://www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/PaperTsuma.pdf">Mercury Ordinance of 1933</a> to ban and criminalise native miners. </p>
<p>In 2013, the then president John Mahama formed the Inter-Ministerial Taskforce to “flush out” illegal miners, which led to many arrests and the expulsion of illegal Chinese miners. The use of force intensified under the current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, who <a href="https://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/news-style-2/309-4847">vowed in 2017</a> to put his presidency on the line to fight illegal mining in Ghana. This culminated in the setting up of <a href="https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/operation-vanguard-launched-to-wipe-out-galamsey.html">Operation Vanguard</a>, the largest centralised military-police joint taskforce to combat illegal mining in Ghana.</p>
<p>The real problem, however, is government’s failure to implement its legislative framework for the formalisation of small-scale miners.</p>
<h2>Barriers to formalisation</h2>
<p>Government first introduced a framework for the formalisation of small-scale miners more than 30 years ago. But it has very little to show for it. Less than 15% of small-scale mining operators have been able to acquire the requisite mining licences. Many don’t bother to apply due to the tedious and cumbersome nature of the regulatory process.</p>
<p>To gain a better understanding of why the formalisation process has not achieved much, an aspect of my <a href="https://www.idrc.ca/en/2019-idrc-doctoral-research-awardees">PhD research</a> sought to unearth local perspectives on the underlying conditions for the creation of these informal local mines. It examines how these underpin persistent informality.</p>
<p>There are two problems. The first is that the current formalisation blueprints fail to adapt to the conditions of the majority of local miners. The second is that the blueprints make it very difficult or too costly for small-scale miners to comply. They are therefore a disincentive to formalise.</p>
<p>Only a small segment of small-scale miners can raise the amount of money required to become <a href="http://www.mincom.gov.gh/acquiring-mining-license">formal operators</a>. The costs include application fees as well as the money required for the preparation and processing of the application. Then there are costs for environmental permits, the hiring of surveyors and for the acquisition of business documents. A prospective small-scale mining licensee could spend at least US$4,000 to secure the requisite legal status. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-large-miners-and-states-stifle-local-capital-and-innovation-in-dr-congo-157529">How large miners and states stifle local capital and innovation in DR Congo</a>
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<p>When unofficial payments (bribes) are included, according to small-scale miners, the costs of getting a licence to mine 25 acres can balloon to as much as US$7,000. A burgeoning body of <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11113-012-9229-6">research</a> has shown that artisanal and small-scale miners in Ghana are driven to mining by poverty.</p>
<p>The second challenge revolves around a centralised bureaucracy and lack of effective engagement with all stakeholders. Despite the administration of small-scale mining being decentralised into nine mining districts across the country, only the national head office can issue a small-scale mining licence. Key local stakeholders like municipal and district assemblies with better understanding of the complexities play no effective role in the licensing process.</p>
<p>Again, the creation of a centralised taskforce to address a localised problem runs parallel to existing local structures. This undermines effective policing, monitoring and accountability.</p>
<h2>Finding solutions</h2>
<p>President Akufo-Addo’s call for a dialogue on illegal mining in his January 2021 <a href="https://www.modernghana.com/news/1053819/akufo-addos-call-for-open-conversation-on-galamse.html">state of the nation address</a> portends a potential shift. </p>
<p>To create the enabling policy environment for a blooming artisanal and small-scale mining industry that is environmentally sustainable and economically beneficial to the state and citizens, greater engagement with local actors is the path to chart.</p>
<p>The solution is the devolution of small-scale mining decisions to municipal and district assemblies working in collaboration with traditional authorities.</p>
<p>This will facilitate greater recognition and inclusion of local actors in the licensing process. It will also open dialogue with local miners since municipal and district assemblies are the local development agents. This will bring decision making processes closer to small-scale miners and enhance the effective policing and monitoring of the sector.</p>
