tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/wagner-group-74413/articlesWagner Group – The Conversation2024-03-13T12:44:11Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2244852024-03-13T12:44:11Z2024-03-13T12:44:11ZPutin has no successor, no living rivals and no retirement plan – why his eventual death will set off a vicious power struggle<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580235/original/file-20240306-16-vhol1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=15%2C15%2C5008%2C3230&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vladimir Putin isn't waving goodbye just yet.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-waves-as-he-attends-a-a-news-photo/1247401905">Pavel Bednyakov/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two things are certain concerning <a href="https://news.umich.edu/putting-putin-in-his-place-a-dictator-at-war/">Russian dictator Vladimir Putin</a>. </p>
<p>First, he will be reelected as president in the rigged <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-election-registration-09a46c2cdbb18758838f67b62c710608">election scheduled to run from March 15 to 17, 2024</a>, by a resounding – if fraudulent – margin. </p>
<p>Second, he is not immortal. He will die one day, and he is likely to die in office rather than retiring willingly. Though we don’t know when that day will come, the world might want to consider the power struggle that will commence the day after Putin departs.</p>
<p>Ever since he <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/07/how-putin-changed-russia-forever/">took over as president in 2000</a>, Putin has been perfecting the machinery of electoral fraud to guarantee victory. Vote buying, ballot miscounting, distribution of pre-filled ballots, tampering with ballot boxes, voter monitoring and intimidation, and ballot stuffing are all methods that Putin’s agents employ to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/forensics-of-election-fraud/10D758699881361E5E58B62177A48394">guarantee a favorable result</a>. </p>
<p>He has also jailed political opponents, exiled others and denied yet others the ability to challenge him in fair elections. In the most extreme cases, he has had hands in the murders of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60878663">opposition figures like Boris Nemtsov</a> and, most recently, <a href="https://theconversation.com/yulia-navalnaya-widow-of-alexei-navalny-steps-forward-to-lead-the-russian-opposition-3-points-to-understand-224050">the prison death of Alexei Navalny</a>. There will be no surprises in this election: Putin’s victory will reaffirm his iron grip on Russia’s politics.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rxMe6yoAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scholar of Russian politics and foreign policy</a> who has studied Putin’s regime for the past 25 years, I have watched him <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2016.11.001">build a dictatorship in Russia</a> that rivals the repressive Soviet Union in both its brutality and corruption. </p>
<p>But ironically, Putin is a prisoner of the political system he has built around himself for the past 24 years. Like many dictators, he cannot walk away from power and enjoy a quiet retirement even if he wanted to. He is too attached to, and dependent on, the <a href="https://www.news.com.au/finance/work/leaders/how-russian-president-vladimir-putin-secretly-became-the-worlds-richest-person/news-story/302a422aca6502c7346cc26435ab2e75">mind-boggling wealth and power</a> he has accumulated during his time as a public servant.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man holding a microphone stands in front of a crowd waving Russian flags." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580244/original/file-20240306-16-rr2em0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin can draw a big crowd.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaPutin/c73ce8bf235340c5907fadc647ee1f48/photo">Mikhail Metzel, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Protection against threats</h2>
<p>But even if Putin got to keep his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/20/russian-emails-vladimir-putin-llcinvest">palaces and yachts</a>, there would be no guarantee of safety in retirement. </p>
<p>If Putin gave up power, his successor might come after him. Putin’s personal authority, charisma and influence would always be a threat to his successor as long as he was alive, a tempting target for the next ruler, and Putin knows it.</p>
<p>The other reason most dictators won’t even name their successor is that it might initiate a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-dictatorships-work/8DC095F7A890035729BB0BB611738497">bitter power struggle</a> even before the dictator retires or dies. Imagine if Putin picked a successor: That person would immediately become the target of the unsuccessful contenders not chosen for the job. </p>
<p>There are bitter rivalries even among <a href="https://time.com/4012838/inside-vladimir-putins-circle/">Putin’s inner circle</a> of cronies. Usually Putin manages to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt4cg8c5">keep those struggles in check</a>, but the 2023 revolt by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/26/opinion/russia-putin-ukraine-wagner.html">Wagner warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin</a> against the Ministry of Defense shows how deadly these competitions can turn. Prigozhin was killed in an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-prigozhin-mutiny-wagner-ukraine-africa-03a8797d0c923d3db3f1dd8f604e9a38">August 2023 plane crash</a> whose real <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/who-killed-yevgeny-prigozhin">cause may never be known</a>, but Putin’s hand is widely suspected. </p>
<p>Behind each of the wealthy insiders who support Putin – <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/03/29/1088886554/how-putin-conquered-russias-oligarchy">his oligarchs</a> – stands a deep network of <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/stealing-russia-blind/">corrupt cronies</a> who would stand to lose their power, wealth and perhaps even freedom if a rival succeeded in taking over. Putin’s departure could set off a bloody power struggle whenever it happened, so why would he risk it ahead of time by naming his successor?</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/E5dtkKspznQ?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A superyacht thought to be owned by Vladimir Putin has been impounded in Italy under global sanctions related to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Power over others</h2>
<p>Putin is not likely to be removed by any palace coup. His control over Russia’s security services has allowed him to crush rivals and control the media, judiciary, regional leaders, parliament and community groups. He has also closely monitored threats from potential opposition figures inside and outside his regime, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/23/putin-coup-russian-regime/">made his regime “coup-proof,”</a> as one scholar put it.</p>
<p>His cultivation of <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nationalist-and-imperial-thinking-define-putins-vision-russia">anti-Western Russian nationalism</a> has won him the loyalty of the military and citizenry – at least for now. </p>
<p>Putin also uses his <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05_russia_financial_crisis_gaddy.pdf">control over Russia’s natural resource wealth</a> to keep his oligarchs in line. He decides <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt4cg8c5.12">which oligarchs are appointed</a> to lead Russia’s major state-owned oil, gas, mineral and industrial producers. As long as they remain loyal to Putin and support his political and economic directives, these oligarchs are allowed to <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/03/22/1087654279/how-shock-therapy-created-russian-oligarchs-and-paved-the-path-for-putin">profit handsomely by plundering the income</a> their companies earn.</p>
<p>The oligarchs’ wealth and freedom are conditional on staying in Putin’s good graces. Cross him and they could lose everything. <a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/yukos-case-old-russian-wrong-keeps-haunting-president-putin">Jailed tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky</a> learned that in 2003 when, after criticizing Putin, he was imprisoned and saw his Yukos oil company seized by the state.</p>
<p>And just in case any of them did step out of line despite their dependence on his largesse, there’s another reason none of the oligarchs cross Putin: For decades he has amassed a trove of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/russia-government-blackmail-kompromat/585850/">compromising materials or “kompromat”</a> with which to blackmail even his closest advisers.</p>
<p>In short, the entire Russian elite have nothing to gain and everything to lose by defecting from Putin’s coalition.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A person in a hard hat and a brightly colored vest walks past large piles of cut trees." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580266/original/file-20240306-20-306kr7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=520&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Russian timber and lumber company Segezha Group is run by a close associate of Vladimir Putin and is under sanctions from the U.S. in the wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/worker-walks-near-harvested-timbers-at-a-felling-site-of-news-photo/1543816008">Alexander Manzyuk/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>After death</h2>
<p>If Putin can’t retire and probably won’t be deposed, what happens when he finally does die in office? According to the Russian constitution, the <a href="http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm">prime minister automatically becomes acting president</a> with limited powers when the president can or will no longer serve. Remember, that was Putin’s first step toward <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/01/world/yeltsin-resigns-overview-yeltsin-resigns-naming-putin-acting-president-run-march.html">becoming president in 2000</a> when Boris Yeltsin resigned.</p>
<p>This time around, the transition would look much different. Russia’s current prime minister is <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/who-is-russias-new-pm-a-career-bureaucrat-with-no-political-aims">Mikhail Mishustin</a>, a rather bland and uncharismatic former tax official who lacks a strong power base of his own. Should he succeed Putin as acting president, it’s unlikely that he would become the permanent replacement.</p>
<p>Under the constitution, <a href="http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm">new presidential elections must be held within three months</a> of the president’s death or incapacitation. But the real scramble for power will take place behind the scenes and not at the ballot box. </p>
<p>It’s possible that the potentially violent power struggle could be resolved before the election, but three months is not much time for a successor to consolidate their grip and fill the void left by Putin. It’s also possible that a consensus candidate might be allowed to win the election while the real struggle between factions plays out in the ensuing months and years.</p>
<p>Or, an informal coalition of leaders attempts to rule collectively while holding the key positions of power like the presidency, premiership and security services. This sort of power-sharing arrangement has historical precedent in Russia: Coalitions proclaiming “collective leadership” <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/125599?seq=1">briefly held power after the deaths of both Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin</a>. But in each case, one member of the coalition was able to outmaneuver and eliminate their partners: <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/125599?seq=1">first Stalin</a> and later <a href="https://babel.ua/en/texts/69417-70-years-ago-nikita-khrushchev-headed-the-communist-party-although-no-one-took-him-seriously-after-stalin-s-death-this-is-how-he-defeated-his-competitors-malenkov-and-beria-and-seized-power-in-the-uss">Nikita Khrushchev</a>. These cases are reminders that autocratic succession is usually a messy affair.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four men in hats and overcoats walk down a street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=455&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580237/original/file-20240306-16-vztbm6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=572&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vladimir Lenin’s successors in power in the Soviet Union, from left, Josef Stalin, Alexei Rykov, Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev. Stalin had the others killed and seized sole power for himself.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LENINSSUCCESSORSMOSCOW/86a64430a2e5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/photo">AP Photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the days, months and years after Putin’s departure may be even more turbulent than anyone expects. Never before has so much personal authority been concentrated in the hands of a single Russian leader with so few supporting institutions to help stabilize a leadership transition. There is no monarchical succession, <a href="https://imperialhouse.ru/en/imperialhouse-en/succession/385.html">as under the Romanovs</a>, the last royal family to rule the country. Nor are there the strong institutions of a <a href="https://pages.ucsd.edu/%7Emnaoi/page4/POLI227/files/page1_11.pdf">single-party state</a> to constrain rivals as in Soviet times. </p>
<p>There is only Putin.</p>
<p><em>The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense or United States government.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224485/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Person is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy. The views presented in this article are his own and do not represent the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or United States Government.</span></em></p>A West Point professor of Russian politics and foreign policy looks at the future of Russia without Putin.Robert Person, Associate Professor of International Relations, United States Military Academy West PointLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232532024-02-14T14:26:07Z2024-02-14T14:26:07ZWagner Group is now Africa Corps. What this means for Russia’s operations on the continent<p><em>In August 2023, Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died after <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/05/hand-grenade-explosion-caused-plane-crash-that-killed-wagner-boss-says-putin">his private jet crashed</a> about an hour after taking off in Moscow. He had been Russia’s pointman in Africa since the Wagner Group <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">began operating on the continent in 2017</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>The group is known for <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-in-africa-russias-presence-on-the-continent-increasingly-relies-on-mercenaries-198600">deploying paramilitary forces, running disinformation campaigns and propping up influential political leaders</a>. It has had a destabilising effect. Prigozhin’s death – and his <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/24/timeline-how-wagner-groups-revolt-against-russia-unfolded">aborted mutiny</a> against Russian military commanders two months earlier – has led to a shift in Wagner Group’s activities.</em></p>
<p><em>What does this mean for Africa? <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=fvXhZxQAAAAJ&view_op=list_works&sortby=pubdate">Alessandro Arduino’s research</a> includes mapping the evolution of <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">mercenaries</a> and private military companies across Africa. He provides some answers.</em></p>
<h2>What is the current status of the Wagner Group?</h2>
<p>Following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, the Russian ministries of foreign affairs and defence quickly reassured Middle Eastern and African states that it would be <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-wagner-group-evolves-after-the-death-of-prigozhin/">business as usual</a> – meaning unofficial Russian boots on the ground would keep operating in these regions.</p>
<p><a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2024/01/with-new-name-same-russian-mercenaries-plague-africa/">Recent reports</a> on the Wagner Group suggest a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/12/russias-wagner-group-expands-into-africas-sahel-with-a-new-brand.html#:%7E:text=Wagner%20Group%20has%20been%20replaced,its%20new%20leader%20has%20confirmed.">transformation</a> is underway. </p>
<p>The group’s activities in Africa are now under the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">direct supervision</a> of the Russian ministry of defence. </p>
<p>Wagner commands an estimated force of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa#:%7E:text=Rather%20than%20a%20single%20entity%2C%20Wagner%20is%20a,of%20former%20Russian%20soldiers%2C%20convicts%2C%20and%20foreign%20nationals.">5,000 operatives</a> deployed throughout Africa, from Libya to Sudan. As part of the transformation, the defence ministry has renamed it the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-01-30/russia-raises-the-stakes-in-tussle-over-africa">Africa Corps</a>. </p>
<p>The choice of <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/new-russian-military-unit-recruiting-former-wagner-fighters-ukraine-veterans-2023-12?r=US&IR=T">name</a> could be an attempt to add a layer of obfuscation to cover what has been in plain sight for a long time. That Russian mercenaries in Africa <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-owned-mine-seized-by-russian-mercenaries-in-africa-is-helping/">serve one master</a> – the Kremlin. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, the direct link to Russia’s ministry of defence will make it difficult for Russia to argue that a foreign government has requested the services of a Russian private military company without the Kremlin’s involvement. The head of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-asked-private-russian-military-firm-help-against-insurgents-ifx-2021-09-25/">attempted to use this defence in Mali</a>.</p>
<p>The notion of transforming the group into the Africa Corps may have been inspired by World War II German field marshal <a href="https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/afrika-korps">Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps</a>. Nazi Germany wove myths around his <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/115/4/1243/35179?redirectedFrom=fulltext">strategic and tactical successes in north Africa</a>.</p>
<p>But will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wagner-group-africa-where-rubber-meets-road-206202">distinctive modus operandi</a> that propelled it to infamy during Prigozhin’s reign? This included the intertwining of boots on the ground with propaganda and disinformation. It also leveraged technologies and a sophisticated network of financing to enhance combat capabilities.</p>
<h2>What will happen to Wagner’s modus operandi now?</h2>
<p>In my recent book, <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538170311/Money-for-Mayhem-Mercenaries-Private-Military-Companies-Drones-and-the-Future-of-War">Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones and the Future of War</a>, I record Prigozhin’s adept weaving of disinformation and misinformation. </p>
<p>Numerous meticulously orchestrated campaigns flooded Africa’s online social platforms <a href="https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/yevgeniy-prigozhins-africa-wide-disinformation-campaign/">promoting</a> the removal of French and western influence across the Sahel. </p>
<p>Prigozhin oversaw the creation of the Internet Research Agency, which operated as the propaganda arm of the group. It supported Russian disinformation campaigns and was sanctioned in 2018 by the US government for meddling in American elections. Prigozhin <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html">admitted</a> to founding the so-called troll farm: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I’ve never just been the financier of the Internet Research Agency. I invented it, I created it, I managed it for a long time.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From a financial perspective, Prigozhin’s approach involved establishing a <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581">convoluted network of lucrative natural resources mining operations</a>. These spanned gold mines in the Central African Republic to diamond mines in Sudan. </p>
<p>This strategy was complemented by significant cash infusions from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/09/how-russia-recruiting-wagner-fighters-continue-war-ukraine">Russian state</a> to support the Wagner Group’s direct involvement in hostilities. This extended from Syria to Ukraine, and across north and west Africa.</p>
<p>My research shows Prigozhin networks are solid enough to last. But only as long as the golden rule of the mercenary remains intact: guns for hire are getting paid.</p>
<p>In Libya and Mali, Russia is unlikely to yield ground due to enduring geopolitical objectives. These include generating revenue from oil fields, securing access to ports for its navy and securing its position as a kingmaker in the region. However, the Central African Republic may see less attention from Moscow. The Wagner Group’s involvement here was <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso/">primarily linked</a> to Prigozhin’s personal interests in goldmine revenues.</p>
<p>The Russian ministry of defence will no doubt seek to create a unified and loyal force dedicated to military action. But with the enduring legacy of Soviet-style bureaucracy, marked by excessive paperwork and procrastination in today’s Russian officials, one might surmise that greater allegiance to Moscow will likely come at the cost of reduced flexibility.</p>
<p>History has shown that Africa serves as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">lucrative arena for mercenaries</a> due to various factors. These include: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>the prevalence of low-intensity conflicts reduces the risks to mercenaries’ lives compared to full-scale wars like in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/13/russia-ukraine-war-list-of-key-events-day-720">Ukraine</a></p></li>
<li><p>the continent’s abundant natural resources are prone to exploitation</p></li>
<li><p>pervasive instability allows mercenaries to operate with relative impunity.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>As it is, countries in Africa once considered allies of the west are looking for alternatives. Russia is increasingly looking like a <a href="https://theconversation.com/five-essential-reads-on-russia-africa-relations-187568">viable candidate</a>. In January 2024, Chad’s junta leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, met with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/putin-meets-chad-junta-leader-russia-competes-with-france-africa-2024-01-24/">develop bilateral ties</a>”. Chad previously had taken a pro-western policy.</p>
<p>A month earlier, Russia’s deputy defence minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, who’s been tasked with overseeing Wagner’s activities in the Middle East and north Africa, <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">visited Niger</a>. The two countries <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">agreed to strengthen military ties</a>. Niger is currently led by the military after a <a href="https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic-comments/2023/the-coup-in-niger/">coup in July 2023</a>.</p>
<h2>Where does it go from here?</h2>
<p>There are a number of paths that the newly named Africa Corps could take.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It gets deployed by Moscow to fight in conflicts meeting Russia’s geopolitical ends. </p></li>
<li><p>It morphs into paramilitary units under the guise of Russian foreign military intelligence agencies.</p></li>
<li><p>It splinters into factions, acting as heavily armed personal guards for local warlords. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The propaganda machinery built by Prigozhin may falter during the transition. But this won’t signal the immediate disappearance of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. </p>
<p>Russian diplomatic efforts are already mobilising to preserve the status quo. This is clear from Moscows’s <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/brief-russia-deepens-counter-terrorism-ties-to-sahelian-post-coup-regimes/">backing</a> of the recent Alliance of Sahelian States encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. All three nations are led by military rulers who overthrew civilian governments a recently announced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-mali-burkina-faso-say-they-are-leaving-ecowas-regional-block-2024-01-28/">plans to exit</a> from the 15-member Economic Community of West African States.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alessandro Arduino is a member of the International Code of Conduct Advisory Group.</span></em></p>Will the Wagner Group under new leadership uphold the ruthless modus operandi that propelled it to the spotlight in Africa?Alessandro Arduino, Affiliate Lecturer, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2223882024-02-05T09:27:55Z2024-02-05T09:27:55ZMali, Burkina Faso and Niger want to leave Ecowas. A political scientist explains the fallout<p><em>Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have sent Ecowas, west Africa’s main political union of 15 countries, a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">formal notice</a> of their withdrawal from the bloc. The three countries are governed by military rulers who <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/coups-africa-even-ecowas">have overthrown</a> democratically elected leaders since 2021.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation Africa’s Godfred Akoto Boafo asked political scientist <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">Olayinka Ajala</a> about the implications of the withdrawal.</em></p>
<h2>Why are Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso withdrawing?</h2>
<p>The three countries have given <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20240129-mali-and-burkina-faso-withdraw-from-ecowas">three main reasons</a>.</p>
<p>First is what they call the “<a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/niger-mali-burkina-faso-announce-withdrawal-from-ecowas">illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions</a>” imposed on them for truncating their democracies. </p>
<p>Second is the failure of Ecowas to assist them in their “existential fight against terrorism and insecurity”. </p>
<p>The juntas have also argued that Ecowas has deviated from the founding principles of the organisation and is now <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-68122947">controlled by foreign powers</a>. </p>
<p>In 2001, Ecowas adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance which included a mechanism for unconstitutional changes of government. <a href="https://www.eisa.org/pdf/ecowas2001protocol.pdf">Article 1a</a> of the protocol maintains a “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”. </p>
<p>Ecowas cited this clause as its reason for suspending the three countries and for imposing sanctions against them.</p>
<p>Ecowas has made it clear that it won’t work with the regimes. Its statements make it clear that it has taken a strong stance because it wishes to deter military coups in other countries within the bloc. </p>
<p>The regional bloc is also clearly frustrated at the lack of interest the three countries have shown in returning to democratic rule. It has asked for a clear and definite transition timetable, especially for Mali and Burkina Faso. </p>
<h2>What impact will the withdrawal have on Ecowas?</h2>
<p>The main impact will be on trade and economic development. Ecowas is primarily an economic community and the loss of any member will affect trade and economic development.</p>
<p>The three countries collectively account for 8% of the <a href="https://countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/economic-community-west-african-states">US$761 billion</a> Ecowas gross domestic product (GDP). In 2022, the total trade volume from the Ecowas region totalled <a href="https://punchng.com/mali-b-faso-niger-exit-may-weaken-277bn-ecowas-trade-report/">US$277.22 billion</a>. </p>
<p>The concern is that the exit of these countries could affect the flow of goods and services in the bloc. </p>
<p>Leaving the bloc could have other knock-on effects too:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>The economic collapse of the countries. These countries have strategic importance, especially in food security. Niger is a key source of onions while Burkina Faso exports tomatoes to the sub-region.</p></li>
<li><p>This would lead to an exodus of citizens to other Ecowas countries, further threatening the stability of the bloc. </p></li>
<li><p>Concerns that the three countries will enter into bilateral relationships with countries that might not be favourable to other Ecowas countries. For example, there are already concerns about Niger’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">alliance with Russia</a> after it severed ties with France. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What impact will it have on each of the countries?</h2>
<p>The main impact on the countries will be on the movement of people, goods and services. </p>
<p>Under Ecowas, members enjoy unrestricted movement of citizens within the bloc. Citizens of Ecowas countries can live and work in any country in the bloc. For instance, there are more than 5 million citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger living and working in Côte d'Ivoire alone. Ghana, Togo and Republic of Benin also host large numbers of Nigeriens. </p>
<p>The citizens of all three landlocked countries would no longer be able to travel to other Ecowas states without impediments. Niger also shares a border of over 1,600km with seven states in Nigeria and <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-01-30/analysis-west-africas-brexit-moment-spells-trouble-for-the-region">80% of its trade</a> is done with Nigeria. </p>
<p>The sanctions imposed on Niger by Ecowas are <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate">already affecting</a> citizens of the country. Hardship is likely to increase after the exit if Nigeria decides to police its borders. </p>
<p>Also, depending on how Ecowas agrees to relate to the countries in future, there could be restrictions on goods and services which would further affect the economies of these countries. </p>
<h2>What impact will it have on security in the region?</h2>
<p>The security arrangement might not be affected in the short term. But it could be in the long term. There is already limited security cooperation between the three countries and other Ecowas members. For instance, they have all withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, resulting in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/6/chad-mauritania-pave-way-to-dissolve-g5-anti-rebel-alliance#:%7E:text=The%20G5%20was%20created%20in,major%20issue%20across%20the%20Sahel.&text=The%20two%20remaining%20members%20of,other%20three%20founding%20countries%20left.">collapse of the organisation</a>. </p>
<p>Although the lack of security support from Ecowas was stated as one of the reasons for exiting Ecowas, a total collapse of existing security infrastructure would affect not only the three countries but also other relatively stable states such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin. The three states have joined forces to form the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/military-led-sahel-states-rally-thousands-support-alliance-2023-12-30/">Alliance of Sahel States</a>, but without support from regional groups such as Ecowas, they will struggle to curtail insurgencies. </p>
<p>Currently, Mali has over 1,000 members of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner group), supported by Russia. There are <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-01-31/wagner-forces-under-a-new-flag-russias-africa-corps-burkina-faso">100 in Burkina Faso</a>. After months of Burkina Faso insisting it would not engage foreign mercenaries, the first contingent arrived in January 2024 and more are expected soon. Niger also recently agreed to <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-and-russia-are-forming-military-ties-3-ways-this-could-upset-old-allies-221696">military cooperation</a> with Russia. </p>
<p>This indicates the three countries still require external assistance to combat insecurity. The problem is that Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine and might not be able to support the three countries as much as they would require. If the three countries fail to combat insurgence through the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States, the threat will spread to other countries in the bloc and beyond. </p>
