tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/zimbabwe-coup-46304/articlesZimbabwe coup – The Conversation2021-01-31T14:55:02Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1540852021-01-31T14:55:02Z2021-01-31T14:55:02ZPresident Mnangagwa claimed Zimbabwe was open for business. What’s gone wrong<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/380858/original/file-20210127-21-12mklr4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa meets his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping in Beijing, in 2018. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Lintao Zhang / POOL</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>In November 2017 Zimbabwe’s military <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-coup/index.html">replaced</a> Robert Mugabe as head of state with his long-time confidante Emmerson Mnangagwa. He declared Zimbabwe <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/24/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-new-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-tells-davos.html">“open for business”</a>, linking foreign relations with economic policy. As he <a href="https://irp-cdn.multiscreensite.com/ff7b7050/files/uploaded/HE%20INAUGURATION%20SPEECH.pdf">stated</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>We look forward to playing a positive and constructive role as a free, democratic, transparent and responsible member of the family of nations.</p>
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<p>International expectations (more so than those among local people) looked forward to <a href="https://www.odi.org/blogs/10581-zimbabwe-after-mugabe-three-reasons-hope">translating these promises into policy</a>. This was despite the fact that Mugabe’s departure had been anything but democratic.</p>
<p>But there have been few if any changes in Zimbabwe’s political trajectory. A <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-shattered-economy-poses-a-serious-challenge-to-fighting-covid-19-135066">deepening economic crisis</a> combined with a brutal crackdown on the government’s domestic opponents has resulted <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">in disappointments</a>.</p>
<p>On the foreign policy front Mnangagwa has fared no better. In a recently published <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909620986579">analysis</a> we examine the status of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. We identify what’s gone wrong in its efforts at rapprochement with Western countries in a bid to get sanctions lifted, and why its efforts at cosying up to China haven’t gone to plan either. </p>
<p>We conclude that Mnangagwa’s hopes of reorienting Zimbabwe’s foreign policy have been confounded by his government’s own actions. Its repressive response to mounting economic and political crisis increased rather than diminished its isolation. The more the Mnangagwa government <a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-and-dialogue-in-zimbabwe-twin-strategies-that-arent-working-122139">fails to engage democratically</a> with its own citizens, the more it will negate any prospect of re-engagement. </p>
<h2>Relations with its neighbours</h2>
<p>Since the <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Mugabe</a> era the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been tolerant of the Zanu-PF regime’s politics.</p>
<p>SADC’s annual summit in 2019 demanded an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49386829">end to Western sanctions</a>.
But the continued repressive nature of Mnangagwa’s regime is not making this loyalty easy.</p>
<p>Tensions have begun to show. In August 2020, South Africa <a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-in-zimbabwe-exposes-south-africas-weakness-144309">dispatched official envoys</a> to Harare to press for restraint on the Mnangagwa government in its actions against opposition figures. The envoys weren’t greeted warmly. Instead they were subjected to a presidential harangue and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-08-11-mnangagwa-blocks-ramaphosa-envoys-from-meeting-opposition-leaders/">denied the opportunity to meet the opposition</a>. </p>
<p>A subsequent mission by South Africa’s governing party the African National Congress (ANC), acting as a fellow liberation movement, was as <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-not-a-province-of-sa-zanu-pf/">shoddily treated</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa’s patience may be wearing thin. But, for its part, the Southern African Development Community has preferred to officially ignore developments by remaining silent. But while “business as usual” translates into continued political loyalty, it does not translate into increased economic collaboration.</p>
<h2>The West</h2>
<p>Two decades ago the US and European Union imposed sanctions on those linked to the government in <a href="https://academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR/article-full-text-pdf/AB5078E40670">response to human rights abuses</a>. Mugabe’s regime reacted by blaming its economic woes on the West. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Mnangagwa</a> decried sanctions as western attempts to bring about <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202008280420.html">“regime change”</a>.</p>
<p>Unimpressed by the rhetoric, the US extended restrictive measures against targeted individuals and companies <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2779/text">in August 2018</a>. In March 2019, US sanctions <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-zimbabwe-sanctions-idUSKCN1QM01Q">were renewed</a>.</p>
<p>In contrast, the EU demonstrated more willingness to reengage with Harare. In October 2019 the EU announced an aid package, bringing support during the year to €67.5 million. Aid to Zimbabwe since 2014 stood at <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6170">€287 million in 2020</a>. This made the EU Zimbabwe’s biggest donor. To ease the woes of the COVID-19 pandemic, it added another €14.2 million humanitarian assistance <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/eu-gives-zimbabwe-nearly-r14-billion-aid">in 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa, however, continued to blame the West for sanctions he compared with cancer. Responding to criticism <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/10/we-aint-moved-by-march-eu-us/">the EU declared</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe is not where it is because of the so-called sanctions, but years of mismanagement of the economy and corruption.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Similarly, the US Ambassador <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/zimbabwe-s-anti-sanctions-march-much-ado-about-nothing/1652712">dismissed</a> “any responsibility for the catastrophic state of the economy and the government’s abuse of its own citizens”. </p>
<p>US Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Jim Risch called upon the Southern African Development Community’s 16 members states to </p>
<blockquote>
<p><a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2019/10/we-aint-moved-by-march-eu-us/">focus their energies on supporting democracy, not kleptocratic regimes</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Looking East</h2>
<p>The deterioration of Zimbabwe’s relations with the West coincided with growing Chinese interest in access to African resources for its own rapidly expanding industries. Zimbabwe’s growing isolation offered a convenient entry point. </p>
<p>But, China’s greater involvement was spurred less by solidarity than by self-interest. And it’s singular importance in throwing a life-line to the Zimbabwean regime in need gave it enormous influence in directing the collaboration. Failure to mend relations with the West and other global institutions leaves Zimbabwe with no other partners for development and cooperation, thus <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0974928417749642">vulnerable to manipulation by China</a>.</p>
<p>An initial honeymoon started at the turn of the century, after Zimbabwe became isolated from the West through its <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03056244.2019.1622210">fast-track land reform</a> of 2000, and the increased repression of the political opposition. But China became increasingly concerned about Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329144700_The_Indigenisation_Policy_and_Economic_Emancipation_in_Zimbabwe_A_Case_Study_of_the_Zimunya-Marange_Communities">indigenisation policy</a>. With Chinese companies the largest foreign direct investors, the announced enforcement of the 51% Zimbabwean ownership in assets exceeding US$ 500,000 from April 2016 <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/04/26/chinas-pains-over-zimbabwes-indigenization-plan/">caused discomfort</a>. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s elevation to the presidency may have received China’s blessing as the best option available. Nonetheless, strains soon appeared. When it became increasingly apparent that Zimbabwe was unable to service its debts, China wrote off some of the liabilities <a href="https://www.news24.com/fin24/Economy/china-writes-off-zims-debt-report-20180405">in 2018</a>. </p>
<p>What particularly rankled Beijing was that Harare’s incapacity to pay its debts was deemed to be due to the government’s misappropriation or misuse of Chinese funds. Accordingly, there was need to tighten controls. This culminated in the signing of a currency swap deal <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1786207/chinas-currency-swap-deal-with-zimbabwe-could-backfire/">in January 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Back in mid-2019 China’s embassy in Harare had already <a href="http://zw.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxws/t1677101.htm">stressed</a> that development relied mainly on a country’s own efforts. It expressed hope that the Zimbabwean side would continue to create a more favourable environment for all foreign direct investment, including Chinese enterprises.</p>
<p>Indications suggest that China’s patience with the ailing Zimbabwean “all weather friend” is <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3037104/will-china-ever-tire-zimbabwes-corruption-and-bad-debt">wearing thinner</a>. The new economic challenges following the COVID-19 pandemic might have shifted priorities in global supply chains. This is also affecting the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">Belt and Road Initiative</a>, China’s massive global infrastructure project. This might reduce interest in <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26937614?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">what Zimbabwe has to offer</a> by way of natural resources. </p>
<h2>No stability, no money, few friends?</h2>
<p>Zimbabwean foreign policy remains locked in the parameters of recent times past: looking to regional solidarity, estranged from the West, and increasingly dependent on China. </p>
<p>Yet China has its own very clearly defined interests. These focus on resource extraction in mining and agriculture for its own domestic economy. As a strategic and developmental partner, Zimbabwe is of <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/polp.12373">minor interest</a>. </p>
<p>Chinese-Zimbabwean relations serve <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0021909619848783">an elite in the Zanu-PF government</a>. They are accused of <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/03/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-wants-to-give-china-investors-the-boot.html">“asset stripping”</a>. They exclude any oversight, civil society involvement, and lack transparency and accountability. The absence of visible benefits for ordinary Zimbabweans has engendered <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0975087820971443">anti-Chinese sentiments</a>.</p>
<p>Having failed to restore friendly relations with the West, and its “look east policy” not bearing fruits, has left the Mnangagwa regime with few options. Russia has entered the arena, showing increased interest in the extractive industries, arms trade and <a href="https://saiia.org.za/research/russias-resurgence-in-africa-zimbabwe-and-mozambique/">political fraternisation</a>.</p>
<p>This sounds not much like an alternative to the current ties with China. The bedfellows remain more than less of the same. And an old adage comes to mind: with friends like these one does not need enemies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The more President Mnangagwa’s government fails to engage democratically with its own citizens, the more it will negate any prospect of re-engagement with the West.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaRoger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1225862020-09-17T08:01:03Z2020-09-17T08:01:03ZThousands of unidentified Zimbabweans lie in secret mass graves – and I want to find them<p>One of my earliest memories is of violence and death. It happened in Harare in 1984 when I was about seven years old. I was supposed to meet a friend to play at a dump site together. He got there before me and started playing with what turned out to be a hand grenade. The bomb exploded in his hands. He died. I was lucky to survive but I have no doubt that the incident shaped who I was to become.</p>
<p>The device, from my understanding now, had been left by either Rhodesian soldiers or guerrilla fighters during the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tribute-to-zimbabwean-liberation-hero-dumiso-dabengwa-117986">war of liberation</a> which raged between 1966 and 1979. Death from grenades and <a href="http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2017/landmine-monitor-2017/casualties.aspx.">landmines</a> was commonplace in Zimbabwe during and after the struggle against colonial rule. </p>
<p>My next exposure to serious violence came when I joined the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) as a constable in 1998. I was trained by former liberation war fighters and soldiers whom we suspected had been redeployed from the notorious “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-mugabe-violence/mugabes-legacy-thousands-killed-in-rain-that-washes-away-the-chaff-idUSKCN1VR18H">5th Brigade</a>”. This army unit was responsible for the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">murder of thousands</a> of Ndebele speaking people and supporters of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union in the 1980s. I joined the police partly due to the lack of employment opportunities and the influence from my stepfather who was a police sergeant. </p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=861&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352525/original/file-20200812-18-ijqr9t.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1082&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">ZRP officer Keith Silika in the late 1990s.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
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<p>The police trainers would subject recruits like me to various forms of torture, including water boarding and battering the soles of our feet with rifle butts and sticks. There were other “endurance exercises” that went way over the top. For example, recruits would be ordered to lie down and forced to roll over repeatedly until we were dizzy and throwing up. Apparently, this was done to strengthen us – both physically and mentally – and to get rid of “civilian weaknesses”, as one trainer put it. I spent most of my post probation period with the Police Protection Unit – the agency responsible for the protection of prominent state ministers, judges and other VIPs.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/288776/original/file-20190820-170910-8bv1s7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<p>This article is part of Conversation Insights
<br><em>The Insights team generates <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/insights-series-71218">long-form journalism</a> derived from interdisciplinary research. The team is working with academics from different backgrounds who have been engaged in projects aimed at tackling societal and scientific challenges.</em> </p>
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<p>But I only really began to realise the extent of the systemic violence in my home country when I left Zimbabwe and started looking up texts, documentaries and meeting surviving victims of atrocities. In the last 50 years, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289331331_When_a_state_turns_on_its_citizens_60_years_of_institutionalised_violence_in_Zimbabwe">five main conflicts</a> have taken place in Zimbabwe. The liberation war (1966-1979), political violence (1980-present day) and the Matabeleland democides (1981-1987) – this is also known as Gukurahundi which is a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shona_language">Shona</a> word meaning “early rain that washes the spring chaff”. </p>
<p>Finally there were the violent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/02/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">farm invasions</a> and the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_9556000/9556242.stm">Marange diamond massacre</a>. Hundreds of thousands of people who were caught up in these conflicts have been killed and gone missing – their deaths covered up and brushed under the carpet by the state.</p>
<p>By 2005 I had joined the police in the UK. But despite my new life I couldn’t stop thinking about how, when and where people were being kidnapped, killed and concealed back home. This had a profound influence on what I chose to do with the next chapter of my life in academia and research. I enrolled for a degree in Forensics and Criminology, pursued a master’s degree in Crime Scene Investigation and then a PhD in Forensic Archaeology.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15740773.2020.1729614#metrics-content">My research</a> has brought me full circle and taken me back to those dangerous playgrounds which I drifted in and out of as a child. I wanted to use my skills as a forensic investigator to find the secret mass graves, the clandestine burial spots. I wanted to know where “the missing” were being hidden. I realised that no systematic forensic investigation of that kind had ever been undertaken.</p>
<p>I was interested in forensic identification, exhumation and the cultural aspects of burial. I interviewed over 60 witnesses – including current and former MPs, human rights defenders and victim family members. I had to keep the identity of my witness a secret to protect them, as many were in fear of their lives. Speaking out can be fatal in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Some of what I discovered during my journey was startling. The sheer scale of the killing was shocking – so were the methods of torture. Some burial locations seemed to be selected at random, some were opportunistic interment while others took forethought and planning. The burial methods were dependent on which arm of the state had done the killing and when. Despite this, my research was able to uncover the tactics used by the state to hide thousands of bodies. Tactics including, stacking multiple bodies on top of each other at cemeteries, dumping bodies in mortuaries and burying them in forests, near schools, hospitals and in disused mine shafts. </p>
<h2>‘Fallen heroes’</h2>
<p>I discovered – mainly through witness testimony – that the Fallen Heroes Trust (FHT), which is aligned to the ZANU-PF government, has been on the forefront of dubious exhumation and identification practises since the early 1980s. It used approaches which made it almost impossible to find anyone accountable for the deaths. The <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1372034/Zimbabwes-killing-fields-Mass-grave-600-bodies-shaft.html">Monkey William Mine exhumation</a> of over 600 human remains in Chibondo is one such example. Here, standard anthropological identification methods where ignored. And when human remains are discovered, state <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/Zim-mass-grave-becomes-propaganda-20110401">propaganda machinery</a> goes into overdrive. </p>
<p>Supporters of then President Robert Mugabe claimed the bodies were those of people killed between 1966 and 1979 under the regime of former president Ian Smith – the last white prime minister of the former colony of Rhodesia. Forensic tests and DNA analysis were not carried out. Instead, Saviour Kasukuwere, a government minister at the time, told the media that traditional African religious figures would perform rites to invoke spirits to identify the dead.</p>
<p>Mr Kasukuwere, <a href="https://africabriefing.org/2020/06/former-zimbabwe-minister-saviour-kasukuwere-says-coup-plot-allegations-laughable/">who is now in exile</a>, said the Chibondo remains were discovered in 2008 by a gold panner who crawled into the shaft. But spirits of war dead had long “possessed” villagers and children in the district. He said: “The spirits have refused to lie still. They want the world to see what Smith did to our people.”</p>
<p>I spoke to an anthropologist who attended the exhumation as an observer who told me that some of the bodies were wearing contemporary clothing which did not exist during the liberation war. Amnesty International advised the government to halt exhumation, pending <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/exhumation-of-bodies-at-chibondo-mine-causes-controversy-as-organizations-call-for-government-to-end-process-119348439/1458156.html">forensic investigation</a>. But this advice was ignored. </p>
<p>My research also found that the state of the human remains in Chibondo pointed to the presence of <a href="https://www.news-medical.net/life-sciences/What-are-Lipids.aspx#:%7E:text=Lipids%20are%20molecules%20that%20contain,not%20made%20up%20of%20protein.">lipids</a>, blood and decaying flesh. It is highly likely that these bodies are the remains of supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) cadres. Since its formation 1999 hundreds of supporters have been killed, injured or <a href="http://mdc-youthassembly.blogspot.com/p/roll-of-honor.html">disappeared</a>.</p>
<p>The FHT routinely exhumes remains without following accepted and professional forensic approaches. For example, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/humus/">black humus soil</a> was incorrectly attributed to human remains found at an exhumation at Castle Kopje farm in Rusape according to one witness I spoke to. During a different exhumation, another witness told me: “One member of the FHT picked up a walking stick and assigned the remains to the individual next to it.” No other identification was used to ascertain identity, according to my witness.</p>
<p>The FHT also claims to have exhumed over 6,000 bodies around the country using “<a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/man-with-a-rare-calling/">spirit mediums</a>” – who are seemingly deemed more effective than forensic science.</p>
<h2>‘Blood soaked human remains’</h2>
<p>One witness I spoke to described how they were detained at Bhalagwe Camp, which is south of Bulawayo where the 5th Brigade set up a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/1852133.stm">concentration camp</a> in 1985. The source, aged only 14 at the time, witnessed a daily routine of dead bodies <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7388214.stm">being dumped</a> into the disused Antelope mine shafts 5km away. They were dumped in the old gold mine after they had been tortured and killed in the camp. The man, now in his 50s, told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I used to be selected, often to assist in dragging blood soaked human remains from the campsite to be deposited into toilet latrines or transported into nearby disused mineshafts.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another male victim I interviewed recalled how he was seized from a bus travelling from Kezi to Bulawayo at a roadblock. He was 20 at the time and was forced off the bus by the 5th brigade and made to stay at a makeshift detention centre.</p>
<p>It was here, he told me, that he saw a pile of human flesh decomposing and later set alight by soldiers. “Most were killed on the false allegation of harbouring and supporting army deserters or dissidents”, he said. This was quite a common narrative at the time. Up until the present day, vital documents and information about the <a href="https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/MURDER.HTM">democide</a> are not known due to the continued obfuscation of information surrounding the massacres by the government.</p>
<h2>State brutality</h2>
<p>Police are seen by some as being just another partisan arm of the state. But Human Rights Watch <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabwe1108/7.htm">has reported</a> that people “routinely” die in police custody. Human Rights Watch and my own interviews found that the police and Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) often refuse to transfer the bodies of the dead through normal burial processes and sometimes even refuse victims access to their deceased relative. There have also been cases where they denied further investigation. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, the army has been killing people on behalf of the state with impunity since 1980. Witnesses <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k9Bk5VIhjiY">have reported</a> seeing the army digging mass grave in Dangamvura cemetery and piling the human remains inside them. On one occasion, a witness saw the army using prisoners to dig the graves.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/k9Bk5VIhjiY?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
</figure>
<p>The state intelligence services are much more elusive and wield authority over other security departments. They have more resources and can use other apparatus to <a href="https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2019/09/01/history-abductions-assassinations/">transfer abductees or human remains</a>. They own properties for training and logistics and some of these locations are are believed to have been used for torture and even burial of human remains, according to <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/10/cio-offices-torture-centres-exposed/">surviving witness testimony</a>. This was also confirmed with a witness I spoke to.</p>
<p>Another witness I interviewed went to the Marange diamond fields at the height of government operation in 2008 – <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/gemd/5644252/Zanu-PF-and-Zimbabwe-military-profiting-from-diamond-massacre.html">Operation Hakudzokwi</a> (“do not return” in Shona). He travelled all the way to Marange, about 120 miles from Chitungwiza, with three friends and got introduced to a syndicate leader who turned out to be a police officer. They were then given a map and some equipment and were directed where to go. He told me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We spent three days in the fields playing cat and mouse with security details. We often heard gunshots in the night. In the day we would see police officers collecting bodies in metal coffins.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since 2000, there have been more than 5,000 abductions by the state with about 49 abductions recorded in 2019 alone, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25944&LangID=E">according to the UN</a>. I spoke to three witnesses who were abducted, tortured, stripped naked and then dumped near lake Chivero, which is 37km south-west of Harare. One said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was bundled into a Toyota Land Cruiser vehicle after being trailed by the unmarked vehicle in Harare. When we arrived near the lake they started beating me up with boots and fists.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The man said the thugs were demanding to know what the opposition plan was on an upcoming demonstration. When he could not confirm anything, they left him to walk naked to the main road for help.</p>
<h2>What happened to the dead?</h2>
<p>According to my study of the Gukurahundi killings, bodies were thrown down mine shafts in Antelope, Chibondo, Silobela, Filabusi and Nkayi. Human remains have been found at schools, hospitals, river banks, dams and caves. They have been dumped near business centres, disused airports and at former detention centres like Bhalagwe and Sun Yet Sen, which were set up during elections by war veterans and ZANU-PF youths. In 2011, for instance, a mass grave containing the remains of 60 people collapsed on a field while <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/05/mass-grave-found-zimbabwe-school">children played football</a>. Victims who are not claimed at mortuaries are given pauper burials. This makes the search and recovery process even more difficult. </p>
<p>The use of cemeteries, like Hanyani and Kumbudzi, for stacking bodies in mass graves, is a particularly nefarious method. Cultural myths associated with the dead mean people very rarely venture into cemeteries. There is a belief that the spirits of the dead roam those places.</p>
<p>The victims of the Marange fields atrocities were killed by criminal syndicates attached to certain military personnel. They were either buried in the mines or taken away. Those taken away were buried by prisoners in cemeteries in Dangamvura, which is 22km away from the mining fields. The army dug two mass graves in Dangamvura cemetery in 2008 and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/06/26/diamonds-rough/human-rights-abuses-marange-diamond-fields-zimbabwe">buried over 60 bodies</a> there.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Missing person Miriam Gonzo" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=803&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354860/original/file-20200826-7352-abrr8i.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1010&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Miriam Gonzo, 50, from Rushinga, Zimbabwe, listed as missing by Interpol.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices#2019-104770">Interpol</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many of these things are common knowledge in Zimbabwe. Yet despite the alarming number of deaths and kidnaps, the official missing person database for Zimbabwe with Interpol currently stands <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices">at just 15</a>. It includes my cousin, <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-Yellow-Notices#2019-104770">Miriam Gonzo</a>, who went missing in South Africa. </p>
<p>Curiously it excludes people missing from the various democides, including journalist and human rights defender <a href="https://www.amnestyusa.org/journalist-and-activist-disappeared-in-zimbabwe">Itai Dzamara</a> who was kidnapped by state agents in broad daylight in 2016 while having a haircut. </p>
<h2>Clouded in secrecy</h2>
<p>Another layer of deception that emerged during the Mugabe era was the issuing of death certificates for the Gukurahundi democide. The vice president at the time, Phelekezela Mphoko, started a programme of issuing <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-government-gukurahundi-atrocities/4868914.html">death certificates</a> to surviving families without any investigation. Such processes will add to the conundrum of trying to identify and reconcile records of the missing in future.</p>
<p>The state often denies all killings and blames them on “insurgents”, “malcontents” and “third parties”. This is the narrative that was offered for the January and August 2019 state killings that saw over 18 people murdered by men in army uniforms. A subsequent <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/motlanthe-commission-s-anniversary-shame.">inquiry</a>, led by former South African president, Kgalema Motlanthe, concluded that the army was culpable – but there are still no prosecutions as a result.</p>