<p>The reform of the licence regime for small-scale mining should be driven by the need to match the costs of formalisation with the complex socio-economic dynamics of the majority of operators. This is attainable when policy treats small-scale mining as a survivalist sector rather than a platform for wealth creation. Artisanal and small-scale mining has also suffered because of its portrayal by the media and public misrepresentation as a vehicle for “quick money”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/158458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Kwaku Kumah receives funding from International Development Research Centre under the IDRC Doctoral Research Award for his current PhD research on artisanal and small-scale mining in Ghana. </span></em></p>The devolution of small-scale mining decisions to municipal and district assemblies working in collaboration with traditional authorities is key to saving the industry in Ghana.Richard Kumah, PhD, PhD Candidate, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1534562021-02-11T13:46:04Z2021-02-11T13:46:04ZGhana’s media need to up their game in covering the presidential election court case<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383237/original/file-20210209-17-1xhgp2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana's Supreme Court plays a key role in election disputes</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nii Darku Otoo/CitiNewsroom</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Ghana, touted for its democracy and peaceful transfer of power since 1992, faced its first presidential election dispute in 2012. This was the sixth election of the country’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326756749_Electoral_Politics_in_Ghana's_4th_Republic_1992-2016_and_its_Implications_on_Future_Elections">fourth republic</a>.</p>
<p>Six months prior to the elections, the sitting president, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18972107">John Evans Atta Mills</a>, passed away and the vice-president, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/7/25/ghana-swears-in-mahama-as-new-president">John Mahama</a>, was sworn in as president. </p>
<p>When the Electoral Commission declared the incumbent the winner of the presidential poll, the outcome was <a href="https://ghalii.org/gh/judgment/supreme-court/2013/137">disputed</a> by Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, presidential candidate of the leading opposition party, the New Patriotic Party. He petitioned the Supreme Court to annul some 3,000,000 votes. </p>
<p>The Election Petition Case, as it was called, was heard publicly. In August 2013, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ghanas-supreme-court-upholds-election-result/a-17054771">Supreme Court</a> ruled that the president had been validly elected and dismissed the petition. </p>
<p>Ghanaians went to the polls again in December 2020. Akufo-Addo was re-elected in the first round after <a href="https://www.bbc.com/pidgin/tori-55237020">securing</a> a majority of the votes. But Mahama contested the outcome and has <a href="https://citinewsroom.com/2020/12/mahama-rejects-2020-election-results-full-speech/">petitioned</a> the Supreme Court.</p>
<p>Presidential election petitions are important because they trigger all three arms of government – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. They provide an opportunity for citizens to understand the political and legal issues at play and affirm the strength of national institutions. </p>
<p>Given the significance of these petitions, the media’s role in portraying them matters a great deal. But how have the media covered presidential election petitions and what should we expect in media coverage? My <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17512786.2020.1784775?journalCode=rjop20">research</a> into how the Ghanaian media framed the 2012 election petition provides some insights.</p>
<p>It was expected that the media would explain the constitutional and electoral issues at stake and why they mattered, to help Ghanaians understand and participate in the democratic process. But I found that the media did a poor job by covering the election petition like any other political campaign. They failed to explain all substantial aspects of the case and depended mainly on partisan sources to the detriment of other legal voices. </p>
<p>I suggest that the media in Ghana and by extension other developing countries need to educate citizens about these judicial processes, issues and implications for the voter. Journalists need to include sources who can clearly explain the judicial and constitutional issues at play.</p>
<h2>The 2012 election petition</h2>
<p>The objectives of my study were to establish:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>whether media coverage followed the lines of normal political coverage focusing on who was winning or losing. </p></li>
<li><p>whether coverage provided insights into the constitutional and electoral issues at play, and</p></li>
<li><p>whose voices were heard. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>I focused on the digital platforms of the leading elite English language and Akan language radio stations. These were Joy Fm and Peace Fm. Their wide listenership made good proxies for other elite and popular media in Ghana. I sampled 400 publications out of the 732 publications.</p>
<p>I assessed the overarching frame of the story – that is, whether it focused on winners and losers or on constitutional and electoral issues at stake. </p>
<p>I further assessed whether coverage focused on conflicts or disagreements, attributed causes or solutions to something or someone, considered the economic consequences, or indicated impacts on individuals. </p>
