tag:theconversation.com,2011:/au/topics/zimbabwe-crisis-46362/articles
Zimbabwe crisis – The Conversation
2023-09-08T14:22:22Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/211755
2023-09-08T14:22:22Z
2023-09-08T14:22:22Z
Zimbabwe elections 2023: a textbook case of how the ruling party has clung to power for 43 years
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543488/original/file-20230818-29-34nlfh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Opposition supporters calling for free and fair elections outside the offices of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission in Harare in 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeksai Njikizana/AFP via Getty Images.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few were surprised as, near midnight on 26 August, the <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/2023-presidential-elections-results/">Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</a> announced incumbent president Emmerson Mnangagwa’s reelection in yet another of Zimbabwe’s tendentious contests. His <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/snubbed-by-most-regional-leaders-emmerson-mnangagwa-parties-on-with-ex-adversaries-instead-20230904">inauguration</a> on 4 September sanctified his return to power.</p>
<p>Fewer still were shocked when South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, attended Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/ramaphosa-warned-not-to-undermine-sadc-ahead-of-mnangagwas-inauguration-4fd42c99-fdf2-4070-be0c-69b5117b8962">inauguration</a> regardless of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) election observation team’s <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/87928/zimbabwes-troubled-election-might-southern-african-leaders-follow-the-example-of-their-observers/">critical report</a> and the absence of most of <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/mnangagwa-inauguration-ramaphosa-expected-to-attend-along-with-a-few-regional-leaders-20230903">his peers</a> from the SADC and the African Union.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa gained 52.6% of the 4,561,221 votes cast. Nelson Chamisa, head of the main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), garnered 1,967,343 or 44%. Zanu-PF’s 136 of parliament’s 210 seats is just under the two-thirds needed to change the constitution. </p>
<p>I’ve observed and written about all <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971404900106">Zimbabwe’s elections</a> since 2000, when Zanu-PF first faced strong opposition from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. My <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">book</a> Mugabe’s Legacy: Coups, Conspiracies, and the Conceits of Power in Zimbabwe covers nearly 50 years of Zanu-PF’s propensity to gain power by any means - even <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-president-was-security-minister-when-genocidal-rape-was-state-policy-in-1983-4-now-he-seeks-another-term-211633">genocide</a>.</p>
<p>This election displayed many of these patterns. However, each election has registered variations as Zimbabwe hovers between open democracy and fully shut authoritarianism. Zanu-PF’s score, with contemporary variants, ranges from pre- and post-election intimidation to electoral “management” and playing off its regional neighbours. The CCC and civil society choirs also shift their tone in response: from outright rejection and court challenges to pleas for reruns and transitional governments.</p>
<h2>Long-term, immediate and post-election intimidation</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/99/article/703839">post-2017 coup period</a> foreshadowed many of Zanu-PF’s contemporary strategies. First was the soldiers killing at least six demonstrators (and bystanders) just after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">mid-2018 elections</a>. In January 2019, a “stayaway” kicked in just after Mnangagwa announced a 150% increase in fuel prices. Planned chaos ensued as riots, looting and protests were encouraged by a multitude of unidentified forces. More than 17 people were killed. As many women were raped. Nearly 1,800 other bodily violations ensued amid <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv2s0jd56">mass trials and convictions</a>. </p>
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<p>Since then, Zanu-PF has reminded many people not to engage in opposition. </p>
<p>By mid-2020 the targets moved towards <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/12/the-gendering-of-violence-in-zimbabwean-politics/">women in the MDC</a>. The case of CCC activist <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXsUkP00M9k">Moreblessing Ali’s</a> murder in May 2022 indicates a new variant on “silent murder”. Ali’s brother, Washington, a long-time MDC-CCC activist in the UK, gained the help of CCC MP and lawyer Job Sikhala to publicise his sister’s murder. Sikhala has been imprisoned since his campaign on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">behalf of Ali</a>. </p>
<p>I examine this horrific assassination in the next issue of the journal <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/198">Transformation</a>. It illustrates how the move towards <a href="https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/18/sweets-for-the-people-zimbabwe-elections-housing-voters-lured-promises-land-barons-zanu-pf">land-baron-led gangsterism</a> in Harare connects with Zanu-PF hierarchies of power.</p>
<p>The August 2023 pre-election murder by stoning of <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/7210805.html">CCC activist Tinashe Chitsunge</a> indicated this sort of politics running wild. </p>
<p>After the election, demonstrators and soldiers did not encounter each other <em>en masse</em>: no shootings. However, residents visiting pubs in “high density suburbs” encountered rough treatment from unidentified people with guns and brand-new uniforms. Later, Glen Norah councillor Womberaishe Nhende and fellow activist Sonele Mukuhlani were left naked after their abduction, whipping and injection with poison on 3 September. Their lawyers, Douglas Coltart and Tapiwa Muchineripi, were arrested when visiting them <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202309060001.html">in hospital</a>.</p>
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<p>The well-funded “Forever Associates of Zimbabwe” (FAZ) earned its keep by intimidating folks during the pre-election phases. FAZ is a <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/if-it-still-breaks-dont-fix-it-time-for-another-election-in-zimbabwe/">Zanu-PF</a> mix of semi-intellectuals and aspirant entrepreneurs. They are Mnangagwa enthusiasts needing connections to the Zanu-PF state. </p>
<p>They ran illegal <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/zimbabwes-vote-is-well-short-of-free-and-fair-standards-say-foreign-observers-20230825">“exit polls” at the stations</a>. FAZ’s members, purportedly <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2023/03/11/wife-of-cio-boss-accused-of-terrorising-zanu-pf-and-cio-members/">paid by the Central Intelligence Organisation</a>, kept their promise to “dominate and saturate the environment while <a href="https://faztrust.com/">denying the same to opponents</a>” – including those within Zanu-PF during its primary <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/311011/zimbabwe-how-intelligence-and-military-are-running-the-upcoming-general-polls/">nomination contests</a>. </p>
<h2>Judicial and electoral ‘management’</h2>
<p>The clouds over liberal horizons darkened further in the legal spheres of repression. The “<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-patriotic-act-erodes-freedoms-and-may-be-a-tool-for-repression-209984">Patriotic Act</a>”, passed ahead of the elections, makes too much opposition-talk with foreigners treasonous. The still unsigned amendment to the Private Voluntary Organisations Bill promises to end all hints of civil society support for <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-01-23-zimbabwean-government-passes-law-designed-to-throttle-independent-civil-society/">opposition parties</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6099">gerrymandered delimitation exercise</a> remapped mostly urban constituencies so they stretch to peri-urban and nearly rural areas. Zanu-PF hoped the majority would thus support it, as in the countryside. This tactic linked well to election day’s improprieties. Up to 75 urban polling stations experienced unexpected and unprecedented <a href="https://www.zawya.com/en/world/africa/polling-delays-and-extension-of-time-for-voting-zimbabwe-e39rl0b4">shortages of ballot papers</a>. This caused long and uncertain waits. Some stations extended voting to the next day. </p>
<p>In Glenview, a Harare suburb, hundreds of poor voters walked kilometres to vote by 7am. They waited – peacefully, fortunately – eight hours for the ballot papers. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-patriotic-act-erodes-freedoms-and-may-be-a-tool-for-repression-209984">Zimbabwe’s ‘Patriotic Act’ erodes freedoms and may be a tool for repression</a>
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<p>At other stations, night-time voting added to voters’ roll problems due to the hasty delimitation exercise that left <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/mnangagwas-son-turned-away-from-polling-station-as-logistical-troubles-and-fear-mar-zim-voting-20230823">many in the wrong constituency</a>. They were advised to find the correct one. </p>
<p>Where voting continued to 24 August, how many returned? </p>
<h2>The V11 forms</h2>
<p>Widespread concerns about the <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6544">V11 forms</a> came on top of worries about the thousands of people giving up on the lost ballot papers. These sheets are posted on the outside walls of the 12,000 polling stations. They show all the votes. They are meant to enable anyone to keep score at the first polling stage. Then the official counting moves on to ward, constituency, and provincial counting centres, and finally to the national “command centre” where the presidential vote is tallied and announced. Suspicion runs rampant about what happens at the links in this chain.</p>
<p>Election NGOs and other organisations were collecting and tabulating images of the V11 forms for digital release. Too late: Zanu-PF conducted on-the-night <a href="https://paradigmhq.org/press-release-the-netrights-coalition-condemns-raids-of-digital-technologies-of-civil-society-actors-in-zimbabwe-during-the-2023-elections/">raids</a> as they were at work. </p>
<p>As the Institute for Security Studies’ southern Africa programme head Piers Pigou noted in conversation with me, if the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was worried about the election’s legitimacy, the V11 forms would have been on its website immediately. But they are not there – or anywhere. </p>
<h2>Regional responses, CCC plans and democracy’s future</h2>
<p>As noted, the election observers’ reports do not paint a pretty picture of the election. The Citizens Coalition for Change hoped to exploit the split between the SADC observers and their <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/analysis/in-depth-zimbabwe-elections-analysts-on-why-sas-response-legitimises-an-authoritarian-regime-20230830">SADC masters</a>. But the SADC’s council of elders seems unable to help the CCC’s plans to arrange a rerun guided by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQQi1Xu_dts">an international committee</a>. South Africa’s enthusiasm for its neighbour gives little solace <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-09-05-ancs-fikile-mbalula-dismisses-talk-of-fresh-poll-in-zimbabwe/">to northern democrats</a>. Given Zimbabwe’s courts’ past biases on the legality of elections, the CCC did not bother taking <a href="https://zimfact.org/fact-check-has-chamisa-filed-an-election-court-challenge/">the judicial route</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/animal-farm-has-been-translated-into-shona-why-a-group-of-zimbabwean-writers-undertook-the-task-206966">Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task</a>
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<p>Mnangagwa’s inauguration has put all those plans to rest. No reruns. No new versions of government of “<a href="https://africanarguments.org/2013/07/review-the-hard-road-to-reform-the-politics-of-zimbabwes-global-political-agreement-reviewed-by-timothy-scarnecchia/">national unity</a>”, modelled after the disputed, violence-marred 2008 contest, or <a href="https://gga.org/please-sign-petition-for-a-transitional-government-in-zimbabwe/">transitional councils</a>. At most, the election observers’ reports portend further critique. The Zimbabwean democratic forces have to think again, and harder, about ways to a better future. </p>
<p>In sum, if Zimbabwe’s 2023 election foreshadows future battles between authoritarianism and liberal democracy, the former has gained the upper hand. Zanu-PF’S iron fist remains, with a velvet coating, albeit fraying. As a woman overheard discussing this election observed, the only hope may be Zanu-PF destroying itself as it almost did in 2017.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211755/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore watched Zimbabwe's 2023 election as a non-accredited observer.</span></em></p>
Zimbabwe’s 2023 elections look like their predecessors: stolen. But this one is a bit different. Opposition strategies and regional responses have changed too. What does this mean for the future?
David B. Moore, Research Associate, Dept of Anthropology & Development Studies and Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/211615
2023-08-22T13:19:50Z
2023-08-22T13:19:50Z
Zimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543288/original/file-20230817-27-gcauag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change, addresses supporters at a rally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/profile-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa">Nelson Chamisa</a>, the 45-year-old leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), is making a second bid to be Zimbabwe’s next president. </p>
<p>A lawyer and a pastor, Chamisa is the most formidable candidate against the ruling Zanu-PF led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The incumbent took over after the coup that ousted the country’s founding president Robert Mugabe in 2017. </p>
<p>Chamisa is over three decades younger than his (<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/03/profile-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-s-crocodile-president//">81-year-old</a>) opponent, and the youngest person running for president in this election. His youthfulness has been a major issue in this election, as it was in the last. </p>
<p>At least 62% of the population is <a href="https://zimbabwe.unfpa.org/en/topics/young-people-2">under 25</a>. They are <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-youth-speak-out-independence-day/2718352.html">“born-frees”</a> who feel the brunt of Zimbabwe’s failing economy. The actual unemployment rate is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42116932">unclear</a>; some claim it is as high as <a href="https://worldhelp.net/zimbabwe-unemployment-as-high-as-80-amid-pandemic/">80%</a>. The government claims it is <a href="https://www.zimstat.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2021_Fourth_Quarter_QLFS_Report_8032022.pdf#page=13">18%</a>. What is true is that many of Zimbabwe’s youth eke a living in the informal sector, estimated to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">90% of the economy</a>. </p>
<p>Many young graduates have settled for being street vendors or have taken the dangerous <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-precarious-road-zimbabweans-travel-to-seek-a-new-life-in-south-africa-58911">illegal track</a> across the crocodile infested Limpopo River to find work in neighbouring <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/zimbabwe-immigration/">South Africa</a>. Others with some financial means seek work overseas, even if it’s below their qualifications.</p>
<p>It is to this demographic that Chamisa is speaking directly. He promises the young a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/08/gift-mugano-unpacking-the-ccc-manifesto-launched-by-nelson-chamisa/">total revamp of the economy</a>. His messaging often includes glossy pictures of high-rise buildings and modernised highway networks that stand in contrast to many dilapidated roads and buildings in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As a political scientist who focuses on voting behaviour, migration and social media, I think Chamisa would have a more than fair chance to win in a truly free and fair election. He resonates with the country’s large disenchanted youth, mainly because of the poor state of the economy. However, campaigning in autocratic conditions is not ideal for the opposition. His and his party’s weakness are also serious hurdles.</p>
<h2>Youth appeal</h2>
<p>According to the independent African surveys network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, 67% of Zimbabweans are <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/zimbabwe_r8_diss1-zs-bh-11june21-v2_17june2021finalreleaseversion.pdf">unsatisfied with the direction the country is taking</a>. </p>
<p>In its recently released <a href="https://www.zimeye.net/2023/08/09/download-ccc-manifesto-a-new-great-zimbabwe-blueprint/">election manifesto</a>, the Citizens Coalition for Change promises to transform Zimbabwe into a US$100 billion economy over the next 10 years. The World Bank puts the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-heads-to-the-polls-amid-high-inflation-a-slumping-currency-and-a-cost-of-living-crisis-209841">battered economy</a> at just under <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/ZW">US$ 21 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare. His party’s manifesto promises universal healthcare and basic education. He also promises to open Zimbabwe to international trade and re-engagement, ending over 20 years of <a href="https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/africa/zimbabwe/opinion-zimbabwes-continued-isolation/">isolation</a>. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth and excluded from debt relief programmes due to ongoing human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe was once Africa’s breadbasket but can no longer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/15/we-could-have-lost-her-zimbabwes-children-go-hungry-as-crisis-deepens">feed</a> its small population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZW">just over 16 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Chamisa’s appeal to the youth vote has been received along partisan lines. For supporters of the ruling party, he is too young, too naïve, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/chamisa-incompetent-western-puppet-faking-political-bravery/">too western-leaning</a>, and lacks liberation credentials. For his support base of mostly young urbanites, Chamisa’s youth is his <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-07-zimbabwes-voters-favour-nelson-chamisa-over-president-mnangagwa-survey-shows/">trump card</a>. They have turned the age mockery from Zanu-PF into a campaign slogan, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxqs4l0RGaA">Ngapinde Hake Mukomana</a>” (let the young man enter the state house). </p>
<p>Chamisa is popular, as shown by huge attendance at his rallies. But will this be enough to help him win his first election as the founding leader of CCC? </p>
<h2>Voter apathy, funding and harassment</h2>
<p>Chamisa and his party face a number of hurdles. The first is getting the youth to vote. </p>
<p>Youth political participation in Zimbabwe has historically been very <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/2023-08-12-zimbabwes-2023-elections-who-votes-and-why/">low</a>. Although the election body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, is still to release a full voter’s roll, analysis by the Election Resource Center shows that <a href="https://twitter.com/ercafrica/status/1692100040196575545?s=20">while 85%</a> (6.6 million) of eligible voters are registered, only a third are under the age of 35. </p>
<p>In addition to voter apathy, Chamisa must contend with other hurdles within the opposition movement and the usual obstacles of running for office in electoral authoritarian state. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">founded</a> the CCC following his forced exit from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2021. The married father of three had been mentored by the opposition movement’s founder, the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/19/zimbabwes-opposition-leader-died-heres-what-you-need-to-know/">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. But Tsvangirai’s death <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066175">in 2018</a> ended Chamisa’s career in the party as divisions grew between him and the old guard. </p>
<p>The formation of the CCC helped him draw in a younger generation of politicians like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2022/7/7/the-zimbabwean-political-leader-fighting-for-her-countrys-future">Fadzayi Mahere</a>. But it also opened up Chamisa to new problems. The CCC has <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/politics-zimbabwe-elections-economy-human-rights-violations/">little money</a> against Zanu-PF’s elections war chest.</p>
<p>Chamisa lost access to state funds and opposition institutions when he left the MDC. His departure also left him with few friends at home or abroad. </p>
<p>He argues that what some see as disorganisation and isolation is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/theindependent/local-news/article/200013680/chamisa-its-time-for-clarity-not-ambiguity">strategic ambiguity</a>. He claims that his party keeps its cards closely guarded against infiltration and manipulation.</p>
<p>Chamisa has valid reasons to do so. The ruling party has successfully co-opted opposition leadership by offering patronage. The ruling party also uses courts to their advantage and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/45b09177-bfbe-41ea-9cbd-ea4c0218f447">violence against</a> opponents. </p>
<p>In 2007, in the months leading up to the election, Chamisa suffered a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17646957">fractured skull</a>. In 2021, his party reported threats to his life when his envoy was attacked using a <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-assailants-attack-nelson-chamisa-vehicle-leader-safe/6277026.html">homemade bomb</a>. Members of his party have been beaten up, and others have even lost <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200014816/ccc-member-stoned-to-death-in-harare-violence">their lives</a>. Job Sikhala, a senior member of the opposition, has been in jail for over a year on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">unclear charges</a>. </p>
<h2>One man show</h2>
<p>Chamisa’s vagueness on policy adds to his challenges. On the social platform X, where he has more than a <a href="https://twitter.com/nelsonchamisa?s=20">million followers</a>, he regularly only shares <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/chamisas-followers-says-they-are-tired-of-bible-verses/">Bible verses</a> or ambiguous messages. This is a lost opportunity for a candidate counting on the youth vote.</p>
<p>His party structures are unclear and it has yet to release its constitution. The only formal position in the party is his position of president. Everyone else is known only as a change agent. </p>
<p>Chamisa has not announced a running mate. This feeds into rumours that he has weak leadership skills and prefers to centre power on himself. One might even wonder if he does not trust his supporters.</p>
<p>Still, those supporting him say they do not need to know his structures. Zimbabweans are hungry for change after four decades of Zanu-PF rule. Many who hoped for change after Mugabe’s ouster are dismayed by the continuing economic challenges and increasing militarisation of the Zimbabwean politics. For these voters, Chamisa is the change they hope to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chipo Dendere receives funding from the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and Wellesley College to support research. </span></em></p>
Nelson Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare to support healthcare and basic education.
Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor, Africana Studies, Wellesley College
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/206966
2023-06-11T05:58:48Z
2023-06-11T05:58:48Z
Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530850/original/file-20230608-30-g3nm04.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Alan Hopps/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since independence in 1980, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Zimbabwe/Rhodesia-and-the-UDI">Zimbabwe</a> has in some ways become like <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Animal-Farm">Animal Farm</a>. Like the pigs in the classic 1945 novel by English writer <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/George-Orwell">George Orwell</a>, the country’s post-liberation leaders have hijacked a revolution that was once rooted in righteous outrage. In Zimbabwe, the revolution was against colonialism and its practices of extraction and exploitation. </p>
<p>The lead characters in Animal Farm have the propensity for evil and the greed for power found in despots throughout history, including former Zimbabwe president <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a>. Zimbabwe’s leaders have also acted for personal gain. They remain in power with no <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/04/zimbabwe-43-years-independence-commemoration-marred-by-rapidly-shrinking-civic-space/">accountability</a> to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-deepening-crisis-time-for-second-government-of-national-unity-122726">suffering</a> of the people they claim to represent. </p>
<p>Animal Farm’s relevance is echoed in celebrated young Zimbabwean author NoViolet Bulawayo’s recent novel <a href="https://theconversation.com/noviolet-bulawayos-new-novel-is-an-instant-zimbabwean-classic-185783">Glory</a>. Her satirical take on Zimbabwe’s 2017 coup and the fall of Mugabe is also narrated through animals. And visual artist <a href="https://zeitzmocaa.museum/artists/admire-kamudzengerere/">Admire Kamudzengerere</a> founded <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjpVCcDZARQ">Animal Farm Artist Residency</a> in Chitungwiza as a space for creative experimentation.</p>
<p>It’s within this context that a group of Zimbabwean writers, led by novelist and lawyer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/nov/13/petina-gappah-zimbabwe-writer-interview">Petina Gappah</a> and poet <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/wait-is-over-for-muchuri/">Tinashe Muchuri</a>, have translated Animal Farm into <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shona">Shona</a>, the country’s most widely spoken language. A dozen writers contributed to the translation of <a href="https://houseofbookszim.com/product/chimurenga-chemhuka/">Chimurenga Chemhuka</a> (Animal Revolution) over five years.</p>
<p>It’s clear to me, as a <a href="https://www.st-annes.ox.ac.uk/cpt_people/mushakavanhu-dr-tinashe/">scholar</a> of Zimbabwean literature, that too few great books are available in the country’s indigenous languages. This matters particularly because there are few bookshops and libraries where young people can access good writing. But Zimbabwe’s writers are taking matters into their own hands. </p>
<h2>The translation project</h2>
<p>Translating Animal Farm into Shona makes perfect sense. Historically, Shona novelists have used animal imagery to conjure up worlds of tradition and custom, and also to examine human foibles. Great Shona writers – such as <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Solomon-M-Mutswairo">Solomon Mutswairo</a>, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Patrick-Chakaipa">Patrick Chakaipa</a> and more recently <a href="https://munyori.org/2022/04/interview-with-ignatius-mabasa/">Ignatius Mabasa</a> – have written books that use allegory to respond to a range of crises in Zimbabwe. (Allegory is a literary device that uses hidden meaning to speak to political situations – such as using pigs instead of people in Animal Farm.) </p>
<p>Gappah kickstarted the <a href="https://pentransmissions.com/2015/10/22/on-translating-orwells-animal-farm/">translation project</a> in a private post on Facebook in 2015:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A group of friends and I thought it would be fun to bring the novel to new readers in all the languages spoken in Zimbabwe. This is important to us because Zimbabwe has been isolated so much in recent years, and translation is one way to bring other cultures and peoples closer to your own.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A book cover featuring an illustration of the imprint of a pig's hoof in blood." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=867&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1090&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1090&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530914/original/file-20230608-28-9rmwf5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1090&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The House of Books</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Eight years later, Chimurenga Chemhuka has come to life. It’s a big achievement, considering that publishing has not been performing well in a <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-economy-is-collapsing-why-mnangagwa-doesnt-have-the-answers-104960">dire Zimbabwean economy</a>. Gappah and her friends have ambitions to translate and publish Animal Farm in all indigenous languages taught in Zimbabwe’s schools. </p>
<h2>Chimurenga Chemhuka</h2>
<p>Though Chimurenga Chemhuka is mainly in standard Shona, its characters speak a medley of different Shona dialects – such as chiKaranga, chiZezuru, chiManyika – plus a smattering of contemporary slang. It’s a prismatic translation in one text. As leading UK translation theorist Matthew Reynolds <a href="https://books.openbookpublishers.com/10.11647/obp.0206/ch6.xhtml">explains</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>To translate is to remake, not only in a new language with its different nuances and ways of putting words together, but in a new culture where readers are likely to be attracted by different themes.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The use of dialects activates the book in a comical way that also leaves it open to different interpretations and connections. For example, Zimbabwe’s president <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-mnangagwa-usher-in-a-new-democracy-the-view-from-zimbabwe-88023">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>, who does not have the same rhetorical gifts as his predecessor, has always tried to distinguish himself with his use of chiKaranga, a dominant dialect of Shona. He adopts a popular wailing Pentecostal style that rises and falls, raising laughter and dust among the rented crowds who attend his rallies.</p>
<p>The title, Chimurenga Chemhuka, is poignant and a direct reference to Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/DC/renov82.10/renov82.10.pdf">liberation war</a>. Chemhuka (animal) Chimurenga (revolution) is not a literal translation of Animal Farm, but here the writers take liberties to connect the book to the country’s larger struggles for independence, commonly known as Chimurenga. </p>
<h2>Why this matters</h2>
<p>This translation project is a significant event in Shona literature. </p>
<p>It’s done by an eclectic group of writers who are passionate about language and literature. They use Orwell’s book and its satiric commentary as a way to creatively express themselves collectively. If this was a choir, the choristers Gappah and Muchuri do a good job of leading a harmonious ensemble.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/noviolet-bulawayos-new-novel-is-an-instant-zimbabwean-classic-185783">NoViolet Bulawayo’s new novel is an instant Zimbabwean classic</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>This is also the first of a series of Shona translations from <a href="https://houseofbookszim.com/">House of Books</a>, a new publishing house in Zimbabwe. The book is being promoted via social media platforms, where it is generating conversation about the need for more Zimbabwean translations of classic literature.</p>
<p>Translation was a major activity in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. It was a way for the newly emergent nation to reintegrate into the pan-African intellectual circuit. As Zimbabwe again reels from political and economic oppression, the translation of Animal Farm reveals to the country that what it’s going through is not new. It has happened before, and it will happen again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Novelist Petina Gappah’s call for translators on Facebook has resulted in the publication of Chimurenga Chemhuka.
Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Junior Research Fellow, University of Oxford
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/203943
2023-04-25T11:04:57Z
2023-04-25T11:04:57Z
South Africa is scrapping special work permits for Zimbabweans – migrants will be left exposed
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/522761/original/file-20230425-1317-8jcqi6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Immigrants, mostly Zimbabwaens, crowd the entrance of a government refugee centre in Johannesburg, in 2008. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Moore/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-migrants-who-move-between-zimbabwe-and-south-africa-access-healthcare-in-border-towns-189822">have flocked</a> to South Africa to escape economic hardship since the 1990s. The South African government has, <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/JLSD/article/view/10639">since 2010</a>, granted the migrants a special permit to live and work in the country. It’s latest iteration is the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit. Now the government says the permit has run its course and wants to scrap it. This <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/this-is-going-to-cause-chaos-in-sa-fears-expressed-over-zimbabwe-extension-permit-cancellation-20220626">has sparked fears</a> that the move will jeopardise the lives of the permit holders and their dependants. The Conversation Africa’s Thabo Leshilo spoke to Sikanyiso Masuku, an immigration and migration expert, about the issue.</em></p>
<hr>
<h2>What is the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit?</h2>
<p>The South African government recognised that it had a huge Zimbabwean migrant population so, in 2010, it granted an amnesty meant to legalise the status of those who had either illegitimately claimed asylum or fraudulently acquired other South African legal documents in order to stay in the country. </p>
<p>This <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23323256.2021.1878381#:%7E:text=In%202010%2C%20the%20South%20African,illegal%2C%20legitimate%20and%20illegitimate%20status">Dispensation for Zimbabwe Permit</a> was valid until 2014. It was succeeded by the <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/JLSD/article/view/10639">Zimbabwe Special Permit</a> that was, in turn, replaced by the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0021909618776413?casa_token=Dhzua3_5NakAAAAA:OrXpNTfVopE-52qUPn4vTfAA3sWp2cKGnWhBaSBPXZ305_0bzxjpX0zWoR5v03Gbc5jPAJmRZO4h32U">Zimbabwe Exemption Permit</a>, effective from September 2017 to December 2021.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Exemption Permit, like the one it replaced</p>
<ul>
<li><p>entitled the holders to the right to live and work in the country</p></li>
<li><p>did not grant them the right to permanent residence – irrespective of how long they had been in the country, and</p></li>
<li><p>would not be renewed or extended.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Holders could not change <a href="https://www.nwivisas.com/nwi-blog/south-africa/zsp-permit-news/">the conditions of the permit in South Africa</a>. Similar exemptions were previously granted to people from <a href="http://www.dha.gov.za/index.php/immigration-services/lesotho-exemption-permit-lep">Lesotho</a> and to <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/home-affairs-renew-angolan-special-permit-amid-looming-deadline/">Angolan refugees</a>.</p>
<h2>How many people have the permit?</h2>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-28/south-africa-defends-plan-to-send-178-000-zimbabweans-back-home#xj4y7vzkg">178,412</a> Zimbabwe Exemption Permit holders, drawn from three waves of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa since the 1990s. Some entered between 1994 and 1997, just after apartheid ended. There was an influx in 2000 as Zimbabweans <a href="https://unisapressjournalza/index.php/JLSD/article/view/10639">fled from an economic and political crisis</a>. This group of forced migrants was only recognised as asylum seekers <a href="https://unisapressjournals.co.za/index.php/JLSD/article/view/10639">in 2002</a>. Then, in 2008, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00083968.2015.1057856?casa_token=ZKNaMnCWVekAAAAA%3AKZNsD_zCAJ2_7Pr62oTrqQsypAVpPr3POmrzSp7PitXrvKbRaUG7RL-LThqGeDCaOcT1duO-nw">even more Zimbabweans arrived, fleeing a heightened economic crisis</a>.</p>
<p>South Africa’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/immigration-act">Immigration Act</a> permits employment under certain visas. These visas include the <a href="https://visa.vfsglobal.com/one-pager/dha/southafrica/english/index.html#general-work-visa">general work visa</a>, <a href="https://visa.vfsglobal.com/one-pager/dha/southafrica/english/index.html#critical-skills-visa">critical skills visa</a> and <a href="https://visa.vfsglobal.com/one-pager/dha/southafrica/english/index.html#permanent-residence-permit">permanent residence permits</a>. The Zimbabweans found that they did not qualify for any of these visas. Most, therefore, pursued the asylum seeker route to live and work in the country legally. </p>
<h2>Why is the matter in court and what are the contested issues?</h2>
<p>The South African government announced <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/cabinet-ends-special-zimbabwean-exemption-permit">on 25 November 2021</a> that the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit would be discontinued in December 2021. Permit holders would have to either return to Zimbabwe or apply for visas allowing them to work. This caused an outcry because of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flz_qyVg6cw">short notice period</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://hsf.org.za/">Helen Suzman Foundation</a>, a think-tank promoting human rights and constitutional democracy, is challenging the November 2021 announcement on behalf of some of the permit holders. Three other entities, the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2023/04/13/zim-immigration-federation-lawyers-on-zep-sa-heading-to-human-catastrophe">Zimbabwe Immigration Federation</a>, the <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/judgment-reserved-in-case-to-decide-future-zimbabweans-in-south-africa/">Zimbabwean Exemption Permit Holders Association</a> and the <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/zep-no-rights-were-taken-away-home-affairs-lawyers-tell-court/">Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa</a>, have mounted separate court challenges. </p>
<p>The Helen Suzman Foundation is partly arguing for the court to rule that the Minister of Home Affairs’ decision was unconstitutional. It is also arguing for a fair process in respect to the permit holder’s <a href="https://iono.fm/e/1195439">children’s rights to family unity, stability and schooling</a>.</p>
<p>The other parties are arguing that the decision to terminate the exemption permits <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/zimbabwean-exemption-permit-intro-minister-acted-outside-his-powers-court-told/">is detached from the economic and political realities in Zimbabwe</a> that necessitated the exemption in 2010.</p>
<p>As part of regularising the permit holders’ status, <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/aaron-motsoaledis-promised-regularisation-is-a-myth-for-zep-holders/">restrictions on their rights to apply for other visas have been lifted</a>. Hence, those who have acquired critical skills can now migrate to other mainstream visas. While this reprieve sounds noble, it only came into effect after the Department of Home Affairs <a href="https://www.nwivisas.com/nwi-blog/south-africa/critical-skills-work-permit-list-for-south-africa-2022-gazetted/">tightened the list of critical skills</a> covered in February 2022. This was just <a href="https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/cabinet-ends-special-zimbabwean-exemption-permit">three months after the termination of the Zimbabwean exemption permits</a>.</p>
<p>There were also concerns that, although Home Affairs was not expected to continue the permits in perpetuity, a <a href="https://iono.fm/e/1195439">consultative process taking into account the risks to the lives and livelihoods of the permit holders</a> – was never done. The <a href="https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-003.pdf">Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 12/7/2009</a> equally demands that the Home Affairs minister must first consult with affected individuals before making any decision.</p>
<p>The department has denied that it failed to consult, <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/aaron-motsoaledis-promised-regularisation-is-a-myth-for-zep-holders/">citing correspondence to this effect</a>.</p>
<p>It also insists that the decision announced on 25 November 2021 was government policy as it was arrived at with the support of the cabinet. It is thus government policy that a blanket exemption for Zimbabwean citizens should end. They would now have to comply with the provisions of the Immigration Act.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the minister argues that the decision on permits did not take away rights, but rather conferred them. The permit holders can now apply for a general worker’s visa, to be granted at the discretion of the department’s director general. </p>
<p>Through a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZhU-wK07E4">waiver system</a>, low skilled exemption permit holders have also been allowed by the department to apply for general work visas <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMMLUjGwVbQ&t=171s">without first obtaining a certificate from the Department of Labour</a>. However, <a href="https://www.groundup.org.za/article/aaron-motsoaledis-promised-regularisation-is-a-myth-for-zep-holders/">a pre-existing backlog of nearly 63,000 visa applications</a> has sparked fears that Home Affairs might lack the capacity to process new waiver applications in time. Zimbabwe Exemption Permit holders’ response to the waiver application system has also been poor, with only <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZhU-wK07E4">4,000 applications</a> received by Home Affairs by September 2022.</p>
<h2>What, in your view, is the correct position?</h2>
<p>The conditions of the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit have always been clear that the holders are not entitled to permanent residence, irrespective of the period of stay in the country. </p>
<p>More than anything, this debate has exposed the challenges arising from the formulation of temporary policies that operate outside the confines of the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/immigration-act">Immigration Act</a>. Clearly, the permit was designed as a contingency plan in response to the reality of mass migration. However, it was never envisioned that, more than 13 years after the conditions necessitating this extraordinary exemption, Zimbabweans would still be desperate to remain in South Africa.</p>
<p>The discontinuation of the permits was inevitable. Most of the litigants in the case against Home Affairs aren’t debating the permits’ cancellation as such. Instead they are focusing more on issues of constitutional validity or procedure, rationality, and fairness of government action. This shows that even they accept its impermanence.</p>
<h2>How should the issue be resolved?</h2>
<p>Although cabinet said on 24 November 2021 that the holders of the exemption permit have to apply for mainstream visas – most of them <a href="https://iono.fm/e/1195439">do not qualify for other visas allowing them to work</a>.</p>
<p>Unless another version of the exemption permit is created (as has been done thrice already), the people concerned will most likely remain ineligible to claim alternative forms of protection under the <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/immigration-act">the Immigration Act</a>. For instance, although the permit was set to expire at the end of 2021, an 18 month grace period was granted. This has not yielded much as <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2022-12-13-few-zimbabweans-in-the-queue-for-new-visas/">97% of the 178,412 permit holders</a> have still not applied for alternative visas.</p>
<p>A viable solution appears to be a measured discontinuation of the exemption permit. This should include assessing and addressing the resultant social and economic effects of the move. That way, the permit holders might finally be able to pursue more durable and alternative solutions and get some closure.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/203943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sikanyiso Masuku receives funding from The Institute for Democracy Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa. He is affiliated with the University of Cape Town. </span></em></p>
The Zimbabwe Exemption Permit gave holders the right to live and work in the country but did not grant them the right to permanent residence.
Sikanyiso Masuku, Research Fellow at The Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs (TM-School), University of South Africa
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/202858
2023-04-20T15:06:01Z
2023-04-20T15:06:01Z
Zimbabwe’s ruling party vilifies the opposition as American puppets. But the party itself had strong ties to the US
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521045/original/file-20230414-16-97marz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa addressing a rally in Bulawayo recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), which has governed Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, is well known for denouncing the United States’ role as a superpower that polices the world. </p>
<p>In a 2007 address at the United Nations, then Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-zimbabwe-mugabe/mugabe-slams-bush-hypocrisy-on-human-rights-idUSN2627903020070926">assailed</a> his American counterpart, George W. Bush. Mugabe charged:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>his hands drip with innocent blood of many nationalities. He kills in Iraq. He kills in Afghanistan. And this is supposed to be our master on human rights? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Confrontation with the US, a recurrent feature of Zimbabwe’s political history since <a href="https://roape.net/2020/01/17/one-who-preferred-death-to-imperialism/">the 1960s</a>, surged after Washington adopted a bipartisan <a href="https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/11/2019/post-mugabe-zimbabwe-retreats-western-outreach-embraces-africa">sanctions package</a> in 2001. The European Union also imposed sanctions. </p>
<p>US officials have <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1158">repeatedly stated</a> that the sanctions target specific individuals or entities that have abused human rights or undermined democracy. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200924-zimbabwe-leader-tells-un-that-sanctions-hurt-development">Zanu-PF has responded</a> by pointing to UN reporting which notes that the sanctions have weakened the country’s economy and impeded national development.</p>
<p>I am a historian of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. My <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Pan-Africanism-Versus-Partnership-Decolonisation-Rhodesian-ebook/dp/B0BSKNHMYH/ref=sr_1_2?qid=1681393772&refinements=p_n_publication_date%3A1250228011&s=books&sr=1-2">forthcoming book</a> focuses on its formative stages in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This was when Mugabe first became active in politics and the US got more involved in the politics of what was then Rhodesia, a British colony. In my view, the 21st century hostility obscures a nuanced historical relationship between the US and Zanu-PF.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/winky-d-is-being-targeted-by-police-in-zimbabwe-why-the-music-stars-voice-is-so-important-202246">Winky D is being targeted by police in Zimbabwe – why the music star's voice is so important</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>At first, the fledgling liberation movement valued American support. Zanu-PF <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=18593742X">broke away</a> from the Soviet-aligned Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in August 1963. Zanu-PF was originally known as Zanu, but adopted the “PF” suffix <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zanu-pf-wins-first-free-elections-zimbabwe">ahead of elections in 1980</a>.</p>
<p>This context is relevant now because Zanu-PF efforts to consolidate both domestic and pan-African support selectively overlook more compatible aspects of its historical relations with the US.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s anti-American bluster</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF has exploited sanctions to its advantage.</p>
<p>Emmerson Mnangagwa, previously Mugabe’s deputy, <a href="https://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/sadc-mobilizes-anti-sanctions-day-25-october/">came to power</a> in a factional coup in late 2017. He has successfully mobilised pan-African support against sanctions.</p>
<p>Since 2019, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union have observed 25 October as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/26/zimbabwe-regime-sanctions-zanupf">“Anti-Sanctions Day”</a> in solidarity with the Zanu-PF leadership.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/25/thousands-in-zimbabwe-denounce-evil-western-sanctions">anti-American rhetoric</a> is not only deployed to win friends abroad. It is also a prominent campaign tactic at home. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/president-mnangagwa-claimed-zimbabwe-was-open-for-business-whats-gone-wrong-154085">President Mnangagwa claimed Zimbabwe was open for business. What's gone wrong</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>With general elections expected <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar2023.php">in July</a> or August, Zanu-PF is following the strategy again. It’s discrediting its leading opponent, Nelson Chamisa of the Citizens Coalition for Change, as a <a href="https://twitter.com/TafadzwaMugwadi/status/1631150059122221056">“US pawn”</a>. </p>
<p>His predecessor, Morgan Tsvangirai, faced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election/mugabe-belittles-opponents-as-frog-and-puppet-idUSL2321227420080223">similar treatment</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man points ahead with his right index finger in front of banners bearing the acronym 'CCC'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zimbabwe’s partisan state media routinely employ such terms as <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/us-president-exposes-puppets-in-zim/">“puppets”, “pawns” and “lackeys”</a> to describe Chamisa and his party. These jibes are intended to convince Zimbabwean voters that Chamisa would prioritise foreign interests.</p>
<p>The rhetoric conceals ZANU-PF’s own American ties.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s American connections</h2>
<p>Historically, relations between the US and Zanu-PF have fluctuated. Mugabe formed a <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/a-walk-down-memory-lane-with-andrew-young/">close bond</a> with Andrew Young, the US ambassador to the UN during <a href="https://theconversation.com/jimmy-carters-african-legacy-peacemaker-negotiator-and-defender-of-rights-200744">Jimmy Carter’s presidency</a>. Carter’s government was the <a href="https://diplomacy.state.gov/encyclopedia/u-s-embassy-harare-zimbabwe/">first to open an embassy</a> in independent Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Solid relations continued during the early years of the Reagan administration. Harare was one of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/12/20/us-slashes-aid-to-zimbabwe-by-almost-half/e67886cf-9f52-4fde-beee-83ba1b40c3e0/">top three African recipients</a> of US aid in the early 1980s. </p>
<p>US vice-president <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/11/18/Vice-President-George-Bush-arrived-today-for-talks-with/7630406443600/">George H.W. Bush travelled to Harare</a> in 1982. In 1997, first lady Hillary Clinton made a <a href="https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1997/03/1997-03-11-first-lady-travels-in-africa-later-this-month.html">goodwill visit</a> to Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Ties were even deeper in the early 1960s when the US government encouraged the party’s very establishment. Historian <a href="https://www.kent.edu/history/profile/timothy-scarnecchia">Timothy Scarnecchia</a>, who has mined records in the US national archives, has <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781580463638/the-urban-roots-of-democracy-and-political-violence-in-zimbabwe/">documented the ties</a> that Zanu forged with American officials 60 years ago. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/repression-and-dialogue-in-zimbabwe-twin-strategies-that-arent-working-122139">Repression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren't working</a>
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<p>The organisation’s core leadership in temporary exile in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (then Tanganyika), regularly consulted with US embassy officials in that country. Its leading representatives, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137543462_5">including Mugabe</a>, lobbied the US government for funding. (There is no evidence that the new party received any directly.) </p>
<p>Zanu’s first president, <a href="https://www.sithole.org/biography.php">Ndabaningi Sithole</a>, received theological education in the US in the late 1950s. Archival records show that on the eve of Zanu’s formation he met with State Department officials in Washington DC who connected him to private American funders. In another archived account of a meeting with the US ambassador in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in July 1963, Leopold Takawira, subsequently Zanu’s first vice-president, relayed that Sithole regarded the US as his second home.</p>
<p>Herbert Chitepo, who became Zanu’s national chair, visited the US in July 1963 and also met with American diplomats. According to a record of their conversation in the US national archives, Chitepo expressed his desire to accept US funding and defied</p>
<blockquote>
<p>anyone to call him an American stooge.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The 11 July 1963 issue of Zimbabwe Today, a periodical produced by Zapu in Tanzania, declared that following Sithole’s return from the US,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the American dollar and its ugly imperialist head is clearly visible in the actions of Mr. Sithole. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on Chamisa and his party’s supposed American connections is a repackaging of the very attacks Mnangagwa’s party faced from Zapu when it was formed 60 years ago. </p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>Although it has not been well documented, the US provided critical support during Zanu’s founding in 1963. It also helped the party consolidate its authority following independence in 1980. Since the US government imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2001, these ties have been overshadowed. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">Can Zimbabwe finally ditch a history of violence and media repression?</a>
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</em>
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<p>As elections approach in Zimbabwe, the role of the US looms large. Zanu-PF overlooks historical aspects of its own relations with the US as it seeks to undermine its domestic opposition and appeal to continental allies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Zanu-PF’s anti-American rhetoric is not only deployed to win friends abroad. As elections approach, it is also a prominent campaign tactic at home.