<p>Ecowas leaders have indicated that they are willing to have a dialogue with the three countries. I think Ecowas granting some concessions to prevent them from exiting would be in the interest of the bloc and all the citizens of Ecowas countries.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The decision by the three countries could change the dynamics of Ecowas.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2216962024-01-29T13:08:07Z2024-01-29T13:08:07ZNiger and Russia are forming military ties: 3 ways this could upset old allies<p>In July 2023, Niger’s military took over in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">a coup</a> just two years after the country’s first transition to civilian power. The coup has brought into sharp focus the role of foreign countries in Niger’s politics.</p>
<p>Before the coup, France and the US were the <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/coup-niger">main security allies</a> of Niger. But the coup leaders, led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, were open about their antagonism to France, the country’s former colonial ruler, and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/25/niger-suspends-cooperation-with-international-francophone-body">ordered the French military to leave</a>.</p>
<p>Now the attention of many people in Niger has shifted to Russia.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup</a>, several analysts have <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/niger-russia-sahel/a-66494597">highlighted</a> the role of Russia. Some analysts and regional experts believe Russia might have played a role <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4135841-the-niger-coup-exposes-russias-grand-strategy-for-africa/">directly or indirectly</a> in the military takeover. </p>
<p>Others (including myself) <a href="https://theconversation.com/scramble-for-the-sahel-why-france-russia-china-and-the-united-states-are-interested-in-the-region-219130">argue</a> that Russia is increasing its grip on the country and actively seeking to benefit from the coup. This was evident when Russia and Niger recently <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">agreed</a> to develop military ties. </p>
<p>Although the details of this partnership are still sketchy, Russia promised to increase the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">“combat readiness”</a> of Niger’s military. In addition, there are discussions to partner in the areas of agriculture and energy. </p>
<p>I have been <a href="https://www.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/staff/dr-olayinka-ajala/">researching</a> the security dynamics of the region for over a decade. The Niger junta’s romance with Russia has potential implications for peace and security in the region and beyond. </p>
<p>I have identified three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>escalation of tensions between Niger and France</p></li>
<li><p>discontent between Niger and its regional allies</p></li>
<li><p>likely disruption of a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline project from Nigeria to the European Union through Niger.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Russia in the region</h2>
<p>After the 2023 coup, France and the regional economic bloc Ecowas <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">threatened</a> to use force to reinstate the deposed president. </p>
<p>Russia <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66478430">warned</a> against such a move. </p>
<p>The military junta then expelled French soldiers. France responded by closing its embassy in Niger. </p>
<p>The US also reduced its military and economic cooperation. Washington cut aid to the country by more than <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231010-france-turns-a-page-as-troops-begin-leaving-coup-hit-niger">US$500 million</a> and removed the country from its <a href="https://credendo.com/en/knowledge-hub/usas-removal-uganda-niger-gabon-and-central-african-republic-agoa-has-only-limited">duty free export</a> programme. </p>
<p>The European Union also <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/eu-adopts-new-niger-sanctions-framework/">instituted sanctions</a>. Niger then cancelled its security and <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20231127-niger-junta-revokes-anti-migration-law-in-setback-to-eu-strategy">migration agreements</a> with the European bloc.</p>
<p>Ecowas <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/west-african-bloc-maintains-sanctions-against-niger/3079035">sanctioned</a> Niger. Another major ally, Nigeria, <a href="https://www.channelstv.com/2023/08/03/coup-nigeria-cuts-off-power-supply-to-niger-republic/">cut electricity</a> and instituted further sanctions. </p>
<p>The sanctions, coupled with an increase in insecurity, weakened and isolated Niger. </p>
<p>Rather than budge, the junta looked for alternative partners – like Russia and China. It also recently joined Mali and Burkina Faso to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68122947">announce a withdrawal</a> from Ecowas. </p>
<p>For its part, Russia was positioning itself as a reliable ally. In December 2023, a <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/12/04/russian-officials-visit-niger-to-strengthen-military-ties/">Russian delegation visited Niger</a> and in January 2024, Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-niger-agree-develop-military-ties-moscow-says-2024-01-16/">visited Moscow</a> to discuss military and economic ties. </p>
<p>Russia is no stranger to the region. Over the last three years it has set up <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">security arrangements</a> with the juntas running Niger’s neighbours: Mali and Burkina Faso. This has been done through the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, a private security company supported by Russia, whose operations in Africa were renamed <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/12/17/africa-corps-russia-s-sahel-presence-rebranded_6352317_124.html">Africa Corps</a> in early 2024. </p>
<p>Russian military advisers have been operating in Mali since 2021. In addition, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Wagner group has 400 mercenaries</a> in the country. Russia also <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/08/10/mali-gets-more-military-equipment-from-russia/">delivered military hardware</a> to the country in 2022. </p>
<h2>Implications</h2>
<p>There are three main potential implications for Niger and other allied countries. </p>
<p>First, a potential escalation of tensions between Niger and France. This will happen if Niger grants Russia uranium exploration rights that affect French companies with existing licences. Niger <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-24/top-uranium-producer-niger-launches-mining-sector-overhaul?leadSource=uverify%20wall&embedded-checkout=true">has suspended new mining licences</a> and is currently auditing existing ones. This could affect French companies. France has <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-warn-attack-embassy-niger/">vowed</a> to protect its economic interests in Niger. </p>
<p>It depends on how the partnership between Russia and Niger develops, in particular how Niger intends to pay for its share of any military cooperation. If this involves the Wagner group, as is the case in security partnerships between Russia and Burkina Faso and Mali, the issue of <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/the-wagner-groups-playbook-in-africa-mali/">mining concessions</a> will come into play. Mali and Burkina Faso have paid for Wagner’s involvement by <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2023/03/a-heavy-price-to-pay-2/">offering</a> mining concessions in return for arms, ammunition and mercenaries. </p>
<p>Second, any security tie involving the Wagner group would create further discontent between Niger and its regional allies, especially Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. </p>
<p>Following the coup, Niger announced it was <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-67605967">leaving</a> the G5 Sahel, which was set up to coordinate security operations in the Sahel. This has turned attention to the country’s participation in the <a href="https://mnjtffmm.org/">Multinational Joint Task Force</a>. </p>
<p>Both institutions were set up to fight insurgency in the region and Niger has been an active contributor. The other countries in the joint task force, such as Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic, will be wary of working with Niger if it is in active partnership with Wagner, which is <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/massacres-executions-and-falsified-graves-wagner-groups-mounting-humanitarian-cost-mali">notorious</a> for human rights abuses.</p>
<p>The third likely major fallout from Russia’s involvement revolves around Niger’s relationship with the EU. The EU is currently constructing a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/648851468123254494/pdf/957770PID0P1500Box391429B00PUBLIC0.pdf#page=3">US$13 billion</a> gas pipeline from Nigeria to the bloc through Niger. The pipeline project was designed to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas.</p>
<p>Based on Russia’s animosity with the EU, I believe Russia could use the security alliance to disrupt the project in order to secure its gas delivery to the EU. </p>
<p>The junta can use the pipeline project as leverage against the EU by demanding major financial concessions, putting the delivery of the project at risk and strengthening Russia’s position. </p>
<p>Migration is another area of contention when it comes to the EU. Niger now <a href="https://www.ewn.co.za/2024/01/24/nigers-gateway-to-the-desert-open-again-for-migrants-1">allows</a> mass illegal migration through its territory for onward journey to Europe. This will create more problems for the EU. </p>
<p>The active presence of Russia in Niger could change the security and economic landscape of the region and affect all parties. </p>
<p>I maintain my <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-ecowas-must-do-these-3-things-to-break-the-stalemate-212403">initial position</a> that rather than use force, the Niger junta should be encouraged to restore democracy as soon as possible. At the same time, some of the sanctions should be lifted to encourage dialogue and reduce the influence of Russia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221696/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Niger’s recent military romance with Russia could escalate tensions with France, regional allies and the European Union.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131272023-10-13T20:08:15Z2023-10-13T20:08:15ZFrom Nordic symbols to sledgehammer executions: Inside the Wagner Group’s neo-pagan rituals<p>According to the Orthodox Eastern Church, the spirit of Wagner chief Evgeny Prigozhin now ought to have embarked in heaven or hell. The religion believes it takes 40 days after death for souls to reach their final destination, a threshold that the once hotdog seller reached on 1 October.</p>
<p>Dozens of everyday Russians and fighters gathered in Moscow and several other Russian cities to mark the occasion, amid notable silence from officials and state media. Prigozhin, who died in a plane explosion weeks after having led the biggest mutiny Russian president Vladimir Putin has faced in his 22-year rule, is thought to be <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/08/30/yevgeny-prigozhin-buried-in-secret-in-st-petersburg_6114809_4.html">buried at Porokhovskoye cemetery in St-Petersburg</a>.</p>
<h2>No orthodox Saint</h2>
<p>It would be mistaken to believe that the mercenary boss was a strictly abiding orthodox during his life, however. Aside from a track record that would have questioned most claims to piousness, Prigozhin and his troops largely practiced Slavic neo-paganism, or Rodnovery, an ideology closely linked to nationalist sentiments within the Russian military, especially special forces and security forces. </p>
<p>Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church were quick to shed doubt on the mercenaries’ faith following the failed mutiny on 23 June, when heavily armed Wagner troops in Ukraine <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/wagner-head-suggests-his-mercenaries-headed-moscow-take-army-leadership-2023-06-24/">advanced north toward Moscow, capturing the town Rostov</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/wagner-fighters-neared-russian-nuclear-base-during-revolt-2023-07-10/">even nearing a Russian nuclear base</a>.</p>
<p>Patriarch Kirill’s vicar, Bishop Euthymius, hinted in his sermon that Prigozhin and his mercenaries served pagan idols, <a href="https://www.business-gazeta.ru/news/598974">and thus Satan himself</a>. Following Prigozhin’s secret funeral, attention was also drawn to the cross symbol erected on his stone, which bears closer resemblance to the <a href="https://www.rbth.com/history/335685-russian-crosses-with-roofs">pagan and Old Believer crosses endowed with roofs</a>, <em>golubets</em>, than a traditional <a href="https://www.fontanka.ru/2023/08/30/72651374/">Orthodox tomb cross</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553035/original/file-20231010-23-qzgtn9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/553035/original/file-20231010-23-qzgtn9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553035/original/file-20231010-23-qzgtn9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553035/original/file-20231010-23-qzgtn9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553035/original/file-20231010-23-qzgtn9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553035/original/file-20231010-23-qzgtn9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/553035/original/file-20231010-23-qzgtn9.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=550&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Golubets crosses lay side by side in an Old Believer cemetery in Kem, now Karalia, 1899.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%86_%D0%9A%D0%B5%D0%BC%D1%8C.jpg">Arkhangelsk Governorate / Public domain</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Rodnovery</h2>
<p>From the Russian <em>Rodnaya vera</em> (“Родная вера”), “Native faith”, Rodnovery emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Russian nationalists thrived amid Soviet nostalgia and mounting interest in Russian and ancient history. The movement also fed off <a href="https://www.ejournals.eu/PJACNS/First-View/Special-issue/art/23626">mass esotericism of the 1990s</a>, as the void left by the communist project gave rise to alternative political practices such as predictions, divination and channeling. </p>
<p>Most Rodnovers believe Slavs originated from the ancient “Aryans” (or <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hyperborean">“Hyperboreans”</a>, the inhabitants of the ancient northern civilisation), deriving a special civilising mission toward the rest of the world. According to various estimates, there are <a href="https://vk.com/@centerprofilaktika-neoyazychestvo-ugroza-ili-spasenie-chast-2-issledovateli-i-i">several hundred to several thousand neo-pagans in every major city in Russia</a> (up to 100,000 throughout Russia).</p>
<p>Mercenaries look up to myriad gods. For example, <a href="https://life.ru/p/1125091">Russian martial arts club</a>, from which fighters are often recruited to be sent to special units, have been reported to carry out rituals at Rodonoveran temples by Kaluga, North West of Moscow, in honour of the Slavic thunder god Perun, and some mercenaries have described themselves as “warriors of Perun”. But Wagner PMC also looks beyond the confines of Slavic neo-paganism to incorporate Scandinavian and Germanic gods. </p>
<p>The Scandinavian god Wotan - also known as Odin - is often invoked. Then there is the Germanic thunder god Thor, in many ways Perun’s Germanic equivalent, whose legendary hammer Mjelnir can be found adorning the bodies of fighters in the form of tattoos and medallions. </p>
<h2>Execution rituals</h2>
<p>It is possible to read Wagnerians’ partiality toward sledgehammers to torture and kill enemies as another reference to Thor’s Mjelnir. Footage shows the fighters already wielding the tool in the Syrian war, with at least one <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/in-syria-a-mutilated-corpse-video-evidence-and-new-scrutiny-for-russian-mercenaries-/30285242.html">2017 video showing soldiers crushing a man’s hand</a>. In November 2022, another video of a man being executed by a sledgehammer blow to the head after having switched sides in the Ukraine war also surfaced. Later that month, Evgeny Prigozhin expressed his disapproval of EU legislators’ decision to place Wagner PMC on the bloc’s terrorist list by sending a sledgehammer smeared with flake blood to the European Parliament. The Wagner chief is on record acknowledging the tool as a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-64629660">symbol of the god Thor</a>.</p>
<h2>Runes</h2>
<p>Other neo-pagan symbols favoured by the mercenaries include the kolovrat, a solar swastika, which also appears in the fighters’ tattoos and medallions. Moreover, runes, letters of ancient Germanic pre-Christian writing that are attributed special mystical properties, have been spotted on military vehicles, uniforms and tattoos. Particularly common is the Tiwaz (Týr) rune, an ancient pagan sign symbolizing military leadership. Favoured by the Nazi regime, it became popular among supporters of white supremacy, especially in militaristic groups. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1343546050938871811"}"></div></p>
<p>The Othala rune symbolizes legacy, heritage and inherited property and is popular among supporters of white supremacy. In Libya, the mercenaries of the PMC Wagner placed this rune on military equipment.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1266032460678258694"}"></div></p>
<p>In the Central African Republic, “Wagnerians” used the “STD” runic inscription, consisting of Sigrún, Tiwaz, and Thurisaz runes, on their chevrons. In Slavic neo-paganism, <a href="https://dzen.ru/a/YbO2scoOJVfuF7Yr">this inscription is interpreted as “Warriors bring good and peace by their force” or “Bringing light with their force”</a>.</p>
<h2>The influence of Prigozhin’s right-hand man</h2>
<p>Neo-Paganism owes much of its popularity within PMC Wagner to the group’s alleged co-founder and Prigozhin’s right-hand man, Dmitry Utkin (call sign “Wagner”), <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/01/moscow-buries-wagner-group-founder-dmitry-utkin-with-honors_6119331_4.html">who died in the plane crash alongside his boss</a>. According to one of the <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/29084090.html">PMC commanders</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Wagner is a tough man in general, not a flabby fellow. He came to the positions near Palmyra, undressed, he has a German swastika on his arm [on his shoulder], a tattoo. His helmet has horns. He is a Rodnover. To become a company commander, it is desirable to be a Rodnover”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Former combattant from the paramilitary company, Marat Gabidullin, even recounts that Utkin created an “ideological department” in 2019 in PMC Wagner to <a href="https://fakty.com.ua/ru/svit/20230624-prygozhyn-povnistyu-zalezhnyj-vid-putina-a-pvk-vagnera-derzhutvorennya-intervyu-z-kolyshnim-vagnerivczem/">“popularise” neo-paganism among his subordinates</a>. </p>
<h2>Nazi undertones</h2>
<p>The Wagnerianes’ penchant for neo-paganism is further echoed in the Russian security services. <a href="https://tsargrad.tv/articles/specnaz-v-kolovratah-neojazychniki-pronikli-v-jelitnye-voennye-chasti-rossii_148917">According to military sources</a>, neo-paganism accounts for half of the personnel in some elite units of the Russian security services. </p>
<p>Neo-pagan mercenaries’ veneration of heroes, cult of strength and courage as well as frequent use of runes often lead them to stray toward neo-nazism. In 2021, a picture surfaced of a bare-chested Dmitry Utkin, revealing <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-force-fight-control-libya-tripoli-gqffq9pg0">tattoos of Nazi collar tabs with Waffen SS bolts and military rank</a>. Other Wagner heads have been captured giving <a href="https://en.respublica.lt/signs-of-neo-nazi-ideology-amongst-russian-mercenaries">the Nazi salute</a>.</p>
<p>In addition, the nationalists who merged into neo-paganism introduced the ideas of superiority and anti-Semitism (Victor Shnirelman writes about this in detail, for example, in his book “Russian Rodnovery. Neo-paganism and nationalism in modern Russia”), the idea of protecting the homeland and their loved ones from the “machinations of the West”.</p>
<p>In the case of PMC Wagner and similar militarized groups, Rodnovery often turns out to be a religious component of the phenomenon which <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/nikolay-mitrohin-eto-natsionalizm-rossiyskih-voennyh-/32331596.html">Russian sociologist Nikolai Mitrokhin has dubbed “Russian militarism” or “militarized Russian nationalism”</a> - the Russian military’s nationalism. </p>
<p>According to him: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“At the heart of this nationalism is an ideology particular to the special-purpose units in the Soviet army (special forces, marines, border guards, etc.), which explains why these guys, mostly from the provinces, with big fists, who were drawn not into gangs, but into sports sections of fist fighting or wrestling, and then sent to these special forces, why they have to work harder than ordinary soldiers, to be ready at any moment to die for the state”.</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213127/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denys Brylov ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.</span></em></p>A scholar in religious studies delves into the peculiar world of Rodnovery, a Russian neo-pagan movement that believes in Slavs’ civilising mission. Many in Wagner side with it.Denys Brylov, Senior Researcher in religious studies, National Academy of Sciences of UkraineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2119432023-09-04T14:54:17Z2023-09-04T14:54:17ZWagner, conflict and poverty drive Central African Republic death rate above crisis levels: but where’s the aid?<p>The Central African Republic (CAR) is one of the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/728281/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-central-african-republic/">poorest countries</a> in the world. Its GDP per capita in 2022 was estimated at US$491 per year.</p>
<p>The nation of roughly <a href="https://data.who.int/countries/140">5 million</a> people has been in political turmoil since a violent takeover of power in 2013. A <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13150044">“total breakdown of law and order”</a> has persisted for nearly 20 years. Roughly half of the countryside has been <a href="https://www.polgeonow.com/search/label/central%20african%20republic">outside the government’s control</a>.</p>
<p>In an attempt to gain back control, the government unleashed a campaign led by the Russian mercenaries, the Wagner Group, in 2020. A <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/">report</a> documenting widespread human rights abuses in the CAR by the Wagner Group describes “well-planned campaigns of mass killing, torture, and rape”. This is consistent with the broader content of <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/11/car-russian-wagner-group-harassing-and-intimidating-civilians-un-experts">press releases</a> and <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/speeches/2023/03/central-african-republic-atrocities-must-end-says-volker-turk">speeches</a> coming from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. </p>
<p>The result is that CAR is now experiencing an acute humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>One of the symptoms of the collapse is the country’s high mortality rate. Two surveys published over the last two years have suggested that large areas of the country were experiencing mortality above the emergency threshold. One was a <a href="https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-021-00385-2">survey done by Médecins sans Frontières in 2020 in Ouaka Prefecture</a>. The <a href="https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13031-021-00381-6">other</a> covered most of Ouham-Pende Prefecture and was done with the International Rescue Committee in 2018. The studies found that 4.9% and 5.0% of the studied populations were dying per year. </p>
<p>These estimates are four times higher than the 2020 <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CDRT.IN?locations=CF">UN mortality estimate of 1.1% per year</a> for the CAR. Most agencies, such as the <a href="https://pesquisa.bvsalud.org/portal/resource/pt/des-11113">Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</a>, consider the doubling of the baseline mortality as a crisis, and four times the baseline is one of the three criteria used to define a famine. </p>
<p>Because of the discordance of recent mortality measures and the official mortality rate, as scholars of public health with research experience in conflict settings, we conducted a survey to measure the nation’s crude mortality rate – the fraction of the population dying per unit of time without considering whether it is a young or old population.</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37072800/">study</a> found that 5.6% of the population died in 2022. This is an astonishing mortality rate, in terms of how people are suffering and how wrong the official statistics are. Most of these deaths were from malaria and diarrhoea. We also found that mortality was markedly higher in the areas outside government control. </p>
<p>The dire conditions under which people are living in the CAR have elicited very little interest or humanitarian response from the rest of the world. Yet, as the mortality figures show, there is a desperate need for food aid, along with work programmes and seed and tool distribution. </p>
<p>This is of particular importance in rural areas outside government control. While some humanitarian actors are doing their best to respond, the crisis-level mortality rate suggests that the needs in the CAR are largely unmet.</p>
<h2>Mortality</h2>
<p>We carried out a survey in two areas. One was in the part of the country within the government’s control (roughly half of the country), and one in the areas mostly outside its control. We randomly selected 40 clusters of 10 households in each. </p>
<p>We found that the birth rate was lower and the death rate markedly higher in areas outside government control. Families described malaria or fever and diarrhoea as the primary reported causes of death. Violence accounted for 6% of all deaths.</p>
<p>People cited access to food and access to medical care as their biggest challenges. Households reported eating roughly half as many meals in 2022 as they had in 2020. Only 15% had received food aid distributions in 2022 despite <a href="https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/car/card/2jVaaAZR3Y/">high levels of malnutrition</a> recorded in the country. </p>
<p>These two challenges interact with each other. Children and other vulnerable people like the elderly who would normally survive an episode of malaria or diarrhoea need competent medical attention to survive when malnourished. Yet, because of economic strife and violence, attendance in rural clinics is generally down compared to previous years. </p>
<p>The cost of healthcare is another factor. Some NGOs provide free healthcare, but most visited by our research team charge a modest user fee. While not standardised, they typically charge an amount equivalent to between half and one US dollar, and sometimes charge separately for drugs. The non-clinic costs such as transport can be even greater.</p>
<p>Another cost is that people are forced to make informal and illegitimate payments when trying to get to healthcare facilities. Many mentioned that police or rebel soldiers demanded money to pass at checkpoints. In Ouaka Prefecture, where the charity Médecins Sans Frontières, also known as Doctors Without Borders, provides medical services with no user fees, an interviewee told us that his daughter had recently given birth at home rather than going to the hospital, because the police at the checkpoints knew a pregnant woman would be desperate to get by and they would charge more than the usual 500 franc (about US$0.8) fee for her to pass.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>Higher nationwide death rates have occurred in Africa in the past. Estimates suggest that at least 500,000 of 7 million <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/14623528.2019.1703329?needAccess=true&role=button#page=1">Rwandans died violently in 1994</a>. During Nigeria’s secessionist war in Biafra from 1967 to 1970 <a href="https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/3949853/mod_resource/content/1/Toyin%20Falola%20-%20A%20History%20of%20Nigeria%20cap7.pdf#page=158">between 1 million and 3 million</a> are estimated to have died. These events triggered dramatic escalations in humanitarian response, aid money and political attention. </p>
<p>Our study couldn’t distinguish the relative importance of decades of ongoing conflict, extreme poverty, the economic disruptions since 2020, or the widespread disruption efforts of the Wagner Group in causing the extreme mortality observed in the CAR. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, it’s clear that they are all contributing to the mortality rate. We can find no examples since 1994 of an entire nation dying at such a high rate as we measured in the CAR in 2022. </p>
<p>Humanitarian actors have been raising the alarm <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/major-food-crisis-central-african-republic-car-malnutrition-rates">for over a decade</a>. The UN <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1152894/">has been warning</a> of extreme food insecurity for two years. To the credit of certain agencies, households report food distributions in some of the most critical areas. </p>
<p>Our findings show that despite these efforts, aid is woefully insufficient. Given that the <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-central-african-republic/">US government alone gave over US$330 million</a> in assistance to the CAR in 2021 and 2022, one has to ponder whether the humanitarian community can do better. In particular, are we in the humanitarian community ignoring one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The birth rate was lower and the death rate markedly higher in areas outside government control in the Central African Republic.Leslie Roberts, Professor Emeritus of Population and Family Health at CUMC, Columbia UniversityJennifer O'Keeffe, Doctoral Candidate, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins UniversityKarume Baderha Augustin Gang, Doctoral Candidate, Université Evangélique en AfriqueLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2127072023-09-04T14:40:57Z2023-09-04T14:40:57ZRussia in Africa: Prigozhin’s death exposes Putin’s real motives on the continent<p>The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-prigozhin-plane-crash-may-have-been-caused-deliberately-2023-08-30/">apparent assassination</a> of Yevgeny Prigozhin in the crash of his private jet between Moscow and St. Petersburg represents an inflection point in Russian-African relations. Prigozhin, as leader of the notorious Wagner Group, had been the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/prigozhin-built-an-empire-in-africa-can-it-survive-him-b566755c">point man</a> for Russia in Africa since Wagner first began operations on the continent in 2017. More than a single entity, the Wagner Group is an amalgamation of shell companies deploying paramilitary forces, disinformation and political interference in Ukraine, Syria and Africa. Its leaders have been <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/prigozhin-wagner-plane-crash-last-days-2c44dd5c">sanctioned by 30 countries</a> for the group’s destabilising activities.</p>
<p>Prigozhin was believed to be <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/why-putin-wanted-prigozhin-dead">living on borrowed time</a> after he led a short-lived insurrection – part of a power struggle with the Russian military leadership – in June. While he quickly backed down, the action embarrassed Russian president Vladimir Putin and triggered chatter that Putin’s perceived weakness would embolden other challengers to his authority.</p>
<p>Prigozhin advanced Russian influence in Africa by propping up politically isolated and unpopular authoritarian leaders. As a result of Wagner’s support, these leaders were <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/03/21/how-russia-is-pursuing-state-capture-in-africa-ukraine-wagner-group/">beholden to Russian interests</a>. Wagner’s backing took a variety of irregular forms, like paramilitary forces, disinformation campaigns, election interference, intimidation of political opponents, and arms for resources deals. Prigozhin <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/27/yevgeniy-prigozhin-wagner-support-russia/">referred</a> to this interlocking set of influence operations as “The Orchestra”, which he conducted.</p>