<p>I also looked at the type of sources used and the tone of headlines.</p>
<h2>Findings</h2>
<p>Overall, both publications mainly presented the election petition as a competition between the incumbent and the opposition by focusing on conflict and responsibility in the proceedings. </p>
<p>Rather than including a diversity of sources, both publications depended almost entirely on official sources – mainly politicians or partisan sources.</p>
<p>I concluded that presenting a legal and constitutional issue merely as a competition between two political parties diverted attention from the electoral issues at stake. </p>
<p>Secondly, it ran the risk of making audiences question the authority of the Supreme Court justices. For instance, a story titled “Tsatsu fights off judges, Addison wears out Atuguba” suggested a fight between the lawyers and judges. </p>
<p>The media’s reliance on partisan sources was also problematic as it led to <a href="https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/10.3366/ajicl.2015.0123">dubious analysts and veiled politicians</a> being used extensively. Neither provided sound analysis of the process and its importance.</p>
<p>Although the use of these sources was not surprising given the political nature of the trial, more legal voices should have been aired to explain the constitutional issues at stake.</p>
<h2>Wake up call</h2>
<p>The Ghanaian media have another opportunity to engage citizens with the most recent presidential election petition. </p>
<p>Journalists need to consider using diverse voices and affording them the same prominence in news stories. They need to move beyond the routine coverage processes to engage and involve citizens and explain the reasoning of the justices to audiences. </p>
<p>The media, which like to promote themselves as nonpartisan, should step up to the plate and provide a service of educating their audiences.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/153456/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Esi Thompson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Ghanaian media decides how the public understands proceedings from the Supreme Court.Esi Thompson, Assistant Professor, Indiana UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1176932019-06-03T13:15:10Z2019-06-03T13:15:10ZGhana’s president has donned the mantle of football mediator – will it work?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/277363/original/file-20190531-69091-19fl893.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ghana's Asamoah Gyan at the World Cup 2014 in Brazil.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Marius Becker/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Many African politicians have found it hard to resist meddling in their countries’ football. The latest example is Ghana’s President Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, just weeks ahead of the start of the 32nd <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/africannationscup">Africa Cup of Nations</a> (Afcon) being hosted by Egypt. He recently waded into the politics of the national <a href="https://www.sport24.co.za/Soccer/AFCON/ghana-name-ayew-new-afcon-captain-20190524">team captaincy</a> to mediate a conflict that had exploded into the Ghanaian public discussion.</p>
<p>To be sure, Akuffo-Addo’s <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/Bury-your-egos-and-play-for-each-other-Nana-Addo-tells-Black-Stars-players-750988">intervention</a> is not unique in African football. Six years ago, Nigeria’s then President Goodluck Jonathan <a href="https://www.codewit.com/nigeria-news/5403-nigeria-president-jonathan-s-intervention-forced-keshi-to-withdraws-his-resignation">stepped in</a> to persuade coach Stephen Keshi not to quit shortly after winning Afcon. Keshi’s decision was prompted by the Nigerian Football Federation’s intense scheming to replace him. In the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/26/sport/football/drogba-toure-ivory-coast-football/index.html">Ivory Coast</a>, political leaders have used the captainships of Yaya Touré (from the north of the country) and Didier Drogba (from the south) to seek ethnic political appeasements.</p>
<p>In Ghana, the trouble began when the country’s national team captain, 33-year-old Asamoah Gyan, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/sport/soccer/africa/asamoah-gyan-retires-in-protest-of-ghana-coachs-afcon-plan-23646784">released a statement</a> announcing his retirement from international football when coach Kwasi Appiah informed him that he (Gyan) was to be replaced as the team captain. Gyan was clearly miffed and it <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/Gyan-s-tirade-Akufo-Addo-s-intervention-criticised-748274">showed</a> in his <a href="https://www.pulse.com.gh/sports/football/here-is-why-asamoah-gyan-resigned-from-black-stars/b770skn">letter</a> where he pointed to his record and his financial assistance to the team, as well as his service to his country.</p>
<p>Importantly, it was clear that he was not happy that his replacement was his rival, <a href="https://www.pulse.com.gh/sports/football/afcon-2019-profile-of-black-stars-captain-andre-ayew/88drmhs">Andre Ayew</a>. As Ghanaians <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/Ghanaians-divided-over-Asamoah-Gyan-s-retirement-from-Black-Stars-748097">weighed in</a> on the conflict, the country’s president invited the coach for a meeting and subsequently had a telephone chat with Gyan. </p>
