tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/tajikistan-21516/articlesTajikistan – The Conversation2024-03-28T12:58:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265702024-03-28T12:58:02Z2024-03-28T12:58:02ZMoscow terror attack showed growing reach of ISIS-K – could the US be next?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584987/original/file-20240328-18-qt434b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=38%2C270%2C5115%2C3160&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More than 140 people died in the Crocus City Hall assualt in Moscow on March 22, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-shows-the-burning-crocus-city-hall-concert-hall-news-photo/2097708778?adppopup=true">AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>A <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">deadly attack in Moscow</a> on March 22, 2024, exposed the vulnerability of the Russian capital to the threat of the Islamic State group and its affiliate ISIS-K. But it also displayed the reach of the network, leading some <a href="https://news.northeastern.edu/2024/03/26/isis-k-moscow-attack/">terror experts to ponder</a>: Could a U.S. city be next?</p>
<p>There has not been a mass casualty assault in the U.S. carried out in the name of the Islamic State group since 2017, when a truck <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/sayfullo-saipov-be-sentenced-life-prison-2017-truck-attack-isis">mowed down cyclists and pedestrians on a New York City bikeway</a>, leaving eight dead.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-islamic-state-five-years-later-persistent-threats-u-s-options/">five years after the Islamic State group’s territorial defeat</a> in Baghuz, Syria, had prompted hopes that the terrorist network was in terminal decline, a recent spate of attacks has thrust the group back into the spotlight. On the same day as the Moscow atrocity, an <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/21/at-least-three-killed-in-suicide-bombing-in-afghan-city-of-kandahar">ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kandahar, Afghanistan</a>, resulted in the deaths of at least 21 people.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/profiles/students/sh5958a.cfm">terrorism expert and a scholar</a> specializing in radical Islamist militant groups and the geographical scope of their attacks, I believe these incidents underscore the growing threat of ISIS-K both within the region it draws support from and on an international scale. </p>
<h2>Amplifying influence</h2>
<p>A successful terror attack on a Western capital is certainly something ISIS-K, or Islamic State Khorasan Province, aspires to. The intent behind the group’s activities is to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-moscow-terror-attack-fits-isis-k-strategy-to-widen-agenda-take-fight-to-its-perceived-enemies-226469">bolster its position among jihadist factions</a> by means of audacious and sophisticated attacks.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man sits looking at screens with Tome, Madrid and London on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584899/original/file-20240327-24-xitpw9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=714&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An image released by pro-Islamic State media outlet Al Battar Foundation reads ‘After Moscow, who is next?’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.memri.org/jttm/posters-pro-islamic-state-isis-media-groups-celebrate-moscow-attack-threaten-and-incite-further">Al-Battar Foundation</a></span>
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<p>It is a strategy that showcases ISIS-K’s capabilities for spectacular operations, distinguishing it from potential rival groups. But it also enhances ISIS-K’s appeal, attracting both supporters and resources in the shape of funding and fighters.</p>
<p>By establishing a unique identity in a crowded extremist landscape, ISIS-K aims to undercut its competitors’ influence and assert its dominance in the jihadist sphere of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/09/25/the-strange-story-behind-the-khorasan-groups-name/">Khorasan region</a> it targets, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other Central Asian countries.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s ambition <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/03/moscow-concert-hall-attack-will-have-far-reaching-impact">extends</a> beyond territorial control, engaging in a broader contest for ideological supremacy and resource acquisition globally.</p>
<h2>An expanding threat</h2>
<p>This global reach and ambition are evident in ISIS-K’s recent planned operations.</p>
<p>These include a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/kerman-us-warning-isisk-bombings-bcb47f04165b3eb7b9bc7b4868c8399c">suicide bombing in Iran</a> in January 2024 and thwarted attacks across Europe, notably <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/world/4418496-germany-netherlands-arrest-9-over-alleged-plan-attacks-line-isis">the foiled plots</a> in Germany and the Netherlands in July 2023.</p>
<p>And without a doubt, a successful attack in the United States is <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-khorasan-could-be-first-afghan-terror-group-to-put-us-in-its-sights/6241617.html">seen within ISIS-K’s hierarchy as a major goal</a>.</p>
<p>Since the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/03/25/1240780292/us-officials-warn-of-isis-k-threat">officials in the Biden administration have repeatedly</a> warned of ISIS-K’s escalating danger to American interests, both at home and abroad.</p>
<p>ISIS-K’s <a href="https://www.militantwire.com/p/islamic-state-khurasan-mocks-us-hysteria">propaganda has persistently framed</a> the U.S. as its principal enemy – a narrative that is fueled by America’s <a href="https://ca.usembassy.gov/fact-sheets-the-global-coalition-working-to-defeat-isis/">extensive</a> military and economic efforts to dismantle Islamic State operations since 2014.</p>
<p>The United States’ involvement, especially in <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">collaboration</a> with the Taliban — ISIS-K’s primary regional adversary — has <a href="https://www.congress.gov/event/115th-congress/house-event/108344/text">placed America firmly</a> in the group’s crosshairs. </p>
<p>Employing <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CTC-Beyond-the-Caliphate-Belgium.pdf">tactics refined during</a> the period that the Islamic State group was most active, ISIS-K seeks to inspire lone-wolf attacks and radicalize individuals in the U.S.</p>
<p>The 2015 mass shooting in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/05/us/san-bernardino-shooting/index.html">San Bernardino</a>, California, which left 14 dead, and the 2016 shooting at a nightclub in <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/index.html">Orlando</a>, Florida, that resulted in at least 49 deaths, were both attacks inspired by the Islamic State group.</p>
<h2>Targeting major powers</h2>
<p>Taking its lead from the Islamic State group, ISIS-K in 2022 <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/05/09/islamic-state-afghanistan-khorasan-propaganda-russia-ukraine-war/">publicly condemned</a> America, calling it an enemy of Islam.</p>
<p>Of course, ISIS-K had by then already demonstrated its intention to harm U.S. interests, notably in a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/15/us-to-conduct-new-interviews-into-the-deadly-2021-bombing-at-kabul-airport">2021 Kabul airport attack</a> in which 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans were killed.</p>
<p>ISIS-K views the U.S. in much the same way as it does Russia: both as a military and an ideological foe.</p>
<p>Russia became a prime target due in part to its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/1/what-has-russia-gained-from-five-years-of-fighting-in-syria">partnering with the Bashar al-Assad government</a> in Syria in operations against Islamic State group affiliates. Similarly, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/22/taliban-isis-drones-afghanistan/">Washington has worked with the Taliban</a> in Afghanistan in countering ISIS-K operations.</p>
<p>While it is easier for ISIS-K to penetrate Russian territory, given the country’s geographical proximity to major <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/islamic-state-recruiting-militants-from-tajikistan-and-other-central-asian-countries">Islamist recruitment centers, such as Tajikistan</a>, the potential for strikes in the United States remains significant. </p>
<p>In 2023, U.S. authorities <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/29/politics/migrants-us-southern-border-smuggler-isis-ties/index.html">investigated</a> a group of Uzbek nationals suspected of entering the country from Mexico with the assistance of traffickers linked to the Islamic State group, underscoring the group’s threat.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="The wreckage of a truck under a blue sheet is seen being towed away." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C2314%2C1367&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=354&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/584913/original/file-20240328-28-g95pq5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=445&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Eight people died in a truck attack in New York City in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BikePathAttack/c09a4360d6b74c0c968a3897dbfa37f0/photo?Query=hudson%20bike%20%20attack&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=38&currentItemNo=27">AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Targeting American interests serve multiple purposes for ISIS-K. By striking against the U.S., ISIS-K not only retaliates against Washington’s counterterrorism efforts but also aims to deter U.S. involvement in regions of interest to ISIS-K.</p>
<p>It also taps into historical grievances against the U.S. and Western interventions in Muslim countries – from the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to the stationing of U.S. troops in significant Islamic centers in the Middle East, <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/osama-bin-laden">notably Saudi Arabia</a>.</p>
<h2>Countering a persistent threat</h2>
<p>In response to the growing threat of Islamic State group affiliates, the United States has <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf">adopted a comprehensive strategy</a> combining military, intelligence and law enforcement efforts. </p>
<p>Military operations have targeted ISIS-K leaders and infrastructure in Afghanistan, while security cooperation with regional and international <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-uzbekistan-relations/">partners such as Uzbekistan</a> continues to monitor and counter the group’s activities. </p>
<p>On the home front, law enforcement and homeland security agencies remain vigilant, <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023-03-28%20-%20Testimony%20-%20Mayorkas.pdf">working to identify</a> and thwart potential ISIS-K plots.</p>
<p>But as <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-cia-terrorism-government-and-politics-87fb25aa94f4e4a8a46d82368f907be9">many experts had warned</a>, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has posed new challenges, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/al-qaeda-a-defeated-threat-think-again/">inadvertently transforming</a> that country once again into a safe haven and operational base for terrorist groups.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/">retreat has also resulted</a> in a significant loss of on-the-ground intelligence amid <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html">doubts</a> over the efficacy of relying on the Taliban for counterterrorism operations.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/">Taliban are struggling</a> to prevent or counteract ISIS-K attacks within their own borders.</p>