<p>Wagner deployed forces to Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. It has also been interfering in domestic politics and information narratives in some <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russia-interference-undermine-democracy-africa/">two dozen African countries</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://africacenter.org/experts/joseph-siegle/">I research</a> the role of governance in advancing security and development as well as the influence of external actors in Africa, including Russia. Democratic transitions and institutions of democratic accountability are among my interests.</p>
<p>The breadth of Russian political interference in Africa points to <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-books/russias-global-reach-security-and-statecraft-assessment/chapter-10-russia-and-africa-expanding-influence-and">Russia’s strategic objectives for the continent</a>. It aims to secure a foothold in North Africa and the Red Sea, undermine western influence, normalise authoritarianism and displace the UN-based international system.</p>
<p>None of these objectives are about making Africa more prosperous or stable. Rather, the continent is primarily a theatre to advance Russia’s geostrategic interests.</p>
<p>Attempting to maintain the lucrative and influential operations of the Wagner Group in Africa after Prigozhin’s death will make it hard for Russia to deny that it uses irregular and illegal actions to extend its influence.</p>
<h2>Maintaining Wagner without Prigozhin</h2>
<p>The Wagner model has seen Russian influence expand rapidly in Africa. That’s despite Russia <a href="https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/russia-tries-break-isolation-engaging-africa-37131">investing very little on the continent</a>. Most of Wagner’s costs have been covered through cash and mineral concessions provided by host regimes. By some accounts <a href="https://thesentry.org/reports/architects-of-terror/">revenues from mining operations</a> in the Central African Republic and Sudan generate billions.</p>
<p>It is no surprise that Russia would want to keep the Wagner enterprise going. Tellingly, on the day of Prigozhin’s plane crash, deputy defence minister <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/russian-deputy-defense-minister-meets-with-libyan-commander/2975834">Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was in Libya</a> to reassure warlord Khalifa Haftar of Russia’s ongoing support. Yevkurov later visited the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-says-leader-discussed-possible-military-cooperation-with-russian-2023-08-31/">military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso</a> to deliver the same message.</p>
<p>The question will be whether the Russian military has the capacity. Russia needs soldiers in Ukraine. So, it may not have experienced fighters to spare in Africa. It is also an open question whether Wagner troops will agree to sign contracts with the Russian defence ministry, given the way their leader was dispatched.</p>
<p>The Russian government would also need to recreate the multidimensional dealings that made Wagner’s operations effective in shoring up client regimes. For years, Russia has promoted <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/report/russian-hybrid-warfare">hybrid warfare</a> – the fusion of conventional and subversive tools. Synchronising this across multiple African contexts will require greater dexterity than the Russian security bureaucracy is likely capable of, however.</p>
<p>Finally, Russia has benefited from the plausible deniability that Wagner has provided while doing Putin’s bidding. In every context in which Wagner forces have been deployed, they have been <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133007">credibly accused of human rights abuses</a> including rape, torture and extrajudicial killings. In Mali, Wagner is linked to more than 320 incidents of human rights abuses and <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/#s6">hundreds of civilian deaths</a>. Wagner has also been accused of driving away local communities where it has secured mining concessions, effectively annexing African territory.</p>
<p>By directly taking over the mantle of Wagner operations in Africa, the Russian government can no longer claim ignorance or impotence to do anything about these unlawful and destabilising actions. Russia has largely escaped serious reputational costs for Wagner’s thuggish activities in Africa. But this will change when it owns the repressive tactics Wagner has deployed.</p>
<h2>Reassessments in Africa</h2>
<p>What of Wagner’s African clients? Leaders of these regimes have come to power through extraconstitutional means. They restrict opposition voices and media. They are isolated internationally. Simply put, they cannot survive without Moscow’s support. So, we should not expect a change in receptivity from the military juntas in Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, the co-opted leadership in the Central African Republic, or the Libyan warlord, Haftar.</p>
<p>What will be telling is the reaction from other governments on the continent. Some will continue to see value in flirting with Russia as a way of hedging against international criticism.</p>
<p>Russia’s reach in Africa may be exceeding its grasp, however. There is a growing awakening on the continent of <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-provides-a-global-stage-for-moscow-to-puff-up-its-influence-209982">how little Russia actually brings to Africa</a> in terms of investment, trade, jobs creation or security. Its deployment of mercenaries, disinformation, political interference and arms for resources deals mean it actually amplifies instability on the continent.</p>
<p>The symbolism of this was vividly brought home in the days before the <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">Russia-Africa Summit</a> at the end of July. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-putin-grain-turkey-syria-ac5c945990c2c53eeca37e642ab6c5a7">Russia pulled out of the Black Sea grain deal</a> that had enabled 33 million tonnes of grain to get from Ukraine to Africa and other parts of the world. The deal had eased supply chain restrictions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Not only did Russia scuttle the deal: it <a href="https://www.eurasiantimes.com/india-china-turkey-urge-russia-to-resume-black-sea-grain/">bombed the Ukrainian ports</a> that were exporting the grain, wasting 180,000 tonnes in the process. The contempt Putin showed for African interests by this action was hard to ignore.</p>
<p>This disregard, coupled with recognition that Russia offers relatively little to Africa, contributed to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-africa-summit-vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-wagner-group/">only 17 African heads of state</a> attending the St. Petersburg summit. By comparison 43 African heads of state attended the Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi in 2019.</p>
<p>The way that Prigozhin was eliminated must also give African leaders pause. </p>
<p>Putin speaks often of his desire to create a new international order. Russia’s lawlessness at home and abroad is bringing into sharp focus what his world order would look like. And that’s not a vision many African leaders share.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212707/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia is not interested in helping Africa to prosper or achieve stability, but as a theatre for advancing the Kremlin’s geostrategic interests.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2124672023-08-30T09:08:34Z2023-08-30T09:08:34ZWagner Group: what Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death means for stability in Africa<p>The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin after his <a href="https://theconversation.com/yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group-boss-joins-long-list-of-those-who-challenged-vladimir-putin-and-paid-the-price-212181">private jet crashed</a> on August 23 has raised questions about the Wagner Group’s future. Many in the west <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/24/wagner-boss-yevgeny-prigozhin-reported-killed-death-russia-biden-suggests-putin">suspect Kremlin involvement</a> in his death and are asking what will become of the mercenary group without its charismatic leader.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group, often described as <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/23/what-we-know-about-the-shadowy-russian-mercenary-firm-behind-the-attack-on-u-s-troops-in-syria/">a private military company (PMC)</a> is a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">state-linked</a> actor with <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">close ties to the Russian military</a>. It has involved itself in the internal politics of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">numerous African countries</a>, advancing Kremlin interests while providing the Russian leadership with “plausible deniability”.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">The Wagner Group comprises</a> former Russian soldiers, convicts and foreign nationals paid to provide mercenary services. It first emerged in Crimea in 2014 and has since extended its services to many other countries including many in Africa. </p>
<p>The death of the Wagner Group’s charismatic leader, a former close ally of Putin, raises questions about these African operations. Based on credible news reports, these include activities in: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/wagner-group-russia-mercenary-ukraine-africa/">Equatorial Guinea</a>, <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Central African Republic (CAR)</a>, <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">Chad</a>, <a href="https://african.business/2022/09/resources/russias-wagner-group-involved-in-central-african-forestry-trade">Mali</a>, <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135">Burkina Faso</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Sudan</a>, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Mozambique</a> and <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">Madagascar</a>. The group reportedly has more than <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">5,000 operatives</a> across its Africa operations.</p>
<p>A common denominator among these countries is the presence of insurgencies or civil wars, abundant natural resources, corrupt leadership, and unconstitutional governance, among other factors. Many of these states, such as <a href="https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Libya-Remains-a-Failed-State-11-Years-After-NATO-Intervention-20220217-0006.html">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/7/24/sudan-is-heading-towards-complete-state-collapse">Sudan</a>, and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/07/mozambique-is-a-failed-state-the-west-isnt-helping-it/">Mozambique</a>, have many of the characteristics of <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/failed-states">“failing” or “failed states”</a>. </p>
<h2>Wagner Group in Africa</h2>
<p>Designated by the US government as a “<a href="https://www.icct.nl/publication/understanding-us-designation-wagner-group-transnational-criminal-organisation#:%7E:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20declaring,United%20States.%E2%80%9D%20What%20constitutes%20a">transnational criminal organisation</a>” the Wagner Group offers <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/06/26/wagner-group-russia-mercenary-ukraine-africa/">a range of services</a>. These include conducting offensive combat operations, training, ensuring regime security, advising government leadership, and the management and extraction of natural resources. </p>
<p>Described by South Africa-based think tank In On Africa as “<a href="https://www.inonafrica.com/2023/07/07/more-than-mere-mercenaries-the-wagner-group-in-africa/">more than mere mercenaries</a>”, the Wagner Group has also discreetly but effectively put stress on Afro-European relations while bolstering autocratic governments. </p>
<p>It has also promoted anti-neo-colonial figures, <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/296849/russia-how-yevgeny-prigozhin-funded-kemi-seba-to-serve-his-own-african-ambitions/">such as Kemi Séba</a> (also known as Capo Chichi). Currently based in Moscow, Séba has <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-09/niger-coup-prigozhin-wagner-exploits-anti-french-sentiment/102696370">gained celebrity status </a> through his social media presence and TV talk shows which frequently target French foreign policy. </p>
<p>This has helped to popularise and boost anti-French sentiment among francophone countries in west Africa. France has arguably <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/12/emmanuel-macron-france-erased-from-africa-niger-coup/">continued a neo-colonial approach to west Africa</a> and refused to accept that the era of its “<a href="https://newafricanmagazine.com/16585/">Francafrique</a>” sphere of influence is over, which has <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/8/17/french-mistakes-helped-create-africas-coup-belt">exacerbated instabilities</a> across the region. For instance, the persistence of French <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/07/12/the-cfa-franc-french-monetary-imperialism-in-africa/">control of the CFA Franc</a>, the common currency used among former French colonies, gave it control over their economies and political affairs.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in west Africa furthers Russian interests by challenging French dominance. The group has done this through the reportedly <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/russia-internet-research-agency-disbands/">now defunct</a> <a href="https://blogs.prio.org/2023/03/soft-power-and-disinformation-the-strategic-role-of-media-in-wagners-expansion-in-africa/">Internet Research Agency</a>, known as “Russia’s troll farm”. This organisation orchestrated disinformation campaigns on social media to spread anti-colonial sentiments. </p>
<p>By doing this, it reinforced the <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/anti-french-sentiment-west-africa-reflection-authoritarian-confrontation-collective-west">already strong anti-French sentiments</a> in the Sahel region to discredit France and position Russia as better alternatives. The Internet Research Agency was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-prigozhin-admits-links-what-us-says-was-election-meddling-troll-farm-2023-02-14/">directly associated with the Wagner Group</a> via Prigozhin as its founder and owner.</p>
<p>Beyond propping up failed and failing states, the Wagner Group has faced accusations of <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">targeting civilians</a> and committing severe human rights violations in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/24/mali-new-atrocities-malian-army-apparent-wagner-fighters">Mali</a>, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/30/russian-mercenaries-accused-of-human-rights-abuses-in-car-un-group-experts-wagner-group-violence-election">CAR</a>. </p>
<h2>The circular business of conflict</h2>
<p>In addition to its military activities, the Wagner Group is estimated to have garnered <a href="https://www.energyintel.com/00000189-bfb6-d835-abbb-ffbf47c10000">more than US$20 billion</a> (£15.9 billion) from its diverse business dealings, which range from <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pmc-russias-wagner-group-in-sudan-gold-military-junta/a-65439746">gold mining in Sudan</a> to <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/313233/how-wagner-prigozhin-teamed-up-with-the-cars-diamond-mafia/">diamond extraction in CAR</a>, where it is also reported to be heavily invested in the <a href="https://african.business/2022/09/resources/russias-wagner-group-involved-in-central-african-forestry-trade">forestry and timber business</a>. </p>
<p>Since mercenaries tend to thrive in conflicts, they are likely to profit by prolonging the conflicts they become involved in. So the activities of a PMC such as Wagner can exacerbate conflicts by prolonging hostilities, as witnessed in Libya, Mozambique and CAR. </p>
<p><a href="https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2023/03/06/when-private-military-operations-fail-the-case-of-mozambique/">For instance</a>, small raids against villages and police units in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, where Wagner groups were deployed, escalated into a full-scale terrorist insurgency linked to the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/43047/chapter-abstract/361462906?redirectedFrom=fulltext">Islamic State’s Central African Province</a>.</p>
<p>In Libya, meanwhile, Wagner Group units <a href="https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/108429/pdf/">first appeared in 2018</a>, according to a submission to the UK parliament, ostensibly to provide technical support for repairing and maintaining armoured vehicles for the Libyan National Army. Since then, the scope of their operations has expanded with increased funding from Russia and the fighting continues.</p>
<p>The involvement of Wagner or other PMCs in these countries almost inevitably leads to the erosion of sovereignty as unstable governments become dependent on the mercenaries for their survival. This situation may cause local leaders to favour the interests of the PMCs, reinforcing their roles as puppet leaders, causing mass exploitation of resources, leading to environmental degradation, poverty, grievances, intensified conflicts – all of which creates further demand for mercenary services.</p>
<p>As long as certain African countries and their leadership remain plagued by corruption, extended terms in office, election manipulations, neo-colonial influences, and looting of the national treasury, coups will remain a persistent concern. Military coups are on the rise again <a href="https://businessday.ng/backpage/article/as-coups-return-to-west-africa-frances-footprint-in-africa-fades/">particularly in west Africa</a>, stimulating an increased demand for mercenary services. As such, Prigozhin’s death is unlikely to significantly affect the Wagner Groups’s African operations. The more pertinent question is what the new leadership will look like and whether it will be more directly state-controlled. </p>
<p>But the use of mercenary companies such as the Wagner Group to help unstable or illegitimate governments hold on to power will not bring sustainable peace. Instead, dialogue, transitional governments reflecting people’s desires, the rule of law, and genuine democracy are essential. Otherwise, Africans will keep demanding positive change by all means.</p>
<p>To maintain popular support in an era of instability, African leaders must be seen to act in their people’s best interests. They must heed popular demands to halt misrule and the misuse of African resources across the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212467/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Idris Mohammed receives funding from the Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development to commission a report on sexual violence in the northwest region of Nigeria. He is a member of conflict research network of west Africa ( CORN West Africa). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russia was using the mercenary group to further its foreign policy aims in west Africa. There’s no reason to think Prigozhin’s death will change that.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonIdris Mohammed, Conflict Researcher, Department of Mass Communication, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, SokotoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122092023-08-25T11:17:05Z2023-08-25T11:17:05ZNiger’s resource paradox: what should make the country rich has made it a target for predators<p>A month after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721">coup in Niger</a> that toppled the democratically elected civilian government of Mohamed Bazoum, the country’s neighbours are still debating the possibility of <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-why-an-ecowas-led-military-intervention-is-unlikely-211136">military intervention</a>. </p>
<p>The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) – a coalition of west African countries, which includes Niger – has said it intends to send in a taskforce to topple the military junta led by General Abdourahamane Tchiani, which ousted Bazoum on July 26.</p>
<p>But the plan to intervene is not without controversy. Niger, a landlocked nation, shares borders with Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso. These countries <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/6/niger-coup-divisions-as-ecowas-military-threat-fails-to-play-out">have expressed solidarity with the military junta</a> and have committed to oppose any potential Ecowas intervention. </p>
<p>France, which <a href="https://capstone.ndu.edu/Portals/83/20-2%20Africa%20Field%20Study%20Book%20II%20Final%20reduced%20Part%20II.pdf">occupied Niger</a> from 1890 until independence in 1960, has also considered intervention – it has a small contingent of troops in the country ostensibly to combat jihadi insurgency in the Sahel region – which the junta has given them <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/23/niger-group-calls-for-withdrawal-of-french-troops//#:%7E:text=Some%201%2C500%20French%20soldiers%20have,its%20Sahel%20operation%20last%20year.&text=On%20August%203%2C%20Niamey's%20ruling,a%20one%2Dmonth%20notice%20period.">notice to withdraw</a>. Algeria has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/22/african-union-issues-ambiguous-view-on-possible-niger-military-intervention#:%7E:text=While%20the%20AU%20issued%20a,diplomatic%20efforts%20to%20restore%20democracy">denied France permission</a> to fly over the country.</p>
<p>For now, the situation remains fluid and uncertain. But beneath the surface of daily news headlines is an intricate web of geopolitical competition and strategic agendas that have profound consequences for the Nigerien people. </p>
<p>The recent coup underscores <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">a geopolitical rivalry</a> deeply rooted in colonial and neo-colonial legacies and intensified by some western nations’ drive for the control of Niger’s resources.</p>
<p>Although Niger <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">grapples with extreme poverty</a>, leading to widespread malnutrition and hunger among its citizens, it is the world’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/01/uranium-niger-france-coup/">seventh-biggest producer of uranium</a>. This juxtaposition of mineral wealth and societal poverty underscores the irony of a nation abundant in resources yet plagued by profound economic hardships.</p>
<p>First <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger.aspx#:%7E:text=Uranium%20was%20discovered%20at%20Azelik,(CEA)%20initiated%20further%20studies.">discovered in 1957 at Azelik</a> by a French colonial expedition looking for copper deposits, Uranium now ranks as Niger’s second-largest export in monetary value – <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">surpassed only by gold</a>. The country is a <a href="https://www.powerengineeringint.com/nuclear/coup-in-niger-brings-countrys-uranium-resources-into-sharper-focus/">principal supplier of uranium to the European Union (EU)</a> and contributes between 15% and 17% of the uranium fuelling France’s electricity generation. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the country <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/video/20230814-power-cuts-worsen-in-niger-following-sanctions-from-ecowas">struggles to produce its own electricity</a> because Nigeria <a href="https://theconversation.com/niger-coup-west-african-union-has-pledged-to-intervene-but-some-members-support-the-plotters-210990">recently terminated</a> its power supply to the nation as a sanction against the military junta, leaving much of the country in darkness.</p>
<h2>Western exploitation</h2>
<p>Given its abundant natural resources, it seems counterintuitive for Niger to rank among the world’s poorest nations. Yet its economic and political struggles have deep roots in historical <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">foreign interventions, exploitation and resource extraction</a>. This situation has, for decades, been further compounded by <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/27/timeline-a-history-of-coups-in-niger">misguided and ineffective leadership</a>, often conniving in exploitation by foreign interests.</p>
<p>While some Ecowas members oppose the coup in Niger and have threatened <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/18/africa/niger-ecowas-d-day-military-intervention-intl-hnk/index.html">military intervention against the coup leaders</a>, some western countries are manoeuvring to uphold their interests. The Nigerian senate <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-senate-cautions-against-niger-military-intervention/a-66450388">opposes military intervention</a>, with one of its <a href="https://tribuneonlineng.com/niger-coup-dont-allow-us-france-push-you-to-unnecessary-war-orji-kalu-tells-tinubu/">members alleging</a> that Ecowas would merely be doing France and America’s bidding. Senator Orji Uzor Kalu suggested that if there is to be military action, it should be carried out by French and US troops.</p>
<p>Colonial powers and other major geopolitical actors have <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ee6fb170-3284-46fa-9eb7-da64212c4989">profoundly influenced</a> Niger’s contemporary situation. France, referred to by the New York Times recently as the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/05/world/africa/niger-coup-france-west-africa.html">Former Coloniser that Stayed</a>”, has already warned that any attack on its interests in Niger will be <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/07/30/france-warns-attacks-on-its-interests-in-niger-will-not-be-tolerated">met with retaliation</a>. Meanwhile the reported presence of Wagner Group mercenaries in the country, after a request from the coup leaders, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/08/05/niger-junta-wagner-group-mali-mohamed-bazoum-ecowas/">is a proxy for Russian interests in Niger</a>. </p>
<p>But following the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66599733">reported death of Wagner Group boss, Yevgeny Progozhin</a>, after his private jet is understood to have crashed on a trip from St Petersburg to Moscow on August 23, the status of the Wagner Group activities in Niger – and Africa generally – is uncertain. However, their operations may come under the direct control of Russia’s military. </p>
<h2>African resources, western interests</h2>
<p>Another important resource issue threatened by instability in Niger is the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/african-countries-seek-to-revive-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline-dream/a-62778681">trans-Saharan gas pipeline (TSGP)</a>, designed to transport natural gas from Nigeria through Niger and on to Algeria and then to Europe. One of the drivers of this project in the past two years has been the European need to wean itself off Russian gas supplies in light of the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Yet again, western resource needs are dictating events in supposedly independent and sovereign African countries.</p>
<p>The dominant narrative in west Africa frequently presents foreign interventions as benevolent efforts to stabilise the Sahel region, in particular, against the threat of jihadi insurgency. Yet a deeper examination <a href="https://journal.iag.ir/article_118383_en.html">uncovers a more intricate reality</a>. As western powers strive to shape political dynamics in Niger – driven not just by a desire for stability but also to preserve their dominance and <a href="https://unherd.com/2023/08/niger-and-the-collapse-of-frances-empire/">control over resource allocation</a> – they portray Niger, and by extension, Africa, as mere markets within the global economy. This ignores the potential <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-coup-could-exacerbate-humanitarian-crisis">humanitarian consequences</a> of such interventions for the people of Niger and west Africa in general.</p>
<p>As Niger faces political instability and possible violent conflict, there’s a pressing need to critically evaluate the motives and repercussions of foreign intervention. </p>
<p>Beyond the veneer of the quest for democracy and stability, the various players’ deeper strategic intentions must be scrutinised. This is the key to understanding the multifaceted dynamics in the Sahel region and their broader global implications.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212209/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A geopolitical struggle for valuable resources such as uranium is behind the wrangling over Niger.Francis Okpaleke, PhD Candidate, Politics and International Security, University of WaikatoOlumba E. Ezenwa, Doctoral Research Fellow, Conflict, Violence, & Terrorism Research Centre, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122212023-08-24T20:51:05Z2023-08-24T20:51:05ZVladimir Putin’s suspected elimination of Yevgeny Prigozhin: The hunter to become the hunted?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544594/original/file-20230824-3987-zkdg4d.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3988%2C2167&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People carry a body bag away from the wreckage of a crashed private jet near the Russian village of Kuzhenkinoi on Aug. 24, 2023. Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner Group, reportedly died in the crash along with nine other people.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/vladimir-putins-suspected-elimination-of-yevgeny-prigozhin-the-hunter-to-become-the-hunted" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, is presumed dead. Russia’s Air Transport Agency has said <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/24/prigozhin-wagner-plane-crash-list-dmitry-utkin/">he was on the passenger manifest of 10 people on board a private jet that came down in a fiery crash</a> close to Moscow, killing everyone on board, while a <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/08/24/prigozhin-presumed-dead-final-nail-in-coffin-for-russias-wagner-group.html">Telegram channel associated with Wagner confirmed his passing.</a></p>
<p>Plane crashes do happen, but in Russia, any unexpected events with political links are viewed with great suspicion. An incident of this magnitude will invariably cast suspicion on the Kremlin. Vladimir Putin’s regime is unlikely to be able to disown the crash — and there will most certainly be unforeseen and unintended consequences.</p>
<p>Many believed Prigozhin was <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/24/opinions/wagner-chief-prigozhin-borrowed-time-putin-treisman/index.html#:%7E:text=Wagner%20Group%20founder%20Yevgeny%20Prigozhin,mutiny%20against%20Russia's%20military%20leadership.">living on borrowed time</a> ever since he led an unsuccessful uprising against Russian forces in June, when he not only demanded a change in Russia’s military leadership but challenged Putin’s rationale for his war on Ukraine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-wagner-group-revolt-in-russia-could-mean-for-the-war-in-ukraine-208428">What the Wagner Group revolt in Russia could mean for the war in Ukraine</a>
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<h2>Eliminating opponents</h2>
<p>Though Prigozhin said his actions <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-26/putin-defense-chief-who-was-focus-of-wagner-mutiny-visits-troops?in_source=embedded-checkout-banner">weren’t an act against Putin</a>, there could hardly have been a more brazen affront. Normally, Putin <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/list-of-people-putin-is-suspected-of-assassinating-2016-3">promptly and mercilessly eliminates opponents for far less.</a></p>
<p>In fact, during the morning of the mutiny, Putin <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9791119/putin-wagner-group-rebellion/">labelled the mutineers traitors and their actions treason</a>. Yet by the afternoon, faced with the reality that his military and his security services had shown no inclination to fight for him, Putin granted the mutineers amnesty. Several days later, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/10/world/europe/putin-prigozhin-meeting-wagner.html">he met with Prigozhin</a> without punishing him.</p>
<p>The Russian leader was clearly faced with an intractable dilemma. His personality-centred regime — despite well-intentioned attempts by scholars to provide <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1282669">sophisticated theoretical characterizations of “Putinism”</a> — does not fit the standard mould for authoritarian leaders.
