tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/taiwan-strait-107024/articlesTaiwan Strait – The Conversation2024-03-01T17:24:48Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2240362024-03-01T17:24:48Z2024-03-01T17:24:48ZTaiwan’s election was a clear show of defiance in the face of Chinese intimidation and pressure<p>Taiwan’s recent election result highlights voters’ steadfast determination to resist China’s influence on their politics. Despite all Beijing’s efforts to sway popular support towards its preferred party, the <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference">Kuomintang (KMT)</a>, the election was won by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, incumbent vice-president William Lai.</p>
<p>Lai Ching-te, who is known as William in the west and Lai Qingde in mainland China, won with 40% of the vote. A nationalist who firmly supports Taiwanese independence from China, he scored a convincing victory over KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih, who placed second with 33.5%. In third place was Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je, who received 26.5%.</p>
<p>Lai will succeed the outgoing DPP president, Tsai Ing-wen, when he is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/five-things-you-need-to-know-about-taiwan-new-president-william-lai-elections-dpp/">inaugurated in May</a>. His election is more than just a victory for Taiwan’s democratic values. It’s an unequivocal rejection by Taiwanese voters of Beijing’s persistent and intrusive meddling in their politics.</p>
<p>Since Taiwan first held direct presidential elections in 1996, Beijing has adeptly employed a dual-faceted strategy towards the island it claims as an inalienable part of its territory. Its “carrot-and-stick approach” is meticulously designed to appeal to voters’ sense of Chinese identity while also trying to steer them way from independence candidates.</p>
<p>This is very much of a piece with China’s <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/01/taiwans-democracy-prevailed-despite-chinas-election-interference">complex relationship</a> with Taiwan. It combines military intimidation and economic incentives, with informal influence operations targeting media organisations and civil society groups.</p>
<p>Beijing reacted to Lai’s election by restating its commitment to unification: “This election cannot change the basic pattern and direction of development of cross-strait relations … that the motherland will eventually be reunified.” </p>
<h2>International reactions</h2>
<p>Beijing also reacted angrily to messages of congratulations received by Lai from an array of world leaders including the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, and the British foreign secretary, David Cameron, who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/14/taiwan-election-global-leaders-draw-beijings-ire-for-congratulating-new-president">said that</a> the result was “testament to Taiwan’s vibrant democracy”.</p>
<p>Western involvement with Taiwan has been complicated by the fact that <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-taiwan">no major western power recognises Taiwan</a> as an independent country. Instead, most countries pay at least official lip-service to Beijing’s <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-38285354">“one China” policy</a>. </p>
<p>This holds that Taiwan is the same country as the People’s Republic (mainland China). At the same time, Taiwan’s western allies <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-67909120">supply it with arms</a> to defend itself against any forced assimilation into China.</p>
<p>In reporting the election result, the international media focused squarely on what it suggested about Taiwan’s relations with the mainland. The message was clear in headlines such as “Taiwan voters rebuff China, ruling party gets third presidential term,” (<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/polls-open-taiwans-critical-elections-watched-closely-by-china-2024-01-13/">Reuters’</a>) or “Taiwan Elects US-Friendly President, Defying China Warnings” (<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-13/taiwan-set-to-elect-president-reviled-by-china-in-setback-for-xi">Bloomberg</a>). Throughout the west the election was billed as a defiant Taiwan refusing to back down to Beijing.</p>
<p>It was against this tense backdrop that a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-68346855">five-member US congressional delegation</a> led by the House China committee chairman, Mike Gallagher, arrived in Taipei to pay their respects to the president-elect. Gallagher, a known China hawk, assured Lai of his country’s continuing support. </p>
<p>He said: “I’m confident regardless of how the presidential election goes, we will maintain our support not only for Taiwan but also a posture of internationalism and engagement.”</p>
<p>Gallagher’s trip angered Beijing, which demanded that the US <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/china-demands-us-stop-official-contact-taiwan-congressional-107459161">cease any official contact with Taiwan</a>. “China opposes any form of official interaction between the US and Taiwan authorities and rejects US interference in Taiwan affairs in whatever form or under whatever pretext,” a foreign ministry spokeswoman said, urging Washington to be “mindful of the extreme complexity and sensitivity” of the situation.</p>
<p>Taiwanese foreign minister, Jaushieh Joseph Wu, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0wuZR0fnmc">welcomed the visit</a>: “Taiwan has been under tremendous military, economic, and also hybrid coercion by the PRC and under these circumstances, the visit of US congressmen has been of tremendous support to Taiwan.”</p>
<h2>China ups the ante</h2>
<p>Most recently, the response from the Chinese Communist party has taken a more strident tone. Wang Huning – a key figure overseeing Taiwanese affairs in China – <a href="https://www.zytzb.gov.cn/zytzb/2024-02/23/article_2024022317133791028.shtml">urged the annual Taiwan Work Conference</a> held in Beijing on February 23 to “resolutely combat ‘Taiwan independence’ separatism, curb interference from external forces, firmly support the patriotic unification forces on the island, broadly unite Taiwan compatriots, and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait”.</p>
<p>Communist party rhetoric has also <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/28172cc1-b3b7-4a72-88b0-5a963d0ce823">ramped up</a> towards advocates of Taiwanese independence since the election. Where previously party officials had used the term “oppose” (fandui 反对), this year it has shifted to “kill” or “combat” (daji 打击) against “Taiwan separatists.” </p>
<p>It’s a notable change in tone compared to previous conferences. This more aggressive stance would appear to affirm widespread expectations that Beijing will <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/27/taiwan-china-lai-ccp-unification-election-invasion-disinformation/">intensify its attempts</a> to push Taiwan towards unification.</p>
<p>China tried a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/09/taiwan-presidential-election-china-influence">range of gambits</a> to interfere with the recent election. These ranged from hosting visits from hundreds of pro-Beijing Taiwanese local officials in the hope that they could use their influence to sway voters (carrot) to threatening to cancel trade concessions for Taiwanese businesses (stick). </p>
<p>There was deep-fake content pushing Beijing’s message and a blizzard of other misleading online content promoting conspiracy theories about DPP candidates. Chinese aircraft and spy balloons violated Taiwan’s airspace regularly during the campaign.</p>
<p>None of this worked. Turnout for the recent election <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications">was 71.86%</a> – significantly higher than in the most recent elections in the US and UK. And there was clear distance between Lai’s 40% of the vote and the other candidates. Clearly the Taiwanese people value their democracy and wanted to send their own message to Beijing through the best medium there is: the ballot box.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224036/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Yukteshwar Kumar is affiliated with the Conservative Party. </span></em></p>Global reaction to the recent Taiwan election, which was won by a pro-independence candidate, contrasts sharply with that of Beijing.Yukteshwar Kumar, Course Director, Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2236082024-02-26T13:09:07Z2024-02-26T13:09:07ZTaiwan election 2024: how presidential candidates left women voters unimpressed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577406/original/file-20240222-15836-azi6l0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C5%2C3889%2C2591&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/supporters-founder-tech-giant-foxconn-terry-2302096449">jamesonwu1972/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Lai Ching-te (also known as William Lai) of the Democratic Progressive Party was elected as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/taiwan-ruling-partys-lai-ching-te-wins-presidential-election">new president of Taiwan</a> in January, beating Hou Yu-ih and Ko Wen-je of the Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party respectively. </p>
<p>Lai picked Hsiao Bi-khim to be his running mate. Hsiao, who had been Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to the US since 2020, is the second woman to become vice president in Taiwan. </p>
<p>Seeing women on the tickets for major political seats is <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0192512120935517?casa_token=pFwzsqGqu7cAAAAA%3AH8HNx-pNysvT4B9yojPw3wxVw3R6y2f2en6AYhLom9eI-6onmaEpMzIjBehJC3_v-4-BS57rgAJR4Q">not unusual</a> for Taiwanese voters. Taiwan’s national legislature has almost attained gender parity, significantly higher than the <a href="https://data.ipu.org/women-averages">global average</a>, and in 2016 it elected a woman as president (Tsai Ing-wen).</p>
<p>Nevertheless, no presidential candidate in the recent election offered concrete plans for how to achieve gender equality in society and, perhaps as a result, did not attract a great deal of support from women. Instead, candidates who chose women as their vice-presidential running mates appeared to do so as a political gesture aimed at attracting support from women, rather than displaying any real intent to advance gender equality in Taiwan.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two Taiwanese politicians (a man and a woman) cheering on a stage in front of a crowd." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577540/original/file-20240223-22-23d6h3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Lai Ching-te (William Lai) and his running mate Hsiao Bi-Khim during a campaign rally.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/lai-chingte-william-vice-president-dpp-2396136779">jamesonwu1972/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Misogyny throughout the campaigns</h2>
<p>As Taiwan geared up for the election, all three candidates spoke about the importance of gender diversity. But none of them truly campaigned for gender justice, at least not with any real conviction. </p>
<p>Ko advocated for the legalisation of surrogacy and gender-neutral bathrooms. Hou campaigned for incorporating gender diversity and equality in school curriculum’s and workplaces. Lai offered no nuances as his platform did not differ much from his opponents. </p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://www.38.org.tw/en/en-index">Modern Women’s Foundation</a> and other leading women’s organisations <a href="https://asianews.network/taiwans-female-v-p-picks-reflect-commitment-to-gender-equality-but-challenges-remain/">demanded</a> that attention be paid to gender-based violence, the gender pay gap, state-subsidised care and, among other things, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politics-and-gender/article/do-government-positions-held-by-women-matter-a-crossnational-examination-of-female-ministers-impacts-on-womens-political-participation/1C587287F90462338F69B9A774096732">women’s ministerial representation</a>. Their efforts were to no avail as none of the candidates offered a concrete solution to any of these problems. </p>
<p>The election also scored high for misogynistic remarks from candidates. Since being elected as the mayor of Taipei ten years ago, Ko has regularly made sexist comments – for example, after a rally in July 2023 where a woman held a sign listing his remarks, his supporters <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/07/26/2003803741">harassed her online</a>. Ko refused to take responsibility for his own statements, saying: “What has that got to do with me?” </p>
<p>Hou also has a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-12/taiwan-presidential-election-what-to-know-about-the-candidates?leadSource=uverify%20wall">history</a> of objectifying women. At a press conference in 2018 where Hou launched a ride-sharing policy, he complimented the woman host’s appearance and age, <a href="https://www.gvm.com.tw/article/107994">saying</a> she had an “unsafe face”. He proceeded by saying that ride sharing would allow men like him to make friends with young women. </p>
<h2>Appealing to women voters</h2>
<p>Needless to say, the main electoral battles in January did not focus on women’s issues. They mainly concentrated on relations with China and on the cost of living. Women make up half of Taiwan’s population, yet their issues were largely ignored.</p>
<p>This lack of appeal was reflected in voting. Based on our own analysis of <a href="http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/">Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study</a> (which collects data of voting behaviour and changes in democratic values), all three candidates struggled to secure support from women. </p>
<p>Lai, the eventual successor, stood out as the only candidate to receive a positive response from women. But even then, only 40% of <a href="https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231229-TPOF-December-2023-Public-Opinion-Poll-%E2%80%93-English-Excerpt.pdf">women without clear political preferences</a> (characterised here as “median voters”) said they voted for him. </p>
<p>More than half of women voters <a href="http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/">expressed unfavourable views</a> towards Ko and Hou. Ko particularly lagged in women’s support, despite enjoying considerable backing from men.<br>
Further analysis revealed an interplay between gender, education, age and candidate preference. Among college-educated men, 63% favoured Ko, compared with only 49% of college-educated women. And among those aged between 30 and 39 years, men favoured Ko to a significantly greater degree than women.</p>
<p>This gender gap suggests that highly educated women, and those in their 30s, were more critical of Ko than men. The differences in support based on gender, age and education were less pronounced for Hou and Lai. </p>
<p>Hou’s supporters are predominantly older, with no significant differences in gender across various ages or educational levels. On the other hand, Lai attracts slightly more college-educated women than men. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A close-up shot of a Taiwanese man wearing glasses and dressed in a white jacket at a rally." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/577543/original/file-20240223-26-fmc9br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ko Wen-je, the presidential candidate from the Taiwan People’s Party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/president-candidate-ko-wenje-attended-rally-2410913131">Alex Chan Tsz Yuk/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Selective running mates</h2>
<p>Polling taken <a href="http://my-formosa.com/DOC_201239.htm">before running mates were announced</a> suggested a neck-and-neck competition, with no candidate demonstrating a substantial lead. This tight race underscored the importance of median voters.</p>
<p>Research suggests that, while vice president picks do not usually sway the electorate broadly, they can appeal to particular voter segments. Therefore, Lai and Ko both <a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-s-female-v-p-picks-reflect-commitment-to-gender-equality-but-challenges-remain">made strategic choices</a> of women to be their vice presidential picks. </p>
<p>But did this strategy pay off? The popularity of both Lai and Ko with women voters saw no improvement. In fact, Ko’s support among women <a href="https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/TPOF-12%E6%9C%88%E6%B0%91%E8%AA%BF%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A.pdf">continued to decline</a> even after introducing his running mate. His challenge in securing women’s support shows that putting a woman on the ticket was not enough to counteract his misogyny and boost women’s support.</p>
<p>Many challenges on gender inequality and injustice await Lai. He campaigned by prioritising other issues such as care for the elderly and the minimum wage. But even these issues cannot be addressed without accounting for gender. </p>
<p>Domestic needs like this can only be resolved by systematically evaluating and incorporating the interests and needs of women.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Taiwan’s presidential candidates failed to address women’s interests and resonate with women voters.Shan-Jan Sarah Liu, Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Gender and Politics, The University of EdinburghLi-Yin Liu, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of DaytonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2198102024-01-14T03:14:37Z2024-01-14T03:14:37ZIn re-electing its government, Taiwan has kept the status quo, but the victory hides a transformed political landscape<p>After months of intense campaigning, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) emerged victorious in the 2024 Taiwan presidential election, securing an historic third consecutive term. However, the party’s dominance has gone from absolute to relative; it secured only 40% of the presidential votes, and fell short of retaining the majority of legislative seats. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Kuomintang (KMT) failed to retake the presidency as well as the majority of legislative seats. The remaining seats are held by Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party, despite occupying third place in the Legislative Yuan with eight seats, achieved a remarkable 26% in the presidential race, punching above its weight considering its limited resources and recent formation. </p>
<p>These results signify a shift in Taiwan’s political landscape. The long-standing two-party system appears to be transitioning into a messy three-party dynamic. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwanese-election-may-determine-whether-beijing-opts-to-force-the-issue-of-reunification-217955">Taiwanese election may determine whether Beijing opts to force the issue of reunification</a>
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<h2>Why is there a third-party rise?</h2>
<p>While the Democratic Progressive Party’s third consecutive presidential term may seem like a victory, cracks in the foundation of Taiwan’s political landscape are widening. </p>
<p>The roots of this instability stretch <a href="https://www.ajpor.org/article/77478-still-aquamarine-china-factor-and-the-2020-election-revisited">back to 2020</a>, where anti-establishment sentiment simmered beneath the surface, even as the China factor dominated headlines. This time, the discontent is boiling over.</p>
<p>The Democratic Progressive government, once riding a wave of youthful support, now faces accusations of <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-amidst-the-division-a-third-wave-emerges/">power abuse</a> and, crucially, a failure to address the very issues that propelled them to power in 2016; skyrocketing housing prices, stagnant wages, and widening inequality. These woes fuelled the rise of the Taiwan People’s Party. </p>
<p>The Kuomintang, the other pillar of the old order, struggles to offer solutions. Their proposed <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202310270021">subsidised interest rates</a> risk further inflating the housing bubble, alienating the young generation they desperately need to win. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the Taiwan People’s Party proposes alternatives – public
housing, rent subsidies, and even property tax hikes – aimed at making housing truly affordable.</p>
<p>For decades, power has swayed between the Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party, yet voter satisfaction with
Taiwanese democracy languishes <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/753202">below 50%</a>. </p>
