tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/nuclear-safety-25798/articlesNuclear safety – The Conversation2021-12-21T19:14:08Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1724742021-12-21T19:14:08Z2021-12-21T19:14:08ZHow to make up your mind about the pros and cons of nuclear power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/438694/original/file-20211221-23072-ka5u8x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C5%2C1220%2C578&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Can't decide? Let scientists guide your thinking. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Nuclear Yes Please/Wise International</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>French president Emmanuel Macron has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/">recently announced</a> that France will invest €1 billion into nuclear power, and build more reactors by 2030 to help stave off Europe’s energy crisis.</p>
<p>But even in France, where nuclear provides <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d06500e2-7fd2-4753-a54b-bc16f1faadd8">more than 70%</a> of the country’s energy mix, the issue is controversial.</p>
<p>The debate is <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Taking-part.pdf">particularly polarised</a> among those who live near nuclear power plants, depending on whether or not they profit either materially or symbolically from this proximity. There is also a <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_The-constant-tension-between-the-press-and-nuclear-power.pdf">constant tension between the press and the nuclear sector</a> over coverage of the industry.</p>
<p>Decades since the first nuclear power plant was built, the debate is still hindered by misunderstandings over both the advantages and drawbacks of this technology.</p>
<h2>Contrasting views</h2>
<p>As physicists, the two of us mainly agree on the scientific and technological basics of the debate, and on every argument based on verifiable facts. But our different sensibilities as citizens lead us to weigh each argument differently and reach different conclusions on nuclear power.</p>
<p>One of us (Stefano Panebianco) estimates that the advantages of this technology make it a viable choice for the future, while the other (François Graner) estimates that our efforts should focus on a significant decrease in our energy consumption.</p>
<p>By drawing on our contrasting views based on a shared understanding of the scientific evidence, we want to help others form an opinion by listing the pros and cons of nuclear power using the rigorous methods of our everyday life as scientists.</p>
<p>To do so, we asked experts from across the spectrum, including physicists, economists, political scientists, anthropologists, historians, journalists, and NGO volunteers to contribute to a <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/dossiers/256-nuclear-power-open-ended-questions-and-points-of-view">review</a> of the major questions relating to nuclear power. The collected works do not provide a conclusion: we leave it to the readers to draw their own.</p>
<p>So, how should you make up your mind? Here are the basics.</p>
<h2>Making choices about the future</h2>
<p>The physics underlying nuclear production of electricity are <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Electronuclear-technology-in-France-today.pdf">well known</a>. It is rather the industrialisation of the process that raises questions.</p>
<p>Scientific and technological research organisations try to anticipate future energy needs and develop new types of nuclear reactors to replace existing ones. Such research should not predict future choices to be made by politicians and society. However, it is a long-term process which often takes <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_New-nuclear-reactor-designs.pdf">several decades of research, design, development and experimentation</a> before approval, and hence the choices of research directions today can be somewhat binding for the future.</p>
<p>For instance, the study of fast neutron breeder reactor design and optimisation is a long-standing research field. This would allow nuclear fuel to be recycled, which would preserve natural uranium resources and reduce nuclear waste.</p>
<p>In France, two successive demonstrators, <a href="http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2011/ph241/abdul-kafi1/">Phenix and Super-Phenix</a>, were built and operated last century and a third one, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-nuclearpower-astrid-idUSKCN1VK0MC">Astrid</a>, was planned in recent years. However, all of these projects have been subject to successive government decisions to pursue, stop, resume, and recently in the case of Astrid, stop again, or at least defer. These decisions were made based on economic, environmental, political and strategical criteria.</p>
<h2>How much does it cost?</h2>
<p>Natural uranium, which is used as fuel in power plants, is still a relatively abundant resource and does not yet contribute much to the total cost of nuclear energy.</p>
<p>The French Court of Auditors estimated the current average generation cost of nuclear energy for a life-span of 50 years at <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_The-Cost-of-Generating-Nuclear-Electricity.pdf">€60 per megawatt-hour</a>, equivalent to six cents per kilowatt-hour. Though comparisons with other electricity sources are difficult to make, the highly variable public sale price of electricity is around 15 cents per kilowatt-hour.</p>
<p>Cost estimates heavily depend on hypotheses about the future, including the prolongation of power plant duration, waste choices and the decommissioning of reactors. Although decisions are often taken within the short-term vision of an electoral mandate, <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Managing-radioactive-waste.pdf">waste policy must take long-term implications into account</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the technical feasibility of decommissioning <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Decommissioning-nuclear-facilities.pdf">is still hard to predict</a> owing to different levels of understanding of the various reactor types. To maintain or decommission a nuclear power plant requires anticipation in term of money, know-how and energy, and so largely engages the next generations.</p>
<p>Nuclear power thus requires long-term political, financial and geological stability.</p>
<h2>Is it safe?</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Radioactivity-in-the-environment.pdf">public debates</a> about safety, a purely technical subject has been transformed into a political one.</p>
<p>Radioactivity must be controlled throughout all stages of the nuclear fuel chain to prevent any harmful effects on either humans or the environment. The risk of <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_The-risk-of-nuclear-accidents.pdf">nuclear accidents</a>, whether related to natural events, human error, waste, malice or war, has been addressed over the decades by significant improvements and by experience feedback from the two main accidents of Chernobyl and Fukushima. However, it remains a major preoccupation for the general public.</p>
<p>Preventing accidents involves many factors, including the human one; the know-how and motivation of workers depend on a <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Subcontracting-and-quality.pdf">strong partnership between operator and subcontractors</a>.</p>
<p>Other environmental impacts during normal operations include the exposure of nuclear workers and the public to <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_The-impact-of-nuclear-power-plants-under-normal-operation-on-health-and-the-environment.pdf">chemical or thermal emissions</a>: the latter becomes problematic with the global warming, as river water required to run reactors becomes scarce and warmer.</p>
<h2>Does nuclear have a role in fighting climate change?</h2>
<p>What is the future of nuclear power? Scientists cannot make predictions. Instead, scenarios are useful tools for examining possible consequences and costs of hypotheses or choices, for instance by <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Envisioning-the-energy-future.pdf">decreasing greenhouse gas emissions or even decreasing energy demand</a>.</p>
<p>The fact that nuclear power plants do not emit carbon, at least during the phase of electricity production (as opposed to the whole fuel and plant life cycles), is an argument to consider in the context of bringing down global emissions.</p>
<p>Nuclear plants also deliver constant power, which is a drawback in terms of adaptation to demand, but an advantage in terms of regularity: development of intermittent renewable energies such as solar and wind <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Electricity-transmission.pdf">exert pressure on electricity distribution networks</a>, as these energies are not necessarily always available at peak times.</p>
<h2>The role of politics</h2>
<p>In practice, global energy transition scenarios are often used to <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Nuclear-power-in-global-energy-transition-scenarios.pdf">establish and endorse choices that have already been made</a>.</p>
<p>Globally, the decisions which have actually been taken rely heavily on geopolitics, for instance attempts to bring down reliance on petrol imports, and also <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_The-technological-priorities-of-French-nuclear-power.pdf">decisions to develop military nuclear power</a> alongside energy policy.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Civil-and-military-nuclear-power.pdf">dual system of funding civil and military research</a> alongside one another is only justified if nuclear weapons are developed, which is again a political decision.</p>
<h2>Why it’s so hard to decide</h2>
<p>In deciding what to think about nuclear power, the list of arguments to take into account is <a href="https://www.refletsdelaphysique.fr/images/stories/news/60-en/Reflets-60_EN_Some-unresolved-questions-and-unaddressed-points.pdf">frustratingly large</a>, and many are coupled together. For instance, some reactors, loaded with the so-called mixed uranium and plutonium oxide fuel, partly contribute to recycle some nuclear products. Shutting them down could have the side effect of filling the current waste storage facilities more quickly than expected.</p>
<p>Even worse, decisions are often based on speculative hypotheses due to the difficulty of prediction. What is beyond doubt is that any decision taken or not taken today will affect future generations more than our own.</p>
<p>This means citizens should not leave decisions to be taken only on the basis of scientific or technical arguments, but should make up their own minds, taking into account the political and societal horizon they want for themselves and their children.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/172474/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>François Graner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefano Panebianco does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.</span></em></p>It can be hard to make up your mind about nuclear power. Two scientists help you sort through the arguments and come to your own conclusions.François Graner, Directeur de recherche CNRS, Université Paris CitéStefano Panebianco, Senior Staff Scientist, CERNLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1565542021-03-10T10:19:26Z2021-03-10T10:19:26ZFukushima: ten years on from the disaster, was Japan’s response right?<p>The world saw something never before caught on camera on March 12, 2011: an explosion ripping the roof off a nuclear power plant – Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi. The blast wasn’t actually nuclear, it was the result of hot hydrogen gas encountering the cool, outside air during the aftermath of the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. But the distinction hardly mattered – something had clearly gone terribly wrong.</p>
<p>A decade on from the tragedy, many people are still mourning the <a href="https://www.npa.go.jp/news/other/earthquake2011/pdf/higaijokyo_e.pdf">nearly 16,000 people</a> who lost their lives to the tsunami. While no-one died from the radiation after the radiation accident at Fukushima Daiichi, roughly two thousand elderly people <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0146645316666707">died prematurely</a> as a result of their enforced evacuation and undoubtedly many more of the huge number of displaced people experienced distress. In order to minimise suffering in future nuclear accidents, there are important lessons from March 2011 that must be learned.</p>
<p>How should a government react when confronted by clear evidence of radioactive material being released into the environment? A precedent was set 25 years before, at Chernobyl in Ukraine. There, authorities evacuated the local population and have kept them away for decades, which was hugely expensive and disruptive for the communities involved.</p>
<p>While Japan was reeling from the natural disaster, the authorities imposed an evacuation order with a radius of 20km around the stricken nuclear plant. A total of <a href="https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/topics/2013/03/the-status-in-fukushima.html">109,000 people</a> were ordered to leave their homes, with a further 45,000 choosing to evacuate from places nearby, which added to the turmoil.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An empty street in Japan." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388509/original/file-20210309-19-1s93m7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388509/original/file-20210309-19-1s93m7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388509/original/file-20210309-19-1s93m7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388509/original/file-20210309-19-1s93m7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=402&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388509/original/file-20210309-19-1s93m7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388509/original/file-20210309-19-1s93m7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388509/original/file-20210309-19-1s93m7u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=505&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Namie, a town of 21,000 people, one month on from the nuclear disaster.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster#/media/File:VOA_Herman_-_April_12_2011_Namie-04.jpg">Steven L. Herman</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>We set out to determine how best to respond to a severe nuclear accident using <a href="http://www.nrefs.org/publications/">a science-led approach</a>. Could we, by examining the evidence, come up with better policy prescriptions than the emerging playbook deployed in Ukraine and Japan? Together with colleagues at the universities of Manchester and Warwick, we used research methods from statistics, meteorology, reactor physics, radiation science and economics and arrived at a surprising conclusion. </p>
<p>Japan probably didn’t need to relocate anyone, and the evacuations after Chernobyl involved five to ten times too many people. In fact, because power plants are generally <a href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/0952-4746/34/2/R1">built some distance</a> from towns and cities, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/process-safety-and-environmental-protection/vol/112/part/PA">very few</a> of even the most severe nuclear accidents would warrant long-term population relocations. </p>
<h2>The analysis</h2>
<p>Our team ran a simulation of a Fukushima-style accident at a fictional reactor in southern England and showed that, most likely, only the people in the nearest village would need to move out. That means hundreds of people relocated, rather than <a href="https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0957582017302872/1-s2.0-S0957582017302872-main.pdf?_tid=43450e06-d2c5-11e7-bb29-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1511713213_ed5cbb1bc2f9063364c42338eb312418">tens of thousands</a>. It’s difficult to argue for any relocation after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan, where the calculated loss of life expectancy from staying put in the worst-affected township, Tomioka, would have been three months – less than Londoners are currently <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957582017300782">losing to air pollution</a> </p>