<p>The successful ISIS-K plots against Iran and Russia also reveal another vulnerability: When a country is distracted or <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/isis-k-allowed-slipped-into-moscow-massacre-because-war-zelenskyy-2024-3#:%7E:text=The%20war%20in%20Ukraine%20distracted,in%20his%20Saturday%20night%20address.">preoccupied with other security concerns or conflicts</a>, it can potentially compromise the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts.</p>
<p>Recent years have witnessed a decrease in high-profile attacks by groups like the Islamic State, leading many to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/u-s-sees-islamic-state-effectiveness-decreasing-but-analysts-warn-resurgence-still-possible-/7238289.html">conclude</a> that the threat was waning. As a result, global attention — and with it, intelligence and security resources — has shifted toward escalating power rivalries and conflicts across the Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.</p>
<p>Yet, this shift risks underestimating the enduring threat terrorist groups pose, laying bare the dangers of complacency.</p>
<p>The Moscow attack emphasizes ISIS-K’s resolve to expand its influence, raising concerns about the potential threat to Western nations, including the United States. Considering ISIS-K’s track record and clear aspirations, it would be naive to dismiss the possibility of an attack on American soil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226570/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A spate of terror operations carried out by the Islamic State group affiliate has raised concerns over a potential attack on US soil.Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, School of Public Affairs, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2265592024-03-25T18:55:03Z2024-03-25T18:55:03ZWhy Russia fears the emergence of Tajik terrorists<p>It has emerged that the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68652380">four gunmen charged</a> in the murder of at least 139 concert-goers at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall theatre <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68652380">were all citizens</a> of the small post-Soviet nation of Tajikistan in Central Asia. </p>
<p>Does their nationality have anything to do with their alleged terrorism? Many Russians probably think so.</p>
<p>Tajikistan, a landlocked country of 10 million sandwiched between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and China, is the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/tajikistan/">most impoverished</a> of the former Soviet republics. Known for its corruption and political repression, it has chafed under the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/tajikistans-eternal-ruler-emomali-rakhmon/a-55234401">iron-fisted rule</a> of President Emomali Rahmon since 1994. </p>
<p>There are estimated to be well over <a href="https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/society/20220214/more-than-3-million-tajik-citizens-reportedly-officially-registered-in-russia-last-year">three million Tajiks</a> living in Russia, about one-third of the total Tajik population. Most of them hold the precarious status of “<a href="https://iwpr.net/global-voices/pressure-central-asian-migrants-russia-grows">guest workers</a>,” holding low-paying jobs in construction, produce markets or even cleaning public toilets. </p>
<p>While Russia’s <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/03/04/russias-population-nightmare-is-going-to-get-even-worse">declining population</a> has led to increasing reliance on foreign workers to fill such needs within its labour force, the attitude of Russians towards natives of Central Asia and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Caucasus">the Caucasus region</a> is generally negative. </p>
<p>It’s similar to the American stereotype about Mexicans so infamously expressed by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/">Donald Trump</a> in 2015: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.” </p>
<p>Non-Slavs are systematically <a href="https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/resource/online-russian-language-hate-and-discrimination-against-central-asian-migrants/">discriminated against</a> in Russia, and since 2022 they have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/1/is-russia-recruiting-muslim-migrants-to-fight-its-war-in-ukraine">disproportionately conscripted</a> and sent to Ukraine to serve as cannon fodder at the front.</p>
<h2>Tajik exclusion</h2>
<p>As I have described in a <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/history-of-the-tajiks-9780755649655/">recent book</a>, few nations in history have seen their standing so dramatically reduced as the Tajiks have over the past 100 years. </p>
<p>For more than a millennium, the <a href="https://sogdians.si.edu/introduction/">Tajiks — Persian-speaking descendants of the ancient Sogdians who dominated the Silk Road</a> — were Central Asia’s cultural elite. </p>
<p>Beginning with what’s known as the <a href="https://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/Geography/samanid.htm">New Persian Renaissance of the 10th century</a> when their capital, Bukhara, came to rival Baghdad as a centre of Islamic learning and high culture, Tajiks were the principal scholars and bureaucrats of Central Asia’s major cities right up to the time of the Russian Revolution. </p>
<p>The famous medieval polymath Avicenna was an ethnic Tajik, as were the hadith collector Bukhari, the Sufi poet Rumi, and many others.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/avicenna-the-persian-polymath-who-shaped-modern-science-medicine-and-philosophy-142667">Avicenna: the Persian polymath who shaped modern science, medicine and philosophy</a>
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<p>But as the most significant purveyors of Central Asia’s Islamic civilization, Tajiks were seen by the Bolsheviks as representing an obsolete legacy that socialism aimed to overcome. </p>
<p>The Tajiks were virtually excluded from the massive social and political restructuring imposed on Central Asia during the early years of the Soviet Union, with most of their historical territory, including the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03068377608729816">fabled cities of Samarkand and Bukhara</a>, being awarded to the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks who were seen as being more malleable. </p>
<p>Only as late as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Tajikistan">1929 were the Tajiks given their own republic</a>, consisting mostly of marginal, mountainous territory and deprived of any major urban centres.</p>
<h2>Impoverished</h2>
<p>Throughout the 20th century, the <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/tajikistan/tajikistan-poverty-biggest-threat-peace">Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was the most impoverished and underdeveloped</a> region of the former Soviet Union, and it has retained that <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/-sp-post-soviet-world-need-to-know-tajikistan">unfortunate status</a> since independence in 1991. </p>
<p>From 1992-1997, the country was plunged into a devastating civil war that destroyed what infrastructure remained from the Soviet period. Since that time, Rahmon has used the threat of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/25/how-tajikistans-president-extended-his-term-for-life-rahmon-isis-migrant-imf/">renewed civil conflict</a> to vindicate his absolute rule. </p>
<p>The spectre of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/rahmon-tajikistan-taliban/31476036.html">radical Islam</a> emanating from neighbouring Afghanistan — <a href="https://minorityrights.org/communities/tajiks/">where the Tajik population considerably outnumbers that of Tajikistan</a> — has provided additional justification for Rahmon’s repressive policies.</p>
<p>In today’s Tajikistan even those with a university education find it almost <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11398444">impossible to earn a salary</a> that would enable them to build a normal family life. </p>
<p>Disempowered and humiliated by the system, they are easy prey for radical Islamic preachers who give them a sense of value and purpose. </p>
<p>The added backdrop of financial desperation makes for an explosive cocktail: one of the suspects in the recent Moscow attacks reportedly told his Russian interrogators that he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/25/four-men-showing-signs-of-severe-beating-charged-over-moscow-concert-attack">was promised a cash reward of half a million Russian rubles (about US$5,300) to carry out his alleged atrocities.</a>.</p>
<h2>Terrorism as desperation?</h2>
<p>Normal, sane human beings everywhere are horrified by terrorist acts regardless of how they are justified by their perpetrators, and the long-suffering people of Tajikistan are no exception.</p>
<p>But unfortunately, the conditions under which a small number of extremists can perceive the psychopathic murder of innocent civilians for cash or ideology as an attractive option show no signs of abating. </p>
<p>Russia’s laughable attempt to somehow link the Moscow attacks <a href="https://theconversation.com/isis-ks-attack-in-moscow-risks-escalating-the-russia-ukraine-war-226472">to Ukraine</a> is a clumsy diversion from the consequences of its relations with Central Asia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226559/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Richard Foltz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>News that four of the suspects in the Moscow terror attacks are Tajik will likely result in further demonization against people already facing poverty and discrimination, despite a glorious history.Richard Foltz, Professor of Religions and Cultures, Concordia UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176502024-03-20T19:21:50Z2024-03-20T19:21:50Z‘He just vanished’ − missing activists highlight Tajikistan’s disturbing use of enforced disappearances<p>“He just vanished; left his apartment for a meeting and disappeared. We’ve checked all the police stations, jails, the hospital and migration centers. We don’t know what to do.” </p>
<p>These were the words Tajik opposition leader Suhrob Zafar uttered to me in late February 2023, days after <a href="https://guruhi24.net/language/en/urgent-news/">Nasimjon Sharipov</a>, his colleague in the <a href="https://guruhi24.net/language/en/home/">political movement Group 24</a>, went missing.</p>
<p>The two of them had lived for almost 10 years in Turkey, having fled Tajikistan in 2014 because of the government’s repression of opposition groups, including the banning of Group 24. Zafar told me that both men had recently received anonymous threats on their phones, warning that they would be kidnapped and sent back to Tajikistan, where the government routinely uses <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/tajikistan/freedom-world/2023">torture and lengthy jail sentences to suppress opposition</a>.</p>