<p>Despite the death of Mugabe, the government continues to mislead the population. In May three women, including MP Joana Mamombe, said they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/10/zimbabwe-charges-activists-with-lying-about-police-torture">were kidnapped</a>, tortured and sexually assaulted by state agents. Not only did the state deny the abductions but they charged the women with breaking COVID-19 lockdown regulations and presenting false information to police.</p>
<p>In 2018 President Emmerson Mnangagwa enacted the <a href="http://www.nprc.org.zw/">National Peace and Reconciliation Act</a>: legislation that facilitated the formation of a commission to look into previous human rights abuses. In addition, the Zimbabwean Parliament is debating the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/coroners-bill-tightens-noose-on-cops-zpcs-and-doctors/">Coroners Act Bill</a> which will establish the office of the coroner to investigate suspicious deaths.</p>
<p>There is a pressing need for human rights groups to compile a comprehensive missing persons database. An independent regulatory authority must oversee this whole process. International organisations, such as the <a href="https://oic.icmp.int/index.php?w=mp_reg">International Commission for Missing Persons</a>, could help.</p>
<p>I hope my research will support this effort and help correct the <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0259-01902018000100003">inaccurate historical record</a>. More importantly, I want to help grieving relatives bury their loved ones and finally achieve some sort of closure. </p>
<p>When I finished my research, the image of my school friend was even more ingrained in my consciousness. It is for people like him, that investigations like mine must be allowed to continue.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=112&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/313478/original/file-20200204-41481-1n8vco4.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=140&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith K Silika does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A forensic archaeologist and former Zimbabwe police officer uses his investigative skills to find the missing and the dead in his homeland.Keith K Silika, PhD Candidate in Forensic Archaeology, Staffordshire UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1395672020-06-30T14:06:00Z2020-06-30T14:06:00ZWhy the African Union has failed to ‘silence the guns’. And some solutions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/343988/original/file-20200625-33524-1mjaun.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A soldier from Niger patrols near the border with Nigeria. Porous borders with Nigeria and Mali are hotbeds for Jihadists and marauding local militias.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Giles Clark/GettyImages</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Seven years ago African leaders committed themselves to working towards an end to armed conflict. As they marked the 50th anniversary of the founding of the African Union they swore to ensure lasting peace on the continent. They <a href="https://dppa.un.org/en/un-support-to-au-initiative-silencing-guns-africa">pledged</a> not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans.</p>
<p>The pledge was followed by the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">adoption</a> in 2016 of the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/au-retreat-to-elaborate-a-roadmap-on-practical-steps-to-silence-the-guns-in-africa-by-2020-concludes-in-lusaka-zambia">Lusaka Road Map</a> to end conflict by 2020. The document outlined <a href="http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/N-Instruments/2018-AU-Silencing-the-Guns-Roadmap-ENG.pdf">54 practical steps</a> that needed to be taken. They focused on political, economic, social, environmental and legal issues. They ranged from adequately funding the <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/82-african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1">African Standby Force</a> for deployment, to stopping rebels or insurgents and their backers from accessing weapons. Other steps included fighting human trafficking, corruption and illicit financial flows.</p>
<p>At the time of the declaration, Africa had disproportionately high levels of conflict. State and non-state actors in Africa waged about 630 armed conflicts between <a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/">1990 and 2015</a>. Conflicts orchestrated by non-state actors accounted for over 75% of conflicts globally. </p>
<p>The efforts to ‘silence the guns’ has been singularly ineffective. Since the pledge was signed conflict in Africa has <a href="https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=1888&type=publicationfile">increased</a>.</p>
<p>One reason for the failure is that the 2020 goal was too ambitious given the number of conflicts on the continent. The second reason is that many are internal, arising from the grievances citizens have with their governments. This internal dynamic appears to have been ignored from the outset. </p>
<p>To make some headway the African Union needs to recognise this, and design solutions to conflicts that are informed by the need to protect human rights. The continental body should be empowered to act against any party that violates core values centred on human dignity.</p>
<h2>Theatre of conflict</h2>
<p>Prominent conflicts by non-state actors include the <a href="https://www.ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/">Tuareg separatist</a> and jihadist insurgencies in Mali, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/boko-haram.html">Boko Haram</a> in Northern Nigeria, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/burkina-fasos-alarming-escalation-jihadist-violence">jihadist and militia</a> insurgencies in Burkina Faso, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/topics/organisations/al-shabab.html">al-Shabaab</a> in Somalia, and the <a href="https://institute.global/policy/ethno-religious-violence-central-african-republic">ethnic war</a> in the Central African Republic. </p>
<p>The most notable civil wars are those in <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next">Libya</a>, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">South Sudan</a> and the one waged by Anglophone Ambazonia <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/02/06/Cameroon-elections-anglophone-separatist-insurgency-Ambazonia">separatists</a> in Cameroon.</p>
<p>Most conflicts are generally centred on these areas: </p>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/fr/sahel---the-worlds-most-neglected-and-conflict-ridden-region/index.html">Sahel region</a>, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Northern Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://plan-international.org/emergencies/lake-chad-crisis">Lake Chad area</a>, including Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria</p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://items.ssrc.org/category/crisis-in-the-horn-of-africa/">Horn of Africa</a>, including Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya, and </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-great-lakes-region/">Great Lakes region</a>, notably Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Though domestic, most of these conflicts tend to be <a href="https://www.routledge.com/African-Borders-Conflict-Regional-and-Continental-Integration-1st-Edition/Moyo-Changwe-Nshimbi/p/book/9780367174835">cross-border in form</a>. They threaten interstate and regional stability. For example, al-Shabaab in Somalia exploits <a href="https://www.foreignbrief.com/security-terrorism/al-shabaab-in-kenya-cross-border-attacks-and-recruitment/">porous borders</a> to carry out deadly attacks in Kenya.</p>
<p>Most of Africa’s conflicts are also increasingly characterised by violent extremism. The <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52532741">emerging conflict</a> in the Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique falls into this category. </p>
<h2>Perennial conflict, elusive peace</h2>
<p>The African Union has put a great deal of emphasis on <a href="https://au.int/en/psc">promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa</a>, including in its <a href="https://au.int/Agenda2063/popular_version">Agenda 2063</a> adopted in 2015. </p>
<p>But peace and security continue to elude the continent. Some conflicts have been raging for decades. These include fighting in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-western-sahara-remains-one-of-africas-most-divisive-political-issues-114373">Western Sahara</a>, conflict in the Maghreb region involving the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280">Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</a>, the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/book/fighting-for-peace-somalia-history-and-analysis-the-african-union-mission-amisom-2007-2017">Somali civil war</a>, and the <a href="http://congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Inside-the-ADF-Rebellion-14Nov18.pdf">Allied Democratic Forces</a> and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027795361730429X">Lord’s Resistance Army</a> insurgencies in Uganda and the DRC. </p>
<p>Eighteen years ago the African Union changed its <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf">Constitutive Act</a>, allowing it to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. Nevertheless, it’s been reluctant to do so. For example, it is conspicuously absent while bloody conflict escalated in <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon">Cameroon</a> and <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya">Libya</a>.</p>
<p>There has been one notable exception: the organisation’s refusal to countenance the coup in Sudan, and <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-854th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan">suspending</a> the country’s membership in June 2019. This should be the norm. </p>
<p>But this highlighted the AU’s double standards. It tacitly countenanced the coups in Egypt in 2013 and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html">Zimbabwe</a> in 2017.</p>
<p>Although it did <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa/african-union-suspends-egypt-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">suspend</a> Egypt after the coup led by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, it subsequently restored its membership in 2014, and went on to make President El-Sisi its <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/egypt-sisi-takes-head-african-union-190210140131428.html">rotational chairman</a> in 2019. This went against its own <a href="https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/1143/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20269%20%28XIV%29%20_E.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">rule</a> that bans coup leaders from occupying political office. </p>
<p>The organisation never suspended Zimbabwe over the coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s despotic presidency. Neither did it speak out against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42053753">General Constantino Chiwenga</a>, the coup leader, becoming the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-coup-general-appointed-vice-president/a-41918031">vice-president</a>.</p>
<p>Another example of failure has been in Libya, where the AU has been seen to be wringing its hands while deadly conflict escalates and external actors make it their war theatre. These include <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya/turkey-signs-maritime-boundaries-deal-with-libya-amid-exploration-row-idUSKBN1Y213I">Turkey</a>, Egypt, Russia and United Arab Emirates. </p>
<p>The presence of foreign military forces on the continent is of concern beyond the Libyan conflict. The increasing number has been <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-601th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-on-early-warning-and-horizon-scanning">recognised</a> by the the African Union Peace and Security Council as a problem.</p>
<p>The numbers are going up via bilateral agreements between African states and foreign governments. </p>
<p>African countries gain economically from hosting foreign military bases. Djibouti, for example, earns about <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html">$63 million annually</a> from the US and <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-parting-the-red-sea-why-the-chinese-and-us-armies-are-fortifying/">$20 million annually</a> from China by leasing parts of its territory for their military bases. It also <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/000203971605100107">hosts</a> British, French, German, Italian, Japanese and Spanish military bases. </p>
<p>The foreign actors establish themselves in Africa to protect their <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79S01091A000300050001-3.pdf">economic interests</a> and for <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/90018134?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">strategic reasons</a>. Djibouti, for instance, is strategically close to the Middle East and the Red Sea.</p>
<h2>Credible solutions</h2>
<p>The African Union should revisit its Constitutive Act to address principles that limit its ability to intervene in conflicts in member states’ territories. This will set the stage for crafting robust legislation, policies, institutions and mechanisms for long-term stability in such countries.</p>
<p>Following that, the organisation should work through regional economic communities and people at grassroots to end conflict. Its eight <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/recs">recognised regions</a> should emulate the successes of the <a href="https://www.ecowas.int/member-states/">Economic Community of West African States</a>.</p>
<p>The regional bloc occasionally gives early warnings of brewing conflicts in member states. It has also provided military support and helped reform the security sector in <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137280794">Sierra Leone</a>, The Gambia and <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/uk/civil-war-and-democracy-in-west-africa-9780857720740/">Liberia</a>. It has also helped with post-conflict reconstruction in these countries.</p>
<p>Notably, its military intervention in The Gambia <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-west-africa-built-the-muscle-to-rout-dictators-and-keep-the-peace-71688">forced the despotic Yahya Jammeh to vacate office</a> in early 2017, after losing the presidential elections. </p>
<p>Ordinary people can also provide vital information to early warning systems. It’s thus imperative to set up long-term, people-centred, innovative and inclusive measures to promote peace. Such bottom-up solutions, based on intimate knowledge of local areas, are key to success.</p>
<p>Finally, the issue of foreign military forces on the continent. Here the African Union has no control over their growing presence because they come through bilateral agreements between member states and foreign powers. Nevertheless, the African Union should work through its regional organisations to play a role in these decisions. </p>
<p>There’s a precedent: the Southern African Development Community under the chairmanship of late Zambian President <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-49.pdf">Levy Mwanawasa</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-usa-africom/u-s-africa-command-aid-crusader-or-meddling-giant-idUSL3030068820070930">opposed</a> the establishment of an American base in the region. Southern Africa went on to establish its own regional military <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/zambia-mwanawasa-launch-of-the-sadc-brigade-17082007-2007-08-17">brigade</a> instead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139567/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Changwe Nshimbi receives funding from the European Commission (Erasmus+), Department of Science and Technology/National Research Foundation (DST/NRF, South Africa), The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). </span></em></p>Leaders’ efforts to end conflict have been ineffective. Working through regional economic communities might be part of a better approach.Chris Changwe Nshimbi, Director & Research Fellow, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1215962019-09-06T09:08:13Z2019-09-06T09:08:13ZRobert Gabriel Mugabe: a man whose list of failures is legion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287334/original/file-20190808-144862-11u42pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe, former President of Zimbabwe, addressing media in Harare, in July 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One wishes one could say “rest in peace”. One can only say, “may there be more peace for Zimbabwe’s people, now that <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Gabriel Mugabe</a> has retired permanently”. Zimbabwe’s former president <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">has died</a>, aged 95.</p>
<p>His failures are legion. They might start with the 1980s Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland and the Midlands, with perhaps <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">20 000 people killed</a>. Next, too much welfare spending <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/reviews/59-becoming-zimbabwe?start=10">in the 1980s</a>. Then crudely implemented <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289336044_The_Economic_Structural_Adjustment_Programme_The_Case_of_Zimbabwe_1990-1995">structural adjustment programmes</a> in the 1990s, laying the ground for angry war veterans and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a strong labour union and civil society based opposition party.</p>
<p>In 1997 Mugabe handed out unbudgeted pensions to the war-vets and promised to really start the “fast track land reform” that got going <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287199114_The_impact_of_land_reform_in_Zimbabwe_on_the_conservation_of_cheetahs_and_other_large_carnivores">in 2000</a>, when the MDC threatened to defeat Zanu (PF) at the polls. That abrogation of property rights started the slide in the Zimbabwean dollar’s value.</p>
<p>From 1998 to 2003 Zimbabwe’s participation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s second war cost US$1 million a day, creating a military cabal used to getting money fast. Speedy money printing presses led to <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/hany_besada_zimbabwe_picking_up_the_piecesbook4you.pdf">unfathomable hyperinflation</a> and the end of Zimbabwe’s sovereign currency, still the albatross around the country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757080">neck</a>. </p>
<p>In 2008, the MDC’s electoral victory was reversed with a presidential run-off when at least 170 opposition supporters were murdered. Hundreds more were beaten and <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/elec/rau_critique_zec_elec_report_090612.pdf">chased from their homes</a>. Even Mugabe’s regional support base could not stand for that, so he was forced to accept a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2013/07/15/review-the-hard-road-to-reform-the-politics-of-zimbabwes-global-political-agreement-reviewed-by-timothy-scarnecchia/">transitional inclusive government</a> with the MDC.</p>
<p>Over the next decade, Mugabe was unable to stop his party’s increasing faction fighting. His years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f05aec20-6d98-425a-8d82-56688ea93246/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=State%2Bintelligence%2Band%2Bthe%2Bpolitics%2Bof%2BZimbabwe%2527s%2Bpresidential%2Bsuccession.pdf&type_of_work=Journal+article">finally wore too thin</a>. When in early November 2017, at his wife Grace’s instigation, he fired his long-time lapdog Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the generals with whom he’d colluded for decades turned on him. A <em>coup petit</em> ensued and returned Mnangagwa from exile, soon to be elevated to the presidency and heavily indebted to his comrades.</p>
<p>Where did Mugabe gain his proclivity for factionalism? And how did he learn to speak the language all wanted to hear – only to make them realise they had been deluded in the end? </p>
<h2>The beginning</h2>
<p>Mugabe and many other Zimbabwean nationalists were jailed in 1964. Ian Smith was preparing for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the first nationalist party had split into Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union and Ndabaningi Sithole’s Zanu. Mugabe had been Nkomo’s Publicity Secretary. </p>
<p>As far back as 1962, Mugabe was registering on the global scales: Salisbury’s resident British diplomat <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9781137543448#aboutAuthors">thought Mugabe was</a> “a sinister figure” heading up a youthful “Zimbabwean Liberation Army … the more extreme wing of Zapu”. </p>
<p>But almost as soon as Mugabe was imprisoned, a man in her majesty’s employ travelled down from his advisory post in newly free Zambia to visit the prisoner. Dennis Grennan returned to Lusaka having <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/opin/080120dm.asp?sector=OPIN&year=2008&range_start=571">promised</a> to look after Mugabe’s wife Sarah, known as “Sally”. Grennan and people like Julius Nyerere’s British friend and assistant <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3518465.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4d7659d7e9f1b2a3dd3124c9a249a47c">Joan Wicken</a> played an important role in Mugabe’s rise. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean nationalists emerged from Salisbury’s prisons late in 1974, as Portugal’s coup led to Angola and Mozambique emerging from colonialism into the Soviet orbit. The fifties generation of Zimbabwean nationalists were to participate in the Zambian and South African inspired détente <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/25/archives/mr-vorsters-detente.html">exercise</a>. This inspired much competition for Zanu’s leadership: Mugabe arrived in Lusaka after ousting Ndabaningi Sithole, Zanu’s first leader. </p>
<p>Samora Machel, freshly in Mozambique’s top office, wondered if Mugabe’s quick rise was due to a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40201256.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1d1f7a14b762adff6a6007321af29132">“coup in prison”</a>. Herbert Chitepo’s March 1975 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3557400.pdf">assassination </a> (which got many of Zanu’s leaders arrested and its army kicked out of Zambia) was only one marker of the many fissures in the fractious party that by 1980 would rule Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In late 1975 the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Vashandi_"><em>vashandi</em></a> group emerged within the Zimbabwean People’s Army. Based in Mozambique’s guerrilla camps, they tried to forge unity between Zimbabwe’s two main nationalist armies and push a left-wing agenda. They were profoundly unsure of Mugabe’s suitability for <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2016/08/08/heroes-day-review-dzino-memories-freedom-fighter/">leadership</a>.</p>
<p>When Mugabe found his way to Mozambique also in late 1975, Machel put him under house arrest in Quelimane, far from the guerrilla camps. In January Grennan helped him to London to visit a hospitalised Sally. He made contacts around Europe and with a few <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03057078008708020">London-based Maoists</a>.</p>
<p>Soon after Mugabe’s return the young American congressman Stephen Solarz and the Deputy Head of the American embassy in Maputo, Johnnie Carson, wended their way to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">Quelimane</a>. Mugabe wowed them.</p>
<p>Solarz and Carson reported back that Mugabe was “an impressive, articulate and extremely confident individual” with a “philosophical approach to problems and … well reasoned arguments”. He claimed to control the “people’s army”. Yet by January 1977, he persuaded Samora Machel to imprison the young advocates of unity with Zapu. His many reasons included their initial refusal to support him at a late 1976 conference in Geneva organised by the British, helped immeasurably by Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State. </p>
<p>At a hastily called congress in March 1977 to consecrate his ascension, Mugabe uttered his leitmotif: those appearing to attempt a change to the party’s leadership by “maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks” would be struck by the <a href="http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuzn197707">“the Zanu axe”</a>.</p>
<p>This was Mugabe’s strategy, embedded at an early stage: tell foreign emissaries what they wanted to hear, use young radicals (or older allies) until their usefulness subsided, and then get rid of them. All the while he would balance the other forces contending for power in the party amid a general climate of fear, distrust, and paranoia. </p>
<h2>Dealing with dissent</h2>
<p>It is not certain if Margaret Thatcher knew about this side of Mugabe when they met less than a month after his April 1980 inauguration. He seemed most worried about how Joshua Nkomo’s Zapu – which he had dumped from the erstwhile “Patriotic Front”, and the violence against which had put Zimbabwe’s election in some doubt – was making life difficult for the new rulers. He <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2016.1214116">warned</a> that he might have “to act against them soon”.</p>
<p>In as much as Zapu was linked with the South African ANC and Thatcher and her colleagues tended to think the ANC was controlled by the South African Communist Party, Zapu intelligence chief <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tribute-to-zimbabwean-liberation-hero-dumiso-dabengwa-117986">Dumiso Dabengwa’s</a> perspective might be more than conspiracy theory. Perhaps Thatcher’s wink and nudge was a green light for the anti-Soviet contingent to eliminate a regional threat. Gukurahundi <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561">followed</a>. It was certainly the biggest blot on Mugabe’s career and created the biggest scar over Zimbabwe. The scar is still there, given the lack of any effort at reconcialitation, truth, or justice.</p>
<p>Four years later the ruling party’s first real congress since 1963 reviewed its history. Mugabe tore the Zipa/Vashandi group that had annoyed him eight years before to shreds. “Treacherous … counter-revolutionary … arms caching … dubbed us all <em>zvigananda</em> or bourgeois”. Thus it “became imperative for us to firmly act against them in defending the Party and the Revolution… We had all the trouble-makers detained”. </p>
<p>The great helmsman recounted the youthful dissenters’ arrest and repeated the axe phraseology. </p>
<p>But few saw these sides of Mugabe’s character soon enough; those who did were summarily shut up. </p>
<h2>The end</h2>
<p>After he’d been ousted, Mugabe could only look on in seeming despair over the ruination he had created. Sanctimonious as ever he wondered how his successor, current President Emmerson Mnangagwa, had become such an ogre. At his 95th birthday, February 21 2019, a few weeks after Mnangagwa’s troops had killed 17 demonstrators, raped as many women, and beaten hundreds more in the wake of his beleaguered finance minister’s methods to create <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">“prosperity from austerity”</a>, Mugabe <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-156949.html">mused to his absent successor</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We condemn the violence on civilians by soldiers … You can’t do without seeing dead bodies? What kind of a person are you? You feed on death? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He only had to look into his own history to see what kind of people he helped create.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Robert Mugabe’s years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself finally wore too thin in 2017.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1227262019-09-05T09:02:06Z2019-09-05T09:02:06ZZimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290911/original/file-20190904-175686-v3skdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Zimbabweans have turned to hawking to keep the wolf from the door as the economic crisis in the country deepens. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is going through its worst socio-economic and political crisis in two decades. Crippling daily power outages of <a href="https://www.biznews.com/africa/2019/08/05/zimbabwe-tipping-point-economic-crisis">up to 18 hours</a> and erratic supply of clean water are just some of the most obvious signs. Meanwhile, an inflation rate of over 500% has put the prices of basic goods beyond the reach of most people.</p>
<p>Hopes that the end of President Robert Mugabe’s ruinous rule in November 2017 would help put the country on a new path of peace and prosperity have long <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">dissipated</a>. Efforts by his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">attract foreign investors</a>, who are critical in reviving Zimbabwe’s ailing economy, have also largely failed.</p>
<p>The situation has not been helped by the rejection of the 2018 presidential election results by the main opposition party. The Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) claims the governing Zanu-PF stole the elections even though the results were <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Regional-observers-Zimbabwe-election-free-and-fair/4552902-4692254-e75fje/index.html">endorsed</a> as free and fair by the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Only the European Union observers were somewhat circumspect <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">in their assessment</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
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<p>The opposition alliance has been calling for Mnangagwa’s government to relinquish power, and a <a href="https://www.openparly.co.zw/chamisa-calls-for-national-trasitional-authority/">national transitional authority</a> appointed to run the country for at least two years, or until the 2023 general elections.</p>
<p>How individuals who will sit on the national transitional authority will be chosen and by whom, is not clear. But the party and <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/01/towards-the-national-transitional-authority/">some academics</a> believe such a transitional authority would normalise Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political situation and help it revive its relations with the West.</p>
<p>The opposition may have a point on re-engagement with the West. This is key to helping end the investment drought that started in earnest <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.908.3003&rep=rep1&type=pdf">between 2000 and 2003</a> under sanctions imposed by Western countries for human rights violations linked to Zanu-PF’s violent land reform seizures and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/03/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">election rigging</a>.</p>
<p>But the transitional authority idea is doomed to fail because of lack of buy-in by Zanu-PF. So, it’s time to consider a more viable alternative path to peace for Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Clamping down</h2>
<p>For now, the government has dismissed talk of a transitional authority as unconstitutional. Instead, in May it launched its own platform, called the <a href="https://www.panafricanvisions.com/2019/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-launches-the-political-actors-dialogue-to-address-long-term-economic-challenges/">Political Actors Dialogue</a>. The forum comprises 17 small political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. </p>