Brooks Marmon, Post-doctoral Scholar, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/195943
2022-12-16T11:09:47Z
2022-12-16T11:09:47Z
Land is a heated issue in South Africa – the print media are presenting only one side of the story
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/500352/original/file-20221212-96198-ffnxf6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africa’s vast commercial press is dominated by four conglomerates.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Moeletsi Mabe/Sunday Times/Gallo Images/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The land question was at the heart of the South African national liberation struggle. The 1913 Natives Land Act restricted black people from owning and occupying parts of the country, leading to whites owning about <a href="https://www.gov.za/1913-natives-land-act-centenary">87% of the land</a>. This reduced the African majority to “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/sol-plaatjes-native-life-in-south-africa/editions-of-native-life-in-south-africa-1916-to-the-present/EC1B8069762D083ECF7D134B97017E42">pariahs in the land of their birth</a>”, in the 1916 words of Sol Plaatje, the founding secretary general of the African National Congress, now South Africa’s governing party.</p>
<p>To reverse this injustice, in 2018 the national assembly acceded to demands from various pressure groups and began the process to <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/project-event-details/285">amend section 25 of the constitution</a>, which deals with restitution and redress of the dispossessed. Some had argued that the section hindered land expropriation. Parliament <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/project-event-details/285">conducted public hearings</a> across the country to get public input on the proposed amendments. </p>
<p>This process received extensive media coverage. But, the voices of ordinary people at the public hearings were severely underrepresented in the media. This amounted to denying them narratives resources to tell their own stories. In the process, the dispossessed and marginalised were forced to look at themselves through the prism of others.</p>
<p>As the land reform debate rages, there are signs that the commercial press marginalises anti-western alternative voices opposed to the current dominant political, social and economic outlook underpinned by capitalism. This is discernible in views such as that the debate causes <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/land-bank-issues-stark-warning-on-land-grabs-16664550">“uncertainty” and investment jitters</a>, primarily driven by business and government sources, are prevalent. </p>
<h2>Commercial press in South Africa</h2>
<p>South Africa’s press is vast and dominated by four conglomerates – Media24, Arena Holdings, Sekunjalo (Independent Media) and Caxton. While recent figures paint a bleak picture with plummeting circulation, the press still commands a sizeable readership. Circulation is estimated at 445,485 physical copies for dailies, 172,348 for weeklies and <a href="https://abc.org.za/">550,416 for weekenders</a>.</p>
<p>Though there have been changes in media ownership patterns since the end of apartheid, we argue in our latest <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23743670.2022.2033289">journal article</a> that the ethos of this press remains rooted in apartheid-like economic and ideological beliefs. Hence the voices opposed to the dominant ideas are marginalised. By elevating the views of economic elites over the dispossessed majority, the media perpetuate the past injustices. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/media-literacy-education-in-south-africa-can-help-combat-fake-news-heres-whats-needed-185338">Media literacy education in South Africa can help combat fake news - here's what's needed</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<p>Commercial factors such as ownership and funding result in unfair treatment of anti-west and anti-capitalist discourses. The media don’t treat the concerns of the dispossessed as legitimate. </p>
<p>But how exactly do the print media represent the land debate? To answer this question, we analysed articles on “land expropriation” in the commercial press between January and December 2018. The newspapers we analysed include <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/">Business Day</a>, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus">Argus</a>, <a href="https://www.citizen.co.za/">The Citizen</a>, <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes">Cape Times</a>, <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/">Financial Mail</a>, <a href="https://www.heraldlive.co.za/">The Herald</a> and <a href="https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/">Sowetan</a>. What emerged was overwhelmingly negative coverage of the discourse, dominated by what we regard as elite sources. Instead of being impartial, the commercial press failed to play a democratic role. This erodes public trust in the media. </p>
<h2>Framing land expropriation</h2>
<p>This negative coverage is driven by five themes: land grabs, private property rights, food insecurity, negative consequences to the economy and investor confidence. </p>
<p>These themes betray the media’s slant towards ideas of the dominant class. Through a close analysis, it becomes apparent that the way the press represents the land debate is linked to its historical place in capitalist economy.</p>
<p>For example, through interviewing and quoting elitist sources from academia and business, the media employed the “land grab” frame to sound the alarm in numerous sensational headlines that the debate scares away investors and is damaging to the country. It’s suggested that the country would head down the same path of “ruin” as Zimbabwe if it pressed ahead with <a href="https://www.pressreader.com/south-africa/daily-news-south-africa/20180816/281522226928541">land expropriation</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/public-trust-in-the-media-is-at-a-new-low-a-radical-rethink-of-journalism-is-needed-155257">Public trust in the media is at a new low: a radical rethink of journalism is needed</a>
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<p>The “private property rights” frame was equally employed. The media leaned heavily on the European classical liberalism that perceives private property protection as the government’s primary purpose. Attempts to redress colonial injustices were portrayed as having dire economic consequences. The “private property” narrative remained unchallenged. </p>
<h2>Description bias and narrow neoliberal framing</h2>
<p>The framing of the land debate is guilty of “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/sf/article-abstract/79/4/1397/2234084">description bias</a>”. This is when the media avoid unpacking underlying causes of important issues. The media fail to critically engage the land question and the broader redistributive justice debate in the country. Their claim to be neutral obscures a neoliberal bias.</p>
<p>Many stories analysed were written in a manner that did not support land expropriation. A narrow neoliberal frame was employed rather than one that recognised the dispossessed. </p>
<p>When parliament organised public hearings on the land debate <a href="https://www.parliament.gov.za/project-event-details/285">in 2018</a> to give ordinary people a chance to air their views, their voices were severely underrepresented in the media. The dispossessed were compelled to look at themselves through the prism of others. The privileged spoke on behalf of the marginalised, reinforcing unequal power relations in society.</p>
<h2>Capitalism and media ownership</h2>
<p>Even though South Africa’s media ownership has gradually shifted to black-owned companies following democracy <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2019-01-04-00-who-runs-sas-media-is-a-black-and-white-issu">in 1994</a>, the financial muscle to control and define the overall goals and scope lies in the hands of powerful corporations with ties to global capital.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africa-ranks-in-the-press-freedom-stakes-116009">How South Africa ranks in the press freedom stakes</a>
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</p>
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<p>The skewed reportage in the land debate can also be explained by the ownership and funding of the media. The causal relationship between ownership and media content is not always discernible. But numerous media scholars have found a strong <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23743670.2022.2096090">correlation between ownership and media texts</a>. </p>
<p>The framing of the land debate contributes to entrenching the injustices of colonialism and apartheid.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195943/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mandla J. Radebe is affiliated with the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Chiumbu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Skewed reportage on the land debate contributes to entrenching the injustices of colonialism and apartheid.
Mandla J. Radebe, Associate Professor and Director, University of Johannesburg
Sarah Chiumbu, Associate Professor, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/183851
2022-06-01T15:04:27Z
2022-06-01T15:04:27Z
Zimbabwe’s 2023 elections: how to judge candidates’ social protection promises
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/465668/original/file-20220527-17-v9r9jp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Traders examine bales of tobacco, which is among Zimbabwe's key exports, at a March 2022 auction in Harare.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is heading for general polls <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar-comprehensive.php">in 2023</a> amid an ongoing macroeconomic crisis. In the decade starting from 2001, the state-led economy started to show <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-inflation-idUSL1992587420070919">signs of strain</a>. Unemployment <a href="https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp197654.pdf?iframe">reached 85%</a>. Inflation, which was a staggering <a href="https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/Hanke_zimbabwe_091708.pdf">79,000,000%</a> in 2008, came down but has been rising in the <a href="https://take-profit.org/en/statistics/inflation-rate/zimbabwe/">past two years</a>. It is still <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/inflation-cpi">among the highest in the world</a>.</p>
<p>The economic crisis has heightened the vulnerability of households and the need for social protection to prevent hunger among poor households, complement the risk mitigation mechanisms of informal workers, and improve access to social services such as education, health and water.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">How informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe shape notions of citizenship</a>
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<p>It is highly unlikely that the formal economy will turn the tide soon to create formal employment, which is vital for the stability of household income, and reduce the need to support food insecure households. </p>
<p>In the last presidential election in 2018, several presidential candidates promised to provide social protection for citizens.</p>
<p>The ruling party, <a href="https://webcms.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/495/country_documents-2020/Zimbabwe/ZANU_PF_2018_MANIFESTO_ENGLISH_%20(39.51).pdf">Zanu-PF promised</a> to create safety nets and enhance access to health and education services. Safety nets are also called <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29115">social assistance</a> and typically include cash and food transfers, public works, subsidies and fee waivers for education and health.</p>
<p>The Zanu-PF government’s safety net package includes cash transfers to <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">52,049 households</a>, public monthly maintenance allowances in form of food and or cash to <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">6,688 households</a> and paltry tuition grants and examination fee subsidies <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/outcry-over-paltry-beam-allocations/">for underprivileged students</a>. </p>
<p>The main opposition party, MDC-Alliance (now <a href="https://www.facebook.com/CitizensCoalition4Change">Citizens Coalition for Change</a>), promised to bolster social protection and <a href="https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MDC-ALLIANCE-SMART-MANIFESTO.pdf">reform the National Social Security Authority</a>. The terms <a href="https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_604882/lang--en/index.html">“social protection” and “social security”</a> are used interchangeably, and typically include social assistance and social insurance measures.</p>
<p>Little-known opposition parties also made promises. For instance, the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/People%E2%80%99s_Rainbow_Coalition">People’s Rainbow Coalition</a> promised to <a href="https://www.slideshare.net/povonews/peoples-rainbow-coalition-2018-election-manifesto-idea">provide social security</a>, and the <a href="https://www.facebook.com/APAZimbabwe">Alliance for the People’s Agenda</a> undertook to <a href="https://t792ae.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/APA-Manifesto-2018.pdf">deliver social packages</a> such as support for education and health care.</p>
<p>As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, due to be held on <a href="http://www.news.cn/english/africa/2021-11/11/c_1310303313.html">23 April 2023</a>, new or recycled promises will be made to voters. </p>
<p>Voters must judge candidates by the soundness of their promises to improve the reach of cash and food transfers to poor households, extend social insurance coverage to informal workers, and facilitate access to education, health and water for all citizens.</p>
<h2>What’s in place</h2>
<p>I have <a href="https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/state-social-assistance-africa-report">researched</a> <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/world/social-protection-operational-tool-humanitarian-development-and-peace-nexus-linkages">social protection</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2516602620936028">in Zimbabwe and beyond</a> for the past decade. There are a few key social protection measures to consider. Among them are social insurance, such as pension, sickness, maternity and unemployment benefits. These depend on contributions from formal economy workers and their employers. </p>
<p>The coverage of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfers programme is <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">limited to 52,049 households</a>. So, it covers only 6% of the food insecure households. But over four million Zimbabweans, out of a population of <a href="https://populationstat.com/zimbabwe/">15 million</a>, <a href="https://www.unicef.org/zimbabwe/press-releases/zimbabwe-rated-one-worlds-top-global-food-crises-new-united-nations-report">are food insecure</a>.</p>
<p>The flagship social assistance programme gives households between US$20-50 bimonthly, depending on household size.</p>
<p>Since inception in 2011, the programme has covered <a href="https://socialprotection.org/discover/programmes/harmonised-social-cash-transfer-hsct">less than 20 districts</a>. There are 59 districts in Zimbabwe and all have food insecure households. </p>
<p>Then there’s <a href="https://www.nssa.org.zw/news-blogs/talking-social-security/schemes-for-social-protection/">social insurance</a> which covers pensions and worker compensation. But this doesn’t cover the risks faced by most workers as it only applies to formal employment. Only 15% of Zimbabweans are employed in the formal economy while 85% work in the <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-09-16-outlook-for-informal-economy-in-zimbabwe-is-dire-after-harsh-covid-19-response/">informal economy</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/insights-from-zimbabwe-on-how-to-link-formal-and-informal-economies-182353">Insights from Zimbabwe on how to link formal and informal economies</a>
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<p>Many informal workers create their own risk mitigation mechanisms such as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0020872815611196">burial societies</a> or subscribe to funeral insurance policies to cover funeral expenses, which can be as high as their <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11150-020-09498-8">yearly income</a>. </p>
<p>Another cost that could be covered by social protection is school fees. According to the Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-vulnerability-assessment-committee-zimvac-2020-rural-livelihoods-assessment">2020 report</a>, 50.3% of children of school-going age were sent away from school in the first term of 2020 because they could not pay fees. </p>
<p>The report also notes that 75% of all rural residents who are chronically ill miss their medication because they cannot afford it. </p>
<p>In the short-term, social protection must focus on fee waivers to improve access to education and health care services for all citizens. In the medium term, all these critical social services must be brought within acceptable travelling distances.</p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>A number of countries in Southern African Development Community region have national social cash transfers for all vulnerable people of a certain demographic group. For instance, in Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa, older people receive an <a href="https://social-assistance.africa.undp.org/data">old age grant</a>.</p>
<p>Some governments in Africa complement the risk mitigation mechanisms of informal workers. For instance, the Rwandan government adds a matching contribution plus life and funeral insurance policies on the contributions that informal workers make <a href="https://ejoheza.gov.rw/ltss-registration-ui/landing.xhtml;jsessionid=BFC430CED41625AEB78C47507D381B8C">towards their pension</a>.</p>
<p>In Ghana, the government contributes 5% to the new national pension scheme, which <a href="https://www.ssnit.org.gh/faq/the-new-pension-scheme/#:%7E:text=The%20new%20National%20Pension%20Scheme,benefits%20as%20and%20when%20due.&text=The%20New%20Pension%20Scheme%20was,implementation%20started%20in%20January%202010">includes informal workers</a>.</p>
<p>Free access to education has had positive impact on enrolment in <a href="https://world-education-blog.org/2016/01/27/can-africa-afford-free-education/#:%7E:text=Among%20the%2053%20countries%20with,of%20Tanzania%20and%20Uganda%20show">Kenya, Malawi and Uganda</a>. There are fee waivers for health care in countries such as <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29115">Eswatini and Burundi</a>.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>It’s important to address two issues when it comes to social protection in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>The first is the lingering view that social protection creates a dependency syndrome – not only in Zimbabwe, but Africa-wide. This <a href="https://academic.oup.com/wbro/article/33/2/259/5127165">myth has been busted</a> by scientific evidence showing that cash transfers do not lead to fewer people seeking jobs.</p>
<p>The second is whether the state can afford to finance the extension of social protection to all food insecure households. </p>
<p>In a constrained macroeconomic environment such as Zimbabwe’s, funding social protection among other competing needs is about budget priorities more than it is an issue of sourcing new revenue.</p>
<p>Where there is high unemployment and food insecurity, it is socially and legally justified for the poor to depend on social assistance as it is their right, for which the government must be held accountable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183851/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gift Dafuleya does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, there are key things voters should watch out for in the social protection promises made by candidates.
Gift Dafuleya, Lecturer in Economics, University of Venda
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/180455
2022-05-01T08:42:45Z
2022-05-01T08:42:45Z
How informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe shape notions of citizenship
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/458856/original/file-20220420-20-u819n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Vincent Nhidza, right, and colleague Mathew Simango, arrange coffins at a street workshop in Harare, Zimbabwe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the late 1990s, as companies in Zimbabwe have shut down and laid off workers due to the country’s <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282076567_The_Crisis_in_Zimbabwe_1998-2008_Brian_Raftopoulos">economic crisis</a>, people have resorted to the informal sector to earn a living. It is estimated that <a href="https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-lockdown-on-zimbabwes-informal-economy/">90%</a> of Zimbabweans now have informal sector livelihoods.</p>
<p>Gradually, informal sector organisations emerged in response to fundamental changes in the economy, politics, and social life from the 2000s. They allowed people to network, get training in business, finance and collective bargaining, and campaign for their socio-economic rights.</p>
<p>Traditionally, trade unions and NGOs were a major focus of study for the country’s political scientists. By the mid-2010s, though, informal sector organisations had become prominent civil society actors. They had become closer to people than other organisations. </p>
<p>But how exactly did they contribute to the political sphere? This question is important for two reasons. Firstly, the informal sector in Zimbabwe is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2013.858541">highly politicised</a>, and any organisation in the informal sector has a potential for some political outcome. Secondly, the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/making-an-impact-from-the-margins-civil-society-groups-in-zimbabwes-interim-powersharing-process/24EDBBF6B3B50994D0399FB5DE5E4F08">civil society</a> in Zimbabwe has also played an important role in politics, and it is useful to understand the political role of newly emerged actors.</p>
<p>My 2016 <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2022.2023295">study</a> focused on three informal sector organisations that were prominent in the mid-2010s. The <a href="https://www.zciea.org.zw/">Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations</a> grew out of the once politically potent <a href="http://www.zctu.co.zw/">Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The <a href="https://zimvendors.wordpress.com/">National Vendors Unions of Zimbabwe</a> was especially politically active at that time. The Zimbabwe Informal Sector Organisation focused on business development. It was led by a former opposition youth leader, <a href="https://www.news24.com/News24/whos-who-in-zimbabwes-anti-government-struggle-20160830">Promise Mkwananzi</a>.</p>
<p>For my qualitative study, I interviewed their leaders and regular members as well as civic activists, politicians and city councillors. I expanded my original pool of over 80 respondents during <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d46cddbd-00e2-44a8-ad65-3c87f887d5ed">further research</a> on citizenship in urban Zimbabwe in 2017-2018. </p>
<p>I asked them about informal sector organisations and the role they played in their members’ lives. I inquired about how they affected people’s views and relations with the authorities and political parties. I also asked about their place in Zimbabwe’s civic and political arenas.</p>
<h2>Shaping perceptions, driving self-reliance</h2>
<p>Because of these bodies’ organisational characteristics and relations with civic actors, I expected to find direct linkages with party politics and so-called hashtag movements, such as <a href="https://theconversation.com/this-time-the-uprising-in-zimbabwe-is-different-but-will-it-bring-regime-change-62447">#Tajamuka and #ThisFlag</a>. These were booming in 2016 in response to the economic and financial crisis, corruption and political oppression.</p>
<p>Contrary to my expectations, I discovered more unique, subtle, and nuanced influences of the informal sector organisations on people’s perceptions of themselves as political actors in relation to parties, social movements, the government, and local authorities. They also influenced how individuals and groups viewed the political community, informal sector, and their place in these structures.</p>
<p>I learned that these organisations had a significant impact on stimulating their members to become self-reliant citizens. In contrast, the government’s approach to the informal sector, especially to street vendors and cross-border traders, was ambiguous and frequently <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/06/vendors-army-backs-off/">confrontational</a>. </p>
<p>The local authorities’ attitudes were often hostile to street vendors and people engaged in “backyard industries”. For example, they <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/07/live-updatesvendors-evicted-from-harare-cbd/">evicted</a> vendors from undesignated vending sites in the city centre many times.</p>
<p>The organisations did not abandon regular governmental politics. They wrote petitions and engaged in protests and demonstrations. But, to a large extent, they shifted to survival, or non-governmental politics. This is citizen-driven political action that is small in scope, with a primary goal of self-help to survive.</p>
<p>National Vendors Unions of Zimbabwe members, for example, united to confront political patronage at a market in the Harare city centre when a pro-ruling party organisation seized vending spaces. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations established a revolving fund to help members save money to use to develop their businesses.</p>
<p>While these actions were quite limited, they helped develop a sense of community. They also provided tools for ensuring safety and support as most people did not rely on help from the authorities. This self-reliance became the norm.</p>
<p>I was surprised to discover that these three informal sector organisations, besides stimulating their members to become self-reliant, also shaped very distinct notions, and consequently practices of citizenship, among them. This was through training and collective action.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Association’s notion of citizenship was collectivist. Its members often referred to it as “family”. This was due to the chamber’s former close connection to the trade unions that gave it a start. Its members expected trade union-like protection from it. </p>
<p>The National Vendors Unions of Zimbabwe, the most politically active of the three, cultivated the classic rights-based definition of citizenship. Its members had a profound awareness of their socio-economic and human rights. Their agenda was quite broad.</p>
<p>They campaigned for issues that affected street vendors <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit-m-vendors-stage-protest-at-town-house-newsday-zimbabwe/">directly</a>, such as harassment and confiscation of their wares. They also took on broader political issues. An example was the <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/06/protests-mphoko-hotel-stay/">inappropriate spending of taxpayers’ money</a> by Vice-President Phelekezela Mphoko in June 2016. They also opposed the <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2016/09/06/vendors-surprise-police-defy-ban-protests/">ban on protests</a> in September 2016.</p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Informal Sector Organisation, the youngest of the three organisations, focused on business training and financial literacy. It shaped a notion of citizenship based on respectability. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe has had very particular notions of urban <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=epkrt-Y-qOkC">modernity and respectability</a> since the colonial and early post-colonial periods. These are related to formal employment, a clear and direct link between education and employment, urban planning, and lifestyle. Many <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319393229_Harare_From_a_European_settler-colonial_'sunshine_city'_to_a_'zhing-zhong'_African_city">aspects of this modernity were lost</a> due to the economic crisis that led to informalisation. </p>
<p>In my interviews, the organisation’s members proudly referred to themselves as businessmen and businesswomen and entrepreneurs. They were rethinking these notions of modernity in line with the radically changed economic conditions.</p>
<h2>What’s next?</h2>
<p>The informal sector in Zimbabwe has been very dynamic, fluid, and affected by broader economic and political developments. </p>
<p>Being novel actors, these and other informal sector organisations try to find the space for themselves to engage with people, other civil society actors, and influence politics. This while combating marginalisation of the informal sector by the authorities. </p>
<p>The development of informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe has no fixed trajectory yet. What is without doubt and unique about their diversity is that they have the potential to influence politics at a personal and societal level – by shaping particular notions of what it means to earn a living in the informal sector.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/180455/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kristina Pikovskaia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Informal sector organisations in Zimbabwe have the potential to influence politics at a personal and societal level.