<p>Zafar and I stayed in touch until March 10, 2024, after which he stopped responding. I later learned that on that day Zafar <a href="https://guruhi24.net/language/en/the-leader-of-the-political-movement-group-24-suhrob-zafar-went-missing-in-istanbul-turkey/">too went missing</a>. An unconfirmed report in independent Tajik media on March 20 suggested that both men had been seen in handcuffs <a href="https://bomdodrus.com/2024/03/20/istochniki-bomdod-lidera-gruppy-24-suhroba-zafara-uzhe-privezli-v-dushanbe/">exiting a plane at an airport in Tajikistan’s capital on March 15</a> – but to date, there has been no official word on the two activists’ whereabouts.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A man in a white shirt." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582847/original/file-20240319-16-gtwyc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582847/original/file-20240319-16-gtwyc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582847/original/file-20240319-16-gtwyc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582847/original/file-20240319-16-gtwyc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582847/original/file-20240319-16-gtwyc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582847/original/file-20240319-16-gtwyc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582847/original/file-20240319-16-gtwyc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tajik democracy activist Suhrob Zafar went missing from his Istanbul home.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Group 24</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Alarm over <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/turkey-central-asia-dissidents-erdogan-disappearances/32861944.html">the fate of both men</a> is understandable. It tallies with <a href="https://crudeaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Enforced_Disappearances_Tajikistan.pdf">research I recently conducted</a> for the Washington, D.C.-based human rights group <a href="https://crudeaccountability.org/">Crude Accountability</a> documenting how Tajikistan has systematically engaged in the practice of enforced disappearances – deemed as one of the most pernicious <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-protection-all-persons-enforced">crimes under international law</a>.</p>
<p>Drawing on primary interviews and profiling 31 cases of incommunicado detention or enforced disappearances over a 20-year period, I traced how enforced disappearances have become a mainstay in Tajikistan’s playbook for suppressing dissent in this nation of over 10 million people.</p>
<h2>A particular terror</h2>
<p>Enforced disappearances occur when a government <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-protection-all-persons-enforced">detains, captures, imprisons or kills</a> while refusing to acknowledge a person’s whereabouts or their grave. In 2010, the U.N. General Assembly adopted The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-protection-all-persons-enforced">which expressly states</a>: “No one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance.” But Tajikistan has never been a signatory.</p>
<p>The practice unleashes a particular terror on both victims and their families: removing someone entirely from the access of their loved ones, while inflicting anguish and uncertainty that may continue for years, even decades.</p>
<p>“Disappearances” entered the popular lexicon after becoming the hallmark of brutal juntas that violently took power in Latin America 50 years ago, such as in Argentina and notably Chile, where <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/honoring-a-murderer-the-confusing-politics-surrounding-pinochet-s-dictatorship-in-chile-21-years-later">at least 1,248 people were disappeared</a> on the orders of Gen. Augusto Pinochet.</p>
<p>Half a century later, my research indicates that this pernicious practice is being committed with disturbing regularity by Tajikistan under the repressive rule of authoritarian President Emomali Rahmon.</p>
<p>Under Rahmon’s rule since 1992, Tajikistan has consistently been <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/FIW_2024_DigitalBooklet.pdf">ranked among the “worst of the worst</a>” when it comes to its political rights and civil liberties records.</p>
<p>The use of enforced disappearances by the Tajik authorities dates back to the <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/long-echo-of-tajikistan-s-civil-war/">1992-97 civil war</a> that ravaged the republic following the Soviet Union’s collapse, leaving anywhere from 20,000 to 150,000 dead.</p>
<p>Arriving at an accurate estimate of the number of Tajiks disappeared is extremely difficult.</p>
<p>Attempts by scholars and the United Nations working group on enforced disappearances, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/07/enforced-disappearance-experts-urge-tajikistan-comprehensively-address">which visited the country in 2019</a>, have been thwarted by Rahmon’s resistance to allow any critical examination of his troops’ potential abuses.</p>
<p>The U.N. team was <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/07/enforced-disappearance-experts-urge-tajikistan-comprehensively-address">unable to get official figures</a>, noting an “unprecedented” indifference in shedding light on the matter in Tajikistan.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, they estimated that thousands of people were unaccounted for from the civil war period.</p>
<h2>Exporting repression</h2>
<p>After Rahmon’s troops emerged victorious from the civil war, the autocratic leader entered his second decade in power – a period that took the country <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/FIW_2024_DigitalBooklet.pdf">down an increasingly repressive route</a>.</p>
<p>Flouting a <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2002/04/peace-agreements-tajikistan">peace deal he signed in 1997</a>, which would have guaranteed 30% of government posts to the opposition party, Rahmon chose a far cruder means of shoring up his rule than allowing competitive elections or a free press: <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/tajikistan/tajikistans-fight-against-political-islam">the detention and kidnapping of critics</a>.</p>
<p>Among those who disappeared was <a href="https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/tajikistan-forced-disappearance-of-mr-shamsuddin-shamsuddinov">Shamsuddin Shamsuddinov</a>, a deputy chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, who was seized at home on May 30, 2003. Shamsuddinov, denied access to a lawyer, was eventually tried and sentenced to 16 years in prison. He died behind bars in 2008 in what supporters say were suspicious circumstances.</p>
<p>By then, grinding poverty meant millions of Tajiks had made the journey to Russia in search of <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/tajikistan/news/tajik-migrants-return-home">work to support their families back home</a>. </p>
<p><iframe id="GJ9sT" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/GJ9sT/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>But this sizable diaspora also made Russia fertile ground for a nascent opposition to Rahmon’s increasingly repressive rule. Tajik authorities caught on to the growing popularity of the opposition in exile and expanded the scope of their disappearances.</p>
<p>Take the case of 24-year-old Ehson Odinaev, who employed his social media skills to Group 24. On May 19, 2015, Odinaev left his apartment in St. Petersburg and <a href="https://crudeaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Enforced_Disappearances_Tajikistan.pdf">disappeared</a>. Tajik authorities had earlier declared him wanted on charges of unspecified “cybercrimes,” registering his case with Interpol. Prior to his disappearance, Odinaev told friends and family he was being followed.</p>
<p>Nine years later, his family told me they have no idea whether Odinaev is alive, imprisoned in Tajikistan or in Russia, or was killed.</p>
<h2>Crackdown on Pamiris</h2>
<p>Since 2022, enforced disappearances have become a focus of Rahmon’s crackdown on perhaps the last bastion of domestic resistance to his rule: the <a href="https://www.specialeurasia.com/2023/03/24/geopolitics-gorno-badakhshan/">Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast</a>.</p>
<p>The region, which lies in the country’s southeast, is populated by ethnic minority Pamiris who speak a distinct language and are predominantly <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/tajikistan/">Shiite Muslims in a Sunni-majority country</a>.</p>
<p>As part of a bloody suppression of unrest in the region – framed by Tajik authorities as a “counterterrorism” operation – the government has allegedly <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur60/7218/2023/en/">arrested and imprisoned hundreds</a> of Pamiri intellectuals, journalists and religious and community leaders.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, dozens of prominent Pamiri individuals living in Russia have been taken by the state. One of those seized was <a href="https://crudeaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Enforced_Disappearances_Tajikistan.pdf">Amriddin Alovatshoev</a>, a youth migrant leader who was seized in the Russian city of Belgorod in January 2022.</p>
<p>In early February, Alovatshoev appeared on Tajik state television uttering what supporters say is an obviously forced confession to unspecified crimes. He received an <a href="https://crudeaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Enforced_Disappearances_Tajikistan.pdf">18-year sentence</a>.</p>
<p>While many people have been disappeared inside Tajikistan itself, my research documents numerous cases involving the disappearance of Tajik dissidents in the territory of a foreign country, with <a href="https://crudeaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Enforced_Disappearances_Tajikistan.pdf">Russia, Turkey and Belarus</a> being the leading three. </p>
<p>As a poor state with modest capabilities, Tajikistan has, it is claimed by human rights groups, partnered with Russia, Turkey and Belarus to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/a-brief-chronicle-of-enforced-disappearances-in-tajikistan/">increase the reach</a> of its own security services.</p>
<p>While the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/article/transnational-repression-2023-insecure-leaders-threaten-dissent-abroad">alleged complicity</a> of Russia, Turkey and Belarus in <a href="https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/dem/release/chair-cardin-to-tajikistan-president-rahmon-end-your-governments-use-of-transnational-repression">transnational repression</a> is not surprising given that the countries share an authoritarian bent, the more shocking revelation, I believe, has been the involvement of <a href="https://crudeaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Enforced_Disappearances_Tajikistan.pdf">established democracies such as Poland, Germany and Austria</a> in the forced return of asylum-seekers to Tajikistan, where they could face incommunicado detention, torture and imprisonment on political grounds.</p>
<p>Tajikistan’s <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/tajikistan/freedom-world/2023">poor human rights record</a> – and use of enforced disappearances – is well known, prompting the European Parliament in January 2024 to <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0039_EN.html">issue a resolution</a> calling on Tajik authorities to “unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained.”</p>
<p>Absent any news of Suhrob Zafar or Nasimjon Sharipov, it is fair to assume that both now figure in that growing list.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steve Swerdlow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Central Asian nation has long figured among the ‘worst of the worst’ in regards to political and human rights. A new report shines light on cases of activists being seized and then going missing.Steve Swerdlow, Associate Professor of the Practice of Political Science and International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1384982020-05-21T13:33:19Z2020-05-21T13:33:19ZHow Central Asia’s authoritarian regimes have used coronavirus to their advantage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336773/original/file-20200521-102632-1s618y9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C10%2C790%2C488&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Business as usual for the Tajik president, Emamoli Rakhmon, at the new year 'Nowruz' celebration in March.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Press service of the president of Tajikistan.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The authoritarian Central Asian state of Tajikistan <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-finally-confirms-its-first-15-coronavirus-cases">admitted to its first cases of COVID-19</a> in late April. This followed a World Health Organization (WHO) decision to dispatch a team to investigate previous claims that the country was coronavirus-free.</p>