<p>This stark statistic betrays a profound representation crisis, an outcry against the established parties, often due to a perceived failure to tackle core issues. </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party, riding this wave of disillusionment, attracts those who yearn for a political shift, focusing on domestic woes. It emerges as a beacon of hope for those who have lost faith in the two-party system. </p>
<h2>Why did the DPP win again?</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5070525">Pre-election polls</a> painted a clear picture: more than 60% craved a change, a break from the Democratic Progressive Party’s grip on power. </p>
<p>But the tide of discontent splintered, dividing voters between the established Kuomintang and the rising force of the Taiwan People’s Party. </p>
<p>Youth flocked to the newcomer, while the Kuomintang found favour among older
demographics. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/with-taiwans-election-just-a-month-away-the-china-threat-looms-large-216069">With Taiwan's election just a month away, the China threat looms large</a>
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<p>To unseat the government, a united front seemed logical. Yet, cooperation crumbled, replaced by escalating animosity between the opposition parties. This fractured landscape handed the ruling party an advantage: a divided opposition meant their own victory was practically guaranteed.</p>
<p>The Kuomintang, desperate to tip the scales, resorted to <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202401060021">strategic voting</a>, aiming to marginalise the Taiwan People’s Party.</p>
<p>Negative campaigns against the Taiwan People’s Party intensified after <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/war-with-china-is-not-an-option-taiwan-ruling-party-vp-candidate-says-2023-11-23/">failed negotiation attempts</a> on November 23. With Taiwan’s traditional media heavily aligned with either the Kuomintang or the government, the Taiwan People’s Party faced an uphill battle for airtime. </p>
<p>Instead of ceding the stage, they went digital. They launched their own YouTube channel, and their supporters spearheaded online and offline campaigns and created alternative news channels. This counteroffensive transformed the fight into a three-pronged clash. </p>
<p>The battle became more than just a contest between the establishment and the anti-establishment. It morphed into a clash between traditional media and
the burgeoning power of social media. </p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party’s digital insurgency challenged the long-held dominance of traditional media and carved out a space for their voices to be heard. </p>
<p>While the outcome of the election may be set, the digital battleground shows a new force has emerged in Taiwan’s political landscape.</p>
<h2>The future of the cross-strait relations</h2>
<p>On the international front, continuity seems to be the watchword. </p>
<p>The established relationship with the US, nurtured by President Tsai Ing-wen, is likely to continue under the guidance of Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao. Her esteemed record as former ambassador to the US inspires confidence in maintaining strong ties.</p>
<p>However, cross-strait relations with China face a potential storm. </p>
<p>With both the President and Vice President openly supporting Taiwan’s independence in the past, China perceives them as a united <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1302696.shtml">“independence duo”</a>. This stance may trigger harsh responses, from further curtailing trade via terminating the free trade agreement to heightened military tensions. </p>
<p>The path forward requires navigating a delicate balance of upholding Taiwan’s democratic values while recognising the complex geopolitical realities. The future of Taiwan’s cross-strait relationship hinges on how well this balance is upheld. The governing Democratic Progressive Party will be judged on how they walk the tightrope.</p>
<p>The Taiwan People’s Party’s emergence may seem to add another layer of complexity, with its potentially divergent views on cross-strait policy. The party believes demonstrating goodwill can lower the temperature and avoid harsher measures like trade restrictions or military escalation. </p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/is-china-preparing-for-a-war-over-taiwan-or-has-the-west-got-it-wrong-here-are-the-indicators-220348">Is China preparing for a war over Taiwan, or has the west got it wrong? Here are the indicators</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Yet, unlike the Kuomintang’s focus on <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/01/11/could-taiwan-be-the-next-ukraine-00135009">appeasement</a>, the Taiwan People’s Party advocates for <a href="https://www.tpp.org.tw/en/our_platform-detail.php?id=20">strengthening national defence </a>to deter aggression and ensure peaceful coexistence with China. </p>
<p>Therefore, while the immediate outlook for cross-strait relations may be turbulent, the robust growth of Taiwan’s democracy offers a glimmer of hope for a future where pragmatism holds sway.</p>
<p>Taiwan’s election has presented a paradox: a familiar victory yet a
fundamental shift in the political landscape. </p>
<p>While the immediate future may be uncertain, the rise of the Taiwan People’s Party and the continued US support offer hope for a more open and responsive
democracy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/219810/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kai-Ping Huang receives funding from National Sceince and Technology Council, Taiwan for a research proposal on negative campaigns. </span></em></p>The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has retained government, but it wasn’t a straightforward race. The campaign revealed much about Taiwan’s changing politics.Kai-Ping Huang, Associate Professor, National Taiwan UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2179552024-01-09T13:44:22Z2024-01-09T13:44:22ZTaiwanese election may determine whether Beijing opts to force the issue of reunification<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568309/original/file-20240108-19-kmxh2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Posters of presidential candidate William Lai and his running mate, Hsiao Bi-khim.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/posters-of-presidential-candidate-lai-ching-te-and-his-news-photo/1905136679?adppopup=true">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the votes are being tallied in <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/1/6/24026992/taiwan-china-president-war-xi-jinping-asia-semiconductors-chips">Taiwan’s presidential election</a>, it won’t be only the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/taiwan/">23.6 million inhabitants of the island</a> eagerly awaiting a result – in Beijing and Washington, too, there will be some anxious faces.</p>
<p>The vote of Jan. 13, 2024, is seen as a litmus test for the future of cross-strait relations, coming at a time when the status quo over Taiwan – a territory <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-taiwan-a-country-or-not-213638">Beijing claims as an integral part of “one China</a>” – is being challenged. If Taiwan’s incumbent, independence-oriented party stays in power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping might feel he has no choice but to force the issue of reunification.</p>
<p>Conversely, if the opposition – which agrees with Beijing that Taiwan and the mainland are part of “one China” but not about who governs it – wins, Beijing might feel it has more space to be patient on the issue.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the vote, Beijing has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-taiwan-is-hyping-up-military-threat-its-own-gain-2023-12-28/">ramped up military exercises</a> in and around the Taiwan Strait in an apparent warning to Taiwanese voters. On Jan. 6, in one of the most recent incidents, China <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taiwan-chinese-balloons-harassment-threat-air-safety-106154165">sent a series of balloons</a> over the island, which the Taiwan government cited as a threat to air travel and an attempt at intimidation.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in his <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202312/t20231231_11215608.html">annual New Year’s address</a>, Xi stated that “China will surely be reunified,” raising fears internationally that he intends to pursue the issue militarily if necessary. </p>
<p>For Washington, too, the outcome of the vote <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/2/us-watching-taiwan-elections-closely-as-beijing-reiterates-claim-to-island">will have implications</a>. The United States has cultivated strong ties with the current leadership of Taiwan. But recent tensions in the strait have raised the risk of war. U.S. actions deemed provocative by Beijing, such as the 2022 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-puts-the-white-house-in-delicate-straits-of-diplomacy-with-china-188116">visit of then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan</a>, have resulted in China upping its military threats in the strait. And this has raised speculation that China’s patience is growing thin and its timeline for reunification is growing shorter. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/but-can-the-united-states-defend-taiwan/">questions about the U.S. capacity</a> to respond to any Chinese aggression over Taiwan have risen; the specter of war in a third region of the world – after Ukraine and Israel – <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/top-us-general-warns-everyone-should-worried-about-war-china-1849085">worries national security leadership</a> in Washington.</p>
<h2>Independence on the ballot?</h2>
<p>The presidential election in Taiwan has come down to a three-way race. The front-runner is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions">current Vice President William Lai</a>, who is the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP views Taiwan as a sovereign country and does not seek reunification with China.</p>
<p>Lai’s challengers are New Taipei City mayor Hou Yu-ih, of the Kuomintang (KMT), and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei running for the center-left Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The KMT embraces the idea of future reunification with China under a democratic government. The TPP criticizes both DPP and KMT platforms on cross-strait relations as too extreme and seeks a middle ground that maintains the status quo: A Taiwan that is de facto sovereign, but with strong economic and cultural ties with China. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman makes a heart shape with her arms, behind her are people carrying flags and placards." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Kuomintang at a campaign rally in Taichung, Taiwan, on Jan. 8, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-listen-kuomintang-presidential-candidate-hou-yu-news-photo/1910638618?adppopup=true">Man Hei Leung/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Taiwan law mandates that no polls are published in the 10 days before the election. As of Jan. 3, when the final polls were published, <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/2024-taiwan-election">averages had Lai leading</a> with 36%, with Hou at 31% and Ko at 24%.</p>
<p>Lai has consistently led in the polls, prompting the KMT and TPP to earlier <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwans-opposition-parties-decide-joint-presidential-ticket-2023-11-15/">consider running on a joint ticket</a>. But the two parties <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67471139">failed to agree on terms</a>, and the coalition attempt imploded. </p>
<p>This may prove crucial, as joining forces may have represented the best chance of a KMT candidate being elected – an outcome that may have cooled tensions with Beijing.</p>
<h2>Taiwanese democracy</h2>
<p>The island of Taiwan has been governed as the “Republic of China” since 1949, when the KMT <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">lost a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party</a>. The CCP set up the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, and the KMT retreated to Taiwan.</p>
<p>For decades, both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China diverged on every possible policy except one: Both governments agreed that there was <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-the-one-china-policy/">only one China</a>, and that Taiwan was a part of China. They each sought to unite Taiwan and the mainland – but under their own rule.</p>
<p>Although that remains the goal in Beijing today, for Taiwan the outlook has started to change. </p>
<p>The change began with <a href="https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/-democratic-transition-and-consolidation-in-taiwan_122745967872.pdf">Taiwanese democratization</a> – a process that began in the early 1990s after decades of autocratic rule. After gradually rolling out direct elections for the legislature, governors and mayors, the island held its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/world/taiwan-s-leader-wins-its-election-and-a-mandate.html">first democratic election for president in 1996</a>. Despite Beijing holding military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to interfere with the vote, the KMT-affiliated incumbent won against a DPP candidate with strong ties to the Taiwan independence movement.</p>
<p>Four years later, the DPP’s candidate won and started the first of two consecutive terms. In 2008, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.3423">KMT candidate returned to power</a>. But since 2016, Taiwan has been led by Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP. </p>
<h2>Uneasy consensus</h2>
<p>Cross-strait tensions tend to rise when the DPP is in office and calm somewhat when the KMT is in power. This isn’t because the KMT agrees with Beijing over the status of Taiwan – the party has always been clear that unification could happen only under its own government and never under the leadership of the Communist Party in Beijing. But the KMT affirms the idea that eventual unification with China is its goal for Taiwan. </p>
<p>In 1992, representatives of the KMT and the CCP met in Hong Kong and reached the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/">1992 Consensus</a>.” Despite the name, the two sides do not fully agree on what it meant. The KMT affirmed the idea of one China but noted disagreement on what the government of that China should be; the People’s Republic of China interpreted it as affirming one China under CCP rule. </p>
<p>Still, the 1992 Consensus became the basis of a series of policies strengthening cross-strait ties, and it made KMT-led governments easier for the PRC to tolerate.</p>
<h2>Pro-independence sentiment</h2>
<p>Though speculation about the geopolitical fallout and China’s reaction to the election has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-election-poses-early-2024-test-us-aim-steady-china-ties-2024-01-05/">dominated coverage</a> <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-tells-taiwan-vote-right-side-history-election-could-determine-cross-strait-relations">of the vote</a> <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/article/3247604/global-impact-taiwan-heads-polls-what-does-islands-presidential-election-mean-cross-strait-and-us">around the world</a>, for Taiwan voters, independence is one of several critical issues the island faces. The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-are-the-key-issues-in-taiwans-2024-presidential-election/">economy frequently rises even above cross-strait issues</a> in importance, with many voters expressing concern over the rapid rise of housing prices, stagnating salaries, slow economic growth and how the incumbent party handled the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>On the issue of independence itself, Taiwanese polls have shown a creep toward pro-independence sentiment. As of September 2023, <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/09/02/2003805648">nearly half of Taiwanese voters</a> said they preferred independence (48.9%) for the island, while 26.9% sought a continuation of the status quo. A shrinking minority – now just 11.8% – said they hoped for future reunification.</p>
<p>If the DPP remains in power, Beijing may feel the pressure to force the issue of reunification. Xi has called for the Chinese military to be capable of <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-AMONSON%20&%20EGLI_FEATURE%20IWD.PDF">a successful cross-strait invasion by 2027</a>, though a forceful reunification effort might include a combination of economic blockade and military pressure. </p>
<p>If that were to be the case, U.S. commitments to Taiwan – along with U.S. credibility among its Asian allies – could be on the line. President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that he is <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-again-indicates-that-us-will-defend-taiwan-militarily-does-this-constitute-a-change-in-policy-190946">prepared to defend the island militarily</a> against an attack from mainland China.</p>
<p>Already in 2024, the U.S. is having to contend with two significant conflicts that are demanding its attention. How Taiwanese voters mark their ballot – and how policymakers in Beijing respond – may determine whether a third war is more or less likely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A candidate from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party looks set to win the presidency despite Beijing’s pressure and rhetoric.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2079812023-06-21T12:29:26Z2023-06-21T12:29:26ZChina and the US are locked in struggle – and the visit by Secretary of State Blinken is only a start to improving relations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/533013/original/file-20230620-19384-h5r2uh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=24%2C24%2C5442%2C3556&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US Secretary of State Antony Blinken joins government officials from the U.S. and China during a meeting with China's President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on June 19, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-attends-a-meeting-with-news-photo/1258808670?adppopup=true"> Leah Millis/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In the weeks building up to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China on June 18-19, 2023, there was a lot of uncertainty in both the United States and China about the purpose and possible outcomes of the visit. When Blinken left Washington, D.C., it wasn’t even clear if he would be able to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He did.</p>
<p>The meeting took place just two weeks after <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-chinese-warships-near-miss-in-taiwan-strait-hints-at-ongoing-troubled-diplomatic-waters-despite-chatter-about-talks-207099">a Chinese naval vessel crossed</a> within 150 yards of a U.S. destroyer, in what the U.S. military calls an “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/chinese-warship-cuts-off-us-navy-ship-marking/story?id=99817905">an unsafe maritime interaction</a>” in the Taiwan strait. It was not an isolated incident. Three weeks before Blinken and Xi sat down, a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/30/united-states-calls-out-china-unnecessarily-aggressive-maneuver-00099309">Chinese fighter jet came dangerously close</a> to a U.S. surveillance plane over the South China sea.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, these two close interactions heightened tensions at a time when <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/02/06/us-china-relations-just-got-more-fragile.html">relations between the two countries were already strained</a>. </p>
<p>President Joe <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/20/us/politics/biden-china-spy-balloon.html">Biden’s characterization of Xi as a dictator</a> during a June 20, 2023, campaign fundraiser – just a day after Blinken returned to the U.S. – shows just how rocky the relationship is between the two countries. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/06/20/biden-xi-jinping-dictator-china/">China is already reacting to the remarks</a>, labeling them “extremely absurd and irresponsible.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=PwGGCkUAAAAJ">scholar of international relations</a> specializing in Indo-Pacific security issues, I closely follow U.S-China relations, including territorial and maritime disputes.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-philippines-military-exercises-60af099f1526c6fce180d217e97788ad">U.S. routinely sails ships and flies planes</a> in the disputed waters and airspace in the South China Sea to indicate the right of free transit mandated by international law. But <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea">China claims both areas</a> as its own territorial waters and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/china-defends-its-actions-in-warship-incident-involving-u-s-canada-in-taiwan-strait">denounces U.S. activities</a> in what China sees as its domestic domain. </p>