Kristina Pikovskaia, Tutor, International Development, University of Oxford
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/177927
2022-04-04T14:04:45Z
2022-04-04T14:04:45Z
A street art mural in Zimbabwe exposes a divided society
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451563/original/file-20220311-26-1f2kx8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">King Lobengula holds Mbuya Nehanda in the mural.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Screenshot/Leeroy Spinx Brittain aka Bow</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shona">Shona</a> and the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ndebele-Zimbabwean-people">Ndebele</a> are Zimbabwe’s two most dominant ethnic groups. Explaining the ever-present tension between them, historian Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/nation-building-in-zimbabwe-and-the-challenges-of-ndebele-particularism/">points to</a> the abuse of the post-colonial state by the ruling Shona-dominated government “in its drive to destroy Ndebele particularism”. He explains, “This sets in motion the current Matabeleland politics of alienation, resentment and grievance.”</p>
<p>This continued marginalisation of Matabeleland (a region in southwestern Zimbabwe inhabited mainly by the Ndebele people) by the ZANU-PF-led government has rendered Zimbabwe so fragile a nation that even a street mural can expose its disunity. </p>
<p>The mural in question borrows two historical figures – King Lobengula and Mbuya Nehanda – to express the possibility of unity between the two dominant groups. How the mural was dealt with is the subject of this analysis.</p>
<h2>The mural that caused the trouble</h2>
<p>Over the weekend of 22 January 2022 a mural appeared at the Corner of Fife Street and 8th Avenue in <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Bulawayo">Bulawayo</a>, Zimbabwe’s second largest city and the main city of Matabeleland. The mural was by <a href="https://www.facebook.com/leeroy.s.brittain">Leeroy Spinx Brittain</a>, popularly known as Bow (black or white). By the afternoon of the 24th, the city’s municipality had erased it.</p>
<p>King Lobengula is portrayed with an arm around the shoulders of Mbuya Nehanda, in life-sized images resembling popular archival reproductions of them. In his other hand Lobengula is holding a heart-shaped balloon instead of his usual spear. It’s derivative of UK-based street artist <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-story-behind-banksy-4310304/">Banksy</a>’s mural <a href="https://www.myartbroker.com/artist-banksy/series-girl-with-balloon">Girl With Balloon</a>.</p>
<p>Bulawayo deputy mayor Mlandu Ncube is <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/king-lobengula-and-mbuya-nehanda-mural-erased/">reported</a> to say that the artist had not applied for permission and creating a mural without the city’s licence could attract a hefty fine or jail time. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1485854215176130563"}"></div></p>
<p>The artist was <a href="https://www.okayafrica.com/zimbabwe-street-art-debate/">calling</a> on Ndebeles and Shonas to begin a dialogue and unite. But judging from the divisive comments on social media platforms like <a href="https://twitter.com/zimlive/status/1485854215176130563?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1485933578554904579%7Ctwgr%5Ehb_0_8%7Ctwcon%5Es2_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.okayafrica.com%2Fzimbabwe-street-art-debate%2F">Twitter</a> and <a href="https://www.facebook.com/215170571826981/posts/5224165710927417/">Facebook</a>, few embraced his message.</p>
<p>According to online comments and news <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-214233.html">articles</a> some found the mural disrespectful and offensive – because of the contentious matter of the <a href="https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-gukurahundi-43923">Gukurahundi</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2b5iVGCDs0">massacres</a>. </p>
<h2>Echoes of Gukurahundi</h2>
<p>Gukurahundi refers to an ethnic cleansing atrocity which claimed up to 20,000 lives in Matebeleland and parts of Midlands in the 1980s. It’s <a href="https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/shemurenga-the-zimbabwean-womens-movement-1995-2000">described</a> by feminist academic and activist Shereen Essof as the <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-gabriel-mugabe-a-man-whose-list-of-failures-is-legion-121596">Robert Mugabe</a> regime’s “first, and still unpunished genocide”. British author Hazel Cameron <a href="https://news.st-andrews.ac.uk/archive/wilful-blindness/">claimed</a> that the massacres were committed under the watchful eye of the British government eager to safeguard its significant economic and strategic interests in Southern Africa. </p>
<p>To this day, Zimbabwe’s leadership refuses to publicly acknowledge and address the massacres, with Mugabe once referring to them as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2021.1954356">moment of madeness</a>. I would argue that the unaddressed atrocities have left Zimbabweans failing to collectively embrace and appreciate even a harmless but constructive expression of art. As long as <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artists-have-preserved-the-memory-of-zimbabwes-1980s-massacres-143847">Gukurahundi</a> continues to be ignored by the state, Zimbabweans will not find common ground.</p>
<h2>Who were Nehanda and Lobengula?</h2>
<p>Mbuya Nehanda is a <a href="https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Zezuru">Zezuru</a> (Shona) ancestral spirit (mhondoro) said to possess different women at different times in history. The Nehanda in the mural is <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/zimbabwe-unveils-statue-anti-colonial-leader-mbuya-nehanda-180977835/">Charwe Nyakasikana</a>. She led the Shona resistance against <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cecil-john-rhodes">Cecil John Rhodes</a>’ colonising forces. For her role in the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/181122?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">1896-7 First Chimurenga Uprisings</a>, she was hanged. To emphasise her importance, the ruling regime erected <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/26/anger-in-zimbabwe-at-nehanda-statue-amid-collapsing-economy">her statue</a> in Harare last year.</p>
<p>A son and successor of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/king-mzilikazi">King Mzilikazi</a>, founder of the Ndebele Kingdom, <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lobengula">King Lobengula</a> ruled the nation from 1868 to the 1890s when his kingdom succumbed to the British. He was never captured. In polarised Zimbabwe, some Shona people blame him for signing the <a href="https://www.ipl.org/essay/The-Rudd-Concession-FJXAHDL4RG">Rudd Concession</a>. This paved the way for the colonisation of the country.</p>
<p>To this day Shonas and Ndebeles identify with these figures, who never met in the flesh.</p>
<h2>Public art in Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>This is the first major controversy around murals and graffiti in the country in years. Sometimes municipal authorities don’t erase work at all, despite it being created without permission. This is the case with <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/mar/07/these-are-our-local-heroes-the-artist-painting-murals-of-hope-in-a-zimbabwe-township?fbclid=IwAR03t5tR74KcXwvd61LD5kFXJLhE7prCjW4k8rkA-UF7XGV9r-eym1R_0qE">Basil Matsika</a>’s murals in Mbare.</p>
<p>It is the state-sanctioned public art, mostly statues, that tend to attract controversy. Issues of patronage and who commissioned the work are crucial in determining whether it survives a critical and public onslaught. In 2010 people were generally unhappy when the government commissioned the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2010-09-30-north-korean-statues-open-wounds-in-zim/">North Koreans</a> for a pair of statues of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joshua-Nkomo">Joshua Nkomo</a> for Bulawayo and Harare. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd with banners gathers around a statue of a man standing proudly on a plinth." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451700/original/file-20220312-21-1xs6hew.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Protesters at the Joshua Nkomo statue in Bulawayo.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ZINYANGE AUNTONY/AFP via Getty Images</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nkomo was a nationalist and revolutionary leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which fought alongside (now ruling) ZANU in the country’s liberation struggle. Ndebele people in particular were incensed that Pyongyang had a hand in training the Fifth Brigade, a section of the Zimbabwe National Army responsible for unleashing Gukurahundi. Zimbabweans were also unhappy that no local sculptor was assigned to do the work.</p>
<p>Last year, the government withdrew the first statue of <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2020/12/18/mnangagwa-rejects-youthful-and-big-booty-mbuya-nehanda-statue/">Nehanda</a> after a public outcry. The youthful, large-bottomed depiction of Nehanda went viral on the internet. The artist, David Guy Mutasa, was given a chance to amend his mistakes. The Nkomo and Nehanda statues went ahead because they were political posturing from the government, disguised as cultural revival initiatives. </p>
<p>The same cannot be said of Bow’s mural as an independent initiative. The artist has worked with advertising company <a href="https://www.facebook.com/caligraph.co/photos/?ref=page_internal">CaliGraph</a> to create murals of other figures like musician Sandra Ndebele and socialite Mbo Mahocs and these have not been removed. This would indicate that the authorities embrace his work as long as it is about aesthetics and not politics.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-artists-have-preserved-the-memory-of-zimbabwes-1980s-massacres-143847">How artists have preserved the memory of Zimbabwe's 1980s massacres</a>
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</em>
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<p>Alongside the likes of Black Phar-I, <a href="https://twitter.com/aero5ol">Aero5ol</a>, <a href="https://www.instagram.com/ckombo/?hl=en">Kombo Chapfika</a>, the Bulawayo-based Bow is part of a new breed of street artists. He is <a href="https://www.chronicle.co.zw/muralist-behind-mbuya-nehanda-king-lobengula-bares-it-all/">reported</a> saying he was raised by a Ndebele grandmother and a Shona grandfather, which makes it difficult to assign him an ethnic group unless he identifies with one. </p>
<p>This makes him a neutral observer in the socio-political divide. Driven by his desire to see a more united Zimbabwe, Bow <a href="https://www.okayafrica.com/zimbabwe-street-art-debate/">promises</a> to do more poster art and murals that call for unity between the Shona and the Ndebele. This will continue challenging the status quo and initiating dialogue around the country’s history.</p>
<h2>Freedom of expression</h2>
<p>Instead of the mural brewing a fresh tribal storm or creating a bitter debate – as highlighted in articles in <a href="https://thestandard.newsday.co.zw/2022/01/30/erased-mural-brews-tribal-storm/"><em>The Standard</em></a> and <a href="https://www.okayafrica.com/zimbabwe-street-art-debate/"><em>Okay Africa</em></a> – I argue that Bow’s piece reminded the nation how polarised it has always been. </p>
<p>And the jail threats of the deputy mayor would certainly deter graffiti artists who desire to address contentious political matters that rattle the state. As long as the government continues to stifle freedom of expression, artists who do street art and graffiti are in danger of limiting their expression to commissions for social campaigns.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177927/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Barnabas Ticha Muvhuti is a Ph.D. candidate in Art History in the NRF SARChI Chair program in Geopolitics and the Arts of Africa, Rhodes University.
His Ph.D. research is partly funded by the Rhodes University African Studies Centre through its funding from the DFG, the German Research Foundation under Germany ́s Excellence Strategy, funding number EXC2052/1</span></em></p>
The unity between Zimbabwe’s two main ethnic groups is so fragile that even an inspirational street mural can expose it.
Barnabas Ticha Muvhuti, Ph.D. in Art History candidate, Rhodes University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/176068
2022-02-01T14:21:11Z
2022-02-01T14:21:11Z
South Africa is in a state of drift: the danger is that the ANC turns the way of Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443502/original/file-20220131-125257-1x63ckg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa (left) with his Zimbabwean counterpart, President Emmerson Mnangagwa, in Harare in 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Dirco/Flickr</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The dismal <a href="https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/dynamics-of-the-zimbabwe-crisis-in-the-21st-century/">fate of Zimbabwe</a> under the stewardship of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (<a href="https://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zanu-PF</a>) government has long stood out as a warning to South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (<a href="https://www.anc1912.org.za/">ANC</a>). Yet rarely has South Africa been in more danger of launching into a trajectory of Zimbabwe-like decline than now. </p>
<p>The South Africa media is thoroughly consumed with the political crisis within the ANC: the <a href="https://theconversation.com/factionalism-and-corruption-could-kill-the-anc-unless-it-kills-both-first-116924">rampant factionalism</a>, the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_south-africas-president-says-anc-cleaning-corruption/6209485.html">massive corruption</a>, the ‘capture’ of the state by the practice of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321223498_The_African_National_Congress_ANC_and_the_Cadre_Deployment_Policy_in_the_Postapartheid_South_Africa_A_Product_of_Democratic_Centralisation_or_a_Recipe_for_a_Constitutional_Crisis">‘cadre deployment’</a>, and the resulting <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-african-voters-are-disillusioned-but-they-havent-found-an-alternative-to-the-anc-171239">decline in the party’s poll ratings</a>.</p>
<p>There are genuine fears (or hopes) that the party will lose its electoral majority at the next general election <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-01-03-the-anc-renewal-boat-has-sailed-so-who-will-rise-and-take-up-the-political-baton-in-the-2024-elections/">in 2024</a>.</p>
<p>From this follows the most fundamental question of all: if the ANC lost its majority at the next election, as Zanu-PF did in the parliamentary and presidential elections of <a href="https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=929b38cb-3d7e-86c4-70da-e9ed343cc38d&groupId=252038">2008</a>, would it democratically concede power?</p>
<p>Or, alternatively, would it thwart the popular will by systematically undermining any post-election coalition government, as Zanu-PF did when it entered a coalition with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/zanu-pf-draft-constitution-angers-mdc-20120824">in 2009</a>? It refused to give up presidential power, and clung on to all the key levers of state power. It subsequently rigged the <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000203971304800305">2013 general election</a>.</p>
<p>What prompts such thinking is the apparent dilemma confronted by President Cyril Ramaphosa, who is also the ANC president. He positioned himself as the candidate who would <a href="https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-sets-out-a-bold-vision-for-south-africa-but-can-he-pull-it-off-109784">reform the ANC</a>. He also pledged to clean up the <a href="https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/">mess of corruption left behind by the Zuma presidency</a>, and set South Africa back on <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2018-state-nation-address-16-feb-2018-0000">the path of growth</a>. </p>
<p>But for all the talk, Ramaphosa has made little progress. He appears to be totally paralysed by an inability to resolve the battle between factions within the ANC. He apparently lacks the authority to control his Cabinet. And <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/columnists/adriaanbasson/adriaan-basson-analysis-paralysis-why-hasnt-ramaphosa-fired-sisulu-20220123">the will to do so</a>.</p>
<p>So long as this continues, the country remains in a state of drift. The <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/Presentation%20QLFS%20Q2_2021.pdf">level of unemployment</a> is shocking, the <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-06/Report-03-10-062015.pdf#page=69">extent of poverty</a> among the black population is appalling, and the prospects for meaningful and appropriate economic growth <a href="https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/statements/monetary-policy-statements/2022/statement-of-the-monetary-policy-committee/Monetary%20Policy%20Committee%20Statement%20January%202022.pdf">are minimal</a>. No wonder so many fear that South Africa is embarked upon a <a href="https://www.biznews.com/good-hope-project/2020/03/09/brains-wired-sa-zimbabwe-wrong-neurologist">Zimbabwean-style decline</a> into a basket-case economy run by a liberation movement autocracy.</p>
<h2>Three key features of liberation movements</h2>
<p>Highlighting three key features of liberation movement rule – such as that by Zanu-PF and the ANC – help us to understand the present crisis in South Africa.</p>
<p>First, liberation movements are characterised by simultaneous <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847011343/liberation-movements-in-power/">democratic and authoritarian impulses</a>. Their claim to having liberated their countries from colonial oppression has much merit. This is true if they are reluctant to share this with other forces which participated in the struggle for freedom.</p>
<p>Furthermore, their present claim to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-anc-insists-its-still-a-political-vanguard-this-is-what-ails-democracy-in-south-africa-141938">representative of ‘the people’ </a> ensures that they cannot completely ignore the needs of their supporters. </p>
<p>On the other hand, they have a long history of authoritarianism. </p>
<p>Although they tolerated internal dissent during the freedom struggle, they also quelled it at times <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/DC/slapr93.3/slapr93.3.pdf">with brutal violence</a>. After the arrival of democracy, they have systematically suppressed rivals or allies with a legitimate claim to having contributed to the struggle for liberation. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, led by Zimbabwean liberation struggle hero Joshua Nkomo, was bruised and beaten until it agreed to merge itself into Zanu-PF <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-liberators-turn-into-oppressors-a-study-of-southern-african-states-57213">in 1987</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/united-democratic-front-udf">United Democratic Front</a>, the effective internal wing of the ANC during the latter years of apartheid, dissolved itself following heavy pressure to do so by the ANC <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/united-democratic-front-udf-dissolved">in 1991</a>.</p>
<p>Both Zanu-PF and the ANC tolerate opposition parties. But they systematically seek to delegitimise them by characterising them as ‘counter-revolutionary or <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-05-13-chasing-butterflies-and-bogeymen-mantashe-beats-regime-change-drum/">agents of foreign powers</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the liberation movements have become the vehicles for <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-corruption-in-south-africa-isnt-simply-about-zuma-and-the-guptas-113056">rapid class-formation</a>. Although they won political power, they inherited only limited economic power, as the commanding heights of their economies remain in private hands. </p>
<p>Nonetheless, by gaining control over the state, Zanu-PF and the ANC secured control over the state owned enterprises. In South Africa, these accounted for around 15% of GDP <a href="https://repository.hsrc.ac.za/handle/20.500.11910/6219">in the early 1990s</a>. </p>
<p>Initially, their principal focus was on removing old-guard public servants, whose loyalty to a democratic government could not be assumed, and replacing them with party loyalists who could be trusted. </p>
<p>This resulted in the merging of party and state, weakening the independence of bodies of accountability established under their respective constitutions. </p>
<p>And, justified on the basis of pursuing the revolution, efforts were made in both countries to ‘capture’ the commanding heights of the economy. This was achieved fully <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847011343/liberation-movements-in-power/">in Zimbabwe</a>, but only partially in South Africa. The process was easily perverted into lining the pockets of an <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781847011343/liberation-movements-in-power/">increasingly predatory party-state bourgeoisie</a>. This, as Zanu-PF’s and the ANC’s control of the public service, including the parastatals, enabled them to allocate high paid jobs, tenders and procurement contracts to cronies.</p>
<p>Third, there is a constant tension between liberation movements’ commitment to the liberal constitutionalism by which they acceded to power and their aspirations to monopoly domination of society. </p>
<p>The liberation movements regard themselves as the historic embodiments of the aspirations of ‘the people’. Their logic is that those who are not for them are against them. Constitutional restraints on the exercise of power by the state are weakened or ignored. Above all, other political parties or organs of civil society which make claims to represent the popular will are dismissed as counter-revolutionary. The popular will cannot be shared.</p>
<p>These (and other) liberation movement dynamics lead inexorably to democratic and economic decline. If liberation movements are the historic embodiments of freedom, then restraints on their power must constitute unfreedom. Similarly, extension of liberation movement control over the economy must by definition constitute the furtherance of the revolution. </p>
<p>Yet such thinking allows little scope for private participation in the economy – unless it is closely aligned with the interests of the ruling party. It allows even less for popular participation in the political arena – unless it takes place under the umbrella of those who rule.</p>
<h2>Leaving the political stage</h2>
<p>These dynamics explain why Ramaphosa’s reform agenda has fallen foul of a political paralysis gripping the ANC and the wider arena of politics in South Africa. </p>
<p>The ANC retains its determination to rule yet lacks the capacity to do so effectively. The only way out of the dilemma is its defeat in an election. </p>
<p>However, as the 2008 Zimbabwean example has shown, defeat of a liberation movement in an election does not guarantee its removal from power, so long as it retains the support of the military, police and security services. </p>
<p>Perhaps South Africa could prove different. The military <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africa-mulls-future-of-its-military-to-make-it-fit-for-purpose-146423">has been run down</a>, and the police and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zumas-abuse-of-south-africas-spy-agency-underscores-need-for-strong-civilian-oversight-154439">security services</a> are themselves <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-06-battle-lines-have-been-drawn-between-saps-factions-and-we-are-the-casualties/">heavily factionalised</a>. However, this assumes that there is an opposition party or coalition capable of displacing the ANC electorally. And that this would be backed up by a level of popular and civil society support which would be ready and willing to combat any attempt to steal an election.</p>
<p>The liberation movements have fulfilled their historic task. Compelling them to leave the political stage is a daunting but necessary agenda.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176068/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p>
The ANC retains its determination to rule yet lacks the capacity to do so effectively. The only way out of the dilemma is its defeat in an election.