<p>To the west, Tajikistan’s near neighbour Turkmenistan, known as the North Korea of Central Asia, continues <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/10/turkmenistan-coronavirus-pandemic-denial-strongman-berdimuhamedov/">to report no COVID-19 cases</a> and has <a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/coronavirus-limits-turkmenistan">avoided use of the word coronavirus</a> as much as possible in order to deter the spread of information about the pandemic. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/coronavirus-turkmenistan-ban-masks-word-a9438266.html">Turkmen police</a> have reportedly arrested citizens found to be discussing coronavirus in public, or wearing protective masks. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Belarus – which has earned the moniker of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2QERR5wyks">“Europe’s last dictatorship”</a> – the president, Alexander Lukashenko, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/30/europe/soviet-strongmen-coronavirus-intl/index.html">advocated vodka, hockey, and folk medicine</a> against the virus and in April <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-belarus/nobody-will-die-from-coronavirus-in-belarus-says-president-idUSKCN21V1PK">reassured Belorussians</a> that “nobody will die from coronavirus in our country”. As of May 21, Belarus has already registered more than <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/belarus/">32,000 coronavirus cases and 179 deaths</a>. </p>
<p>Censorship, repression, and disinformation are hardly new strategies for post-Soviet regimes. Just like many of their counterparts <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/28/authoritarians-exploiting-coronavirus-undermine-civil-liberties-democracies/">elsewhere in the world</a>, Central Asia’s authoritarian strongmen have weaponised the pandemic to further consolidate their hold on power – those, that is, who have acknowledged the virus threat in the first place.</p>
<p>Just as COVID-19 has offered opportunities to authoritarian – and would-be authoritarian – leaders, so it also presents significant challenges. Authoritarian rule is sustained by a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">range of tools and mechanisms</a>, from coercion to co-option, but can rarely survive a major crisis without offering something more. Authoritarian regimes often <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/authoritarianism-and-securitization-development-africa">define</a> this “something more” as strength and stability, and this has also been the case during COVID-19. For example, Kazakhstan’s state and state-aligned media has been replete with references to <a href="https://kazakh-tv.kz/en/view/central_asia/page_211350_central-asia-keeps-up-the-fight-with-covid19">“discipline”</a> in recent weeks.</p>
<p>A global pandemic can play into the hands of authoritarian rulers in this regard, but it can also leave them dangerously exposed.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=270&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/337546/original/file-20200526-106848-yt3pco.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">Data from Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>When repression isn’t enough</h2>
<p>In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, authorities have enforced lockdown and quarantine measures in a typical Soviet military style. Soldiers equipped with guns and armoured vehicles are patrolling public spaces and restricting the movement of citizens and traffic between, and within, cities.</p>
<p>In Uzbekistan, the <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2020/04/06/covid-diary/">General Prosecutor’s office</a> recommended that citizens keep personal diaries of who they meet, when and where. Given the <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/uzbekistan/freedom-world/2020">extensive power of the General Prosecutor’s Office</a>, such a “recommendation” should be perceived by Uzbek citizens as an obligation.</p>
<p>Kazakhstan is actively using <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-experiments-with-surveillance-technology-to-battle-coronavirus-pandemic/">intellectual facial recognition technologies</a> and a video camera system called <em>Sergek</em>, which means “sharp eye” in Kazakh, to catch and fine citizens who violate quarantine restrictions.</p>
<p>The Kazakhstani authorities are planning to introduce a new mobile application, developed by the Ministry of Health Care and local government of Nur-Sultan city, called <a href="https://vlast.kz/obsshestvo/38384-svoboda-vo-vrema-cp.html">Smart Astana</a> to track physical movement of citizens who are in quarantine. In the context of these Central Asian regimes in particular, the use of such technologies presents a high risk of data abuse and manipulation by the authorities. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/336724/original/file-20200521-102667-g0ujw2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Entry post to Nur-Sultan city, the capital of Kazakhstan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Saltanat Janenova</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite the risks, citizens from Central Asian countries have flooded social media with photos and videos complaining about the devastating conditions in hospitals and <a href="https://cabar.asia/en/i-fear-to-be-infected-how-ca-authorities-meet-and-quarantine-their-citizens/">quarantine facilities</a> within days of the outbreak. Some 170 people being held in quarantine at a former US military base in Kyrgyzstan complained of bad smells, a lack of heating, and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyz-quarantine-quarters-called-horribly-cold-and-dirty-/30499760.html">“horribly cold and dirty” conditions</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://rsf.org/en/news/kazakh-journalists-harassed-over-covid-19-reporting">Kazakhstan</a>, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/media-restrictions-blow-covid-19-coverage-kyrgyz-journalists-say">Kyrgyzstan</a> and <a href="https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistans-coronavirus-information-lockdown-prompts-questions">Uzbekistan</a> swiftly enforced state of emergency legislation prohibiting photo and video recordings in medical institutions and quarantine facilities. They threatened people who disobeyed with prosecution for “spreading false information”. Some civic activists, bloggers and journalists have <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-kazakh-activists-coronavirus-human-rights-economy/30542645.html">already been imprisoned</a> on the same charge. </p>
<h2>Trust issues</h2>
<p>In <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/04/23/life-carries-on-as-usual-in-tajikistan-and-turkmenistan">Tajikistan, Turkmenistan</a> and <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/22/belarus-denies-danger-coronavirus-outbreak-football-matches/">Belarus</a>, governments have continued to operate as if business were carrying on as usual. They have denied the pandemic and given a green light to large celebrations such as the New Year (“Nowruz”) celebrations at the end of March in <a href="https://eurasianet.org/tajikistan-feast-in-the-time-of-coronavirus">Tajikistan</a>, World Health Day in April in <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/turkmenistan-celebrates-world-health-day-unwisely/">Turkmenistan</a>, and a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52574749">military parade in Belarus</a> in May. </p>
<p>In the absence of a strong government public health response, many <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/05/05/russias-post-soviet-neighbors-belarus-and-turkmenistan-face-coronavirus-as-leaders-deny-problem-a70188">Turkmens and Belarussians are limiting their contacts</a> and avoiding mass gatherings voluntarily. </p>
<p>More widely, there has been a gradual loss of public trust in Central Asian <a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-030-03008-7_55-1">governments’ competence</a> in recent years, resulting from weak policy implementation capacity, rampant corruption, and limited citizen engagement. </p>
<p>In this context, the authoritarian governments in the former Soviet bloc have responded to the pandemic by reinforcing their grip on power even further. Temporary measures introduced during the emergency, such as harsh legislative measures and new surveillance tools, are likely to remain a permanent feature of the new normal. But at the same time, the pandemic has left these regimes dangerously exposed to the risks of rising public discontent unless they take measures to regain the trust of their citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/138498/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Saltanat Janenova is also affiliated with the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University (Kazakhstan). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Fisher receives research funding from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and WhatsApp (Research Awards for Social Science and Misinformation) and has previously received funding from the AHRC, British Academy, ESRC, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. He is a Visiting Fellow at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, Stellenbosch University, and is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies at the University of the Free State.</span></em></p>Censorship, repression and disinformation have characterised Central Asian responses to COVID-19.Saltanat Janenova, Teaching Fellow in Public Policy and Management, University of BirminghamJonathan Fisher, Director, International Development Department, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1105022019-03-18T20:44:16Z2019-03-18T20:44:16ZBreeding young men for export in poor countries<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257070/original/file-20190204-193199-1584lpc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Because male migrants earn more money to send back home than females, families in some post-communist countries are strongly tempted to use sex-selective abortion to improve their lives. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Johann Walter Bantz/Unsplash</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Large-scale migration from the poorest countries of Europe, and parts of Asia, began immediately <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/1989-twenty-years-end-communism-and-fate-eastern-europe">following the collapse of communism in 1990.</a></p>
<p>State pensions and public health provisions are paltry in these countries, and domestic job opportunities scarce.</p>
<p>That means the migration of young people has become an important part of household survival strategies as younger family members leave and then send wages back home. Those wages are known as “remittance” income. </p>
<p><a href="https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf">The majority of all international migrants are male</a>. The reasons for this may be partly cultural and partly economic. </p>
<p>Male migrants generally earn higher wages. And there’s some evidence that reality is serving as an incentive for families in these struggling economies to use <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/gender-biased-sex-selection">sex-selective abortion to try to improve their lives.</a></p>
<h2>Sons responsible for their parents</h2>
<p>The lack of domestic jobs in post-communist countries makes bearing sons even more important to the security of parents as they age. Even before international migration was possible, responsibility for aging parents resided with adult sons. </p>