<p>The main opposition party is boycotting the process on grounds that Mnangagwa is an illegitimate president. Recently, it attempted to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-gdPunLfkAhXfSBUIHdWZCeIQFjAEegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-africa-49366224&usg=AOvVaw0fkr2f1y4BV0-4W2SlJHGY">embark on public protests</a> in the hope of bringing the government to its knees. The protests fell flat after being blocked by the courts and the police.</p>
<p>It boggles the mind why the MDC-A, led by Nelson Chamisa, insists on marches when previous attempts were crushed with brute force. These led to deaths in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=21&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwingbiQ87TkAhVsZhUIHWexAsIQFjAUegQICBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.news24.com%2FAfrica%2FZimbabwe%2Fzimbabwean-generals-deny-troops-shot-and-killed-6-protesters-20181113&usg=AOvVaw02nyk1uLwat64nJso2EImF">August 2018</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwicyIfl87TkAhV9SBUIHXzrAC4QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2019-01-30-zim-army-responsible-for-murders-rapes-report&usg=AOvVaw1fiTJ2kraC9xNiMyQ4TBM6">January 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The Zanu-PF regime has always clamped down heavily on perceived threats to its rule since 1980. Why then does the MDC-A continue to endanger people’s lives through this deadly route as a way of resolving Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crises?</p>
<p>I firmly believe that the opposition needs to change tack and focus on entering into dialogue with the government. </p>
<h2>Dialogue and unity government</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis requires the two leading political protagonists - Mnangagwa and Chamisa - to enter into serious dialogue. Both leaders need to soften their hard-line stances towards each other and put the people of Zimbabwe first.</p>
<p>There’s a precedent for this. Ten years ago, then South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to bring then President Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiMheeVnrfkAhVXShUIHeBIDw04ChAWMAB6BAgAEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.france24.com%2Fen%2F20080721-mbeki-harare-mediate-talks-zimbabwe-political-crisis&usg=AOvVaw2pLPeTVwBEVrH2TSAcW5e3">negotiation table</a>. </p>
<p>The talks culminated in the formation of the government of national unity that ran Zimbabwe from February 2009 to July 2013, with Mugabe as the President and Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister. The unity government was fairly successful and managed to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiv9PjanrfkAhUUTBUIHQR0D0cQFjAJegQIABAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theindependent.co.zw%2F2013%2F07%2F11%2Freflecting-on-positive-zimbabwe-gnu-moments%2F&usg=AOvVaw25plQQHFWt-5PTjI9_Fi6J">stabilise the economy</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades of suffering have shown that it is not the threat of protests or sanctions from the West that can move Zanu-PF to change, but neighbouring countries under the aegis of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwia1fucj7HkAhWnRhUIHcY8Dvc4ChAWMAB6BAgAEAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.fes.de%2Fpdf-files%2Fbueros%2Fmosambik%2F07874.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2PSzn2eTrgI53Cnw2yrI2t">SADC</a>. South Africa is pivotal in this regard as the region’s strongest economic and military power. </p>
<p>It’s time to experiment with a second government of national unity for Zimbabwe. But for this to happen, SADC and South Africa must have the appetite to intervene in Zimbabwe. This is currently lacking. </p>
<h2>Dialogue in Zimbabwe’s history</h2>
<p>Historically, dialogue has moved Zimbabwe forward as a nation during its darkest hours. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A year before independence in 1980, battle-hardened guerrilla commanders agreed to talk to the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to end Zimbabwe’s liberation war even though they were convinced that they were winning. </p></li>
<li><p>In 1987 Joshua Nkomo, who was the leader of the main opposition party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union, agreed to talk to his political nemesis, then Prime Minister Mugabe. Yet before this, he had been hounded out of the country by Mugabe in the mid-80s, and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">thousands of his supporters killed</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>More recently in 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to enter into a unity government with Mugabe, despite winning the first round of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">2008 elections</a>. The unity government briefly resuscitated and stabilised Zimbabwe’s fragile economy. Hyperinflation was tamed, basic commodities became available again and people regained purchasing power.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Given the MDC-A’s positive contribution during its brief stint in the 2009-2013 unity government, the party should be expending its energies on dialogue. The main opposition party can enter into a second government of national unity, but continue building and strengthening its own support.</p>
<p>In the same vein, Zanu-PF also needs to realise that without the involvement of the MDC-A, its attempts to revive the economy and end the strife in the country, on its own terms, are destined to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>It’s time for a new approach as it becomes increasingly clear that protests won’t topple the Zanu-PF government.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1221392019-08-21T09:42:34Z2019-08-21T09:42:34ZRepression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren’t working<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288885/original/file-20190821-170927-slrpli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's crisis is deepening on all fronts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">globalnewsart.com/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the November 2017 coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the elections in 2018, the regime of President Emmerson Mnangagwa has forged two forms of rule. These have been based on coercion on the one hand, and on the other dialogue.</p>
<p>Following the 2018 general elections and <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1800/Zimbabwe-the-2018-elections-and-their-aftermath/">the violence that marked its aftermath</a>, the Mnangagwa regime once again resorted to coercion in the face of the protests in January 2019. The protests were in response to the deepening <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-06-zimbabwe-hikes-fuel-prices-by-26-percent/">economic crisis in the country</a>, and part of the opposition strategy to contest the legitimacy of the government. </p>
<p>The response of the state to the protests was swift and brutal. Seventeen people were killed and 954 jailed nationwide. In May the state turned its attention to civic leaders, arresting seven for “subverting” a constitutional government. The repressive state response was felt once again on 16 and 19 August, when the main opposition Movement for Democratic Chance (MDC) and civic activists were once again prevented from marching against the <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/police-soldiers-deploy-in-zimbabwe's-bulawayo-as-opposition-challenges-protest-ban/">rapid deterioration of Zimbabwe’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>These coercive acts represent a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era.</p>
<p>At the same time Mnangagwa has pursued his objective of global re-engagement and selective national dialogue. This is in line with the narrative that has characterised the post-coup regime.</p>
<p>In tracking the dialogue strategy of the Mnangagwa government, it is apparent that it was no accident that key elements of it were set in motion in the same period as the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new staff monitored programme. </p>
<p>The purported objective is to move the Zimbabwe Government towards an economic stabilisation programme. This would result in a more balanced budget, in a context in which excessive printing of money, rampant issuing of treasury bills and high inflation, were the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/05/31/Zimbabwe-Staff-Monitored-Program-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-46952">hallmarks of Mugabe’s economic policies</a>. </p>
<p>The dialogue initiatives also took place in the context of renewed discussions on re-engagement with the European Union (EU) in June this year.</p>
<p>But, Mnangagwa’s strategy of coercion and dialogue has hit a series of hurdles. These include the continued opposition by the MDC. Another is the on-going scepticism of the international players about the regime’s so-called reformist narrative.</p>
<h2>Dialogues</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has launched four dialogue initiatives. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Political Actors: This involves about 17 political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. They all have negligible electoral support and are not represented in parliament. The purported intent is to build a national political consensus. The main opposition party, the MDC, boycotted the dialogue, dismissing it as a public relations exercise controlled by the ruling Zanu-PF. </p></li>
<li><p>The Presidential Advisory Council: This was established in January to provide ideas and suggestions on key reforms and measures needed to improve the investment and business climate for economic recovery. This body is largely composed of Mnangagwa allies. </p></li>
<li><p>The Matabeleland collective: This is aimed at building consensus and an effective social movement in Matabeleland to influence national and regional policy in support of healing, peace and reconciliation in this region. But it has come in for some criticisms. One is that it has been drawn into Mnangagwa’s attempt to control the narrative around the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/06/04/gukurahundi-zimbabwe-mnangagwa/">Gukurahundi massacres</a>. These claimed an estimated 20 000 victims in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions in the early 1980’s. Another criticism is that it has exacerbated the divisions within an already weakened civic movement by regionalising what should be viewed as the national issue of the Gukurahundi state violence. </p></li>
<li><p>The Tripartite National Forum. This was launched in June, 20 years after it was <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/building-from-the-rubble">first suggested by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The functions of this body set out in an <a href="https://www.greengazette.co.za/documents/national-gazette-42554-of-28-june-2019-vol-648_20190628-GGN-42554">Act of Parliament</a>, include the requirement to consult and negotiate over social and economic issues and submit recommendations to Cabinet; negotiate a social contract; and generate and promote a shared national socio-economic vision.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The establishment of the forum could provide a good platform for debate and consensus. But there are dangers. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions warned of the long history of the lack of “broad based consultation on past development programmes”. It <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/tnf-launched-20-years-later-amid-visible-tensions">insists that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>reforms must never be deemed as tantamount to erosion of workers’ rights.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The strategy</h2>
<p>In assessing the central objectives of the various strands of Mnangagwa’s dialogue strategy, three factors stand out.</p>
<p>The first is that the Political Actors Dialogue, the Presidential Advisory Council and the Matabeleland Collective were developed to control the pace and narrative around the process of partnership with those players considered “reliable”. Major opposition and civic forces that continued to question the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa boycotted these processes.</p>
<p>Secondly, the formal establishment of the long awaited Tripartite National Forum may serve the purpose of locking the MDC’s major political ally, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions, into a legally constructed economic consensus. The major parameters of this will likely be determined by the macro-economic stabalisation framework of the IMF programme.</p>
<p>When brought together, all these processes place increased pressure on the political opposition to move towards an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa regime, and into a new political consensus dominated by the ruling Zanu-PF’s political and military forces, thus earning them the seal of approval by major international forces.</p>
<p>The MDC has responded with a combined strategy of denying Mnangagwa legitimacy, protests as well as calls for continued global and regional pressure. The MDC believes that the continued decline of the economy will eventually end the dominance of the Mnangagwa regime. </p>
<p>As part of its 2018 election campaign, the MDC made it clear it would accept no other result than a victory for itself and Chamisa. That message has persisted and is a central part of the de-legitimation discourse of the opposition and many civic organisations. The MDC has regularly <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/sikhala-mnangagwa-faces-overthrow-through-citizen-mass-protests/">threatened protests since 2018</a>.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The MDCs strategies have not resulted in any significant progress. The hope that the economic crisis and attempts at mass protests to force Zanu-PF into a dialogue are, for the moment, likely to be met with growing repression. Moreover, the deepening economic crisis is likely to further thwart attempts to mobilise on a mass basis.</p>
<p>The EU, for its part, is still keen on finding a more substantive basis for increased re-engagement with Mnangagwa and will keep the door open. Regarding the US, given the toxic politics of the Trump administration at a global level, and the ongoing <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/trump-administration-condemns-latest-govt-abductions-and-torture-of-opposition-in-zimbabwe/">strictures of the US on the Zimbabwe government</a>, there has been a closing of ranks <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">around a fellow liberation movement</a> in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">recent appointment</a> as Chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Peace and Security in Tanzania will only further cement this solidarity.</p>
<p>There is clearly a strong need for a national dialogue between the major political players in Zimbabwean politics. But there is little sign that this will proceed. Moreover, the current position of regional players means that there is unlikely to be any sustained regional pressure for such talks in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is affiliated with a Zimbabwean NGO Ukuthula Trust. </span></em></p>The Mnangagwa regime’s coercive acts are a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era, while he seeks global re-engagement and selective national dialogue.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1184632019-06-07T13:22:57Z2019-06-07T13:22:57ZSudan: a chance for the AU to refine support for countries in crisis<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278511/original/file-20190607-52776-1yl5566.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Sudan's military rulers rally in Khartoum. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE-Marwan Ali</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) has <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-854th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan">suspended</a> Sudan from all the organisation’s activities “until the effective establishment of a civilian-led Transitional Authority”. </p>
<p>It also threatened to impose punitive measures on individuals and entities obstructing the establishment of a civilian-led transitional authority. The AU has given the Sudan Transitional Military Council, which orchestrated the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in April, a <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-846th-psc-meeting-held-in-tunis-tunisia-on-30-april-2019-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan?fbclid=IwAR34e_F2nenA8vowbJlDd5Koh2EpiEqIPPQtzeeLJZHXDGjXVoaiae53ydY">60-day deadline</a> to do so. </p>
<p>The AU’s suspension followed the forceful dispersal of the month long sit-ins. The military action resulted in the death of <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/sudan-protesters-reject-talks-108-killed-crackdown-021654289.html;_ylt=AwrXnCHYsfhchTAAg0HQtDMD;_ylu=X3oDMTEyMzVuNWlzBGNvbG8DZ3ExBHBvcwMxBHZ0aWQDQjc1MDZfMQRzZWMDc3I-?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly90LmNvL1czNGFGTENGbHE&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMUvivOstwnAH9juzCRqSZFhUgTbout7mSjZ_B_aAtKv-pbFLnhCRP6WOrX5wb-FsWJUAVZAkvnYOK1M_GbRa_siWrmeg9PLDxxxaBpPtbvaoU7tr5J1o0X4YX9UOKKNEBckbpSFwOs0yn_AoVkfoFRQ6w55YRZvkVwxSNkhhc_q">more than a hundred protesters</a>.</p>
<p>Prior to the killings, the Transitional Military Council had cancelled all tentative agreements with the Forces for the Declaration of Freedom and Change, the coalition negotiating on behalf of the protesters. It had also suspended negotiations, and announced plans to hold elections within <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/sudan-military-ruler-calls-elections-within-nine-months">nine months</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190603/statement-chairperson-situation-sudan">Chairperson</a> of the AU Commission as well as some <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sudan-troika-statement-june-2019">western powers</a> condemned the attacks on civilian protesters. There have also been calls for an independent investigation and restraint.</p>
<p>The killings signified a lack of progress in the establishment of a civilian-led transitional government. It also showed the reluctance of the military council to hand over power. This had been set as a precondition by the AU Peace and Security Council for delaying the full suspension of Sudan, which is normally immediate. </p>
<h2>Complex</h2>
<p>The AU declared the removal of long time leader Al-Bashir in April <a href="https://theconversation.com/popular-protests-pose-a-conundrum-for-the-aus-opposition-to-coups-116315">a coup d’état</a>. But it took cognisance of the legitimacy of the popular protests that preceded the military intervention. As a result, it granted the Military Council an initial two weeks to establish a civilian-led transitional authority. The period was subsequently extended by up to 60 days.</p>
<p>The circumstances that justified initially granting the Transitional Military Council the benefit of the doubt have vanished with the deadly breakdown. The AU has justifiably cut the grace period short. Any other response would have <a href="https://solomondersso.wordpress.com/2019/06/04/sudan-after-events-of-3-june-time-for-au-to-apply-lome-declaration/">undermined</a> its long-established norm and practice against military takeovers and the primacy of civilian rule.</p>
<p>The AU has traditionally immediately suspended countries experiencing coups d’etat. This has been in line with the <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">Lome Declaration</a> of 2000. But responses to the military take overs in Burkina Faso in 2014, Zimbabwe in 2017 and Sudan in 2019 showed the <a href="https://theconversation.com/popular-protests-pose-a-conundrum-for-the-aus-opposition-to-coups-116315">challenges</a> that tail-end military takeovers in support of popular uprisings present.</p>
<p>The engagement in Burkina Faso was a remarkable success. The AU gave the military an ultimatum to handover power to a civilian authority. This was complied with and underpinned the approach in Sudan. But, in Sudan’s case it’s failed so far. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, this need not discourage the AU from following similar approaches in the future. This could involve suspension that isn’t immediate, particularly where the military sides with popular protesters against authoritarian leaders.</p>
<p>In granting time for transitions to civilian rule, the AU has resorted to creative flexibility. This recognises the legitimacy of popular opposition to authoritarian rule. It has attempted to do this without undermining its zero-tolerance policy against military takeovers. </p>
<p>This approach also shows its commitment to prioritising engagement over confrontation. It ensurs the swift transfer of power from military to a civilian-led authority.</p>
<h2>Suspension but not disengagement</h2>
<p>In condemning the killing of civilians, the AU Chairperson affirmed the determination to engage and support the Sudanese people. Similarly, the Peace and Security Council <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-854th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan">noted</a> that the</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Sudanese stakeholders are the sole authors of their destiny.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Council opposes any external interference. This is presumably in reference to allegations of support for the Military Council from <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/05/arab-states-foment-sudan-chaos-while-u-s-stands-by-sudan-khartoum-protests-violent-crackdown-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates-egypt-democracy-push/">Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates</a>.</p>
<p>This emphasis on Sudanese ownership of the transition underlines the primacy of African-led initiatives, through the AU and <a href="https://au.int/en/recs/igad">Intergovernmental Authority for Development</a>. And, it calls for engagements to be scaled up to resolve the crisis. Hence the Peace and Security Council <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-854th-meeting-of-the-peace-and-security-council-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan">emphasised</a> the mobilisation of </p>
<blockquote>
<p>all the Sudanese stakeholders to dialogue, with a view to speedily establish a civilian-led Transitional Authority. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>It also asked the Chairperson of the AU Commission to do everything possible to help facilitate dialogue among the <a href="http://www.zbc.co.zw/124228-2/">principal Sudanese stakeholders</a>. The military has since <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/sudan-protesters-reject-talks-108-killed-crackdown-021654289.html;_ylt=AwrXnCHYsfhchTAAg0HQtDMD;_ylu=X3oDMTEyMzVuNWlzBGNvbG8DZ3ExBHBvcwMxBHZ0aWQDQjc1MDZfMQRzZWMDc3I-?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly90LmNvL1czNGFGTENGbHE&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAMUvivOstwnAH9juzCRqSZFhUgTbout7mSjZ_B_aAtKv-pbFLnhCRP6WOrX5wb-FsWJUAVZAkvnYOK1M_GbRa_siWrmeg9PLDxxxaBpPtbvaoU7tr5J1o0X4YX9UOKKNEBckbpSFwOs0yn_AoVkfoFRQ6w55YRZvkVwxSNkhhc_q">called</a> for the resumption of talks. The initial response from the representatives of protesters was to reject this call. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278512/original/file-20190607-52776-1e244b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/278512/original/file-20190607-52776-1e244b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278512/original/file-20190607-52776-1e244b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278512/original/file-20190607-52776-1e244b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278512/original/file-20190607-52776-1e244b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278512/original/file-20190607-52776-1e244b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/278512/original/file-20190607-52776-1e244b5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Sudanese workers on a two-day nationwide strike.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Marwan Ali</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The challenge now is to convince protesters that their cause is not all lost. This may require securing clear concessions from the military. And an affirmation that it’s committed to a civilian-led transition.</p>
<p>On this score, Sudan’s suspension could provide useful leverage.</p>
<p>This policy of suspension while continuing engagement is necessary to enable a relatively swift transition to civilian rule. Nevertheless, facilitating dialogue may be insufficient to break the impasse. The establishment of a transitional government is a tremendous exercise in institutional and (interim) constitutional design.</p>
<h2>Continental help</h2>
<p>Sudan’s Interim Constitution, <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/sd/sd003en.pdf">adopted in 2005,</a> has been suspended following the military takeover in April 2019. This means that a <a href="http://constitutionnet.org/news/need-transitional-constitutional-framework-post-al-bashirs-sudan">transitional constitutional framework</a> is necessary to legitimise the continuing exercise of power. The military council has already released a <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-s-military-council-issuing-draft-constitution/4906075.html">draft constitutional document</a> it wants to have as the basis for a transitional government. This was in response to an <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67458">initial draft</a> from the representatives of protesters. But agreement on the details of a framework has so far been elusive. Talks were deadlocked before demonstrators were killed this week.</p>
<p>As ultimate expressions of sovereign decisions, constitutional choices must be made by Sudanese stakeholders and representatives of the people. Nevertheless, the negotiators can benefit from African and global expertise and experience. This could expand the horizon of alternatives and improve the chances for compromise.</p>
<p>The planned AU Facilitation Team should include prominent facilitators and political personalities. In addition, it should include a select group of constitutional experts. </p>
<p>The challenges presented by events unfolding in Sudan provide a great opportunity for the AU to refine and consolidate its approach to supporting countries in crisis. This is particularly true when the situation involves constitutional reform.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118463/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adem K Abebe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The killing of protesters by the Sudanese military signifies its reluctance to hand over power, as demanded by the African Union.Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer and editor of ConstitutionNet, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1170392019-05-17T09:31:48Z2019-05-17T09:31:48ZWhy the African Union shouldn’t ease up on Sudan’s coup leaders<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/275111/original/file-20190517-69199-17ourk2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters outside the army headquarters in Khartoum, Sudan.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Two weeks after a transitional military council came to power in Sudan through a <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/after-coup-sudan-faces-fragile-transition-to-democracy/ar-BBVYiZ3">coup</a> in April, African heads of state <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKCN1RZ191-OZATP">decided</a> to ease the pressure on the new rulers. </p>
<p>This decision was a big mistake.</p>
<p>President Omar al-Bashir governed Sudan through military force, repression and divide-and-rule tactics for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/profile-omar-al-bashir-sudan-longtime-ruler-190411083628141.html">three decades</a>. Years of rebellions and popular protests culminated in the mid-April coup. On taking power, the military council suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and said it planned to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/sudans-military-expected-to-announce-overthrow-of-president-following-months-of-popular-protests/2019/04/11/bedcc28e-5c2b-11e9-842d-7d3ed7eb3957_story.html?utm_term=.99b4d08fbdae">rule Sudan for two years</a>.</p>
<p>The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) immediately <a href="http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article67375">condemned</a> the unconstitutional seizure of power. It demanded that the military council step down and transfer power to a civilian transitional government. The Peace and Security Council warned that the AU would suspend Sudan if the generals did not comply with this demand <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/african-union-and-un-back-civilian-led-sudan-transition-20190507">within 15 days</a>.</p>
<p>But as this deadline approached, the African heads of state countermanded the Peace and Security Council’s position. They extended the deadline and gave the generals three months to <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/04/24/African-Union-extends-deadline-for-Sudanese-military-to-relinquish-state-power/6371556094467/">hand the reins</a> to a civilian interim government. Driving this decision was Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the current chairperson of the AU. Sisi is a former general who participated in a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/16/egypt-coup-catastrophe-mohamed-morsi">coup in his own country</a> in 2013.</p>
<p>The military has engaged in tense negotiations with the protest leaders over the composition of the interim government. If the current deadlock is overcome, a new supreme council will be formed with a mix of civilians and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48276764">military officers</a>. The interim regime will thus not be purely civilian government. </p>
<p>The AU has a “zero tolerance” <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">policy</a> on coups. If it does not apply this policy strictly in the case of Sudan, there is the distinct danger that the army will continue to meet the protests with violence. Already, over 70 protesters have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/sudanese-security-forces-open-fire-khartoum-sit-190515160917339.html">killed</a> by government forces .</p>
<p>Sudan could become increasingly unstable, with negative spillovers for neighbouring states. In addition, the AU’s failure to adhere strictly to its policy will weaken the credibility of that policy and reduce its potential to deter future coups.</p>
<h2>The policy</h2>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">Lomé Declaration</a>, coup perpetrators shall be given six months to restore constitutional order. During this period, the country shall be suspended from the AU. The <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf">Peace and Security Council Protocol</a> adds that the Peace and Security Council shall institute sanctions following an unconstitutional change of government.</p>
<p>The policy emphasis on “shall” and “zero tolerance” offers no wriggle room for a discretionary response to coups. Coups are a scourge that destroy the constitutional order and preclude the emergence and consolidation of democracy.</p>
<p>There’s no doubt about the tyrannical way in which al-Bashir ruled Sudan. His war crimes were set out in the <a href="http://saharareporters.com/2019/04/12/turn-over-al-bashir-international-criminal-court-amnesty-international-tells-sudan">indictment</a> against him by the International Criminal Court. There’s therefore every reason to share the Sudanese people’s joy at his downfall. But if the AU does not adopt a tough posture, there may be no progress in Sudan towards real democracy.</p>
<h2>Precedents</h2>