Various historical strands, philosophies or precedents for clues simply muddy the waters when it comes to Putin’s rationales and motives.</p>
<p>In certain ways, Putin’s rule is both more simple and more sinister. He is all about power and privilege, and given the nature of his corrosively corrupt regime, which <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/08/23/yevgeny-prigozhins-reported-death-may-consolidate-putins-power?utm_content=article-link-1&etear=nl_today_1&utm_campaign=a.the-economist-today&utm_medium=email.internal-newsletter.np&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=8/23/2023&utm_id=1734548">the <em>Economist</em> magazine calls a “mafia state,”</a> he must ruthlessly and visibly punish challengers to deter anyone from infringing on his powers.</p>
<p>Normally, Putin’s brutality has paid off and reinforced his image of invincibility. Opponents have been shot, poisoned, fallen out of windows or committed sudden suicide. Antony Blinken, the United States secretary of state, quipped recently: <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-21-23/h_57611fbdfa9f02986dafbb36c1dff340#:%7E:text=US%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony%20Blinken%20said%20that%20Wagner%20founder,has%20an%20open%2Dwindows%20policy.">“NATO has an open-door policy; Russia has an open windows policy.”</a></p>
<p>Putin, however, also appreciated the risks of eliminating Prigozhin. He had good reason to be cautious. </p>
<h2>Prigozhin loyalists</h2>
<p>Unlike other political opponents, or various dissidents, Prigozhin commanded a powerful base. The Wagner Group, co-founded by Dmitry Utkin, may have been bloated by the recruitment of thousands of convicts, but at its core the organization is comprised of highly trained former Russian military men, often from elite units, who have been fiercely loyal to Prigozhin.</p>
<p>These men could be profoundly dangerous if angered and focused on a particular cause.</p>
<p>Yet Putin could not afford to have the leader of the mutiny go unpunished.</p>
<p>The early reaction of the Wagner Group to the death of Prigozhin, (and his No. 2, Utkin) — declaring on the social media platform Telegram that Prigozhin was a “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/plane-allegedly-carrying-wagner-chief-prigozhin-crashes-after-mutiny-against-putin/#:%7E:text=On%20its%20Telegram%20group%2C%20Wagner,had%20been%20on%20the%20plane.">hero of Russia, a true patriot of his Motherland… (who) died as a result of the actions of traitors to Russia”</a> — offers a noteworthy warning of events to come.</p>
<p>In fact, just weeks before the mutiny, Prigozhin was portrayed as a hero in Russia. In Rostov-on-Don, he and the mutineers were greeted by the population with enthusiasm. </p>
<p>As news began to spread of his death, Russians began leaving masses of flowers at Wagner headquarters in St. Petersburg.</p>
<p>The risk here for Putin is that rather than looking strong and fearsome — which could be the case in the short-term amid state media’s reporting of the crash — he will also appear duplicitous and increasingly desperate. </p>
<p>Over the long term, it’s hardly inconceivable that the core members of Wagner, who so admired and were so loyal to Prigozhin, will seek revenge against the Russian leader. In that case, Putin, who always views himself as a hunter, might well become the hunted.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aurel Braun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The core members of the Wagner Group, who are loyal to the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, will likely seek revenge against Vladimir Putin for his death. Is the Russian leader now living on borrowed time?Aurel Braun, Professor, International Relations and Political Science, University of TorontoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2122192023-08-24T20:19:37Z2023-08-24T20:19:37ZRegardless of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s fate, Vladimir Putin benefits<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544640/original/file-20230824-18379-6nqbwx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C5%2C3936%2C2667&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Face masks depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin displayed at a souvenir shop in St. Petersburg, Russia. Prigozhin reportedly died in a plane crash on Aug. 23.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo, File)</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe style="width: 100%; height: 100px; border: none; position: relative; z-index: 1;" allowtransparency="" allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" src="https://narrations.ad-auris.com/widget/the-conversation-canada/regardless-of-wagner-group-leader-yevgeny-prigozhins-fate-vladimir-putin-benefits" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>On Aug. 23, Russian media reported that Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/moscow-plane-crash-yevgeny-prigozhin-1.6945096%22">was listed among the passengers of a plane that crashed, leaving no survivors</a>. Speculation has <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/2023/08/24/Prigozhin-death-is-likely-Putin-s-payback-for-mutiny-warning-to-opposition-Analysts">already begun about Putin’s potential involvement in the crash</a>. This speculation is likely to continue unabated well into the future. </p>
<p>Some have even argued that due to <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/business-jet-crash-russia-kills-10-officials-wagner-102499339">many individuals changing their names to Yevgeny Prigozhin in an attempt to thwart surveillance of the Wagner leader</a>, it might not have been him on the flight.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether Putin was responsible or even if Prigozhin is still alive, the latter’s position has been undermined in Russia; Putin will benefit from this development.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="men in uniform stand around the remains of a plane in a field" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/544638/original/file-20230824-22-pas8d2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian servicemen inspect a part of a crashed private jet that may have been carrying Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)</span></span>
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<h2>Domestic advantages</h2>
<p>Prigozhin’s death will stabilize Putin’s domestic position. Putin has been at his <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-the-wagner-group-revolt-in-russia-could-mean-for-the-war-in-ukraine-208428">weakest point</a>, politically speaking, since the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wagner-groups-rebellion-putin-unfolded/story?id=100373557">Wagner Group’s insurrection in June</a>.</p>
<p>Not only did domestic elites <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-the-fallout-of-russias-wagner-rebellion/">not immediately support Putin</a>, but the insurrection demonstrated to the Russian people that Putin’s position was not unassailable. Prigozhin’s revolt challenged the Russian political establishment in a way not done since Putin <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Vladimir-Putin">assumed power over two decades ago</a>.</p>
<p>Many Russians will see Prigozhin’s death as emanating from the Kremlin. Although some people <a href="https://news.sky.com/video/russians-bring-flowers-to-wagner-hq-for-wagner-leader-yevgeny-prigozhin-12946437">laid flowers</a> outside of Wagner headquarters in honour of Prigozhin, this gesture does not appear to represent the majority. Instead, Prigozhin’s alleged demise will reinforce Putin’s domestic position, whether through his <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/may/09/putin-may-have-high-ratings-but-russians-are-terrified-too">genuine popularity or fear of opposing him</a>.</p>
<h2>Russia and sanctions</h2>
<p>The economic sanctions against Russia have been simultaneously controversial and effective. The controversy stems from the fact that the sanctions at their outset had minimal effect on the Russian economy. The Russian economy <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/21/russias-economy-contracted-2-1-in-2022">did not contract to the extent hoped for</a> by those implementing the sanctions. </p>
<p>This development should not have been shocking, as Russia knew sanctions were likely after Western countries made a similar move after its annexation of Crimea. The Russian state, therefore, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/world/europe/putin-sanctions-proofing.html">made moves</a> to fortify its economy against the effects of economic sanctions.</p>
<p>Crucial to Russia’s ongoing efforts to avoid the worst effects of the sanctions has been finding non-Western countries with which to conduct trade. Outlets for Russian resources, such as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/asia-crude-imports-hit-high-china-india-gorge-russian-oil-russell-2023-08-03/">China and India</a>, have kept the Russian economy functioning, if not in an ideal manner. These markets have helped the Russian economy weather the worst impacts of the sanctions.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-russias-economy-proved-resilient-last-year-now-the-pain-is-setting-in/">collapsing ruble</a> however, suggests that while sanctions were ineffective in the short term, the long-term costs are being felt. </p>
<p>For Russia to surmount this problem, additional markets and means of overcoming the sanctions are needed.</p>
<h2>Wagner operations</h2>
<p>The Wagner Group’s involvement in Ukraine represented an aberration in its standard operations. In Ukraine, the Wagner Group operated as a <a href="https://theconversation.com/bakhmut-is-increasingly-a-quagmire-that-works-to-russias-advantage-203524">direct appendage of the Russian state</a>. This was in contrast to how the group often acted in relationship to the state — it was much more common for Wagner to pursue Russian interests in campaigns where the Russian government <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state">wished to downplay its active involvement</a>.</p>
<p>Syria was a textbook example of how Russia used the Wagner Group to pursue its interests while minimizing its direct involvement. In Syria, Wagner Group soldiers took an <a href="https://apnews.com/general-news-7f9e63cb14a54dfa9148b6430d89e873">active role in not only defending the regime of Bashar al-Assad</a>, but also conducting offensive operations that allowed the Syrian president to retake control of much of the country. </p>
<p>In exchange, the Wagner Group received <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/wagner-group-syria-profiting-failed-states">25 per cent of the gas, oil and phosphate production</a> in the areas it recaptured for the Syrian government.</p>
<p>The Wagner Group’s actions in Africa are even more explicit from an economic standpoint. While the Wagner Group’s operations in Libya were nominally in support of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whos-who-libyas-war">Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army</a>, it simultaneously <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/08/wagner-group-libya-oil-russia-war/">took control of key oil fields and natural gas facilities</a>. </p>
<p>This development has occurred against the backdrop of the European Union looking to <a href="https://globaleurope.eu/globalization/the-eu-and-the-middle-east-exploring-alternatives-to-russian-energy/">Libya and other countries</a> to reduce their reliance on Russian oil and natural gas.</p>
<p>Libya is not alone in this regard. The Wagner Group has been actively involved in supporting numerous governments in Africa. In some countries, <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-accuses-russias-wagner-group-mercenaries-fueling-war-sudan-rcna86492">such as Sudan</a>, this involved the Wagner Group establishing companies in order to directly exploit the natural resources of the country.</p>
<p>In other African countries, a Wagner Group presence allows for <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/whats-ahead-for-the-wagner-group-in-africa-and-the-middle-east/">smuggling and money laundering operations</a>. For many governments, such as the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">recently established junta in Niger</a>, this is a cost they are willing to pay.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">Wagner group mercenaries in Africa: why there hasn't been any effective opposition to drive them out</a>
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<h2>Wagner’s loyalty</h2>
<p>For Russia, all these activities by the Wagner Group provide a way of overcoming the sanctions regime. The problem Putin faced was that while Wagner Group provided him and the Russian state with vast political and economic resources, Prigozhin’s June revolt made him unreliable. </p>
<p>As the effects of the sanctions become more pronounced, the Russian state is exploring <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/putin-urges-govt-to-propose-reforms-for-overcoming-sanctions/2863665">all avenues available to overcome these economic challenges</a>. Whether Prigozhin truly is dead is irrelevant; Putin, in the underlying confusion, will be able to replace him with individuals <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/putin-is-dismantling-and-rebadging-the-wagner-group-after-prigozhin-plane-crash-experts-say/ar-AA1fJbcY">loyal to him to take charge of Wagner’s vast economic empire</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212219/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner Group, reportedly died when a private jet he was said to be on crashed on Aug. 23, 2023, killing all 10 people on board.James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121802023-08-24T09:15:32Z2023-08-24T09:15:32ZWagner chief Prigozhin reportedly killed, but has Putin cooked his own goose?<p>Perhaps the most unexpected thing about the plane crash that reportedly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-66599774">killed</a> Yevgeny Prigozhin, the bombastic head of Russia’s infamous Wagner group, is that it happened a full two months after he brought Russia to what President Vladimir Putin warned at the time was the brink of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-military-wagner-civil-war/32477931.html">civil war</a>. </p>
<p>Prigozhin certainly seemed to be living on borrowed time. His <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagners-rebellion-may-have-been-thwarted-but-putin-has-never-looked-weaker-and-more-vulnerable-208436">bizarre revolt</a> against Russia’s military leadership, which saw an armoured Wagner convoy proceed largely unchallenged through southern Russia until it stopped just short of Moscow, flew in the face of the twin rules for survival in Putin’s Russia. One, you don’t rock the boat. Two, you don’t challenge the tsar.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagners-rebellion-may-have-been-thwarted-but-putin-has-never-looked-weaker-and-more-vulnerable-208436">Wagner's rebellion may have been thwarted, but Putin has never looked weaker and more vulnerable</a>
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<p>But the popular assumption that Prigozhin would swiftly be eliminated – which shifted to surprise when he wasn’t – tells us much about the current weakness and fragility that surrounds Russian politics. In fact, Prigozhin’s apparent elimination is likely to <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/prigozhin-dead-putin-still-weakened">exacerbate that weakness</a> rather than lead to a magical reassertion of Putin’s authority.</p>
<p>First, it shows Russian elites they can’t trust anything their president says. That’s a significant departure from the Kremlin’s previous modus operandi, whereby those in positions of power and influence were <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/12/01/centrifugal-forces-why-russian-oligarchs-remain-loyal-to-the-putin-government-op-ed-a59760">protected</a> by Putin. They could count on him as long as they played by his rules. </p>
<p>Although Prigozhin eventually departed from that, he went out of his way for many years – even <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230710-russian-president-putin-met-wagner-chief-prigozhin-in-moscow-days-after-failed-mutiny">after</a> his mutiny – to demonstrate his loyalty to Putin. </p>
<p>Following the Wagner revolt it seemed <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90161">perplexing</a> for Putin to give Prigozhin and his Wagner co-conspirators a public assurance they would be safe from retribution. Now, Prigozhin’s subsequent likely death – the crash was reported by Wagner’s Telegram channel as having been caused by a Russian <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/jet-believed-to-be-carrying-wagner-boss-prigozhin-crashes-in-russia/">air defence missile</a> – means it matters very little whether it was an accident: nobody will believe this was anything other than revenge. </p>
<p>While that may initially give the more ambitious members of the Kremlin clans some pause, they now have real incentives to seek out an alternative. Put simply, Putin’s politics of terror has a self-destructive flaw: ruling through fear and deception inevitably prompts those who might be targets (which is essentially anyone) to eventually try to change the rules of the game.</p>
<p>Second, Prigozhin’s death won’t spell the end for private military companies (PMCs) in Russia. On the contrary, they’re likely to continue to <a href="https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/06/ukraine-is-a-breeding-ground-for-russian-pmcs.html">proliferate</a>. Already the energy giant <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2023/02/22/the-coming-hurricane-russian-energy-giant-gazprom-is-creating-an-army/?sh=5d11fa9842e9">Gazprom</a> has several of them, with operators in Ukraine as well as Russia. There is also speculation the fast-expanding <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-other-mercenary-companies-ukraine/32424520.html">Redut</a> group may now try to step in to fill the Wagner void.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-yevgeny-prigozhin-how-a-one-time-food-caterer-became-vladimir-putins-biggest-threat-208450">The rise of Yevgeny Prigozhin: how a one-time food caterer became Vladimir Putin's biggest threat</a>
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<p>But this has a bearing on Russian domestic politics too: PMCs are likely to be used by influential figures as private armies for their own protection from the Russian state, just as much as they might be employed as proxies in its service. </p>
<p>That, in turn, raises the spectre of a society of warlords – not just confined to strongmen on Russia’s periphery, such as the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/20/mad-dogs-what-are-chechen-fighters-doing-in-ukraine">Kadyrovites</a> who are loyal to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov – but in other parts of Russia closer to the centres of power in Moscow and St Petersburg. Under those circumstances, the prospects for stability in Russia are grim. </p>
<p>Ironically, perhaps the least significant impact of Prigozhin’s death will be on Russia’s war in Ukraine. Wagner forces had been <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-05-25/kyiv-defences-repel-russian-drone-attack-officials/102393300">withdrawn</a> from combat a couple of months previously. They have not been redeployed to the front since Prigozhin’s revolt. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-under-pressure-the-military-melodrama-between-the-wagner-group-and-russias-armed-forces-205475">Putin under pressure: the military melodrama between the Wagner group and Russia’s armed forces</a>
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<p>Wagner troops have been offered the choice of joining other Russian PMCs or signing contracts with the Russian armed forces: the former remains the preferred option given the regular Russian military is <a href="https://qz.com/wagner-group-pay-russian-military-yevgeny-prigozhin-1850575697">poorly paid</a> in comparison. There will also be those who choose neither option, leaving the problem of significant numbers of Russian men trained for violence at large in its society.</p>
<p>As for the future of the organisation itself, Wagner is at a crossroads. In addition to Prigozhin, two other victims in the crash were Wagner’s alleged co-founder <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state">Dmitry Utkin</a>, who was responsible for its combat operations, and its head of security <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wagner-group-leader-yevgeny-prigozhin-passenger-list-plane/story?id=102497445">Valery Chekalov</a>. The crash has therefore not only killed a Putin rival, but also permanently erased Wagner’s senior command structure. </p>
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<p>Yet Wagner remains important for the promotion of the Kremlin’s interests in damaging US and European influence in Africa. Beyond its active role in Syria, it has been instrumental in <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/it-s-time-australia-branded-russia-s-wagner-group-terrorist-organisation">boosting Russian prestige</a> by propping up regional dictators in Mali and the Central African Republic, which have rewarded Wagner with lucrative natural resource contracts. It may continue in an abridged form under new management, or be subsumed into another proxy Russian force.</p>
<p>A final important puzzle concerns why the Kremlin waited so long to rid itself of Prigozhin. We can only speculate here, but one theory is the intelligence services needed time to discover how deeply the pro-Wagner rot had extended into the armed forces and other power structures. </p>
<p>It is striking that Sergei Surovikin (the former commander of Russian forces in Ukraine who had disappeared under suspicion of being a Wagner sympathiser) was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/23/russia-removes-sergei-surovikin-as-head-of-aerospace-forces">formally removed from his post</a> as Russia’s Air Force chief at almost the exact same time as Prigozhin’s plane went down. </p>
<p>Prigozhin’s career trajectory saw him rise from a convicted felon to presidential caterer, then Russia’s main disinformation peddler, and eventually the wealthy and brutal head of a semi-private military company that sought to outcompete Russia’s own Defence Ministry for influence. </p>
<p>But despite his colourful CV, one suspects his real legacy will be that in abortively mounting a challenge to Moscow’s established power structures, Prigozhin ultimately established a precedent for one that succeeds.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212180/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.</span></em></p>The apparent death of the warlord in a plane shot down over Russia tells us much about the fragility that surrounds Russian politics.Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121812023-08-24T09:07:33Z2023-08-24T09:07:33ZYevgeny Prigozhin: Wagner Group boss joins long list of those who challenged Vladimir Putin and paid the price<p>Two months after challenging Vladimir Putin’s leadership in an apparent but abortive “mutiny”, Yevgeny Prigozhin – the former owner of the mercenary private military company Wagner Group – has joined a long <a href="https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/full-list-suspicious-russian-deaths/">list</a> of prominent Russians to die in mysterious circumstances. </p>
<p>Prigozhin’s private jet <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-mercenary-yevgeny-prigozhins-plane-appeared-fine-radar-until-last-30-2023-08-24/">apparently crashed</a> on a routine flight from Moscow to St Petersburg just after 3pm local time. Confirmation of Prigozhin’s likely demise came in the form of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ten-killed-private-jet-crash-north-moscow-tass-2023-08-23/">announcements</a> by Russia’s authorities and a Telegram channel linked to the Wagner group. Conveniently, there was also <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-AFqvahzHzs">video</a> footage of the plane falling out of the sky and burning on the ground.</p>
<p>With him on the aircraft was Dmitry Utkin, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/24/who-was-dmitry-utkin-wagner-commander-plane-crash-yevgeny-prigozhin">widely considered</a> to be his second in command at the Wagner Group. Other <a href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/foreign/who-prigozhins-crashed-plane">passengers are reported to have included</a> Valery Chekalov, the head of Wagner security, Yevgeny Makaryan, who has been described as Prigozhin’s bodyguard and other Wagner Group personnel.</p>
<p>While it is unlikely that we will ever know for sure how, why and on whose orders Prigozhin might have been killed, it is far less difficult to imagine that he finally paid the price for his march on Moscow at the head of a column of his Wagner Group troops at the end of June 2023. The deaths of other top Wagner personnel in the crash spell the likely end of the group in its current form.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-seriously-weakened-by-wagner-group-mutiny-but-it-was-a-missed-opportunity-for-ukraine-too-208426">Putin seriously weakened by Wagner Group mutiny – but it was a missed opportunity for Ukraine too</a>
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<p>At the time, Prigozhin went to great lengths to paint his mutiny as directed against the top brass in the Russian ministry of defence and not as a direct challenge to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Yet the brief episode <a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-seriously-weakened-by-wagner-group-mutiny-but-it-was-a-missed-opportunity-for-ukraine-too-208426">exposed cracks in the regime</a>. Unopposed by local and regional security forces, Prigozhin’s troops were able to take Rostov-on-Don and the headquarters of Russia’s southern military district and command centre of the war in Ukraine. They also marched to within 200km (125 miles) of the Russian capital, again mostly unopposed.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/putin-seriously-weakened-by-wagner-group-mutiny-but-it-was-a-missed-opportunity-for-ukraine-too-208426">Putin seriously weakened by Wagner Group mutiny – but it was a missed opportunity for Ukraine too</a>
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<p>Following a deal brokered by Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko, Prigozhin called off his rebellion, agreeing to relocate his men and himself to Belarus and Wagner’s overseas bases – mostly in Africa.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Yevgeny Prigozhin in what appears to be a recruitment video for the Wagner Group apparently filmed in Africa.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Despite some concerns over an <a href="https://theconversation.com/lukashenkos-joke-about-wagner-group-invading-poland-highlights-regional-security-fears-of-rogue-mercenaries-210304">increasing Wagner presence closer to Nato members Poland and Lithuania</a>, little of the agreed relocation seems to have happened. Prigozhin himself appears to have enjoyed significant freedom of movement in Russia in the weeks after his abortive mutiny, including making an appearance on the sidelines of the Russia-Africa summit at the end of July.</p>
<h2>Putin’s purges</h2>
<p>Though abrupt, his death is not unexpected. Under Putin, a former KGB operative himself, Russia has carried out several high-profile assassinations and assassination attempts, including in the UK and Germany, to go after alleged traitors and Putin critics. </p>
<p>Many opposition figures in Russia have either died mysteriously or been assassinated. The list includes figures such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-suspected-poisoning-why-opposition-figure-stands-out-in-russian-politics-144836">Alexei Navalny</a> (who survived novichok poisoning), former deputy prime minister <a href="https://theconversation.com/in-death-boris-nemtsov-embodies-the-hope-of-a-better-russia-38242">Boris Nemtsov</a>, anti-corruption lawyer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jul/06/who-was-sergei-magnitsky-and-how-did-uk-sanctions-come-about">Sergei Magnitsky</a>, and journalist <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/ten-years-putin-press-kremlin-grip-russia-media-tightens">Anna Politkovskaya</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, some regime critics may have thought themselves to be beyond his reach in <a href="https://www.parliament.uk/globalassets/documents/commons-committees/home-affairs/Correspondence-17-19/Chair-to-Home-Secretary-RE-Review-of-deaths-with-allegations-of-state-responsibility-06-03-18.pdf">the UK</a> or other countries, have also been disposed of. These include oligarch and former friend turned critic, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21913356">Boris Berezovsky</a>, and former spies <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58637572">Alexander Litvinenko</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51722301">Sergei Skripal</a>, who were both poisoned (although Skripal survived) have been targeted.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Former spy and Putin critic Alexander Litvinenko died of polonium poisoning in London.</span></figcaption>
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<p>Putin’s message here has been clear for two decades: opposition will not be tolerated and will probably have fatal consequences. </p>
<p>Prigozhin’s likely assassination reaffirms this message spectacularly. But it is not the only step that Putin has taken to reassert control. On the day of Prigozhin’s death, one of his presumptive allies in the military establishment, Sergei Surovikin – a former commander of Russian forces in Ukraine – was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64235713">apparently dismissed</a> as head of the Russian aerospace forces. This followed weeks of speculation following his disappearance after the Prigozhin mutiny. </p>
<p>Other top military officials critical of Russia’s conduct of the war in Ukraine, including the commander of the Russia 58th Combined Arms Army, Ivan Popov, were <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66185545">dismissed</a>. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-detained-several-senior-military-officers-in-wake-of-wagner-mutiny-35a696e4">Other officials</a>, considered close to Prigozhin, including the deputy head of military intelligence, Vladimir Alexeyev, are still unaccounted for.</p>
<p>Outside the military, alleged critics of Putin’s war in Ukraine have not been safe either. A series of mysterious deaths struck fear into Russian <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/12/russian-tycoon-pavel-antov-dies-putin-ukraine/672601/">oligarchs</a> in the months after the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine began in February 2022. Since then, criticism from the Russian business elite has been muted.</p>
<p>The apparent assassination of Prigozhin would therefore seem to be business as usual for Putin. It was foreshadowed in the Russian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/24/vladimir-putin-accuses-wagner-chief-treason-vows-neutralise-uprising">president’s speech on June 24</a>, the morning after Prigozhin’s mutiny began, when he vowed to punish the “traitors”, as he described them. </p>
<h2>Back to business as usual?</h2>
<p>Prigozhin’s demise also draws a line under the apparent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66013532">power struggle within the Russian military</a>. As the chief architects of the war in Ukraine, the defence minister, Sergey Shoigu, and chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov, are the most obvious beneficiaries of Prigozhin’s death and the wider purges of critics inside and outside the military.</p>
<p>Putin, and his inner circle, clearly have prevailed on this occasion. This is not surprising, given how little direct and public support Prigozhin received over the course of his mutiny. In this sense, Putin’s regime is still highly effective and has demonstrated its capacity to survive domestic challenges. </p>