<h2>The bar was fairly low</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/08/secretary-of-state-mike-pompeos-visit-to-china-kicks-off-with-a-frosty-exchange.html">last visit by a U.S. secretary of state</a> to China was in 2018, and dialogue has been limited on multiple levels since then. While the relationship between the U.S. and China has grown increasingly tense and uncertain for several years, the past year has seen the worst relations since <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/15/us-recognizes-communist-china-dec-15-1978-1060168">diplomatic relations began in 1979</a>. </p>
<p>Despite the continued <a href="https://guides.loc.gov/us-trade-with-china">economic connections between the two</a> powers, political and security relations have soured dramatically. Both countries have repeatedly condemned each other for a variety of reasons, resulting in the current tensions.</p>
<p>While not likely to become another cold war, the U.S.-China relationship is certainly an intense rivalry. It is in this context that Blinken visited China.</p>
<p>The Blinken visit opened the lines of communication for the more serious talks the two countries must have in order to lower tensions. But in other ways, it was more symbolic and part of the tenuous, uncertain relationship between the world’s two most powerful countries. </p>
<p>The official reason for the trip was mainly <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/">to reestablish regular communication</a>. But restarting regular communication, which Blinken and Xi said <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-china-blinken-xi-biden-ce8bf13e5a02977a5291c001761ae0b3">the countries are willing to do</a>, made the talks a successful first step in the long walk back to diplomacy.</p>
<p>Now, the tedious work begins. Other U.S. officials such as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, climate envoy John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin – whose request to meet with Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu at a security conference in Singapore in May 2023 <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-rejects-meeting-defense-chiefs-lloyd-austin-li-shangfu-rcna86732">was rejected by China</a> – will be able to more easily meet with their counterparts. On their agendas will be issues ranging from concerns about imports and exports to avoiding armed conflict. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2728%2C1848&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Two men, wearing suits and ties stand side-by-side and shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2728%2C1848&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532995/original/file-20230620-19-kstozd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets China’s President Xi Jinping in Beijing on June 19, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-shakes-hands-with-chinas-news-photo/1258808175?adppopup=true">Leah Millis/Pool/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Growing list of issues</h2>
<p>It will be a while before we know whether Blinken’s main goal of arranging a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/19/us-secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-to-meet-chinas-xi-jinping.html">meeting between Xi and Biden</a> later in 2023 was successful. </p>
<p>I believe the diplomatic visit was a good step toward addressing a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28673.6">growing list of bilateral issues</a> that need attention. But it will take more time and require much more communication before a clearer picture of the status of the U.S.-Chinese relationship appears.</p>
<p>This will require continual dialogue, not the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/05/30/unstable-us-china-relationship">on-again, off-again meetings</a> that have been happening in the past five years. Even then, while the U.S. government <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-china/">appears to be direct and transparent</a> about its foreign policy – <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">following through with stated policies</a> in its actions – the Chinese approach to diplomacy is opaque and <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_chinas_complicated_foreign_policy311562">frequently features a disconnect </a> between what is claimed versus what is done. The Chinese government rarely publicizes foreign policy documents, and speeches by government officials tend to be deliberately ambiguous and nonspecific. Uncertainty is the name of the game for at least one side in this rivalry.</p>
<h2>Issues at stake</h2>
<p>The list of bilateral issues and disputes between the two countries is extensive: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/">U.S. support for Taiwan</a>, which <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202208/t20220802_10732293.html">China contends</a> “seriously infringes upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” </p></li>
<li><p>Chinese <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/48601793">territorial and maritime claims</a> in the East China Sea and South China Sea <a href="https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/index.html">conflict with the U.S. position</a> that international law guarantees freedom of the sea. </p></li>
<li><p>China is angry over <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/25/maintaining-military-edge-over-china-pub-8690">national security-based restrictions</a> by the U.S. and several allies on the importation of Chinese-made semiconductor chips and exports of certain technologies to China.</p></li>
<li><p>U.S. condemnation of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-debt-banking-loans-financial-developing-countries-collapse-8df6f9fac3e1e758d0e6d8d5dfbd3ed6">Chinese economic coercion</a> in countries around the world – providing loans at low rates, then <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html">taking control of a port</a> or other infrastructure when the country cannot repay the loan in time. </p></li>
<li><p>U.S. criticism of China’s human rights violations <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/31/asia/un-xinjiang-china-bachelet-report-intl/index.html">in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The existing Chinese spy base in Cuba, which, according to The New York Times, might <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/10/us/politics/china-spy-base-cuba.html">allow China to intercept electronic signals</a> from U.S. military and commercial buildings.</p></li>
<li><p>Recent <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-navy-releases-video-chinese-warships-unsafe-interaction-near-taiwan-2023-06-05/">near misses between U.S. and Chinese vessels in the Taiwan Strait</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/08/asia/south-china-sea/">South China Sea</a>. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The overarching point of contention for the U.S. is China’s implied intention to displace the U.S. and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">become the world’s most powerful</a> country. The current <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf">U.S. national security strategy</a> names China as the most significant security challenge to the U.S. in our time.</p>
<h2>China’s superpower ambitions</h2>
<p>It’s a classic power struggle. The U.S. views China as a direct threat to its position as the lone superpower, with China attempting to replace the U.S.-led world order. The key questions are whether China will displace the U.S., when, and whether peacefully or by military force.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59600475">speed of the Chinese military buildup</a> over the past decade, both conventional and nuclear, is remarkable and daunting. While neither country wants a war, a potential military clash over Taiwan, in the East China Sea or the South China Sea could escalate, forcing U.S. officials to make difficult decisions about using force against China, which would have massive consequences felt around the world. </p>
<p>Even if diplomatic relations improve, the official U.S. national security strategy citing China as the most comprehensive and serious challenge to the U.S. will remain as the predominant foreign policy issue of our time. This is the <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/us-and-china-hold-top-level-talks-but-their-rivalry-remains-unchecked/">century of a U.S.-China rivalry</a>, with tensions being the only certainty of the relationship. </p>
<p>One visit by the U.S. secretary of state will not solve that problem.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207981/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Krista Wiegand is an Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum, and was a Visiting Scholar at the East-West Center and a Fulbright Senior Fellow in the Philippines. </span></em></p>The US and China are engaged in a classic power struggle. The question is, who will come out on top?Krista Wiegand, Professor of Political Science, University of TennesseeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2070992023-06-06T12:32:03Z2023-06-06T12:32:03ZUS, Chinese warships’ near miss in Taiwan Strait hints at ongoing troubled diplomatic waters, despite chatter about talks<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530210/original/file-20230605-15-7sme40.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=36%2C219%2C4846%2C2730&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The USS Chung-Hoon observes a Chinese navy ship cross into its path.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ChinaUS/c5c2eb573dff49a688c81c9fe4adc103/photo?Query=Taiwan%20Strait&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=524&currentItemNo=0">Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Andre T. Richard/U.S. Navy via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>An encounter in which a Chinese naval ship <a href="https://apnews.com/article/us-china-taiwan-strait-489a45bb6df134fa09443d285b3f8669">cut across the path of a U.S. destroyer</a> in the Taiwan Strait on June 3, 2023, has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/04/asia/china-defense-minister-shangri-la-speech-intl-hnk/index.html">both Beijing</a> <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-30/us-accuses-china-of-aggressive-encounter-over-south-china-sea#xj4y7vzkg">and Washington</a> pointing fingers at each other.</em></p>
<p><em>It was the second near miss in the space of just a few weeks; in late May a Chinese plane <a href="http://aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/31/provocative-dangerous-china-blames-us-for-air-confrontation">crossed in front of an American surveillance aircraft</a> above the South China Sea.</em></p>
<p><em>Meredith Oyen, <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">an expert on China-U.S. relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, helps explain the context of the recent encounters and how they fit within growing tensions between the two countries.</em></p>
<h2>What do we know about the Taiwan Strait incident?</h2>
<p>It came as the U.S. and Canada were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-canadian-navies-stage-rare-joint-mission-through-taiwan-strait-2023-06-03/">conducting a joint transit</a> of the Taiwan Strait – a body of water that separates the island of Taiwan from mainland China. Washington does these transits fairly regularly, but not usually with another country.</p>
<p>As the American destroyer USS Chung-Hoon and Canadian frigate HMCS Montreal traveled up the channel, a Chinese warship passed and <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-military-releases-video-of-near-collision-between-chinese-u-s-warships-in-taiwan-strait">veered across the U.S. vessel’s path at a pretty close range</a>, according to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. As a result, the USS Chung-Hoon had to reduce its speed to avoid a collision. </p>
<p>The U.S. has <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3223054/us-military-slams-chinese-warships-unsafe-and-unprofessional-manoeuvres-taiwan-strait">characterized the incident as an “unsafe” maneuver</a> on behalf of the Chinese and protested that it took place in international waters.</p>
<p>The perspective from Beijing is that the U.S. and Canada were “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-canadian-navies-stage-rare-joint-mission-through-taiwan-strait-2023-06-03/">deliberately provoking risk</a>” by sailing a warship through Chinese waters.</p>
<h2>Who is right? Did it take place in international or Chinese waters?</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> stipulates that a country’s “territorial waters” extend 12 nautical miles off its coast – anything above or on the sea in that zone is considered part of the country’s territory. After that, there is a further 12-mile “contiguous zone,” over which a coastal state has rights to prevent infringement of the country’s “customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary” laws, according to the UN treaty.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An aerial shot shows blue waters and two green land masses." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530211/original/file-20230605-17-2nzyjt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Taiwan Strait.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/the-taiwan-strait-is-a-strategic-maritime-shipping-route-news-photo/1091868100?adppopup=true">Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Complicating matters, Beijing – a signatory to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, unlike the U.S. – claims the island of Taiwan as part of China. Under the U.N. convention’s stipulations, this would also mean Beijing can claim the 12 miles of territorial waters off Taiwan’s coast, as well as a 12-mile contiguous zone.</p>
<p>But even at its narrowest point, the <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillgoldenziel/2022/06/28/china-claims-to-own-the-taiwan-strait-thats-illegal/?sh=6cc6f59d9ba2">Taiwan Strait is around 86 miles wide</a>. So even accepting Beijing’s territorial claim, there would, under U.N. law, be a channel that falls outside its territory. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, Beijing <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/07/narrowing-the-differences-between-china-and-the-us-over-the-taiwan-strait/">claims sovereignty of the entirety of the waters</a> between Taiwan and China under its exclusive economic zone. </p>
<p>Despite not signing the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the U.S. abides by the 12-mile standard and views a large chunk of the strait as international waters.</p>
<h2>How common are these ‘near misses’?</h2>
<p>The United States has regularly sailed vessels through the Taiwan Strait for decades. At times of tension – notably <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises">during the Korean War and Taiwan Straits crises of 1954-55, 1958 and 1962</a> – the U.S. has deployed destroyers in the channel as a deliberate show of military strength and support for Taiwan.</p>
<p>This continued after the U.S. normalized relations with China in 1978 until today, with few incidents that caused the level of tit-for-tat recriminations such as in the latest case. But there have been “near misses” in the sky, noticeably the <a href="http://aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/31/provocative-dangerous-china-blames-us-for-air-confrontation">recent airplane-to-airplane encounter</a> that preceded this incident.</p>
<p>What we have increasingly seen, though, is Chinese officials protest these Taiwan Strait transits by the U.S. And the number of protests by China has increased in recent years, as <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-again-indicates-that-us-will-defend-taiwan-militarily-does-this-constitute-a-change-in-policy-190946">tension over Taiwan has increased</a>.</p>
<h2>How does this incident fit growing maritime tension in the region?</h2>
<p>The past few years have seen a deterioration in U.S.-China relations. There have been <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/11/why-u.s.-and-chinese-militaries-aren-t-talking-much-anymore-pub-85123">no direct, high-level military talks between the two countries since 2019</a>. Meanwhile, relations have further soured on other topics, such as the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352">ongoing trade war</a>, the issue of Taiwan and <a href="https://theintercept.com/2020/03/18/coronavirus-china-world-power/">allegations relating to the spread</a> of COVID-19.</p>
<p>At times of better relations between Beijing and Washington, military transits such as the one in the Taiwan Strait might have gone largely unremarked upon. But amid such tensions, any incident is elevated to the level of uniquely bad provocation.</p>
<p>The broader context is that the U.S. regularly holds military drills and <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3370607/dod-releases-fiscal-year-2022-freedom-of-navigation-report/#:%7E:text=Upholding%20freedom%20of%20navigation%20as,operate%20wherever%20international%20law%20allows.">“freedom of navigation” operations</a> in the South China Sea. These activities are used by the U.S. Department of Defense to demonstrate that the U.S. has a right to sail in waters it views as international, even if they are claimed by nation states.</p>
<p>The concern is that with tensions as they are – and with no official direct line of dialogue – a near miss during such a drill, or, worse still, an actual collision, could escalate beyond control, leading to military conflict.</p>
<h2>Any significance over why this happened now?</h2>
<p>The near miss came at a curious time – while top diplomats and defense chiefs from both the U.S. and China were attending <a href="https://www.iiss.org/events/shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2023/">the Shangri-La Dialogue</a> in Singapore.</p>
<p>At that security summit, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/02/austin-china-military-handshake-00099875">shook the hand</a> of his Chinese counterpart, Li Shangfu. But they didn’t hold a side meeting – as some observers had hoped.</p>
<p>Austin also <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/02/asia/austin-shangri-law-dialogue-speech-taiwan-intl-hnk/index.html">underscored the importance of the Taiwan Strait</a> to Washington: “The whole world has a stake in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The security of commercial shipping lanes and global supply chains depends on it. And so does freedom of navigation worldwide. Make no mistake: conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be devastating.”</p>
<p>Washington <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/05/10/deconfliction-us-china-talk-about-talking/">has suggested</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/3/us-says-talks-with-china-key-to-a-prevent-crisis-or-conflict">that it wants to resume official talks</a> with Beijing. Incidents such as that in the Taiwan Strait underscore the potential need for such discussions, if only to avoid encounters escalating into something more serious.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207099/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What was behind the latest encounter between US and Chinese military vessels in contested waters?Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1909462022-09-19T18:14:40Z2022-09-19T18:14:40ZBiden again indicates that US will defend Taiwan ‘militarily’ – does this constitute a change in policy?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485381/original/file-20220919-20-ffwav1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C64%2C4297%2C2804&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Are Biden's comments on Taiwan an accidental or deliberate pivot?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BritainRoyalsBiden/c500cee205ea45289051ace49190427f/photo?Query=Biden&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=86632&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Susan Walsh</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Joe Biden has – <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html">not for the first time</a> – suggested that the U.S. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/19/biden-taiwan-china-defense/">would intervene “militarily”</a> should China attempt an invasion of Taiwan._</p>