<p>Akufo-Addo was playing the role of “Father of the Nation”. He was the mediator. The result was that Gyan, who has captained the Black Stars for a record seven years, was <a href="https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/Asamoah-Gyan-elevated-to-General-Captain-748970">given</a> the position of “General Captain”.</p>
<p>Akufo-Addo’s intervention marks a continuing move by African political leaders to use football to advance or affirm political situations. But there are pitfalls. A quick intervention – where the position of presidency offers tremendous power – may appear to solve the conflict. In reality, the conflict may fester underneath the surface.</p>
<h2>Power vested in the president</h2>
<p>Clearly, this is not the usual mediator that one encounters in every day conflicts. A mediator is usually an acceptable third party who intervenes but has limited or no authoritative decision making power over the disputants. While mediators may be people of authority, their authority is often limited to the respect that they accumulate in public roles. </p>
<p>That, certainly, is not the case with Akufo-Addo’s intervention. The president has tremendous powers and the disputants are keenly aware of this. The consequence of going against the president’s wishes can be significant and reverberate over a long period of time. The president can deny the disputants benefits that ordinarily accrue to the country’s citizens.</p>
<p>This, perhaps, explains why this type of mediation ends very quickly with disputants claiming the conflict has been settled. In reality, they may have acquiesced simply because the consequences for not doing so are much higher. Moreover, the excuse for giving in can always be the ready use of a face saver: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The President appealed to me, who am I to refuse?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For the mediator, the benefit of intervention is remarkably high. He is the man who has supposedly united the national team. If Ghana wins the Afcon in Cairo in July, much of the glory will surely be attributed to him. His political calculation here is deft and comes with few risks, if any.</p>
<p>But, ultimately, has the conflict disappeared? The answer is: unlikely. Successful mediation requires that disputants feel their deep interests have been met. It is obvious from Gyan’s initial statement of retirement that his interest is to remain captain of the team and not step in as “general captain”, the role that was offered by coach Appiah. </p>
<h2>Unresolved</h2>
<p>“General captain” is only a title; it is without designated or significant duties. It often means the holder plays a reduced role that may even mean not being included in the starting line-up. </p>
<p>Yet, after the President’s intervention, Gyan has seemingly accepted this reduced role and the fact that his rival will now be the team’s captain. He conveniently referred to the president as “The Father of the nation” and then to his commitment to Ghana. Gyan did not refer to his conviction that his personal interests have been served. While this is public, it remains to be seen what his every day attitude with the team and the coach will be. </p>
<p>Maybe, just maybe, his real interest is to feel loved. If that’s the case the president has demonstrated just this by personally talking with him and “appealing” to that interest. </p>
<p>On coach Appiah’s part, he obviously wants a team free of conflict – hence his offer of “general captain”, hoping to appease Gyan. The fact that Gyan initially declined the offer but then accepted it after pressure from the president may lead to the attitude of a horse dragged, against his volition, to the water hole.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117693/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chuka Onwumechili does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Akufo-Addo’s intervention marks a continuing move by African political leaders to use football to advance or affirm political situations.Chuka Onwumechili, Professor of Communications, Howard UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/764682017-04-24T15:59:59Z2017-04-24T15:59:59ZJohannesburg and Accra: inching their way up the urban food chain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166504/original/file-20170424-12658-1gnaot4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Johannesburg's night sky with its most densely-populated suburb of Hillbrow in the foreground.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Leon Krige</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Like it or not, we measure the success (or failure) of cities according to broad principles of urban culture inherited largely from the west. This includes quantitative data: infrastructure, transportation, access to health care, education, amenities and so on. Harder to measure, but no less important, are “other” factors like a sense of belonging, community, identity and history.</p>
<p>What makes a good city? Or what makes a city “good”, as opposed to “bad”? In the past 30 years or so, measuring urban success has become an industry in its own right. There are a host of companies willing to answer that question. They use a mixture of factors that include political stability, economic performance, environmental issues, safety and security, transportation and public services. Add to it more nuanced indices like inclusion, diversity, multiculturalism and choice.</p>