<p>Since the introduction of the anti-coup policy in 2000, there have been 16 coups in Africa - <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B10AD77AA-F0B5-E711-80C7-005056AB0BD9%7D.pdf">14 between 2000 and 2014</a>, then in Zimbabwe and Sudan. In most cases, the Peace and Security Council has indeed been tough. <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/%7B10AD77AA-F0B5-E711-80C7-005056AB0BD9%7D.pdf">Research</a> shows that suspension and sanctions have been effective: within an average period of 20 months, the targeted country reestablished constitutional order through elections.</p>
<p>In all these cases, the African pressure was intensified through sanctions imposed by the US, the European Union and other providers of financial aid. It was also accompanied by mediation undertaken by African organisations, which facilitated the return to constitutional rule.</p>
<p>The message from the AU and its international partners was thus clear: unlike the widespread tolerance of African coups in the 1970s and 1980s, a coup is no longer a viable means to retaining power. It is a cul de sac. The only exit for the coup regime is to step down and permit free and fair elections.</p>
<p>In short, pressure shuts the door to sustained military rule, and mediation opens the door to restoring constitutional order in a legitimate manner.</p>
<p>The positive outcomes of African and international pressure can be contrasted with cases where the AU failed to apply its policy. For example, the AU turned a blind eye to the de facto <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html">coup</a> in Zimbabwe in 2017. This allowed the army and ruling party to get away with forcibly deposing President Robert Mugabe and installing another brutal hardliner, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>.</p>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe, as well as Egypt, a coup leader contested presidential elections and won. This was a violation of the AU policy, which <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/">bans</a> the perpetrators of unconstitutional action from running for office. The ban is meant to prevent coup leaders from whitewashing their offence and staying in power via the ballot box.</p>
<h2>No ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’</h2>
<p>There should be no debate about the main thrust of the continental and international response to the coup in Sudan. Suspension and sanctions should be imposed immediately, and should be lifted only when constitutional rule is restored through free and fair elections have been held.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/117039/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Laurie Nathan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The African Union’s policy offers no wriggle room for a discretionary response to coups, a scourge that imperils the consolidation of democracy.Laurie Nathan, Professor of the Practice of Mediation, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1163152019-05-05T07:34:43Z2019-05-05T07:34:43ZPopular protests pose a conundrum for the AU’s opposition to coups<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272187/original/file-20190502-103075-ttyu2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Unyielding protesters put an end to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir's 26-year old authoritarian rule. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Sudan’s President Omar al Bashir was overthrown in April following months of incessant countrywide protests. Less than two weeks earlier, protesters forced Algeria’s long-time President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/02/algeria-latest-news-president-abdelaziz-bouteflika-resigns">step down</a>. </p>
<p>The ultimate push in both instances came from the army. </p>
<p>The crucial distinction is that the involvement of the army in Algeria was very <a href="https://www.apnews.com/20f0eaa9a1a24d6db435b32acb459583">subtle</a>, with the head of the army suggesting that Bouteflika should step down. In contrast, the Sudanese army threw the decisive punch that abruptly ended al-Bashir’s regime. </p>
<p>In this sense, the role of the Sudanese military may be more appropriately compared with the situation in Zimbabwe when the army’s involvement led to the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">resignation</a> of Robert Mugabe in November 2017. It is also similar to the coup that toppled Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaore in November 2014 which also followed days of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/burkina-faso-president-blaise-compaore-ousted-says-army">protests</a>.</p>
<p>Nineteen years ago the African Union (AU) adopted a declaration that rejected “unconstitutional changes of government” (known as the <a href="https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm">Lome Declaration</a>. The policy was followed by the <a href="http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/">African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance</a>, which formalised the rules.</p>
<p>But the tail-end involvement of the military after intensive and popular protests raises questions about how this should be applied. While there have been some hiccups and inconsistencies, the rule has allowed the AU to reject coups d’état and suspend governments from its membership. But the recent round of popular protests that finally led to the toppling of authoritarian presidents is a reminder of the conundrum the AU faces.</p>
<h2>Gaps</h2>
<p>Gaps emerged with the intervention of the Egyptian military in the removal of President Mohammad Morsi <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/456743-world-leaders-ditched-by-army-amid-popular-revolts">in 2012</a> following days of extensive popular protests. The intervention of the military was the decisive last step that ended Morsi’s rule.</p>
<p>The AU labelled the events a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-africa/african-union-suspends-egypt-idUSBRE9640EP20130705">coup</a> and condemned the military. It demanded a return to civilian rule. Egypt was also suspended from AU membership. </p>
<p>In 2014 the leader of the coup, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, ran for the presidency and won. This went against the AU rule that coup leaders be <a href="http://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/1143/Assembly%20AU%20Dec%20269%20%28XIV%29%20_E.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y">banned from occupying political positions</a>. </p>
<p>In the end the AU blinked, and later that year Egypt’s membership was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/egypt-vs-african-union-mutually-u-2014714687899839.html">reinstated</a>. It even went one step further, allowing Sisi to take over as the rotational <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/egypt-sisi-takes-head-african-union-190210140131428.html">head of the AU</a> in 2019.</p>
<p>The events in Egypt and the subsequent AU response underscored the unique dilemma that a combination of popular protests and military intervention pose for the continental body’s policy against coups. </p>
<p>A 2014 report from an <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/final-report-of-the-african-union-high-level-panel-for-egypt">AU High Level Panel</a> considered the compatibility of popular uprisings with the AU’s framework against unconstitutional changes of government.</p>
<p>The report said that a necessary condition for the removal of government to not constitute a coup was that the military shouldn’t be involved. The other criteria were that the protests be popular and peaceful. </p>
<p>But the report was never formally adopted by the AU. This means that it doesn’t have a definitive policy on the issue.</p>
<h2>Confusion in the ranks</h2>
<p>Two other instances point to a lack of clarity on the AU’s part – Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>When President Blaise Compaore fled Burkina Faso in November 2014, the military took advantage of the political vacuum and arrogated power. The AU <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burkina-politics/burkina-faso-opposition-parties-african-union-reject-army-takeover-idUSKBN0IJ0NZ20141101">rejected</a> the military takeover and demanded the establishment of a civilian authority. </p>
<p>The military was given two weeks to ensure a civilian-led transition, which it honoured. One of the military leaders was then named prime minster. </p>
<p>The AU’s response to events in Zimbabwe was <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/african-union-wrong-zimbabwe-171204125847859.html">confused</a>. The country was never suspended from AU membership. And the army general who led the military intervention <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/zimbabwe-military-power-grows-as-general-promoted-to-vice-president-1514038547">subsequently became vice-president</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/272194/original/file-20190502-103049-1q99x6i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former President Robert Mugabe, in power for 37 years, was forced to resign following a ‘soft coup’ in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The events in Sudan have created another troubling scenario for the AU. The chairperson of the AU Commission <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190411/statement-chairperson-commission-situation-sudan">labelled</a> the move a “military take-over” and noted that a “coup is not the appropriate response” to Sudan’s myriad challenges.</p>
<p>On 15 April, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed the chairperson’s statements and demanded the establishment of a civilian-led transitional authority within 15 days, failing which Sudan would be suspended. </p>
<p>Yet, in a joint communique of the “consultative meeting of the regional partners of Sudan” on 23 April, led by Egyptian President Sisi, and attended by the AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki, the participants recommended the peace and security council <a href="http://sis.gov.eg/Story/139654/President-El-Sisi's-Closing-Statement-at-Consultative-Summit-of-Regional-Partners-of-Sudan?lang=en-us">extend</a> the transition period by three months. The council later <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-846th-psc-meeting-held-in-tunis-tunisia-on-30-april-2019-on-the-situation-in-the-sudan?fbclid=IwAR34e_F2nenA8vowbJlDd5Koh2EpiEqIPPQtzeeLJZHXDGjXVoaiae53ydY">extended</a> the period of such transition by 60 days.</p>
<p>Under the Lome Declaration, once the Peace and Security Council labels a change of government as unconstitutional, it must immediately suspend the relevant government. But, apparently because of the gaps in the applicable norm on unconstitutional change of government relating to popular protests, this does not always happen. </p>
<h2>Complex questions</h2>
<p>The Sudanese situation raises complex issues. Given unfolding events, the initial two-week deadline for a return to civilian rule appeared to have been impractical. An extension was therefore understandable. But it creates the danger that military rule might become entrenched. The Peace and Security Council needs to agree on a schedule for the transition to civilian authority within the provided timeline. </p>
<p>To ensure consistency in future, the AU should clear the dust on the report of the <a href="http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/final-report-of-the-african-union-high-level-panel-for-egypt">High Level Panel on Egypt</a>. It should clarify the rules on whether tail-end military intervention to support sustained popular protests against despots may in some instances constitute an exception to unconstitutional change of government. </p>
<p>In addition, the AU standards speak about the removal of “democratically elected governments”. In practice, it never asks whether the removed government was democratic, and does not have mechanisms to make a proper determination on the issue. </p>
<p>The AU should give equivalent focus to the pervasive problem of unconstitutional retention of government power. But, in cases where coups occur, it should continue to insist on civilian-led and controlled transitions within a reasonable time to allow for diplomatic efforts, regardless of the nature of the regime that was removed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116315/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adem K Abebe also works at the Constitution Building Processes Programme of International IDEA and is the editor of ConstitutionNet.
</span></em></p>The role of the military in toppling authoritarian rulers, after intensive popular protests, raises questions about how the AU’s policy against coups should be applied.Adem K Abebe, Extraordinary Lecturer and editor of ConstitutionNet, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129732019-03-10T09:20:04Z2019-03-10T09:20:04ZResponses to Zimbabwe highlight gulf between the region and the west<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262191/original/file-20190305-48423-1k7l4u1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa's regime has yet to show it differs from that of Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The post-Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe continues to struggle to establish its legitimacy. While this is the case the terms of its future international re-engagement will continue to occupy the Zanu-PF government.</p>
<p>The government’s problems are compounded by the international outcry over its brutal response to the protests against <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/huge-zim-fuel-price-hike-foreigners-to-pay-in-forex-20190113">massive fuel price hikes</a> in January. At least 16 people died and hundreds were wounded from ‘gunshots, dog bites, <a href="http://kubatana.net/2019/02/03/crimes-humanity-alert-zimbabwe-brink-violations-intensify/">assaults and torture"</a>. </p>
<p>The events of January once again underscored the fault lines in Zimbabwe’s foreign relations. One the one hand the Southern African Development Community came out in support of a member state in the face of clear evidence of state brutality against its citizens. It even went so far as to condemn the continuing <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/sadc-backs-zim-against-onslaught/">“illegal sanctions”</a> against Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In contrast, the UK, EU and the US all condemned the human rights abuses of the Zimbabwean state. They called for a return to the commitment to political and economic reforms. And they renewed their calls for as inclusive, credible national dialogue to map <a href="http://www.newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk/2019/02/us-slams-ed-govt-over-violence.html">the way forward</a>.</p>
<p>These responses once again show how polarised regional and western government policies are on the Zimbabwe crisis. This has had another consequence – the sidelining of efforts to reach a consensus on economic and political reforms. There have been at least three efforts at some sort of reconciliation over the past decade. The first was during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Global-Political-Agreement">Global Political Agreement (2009-2013)</a>, again in the aftermath of the November 2017 coup, and then again in the run up to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">2018 elections</a>.</p>
<p>Another consequence of the fallout from January is that Mnangagwa’s government has reached out further to its authoritarian economic and political partners in <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/with-president-mnangagwa-in-russia-zimbabwe-descends-into-chaos">Eurasia</a>. The problem with this is that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414016666859">linkages with other autocratic regimes</a> provide some protection against forces pushing for democratic change. In addition, these relationships tend to consolidate those in the military and business sectors who see any prospect of serious economic and political reform as a threat.</p>
<h2>Responses</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/statement-sadc-chairperson-his-excellency-dr-hage-g-geingob-president-republic-namibia-political-and-socio-economic-situation-zi/">statement</a> issued by the current head of the Southern African Development Community repeated the official position of the Zimbabwe government. It criticised “some internal players, in particular NGOs, supported by external players (who have) continued to destabilise the country.”</p>
<p>Early signs of this position were clear in South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s speech at the International Labour Organisation in January. He claimed that sanctions against the country were <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ramaphosa-says-lift-zimbabwe-sanction-20190122">no longer necessary</a> because the government had “embarked on democracy”.</p>
<p>Once again the regional body has conflated genuine concerns over imperial interventions in the developing world with the fight for democratic and human rights by national forces. Like Zanu PF – both under former President Robert Mugabe and Mnangagwa – Southern African Development Community has affirmed its support for a selective anti-imperialist narrative by an authoritarian nationalist regime that conflates the fight for democratic rights with outside intervention.</p>
<p>The response from the EU couldn’t have been more different. A <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2019-0116&language=EN">resolution</a> of the European Parliament in mid-February strongly condemned the violence and excessive force used in January. It reminded the government of Zimbabwe that long term support for it is dependent on “comprehensive reforms rather than mere promises”. </p>
<p>The resolution also called on the European Parliament to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(review restrictive measures against) individuals and entities in Zimbabwe, including those measures currently suspended, in the light of accountability for <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2019-0116&language=EN">recent state violence</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This position in effect put on hold any new restrictive measures against the Zanu-PF government. It also left open the option for renewed dialogue.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>The debate on sanctions on Zimbabwe has been lost in the region and on the continent. And this solidarity with the Mnangagwa regime is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>Change, if any, might come from the EU and US. It’s possible that they could change their positions again if the Mnangagwa government made another attempt at minimalist reforms. </p>
<p>The current US policy in Africa is targeted against what it considers to be the “rapidly expanding” financial and political <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/">influence of China and Russia</a> on the continent. Trump is also looking to make the US the major player in the new battle for metal resources in Africa. This new struggle for technology metals is taking place in countries such as Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/business/how-president-trump-is-using-britain-to-fight-his-trade-war-against-china-in-africa-a4078031.html">Tanzania and Sierra Leone</a>. </p>
<p>The White House announced this week that it has extended sanctions against Zimbabwe for <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-03-05-trump-extends-us-sanctions-against-zimbabwe-by-a-year/">another year</a>. Nevertheless, at some stage the politics of US strategic interests in Africa could lead to a more accommodating relationship with an authoritarian regime such as the Mnangagwa administration. This has happened on many occasions in its foreign policy interventions.</p>
<p>The EU is in a “wait and see” mode. It will need evidence of some notable movement by the Zimbabwean state on the political and economic reform front before it pushes the re-engagement process forward. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s regime has yet to show that it is any different from Mugabe’s. Given the continuing factional battles in the ruling party – and its inability to imagine itself out of power – it is difficult to view the current government as anything other than a continuation of the authoritarian Zanu-PF’s legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> He/ is affiliated with Solidarity Peace Trust.. </span></em></p>The debate on sanctions on Zimbabwe has been lost in the southern African region and on the continent.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1101972019-01-22T09:09:00Z2019-01-22T09:09:00ZFantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/254899/original/file-20190122-100261-p4boy9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe President Emmerson Mnangagwa with Russian President Vladimir Putin.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Sergei Chirikov</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>As of January 18, more than 12 people had died, no less than 78 had suffered gunshot injuries, and at least 240 had been beaten and tortured by the Zimbabwean state. More than 466 had been arbitrarily arrested and detained, while hundreds are displaced or in safe houses in and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-19-revolt-and-repression-in-zimbabwe">outside the country</a>. </p>
<p>Added to that is the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/zimbabwe-shuts-down-all-internet-connectivity-again-18869497">shutdown</a> of the internet and social media. All this points to a vicious authoritarian state showing its true face, this time in response to a stay-away protesting a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwes-president-hikes-fuel-prices-to-tackle-shortages-20190113">massive petrol price rise</a>. </p>
<p>The latest events are happening in the context of years of economic crisis, and the government’s months-long legitimacy crisis.</p>
<p>The last few days have wiped out any trust people might have had in the ability of the <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/703839/pdf">November 2017 coup</a> that toppled former President Robert Mugabe to bring democratic and socio-economic rights to Zimbabwe’s long-suffering people.</p>
<p>Yet one wonders: is this a vicious repressive state or the accumulative effect of institutions that decayed under the doddering Mugabe; now disintegrated, dead and disinterred thanks to <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/economic-turmoil-is-unavoidable-in-mnangagwas-zimbabwe">diminishing dollars</a>?</p>
<p>Will Zimbabwe’s future be even worse than its terrible past? Can its neighbours bang some heads together to create a “transitional authority” of some sort, as Zimbabwean scholar and activist Professor Brian Raftopoulos <a href="https://player.fm/series/the-karima-brown-show-2342437/unpacking-the-violence-and-killings-in-zimbabwe-as-it-enters-its-3rd-day-of-protest">suggests</a>?</p>
<p>That’s needed, clearly. But it would not be advisable to raise one’s hopes.</p>
<h2>Mugabe’s legacy</h2>
<p>A veteran of many struggles against Mugabe once said that the old tyrant’s main problem was his inability to <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304869932_Robert_Mugabe_An_Intellectual_Manque_and_His_Moments_of_Meaning">abide people smarter than him</a>. So he surrounded himself with sycophants, and the odd idiot savant. </p>
<p>As another astute Zimbabwean observer put it to me, Mugabe was good at playing the country’s many opposing groups against one another. He would grant one the hope of ascendance, then pull it away in favour of another grasping gang. It created a precarious balance. Now one of the groups has the levers of state in hand, the awkward equilibrium is no more – and the winners are split in all directions too.</p>
<p>With Mugabe gone, the victors – <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Mnangagwa’s faction of the ruling Zanu-PF</a> – have no idea how to police themselves, let alone an economy, their subjects and the opposition. Harvard professor and emeritus president of the World Peace Foundation, Robert Rotberg, has politely called their plans’ <a href="https://theconversation.com/bold-steps-mnangagwa-should-be-taking-instead-of-fiddling-with-the-petrol-price-109890">“barmy”</a>. </p>
<p>My guess is that the men and women in charge are following some of the advice of their <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2018/09/15/who-is-professor-mthuli-ncube/">financial guru</a> Professor Mthuli Ncube. He’s one of those mathematical geniuses whose ideology of short term pain producing fantastical gain needs either a lesson or two <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2019/01/15/chief-justice-luke-malaba-condemns-mthuli-ncube-austerity-measures-says-they-threaten-the-rule-of-law/?_ga=2.38229859.1398503167.1548007307-1613363783.1531465861">in politics</a> or an iron fist. He has the latter.</p>
<p>It’s likely that those charged with implementing “austerity for prosperity” so zealously are fighting among themselves while their soldiers loot and kill on their own, as well as their officers’, will. </p>
<p>As the spoils’ scarcity worsens and power’s centre cannot hold – all in the shadows cast by the near dead – stories of <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2019/01/21/breaking-ed-impeachment-plotters-tried-to-kill-me-mayor-justice-wadyajena/">post-coup coups</a> and impeachments pop up. Police spokesperson Charity Charamba even believes the soldiers looting and torturing are people who have stolen their uniforms, so any “retired, deserted, and AWOL” soldiers must</p>
<blockquote>
<p>immediately hand over uniforms either to the police or the <a href="https://www.sundaynews.co.zw/government-warns-rioters-1-fare-buses-introduced/">Zimbabwe Defence Forces"</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>A good excuse to round up suspected mutineers? </p>
<h2>Chilling warning</h2>
<p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced the gargantuan increase in fuel prices and then took his begging bowl to the oligarchic remnants of the Soviet ruins. His next stop was due to <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2019/01/19/Big-Saturday-Read-Davos%E2%80%99-shame-as-Zimbabwe-burns">be Davos</a> where he hoped to charm those with money by repeating his “open for business” mantra. But a <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2019/01/president-mnangagwa-not-going-to-davos-hes-coming-home-to-deal-with-crisis">60,000 strong petition</a> helped keep him away. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa has <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-president-mnangagwa-returns-amid-economic-crisis-crackdown-20190122">returned from his travels</a> with power retained, although now more tainted than before. He’s likely to be at his crudest. Presidential spokesperson George Charamba promises that so far there has been only seen a “foretaste of things to come”, and that Zanu-PF would <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/mdc-and-allies-will-be-held-accountable/">“revisit”</a> the sections of the constitution protecting rights of association and expression, “which we now know are prone to abuse by so-called proponents <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/01/20/world/africa/20reuters-zimbabwe-politics.html">of democracy”</a>.</p>
<p>As this week began, an eerie calm settled. But many civil society and political opposition activist members are still in hiding, lest the fate of teachers’ union president Obert Masaraure, abducted in the early hours of 18 January, tortured, and dumped at Harare’s Central Police Station, befall them. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Human <a href="http://www.hrforumzim.org/news/zimshutdown-violations-updates/">Rights NGO Forum</a> also chronicles the torture of Rashid Mahiya’s mother and his pastor. He is the chairperson of Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and Executive Director of Heal Zimbabwe Trust, and is accused of “masterminding” last week’s protests. </p>
<p>Movement for Democratic Change member and former Minister of Education Senator David Coltart has accused the military and those it has hired of <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-01-20-blocked-internet-in-zimbabwe-hides-government-crimes-against-humanity/">crimes against humanity</a>. In personal communication from Bulawayo he writes that last week’s debacle was a “deliberate campaign to punish the working class people” in his city. </p>
<h2>A dream deferred</h2>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">The nightmare of August 1 last year</a> – when the military brutally clamped down on opposition supporters protesting against the announcement that Mnangagwa had won the presidential election, killing at least six – started to dash the post-Mugabe leader’s dream of legitimacy.</p>
<p>Economic revival might have done the trick: now there’s no chance of that. Last week’s events have exposed the fantasy in full finality. The only Zimbabweans still in the trance are its supposed leaders. </p>
<p>Their neighbours seem caught in it too. They had better wake up before the maelstrom mauls them in the morning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110197/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Zimbabwean government’s brutal response to protests has dashed hopes for democracy under President Mnangagwa.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1070972018-12-17T12:10:59Z2018-12-17T12:10:59ZZimbabwe minus Mugabe: two books on his fall and Mnangagwa’s rise<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250014/original/file-20181211-76956-5ex5kg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's former president Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Penguin Books has released two books by Zimbabwean journalists in time to celebrate the first anniversary of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113249">coup</a> that finally put Robert Mugabe’s ruinous reign to an end. These are Ray Ndlovu’s <em>In the Jaws of the Crocodile: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Rise to Power in Zimbabwe</em> and <em>The Graceless Fall of Robert Mugabe: The End of a Dictator’s Reign</em> by Geoffrey Nyarota.</p>
<p>The books, about the end of Mugabe’s nearly four decades of ruling Zimbabwe, arrive at a time when journalists have to constantly rush to beat tweets and Facebook posts. This haste can work against their claim to be offering something closer to truth’s complexities than can be rendered in 280 characters.</p>
<p>At the time of the coup the international community, the long-suffering urban unemployed and rural peasants, and the business players itching to embrace the graces of a régime “open for business”, hoped that a long-delayed nirvana was just over the horizon. </p>
<p>That vista remains distant: if there was a rainbow – President Emmerson Mnangagwa promised Zimbabwean whites their place back in Zanu-PF’s good books – the pot of gold keeps receding. The long lines of fuel-starved vehicles indicated more about the first birthday of Zimbabwe’s “Second Republic” than Zanu-PF’s comparatively muted celebrations. </p>
<p>‘Queuing after the coup’ seemed an alliteration appropriate to this review of the two books, neither of which does justice to the enormity both of events in Zimbabwe as well as the sheer scale of what’s required to rebuild the country. </p>
<h2>The coup</h2>
<p>‘Romancing the <a href="https://www.commonsensemedia.org/movie-reviews/romancing-the-stone">coup’</a> could also characterise such tales. Ndlovu’s chronicle of Mnangagwa’s adventures bears the hallmarks of a roller-coaster thriller. <em>In the Jaws</em> excurses excitedly through “The Crocodile’s” firing from the vice-presidency, forced exile and escape, his Pretoria-based saviour, corrupt police (contrasted with brave soldier-saints), and his triumphant return to the treasures surely to follow his presidential inauguration. </p>
<p>Nyarota’s more sober historical take characterises former First Lady Grace Mugabe as someone whose treasure map bore little relation to the route she and her fellow plotters in “Generation-40” – the faction conniving to rid their party and country of “Lacoste” (a play on Mnangagwa’s nickname) group – took when they persuaded then President Mugabe to fire his longtime lackey.</p>