<p>But the underlying problem – a disastrous military campaign in Ukraine – has not gone away with the death of Prigozhin. Putin may have silenced one of the most outspoken critics of the conduct of the war, and have others arrested or murdered, like prominent pro-war bloggers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/21/russia-arrests-pro-war-putin-critic-igor-girkin-reports">Igor Girkin</a> and <a href="https://www.itv.com/news/2023-04-02/explosion-at-st-petersburg-cafe-kills-prominent-military-blogger">Vladen Tatarsky</a>. But many who share Prigozhin’s misgivings without backing him publicly will have survived Putin’s clean-up operation. </p>
<p>Putin can be sure that they will now be extra careful not to stand too close to high windows or accept cups of tea from anyone connected with Russia’s security services. But this may not be the only lesson they have learned from Prigozhin’s demise – and that will likely worry the Kremlin and increase the paranoia of Putin and those around him.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212181/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>The Wagner Group boss had died in mysterious circumstances when his private jet crashed on August 23 2023.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121682023-08-24T00:23:32Z2023-08-24T00:23:32ZWagner group’s Yevgeny Prigozhin reportedly died in private jet crash – if confirmed, it wouldn’t be first time someone who crossed Putin met a suspicious demise<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/544377/original/file-20230823-23-5on0z0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C594%2C3280%2C2469&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Wagner group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, photographed on June 24, 2023, in Russia.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/head-of-the-wagner-group-yevgeny-prigozhin-left-the-news-photo/1259027097?adppopup=true">Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Russian mercenary leader <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-wagner-prigozhin-jet-crash-a7859e4e57f2efa2547dfbe5bdbaa1b2">Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner Group</a>, reportedly died when a private jet he was said to be on crashed on Aug. 23, 2023, killing all 10 people on board.</em> </p>
<p><em>The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency confirmed that Prigozhin, who had led a brief rebellion again the Russian military two months earlier, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/23/europe/russia-wagner-prigozhin-plane-crash-intl/index.html">was among the dead</a>. However, Prigozhin was believed to have numerous passports, and he would <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/pentagon-suspects-head-wagner-group-110104468.html">compel others to travel under his name</a> to protect him from possible attacks.</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation U.S. asked national security scholar <a href="https://spatial.usc.edu/team-view/gregory-f-treverton/">Gregory F. Treverton</a>, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Obama administration, to explain what Prigozhin’s death would signify.</em> </p>
<h2>Who was – or is – Prigozhin?</h2>
<p>Prigozhin <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/23/europe/wagner-chief-yevgeny-prigozhin-russia-intl/index.html">came from humble beginnings</a>. </p>
<p>He was a petty criminal who, after serving nine years in a Soviet prison, became a hot dog vendor and eventually owned elegant restaurants and a catering service. He was best known as the rich and connected leader of the Wagner group, a <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-reliance-on-mercenaries-in-ukraine-points-to-the-weakness-of-its-military-and-putins-strategy-of-deflecting-blame-190612">private military force with links to the Russian government</a>. Wagner troops fought on the Russian side in Ukraine, but Prigozhin went public in the spring of 2023 with <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-russia-nuclear-647a545db4e4628676ff7db5b1bded34">criticism of the conflict’s cost</a> in terms of Wagner troops and complaints about the way the war was being fought by the Russian government. Defense Minister <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-65996531">Sergey Shoigu</a> was a particular target of Prigozhin’s complaints regarding military strategy.</p>
<p>In June, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/23/europe/wagner-prigozhin-criminal-case-explainer-intl/index.html">Prigozhin orchestrated what was effectively a revolt</a> against Russia’s government. He dispatched Wagner troops on a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-launches-criminal-probe-over-wagner-group-leaders-threats-against-defense-minister">march unimpeded toward Moscow</a>.</p>
<p>Prigozhin was 62 years old at the time of the crash.</p>
<h2>What was his relationship with President Vladimir Putin?</h2>
<p>It was complicated, to say the least. </p>
<p>An oligarch, Prigozhin was thought to be close to the Russian leader. He was called “<a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/06/1160851615/russia-putin-chef-yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group">Putin’s chef</a>” due to the services he provided the Kremlin and the personal touches he employed when <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-yevgeny-prigozhin-how-a-one-time-food-caterer-became-vladimir-putins-biggest-threat-208450">Putin dined in his restaurants</a>.</p>
<p>In June, when he launched his mutiny against Moscow, Prigozhin must have realized he had gone too far with his public rebukes. The only general he admired, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/30/europe/russian-general-sergey-surovikin-wagner-vip-intl-hnk/index.html">Sergey Surovikin</a>, released a video message telling him to stand down and to “obey” Putin. Prigozhin soon disbanded the march, saying he wanted to spare “<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wagner-chief-prigozhin-russia-truce-brokered-by-belarus/">Russian blood</a>.” Afterward, the mercenary leader said he met with Putin before leaving for what was expected to be his exile in Belarus. </p>
<p>At the time, I was looking for cracks in Russia’s will to fight, particularly in its military. At some level, it has to hate hemorrhaging men and materiel in a conflict that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/06/europe/captured-russian-soldiers-ukraine-intl-cmd/index.html">many conscripts don’t even understand</a> or support.</p>
<p>In that sense, I saw Prigozhin’s criticisms of Russia’s military strategy in Ukraine as a positive sign, especially as his take seemed to resonate with the Russian people and even its armed forces. Yet when it looked like Prigozhin might prevail, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/30/vladimir-putin-ousted-wagner-group-00104272">American officials were worried</a>. As the saying goes: When the gods wish to punish us, they grant us our wishes. Would putting an end to Putin’s rule lead to chaos in Russia, and how dangerous would that be with <a href="https://theconversation.com/prigozhin-revolt-raised-fears-of-putins-toppling-and-a-nuclear-russia-in-chaos-208731">all of those nuclear weapons</a> it harbors? </p>
<h2>Why do you think Putin’s opponents, many of whom are dead or imprisoned, have met so much misfortune?</h2>
<p>It was painfully plain that after his failed rebellion, Prigozhin was a dead man flying.</p>
<p>Indeed, the surprise was that Putin dropped charges and let him go, albeit to Russia’s vassal ally, Belarus. But many believe, including me, that Prigozhin was destined to eventually meet the <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/22/accidental-defenestration-and-murder-suicides-too-common-among-russian-oligarchs-and-putin">fate of others who have crossed Putin</a>.</p>
<p>That growing list includes <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/29/gunman-found-guilty-murdering-russian-opposition-leader-boris-nemtsov">Boris Nemtsov</a>, the Russian physicist, politician and critic of Putin who was assassinated in 2015, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/alexei-navalny-leads-russians-in-a-historic-battle-against-arbitrary-rule-with-words-echoing-catherine-the-great-154717">Alexei Navalny</a>, the Russian opposition leader who remains in prison after Putin allegedly orchestrated his poisoning in 2020. </p>
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<h2>Would Prigozhin’s death change anything for US policy toward Putin and Russia?</h2>
<p>In the end, unless Prigozhin’s rebellion does turn out to have planted the seeds of real resistance, I don’t believe his death is likely to change the course of the Ukraine war or U.S. policy toward Putin and Russia.</p>
<p>However, it’s likely to take Wagner troops, which had been <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wagner-groups-armed-rebellion-russias-endgame-ukraine/story?id=100169872">among Russia’s most effective</a>, out of the conflict in Ukraine. And it may wind up diminishing <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/22/prigozhin-africa-wagner-russia/">Wagner’s operations in Africa</a>, which until now have furthered Russian interests. Yet the Ukraine war has become America’s war, and the U.S. government doesn’t want to see Ukraine lose it – even if it doesn’t win dramatically. </p>
<p>The United States will still have to deal with Putin as it continues to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/03/fact-sheet-the-united-states-continues-to-target-russian-oligarchs-enabling-putins-war-of-choice">sanction him and his associates</a>, and ultimately seeks to see him tried as a war criminal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212168/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory F. Treverton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The lesson in the presumed death of the mercenary leader two months after his mutiny against Putin: Don’t make yourself an enemy of Russia’s leader.Gregory F. Treverton, Professor of Practice in International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2111392023-08-07T15:30:39Z2023-08-07T15:30:39ZNiger: with a key deadline passed, Nigeria must take decisive steps to prevent a civil war in its neighborhood<p>The deadline set by the <a href="https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/regional-economic-communities-rec/economic-community-west-african-states#:%7E:text=The%2015%20members%20of%20the,%2C%20Sierra%20Leone%2C%20and%20Togo.">Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas)</a> for the elected president of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum – who was deposed in a coup on July 26 – to be reinstated to office <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/niger-coup-junta-closes-airspace-as-deadline-to-reinstate-ousted-president-passes-12935276">has passed</a>. West Africa is now bracing to see how Ecowas, which has threatened to take all steps, including military intervention, will react.</p>
<p>The situation is complicated by the fact that several member states of Ecowas, including Mali and Burkina Faso, both of which have also had recent military coups, have <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-%F0%9F%94%B4-live-niger-junta-closes-airspace-as-ecowas-deadline-expires">publicly supported the coup plotters</a>.</p>
<p>The military junta, led by the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tiani, is understood to have <a href="https://apnews.com/article/wagner-russia-coup-niger-military-force-e0e1108b58a9e955af465a3efe6605c0">asked for assistance</a> from the Russian-owned mercenary Wagner Group.</p>
<p>Niger’s coup bears serious consequences for regional peace, security, and stability in west Africa, especially as it affects Nigeria and the already <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66322914">troubled Sahel region</a>. Niger, which has been described as the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/how-military-coup-niger-threatens-stability-west-africa-2023-07-27/">only hope</a>” for stability in the Sahel, is struggling to contain two insurgencies in the south of the country involving jihadi groups which have spilled over from Mali and Nigeria.</p>
<p>In its response to the coup, a <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/first-extraordinary-summit-of-the-ecowas-authority-heads-of-state-and-government-on-the-political-situation-in-niger/">summit held in Nigeria by Ecowas</a> issued a seven-day ultimatum to the coup leaders calling on them to relinquish political power. But thus far the military junta has shown no signs of backing down and is supported by a significant number of Niger’s population. </p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas countries" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541529/original/file-20230807-27645-24ggu2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Strife-torn neighbourhood: the Ecowas group of west African countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecowas.png">Scantyzer1/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
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<p>The options now before Ecowas are to extend the deadline to give mediation and diplomatic efforts a chance, or to proceed with the threatened military intervention. The Nigerian Senate <a href="https://dailypost.ng/2023/08/06/coup-nigerian-senate-rejects-tinubus-proposal-for-military-intervention-in-niger-republic/">voted against military action</a> on August 5 and public opinion appears to favour further mediation.</p>
<p>Having called on the Wagner Group for assistance in the event of an Ecowas military intervention, it appears likely that Niger’s coup leaders will look to Moscow to fill the gaps resulting from the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-loses-aid-western-countries-condemn-coup-2023-07-29/">suspension of humanitarian and security aid</a> by western powers. This would further entrench Russia’s influence in the region. </p>
<h2>Jihadi insurgency threats</h2>
<p>Despite Niger being seen in the west as a “poster-child” for stability in the region following the peaceful transition of power in elections in 2021, parts of the country are afflicted by ongoing violence. In the southwestern Tillabéri region, which borders Mali and Burkina Faso, more than 2,500 people have been killed and 100,000 displaced by fighting involving a number of armed insurgent groups.</p>
<p>Elsewhere in southern Niger there is overspill from violence in northern Nigeria involving jihadist groups, including Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP)</a>.</p>
<p>As with elsewhere in the Sahel, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries are keen to <a href="https://theconversation.com/mapping-the-contours-of-jihadist-groups-in-the-sahel-168539">exploit the turmoil</a> to help Moscow increase its influence in the region at the expense of the former colonial power, France, as well as the US. Both have had peacekeeping troops in the region. </p>
<p>To add to the instability, there are estimated to be as many <a href="https://dailytrust.com/matawalle-there-are-30000-armed-bandits-across-the-north/">30,000 “bandits”</a>, mainly operating in and around northern Nigeria. While described as “terrorists” by the Nigerian government, these are generally driven by economic and criminal, enterprises. There is already a <a href="https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//the-complex-dynamics-of-small-arms-in-west-africa-en-329.pdf">flourishing trade</a> in illegal small arms and light weapons in the region, made easier by the porous border between Niger and its neighbouring countries.</p>
<p>The net result of this violence is an explosion in the number of refugees and displaced people, which would only increase were civil war to break out in Niger. This would put intense pressure on Nigeria’s already strained social and medical infrastructure. Niger is already hosting an estimated <a href="https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/ner">influx of 30,000 refugees</a> from the conflict in Mali who would be likely to flee into Nigeria were violence to spread in Niger.</p>
<h2>All eyes on Nigeria’s response</h2>
<p>Nigeria, which currently holds the chair of Ecowas, has taken some decisive steps intended at reversing the coup in Niger, such as backing the Chadian leader who is acting as a mediator. </p>
<p>It has also <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230801-coup-d-%C3%A9tat-au-niger-une-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-de-la-c%C3%A9d%C3%A9ao-avec-le-sultan-de-sokoto-leader-religieux-influent-attendue-%C3%A0-niamey">dispatched a team of mediators</a> which includes the former military leader of Nigeria, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdusalam-Abubakar">General Abdulsamali Abubakar</a>, and the Sultan of Sokoto, <a href="https://themuslim500.com/profiles/muhammadu-saadu-abubakar-iii/">Sa'adu Abubakar</a>, who leads the Sokoto Caliphate, a Sunni Muslim community of West Africa.</p>
<p>Military action from Ecowas would come at a heavy cost to Nigeria, whose economy is in the process of a <a href="https://businessday.ng/news/article/world-bank-imf-others-back-tinubus-economic-reforms/">long-overdue programme of economic reform</a> and cannot afford to fund such a military intervention. The cost of previous Ecowas interventions, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has largely been borne by Nigeria. Ecowas must ensure that all options for a negotiated peace settlement are fully explored and at most should deploy a contingent of special operations forces on high alert to Nigeria’s border with Niger.</p>
<p>So despite the passing of the Ecowas deadline, member states must take great care not to allow the situation to descend into a civil war which could draw in the rest of the Sahel on either side. That would have calamitous consequences for the region and major implications for global security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>All eyes are on Nigeria where west African countries are discussing the possibility of military intervention to reverse the coup.Folahanmi Aina, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2110082023-08-03T16:54:29Z2023-08-03T16:54:29ZUkraine recap: counter-offensive gathers pace while Wagner Group takes on new role<p>Reports from the front lines of the various conflict zones reveal daily just how difficult Ukraine is finding its summer counter-offensive. Russia has had months to build defensive fortifications and Ukrainian troops are having to fight their way through territory which – according to Oleksiy Danilov, the secretary of Ukraine’s security council – is liberally seeded with landmines. </p>
<p>“The number of mines on the territory that our troops have retaken is utterly mad,” he told Ukrainian television this week. “On average, there are three, four, five mines per square metre.”</p>
<p>That said, there is geolocational evidence that Ukraine is gradually pushing back Russian troops in some sectors and there have been suggestions that Ukrainian troops have broken through Russian lines in some area, liberating settlements in the southeast of the country. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1684629552918622208"}"></div></p>
<p>Chris Morris, an expert in military strategy at the University of Portsmouth, says that, as part of a concerted push before the weather begins to turn, Ukraine is now committing a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-two-months-of-slow-progress-the-long-awaited-counteroffensive-is-picking-up-speed-why-has-it-taken-so-long-210653">significant portion of its available forces to achieve progress</a>. That includes a number of brigades trained and equipped by Kyiv’s Nato allies.</p>
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<p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-after-two-months-of-slow-progress-the-long-awaited-counteroffensive-is-picking-up-speed-why-has-it-taken-so-long-210653">Ukraine war: after two months of slow progress the long-awaited counteroffensive is picking up speed. Why has it taken so long?</a>
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</p>
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<h2>The trouble with the Wagner Group</h2>
<p>Russia is having to do without the assistance of Wagner Group fighters, who – following the “mutiny” at the end of June – are now mainly domiciled in neighbouring Belarus, where they are apparently training that country’s armed forces. </p>
<p>As you’d expect, this has prompted deep concern in Warsaw, which is aware of the strategic importance of the Suwalki gap. This is a 60-mile stretch of Polish territory on its border with Lithuania, linking Belarus with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Belarus president Alexander Lukashenko mischievously quipped to Vladimir Putin that he might not be able to control the Wagner mercenaries who, he said, were itching to “go west”.</p>
<p>Natasha Lindstaedt, professor of international relations at the University of Essex with a special interest in non-state paramilitary groups, says that while Lukashenko was clearly joking, mercenary companies such as the Wagner Group are <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-joke-about-wagner-group-invading-poland-highlights-regional-security-fears-of-rogue-mercenaries-210304">notoriously difficult to control</a>. It remains unclear as to the extent to which their boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, remains sympathetic to the Kremlin’s war aims. Poland isn’t taking any chances, moving troops to its eastern border to counter any threat from inside Belarus.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/lukashenkos-joke-about-wagner-group-invading-poland-highlights-regional-security-fears-of-rogue-mercenaries-210304">Lukashenko's 'joke' about Wagner Group invading Poland highlights regional security fears of rogue mercenaries</a>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510322/original/file-20230215-22-dna0kj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p><em>Since Vladimir Putin sent his war machine into Ukraine on February 24 2022, The Conversation has called upon some of the leading experts in international security, geopolitics and military tactics to help our readers <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-12-months-at-war-134215?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">understand the big issues</a>. You can also <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Ukraine12Months">subscribe to our fortnightly recap</a> of expert analysis of the conflict in Ukraine.</em></p>
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<p>The role Lukashenko played in dealing with the Wagner Group’s apparent and abortive “rebellion” has given the Belarus leader a <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-wagner-group-boss-and-belaruss-president-are-still-manoeuvring-for-power-205333">degree of leverage with Putin</a>, writes Jennifer Mathers, a senior lecturer in international politics at Aberystwyth University.</p>
<p>As Mathers notes, Lukashenko had previously been beholden to Putin for his political survival. But by providing a face-saving solution that allowed both Prigozhin and Putin to step back from what threatened to be high-risk confrontation, the Belarus leader appears to have regained a degree of autonomy. This, she says, is important as Lukashenko continues his balancing act of trying to acquiesce to Moscow’s demands while also resisting a more direct involvement in a war which is deeply unpopular with his own people.</p>
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<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-boss-and-belaruss-president-are-still-manoeuvring-for-power-205333">Wagner Group boss and Belarus's president are still manoeuvring for power</a>
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<h2>Scramble for Africa</h2>
<p>Prigozhin, meanwhile, was spotted on the fringe of the recent Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg. The summit followed hot on the heels of Putin’s decision not to renew the grain deal, which had allowed Ukraine to export wheat and other foodstuffs, much of it to African countries. As Stefan Wolff of the University of Birmingham notes, Putin spent a fair bit of time at the gathering trying to justify his decision, which had gone down very badly with those African countries that have been heavily dependent on grain imports from Ukraine. </p>
<p>Wolff writes that Putin’s pledge to “to provide, free of charge, a supply of 25,000–50,000 tonnes of grain each to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Eritrea” <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-putin-offers-unconvincing-giveaways-in-a-desperate-bid-to-make-up-for-killing-the-ukraine-grain-deal-210330">rings pretty hollow</a> when compared to the volume of food that had been flowing from Ukrainian ports before Russia pulled out of the deal. </p>
<p>But what Putin may not be able to achieve through diplomacy in terms of influence in Africa, Russia’s Wagner Group proxies appear to be securing by propping up unstable regimes (and destabilising others) across west Africa. Wolff sees this as another front in Putin’s cold war against the west.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-putin-offers-unconvincing-giveaways-in-a-desperate-bid-to-make-up-for-killing-the-ukraine-grain-deal-210330">Russia-Africa summit: Putin offers unconvincing giveaways in a desperate bid to make up for killing the Ukraine grain deal</a>
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<h2>Crimean Tatars’ guerrilla war</h2>
<p>Another important non-state group that is playing an increasingly prominent role in the war – this time on Ukraine’s side – are the Crimean Tatars. The Atesh (fire) movement was formed by fighters from this ethnic group native to the Russian-occupied peninsula. It is waging what appears to be a highly effective guerrilla campaign, disrupting logistics, sabotaging key targets and stoking discontent against – and within – the Russian army.</p>
<p>Gerald Hughes, a reader in military history and intelligence studies at the University of Aberystwyth, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-why-crimean-tatar-fighters-are-playing-an-increasing-role-in-resistance-to-russian-occupation-210484">tells the story of Crimea’s Tatars</a>. Their history of mistreatment at the hands of the Soviet Union and again by the Russians after Crimea was annexed in 2014 has given them ample reason to mobilise against the invaders.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-crimean-tatar-fighters-are-playing-an-increasing-role-in-resistance-to-russian-occupation-210484">Why Crimean Tatar fighters are playing an increasing role in resistance to Russian occupation</a>
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<p>Whether the Tatars were involved in the recent attack on the Kerch bridge, which links Crimea with the Russian mainland, is not known. It’s the second time the bridge has been badly damaged in an act of sabotage. As well strategically disrupting Russian supply lines, the attack had symbolic importance. </p>
<p>The bridge was a pet project for Putin who drove the first truck across on its completion in 2018 and again after the damage from last year’s attack had been repaired in December last year. As Stefan Wolff writes, following June’s Wagner Group “mutiny”, it’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-crimean-bridge-attack-is-another-blow-to-putins-strongman-image-209934">another blow</a> to Putin’s aura of invincibility.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/crimean-bridge-attack-is-another-blow-to-putins-strongman-image-209934">Crimean bridge attack is another blow to Putin's strongman image</a>
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<h2>Russians on the home front</h2>
<p>Despite all this, Vladimir Putin’s approval rating at home remains very high: 80% of people told a <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/">Statista survey in July</a> they approved of their president’s activities. And polls conducted by the Levada Center consistently record approval ratings of 70% or above towards the conflict in Ukraine, although a majority would like to see an end to the war as soon as possible.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, ordinary people in Russia are <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russians-are-rallying-on-the-home-front-to-support-their-boys-207696">doing what they can to support “their boys”</a>, writes Anna Matveeva, a visiting senior research fellow at King’s College London who specialises in conflict and peace studies. Matveeva has spoken with ordinary Russians who either donate funds or run grassroots campaigns to provide everything from stretchers and medical supplies to drones and other weaponry to help fill perceived shortfalls. </p>
<p>As Matveeva notes, these volunteers tend to be solidly middle class. Oligarchs are “conspicuous by their absence”, she says. But there’s a sense that by helping the men at the front, it could reduce the prospect that their own sons might be called up.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-how-russians-are-rallying-on-the-home-front-to-support-their-boys-207696">Ukraine war: how Russians are rallying on the home front to support 'their boys'</a>
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<h2>Nato matters</h2>
<p>One of Russia’s stated aims in invading Ukraine was to combat what it saw as Nato’s pernicious expansion into its neighbourhood. So the announcement last month that Turkey and Hungary had dropped their objections to Sweden joining the alliance will have come as a desperate blow. </p>
<p>Sweden’s accession to Nato – coming hot on the heels of Finland’s in April – will <a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-is-joining-nato-what-that-means-for-the-alliance-and-the-war-in-ukraine-209539">vastly strengthen the alliance’s presence</a> across Russia’s western borders, write international relations experts Simon J. Smith of Loughborough University and Jordan Becker of the United States Military Academy West Point. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sweden-is-joining-nato-what-that-means-for-the-alliance-and-the-war-in-ukraine-209539">Sweden is joining Nato: what that means for the alliance and the war in Ukraine</a>
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<p>In a sense, the accession of Sweden and Finland were fairly predictable in the face of Russia’s aggression towards its neighbour Ukraine. And it recalls the reason that Nato came into being in the first place. By 1949, Soviet plans for expansion in eastern Europe and Germany were becoming increasingly clear, especially with the blockade of Berlin still in place. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, to give Nato its full name, was the obvious response.</p>
<p>As Jan Ruzicka and Gerald Hughes – experts in international security and military history at the University of Aberystwyth – write, the foundation of Nato nearly 75 years ago has <a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-aggression-prompted-the-birth-of-the-nato-alliance-heres-why-that-matters-now-209608">parallels with today</a>: </p>
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<p>The most decisive impulse to Nato’s existence came from a threat to a people and a territory that were not originally part of the alliance. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) only became a Nato member in May 1955. Today, Ukraine’s resistance has clearly reinvigorated Nato.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-aggression-prompted-the-birth-of-the-nato-alliance-heres-why-that-matters-now-209608">Soviet aggression prompted the birth of the Nato alliance – here's why that matters now</a>
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<p><em>Ukraine Recap is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/ukraine-recap-114?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=UK+Newsletter+Ukraine+Recap+2022+Mar&utm_content=WeeklyRecapBottom">Click here to get our recaps directly in your inbox.</a></em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211008/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of the best of our coverage of the conflict from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2109902023-08-03T15:15:11Z2023-08-03T15:15:11ZNiger coup: west African union has pledged to intervene – but some members support the plotters<p>When the Nigerian president, <a href="https://businessday.ng/columnist/article/questionable-mandate-tinubu-lacks-legitimacy-to-govern-nigeria/">Bola Tinubu</a>, was elected as chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) on July 10, he asserted that the organisation would no longer be a “<a href="https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2023/07/10/tinubu-asks-ecowas-leaders-to-stop-being-toothless-bulldogs-against-coup-plotters/">toothless bulldog</a>”. Tinubu insisted that Ecowas would work collectively to <a href="https://leadership.ng/ecowas-must-rise-against-coup-detat-tinubu/">combat terrorism and promote democracy</a> in west Africa, explaining:</p>