<p>Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 2017, European cities dominated the top 20, with Singapore, Tokyo, Melbourne and Auckland also in the mix. African cities are always in the bottom quartile of every survey, from Mercer’s <a href="https://www.imercer.com/content/mobility/quality-of-living-city-rankings.html?WT.mc_id=A001185">Quality of Life Index</a> (QoL) to the <a href="http://wcr.unhabitat.org/">UN’s World Cities Report</a>. Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Louis and Durban are the continent’s highest-ranked cities. In Mercer’s 2016 QoL Index, Accra, the capital city of Ghana, Africa’s first independent nation, is at # 166, one slot ahead of Riyadh and one behind Cairo. </p>
<p>Partly because Accra and Johannesburg are the only two African cities I can claim to know in detail, and partly because they represent two very different versions of a contemporary African city, this article looks at their slow climb up the urban food chain. </p>
<h2>Cities of the same generation</h2>
<p>Accra and Johannesburg are roughly the same age. Gold was <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/discovery-gold-1884">discovered</a> just outside present day Johannesburg in 1884, triggering the rush that founded the city. The British <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9780230294790_12">declared</a> Accra the colonial administrative capital of the Gold Coast in 1877, both events occurring within a decade of each other. </p>
<p>Today, metropolitan Johannesburg’s population is around 5 million, whilst Accra’s is just over 2.5 million. Johannesburg’s brand identity, prominently displayed in its media image, is of a <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/50479/joburg-actually-is-a-world-class-african-city/">“world class African city”</a>. Accra makes fewer claims to “world class” status, but in 2016, was awarded the title of Africa’s <a href="http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Accra-Africa-s-Most-Expensive-City-125798">“most expensive city”</a>.</p>
<p>Companies like Mercer Consulting, Moody’s, Fitch, Standard & Poor’s, CNNMoney.com and PricewaterhouseCoopers cover almost every conceivable inch and index of global urbanity. It’s mostly according to the indices covered above. Yet the lived, daily life experience of millions of city-dwellers, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is hardly, if ever, captured by this data. So who is this data actually for? There’s an <a href="https://www.mercer.com/newsroom/2017-quality-of-living-survey.html">important clue</a> on Mercer Consulting’s website:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These rankings indicate differences in quality of living factors affecting expatriates in popular assignment destinations. These rankings shouldn’t be used as the basis for determining hardship premiums, as many complex and dynamic factors must be taken into account. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Among the indicators used in determining the “value” of a given global city, the price of groceries, transport, utility bills, restaurants and rent are seen as benchmarks. But this says next-to-nothing about wages, recreation (other than restaurants), local class structures, social patterns, language and even “local” culture, most commonly described by expatriates as “traditions”. </p>
<p>Multinational expatriates may not be the site’s only users, but they’re certainly its target market. Presumably, then, the true purpose of the index is to work out how much to pay the average Briton, European or American in far-flung exotic or dangerous locations.</p>
<h2>Booming economies</h2>
<p>Ghana is classified by the World Bank as a lower middle-income <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana">economy</a> with a per capita GDP of $1,100. </p>
<p>In principle, citizens of Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi (Ghana’s three largest cities) should be entitled to expect at least a reasonable quality of urban existence in line with their own aspirations and ambitions. One of the least talked-about issues in African city-making discourses, however, is precisely what these aspirations and ambitions are, should be … or even could be. </p>
<p>Expatriate expectations (and their salary scales) hardly ever take local realities into account. For your average Ghanaian, going to a funeral or visiting extended family relatives at the weekend may be infinitely more socially rewarding than sitting in an air-conditioned restaurant a deux, listening to piped musak. </p>
<p>Shopping for food in an open-air market where prices can be negotiated may be more convenient than going to an impersonal mall. Yet funerals and roadside markets don’t feature anywhere on any urban index. Given Accra’s current position (# 166), alongside the vast majority of other African cities, whatever local aspirations and expectations may be, they are neither being articulated nor met. </p>