<p><em>In an <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-joe-biden-60-minutes-interview-transcript-2022-09-18/">interview with CBS’s “60 Minutes”</a> on Sept. 18, 2022, Biden vowed to protect the island in the face of any attack. Pressed if that meant the U.S. getting “involved militarily,” the president replied: “Yes.”</em></p>
<p><em>The comments <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202209190005">appear to deviate</a> from the official U.S. line on Taiwan, in place for decades. But White House officials said the remarks <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/09/19/1123759127/biden-again-says-u-s-would-help-taiwan-if-china-attacks">did not represent any change in Taiwan policy</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Meredith Oyen, an <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">expert on U.S.-China relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, helps explain the background to Biden’s comments and untangles what should be read into his remarks – and what shouldn’t.</em></p>
<h2>What did Biden say and why was it significant?</h2>
<p>In an exchange on “60 Minutes,” Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/19/biden-taiwan-china-defense/">was asked directly</a> if the U.S. would “come to Taiwan’s defense” if it were attacked by China. He replied: “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.” He also confirmed that U.S. intervention would be military. </p>
<p>By my count, this is the fourth time Biden as president has suggested that the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s aid militarily if the island is attacked. In 2021 he made similar remarks in an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/20/us-position-on-taiwan-unchanged-despite-biden-comment-official-says.html">interview with ABC News</a> and then again <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/10/22/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-cnn-town-hall-with-anderson-cooper-2/">while taking part in a CNN town hall event</a>. And earlier this year he said something similar while in Japan, marking the first time he has made the assertion while in Asia.</p>
<p>On each occasion he has made such a comment, it has been followed quite quickly by the White House’s walking back the remarks, by issuing statements along the lines of “what the president actually means is …” and stressing that this isn’t a shift away from the official U.S. policy on China or Taiwan. </p>
<p>But I think that with each incident it is harder to prevaricate about Biden’s comments being an accident, or suggest that he in some way misspoke. I think it is clear at this point that Biden’s interpretation of the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479">Taiwan Relations Act</a> – which since 1979 has set out the parameters of U.S. policy on the island – is that it allows for a U.S. military response should China invade. And despite White House claims to the contrary, I believe that does represent a departure from the long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan.</p>
<h2>What does ‘strategic ambiguity’ mean?</h2>
<p><a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-strategic-ambiguity-trumps-strategic-clarity-taiwan/">Strategic ambiguity</a> has long been the U.S. policy toward Taiwan – really since the 1950s, but certainly from 1979 onward. While it does not explicitly commit the U.S. to defending Taiwan in every circumstance, it does leave open the option of American defensive support to Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack by China.</p>
<p><iframe id="NS3cP" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NS3cP/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Crucially, the U.S. hasn’t really said what it will do – so does this support mean economic aid, supply of weapons or U.S. boots on the ground? China and Taiwan are left guessing if – and to what extent – the U.S. will be involved in any China-Taiwan conflict.</p>
<p>By leaving the answer to that question ambiguous, the U.S. holds a threat over China: Invade Taiwan and find out if you face the U.S. as well. </p>
<p>Traditionally, this has been a useful policy for the U.S., but things have changed since it was first rolled out. It was certainly effective when the U.S. was in a much stronger position militarily compared with China. But it might be less effective as a threat now that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-22/china-is-catching-up-to-the-u-s-when-it-comes-to-military-power">China’s military is catching up</a> with the U.S.</p>
<p>Leading voices from U.S. allies in Asia, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/U.S.-should-abandon-ambiguity-on-Taiwan-defense-Japan-s-Abe">such as Japan</a>, believe that “strategic clarity” might be a better option now – with the U.S. stating outright that it would defend Taiwan if the island were attacked.</p>
<h2>What is the history of US relations with Taiwan?</h2>
<p>After the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949</a>, the defeated Republic of China government withdrew to the island of Taiwan, located just 100 miles off the shore of Fujian province. And until the 1970s, the U.S. recognized only this exiled Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="President Richard Nixon confers with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong as they sit in comfy chairs." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nixon in China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/peking-china-president-richard-m-nixon-confers-with-chinese-news-photo/515401848?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in 1971, the <a href="https://web-archive-2017.ait.org.tw/en/un-res-2758-voted-to-admit-communist-china.html">United Nations shifted recognition</a> to the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. In 1972, President Richard Nixon made a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/nixons-1972-visit-china-50">now-famous trip to China</a> to announce a rapprochement and sign the Shanghai Communique, a joint statement from Communist China and the U.S. signaling a commitment to pursue formal diplomatic relations. A <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325">critical section of that document</a> stated: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”</p>
<p>The wording was crucial: The U.S. was not formally committing to a position on whether Taiwan was part of the China nation. Instead, it was acknowledging what the governments of either territory asserted – that there is “one China.” </p>
<h2>Where does US commitment of military support for Taiwan come from?</h2>
<p>After establishing formal diplomatic relations with China in 1979, the U.S. built an informal relationship with the ROC on Taiwan. In part to push back against President Jimmy Carter’s decision to recognize Communist China, U.S. lawmakers passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Taiwan%20Relations%20Act%20%2D%20Declares%20it,other%20people%20of%20the%20Western">Taiwan Relations Act in 1979</a>. That act outlined a plan to maintain close ties between the U.S. and Taiwan and included provisions for the U.S. to sell military items to help the island maintain its defense – setting the path for the policy of strategic ambiguity. </p>
<h2>What has changed recently?</h2>
<p>China has long maintained its desire for an eventual <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/10/09/chinas-xi-jinping-calls-peaceful-reunification-taiwan/6072388001/">peaceful reunification</a> of its country with the island it considers a rogue province. But the commitment to the principle of “one China” has become increasingly one-sided. It is an absolute for Beijing. In Taiwan, however, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/07/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/">resistance to the idea of reunification has grown</a> amid a <a href="https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6963/Tondu202112.jpg">surge of support for moving the island toward independence</a>.</p>
<p>Beijing has become more aggressive of late in asserting that Taiwan must be “returned to China.” Domestic politics plays a role in this. At times of internal instability in China, Beijing has sounded a more belligerent tone on relations between the two entities separated by the Taiwan Strait. We have seen this over the past year with Beijing sending <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-taiwan-warplanes-fly-incursions-air-defense-zone/">military aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Zone</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Chinese <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_5--Hong_Kongs_Government_Embraces_Authoritarianism.pdf">assertion of increased authority over Hong Kong</a> has damaged the argument for “one country, two systems” as a means of peaceful reunification with Taiwan.</p>
<h2>How has the US position shifted in the face of Beijing’s stance?</h2>
<p>Biden has definitely been more openly supportive of Taiwan than previous presidents. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-taiwan/taiwan-biden-ties-off-to-strong-start-with-invite-for-top-diplomat-idUSKBN29Q01N">officially invited a representative from Taiwan to his inauguration</a> – a first for an incoming president – and has repeatedly made it clear that he views Taiwan as an ally.</p>
<p>He also didn’t overturn the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535">Taiwan Travel Act</a> passed under the the previous administration of Donald Trump. This legislation allows U.S. officials to visit Taiwan in an official capacity.</p>
<p>In August 2022, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-puts-the-white-house-in-delicate-straits-of-diplomacy-with-china-188116">U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan</a>, making her the highest-profile U.S. politician to go to the island in decades.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/16/politics/biden-china-taiwan/index.html">for the second time</a>, Biden in his “60 Minutes” interview indicated a belief that it was up to Taiwan to decide its future, departing slightly from the usual line that the U.S. doesn’t support changes to the status quo. However, Biden has also said he does not support a unilateral declaration of independence from Taiwan.</p>
<p>So there has been a shift to a degree. But the White House is keen not to overstate any change. At heart, there is a desire by the U.S. to not stray from the Shanghai Communique. </p>
<h2>So is an invasion of Taiwan likely?</h2>
<p>The current rhetoric from the U.S. and response from China do raise the risk of conflict, but I don’t think we are at that point yet. Any invasion across the Taiwan Strait would be militarily complex. It also comes with risks of backlash from the international community. Taiwan would receive support from not only the U.S. – in an unclear capacity, given Biden’s remarks – but also Japan and likely other countries in the region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China maintains that it wants to see reintegration through peaceful means. As long as Taiwan doesn’t force the issue and declare independence unilaterally, I think there is tolerance in Beijing to wait it out. And despite <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3462914-russias-war-on-ukraine-makes-chinas-attack-on-taiwan-more-likely/">some commentary to the contrary</a>, I don’t think the invasion of Ukraine has raised the prospects of a similar move on Taiwan. In fact, given that Russia is now bogged down in a monthslong conflict that has hit its military credibility and economy, the Ukraine invasion may actually serve as a warning to Beijing.</p>
<p><em>This is an update to an <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">article that was originally published</a> on May 24, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190946/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Remarks by the US president come amid heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing and follow a contentious visit to Taiwan by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881482022-08-21T20:03:13Z2022-08-21T20:03:13ZConflict in the South China Sea threatens 90% of Australia’s fuel imports: study<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478682/original/file-20220811-25-3vqk16.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>China’s sabre-rattling around Taiwan underlines the need for Australia to be prepared for conflict in the South China Sea.</p>
<p>With its growing navy and air force, and the bases it has built throughout the area, China is increasingly capable of disrupting shipping lanes crucial to Australia’s exports and imports.</p>
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<p>Of particular concern is our reliance on liquid fuels imported via South China Sea shipping routes. This reliance has become more pronounced over the past few decades as <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-02-11/australia-loses-another-oil-refinery-risking-fuel-supply/13139648">all but two</a> local refineries have closed. So even while we export crude oil, we import about 90% of refined fuels.</p>
<p>Our research team was commissioned by the Department of Defence to analyse threats to Australia’s maritime supply chains throughout the Indo-Pacific region (the South China Sea and East China Sea).</p>
<p>We calculate a major conflict would threaten routes supplying 90% of refined fuel imports, coming from South Korea, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and Vietnam.</p>
<p>Even if the routes between these countries and Australia do not pass through the South China Sea, most of the crude oil these countries import to produce that refined fuel does. </p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/friday-essay-if-growing-us-china-rivalry-leads-to-the-worst-war-ever-what-should-australia-do-185294">Friday essay: if growing US-China rivalry leads to 'the worst war ever', what should Australia do?</a>
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<h2>Previous analyses of vulnerability</h2>
<p>Our analysis is the first commissioned by the Department of Defence on the specific threat of prolonged maritime supply chain disruptions due to conflict in the South China and East China seas. </p>
<p>It builds on broader analyses of supply-chain vulnerabilities, such as the Department of Energy and the Environment’s 2019 interim <a href="https://www.energy.gov.au/publications/liquid-fuel-security-review-interim-report">Liquid Fuel Security Review</a> and the Productivity Commission’s <a href="https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/supply-chains/report/supply-chains.pdf">2021 report</a> spurred by import shortages arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>The 2019 liquid fuel security review determined Australia imports the equivalent of 90% of its refined fuel needs. </p>
<p>In 2018 just five Asian nations supplied 87% of fuel imports: South Korea (27%), Singapore (26%), Japan (15%) and Malaysia (10%) and Taiwan (9%). The balance came from India (6%), the Middle East (1%) and the rest of the world including Vietnam and Philippines (6%). </p>
<h2>Shipping route vulnerabilities</h2>
<p>Our analysis involved examining GPS traffic data for tanker and cargo ships throughout the South China Sea and East China Sea region.</p>
<p>It’s not just shipping routes between source countries and Australia that matter. It is where these countries import the crude oil they refine into petrol, diesel, jet fuel, marine fuel and kerosene.</p>
<p>More than 80% of crude oil imports for Singapore, South Korea and Japan come from the Middle East – passing through the narrow Malacca Strait that separates the Malay Peninsula from the Indonesian island of Sumatra. </p>
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<p>So while export routes from Japan and Korea to Australia can avoid the South China Sea, their import routes can’t. </p>
<p>Any prolonged closure of the South China Sea will force tankers to take alternative routes. With longer routes will come higher freight costs and tanker shortages. Flow-on effects to Australia are inevitable.</p>
<h2>Planning and preparedness</h2>
<p>As the 2019 liquid fuel security review noted, Australia is a global outlier in its approach to liquid fuel security. Comparable economies manage fuel security as part of their strategic capability.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia, by comparison, has chosen to apply minimal regulation or government intervention in pursuit of an efficient market that delivers fuel to Australians as cheaply as possible. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Until now, Australia’s strategic planning for conflict in the South China Sea has largely focused on military requirements. . </p>
<p>With China’s increasing military capability and belligerence, there is no longer room to be complacent about Australia’s lack of energy security. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.engineersaustralia.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2020-05/Industry%20Mobilisation%20-%20Engineers%20Australia%20workshop%20report.pdf">2019 workshop</a> of engineering experts convened for the Department of Defence determined Australia would run out of liquid fuels within two months of a major prolonged import disruption.</p>
<p>This would have cascading effect on all sectors of the economy – crippling transport, harming food security and emergency services. Among other things, the experts warned a lack of diesel for back-up generators in hospitals and other buildings could be catastrophic in the event of a large-scale electricity outage.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-challenges-to-australian-ships-in-the-south-and-east-china-seas-are-likely-to-continue-187061">Why China's challenges to Australian ships in the South and East China Seas are likely to continue</a>
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<p>There are five main options to reduce our vulnerability: diversify import sources; increase local refining capability; reduce dependence on fossil fuels; increase strategic reserves; and educate and prepare the population for possible shortages.</p>
<p>All will require government departments planning together with various industry sectors, including fuel retailers, refineries and import terminals, manufacturing, freight transport, maritime, defence, communities and other relevant stakeholders.</p>
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<p><em>Correction: the Malacca Strait separates the Malay Peninsula from the Indonesian island of Sumatra, not Borneo as originally stated.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article is based on the findings from Project Grant 202021-0239, Strategic Policy Grants Program 2021, Australian Department of Defence, Canberra.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Booi Kam together with research collaborators received a 2021 Strategic Policy Defence Grant from the Department of Defence. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article is based on the findings from Project Grant 202021-0239, Strategic Policy Grants Program 2021, Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>This article is based on the findings from Project Grant 202021-0239, Strategic Policy Grants Program 2021, Australian Department of Defence.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Prem Chhetri receives funding from Department of Defence. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Vinh Thai together with research collaborators received a 2021 Strategic Policy Defence Grant from the Defence. </span></em></p>Our analysis is the first commissioned by the Department of Defence on the specific threat of prolonged maritime supply-chain disruptions due to conflict in the South China and East China seas.Richard Oloruntoba, Associate Professor of Supply Chain Management, Curtin UniversityBooi Kam, Professor, RMIT UniversityHong-Oanh Nguyen, Associate Professor, University of TasmaniaMatthew Warren, Director, RMIT University Centre for Cyber Security Research and Innovation, RMIT UniversityPrem Chhetri, Professor, RMIT UniversityVinh Thai, Associate professor, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1882052022-08-08T17:05:58Z2022-08-08T17:05:58ZNancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477952/original/file-20220807-51907-nxvblg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=53%2C0%2C6000%2C3413&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People walk past a billboard welcoming U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, in Taipei, Taiwan, on Aug. 3, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the United States House of Representatives, lasted just 24 hours. </p>