<p>And so in the absence of functioning social security and health systems, and with the lack of local jobs, the motivation for bearing sons has undoubtedly increased. </p>
<p>In fact, among women aged 40 and older in 2002, 40 per cent had at least one son living abroad. My calculations, using data from the Albania Institute of Statistics and the 2012 World Bank Living Standards Monitoring Survey, suggest that each additional male birth increases <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3283200">the number of sons residing abroad by about 0.18 per cent</a> </p>
<p>The data also show that more than 50 per cent of women with sons abroad had received remittances in the previous year. Only 23 per cent of daughters residing abroad had sent wages back home.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257071/original/file-20190204-193203-di3lcc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Albanian university students protest outside the education ministry in Tirana in December 2018 demanding lower tuition fees and a bigger education budget. Increasing numbers of male babies are being born in the eastern European nation.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/ Hektor Pustina)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Within migrant-sending countries, the availability of prenatal technology and sex-selection abortion has made the economic incentives to bear sons more apparent. </p>
<p>Masculinized sex ratios at birth have been well-documented for <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2012.00513.x">Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia</a>, <a href="https://www.whijournal.com/article/S1049-3867(11)00013-2/pdf">for Nepal</a> and for Albania, where increasing numbers of male babies are being born into both Christian and Muslim families.</p>
<h2>Male-to-female birth ratio not typical</h2>
<p>In both more traditional and tribal Albanian regions of the country, and in its urbanized central and south regions, there are more male births than the biological norm of 105:100 male-to-female live births. According to the 2011 census, the ratio for children under five was 109 boys to 100 girls, while the ratio for children aged five to nine was 119:100.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257075/original/file-20190204-193220-1q2vj1p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In this 2016 photo, a woman breaks down after seeing the body of her son, a migrant worker who died in his sleep in a village in Nepal. The number of Nepali workers going abroad has more than doubled since the country began promoting foreign labour in recent years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Niranjan Shrestha)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>International migration and increased household size also appear to be household survival strategies that transcend cultures, religion and recent economic history.</p>
<p>And the prevalence of multiple generations living in one household appears to be common to countries that are receiving lots of remittance income. </p>
<p>Nepal, for example, does not share the recent communist history of some eastern European or mid-Asian countries, but it also has both a high fraction of GDP from remittance income (<a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS">28.3 per cent in 2017)</a>) and a high number of multiple-generation households. </p>
<p>More than 95 per cent of Nepalis <a href="https://nepal.iom.int/jupgrade/images/stories/CoM/LabourMigration_for_Employment-A_%20StatusReport_for_Nepal_201516201617_Eng.PDF">obtaining permits to migrate are male</a>. Remittance income in 2017 was greater than the sum of official development assistance and foreign direct investment.</p>
<p>The economic motives for son preference, therefore, appear to trump religious and cultural considerations. As mentioned, wages of unskilled males, after all, are much higher in destination countries than at home.</p>
<h2>Brides live with in-laws</h2>
<p>The trend underscores the difficult lives of women in countries that are reliant on remittance income from the boys and men who have gone abroad.</p>
<p>Cultural norms that dictate brides go live with the family of their new husbands are particularly strong in <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596712000881">Albania, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan</a>. </p>
<p>In Tajikistan, young men leave to work in Russia within months of marrying. The newlywed bride resides with the young groom’s parents and bears responsibility for most domestic <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233715176_Tajik_Male_Labour_Migration_and_Women_Left_Behind_Can_They_Resist_Gender_and_Generational_Hierarchies">tasks in the new household</a>. But remittance money is sent by the young man to his parents, not to his wife.</p>
<p>Daughters <a href="https://glm-lic.iza.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/glmlic-wp040.pdf">seldom work,</a> and are not welcomed back into their birth homes in the <a href="http://www.iom.tj/pubs/abandoned_wives_English.pdf">event of divorce</a>. <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00305.x">Children receive relatively little schooling, since resources are focused on the oldest generations.</a></p>
<h2>Why is this happening?</h2>
<p>Nearly 30 years after market liberalization began, most post-communist countries have failed to create environments in which private sector employment thrives. </p>
<p>As a result, remittances from international migration remain a major source of household income. Household members are sent abroad to provide a steady flow of international currency to support those remaining. </p>
<p>Wage gaps among the countries in the region are a key driver for international migration. Wages are much higher in nearby Russia than in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, for example. They are also much higher in Italy and Greece than in Albania. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/257080/original/file-20190204-193206-1vt1sv9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters, one of them holding a Kyrgyz national flag, are seen during a protest in Barskoon, Kyrgyzstan in 2013. Hundreds of protesters stormed the office of the Kumtor gold mine run by a Canadian-based company, demanding its nationalization and more social benefits.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Abylay Saralayev)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In 2013, remittances reached a high of 49 per cent of <a href="https://www.news.tj/en/news/world-bank-tajikistan-world-s-most-remittance-dependent-country">GDP in Tajikistan</a>. </p>
<p>In 2017, Kyrgyzstan was the country most dependent on remittances. Nearly 33 per cent of the country’s 2017 GDP came from this <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS">this source</a>. And in Albania from 2008-2017, remittances averaged <a href="https://www.bankofalbania.org/rc/doc/Remitancat_Revista_eng_12103.pdf">9.1 per cent of GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Migration and remittances provide many benefits to receiving households and countries. Migrants provide insurance against shocks to household income, such as poor harvests or illness of household members. As well, they improve the spending power of remaining household members.</p>
<h2>Eases pressure to create jobs</h2>
<p>But there are several less desirable effects of reliance on remittance income. Governments are less pressed to create jobs, for example. Those who might foment unrest — young unemployed males — are outside the country. They’re not around to participate in protests to demand better living conditions and job opportunities.</p>
<p>Remittances are not often spent on investments in children’s education or to start up new businesses in home countries. Instead, the money largely goes to housing and the purchase of imported goods. This does not create long-run growth or generate tax revenue for the construction of social safety nets.</p>
<p>The value of remittances varies with economic and political conditions in <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstans-national-bank-governor-analyzes-effects-of-russian-downturn">migrant-receiving countries</a>. As well, migration may have major demographic consequences.</p>
<p>The nature of markets for unskilled labour is likely important. For example, female Tajik migrants in Russia are concentrated in low-paying service industry jobs. To take such jobs, they must speak Russian. Males are concentrated in the construction sector, where Russian language knowledge is less essential, and wages much higher.</p>
<h2>How the West can affect change</h2>
<p>Through tax-financed contributions to organizations including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, western nations can support policies that reduce reliance on migration. </p>
<p>Institutional environments that foster private sector job creation may both reduce the importance of international remittances and increase the relative status of women in society. </p>
<p>There is <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/696073">evidence from Vietnam</a> that changes in local labour market conditions may also change attitudes towards female children. </p>
<p>As a condition of concessional international loans, the boards of international organizations should press hard for reforms that will create jobs domestically. </p>
<p>Breeding young men for export has never been and should never be a successful economic development strategy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110502/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Louise Grogan receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).</span></em></p>Breeding young men for export has never been a successful economic development strategy. Policies that improve local labour market opportunities could increase the status of women.Louise Grogan, Professor, University of GuelphLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/757222017-04-05T13:16:45Z2017-04-05T13:16:45ZWhy China’s $1 trillion new Silk Road plan is being greeted coolly by the West<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163873/original/image-20170404-5725-jxkgva.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A bridge too far?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-illustration/two-words-china-europe-united-by-135128720?src=5Bf5oxzjnZe_-wcNh3H1-A-1-18">sibgat</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Beijing is gearing up for a major diplomatic offensive in May as it welcomes Vladimir Putin among 20 international leaders for <a href="http://english.cctv.com/2017/01/17/ARTIdF912TLb6wOkkYQNBoTg170117.shtml">a summit</a> on building a “new Silk Road” to bring China closer to the world. This is the One Belt, One Road project – the centrepiece of Chinese international engagement. </p>
<p>It involves a US$1 trillion (£804 billion) <a href="http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html">mega-investment</a> to transform China’s transport and trade links through Eurasia and South-East Asia. <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-new-silk-road-is-all-part-of-its-grand-strategy-for-global-influence-70862">The aim</a> is for China to become a global pillar of trade and free markets and secure its place as a 21st-century superpower. </p>
<p>So far, however, no Western leaders have confirmed their attendance at the summit. What should we read into this, and what does it mean for the success of the project?</p>
<p>One Belt, One Road was <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml">unveiled by</a> Chinese president Xi Jinping four years ago. It aims to increase the country’s influence at a time when Europe is still struggling with the consequences of the financial crisis and the US is revising its role as promoter of economic liberalism under the Trump administration. </p>