<p>Of course, we are not saying nothing should be done, quite the opposite. The University of Bristol researchers had developed the J-value (with “J” standing for judgement) to help arrive at objective answers for safety questions arising from nuclear plants, railways and other infrastructure that improves our lives. </p>
<p>How much should a nuclear power plant spend on protecting its workers? Is it cost-effective to install a new safety system for railway signalling? Should a government be spending more to prevent road deaths? The J-value balances the amount of life expectancy that a safety measure restores against its cost. And it takes the ethical stance that each day of life has the same value for everyone – whether a person is rich or poor, young or old. </p>
<p>In the aftermath of a nuclear accident, the J-value can help prioritise the <a href="https://ac.els-cdn.com/S0957582017302173/1-s2.0-S0957582017302173-main.pdf?_tid=6e1f0f9c-d2c4-11e7-b9fc-00000aab0f26&acdnat=1511712856_b8452e8f6846dc911ad60850784f93ba">most useful measures</a>, like cleaning roofs and gutters in towns and cities and reducing radioactive caesium uptake in farmland by adding ferrocyn to cattle feed and replacing contaminated soil.</p>
<p>Why is relocating people rarely one of those? Relocations are not just expensive, they also cause difficult-to-quantify problems for evacuees which can be equally, or more, serious than remaining. The World Health Organization <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/05-09-2005-chernobyl-the-true-scale-of-the-accident">documented</a> the upheaval of the Chernobyl disaster among the relocated community and found a legacy of depression and <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5067661/">alcoholism</a>. Across the population, a rise in suicide and substance abuse can shorten evacuees’ lives far more than might have been lost to radiation in their old homes. Similar evidence is starting to emerge from Fukushima, especially for <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6263751/">male suicide</a>.</p>
<h2>A greater threat looms</h2>
<p>Japan in 2010 was arguably the world leader in civil nuclear power, having opened the first “third generation” nuclear unit at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in 1996. Mighty conglomerates Toshiba and Hitachi were poised to deliver a nuclear renaissance worldwide. Both have since left the UK with empty spaces where new nuclear power plants were supposed to be. Hitachi’s ambitions for Taiwan (Lungmen) and the US (South Texas) also evaporated, as well as at home in Japan (Shimane). In Japan many, already built, plants remain shutdown. </p>
<p>There is a clear imbalance between the very low risk of a severe nuclear accident that can be expected to kill remarkably few people on the one hand, and the near certainty, on the other, of climate change threatening the futures of all the world’s species as a result of the continued burning of fossil fuels. Japan’s case illustrates the point. </p>
<p>Carbon-free nuclear power supplied 25% of <a href="https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics?country=JAPAN&fuel=Energy%20supply&indicator=ElecGenByFuel">the country’s electricity</a> in 2010, but its share dropped to less than 1% four years after the accident. The shortfall was made up by a 30% rise in the use of coal, oil and natural gas. By 2019, fossil fuels were still providing 70% of Japan’s electricity.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A graph depicting Japan's energy mix 2000-2017." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388516/original/file-20210309-21-1ftq5rh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/388516/original/file-20210309-21-1ftq5rh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=286&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388516/original/file-20210309-21-1ftq5rh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=286&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388516/original/file-20210309-21-1ftq5rh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=286&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388516/original/file-20210309-21-1ftq5rh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388516/original/file-20210309-21-1ftq5rh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/388516/original/file-20210309-21-1ftq5rh.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=359&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nuclear power nearly disappeared from Japan’s energy mix post-Fukushima.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster#/media/File:Japan_net_electricity_generation_in_2000_through_2017_(48061019128).png">US Energy Information Administration</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Analysts report that Japan could generate <a href="https://www.energyglobal.com/special-reports/19082020/japan-invests-in-wind-and-solar-power-plants/#:%7E:text=Over%20US%24100%20billion%20of,country's%20target%2C%20says%20Wood%20Mackenzie.">almost a third</a> of its energy from renewable sources by 2030. But decarbonisation could have proceeded even quicker if nuclear power had not been forced from the mix. Though the reaction is understandable – <a href="https://theconversation.com/six-years-after-fukushima-much-of-japan-has-lost-faith-in-nuclear-power-73042">trust was broken</a>.</p>
<p>The sense that something must be done can be powerful amid widespread disaster. The challenge is directing it towards finding the right solutions.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/156554/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>William Nuttall received funding from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, UK under grant reference number EP/K007580/1. He was a Co-Investigator for the NREFS project (Management of Nuclear Risk Issues: Environmental, Financial and Safety) and project lead at The Open University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Thomas is professor of risk management at the University of Bristol and director of Michaelmas Consulting Ltd. The work reported on was carried out as part of the NREFS project, Management of Nuclear Risk Issues: Environmental, Financial and Safety, led by Philip Thomas while he was at City, University of London and then the University of Bristol, and carried out in collaboration with Manchester, Warwick and Open Universities and with the support of the Atomic Energy Commission of India as part of the UK-India Civil Nuclear Power Collaboration. The author acknowledges the support of the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) under grant reference number EP/K007580/1. </span></em></p>The rush to evacuate communities and abandon nuclear energy was understandable, but an error.William Nuttall, Professor of Energy, The Open UniversityPhilip Thomas, Professor of Risk Management, University of BristolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1302482020-03-11T11:47:16Z2020-03-11T11:47:16ZWhy is the UAE, where solar energy is abundant, about to open four nuclear reactors?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319135/original/file-20200306-118960-2eir4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=88%2C79%2C1955%2C1280&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Construction underway at Barakah nuclear power plant in the UAE. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/26967070154/in/photolist-dQG6ZU-dQAaMg-dQAaNx-H5Zhrq-dSd5pJ">IAEA Imagebank/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is building the world’s <a href="https://bigthink.com/technology-innovation/dubai-solar-power">largest concentrated solar power plant</a>, capable of generating 700 megawatts. During daylight, solar power will provide cheap electricity, and <a href="https://www.irena.org/remap">at night the UAE</a> will use stored solar heat to generate electricity. </p>
<p>But at the same time, the first of four new nuclear reactors <a href="https://gulfbusiness.com/uae-officially-starts-operations-at-barakah-nuclear-power-plant/">was completed</a> in early March in the UAE, built by the South Korean Electric Power Corporation, KEPCO. The nuclear power plant is named Barakah. </p>
<p>The UAE’s investment in these four <a href="https://www.nuclearconsult.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Gulf-Nuclear-Ambition-NCG-Dec-2019.pdf">nuclear reactors risks</a> further destabilising the volatile Gulf region, damaging the environment and raising the possibility of nuclear proliferation.</p>
<h2>Safety flaws</h2>
<p>The UAE nuclear contract remains South Korea’s one and only export order, despite attempts by KEPCO to win contracts in Lithuania, Turkey, Vietnam and <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-nuclear/south-koreas-kepco-loses-preferred-bidder-status-for-uk-nuclear-project-idUKKBN1KL1YK">the UK</a>. Barakah, construction of which <a href="https://www.enec.gov.ae/news/latest-news/enec-begins-construction-of-uaes-first-nuclear-energy-plant/">began in 2012</a>, is in the Al Dhafra region of Abu Dhabi, on the coast.</p>
<p>Although nuclear reactor design has evolved over time, key safety features <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613325/how-greed-and-corruption-blew-up-south-koreas-nuclear-industry/">haven’t been included at Barakah</a>. This is important, since these reactors might not be able to defend against an accidental or deliberate airplane crash, or military attack. In response, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), which owns Barakah, told The Conversation that the plant “meets all national and international regulatory requirements and standards for nuclear safety.”</p>
<p>Particularly worrying is the lack of a “<a href="https://www.crcpress.com/Nuclear-Engineering-Handbook/Kok/p/book/9781482215922">core-catcher</a>” which, if the emergency reactor core cooling system fails, works to keep in the hot nuclear fuel if it breaches the reactor pressure vessel. ENEC stressed the plant’s design contained safety features equivalent to the core-catcher design, and was certified by the UAE’s Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation, which gave Unit 1 at the plant an <a href="https://fanr.gov.ae/en/media-centre/news?g=01d112c7-91b4-42be-a2e3-e254e8b5a65b">operating licence</a> in February 2020.</p>
<p>All this is further complicated by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-nuclear/south-korea-charges-100-with-corruption-over-nuclear-%20scandal-idUSBRE99905O20131010">large-scale falsification</a> of KEPCO quality control documents in South Korea in a case unrelated to Barakah, which ended up in a far-reaching criminal investigation and <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/s-korea-jails-nuclear-workers-over-bribe-scandal">convictions</a> in 2013 in South Korea.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/319369/original/file-20200309-118881-oby2f1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A field of solar panels in Dubai.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/dubai-united-arab-emirates-january-17-795953449">By Dominic Dudley/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Proliferation risks</h2>
<p>The tense Gulf strategic geopolitical situation makes new civil nuclear construction in the region even more controversial than elsewhere, as it can mean moves towards nuclear weapon capability, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-powers-once-shared-their-technology-openly-how-irans-programme-fell-on-the-wrong-side-of-history-124299">experience with Iran has shown</a>. </p>
<p>Following <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html">military strikes</a> against Saudi oil refineries in late 2019, nuclear energy safety in the region increasingly revolves around the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2665799e-dad2-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17">broader issue of security</a>. This is especially the case since some armed groups may view the UAE’s <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/48f44b08-caa5-11e9-a1f4-3669401ba76f">military operations</a> in Yemen as a reason to target nuclear installations, or intercept enriched uranium fuel or waste transfers. </p>
<p>Such spillover from foreign policy – and politics more generally – will increasingly <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/the-ultimate-middle-east-missile-target-nuclear-reactors">dovetail</a> with nuclear safety considerations in the region.</p>
<p>Perhaps disconcertingly, Yemeni rebels <a href="https://www.janes.com/article/89233/yemeni-rebels-claim-second-cruise-missile-attack">already claim</a> to have fired a missile at the Barakah nuclear power plant site in 2017. Although UAE denied the claim, saying it had an air defence system capable of dealing with any threat, protection of Barakah won’t be an easy task. </p>
<p>Time to scramble fighter aircraft or fire surface-to-air missiles may be limited, as the attacks in Saudi Arabia indicated. Not only that, but the increase in transport of radioactive materials into and through the Gulf once the reactors at Barakah start up will, unfortunately, present a major maritime risk. </p>
<h2>Environmental concerns</h2>
<p>The Gulf is one of the most water-scarce regions in the world, and Gulf states <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/sep/29/peak-salt-is-the-desalination-dream-over-for-the-gulf-states">rely on desalination</a>. Radioactive release to the marine environment following an accident or deliberate incident at Barakah would have significant pollution consequences for desalination and drinking water in the region. </p>
<p>And the UAE coast is a vulnerable environment, critically important for a very large range of marine life. Extensive mangrove habitats grow on and in coastal fine sediments and mudflats, notable for their ability to sequester radioactivity. Acting as a “sink” and concentrating radioactivity over time, normal operational nuclear discharge from Barakah will <a href="https://www.nuclearconsult.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/UAE-marine-and-nuclear-TD-J-A4.pdf">inevitably lead to</a> human inhalation and ingestion.</p>
<p>ENEC, which runs Barakah, told The Conversation it had taken comprehensive measures to ensure the safe and secure transportation of nuclear components and fuel, and that it adheres to the highest international safety standards, including regarding accidental radioactive releases.</p>
<p>The debate over nuclear power and climate is hotting up, with <a href="https://institutions.newscientist.com/article/2185486-environmentalists-must-embrace-nuclear-power-to-stem-climate-change/">some scientists suggesting</a> new nuclear can help. Yet, the International Panel on Climate Change <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/report/srocc/">recently reported</a> that extreme sea-level events will significantly increase, whether emissions are curbed or not. All coastal nuclear plants, including Barakah, will be <a href="https://ensia.com/features/coastal-nuclear/">increasingly vulnerable</a> to sea-level rise, storm surges, flooding of reactors and spent fuel stores. The UAE’s governmental environmental assessment of global heating’s impact on Barakah is conspicuous by its absence.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/to-cut-carbon-emissions-and-keep-the-lights-on-it-has-got-to-be-nuclear-power-35062">To cut carbon emissions and keep the lights on, it has got to be nuclear power</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Since not all energy policy choices are equal, the case for nuclear power in the Middle East has never been strong. While lower CO₂ emissions and improvement in renewable technology is one explanation for the dynamic global ramp in new renewable generation and the fall in new nuclear, the main driver seems to be the <a href="https://blogs.imf.org/2019/04/26/falling-costs-make-wind-solar-more-affordable/">plummeting costs</a> of the former and the <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-658-25987-7_5.pdf">increasing costs</a> of the latter.</p>