<p>At the “other” end of the scale is Johannesburg, an African city unlike any other. Narrowly within the world’s top 100, it’s a city undergoing enormous changes, although, like Accra, the pace of transformation is often perceived by its citizens to be too slow.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166501/original/file-20170424-12650-1tr2rd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/166501/original/file-20170424-12650-1tr2rd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166501/original/file-20170424-12650-1tr2rd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166501/original/file-20170424-12650-1tr2rd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=413&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166501/original/file-20170424-12650-1tr2rd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166501/original/file-20170424-12650-1tr2rd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/166501/original/file-20170424-12650-1tr2rd8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=519&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man selling coconuts on the streets of Accra.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Legnan Koula/EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>By and large, South African cities are closer in form, behaviour and appearance to their “world-class” counterparts – or at least those portions of the city that conform to the stereotype of ordered, well-organised and consensual urbanity. Informal settlements, squatter camps, inner cities, townships and rural landscapes are markedly different for complex historical, political and economic reasons.</p>
<p>Largely due to its demographic make-up, there’s no real expatriate culture in South Africa (with the possible exception of Cape Town, which holds large numbers of non-resident Europeans and Americans). In marked contrast to Accra, expressed as a percentage of the total urban population, middle-class Jo'burgers enjoy relatively easy access to a comfortably bourgeois lifestyle without the input or demands of expatriates. </p>
<p>The gentrification of inner city Johannesburg has prompted much debate, including <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-06-03-gentrification-the-process-of-making-suffering-a-crime/#.WPjMtfl97IU">outcry</a>. But the truth of the matter is that in a context where race and class have historically meant the same thing (you’re poor because you’re black and black because you’re poor), it’s neither possible nor productive to talk about gentrification in the same way as it’s in London, New York or Paris.</p>
<p>Some of the up-and-coming inner city neighbourhoods on which architects and urbanists pour such scorn are the few – if not only – places where young South Africans of all races freely mix. Yes, they do so on the basis of bourgeois values and common class interests, but what’s the alternative? Segregated cities? South Africans have had nearly two centuries of those: forgive a foreigner’s assumption, but I’m guessing the answer is “no”.</p>
<h2>Up the urban food chain</h2>
<p>Both Accra and Johannesburg have some way to go before they make it onto anyone’s top 20. Both cities have considerable challenges to overcome, not least the dramatic and desperate gap between rich and poor, haves and have-nots (which, certainly in most African cities, includes the gap between locals and expatriates). </p>
<p>But inequality is not a uniquely African problem, neither is intolerance, immigration and displacement. As we’ve seen only too dramatically in the past year, these are issues that continue to confound and confront cities across the globe. Developing more nuanced tools and yardsticks to measure the health and wealth of African cities may be more useful to the rest of the world than we currently acknowledge.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/76468/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>In her capacity as Head of the Graduate School of Architecture at the University of Johannesburg, Lesley Lokko has received funding from the Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in Fine Arts to develop an internationally peer-reviewed journal of African architecture, Folio, which will be available from May 25 2017. </span></em></p>Accra and Johannesburg have some way to go before making it onto anyone’s top 20. Both cities have a desperate gap between rich and poor but inequality is not a uniquely African problem.Lesley Lokko, Associate Professor of Architecture, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/711732017-01-15T07:25:26Z2017-01-15T07:25:26ZHow The Gambia is testing West Africa’s resolve to protect democracy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152654/original/image-20170113-11207-1f01t1m.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Gambia's Yahya Jammeh is under pressure from regional leaders to cede power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thierry Gouegnon</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Gambia is an opportunity to reinforce election quality norms for the <a href="http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information/">Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</a>. The 15-member regional group was initially set up as a trading bloc. But it has increasingly pursued an agenda of trying to ensure that countries apply principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance. This motivation has its roots in protecting civilian governments from military coups and preventing civil conflict in West Africa.</p>