<p>The project has two strands – “one road”, which is road and rail connections, and “one belt”, which is about the sea. The sea element is focused on everything from a <a href="http://www.aninews.in/newsdetail-MTY/MzA2MTcw/china-039-s-one-belt-one-road-policy-picks-up-pace.html">harbour development</a> in Malaysia to a new free trade agreement <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/china-new-zealand-to-expand-free-trade-agreement-cooperate-on-one-belt-one-road">with New Zealand</a>, while the land part has primarily focused on Central Asia as the most realistic route to Europe. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/163901/original/image-20170404-5729-1ejecsk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Google Maps</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Unlocking Central Asia</h2>
<p>China’s routes through five former Soviet states are currently beset with border delays, hefty customs fees, poor roads and railways, and formidable geographic hurdles – notably mountain ranges in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. </p>
<p>There should also be benefits to these landlocked republics from tackling these difficulties. Better links to Europe and the Middle East and potential access to seaports point to greater trading opportunities and extra revenues from transit fees to and from China. Each republic has been enthusiastic about participating, and there have so far been <a href="http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-central-asia-obor/28112086.html">railway lines completed</a> from China to Iran and Afghanistan via the region. </p>
<p>Other planned investments include a <a href="http://24.kg/archive/en/bigtiraj/174939-news24.html/">new highway</a> connecting the north and south of Kyrgyzstan and a <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2016-07/21/content_38929557.htm">highway</a> between it and Uzbekistan. There is also the “Angren-Pap” <a href="http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/infrastructure/single-view/view/two-presidents-open-angren-pap-railway.html">railway tunnel</a> in Uzbekistan, the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan <a href="http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2422311.html">gas pipeline</a> and the “Dushanbe-Kulyab-Khorog-Kulma-Karokurum” <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/tajik-leader-in-china-building-roads/">highway</a> in Tajikistan. </p>
<p>China’s diplomatic relations with the republics are very warm – in some cases more so than those of Russia, which can sometimes behave like the overlord it once was. Yet problems may loom for One Belt, One Road all the same. </p>
<p>Investments may be slowed down by unfinished border demarcation and disputes in several unsettled areas, especially between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There is also a cautious and sometimes hostile attitude towards Chinese migrants and workers from local people, especially <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-36163103">in Kazakhstan</a>. This is a potential problem given that the price of investment from Beijing is often Chinese companies winning contracts and supplying labour and equipment. </p>
<p>The Chinese may therefore have to extend their diplomatic efforts to Central Asian people more generally. The leaders of the five republics may also need to be more transparent with their citizens about how they plan to carry One Belt, One Road forward, contrary to the frequently opaque business operations in the region. </p>
<p>Russia is closely interested despite hosting no initiatives to date. Relations between China and Russia tend to be “coldly cordial”, turning on mutual support on some international issues such as Syria, and peaceful coexistence in Eurasia. </p>
<p>Chinese investments in Central Asia are a potential flashpoint, since Russia keeps Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and possibly <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-tajikistan-mulls-eeu-feels-pull-of-russia/27893070.html">soon Tajikistan</a> in its orbit through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Russia can benefit from improved connectivity and therefore stability in the region, but it wants guarantees that One Belt, One Road won’t undermine the economic relevance of the EEU. </p>
<p>Russia and China adopted a <a href="http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-Construction-of-Joint-Eurasian-Economic-Union-and-the-Silk-Road-Projects/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A3ABV.htm">joint statement</a> on EEU and Silk Road projects in 2015, but it was vague and cautious. The Chinese will be pleased that Putin is attending next month’s summit, but his enthusiastic backing would be better. </p>
<h2>The Western dimension</h2>
<p>The EU has been remarkably silent on One Belt, One Road. This is despite the project’s obvious geopolitical and economic importance – trade with China <a href="http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2016/04/01/content_281475318738444.htm">was</a> US$593 billion in 2015 – and the existence of a <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2258_en.htm">EU-China Connectivity Platform</a>. Europe’s attitude can partly be explained by Brexit; rising nationalism in several European states; compatibility with European labour norms and standards; the still unclear degree of Chinese companies’ involvement; and the general distraction of the eurozone crisis. </p>
<p>The EU also seems unable to speak with a single voice to China, with member states usually preferring bilateralism or <a href="http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/161-framework-and-economic-relations-between-china-and-ceec/">sub-regional frameworks</a> of cooperation. And from an economic point of view, One Belt, One Road is potentially a double-edged sword. Connectivity should benefit everyone, but more competitive Chinese goods flooding Europe is a potential threat unless EU members can coordinate their response. Increased connectivity may also encourage illegal traffickers, organised crime and counterfeiters. </p>
<p>Other Western nations have been lukewarm, too. When New Zealand <a href="http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/china-new-zealand-to-expand-free-trade-agreement-cooperate-on-one-belt-one-road">announced</a> its involvement with One Belt, One Road last month, it was one of few Western states to have done so (<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-hungary-idUSKBN0ON01W20150607">Hungary</a> and the <a href="http://www.czech.cz/cz/Aktuality/Czech-Republic-and-China-ink-investment-boosting-m">Czech Republic</a> are on board). <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/e30f3122-0eae-11e7-b030-768954394623">Australia declined</a> to follow suit, despite a visit from the Chinese premier on the same trip. </p>
<p>Evidently China still has much work to do to persuade the world of the merits of its big initiative. Political and security issues could yet prove insurmountable unless Beijing can win round neighbours and major rivals alike. </p>
<p>This will need both political and diplomatic patience, and next month’s summit is more likely to be about bridge building than major new announcements. The irony is that while One Belt One Road is aimed at facilitating infrastructure and connectivity, its implementation looks like a long and very bumpy road.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75722/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Filippo Costa Buranelli is affiliated with the Higher Education Academy.</span></em></p>China’s One Belt, One Road initiative is holding international summit in Beijing, but no Western leaders have said they are coming yet.Filippo Costa Buranelli, Lecturer, International Relations, University of St AndrewsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/649452016-09-07T13:54:31Z2016-09-07T13:54:31ZAfter 25 years of independence, Tajikistan is a bastion of torture and repression<p>As Tajikistan marks 25 years since its independence from the Soviet Union, the fragile peace it has made has been offset by a brutal crackdown on the opposition and an impending economic crisis.</p>
<p>The Central Asian republic was <a href="http://countrystudies.us/tajikistan/8.htm">born</a> amid political turmoil, and quickly descended into a <a href="http://www.un.org/events/tenstories/06/story.asp?storyID=600">civil war</a> that cost more than 50,000 lives and turned some 250,000 people into refugees. A peace agreement in 1997 formally brought the war to an end, but the president, Emomali Rahmon, who came to power during the fighting, has now eradicated the opposition with whom he negotiated the accord; this year, he won a referendum <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/23/tajikistan-votes-to-allow-president-emomali-rahmon-to-rule-indefinitely">allowing him to rule indefinitely</a>.</p>
<p>Order has returned since the chaos of the war ended, but memories of the peace are receding. The real dividends have gone to the president, his circle, and a few hundred families who are closely tied to the regime.</p>
<p>To many Tajiks, this year’s anniversary celebrations won’t feel all that celebratory. They will be tightly managed by the state, with no room for spontaneous public participation, critical comment or dissent. Approximately half the working-age male population will be absent from these celebrations, as they have migrated to Russia and other countries for work, and many of the country’s women, children and elderly citizens will have little enthusiasm for the anniversary when their economic prospects are so bleak.</p>
<p>Inflation and the depreciation of the currency have made the ordinary Tajik poorer this year. Around half of the country’s income depends on Tajiks working abroad and sending money home, but according to <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/79401">Russia’s Central Bank</a>, the amount of money transferred from Russia to Tajikistan fell precipitously from $3.8 billion in 2014 to $1.28 billion in 2015. The <a href="http://www.asiaplus.tj/en/news/remittance-flows-tajikistan-reportedly-decline-221-percent">National Bank of Tajikistan</a> reports that the figure slid a further 22% in the first half of 2016.</p>
<p>National economic development is painfully slow. The <a href="http://www.casa-1000.org/MainPages/CASAAbout.php">highest hydroelectric dam in the world</a> is due to be built in Rogun before the end of the decade to export electricity to South Asia. But what resources Tajikistan has are generally used for the benefit of the few, not the many – look at the aluminium industry, for example, whose profits are <a href="https://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2014/05/22/camelflage-tajik-president-emomali-rahmon-and-james-fabiani-hide-expensive-washington-lobbying-secrets/">channelled into secretive offshore accounts</a>.</p>
<p>Worse still, the apparent pacification of the country conceals the by turns banal and brutal ways in which control is maintained. </p>
<p>The media is supressed; business is co-opted. The government has gradually discredited the last remaining political opposition, accusing it of links to Islamist terrorism as a pretext for crushing it. Political prisoners are <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/tajikistan/report-tajikistan/">arbitrarily arrested, abused and tortured</a> in Tajikistan’s prisons, and their lawyers and relatives are intimidated and detained. A recent Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/tajikistan#5f08d5">report</a> found that “torture remains widespread in the criminal justice system” and that the police “routinely use torture to coerce confessions and deny detainees access to counsel”.</p>
<p>In recent weeks, a group of leading Tajikistani civil society and human rights activists <a href="http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2016/08/22/statement-by-the-representatives-of-tajikistans-civil-society-about-status-of-political-prisoners/">appealed</a> to the UN and international community to publicly demand that the government complies with its own laws and international commitments.</p>