<p>Could military commander Constantino Chiwenga save the day and grab the treasure? Now a Vice-President, many credit Chiwenga with organising the “militarily assisted transition” allowing Mnangagwa to cross the river. <em>In The Jaws</em> celebrates the bromance between Chiwenga and Mnangagwa. But circumspection regarding such claims is cautioned. </p>
<p>The real gold lies under Zimbabwe’s putrid piles of economic ruin. Thus hopes are pinned on Mthuli Ncube, Zimbabwe’s new finance minister. These hopes are tied tightly to Zanu-PF’s factional fights for pieces of a Zimbabwean pie as ethereal as the electronic “money” used in the absence of real currency.</p>
<p>Ncube’s fantastical neo-liberal solutions are eerily reminiscent of the economic structural adjustment policies that during the 1990s’ precipitated Zimbabwe’s nosedive. Even the International Monetary Fund had to restrain Ncube’s exuberant <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-11-23-zimbabwe-announces--austerity-measures-to-spur-stalling-growth/">“Austerity for Prosperity”</a> <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/11/23/imf-pressures-ncube-on-reforms-sequence/">plans</a>. Matched with the ruling party’s scrambles and the poor’s impatience, roiling ensues.</p>
<p>Keynesians and neo-liberals alike have little to which they can look forward, although the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industry proclaims that industrial capacity rose <a href="https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/industry-optimistic-of-growth">by 5% in early 2018</a>. Yet just after mid-year, the little electoral legitimacy on which the global citadels of finance and investment banked slid away. The military killed at least six demonstrators while, as many say, its intelligence corps took over counting the election’s votes.</p>
<p>Neither of the two books portend much of the coup’s consequences. They improve on an unhappy catalogue of books on Zimbabwean politics. But the bar is low. The best that can be said of them is that they are good in parts. </p>
<h2>Map still missing</h2>
<p>Nyarota’s enthusiasm for the new régime is muted, but he’s very happy to see the back of Mugabe and his unruly wife. </p>
<p><em>Graceless</em> is more about their drawn-out fall than the coup per se. The elder Nyarota’s world-weary schadenfreude contrasts vividly with Ndlovu’s youthful exuberance. Nyarota’s historical depth, if meandering, gives necessary context to last year’s events. His insight into the near-coups in the 1970s that Ndlovu misses completely – when not misconstruing history – are valuable indeed. </p>
<p><em>Graceless</em> has no interviews: Mugabe’s minders refused Nyarota’s requests. Yet Ndlovu’s one-on-ones are mostly with the victors. </p>
<p>Of course, purported “Generation-40” leader and former cabinet minister Jonathan Moyo’s unstoppable stream of tweets and interviews from wherever resides his physical self, features prominently. But since they are accessible to anyone with internet they need deconstruction, not replication. </p>
<p>One would expect journalists to criticise Moyo’s nefarious role in his information portfolio (and many others). The elder and the younger don’t disappoint. Unsurprisingly, when the born-again constitutionalist Moyo was interviewed recently he judged Ndlovu’s work as a hagiography for <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2018/11/10/Big-Saturday-Read-One-year-after-the-Coup---A-Conversation-with-Professor-Jonathan-Moyo">Mnangagwa</a>. Unfortunately, Nyarota’s unpacking of Moyo’s past looks too much like Wikipedia to satisfy. </p>
<p>Moyo’s criticism of <em>In the Jaws</em> goes too far. But both books suggest more questions than answers. Even given publishers’ and the media rushes to keep up with insubstantial and fake news circulating via billions of clicks, this is not enough. Zimbabwe’s treasures haven’t been dug up yet, and these journalists-cum-authors haven’t drawn the map.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107097/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two new books about Zimbabwe deal with the coup in November 2017. But the country’s treasures haven’t been dug up yet.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1078402018-12-05T12:09:51Z2018-12-05T12:09:51ZLiberation hero Mugabe evokes polarised emotions among Zimbabweans<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/247966/original/file-20181129-170250-1fqyfc2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The end of Robert Mugabe’s rule was greeted with momentous national celebration. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">GCIS</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Robert Mugabe’s name is <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">synonymous</a> with both Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle and its post-colonial politics. His role and that of his Zanu-PF party have been central to the country’s dynamics since the early 1960s – and could well set the tone for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>For much of his political life Mugabe has often been viewed, in the words of one of his biographers <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=vQY4DgAAQBAJ&pg=PT23&lpg=PT23&dq=Martin+Meredith,+Mugabe+%22secretive+and+solitary%22&source=bl&ots=DmCK97xurM&sig=PymYcd-DCAyFl-2WFRS18fAIbao&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwijmNmroPneAhWQsKQKHZANDhAQ6AEwAnoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=Martin%20Meredith%2C%20Mugabe%20%22secretive%20and%20solitary%22&f=false">Martin Meredith</a>, as “secretive and solitary”, an “aloof and austere figure”.</p>
<p>However he is described, there’s no doubt that Mugabe’s political legacy is highly contested. To understand how this happened, it’s necessary to examine his personal history; his <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/11/17/its-been-one-year-since-zimbabwe-toppled-mugabe-why-isnt-it-a-democracy-yet/?utm_term=.11c978401892">political demise</a> in 2017; and Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/19/zimbabwe-needs-aid-to-prevent-further-crisis-warns-ruling-party">deepening political and economic crisis</a> more than a year after Mugabe’s ouster.</p>
<p>For the faction that has succeeded Mugabe, led by President Emmerson Mnangagawa, moving beyond the highly problematic legacy that they helped to create remains a daunting task.</p>
<h2>Early life</h2>
<p>Robert Mugabe was born 94 years ago at Kutama Mission in Zvimba District, west of what was then called Salisbury, the capital of then <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Southern-Rhodesia">Southern Rhodesia</a> (today’s Zimbabwe). He received a <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/africa/robert-mugabe">Jesuit education</a> and was by many accounts an exceptional student.</p>
<p>In 1945 Mugabe left Kutama Mission with a teaching diploma. He won a scholarship to South Africa’s Fort Hare University in 1949. There he met other emerging nationalists and was <a href="http://www.channelafrica.co.za/sabc/home/channelafrica/news/details?id=7aa25498-9448-4324-89c2-e4f62a324e17&title=The%20rise%20and%20fall%20of%20Mugabe">introduced to Marxist ideas</a>. </p>
<p>Armed with a BA degree in history and English Literature, Mugabe returned to Southern Rhodesia in 1952. He soon moved to the Northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) in 1955 to take up a teaching post. In 1958 he moved again, to a teacher training college in Ghana. There, a year after Ghana’s independence in 1957, he experienced the thrill and sense of possibility of a newly independent African state. It was a seminal political moment for him.</p>
<h2>Making of a revolutionary</h2>
<p>Mugabe returned home in 1960 on extended leave to introduce his new wife <a href="https://www.zambianobserver.com/the-forgotten-story-of-sally-mugabe-the-beloved-mother-of-zimbabwe-robert-mugabes-first-wife-and-true-love-the-woman-whose-death-changed-president-mugabe-forever/">Sally Hayfron</a> to his family. Instead of returning to Ghana, he became entangled in nationalist politics. This included the turmoil that the two major nationalist parties, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30035743?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) and Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu)</a>, split. </p>
<p>In 1963 he was arrested, along with many other nationalists. He was <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/10/dtente-the-release-of-nationalist/">released</a> after 11 years. </p>
<p>Mugabe and his colleague <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Edgar_Tekere">Edgar Tekere</a> escaped to Mozambique in 1974 to join the liberation war against the regime of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">Prime Minister Ian Smith</a>, conducted from bases in that country. There have been different accounts of Mugabe’s rise to the top of the leadership in Mozambique. As liberation war veteran <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/a-real-zimbabwean-war-veteran-speaks-97206">Wilfred Mhanda tells it</a>, their support for Mugabe was premised on his commitment to building unity between the rival nationalist movements. </p>
<p>But he reneged on this, instead pursuing the supremacy of his own party Zanu.</p>
<p>Following the Lancaster House settlement and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395186?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">1980 elections</a>, Mugabe’s Zanu emerged as the dominant party. He set out his policy of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">reconciliation with the white population</a>. This allowed the existing property and economic relations from the Rhodesian period to continue, while the politics of state control was transferred to Zanu. </p>
<p>This period witnessed the consolidation of Mugabe’s control of both his party and the state. The massive violence committed against the competing party of liberation, <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Zimbabwe_African_People's_Union">Zapu</a>, through the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacres</a>, signalled Zanu’s violent intolerance of opposition. </p>
<p>However, the 1980s were also evidence of Mugabe’s commitment to social policies such as health and education. Mugabe’s government greatly expanded the state expenditure in these areas in the <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/zimbabwe.-the-political-economy-of-transition-1980-1986">first decade of independence</a>. </p>
<p>The hostilities between Zapu, led by Joshua Nkomo, and Mugabe’s Zanu officially ended with the signing of a <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Unity_Accord">Unity Accord</a> by the two leaders on December 22, 1987. Zapu was effectively swallowed by Zanu PF. The ruling party had used the acronym since the end of the brief Patriotic Front coalition (1976-79) between the two liberation parties, on the eve of the 1980 elections. </p>
<h2>Things go south</h2>
<p>During the 1990s, opposition to Mugabe <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300366769_The_Movement_for_Democratic_Change_MDC_and_the_Changing_Geo-Political_Landscape_in_Zimbabwe">grew</a> in size and influence. Faced with the real possibility of political defeat – and dissent from the war veterans – Mugabe drew on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/zimbabwe/ZimLand0302-02.htm">longstanding land grievances</a> to reconfigure the politics of the state and Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>His <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358530500082916">Fast Track Resettlement</a> programme radically reconstructed the land relations from the settler colonial period. There is a continuing debate about the effects of the land redistribution exercise. It resulted in the violent allocation of land to a combination of large numbers of small farmers and the ruling party elite, and its long term impact on the country’s economy remains problematic.</p>
<p>The process also created a massive rupture between <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111691/P202.pdf">human and redistributive rights </a>. By legitimising the Fast Track programme, Zanu-PF emphasised economic redistribution and settling the colonial legacy around the land question. </p>
<p>But in doing so, the ruling party opportunistically labelled the fight for human and democratic political rights – which had long been central to the anti-colonial struggle – as a foreign <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/sunday-times/20180218/282342565314857">“regime change agenda”</a> pushed by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and civic movements. </p>
<p>The politics of the land reform process unleashed many questions around citizenship, belonging, and assertions of identity. Mugabe’s often valid critique of imperialist duplicity was accompanied by an unacceptable authoritarian intolerance of dissent within Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>The armed forces were <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-mugabe-why-the-role-of-zimbabwes-army-cant-be-trusted-87872">central to his stay in power</a>. The push in his final years to have his wife Grace succeed him heralded a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mugabe-announces-appointment-of-controversial-wife-grace-to-a-key-post-20170915">longer term reign for a Mugabe dynasty</a>. To further his wife’s ambitions, Mugabe first moved against Vice President Joyce Mujuru, the favoured contender to succeed him, in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/clues-to-successor-as-mugabe-names-vice-president/a-18122886">2014</a>.</p>
<p>Next, the Mugabes, with the support of a faction of Zanu-PF known as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-g40-factbox/factbox-key-figures-in-zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-mugabes-g40-faction-idUSKBN1DF1DX">G40 group</a>, took on another potential successor, Vice President Mnangagwa. He was dismissed from his state and party positions in <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/mnangagwa-fired-disloyal-disrespectful-deceitful2/">early November 2017</a>.</p>
<p>This set off a dramatic series of events. In mid- November 2017, following military chief Constantine Chiwenga’s warning of <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/counter-revolutionaries-want-to-destroy-zanu-pf-army-chief-tells-mugabe-20171113">“counter-revolutionaries”</a> in the ruling party, the armed forces <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">effectively took power</a> away from the executive. </p>
<p>This was followed by the initiation of an impeachment process against Mugabe. But, on the day the process began, in November 2017, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">he resigned</a>. </p>
<h2>End of an era</h2>
<p>For many Zimbabweans Mugabe remains a contested figure. For those who lived through the humiliations of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/720978?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">settler colonialism</a>, his strident critique of its legacies still ring true. But others will find it impossible to accept his exclusivist assertions of <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-129803.html">national belonging</a> and authoritarian intolerance of dissent.</p>
<p>When combined with the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249599119_Zimbabwe_Now_The_Political_Economy_of_Crisis_and_Coercion">deep economic crisis</a> over which he presided, it is little surprise that the end of Mugabe’s rule was greeted with such momentous national celebration.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/107840/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is a Research Fellow in the International Studies Group at the University of the Free State, and Research Director of Solidarity Peace Trust a Human Right Organisation working on Zimbabwe . </span></em></p>For many Zimbabweans Robert Mugabe will remain a contested figure.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994022018-07-24T10:00:45Z2018-07-24T10:00:45ZA vicious online propaganda war that includes fake news is being waged in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228219/original/file-20180718-142408-1pgb4gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters from the MDC-Alliance march in Harare demanding electoral reforms. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fake news is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/03/2018-elections-of-fake-news-social-media/">on the upsurge</a> as Zimbabwe gears up for its watershed elections on 30 July. Mobile internet and social media have become vehicles for spreading a mix of fake news, rumour, hatred, disinformation and misinformation. This has happened because there are no explicit official rules on the use of social media in an election.</p>
<p>Coming soon after the 2017 military coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">37 years in power</a>, these are the first elections <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/30/africa/zimbabwe-elections-july-intl/index.html">since independence</a> without his towering and domineering figure. They are also the first elections in many years without opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">died in February</a>. </p>
<p>The polls therefore potentially mark the beginning of a new order in Zimbabwe. The stakes are extremely high. </p>
<p>For the ruling Zanu-PF, the elections are crucial for legitimising President Emmerson Mnangagwa (75)‘s reign, and restoring constitutionalism. The opposition, particularly the MDC-Alliance led by Tsvangirai’s youthful successor, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa (40)</a>, views the elections as a real chance to capture power after Mugabe’s departure.</p>
<p>The intensity of the fight has seen the two parties use desperate measures in a battle for the hearts and minds of voters. They have teams of spin-doctors and “online warriors” (a combination of bots, paid or volunteering youths) to manufacture and disseminate party propaganda on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Known as <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/eds-office-speaks-on-sms-campaign/?PageSpeed=noscript">“<em>Varakashi</em>”</a>, (Shona for “destroyers”) Zanu-PF’s “online warriors” are pitted against the <a href="http://www.thegwerutimes.com/2018/05/15/of-zimbabwe-and-toxic-politics/">MDC’s “<em>Nerrorists</em>”</a> (after Chamisa’s nickname, “Nero”) in the unprecedented online propaganda war to discredit each other.</p>
<p>Besides the fundamental shifts in the Zimbabwean political field, the one thing that distinguishes this election from previous ones is the explosion in mobile internet and <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Annual-Sector-Perfomance-Report-2017-abridged-rev15Mar2018-003.pdf">social media</a>. Information is generated far more easily. It also spreads much more rapidly and widely than before. </p>
<p>What’s happening in the run-up to the polls should be a warning for those responsible for ensuring the elections are credible. </p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Images shared on social media platforms have become a dominant feature in the spread of fake news ahead of the elections. Both political parties have used doctored images of rallies from the past, or from totally different contexts, to project the false impression of overwhelming support. </p>
<p>Supporters of the MDC-Alliance, which shares the red colour with South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">EFF</a>, have been sharing doctored images of EFF rallies – and claiming them as their own – to give the impression of large crowds, according to journalists I interviewed in Harare.</p>
<p>Doctored documents bearing logos of either government, political parties or the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission are being circulated on social media to drive particular agendas. Examples include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A purported official letter announcing the resignation of the president of the newly formed <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chaos-rock-mugabe-party-spokesman-denies-interim-leader-resignation/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The circulation of a fake sample of a ballot paper aimed at discrediting the <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/fake-ballot-paper-sample-in-circulation/">electoral commission</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>A sensational claim that Chamisa had offered to make controversial former first Lady Grace Mugabe his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ill-never-appoint-grace-mugabe-as-my-deputy-says-mdc-leader-chamisa-20180710">vice president</a> if he wins. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of these fake images and documents have gained credibility, after they were picked up as news by the mainstream media. This speaks to the diminishing capacity of newsrooms to <a href="https://www.sla.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Information-Verification.pdf">verify information</a> from social media, in the race to be first with the news.</p>
<p>And, contrary to electoral <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/new-guidelines-prepare-zimbabwean-media-for-up-coming-elections/">guidelines for public media</a> partisan reporting continues unabated. The state media houses are endorsing Mnangagwa while the private media largely roots for the <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MONITORS-BASELINE-REPORT-3.pdf">MDC-Alliance</a>. </p>
<h2>Explosion of the internet</h2>
<p>These are the first elections in a significantly developed social media environment in Zimbabwe. Mobile internet and social media have been rapidly growing over the years. </p>
<p>Internet penetration has increased by 41.1% (from 11% of the population to 52.1%) <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Mar-2014-Zimbabwe-telecoms-report-POTRAZ.pdf">between 2010 and 2018</a>, while mobile phone penetration has risen by 43.8% from 58.8% to 102.7% <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sector-Perfomance-report-First-Quarter-2018-Abridged-9-July-2018.pdf">over the same period</a>.</p>
<p>That means half the population now has internet access, compared to 11% in 2010. </p>
<p>Ideally, these technologies should be harnessed for the greater good – such as voter education. Instead, they are being used by different interest groups in a way that poses a great danger to the electoral process. This can potentially cloud the electoral field, and even jeopardise the entire process. </p>
<p>A good example are the attacks on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which has become a major target of fake news. These attacks threaten to erode its <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/03/african-agriculture-expresses-differences-men-women/">credibility as a neutral arbiter</a>. For example, an app bearing its logo, prompting users to “click to vote”, went viral on WhatsApp. But, responding to the prompt led to a message congratulating the user on <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2018/05/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-distances-itself-from-fake-whatsapp-message/">voting for Mnangagwa</a>, suggesting that the supposedly independent electoral body had endorsed the Zanu-PF leader.</p>
<p>Numerous other unverified stories have also been doing the rounds on social media, <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/its-a-fake-voters-roll/">labelling the voters’ roll “shambolic”</a>. This, and claims of bias against it, have forced the commission to persistently issue statements refuting what it dismisses as “fake news”.</p>
<p>Events in Zimbabwe and <a href="https://portland-communications.com/pdf/How-Africa-Tweets-2018.pdf">elsewhere on the continent</a> point to the need for measures to guard against the abuse of social media, and bots to subvert democratic processes. There’s also a need for social media literacy to ensure that citizens appreciate the power the internet gives them - and to use it responsibly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dumisani Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s upcoming elections potentially marks the start of a new order in the country, where the stakes are extremely high.Dumisani Moyo, Associate Professor, Department of Journalism, Film and Television, and Vice Dean Faculty of Humanities, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1001002018-07-20T11:06:31Z2018-07-20T11:06:31ZZimbabwe poll: the bar for success is low, the stakes are high and it’s a close race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228455/original/file-20180719-142432-1pyjir6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the opposition MDC Alliance in Unity Square before marching to protest outside the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Moore</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the ruling Zanu-PF hope a credible victory in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/top-africa-stories-zim-election-date-set-kagame-on-chamisa-20180531">July 30 election</a> will legitimise the power (both party and state) they gained from the “soft coup” that toppled his predecessor Robert Mugabe <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabweans-must-draw-on-years-of-democratic-struggle-to-stop-a-repeat-of-mugabes-militarism-87961">last November</a>.</p>
<p>With victory, they say, the <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2018/07/14/infighting-between-mnangagwa-and-chiwenga-factions-frustrating-eager-investors/">donors and dollars</a> will flood in to the country they have resurrected from <a href="http://country.eiu.com/zimbabwe">nearly two moribund decades</a>. Zimbabwe is now <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">“open for business”</a> and will thrive. Zanu-PF’s resurrection will thus be complete.</p>
<p>But a new <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno223_zimbabwe_presidential_race_tightens.pdf">survey</a> suggests Zanu-PF should stall any premature celebration plans. The latest one showed that, in the space of one month, Nelson Chamisa’s MDC-Alliance has closed the gap with Zanu-PF. The surveys are conducted by Afrobarometer, an independent research network that conducts public attitude surveys across Africa and its Zimbabwean partner, Mass Public Opinion Institute, a non-profit, non-governmental research organisation.</p>
<p>If the respondents were to cast their ballot now Mnangagwa would take 40% of the votes and opposition leader Nelson Chamisa would take 37%. The still undecided or not-saying potential voters are at 20%. Split that and you get a 50/47 race. </p>
<p>The numbers are very close indeed. If not a victory for the MDC-Alliance, this looks like a presidential runoff. The MDC-Allaince has a 49% to 26% lead in the cities and towns and in the countryside the figures are 30% for the opposition to Zanu-PF’s 48%. In parliament Zanu-PF would get 41% to the MDC-Alliance’s 36. This is a big change from <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/media-briefings/findings-pre-election-baseline-survey-zimbabwe-aprilmay-2018">May’s survey</a>.</p>
<p>Given the MDC-Alliance momentum, the post-Mugabe Zanu-PF’s hopes of a resurrection may be dashed. A great deal hangs on both parties’ ability to manage this interregnum.</p>
<p>Big trade-offs will be negotiated, ranging from coalition governments, which the poll shows has the backing from 60% of respondents, to amnesties for the chief crooks and killers.</p>
<p>Striking deals might indeed lie at the centre of whether or not the election is a success. That’s because this election is about grabbing back the core of hardwon democracy from a military dominated regime. It’s about cleansing out <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">generations of fear</a>. </p>
<p>That is a hard task at any time. It’s harder still when it took a coup to retire its prime source.</p>
<h2>A divided Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has been spectacularly unsuccessful at winning past elections in <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2015/05/26/mnangagwa-cannot-win-elections">his own constituencies</a>, standing for parliament three times and losing twice. </p>
<p>The factions in Zanu-PF that squared up against one another prior to the coup - the <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation-40 group</a> that supported Grace Mugabe for the party and state president and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste</a>, which supported Mnangagwa – are <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-says-zanu-pf-legislators-plotting-to-impeach-him-15237903">still battling</a> along lines more ethnically drawn <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/02/19/ethnicity-zanu-pfs-messy-predicament/">than ever</a>. Some of the losers in the Generation-40 group have left the party to form the <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2018/07/14/mugabes-offered-24-million-12-cars-for-chamisas-campaign-in-exchange-of-82-parliamentary-seats-vice-presidents-post/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p>
<p>Although the perpetrators have not been found, the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/zimbabwe-blast-feared-to-herald-pre-election-violence-1.3543607">blast</a> at Zanu-PF’s Bulawayo rally in late June that killed two people and only narrowly missed a whole stage of luminaries, could suggest that the party’s wounds have yet to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/06/29/bulawayo-bomb-blast-escalates-mnangagwa-chiwenga-tensions/">heal</a>. </p>
<p>And the soldiers are not of one mind. </p>
<p>If the military side of the somewhat shaky post-coup pact in Zanu-PF fears losing an election, and thus access to more of the wealth more power can bring, the free and fair dimensions of the electoral contest would be <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-05-23-fears-of-armys-readiness-to-influence-zimbabwes-elections/">drastically diminished</a>. Would a repeat of <a href="https://public.tableau.com/profile/acled6590#!/vizhome/Zimbabwe_1/ProportionZiminTotal">mid-2008’s post-electoral mayhem</a>, when at least 170 people were killed and nearly 800 beaten or raped, ensue?</p>
<p>To make matters more complex, there are no guarantees that <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/15/military-pay-hike-angers-teachers">hungry and angry junior army officers</a> would follow their seniors’ attempts to alter the peoples’ will.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa could be at some of the soldier’s mercy. Some suggest that Constantino Chiwenga, the <a href="https://minbane.wordpress.com/2018/04/19/https-wp-me-p1xtjg-6lv/">mercurial vice-president</a> and – unconstitutionally – defence minister <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chiwenga-exposes-mnangagwas-great-escape-yarn/">might be among them</a>. </p>
<p>Others argue that the two leaders need each other if the régime is going to deliver on promises of a clean <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/05/zim-2018-election-trading-democracy-for-neoliberal-foreign-policy/">election</a> </p>
<p>And as George Charamba, Zimbabwe’s permanent secretary for information, put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This election is about restoring international re-engagement and legitimacy …. It must be flawless, it must be transparent, it must be free, it must be fair, it must meet international standards, it must be violence free and therefore it must be universally endorsed because it is an instrument of foreign policy … It’s about re-engagement and legitimacy; we are playing politics at a higher level.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a clarion call for a free and fair poll. If the election fails to meet these expectations and its results are tight, legitimacy could be maintained with carefully calculated deals. Perhaps the unity government widely expected during the coup could <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1DG1RL-OZATP">reappear</a>. </p>