<p>In contrast to other African regional organisations, such as the Southern African Development Community <a href="http://www.sadc.int/">(SADC)</a> and the East African Community <a href="http://www.au.int/en/recs/eac">(EAC)</a>, ECOWAS has pioneered norms around election conditions and observation. This has <a href="http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democracy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf">included</a> “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”.</p>
<p>For ECOWAS, constitutionalism has increasingly began to trump national sovereignty.</p>
<p>The events unfolding in The Gambia present a crucial test for the regional body’s commitment to this principle.</p>
<p>On 2 December <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38183906">President Yahya Jammeh conceded defeat</a> shortly before the Independent Electoral Commission announced that opposition leader Adama Barrow had won the election. A week later he <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-election-idUSKBN13Y2QO">withdrew his concession</a>. Even before the elections it had been widely expected that Jammeh would try and rig the outcome. This would not have been out of character for a regime that has consistently suppressed <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/gambia#899ef4">political dissent and critical media</a>.</p>
<p>Prior to the December election, ECOWAS challenged Jammeh’s behaviour in power. Based on a pre-election assessment it concluded that the minimal conditions for <a href="http://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1361893/ecowas-to-boycott-gambias-presidential-elections/">free and fair elections were not being met</a>. It said it would not be sending <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15851706">observers</a>, a decision it had also taken ahead of The Gambia’s 2011 presidential election.</p>
<h2>Not the first time</h2>
<p>The Gambian election dispute is not the first that ECOWAS has confronted. Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 presidential election is a case in point. The country’s electoral commission declared that Alassane Ouattara had <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE6B13FN20101202">won the second round</a>. But, with the power to review the election, the Constitutional Court headed by an ally of the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo cancelled the results in several Ouattara strongholds and <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11913832">handed Gbagbo the election</a>. </p>
<p>ECOWAS, cooperating with the United Nations in Côte d’Ivoire, rejected what it viewed as an obvious manipulation of the result by the court. </p>
<p>It went on to reject any power-sharing arrangements being negotiated. This was despite the fact that the African Union (AU), in particular Gbagbo’s ally Angola, had floated the idea. </p>
<p>ECOWAS’s stance was driven by a number of factors. These included:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The failure of power-sharing agreements in Kenya (2008) and Zimbabwe (2008). ECOWAS feared that a power-sharing arrangement would open the door to similar agreements spreading like a cancer in the region. This would mean that losing candidates and parties would always expect power-sharing agreements. </p></li>
<li><p>Its view that power-sharing puts a country outside normal constitutional procedures, contravening the norms of constitutionalism.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Another factor influencing its decision was Gbagbo’s poor relations with neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso, Togo, and Nigeria. </p>
<p>As a result ECOWAS sided with Ouattara and, with backing from the UN and France, organised military intervention.</p>
<h2>Gambia presents another test</h2>
<p>There are certainly differences between The Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire. But a similar dynamic appears to be at work. In The Gambia the election commission also declared the opposition the winner. Despite its critical stance before the elections ECOWAS accepted the result because the poll had taken place in line with The Gambia’s constitutional framework.</p>
<p>But, just as Gbagbo had done, Jammeh looked for ways to stall the process. He did this by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38582180">pursuing an elections dispute</a> resolution at the Supreme Court. The problem was that the Supreme Court did not have the requisite judges to hear a case. In addition, as as in Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Court case, the independence of the court is questionable.</p>
<p>ECOWAS is unlikely to be fooled by Jammeh’s legal acrobatics, just as it wasn’t in Côte d’Ivoire. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152630/original/image-20170113-11175-oykkud.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Jammeh welcomes the presidents of Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ghana for crisis talks in December.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This stands in contrast to comparable tactics working in other regions. One example was Robert Mugabe’s move in Zimbabwe to suppress Morgan Tsvangirai and his supporters before the second round of the 2008 presidential election. Even though SADC observers and states <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/zim2008sadc2.pdf">condemned the violence</a>, the regional body did not facilitate a fair solution to prevent wholesale manipulation. </p>