<p>But it vividly highlighted both China’s heavy-handed reaction, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/08/china-announces-fresh-military-drills-around-taiwan.html">including continuing military drills around Taiwan</a> days after her departure, and how the Taiwan Strait is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/05/what-the-fallout-from-pelosis-visit-means-for-taiwan-and-china">geopolitical fault-line between the China and the rest of the world</a>. </p>
<p>At its narrowest, the Taiwan Strait is a 130-kilometre-wide channel of water separating the People’s Republic of China from the island of Taiwan. </p>
<p>But the divide between Taiwan and China is more than geographic. For more than half a century, the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises">Taiwan Strait has been one of the last vestiges of the Cold War</a>. It’s emblematic of the division between the authoritarianism of China and the thriving democracy of Taiwan.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, Taiwan is also something of an international pariah. That’s because few countries officially maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, often out of fear of China’s repercussions. For too long, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354">the so-called “One China” policy</a>, which provides that there is only one China in the world — and that Taiwan is part of that China — has been the foundation of all dealings with Taiwan. </p>
<p>However, while China dictates that all countries adhere to this policy, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/">United States</a>, the <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/uc574iv/574m15.htm">United Kingdom</a>, the <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-taiwan-political-relations-and-cooperation-speech-behalf-high-representativevice-president_en">European Union</a> and also <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/taiwan/relations.aspx?lang=eng">Canada</a> have merely said they “acknowledge” it.</p>
<p>Much to China’s ire, many countries continue to maintain economic, cultural and even military ties with Taiwan. Pelosi’s visit, in Beijing’s eyes, was “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-us-politicians-who-play-with-fire-taiwan-will-pay-2022-08-02/">playing with fire</a>.”</p>
<h2>Routine visit and China’s over-reaction</h2>
<p>China’s immediate reaction to Pelosi’s visit was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/5/china-military-drills-to-resume-around-taiwan-despite-concerns">to conduct military drills and send ballistic missiles over Taiwan</a>. However, visits by foreign lawmakers to Taiwan are nothing new. </p>
<p>The Czech Republic’s Senate speaker led a delegation to Taiwan in August 2020, and China responded that Czech leaders would <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/czech-china-taiwan/a-54764477">“pay a heavy price.”</a> The <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/world/asia/2022/07/20/european-parliament-vp-urges-renewed-china-taiwan-dialogue.html">vice president of the European Parliament visited Taiwan in July 2022</a>, and underscored the island’s “role as a global, strategic, responsible and reliable international partner.”</p>
<p>Yet Pelosi is the only person to be personally sanctioned by China, <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/nancy-pelosi-taiwan-sexist-china-b2137335.html">sparking speculation that China’s reaction is misogynistic</a>. </p>
<p>Taiwan’s democratically elected president, Tsai Ing-Wen, is a woman and was on <a href="https://time.com/collection/100-most-influential-people-2020/5888307/tsai-ing-wen/"><em>Time</em> magazine’s 2020 list of the most influential people in the world </a> for standing up to China’s constant and overt aggressions.</p>
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<h2>World response to the crisis</h2>
<p>In retaliation for Pelosi’s visit, China also suspended <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/china-summons-european-diplomats-statement-taiwan-87981101">climate talks and military ties with the United States</a>, further escalating tensions and suggesting China is not very serious about climate action. </p>
<p>The European Union’s foreign minister called on China not to “<a href="https://twitter.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1555014758335668227">use a visit as pretext for aggressive military activity in the Taiwan Strait</a>.” Japan said China’s military drills will have “<a href="https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220805-japan-s-prime-minister-calls-for-immediate-cancellation-of-chinese-military-drills">a serious impact on the peace and stability of our region and the international community</a>,” while the G7 foreign ministers condemned the “<a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2545896">threatening actions … particularly live-fire exercises and economic coercion, which risk unnecessary escalation</a>.”</p>
<p>With the <a href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/china-extends-threatening-military-exercises-around-taiwan-1.6018056">ongoing military drills</a>, China appears to be demonstrating its ability to <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/toward-fourth-taiwan-strait-crisis">implement a blockade of Taiwan</a>. </p>
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<p>But the <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/taiwan-tensions-raise-risks-in-one-of-busiest-shipping-lanes-1.1800174">Taiwan Strait is one of the busiest international shipping lanes in the world</a>. In addition, some of the <a href="https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/files/iasl/the_missing_link_in_the_global_aviation_safety_and_security_network_text_final_0.pdf">world’s busiest commercial airline routes traverse the airspace surrounding Taiwan</a>. </p>
<p>This is no surprise because Taiwan is a large trading nation, producing more than <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/16/2-charts-show-how-much-the-world-depends-on-taiwan-for-semiconductors.html">50 per cent of the world’s semiconductors, which provide the computing power behind modern devices and fuel the global economy</a>. A Chinese blockade or invasion of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-23/economic-chaos-of-a-taiwan-war-would-go-well-past-semiconductors">Taiwan would have extreme ramifications for the rest of the world</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A contrail from a military jet in a blue sky with a half-moon visible." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477951/original/file-20220807-51907-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477951/original/file-20220807-51907-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477951/original/file-20220807-51907-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477951/original/file-20220807-51907-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477951/original/file-20220807-51907-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477951/original/file-20220807-51907-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477951/original/file-20220807-51907-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A military plane flies above the Taiwan Strait at the closest point in mainland China to the island of Taiwan in southeastern China’s Fujian province on Aug. 5, 2022, three days after Pelosi’s visit.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ng Han Guan)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Critical stretch of international waters</h2>
<p>Earlier in June, China said it has <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202206/t20220613_10702460.html">“sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait</a>,” a claim that’s been <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillgoldenziel/2022/06/28/china-claims-to-own-the-taiwan-strait-thats-illegal/?sh=4fe1845d9ba2">refuted by the U.S. as a violation of international law</a>. </p>
<p>China also claims sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea, a claim that the <a href="https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/">Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled has no legal basis</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> clearly provides that the high seas are not subject to claims of sovereignty and all states enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight. <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-canada-warships-taiwan-strait-1.6214303">Canada and other countries regularly send warships through the Taiwan Strait</a> in an effort to refute China’s attempt to take control of this international body of water.</p>
<p>In violation of international law, China’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/05/china-missile-drills-around-taiwan-a-threat-to-regional-security-says-japan-pm">deliberate testing of ballistic missiles and drills impact not just Taiwan’s territorial sea</a>, but also encroaches on the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-protests-after-chinese-missiles-land-its-exclusive-economic-zone-2022-08-04/">exclusive economic zone of Japan</a>.</p>
<p>That means China’s overreaction to what it claims is a purely domestic issue is ironically turning the conflict over Taiwan into an international crisis. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A large ship moves along a blue sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477953/original/file-20220807-67272-qales6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477953/original/file-20220807-67272-qales6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477953/original/file-20220807-67272-qales6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477953/original/file-20220807-67272-qales6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477953/original/file-20220807-67272-qales6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477953/original/file-20220807-67272-qales6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477953/original/file-20220807-67272-qales6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ships move through the Taiwan Strait.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Ng Han Guan)</span></span>
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</figure>
<h2>The people of Taiwan matter</h2>
<p>In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs wrote: “<a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/02/2003774022">The people of Taiwan unfortunately know all too well what it is like to live under the shadow of threats and intimidation</a>.”</p>
<p>Before Taiwan became a democracy, it was an oppressive military dictatorship. Why would 23.5 million people made up of <a href="https://www.stearthinktank.com/post/indigenous-linguistic-legacy-taiwan">ethnic Taiwanese, Chinese and 15 Pacific Island Indigenous tribes</a> who live <a href="https://www.businessinsider.in/international/news/nancy-pelosi-calls-taiwan-one-of-the-freest-societies-in-the-world-during-visit-to-the-island/articleshow/93316096.cms">in what Pelosi called “one of the freest societies in the world</a>” want to be, <a href="https://chineseposters.net/themes/taiwan-liberation">as China has for decades stated, “liberated?”</a> </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Protesters light candles at a night-time vigil." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477954/original/file-20220807-32086-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477954/original/file-20220807-32086-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477954/original/file-20220807-32086-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477954/original/file-20220807-32086-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477954/original/file-20220807-32086-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477954/original/file-20220807-32086-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477954/original/file-20220807-32086-zekez8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hundreds of participants attend a candlelight vigil at Democracy Square in Taipei, Taiwan, in June 2020 to mark the anniversary of the Chinese military crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite binding obligations under <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-handover-of-hong-kong">the Sino-British Joint Declaration</a>, the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/feature/2021/06/25/dismantling-free-society/hong-kong-one-year-after-national-security-law">erosion of civil liberties and judicial independence in Hong Kong</a> illustrate that Beijing does not live up to its international commitments. </p>
<p>Furthermore, China has incarcerated more than a million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in so-called “re-education camps” and subjected them to what <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/uyghur-tribunal-genocide-xinjiang-b1972682.html">amounts to crimes against humanity</a>. </p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-an-independent-tribunal-came-to-rule-that-china-is-guilty-of-genocide-against-the-uyghurs-173604">How an independent tribunal came to rule that China is guilty of genocide against the Uyghurs</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<p>The Chinese ambassador to France recently said openly that the people of <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/china-reeducate-taiwan-reunification-ambassador-1731141">Taiwan too will be “re-educated</a>.” It’s hard to imagine why anyone would wish to live under a regime where there is no <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china">political or media freedom</a> and where <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/15/canada-us-and-allies-denounce-immoral-arbitrary-detentions">citizens and foreign nationals are subject to arbitrary detention</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://press.un.org/en/2012/gashc4051.doc.htm">Self-determination is the inalienable right of all peoples to live free from fear and oppression</a>. As China and the United States lock horns in the Indo-Pacific, it’s vital that the world stand behind the people of Taiwan. The international community must call out acts of aggression that undermine regional and global peace and security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188205/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kuan-Wei Chen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Visits by foreign law-makers to Taiwan are nothing new. So why did China react in such a heavy-handed manner to Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit?Kuan-Wei Chen, Executive Director, Centre for Research in Air and Space Law, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1883242022-08-08T13:04:17Z2022-08-08T13:04:17ZTaiwan: the US has been strengthening support for years – now it needs a way to ease tensions with China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478064/original/file-20220808-2624-q3pbp6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C3%2C2048%2C1171&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/TAIWAN Presidential Palace</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The recent visit by the speaker of the US House of Representatives to Taiwan, Nancy Pelosi, was made against the wishes of the US government and despite threats from the People’s Republic of China. Following Pelosi’s visit, China launched the <a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwan-beijing-reacts-to-pelosis-visit-with-live-fire-exercises-prompting-fears-of-escalation-188192">largest military exercises</a> ever held so close to the island of Taiwan, which simulated, according to the People’s Liberation Army, an “island attack campaign” in the actual airspace and waters where such an attack would begin.</p>
<p>Despite insisting that the exercises would end on August 7, the drills are reportedly continuing. So is a barrage of Chinese propaganda designed to undermine morale in Taiwan and increase pressure on Washington over the question of Chinese sovereignty over the island, which Beijing has claimed since the communist takeover in 1949.</p>
<p>The US government has maintained the core elements of its policy towards Taiwan, including “<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-withdrawal-has-taiwan-pondering-its-alliance-with-the-us-and-china-is-upping-the-pressure-166713">strategic ambiguity</a>”. This is the doctrine which maintains that the US will help build Taiwan’s military capabilities, but provides no guarantees to provide direct military support in response to a military attack by China. But over the past decade Washington has increased its emphasis towards support for Taiwan in response to what it perceives to be increasingly assertive Chinese actions. </p>
<p>The US has taken a range of measures to deepen the unofficial ties <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275">between Washington and Taipei</a>. These include the Taiwan Travel Act (2018) that enables informal exchanges between US and Taiwanese officials and the 2019 <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2002">Taiwan Assurance Act</a> which has enabled multiple arms sale packages. </p>
<p>The Biden administration has continued to maintain high-profile support for Taiwan by continuing military arms sales and training, enhancing official exchanges and seeking to include Taiwan in the Japan-US <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japans-security-role-taiwan-seen-focus-two-plus-two-talks-with-us-2022-01-06/">“Two+Two”</a> security agreement. </p>
<p>In May 2022 the US president, Joe Biden, said the US would defend Taiwan if it was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/24/biden-taiwan-china-defense-policy/">attacked</a>, a statement which appeared to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-taiwan-why-the-war-of-words-is-unlikely-to-lead-to-military-conflict-for-now-at-least-169746">in violation of</a> “strategic ambiguity”. The administration soon walked back Biden’s statements and reaffirmed that US policy in respect to the security of Taiwan <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/is-biden-bringing-strategic-ambiguity-on-taiwan-to-an-end/">had not changed</a>.</p>
<h2>Biden’s priorities</h2>
<p>Despite its policy of strengthening US-Taiwan relations, the Biden administration did not support Pelosi’s trip to Taipei because of the potential for escalating tension with <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/03/biden-pelosi-taiwan-trip-beijing-00049625">Beijing</a>. The Pelosi trip drew a mixed response in the US press. Some prominent commentators considered the trip unwise as it unnecessarily raised tension in a complex strategic relationship at a time when the US had to deal with the Ukraine <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/01/opinion/nancy-pelosi-taiwan-china.html">invasion crisis</a>. </p>
<p>But the fear that China’s military exercises could lead to a military confrontation between China and USA seems <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-and-taiwan-why-the-war-of-words-is-unlikely-to-lead-to-military-conflict-for-now-at-least-169746">misplaced</a>. Both sides have strong interests in avoiding this outcome. </p>
<p>Instead China’s actions appear to aim to send a powerful signal to the US government to reverse what they see as a Washington’s “hollowing out” of agreed policies towards Taiwan. At the same time this display of China’s military might also be designed to demonstrate Xi’s strength to a domestic audience as he works to be appointed to a third presidential term at the 20th party congress <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/ccp-regulations-and-xi-jinpings-bid-for-a-third-term/">later this year</a>. </p>
<p>While the Biden administration rebuked China for its disproportionate actions, the China extended its military exercises further as a “warning to the United States”. It has also suspended cooperation with the US on a range of issues, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/china-suspends-climate-talks-with-us/">including on climate change</a>, making it clear that the signals it is sending are not primarily targeted at Taipei but at <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/8/6/23294700/us-china-taiwan-pelosi-visit-protest">Washington</a>. </p>
<p>In the longer term, it is unlikely that the Biden administration will depart from its “one-China” policy. But the concept of “strategic ambiguity” is coming under strain, as the US has become much more concerned with deterring China from attempting to reunify Taiwan by force. </p>
<p>Taiwan’s public and political parties appear content to <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden">maintain the status quo</a>. But by contrast, China’s increasingly assertive policies towards Taiwan, and more widely in the region, imply that future crises in the Taiwan Straits are likely. </p>
<p>A future crisis could escalate into an attempted invasion of Taiwan if China’s leaders believe that the US is unlikely to become directly militarily involved. This could lead to a wider war involving China, the US and others – a terrible outcome for all parties. </p>