<p>So it’s strange that the UAE has cast significant resources at nuclear power, when other viable options already exist. The <a href="https://www.enec.gov.ae/doc/uae-peaceful-nuclear-energy-policy-5722278a2952f.pdf">UAE’s Nuclear Energy policy</a> says that its pursuit of nuclear energy is based on a plan to increase its electricity supply and diversify its electricity mix. Yet, since new nuclear seems to make little economic sense in the Gulf, which has some of the best solar energy resources in the world, the nature of Emirati interest in nuclear may lie hidden in plain sight – nuclear weapon proliferation. </p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article was updated on March 25 to include responses from the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation. The date at which Barakah began construction has also been corrected – it was 2012 not 2011 – and an incorrect reference to the name meaning divine blessing in Arabic has been removed.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/130248/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Dorfman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new nuclear plant called Barakah is nearing completion in the UAE. But it risks further stabilising the volatile Gulf region.Paul Dorfman, Honorary Senior Research Associate, Energy Institute, UCLLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1219662019-08-16T19:41:17Z2019-08-16T19:41:17Z‘Nuclear-powered’ missile accident in Russia – what really happened?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288376/original/file-20190816-192246-ccuvjf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Severodvinsk, Russia.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kuleshov Oleg / shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A missile engine exploded at a naval test range, west of the city of Severodvinsk on Russia’s northern coast at 9am on August 8. At least <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-49301438">five people were killed</a> and several others injured. As it is associated with Russia’s defence programme, the incident is shrouded in mystery. But shortly after the explosion the state weather monitoring agency, Roshydromet, reported a <a href="http://www.meteorf.ru/product/infomaterials/91/19630/?referer=%2Fproduct%2Finfomaterials%2F91%2F">spike in radiation</a> 40 km away. </p>
<p>At first, the Russian authorities <a href="https://www.polygraph.info/a/russian-defense-ministry-initially-denied-radiation-leak-after-rocket-engine-explosion/30106227.html">denied the radiation leak</a>, then later confirmed it. There were conflicting reports of the source of the explosion and a <a href="https://29.ru/text/incidents/66196021/">planned, then later cancelled evacuation of a nearby village</a>. Unsurprisingly, tabloid media speculation followed that the Russian authorities may be <a href="https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9715988/chernobyl-radiation-russia-blast-evacuation/">hiding a Chernobyl-like accident</a>.</p>
<p>Missile tests don’t usually involve radioactive materials, unless the missile in question is carrying a nuclear warhead (which is prohibited under the UN’s <a href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</a>). So what is going on? No one outside of the Russian government and military can yet be entirely certain but, as an <a href="https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/materials/about/staff/academic/corkhillc">academic researcher in nuclear materials</a>, I can do my best to piece together the available evidence. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288346/original/file-20190816-192250-1jhlfuy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288346/original/file-20190816-192250-1jhlfuy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288346/original/file-20190816-192250-1jhlfuy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288346/original/file-20190816-192250-1jhlfuy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288346/original/file-20190816-192250-1jhlfuy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288346/original/file-20190816-192250-1jhlfuy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288346/original/file-20190816-192250-1jhlfuy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288346/original/file-20190816-192250-1jhlfuy.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Severodvinsk (red dot) is on the coast of the White Sea, just below the Arctic Circle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rs-map.png">CIA/wiki</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russian authorities have confirmed that the explosion involved “<a href="http://rosatom.ru/journalist/news/zayavlenie-departamenta-kommunikatsiy-goskorporatsii-rosatom/">an isotope power source in a liquid propulsion system</a>”. There’s nothing particularly new about the propulsion system – early ballistic missiles used a pressurised stream of liquid fuel and oxygen which, when ignited, expanded and rushed out of the bottom of the missile, propelling it in the opposite direction. </p>
<p>The “isotope power source” part is new though. Radioactive isotopes are unstable atoms that release excess energy by emitting radiation. So if the missile is powered by isotopes this indicates the Russians have developed a mini-nuclear reactor – able to fit inside a missile – that is capable of using radiation to heat the liquid fuel for propulsion. This has never been achieved before. </p>
<p>This admission prompted <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/12/russia-mysterious-explosion-arctic-putin-chernobyl/">American</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/12/russia-indicates-rocket-engine-exploded-in-test-of-mini-nuclear-reactor">UK</a> experts to conclude the source of the radiation leak must be a type of long-range missile that Russia has previously claimed would be nuclear powered. It is known by the Russians as 9M730 Burevestnik, and by NATO as the SCC-X-9 Skyfall.</p>
<p>The exact details of the mini-nuclear reactor that may have been developed to power a Russian missile are not known, but there are a few potential types that may be used. The key difference between a nuclear reactor used to generate energy and one that might be used to power a missile is the quantity of material required. The RBMK reactor that blew up at Chernobyl contained 200 tonnes of uranium dioxide fuel. A significantly smaller amount of fuel would be required — perhaps a few kilos at most — to lift a missile.</p>
<p>One possibility is what’s known as a <a href="https://rps.nasa.gov/power-and-thermal-systems/power-systems/current/">radioisotope thermoelectric generator</a> (RTG). This converts heat from radioactive decay into electricity. Potential candidates for the fuel are plutonium-238, <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/604332main_APP%20MSL%20Launch%20Nuclear%20Safety%20FS%203-2-11.pdf">4.8kg of which powered the Curiosity Rover on Mars</a>, americium-241 – widely used to power smoke detectors – and polonium-210, infamously used in the poisoning of Russian spy <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/493860/The-Litvinenko-Inquiry-H-C-695-web.pdf">Alexander Litvinenko</a>. Strontium-90, which emits both beta and gamma radiation in its radioactive decay, has been used in both <a href="http://www.wmsym.org/archives/2009/pdfs/9415.pdf">American</a> and Russian applications of RTGs in the past, including inside <a href="https://englishrussia.com/2009/01/06/abandoned-russian-polar-nuclear-lighthouses/">Russian lighthouses</a>. Given the measured increase in gamma activity at nearby Severodvinsk, the latter is certainly plausible.</p>
<p>The second possibility is that the missile was powered by a nuclear thermal reactor. This is perhaps more likely given the authorities’ description of the accident. These reactors could use the heat generated from radioactive decay to heat liquid hydrogen fuel. Such a system could theoretically use a solid uranium core, a liquid radioisotope core, or even gaseous uranium to power a missile in flight for long distances. However, none of these technologies have been proven, at least with regard to missiles, and it is not possible to guess the fuel type with any certainty, making the radiation in Severodvinsk difficult to explain.</p>
<p>Whatever the source of radiation, the release seems to be relatively small. To the layperson, 16 times above background rate may sound like a lot, but that background rate is tiny and relatively harmless – for instance the English county of <a href="https://www.phe-protectionservices.org.uk/radiationandyou/">Cornwall has three times the background rate</a> thanks to naturally-occuring uranium-bearing rocks in the earth there. Compare this with the Chernobyl accident, which released radioactivity 7,000 times above background. </p>
<p>Norwegian and Finnish authorities are <a href="https://www.dsa.no/en/news/94877/radioactive-incident-in-arkhangelsk-in-the-federation-of-russia">monitoring the air</a> but have not yet reported anything abnormal. Western scientists are even asking residents of Severodvinsk <a href="https://twitter.com/MKaltofen/status/1161071642023538691">to donate their car air filters</a>, so that, at some point, we may understand more about what was released and how harmful it might be. That should give some indication as to the threat posed by the testing of such weapons.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Corkhill receives funding from the UK Engineering and Physical Science Research Council, The European Union, Radioactive Waste Management Limited, Sellafield Limited, the National Nuclear Laboratory and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, for research on the safe disposal of legacy nuclear waste. </span></em></p>Russia appears to have developed a revolutionary mini-reactor able to power a missile.Claire Corkhill, Research Fellow in nuclear waste disposal, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/812522017-07-24T23:18:46Z2017-07-24T23:18:46ZSmall nuclear power reactors: Future or folly?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/178921/original/file-20170719-13558-rs7g2s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C532%2C4000%2C2377&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Large nuclear reactors could fade into history, proponents of small modular nuclear reactors argue. The reality may be more complex.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/nuclear-power-plant-temelin-czech-republic-256727668">(Shutterstock)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nuclear energy companies are proposing <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608271/small-reactors-could-kick-start-the-stalled-nuclear-sector/">small nuclear reactors</a> as a safer and cheaper source of electricity. </p>
<p>In June, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories put out a “call for a discussion around <a href="http://www.cnl.ca/en/home/news-and-publications/news-releases/2017/SMR.aspx">Small Modular Reactor (SMRs) in Canada</a>,” and the role the organization “can play in bringing this technology to market.” </p>
<p>The news release asserts that SMRs are “a potential alternative to large-scale nuclear reactors,” would be effective at “decreasing up-front capital costs through simpler, less complex plants” and are “inherently safe” designs. All of this warrants examination. </p>
<p>As a physicist who has researched and written about various policy issues related to nuclear energy and different nuclear reactor designs for nearly two decades, I believe that one should be skeptical of these claims. </p>
<p>SMRs produce small amounts of electricity compared to currently common nuclear power reactors. In Canada, the last set of reactors commissioned were the four at Darlington, east of Toronto, which entered service between 1990 and 1993. These are designed to feed 878 megawatts into the electric grid. </p>
<p>In contrast, the first two nuclear power reactors commissioned in Canada were the Nuclear Power Demonstration reactor at Rolphton, Ont., in 1962, and Douglas Point, Ont., in 1968. These fed 22 and 206 megawatts respectively to the grid. </p>
<p>In other words, reactors have increased in size and power-generating capacity over time. For perspective, normal summer-time peak demand for electricity in Ontario is estimated at <a href="http://www.ieso.ca/en/power-data/demand-overview/real-time-demand-reports">over 22,000 megawatts </a>.</p>
<h2>Cost considerations key</h2>
<p>The reason for the increase in reactor output is simple: Nuclear power has always been an expensive way to generate electricity. Historically, <a href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/the-forgotten-history-of-small-nuclear-reactors">small reactors built in the United States all shut down</a> early because they couldn’t compete economically. One of the few ways that nuclear power plant operators could reduce costs was to capitalize on economies of scale — taking advantage of the fact that many of the expenses associated with constructing and operating a reactor do not change in proportion to the power generated. </p>
<p>Building a 800-megawatt reactor requires less than four times the quantity of concrete or steel as a 200-megawatt reactor, and does not need four times as many people to operate it. But it does generate four times as much electricity, and revenue.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179096/original/file-20170720-24021-1kb0xsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179096/original/file-20170720-24021-1kb0xsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/179096/original/file-20170720-24021-1kb0xsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179096/original/file-20170720-24021-1kb0xsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179096/original/file-20170720-24021-1kb0xsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=375&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179096/original/file-20170720-24021-1kb0xsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179096/original/file-20170720-24021-1kb0xsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/179096/original/file-20170720-24021-1kb0xsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Small modular reactors are compact enough to be transported fully assembled, as this image from NuScale Power illustrates.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.nuscalepower.com/our-technology/factory-built">(Handout/NuScale)</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Small modular reactors are even smaller. The <a href="http://www.nuscalepower.com/smr-benefits/small">NuScale reactor</a> being developed by NuScale Power in the United States is to feed just 47.5 megawatts into the grid. This reduction is chiefly due to the main practical problem with nuclear power: reactors are expensive to build. </p>
<p>Consider the experience in Ontario: In 2008, the province’s government asked reactor vendors to bid for the construction of two more reactors at the Darlington site. The bid from Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. was reported to be <a href="http://www.thestar.com/business/2009/07/14/26b_cost_killed_nuclear_bid.html">$26 billion for two 1200-megawatt CANDU reactors</a> — more than three times what the government had assumed. The province <a href="http://globalnews.ca/news/894709/ontario-nixes-building-two-nuclear-reactors/">abandoned its plans</a>.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, with costs so high, few reactors are being built. The hope offered by the nuclear industry is that going back to building smaller reactors might allow more utilities to invest in them. </p>
<p>NuScale Power says a 12-unit version of its design that feeds 570 MW to the grid will <a href="http://www.nuscalepower.com/smr-benefits/economical/construction-cost">cost “less than $3 billion.”</a> But because the reactor design is far from final, the figure is not reliable. There is a long and well-documented history of <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629614000942">reactors being much more expensive</a> than originally projected. This year, Westinghouse Electric Company — historically <a href="https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Westinghouse-Origins-and-Effects-of-the-Downfall-of-a-Nuclear-Giant.html">the largest builder of nuclear power plants in the world — filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy</a> protection in the United States precisely because of such cost overruns. </p>