<p>Of particular concern to these activists is the status of prisoners linked to the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT), whose leader signed the <a href="http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/key-elements-tajikistan-peace-agreement">1997 peace agreement</a>.</p>
<h2>Beyond the pale</h2>
<p>Despite years spent carefully toeing a moderate line in the face of electoral fraud and repression, the IRPT was <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/tajikistan">banned in 2015</a>. This summer, two political prisoners linked to the party, <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/80171">Kurbon Mannonov</a> and Nozimdzhon Tashripov, died in Tajikistan’s prisons. The health of another prisoner, former deputy chairman of the IRPT Mahmadali Hayit, is also in danger, and on <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-opposition-politician-family-members-missing/27939830.html">August 22</a>, his wife and son were taken from their home by men in plain clothes and have not been seen since. On <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/jailed-tajik-politicians-lawyer-remanded-yorov-hayit/27952368.html">August 29</a>, Hayit’s lawyer was remanded in custody.</p>
<p>One of the few IRPT leaders to have escaped imprisonment is its chairman, <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2016/01/27/interview-with-muhiddin-kabiri-leader-of-the-islamic-renaissance-party-of-tajikistan-in-exile/">Muhiddin Kabiri</a>, who went into exile in 2015. A genial man who maintained a persistently moderate stance in opposition, Kabiri is now wanted in Tajikistan on charges of terrorism. Given the obvious political motive for the campaign against the party and the government’s abuse of its members, it is astonishing that INTERPOL agreed to a Tajik request to put out a global “<a href="http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2015-63685">red notice</a>” for his arrest.</p>
<p>Western states’ public expressions of concern about all this mean little without serious threats to end military aid and security co-operation. As things stand, the West seems happy to keep spending <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/77751">millions of dollars</a> a year on Tajik border security, counter-terrorism and military training. These governments are apparently <a href="http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/09/29/us-looks-away-as-tyranny-steals-a-march-in-central-asia/6">unwilling to accept</a> that providing military aid and security training to a country that behaves like Tajikistan is ineffective, and perhaps even counter-productive.</p>
<p>The Tajik government, which obviously gives itself full credit for the fact that civil war has not returned, must be held responsible for the increasingly brutal authoritarianism and the economic decay which has marred the post-war era. INTERPOL, which claims to uphold international human rights standards, should make sure it is not <a href="https://www.fairtrials.org/policy-report-interpol-and-human-rights/">exploited</a> to serve the government’s political motives.</p>
<p>Tajikistan’s recovery and relative stability since the civil war should be a cause to celebrate – but a peace managed with such means is no peace at all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Heathershaw receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Edward Lemon has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. </span></em></p>Tajikistan, a longstanding human rights violator, has been cracking down harshly on what’s left of its political opposition.John Heathershaw, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of ExeterEdward Lemon, PhD Candidate in Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/544242016-04-11T13:29:03Z2016-04-11T13:29:03ZHow big a threat is Islamic State in Central Asia?<p>The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is seen as a growing threat throughout much of the world, its influence extending to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-islamic-state-is-moving-its-egyptian-battle-from-sinai-to-cairo-46439">North Africa</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/catch-up-why-islamic-state-targeted-paris-and-why-its-changing-tack-50731">Europe</a>, and even as far as <a href="https://theconversation.com/jakarta-attacks-is-islamic-states-presence-in-south-east-asia-overstated-52735">Indonesia</a>. Yet for the post-Soviet Central Asian republics the potential consequences of the rise of radical Islamism are not clear.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/opinion/jihads-new-frontier-tajikistan.html?_r=4">For some</a>, IS is simply the latest version of the “Islamic threat” to Central Asian security. The <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2015/europe/syria-calling-radicalisation-in-central-asia.aspx">International Crisis Group</a>, for example, links growing support for violent extremism with the last few decades’ <a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/19/reviving-central-asia-s-religious-ties-with-indian-subcontinent-jamaat-al-tabligh">Islamic revival</a> in Central Asia. Others in the media <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/how-many-tajik-isis-recruits-were-arrested-in-turkey/">have been more sceptical</a> about the influence of IS in the region, and the attitude of some Western officials has, more than anything, been rather <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73836">cheerful</a>. </p>
<p>Yet Central Asian governments have continued to use the “war on terror” as an excuse to <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74061">crack down on opposition</a>, whether Islamic or otherwise. Oppressive security policies towards Islam in Central Asia are often just short-sighted “fixes” that do little to address the long-term structural problems, and if anything, only aggravate them. In their attempts to deal with perceived threats to civil stability, Central Asian governments may actually end up deepening the very problem they seek to resolve.</p>
<h2>What is the threat?</h2>
<p>Very little is known about IS’s involvement in the countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. What we hear is often alarming, or perhaps alarmist.</p>
<p>Kyrgyz authorities cite a raid they mounted on the home of alleged terrorists in July 2015 as <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74326">evidence of an IS cell in the capital, Bishkek</a>. The recent defection to IS <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/tajikistan/11636529/Missing-Tajikistan-police-chief-defects-to-the-Islamic-State.html">of Tajik special forces commander</a>, Gulmorod Khalimov, was also understood as an example of “radicalisation”. While the full context of these events has not been made clear, it’s doubtful that they indicate a broad trend of IS activity in the region. In the case of Khalimov, at least, his defection was probably more tied to his falling out <a href="http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2015/05/31/halimov/">with the regime</a> than to any jihadist conviction.</p>
<p>Estimates of the number of Central Asians recruited by IS vary. Most are <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2015/02/23/islamic-state-messaging-to-central-asians-migrant-workers-in-russia/">migrant labourers</a> with little religious background, recruited from Russia and other intermediary countries. Unlike wealthier Muslims in Europe and in neighbouring Middle Eastern states, in remote Central Asian villages, where the internet is less accessible, residents have less opportunity to join IS.</p>
<h2>Why are Central Asians joining IS?</h2>
<p>Despite limited opportunities and their small numbers, the Central Asian recruits who have joined the extremist group deserve attention. </p>
<p>The absence of widespread political violence in Central Asia since the 1990s may explain why recruitment is lower in this region than in the Middle East and North Africa, where war and brutality have been common features for many years. But violence is more than physical. Threats to a person’s ethnic and gender identity and to their daily survival can be, and have been, just as much of an incentive. </p>
<p>There also appears to be a link between domestic violence and sympathy for violent extremism, which is particularly visible in the highly <a href="https://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/contentassets/2b68cbff89b84558b78ffe9fe4b2a250/semiotics-forced-marriages-domestic-violence--final-report.pdf">patriarchal societies</a> that prevail in much, but not all, of Central Asia.</p>
<p>This points to another crucial factor, which is altogether more personal, more gendered and probably more important: feelings of alienation and exclusion. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32960340">Noah Tucker</a>, who has surveyed the social media accounts of Uzbek IS recruits, notes that “young people who go want to belong to something bigger than themselves, often in a situation in which they feel isolated and alone. They are looking for meaning in their lives, for something significant to be a part of.” In many cases, rather than a gradual process of becoming more and more religious, the shift in opinion to support of jihad occurs rapidly.</p>
<h2>The politics of counter-radicalisation</h2>
<p>It seems that IS’ political ideas about the repression of Muslims, at home and abroad, are more important for many <a href="http://centralasiaprogram.org/blog/2015/02/23/islamic-state-messaging-to-central-asians-migrant-workers-in-russia/">Central Asian recruits</a> than its religious beliefs and practices. The political ideas of IS can be held by someone with little or no knowledge of Islamic moral code and with no commitment to its practice in prayer, worship or other rituals. </p>
<p>This distinction between politics and religion – a distinction found neither in the extremist ideology itself, nor in much secular analysis of it — is narrow but important. The existence of this distinction is crucial to make sense of why IS attracts many Muslims, and even some non-Muslims, with little or no knowledge of Islam.</p>
<p>The politics of counter-radicalisation are far more significant than radicalisation itself to Central Asia, which has, so far, been free of IS-inspired terror attacks. Authoritarian governments in the region have increasingly used the hysteria surrounding IS as a pretext to crack down on their non-violent religious and political opponents. </p>
<p>In Tajikistan, for example, the country’s only real opposition party, the Islamic Revival Party (IRPT), was banned and its leaders charged with terrorism offences in September 2015. And then in January 2016, the <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76696">IRPT’s</a> exiled leader travelled to Iran and met with the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. At first glance, this supposed connection with violent extremism and move to associate with the regime in Iran, widely <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/28/un-summit-isis-iran-not-invited-state-sponsor-terrorism-label">condemned as a state sponsor of terror groups</a>, may seem like evidence of radicalisation – but in reality, the IRPT (very moderate Sunni) and Khameini (a highly conservative Shia) don’t share much religious common ground.</p>
<p>Even so, it is bad news for Central Asia that political and religious opposition can only exist in exile, and with foreign support. Central Asia’s counter-radicalisation policies may end up being a greater threat to democracy than IS-inspired radicalisation itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/54424/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Heathershaw receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK and the British Council in the USA. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Montgomery has received funding from American Councils, IREX, and the British Council.