<h2>A rising opposition</h2>
<p>Chamisa and the MDC (the alliance is made up of seven parties, most having split from the late Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC), appear to be building on the <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/nelson-chamisa-threatens-to-take-zec-headon-elections-zimbabwe/4486127.html">momentum</a> they seem to have gained by challenging the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s management of the contest. The alliance has challenged the commission’s neutrality and raised concerns over the accuracy of the voters’ <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-07-19-new-rules-and-ghost-voters-threaten-zimbabwes-vote">roll</a>.</p>
<p>Not all its allegations necessarily stand up to scrutiny. The 250,000 alleged ghosts may be a canard, but as Derek Matyszak, the Institute for Security Studies man in Harare, argues, the roll was not released in time for the primaries so none of the candidates are constitutionally valid. </p>
<p>Emboldened by the lack of police, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwe-opposition-marches-on-electoral-agency-to-demand-reforms-idUSKBN1K11FW">thousands of protesters</a> led by the MDC-Alliance marched to the commission’s headquarters on July 11, showing no fear. </p>
<p>If this impetus keeps building over the next week, a victory is conceivable. So is a presidential run-off. To be sure, the ruling party might win fairly, but the opposition will have to be convinced of that. The mode of politics for the next round should be peacemaking, not war. </p>
<h2>Low bars, high stakes</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/zimbabwes-elections-a-turning-point/">bars are low</a> – ‘the west’, led in this case by the UK, seemed to be happy with the winners of the coup, perhaps hoping for a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/zimbabwes-future-rests-on-a-free-and-fair-election-speech-by-ambassador-catriona-laing">renewed Zanu-PF</a>. <a href="https://www.newdawnmagazine.com/articles/perfidious-albion-an-introduction-to-the-secret-history-of-the-british-empire">Perfidious Albion</a> (Treacherous England) could end its schizophrenic career in Zimbabwe with a whimper about the <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597">end of a liberal democratic dream</a>. But the stakes are high for Zimbabweans: much higher than the reputation of a minor global power past its glory. </p>
<p>The people of Zimbabwe face a lot more than reputational damage: maybe the former colonial power will have a Plan B that helps more than hinders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new survey suggests opposition Zimbabwean leader Nelson Chamisa is closing in on the ruling Zanu-PF’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/992452018-07-09T15:26:57Z2018-07-09T15:26:57ZCould African Union law shape a new legal order for the continent?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/226305/original/file-20180705-122274-v1l6gj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">African leaders at the closing of the 26th African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, in 2016. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Solan Kolli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In his forthcoming book, <a href="https://www.routledge.com/African-Union-Law-The-Emergence-of-a-Sui-Generis-Legal-Order/Amao/p/book/9781138914940">African Union Law</a>, Femi Amao argues that Africa is on the cusp of a new continental legal order. It’s evolving slowly but there are early signs that it’s showing traits similar to the development of European Union law. The Conversation Africa’s Julius Maina asked him to explain.</em></p>
<p><strong>What are the preconditions for a new legal order?</strong></p>
<p>The African Union legal order stems from the integration efforts that started with pre-independence <a href="http://www.africanidea.org/pan-Africanism.html">Pan-Africanism</a>. This led to the <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/organisation-african-unity-formed-and-africa-day-declared">formation</a> of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was <a href="https://au.int/en/au-nutshell">succeeded</a> by the African Union (AU) in 2002.</p>
<p>The formation of the AU formally marked the beginnings of continental legal order because, unlike the OAU, it was formed by a Constitutive Act – a recognised social contract and legal code that now underpins the continental legal order. </p>
<p>This development means that we now have the prerequisite framework for a continent-wide legal order. It’s acknowledged that the legal order is in its infancy and there’s a long way to go. Even though the AU has made significant progress in meeting its ambitious goal of political integration, African leaders are aware of the need for further reform. That was why the AU Assembly commissioned the Kagame report which recommended a number of institutional and legal reforms. These include improving the effectiveness of the AU Court system, clarifying the legislative powers of the Pan-African Parliament and the speedy implementation of the AU continental passport.</p>
<p><strong>You argue that AU law is beginning to show traits similar to the development of European Union law. What are these?</strong></p>
<p>The design of AU institutions is broadly similar to that of the EU with comparable institutions. Laws of supranational organisation evolve progressively with the institutions. It is therefore not surprising that the emerging AU law is also showing characteristics similar to EU law. </p>
<p>For example, the powers and jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights and that of the European Court of Justice are <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Law/bp0309sceats.pdf">broadly similar</a>. Also, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights have <a href="http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf">increasingly made reference</a> to the European jurisprudence in their case law.</p>
<p>The emergent AU law is seen as distinct and separate from international law and the domestic laws of member states. EU law is now seen as a “supranational law” – beyond individual nation states. It’s arguable that, with time, AU law will evolve to the same level. </p>
<p>It’s worth noting that the AU’s legal order borrows certain legal principles from the EU. For example, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The principle of subsidiarity prescribes that decisions should be taken at local levels except where continental level decision making is more effective. The principle broadly governs the division of powers between the AU and other regional bodies and also Member States. The principle of proportionality is closely linked with the subsidiarity principle and prescribes that actions at the continental level should not extend beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the union. The concepts have already been <a href="https://ijrcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2.-African-Human-Rights-System-Manual.pdf">applied in judicial decisions</a> of the AU judicial system.</p>
<p>The area of human rights is probably where the greatest similarities are. Human rights are fundamental to the EU legal order. Member states are required to apply the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Similarly, the AU Constitutive Act has consolidated and advanced the framework for promoting and protecting human rights in Africa by giving it constitutional status binding on all member states.</p>
<p><strong>You also suggest that the AU is gradually and incrementally de-emphasising nation state sovereignty. Can you site examples?</strong></p>
<p>National sovereignty was fundamental under the OAU, which adhered strictly to a norm of <a href="http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/25/african-unity-at-50-from-non-interference-to-non-indifference/">non-interference</a> in a member state’s affairs. </p>
<p>But the AU has abandoned this approach, adopting the “non-indifference” norm in Article 4 of its <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/106/423/253/50402">Constitutive Act</a>. Under this act, the AU has the power to intervene in a member state’s affairs and use force if necessary in grave circumstances. These include war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threat to legitimate order. </p>
<p>The adoption and ratification of this act is the clearest example of African nations’ willingness to surrender some sovereign powers for the greater good of the continent. </p>
<p>The “non-indifference” norm is a direct response to a long history of military interventions in Africa. It is widely acknowledged that military coups not only undermine democratic and constitutional rule. They also entrench bad governance that leads to the violations of the rights of citizens. </p>
<p>The recent military intervention in Zimbabwe is the latest example of how the norm is shaping member States’ behaviour. To avoid AU sanctions, the military made every effort to <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/au-diplomat-applauds-zim-military-action-says-there-was-no-coup-20171204">abide by the country’s constitutional law</a> when it removed former President Robert Mugabe.</p>
<p>The role of the AU alongside ECOWAS and the EU in restoring democratic governance in the <a href="https://theconversation.com/curb-your-enthusiasm-there-are-limits-to-the-gambia-effect-for-the-rest-of-africa-71842">Gambia</a> in 2017 is also evidence of the effect of the norm.</p>
<p>The emerging continental court system is also a significant step away from nation state sovereignty. The continental court system’s decisions are binding on member states and supersede domestic courts in its area of competence. </p>
<p>In 2015, the African Court’s competence to evaluate evidence presented to a domestic court and the appropriateness of the penalty imposed was <a href="http://www.african-court.org/en/images/Cases/Judgment/003-2015-%20EN-Kennedy%20Owino%20Onyachi%20and%20Charles%20John%20Mwanini%20Njoka%20v.%20United%20Republic%20of%20Tanzania-Judgment-28%20September%202017%20-%20Optimized.pdf">challenged</a> on the grounds that it could not sit as a ‘Supreme Appellate Court’. But the African Court rejected this argument. It held it has the power to examine whether the proceedings at the member state’s court was in conformity with the fair trial provision in the African Charter and held the domestic Court accountable on that basis.</p>
<p><strong>EU members states have relinquished powers to pan-European institutions. Do you envisage AU countries doing the same?</strong></p>
<p>AU member states have not relinquished nearly as much power to AU institutions when compared with the EU. This is not surprising because the two systems emerged from different historical contexts. But the AU is taking a gradual approach and also focusing on specific areas where collective action would be more productive, such as the example of managing the problem of coups d'état. </p>
<p>The introduction of the pan-African parliament and the expanding role of the continental level judicial system are strong indications that more powers may be ceded to the AU institutions in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99245/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Femi Amao receives funding from Arts & Humanities Research Council.</span></em></p>The emergent AU law is seen as distinct and separate from international law and the domestic laws of member states.Femi Amao, Senior Lecturer, University of SussexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/988672018-06-26T13:36:26Z2018-06-26T13:36:26ZScene is set for interesting contest in Zimbabwe’s upcoming poll<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/224856/original/file-20180626-112611-15e9m20.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa (centre) at a ZANU-PF rally in Bulawayo.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Aaron Ufumeli/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans are heading to the polls on July 30. They will be making their decisions not only on what appears to be a dramatically changed political landscape, but with looming fears of a destabilised country following the <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/breaking-news-attempt-on-eds-life/">recent bomb blast</a> at a Zanu-PF election rally in Bulawayo. Reports say that the attack targeted President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Opposition parties now <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/24/zimbabwe-opposition-fears-crackdown-election-rally-bombing-emmerson-mnangagwa">fear a crackdown</a>.</p>
<p>But Mnangagwa and his <a href="http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/nothing-will-stop-zimbabwes-election-vice-president/">deputy</a> immediately pledged that the bomb attack wouldn’t <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/nothing-will-stop-zimbabwes-july-election-vp-chiwenga-20180624">stop</a> the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44593338">elections going ahead</a>. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, the incident is likely to create a climate of fear, insecurity, intense polarity and high securitisation of the state. Even before it happened civil society actors and think-tanks in Zimbabwe had raised questions about the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vdno_qu25b0">possibility of a rigged election</a>. </p>
<p>But be that as it may, the circumstances are very different from when Zimbabweans went to the polls in 2013. Then Zanu-PF won a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/Mugabe-gets-two-thirds-majority-20130802">two thirds majority</a>.</p>
<p>The upcoming elections will be closely fought between the 75-year-old Mnangagwa and new leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-Alliance), Nelson Chamisa (40). In addition, the polls will be contested without two men who have dominated Zimbabwe’s politics for decades - Robert Mugabe, who was <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">deposed</a> in 2017 and Morgan Tsvangirai who <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-dies-aged-65">died</a> in February this year.</p>
<p>These two factors – new leaders and the absence of old ones – set up an interesting contest.</p>
<p>As things stand, the MDC-Alliance is seeking to regain its relevance in the absence of Tsvangirai. Across the aisle, Mnangagwa is seeking to legitimately secure his authority, and the dominance of his party following the November 2017 transition after 37 years of Mugabe’s rule. </p>
<p>The elections are significant for average Zimbabweans too. Citizens are eager for new leaders to kick start the economy after <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/11/21/this-is-how-mugabe-broke-zimbabwes-economy_a_23284108/">years of decline</a> under Mugabe’s rule.</p>
<h2>Restoring legitimacy</h2>
<p>A lot is at stake for Zanu-PF. The party has aggressively pursued an agenda to restore its legitimacy regionally and internationally. For example, the Mnangagwa administration has repeatedly promised that the election will be credible. It has even taken its reform agenda to the <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/zimbabwe-s-international-re-engagement-and-socio-economic-recovery">international stage</a>. </p>
<p>To bolster its credible election claim, the administration has also <a href="https://www.ndi.org/publications/joint-iri-ndi-delegation-zimbabwe-issues-pre-election-statement-2018">invited international observers</a> from the European Union, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, to witness the upcoming poll. Observers weren’t welcome in Mugabe’s time owing to his strained relations with the West for over <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-to-observe-zimbabwe-polls-for-first-time-in-16-years-20180528">16 years ago</a>. </p>
<p>Although the administration has made delivering a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/18/zimbabwe-president-pledges-free-and-fair-vote-in-four-to-five-months">credible election</a> a top priority, its promises haven’t inspired confidence among ordinary Zimbabweans and opposition parties. </p>
<p>What remains worrisome is that several issues related to the <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chamisa-election-agent-zecs-justice-chugumba-in-violation-of-oath-of-office-must-apologise/">biometric voter register</a> remain a bone of contention among the contesting <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/06/21/mdc-zec-row-threatens-polls">parties</a>. If un-addressed, they will raise concerns about the credibility of the poll.</p>
<p>And with just a few weeks remaining until the election and after the official <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/371590-2/">confirmation of candidates</a>, the voters’ roll has <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/confusion-reigns-over-voters-roll-release-as-parties-deny-zec-claims/">not been made available</a> to opposition parties. </p>
<p>On top of this a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/nothing-can-stop-the-election-says-zimbabwe-elections-body-15539555">comment</a> by Zimbabwe’s Electoral Commission (ZEC) chairperson Justice Priscilla Chigumba has raised concerns because it suggests that the elections will take place, no matter what. Her words were:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The first thing to take note of is once the President has proclaimed the election date, there is nothing short of an earthquake which can stop the election so whether candidates scrutinise the voters’ roll, whether they see any anomalies in it, whatever the anomalies are, whatever legal recourse they have will not stop the election. I want that to be very clear, that is the law.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Split opposition vote</h2>
<p>Another concern is the fact that the political space is very crowded given that there are <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/371590-2/">23 aspirant presidential candidates</a>. One possible outcome is that the opposition vote will be split. The likelihood of this happening is more so, given that the main opposition parties have been unable to come together and field a single candidate. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-rainbow-coalition-joice-mujuru/4079821.html">People’s Rainbow Coalition</a> led by Joice Mujuru, Elton Mangoma’s <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/code-nominates-mangoma-presidential-candidate/">Coalition for Democrats</a>, Thokozani Khupe’s <a href="http://www.zbc.co.zw/khupe-mdc-t-to-field-112-parly-candidates/">MDC-T</a>, and Chamisa’s <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-zec-mdc-alliance/4425687.html">MDC-Alliance</a> are all fielding candidates in most constituencies nationwide. </p>
<p>The over-crowded opposition field have diminished chances that Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF could be dislodged. </p>
<p>There are also concerns that a <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/06/15/mdc-alliance-threatens-to-boycott-forthcoming-polls/">bloated ballot paper</a> will confuse the average voter. </p>
<h2>More questions than answers</h2>
<p>Questions abound as Zimbabwe prepares for the polls. Would Mnangagwa have risked dethroning Mugabe only to allow the opposition to assume the reins of power without a fight? In a telling sign of <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/05/mukupe-offside-on-military-intervention-if-chamisa-wins/">what might be in store for Zimbabwe</a>, Deputy Finance Minister Terence Mukupe and Minister of State for Masvingo province, Josiah Hungwe revealed that the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/05/25/mnangagwa-will-shoot-to-keep-power">army would not accept a Chamisa win</a> in the event that Zanu-PF lost. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s favourite <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-05-08-the-voice-of-the-people-is-the-voice-of-god-says-emmerson-mnangagwa/">dictum</a> is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the voice of the people is the voice of God.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Will it still be the case once the people have spoken in the upcoming historic poll?</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/98867/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gift Mwonzora is a Research Fellow at Rhodes University</span></em></p>The world waits to see if Zimbabwe will pass the democracy test as it holds its first election after Robert Mugabe next month.Gift Mwonzora, Post-Doctoral Research fellow (specializing in Political Sociology) in the Unit of Zimbabwean studies - Sociology Department at Rhodes University, South Africa., Rhodes UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/969542018-05-22T07:14:21Z2018-05-22T07:14:21Z12 years without an execution: Is Zimbabwe ready to abolish the death penalty?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/219795/original/file-20180521-14950-cocwvx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa opposes capital punishment.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>At the end of 2017, the world watched with keen interest as President Robert Mugabe was deposed after 37 years of ruinous rule, and replaced by Emmerson Mnangagwa, who promised <a href="http://www.euronews.com/2017/11/22/mnangagwa-promises-a-new-democracy-in-zimbabwe">“a new democracy”</a>.</p>
<p>The change of power is also significant for those interested in Zimbabwe’s death penalty policy. Mugabe, around the time of his departure from office, had plans to resume executions. Advertisements were placed to recruit a hangman – <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/01/lets-restore-death-penalty-says-zimbabwes-robert-mugabe">a position that had been vacant since 2005</a>. Mnangagwa, on the other hand, has been vocal in <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2013/11/a-big-step-closer-to-abolishing-the-death-penalty-in-zimbabwe/">his opposition to the death penalty</a>. Significantly, he himself had faced the prospect of being hanged under the government of Ian Smith, against which he fought during the liberation war. </p>
<p>Within four months of assuming office, Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/zimbabwe-president-mnangagwas-commutation-death-sentences-progressive-step">commuted</a> to life imprisonment the death sentences of prisoners who had been on death row for more than ten years.</p>
<p>I have just written a <a href="http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/12-Years-Report.pdf">new report</a>, “12 Years Without an Execution: Is Zimbabwe Ready for Abolition?” that examines Zimbabwean citizens’ attitudes towards the death penalty. It explores what it means to be a “retentionist” or an “abolitionist” in a country that has not executed anyone since 2005, and the potential consequences of abolition.</p>
<p>The launch of the report forms part of a bigger project on the death penalty carried out by <a href="http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org">The Death Penalty Project</a>, in partnership with <a href="http://www.veritaszim.net">Veritas</a> (an NGO based in Zimbabwe) that’s funded by the the Swiss Foreign Office and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The report indicated that Zimbabweans are ready to embrace abolition if the government were to exercise political leadership to this effect. </p>
<h2>Trend towards abolition</h2>
<p>Over the last four decades more and more countries have <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/04/death-penalty-facts-and-figures-2017/">dropped the death penalty</a>. In 1977 only 16 countries had abolished capital punishment in law or practice. By 2017 the figure had risen to two-thirds of the countries in the world – 142 in total. </p>
<p>The abolition of the death penalty has been boosted by the positions organisations like the <a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/news-2016/-/asset_publisher/StEVosr24HJ2/content/abolition-of-death-penalty-and-public-opinion?inheritRedirect=false&desktop=true">Council of Europe</a> and the European Union has taken. The Council of Europe made the abolition of the death penalty as one of its priorities while the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/34161/eu-local-statement-abolition-death-penalty_en">European Union’s</a> made abolition a condition of membership.</p>
<p>There’s also been an increase in the number of states in the <a href="https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty">US</a> that have abolished the death penalty or placed a moratorium on executions. Public support for the death penalty has <a href="http://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx">declined</a> in the country: in 1994 80% of Americans supported the death penalty. By 2017 the number had dropped to 55%. </p>
<p>There is progress in <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-death-penalty-is-losing-favour-in-sub-saharan-africa-43130">sub-Saharan Africa</a> too. In 2016 the Constitutional Court of Benin ruled that all laws providing for the death penalty were void and death sentences could <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/benin-death-row-prisoners-held-in-cruel-limbo/">no longer be imposed </a>. In the same year, Guinea abolished the death penalty for <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/04/africa-must-move-away-from-the-death-penalty/">ordinary crimes</a>. </p>
<p>Now Zimbabwe appears primed to join the trend towards abolition.</p>
<h2>Zimbabwe: a de facto abolitionist</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe is often referred to as a de facto abolitionist. This is because it hasn’t carried out an execution in more than 12 years. And under the country’s <a href="https://www.zimlii.org/zw/legislation/act/2013/amendment-no-20-constitution-zimbabwe">new constitution adopted in 2013</a> it restricted the scope of the death penalty. Changes included abolishing the mandatory death sentence for murder without extenuating circumstances. It also banned the execution of offenders over 70 years of age, and those who were younger than 21 (from 18) when they committed offences carrying the death sentence. </p>
<p>While the new Constitution restricted the scope of the death penalty, the policymakers felt that the <a href="http://www.handsoffcain.info/bancadati/africa/zimbabwe-40000035">Zimbabwean public</a> was not ready to embrace complete abolition.</p>
<h2>What we found</h2>
<p>In our survey, 61% supported the retention of the death penalty. But 80% of them said that if the government took leadership in abolishing the death penalty, they would accept it as government policy. </p>
<p>In addition, it was clear from the responses that support for the death penalty in Zimbabwe is symbolic – 83% of respondents weren’t even aware that the country hadn’t carried out any executions for more than a decade. And, 45% of respondents didn’t know the method of execution (hanging).</p>
<p>Too often, surveys on the death penalty concentrate exclusively on the punishment, forgetting that it is one of the many policies to control crime. In our survey, respondents were asked to rank a range of policies to tackle violent crime, which included the death penalty.</p>
<p>Both those who wanted to retain the death penalty, and those in favour of abolishing it considered moral education and reducing poverty to be more effective than the use of the death penalty.</p>
<h2>No barrier</h2>
<p><a href="http://www.handsoffcain.info/bancadati/africa/zimbabwe-40000035">Public opinion</a> has been cited as one of the reasons Zimbabwe is not ready to abolish the death penalty. But the findings in our report should serve to assure Zimbabwean policy makers that public opinion don’t need to pose a barrier to abolition. Indeed, the findings suggest that the Zimbabwean public is ready to accept abolition, should the government decide to move away from the death penalty in law – and in practice.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/96954/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mai Sato receives funding from the Swiss Foreign Office and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.</span></em></p>Survey shows Zimbabwean policy makers need not fear a public backlash if they choose to abolition of the death penalty.Mai Sato, Lecturer in Criminal Law and Criminology, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/941962018-04-16T13:56:19Z2018-04-16T13:56:19ZWeaning African leaders off addiction to power is an ongoing struggle<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/215044/original/file-20180416-540-1cwprob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni refuses to relinquish power.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Stringer</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some African countries have recorded democratic victories in the past 12 months. Ethiopia has a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-ethiopias-new-leader-could-be-a-game-changer-94424">new leader</a> whose ascent holds great promise for change, despite the country’s <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/ethiopia-100-election">problematic 2015 election</a>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/30/liberia-george-weah-salary-change-constitution-racism">Liberia</a> and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/sierra-leones-new-leader-bio-starts-work-as-president-20180405">Sierra Leone</a> have new leaders.</p>
<p>But elsewhere on the continent, leaders continue to disregard their countries’ own constitutions and laws governing presidential tenure. The Democratic Republic of Congo’s Joseph Kabila has been in power <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/07/joseph-kabila-will-not-stand-in-next-drc-elections-aide-says">since 2001</a>. He refuses to go even though he was meant to step down in December 2016. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni has clung to power since <a href="http://www.africareview.com/news/UG-lawmakers-pave-the-way-for-Museveni-stay-in-power/979180-4093204-ug1sqi/index.html">1986</a>. Denis Sassou Nguesso has ruled Congo for <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14121193">almost 30 years</a>. </p>
<p>Their refusal to step down at the appointed time flies in the face of several governance blueprints adopted as African countries shifted away from liberation politics to the new post independence <a href="https://theconversation.com/democracy-in-africa-the-ebbs-and-flows-over-six-decades-42011">struggle for democracy</a> in the early 2000s.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/organisation-african-unity-formed-and-africa-day-declared">Organisation of African Unity</a> was transformed into the <a href="https://au.int/">African Union</a> in 2001 with this shift in mind. The continent adopted progressive governance tools like the <a href="https://au.int/en/organs/aprm">African Peer Review Mechanism</a>. This was spearheaded by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki as a tool for African countries to review one another’s performance. </p>
<p>Numerous African countries adopted and agreed to uphold the terms of the African Union Charter on Democracy, <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-treaty-0034_-_african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and_governance_e.pdf">Elections and Governance</a>. It came into force in 2012 and was designed to guard against undemocratic governance.</p>
<p>These plans promised a great deal. They were designed to usher in good governance, democracy and security. It was hoped Africa’s image as a continent of ignorance, poverty, disease, misrule and corruption could be erased.</p>
<p>The rhetoric pointed in the right direction. But not all African leaders were willing to be swept by this wave of democratic reforms. Some are quite simply addicted to power, as shown by their reluctance – if not outright resistance – to leave at the end of their legal terms.</p>