<p>Cost overruns aside, smaller reactors might be cheaper but they also produce much less electricity and revenue. As a result, generating each unit of electricity will be more expensive.</p>
<h2>Design aims to reduce costs</h2>
<p>The second part of the SMR abbreviation, “Modular,” is again an attempt to control costs. The reactor is to be mostly constructed within a factory with limited assembly of factory-fabricated “modules” at the site of the power plant itself. It may even be possible to completely build a SMR in a factory and ship it to the reactor site. </p>
<p>Modular construction has been increasingly incorporated into all nuclear reactor building, including large reactors. However, since some components of a large reactor are physically voluminous, they have to be assembled on site. Again, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/pre-fab-nuclear-plants-prove-just-as-expensive-1438040802">modularity is no panacea</a> for cost increases, as Westinghouse found out in recent years.</p>
<h2>Safety in scale?</h2>
<p>SMR developers say the technology poses a lower risk of accidents, as Canadian Nuclear Laboratories suggests when it asserts “inherent safety” as a property of SMRs. Intuitively, smaller reactors realize safety benefits since a lower power reactor implies less radioactive material in the core, and therefore less energy potentially released in an accident. </p>
<p>The problem is that safety is only one priority for designers. They must also consider about other priorities, including cost reductions. These <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629614000486">priorities drive reactor designs in different directions</a>, making it practically impossible to optimize all of them simultaneously.</p>
<p>The main priority preventing safe deployment is economics. Most commercial proposals for SMRs involve cost-cutting measures, such as siting multiple reactors in close proximity. This increases the risk of accidents, or the impact of potential accidents on people nearby. </p>
<p>At Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant, explosions at one reactor damaged the spent fuel pool in a co-located reactor. Radiation leaks from one unit made it difficult for emergency workers to approach the other units.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>The future for nuclear energy in Canada is not rosy. Canada’s National Energy Board’s latest <a href="https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/ftr/2016updt/index-eng.html">Canada’s Energy Future 2016 report</a> that projects supply and demand to the year 2040 states: “No new nuclear units are anticipated to be built in any province during the projection period.” It notes annual nuclear generation is forecast to decline nearly 12.5 per cent from 98 terawatt-hours in 2014 to 77 in 2040.</p>
<p>Promoters of SMRs argue that investing in small reactors will change this bleak picture. But technical and economic factors, as well as the experience of small nuclear reactors built in an earlier era, all suggest that this is a mislaid hope.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/81252/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>MV Ramana has received funding from various foundations, including MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and Princeton University's Carbon Mitigation Initative to research various policy issues related to nuclear energy and small modular reactors. All opinions expressed in this article, however, are his own. </span></em></p>Nuclear industry players tout small modular reactors as an “inherently safe,” cost-effective source of electricity. The reality may be less attractive.MV Ramana, Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and Human Security at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British ColumbiaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/692412016-11-23T11:05:45Z2016-11-23T11:05:45ZJapan earthquake: social aftershocks of Fukushima disaster are still being felt<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/147047/original/image-20161122-10967-t6k0l6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A fishing boat washed inland by the 2011 Tsunami next to a shrine inside the Fukushima nuclear exclusion zone. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Thom Davies</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At 5.59am local time on November 22, Fukushima was hit by a <a href="http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/indexe.html">7.4</a> magnitude earthquake, triggering a tsunami warning. For residents in the same region of Japan devastated by the major 2011 <a href="https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/11mar2011.html">Tōhoku</a> earthquake and its tsunami, the threat of a renewed disaster was very real. </p>
<p>The tsunami warning was <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38059371">lifted</a> a few hours later, and the earthquake was later <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-38061313">declared</a> a long-term aftershock from the larger quake five years ago. But for people still coming to terms with that disaster and its aftermath, this new earthquake will severely test their resilience once again. </p>
<p>On March 11 2011, the 9.0 magnitude earthquake created a 15-metre tsunami that inundated the Fukushima Daiichi (Fukushima I) nuclear power station. Power was disabled to three reactors, which caused a serious <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx">nuclear accident</a> as cooling systems failed. Large quantities of radiation were immediately released into the environment and approximately <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx">100,000</a> people were evacuated. </p>
<p>The long-term social consequences of the original Fukushima Daiichi accident have been <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/world/asia/japans-nuclear-refugees-still-stuck-in-limbo.html">broad and far-reaching</a>. Perception of <a href="https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/the-risk-society-and-beyond/book205997">risk</a>, the likelihood of exposure to danger, has been at the heart of social controversy after the 2011 disaster. Radiation is invisible, and it is challenging to understand or percieve a threat that can only be detected by specialist scientific equipment. Often women and children are hit the hardest by this, regardless of socioeconomic status. </p>
<p>The concept of <em>Fūhyōhigai</em>, or the “harmful rumour”, was initially used by the media and local government to dismiss local women’s concerns about radiation exposure as weak and unscientific. However, this led to a cultural shift by women known as Fukushima’s <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/radiation-brain-moms-and-citizen-scientists/?viewby=title">“radiation brain moms”</a>, who purchased monitoring equipment and took matters into their own hands, forming citizen radiation monitoring organisations <a href="http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2016/02/13/how-citizen-science-changed-the-way-fukushima-radiation-is-reported/">(CRMOs)</a>. </p>
<p>By forming these groups of resistance, self-help and support, women rejected their culture’s social norms of obedience and subservience, that could have suppressed them from cultivating outrage over injustice and inequality. Participation in CRMOs has decreased over time, as the social memory of Fukushima Daiichi fades, but citizen science initiatives such as <a href="http://blog.safecast.org/about/">Safecast</a> still provide useful information to many. </p>
<p>The recent earthquake temporarily halted the cooling system at the nearby <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/asia/japan-earthquake.html?_r=0">Fukushima Daini</a> (Fukushima II) reactor, and so there is likely to be a resurgence in monitoring, and a reunion of these support networks. Regardless of what happens now, there has already been a positive seismic shift in attitudes by both the government and scientists toward concerned mothers and community monitoring. </p>
<h2>Living in ‘temporary’ permanence</h2>
<p>Many impacts of the 2011 disaster have been hidden away in the private spaces of everyday life, with the tragedy putting <a href="https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/atomic-divorce-how-japans-nuclear-disaster-is-breaking-up-marriages">enormous strain on family relations</a>. Not only were thousands of families displaced from their homes, evacuation has meant the separation of family groups. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146991/original/image-20161122-21709-qgy8y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/146991/original/image-20161122-21709-qgy8y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146991/original/image-20161122-21709-qgy8y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146991/original/image-20161122-21709-qgy8y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146991/original/image-20161122-21709-qgy8y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146991/original/image-20161122-21709-qgy8y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/146991/original/image-20161122-21709-qgy8y0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Two girls play on a swing next to a radiation monitor and their temporary housing in Minamisōma, Fukushima prefecture. Photograph by Thom Davies.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Where once three generations could live together in Fukushima’s close-knit rural villages, relocation to cramped prefabricated temporary housing has meant many are forced to live apart. Today, five years after the disaster, 174,000 people are still displaced in a state of “temporary” permanence. Disconnection from the familiarity of place and family, as well as the constant worry about radiation risk, even threatens marital relationships. “Atomic divorce” (<em>Genpatsu rikon</em>) is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/feb/24/divorce-after-fukushima-nuclear-disaster">on the rise</a>, with disagreements on radiation safety, or whether to relocate back to territory now deemed “decontaminated”. News of the recent earthquake will doubtless have jogged memories and resurfaced hidden tensions.</p>
<p>The Japanese government is gradually declaring sections of the 20km nuclear exclusion zone safe and habitable. Despite this, the desire to move back to previously contaminated land has been <a href="https://toxicnews.org/2016/05/03/fukushima-and-the-right-not-to-return-nuclear-displacement-in-a-system-for-hometown-recovery/">underwhelming</a>. For example, four months after Naraha Town was declared safe in September last year, only 6% of former inhabitants decided to move home to one of Fukushima’s many atomic “<a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-fukushima-ghost-town-20160310-story.html">ghost towns</a>”. </p>
<p>In the town of Minamisōma, on the northern edge of the exclusion zone, thousands of mothers and children have <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/minamisoma-the-long-road-to-recovery-for-the-city-that-was-all-but-swept-away-by-2011-tsunami-a6921761.html">refused to return</a>, despite societal pressure not to “betray” their home communities. </p>
<h2>Nuclear uncertainty</h2>
<p>While Japan’s tsunami warning system <a href="http://www.theverge.com/2016/11/21/13710204/japan-earthquake-tsunami-fukushima-daini-nuclear-plant-2016">worked well</a>, there is still considerable uncertainty surrounding the consequences and likelihood of a further natural hazard causing a nuclear accident in Japan. </p>
<p>The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident had already permanently changed the Japanese nuclear landscape. The government has undergone a process of gradual <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx">nuclear decommissioning</a> since October 2011, and Fukushima Daaichi and Dai-ni no longer produce energy. Yet, Japan is still heavily reliant on nuclear energy and since 2015 has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/15/japan-restarts-second-nuclear-reactor-despite-public-opposition">restarted two</a> of its nuclear reactors, with 24 other reactors in the process of restart approvals.</p>
<p>While social resilience to emergencies has improved since 2011 in Japan, the social aftershocks of Fukushima Daaichi are ongoing. Though many advances have been made that emancipate vulnerable populations and provide increased connectivity, it remains to be seen how much these new technologies and attitudes have improved social resilience and reduced the likelihood of anxiety within the community of Fukushima.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69241/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Becky Alexis-Martin receives funding from the Aged Veterans Fund. She is the Principal Investigator of the UK Nuclear Families project, and explores the social and cultural impacts of nuclear weapons testing. She works closely with the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association and the NCCF.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thom Davies receives funding from the ERC, working on a project called 'Toxic Expertise' and has previously been funded by the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science. He has conducted research in Fukushima and Chernobyl.</span></em></p>Those communities affected by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident are having their resilience tested once again.Becky Alexis-Martin, Research Fellow in Human and Social Sciences, University of SouthamptonThom Davies, Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology, University of WarwickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/692132016-11-22T22:29:57Z2016-11-22T22:29:57ZIs Fukushima still safe after the latest earthquake?<p>We all remember March 11, 2011, when the magnitude-9.0 <a href="https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqarchives/poster/2011/20110311.php">Great East Japan earthquake</a> triggered a <a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Fukushima_faced_14-metre_tsunami_2303113.html">14-metre tsunami</a> that flooded the <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/index-e.html">Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant</a>. Four of the six reactors on site were badly damaged, <a href="http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/24-hours-at-fukushima/0">three suffering core meltdowns</a>.</p>
<p>Also affected by the tsunami, but to a much lesser extent, were the four reactors at the <a href="https://www4.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f2/index-e.html">Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant</a>, roughly 11km further south. That site was partially flooded, but sufficient safety systems were still available to shut down and cool the reactors safely.</p>
<p>At 5.59 am local time on Tuesday the tsunami alarms sounded again, as a magnitude-6.9 earthquake 10km off the coast shook the area. Just over half an hour later the resulting tsunami hit the Fukushima coast – but this one was barely a metre high, and well below the height of the 5.7m seawall, meaning that Fukushima’s nuclear plants were spared another flood. </p>
<p>However, the earthquake caused a circulation pump in the used fuel cooling pond of Fukushima Daini reactor 3 to <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-22/japan-earthquake-prompts-tsunami-warning-blog/8044796">shut down</a>. After checking the system, the pump was restarted after 99 minutes, and operator TEPCO said the plant had suffered no lasting damage. </p>
<p>The situation might have been more serious were it not for the fact that Fukushima Daini, like most of Japan’s nuclear power stations, has been out of action ever since the disaster at its neighbouring station prompted Japan to shut down all of its nuclear reactors for safety checking and upgrades.</p>