He is affiliated with CEDAR--Communities Engaging with Difference and Religion. </span></em></p>Islamic State has been spreading its influence beyond the Middle East – and Central Asia could be in the firing line.John Heathershaw, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of ExeterDavid W. Montgomery, Visiting Scholar at the Ali Vural Ak Center for Global Islamic Studies, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/490342015-10-14T05:29:18Z2015-10-14T05:29:18ZWhat are Russia’s grand designs in Central Asia?<p>While international attention has focused on Russian military operations in Ukraine and Syria, Moscow has also been <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html">involved</a> in a flurry of diplomatic and security initiatives to address the growing instability in northern Afghanistan. </p>
<p>But its moves to bolster regional security are more than just a response to local security concerns. Russia has a broader strategy that could leave it as the dominant security actor across much of Eurasia.</p>
<p>Even before the shock of the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/afghanistan-city-of-kunduz-largely-under-taliban-control-1443447706">Taliban occupation of Kunduz</a> in late September, Russian officials were concerned about the fragile security situation in northern Afghanistan, including the rise of Islamic State in northern Afghanistan and its potential spread to Central Asia and thence to Russia’s large Muslim community. As if to emphasise the domestic threat, on October 12 Russian police announced that they had <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/12/isis-trained-russians-foiled-moscow-terror-attack">uncovered a terrorist plot in Moscow</a> apparently involving a group of Central Asian militants.</p>
<p>Insecurity in Afghanistan may pose a potential security threat for Moscow, but it is being seized upon as a major geopolitical opportunity. Against a backdrop of failed Western policies across much of Russia’s southern flank, Moscow is moving quickly to fill a security vacuum in the region. It is strengthening existing alliances to consolidate its hold over former Soviet republics in Central Asia and reshaping the security dynamics of the region around its own favoured security groupings – the <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm">Collective Security Treaty Organisation</a> (CSTO) and the <a href="http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/">Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</a> (SCO).</p>
<p>The first step has been a series of meeting with Central Asian leaders, all on the front line in case of renewed Afghan insecurity. A meeting between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Emomali Rakhmon, the president of Tajikistan, led to promises of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/07/us-russia-tajikistan-defence-idUSKCN0S10TT20151007">more attack helicopters</a> to bolster the existing Russian military based in the country, which has become the hub of a <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/tajikistan-far-outpost-of-great-powers/27141036.html">well-developed defence system</a> against cross-border infiltration.</p>
<h2>Crisis and opportunity</h2>
<p>Putin also took time out of his birthday celebrations in Sochi to meet Almazbek Atambayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, a country that has become the linchpin of Russia’s security strategy in the region. Until 2014 Kyrgyzstan hosted a US airbase, but as I <a href="https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/18208/Lewis%20Russia%20and%20Kyrgyzstan%202015.pdf?sequence=1">explored in a recent paper</a>, Russia has been remarkably successful in ousting the Americans and turning Kyrgyzstan into a dependable ally in the region.</p>
<p>If Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are relatively relaxed about an enhanced Russian military presence, the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, is instinctively allergic to talk of renewed Russian influence and <a href="http://www.academia.edu/4058733/Uzbekistan_s_challenging_withdrawal_from_the_CSTO">pulled out of the Russian-led CSTO in 2012</a>. </p>
<p>Now the northern Afghan crisis offers an opportunity to bring Uzbekistan back into Moscow’s embrace. A delegation from the Russian MOD, led by deputy minister Anatoly Antonov, has recently <a href="http://www.uzmetronom.com/2015/10/07/tovarishhi_po_oruzhiju.html">paid the country its first high-level visit since 2007</a>.</p>
<p>There was no coverage of the Russian visit in Uzbekistan’s heavily censored press. Instead, the <a href="http://www.ng.ru/cis/2015-10-08/1_ashabad.html">newpapers led on a summit</a> with neighbouring Turkmen president, Gurmanguly Berdymukhamedov. The two presidents both have serious security concerns about Afghanistan, but both want to manage them without Russian assistance. Both states have appalling human rights records, limiting the potential for Western aid, and it may be hard to refuse Russian offers of help if unrest grows along their borders with Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Friends reunited</h2>
<p>Afghan officials have also been in Moscow, seeking assistance. Vice-president and Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, has sought to revive old ties during a recent visit, also paying a side visit to the influential Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html">to share experiences of “fighting terrorism”</a>. If the Afghan situation worsens significantly, Dostum offers the potential for Moscow to build up a further band of loyal forces in the north of Afghanistan, in an effective re-run of its Taliban-era support for the Northern Alliance.</p>
<p>Other Afghan government officials attended a conference of SCO members and observers on Afghanistan in Moscow. The chief of Russia’s general staff, first deputy defence minister, Valery Gerasimov, took time out to give a speech that highlighted the failure of US policy in the Middle East, leaving little doubt that Moscow now sees Afghanistan through the same geopolitical prism as it frames Syria. Russian intelligence officials regularly claim that IS is part of a <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/75486">broader US plot to destabilise Central Asia and Russia</a> from the south.</p>
<p>Still, there is no appetite for Russia to get involved in Afghanistan in the way it has in Syria. There are still bitter memories of the humiliating Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But an anti-IS stance in the region provides Russia with the opportunity to consolidate its presence in Central Asia and become the centre of new alliances in the region – with SCO partners such as China, and with Iran – and to sponsor anti-Taliban and anti-IS forces in northern Afghanistan.</p>
<p>More intriguingly, some Russian officials see Moscow’s new strategic initiatives in Syria and Afghanistan as a chance to carve out a significant role in a wider region. State Duma speaker, Sergei Naryshkin, has been talking of a “<a href="http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en">Greater Eurasia</a>”, linking Russia not only to former Soviet republics, but more widely to a range of allies in Syria, Iran, India and China. </p>
<p>This may be just another of Russia’s historical spatial fantasies for now, but in a rapidly changing international environment, Moscow will try to use its dominance in Central Asia as a first step towards shaping a new regional security order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/49034/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lewis has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council project 'Rising Powers and Conflict Management in Central Asia'.</span></em></p>A renewed security focus on Afghanistan is part of Vladimir Putin’s plan to re-energise Russia’s vision of a ‘Greater Eurasia’.David Lewis, Senior Lecturer, Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.