<p>Likewise, the EAC attempted to mediate the political dispute around Burundi’s flawed 2015 election. Yet the selection of Uganda’s <a href="http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-12-16-as-body-count-mounts-mediator-museveni-takes-his-eyes-off-burundi-and-country-inches-closer-to-civil-war">Yoweri Museveni to lead mediation efforts</a> – a man who doesn’t support term limits – showed that the EAC was not serious about political dialogue.</p>
<h2>A different approach</h2>
<p>ECOWAS is likely to behave differently when it comes to The Gambia. It has shown that it believes constitutionalism and the transfer of power is a priority. </p>
<p>Article 9 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance states that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The party and/or candidate who loses the election shall concede defeat to the political party and/or candidate finally declared the winner, following the guidelines and within the deadline stipulated by the law.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The seriousness of this commitment was seen in Côte d’Ivoire.</p>
<p>It is further buttressed by a burgeoning coalition of heads of state who were formerly opposition leaders. Nana Akufo-Addo (Ghana), Muhammadu Buhari (Nigeria), Macky Sall (Senegal), Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia), and Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire all have significant experience in the political opposition before being elected. The fact that they are the product of a transfer of power makes them more willing to push for a transfer of power in The Gambia to reinforce the regional norm.</p>
<p>This is not the case in the EAC or SADC where countries are still largely beholden to the old guard of ruling political parties and elites. </p>
<p>There are another three crucial factors.</p>
<p>Regional isolation allows ECOWAS to be tough on Jammeh. There is little evidence that he has friends in West Africa. He made himself unpopular by announcing that The Gambia was <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37771592">leaving the ICC</a>. He also alienated neighbours by vetoing the ECOWAS norm of <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32808685">establishing presidential term limits</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=913&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/152644/original/image-20170113-11166-orxg02.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1147&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Robert Mugabe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Aaron Ufumeli / Pool</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>ECOWAS has also shown it has the ability to gather and assimilate information about political processes, including elections. Although it didn’t deploy an election observation mission in The Gambia, the secretariat is likely to be receiving useful information from an advanced early warning unit. This was designed to monitor conflicts and provide political analysis. </p>
<p>ECOWAS also consistently collaborates with the UN in mediation and intervention efforts. Other regional bodies largely prefer to act independently. ECOWAS regularly consults with the UN Security Council. It did so after the 2010 Côte d’Ivoire election and has done so again over the Gambian election. These consultations are likely to provide additional international support for intervention, which includes mobilising UN assets if necessary. The AU also seems supportive of ECOWAS’ efforts by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/african-union-to-cease-recognizing-jammeh-as-gambias-leader/2017/01/13/375c9198-d9a3-11e6-a0e6-d502d6751bc8_story.html?utm_term=.d3dd6a01a003">refusing to recognise Jammeh</a> as president past 18 January.</p>
<p>Finally, ECOWAS has been willing to <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38302533">set time tables with consequences</a>. This was made clear in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/23/forces-on-standby-to-oust-gambian-president-yahya-jammeh">statements from ECOWAS heads of state</a> that Jammeh must step down on 18 January to allow a transfer of power or face possible military intervention. The one major consideration for ECOWAS is how to handle a potential show down with The Gambia’s military if intervention becomes necessary.</p>
<p>Failure to secure a full transfer of power in The Gambia could affect the ECOWAS’s efforts to manage other disputes in the future. And, supporting a power-sharing agreement could bring about a series of destabilising post-election outcomes. This means that Jammeh is likely to leave power – or feel the collective weight of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71173/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Penar is affiliated with Afrobarometer.</span></em></p>The Gambian election dispute is not the first that ECOWAS has confronted. Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 presidential election is a case in point. There it resorted to military action to enforce the outcome.Peter Penar, Researcher and PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.