<p>Leaders continuing to overstay their welcome undermines Africa’s attempts at overhauling its leadership and negates the noble intentions of the AU’s founders.</p>
<h2>Term limits</h2>
<p>Term limits regulate leadership succession. They are meant to counteract leaders’ temptation to overstay their welcome. This helps to consolidate and legitimise democratically elected leadership. </p>
<p>Of course, they’re not enough. Regular transfer of power as seen in countries like Mauritius, Ghana, Botswana and Zambia, among others, cannot guarantee political and socio-economic stability. Other ingredients such as accountable, legitimate leadership are critical. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=889&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/214725/original/file-20180413-540-1oiql55.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1118&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Botswana president Ian Khama recently stepped down.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Felipe Trueba</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But regular transfers of power give citizens hope that new policies, programmes and approaches will be adopted by the new leadership. In turn, this could overturn numerous political, social, economic impacts of uninterrupted strangleholds on power in Africa. </p>
<p>The benefits of frequent power transfers are evident in African countries that have them, such as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/electoral-commission-confirms-senegal-ruling-coalition-landslide-20170805-2">Senegal</a>; <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-botswana-politics/botswanas-khama-steps-down-as-president-after-a-decade-at-helm-idUSKBN1H70DO">Botswana</a> and <a href="https://guardian.ng/news/mauritius-gets-new-pm-opposition-demands-new-election/">Mauritius</a>. Incumbents are kept on their toes because there’s a real chance they can be removed from power if they fail to govern properly. </p>
<p>Term limits have recently become controversial and divisive. Some leaders have used dubious constitutional amendments to extend their stay in power. Usually, governing parties and their leaders almost exclusively pass such amendments with minimal or no opposition participation. That’s what happened in Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Congo Republic. </p>
<p>Similarly, despite constitutional provisions and regular elections, countries such as Angola, Togo, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea are virtually de facto one party or one leader repressive states wherein resignation, retirement and term limits are meaningless.</p>
<p>Leaders have different reasons for refusing to leave office. In some countries, the answer lies in a lack of succession planning to transfer power. In others, leaders blatantly refuse to resign because of their despotic and kleptocratic tendencies. They abuse their states’ minerals, oil and money with their <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/african-leaders-take-the-blame-for-the-continents-resource-curse">families and friends</a>. Stepping aside would cost them these “benefits”.</p>
<p>For instance, the eventual departure of Angola’s Eduardo Dos Santos from office after decades in power has <a href="https://theconversation.com/stability-in-southern-africa-hinges-on-how-leaders-gain-and-lose-power-89980">left his family exposed</a>. His children stand accused of amassing billions during their father’s many terms. </p>
<p>Without strong constitutional safeguards and a democratic culture to counter the negative consequences of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-13-anc-must-renew-itself-and-root-out-sins-of-incumbency">“sins of incumbency”</a> – as corruption associated with state power is often described by South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress – can be menacing. It breeds <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Big-Men-Little-People-Leaders/dp/081477542X">“Big Men, Little People”</a>, to borrow a phrase from the title of a book by journalist Alec Russel.</p>
<h2>Weaning leaders off power addiction</h2>
<p>Perceptive leaders know when to leave office, whether through resignation or <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2018/03/31/botswana-president-ian-khama-steps-down-after-end-of-tenure//">retirement</a>. Botswana’s past and current presidents have established this practice despite the country’s continued <a href="http://www.thepatriot.co.bw/analysis-opinions/item/3585-single-party-dominance-not-good-for-democracy.html">one-party domination</a>.</p>
<p>With the emergence of a strong democratic culture, South Africa has experienced the opposite of such presidential power mongering. Two presidents were recalled by their political party the ANC, albeit for different reasons. Thabo Mbeki readily <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-21-mbeki-resigns-before-the-nation">accepted his fate</a> when he was told to pack up and go, although he was not accused of any specific wrong doing. Jacob Zuma remained defiant and only stepped aside when faced with the very real prospect of a vote of <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-02-13-anc-want-motion-of-no-confidence-against-zuma">no-confidence</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/nana-akufo-addo-sworn-ghana-president-170107124239549.html">Ghana</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37086365">Zambia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/namibia-grown-up-after-a-generation-into-independence-but-not-yet-mature-74571">Namibia</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/buharis-victory-in-nigerian-election-has-global-significance-39416">Nigeria</a>, <a href="https://www.constitutionnet.org/news/presidential-elections-malawi-towards-majoritarian-501-electoral-system">Malawi</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/magufuli-has-been-president-for-two-years-how-hes-changing-tanzania-86777">Tanzania</a> are other African states where regular transfer of power has occurred.</p>
<p>African voters are not blameless. They habitually relax their vigilance on leaders and fail to hold them to account after elections. This, coupled with winner-take-all election systems, renders some African countries vulnerable to autocratic, despotic and non-accountable leaders who would rather die in office than leave.</p>
<p>What, then, is the solution? It may be time for ordinary voters across the continent to begin to collaborate through non-governmental organisations and other cross-border institutional mechanisms to share experiences and begin to enforce durable continental democracy. Africa needs democracy from below.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/94196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kealeboga J Maphunye receives funding from National Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, NIHSS, South Africa. </span></em></p>Not all African leaders are willing to be swept by the democratic reforms of the early 2000s.Kealeboga J Maphunye, Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), University of South AfricaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/899802018-01-22T15:43:51Z2018-01-22T15:43:51ZStability in southern Africa hinges on how leaders gain and lose power<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202402/original/file-20180118-29900-1tmlu4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters demand Congolese President Joseph Kabila step down.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Thomas Mukoya</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>While each country in Southern Africa has its own politics, recent developments involving presidents provide interesting contrasts across the region. Which presidents gain and lose power in 2018 – and how they do so – will have significance for the region as a whole, not least in helping determine its continued stability.</p>
<p>As 2018 begins, Joseph Kabila is clinging to the presidency of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), claiming that there is insufficient funding to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/16/delayed-drc-elections-could-be-put-back-further-by-cash-shortage">hold an election</a>, amid <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/53-protesters-killed-over-six-months-in-drc-report-20171121">growing protests</a> against him in Kinshasa and elsewhere. It remains to be seen if he will fulfil the undertaking he has made that elections will be held in <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/kabila-at-un-pledges-drc-elections-but-still-no-date-20170923">December this year</a>.</p>
<p>Other countries in the region start 2018 on a much more promising footing. In Botswana, President Ian Khama, approaching the end of his two presidential terms, is expected to step down in an <a href="http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/09/botswana-president-says-he-will-step-down-at-the-end-of-his-term-in-april//">orderly succession</a> in April and will be suceeded by the vice-president.</p>
<p>In both Zimbabwe and Angola autocratic presidents who had been in power for almost four decades lost power in 2017 in very different ways.</p>
<h2>Military intervention in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>In the case of Zimbabwe the country’s army intervened in November 2017 to force Robert Mugabe to <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">give up power</a>. This came after he had, under the influence of his wife Grace, sacked Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/07/vp-mnangagwa-fired">as vice-president</a>. The Southern African Development Community did not need to intervene, and even the mediation mission it planned wasn’t required.</p>
<p>Instead, the Zimbabwe military acted, with the ruling party, Zanu-PF, to replace Mugabe with Mnangagwa. It did so peacefully, denying during the entire process that a coup was underway. The 93-year-old Mugabe, in office since 1980, initially refused to step down, but was finally removed both as president of the <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-21-breaking--zimbabwes-president-robert-mugabe-has-resigned/">country and of the ruling party</a>.</p>
<p>The country will go to the polls in <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/earliest-election-date-july-23-2018/">mid-2018</a>, and Mnangagwa, who was confirmed in December 2017 as Zanu-PF’s presidential candidate, has said that the election will be credible, <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2017/12/16/mnangagwa-promises-free-fair-elections/">free and fair</a>, but he has yet to confirm that he will allow international and other observers.</p>
<p>With the military more obviously involved in government than anywhere else in the region, Zimbabwe’s opposition parties divided, and with Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/morgan-tsvangirai-seriously-ill-11532872">seriously ill</a>, there is little likelihood that Zanu-PF or Mnangagwa will lose power.</p>
<h2>Angola</h2>
<p>In Angola José Eduardo dos Santos, suffering from ill-health, agreed in early 2017 to step down as president of the country. He nominated a man he thought would be a trusted successor, hoping to continue to wield influence as president of the ruling MPLA.</p>
<p>After elections for the National Assembly in August, <a href="https://theconversation.com/angolas-ruling-party-regains-power-but-faces-legitimacy-questions-83983">João Lourenço duly succeeded Dos Santos</a> as president. To widespread surprise, he began sacking the heads of some of the country’s key institutions. These included Dos Santos’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos, who was <a href="https://qz.com/1130420/africas-richest-woman-has-been-fired-from-angolas-state-oil-firm-by-the-new-president/">CEO of the state oil company Sonangol</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202404/original/file-20180118-29885-i4krt0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Former Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, left, and his successor Joao Lourenco.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA/Manuel de Almeida</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>And in early 2018 her brother José Filomeno dos Santos, was removed as head of Angola’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42638761">sovereign wealth fund</a>. Their father’s influence was rapidly slipping away.</p>
<p>In Angola, as in Zimbabwe, a change of leader to one with a more reformist approach probably means that the ruling party has consolidated itself in power.</p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p>In South Africa in December 2017 the leadership of the governing African National Congress (ANC) passed <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1762486/breaking-cyril-ramaphosa-is-the-new-anc-president/">from Jacob Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa</a>, who thus became heir apparent to the presidency of the country. While there is no two-term limit for ANC presidents, Zuma had brought the ANC into discredit and Ramaphosa, despite having worked closely with Zuma as deputy president, was seen as the one who would curtail the corruption and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-threat-to-south-africas-democracy-runs-deeper-than-state-capture-78784">“state capture”</a>.</p>
<p>For now, Zuma remains president of the country until general elections due to be held by June 2019. The country waits to see whether, how and when Ramaphosa can <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-should-end-the-presidential-merry-go-round-in-south-africa-90116">arrange to take over</a> as president of the country as well as of the ruling party.</p>
<h2>A presidential challenge defeated</h2>
<p>In Namibia, <a href="http://links.org.au/node/4190">Hage Geingob</a> had to meet a challenge to his continuing as leader of Swapo, the governing party, in <a href="https://www.newera.com.na/2017/07/10/swapo-elders-endorse-geingob-as-swapo-presidential-candidate/">November last year</a>. He was, however, confirmed in his position and will therefore be Swapo’s presidential candidate for the election scheduled to take place in November 2019.</p>
<p>Geingob supporters now fill all the key posts in his government, enabling him to make policy as he wishes. This is very different from South Africa, where the new ANC leadership remains divided and where Ramaphosa, when he becomes president of the country, will find it difficult to <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/when-will-zuma-go-its-a-matter-of-time-20171224-3">adopt new policies</a>.</p>
<h2>Malawi and Zambia</h2>
<p>Malawi must hold elections <a href="http://www.mec.org.mw/category/Steps_towards_2019.html">in 2019</a> and the contest for the presidency then has already begun. It is not known whether Joyce Banda, the former president and leader of one of the country’s leading political parties, will <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2015/12/30/malawi-why-wont-joyce-banda-come-home-2/">return from self-imposed exile</a> abroad to stand again. In 2017 she was formally charged with having been involved in the massive <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/malawi-issues-warrant-of-arrest-for-former-president-banda-20170731">“Cashgate’ corruption scandal”</a> that was uncovered while she was president.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=722&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/202406/original/file-20180118-29888-1qdqaf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=908&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zambian President Edgar Lungu.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters//Siphiwe Sibeko</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In Zambia, by contrast, where the next election is not due until 2021, the question is how Edgar Lungu, who took over the presidency after narrowly winning the presidential election in August 2016, will try to consolidate his power. </p>
<p>In 2017 Lungu became <a href="https://theconversation.com/lungu-tries-to-have-his-cake-and-eat-it-a-state-of-emergency-in-all-but-name-80628">more authoritarian</a>. Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the main opposition United Party for National Development, was arrested on what were clearly trumped-up charges. These were only <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/08/16/knew-hhs-treason-charge-trumped-antonio-mwanza/">dropped in August</a> after interventions by the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and inside Zambia by the <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/09/20/real-reasons-hh-released-jail/">local Catholic Archbishop</a>.</p>
<p>Lungu wants to serve a <a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/11/05/no-third-term-president-lungu-gbm/">third term as president</a>, and the country’s Constitutional Court has been asked to <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/africa/2017-11-10-is-zambia-headed-for-a-constitutional-crisis/">rule on the matter</a>.</p>
<h2>Regional perspective</h2>
<p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation from similar ones elsewhere. Given that South Africa is the most important country in the region, how the Ramaphosa-Zuma poser is resolved will be significant for the region. Elsewhere, how presidents gain and lose, and try to consolidate their power, will help shape the continued stability of the region. </p>
<p>Will political tensions be managed internally, as in Zimbabwe in late 2017? Or will they require some kind of intervention by the Southern Africa Development Community, in the DRC and perhaps elsewhere, to prevent them from escalating? Throughout the region, contests for presidential power are likely to keep political passions on the boil.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89980/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Saunders does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Too often developments in one country are seen in isolation. In southern Africa events in one affect others in the region.Chris Saunders, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape TownLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/891772017-12-29T08:23:21Z2017-12-29T08:23:21ZThe three barriers blocking Zimbabwe’s progress: Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the military<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199889/original/file-20171219-27557-8tx029.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=206%2C577%2C5544%2C3026&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s new President <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> has been cautiously welcomed with the hope that he will place Zimbabwe on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-has-the-capacity-to-focus-on-the-new-zimbabwe-but-will-he-88254">more democratic trajectory</a>. He has spoken of a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/can-emmerson-mnangagwa-a-mugabe-ally-bring-change-to-zimbabwe-12134023">new democracy “unfolding”</a> in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>But this is wishful thinking.</p>
<p>There are three major barriers to a decisive break from the corrupt and dysfunctional political system that has been playing out in Zimbabwe: the ruling <a href="http://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zanu-PF</a>, its president and what’s been their main sustainer – the military. </p>
<p>None would want to oversee real change because facilitating democratic rule with real contestation for power would mean running the risk of electoral defeat. This would endanger the networks of self enrichment that have been put in place over decades. </p>
<p>Instead, the next few months will see Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">military</a> continue to block democracy as they seek to hold onto the power. </p>
<h2>The nature of Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF presents a formidable obstacle to democratic progress in the country. Zimbabwe has maintained the outward appearance of a multiparty democracy since <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid_2515000/2515145.stm">independence in 1980</a>. But it’s effectively been a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/towards-the-oneparty-state-in-zimbabwe-a-study-in-african-political-thought/BD356807617492EBE85877DB6CD815C7">one-party dictatorship</a>. </p>
<p>The party brings a zero-sum game mindset to politics: it must always prevail, and its <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">opponents must be crushed</a> rather than accommodated. Opposition parties formally exist but they have not been allowed to win an election. Should such a possibility arise – as it did in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">2002, 2008 and 2013</a> – elections will be rigged to preserve the status quo. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF provides the most egregious example of the culture of exceptionalism which has characterised the liberation party in power. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the belief that its entitled to rule indefinitely, </p></li>
<li><p>its refusal to view itself as an ordinary political party, </p></li>
<li><p>its conflating of party and state, and </p></li>
<li><p>its demonising of other parties as ‘enemies of liberation’ seeking to restore colonialism or white minority rule. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The way in which Zanu-PF has colonised the state over almost four decades means that there is a vast web of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2013.862100?src=recsys">patronage networks</a> that have been entrenched to facilitate the looting of the state’s resources. Democratic change and clean government pose a mortal threat to these networks and such privileges are unlikely to be surrendered without intense resistance.</p>
<h2>The new president</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa’s ominous record makes it difficult to build a persuasive case that he represents a new beginning. </p>
<p>He served as <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-has-the-capacity-to-focus-on-the-new-zimbabwe-but-will-he-88254">Mugabe’s “chief enforcer”</a> until November 2017. He was pivotal to the collapse of the rule of law and the implosion of the Zimbabwean economy. And he has been a central player in the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20161116-Zimbabwe-Early-Warning-Report.pdf">gross human rights abuses</a> that have characterised Zanu-PF rule. This includes the killings in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Matabeleland killings</a> in the 1980s. This is a past for which he has refused to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/#.WjFR4Ux2trQ">acknowledge any responsibility</a>. </p>
<p>His more conciliatory language has not matched his actions. After becoming president he appointed an administration of cronies, <a href="http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-40875-Chiwenga+appointed+defence+minister/news.aspx">military hardliners</a> and ‘war veterans’. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at his inauguration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The appointments appeared to consolidate the power of the now dominant faction of Zanu-PF: the old guard securocrats who routed Grace Mugabe’s equally malign <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_(Zanu-PF_Faction)">G40 faction</a> through the barrel of a gun rather than democratic processes. </p>
<p>Having waited such a seemingly interminable length of time to land the top job, it is difficult to envisage Mnangagwa now placing his hard earned spoils at the mercy of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-11-20-justice-malala-dont-fool-yourself-zimbabwe-wont-be-fixed-by-mugabes-ex-cronies/">a programme of democratisation</a>.</p>
<h2>The military</h2>
<p>The Zimbabwean Defence Force’s role in the removal of the president means that it has secured a place for itself as a privileged political actor and overseer of the entire political system. </p>
<p>The defence force has never been a neutral custodian of constitutional rule. Instead it has always been a highly politicised extension of the ruling party, a party militia in effect. </p>
<p>Previously its role was confined to repressing the ruling party’s opponents and maintaining the party’s dominance. The principle of civilian rule was respected even if this model of civil-military relations failed to meet any reasonable democratic standards. But with the coup, the military crossed a line. They determined the outcome of power struggles within the ruling party itself. </p>
<p>In the same way that the military has been politicised, the political system has been heavily militarised. This can be seen in the several key military veterans who have been appointed to the cabinet as well as Mnangagwa being the military’s candidate for the presidency. Essentially this is the civilian face of quasi-military rule in Zimbabwe. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing a press conference in Harare, in November.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What this points to is an effective “barracks democracy” emerging in Zimbabwe. The military has secured a veto over the leadership of the ruling party and over the wider political process. It also reserves the right to reject election results that it does not approve of, or to take action that could prevent such results materialising in the first place. </p>
<p>To see the military’s removal of Mugabe as an overriding good ignores the fact that it has no concept of the national interest, or that it views that national interest as synonymous with its own and Zanu-PF’s. </p>
<p>It is dangerously naïve to expect such a force to help facilitate genuine democratic transition when its entire raison d’etre has been to preserve one-party rule (under a leadership of its choosing), to disable meaningful opposition and to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/09/15/military-looted-diamonds-report/">preserve its own corruption networks</a>.</p>
<h2>Unsettling prospects</h2>
<p>True democratisation – as opposed to merely maintaining the procedural forms of democratic government – is anathema to Zimbabwe’s ruling party, its president and the military. </p>
<p>It is evident that their task is threefold over the next few months. They have to secure support for a measure of liberalisation; arrest political enemies for corruption rather than tackling corruption <em>per se</em>; and provide a smokescreen of a largely vacuous democratic rhetoric. </p>
<p>The hope is that this will be sufficient to secure aid, investment and an endorsement by external donors while virtually nothing changes in the actual power relations inside the country. </p>
<p>Anyone committed to democracy in Zimbabwe -– whether inside or outside the country – should begin mobilising against this project sooner rather than later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89177/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Robert Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe is over. But the country’s road to democracy remains a bumpy one as Zanu-PF, the new president and the military go about entrenching power.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/889042017-12-11T08:51:42Z2017-12-11T08:51:42ZA year of illusions: five things we learnt about democracy in Africa in 2017<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198323/original/file-20171208-27689-s95w1k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A strong judiciary isn't enough to keep democracy in place. Kenya's Supreme Court decision nullifying the re-election of Uhuru Kenyatta is a case in point.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Baz Ratner</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The last twelve months have been a confusing time for African democracy. We have seen coups that didn’t look like coups and elections that didn’t look like elections. In this sense, it was a year of illusions.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016">in 2016</a>, the broad trend is clear: with a number of <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/the-state-of-democracy-in-africa/">notable exceptions</a>, the gains made in the early 1990s are under threat from governments with little commitment to plural politics. It’s true that 2017 provided further evidence of the danger of <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-mugabe-all-eyes-are-on-museveni-how-long-can-he-cling-to-power-87964">democratic backsliding</a>. But it also saw powerful presidents suffer embarrassing setbacks in a number of countries.</p>
<p>So what lessons does 2017 have to teach us, and what is going to grab the headlines in 2018?</p>
<h2>1. Don’t mess with the military</h2>
<p>In November 2017 the Zimbabwean Defence Forces placed President Robert Mugabe under <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/africa/zimbabwe-coup-mugabe.html">house arrest</a> and subsequently orchestrated his removal. The intervention was cleverly framed as a corrective action to remove “criminal” elements around the president. In reality, it represented an effort by the military to protect its own <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1776/zimbabwe-caught-between-the-croc-and-gucci-city/">political and economic interests</a>.</p>
<p>Once General Chiwenga had spoken out <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41970317">against the sacking of Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> – the political leader closest to the security forces – he faced being replaced, arrested and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-15-zimbabwe-ministers-arrested/">charged with treason</a>. In other words, Chiwenga had little to lose and everything to gain from military intervention. The ousting of Mugabe therefore serves as an important reminder that despite thirty years of multiparty elections in Africa, messing with the military can still be fatal.</p>
<h2>2. If you’re polite, you can get away with murder</h2>
<p>The military intervention in Zimbabwe was also remarkable for being the politest coup in history. To avoid domestic and international criticism, the coup plotters went to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/15/zimbabwe-when-a-coup-is-not-a-coup/?utm_term=.65adbc981319">remarkable lengths</a> to make their usurpation of power look constitutional. Instead of being executed or sent into exile, Mugabe was allowed to remain in his house and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/16/mugabe-detention-photos-emerge-as-pressure-grows-on-zimbabwes-military">posed for pictures</a> with his captors.</p>
<p>Amazingly, the theatre worked. Delighted to see the back of Mugabe, even some committed democrats were prepared to hold their nose and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwe-has-chance-of-a-future-free-of-oppression-uk-20171121">welcome the “transition”</a>. </p>
<p>The willingness of many people to play along with the idea of a bloodless coup is deeply problematic, first because it may encourage security forces in other countries to try and repeat the trick, and second because it is false. </p>
<p>There are growing reports that a number of <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21731339-after-37-years-power-game-up-zimbabwes-army-mounts-coup-against">deaths</a> and <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/22/zimbabwe-protect-detainees-rights">human rights abuses</a> occurred as the military moved to exert political control. When the testimonies of the victims are finally heard, it will cast a very different light on the coup and its aftermath.</p>
<h2>3. Judges can’t promote democracy on their own</h2>