<h2>Stronger messaging</h2>
<p>One approach to achieving more robust deterrence would be for the US and its allies to make clearer commitments – and also realistic military preparations – to come to the defence of Taiwan in response to a military attack by China. This could reduce the risk that China believes it can escalate and deescalate crises at will, and so make it more cautious about issuing threats against its neighbours. </p>
<p>Some analysts draw lessons from the cold war experience, arguing that early crises over Berlin, Korea and Cuba ultimately led to relatively stable security arrangements between the [US and the Soviet Union]. Tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea may accelerate the formation of multilateral arrangements to contain China. For example the <a href="https://opal.latrobe.edu.au/articles/report/The_Quadrilateral_Security_Dialogue_Towards_an_Indo-Pacific_order_/13309820">Quadrilateral Security Dialogue</a> (the Quad) between Australia, India, Japan and the US could be turned into a coalition with tangible military capabilities. </p>
<p>But this approach also has great risks. A cold war confrontation between US and China could have disastrous implications for other US foreign policy priorities. This becomes all the more complex, given Washington’s need to tackle Russian aggression in Europe while also addressing global problems such as climate change. Moreover, despite their disputes with China, virtually all of China’s neighbours want to avoid such an outcome, and are unlikely to participate.</p>
<p>Instead we can expect continued US strategic ambiguity combined with closer informal relations with Taiwan. The priority for the US, China and other interested states must be to develop a stronger framework for conflict prevention and crisis management. And to find a way to lower the temperature so that informal US visits to Taiwan become more acceptable to China.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188324/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Owen Greene is affiliated with several NGOs and NGO networks that are concerned with conflict prevention and international security, including Saferworld and VERTIC (Verification Research, Information and Information Centre). Note that this article reflects the individual views of the authors, and does not necessarily reflect views of either of these organisations.. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Washington must continue to support Taiwan while seeking a better security dialogue with Beijing.Owen Greene, Professor of International Security and Development, University of BradfordChristoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1881162022-08-02T16:54:12Z2022-08-02T16:54:12ZWhy Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan puts the White House in delicate straits of diplomacy with China<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477209/original/file-20220802-11-dgun2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C143%2C5964%2C4203&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Not everyone is so thrilled by the visit.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TaiwanAsiaPelosi/9de571a85ea94764b42c8468f79e6bbe/photo?Query=Pelosi&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=15306&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/08/02/world/pelosi-taiwan">arrived in Taiwan</a> on Aug. 2, 2022 – a highly controversial trip that has been strongly opposed by China.</p>
<p>Such is the sensitivity over the island’s status that even before Pelosi’s plane touched down in the capital of Taipei, mere reports of the proposed trip prompted a <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-07-25/china-confirms-warnings-to-u-s-on-pelosis-possible-taiwan-visit">warning by China</a> of “serious consequences.” In the hours before she set foot on the island, Chinese fighter jets <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pelosi-expected-arrive-taiwan-tuesday-sources-say-2022-08-02/">flew close to the median line separating Taiwan and China</a>, while Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi commented that U.S. politicians who “play with fire” on Taiwan would “come to no good end.”</p>
<p>For its part, the U.S. has distanced itself from the visit. Before the trip <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/20/biden-pelosi-trip-taiwan-china-military-00047031">President Joe Biden</a> said it was “not a good idea.” </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3LqBuPEAAAAJ&hl=en">someone who has long studied</a> the U.S.’s delicate diplomatic dance over Taiwan, I understand why this trip has sparked reaction in both Washington and Beijing, given the current tensions in the region. It also marks the continuation of a process that has seen growing U.S. political engagement with Taiwan – much to China’s annoyance.</p>
<h2>Cutting diplomatic ties</h2>
<p>The controversy over Pelosi’s visit stems from the “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter">one China” policy</a> – the diplomatic stance under which the U.S. recognizes China and acknowledges Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China. The policy has governed U.S. relations with Taiwan for the past 40-plus years. </p>
<p>In 1979, the U.S. abandoned its previous policy of recognizing the government of Taiwan as that of all of China, instead <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy">shifting recognition</a> to the government on the mainland.</p>
<p>As part of this change, the U.S. cut off formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, with the U.S. embassy in Taiwan replaced by a nongovernmental entity called the <a href="https://www.ait.org.tw/">American Institute in Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>The institute was a de facto embassy – though until 2002, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/1646">Americans assigned to the institute</a> would have to <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2019/02/ex-diplomat-calls-for-oversight-of-us-office-in-taiwan/">resign from U.S. State Department</a> to go there, only to be rehired once their term was over. And contact between the two governments was technically unofficial.</p>
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<p>As the government in Taiwan <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/taiwans-democracy-and-the-china-challenge/">pursued democracy</a> – starting from the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/end-martial-law-important-anniversary-taiwan">lifting of martial law in 1987</a> through the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/opinion/taiwan-s-democratic-election.html">first fully democratic elections in 1996</a> – it shifted away from the assumption once held by governments in both China and Taiwan of eventual reunification with the mainland. The government in China, however, has never abandoned the idea of “one China” and rejects the legitimacy of Taiwanese self-government. That has made direct contact between Taiwan and U.S. representatives contentious to Chinese officials. </p>
<p>Indeed, in 1995, when Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s first democratically elected president, touched down in Hawaii en route to Central America, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1999/01/10/between-china-and-the-us/b540ea0c-3bdb-4b1a-8152-8230b7a47184/">didn’t even set foot on the tarmac</a>. The U.S. State Department had already warned that the president would be refused an entry visa to the U.S., but had allowed for a brief, low-level reception in the airport lounge during refueling. Apparently feeling snubbed, Lee refused to leave the airplane.</p>
<h2>Previous political visits</h2>
<p>Two years after this incident came a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/03/31/gingrich-tells-china-us-to-defend-taiwan/e6baa8f8-58fa-4119-8c0d-c936d36e9850/">visit to Taiwan by then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly to the Pelosi visit, the one by Gingrich <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/03/31/gingrich-tells-china-us-to-defend-taiwan/e6baa8f8-58fa-4119-8c0d-c936d36e9850/">annoyed Beijing</a>. But it was easier for the White House to distance itself from Gingrich – he was a Republican politician visiting Taiwan in his own capacity, and clearly not on behalf of then-President Bill Clinton.</p>
<p>Pelosi’s visit my be viewed differently by Beijing, because she is a member of the same party as President Joe Biden. China may assume she has Biden’s blessing, despite his comments to the contrary.</p>
<p>Asked on July 20 about his views on the potential Pelosi trip, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/20/biden-pelosi-trip-taiwan-china-military-00047031">Biden responded</a> that the “military thinks it’s not a good idea right now.” </p>
<p>The comment echoes the <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">White House’s earlier handling of a comment by Biden</a> in which he suggested in May 2022 that the U.S. would intervene “militarily” should China invade Taiwan. Officials in the Biden administration rolled back the comment, which would have broken a long-standing policy of ambiguity over what the U.S. would do if China tried to take Taiwan by force.</p>
<p>Similarly with Pelosi, the White House is distancing itself from a position that suggests a shift in U.S.-Taiwanese relations following a period in which the U.S. had already been trying to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/11/after-lifting-restrictions-on-us-taiwan-relations-what-comes-next/">rethink how it interacts</a> with Taiwan.</p>
<h2>Shifting policy?</h2>
<p>In 2018, Congress passed the bipartisan <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535">Taiwan Travel Act</a>. This departed from previous policy in that it allowed bilateral official visits between the U.S. and Taiwan, although they are still considered to be subdiplomatic.</p>
<p>In the wake of that act, Donald Trump’s Health and Human Services secretary, Alex Azar, became the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/politics/alex-azar-taiwan/index.html">highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan</a> since 1979. Then in 2020, Keith Krach, undersecretary for economic growth, energy and the environment, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/world/asia/us-official-taiwan-china.html">visited Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>And in April 2022, a U.S. <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/19/pelosi-trip-to-taiwan-00046495">congressional delegation visited Taiwan</a>. Pelosi herself was reportedly due to visit the island that same month, but canceled after <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/08/asia/nancy-pelosi-covid-19-taiwan-us-asia-intl-hnk/index.html">testing positive for COVID-19</a>. </p>
<p>Each of these visits has provoked angry statements from Beijing.</p>
<p>A high-profile visit – even one without the public backing of the White House – would signal support to the island at a time when the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has raised questions over the international community’s commitment to protect smaller states from more powerful neighbors.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong has undermined China’s commitment to the idea of “one nation, two systems.” The principle, which allowed Hong Kong to maintain its economic, political and social systems while returning to the mainland after the end of British rule, had been cited as a model for reunification with Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party also plans to hold its <a href="https://www.scmp.com/topics/chinas-20th-party-congress">20th congress</a> in the coming months, making the timing sensitive for a Taiwan visit from a high-profile U.S. political figure such as Pelosi.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-big-fuss-over-nancy-pelosis-possible-visit-to-taiwan-187657">article originally published</a> on July 26, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese fighter jets buzzed the line separating China and Taiwan just hours before the US House speaker arrived on the island.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1767652022-05-24T12:46:37Z2022-05-24T12:46:37ZBiden on Taiwan: Did he really commit US forces to stopping any invasion by China? An expert explains why, on balance, probably not<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464882/original/file-20220523-25530-80lkyr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C41%2C7000%2C4610&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pondering a shift in strategy on Taiwan? Possibly not.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html">Nicolas Datiche/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The White House has been left scrambling a little after President Joe Biden suggested on May 23, 2022, that the U.S. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html">would intervene militarily</a> should China attempt an invasion of Taiwan.</em></p>
<p><em>The comment, which Biden made during a trip to Japan, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-61548531">was taken by</a> some observers <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/video/biden-signals-major-shift-warning-us-respond-militarily-84914670">as a deviation</a> from the official U.S. line on Taiwan, in place for decades. But officials in Washington <a href="https://nypost.com/2022/05/23/white-house-walks-back-biden-taiwan-defense-claim-again/">walked back that interpretation</a>, saying instead that it only referred to military assistance.</em></p>
<p><em>Meredith Oyen, an <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">expert on U.S.-China relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, helps explain the background to Biden’s recent comments and untangles what should be read into his remarks – and what shouldn’t.</em></p>
<h2>What did Biden say and why was it significant?</h2>
<p>Asked if the U.S. was willing to get involved “militarily” in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/23/biden-taiwan-china-defense/">Biden replied</a>, “yes.” A follow-up question saw the U.S. president add: “That’s the commitment we have made.”</p>
<p>By my count, this is the third time Biden has as president suggested that the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s aid militarily if the island is attacked. In 2021 he made similar remarks in an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/20/us-position-on-taiwan-unchanged-despite-biden-comment-official-says.html">interview with ABC News</a> and then again <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/10/22/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-cnn-town-hall-with-anderson-cooper-2/">while taking part in a CNN town hall event</a>.</p>
<p>But it is significant that this is the first time he has made the assertion while in Asia.</p>
<p>An important thing to note is that on each occasion he has made such a comment, it has been followed quite quickly by the White House walking back the remarks, by issuing statements along the lines of “what the president actually means is…” and stressing that this isn’t a shift away from the official U.S. policy on China or Taiwan. </p>
<p>However, the remarks and the clarifications have increased doubt over whether Biden is continuing the policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan.</p>
<h2>What does ‘strategic ambiguity’ mean?</h2>
<p><a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-strategic-ambiguity-trumps-strategic-clarity-taiwan/">Strategic ambiguity</a> has long been the U.S. policy toward Taiwan – really since the 1950s but certainly from 1979 onward. While it does not explicitly commit the U.S. to defending Taiwan in every circumstance, it does leaves open the option of American defensive support to Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack by China.</p>
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<p>Crucially, the U.S. hasn’t really said what it will do – so does this support mean economic aid, supply of weapons or U.S. boots on the ground? China and Taiwan are left guessing if – and to what extent – the U.S. will be involved in any China-Taiwan conflict.</p>
<p>By leaving the answer to that question ambiguous, the U.S. holds a threat over China: Invade Taiwan and find out if you face the U.S. as well. </p>
<p>Traditionally, this has been a useful policy for the U.S., but things have changed since it was first rolled out. It was certainly effective when the U.S. was in a much stronger position militarily compared to China. But it might be less effective as a threat now that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-22/china-is-catching-up-to-the-u-s-when-it-comes-to-military-power">China’s military is catching up</a> with the U.S.</p>
<p>Leading voices from U.S. allies in Asia, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/U.S.-should-abandon-ambiguity-on-Taiwan-defense-Japan-s-Abe">such as Japan</a>, believe that “strategic clarity” might be a better option now – with the U.S. stating outright that it would defend Taiwan if the island is attacked.</p>
<h2>So Biden’s comments could hint at this shift?</h2>
<p>There does seem to be a pattern: Biden says something seemingly very clear on defending Taiwan, and that then gets walked back. If no one in Washington was walking back the comments then it would seem like an intentional shift in policy by the Biden administration.</p>
<p>But the fact that the White House has always been quick to clarify the comments suggests to me that it isn’t necessarily intentional. It seems like Biden is simply trying to signal more support for Taiwan, and perhaps reassure U.S. allies in Asia. </p>
<p>But I’m a historian, not a strategist. It could be that this is some advanced chess game that I can’t figure out.</p>
<h2>What is the history of US relations with Taiwan?</h2>
<p>After the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949</a>, the defeated Republic of China government withdrew to the island of Taiwan, located just 100 miles off the shore of Fujian province. And until the 1970s, the U.S. recognized only this exiled Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of China.</p>
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<img alt="President Richard Nixon confers with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong as they sit in comfy chairs." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Nixon in China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/peking-china-president-richard-m-nixon-confers-with-chinese-news-photo/515401848?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>But in 1971, the <a href="https://web-archive-2017.ait.org.tw/en/un-res-2758-voted-to-admit-communist-china.html">United Nations shifted recognition</a> to the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. In 1972, President Richard Nixon made a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/nixons-1972-visit-china-50">now-famous trip to China</a> to announce a rapprochement and sign the Shanghai Communique, a joint statement from communist China and the U.S. signaling a commitment to pursue formal diplomatic relations. A <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325">critical section of that document</a> stated: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”</p>
<p>The wording was crucial: the U.S. was not formally committing to a position on whether Taiwan was part of the China nation. Instead, it was acknowledging what the governments of either territory asserted – that there is “one China.” </p>
<h2>Where does US commitment of military support for Taiwan come from?</h2>
<p>After establishing formal diplomatic relations with China in 1979, the U.S. built an informal relationship with the ROC on Taiwan. In part to push back against President Jimmy Carter’s decision to recognize communist China, U.S. lawmakers passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Taiwan%20Relations%20Act%20%2D%20Declares%20it,other%20people%20of%20the%20Western">Taiwan Relations Act in 1979</a>. That act outlined a plan to maintain close ties between the U.S. and Taiwan and included provisions for the U.S. to sell military items to help the island maintain its defense – setting the path for the policy of strategic ambiguity. </p>
<h2>What has changed recently?</h2>
<p>China has long maintained its desire for an eventual <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/10/09/chinas-xi-jinping-calls-peaceful-reunification-taiwan/6072388001/">peaceful reunification</a> of its country with the island it considers a rogue province. But the commitment to the principle of “one China” has become increasingly one-sided. It is an absolute for Beijing. But in Taiwan, however, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/07/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/">resistance to the idea of reunification has grown</a> amid a <a href="https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6963/Tondu202112.jpg">surge of support for moving the island toward independence</a>.</p>