<p>Although all of Daini’s systems have since been restored, its reactors have not been restarted. All the fuel has been removed from the reactors and is stored in cooling ponds – which is where the circulation pump failed that normally pushes water through a heat exchanger for cooling. </p>
<p>Because of the low residual heat in the used fuel, the reported temperature rise was less than 1°C during the 99-minute outage. Without cooling, the temperature of the cooling pool would be expected to <a href="http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Fukushima-earthquake-leaves-nuclear-plants-unaffected-2211167.html">rise by 0.2°C per hour</a>. It would therefore take more than a week without cooling before the normal operating range of 65°C would be exceeded, and this would still be far below the fuel melting point of <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx">around 2,800°C</a>.</p>
<p>There has been no reported damage from the latest earthquake at the Fukushima Daiichi plant where decommissioning work continues (although it was briefly stopped in response to the earthquake). As of 11am on Tuesday, <a href="http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/pla/2016/images/table_summary-e.pdf">plant parameters</a> show reactor cooling systems operating normally with reactor temperatures of 20-25°C, again far below any dangerous levels. Again, the low amount of residual heat in the fuel means that any changes on loss of cooling are slow. This is in stark contrast to the situation in 2011 where loss of cooling to the operating reactors led to fuel <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx">melting in less than four hours</a>.</p>
<h2>Is Japan’s nuclear power coming back?</h2>
<p>Before the 2011 meltdowns, there were 54 nuclear power reactors operating in Japan. Since then, only three reactors have completed all of the required modifications and safety inspections and returned to operation, and one of these is currently shut down for routine refuelling. Currently 42 reactors will potentially be restarted, 24 of which are slowly going through the <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx">restart approval process</a>.</p>
<p>The extent of modifications to avoid possible damage from tsunamis is illustrated by the work that Chubu Electric Power Company is <a href="http://hamaoka.chuden.jp/english/provision/shikichinai.html">carrying out at its Hamaoka nuclear power plant</a> in Japan’s southeast Shizuoka prefecture. This year Chubu has completed construction of a huge seawall, 22m high and 1.6km long, which together with other safety upgrades will cost about 400 billion yen (A$4.9 billion).</p>
<p>After TEPCO faced accusations that it <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/asia/tepco-admits-failure-in-acknowledging-risks-at-nuclear-plant.html?_r=0">failed to take full account of the tsunami risk at Fukushima</a>, Japan is clearly taking no chances next time around.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/69213/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tony Irwin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The latest earthquake off Japan’s east coast was an ominous reminder of the 2011 Fukushima disaster. But despite a technical hitch at one of Fukushima’s other reactors, there was no repeat this time.Tony Irwin, Visiting Lecturer, Nuclear Reactors and Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/636282016-10-05T19:35:20Z2016-10-05T19:35:20ZTerrorism fallout shelters: Is it time to resurrect nuclear civil defense?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/140579/original/image-20161005-20139-iir2qr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Could we use Cold War fallout shelters?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/pigmonkey/1892382528/">pigmonkey/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fifty-five years ago, on Oct. 6, 1961, President John F. Kennedy <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2009/10/jfk-urges-americans-to-build-bomb-shelters-oct-6-1961-027936">advised Americans</a> to build an underground protective room, commonly known as a “fallout shelter,” in their homes.</p>
<p>At that time – the middle of the Cold War – the U.S. feared that a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union was imminent. Kennedy <a href="https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches.aspx?p=2">said</a>, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“in the event of an attack, the lives of those families which are not hit in a nuclear blast and fire can still be saved if they can be warned to take shelter and if that shelter is available.” </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He proposed spending US$207.6 million for a civil defense plan “to identify and mark space in existing structures – public and private – that could be used for fallout shelters.”</p>
<p>The American people heeded his advice and began an enormous grassroots effort to construct <a href="http://nyupress.org/books/9780814775233/">fallout shelters</a> in every private residence and public building. Today, those shelters in the basements of 1960s-era homes are largely used for storage. The only reminder of the public shelters is the occasional yellow <a href="http://gizmodo.com/5814592/where-did-the-iconic-fallout-shelter-symbol-come-from">fallout shelter sign</a> that still remains affixed to the outside wall of some buildings. Now, no one builds fallout shelters.</p>
<p>But, why not? The nuclear weapons are still around.</p>
<p>As a radiation protection expert and a professor of radiation medicine, I am sometimes asked this question. The answer is an interesting story that should give us all pause, especially as we now face new nuclear weapon threats.</p>
<h2>The Cold War</h2>
<p>The main reason we no longer build fallout shelters is that as nuclear bombs have grown in size and number, the prospects of surviving a nuclear war – even in a shelter – have decreased. A <a href="http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5115.html">study by the RAND Corporation</a> in 1966 determined that as many as 62 percent of all Americans would die in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, and painted a pretty grim picture of the lives of the survivors. </p>
<p>As a result, fallout shelters became seen as an ineffective way to protect the lives of the vast majority of the population. Gradually, <a href="https://www.dukeupress.edu/stages-of-emergency/?viewby=title">civil defense efforts</a> moved away from nuclear bombs and concentrated on everyday threats that could be more easily defended against, such as tornadoes, earthquakes and hurricanes.</p>
<p>How, then, could Americans protect themselves from the threat of nuclear holocaust if a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union was not survivable? </p>
<p>Mutually assured destruction, commonly known as <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/09/the-dustbin-of-history-mutual-assured-destruction/">“MAD,”</a> became the cornerstone of our <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100666300&fa=author&person_id=5173#content">nuclear defense strategy</a>. Since no sane leader would initiate a suicidal war, an arms race began in order to produce so many nuclear weapons on both sides that only a deranged person would think it wise to launch a nuclear attack. The basic defense strategy, using the MAD approach, was to make nuclear war such an unthinkable option that nuclear weapons would never be used offensively by either side. </p>
<p>But the nuclear arms race became a huge <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/maintaining-our-nuclear-arsenal-is-expensive/">financial burden</a>, and each country soon had excess capacity to annihilate the other many times over. Talks were initiated between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (now Russia) to limit the production of new nuclear weapons and even reduce the existing stockpiles. Beginning with the <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USRussiaNuclearAgreementsMarch2010">Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</a> (START) of 1991, and culminating with the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-new-start-treaty">New START</a> agreement that entered into effect in 2011, stockpiles of nuclear weapons have been reduced from a peak of about 35,000 strategic nuclear warheads held by each country in the mid-1980s to about 7,000 each today. With regard to deployed strategic nuclear weapons, the goal is to limit each side to just 1,550 by Feb. 5, 2018. </p>
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<p>Whether this reduction in nuclear warheads has made us any safer is debatable. Both sides still retain enough to maintain a defense strategy of mutually assured destruction. Certainly, the societal costs of feeding the massive nuclear war machine have been reduced to the benefit of all.</p>
<p>But, a war between superpowers is not the only nuclear weapon threat Americans currently face.</p>
<h2>Nuclear terrorism</h2>
<p>Today, smaller nations and <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674032385">terrorist groups</a>, such as <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/25/al-qaedas-pursuit-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction/">al-Qaida</a>, are seeking nuclear weapons. Some nations, like <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-north-korean-nuclear-weapons-101-13940">North Korea</a>, already have them. Others may be a decade away. </p>
<p>It is not unreasonable to believe that the use of a single nuclear weapon by a rogue nation or a terrorist group now poses a more likely scenario for a nuclear confrontation than a nuclear war between Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, <a href="http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/18230/nuclear_attack_a_worstcase_reality.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F19819%2Fnuclear_disorder">some downplay</a> the threat of a nuclear attack to the United States’ mainland by these new nuclear adversaries. They argue that adversaries not only need nuclear weapons, but must also be able to deliver them to their targets.</p>
<p>Since missile technology is not a strength of small <a href="http://inhomelandsecurity.com/nations-terrorists-seek-robust-capable-missiles/">nations and terrorists</a>, the lack of launch capacity is often cited as a major obstacle to such would-be nuclear attackers. But recently, North Korea’s successful missile launch tests seriously challenge this assumption about limited <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17399847">missile capabilities</a>. Regardless, missiles aren’t essential to deliver a nuclear weapon. A bomb in a cargo ship in <a href="http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA444774">New York harbor</a> is just as much a threat as one launched by missile from overseas. And, as bombs are miniaturized, the prospects of detecting and stopping nuclear weapons coming across our borders and through our ports is greatly reduced.</p>
<p>We are entering an era in which multiple small countries or terrorist organizations may acquire a few “small” nuclear weapons in hidden locations around the world. Such small weapons could be used to inflict a considerable amount of damage, but nothing on the scale what we envisioned during the Cold War. These small bombs are probably survivable with fallout shelters that would be useless during a full nuclear war. In fact, these relatively small nuclear weapons – if you consider <a href="https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/types-of-nuclear-weapons/">Hiroshima-sized bombs</a> to be small – are precisely the size that were envisioned when fallout shelters were first proposed for civil defense.</p>
<h2>Old solution, new problem</h2>
<p>Is it time to resurrect nuclear civil defense in response to the increasing threat from terrorists? </p>
<p>Although <a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20057/nuclear_terrorism_fact_sheet.html">experts</a> think it unlikely that terrorists are currently technologically sophisticated enough to make their own nuclear weapons from scratch, even if they had access to <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/ur-enrichment.html">enriched uranium</a> (the required fuel), there is no question that they could steal one from some small (or large) nuclear nation, particularly during the chaotic aftermath of a coup. Turkey had <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/17/turkey-coup-attempt-raises-fears-over-safety-of-us-nuclear-stockpile">nuclear weapons</a> at the time of its recent coup attempt, for example. Alternatively, terrorists could obtain them by discretely purchasing them from renegade nuclear nations, or clandestinely by bribing military officials. </p>
<p>One nuclear bomb, in one ship, in one harbor is all it takes to get into the nuclear terrorism business.</p>
<p>It is clear that mutually assured destruction is a defense strategy that only works between stable nations with sane leaders. Mutually assured destruction is not a strategy that works against nations with unstable rulers, such as in North Korea, or enemies with no known address to which you can deliver a retaliatory strike, such as terrorists.</p>
<p>For these adversaries, we need an alternative strategy to protect ourselves. Right now we don’t have one, other than screening cargo for nuclear weapons and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/05/weapons-grade-uranium-process-explained">weapons-grade uranium</a>. And, as I describe in my book, <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10691.html">“Strange Glow: The Story of Radiation</a>,” mock tests of this screening program have revealed significant weaknesses.</p>
<p>I believe we need to better address this new and growing threat of nuclear terrorism right now, and devote as many resources as necessary toward dealing with it. If we don’t find a more effective strategy to thwart nuclear terrorism soon, we may be forced to go back to fallout shelters as our only protective option, whether we like it or not.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/63628/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy J. Jorgensen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is the U.S. prepared for nuclear attacks from terrorists or rogue nations? A radiation expert explains how Cold War-style fallout shelters could help protect us from this growing threat.Timothy J. Jorgensen, Director of the Health Physics and Radiation Protection Graduate Program and Associate Professor of Radiation Medicine, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/613802016-06-28T01:59:17Z2016-06-28T01:59:17ZRisks, ethics and consent: Australia shouldn’t become the world’s nuclear wasteland<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127550/original/image-20160621-13031-1v5076y.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dry nuclear fuel casks similar to those Australia would use to store nuclear waste temporarily above ground.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last month the South Australian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission <a href="http://yoursay.sa.gov.au/pages/nuclear-fuel-cycle-royal-commission-report-release/">recommended</a> that the state government develop a business venture to store a large fraction of the world’s high- and intermediate-level nuclear power station wastes in South Australia. It proposes to do this by first building an interim above-ground store, to be followed by permanent underground repository. </p>
<p>But the commission’s recommendation is based on several debatable assumptions, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>an economic analysis that purports to show huge profits with negligible commercial risk</p></li>
<li><p>the notion that social consent could be gained by “careful, considered and detailed technical work”</p></li>
<li><p>the argument that Australia, as a net exporter of energy, has an ethical responsibility to help other countries lower their carbon emissions by means of nuclear power.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>I have analysed critically these and other assumptions of the royal commission in a <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629616301323">scholarly paper</a> published in the international journal Energy Research and Social Science.</p>