<p>The Kenyan Supreme Court made history when it became the first judicial body on the continent to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/world/africa/kenya-election-kenyatta-odinga.html">nullify the election of a sitting president</a> – Uhuru Kenyatta – on 1 September. This remarkable assertion of judicial independence was celebrated <a href="http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Supreme-Court-democracy-Kenya-election-petition--/2558-4080166-dqrv82/index.html">throughout Africa</a> and <a href="https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/election-annulment-momentous-development-for-rule-of-law/5062633.article">beyond</a>, as democrats dared to dream of a new phase of judicial activism. </p>
<p>But any hope that the need to repeat the election would lead to widespread reforms and a better quality process turned out to be overly optimistic. Instead, the second poll was just as controversial as the first as evidence emerged of continued political interference in the electoral commission and the main opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-election/kenya-opposition-leader-urges-vote-boycott-civil-disobedience-idUSKBN1CU0KR">boycotted the contest</a>.</p>
<p>The Kenyan experience is significant because it demonstrates that while independent judiciaries can have a major impact on democracy, their effectiveness is constrained by weaknesses elsewhere in the political system. Because Supreme Courts <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-11-15/why-kenyas-supreme-court-cant-solve-countrys-electoral-crisis">lack both legislative and enforcement powers</a>, they are dependent on others for their decisions to be implemented, and so have a limited capacity to enforce the rule of law.</p>
<h2>4. Political exclusion breeds secessionism</h2>
<p>One of the main stories of the last 12 months is an upsurge of secessionist sentiment in <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/On-the-causes-and-consequences-of-secessionism/440808-4184144-4sgnte/index.html">Cameroon, Kenya and Nigeria</a>. Significantly, while the demand for the creation of a separate state has complex roots, in each case it was triggered by perceptions of political and legal exclusion – and the fact that certain ethnic and linguistic communities have not held the presidency for decades, if at all. </p>
<p>Although these movements have very different dynamics, they have all led to protests and met with a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/peaceful-pro-biafra-activists-killed-in-chilling-crackdown/">hostile state response</a>.</p>
<p>Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, they are also movements full of people who don’t <a href="http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/On-the-causes-and-consequences-of-secessionism/440808-4184144-4sgnte/index.html">really want to secede</a>: in each case, opposition leaders are using the threat of separation as a way to highlight – and contest – their political exclusion. Nonetheless, unless some of their demands are met, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/60b86886-bef5-11e7-b8a3-38a6e068f464">secessionist sentiment</a> is likely to harden, undermining national identities and paving the way for future political crises.</p>
<h2>5. Western companies are part of the problem</h2>
<p>The last year has revealed the extent to which Western companies have become involved in helping political leaders in Africa run divisive public relations campaigns to boost their electoral prospects. </p>
<p>The most high profile example of this was Bell Pottinger, a British “<a href="https://bellpottinger.com/">reputational management agency</a>” that was accused of designing a campaign to stir up racial tensions in South Africa as a way of deflecting attention away from the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/04/bell-pottinger-expelled-from-pr-trade-body-after-south-africa-racism-row">poor performance of the African National Congress government</a>. </p>
<p>The company was paid £100,000 a month, although this proved to be little compensation when the scandal broke and it was forced <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/business/bell-pottinger-administration.html">into administration</a>.</p>
<p>While Bell Pottinger has gone, many of the multinational companies who do this kind of work <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-40792078">continue to operate</a> – although exactly what they do remains unclear. Given the lucrative nature of these contacts, we can assume that Western companies will continue to play a questionable role in African elections in the future, unless their activities are exposed.</p>
<h2>2018 and beyond</h2>
<p>The next 12 months are not likely to be kind to African democracy. Very rarely has the continent seen so many <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/calendar2018.php">elections scheduled</a> in such unpromising contexts. Early elections in Sierra Leone have the best prospects of going well, but after that a series of general elections will be held in particularly challenging contests: Cameroon, Mali, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>The great challenge facing Mali and South Sudan is to organise a credible contest against a backdrop of <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/south-sudan-doomed-fail/">political instability and weak institutions</a>. </p>
<p>The situation is markedly different in Cameroon and Zimbabwe, where entrenched regimes that tightly control the political landscape will hold elections that they have no intention of losing.</p>
<p>But it’s important not to be defeatist. In the last few years the most significant democratic breakthroughs – in <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38183906">Gambia</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32139858">Nigeria</a>, Kenya and beyond – have been unanticipated. The next great democratic moment could be just around the corner.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88904/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The past 12 months provided further evidence of the danger of democratic backsliding in Africa. But it also saw powerful presidents suffer embarrassing setbacks in a number of countries.Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/887052017-12-07T12:36:32Z2017-12-07T12:36:32ZWhy the focus on China’s role in Mugabe’s fall missed the bigger picture<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/197972/original/file-20171206-915-1jj24bq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews the guard of honour on a state visit to Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The fall of Robert Mugabe has dominated global coverage of Africa over the past few weeks. In Western coverage of the first week after the coup in Zimbabwe there was <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/28/zimbabwe-coup-china-benefits-from-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-post-mugabe.html">speculation</a> about what China knew beforehand and whether Beijing played an active role in pushing for it.</p>
<p>China’s mention drowned out other notable external stakeholders such as the UK, the US, South Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU). And it almost threatened to overshadow the domestic dynamics that led to the changeover. </p>
<p>There are reasons to draw a direct parallel between China and the recent events in Zimbabwe. The most obvious is the fact that army chief General Constantino Chiwenga <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/16/zimbabwe-army-chief-trip-china-last-week-questions-coup">visited Beijing</a> shortly before the tanks rolled into Harare. The timing of the visit was certainly eye-catching. It led to speculation that Beijing was informed beforehand of the coming coup. </p>
<p>There were also rumours that other external stakeholders, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-17-00-just-what-did-sa-know-about-zimbabwes-coup">notably South Africa</a>, had been informed. </p>
<p>But some coverage underplayed the distinction between knowing the coup was afoot and actively pushing for it. In some reporting, China was all but accused of <a href="http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=11945674">fomenting regime change</a>. The reason put forward was that relations between the two countries had soured in recent years because of Beijing’s concerns about loan repayments. There was also the issue of Chinese investments in the face of a ramped up indigenisation campaign by Harare. </p>
<p>A decline in the “special friendship” between Mugabe and China is <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/04/26/chinas-pains-over-zimbabwes-indigenization-plan/">well documented</a>. It’s a relationship that goes back to the Mao era and also involves Emmerson Mnangagwa, now president, who received military training in China. But simply jumping from these facts to the implication that China actively pushed for, or orchestrated Mugabe’s fall, skips over a few important facts. </p>
<h2>Three reasons to dismiss the conspiracy theorists</h2>
<p>In the first place, China has <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-27-china-hails-new-zimbabwe-leader-denies-role-in-transition">strenuously denied</a> any involvement in the change of government. This is worth noting, though it’s unlikely to convince those looking for a conspiracy. </p>
<p>More fundamentally, there is little evidence of China in the post-Mao era pushing for regime change in Africa. This includes countries where it has larger economic interests than in Zimbabwe, and where those are in considerably more danger than in Zimbabwe. South Sudan is one example. </p>
<p>For all Mugabe’s many crimes, Zimbabwe during his reign was relatively stable and predictable. No matter how frosty the relationship between Harare and Beijing had become, Zimbabwe seems like an unlikely candidate for such a big departure in tactics. This is especially true after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, an event that <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bbfb1cb8-ceb1-11e7-b781-794ce08b24dc">pushed China even further away</a> from support for interventionism. </p>
<p>Second, <a href="http://www.mangalmedia.net/english//decentering-colonial-narratives-about-zimbabwe">as the young, Hong Kong-based Zimbabwean academic Innocent Mutanga has argued</a>, the Western fixation on a possible Chinese regime change plot has the effect of discounting African agency. This is doubly problematic because it also discounts the ability of African governing bodies like SADC to enforce the rules in their own back yard.</p>
<p>In fact, the careful choreography that accompanied the ousting of Mugabe was clearly aimed at appeasing the AU. The aim was to avoid any invocation of the AU’s mandatory suspension of unconstitutional changes in government. This was a concern every bit as important for Mnangagwa’s faction as assuaging external powers’ interests. </p>
<p>The regime change argument misses a wider point: that Chiwenga’s visit can be read as a sign of China’s new prominence on the global stage. The fact that China was probably informed about the coup beforehand actually makes clear of its shifting geopolitical position. Being given prior warning shows that China is getting recognition alongside the US and UK as a fully fledged great power. </p>
<p>This perspective should lead us to focus in detail on Chinese investments in Zimbabwe – not because they might point towards direct Chinese involvement in Mugabe’s fall, but because they raise questions about how various Chinese actors interact with illiberal governments across the global south. </p>
<p>Since 2006 the relationship between China and Zimbabwe has been rooted in collusion <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/diamonds-and-the-crocodile-chinas-role-in-the-zimbabwe-coup/">between military and party elites</a> on both sides. This led prominent Chinese companies into lucrative mining contracts in <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-10/diamonds-fund-zimbabwe-political-oppression-global-witness-says">collaboration</a> with companies owned by the Zimbabwean military. One such Chinese company is the arms manufacturer <a href="http://source.co.zw/2017/02/mugabe-lifts-lid-arms-minerals-deal-china/">Norinco</a>. President Mnangagwa, and possible vice-president Chiwenga have been enriched via such <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/diamonds-and-the-crocodile-chinas-role-in-the-zimbabwe-coup/">joint deals</a>. </p>
<p>In addition, large loan packages and prospective infrastructure investments have followed, broadening ties across sectors and society.</p>
<h2>Wider lens needed</h2>
<p>A narrow focus on whether China actively pushed for Mugabe’s fall tends to assume that the China-Africa relationship is a unique and isolated phenomenon. We would argue that the Zimbabwe situation calls for a broader look at how various Chinese role players act globally. </p>
<p>Under President Xi Jinping, China has begun to push more explicitly for great power status, and for a leadership position in world politics. Events in Zimbabwe strongly suggest that it’s time that the world – and particularly Africa – started to reflect on this new role and focused on what kind of global power China will be.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88705/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cobus van Staden is affiliated with the South African Institute of International Affairs. He is also a co-founder and co-chair of the China-Africa Project, a US-listed non-profit focused on widening the conversation about China-Africa relations. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chris Alden does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A narrow interest in whether Beijing actively pushed for Mugabe’s fall is based on the assumption that the China-Africa relationship is an isolated phenomenon.Cobus van Staden, Senior Researcher: China Africa, South African Institute of International AffairsChris Alden, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/880852017-12-03T10:19:57Z2017-12-03T10:19:57ZA clean break with Mugabe’s past will have to wait - even beyond elections<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196676/original/file-20171128-7447-t1w0v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa has officially been sworn in as interim Zimbabwean President.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Who would have thought that this year would end with <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a> having lost the presidency of both the governing Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe? None could have foreseen such a development being the work of his ruling party’s inner circle.</p>
<p>The whole development is clearly a product of internal Zanu-PF tensions and actions. The military top brass involved are old standing Zanu-PF cadres that have <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">propped Mugabe up</a> for decades. Emerson Mnangagwa, who has been sworn in as his successor, has been Mugabe’s right hand man for <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/profile-zimbabwe-president-robert-mugabe-20171115">37 years</a>. </p>
<p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems. The same Zanu-PF leadership has taken control of this transition, making it an intra-party matter rather than a national opportunity for deepening democracy as many hope. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s first priority will be to ensure consolidation of Zanu-PF power. He may do so by positioning Zanu-PF as a born again party committed to change. He may seize the opportunity to introduce real changes in the conduct of Zanu-PF and government leadership, in economic policies and in rebuilding the social compact by showing greater maturity in relations with other political parties and civil society.</p>
<p>But, as reports surface about the harassment of some of Mugabe appointed ministers and their families at the hands of <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/zimbabwe-judge-military-action-mugabe-legal-51375327">men in uniform</a>, we are reminded that the military should never be encouraged to manage political problems because they are likely to cross the line of civil-military relations. Excessive use of military power is likely to follow.</p>
<h2>Mugabe the survivor</h2>
<p>Mugabe has survived many attempts to get rid of him before. These include the efforts of the previous opposition Zimbabwean African People’s Union <a href="http://africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/How-intellectuals-made-history-in-zimbabwe.pdf">(Zapu)</a> under Joshua Nkomo in the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Joshua_Nkomo">1980s</a>, through to the <a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Laakso-Vol-7-Issues-23.pdf">Zimbabwe Unity Movement in the 1990s</a> and to Movement for Democratic Change <a href="http://www.mdc.co.zw">(MDC) in the 2000s</a>. All these efforts failed because Mugabe has, at times, been popular, at times cunning and at times ruthless in preserving power – for himself and the Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>At times reliance on patronage of <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/mdc-t-says-chiefs-not-zanu-pf-political-commissars/">indigenous systems of leadership</a> helped Mugabe and the party ward off challenges. Over the past 15 years, Zanu-PF has relied on the crude use of state power, <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/01/securitization-will-be-an-ill/">draconian security measures</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">brutality on the streets</a>.</p>
<p>It has also resorted to buying popularity through measures such as the violent land restitution process between <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE13.2Magure.pdf">2001 and 2007</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabweans at the inauguration of Emmerson Mnangagwa in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After 2007, Zanu-PF and Mugabe had to contend with a regional mediation process by the Southern African Development Community after an election they lost, but which the MDC did not win by margins needed to <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">form its own government</a>. Zanu-PF responded by unleashing violence and <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008postd.htm">brutality on opponents</a>. Power sharing, which gave the MDC and its leader <a href="https://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPOLISJ/TOPOLISJ-5-28.pdf">Morgan Tsvangarai</a> an opportunity to position themselves as alternatives, saw Mugabe and Zanu-PF play every trick in the book to preserve power.</p>
<p>After Zanu-PF narrowly won the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf">2013 elections</a>, it seemed that Mugabe and his party had finally prevailed. But the power battles turned inward, as party factions jostled over who would succeed Mugabe. </p>
<h2>Zanu-PF power struggles</h2>
<p>Various factions in the Zanu-PF have crystallised into two main camps. </p>
<p>The first is Mugabe and his henchmen of the so-called <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-122610.html">Zezuru group</a>, including top heads of security forces who had wanted Mugabe to continue for a long time. They favoured Solomon Mujuru before he died and later Mnangagwa as a successor. </p>
<p>The second was made up of younger, rather flamboyant group of mainly men around Mugabe Zanu-PF politicians who had gained power and influence in the civil service. This group was known as the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/17/unpacking-the-g40">G-40</a>. In the past few years this group backed Grace Mugabe as her husband’s successor. </p>
<p>Things have hung in the balance with the G40 gaining momentum because they could influence Mugabe’s judgement and decisions through his wife and nephews. This group could make a call who needed to be fired or isolated – and the president would act accordingly. </p>
<p>For example, when moderates in the Zanu-PF and war veterans touted Vice President Joice Mujuru as possible successor to Mugabe, the G40 aimed a barrage of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/11241242/Grace-Mugabe-claims-Joice-Mujuru-plans-to-kill-her-Gaddafi-style.html">insults against her</a> and publicly declared that her time was up. Shortly afterwards Mugabe fired her and got her <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/i-was-a-clear-successor-to-mugabe-says-former-vp-joice-mujuru-20170309">expelled from the party</a>. This deepened divisions within Zanu-PF and intensified concern about the G40 and Grace Mugabe. </p>
<p>The last straw was the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/06/mugabe-fires-deputy-mnangagwa">firing of Mnangagwa</a> and threats against chiefs of armed forces.</p>
<p>Believing that Mugabe was being manipulated by the G40, the military stepped in to weed out those around the president. What they wanted was to persuade Mugabe to go and for Mnangagwa to replace him in as peaceful a process as possible so as not to destabilise Zanu-PF’s hold on power. The military showed great patience as it set about achieving this outcome. </p>
<p>In the end – and after citizens had taken to the streets calling for Mugabe, and the G40, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-19-today-we-have-won-zimbabweans-cheer-during-mass-rally">to go</a> – the old man <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">resigned</a>, thus avoiding an embarrassing impeachment process. </p>
<h2>New forces versus old</h2>
<p>Mugabe is gone. A faction of the Zanu-PF that had gained currency around him is being squeezed out of every space in Zimbabwe. A new faction under Mnangagwa is in place. </p>
<p>Mugabe stands as a shadow of continuity behind leaders who have been around him for decades and who have now been entrusted with the renewal agenda. Mugabe has left, but what’s been called <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">Mugabeism</a> remains: both the positive side of vehemently defending the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the negative side of the brutality of state power. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa and the military have lavished him with generous post-retirement packages, honoured with a <a href="http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/life/happy-sunset-awaits-mugabe-with-sh1billion-golden-handshake/">holiday in his name and praise</a>. The interim president has warned the deposed G-40 faction of Zanu-PF to return stolen state monies or <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/three-month-zimbabwe-amnesty-for-cash-stashed-abroad-12183516">face the law</a>. </p>
<p>A clean break with Mugabe’s heritage of violence and crude dominance will have to wait even beyond <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">elections next year</a>. Zimbabwean citizens have been energised by their role in removing Mugabe. They would do well to remain vigilant, to press for more fundamental changes in the way the state behaves and insisting on democratic processes in economic policies. Otherwise they will continue to live under one Zanu-PF faction to another without real change in their lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Robert Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems.Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/882742017-11-30T10:59:18Z2017-11-30T10:59:18ZNow Mugabe is gone there is a chance to get HIV/AIDS under control<p>In Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, the poor and the marginalised with HIV/AIDS lived on borrowed time. Although there were significant strides in reducing the country’s HIV prevalence from an average of <a href="http://zimbabwe.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/FACTSheetHIVDeclineinZimbabweFinal.pdf">27% in the 1990s</a> to less than <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR322/FR322.pdf">15% in 2017</a>, those pushed into extreme poverty continue to fight a daily battle against corruption and prejudice which limits their access to vital treatment, support and care. Now Mugabe is gone there is a glimmer of hope. But Zimbabwe’s new leaders need to take action quickly before more lives are lost.</p>
<p>In rural Goromonzi, in eastern Zimbabwe, during my ethnographic enquiry in 2014, I met over 100 people living with HIV/AIDS. All had distressing stories and accounts. I particularly remember meeting 33-year-old Charity (not her real name) at the rural home where she had lived with her husband, Tino, and their three children. They seemed to sum up what life was like to be poor and afflicted with HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>When we met, Charity looked at me intently, as if she wanted to break me with her eyes. Although Charity and Tino lived together, they barely talked – afraid of upsetting each other. I sat next to Charity and opposite her was the emaciated and silent Tino who leaned on soft pillows. Neither spoke for several moments. Charity interrupted the long silence and began to speak calmly, with her head slightly bowed, but maintaining constant eye contact with me:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>I am on ARVs [antiretrovirals]. Our children are HIV negative thanks to the ARVs. Tino is not on HIV treatment and won’t go back to the clinic because it’s very far … his wounds are not healing. The people in the community are also very unfriendly because he is gay … We have nothing here. No jobs in Zimbabwe, our children do most of the work in nearby farms, Rudo [their eldest daughter] stopped going to school because we couldn’t raise the exam fees. For these ARVs to work, we need food, and it’s a struggle to get food.“</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196970/original/file-20171129-29092-105h6ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196970/original/file-20171129-29092-105h6ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=164&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196970/original/file-20171129-29092-105h6ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=164&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196970/original/file-20171129-29092-105h6ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=164&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196970/original/file-20171129-29092-105h6ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=206&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196970/original/file-20171129-29092-105h6ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=206&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196970/original/file-20171129-29092-105h6ks.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=206&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A township in rural Zimbabwe.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Fortunate Machingura</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Charity described the times she had to deal with depression along with the recurrent fungal skin infections that are common among immune-suppressed individuals. Like Tino, Charity’s mental and physical health worsened with time and as she narrated her experience, by turns, she appeared to display a range of negative emotions, from extreme depression, through to anxiety, anger, and hopelessness. They were in despair. </p>
<p>This case is emblematic of what happens when HIV infection, poverty, sexuality and poor access to treatment all come together. Although progress has been made and the number of <a href="http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/country/documents/ZWE_narrative_report_2016.pdf">new HIV infections has reduced</a>, the <a href="https://www.odi.org/comment/10581-zimbabwe-after-mugabe-three-reasons-hope">downfall of Robert Mugabe</a> offers Zimbabwe another opportunity to recalibrate the HIV/AIDS trajectory to leave no one behind – by prioritising and fast-tracking actions for the poorest and most marginalised people.</p>
<p>The success of which will depend ultimately on how <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> frames the discourse of development going forward. But here are three quick wins for him to consider.</p>
<h2>Stop new HIV infections</h2>
<p>The Zimbabwe Health Ministry and its National AIDS Council will need to continue strengthening explicit and proactive HIV/AIDS programs that target women and girls, disabled people, the elderly, prisoners and people in remote rural areas, <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/zim-urged-to-include-key-populations-in-hivaids-fight/">male and female sex workers</a>, people in same-sex relationships and those living in extreme poverty.</p>
<p>These groups suffer <a href="http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/12_Populations_en_0.pdf">discrimination and disadvantage</a> and experience a higher risk of preventable and premature death due to HIV/AIDS. While it is noble to target everyone, the benefits of development will continue to advantage the better off groups first and worst off groups later, widening the gap between them. There is a moral responsibility to give greater voice to people like Tino and Charity so that they can participate in the process and help improve it. </p>
<h2>Invest in electronic health records</h2>
<p>To measure progress, detailed information about the most vulnerable needs to be available. President Mnangagwa’s government should aim to reshape civil registration and finance the roll-out of electronic based counting systems, such as the Electronic Health Records (EHR). Keeping track of a single patient on ARVs can be complicated. Doing it for a low-income country with over <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR322/FR322.pdf">13% HIV prevalence</a> while coping with high demand for treatments of all <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/10/typhoid-outbreak-hits-mbare/">sorts of outbreaks</a> and a sputtering economy magnifies the complexity.</p>
<p>This is why investing in the roll-out of the <a href="http://www.umc.org/news-and-media/mashambanhaka-clinic-pioneers-computerization">already piloted Zimbabwe EHR</a> – which can provide high-quality data security, storage and analysis in some of the busiest HIV/AIDS clinics in the nation – is crucial.</p>
<h2>Address corruption</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016">Zimbabwe</a> is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The people’s dissatisfaction with the government’s corruption was reflected in the recent anti-Mugabe demonstrations following General Chiwenga’s famous ”<a href="http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Zimbabwe-s-military-launch-Operation-Restore-Legacy-to-remove-Mugabe-140853.html">operation restore legacy</a>“ which aims to punish all criminals and restore justice.</p>
<p>Corruption not only continues to challenge electoral democracy but also feeds the seeds of inequality, creating a vicious cycle of crime, poverty and the unequal distribution of power and wealth. Poor people and especially marginalised groups living with HIV/AIDS continue to rely on public services that have been weakened by the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/03/world/africa/03zimbabwe.html">misappropriation of funds</a>.</p>
<p>Addressing corruption means channelling resources back into research, social welfare support, agriculture, education, health and insurance – sectors that mean the most for people like Charity and Tino. But all this cannot be achieved without serious political will from President Mnangagwa to follow up on his commitments.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88274/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fortunate Machingura holds an ESRC Global Challenges Research Fund Post-Doctoral Fellowship Grant. She is looking at premature mortality in Zimbabwe and actions that the Zimbabwean government can take to accelerate progress in "leaving no-one-behind". She is also a Research Fellow with the Overseas Development Institute in London; a Research Associate with the Sheffield Institute for International Development and a health informatics and surveillance systems advisor with RTI International in the Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Care in Harare.
</span></em></p>But Zimbabwe must act quickly.Fortunate Machingura, Global Challenges Research Fund Post Doctoral Fellow and Lecturer , University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.