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<p>We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in west Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Within a month, however, the democratically elected leader of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/26/africa/niger-presidency-attempted-coup-intl/index.html">overthrown by his own palace guard</a>.</p>
<p>As Tinubu noted when taking on the leadership of Ecowas, <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/01/a-deeper-look-into-the-west-african-coup-wave/">coups and counter-coups</a> have become commonplace within the region in recent years. Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso (twice in eight months) have all experienced military takeovers that have ousted their elected governments. Now the same fate has befallen Niger, where the election of Bazoum in April 2021 was considered to be a rare case of successful and democratic transition of power in west Africa. </p>
<p>The coup – which installed the former leader of the presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, as leader – has been roundly condemned by the US, France, the EU and the United Nations. The US, which has has had troops in Niger for more than a decade advising the country’s military on counter-terrorism, said it would “take measures” to restore democratic government in the country. </p>
<p>On July 30, Ecowas issued a <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ecowas-threatens-use-of-force-against-niger-junta/a-66398008">seven-day ultimatum</a> vowing to use force to dislodge the junta should they not restore Bazoum to the presidency. </p>
<p>Ecowas has also <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/7/29/23812389/niger-coup-africa-ecowas-tchiani-bazoum">closed its countries’ borders</a> with Niger, instituted a no-fly zone, and frozen the country’s assets and those of those involved in the coup and their families. In addition, Nigeria has <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-66383119">discontinued electricity supplies to Niger</a>, leading to blackouts in its major cities. But the junta has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/niger-reopens-borders-with-several-neighbours-week-after-coup-2023-08-02/">pledged not to back down</a> despite these “inhumane sanctions”.</p>
<h2>What is Ecowas?</h2>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/002190961557095">Ecowas</a>, a 15-member regional group formed in 1975 and comprising mainly former British and French colonies, aims to “<a href="https://ecowas.int/about-ecowas/">promote cooperation and integration</a>” among members in the form of an economic union. Over the years, it has expanded its remit to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">include a security role</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Ecowas nations" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=324&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/541016/original/file-20230803-19-8d6vll.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ecowas: a community of west African nations.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Scantyzer1 via Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/">CC BY-NC-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
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<p>In 1990, the group’s military wing, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (Ecomog), was deployed in a peacekeeping role in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319408413509">civil war in Liberia</a>, enjoying initial success but ultimately failing to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities that lasted through most of the 1990s – only ending with the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005.</p>
<p>In neighbouring Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma, an army major, led a military coup on May 25 1997, overthrowing the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Ecomog troops stationed in Liberia were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194480">deployed to restore peace and democracy there</a>, but were unable to prevent a bitter civil war <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419">breaking out</a>, requiring intervention from UN peacekeepers and British troops.</p>
<p>In both Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire, Ecowas has again intervened to ensure the democratic transition of power when it appeared that the incumbent leaders would not respect election results.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-gambia-is-testing-west-africas-resolve-to-protect-democracy-71173">How The Gambia is testing West Africa's resolve to protect democracy</a>
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<h2>Stretching military capacity</h2>
<p>It remains to be seen whether Ecowas will follow through with its pledge to intervene if Bazoum is not restored to office in Niger. But conditions are very different in the region now from when the organisation successfully led the interventions described above.</p>
<p>West Africa is riddled with violence associated with <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2021.1888082?casa_token=cDR2sgiLEKoAAAAA%3ASTrfRYVK_ZnNjGov4jaEa82EoITfidvU_FtyHW-zZfPFxLZDo-6oJ_-_oEBSBR-V1RhMeA6lFg">jihadi terrorism</a> involving Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram. There are also regular <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015">outbreaks of violence</a> between herders and farmers over land in the face of droughts and scarcity of resources. These issues have <a href="https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-islamic-state-affiliate-attempts-to-assassinate-nigerian-president">stretched the military capacity</a> of Ecowas member states, many of whom have their own problems to deal with.</p>
<p>And then there’s the prospect of the involvement of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-russias-wagner-group-doing-africa">the Wagner Group</a>. The coup junta is reported <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/02/africa/niger-coup-mali-wagner-intl-afr/index.html">to be engaged in discussions</a> with this Russia-backed mercenary army, which has been active across the region. Several countries where the Wagner Group is involved <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/613369-burkina-faso-mali-guinea-declare-support-for-niger-coup-as-soldiers-arrest-politicians.html">have declared their backing</a> for the coup, rejected the Ecowas sanctions, and pledged support for the coup leaders if Ecowas intervenes militarily.</p>
<p>As in Burkina Faso and Mali, there is also growing <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/africa/protesters-attack-french-embassy-niger-west-african-governments-threat-rcna97181">anti-French sentiment</a> on the streets of Niger. This is being fuelled by the Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has hailed the coup as a blow against colonialism – a message which resonates with many in Niger, where France maintains a 1,500-strong peacekeeping force to combat jihadist terrorism. </p>
<h2>Unpopular leader</h2>
<p>Much has been made by Bazoum’s opponents of his membership <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">of a minority ethnic Arab group</a>, which led to him being dubbed as “foreign” during Niger’s election campaign. His election was also condemned in some quarters as cronyism, as he was the handpicked successor of the outgoing president Mahamadou Issoufou. Bazoum’s decision to ban members of his government from <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202206160312.html">having more than one wife</a> has also ruffled powerful feathers.</p>
<p>All these factors will complicate any decision by Ecowas to use force to restore Bazoum to power. But Nigeria, under the leadership of Tinubu, appears determined to take this opportunity to prove that Ecowas still wields muscle in the region.</p>
<p>His chief of staff, General Christopher Musa, has assembled Ecowas defence ministers for a <a href="https://leadership.ng/just-in-ecowas-defence-chiefs-meet-in-abuja-over-niger-coup/">two-day summit in Abuja</a>. Representatives from Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, The Gambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Cabo Verde, and Senegal attended, while Niger, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea-Bissau were not represented.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russia and the west – which harbours fears about Moscow’s intentions in the region – are both watching closely to see whether yet another west African country will descend into the pit of instability and violence.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210990/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olumba E. Ezenwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The coup in Niger has the potential to further destabilise the whole of west Africa.Olumba E. Ezenwa, Royal Holloway University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2107212023-07-31T13:33:38Z2023-07-31T13:33:38ZWhat caused the coup in Niger? An expert outlines three driving factors<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/540134/original/file-20230731-17-4d3tv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Niger's Gen Abdourahamane Tchiani declares himself head of state on 28 July 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">ORTN-Télé Sahel/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><iframe id="noa-web-audio-player" style="border: none" src="https://embed-player.newsoveraudio.com/v4?key=x84olp&id=https://theconversation.com/what-caused-the-coup-in-niger-an-expert-outlines-three-driving-factors-210721&bgColor=F5F5F5&color=D8352A&playColor=D8352A" width="100%" height="110px"></iframe>
<p>At an emergency meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on 30 July, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/pro-coup-protests-niger-west-african-leaders-meet-2023-07-30/">demanded</a> the “immediate release and reinstatement” of Niger’s elected president, Mohamed Bazoum. He had been held by the military since 19 July.</p>
<p>The regional bloc gave the military in Niger a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/30/west-african-govts-give-niger-coup-leaders-a-week-to-cede-power">one-week ultimatum</a> to comply and warned it would take all measures necessary – including force – to restore constitutional order. </p>
<p>On 28 July, the head of Niger’s presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230726-presidency-sealed-off-in-coup-prone-niger">declared himself</a> head of state after the military seized power. </p>
<p>Beyond warning against any regional and foreign interventions, the military leaders in Niger have given no indications of ways forward. </p>
<p>This coup d’etat will have a significant impact on peace and stability in Niger and the entire Sahel region. </p>
<p>Although Niger has recently enjoyed its longest democratic rule since independence, there has been a constant threat of coups. When Bazoum was elected president in 2021, there was a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-56589168">coup attempt</a> about 48 hours before his inauguration. It failed as presidential guards fought off the coup plotters. </p>
<p>As a political scientist with expertise on international security, conflict analysis and governance in Africa, including knowledge on Niger, I <a href="https://theconversation.com/botched-coup-in-niger-points-to-deep-fissures-in-the-country-158330">explained</a> then, the coup attempt pointed to deep fissures in the country. It suggested that the military had not fully embraced democracy. </p>
<p>The current coup plotters have blamed rising insecurity and a lack of economic growth. They <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/soldiers-nigers-presidential-guard-blockade-presidents-office-security-sources-2023-07-26/">stated</a> that the intervention was necessary to avoid “the gradual and inevitable demise” of the country. I believe, however, there are other issues that precipitated the latest coup d’etat. These are: ethnicity; the presence of foreign forces; and the weakness of regional bodies.</p>
<h2>Factors that led to the coup</h2>
<p>There are no doubts that the rise in insecurity and <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview">declining economic prospects</a> contributed to fragility in the country. </p>
<p>Despite the increase in foreign forces, especially from the <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/">US</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/which-western-countries-have-foreign-forces-niger-2023-07-28/#:%7E:text=FRANCE,in%202021%20and%202022%2C%20respectively.">France</a>, and military bases in Niger, the leadership has been unable to stop insurgent attacks.
There are several insurgent groups, such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Qaeda">Al-Qaeda</a> and <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052144">Islamic State</a> affiliates, as well as <a href="https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/boko_haram.html#:%7E:text=Boko%20Haram%2C%20which%20refers%20to,replace%20it%20with%20a%20regime">Boko Haram</a> operating in the country. </p>
<p>These attacks have resulted in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel">thousands of deaths and displacements</a> in the last decade. Hundreds of youths in the capital, Niamey, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/28/power-impasse-continues-in-niger-48-hours-after-coup">gathered to celebrate</a> the July coup, waving Russian flags and chanting “Wagner”. This suggests that some people in Niger believe the military, supported by Russia and the private military contractor, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-60947877">Wagner group</a>, would do a better job of fighting insurgents.</p>
<p>In addition to insecurity and economic stagnation, three other issues help explain the recent coup d’etat.</p>
<p>First, the debate over the ethnicity and legitimacy of Bazoum was an issue during the last election campaign. Bazoum is from Niger’s ethnic Arab minority and has always been <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2021/02/19/who-is-nigerien-presidential-candidate-mohamed-bazoum/">labelled</a> as having foreign origins. </p>
<p>This did not sit well within the military circle, which is predominantly composed of the larger ethnic groups – even though Bazoum got <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/22/nigers-top-court-confirms-mohamed-bazoums-election-win">about 56%</a> of the vote and is from the same party as former president Mahamadou Issoufou. </p>
<p>There is a lot of emphasis on ethnic military composition in the country; understanding this helped Issoufou complete two terms as president. Appointments in the military are made <a href="https://theconversation.com/botched-coup-in-niger-points-to-deep-fissures-in-the-country-158330">along ethnic lines</a>. </p>
<p>Second, the large number of foreign military troops and bases in the country has not been well received by the military. They believe this undermines them. Niger is a key ally of western countries in the fight against insurgency in the region. France’s <a href="https://www.africanleadershipmagazine.co.uk/france-eyes-africas-mining-industry-with-550m-investment/">huge investments</a> in Niger’s mining sector are another reason for its interest in security. </p>
<p>In 2019, the US opened a <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/02/20/niger-military-base-contractor/">drone base</a> in Niger despite protests. As I have <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2018.1552452">pointed out</a> before, the drone base could make Niger a target for terrorists and increase instability.</p>
<p>In 2022, France and other European allies withdrew their forces from neighbouring Mali. Bazoum was quick to invite them to Niger. The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/18/after-mali-exit-niger-accepts-foreign-forces-to-secure-border">Nigerien military leadership</a> and some influential individuals in the country denounced the increase in foreign forces. </p>
<p>Third, I suggest the failure of regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the African Union to take a firm stance against military power seizures in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali emboldened the Nigerien military. ECOWAS leaders have <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/31/ecowas-leaders-give-niger-one-week-ultimatum-to-restore-president/">now threathened to use force</a> to restore Bazoum if the coup plotters do not reinstate him. </p>
<p>In the last four years, there have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577">seven coup d’etats</a> in the region. Three were successful. Leaders of ECOWAS and the African Union have threatened sanctions on these three countries, but nothing much has been done to deter other opportunistic military leaders. </p>
<p>In a round table organised by the think tank Chatham House London on the impact of military intervention in west Africa, one of the leaders from the region stated that they kept avenues of communication open with the three military presidents as a courtesy. This creates an impression that there is no deterrence for military takeovers. </p>
<h2>Implications for Niger and the region</h2>
<p>The latest coup d’etat has severe consequences for Niger and the entire Sahel region. Niger is a strong ally of western nations, especially France, the US and the European Union in fighting insurgency and curbing illegal migration to Europe. </p>
<p>Efforts to address these issues will be affected. And the new military leaders will want to use these issues as leverage in negotiations and to force acceptance of the new regime. </p>
<p>The new leaders in Niger might also engage with the Wagner group to combat the Islamist insurgency. The leader of the group has already <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exiled-russian-mercenary-boss-prigozhin-hails-niger-coup-touts-services-2023-07-28/">praised</a> them for seizing power. The influence of Russia and Wagner in the region could grow. </p>
<p>Yet Wagner has been unable to halt terrorist advancement in Mali and Burkina Faso.</p>
<p>Finally, a successful military takeover in Niger would be a major drawback for democracy in the region and Africa as a whole. The military regimes of Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso already plan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burkina-faso-guinea-mali-juntas-plan-three-way-partnership-2023-02-10/">to form a “military alliance”</a>, supposedly to combat insecurity. </p>
<p>African leaders need to do more to prove that they are working for the masses.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210721/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ethnic politics, the presence of foreign troops and the weaknesses of past responses to coups encouraged Niger’s recent military takeover.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2103302023-07-28T15:27:59Z2023-07-28T15:27:59ZRussia-Africa summit: Putin offers unconvincing giveaways in a desperate bid to make up for killing the Ukraine grain deal<p>The second <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/27/europe/putin-russia-african-summit-intl/index.html">Russia-Africa summit</a> in St Petersburg on July 27 and 28 was predictably overshadowed by the war in Ukraine – and especially Russia’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2023/07/19/1188714712/russias-nixing-of-ukraine-grain-deal-deepens-worries-about-global-food-supply">refusal</a> to agree an extension of the Black Sea grain deal, which expired earlier in the month. </p>
<p>Russia’s decision was widely <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66223280">condemned</a> at the time – including by the Kenyan government, which <a href="https://twitter.com/SingoeiAKorir/status/1680995973311393792?s=20">called</a> it “a stab in the back”.</p>
<p>Russia’s efforts to woo African leaders are part of the Kremlin’s broader efforts to extend its influence across the global south. The summit in St Petersburg, however, could not gloss over the limited success Russia has had in achieving this aim, nor the darker side of such efforts – including the weaponisation of food, and Russia’s support for some of the most repressive regimes in Africa.</p>
<p>At the summit, Moscow presented its attempts to extend its influence across the continent with seemingly eye-catching plans for investment in cultural and educational exchanges and economic diplomacy. This was evident in Vladimir Putin’s <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71814">speech</a>: Russia’s president praised – among other things – growing trade links, joint infrastructure and energy projects, and plans for Russian schools and universities to open branches in Africa.</p>
<p>But, even on paper, Russian accomplishments are far from impressive. According to the latest available <a href="https://comtradeplus.un.org/TradeFlow?Frequency=A&Flows=all&CommodityCodes=TOTAL&Partners=0&Reporters=643&period=2022&AggregateBy=none&BreakdownMode=plus">UN statistics</a>, trade with Africa amounts to around 2% of all Russian trade – putting Putin’s <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71814">claim</a> that Russia-Africa trade increased to US$18 billion in 2022 as a result of the first Russia-Africa summit in 2019 into a more sobering perspective. </p>
<p>Similarly, Russian energy projects have been notoriously difficult to implement. Among the most high-profile plans, an agreement was struck in 2015 for Russia to build a nuclear power plant in Egypt – but its construction only <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russian-company-starts-building-egypts-first-nuclear-plant/a-62559065">started</a> in summer 2022, and the plant is not <a href="https://www.egyptindependent.com/the-first-nuclear-unit-at-dabaa-plant-to-be-installed-by-october-report/">projected</a> to reach full capacity until 2030. </p>
<h2>Grain deal damage</h2>
<p>Unsurprisingly, Putin also devoted considerable time in his speech to trying to justify Russia’s pull-out from the Black Sea grain deal. In its stead, he offered to replace Ukrainian grain shipments with Russian ones. This came in the form of a <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/71814">promise</a> “to provide, free of charge, a supply of 25,000–50,000 tonnes of grain each to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Eritrea”. </p>
<p>This notably excludes Kenya and includes countries in which Russia already has an established presence. It has been <a href="https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20230728-russia-s-offer-of-free-grain-to-african-countries-not-a-solution-un">described</a> by the UN as completely insufficient as a replacement for the Black Sea grain deal. Under that deal, Ukraine was able to <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukrainian-grain-exports-explained/">export</a> some 33 million tons of grain and other foodstuffs, and it enabled the World Food Programme <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1138532">to ship</a> 725,000 tons of wheat alone to Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.</p>
<p>Even more cynically, Russia has tried to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/df07e213-c6d1-4cca-85c4-7f178952bb01">promote</a> a trilateral plan with Turkey and Qatar to replace Ukrainian grain exports with its own. Given that prices have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66253143">increased</a> by almost 10% since Russia pulled out from the grain deal, declared civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate targets, and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66242446">attacked</a> Ukrainian port infrastructure, this makes perfect economic sense for Russia. </p>
<p>If this trend continues, it is likely to reverse the <a href="https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/">significant fall</a> in global food prices of almost 25% since their peak in March 2022, which was achieved because of the grain deal that Russia has now spurned.</p>
<h2>Kremlin influence-seeking in Africa</h2>
<p>The Russia-Africa summit, with its supposed focus on economic and humanitarian cooperation, thus masks the darker reality of Russian influence-seeking in Africa. As evidenced in a <a href="https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmfaff/167/report.html">recent report</a> by the foreign affairs committee of the UK parliament, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s paramilitary Wagner group has been one of the Kremlin’s primary tools of projecting Russian influence in Africa. Prigozhin, whose group has propped up fragile authoritarian regimes <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-questions-about-wagner-group-involvement-as-another-african-country-falls-prey-to-russian-mercenaries-204299">across the continent</a> and extracted valuable natural resource concessions in return, was reportedly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66333403">sighted</a> at the Russia-Africa summit shaking hands with various delegates.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1684502548579852290"}"></div></p>
<p>The countries in which Wagner has had long-term involvement include the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, Libya, Zimbabwe and Burkina Faso. Four of these are now likely recipients of Putin’s “free grain” offer. Among them, Mali, the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso have all suffered from long-lasting instability, which further increased after they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66320895">turned</a> to the Wagner group to prop up their regimes. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/sudan-questions-about-wagner-group-involvement-as-another-african-country-falls-prey-to-russian-mercenaries-204299">Sudan: questions about Wagner Group involvement as another African country falls prey to Russian mercenaries</a>
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<p>Prigozhin’s apparent support for the recent coup in <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9862780/wagner-yevgeny-prigozhin-niger-coup/">Niger</a> and his offer to provide his mercenaries to restore order, therefore, do not bode well for the last even remotely stable western ally in the Sahel region.</p>
<p>Yet, the actual capacity of Russia to achieve lasting influence in Africa as a result of any or all of these efforts may in the end be rather more limited than the Kremlin might hope. After all, fewer than half of the countries attending the St Petersburg summit were represented at the level of their head of state or government –21 out of 49. This <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/49454808-7f14-41ec-8a28-7d6983d94bc9">contrasts</a> sharply with the first summit back in 2019, when 43 heads of state or government travelled to the summit. </p>
<p>This does not mean that Russian influence across Africa will not be a problem for the people whose countries are targeted by Russia. Its involvement – whether through official channels or through the Wagner group – will above all serve Russian interests, and then the interests of the regimes in power who rely on Russian support. </p>
<p>Contrary to the picture that the Russia-Africa summit seeks to paint, this is neither about economic development in Africa nor humanitarian support for its people. For Putin, this is nothing but a different front in what Russia perceives as its struggle against the west.</p>
<p>Bearing in mind the Soviet experience in Africa during the cold war, during which Moscow confronted the west in proxy conflicts including in Angola, South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbawe, this new gamble for influence is unlikely to pay off.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210330/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin is engaged in a bid to woo support among African leaders, but the summit masks the darker reality of Russian influence-seeking in AfricaStefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2101062023-07-25T11:20:58Z2023-07-25T11:20:58ZRussia-Africa Summit: five things African leaders must achieve<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538951/original/file-20230724-17-988lxn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Delegates at the Russia-Africa Economic Forum in Sochi, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kremlin Press Office / Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The second <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">Russia-Africa Summit</a> takes place in St Petersburg on 27-28 July. This comes at a time of a <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/07/great-power-competition-implications-africa-russian-federation-and-its-proxies">major geopolitical shift</a>, which African leaders may see as offering beneficial opportunities. </p>
<p>The previous summit, in 2019, led to the signing of <a href="https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/feature/russias-ongoing-charm-offensive-in-africa-78348">92 agreements</a>, contracts and memoranda of understanding worth over $11 billion. Several African countries <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/07/second-russia-african-summit-expectations-impact-on-nigerian-economy/">(Nigeria, for one) have benefited</a> from these agreements, especially in areas of energy generation and education. </p>
<p>This time, many countries on the continent are facing a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/10/20/africas-inflation-among-regions-most-urgent-challenges#:%7E:text=With%20food%20and%20energy%20accounting,the%20end%20of%20this%20year.">cost of living crisis</a>. But how likely are they to get help from Russia? Its invasion of Ukraine has led to sharp increases in fertiliser and grain prices, pushing up food prices and raising food insecurity on the continent. </p>
<p>The second complication in the engagement is the controversial role of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">Wagner group</a> in several African countries. The third is that the state of Russia’s economy <a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-africa-summit-provides-a-global-stage-for-moscow-to-puff-up-its-influence-209982">limits</a> President Vladimir Putin’s ability to offer Africa any meaningful economic assistance.</p>
<p>And African countries are not likely to reap benefits if they fail to negotiate as a block. </p>
<p>A critical look at the previous summits between African countries and <a href="https://african.business/2021/11/trade-investment/what-can-africa-expect-from-focac-2021">China</a>, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/africasummit/">US</a> and <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/index.html">Japan</a> reveals the fragmentation in African countries’ negotiations. National interests tend to overshadow collective interests, and this reduces their negotiating power.</p>
<p>The continent has not been able to assert its agency. </p>
<p>The 2023 summit is attracting attention because of the <a href="https://jmss.org/article/view/76591">posture</a> of several African countries in relation to the war in Ukraine. About half of African countries have either been “neutral” or supported Russia’s action. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-war-with-ukraine-five-reasons-why-many-african-countries-choose-to-be-neutral-180135">Russia’s war with Ukraine: Five reasons why many African countries choose to be ‘neutral’</a>
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<p>Russia’s <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/prigozhin-coup-political-implications-putin-weak-by-joschka-fischer-2023-07">weakened position</a> in world politics offers a rare chance for African countries to express their agency. Despite security and economic challenges, the continent’s potential remains unchanged and this explains the renewed “clamour for Africa”. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/03/07/africa-is-attracting-ever-more-interest-from-powers-elsewhere">renewed interest</a> in establishing or redefining relationships with African countries, as seen in other summits, shows how important Africa is in world politics. African leaders must take advantage of that. </p>