<h2>Risky economics</h2>
<p>The commission’s economic analysis rests on the heroic assumption that customers would, upon delivery of their nuclear wastes to South Australia, pay up-front for both interim above-ground storage <em>and</em> permanent underground storage. This would be up to 17 years before the underground repository has actually been built. The estimated total payment would be about A$1.75 million per tonne of heavy metal (tHM) for storing possibly 138,000 tHM in total. </p>
<p>However, this ignores the huge financial risk to the government and taxpayers in the following scenario: the SA government builds the initial facilities – port, underground research and an interim above-ground storage – at a cost of about A$3 billion. Commencing in year 11, customers deliver their nuclear wastes in dry casks, but pay initially only for the costs of interim storage of the casks, declining to pay for geological storage until the underground repository has been built and becomes operational in year 28. </p>
<p>Despite the royal commission’s claim that the government would not develop the project under these conditions, the government could be influenced to accept the wastes by pressure, both positive and negative, from overseas governments, multinational corporations and/or internal politics. </p>
<p>Then, after a large quantity of nuclear waste has been placed into interim storage in SA, the government might not proceed with the geological storage, costing an extra A$38 billion, for technical, political or financial reasons. </p>
<p>A similar situation occurred in the United States with the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/10/10greenwire-gao-death-of-yucca-mountain-caused-by-politica-36298.html?pagewanted=all">termination of funding for the Yucca Mountain repository</a> after US$13.5 billion had already been spent. </p>
<p>In this scenario, SA would be locked into managing a large number of dry casks, designed only for interim storage and located above ground, which will gradually erode and leak their dangerous contents over several decades. The physical hazards and the corresponding financial burden on future generations of all Australians would be substantial.</p>
<p>In this scenario, it would also be risky for customers who relied upon it and so failed to provide their own domestic geological repository.</p>
<h2>Social consent</h2>
<p>Aware that Australians are divided on the nuclear industry, the royal commission acknowledges that gaining “social consent warrants much greater attention than the technical issues during planning and development”. </p>
<p>Then, on the same page of its report, it postulates that community support could be gained by “careful, considered and detailed technical work”. It thus creates the false impression that all social and ethical concerns can be reduced to technical issues. </p>
<p>Ultimately, gaining social consent is a socio-political struggle that draws only slightly on research and education on science, technology and economics. This is demonstrated by current debate in Australia on climate science, in which citizens are influenced by a <a href="https://theconversation.com/big-australian-media-reject-climate-science-19727">print media that in many cases is biased towards denial</a>, and a <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-climate-denial-gained-a-foothold-in-the-liberal-party-and-why-it-still-wont-go-away-56013">Coalition government that contains several vocal climate sceptics</a>.</p>
<p>Indigenous Australians have successfully <a href="https://www.acfonline.org.au/be-informed/northern-australia-nuclear/muckaty-radioactive-dump">opposed for 20 years an above-ground dump</a> for low-level national nuclear waste on their land at Muckaty in the Northern Territory. Indigenous communities are already mobilising, together with environmentalists, to <a href="http://www.anfa.org.au">resist very strongly any development of intermediate- and high-level repositories</a> in South Australia. The social impacts of a low-level waste dump are bad enough, but would be dwarfed by the social, physical and financial impacts of a high-level waste repository. </p>
<h2>Ethics</h2>
<p>One of the assumptions underlying the royal commission’s ethical argument is that nuclear power will continue to be a low-carbon energy source. </p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/sure-lets-debate-nuclear-power-just-dont-call-it-low-emission-21566">life-cycle CO₂ emissions from conventional nuclear power will increase greatly</a> as high-grade uranium ore is used up and low-grade ore is mined and milled with fossil fuels. This limitation could be avoided only if mining and milling are done with renewable energy or if new fuel is produced in fast breeder reactors, but neither of these options appears likely on a commercial scale within the next 20 years. </p>
<p>Second, the royal commission assumes that those countries that lack sufficient indigenous renewable energy cannot be supplied by trade of renewable electricity via transmission lines or renewable liquid and gaseous fuels delivered by tanker. After all, countries that lack fossil fuels or uranium are supplied by sea trade.</p>
<p>Third, it assumes that it is ethically a good thing to foster the expansion of an energy technology that has risks with huge potential adverse impacts, possibly comparable in magnitude to those of global climate change. </p>
<p>The risk with the highest impacts could be its contribution to the proliferation of nuclear weapons (for details see the <a href="http://nuclearweaponarchive.org">Nuclear Weapon Archive</a> and chapter 6 of <a href="https://www.newsouthbooks.com.au/books/sustainable-energy-solutions-climate-change/">Sustainable Energy Solutions for Climate Change</a>) and hence the likelihood of nuclear war that could cause a nuclear winter.</p>
<h2>Politics</h2>
<p>In a country that is divided about nuclear power and where the annual economic value of uranium exports is <a href="https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/international-relations/asno-annual-report-2013-14/html/section-2/australias-uranium-production-and-exports.html">a modest A$622 million</a> (roughly equal to Australia’s cheese exports), the origin of the nuclear waste proposal is puzzling and inevitably involves speculation. </p>
<p>However, one could suggest the political influence of BHP-Billiton, owner of Olympic Dam in South Australia, Australia’s largest uranium mine and the second-largest in the world, and Rio Tinto, owner of the Ranger uranium mine in the Northern Territory. </p>
<p>A global nuclear waste site would lock future generations of Australians into an industry that is dangerous and very expensive. It’s unlikely to gain social consent from Indigenous Australians, or indeed the majority of all Australians. Given the risks, it would be wise not to proceed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61380/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Diesendorf receives funding from the CRC on Low Carbon Living and the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>The South Australian royal commission recommended the state investigate a high-level nuclear storage facility. But the costs don’t stack up.Mark Diesendorf, Associate Professor, Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies, UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/592422016-05-11T20:09:43Z2016-05-11T20:09:43ZLocation, location, location: why South Australia could take the world’s nuclear waste<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/122080/original/image-20160511-18132-9llz8n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Australia could take spent fuel from nuclear power stations overseas. This one is in South Korea. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/8506930230/in/photolist-dXJeYS-dXCy7D-epEPc-nyJzvd-qnJuqp-drRGmv-dXCycx-drRGE6-73Woah-dXCysr-dXJeVo-5cuF1T-3iZxCW-8jhrGg-oDCLU5-epENQ-cMoVuU-dXCy8V-4eXRXh-7R4UhX-dmKEr4-5UYxAU-6DvtX2-ND1Yu-nSRaL9-9vCGCh-8P7bsF-abrSH8-ao4RV1-ot7ktg-rSFesa-rUq59E-7uuNRi-drRRtw-rSFdxK-dyoHYp-aY48Qg-ao4RNu-aY48oH-4ueNbW-7L2hRS-fGts9F-9wucoR-91DWUb-aVWpXH-aVWkPp-o6Yx4h-rn9qFB-9m4o3-ND1YC">IAEA Imagebank/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Australia’s <a href="http://nuclearrc.sa.gov.au/">Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission</a> has recommended the state investigate an <a href="http://yoursay.sa.gov.au/pages/nuclear-fuel-cycle-royal-commission-report-release/">international storage site</a> for intermediate and high-level (spent fuel) nuclear waste. </p>
<p>This coincides with the <a href="http://www.radioactivewaste.gov.au/media/site-shortlisted-national-radioactive-waste-management-facility">shortlisting</a> of South Australia’s Barndioota Station as the federal government’s preferred site for storing domestic low- and intermediate-level nuclear waste. </p>
<p>Two years ago, Barry Brook and I argued that “<a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-waste-is-safe-to-store-in-our-suburbs-not-just-the-bush-28206">nuclear waste is safe to store in our suburbs, not just the bush</a>”. Based on the knowable hazard and established management techniques, we argued that storage and even disposal of radioactive materials does not demand the use of the remotest locations Australia has to offer. </p>
<p>Fast forward to today, and our nation, with its well-earned reputation for <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzbI0UPwQHg">hypocritical antipathy</a> to nuclear technology, is taking serious steps toward hosting used nuclear fuel from the global market. </p>
<p>So how is our “don’t avoid involving our cities” argument holding up? </p>
<p>As a member of the <a href="http://www.radioactivewaste.gov.au/independent-advisory-panel-membership-list">independent advisory panel</a> assisting the federal government in the siting process for the domestic facility, I have learned a lot about how the waste challenge can both succeed and struggle with the tools available to us.</p>
<h2>Getting community buy-in</h2>
<p>For the domestic facility, committing to a voluntary process paid dividends, with an unexpectedly high 28 nominations from around the country. </p>
<p>So, lesson one: voluntary processes can work. Give people a no-obligation process and many will participate. </p>
<p>Lesson two: in a voluntary process you work with what is volunteered. I would have loved to explore locations closer to Australia’s capital cities, but none were volunteered, so the point was moot from the get-go.</p>
<p>In assessing these volunteered locations, experts on our panel could say with relatively certainty that nearly all nominated sites were “good enough”. Give or take some design and engineering, they could all work well. </p>
<p>Here lies a perverse problem: Australia is spoiled for choice in terms of technically good locations for such facilities. To distinguish between locations on physical characteristics inevitably favours flatter, drier, remoter locations.</p>
<p>This can have unintended consequences, as remote locations scream “danger” in a perfectly rational way to everyday Australians.</p>
<p>So lesson three: just because we can does not mean we must. The mere availability of somewhere more remote than another place may not make it materially better, even if it looks better in assessment.</p>
<p>So is Barndioota Station a good choice for detailed site assessment and deeper consultation?</p>
<p>In many respects, it is excellent. The location was volunteered by the landowner. It is, technically, outstandingly suitable even by Australian standards. While remote, it has reasonable accessibility. </p>
<p>There are no known cultural heritage issues on the site itself and <a href="http://www.nntt.gov.au/nativetitleclaims/Pages/default.aspx">no native title claim</a>. </p>
<p>The local government has expressed support for a more detailed assessment, as did a notable body of stakeholders in the nearest towns. There is flexibility in where the actual facility (just 100 hectares) could be placed within the very large station property. </p>
<p>Counting against, the traditional owners have expressed their wish for this site not to proceed. Some neighbouring landowners and community members have also <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-29/nuclear-waste-dump-expected-south-australian-cattle-station/7369346">expressed concerns</a>. </p>
<p>That holds lesson four: in none of the long-listed locations was support from local stakeholders universal. We must maintain realistic expectations in that regard.</p>
<p>If this sounds like a broadly familiar situation, it is. Back in 2014 we wrote of the (failed) process to <a href="https://theconversation.com/nuclear-waste-is-safe-to-store-in-our-suburbs-not-just-the-bush-28206">shortlist Muckaty Station in the Northern Territory</a> for a nuclear waste site. We asked:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>How have we ended up with a process that includes only one site, with that site in the middle of nowhere?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With no disrespect intended to Barndioota Station, we seem to be in roughly the same place today, even if the process that brought us to here was remarkably robust. </p>
<p>I’m feeling the irony. I don’t object to the Barndioota decision per se. However, I suspect that shortlisting only Barndioota may prove to be the catalyst for agitation based on perceptions of unfair imposition. It doesn’t need to end that way, although there is much work ahead.</p>
<h2>Now for international waste</h2>
<p>These lessons are crucially important if South Australia goes ahead with a higher-level, international waste site. The commission has proposed a storage site in two stages: a temporary above-ground site, before shifting to a permanent below-ground site over a period of 30 years. </p>
<p>A safe above-ground temporary facility for storing used fuel can go anywhere with suitable zoning. </p>
<p>If the whole state is to profit, then the whole state must be equitably involved in the responsibility. That may not suit an entirely voluntary process. </p>
<p>Keeping our cities involved may demand a more active hand from government in identifying and involving sites, based on the recent experience that wholly voluntary processes may not yield any near-city locations. As a resident of Adelaide, I would welcome an approach that actively included suitable sites near my city.</p>
<p>We also need to walk the talk in demonstrating the difference between hazard and danger. </p>
<p>An adult African lion is hazardous to humans. Yet three of them live in the centre of Adelaide, in our zoo. The hazard is there, yet instead of thinking “danger” we think “outing with the kids”. The difference is the engineered barriers, the operators of the zoo, and the trust we have in these barriers and institutions. </p>
<p>The storage of high-level nuclear waste should be no different. It too should be a site for education, visitation, science, research and development. It should be planned and presented as a part of the future industrial and cultural fabric of our state.</p>
<p>Should South Australia create such a facility I will honour this pledge: give me a crib, some power and an internet connection and I will live there, among the casks, for a week. Or a fortnight, if that will make the difference. </p>
<p>While good science necessarily deals in probabilities, safety is essentially a binary issue for everyday people: it is or it isn’t safe. I say it is, so I will do it.</p>
<p>Australia has moved remarkably quickly in the nuclear space to be now <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-uranium-idUSKCN0Y00V2">seriously examining a project of global significance</a>, in part thanks to an embrace of innovative ideas and approaches. We mustn’t stop the innovation now.</p>