<p>Beijing has become more aggressive of late in asserting that Taiwan must be “returned to China.” Domestic politics plays a role in this. At times of internal instability in China, Beijing has sounded a more belligerent tone on relations between the two entities separated by the Taiwan Strait. We have seen this over the last year with Beijing sending <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-taiwan-warplanes-fly-incursions-air-defense-zone/">military aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Zone</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Chinese <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_5--Hong_Kongs_Government_Embraces_Authoritarianism.pdf">assertion of increased authority over Hong Kong</a> has damaged the argument for “one country, two system” as a means of peaceful reunification with Taiwan.</p>
<h2>How has the US position shifted in the face of Beijing’s stance?</h2>
<p>Biden has definitely been more openly supportive of Taiwan than previous presidents. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-taiwan/taiwan-biden-ties-off-to-strong-start-with-invite-for-top-diplomat-idUSKBN29Q01N">officially invited a representative from Taiwan to his inauguration</a> – a first for an incoming president – and has repeatedly made it clear that he views Taiwan as an ally.</p>
<p>He also didn’t overturn the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535">Taiwan Travel Act</a> passed under the the previous administration of Donald Trump. This legislation allows U.S. officials to visit Taiwan in an official capacity.</p>
<p>So there has been a shift to a degree. But the White House is keen not to overstate any change. At heart, there is a desire by the U.S. to not stray from the Shanghai Communique. </p>
<h2>So is an invasion of Taiwan likely?</h2>
<p>I don’t think we are anywhere near that yet. Any invasion across the Taiwan Strait would be militarily complex. It also comes with risks of backlash from the international community. Taiwan would receive support from not only the U.S. – in an unclear capacity, given Biden’s remarks – but also Japan and likely other countries in the region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China maintains that it wants to see reintegration through peaceful means. As long as Taiwan doesn’t force the issue and declare independence unilaterally, I think there is tolerance in Beijing to wait it out. And despite <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3462914-russias-war-on-ukraine-makes-chinas-attack-on-taiwan-more-likely/">some commentary to the contrary</a>, I don’t think the invasion of Ukraine has raised the prospects of a similar move on Taiwan. In fact, given that Russia is now bogged down in a months-long conflict that has hit its military credibility and economy, the Ukraine invasion may actually serve as a warning to Beijing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176765/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Biden’s suggestion that the US is prepared to intervene militarily if Taiwan was invaded was quickly walked back by White House officials.Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1667422021-12-16T02:09:58Z2021-12-16T02:09:58ZDoes the US have the right to sail warships through the South China Sea? And can China stop them?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437676/original/file-20211215-15-1mqng9t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=180%2C45%2C4539%2C3293&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz sailing in the South China Sea in July 2020.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Samantha Jetzer/US Navy/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Images of what appeared to be US warships <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/nov/08/satellite-images-china-mock-ups-us-warships">emerged</a> from China last month, but they were not anywhere near an ocean. In fact, they were thousands of kilometres away, in a desert in western China.</p>
<p>Military experts said the mock-ups of US warships were part of a new target range developed by the People’s Liberation Army. The images demonstrate how seriously China is taking the repeated appearances of foreign warships in waters it claims to control – and why this is a worry for the stability of the region. </p>
<p>In late November, a US destroyer <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/23/us-warship-sails-through-taiwan-strait-first-since-biden-xi-meet">sailed</a> through the Taiwan Strait, prompting a warning from China to “stop stirring up trouble, crossing the line and playing with fire”. This followed sailings of naval ships through the strait in recent months by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-canadian-warships-sailed-through-taiwan-strait-last-week-2021-10-17/">Canada</a>, <a href="https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4314084">France</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/sep/28/uk-sends-warship-through-taiwan-straight-for-first-time-in-more-than-a-decade">the UK</a>.</p>
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<p>The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3155365/more-warships-are-raising-risk-misfire-south-china-sea">made nine visits</a> to the South China Sea this year, most recently in October when it <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/10/27/uss-carl-vinson-operates-in-south-china-sea-with-japan-maritime-self-defense-force/">conducted training exercises</a> with a Japanese helicopter destroyer. </p>
<p>China has been incensed by this uptick in naval activity. Beijing claims the vast majority of the South China Sea as its own and regards self-governing Taiwan as a renegade province. </p>
<p>In a clear demonstration of its own naval capabilities, four People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels <a href="https://www.alaskapublic.org/2021/09/14/coast-guard-encountered-chinese-warships-in-the-aleutians/">conducted military and surveillance operations</a> just 75km (45 miles) off the coast of Alaska in the US exclusive economic zone in late August. </p>
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<p>Both nations’ naval operations are fuelling an atmosphere of deep distrust and suspicion. Chinese commentators blame the US for turning the Taiwan Strait into a flashpoint, and characterise US transits in the South China Sea as provocative violations of China’s sovereignty. </p>
<p>And although the passage of the PLAN vessels near Alaska was in compliance with international law, the US is concerned about China’s aims to aggressively expand its naval operations to become the dominant power in the Pacific.</p>
<p>With tensions running high in the Pacific, where does international law come in? What does the law say about sailing vessels in disputed waters, and have China or the US and its allies violated these rules?</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-why-is-the-south-china-sea-such-a-hotly-contested-region-143435">Explainer: why is the South China Sea such a hotly contested region?</a>
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<h2>The rule of law in the oceans</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm">United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea</a> (UNCLOS) establishes the rule of law in the oceans, as well as the rights of both coastal and maritime states.</p>
<p>For example, coastal states have the right to control and manage the resources in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which extend 200 nautical miles (370km) from their shores. </p>
<p>At the same time, these zones remain international waters through which ships may travel consistent with international law.</p>
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<p>UNCLOS also specifies which waters fall under a state’s direct sovereign control, otherwise known as its “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_waters#Territorial_sea">territorial seas</a>”. This extends at most 12 nautical miles (22km) from a nation’s coast. </p>
<p>Some of the world’s most important waterways, such as the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18366503.2014.956856">Straits of Malacca</a> between Indonesia and Malaysia and the Taiwan Strait, fall into this category. </p>
<p>Foreign ships have a right of innocent passage through these territorial waters, as long as they navigate “<a href="https://www.maritime-executive.com/features/Maritime-Security-Private-The-Concept-of-Innocent-Passage">continuously and expeditiously</a>”, not unnecessarily stopping or anchoring. They must travel on the surface of the water and not threaten the “peace, good order, or security of the coastal state”.</p>
<p>Coastal states may stop foreign ships from passing through their territorial waters if they deem it “non-innocent”, but the passage itself cannot be considered a threat.</p>
<h2>Ambiguity being exploited by China</h2>
<p>UNCLOS is scattered with undefined and ambiguous terms in an attempt to strike a balance between the competing interests of coastal and maritime states. </p>
<p>This ambiguity raises the risk of clashing interpretations of the law, as well as the potential for nations to exploit it for their own purposes. China, for example, has complained US surveillance in its EEZ is not for “peaceful purposes” – an undefined term under UNCLOS.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-the-legal-implications-of-the-south-china-sea-ruling-62421">Explainer: what are the legal implications of the South China Sea ruling?</a>
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<p>UNCLOS also does not grant sovereignty over the sea in the absolute terms that China claims. Under the convention, the sea is shared by states and no nation can claim absolute dominion over it. </p>
<p>In recent years, China has passed domestic laws that claim to supersede international law. For example, Beijing <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/deliberate-ambiguity-china-s-new-territorial-waters-declaration">requires vessels</a> to seek permission before undertaking innocent passage through the South China Sea, which it considers its “territorial waters”.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Chinese vessels in the South China Sea." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/437677/original/file-20211215-19-hzffee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Chinese vessels moored at Whitsun Reef in the South China Sea.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">National Task Force-West Philippine Sea/AP</span></span>
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<p>China also claims <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea">historical control</a> over the South China Sea, which is also not clearly defined under UNCLOS. Historical control over waters has been recognised under international law, but this requires a state to have had continuous authority over a sea, with the acquiescence of other nations. </p>
<p>China’s claim to historical control over the South China Sea has been <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/whatever-happened-south-china-sea-ruling">dismissed</a> by an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china">international tribunal</a> and vigorously protested by its neighbours, as well as other nations without claims to the waters. </p>
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<h2>US belief in freedom of navigation</h2>
<p>The US maintains its passages through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea are within its rights under UNCLOS, even though it is not a signatory. (It believes the convention contains pre-existing customary rights, such as the freedom of navigation, which all nations have always enjoyed.) </p>
<p>To maintain these rights, Washington has maintained a <a href="https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/archive/fonops/">Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) program</a> since the late 1970s. The purpose of these operations is to ensure all nations retain their unrestricted sea transit rights as spelled out under UNCLOS.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-does-not-want-war-at-least-not-yet-its-playing-the-long-game-160093">China does not want war, at least not yet. It's playing the long game</a>
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<p>As such, FONOPS send an overt message – the US has the right to sail its warships through the South China Sea because UNCLOS permits it. There must be no ambiguity under the convention when it comes to this.</p>
<p>China claims FONOPS are a mask for unwarranted aggression and regional interference. Beijing’s opposition is not surprising – the program contests the legality of both China’s sea claims and its attempts to restrict navigational freedom through these waters. </p>
<p>China has no legal grounds for dismissing these international rules. However, the longer it does, the more likely the tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait are going to intensify.</p>
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<p><em>Correction: An earlier version of this article misstated that the right of innocent passage is applicable to international waters, whereas it is relevant only to territorial seas.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/166742/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claudio Bozzi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>China and the US have differing interpretations of the law of the sea – and this is fuelling deep distrust and suspicion.Claudio Bozzi, Lecturer in Law, Deakin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1697462021-10-12T17:20:42Z2021-10-12T17:20:42ZChina and Taiwan: why the war of words is unlikely to lead to military conflict (for now, at least)<p>In the past fortnight, record numbers of Chinese military aircraft have <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/04/asia/taiwan-china-warplane-incursion-monday-intl/index.html">deliberately flown into Taiwan’s air defence zone</a>, sparking alarm in Taiwan and concern across the region as well as for the United States and its allies. This intentional aggression has been accompanied with <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/10/08/china/xi-jinping-taiwan-reunification-intl-hnk/index.html">forthright statements</a> from the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>It is routine each year for the Chinese government to issue high-level statements on October 1 – its national day – that it regards Taiwan to be a renegade province of China and reserves the right to reunify it with the mainland, by force if necessary. But is exceptional for China to back this up with major fighter plane incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) – <a href="https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/j-16-is-chinas-go-to-fighter-in-taiwan-aerial-incursions/145755.article">more than 110 such incursions</a> in the first four days of October alone.</p>
<p>On October 6, Taiwan’s defence minister, Chiu Kuo-Cheng, stated that this military challenge from China was the toughest in 40 years. He added that that Chinese military capabilities were growing at a pace that could enable a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3151340/beijing-capable-taiwan-invasion-2025-islands-defence-minister">full-scale invasion attempt by 2025</a> at a cost that the Chinese Communist Party might consider “bearable”. There have been many signals that Beijing is reconsidering its hitherto peaceful approach to the idea of unification with Taiwan in favour of the notion of <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/xi-jinping-renews-chinas-pledge-to-swallow-taiwan-pbn0b06d3">unification by force</a>. </p>
<p>The timing of recent actions and the signals that they are designed to send most likely relate to the “shift to the Pacific” adopted by the US in the aftermath of its abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan. The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/sep/15/australia-nuclear-powered-submarines-us-uk-security-partnership-aukus">creation of the Aukus (Australia-UK-US) alliance</a>, with its commitment to help Australia acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to contribute to military capabilities in the region, would have prompted some kind of reaction from Beijing. </p>
<h2>Uncertainty and risk</h2>
<p>Recent events seem alarming – but the consensus among military experts is that China is not (yet) ready for a <a href="https://news.usni.org/2021/06/23/milley-china-wants-capability-to-take-taiwan-by-2027-sees-no-near-term-intent-to-invade">military campaign to occupy Taiwan</a>. China could easily strike targets on the island with airstrikes and missiles, as the recent air incursions suggest. It could also use naval forces and cyberattacks to cut Taiwan off from the outside world.</p>
<p>But there remain two sources of uncertainty. The first is that China may not yet be ready to launch out an all-out amphibious assault on the island. Such an operation is likely to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/why-a-taiwan-invasion-would-look-nothing-like-d-day/">stretch China’s capabilities</a> and result in substantial casualties on both sides.</p>
<p>The other uncertainty for China is the response of the US. While military planners in Beijing may feel that China’s forces have now <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/updated-report-chinese-strategy-and-military-forces-2021">some degree of local superiority</a>, it is unclear to what level the US would be willing to escalate a conflict if it comes to Taiwan’s aid. And any Chinese military intervention to force Taiwan’s unification with the mainland poses <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/taiwan-war-global-economic-psychological-damage/">potentially catastrophic risks</a> to China’s wider economic and foreign policy objectives. </p>
<h2>View from Beijing</h2>
<p>So why do leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) persist in threatening Taiwan and refuse to accept any discussion of Taiwanese independence? The answer is not that Taiwan realistically poses any external security threat to China. It is rather that the party has chosen to make reunification with Taiwan a symbol of the strength and legitimacy of CPP rule. </p>
<p>It is unlikely that any Chinese president would politically survive a successful declaration of independence by Taiwan. Under Xi’s much more assertive foreign and security policy since 2014, China’s capacity to assert influence and impose controls on what it declares to be “internal” issues has become even more significant in internal Chinese politics. </p>
<p>At the same time the Chinese leadership seems to be determined to signal resolve against a greater engagement by the US in the region, something seen in Beijing as being based on hostility towards China. So the risks of confrontation and an escalation of armed conflict in the Taiwan Straits are a major concern.</p>
<h2>Strategic ambiguity</h2>
<p>Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between USA and mainland China in 1972, the USA has maintained a policy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-withdrawal-has-taiwan-pondering-its-alliance-with-the-us-and-china-is-upping-the-pressure-166713">strategic ambiguity</a> on this issue. It has tried to strike a delicate balance between deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan and avoiding any promises to Taiwan that might give a Taiwanese government the confidence to formally declare independence. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/afghanistan-withdrawal-has-taiwan-pondering-its-alliance-with-the-us-and-china-is-upping-the-pressure-166713">Afghanistan withdrawal has Taiwan pondering its alliance with the US – and China is upping the pressure</a>
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<p>This balance now appears to be shifting. The recent US official acknowledgement that there are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/07/taiwan-us-military-trainers-china">American trainers in Taiwan</a> working with the Taiwanese military is a significant indicator. But the actual extent of US commitments to the defence of Taiwan remains ambiguous.</p>
<p>It is still highly unlikely that major war is imminent. The greatest risk appears to arise from an inadequately controlled escalation of a military incident. As Taiwanese air defences scramble to respond to continued Chinese naval and fighter aircraft incursions, there are risks of unintended incidents. </p>
<p>Xi is unlikely to accept the shooting down of a Chinese fighter aircraft, for example, without ordering some kind of military retaliation. There has been inadequate investment to develop communication and diplomatic arrangements for crisis management in the Taiwan Straits between China, Taiwan and the USA. This is partly because China does not want its adversaries to be able to predict with any confidence what might happen. </p>