<h2>What Africa must achieve</h2>
<p>I believe there are five things Africa must achieve at the second Russia-Africa summit. </p>
<p>First, African countries must speak with one voice. African countries are at different stages of development and therefore have diverse needs. Taking a clear position on issues that affect the entire continent will be more productive.</p>
<p>Second, security is an issue that is of paramount interest to Africa. African countries must agree on an alternative security arrangement with Russia which does not include private military contractors. </p>
<p>Several African countries have been apprehensive about the Wagner group. <a href="https://irr.org.za/media/what-should-sa-at-the-least-be-saying-about-the-wagner-group-defenceweb">Ghana</a> has been the most vocal. The group has been accused of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/">gross human right violations</a>. </p>
<p>While some African countries rely on Russia to provide weapons to fight insurgencies in their countries, it is important to cut out private military contractors and deal directly with Russia. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-in-africa-russias-presence-on-the-continent-increasingly-relies-on-mercenaries-198600">Wagner Group in Africa: Russia's presence on the continent increasingly relies on mercenaries</a>
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<p>Third, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has had a disproportionate impact on African countries through food prices. Several African countries depend on Russia and Ukraine for grains and fertilisers. </p>
<p>Although Turkey was able to secure a deal with Russia in 2022 to supply grains to Africa, Russia has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/crimea-bridge-key-russian-supply-line-damaged-two-dead-reports-blasts-2023-07-17/">refused</a> to renew the deal. This poses serious threats to African countries. </p>
<p>The leaders of African countries understand the impact of food security on political stability. This issue must take priority at the summit. African countries need grains and fertiliser, and Russia is desperate not to lose its African allies. Securing a new deal should be on the table in St Petersburg. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russia-ukraine-crisis-highlights-africas-need-to-diversify-its-wheat-sources-181173">Russia-Ukraine crisis highlights Africa's need to diversify its wheat sources</a>
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<p>Fourth, although it has been <a href="https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/07/second-russia-african-summit-expectations-impact-on-nigerian-economy/">reported</a> that the volume of trade between Russia and Africa has increased in the last few years, it remains lopsided. Many African countries have remained importers of Russian products rather than exporters. They should negotiate for a programme that will allow them to increase their volume of exports to Russia – something like the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/agoa-us-africa-trade-program">Africa Growth and Opportunity Act</a> which allowed countries in sub-Saharan Africa to export products to the US tariff free. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-biden-is-meeting-african-leaders-why-free-trade-is-a-major-talking-point-196202">Joe Biden is meeting African leaders - why free trade is a major talking point</a>
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<p>Finally, African countries at the summit must seek specific measures to reduce the impact of the war on their nations. A delegation of African countries earlier in the year <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65951350">failed</a> to convince Russia and Ukraine to end the conflict. But they must secure a commitment to reduce the impact of the war on the continent. </p>
<p>They might find it difficult to secure much aid from Russia, but should push for the transfer of technology that will help them to be self-sufficient.</p>
<p>In summary, the most important thing is for the leaders to speak with one voice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210106/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Olayinka Ajala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>African leaders at the second Africa-Russia summit need to speak with one voice.Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2103042023-07-25T11:19:50Z2023-07-25T11:19:50ZLukashenko’s ‘joke’ about Wagner Group invading Poland highlights regional security fears of rogue mercenaries<p>Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko reportedly remarked – suppposedly in a joking tone – during a recent meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg that Wagner mercenaries are <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-lukashenka-wager-poland/32515408.html">eager to move into Poland</a>. </p>
<p>While Lukashenko may not have been being totally serious about a possible mercenary excursion into Warsaw, the presence of Russian Wagner Group troops in neighbouring Belarus is problematic for a number of reasons.</p>
<p>The first issue is that it’s not clear how effectively Belarus will be able to control the Wagner Group. Lukashenko <a href="https://www.eurasiareview.com/24072023-wagner-troops-in-belarus-want-to-go-west-into-poland-lukashenka-quips-during-meeting-with-putin/">claimed</a>: “The Wagner guys have started to stress us. They want to go west.”</p>
<p>While he <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/23/hosting-lukashenko-putin-says-ukraines-counteroffensive-failed">is reported to have added</a>, “I am keeping them in central Belarus, like we agreed,” it’s clear that having the mercenary troops in Belarus is cause for concern.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/03/statement-un-working-group-use-mercenaries-warns-about-dangers-growing-use">Research</a> on mercenaries, paramilitaries, private security companies and the like has pointed to some of the negative repercussions of granting violent non-state actors too much power and autonomy in a conflict. </p>
<p>Lacking regulations, mercenaries can go rogue, as the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20020128.pdf">Gurkha Security Guards</a>, which were hired by the government of Sierra Leone did in 1994, or in the case of <a href="https://sk.sagepub.com/books/global-politics-and-violent-non-state-actors">right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia</a>. </p>
<p>As these groups feel immune from state retaliation, they are often willing to take on greater risks and commit human rights abuses with impunity, as in the two cases above. </p>
<p>Using these types of violent non-state actors not only makes it more difficult for states to monitor and control them, but these types of organisations often also lack professionalism and a willingness to adhere to international law. War becomes <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20020128.pdf">defined by a profit motive</a> which can corrupt local warring groups. </p>
<p>Their use can also lead to the spread of cheap infantry weapons such as when <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/04/dead-dictators-impact-gadhafi-guns-africa">Muammar Gaddafi’s mercenaries</a> left Libya after his regime fell and took their weapons further across Africa, seriously adding to the instability there.</p>
<p>Wagner mercenaries appear to have become emboldened by their failed march towards Moscow, rather than deterred. This has sparked concern for neighbouring countries in the region, particularly Poland, which is <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/07/22/exp-poland-moves-troops-wagner-belarus-rdr-072202aseg1-cnni-world.cnn">moving troops eastwards</a> to face any possible incursions. </p>
<p>While the Russian president went on national television <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/26/opinion/international-world/putin-russia-uprising.html">vowing to “crush” the armed mutiny</a>, it was not the Russian military that pushed Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner group out, but an amnesty deal that was struck with the help of Lukashenko to save face.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-boss-and-belaruss-president-are-still-manoeuvring-for-power-205333">Wagner Group boss and Belarus's president are still manoeuvring for power</a>
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<p>The Wagner Group was given the impression that Moscow was unable to stop it, and Russian forces were essentially paralysed. Wagner’s forces were also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/24/rostov-on-don-russia-residents-welcome-prigozhin-wagner-forces">warmly greeted</a> by many Russian citizens in Rostov-on-Don in Russia as they crossed on their march out of Ukraine towards Moscow in June.<br>
Though Lukashenko has claimed that he has the Wagner Group under control, it is the Wagner fighters that have been training Belarusian special forces <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/23/wagner-group-fighters-want-attack-poland-lukashenko-belarus/">near the border with Poland</a>, not the other way around.</p>
<h2>Stirring the pot</h2>
<p>What does Lukashenko have to gain from all this? Lukashenko’s recent quips appear mostly to be an attempt to maintain attention and position. The Belarus president has revelled in being at the centre of world events, after he brokered the Wagner Group deal. </p>
<p>Lukashenko <a href="https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/putin-s-vassal-belarus-in-the-inner-russian-power-struggle-a-33eaadaf-76b5-45d4-b36c-c89d2e5d163b">claimed that</a> Putin had complained to him that Prigozhin wasn’t responding to his calls. The Belarus leader boasted that he alone had been able to resolve the situation.</p>
<p>Lukashenko also appears to relish being Putin’s sounding board and enjoys having the Russian president’s ear. In return he has received a fresh security assurance: any Polish attack on Belarus would constitute an <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/23/wagner-group-fighters-want-attack-poland-lukashenko-belarus/">attack on Russia</a> which would be responded to “<a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/21/russia-invasion-ukraine-poland-belarus-vladimir-putin/">with all the means at our disposal</a>”. </p>
<h2>Moscow-Minsk axis</h2>
<p>For all this, Belarus remains firmly the junior partner in its alliance with Russia. In addition to allowing Belarus to serve <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/belarusians-wary-of-being-drawn-into-russias-war-in-ukraine">as a base</a> to launch attacks into Ukraine, some of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons have been <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6prAB2srKDg">stationed in Belarus</a>, something that most Belarusians <a href="https://euroradio.fm/en/more-supporters-nuclear-weapons-belarus-survey">remain opposed to</a>.</p>
<p>But Minsk has little choice at this point. Belarus only survives because Russia provides it with crude oil, gas and other goods. It pocketed <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6364a92e-0939-4cbe-9a4b-f7e05d80e2c2">US$1.7 billion (£1.32 billion) last year</a> by selling on Russian crude oil to other countries. </p>
<p>While Lukashenko occasionally tried to lean towards the west, offering some occasional criticisms of Moscow and making promises to ease repression, the west has never been convinced of his bona fides. Attempts in 2014 and 2015 to hold talks in Minsk with Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France to alleviate tensions <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/17/minsk-agreement-ukraine-russia-peace/">also failed</a>.</p>
<p>But this loyalty has come at a price. Thousands of companies have <a href="https://som.yale.edu/story/2022/over-1000-companies-have-curtailed-operations-russia-some-remain">left Belarus since the war started</a> and Minsk has been slapped with sanctions. And the vast majority of people in Belarus <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-10/reluctant-co-aggressor-minsks-complicity-war-against-ukraine">do not want</a> their country to get directly involved in the war against Ukraine. </p>
<p>By providing a safe haven for Wagner’s mercenaries, Lukashenko pushes the limits of Belarus’s involvement in the conflict while also lifting his perceived status with Putin.</p>
<p>This comes at a time when Lukashenko’s approval rating in Belarus is <a href="https://emerging-europe.com/news/in-its-struggle-to-hold-on-to-power-the-lukashenko-regime-risks-belarus-future/">below 30% and falling</a>. And now Lukashenko has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-wagner-ukraine-mercenary-mercenaries-lukashenko-82d304924c6531b95fba279acd783a84?">8,000 mercenary troops</a> that he might not be able to control.</p>
<h2>High risk</h2>
<p>Though it’s not clear what the Wagner group will do next, going into Poland and bringing Nato directly into the conflict by triggering Article 5 of the Nato treaty – under which an attack on one member state is considered an attack on all members – would be the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-natos-defense-obligations-could-be-triggered-by-ukraine-conflict-2022-11-15/">last thing Putin needs</a>.</p>
<p>An expansion of the war into another country would strain Russia even further at a time when its armed forces have already lost at least <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/06/13/putins-generals-are-still-dropping-like-flies/">15 generals</a> in the conflict, and about <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/07/14/1187847548/how-many-russians-have-died-in-ukraine-new-data-estimates-soldier-casualties">47,000 soldiers</a>, according to recent modelling by independent Russian media outlets Meduza and Mediazona.</p>
<p>In any event, both Putin and Lukashenko are taking on huge risks with their dealings with mercenaries – something that will not only make their own countries more insecure but could also have dire consequences for regional security.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210304/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Wagner Group mercenaries in Belarus remain a worrying wild card with possible consequences for the conflict and the wider region.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2101312023-07-23T19:58:49Z2023-07-23T19:58:49ZHas Russia contained the Prigozhin threat? Its long history of managing violent mercenaries suggests so<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538650/original/file-20230721-28237-i4fz8a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=278%2C35%2C5712%2C3952&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Vasily Deryugin/Kommersant Publishing House/AP</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>A month on since pundits declared the imminent start of a new <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/russia-on-the-brink-of-civil-war-how-we-got-here-and-what-comes-next/">Russian civil war</a>, we’re still waiting. Moreover, we still know <a href="https://cgcinternational.co.in/prigozhins-march-of-the-just/">very little</a> about what went on when Wagner leader <a href="https://uifuture.org/publications/how-long-will-yevgeny-prigozhin-last/">Yevgeny Prigozhin</a> launched a brief rebellion against the Kremlin.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/history-sheds-little-light-on-yevgeny-prigozhin-affair/news-story/e4743e2c5b1d67106c3c2a7120775d6c">basic outlines</a> of what happened are as follows: after months of conflict between the various power brokers around Russian President Vladimir Putin, Prigozhin made a move. </p>
<p>The former criminal might have been drunk with his <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/world/europe/there-was-no-plan-an-alternative-theory-of-yevgeny-prigozhin-s-mutiny-20230627-p5djqr.html">support on social media</a>. More importantly, his business interests and political position were threatened by an attempt to bring his Wagner Group under state control. So he set his troops in motion to prompt the removal of his rivals in Moscow. The goal was to elevate his own position within the power structure, not destroy the system which had made him.</p>
<p>As Prigozhin’s troops marched on Moscow, they shot down choppers and a military plane. But then, Putin publicly sided with the regular military by calling Prigozhin a traitor. Prigozhin backed down.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538657/original/file-20230721-18931-x7dgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538657/original/file-20230721-18931-x7dgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538657/original/file-20230721-18931-x7dgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538657/original/file-20230721-18931-x7dgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538657/original/file-20230721-18931-x7dgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538657/original/file-20230721-18931-x7dgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538657/original/file-20230721-18931-x7dgj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">An image taken from a video released by the Prigozhin Press Service in May of Yevgeny Prigozhin standing in front of multiple bodies in an unknown location.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Prigozhin Press Service/AP</span></span>
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<p>Since then, the story has become even more bizarre. Having agreed to move to Belarus, he instead <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/06/wagner-boss-yevgeny-prigozhin-russia-alexander-lukashenko-belarus">shuttled</a> between Belarus, Moscow and St. Petersburg, presumably in an attempt to <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/07/13/prigozhin-linked-companies-win-government-contracts-after-failed-mutinyment-contracts-after-failed-mutiny-a81827">rescue</a> whatever he could of his business empire. This includes a restaurant and catering empire, his military enterprise, a media company and a rather effective internet troll factory, as well as various mining concessions abroad. </p>
<p>He even secured a meeting with Putin, who, according to his <a href="https://tass.com/defense/1644719">spokesman</a>, told the mercenaries what he thought of their actions and their possible futures. </p>
<p>While the Kremlin sent signals the one-time traitor might have been forgiven, the Russian state simultaneously <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/05/putin-takes-on-yevgeny-prigozhin-business-empire">went after his assets</a> and raided his mansion, <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/07/06/russian-state-tv-broadcasts-prigozhin-estate-raid-claims-probe-into-mutiny-ongoing-a81748">revealing</a> his “opulent lifestyle that contrasts with the public image of a crusader against corruption,” as one media outlet put it.</p>
<p>Prigozhin continues to try to contain the fallout of his misjudged adventure. Late <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/19/video-appears-to-show-wagner-chief-yevgeny-prigozhin-addressing-fighters-in-belarus">last week</a>, he was filmed in Belarus addressing his fighters, which suggests the agreement that ended the mutiny has been at least partially implemented. However, it also appears Prigozhin flew in from Russia for the speech and returned there afterwards.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1681664433917943812"}"></div></p>
<h2>Russia’s history of paramilitarism</h2>
<p>What are we to make of all of this? First, while it is true Putin’s position certainly was <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/prigozhins-putsch-putin-wont-forget-or-forgive/">not strengthened</a> by the rebellion, the destabilisation should not be over-drawn. <a href="https://www.hachette.com.au/mikhail-zygar/all-the-kremlins-men-inside-the-court-of-vladimir-putin">Putin’s dictatorship</a> is “a closed, personalist authoritarian regime, potentially en route to becoming a more totalitarian model,” as one political scientist has <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090760">noted</a>. </p>
<p>It is highly repressive towards the population. But it is not a top-down, military-style operation, where the boss makes decisions and everybody else stands to attention. Putin is frequently indecisive and the power structure around him is dynamic. People and power-clans can move in and out of the inner layers as they compete for power and influence.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538659/original/file-20230721-29-5ogwnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538659/original/file-20230721-29-5ogwnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538659/original/file-20230721-29-5ogwnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538659/original/file-20230721-29-5ogwnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=434&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538659/original/file-20230721-29-5ogwnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538659/original/file-20230721-29-5ogwnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538659/original/file-20230721-29-5ogwnb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=546&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vladimir Putin, centre, speaking with chief of the general staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, left, and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, in December 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mikhail Klimentyev/Pool Sputnik Kremlin/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia is a state with a bureaucracy, army and police forces, but its monopoly of force is eroded by the proliferation of privatised armies. They are misleadingly called “<a href="https://russianpmcs.csis.org/">private military companies</a>”, but are an integral part of a power structure which can be described, using the terminology of historians <a href="https://researchers.adelaide.edu.au/profile/vesna.drapac">Vesna Drapac</a> and <a href="https://researchers.adelaide.edu.au/profile/gareth.pritchard">Gareth Prichard</a>, as “paramilitarised”.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/resistance-and-collaboration-in-hitlers-empire-9781137385345/">paramilitarised regime</a>, the state can be challenged and undermined, but not completely destroyed, by semi-independent military, paramilitary or criminal organisations. This type of violent regime was observed
in much of central and eastern Europe <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/660364">after the first world war</a>, in many parts of the <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/hitlers-empire-9780141917504">Nazi empire</a> and in the western borderlands of the Soviet Union <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/au/stalinism-at-war-9781350153516/">after the second world war</a>. </p>
<p>In a civil war or warlordism (like in China after 1916 or <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20749809">Russia</a> after 1917), the state either ceases to exist or becomes one of many violent actors vying over control of bits of territory. By contrast, in a paramilitarised regime, the state gradually loses its ability to control the violence, but is not complete destroyed.</p>
<p>Russia has existed in states of paramilitarisation for quite a long time, and the regime has learned to live with, and to control, the private armies of entrepreneurs. Russia entered the post-Soviet world in 1991 with a fragile democratic regime, barely able to control the wielding of physical force. </p>
<p>Some of the first private military companies emerged in this context, but more important were the violent robber barons politely described as “oligarchs”. They ran their own affairs and their private armies of leather-jacketed thugs enforced their contracts. They acted as if they owned Russia, while the state was there to serve their interests. This was a paramilitarised regime of <a href="https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501703287/violent-entrepreneurs/#bookTabs=1">violent entrepreneurs</a>. The main difference to Prigozhin was that war-making was not part of the business model.</p>
<p>Since 2000, <a href="https://www.penguin.com.au/books/putin-9781847923387">Putin</a> has put them all in their place. He did so slowly and methodically. He told the oligarchs what was expected of them (as he did with Prigozhin after the mutiny). </p>
<p>He then took them on, one after the other, like cutting a <a href="https://politicaldictionary.com/words/salami-tactics/">salami</a>, slice by slice, until nothing was left. Those who did not submit to the rebuilt Russian state were eventually exiled, arrested or killed. But this was not a one-day operation. It took years.</p>
<p>Joseph Stalin, one of the heroes of Russia’s <a href="https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781784994310/">history-obsessed</a> president, called this approach “dosage”. </p>
<p>Challengers would be undermined gradually: first removed from the inner sanctum around the leader, then pushed from formal positions of power, and eventually arrested, exiled or shot. This whole process was designed, as historian Sheila Fitzpatrick <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/on-stalins-team-hardback">has argued</a>, to bring the other leaders on board who might otherwise side with the victim.</p>
<p>Putin presides over a much more volatile power structure. He has an even greater need for “dosage”: he needs to keep the men (and a few women) around him divided and devoted to himself as the ultimate arbiter. His own power depends on it. </p>
<p>And the stakes have become higher after he allowed some of them partially to privatise the state’s means of violence, undermining his earlier successful efforts to re-establish the state’s monopoly over force.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/wagners-rebellion-may-have-been-thwarted-but-putin-has-never-looked-weaker-and-more-vulnerable-208436">Wagner's rebellion may have been thwarted, but Putin has never looked weaker and more vulnerable</a>
</strong>
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</p>
<hr>
<h2>New private military companies emerge</h2>
<p>The context of this <a href="https://uifuture.org/publications/russian-pmcs-short-course-history-impact-logic-of-development/">return to paramilitarism</a> in recent years was war: first in Iraq, then in Syria and finally in Ukraine. </p>
<p>In Iraq, the Russian oil companies needed to protect their assets, so they used their private armies to do so. These were <a href="https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/a9e28227f557dc1e6659c1d88613790bb3dddb5b/">illegal in Russia</a>, but allowed to operate abroad. </p>
<p>Soon, Russian private military companies proliferated. Some of them then broadened their operations to escort ships in the piracy-infested waters off the African coast or security work in Africa itself. The civil war in Syria offered new opportunities.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1682029422256455683"}"></div></p>
<p>However, the Russian state remained wary of the military entrepreneurs, particularly if they tried to establish a presence back home. Two major private military company leaders, of the <a href="https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state">Slavonic Corps</a>, were arrested in 2013 and convicted as mercenaries. </p>
<p>This is where Prigozhin stepped in. Putin’s regime suddenly needed private military companies to help fight the war in eastern Ukraine from 2014 while maintaining plausible deniability: the fighters were all “volunteers” or “locals.” </p>
<p>Hence Prigozhin, a long-time, loyal Putin client, was put in charge of the remnants of Slavonic Corps. The mercenaries were returned to Russia and “curated” by the restaurateur into the Wagner Group, which then fought in Ukraine and Syria. Contracts to secure Russian oil and gas installations in North Africa and Venezuela soon followed. </p>
<p>These contracts were then leveraged to negotiate deals to train special forces in Africa and Latin America. Payment was often in lucrative mining concessions.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-yevgeny-prigozhin-how-a-one-time-food-caterer-became-vladimir-putins-biggest-threat-208450">The rise of Yevgeny Prigozhin: how a one-time food caterer became Vladimir Putin's biggest threat</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>From the perspective of the Russian state, these international ventures had several functions: they secured Russian military interests, raised funds and helped Russia gain diplomatic influence at a time when it had become more and more isolated internationally. </p>
<p>Finally, sending the mercenaries abroad removed them as a threat to the Russian state at home. Even during the battle of Bakhmut in Ukraine, Prigozhin’s greatest claim to fame, the core of the Wagner group had “<a href="https://uifuture.org/publications/russian-pmcs-short-course-history-impact-logic-of-development/">remained in Africa</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538661/original/file-20230721-34091-lqoann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538661/original/file-20230721-34091-lqoann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538661/original/file-20230721-34091-lqoann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538661/original/file-20230721-34091-lqoann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538661/original/file-20230721-34091-lqoann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538661/original/file-20230721-34091-lqoann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/538661/original/file-20230721-34091-lqoann.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Wagner fighters wave a Russian and Wagner flag atop a damaged building in Bakhmut.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Prigozhin Press Service/AP</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Can the threat be contained again?</h2>
<p>This was how the Russian state managed the paramilitary threat and deployed it to its own ends. The Prigozhin rebellion, however, showed how risky this tactic is when the mercenaries are deployed next door, in <a href="https://www.mup.com.au/books/russias-war-against-ukraine-paperback-softback">Russia’s war against Ukraine</a>. Russia had veered back to paramilitarism – but of a new type, driven by modern-day entrepreneurs of violence rather than the violent entrepreneurs of the 1990s.</p>
<p>A month later, however, it appears this was only temporary. Putin’s regime is in the process of containing the threat. And it uses tactics it has employed before: dosage, public shaming, seizure of assets, the deployment of dangerous mercenaries away from home. </p>
<p>This tactic might work again. One month on, it is still too early to predict the outcome, but it certainly appears that expectations for Russia’s dissolution or the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/26/politics/wagner-putin-us-ukraine-analysis/index.html">collapse</a> of Putin’s regime were premature. </p>
<p>Putin might yet fail in reasserting his authority, but at the moment there is little evidence that he is.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/210131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mark Edele receives funding from the Australian Research Council. </span></em></p>Russia has long been a ‘paramilitarised’ regime, where the state can be challenged and undermined, but is not completely destroyed, by paramilitary or criminal groups.Mark Edele, Hansen Professor in History, Deputy Dean, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2099822023-07-21T11:52:19Z2023-07-21T11:52:19ZRussia-Africa summit provides a global stage for Moscow to puff up its influence<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/538045/original/file-20230718-25-9ghvqm.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Russia-Africa Summit in 2019 in Sochi, Russia. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Forty-three African heads of state attended the <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/news/podvedeny-itogi-pervogo-sammita-i-ekonomicheskogo-foruma-rossija-afrika-roskongress-prodolzhit-rabotu-na-afrikanskom-treke-v-period-do-sledujuschego-foruma/">2019 Russia-Africa summit</a>. They had high hopes that Russia would emerge as a new source of investment and trade for the continent. Russian president Vladimir Putin promised to double Russian trade with Africa in five years to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/as-the-us-looks-elsewhere-russia-seeks-a-closer-relationship-with-africa/2019/10/25/7e329124-f69e-11e9-b2d2-1f37c9d82dbb_story.html">US$40 billion</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, Russian <a href="https://www.ecofinagency.com/public-management/0903-43450-africa-imports-seven-times-more-russian-products-than-it-exports-to-moscow">trade with the continent has contracted</a> to US$14 billion. It is lopsided, with Russia exporting seven times as much as it imports from Africa. Additionally, 70% of this trade is <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1063407/russia-leading-trade-partners-in-africa-by-trade-volume/">concentrated in just four countries</a>: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa.</p>