<p><em>Ben will be on hand for an author Q&A 5pm AEST Thursday May 12. Leave your questions in the comment field below.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59242/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Heard was a member of the Independent Advisory Panel assisting the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science in the process of assessing sites for the location of Australia's domestic radioactive waste storage and disposal facility. He is affiliated with Terrestrial Energy as a member of the International Advisory Board. Ben consults in a private capacity to government and private stakeholder in matters relating to nuclear technology.</span></em></p>South Australia’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission has recommended a nuclear waste site for the state.Ben Heard, Doctoral student, University of AdelaideLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/584522016-04-26T15:22:27Z2016-04-26T15:22:27ZWhat we learned from Chernobyl about how radiation affects our bodies<p>The world has never seen a nuclear accident as severe as the one that unfolded when a reactor exploded in Chernobyl on April 26 1986, sending vast amounts of radiation into the skies around Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.</p>
<p>The planet had experienced massive releases like this before, in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But Chernobyl-related radiation exposure had a more protracted character. </p>
<p>It was the first time in history that such a large population, particularly at a very young age, was exposed to radioactive isotopes, namely iodine-131 and cesium-137, not just through direct exposure, but through eating contaminated food as well. </p>
<p>In 2006, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijc.22037/full">published estimates</a> of how many excess cancers would occur as a result of this contamination. </p>
<p>While noting that these estimates are subject to substantial uncertainty, the authors found that 1,000 cases of thyroid cancer and 4,000 cases of other cancers had already been caused by the accident. They further estimated that by 2065, 16,000 cases of thyroid cancer and 25,000 cases of other cancers could be attributed to the effects of Chernobyl radiation.</p>
<p>Research on the health impact of the Chernobyl disaster has mainly focused on <a href="http://journals.lww.com/health-physics/Abstract/2007/11000/THYROID_CANCER_INCIDENCE_AMONG_PEOPLE_LIVING_IN.15.aspx">thyroid cancer</a>, in particular in those exposed to radioactive iodine isotopes in childhood and adolescence. Large amounts of iodine-131 were released into the atmosphere after the explosion, and children were exposed by consuming locally produced milk and vegetables.</p>
<p>Efforts were made to better understand the mechanisms of radiation-induced thyroid cancer and which factors could modify the radiation risk. This allowed us to identify a molecular “radiation fingerprint”, which can point to changes that are specific to radiation exposure, as opposed to any other factors. </p>
<p>Studies were also conducted to evaluate the risk of <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19138033">haematological malignancies</a> – tumours that affect the blood, bone marrow, lymph, and lymphatic system – in children and Chernobyl clean-up workers in the three most affected countries. Studies of cancer incidence and mortality, <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3107017/">cardiovascular diseases</a> and all-cause mortality were also conducted on clean-up workers. Although of variable quality, the list of studies done on people affected by the blast is long. </p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>Today, there is an overall agreement among scientist that thyroid cancers increased following exposure to radiation in childhood and adolescence. Several studies have also indicated an increase in <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16614710">haematological malignancies</a> and thyroid cancer in Chernobyl clean-up workers.</p>
<p><a href="http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/121/1/ehp.1204996.pdf">Findings</a> on radiation-associated risk both for chronic lymphocytic leukaemia and other types of leukaemia in clean-up workers were reported in 2013. Before then, chronic lymphocytic leukaemia was not considered to be sensitive to radiation. Further research will be required to confirm these findings. </p>
<p>Some studies focused on non-cancer health consequences of exposure to radiation. <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17390731">Convincing results</a> on eye lens cataracts among Chernobyl clean-up workers led to the revision and considerable reduction in the recommended radiation dose limit for the lens of the eye. </p>
<p>Chernobyl also led to a greater knowledge on optimising treatment and follow-up of survivors of <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18049222">acute radiation sickness</a>. A better understanding of thyroid cancer radiation risks allowed us to respond better to other disasters, such as Fukushima, to minimise potential adverse health consequences.</p>
<h2>What we still don’t know</h2>
<p>Despite these important findings, many grey areas still remain. For example, we still have no convincing evidence for childhood leukaemia associated with Chernobyl. It is unclear if this is due to methodological limitations or for other reasons. </p>
<p>Nor do we know how radiation risk changes over time after a someone is exposed as a child, as a longer follow-up study is required. We also don’t yet understand the potential transgenerational affects on children born to exposed parents. </p>
<p>The need for more research is immense, yet funding is declining. We need a sustainable approach to Chernobyl health research – similar to that taken after the <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC33856/">Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in Japan</a>. Without this, it is unlikely that the true impact of Chernobyl will ever be fully understood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58452/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ausrele Kesminiene ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>Chernobyl is already responsible for up to 5,000 cases of cancer in Europe.Ausrele Kesminiene, Deputy Section Head Section of Environment and Radiation at IARC, International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/579422016-04-25T13:49:12Z2016-04-25T13:49:12ZForget Fukushima: Chernobyl still holds record as worst nuclear accident for public health<p>The 1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accidents both share the notorious distinction of attaining the highest accident rating on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) <a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/ines.asp">scale of nuclear accidents</a>. No other reactor incident has ever received this Level 7 “major accident” designation in the history of nuclear power. Chernobyl and Fukushima earned it because both involved core meltdowns that released significant amounts of radioactivity to their surroundings.</p>
<p>Both of these accidents involved evacuation of hundreds of thousands of residents. Both still have people waiting to return to their homes. And both left a legacy of large-scale radioactive contamination of the environment that will persist for years to come, despite ongoing cleanup efforts.</p>
<p>So the tendency is to think of these accidents as similar events that happened in different countries, 25 years apart.</p>
<p>But the IAEA scale isn’t designed to measure public health impact. In terms of health ramifications, these two nuclear accidents were not even in the same league. While <a href="http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/a_e/fukushima/faqs-fukushima/en/">Fukushima</a> involved radioactivity exposures to hundred of thousands of people, <a href="http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2005/pr38/en/index1.html">Chernobyl</a> exposed hundreds of millions. And millions of those received substantially more exposure than the people of Fukushima.</p>
<p>On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the April 26, 1986 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine, we do well to reflect on the health burden it caused – and compare it with what we expect to see from Japan’s Fukushima nuclear accident. As I report in my book “<a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10691.html">Strange Glow: The Story of Radiation</a>,” from a public health standpoint, there’s really no comparison between the two events. </p>
<h2>Higher doses of radiation, more health harm</h2>
<p>Chernobyl was by far the worst reactor accident of all time. A total of 127 reactor workers, firemen and emergency personnel on site sustained radiation doses sufficient to cause radiation sickness (over 1,000 mSv); some received doses high enough to be lethal (over 5,000 mSv). Over the subsequent six months, <a href="http://pegasusbooks.com/books/atomic-accidents-9781605984926-hardcover">54 died from their radiation exposure</a>. And it’s been estimated that 22 of the 110,645 cleanup workers may have <a href="https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2012/11/13087/chernobyl-cleanup-workers-had-significantly-increased-risk-leukemia">contracted fatal leukemias</a> over the next 25 years.</p>
<p>In contrast, at Fukushima, there were no radiation doses high enough to produce radiation sickness, even among the reactor core workers. Two Fukushima workers who had leaky respirators received effective doses of <a href="http://pegasusbooks.com/books/atomic-accidents-9781605984926-hardcover">590 mSv and 640 mSv</a>. That’s above the Japanese occupational limit for conducting lifesaving rescue work (250 mSv), but still below the threshold for radiation sickness (1,000 mSv). Due to their exposure, the two workers’ lifetime cancer risks will <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10691.html">increase about 3 percent</a> (from the 25 percent background cancer risk rate to about 28 percent), but they are unlikely to experience other health consequences.</p>
<p>Beyond just the plant workers, over 572 million people among 40 different countries got at least some exposure to Chernobyl radioactivity. (Neither the United States nor Japan was among the exposed countries.) It took two decades to fully assess the cancer consequences to these people. Finally, in 2006, an international team of scientists completed a comprehensive <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijc.22037">analysis of the dose and health data</a> and reported on the cancer deaths that could be attributed to Chernobyl radioactivity.</p>
<p>Their detailed analysis included countrywide estimates of individual radiation doses in all 40 exposed countries, and regionwide estimates for the most highly contaminated regions of the most highly contaminated countries (Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine).</p>
<p>Using statistical models, the scientists predicted a total of 22,800 radiation-induced cancers, excluding thyroid cancers, among this group of 572 million people. Thyroid cancer warranted separate special scrutiny, as we will discuss presently; this hormonally important gland is uniquely affected by a specific radioactive isotope, iodine-131.</p>
<p>So that’s 22,800 non-thyroid cancers in addition to the approximately 194 million cancer cases that would normally be expected in a population of that size, even in the absence of a Chernobyl accident. The increase from 194,000,000 to 194,022,800 is a 0.01 percent rise in the overall cancer rate. That’s too small to have any measurable impact on the cancer incidence rates for any national cancer registries, so these predicted values will likely remain theoretical.</p>
<h2>Chernobyl’s iodine-131 thyroid effects far worse</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, at Chernobyl, the one type of cancer that could have easily been prevented was not. The population surrounding Chernobyl was not warned that iodine-131 – a radioactive fission product that can enter the food chain – had contaminated milk and other locally produced agricultural products. Consequently, people ate iodine-131-contaminated food, resulting in thyroid cancers.</p>
<p>For the local population, iodine-131 exposure was a worst-case scenario because they were already <a href="http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/backgrounder/en/">suffering from an iodine-deficient diet</a>; their <a href="http://www.thyroid.org/iodine-deficiency/">iodine-starved thyroids</a> sucked up any iodine that became available. This extremely unfortunate situation would not have happened in countries such as the United States or Japan, where diets are richer in iodine.</p>
<p>Thyroid cancer is rare, with a low background incidence compared to other cancers. So excess thyroid cancers due to iodine-131 can be more readily spotted in cancer registries. And this, in fact, has been the case for Chernobyl. Beginning five years after the accident, an increase in the rate of thyroid cancers started and continued rising over the following decades. Scientists estimate that there will ultimately be about <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijc.22037">16,000 excess thyroid cancers</a> produced as a result of iodine-131 exposure from Chernobyl.</p>
<p>At Fukushima, in contrast, there was much less iodine-131 exposure. The affected population was smaller, local people were advised to avoid local dairy products due to possible contamination and they did not have iodine-deficient diets.</p>
<p>Consequently, typical radiation doses to the thyroid were low. Iodine-131 uptake into the thyroids of exposed people was measured and the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00507">doses were estimated to average</a> just 4.2 mSv for children and 3.5 mSv for adults – levels comparable to annual background radiation doses of approximately 3.0 mSv per year.</p>
<p>Contrast this to Chernobyl, where a significant proportion of the local population received thyroid doses in excess of 200 mSv – 50 times more – well high enough to see appreciable amounts of excess thyroid cancer. So at Fukushima, where iodine-131 doses approached background levels, we wouldn’t expect thyroid cancer to present the problem that it did at Chernobyl. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, there has already been one report that <a href="http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160307/p2a/00m/0na/022000c">claims there is an increase</a> in thyroid cancer among Fukushima residents at just four years post-accident. That’s earlier than would be expected based on the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/sj.bjc.6601860">Chernobyl experience</a>. And the study’s design has been criticized as flawed for a number of scientific reasons, including the <a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/mystery-cancers-are-cropping-children-aftermath-fukushima">comparison methods used</a>. Thus, this report of excess thyroid cancers must be considered suspect <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jjco/hyv191">until better data arrive</a>.</p>
<h2>Chernobyl has no comparison</h2>
<p>In short, Chernobyl is by far the worst nuclear power plant accident of all time. It was a totally human-made event – <a href="http://pegasusbooks.com/books/atomic-accidents-9781605984926-hardcover">a “safety” test gone terribly awry</a> – made worse by incompetent workers who did all the wrong things when attempting to avert a meltdown.</p>
<p>Fukushima in contrast, was an unfortunate natural disaster – caused by a tsunami that flooded reactor basements – and the workers acted responsibly to mitigate the damage despite loss of electrical power.</p>
<p>April 26, 1986 was the darkest day in the history of nuclear power. Thirty years later, there is no rival that comes even close to Chernobyl in terms of public health consequences; certainly not Fukushima. We must be vigilant to ensure nothing like Chernobyl ever happens again. We don’t want to be “celebrating” any more anniversaries like this one.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/57942/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy J. Jorgensen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The meltdown at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986 exposed 572 million people to radiation. No other nuclear accident holds a candle to that level of public health impact.Timothy J. Jorgensen, Director of the Health Physics and Radiation Protection Graduate Program and Associate Professor of Radiation Medicine, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/580252016-04-22T09:47:11Z2016-04-22T09:47:11ZChernobyl: new tomb will make site safe for 100 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119822/original/image-20160422-17371-lqs5ls.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:New-safe-confinement-April-2015-IMG_8747.jpg">Tim Porter/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thirty years after the <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident.aspx">Chernobyl nuclear accident</a>, there’s still a significant <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-still-dont-really-know-the-health-hazards-of-a-nuclear-accident-56320">threat of radiation</a> from the crumbling remains of Reactor 4. But an innovative, €1.5 billion super-structure is being built to prevent further releases, giving an elegant engineering solution to one of the ugliest disasters known to man.</p>