<p>Against this atmosphere of uncertainty and ambiguity, it must be hoped that Xi and the leadership of the CCP are satisfied they have made their point and scale down the incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ soon.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/169746/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Recent speeches by the leaders of China and Taiwan have turned up the heat on relations across the Taiwan Strait.Owen Greene, Professor of International Security and Development, University of BradfordChristoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1640922021-07-08T20:09:16Z2021-07-08T20:09:16ZCan Taiwan rely on Australia when it comes to China? New poll shows most Australians don’t want to send the ADF<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410109/original/file-20210707-23-u578jw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=106%2C106%2C5226%2C3399&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ritchie B Togo/EPA/AAP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>I have been in Taiwan since April as a visiting fellow. During this time, there are two questions I’ve been consistently asked. What’s happened to Australia’s relationship with China? And what does it mean for Australian support for Taiwan?</p>
<p>The Australia-China relationship I can explain somewhat. I can chart the causes of the <a href="https://www.themandarin.com.au/144763-opinion-australia-china-relations-downward-spiral-can-be-reversed/">downward spiral</a> of relations. I can say <a href="https://theconversation.com/australias-china-policy-cant-be-based-on-paranoia-or-corporate-interests-there-is-a-better-way-163494">why it’s unlikely to improve</a> anytime soon. The 2021 <a href="https://poll.lowyinstitute.org">Lowy Institute poll</a> shows how deep the negative sentiment now runs, with only 16% of surveyed Australians expressing trust in China compared with 52% just three years ago. </p>
<p>But how to answer what level of support there is for Taiwan in Australia? </p>
<h2>New poll: what do Australians and Taiwanese think?</h2>
<p>The Lowy poll last asked Australians this question in <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2019">2019</a>. Given the most compelling scenario — where Chinese invades and the United States decides to intervene — only 43% of respondents supported deploying military forces. </p>
<p>With the deterioration of the Australia-China relationship and the talk of war, would we expect this to go up or down?</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/china-does-not-want-war-at-least-not-yet-its-playing-the-long-game-160093">China does not want war, at least not yet. It's playing the long game</a>
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<p>To try to answer this, I worked with the Australia Institute <a href="https://australiainstitute.org.au/report/should-australia-go-to-war-with-china-in-defence-of-taiwan">to survey</a> both Taiwanese and Australians citizens (asking more than 600 people in each country with a 4% margin of error) about each nation’s security and relationship with China.</p>
<h2>A China attack?</h2>
<p>The results are surprising on two fronts.</p>
<p>First, the degree of threat felt by Australians surveyed is striking. A similar number of Australians think China will launch an armed attack on Australia (42%) as on Taiwan (49%). I don’t think I could find a military planner in the world that would agree with this. </p>
<p>Despite Australia’s distance from China, Australians and Taiwanese have a similar threat perception. Both see China as being a very aggressive country (62% and 65%). Given the great differences of geography and history, this convergence is noteworthy.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Crowds wait for an Anzac Day march." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=389&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410112/original/file-20210707-27-fudut4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=489&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Australians support Taiwanese independence but not necessarily to the point of sending the Australian military.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Darren England/AAP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Second, more Australians (13%) than Taiwanese (4%) think a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is likely sometime soon. Perhaps Taiwanese think it more likely that China will continue to use “grey zone” coercive tactics rather than attack. Certainly they are not in imminent fear.</p>
<p>Taiwanese are very clear they want independence, with 73% surveyed preferring independence if peaceful relations with China could be maintained. This is in line with <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-opinion-polling-on-unification-with-china/">other polls</a>. </p>
<p>About half still want independence, even if this leads China to attack. Only 14% of Taiwan’s citizens think they could defend themselves unaided. And only 26% of Taiwanese think the US would commit its armed forces to fight a war against China in defence of Taiwan. But they still want independence. That’s the depth of feeling.</p>
<h2>The importance of support for Taiwan</h2>
<p>Taiwan has an overriding fear of abandonment. It doesn’t want its security and independence to be seen as something for China and Taiwan to “solve by themselves”. So it is highly relevant whether other countries would come to Taiwan’s aid.</p>
<p>Clearly, Australians are sympathetic to Taiwanese aspirations for independence. Two thirds of those polled agreed Taiwan should still become a new country, even if China decides to attack after Taiwan declares independence. </p>
<p>But in a crisis, could Taiwan rely on Australia? With these polling numbers, I’d advise Taiwanese to be very cautious.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Taiwanese Air Force personnel conduct a drill." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/410113/original/file-20210707-19-u2629.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Taiwan is on high alert after an increase in Chinese military activity in Taiwan’s air zone.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ritchie B Togo/EPA/AAP</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>Only 21% of Australians agreed the Australian people are prepared to go to war to help the Taiwanese people gain their independence from China. A further 40% were against and 39% were undecided. When we asked the question as “if China incorporated Taiwan, do you agree Australia should send its defence forces to Taiwan?” 37% agreed, 29% were against and 34% were undecided.</p>
<p>While neither is directly comparable to the Lowy poll result (where 43% supported deploying the military), the response is consistent with a relatively low level of support. By contrast, 80% supported using the military to stop a government from committing genocide and 77% to restore law and order in a Pacific nation in the 2019 Lowy poll.</p>
<p>These results suggest that the number of people who support military involvement in Taiwan may even have decreased in the last two years as there has been more talk of war. In the 2021 Lowy Poll, 57% of Australians said in the event of a military conflict between China and US, Australia should stay neutral.</p>
<h2>The trouble for Taiwan</h2>
<p>Some of the recent tough talk about China from Canberra (think “<a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/australia-security-official-warns-staff-drums-war-77331057">drums of war</a>”) might give the Taiwanese the impression they can rely on Australia. But Australia should not give Taiwanese false hope. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australia-would-be-wise-not-to-pound-war-drums-over-taiwan-with-so-much-at-stake-159993">Australia would be wise not to pound 'war drums' over Taiwan with so much at stake</a>
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<p>Whether Australia would decide whether to become involved in a crisis in the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/china-once-again-increases-military-activity-against-taiwan/news-story/125212f353a0b0c909515ca5e5530029">Taiwan Strait</a> would depend on a host of factors, including political and public opinion. Yet the high number of undecideds in the polling figures suggest it would be unwise to assume it would be an easy or popular decision.</p>
<p>Taiwan would be unwise to count on Australia as things currently stand.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melissa Conley Tyler is in Taiwan as a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, funded by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellowship.</span></em></p>A new survey of Taiwanese and Australian citizens has revealed some surprising results about their views on security and China.Melissa Conley Tyler, Research Associate, Asia Institute, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1456992020-12-08T00:52:21Z2020-12-08T00:52:21ZHow the Australian Women’s Weekly spoke to ‘50s housewives about the Cold War<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/359941/original/file-20200925-20-4gd101.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C644%2C858&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Trove</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Under editor <a href="http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/fenston-esme-ezzie-10165">Esmé Fenston</a>, by the end of the 1950s, the Australian Women’s Weekly was selling over <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/26364798">805,000</a> copies a week. <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/6920373">More than half</a> of all Australian women read the magazine.</p>
<p>It focused on promoting a vision of the “everyday” Australian woman. Of course she did not represent all women — she was white, middle class, not working in paid employment and devoted to her home and family. Articles on fashion, cooking, homemaking, motherhood and romance supported this image. </p>
<p>But the Weekly also saw itself as a “<a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/4809486">women’s paper</a>” with a responsibility to educate its readership by including current affairs and news stories in each issue.</p>
<p>While we might not think of the 1950s housewife as taking an active interest in Cold War politics, a close reading of the Weekly – the “<a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/33344883">popular face of femininity</a>” – shows Australian women were not only interested in global politics, but encouraged to join in the discussion.</p>
<h2>The 1950s political landscape</h2>
<p>The second world war had changed Australian society, <a href="https://info.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/women-in-wartime">particularly for women</a>.
As men were sent overseas, women filled the jobs men left behind. US servicemen charmed local women — who explored the new sexual and romantic opportunities available to them. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Vintage photograph" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363115/original/file-20201013-19-1ljob30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363115/original/file-20201013-19-1ljob30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363115/original/file-20201013-19-1ljob30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363115/original/file-20201013-19-1ljob30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=560&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363115/original/file-20201013-19-1ljob30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=703&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363115/original/file-20201013-19-1ljob30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=703&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363115/original/file-20201013-19-1ljob30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=703&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">WWII gave many Australian women the opportunity to work outside the home, like these women cleaning dust from the interiors of Beaufort bomber oil tanks in South Australia in 1943.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">State Library of South Australia/flickr</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Though encouraged by the government to return to their homemaking duties, after the war, many women continued to work in paid employment and were more vocally interested in romance and sex. </p>
<p>By the early 1950s, meanwhile, the Cold War dominated international politics as the world split into two political blocs, aligned with the communist Soviet Union or the capitalist United States. Australia allied with the US, and <a href="https://electionspeeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/1951-robert-menzies">fear</a> of communism spread, with suspicion of anyone not following social norms. </p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/OrGJn2lludI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">An Australian propaganda film from 1952 about the threat of communism.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many Australians, particularly the middle classes, feared women would abandon their traditional family-focused roles. The family home thus became a <a href="http://www.liberals.net/theforgottenpeople.htm">symbol of peace and security</a> and a bulwark against communist overthrow.</p>
<h2>Female readers as thinkers</h2>
<p>The Weekly was clear in the belief women should be engaged with Cold War politics. In 1955, after the first <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis">Taiwan Strait Crisis</a>, Fenston <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/4815914">rued</a> “not one woman is directly concerned with the deliberations that may or may not lead to war”. </p>
<p>She encouraged her readers to take on a bigger role in these discussions, paraphrasing Alfred Tennyson’s poem <a href="https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/45362/locksley-hall">Locksley Hall</a> to profess her hope that in the future “women’s commonsense shall hold a fretful realm in awe” as they took an active part in diplomacy and politics.</p>
<p>On the topic of nuclear weapons, an article by the Canadian physician <a href="https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1957/11/23/the-spinster-who-lectures-wives-on-love-and-childbirth">Dr Marion Hilliard</a> in 1958 <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/5527729">urged women</a> to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>rise up and say: It’s time to stop. Let there be no more use of weapons which will let loose radioactive power in this world. My child, all the children of the world should have a chance to start life as sound in body and mind as possible.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Over the decade, Cold War topics were regularly combined with more socially acceptable feminine issues. In 1953, an article by Sylvia Connick appeared on the surface to be <a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/4816548">a simple romantic story</a> of an Australian girl and a her Czechoslovakian fiancé. </p>
<p>But within this, Connick referenced the oppression of Soviet rule in Czechoslovakia and the horrors of communist labour camps. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363110/original/file-20201013-21-vvgtm4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man and a woman feed a calf. Magazine headline reads: musician helped her fiancé escape from Reds." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363110/original/file-20201013-21-vvgtm4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363110/original/file-20201013-21-vvgtm4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363110/original/file-20201013-21-vvgtm4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363110/original/file-20201013-21-vvgtm4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=528&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363110/original/file-20201013-21-vvgtm4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363110/original/file-20201013-21-vvgtm4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363110/original/file-20201013-21-vvgtm4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=664&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Articles, like this one from January 1954, would use romantic stories to talk about political issues.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Trove</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The magazine positioned women as a distinct category of political thinker who had “instinctive” knowledge of how to conduct herself in political discussions with her contemporaries. </p>
<p>As Fenston wrote in an editorial on the 1954 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin_Conference_(1954)">Big Four Conference</a> between France, America, Britain and the Soviet Union, while “the finer points of high-level diplomacy may be lost to many women”, women knew “<a href="https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/page/4816762">tongues before guns</a>” was a more effective political tool. </p>
<p>Using domestic analogies of “a quiet talk over the back fence” to describe international relations, Fenston suggested that women instinctively understood how diplomacy was more effective than the nuclear war tactics of “hurling rocks on your neighbour’s roof.”</p>
<h2>Feminised politics</h2>
<p>Reading the magazine’s Cold War articles, it would be easy to conclude the Weekly believed women were uninterested in international politics unless a feature also included comments on the latest fashion. </p>
<p>This would be a disservice to the magazine and its readership. </p>
<p>Instead, this approach is an example of what I have termed “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14443058.2020.1788116">feminised politics</a>”. Overt political discussions were combined with conventionally acceptable feminine themes to avoid provoking widespread anxieties about social changes. </p>
<p>This feminised politics echoed the <a href="https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/motherhood/n373.xml">maternal feminism</a> of the early 20th century, used by suffragists to argue women would bring a maternal morality to the political sphere, updated to fit with the changed social context. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363114/original/file-20201013-19-uxcr5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A 1950s woman reads a magazine" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363114/original/file-20201013-19-uxcr5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363114/original/file-20201013-19-uxcr5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=647&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363114/original/file-20201013-19-uxcr5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=647&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363114/original/file-20201013-19-uxcr5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=647&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363114/original/file-20201013-19-uxcr5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=814&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363114/original/file-20201013-19-uxcr5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=814&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/363114/original/file-20201013-19-uxcr5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=814&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Australian Women’s Weekly gave readers a safe space to develop their ideas.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Les Anderson/Unsplash</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Women’s political interests in the 1950s are often forgotten, sandwiched as the period is between the very public first and second wave feminist movements. But while the 1950s housewife did indeed <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-05-29/your-grandma-did-more-housework-in-a-week-than-you-do-in-a-month/9806790">spend a lot of time on homemaking duties</a>, that did not mean she sat out the important political discussions shaping her world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145699/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Hannah Viney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While we might not think of the 1950s housewife as taking an active interest in Cold War politics, a close reading of the Weekly shows its female readers were encouraged to join in the discussion.Hannah Viney, PhD Candidate, School of Philosophical, Historical & International Studies, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.