<p><a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/WIR2022-Regional_trends_Africa_en.pdf">Russia invests very little in Africa</a>. It accounts for 1% of the foreign direct investment that goes to the continent. <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1561950939&Country=Egypt&topic=Economy&subtopic=Ope_2">Mauritius is a larger source of foreign direct investment</a> for Africa. Additionally, Russia’s gross domestic product has <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/RUS/russia/gdp-gross-domestic-product">shrunk in value from US$2.3 trillion in 2013</a> to US$1.8 trillion in 2021.</p>
<p>Despite these diminishing economic ties, <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russia-is-growing-its-strategic-influence-in-africa-110930">Russia’s influence in Africa</a> has rapidly expanded since 2019. It has deployed troops to the continent and become the dominant external partner in a handful of countries. <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-disinformation-in-africa/">Russian disinformation campaigns</a> in at least 16 African countries are shaping the information environment on the continent. </p>
<p>This has largely been <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/09/17/russia-asymmetric-strategy-expanding-influence-in-africa-security-moscow/">achieved through irregular means</a>. These include propping up isolated, autocratic regimes through a combination of the deployment of <a href="https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-mercenaries-in-africa-why-there-hasnt-been-any-effective-opposition-to-drive-them-out-207318">Wagner paramilitary forces</a>, electoral interference, disinformation and arms-for-resources deals.</p>
<p>Each of these tactics is destabilising for the host country. </p>
<p>Predictably, half of the two dozen African countries where Russia has been actively plying its influence <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russia-interference-undermine-democracy-africa/">are in conflict</a>. Russia has similarly undermined <a href="https://theconversation.com/rising-instability-in-mali-raises-fears-about-role-of-private-russian-military-group-174634">UN operations in African countries</a> where Moscow is vying for influence, further compounding instability.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-is-on-a-charm-offensive-in-africa-the-reasons-arent-pretty-187711">Why Russia is on a charm offensive in Africa. The reasons aren't pretty</a>
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<p>Despite Russia’s increasingly aggressive policies on the continent and internationally, roughly the same number of African heads of state are expected to participate in this year’s <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">St Petersburg summit</a> as in 2019. More significant than any commercial deals announced are the political and financial benefits Russian and African elites are expecting to gain. Having closely followed <a href="https://africacenter.org/in-focus/russia-in-africa/">Russia’s disruptive interventions in Africa</a> for many years, the main losers will be ordinary citizens who will pay for these exclusive partnerships – through higher taxes, greater instability and less freedom. </p>
<p>The Russia-Africa summit has obvious benefits for Moscow. It conveys a perception of normalcy following <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine</a>, an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/icc-putin-war-crimes-ukraine-9857eb68d827340394960eccf0589253">International Criminal Court war crimes arrest warrant for Putin</a> and the aborted <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-wagner-prigozhin-9acbdf1eda849692ca0423a4116058d1">insurrection led by Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin</a>. </p>
<p>While Russian-African economic ties are modest, the continent provides Russia with a global stage from which Moscow can puff up its geostrategic posture. Africa matters more to Russia than Russia does to Africa.</p>
<h2>The upside for Moscow</h2>
<p>Given Russia’s track record of destabilisation on the continent since 2019, it begs the question why African leaders would even consider attending the <a href="https://summitafrica.ru/en/">St Petersburg summit</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-catastrophe-accelerating-under-junta-rule/">Security has deteriorated</a> in every African country where Wagner has been deployed, while <a href="https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/">human rights abuses have surged</a>. Local communities have been intimidated into leaving their homes where Wagner has been given mining access, effectively annexing these territories.</p>
<p>Moscow curries favour with some of these regimes by providing <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/russia-in-africa/">protection from international sanctions</a> for human rights violations or for violating democratic practices. Unsurprisingly, the African countries where Russia is most involved have <a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russia-interference-undermine-democracy-africa/">median democracy scores of 19</a>. The African democracy median is 51 on <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores">Freedom House’s 100-point scale</a>.</p>
<p>The summit is a chance to show it’s business as usual for Russia. And that Russia is not a pariah, but enjoys the implicit endorsement of its violations of international law by African heads of state.</p>
<p>Russia will likely use this year’s summit to falsely claim that western sanctions are limiting the export of Russian (and Ukrainian) food and fertiliser to Africa, distracting attention from Russia’s culpability for <a href="https://theconversation.com/here-are-the-terrible-costs-of-vladimir-putins-enduring-war-in-ukraine-184367">triggering the disruption in global grain supplies</a>.</p>
<p>The summit also highlights the increasing importance of Africa to Russian foreign policy. Africa remains the continent <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-fresh-warning-that-africa-needs-to-be-vigilant-against-russias-destabilising-influence-178785">most welcoming of Russian engagement</a>. It’s also the least willing to criticise Moscow for its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2022/9/29/russia-ukraine-live-news-annexed-regions-could-join-by-tuesday-2#:%7E:text=Latest%20Ukraine%20updates%3A%20US%20calls%20Russian%20annexation%20a%20'land%20grab',-By%20Edna%20Mohamed&text=US%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony,is%20illegal%20under%20international%20law.">land grab in Ukraine</a>. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has made <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-russia-is-on-a-charm-offensive-in-africa-the-reasons-arent-pretty-187711">at least eight visits to Africa</a> since Russia launched its attack in March 2022.</p>
<h2>Dubious benefits to Africa</h2>
<p>Anaemic investment, normalising autocracy, fomenting instability and intervening in African domestic politics doesn’t sound like a winning strategy for building a long-term partnership. </p>
<p>It’s one thing to take a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64759845">non-aligned posture</a> on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which may seem like a far-off conflict. But why would African leaders continue to engage with a foreign actor with an active record of undermining stability on the continent?</p>
<p>A clear-eyed assessment of national interests isn’t compelling. The instability caused by Russia’s irregular tactics threatens to spill across borders and is creating crises of sovereignty on the continent. </p>
<p>The upending of the rule of law is simultaneously damaging the continent’s budding reputation as a reliable destination for investment and international partnerships.</p>
<p>Russia’s influence operations are nearly always aimed at helping incumbent (typically autocratic) regimes retain power. Opaque mining and arms deals are frequently part of the package. African leaders benefiting from these tactics welcome Moscow’s overtures.</p>
<p>Other African leaders see engaging with Russia as a tactic to get more support from the west.</p>
<p>A minority may naively see their participation as a genuine opportunity to gain more Russian investment or encourage more constructive Russian engagement. Expected announcements of mining, energy, grain, transport and digitisation deals at the summit will provide a justifying fig leaf to all attendees. Even if such plans never materialise.</p>
<h2>Reality check</h2>
<p>The reality is that <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/russia-in-africa-undermining-democracy-through-elite-capture/">Russia’s strategy of elite cooption</a> is widening the gap between African leaders’ and citizens’ interests. Citizens regularly say <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/africans-durable-demand-for-democracy/">they want more democracy</a>, job creation and upholding of the rule of law. Russian engagements on the continent are undermining all three.</p>
<p>The “interests gap” between African leaders and citizens points to another takeaway from the summit: most African political leaders won’t be championing reforms on citizen priorities for better governance, development and security. Rather, leadership on these interests will need to come from African civil society, media and independent judiciaries.</p>
<p>Moscow is sure to use this year’s gathering in St Petersburg to conjure up the imagery of shared Russian and African interests. The key question for African citizens to ask is: whose interests are being served?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209982/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joseph Siegle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Russia-Africa summit has obvious benefits for Moscow: it conveys a perception of normalcy and the tacit approval of African elites.Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2053332023-07-17T15:12:14Z2023-07-17T15:12:14ZWagner Group boss and Belarus’s president are still manoeuvring for power<p>Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko is emerging with more power in the aftermath of the military uprising and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/25/wagner-boss-to-leave-russia-as-reports-say-us-spy-agencies-picked-up-signs-of-planned-uprising-days-ago">march on Moscow</a> as he publicly questions President Vladimir Putin’s version of events.</p>
<p>Lukashenko was credited with <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/24/europe/russia-putin-wagner-uprising-saturday-intl/index.html">negotiating the deal</a> that appeared to have ended Wagner Group boss Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny. The armed uprising was prompted by a demand that Putin replace some leaders of the Russian military. By acting as the intermediary and offering to host Prigozhin and any Wagner Group soldiers who were unwilling to join the Russian military, Lukashenko provided a face-saving solution that allowed both Prigozhin and Putin to step back from a high-risk confrontation. </p>
<p>But it appears that announcements on June 24 did not finish negotiations and all sides are still manoeuvring for power and position.</p>
<p>Since the mutiny, the Belarusian leader has set the stage for a series of humiliating revelations that raise questions about Putin’s ability to handle the military and political challenges posed by Prigozhin’s rebellion.</p>
<h2>New revelations</h2>
<p>After indicating <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-lukashenka-prigozhin-alert-nato-threat/32477711.html">on June 27 that Prigozhin had arrived in Belarus</a> to begin his exile, Lukashenko later revealed that the story had taken a different turn. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66122337">At a press conference on July 6</a> at the Palace of Independence in Minsk, the Belarusian president claimed that Prigozhin had returned to Russia and might even be on his way to Moscow. Two days later, to make the point even more clearly, the Belarusian defence ministry invited foreign journalists to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-66140699">tour an empty camp</a> to show that no Wagner Group soldiers were there.</p>
<p>Eventually <a href="https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/07/10/putin-spokesman-confirms-putin-met-with-prigozhin-after-rebellion">the Kremlin confirmed Lukashenko’s version of events</a>. Not only had Prigozhin been in Russia, but he had met with Putin, and significant parts of the deal that ended the mutiny were still being determined. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537782/original/file-20230717-231543-xkj60l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Alexander Lukashenko." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537782/original/file-20230717-231543-xkj60l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537782/original/file-20230717-231543-xkj60l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537782/original/file-20230717-231543-xkj60l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537782/original/file-20230717-231543-xkj60l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537782/original/file-20230717-231543-xkj60l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537782/original/file-20230717-231543-xkj60l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/537782/original/file-20230717-231543-xkj60l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Lukashenko appears to be trying to strengthen his hand against Putin.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/minsk-belarus-may-9-2019-president-1392929765">exsilentroot/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<p>New developments keep on coming. On July 10, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced that the Russian president held a lengthy meeting <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/10/putin-met-with-wagner-leader-gerasimov-makes-an-appearance">on June 29 with Prigozhin</a> and more than 30 of his Wagner Group commanders. On July 14 <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/putin-give-account-post-mutiny-prigozhin-meeting-pmc-wagner-not-exist/">Putin revealed</a> that he had offered Wagner Group soldiers the opportunity to continue to fight together in Ukraine under one of the Wagner Group’s senior commanders. This was a significant concession, considering that on the day of Prigozhin’s rebellion, Putin described those involved in the <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/06/24/we-re-faced-with-a-betrayal">mutiny as betrayers</a>. According to Putin, Prigozhin refused the offer on the men’s behalf.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/failed-wagner-group-coup-leaves-putin-humiliated-and-belarus-dictator-lukashenko-more-secure-for-now-208492">Failed Wagner Group coup leaves Putin humiliated and Belarus dictator Lukashenko more secure – for now</a>
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<p>Both the fact and the substance of this meeting with Putin suggest that Prigozhin still has some political power. Recent revelations that <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russian-general-dismissed-after-criticizing-leadership/a-66237138#:%7E:text=Ivan%20Popov%2C%20the%20commander%20of,or%20tell%20the%20truth...">a Russian general is concerned</a> about the conduct of the war as well as reports of suspensions and sackings among senior officers suspected of <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/07/13/dozens-of-senior-russian-officers-detained-fired-after-wagner-mutiny-wsj-a81830">sympathising with Prigozhin</a> indicate that Putin may not be able to count on the continued loyalty of his army.</p>
<h2>Pushing Putin</h2>
<p>Lukashenko’s public revelations of contradictions in the Kremlin’s narrative have put pressure on senior Russian officials – including Putin himself.</p>
<p>But why is Lukashenko giving western journalists these damaging details? The most likely explanation is that Lukashenko is playing a tactical game. He is seeking to exploit Prigozhin’s rebellion to increase the room for manoeuvre in his relationship with Putin and with Russia.</p>
<p>Lukashenko is an authoritarian leader in his own right, but he depends on Moscow as the ultimate guarantor of his grip on power. And Putin has been quick to take advantage of any weakening of Lukashenko’s position to expand Russia’s influence over Belarus. </p>
<p>In return for Moscow’s support during mass protests <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/14/lukashenko-seeks-putins-help-in-attempt-to-survive-mass-protests">against Lukashenko</a> after he declared himself the winner of the August 2020 presidential elections, the Belarusian leader agreed to strengthen the alliance with Russia. This “union” had existed mainly on paper since it was established in 1999, but <a href="https://pism.pl/publications/the-belarusian-vector-of-the-russian-threat-to-nato">recently it has been bolstered</a> by a new military doctrine and closer links between the two countries’ defence industries and an increase in joint military exercises.</p>
<p>This means that <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3783470-why-belarus-matters-for-the-russia-ukraine-war/">Russia can draw on Belarusian assets for the war in Ukraine</a>. Belarus has not only provided a platform for launching attacks on Ukraine but also weapons, ammunition and medical facilities. </p>
<p>Now Belarus has begun to accept the deployment of Russian tactical <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-nuclear-weapons-belarus-lukashenka-putin-ukraine/">nuclear weapons on its territory</a>. This development allows Moscow to back up its nuclear rhetoric with action, as well as to tighten the connections between Belarus and Russia.</p>
<p>Lukashenko has conducted a balancing act throughout the war, demonstrating support for Russia but avoiding committing his own soldiers to the fight. With society in Belarus strongly opposed to more direct <a href="https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-02-10/reluctant-co-aggressor-minsks-complicity-war-against-ukraine">involvement in the war</a>, sending Belarusian soldiers over the border into Ukraine would risk provoking another round of mass protests and once again put Lukashenko’s position in doubt.</p>
<p>But while Moscow has been able to dictate terms to Minsk in recent years, that relationship would look very different if Russia were the country undergoing political instability. A Russian leader who is distracted, and even weakened, by the need to assert his control over challengers and respond to internal criticism will have less time to ensure that Lukashenko stays in line. </p>
<p>Lukashenko has taken advantage of opportunities to improve relations with countries beyond Moscow’s orbit, including those in the west. We have seen this as recently as the autumn of 2022, when the Belarusian foreign minister reportedly met informally with western diplomats <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/belarus-lukashenka-russia-ukraine-mobilisation-war/">at the United Nations</a> for talks, which were believed to be about improving relationships. Details were not revealed. </p>
<p>Lukashenko’s interventions in the Prigozhin mutiny episode show that he does not necessarily operate in lockstep with Moscow. Now that <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/wagner-troops-belarus-russia-mutiny/32505071.html">Wagner Group soldiers have finally begun to arrive in Belarus</a>, we should be on the lookout for Lukashenko to make further tactical moves to exploit Putin’s political weaknesses and create the basis for a more independent stance by Minsk.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/205333/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jennifer Mathers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Machinations over the march on Moscow are continuing.Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2087032023-07-17T12:24:34Z2023-07-17T12:24:34ZImpunity over Wagner mutiny signals further degradation of rule of law in Russia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537559/original/file-20230714-25-5qbdu0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=17%2C0%2C3918%2C2673&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Face masks depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin and owner of private military company Wagner Group Yevgeny Prigozhin.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaWagner/c8d109fd827a4ad4b80ecaf457ea1f22/photo?Query=Prigozhin%20Putin&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=141&currentItemNo=6">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When mercenary chief <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/wagner-group-who-is-yevgeny-prigozhin-russia-mercenary-private-military-company/">Yevgeny Prigozhin</a> led his rebels in a short-lived mutiny, many observers focused on how it would challenge the Kremlin politically – few looked at how the episode and the reaction of the Russian authorities <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-prigozhin-wagner-mutiny-ukraine-putin-898d750e843aeb105a3c220bb917f606">undermine the country’s legal system</a>.</p>
<p>On June 24, 2023, as the Wagner Group looked set to march on Moscow, the Russian Federal Security Bureau <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/23/wagner-chief-accuses-russias-military-of-attack-and-says-evil-leadership-must-be-stopped">officially announced</a> the opening of an investigation under Article 279 of the Criminal Code, which prosecutes armed mutiny.</p>
<p>The crime is a particularly grave one under <a href="https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/fceb931af1d53a0da76eca119394fed15d8a0b26/">the Russian Criminal Code</a>, punishable by imprisonment ranging from 12 to 20 years.</p>
<p>Yet just a few hours after being opened, the case was closed. As a <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/wagner-group-russia-forces-turn-back-moscow-prigozhin-declares/">result of negotiations</a>, Prigozhin ended the march some 200 kilometers (124 miles) short of Moscow. In return, the investigation into the rebels’ actions was dropped, and Prigozhin himself was granted passage to Belarus. The criminal case was <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/russia/article/2023/06/27/russia-drops-charges-against-wagner-mutineers_6038223_140.html">officially dropped</a> on June 27 in an announcement by the Federal Security Bureau.</p>
<p>Russia has long <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-world/2023">lost its status</a> as a state governed by the rule of law. Since the invasion of Ukraine, it has been accused of <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-ukraine-massive-human-rights-violations-russia-war/">massive human rights violations</a> and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/russia-un-experts-condemn-civil-society-shutdown">systematic repression of human rights defenders</a> and opposition activists.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the dropping of the criminal case against Prigozhin and his mercenaries is unprecedented – especially given the perceived threat to the Russian state, the destruction of military equipment and the <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russian-defense-minister-makes-first-public-appearance-since-mercenary-revolt-as-uncertainty-still-swirls">deaths of some 15 Russian troops</a>. As someone who has been <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/the-russia-and-eurasia-program-welcomes-new-visiting-scholar-maxim-krupskiy/">involved in the Russian legal system</a> for more than 12 years, as an attorney and a scholar of law, it is the first time I have heard of the dismissal of a criminal case involving such a massive violation of the law. It also runs counter to the experience of others in Russia who have been <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-antiwar-activist-sentenced-ukraine/32415810.html">imprisoned for many years</a> for <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/russia-protesters-arrested-putin-documentary-excerpt-ukraine-war/">expressing anti-war sentiment</a> in public.</p>
<h2>Undermining Putinism</h2>
<p>Russia under Vladimir Putin has increasingly employed repressive legal practices under the guise of protecting national security. Indeed, Putin at first tried to use the weight of the Russian legal system to pressure the Wagner Group to abandon its march on Moscow. The Russian president promised that all those responsible would be punished and referred to their <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/24/putin-vows-to-punish-those-involved-in-mutiny-accuses-them-of-treason.html">actions as “treason</a>.” </p>
<p>Since “<a href="https://warsawinstitute.org/state-duma-adopts-harsher-treason-penalties/">treason” under the Russian Criminal Code</a> refers to those defecting to an enemy, such a charge was not applicable. Instead, criminal proceedings were opened under the article on armed mutiny. Nonetheless, Putin initially sent a clear signal that Prigozhin’s actions were seen not only as a very serious crime that would be treated as such but as “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/24/putin-vows-to-punish-those-involved-in-mutiny-accuses-them-of-treason.html">a deadly threat</a>” to Russian statehood and the nation.</p>
<p>The failure to carry through with such rhetoric undermines Putin’s long-cultivated image as someone who refuses to negotiate with criminals when given an ultimatum. It is, to my knowledge, the first public example of Putin breaking his own rule against negotiating with those who challenge his regime. Such a policy has been Putin’s default ever since he came to power. Then, with the backdrop of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/12/1085861999/russias-wars-in-chechnya-offer-a-grim-warning-of-what-could-be-in-ukraine">war in Chechnya</a>, Russia faced a large number of terrorist attacks. Rather than negotiate, Putin would pursue a policy of destroying those attacking the Russian state – even at the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39586814">heavy cost of hostages’ lives</a>. That image of a man who will not negotiate has now been shattered.</p>
<h2>‘Erosion of the legal system’</h2>
<p>But the damage goes beyond denting Putin’s reputation – it also undermines Russia’s legal system itself. As St. Petersburg municipal council member Nikita Yuferev noted in the aftermath of the episode, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-prigozhin-wagner-mutiny-ukraine-putin-898d750e843aeb105a3c220bb917f606">dropping of the criminal case represents</a> the “gradual erosion of the legal system” in Russia.</p>
<p>In terms of Russian law, the Federal Security Bureau has presented nothing in the way of sound legal justification for dropping the criminal case against Prigozhin or the Wagner Group. It could have dismissed the case if the acts committed by the Wagner Group were not deemed to be mutinous or if the people involved in organizing and participating in it had died.</p>
<p>But in dropping the criminal case, the bureau <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/27/fsb-says-closed-criminal-mutiny-case-against-prigozhin-a81658">merely offered</a> that the rebels had “ceased their actions aimed at committing a crime.” From a legal standpoint, this looks extremely unconvincing. The Wagner Group seized several cities, including the headquarters of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces, and killed several Russian military personnel by the time it announced the end of its march on Moscow.</p>
<p>That the Russian authorities have so far failed to come up with any legal justification for dropping the case marks a departure from past precedent. As a rule, Putin has sought to shroud his actions in at least quasi-legal reasoning. </p>
<p>Take, for example, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/moscow-official-kherson-referendum-postponed/32019315.html">Russia’s annexation</a> of the eastern territories of Ukraine. In order to give the annexation the appearance of legality, authorities organized referendums in the occupied territories and presented the annexation as being the result of the free expression of will. <a href="https://theins.ru/en/news/262795">Recent rulings</a> by Russia’s Constitutional Court against people who criticize Russian aggression against Ukraine, along with <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/01/russia-new-restrictions-foreign-agents">legislation on “foreign agents</a>,” also provide evidence of how Putin uses quasi-legal tools for political ends.</p>
<p>Indeed, the whole Wagner Group episode, from its deployment in Ukraine to its leader’s negotiated exile, recalls the “wild 1990s” in Russia, a post-Soviet decade in which politics and organized crime went hand in hand. </p>
<p>Under the <a href="https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/a9e28227f557dc1e6659c1d88613790bb3dddb5b/">Russian Criminal Code</a>, being part of a mercenary group is a crime. So too is the financing and other material support of mercenaries, punishable by imprisonment for up to 18 years. The state is prohibited from funding mercenary activities – something that raises legal questions over the financing of Prigozhin’s private army in Ukraine in the first place.</p>
<h2>Laws not written in stone</h2>
<p>The treatment of Prigozhin also contrasts with the experience and the use of law against other Russians. While Prigozhin avoided charges despite directly challenging the Russian state – and decrying Moscow’s military progress in Ukraine – many others have been imprisoned for simply speaking out against the conflict.</p>
<p>In the opening days of the February 2022 invasion, it became a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake-information-about-army-2022-03-04/">criminal offense in Russia</a> to spread “false information” or “discredit” the Russian army. The vaguely worded law has made possible the large-scale political persecution of Russian citizens with anti-war views. Since then, the <a href="https://en.ovdinfo.org/discreditation-articles-explainer">state has initiated</a> <a href="https://www.svoboda.org/a/sroki-sopostavimye-so-srokami-za-ubiystvo-dela-o-feykah-pro-armiyu/32310199.html">more than 150</a> criminal cases under the article on spreading “fake news” about the Russian army, 89 criminal cases on “discrediting” the Russian army and 7,182 administrative cases.</p>
<p>The idea that the rule of law can be used for political ends – be it to finance a private army, dismiss charges against such groups or used to suppress anti-war sentiment – is something that has been actively promoted by some Russian propagandists. For example, the editor in chief of state-controlled broadcaster RT, Margarita Simonyan, said of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a6fb9f42-f17b-4d1f-9298-6eb0eed35e86">decision to drop charges</a> in regard to the Prigozhin armed mutiny: “Legal norms are not the commandments of Christ or the tablets of Moses.” In other words, if necessary they can be ignored.</p>
<p>This public dismissal of law as the main regulator of social relations, and its replacement by agreements to settle criminal disputes, indicates a new stage of degradation of the Russian legal system. I fear it will give Russian authorities even more discretion and will entail a new round of repression inside the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208703/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Maxim Krupskiy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Russian authorities have given no legitimate justification for dropping criminal cases against rebel troops – undermining both President Vladimir Putin and the legal system.Maxim Krupskiy, Visiting scholar, Russia and Eurasia Program, Tufts UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.