<p>Since the disaster that directly killed <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/explainer/2013/04/chernobyl_death_toll_how_many_cancer_cases_are_caused_by_low_level_radiation.html">at least 31</a> people and released large quantities of radiation, the reactor has been encased in a tomb of steel-reinforced concrete. Usually buildings of this kind can be protected from corrosion and environmental damage through regular maintenance. But because of the hundreds of tonnes of highly radioactive material inside the structure, maintenance hasn’t been possible.</p>
<p>Water dripping from the sarcophagus roof has become radioactive and leaks into the soil on the reactor floor, <a href="http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/12/features/containing-chernobyl">birds have been sighted</a> in the roof space. Every day, the risk of the sarcophagus collapsing increases, along with the risk of another <a href="https://inis.iaea.org/search/searchsinglerecord.aspx?recordsFor=SingleRecord&RN=27019860">widespread release of radioactivity</a> to the environment.</p>
<p>Thanks to the sarcophagus, up to 80% of the original radioactive material left after the meltdown remains in the reactor. If it were to collapse, some of the melted core, a lava-like material called corium, could be ejected into the surrounding area in a dust cloud, as a mixture of highly radioactive vapour and tiny particles blown in the wind. The key substances in this mixture are iodine-131, which has been linked to thyroid cancer, and cesium-137, which can be absorbed into the body, with effects ranging from <a href="http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-bin/sis/search/a?dbs+hsdb:@term+@DOCNO+7389">radiation sickness to death</a> depending on the quantity inhaled or ingested.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119819/original/image-20160422-17411-l7bqeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/119819/original/image-20160422-17411-l7bqeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119819/original/image-20160422-17411-l7bqeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119819/original/image-20160422-17411-l7bqeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119819/original/image-20160422-17411-l7bqeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119819/original/image-20160422-17411-l7bqeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/119819/original/image-20160422-17411-l7bqeb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Metal tomb.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tschernobyl_2013_2.jpg">Arne Müseler/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With repair of the existing sarcophagus <a href="chernobylgallery.com/chernobyl-disaster/sarcophagus/">deemed impossible</a> because of the radiation risks, a new structure designed to last 100 years is now being built. This “new safe confinement” will not only safely contain the radioactivity from Reactor 4, but also enable the sarcophagus and the reactor building within to be safely taken apart. This is essential if potential future releases of radioactivity, 100 years or more into the future, are to be prevented. </p>
<p>Construction of the steel arch-shaped structure began in 2010 and is currently scheduled for completion in 2017. At 110 metres tall with a span of 260 metres, the confinement structure will be large enough to house St Paul’s Cathedral or two Statues of Liberty on top of one another. But the major construction challenges are not down to size alone. </p>
<p>The close-fitting arch structure is designed to completely entomb Reactor 4. It will be hermetically sealed to prevent the release of radioactive particles should the structures beneath collapse. Triple-layered, radiation-resistant panels made from polycarbonate-coated stainless steel will clad the arch to provide shielding that will be crucial for allowing people to safely return to the area in <a href="http://eng.belta.by/photonews/view/over-20000-people-were-resettled-from-khoiniki-district-after-chernobyl-accident-741/">ongoing resettlement programmes</a>.</p>
<h2>Innovative engineering solutions</h2>
<p>Operating a building site at the world’s most radioactively hazardous site has inevitably led to a number of engineering innovations. Before work could start, a construction site was prepared 300 metres west of the reactor building, so workers could build the structure without being exposed to radiation. Hundreds of tonnes of radioactive soil had to be removed from the area, and great slabs of concrete laid to provide extra radiation protection. </p>
<p>Inconveniently for a 110 metre-high construction, working above 30 metres is impossible – the higher you go, the closer you get to the top of the exposed reactor core, where radiation dose rates are high enough to pose a significant threat to life. The solution? Build from the top down. After each section of the structure was built, starting with the top of the arch, it was hoisted into the air, 30 metres at a time, and then horizontal supports were added. This was done using jacks that were once used to raise the Russian nuclear submarine, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/aug/05/kursk.russia">the Kursk</a>, from the bottom of the Barents Sea. The process was repeated until the giant structure reached 110 metres into the air. The two halves of the arch were also constructed separately and have <a href="http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/sectors/nuclear-safety/chernobyl-new-safe-confinement.html">recently been joined together</a>.</p>
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<p>The next challenge is to make sure the confinement structure lasts 100 years. In the old sarcophagus, “<a href="http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/12/features/containing-chernobyl">roof rain</a>” condensation formed when the inside surface of the roof was cooler than the atmosphere outside, corroding any metal structures it came into contact with. To prevent this in the new structure, a complex ventilation system will heat the inner part of the confinement structure roof to avoid any temperature or humidity differences.</p>
<p>Finally, a state-of-the-art solution is required to move the confinement structure, which weighs more than 30,000 tonnes, from its construction site to the final resting place above Reactor 4. The giant building will slide 300 metres along rail tracks, furnished with specially developed <a href="https://www.theengineer.co.uk/building-chernobyls-new-safe-confinement/">Teflon bearings</a>, which will minimise friction and allow accurate positioning. </p>
<h2>Future safety</h2>
<p>Once the new structure finally confines the radiation, deconstruction of the previous sarcophagus and Reactor 4 within can begin bit by bit. This will be done using a remotely operated heavy-duty crane and robotic tools suspended from the new confinement roof. However, the high levels of radioactivity may damage these remote systems, much like the robots that entered the stricken Fukushima core and “<a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/03/10/these_fukushima_decontamination_bots_are_dying_trying.html">died trying</a>” to capture the damage on camera. </p>
<p>At the very least, building a new confinement structure buys the Ukrainian government more time to develop new radiation-resistant clean-up solutions and undertake the clean-up as safely as possible, all while the radioactive material is decaying. This is an enforced lesson in patience. Only constant innovation in engineering, robotics and materials will allow nuclear disaster sites like Chernobyl and Fukushima to be made safe, once and for all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58025/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Corkhill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Engineers have devised an innovative way to dismantle Chernobyl’s reactor while preventing further radiation escaping.Claire Corkhill, Research Fellow in nuclear waste disposal, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/561902016-03-15T10:05:26Z2016-03-15T10:05:26Z‘Acceptable risk’ is a better way to think about radiation exposure in Fukushima<p>On March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Prefecture of Japan experienced <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident/">multiple nuclear reactor meltdowns</a> as a consequence of an earthquake and a subsequent tsunami. The meltdowns resulted in the release of radioactivity into the environment and <a href="http://doi.org/10.1126/science.351.6277.1018">150,000 people were evacuated</a> from their homes specifically due to radiation concerns.</p>
<p>Now, five years later, many of these people remain refugees, unable to return home for fear of radiation exposure. As the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/video/2016/03/11/no-end-in-sight-for-fukushima-clean-up?videoId=367688438">radioactivity cleanup continues</a>, people are coming to an uncomfortable realization: although cleanup can reduce the level of radioactive contamination, the environmental radiation dose levels within the prefecture will <a href="http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a05202/">remain elevated for many generations</a> before they finally reach the very low levels that existed prior to the accident.</p>
<p>So, when will it be safe for people to return to their homes and to normal life in the Fukushima Prefecture? As I explain in my book, <em><a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10691.html">Strange Glow: The Story of Radiation</a></em>, there may be 150,000 different answers to that question.</p>
<h2>‘Safe’ has a fluid meaning</h2>
<p>With regard to radiation exposure, “safe” really means an “acceptable level of risk,” and not everyone agrees on what is acceptable. The Japanese government has set an annual effective <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx">dose limit to the public of 20 millisieverts (mSv) per year</a> above background as its remediation goal for the Fukushima Prefecture – up from one mSv per year, which was the official limit for exposures to the public prior to the incident. Although accurate numbers are hard to come by, it’s been estimated that about 50 percent of the original evacuation zone remains restricted because its radiation levels still exceed 20 mSv per year, and for half of this restricted half (about 25 percent of the total evacuated area) annual dose levels still <a href="http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/appendices/fukushima-radiation-exposure.aspx">exceed 50 mSv per year</a>.</p>
<p>To the Japanese people, this raising of the annual safety limit from one to 20 mSv appears like the government is backpedaling on its commitment to safety. They suspect it’s because the government knows it is not technically or financially feasible to deliver on any cleanup commitment to reduce the annual effective dose below 20 mSv, and that, of course, is true. This is the problem with moving regulatory dose limits after the fact to accommodate inconvenient circumstances; <a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/03/09/voices/five-years-fukushima-evacuees-voice-lingering-anger-fear-distrust/#.Vubt3xjWTP8">it breeds distrust</a>.</p>
<p>These arbitrary-feeling radiation levels can seem very abstract to the general public. Rather than moving the dose limits around, the Japanese authorities would be better off to just explain what the actual cancer risks are at the various radiation doses and let people decide for themselves if they want to go back to their homes.</p>
<p>For example, receiving an annual environmental dose of 20 mSv is similar to having a single annual whole-body <a href="http://www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/MedicalImaging/MedicalX-Rays/ucm115329.htm">CT scan for medical diagnostic purposes</a>. Epidemiological evidence indicates that the lifetime cancer risk from a single whole-body dose of 20 mSv is about 0.1 percent (or odds of 1:1,000). Put another way, if 1,000 people received a dose of 20 mSv, just one would be expected to develop cancer.</p>
<p>Now ask yourself: would it be worth it to me to go back to my home knowing I was facing this level of personal cancer risk? How you answer probably depends upon what you stand to lose by not returning home, in terms of your livelihood, possessions and finances. It also may depend upon what other personal behaviors you have that affect your cancer risk, such as smoking.</p>
<h2>Letting individuals choose</h2>
<p>Providing transparent risk characterizations for various radiation doses and allowing people to decide for themselves what radiation dose they are willing to accept is better than setting opaque “safety limits” that are enforced uniformly upon everyone. That way, individuals can choose their own “acceptable risk.”</p>
<p>And this is particularly true if regulatory agencies are going to start moving those safety limits around to suit the circumstances. The risk estimates for 20 mSv were the same before the Fukushima accident as they were after the accident. The risk per unit dose doesn’t change with the circumstances.</p>
<p>Regulatory limits don’t represent thresholds for safety. The limits are merely arbitrary lines that are drawn in the sand by some regulatory body, marking the fuzzy border between the dose levels that entail “acceptable” versus “unacceptable” amounts of risk. If you don’t like where that line has been drawn, pick up a stick and draw a different line for yourself. When it comes to risk tolerance, different people will always draw different lines.</p>
<p>These are the issues the people from the Fukushima Prefecture are now facing with regard to radiation. It’s not necessary that all of them arrive at the same conclusion about their personal safety. Whether or not to return should be an individual choice, and people can make different decisions, all equally valid. But they do need the facts to make a credible assessment of their personal risk level, in accord with their individual circumstances.</p>
<p>Providing people with this risk characterization information, at the very least, is within the power of all radiation regulatory agencies, even if achieving complete cleanup of the environment is beyond their reach. The mayor of one town, where 14,000 people were evacuated after the accident, was quoted in <em>Science</em> saying:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>There has been <a href="http://doi.org/10.1126/science.351.6277.1018">no education regarding radiation</a>. It’s difficult for many people to make the decision to return without knowing what these radiation levels mean and what is safe.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This public information void about radiation risks needs to be filled. People can make their own decisions once they’re empowered with credible and intelligible risk information.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/56190/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Timothy J. Jorgensen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Remediation will never get radiation to zero in the area affected by the 2011 meltdown at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant. Rather than safety, the conversation should focus on acceptable risk.Timothy J. Jorgensen, Associate Professor of Radiation Medicine, Georgetown UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.