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/147109
2020-10-13T13:36:46Z
2020-10-13T13:36:46Z
Zimbabwe’s restrictions on mobile money transfers are a blow to financial inclusion
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/363345/original/file-20201014-15-zrgscb.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A closed mobile money kiosk in Harare. Up to 50,000 small agents are affected countrywide.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Tampiwa Mahari/Great Gatsby Photography</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mobile financial services are, in most African countries, born out of <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/expanding-digital-financial-services-can-help-developing-economies-cope-crisis-now-and-boost-growth-later">crises</a>. In 2011, Zimbabwe had gone through a volatile decade of economic crises – hyperinflation, currency instability and a collapse of the formal financial system. Consumers, mostly employed in the informal sector, had a widespread mistrust of the formal banking system.</p>
<p>In came Econet, a major mobile operator, to launch a mobile money service called Ecocash. Taking advantage of the country’s high mobile penetration, the service had 2.3 million users within 18 months. Today, <a href="https://nextbillion.net/how-mobile-airtime-vendor-became-fastest-growing-bank/">close to 90% of adult Zimbabweans</a> use Ecocash. In addition, Ecocash paved the way for competitors such as OneMoney, Telecash and Mycash. </p>
<p>The economic crisis in Zimbabwe spurred the rapid adoption and use of mobile money. First came <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45822166">cash shortages</a> coupled with higher cash withdrawal fees and lower withdrawal limits. Then loss of savings to soaring inflation and loan denials in the formal banking system engendered mistrust among consumers. This forced a government-led drive towards a cashless economy and <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1212021/zimbabwe-wants-mobile-money-interoperability-for-econet-others-as-cash-crunch-bites/">non-cash transactions</a>. </p>
<p>Mobile money transfers in Zimbabwe are mainly from one person to another. This allows for urban to rural money remittances for family support, payment for goods and services in retail settings and financial flows between the formal and informal business sectors. Another important use of mobile money is to store money securely in high crime areas. </p>
<p>An important benefit is the <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1719085/zimbabwe-shuts-down-mobile-money-cash-options-with-ecocash/">cash-in and cash-out functionality</a>. This allows users to deposit cash into a mobile account through a mobile money agent and withdraw physical cash at a convenient time and place. They can avoid the long queues and withdrawal limits set by the formal banking system. </p>
<p>Despite the compelling value proposition that mobile money offers, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe recently <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/documents/mps/2020/MPS--MID-TERM.pdf">placed significant regulatory restrictions</a> on its operations. The regulator said mobile money services were fuelling illegal foreign currency exchange, money laundering and fraud, especially through the cash-in/cash-out service.</p>
<p>The restrictions followed the Reserve Bank’s audit of the four mobile money platforms, including Ecocash. It found that some accounts were opened using fictitious or unverified identification documents. There was also a rampant misuse of mobile money accounts for <a href="https://www.rbz.co.zw/documents/mps/2020/MPS--MID-TERM.pdf">money laundering schemes and fraudulent overdrafts or fictitious credit</a>. It also cited cases of foreign currency trading outside the formal channels.</p>
<p>Users are now restricted to just one mobile wallet account per person and a daily transfer limit of ZW$5,000 (US$50). In addition, users can no longer transact through mobile money agents. Their operations have been abolished. </p>
<p>As a result, close to <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2020/08/agent-lines-banned-by-rbz-as-they-no-longer-serve-any-legitimate-purpose/">50,000 mobile money agents</a> have lost their source of income. This is likely to affect customers in the rural areas of Zimbabwe who depended on the agents to access mobile money services. These agents gave rural consumers the opportunity to be integrated into the financial system.</p>
<p>The overall effect is that mobile money accounts can only be used for transacting but not “store of value” purposes. Store of value means savings or investment accounts. This is seemingly at odds with <a href="https://voxeu.org/article/economics-mobile-money">findings</a> by academics and development practitioners that mobile money accounts encourage poor customers who are not well served by the formal financial sector to save regularly.</p>
<p>This is all the more so in a country battling with a shortage of banknotes and coins and the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45822166">collapse of the traditional financial system</a>. The stringent restrictions could stifle innovation among mobile money operators and hinder access to financial services for many unbanked Zimbabweans.</p>
<h2>Alternative approaches</h2>
<p>The blanket restrictions may have the unintended consequence of excluding legitimate merchants and consumers from accessing financial services. The new regulations also appear out of proportion to the risk. For instance, a <a href="https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GSMA-Mobile-Money-Policy-Handbook-2018.pdf">tiered approach</a> to know-your-customer regulation could have allowed the regulator to distinguish between risky high-value transactions and low-value transactions.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe has a national population registration system which is only accessible by authorised government workers. The ordinary mobile money agent would not have access to it. But customers without adequate identification could still sign up for a basic account with low transaction and withdrawal limits, instead of being excluded entirely from the financial system. </p>
<p>Alternative forms of identification could have been used for opening accounts. These could include utility bills or letters from local church and village leaders. </p>
<p>The mobile money agent network increased access to financial services in rural and hard-to-reach areas of Zimbabwe. Instead of abolishing the role of mobile money agents, the financial regulator could have reprimanded and fined agents found guilty of money laundering and the trading of foreign exchange without a licence. </p>
<p>The Reserve Bank also needs a financial sector policy that facilitates the development of safe and accessible mobile money services for Zimbabweans who currently don’t have access to financial services. This would require that all stakeholders, including the regulator, mobile money operators, telecommunication regulators and financial intelligence authorities, develop a collaborative regulatory framework. </p>
<p>Such a framework would seek to protect the integrity of the financial system from fraud and misuse. At the same time it would ensure that consumers and merchants enjoyed the full benefits of mobile money services. At all times, the end goal of greater financial inclusion must remain a priority.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147109/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marcia Kwaramba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Stringent restrictions could stifle innovation among mobile money operators and hinder access to financial services.
Marcia Kwaramba, Scholar-in-Residence in the Social Responsibility and Sustainability Division, University of Colorado Boulder
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/145072
2020-09-20T07:44:57Z
2020-09-20T07:44:57Z
Why South Africa’s new plan to fortify its borders won’t stop irregular migration
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/358433/original/file-20200916-16-1jgpbnk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean migrants illegally cross Into South Africa.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">John Moore/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa has just passed a <a href="https://www.gov.za/documents/border-management-authority-act-2-2020-english-sepedi-21-jul-2020-0000">new law</a> in response to growing concerns in the country about its porous borders. The socioeconomic and <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-08-14-porous-borders-biggest-threat-to-domestic-security-in-sa-new-spy-boss/">security dangers</a> posed by having large numbers of undocumented migrants have become key political issues in the country in recent times.</p>
<p>It’s <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/09/17/fact-check-are-the-11-million-undocumented-migrants-in-sa">difficult to ascertain</a> how many undocumented migrants there are in the country, leading to <a href="https://africacheck.org/reports/do-5-million-immigrants-live-in-s-africa-the-new-york-times-inflates-number/">exaggerated estimates</a>. According to Statistics South Africa figures from 2011, legal migrants were about 4.2% of the total population, or about <a href="http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-01-79/Report-03-01-792011.pdf">2.1 million people</a>. Over 75% came from the African continent, with the majority (68%) from within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Over 45% of those from the SADC region were Zimbabweans. </p>
<p>The new law provides for the establishment of a <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202007/43536gon799.pdf">Border Management Authority</a>. Its primary function is to provide integrated border law enforcement. Its core functions include the governance and management of the lawful movement of people and goods within the border law enforcement areas and at ports of entry. It’ll work with other arms of government and relevant stakeholders in the discharge of border law <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202007/43536gon799.pdf">enforcement functions</a>.</p>
<h2>Why the change</h2>
<p>Migration and immigration are not efficiently managed at the moment, being undertaken by several entities. These include the Department of Home Affairs, South African Revenue Service, the Defence Force and the State Security Agency.</p>
<p>The functions and roles of these and other organs of state have been reconfigured. They will now basically fall on committees providing advice to the new agency on, inter alia, politics, security, defence and economy.</p>
<p>It is envisioned that the new agency and stronger policing will secure the porous borders, stop undocumented migration and enhance legitimate trade. But a closer reading of the new Act, particularly Chapter 6, shows that there is a strong move towards the militarisation of the country’s borders. This approach, which is similar to what European countries have implemented, is bound to fail in curbing undocumented migration. Undocumented migration is the crossing of borders without meeting immigration requirements.</p>
<h2>Militarisation and securitarisation</h2>
<p>Border militarisation involves the deployment of, among others, military technologies, equipment and <a href="https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/tran.12115#:%7E:text=In%20contrast%20to%20claims%20of,into%20new%20spaces%20and%20arenas">personnel</a> to protect borders.</p>
<p>Border securitisation involves stringent immigration requirements as well as the reinforcement of the physical border, by for example, <a href="https://gizmodo.com/5-european-countries-have-built-border-fences-to-keep-o-1731065879">erecting walls or fences</a>.</p>
<p>In the case of South Africa, this will, among other things, entail the deployment of border guards who have powers to arrest and detain anybody deemed to have transgressed the new law. The border guards will have extensive powers. They will, for example, be empowered to search any person, premise, goods and vehicles as well as question any person about any matter related to the passage of people, goods or vehicles through a port of entry or <a href="https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202007/43536gon799.pdf">across the borders</a>. </p>
<p>This has parallels with other parts of the world. Examples include the European Union (EU) borders between Morocco and <a href="https://beatingborders.wordpress.com/2015/06/17/the-militarisation-of-the-european-borders-the-daily-terror-in-morocco/">Spain at Ceuta and Melilla</a>, where the objective is to keep migrants and refugees out, particularly those from Africa. </p>
<p>This involves the use of security technologies so sophisticated that they can <a href="https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/05/treacherous">sense the heartbeat</a> of a border jumper. </p>
<h2>Lessons from elsewhere</h2>
<p>Nation states are entitled to secure their borders. Indeed, they are constitutionally bound to uphold their territorial sovereignty. But the militarisation of borders and securitisation of migration have always failed to stop irregular migration. </p>
<p>This can be seen in the case of the EU where they have failed to stop migrants from <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/06/impact-externalization-migration-controls-rights-asylum-seekers-and-other-migrants">crossing into Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Instead, the migrants have been led to find alternative ways to cross the border. I expect the same thing to happen in the case of South Africa. </p>
<p>No single country can effectively address the problem of irregular migration on its own in the southern African setting. Beefing up security at borders through military and security strategies is not the answer. An effective response lies in a regional approach to the management of migration and its root causes.</p>
<h2>Regional approach to illegal migration</h2>
<p>Such an approach should recognise that migration is a multidimensional phenomenon in terms of its causes, patterns, settings and consequences. </p>
<p>The 16 member states of the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/member-states/">Southern African Development Community</a> should jointly deal with the issue of undocumented migration through a regional migration mechanism which promotes free human mobility. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf">Declaration and Treaty of the SADC of 1992</a> and the subsequent <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/9513/5292/8363/Protocol_on_Facilitation_of_Movement_of_Persons2005.pdf">SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons</a> provide a good starting point for the region to formulate a regional migration management architecture that enables unlimited migration between member states. </p>
<p>The declaration and treaty commit the SADC to promoting regional integration and free human mobility. The protocol on the <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/9513/5292/8363/Protocol_on_Facilitation_of_Movement_of_Persons2005.pdf">movement of persons</a>, which is not yet in full force, is a move in this direction.</p>
<p>Its main objective is to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of people in the SADC region and within member states. It calls for the harmonisation of respective national laws in fulfilment of <a href="https://www.sadc.int/files/9513/5292/8363/Protocol_on_Facilitation_of_Movement_of_Persons2005.pdf">this objective</a>.</p>
<p>I posit that undocumented migration occurs because of stringent immigration regimes which force people to resort to such illegal acts as <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15562948.2019.1570416">smuggling people across borders</a>. Differently stated, if there were free movement between countries in the region, the issue of undocumented and irregular migration would not arise. </p>
<p>This raises the related question of what nation states should do in the absence of a regional migration governance mechanism. In other words, should countries like South Africa stop improving the safety and management of their borders? </p>
<p>By all means countries should maintain their territorial integrity. But in an African setting, the historical context of borders and migration matters. </p>
<p>Africa’s borders were drawn arbitrarily by colonial powers, often separating people who had always lived together. These contiguous borders have <a href="https://theconversation.com/southern-africas-porous-borders-pose-a-problem-for-containing-the-coronavirus-135386">always been ignored and breached</a>. Thus, no amount of border militarisation and securitisation can stop such irregular migration.</p>
<h2>Addressing causes of irregular migration</h2>
<p>The multifaceted nature of migration in the SADC region requires the regional body to also address the issues which uproot people from their countries. These include bad governance and human rights abuses. </p>
<p>For example, if the SADC had responded swiftly and appropriately to the crisis in Zimbabwe in the 2000s, when that country embarked on questionable political programmes with regional political and economic ramifications, Zimbabweans would not have been forced to migrate in such great numbers to South Africa for economic reasons.</p>
<p>The SADC should have collectively leaned on the Zimbabwean government to stop human rights abuses. Instead, only the late Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa openly criticised the Zimbabwean government and called on the SADC <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-sadc/zambian-president-calls-zimbabwe-sinking-titanic-idUSL2140021620070321">to help address the country’s economic and political problems</a>. This never happened. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean crisis continues unabated two decades later, leading many people to continue to flee to South Africa, some of them swimming across the <a href="https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/smuggling-at-beit-bridge-border-continues-despite-r37-million-fence/">crocodile infested Limpopo River</a>. This shows that nothing can stop irregular migration – short of addressing its root causes, over and above a regional migration management approach. Given that most migrants in South Africa are from the SADC countries, with over 45% coming from Zimbabwe, it makes sense to deal with the issue of migration within the SADC first, before addressing those from other parts of Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145072/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Inocent Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The militarisation of borders and securitisation of migration have always failed to stop irregular migration.
Inocent Moyo, Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/144299
2020-09-06T09:26:52Z
2020-09-06T09:26:52Z
Dear Dambudzo Marechera… The letters Zimbabweans wrote to a literary star
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354881/original/file-20200826-7165-a0o96v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Dambudzo Marechera, 1986</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Ernst Schade via Humboldt University</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The writer <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1365977/dambudzo-marecheras-the-house-of-hunger-novel-still-plays-out-in-zimbabwe/">Dambudzo Marechera</a>, who died on 18 August 1987, remains a popular figure in Zimbabwe. He is heralded by a young generation as a radical and counter-culture figure.</p>
<p>Marechera became an instant star when his first book <em>The House of Hunger</em> was published to critical acclaim in 1978. The novella tells of growing up in colonial Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in raw and exquisite prose, a harrowing portrait of lives disrupted and young disillusionment. The rumour is that he wrote it in a tent or squat, but then perhaps he did not, for as James Currey puts it in <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Africa+Writes+Back"><em>Africa Writes Back</em></a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Marechera developed his own life story with the self-regarding obsession of an actor.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Everything to do with his conflicted legacy had a touch of mythology. Whether it was throwing plates and cups at his hosts at the Guardian Fiction Prize ceremony, trying to burn down a university library, or travelling without a passport between countries and continents. </p>
<p>His magnum opus, <em>The House of Hunger</em>, came immediately after his expulsion from New College, Oxford university. Though his publishers desperately expected him to produce the ‘great Zimbabwean novel’, Marechera’s later work was inconsistent. He saw two more books published: <em><a href="https://readingzimbabwe.com/books/black-sunlight">Black Sunlight</a></em> (1980) and <em><a href="https://readingzimbabwe.com/books/mindblast">Mindblast</a></em> (1984). Further work was released posthumously: <em><a href="https://readingzimbabwe.com/books/the-black-insider">The Black Insider</a></em> (1990), <em><a href="https://readingzimbabwe.com/books/cemetery-of-mind">Cemetery of Mind</a></em> (1992) and <em><a href="https://readingzimbabwe.com/books/scrapiron-blues">Scrapiron Blues</a></em> (1994).</p>
<p>After confounding critics and foes, and leading an erratic lifestyle, the writer was dead at 35. Marechera embodies celebrity and politics, spectacle and radicalism, universality and self-aggrandisement. What endears him to a generation of readers is his refusal to offer easy answers or present static identities for his fictional characters or for himself.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354613/original/file-20200825-15-1luo5zg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Book cover with an illustration of a man against a spider's web, a spider with a needle stitching a long cut on his forehead." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354613/original/file-20200825-15-1luo5zg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354613/original/file-20200825-15-1luo5zg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354613/original/file-20200825-15-1luo5zg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354613/original/file-20200825-15-1luo5zg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=906&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354613/original/file-20200825-15-1luo5zg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354613/original/file-20200825-15-1luo5zg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354613/original/file-20200825-15-1luo5zg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1139&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">House of Hunger.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Heinemann Books London</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But who is Dambudzo Marechera? I never met him. He died when I was four years old and has always been an enigma. But I recently discovered a set of <a href="https://witswiser.podbean.com/e/tinashe-mushakavanhu-marechera-the-story-doctor/">old letters</a> which reveal the real import of <a href="https://uglyducklingpresse.org/publications/reincarnating-marechera-notes-on-a-speculative-archive/">Marechera’s influence</a>. </p>
<h2>A visit to the archive</h2>
<p>For a long time I associated the <a href="http://www.archives.gov.zw">National Archives of Zimbabwe</a> with bureaucracy and viewed it as an unwelcoming security zone. My early visits were focused on accessing the Marechera papers, or what remains of them. The more I visited, the more items went missing, and sometimes they were truncated. When I told friends about the appearance, disappearance and reappearance of materials, many suggested that the institution has a general suspicion of researchers and that it censors information.</p>
<p>It was during one of these visits that I saw a folder that contained a neat pile of hundreds of handwritten letters. The melodramatic structure and rhetoric of the letters disturbed the stable meanings I held about Marechera, especially their expressions of psychic pain, longing, desire, frustration, boredom, and the material details of the correspondents’ private lives – that now make them irresistible, intimate public archives.</p>
<p><audio preload="metadata" controls="controls" data-duration="1010" data-image="" data-title="The Wiser Podcast: Marechera, The Story Doctor" data-size="40410300" data-source="Wiser, Wits University" data-source-url="https://witswiser.podbean.com/e/tinashe-mushakavanhu-marechera-the-story-doctor/" data-license="" data-license-url="">
<source src="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2041/tinashe-marechera-79nrq.mp3" type="audio/mpeg">
</audio>
<div class="audio-player-caption">
The Wiser Podcast: Marechera, The Story Doctor.
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" rel="nofollow" href="https://witswiser.podbean.com/e/tinashe-mushakavanhu-marechera-the-story-doctor/">Wiser, Wits University</a><span class="download"><span>38.5 MB</span> <a target="_blank" href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/audio/2041/tinashe-marechera-79nrq.mp3">(download)</a></span></span>
</div></p>
<p>The letters are valuable historic documents; their inclusion in the national archives was a fate their writers could never have imagined. The value of these letters depends on their continued circulation. Yet, they have been ignored by researchers who have hollowed out black testimony in constructing the figure of Marechera. Much of the Marechera scholarship is scaffolded on white memory. </p>
<p>The letters function as a space of knowledge and confession and are complex objects positioned at the intersection of personal, institutional and memorial motives.</p>
<h2>The story doctor</h2>
<p>Addressed in care of the Dambudzo Marechera Trust, the letters were dispatched after Marechera’s death from urban townships, rural areas, growth points, mining compounds, farms; places that only appear in the news during election season or moments of catastrophe. In death, Marechera <a href="https://chimurengachronic.co.za/home-mean-nothing-to-me/">ruptures</a> the view of Zimbabwe as a little corridor that starts in Harare and ends in Bulawayo. These letters provide a unique psychological and physical map of his enduring influence – a community forged around issues of privacy, of friendship and of individual freedom.</p>
<p>The correspondents feel comfortable talking to Marechera. They know he will never scold them for what they say. He is ordinary like them, but constantly harassed by the state and its security apparatus. Most are school dropouts who absconded to join the war and came back to no jobs or unwelcoming families. </p>
<p>After the war, they were expected to grow up quickly and join the army of nation builders. But there were no systems created to deal with the traumas of war. Many returned with stories and nightmares and didn’t know how to share them, or where to turn for help. The government bureaucrats were unconcerned. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354883/original/file-20200826-16-1ummmbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A dreadlocked man stands at a microphone, holding a notebook in an outdoor city space, crowds of people around the platform he stands on." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354883/original/file-20200826-16-1ummmbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/354883/original/file-20200826-16-1ummmbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354883/original/file-20200826-16-1ummmbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354883/original/file-20200826-16-1ummmbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354883/original/file-20200826-16-1ummmbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354883/original/file-20200826-16-1ummmbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/354883/original/file-20200826-16-1ummmbr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=603&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Marechera reading in First Street Mall, Harare, during the International Book Fair Harare in August 1983.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">© Tessa Colvin via Humboldt University</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Marechera decided to be the story doctor who provided an outlet for people to vent. He opened a small office in the Harare City Centre. The office was minimalistic, it had no furniture; there was a phone in the corner. Marechera had decided to build a healing platform outside the official system. He understood the sickness that was all around him that could only be cured through storytelling sessions. The writing surgery operated for four days before it was shut down by government agents. At least 1,000 young people had consulted Marechera.</p>
<p>They turned to Marechera who was the resident philosopher in Harare’s nightclubs and bars. They eagerly identified with his iconoclasm. To them, his was a <a href="https://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/seminar/Mushakavanhu2019.pdf">fearless voice</a> that undermined every kind of complacency and hypocrisy.</p>
<h2>Death that refuses to be killed</h2>
<p>One letter, dated 18 May 1989, reads:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Never before have I encountered an author so seriously dedicated to his pen and voice as the late Dambudzo “Desperate” Marechera. He remains my luminary in my poetic endeavor; his courageous denunciation of “filthy first citizens” an undying inspiration to me. These are the bigots, now coming to the foreground dead and alive because of their sins, who kept Dambudzo well under foot till his death.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>From the perspective of the speculative enterprise, Marechera’s death was a necessary death, a death that has had movement, that created a schism in the Zimbabwean imagination. For the political class it was good riddance, but for multitudes of young people Marechera’s death was the awakening. </p>
<p>It was a new type of death that refused to be killed. Marechera’s transcendence to the afterlife became an expression of the radical and new logic, a speculative process. </p>
<p>His death is the moment he is born again, every utterance of his name is a recreation of who he was, of who he should have been. He changes with every memory, every retelling. If Dambudzo Marechera had not existed, Zimbabwe would have invented him.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>Mushakavanhu is the author of the just-released book <a href="https://uglyducklingpresse.org/publications/reincarnating-marechera-notes-on-a-speculative-archive/">Reincarnating Marechera</a>: Notes on a Speculative Archive. The public is invited to contribute to Marechera’s archive over <a href="https://marechera.com">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144299/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Hundreds of handwritten letters found in an archive have revealed the real import of the writer’s enduring influence.
Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/144292
2020-08-11T14:25:23Z
2020-08-11T14:25:23Z
State of democracy in Africa: changing leaders doesn’t change politics
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352212/original/file-20200811-14-16wenam.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">shutterstock</span> </figcaption></figure><p>For the last few years the African political landscape has been dominated by high profile changes of leaders and governments. In Angola (2017), Ethiopia (2018), South Africa (2018), Sudan (2019) and Zimbabwe (2018), leadership change promised to bring about not only a new man at the top, but also a new political and economic direction. </p>
<p>But do changes of leaders and governments generate more democratic and responsive governments? The Bertelsmann Transformation Index Africa Report 2020 (BTI), <a href="https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/changing-guards-change-systems">A Changing of the Guards or A Change of Systems?</a>, suggests that we should be cautious about the prospects for rapid political improvements.</p>
<p>Reviewing developments in 44 countries from 2017 to the start of 2019, the report finds that leadership change results in an initial wave of optimism. But ongoing political challenges and constraints mean that it is often a case of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289660924_Kenya_since_2002_The_more_things_change_the_more_they_stay_the_same">“the more things change the more they stay the same”</a>. </p>
<p>Political change occurs gradually in the vast majority of African countries. </p>
<h2>More continuity than change</h2>
<p>From 2015 to 2019, the general pattern has been for the continent’s more authoritarian states – such as Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and Rwanda – to make little progress towards democracy. In some cases countries became incrementally more repressive. </p>
<p>At the same time, many of the continent’s more democratic states – including Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa – have remained “consolidating” or “defective” democracies. Very few of these dropped out of these categories to become “authoritarian” regimes.</p>
<p>A number of countries have seen more significant changes. But in most cases this did not fundamentally change the character of the political system. For example, Cameroon, Chad, Kenya and Tanzania moved further away from lasting political and economic transformation. Meanwhile Angola, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe initially made progress towards it, but these gains were limited – and only lasted for a short period in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As this brief summary suggests, at a continental level the trajectories of different states have by and large cancelled each other out. Positive trends in some cases were wiped out by negative trends in others.</p>
<p>Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has thus seen no significant changes to the overall level of democracy, economic management and governance. For example, the index shows that between 2018 and 2020, the overall level of democracy declined by just 0.09, a small shift on a 1-10 scale. This suggests continuity not change. </p>
<h2>Leadership changes often disappoint</h2>
<p>In almost all cases, positive trends were recorded in countries where leadership change generated hope for political renewal and economic reform. This includes Angola, after President <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/africa/angola-dos-santos.html">José Eduardo dos Santos</a> stepped down in 2017, and Ethiopia, following the rise to power of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopias-abiy-ahmed-wont-be-answering-any-questions-when-he-receives-his-nobel-prize/2019/12/09/5277fe12-1871-11ea-80d6-d0ca7007273f_story.html">Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed</a>. It also includes Zimbabwe, where the transfer of power from <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/118/472/580/5462513">Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> was accompanied by promises that the Zanu-PF government would show greater respect for democratic norms and values in future.</p>
<p>Sierra Leone also recorded a significant improvement in performance following the victory of opposition candidate Julius Maada Bio in the presidential election of 2018. Nigeria has continued to make modest but significant gains in economic management since Muhammadu Buhari replaced Goodluck Jonathan as president in 2015. </p>
<p>The significance of leadership change in all of these processes is an important reminder of the extent to which power has been personalised. But it is important to note that events since the end of the period under review in 2019 have cast doubt on the significance of these transitions.</p>
<p>Most notably, continued and in some cases increasing human rights abuses in countries such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe suggest that we have seen “a changing of the guards” but not a change of political systems. </p>
<p>Nowhere is this more true than Zimbabwe, where the last few weeks have witnessed a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/zimbabwe-activists-decry-unprecedented-clampdown-arrests-200805144813725.html">brutal government crackdown</a>. Not only have journalists been arrested on flimsy charges, but the rule of law has been manipulated to keep them in jail. Following this sustained attack on democracy, it is now clear that the Mnangagwa government is no more committed to human rights and civil liberties than its predecessor was. </p>
<h2>There is no one ‘Africa’</h2>
<p>So what does the future hold? I often get asked what direction Africa is heading in. My answer is always the same: where democracy is concerned, there is no one “Africa”. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index report shows how true this is. </p>
<p>In addition to the well-known differences between leading lights like Botswana and entrenched laggards like Rwanda, there is also a profound regional variation that is less well recognised and understood. </p>
<p>From relatively similar starting points in the early 1990s, there has been a sharp divergence between West and Southern Africa – which have remained comparatively more open and democratic – and Central and Eastern Africa, which remained more closed and authoritarian. There is also some evidence that the average quality of democracy continued to decline in Eastern and Central Africa in the past few years. Because it continues to increase in West Africa, we have seen greater divergence between the two sets of regions.</p>
<p>Figure 1. Average Democracy scores for African regions, BTI 2006-2020*</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=386&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/352175/original/file-20200811-23-1tvj99j.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=485&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These variations reflect the historical process through which governments came to power, the kinds of states over which they govern, and the disposition and influence of regional organisations. In particular, East Africa features a number of countries ruled by former rebel armies (Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda). Here political control is underpinned by coercion and a longstanding suspicion of opposition. </p>
<p>This is also a challenge in some Central African states. Here the added complication of long-running conflicts and political instability (Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo) has undermined government performance in many ways. </p>
<p>A number of former military leaders have also governed West African states, including Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. But the proportion has been lower and some countries, such as Senegal, have a long tradition of plural politics and civilian leadership. In a similar vein, southern Africa features a number of liberation movements. But in a number of cases these developed out of broad-based movements that valued political participation and civil liberties. Partly as a result, former military or rebel leaders have had a less damaging impact on the prospects for democracy in Southern and West Africa.</p>
<p>It is important not to exaggerate these regional differences. There is great variation within them as well as between them. But, this caveat notwithstanding, we should not expect to see any convergence around a common African democratic experience in the next few years. If anything, the gap between the continent’s most democratic and authoritarian regions is likely to become even wider.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/144292/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nic Cheeseman was paid for his work writing this report for the BTI.</span></em></p>
The gap between the continent’s most democratic and authoritarian regions is likely to continue to grow.
Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of Birmingham
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/135066
2020-04-12T14:04:15Z
2020-04-12T14:04:15Z
Zimbabwe’s shattered economy poses a serious challenge to fighting COVID-19
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/326155/original/file-20200407-85423-12r0p9p.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Hawkers' stalls in Harare, Zimbabwe, lie deserted following lockdown in a bid to slow down the spread of the coronavirus.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The COVID-19 pandemic has left Zimbabwe in an extremely difficult situation. As of early April, the number of infections and deaths from the pandemic <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/zim-records-3rd-coronavirus-death/">appeared low</a>, although the available data isn’t necessarily reliable. </p>
<p>President Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/breaking-mnangagwa-decrees-21-day-covid-19-lockdown-starting-monday/">announced</a> a 21-day lockdown which began on 30 March, in a bid to contain the spread of the coronavirus. The decree ordered all citizens to stay at home, “except in respect of essential movements related to seeking health services, the purchase of food”, or carrying out responsibilities that are in the critical services sectors. </p>
<p>Other measures include the shutting down of public markets in the informal sector, except those that sell food. </p>
<p>None of this will be easy to implement in Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>The country has an economic profile similar to that of many developing countries. The difference is that its informal sector makes up a much higher percentage of the overall economy. According to a 2018 International Monetary Fund report, Zimbabwe’s informal economy is <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/01/25/Shadow-Economies-Around-the-World-What-Did-We-Learn-Over-the-Last-20-Years-45583">the largest in Africa</a>, and second only to Bolivia in the world. The sector accounts for at least 60% of all of Zimbabwe’s economic activity. </p>
<p>In addition to the usual problems faced by countries with large informal economies, including poor governance and low tax revenues, Zimbabwe has an added set of problems: its economy is broken.</p>
<p>To implement the nationwide <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/breaking-mnangagwa-decrees-21-day-covid-19-lockdown-starting-monday/">lockdown</a> Mnangagwa is likely to have to inflict further damage to an already extremely fragile economy. </p>
<p>The president did not announce a stimulus financial package to cushion business from the impact of the lockdown. This might result in the total collapse of some businesses. </p>
<h2>Fragile economy</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s economy has been shrinking since <a href="https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/3.%20Zimbabwe%20Report_Chapter%201.pdf">2000</a>, triggered by the government’s controversial land <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/5-lessons-sa-can-learn-from-zim-land-grabs-20180305-2">re-distribution programme</a> of that year. The violent programme wreaked havoc on agriculture, which was then the mainstay of the Zimbabwean economy. </p>
<p>This was compounded by subsequent sanctions imposed by the West in response to the <a href="http://www.thethinker.co.za/resources/Thinker_81/81%20chagonda.pdf">seizures of white-owned farms and land</a>. </p>
<p>Around <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">6 million Zimbabweans</a> – about 34% of the population – live in extreme poverty.</p>
<p>The IMF recently gave a very bleak <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/02/26/pr2072-zimbabwe-imf-executive-board-concludes-2020-article-iv-consultation">assessment</a>, saying that the country’s economy had contracted by 7.5% in 2019. It put the inflation rate at over 500%, meaning that the country was heading back to the traumatic hyper-inflation era of <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">2007/8</a>, when inflation peaked at an official <a href="https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/390/inflation/hyper-inflation-in-zimbabwe/">231 million percent</a>.</p>
<p>The IMF report shows that Zimbabwe’s economy performed the worst in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019. Its prognosis is disheartening, showing that if </p>
<blockquote>
<p>…governance, and corruption challenges, entrenched vested interests, and enforcement of the rule of law, (were not observed) then…there is little prospect of a major improvement to Zimbabwe’s economic and financial challenges in the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">short to medium term …</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The dire economic situation is further worsened by the fact that the country is suffering its <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/03/zimbabwe-in-economic-and-humanitarian-crisis-as-imf-sounds-alarm.html">worst hunger crisis in a decade</a>, largely due to an ongoing drought that started last year. The shortage of essential foods, such as the staple maize meal, often results in stampedes at the few <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/millers-avail-40-000t-maize-for-roller-meal/">markets</a> where they can still be found. </p>
<h2>Zimbabwe’s informal sector</h2>
<p>Two decades of economic turmoil have seen Zimbabwe’s formal economic sector shrinking significantly. For example, manufacturing, clothing and textile industries have almost totally collapsed, with factories reduced to <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/SET-Outlook-for-Zimbabwe-Economy_Sep2017.pdf">dilapidated shells</a>.</p>
<p>The consequence is that the informal sector has grown exponentially. It’s estimated that a staggering 90% of Zimbabwe’s working population is <a href="https://set.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/SET-Outlook-for-Zimbabwe-Economy_Sep2017.pdf">employed in this sector</a>. </p>
<p>I have been doing <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&hl=en">research</a> on Zimbabwe’s informal sector for the last 12 years. I have found that it sustains many families’ livelihoods, even though the majority of participants in the sector live from hand to mouth as petty traders. This reality that confronts Zimbabwe’s informal economy is corroborated by <a href="https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/simbabwe/13714.pdf">research</a> by the Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>In addition, almost everyone who is employed in the formal economy augments their income through informal sector activities such as <a href="https://scholar.google.co.za/citations?user=sQSjKP0AAAAJ&hl=en">cross-border trading</a>.</p>
<p>Reliable numbers are hard to come by, but a very high number of Zimbabweans <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/zimbabwe-economy-founders-millennials-eke-living-190910134415766.html">eke out a living in this sector</a>, or rely on it for food, clothing, fuel, local currency and forex. </p>
<h2>Stern test</h2>
<p>The lockdown in Zimbabwe is going to provide a stern test for its informal economy, which is the country’s dominant economy. Most traders are subsistence traders and are already mired in extreme poverty. The jury is out on the extent to which they will observe the lockdown. </p>
<p>The government should immediately put in place a stimulus package that can cushion the informal economy. </p>
<p>Otherwise, a lot of livelihoods are going to be destroyed. The ramifications for the country and the whole region, especially neighbouring South Africa, will be grim.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-deepening-crisis-time-for-second-government-of-national-unity-122726">Zimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?</a>
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</em>
</p>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/135066/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>
The current lockdown in Zimbabwe is going to provide a stern test for its informal economy, which is the country’s dominant economy and employs 90% of people.
Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/123053
2019-09-10T08:40:39Z
2019-09-10T08:40:39Z
Xenophobia: time for cool heads to prevail in Nigeria and South Africa
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291544/original/file-20190909-109943-1h6fkvp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C152%2C1628%2C1044&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, left, with his Nigerian counterpart Muhammadu Buhari in late August in Japan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/48663894001/in/photolist-2h9eocY-2h9gXVu-2h9eobW-2h9gbpo-2h9gXSZ-2h9eo89-2h9gbmT-2h9eo7s-2h9gXNk-2h9eo4w-2h9gbgc-2h9enLn-2hc93x8">GCIS/Flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The latest <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/live-peace-migrants-fearful-sa-attacks-190904051255164.html">xenophobic attacks</a> in South Africa have ignited the long-standing tensions between the country and Nigeria. These are captured in the retaliatory attacks on <a href="https://www.biznews.com/global-investing/2019/09/05/xenophobia-mtn-shoprite-nigeria-ramaphosa-tweets">South African businesses in Nigeria</a> and the diplomatic outrage by Nigerian authorities.</p>
<p>Nigeria also boycotted the recent World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting <a href="https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/350546-breaking-nigeria-recalls-ambassador-to-south-africa.html">in Cape Town</a>. More critical was the temporary closure of South African missions in <a href="https://www.thesouthafrican.com/videos/xenophobia-nigeria-shoprite-attacks-video/;https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerians-attack-south-african-businesses-retaliation">Abuja and Lagos</a> and Nigeria’s decision to <a href="https://punchng.com/breaking-xenophobia-nigeria-recalls-ambassador-to-south-africa-shuns-wes/">recall its ambassador</a>. </p>
<p>But in the larger scheme of things, xenophobia is a distraction from the leadership role that Nigeria and South Africa should play on the continent on fundamental issues of immigration and economic integration.</p>
<h2>A constant irritant</h2>
<p>Accurate figures are hard to get. But Statistics South Africa put the number of Nigerian migrants at <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201908150322.html">about 30,000</a> in 2016, far below Zimbabweans and Mozambicans.</p>
<p>Xenophobia has remained a constant irritant in Nigeria-South Africa relations since the major attacks on African migrants in poor neighbourhoods in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/world/africa/20safrica.html">in 2008</a> and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/report-blames-media-xenophobic-panic-africa-160406102827284.html">2015</a>. But, contrary to popular perception, xenophobic attacks do not disproportionately target Nigerians. Nigerians often exaggerate the effect of violence on their citizens. That is probably because Nigeria has a better organised, savvy, and loud <a href="https://punchng.com/killing-of-nigerians-in-south-africa-will-no-longer-be-tolerated-fg-warns-sa/">diaspora constituency</a> in South Africa.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, the loudness of the Nigerian diaspora transforms victimhood into foreign policy, generating the reactions that have been witnessed recently. It also plays into the naïve narrative of the <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/south-africa-should-be-eternally-grateful-to-nigeria-for-defeating-apartheid">“liberation dividend”</a>. This entails Nigerians seeking to be treated uniquely because of their contribution to the struggle for majority rule in South Africa. There were no such expectations from the other countries that supported South Africa’s liberation struggle.</p>
<p>This narrative has taken on an equally economic tinge. South African companies are heavily invested in Nigeria. So, they often become targets of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190905-nigeria-south-africa-businesses-attacks-xenophobic-violence">Nigerian ire</a> in times of xenophobia. </p>
<p>The accurate picture is that <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/south-africa-years-of-impunity-for-xenophobic-crimes-driving-the-latest-attacks/">xenophobia affects all African migrants</a>. These are mostly migrants from Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and, increasingly Ethiopians, Kenyans and Somalis. Nigerians are affected. But they’re not on top of the list.</p>
<p>The Nigerian responses are understandable in light of the <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/enough-is-enough-says-nigerian-govt-over-violent-attacks-in-south-africa-20190903">frequency of these attacks</a>. But, it is important to <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-research-reveals-about-drivers-of-anti-immigrant-hate-crime-in-south-africa-123097">probe the drivers of xenophobia</a> to understand it more deeply.</p>
<h2>What drives xenophobia?</h2>
<p>First, some <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12288405">studies reveal</a> that the intrusion of foreign migrants into vulnerable communities beset by joblessness and despair inevitability produces <a href="https://www.polity.org.za/article/unemployment-and-immigration-in-south-africa-2013-05-24">a tinderbox</a> that <a href="https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/3186">sparks violence </a>. </p>
<p>Migrants are easy targets. That’s because they are seen as being better off by the locals. They therefore become targets of people who feel their circumstances have not been addressed by government. It is no surprise that xenophobic attacks have typically occurred in poor <a href="https://theconversation.com/protests-soar-amid-unmet-expectations-in-south-africa-42013">neighbourhoods that have been affected</a> by service delivery protests since the mid-2000s.</p>
<p>Second, xenophobia thrives on ineffective policing in South Africa. Barely two days after the Johannesburg attacks started, the national police spokesman admitted that the police were running out of resources to manage the violence. This prompted the Premier of Gauteng, the country’s economic hub, to threaten to also <a href="https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/riots-in-gauteng-draining-police-resources-20190903">deploy the army</a> if the violence continued.</p>
<p>Examples of the police’s inability to maintain order and respond to threats to property and livelihoods are <a href="https://city-press.news24.com/News/xenophobia-police-have-no-plan-as-crime-intelligence-is-caught-napping-20190909">legion</a>. This, in part, forces people to <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africa-can-turn-the-rising-tide-against-vigilantism-72986">take the law into their own hands</a>. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/how-south-africa-can-turn-the-rising-tide-against-vigilantism-72986">How South Africa can turn the rising tide against vigilantism</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But the police are sometimes complicit in stoking anti-foreign sentiments. The July 2019 raids on foreign-owned businesses in Johannesburg in apparent efforts to <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/08/08/gauteng-top-cop-vows-to-remove-counterfeit-good-from-joburg-cbd">stamp out illicit goods</a> added to the current climate of xenophobia. When some business owners retaliated against the police, some local leaders appropriated the language of “threats on South Africa’s sovereignty” to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/police-union-condemns-mob-attack-on-police-in-johannesburg-30264628">justify the police response</a>. </p>
<p>Reforms are urgently needed to create a competent, less corrupt, better-resourced, and civic-minded police service. </p>
<p>Xenophobia is also an outcome of a rickety migration and border control regime. Efficient border controls are one of the hallmarks of sovereignty and the first line of defence against xenophobia. Broken borders breed criminality. These include <a href="http://www.702.co.za/articles/308313/human-trafficking-rife-in-south-africa-with-more-women-lured-into-dens">human</a> and <a href="https://www.news.uct.ac.za/article/-2017-05-16-migration-of-the-nigerian-mafia">drug</a> trafficking. Human and drug trafficking feature prominently in the discourse on xenophobia in South Africa.</p>
<p>How, then, does xenophobia distract South Africa and Nigeria from what should be their leadership on core African issues?</p>
<h2>Overreaction</h2>
<p>The weighty issues of creating a humane and just society for South Africans and migrants alike will ultimately be led by the South African government. Outsiders can make some diplomatic noises and occasionally boycott South Africa. But these actions are unlikely to drive vital change. </p>
<p>In fact, the <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/09/03/zambia-cancels-bafana-friendly-due-to-attacks-on-foreign-nationals">overreactions</a> by Nigeria and other African countries simply undercut the South African constituencies that have a crucial stake in wide-ranging reforms that address the multiplicity of problems around xenophobia.</p>
<p>In the previous instances of xenophobic violence, Nigeria urged the African Union (AU) to force South Africa to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/nigerians-africa-living-fear-attacks-170221155456218.html">take action</a>. But such unhelpful statements only inflame passions and prevent civil diplomatic discourse.</p>
<p>Instead, the best policy would be for Nigeria to engage South Africa through their existing <a href="http://www.dirco.gov.za/abuja/bilateral.html">binational commission</a>. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari is scheduled to visit South Africa next month.</p>
<h2>Taking the lead</h2>
<p>Rather than the perennial relapse into shouting matches and hardening of rhetoric, it is essential for Pretoria and Abuja to take decisive leadership at the continental level. The two nations must articulate immigration policies. </p>
<p>The newly-inaugurated AU <a href="https://www.ilo.org/africa/areas-of-work/labour-migration/policy-frameworks/WCMS_671953/lang--en/index.htm">Free Movement of Persons Protocol</a> will not be implemented if South Africa and Nigeria do not join hands to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/belt-and-road/tito-mboweni-has-called-for-the-free-movement-of-africans-within-the-continent-31930766">make it a reality</a>. More ominously, migration to South Africa as the premier African economy will only get worse in the coming years. This, as Europe and the United States tighten their borders <a href="https://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/financial/2019/05/23/op-ed-the-future-of-africas-diaspora-is-in-africa/">against African migrants</a>.</p>
<p>Also, without the leadership of its two major economies, Africa is not going to make any traction on the new treaty establishing the African Continental <a href="https://theconversation.com/more-work-lies-ahead-to-make-africas-new-free-trade-area-succeed-118135">Free Trade Agreement</a>. Ironically, the WEF meeting in Cape Town addressed ways to boost intra-African trade. Nigeria should not have boycotted it because of xenophobia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123053/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gilbert M. Khadiagala does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
South Africa and Nigeria need to lead policy debates on long term measures to address migration in Africa.
Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations and Director of the African Centre for the Study of the United States (ACSUS), University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/121596
2019-09-06T09:08:13Z
2019-09-06T09:08:13Z
Robert Gabriel Mugabe: a man whose list of failures is legion
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/287334/original/file-20190808-144862-11u42pa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe, former President of Zimbabwe, addressing media in Harare, in July 2018.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>One wishes one could say “rest in peace”. One can only say, “may there be more peace for Zimbabwe’s people, now that <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Gabriel Mugabe</a> has retired permanently”. Zimbabwe’s former president <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">has died</a>, aged 95.</p>
<p>His failures are legion. They might start with the 1980s Gukurahundi massacres in Matabeleland and the Midlands, with perhaps <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">20 000 people killed</a>. Next, too much welfare spending <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/reviews/59-becoming-zimbabwe?start=10">in the 1980s</a>. Then crudely implemented <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289336044_The_Economic_Structural_Adjustment_Programme_The_Case_of_Zimbabwe_1990-1995">structural adjustment programmes</a> in the 1990s, laying the ground for angry war veterans and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a strong labour union and civil society based opposition party.</p>
<p>In 1997 Mugabe handed out unbudgeted pensions to the war-vets and promised to really start the “fast track land reform” that got going <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287199114_The_impact_of_land_reform_in_Zimbabwe_on_the_conservation_of_cheetahs_and_other_large_carnivores">in 2000</a>, when the MDC threatened to defeat Zanu (PF) at the polls. That abrogation of property rights started the slide in the Zimbabwean dollar’s value.</p>
<p>From 1998 to 2003 Zimbabwe’s participation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s second war cost US$1 million a day, creating a military cabal used to getting money fast. Speedy money printing presses led to <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/file%20uploads%20/hany_besada_zimbabwe_picking_up_the_piecesbook4you.pdf">unfathomable hyperinflation</a> and the end of Zimbabwe’s sovereign currency, still the albatross around the country’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48757080">neck</a>. </p>
<p>In 2008, the MDC’s electoral victory was reversed with a presidential run-off when at least 170 opposition supporters were murdered. Hundreds more were beaten and <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/elec/rau_critique_zec_elec_report_090612.pdf">chased from their homes</a>. Even Mugabe’s regional support base could not stand for that, so he was forced to accept a <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2013/07/15/review-the-hard-road-to-reform-the-politics-of-zimbabwes-global-political-agreement-reviewed-by-timothy-scarnecchia/">transitional inclusive government</a> with the MDC.</p>
<p>Over the next decade, Mugabe was unable to stop his party’s increasing faction fighting. His years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself <a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f05aec20-6d98-425a-8d82-56688ea93246/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=State%2Bintelligence%2Band%2Bthe%2Bpolitics%2Bof%2BZimbabwe%2527s%2Bpresidential%2Bsuccession.pdf&type_of_work=Journal+article">finally wore too thin</a>. When in early November 2017, at his wife Grace’s instigation, he fired his long-time lapdog Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the generals with whom he’d colluded for decades turned on him. A <em>coup petit</em> ensued and returned Mnangagwa from exile, soon to be elevated to the presidency and heavily indebted to his comrades.</p>
<p>Where did Mugabe gain his proclivity for factionalism? And how did he learn to speak the language all wanted to hear – only to make them realise they had been deluded in the end? </p>
<h2>The beginning</h2>
<p>Mugabe and many other Zimbabwean nationalists were jailed in 1964. Ian Smith was preparing for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the first nationalist party had split into Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union and Ndabaningi Sithole’s Zanu. Mugabe had been Nkomo’s Publicity Secretary. </p>
<p>As far back as 1962, Mugabe was registering on the global scales: Salisbury’s resident British diplomat <a href="https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9781137543448#aboutAuthors">thought Mugabe was</a> “a sinister figure” heading up a youthful “Zimbabwean Liberation Army … the more extreme wing of Zapu”. </p>
<p>But almost as soon as Mugabe was imprisoned, a man in her majesty’s employ travelled down from his advisory post in newly free Zambia to visit the prisoner. Dennis Grennan returned to Lusaka having <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/opin/080120dm.asp?sector=OPIN&year=2008&range_start=571">promised</a> to look after Mugabe’s wife Sarah, known as “Sally”. Grennan and people like Julius Nyerere’s British friend and assistant <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3518465.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4d7659d7e9f1b2a3dd3124c9a249a47c">Joan Wicken</a> played an important role in Mugabe’s rise. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwean nationalists emerged from Salisbury’s prisons late in 1974, as Portugal’s coup led to Angola and Mozambique emerging from colonialism into the Soviet orbit. The fifties generation of Zimbabwean nationalists were to participate in the Zambian and South African inspired détente <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1975/03/25/archives/mr-vorsters-detente.html">exercise</a>. This inspired much competition for Zanu’s leadership: Mugabe arrived in Lusaka after ousting Ndabaningi Sithole, Zanu’s first leader. </p>
<p>Samora Machel, freshly in Mozambique’s top office, wondered if Mugabe’s quick rise was due to a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40201256.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1d1f7a14b762adff6a6007321af29132">“coup in prison”</a>. Herbert Chitepo’s March 1975 <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3557400.pdf">assassination </a> (which got many of Zanu’s leaders arrested and its army kicked out of Zambia) was only one marker of the many fissures in the fractious party that by 1980 would rule Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In late 1975 the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Vashandi_"><em>vashandi</em></a> group emerged within the Zimbabwean People’s Army. Based in Mozambique’s guerrilla camps, they tried to forge unity between Zimbabwe’s two main nationalist armies and push a left-wing agenda. They were profoundly unsure of Mugabe’s suitability for <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2016/08/08/heroes-day-review-dzino-memories-freedom-fighter/">leadership</a>.</p>
<p>When Mugabe found his way to Mozambique also in late 1975, Machel put him under house arrest in Quelimane, far from the guerrilla camps. In January Grennan helped him to London to visit a hospitalised Sally. He made contacts around Europe and with a few <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03057078008708020">London-based Maoists</a>.</p>
<p>Soon after Mugabe’s return the young American congressman Stephen Solarz and the Deputy Head of the American embassy in Maputo, Johnnie Carson, wended their way to <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2014.956499">Quelimane</a>. Mugabe wowed them.</p>
<p>Solarz and Carson reported back that Mugabe was “an impressive, articulate and extremely confident individual” with a “philosophical approach to problems and … well reasoned arguments”. He claimed to control the “people’s army”. Yet by January 1977, he persuaded Samora Machel to imprison the young advocates of unity with Zapu. His many reasons included their initial refusal to support him at a late 1976 conference in Geneva organised by the British, helped immeasurably by Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State. </p>
<p>At a hastily called congress in March 1977 to consecrate his ascension, Mugabe uttered his leitmotif: those appearing to attempt a change to the party’s leadership by “maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks” would be struck by the <a href="http://www.aluka.org/action/showMetadata?doi=10.5555/AL.SFF.DOCUMENT.nuzn197707">“the Zanu axe”</a>.</p>
<p>This was Mugabe’s strategy, embedded at an early stage: tell foreign emissaries what they wanted to hear, use young radicals (or older allies) until their usefulness subsided, and then get rid of them. All the while he would balance the other forces contending for power in the party amid a general climate of fear, distrust, and paranoia. </p>
<h2>Dealing with dissent</h2>
<p>It is not certain if Margaret Thatcher knew about this side of Mugabe when they met less than a month after his April 1980 inauguration. He seemed most worried about how Joshua Nkomo’s Zapu – which he had dumped from the erstwhile “Patriotic Front”, and the violence against which had put Zimbabwe’s election in some doubt – was making life difficult for the new rulers. He <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2016.1214116">warned</a> that he might have “to act against them soon”.</p>
<p>In as much as Zapu was linked with the South African ANC and Thatcher and her colleagues tended to think the ANC was controlled by the South African Communist Party, Zapu intelligence chief <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-tribute-to-zimbabwean-liberation-hero-dumiso-dabengwa-117986">Dumiso Dabengwa’s</a> perspective might be more than conspiracy theory. Perhaps Thatcher’s wink and nudge was a green light for the anti-Soviet contingent to eliminate a regional threat. Gukurahundi <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1309561">followed</a>. It was certainly the biggest blot on Mugabe’s career and created the biggest scar over Zimbabwe. The scar is still there, given the lack of any effort at reconcialitation, truth, or justice.</p>
<p>Four years later the ruling party’s first real congress since 1963 reviewed its history. Mugabe tore the Zipa/Vashandi group that had annoyed him eight years before to shreds. “Treacherous … counter-revolutionary … arms caching … dubbed us all <em>zvigananda</em> or bourgeois”. Thus it “became imperative for us to firmly act against them in defending the Party and the Revolution… We had all the trouble-makers detained”. </p>
<p>The great helmsman recounted the youthful dissenters’ arrest and repeated the axe phraseology. </p>
<p>But few saw these sides of Mugabe’s character soon enough; those who did were summarily shut up. </p>
<h2>The end</h2>
<p>After he’d been ousted, Mugabe could only look on in seeming despair over the ruination he had created. Sanctimonious as ever he wondered how his successor, current President Emmerson Mnangagwa, had become such an ogre. At his 95th birthday, February 21 2019, a few weeks after Mnangagwa’s troops had killed 17 demonstrators, raped as many women, and beaten hundreds more in the wake of his beleaguered finance minister’s methods to create <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">“prosperity from austerity”</a>, Mugabe <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-156949.html">mused to his absent successor</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We condemn the violence on civilians by soldiers … You can’t do without seeing dead bodies? What kind of a person are you? You feed on death? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He only had to look into his own history to see what kind of people he helped create.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/121596/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Robert Mugabe’s years of playing one group off against the other to favour himself finally wore too thin in 2017.
David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of Johannesburg, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/108103
2019-09-06T05:39:36Z
2019-09-06T05:39:36Z
Robert Mugabe: as divisive in death as he was in life
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291235/original/file-20190906-175663-u64qs1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Robert Mugabe during his swearing-in ceremony in Harare, 2008. The former Zimbabwean president has died aged 95.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Robert Mugabe, the former president of Zimbabwe, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/09/06/377714687/robert-mugabe-veteran-president-of-zimbabwe-dead-at-95">has died</a>. Mugabe was 95, and had been struggling with ill health for some time. The country’s current President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced Mugabe’s death on Twitter on September 6:</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1169839308406054912"}"></div></p>
<p>The responses to Mnangagwa’s announcement were immediate and widely varied. Some hailed Mugabe as a liberation hero. Others dismissed him as a “monster”. This suggests that Mugabe will be as divisive a figure in death as he was in life.</p>
<p>The official mantra of the Zimbabwe government and its Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) will emphasise his leadership of the struggle to overthrow <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ian-Smith">Ian Smith’s</a> racist settler regime in what was then Rhodesia. It will also extol his subsequent championing of the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00358530500082916">seizure of white-owned farms</a> and the return of land into African hands.</p>
<p>In contrast, critics will highlight how – after initially <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hd4n.7?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">preaching racial reconciliation</a> after the liberation war in <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Rhodesian_Bush_War">December 1979 </a> – Mugabe threw away the promise of the early independence years. He did this in several ways, among them a <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">brutal clampdown</a> on political opposition in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Matabeleland in the 1980s</a>, and Zanu-PF’s systematic <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">rigging of elections</a> to keep he and his cronies in power. </p>
<p>They’ll also mention the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321704136_The_Curse_Of_Corruption_In_Zimbabwe">massive corruption</a> over which he presided, and the <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/costs-and-causes-zimbabwes-crisis">economy’s disastrous downward plunge</a> during his presidency.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the focus will primarily be on his domestic record. Yet many of those who will sing his praises as a <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/201709220815.html">hero of African nationalism</a> will be from elsewhere on the continent. So where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?</p>
<h2>Slide into despotism</h2>
<p>Most African countries have been independent of colonial rule for <a href="https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2010/weighing-half-century-independence">half a century or more</a>.</p>
<p>The early African nationalist leaders were often regarded as gods at independence. Yet they very quickly came to be perceived as having feet of very heavy clay.</p>
<p>Nationalist leaders symbolised African freedom and liberation. But few were to prove genuinely tolerant of democracy and diversity. One party rule, nominally in the name of “the people”, became widespread. In some cases, it was linked to interesting experiments in one-party democracy, as seen in Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda. </p>
<p>Even in these cases, intolerance and authoritarianism <a href="https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/doorenspleet/opd/">eventually encroached</a>.
Often, party rule was <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/159875?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">succeeded by military coups</a>.</p>
<p>In Zimbabwe’s case, Mugabe proved unable to shift the country, as he had wished, to one-partyism. However, this did not prevent Zanu-PF becoming increasingly intolerant over the years in response to both economic crisis and rising opposition. Successive elections were shamelessly perverted. </p>
<p>When, despite this, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">Zanu-PF lost control of parliament</a> in 2008, it responded by rigging the presidential election in a campaign of unforgivable brutality. Under Mugabe, the potential for democracy was snuffed out by a brutal despotism.</p>
<h2>A wasted inheritance</h2>
<p>Whether the economic policies they pursued were ostensibly capitalist or socialist, the early African nationalist leaders presided over <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/78">rapid economic decline</a>, following an initial period of relative prosperity after independence. </p>
<p>In retrospect, it’s widely recognised that the challenges they faced were immense. Most post-colonial economies were underdeveloped and depended upon the export of a small number of agricultural or mineral commodities. From the 1970s, growth was crowded out by the International Monetary Fund demanding that mounting debts be surmounted through the pursuit of <a href="https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/structural-adjustment/">structural adjustment programmes</a>. This hindered spending on infrastructure as well as <a href="http://www.globalissues.org/article/3/structural-adjustment-a-major-cause-of-poverty">social services and education</a> and swelled political discontent.</p>
<p>In contrast, Mugabe inherited a viable, relatively broad-based economy that included substantial industrial and prosperous commercial agricultural sectors. Even though these were largely white controlled, there was far greater potential for development than in most other post-colonial African countries. </p>
<p>But, through massive corruption and mismanagement, his government threw that potential away. He also presided over a disastrous downward spiral of the economy, which saw both industry and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/a-seized-zimbabwe-farm-is-returned-but-uncertainty-reigns-20180301">commercial agriculture collapse</a>. The economy has never recovered and remains in a state of acute and persistent crisis today.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-economy-is-collapsing-why-mnangagwa-doesnt-have-the-answers-104960">Zimbabwe's economy is collapsing: why Mnangagwa doesn't have the answers</a>
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<h2>Reputation</h2>
<p>On the political front, the rule of some leaders – like <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/milton-obotes-lasting-legacy-to-uganda/a-19191275">Milton Obote in Uganda</a> and <a href="https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/">Siad Barre in Somalia</a> – created so much conflict that coups and crises drove their countries into civil war. Zimbabwe under Mugabe was spared this fate – but perhaps only because the political opposition in Matabeleland in the 1980s was so brutalised after up to <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">30 000 people were killed</a>, that they shrank from more conflict. Peace, then, was merely the absence of outright war.</p>
<p>Some leaders, notably Ghana’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kwame-Nkrumah">Kwame Nkrumah</a> and <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/former-tanzanian-president-julius-nyerere-dies">Julius Nyerere</a> in Tanzania, are still revered for their commitments to national independence and African unity. This is despite the fact that, domestically, their records were marked by failure. By 1966, when Nkrumah was <a href="https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/2/23/february-24-1966-dr-kwame-nkrumah-overthrown-as-president-of-the-republic-of-ghana">displaced by a military coup</a>, his one-party rule had become politically corrupt and repressive. </p>
<p>Despite this, Nyerere always retained his reputation for personal integrity and commitment to African development. Both Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s ideas continue to inspire younger generations of political activists, while other post-independence leaders’ names are largely forgotten.</p>
<p>Will Mugabe be similarly feted by later generations? Will the enormous flaws of his rule be forgotten amid celebrations of his unique role in the liberation of southern Africa as a whole? </p>
<h2>A Greek tragedy</h2>
<p>The problem for pan-Africanist historians who rush to praise Mugabe is that they will need to repudiate the contrary view of the millions of Zimbabweans who have suffered under his rule or have fled the country to escape it. He contributed no political ideas that have lasted. He inherited the benefits as well as the costs of settler rule but reduced his country to penury. He destroyed the best of its institutional inheritance, notably an efficient civil service, which could have been put to good use for all.</p>
<p>The cynics would say that the reputation of <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/patrice-emery-lumumba">Patrice Lumumba</a>, as an African revolutionary and fighter for Congolese unity has lasted because he was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/patrice-lumumba-50th-anniversary-assassination">assassinated in 1961</a>. In other words, he had the historical good fortune to die young, without the burden of having made major and grievous mistakes.</p>
<p>In contrast, there are many who would say that Mugabe simply lived too long, and his life was one of Greek tragedy: his early promise and virtue marked him out as popular hero, but he died a monster whom history will condemn.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/108103/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Roger Southall receives funding from the National Research Foundation </span></em></p>
Where should we place Mugabe among the pantheon of African nationalists who led their countries to independence?
Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/122726
2019-09-05T09:02:06Z
2019-09-05T09:02:06Z
Zimbabwe’s deepening crisis: time for second government of national unity?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290911/original/file-20190904-175686-v3skdk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Many Zimbabweans have turned to hawking to keep the wolf from the door as the economic crisis in the country deepens. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe is going through its worst socio-economic and political crisis in two decades. Crippling daily power outages of <a href="https://www.biznews.com/africa/2019/08/05/zimbabwe-tipping-point-economic-crisis">up to 18 hours</a> and erratic supply of clean water are just some of the most obvious signs. Meanwhile, an inflation rate of over 500% has put the prices of basic goods beyond the reach of most people.</p>
<p>Hopes that the end of President Robert Mugabe’s ruinous rule in November 2017 would help put the country on a new path of peace and prosperity have long <a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">dissipated</a>. Efforts by his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa to <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">attract foreign investors</a>, who are critical in reviving Zimbabwe’s ailing economy, have also largely failed.</p>
<p>The situation has not been helped by the rejection of the 2018 presidential election results by the main opposition party. The Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) claims the governing Zanu-PF stole the elections even though the results were <a href="https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Regional-observers-Zimbabwe-election-free-and-fair/4552902-4692254-e75fje/index.html">endorsed</a> as free and fair by the African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Only the European Union observers were somewhat circumspect <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/eu-observers-say-zimbabwe-election-fell-short-on-fairness-20181010">in their assessment</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
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<p>The opposition alliance has been calling for Mnangagwa’s government to relinquish power, and a <a href="https://www.openparly.co.zw/chamisa-calls-for-national-trasitional-authority/">national transitional authority</a> appointed to run the country for at least two years, or until the 2023 general elections.</p>
<p>How individuals who will sit on the national transitional authority will be chosen and by whom, is not clear. But the party and <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/01/towards-the-national-transitional-authority/">some academics</a> believe such a transitional authority would normalise Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political situation and help it revive its relations with the West.</p>
<p>The opposition may have a point on re-engagement with the West. This is key to helping end the investment drought that started in earnest <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.908.3003&rep=rep1&type=pdf">between 2000 and 2003</a> under sanctions imposed by Western countries for human rights violations linked to Zanu-PF’s violent land reform seizures and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/03/zimbabwe.andrewmeldrum">election rigging</a>.</p>
<p>But the transitional authority idea is doomed to fail because of lack of buy-in by Zanu-PF. So, it’s time to consider a more viable alternative path to peace for Zimbabwe.</p>
<h2>Clamping down</h2>
<p>For now, the government has dismissed talk of a transitional authority as unconstitutional. Instead, in May it launched its own platform, called the <a href="https://www.panafricanvisions.com/2019/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-launches-the-political-actors-dialogue-to-address-long-term-economic-challenges/">Political Actors Dialogue</a>. The forum comprises 17 small political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. </p>
<p>The main opposition party is boycotting the process on grounds that Mnangagwa is an illegitimate president. Recently, it attempted to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi-gdPunLfkAhXfSBUIHdWZCeIQFjAEegQIBBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-africa-49366224&usg=AOvVaw0fkr2f1y4BV0-4W2SlJHGY">embark on public protests</a> in the hope of bringing the government to its knees. The protests fell flat after being blocked by the courts and the police.</p>
<p>It boggles the mind why the MDC-A, led by Nelson Chamisa, insists on marches when previous attempts were crushed with brute force. These led to deaths in <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=21&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwingbiQ87TkAhVsZhUIHWexAsIQFjAUegQICBAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.news24.com%2FAfrica%2FZimbabwe%2Fzimbabwean-generals-deny-troops-shot-and-killed-6-protesters-20181113&usg=AOvVaw02nyk1uLwat64nJso2EImF">August 2018</a> and <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwicyIfl87TkAhV9SBUIHXzrAC4QFjAAegQIAhAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmg.co.za%2Farticle%2F2019-01-30-zim-army-responsible-for-murders-rapes-report&usg=AOvVaw1fiTJ2kraC9xNiMyQ4TBM6">January 2019</a>. </p>
<p>The Zanu-PF regime has always clamped down heavily on perceived threats to its rule since 1980. Why then does the MDC-A continue to endanger people’s lives through this deadly route as a way of resolving Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crises?</p>
<p>I firmly believe that the opposition needs to change tack and focus on entering into dialogue with the government. </p>
<h2>Dialogue and unity government</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis requires the two leading political protagonists - Mnangagwa and Chamisa - to enter into serious dialogue. Both leaders need to soften their hard-line stances towards each other and put the people of Zimbabwe first.</p>
<p>There’s a precedent for this. Ten years ago, then South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to bring then President Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiMheeVnrfkAhVXShUIHeBIDw04ChAWMAB6BAgAEAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.france24.com%2Fen%2F20080721-mbeki-harare-mediate-talks-zimbabwe-political-crisis&usg=AOvVaw2pLPeTVwBEVrH2TSAcW5e3">negotiation table</a>. </p>
<p>The talks culminated in the formation of the government of national unity that ran Zimbabwe from February 2009 to July 2013, with Mugabe as the President and Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister. The unity government was fairly successful and managed to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiv9PjanrfkAhUUTBUIHQR0D0cQFjAJegQIABAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theindependent.co.zw%2F2013%2F07%2F11%2Freflecting-on-positive-zimbabwe-gnu-moments%2F&usg=AOvVaw25plQQHFWt-5PTjI9_Fi6J">stabilise the economy</a>.</p>
<p>Two decades of suffering have shown that it is not the threat of protests or sanctions from the West that can move Zanu-PF to change, but neighbouring countries under the aegis of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwia1fucj7HkAhWnRhUIHcY8Dvc4ChAWMAB6BAgAEAI&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.fes.de%2Fpdf-files%2Fbueros%2Fmosambik%2F07874.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2PSzn2eTrgI53Cnw2yrI2t">SADC</a>. South Africa is pivotal in this regard as the region’s strongest economic and military power. </p>
<p>It’s time to experiment with a second government of national unity for Zimbabwe. But for this to happen, SADC and South Africa must have the appetite to intervene in Zimbabwe. This is currently lacking. </p>
<h2>Dialogue in Zimbabwe’s history</h2>
<p>Historically, dialogue has moved Zimbabwe forward as a nation during its darkest hours. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>A year before independence in 1980, battle-hardened guerrilla commanders agreed to talk to the then Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, to end Zimbabwe’s liberation war even though they were convinced that they were winning. </p></li>
<li><p>In 1987 Joshua Nkomo, who was the leader of the main opposition party, the Zimbabwean African People’s Union, agreed to talk to his political nemesis, then Prime Minister Mugabe. Yet before this, he had been hounded out of the country by Mugabe in the mid-80s, and <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">thousands of his supporters killed</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>More recently in 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai agreed to enter into a unity government with Mugabe, despite winning the first round of the <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-10-00-zim-2008-election-taken-by-a-gun-not-a-pen">2008 elections</a>. The unity government briefly resuscitated and stabilised Zimbabwe’s fragile economy. Hyperinflation was tamed, basic commodities became available again and people regained purchasing power.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>The way forward</h2>
<p>Given the MDC-A’s positive contribution during its brief stint in the 2009-2013 unity government, the party should be expending its energies on dialogue. The main opposition party can enter into a second government of national unity, but continue building and strengthening its own support.</p>
<p>In the same vein, Zanu-PF also needs to realise that without the involvement of the MDC-A, its attempts to revive the economy and end the strife in the country, on its own terms, are destined to fail.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>
It’s time for a new approach as it becomes increasingly clear that protests won’t topple the Zanu-PF government.
Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/122139
2019-08-21T09:42:34Z
2019-08-21T09:42:34Z
Repression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren’t working
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288885/original/file-20190821-170927-slrpli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's crisis is deepening on all fronts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">globalnewsart.com/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the November 2017 coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the elections in 2018, the regime of President Emmerson Mnangagwa has forged two forms of rule. These have been based on coercion on the one hand, and on the other dialogue.</p>
<p>Following the 2018 general elections and <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1800/Zimbabwe-the-2018-elections-and-their-aftermath/">the violence that marked its aftermath</a>, the Mnangagwa regime once again resorted to coercion in the face of the protests in January 2019. The protests were in response to the deepening <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-06-zimbabwe-hikes-fuel-prices-by-26-percent/">economic crisis in the country</a>, and part of the opposition strategy to contest the legitimacy of the government. </p>
<p>The response of the state to the protests was swift and brutal. Seventeen people were killed and 954 jailed nationwide. In May the state turned its attention to civic leaders, arresting seven for “subverting” a constitutional government. The repressive state response was felt once again on 16 and 19 August, when the main opposition Movement for Democratic Chance (MDC) and civic activists were once again prevented from marching against the <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/police-soldiers-deploy-in-zimbabwe's-bulawayo-as-opposition-challenges-protest-ban/">rapid deterioration of Zimbabwe’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>These coercive acts represent a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era.</p>
<p>At the same time Mnangagwa has pursued his objective of global re-engagement and selective national dialogue. This is in line with the narrative that has characterised the post-coup regime.</p>
<p>In tracking the dialogue strategy of the Mnangagwa government, it is apparent that it was no accident that key elements of it were set in motion in the same period as the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new staff monitored programme. </p>
<p>The purported objective is to move the Zimbabwe Government towards an economic stabilisation programme. This would result in a more balanced budget, in a context in which excessive printing of money, rampant issuing of treasury bills and high inflation, were the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/05/31/Zimbabwe-Staff-Monitored-Program-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-46952">hallmarks of Mugabe’s economic policies</a>. </p>
<p>The dialogue initiatives also took place in the context of renewed discussions on re-engagement with the European Union (EU) in June this year.</p>
<p>But, Mnangagwa’s strategy of coercion and dialogue has hit a series of hurdles. These include the continued opposition by the MDC. Another is the on-going scepticism of the international players about the regime’s so-called reformist narrative.</p>
<h2>Dialogues</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has launched four dialogue initiatives. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Political Actors: This involves about 17 political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. They all have negligible electoral support and are not represented in parliament. The purported intent is to build a national political consensus. The main opposition party, the MDC, boycotted the dialogue, dismissing it as a public relations exercise controlled by the ruling Zanu-PF. </p></li>
<li><p>The Presidential Advisory Council: This was established in January to provide ideas and suggestions on key reforms and measures needed to improve the investment and business climate for economic recovery. This body is largely composed of Mnangagwa allies. </p></li>
<li><p>The Matabeleland collective: This is aimed at building consensus and an effective social movement in Matabeleland to influence national and regional policy in support of healing, peace and reconciliation in this region. But it has come in for some criticisms. One is that it has been drawn into Mnangagwa’s attempt to control the narrative around the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/06/04/gukurahundi-zimbabwe-mnangagwa/">Gukurahundi massacres</a>. These claimed an estimated 20 000 victims in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions in the early 1980’s. Another criticism is that it has exacerbated the divisions within an already weakened civic movement by regionalising what should be viewed as the national issue of the Gukurahundi state violence. </p></li>
<li><p>The Tripartite National Forum. This was launched in June, 20 years after it was <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/building-from-the-rubble">first suggested by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The functions of this body set out in an <a href="https://www.greengazette.co.za/documents/national-gazette-42554-of-28-june-2019-vol-648_20190628-GGN-42554">Act of Parliament</a>, include the requirement to consult and negotiate over social and economic issues and submit recommendations to Cabinet; negotiate a social contract; and generate and promote a shared national socio-economic vision.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The establishment of the forum could provide a good platform for debate and consensus. But there are dangers. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions warned of the long history of the lack of “broad based consultation on past development programmes”. It <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/tnf-launched-20-years-later-amid-visible-tensions">insists that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>reforms must never be deemed as tantamount to erosion of workers’ rights.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The strategy</h2>
<p>In assessing the central objectives of the various strands of Mnangagwa’s dialogue strategy, three factors stand out.</p>
<p>The first is that the Political Actors Dialogue, the Presidential Advisory Council and the Matabeleland Collective were developed to control the pace and narrative around the process of partnership with those players considered “reliable”. Major opposition and civic forces that continued to question the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa boycotted these processes.</p>
<p>Secondly, the formal establishment of the long awaited Tripartite National Forum may serve the purpose of locking the MDC’s major political ally, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions, into a legally constructed economic consensus. The major parameters of this will likely be determined by the macro-economic stabalisation framework of the IMF programme.</p>
<p>When brought together, all these processes place increased pressure on the political opposition to move towards an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa regime, and into a new political consensus dominated by the ruling Zanu-PF’s political and military forces, thus earning them the seal of approval by major international forces.</p>
<p>The MDC has responded with a combined strategy of denying Mnangagwa legitimacy, protests as well as calls for continued global and regional pressure. The MDC believes that the continued decline of the economy will eventually end the dominance of the Mnangagwa regime. </p>
<p>As part of its 2018 election campaign, the MDC made it clear it would accept no other result than a victory for itself and Chamisa. That message has persisted and is a central part of the de-legitimation discourse of the opposition and many civic organisations. The MDC has regularly <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/sikhala-mnangagwa-faces-overthrow-through-citizen-mass-protests/">threatened protests since 2018</a>.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The MDCs strategies have not resulted in any significant progress. The hope that the economic crisis and attempts at mass protests to force Zanu-PF into a dialogue are, for the moment, likely to be met with growing repression. Moreover, the deepening economic crisis is likely to further thwart attempts to mobilise on a mass basis.</p>
<p>The EU, for its part, is still keen on finding a more substantive basis for increased re-engagement with Mnangagwa and will keep the door open. Regarding the US, given the toxic politics of the Trump administration at a global level, and the ongoing <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/trump-administration-condemns-latest-govt-abductions-and-torture-of-opposition-in-zimbabwe/">strictures of the US on the Zimbabwe government</a>, there has been a closing of ranks <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">around a fellow liberation movement</a> in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">recent appointment</a> as Chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Peace and Security in Tanzania will only further cement this solidarity.</p>
<p>There is clearly a strong need for a national dialogue between the major political players in Zimbabwean politics. But there is little sign that this will proceed. Moreover, the current position of regional players means that there is unlikely to be any sustained regional pressure for such talks in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is affiliated with a Zimbabwean NGO Ukuthula Trust. </span></em></p>
The Mnangagwa regime’s coercive acts are a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era, while he seeks global re-engagement and selective national dialogue.
Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/112973
2019-03-10T09:20:04Z
2019-03-10T09:20:04Z
Responses to Zimbabwe highlight gulf between the region and the west
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262191/original/file-20190305-48423-1k7l4u1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa's regime has yet to show it differs from that of Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The post-Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe continues to struggle to establish its legitimacy. While this is the case the terms of its future international re-engagement will continue to occupy the Zanu-PF government.</p>
<p>The government’s problems are compounded by the international outcry over its brutal response to the protests against <a href="https://www.fin24.com/Economy/huge-zim-fuel-price-hike-foreigners-to-pay-in-forex-20190113">massive fuel price hikes</a> in January. At least 16 people died and hundreds were wounded from ‘gunshots, dog bites, <a href="http://kubatana.net/2019/02/03/crimes-humanity-alert-zimbabwe-brink-violations-intensify/">assaults and torture"</a>. </p>
<p>The events of January once again underscored the fault lines in Zimbabwe’s foreign relations. One the one hand the Southern African Development Community came out in support of a member state in the face of clear evidence of state brutality against its citizens. It even went so far as to condemn the continuing <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/sadc-backs-zim-against-onslaught/">“illegal sanctions”</a> against Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>In contrast, the UK, EU and the US all condemned the human rights abuses of the Zimbabwean state. They called for a return to the commitment to political and economic reforms. And they renewed their calls for as inclusive, credible national dialogue to map <a href="http://www.newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk/2019/02/us-slams-ed-govt-over-violence.html">the way forward</a>.</p>
<p>These responses once again show how polarised regional and western government policies are on the Zimbabwe crisis. This has had another consequence – the sidelining of efforts to reach a consensus on economic and political reforms. There have been at least three efforts at some sort of reconciliation over the past decade. The first was during the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Global-Political-Agreement">Global Political Agreement (2009-2013)</a>, again in the aftermath of the November 2017 coup, and then again in the run up to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">2018 elections</a>.</p>
<p>Another consequence of the fallout from January is that Mnangagwa’s government has reached out further to its authoritarian economic and political partners in <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/with-president-mnangagwa-in-russia-zimbabwe-descends-into-chaos">Eurasia</a>. The problem with this is that <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414016666859">linkages with other autocratic regimes</a> provide some protection against forces pushing for democratic change. In addition, these relationships tend to consolidate those in the military and business sectors who see any prospect of serious economic and political reform as a threat.</p>
<h2>Responses</h2>
<p>A <a href="https://www.sadc.int/news-events/news/statement-sadc-chairperson-his-excellency-dr-hage-g-geingob-president-republic-namibia-political-and-socio-economic-situation-zi/">statement</a> issued by the current head of the Southern African Development Community repeated the official position of the Zimbabwe government. It criticised “some internal players, in particular NGOs, supported by external players (who have) continued to destabilise the country.”</p>
<p>Early signs of this position were clear in South African President Cyril Ramaphosa’s speech at the International Labour Organisation in January. He claimed that sanctions against the country were <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ramaphosa-says-lift-zimbabwe-sanction-20190122">no longer necessary</a> because the government had “embarked on democracy”.</p>
<p>Once again the regional body has conflated genuine concerns over imperial interventions in the developing world with the fight for democratic and human rights by national forces. Like Zanu PF – both under former President Robert Mugabe and Mnangagwa – Southern African Development Community has affirmed its support for a selective anti-imperialist narrative by an authoritarian nationalist regime that conflates the fight for democratic rights with outside intervention.</p>
<p>The response from the EU couldn’t have been more different. A <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2019-0116&language=EN">resolution</a> of the European Parliament in mid-February strongly condemned the violence and excessive force used in January. It reminded the government of Zimbabwe that long term support for it is dependent on “comprehensive reforms rather than mere promises”. </p>
<p>The resolution also called on the European Parliament to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>(review restrictive measures against) individuals and entities in Zimbabwe, including those measures currently suspended, in the light of accountability for <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2019-0116&language=EN">recent state violence</a>. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>This position in effect put on hold any new restrictive measures against the Zanu-PF government. It also left open the option for renewed dialogue.</p>
<h2>Going forward</h2>
<p>The debate on sanctions on Zimbabwe has been lost in the region and on the continent. And this solidarity with the Mnangagwa regime is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. </p>
<p>Change, if any, might come from the EU and US. It’s possible that they could change their positions again if the Mnangagwa government made another attempt at minimalist reforms. </p>
<p>The current US policy in Africa is targeted against what it considers to be the “rapidly expanding” financial and political <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/">influence of China and Russia</a> on the continent. Trump is also looking to make the US the major player in the new battle for metal resources in Africa. This new struggle for technology metals is taking place in countries such as Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, <a href="https://www.standard.co.uk/business/how-president-trump-is-using-britain-to-fight-his-trade-war-against-china-in-africa-a4078031.html">Tanzania and Sierra Leone</a>. </p>
<p>The White House announced this week that it has extended sanctions against Zimbabwe for <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-03-05-trump-extends-us-sanctions-against-zimbabwe-by-a-year/">another year</a>. Nevertheless, at some stage the politics of US strategic interests in Africa could lead to a more accommodating relationship with an authoritarian regime such as the Mnangagwa administration. This has happened on many occasions in its foreign policy interventions.</p>
<p>The EU is in a “wait and see” mode. It will need evidence of some notable movement by the Zimbabwean state on the political and economic reform front before it pushes the re-engagement process forward. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s regime has yet to show that it is any different from Mugabe’s. Given the continuing factional battles in the ruling party – and its inability to imagine itself out of power – it is difficult to view the current government as anything other than a continuation of the authoritarian Zanu-PF’s legacy.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112973/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span> He/ is affiliated with Solidarity Peace Trust.. </span></em></p>
The debate on sanctions on Zimbabwe has been lost in the southern African region and on the continent.
Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free State
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/109890
2019-01-15T15:10:32Z
2019-01-15T15:10:32Z
Bold steps Mnangagwa should be taking instead of fiddling with the petrol price
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/253840/original/file-20190115-152986-1z00z45.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe erupted in violent protest after the government doubled the price of petrol. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When economically challenged rulers try to run nations, especially fragile ones, they can easily make mistakes. </p>
<p>In the past few weeks demonstrators have taken to the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman to protest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s removal of subsidies that have long kept <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/sudan-official-death-toll-protests-rises-24-190113065645372.html">bread and fuel affordable</a>. </p>
<p>Now it’s Zimbabwe’s turn. Just before flying off to Russia last weekend, President Emmerson Mnangagwa <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zimbabwes-president-hikes-fuel-prices-to-tackle-shortages-20190113">doubled the price of petrol</a>. Doing so brought already impoverished urban Zimbabweans out onto the streets of the capital Harare as well as Bulawayo and a dozen other cities and towns. Protesters blocked roads with tyres, trees and rocks, stopped bus transport, attacked the police, threw canisters of tear gas back at security forces and <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/deaths-in-zimbabwe-fuel-protests-says-security-minister-20190115">generally ran amok</a>. </p>
<p>At least five people <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/military-deploys-in-zimbabwe-fuel-hike-protests-5-killed/2019/01/15/d44875f6-18aa-11e9-b8e6-567190c2fd08_story.html?utm_term=.2af9f13b1349">were reported</a> to have been killed. Flights into Harare <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-01-14-fastjet-cancels-flights-as-zimbabwe-unrest-continues-countrywide/">were cancelled</a> and the government <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2019/01/econet-and-telone-shut-down-the-internet-completely-now-its-darkeness/amp/?__twitter_impression=true">closed down the internet</a>. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1085088020640997376"}"></div></p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s excuse for raising prices so abruptly is not clear. Possibly he thinks that more costly petrol will bring more cash into national coffers that are mostly bare. Or perhaps he believes that more petrol will pour into the country via the pipeline from Beira in Mozambique if it is more valuable. Both ideas are barmy. </p>
<p>Before flying off to Russia, Mnangagwa said that the fuel price rise was intended to reduce shortages of fuel that, he indicated, were caused by rises in the use of fuel and what he called <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/anger-as-mnangagwa-raises-gas-prices-in-zimbabwe-20190113-2">“rampant” illegal trading</a> – accusations that make no sense whatsoever. Making petrol purchasing more expensive for poor Zimbabweans – the majority of the nation’s people – simply adds to their hardship and further slows an already crippled economy.</p>
<p>Instead Mnangagwa should do everything his government can to reduce the shortage of real (rather than fake) cash that is crippling the local economy, reducing local production and corporate and consumer cash flows, and driving an already weakened economy <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2019/01/12/zimbabwe-plans-new-currency-as-dollar-shortage-bites-finance-minister">further into recession</a>.</p>
<p>He should also be focused on taking a number of other bold steps to try and reverse the collapse of the country’s economy. Among them are bringing state looting to a halt.</p>
<h2>The cash crisis</h2>
<p>The US dollar is the official currency of commerce. But because Zimbabwe’s economy has essentially ground to a halt, it has few means of bringing new dollars into the country. That, and the steady money laundering of real dollars by high-level officials of the ruling Zanu-PF party, has drained the country of <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/10/looting-of-state-resources-to-blame-for-economic-crisis/">currency</a>. </p>
<p>The government has printed $1 bond notes — known as <a href="https://businesstimes.co.zw/dollars-vs-zollars-zim-puts-accounting-standards-to-test/">zollars</a> – for Zimbabweans to use instead of real dollars. They are supposed to be exchangeable at par, but in 2019 they are worth as little as a third of a paper dollar. Many merchants refuse to accept zollars at all.</p>
<p>Bond notes now trade on the black market at 3.2 per dollar, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-14/no-currency-just-a-currency-crisis-zimbabwe-s-woes-deepen">according</a> to the Harare-based ZimBollar Research Institute.</p>
<p>The stress has also spread to financial markets, with locals piling into equities to hedge against price increases. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa may be <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/with-president-mnangagwa-in-russia-zimbabwe-descends-into-chaos">attempting to obtain loans</a> from Russia and from shady Central Asian countries <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/04/kazakhstan-at-twenty-five-stable-but-tense-pub-62642">like Kazakhstan</a>. But what the president should be doing is prosecuting and imprisoning his corrupt cronies. That could limit the flight of dollars from Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>He also needs to trim the bloated civil service of excessive patronage appointments. Most of all, if he dared, he should be cutting military expenditures. Zimbabwe has no imaginable need for its large and well equipped a security establishment.</p>
<p>Such bold measures could return confidence to the country’s corporate and agri-business sectors. If coupled with reduced military and other expenditures, and bolstered by funds no longer being transferred overseas, Zimbabwe’s long repressed economy could take off from a very low base.</p>
<h2>Poor leadership</h2>
<p>Raising petrol prices in a land where but a few months ago supplies of petrol were short and motorists <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-27/zimbabwe-suffering-worst-economic-crisis-in-a-decade/10433028">queued for hours and days</a> outside stations is neither politically nor economically wise. The newly aroused protesters will not readily melt away. Putting such a hefty extra charge on an essential commodity, and doing so just when Zimbabwe’s parlous economy was beginning to show signs of stability, shows few leadership skills and little common sense.</p>
<p>Inflation has soared since the national election in July, almost reaching the <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=sudan+70%25+inflation&rlz=1C1NHXL_enZA711ZA711&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiwn7u4oO_fAhVMUBUIHVJzAKEQsAR6BAgEEAE&biw=1283&bih=638">Sudanese level of 70% a year</a>. Foreign capital and domestically reinvested capital is avoiding the country. </p>
<p>On top of this, exporters are struggling under draconian Reserve Bank regulations. Only Chinese purchases of ferrochrome, other metals and tobacco, keep the economy ticking over, albeit in an increasingly dilatory manner.</p>
<p>A further drain on confidence and economic rational thinking is the Reserve Bank’s allocation of whatever hard currency there is to politically prominent backers of the president. That is how arbitrage during President Robert Mugabe’s benighted era helped to enrich his entourage while sinking the Zimbabwean economy and impoverishing its peoples.</p>
<h2>Work that needs to be done</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa’s regime has much more work to do to stimulate sustainable economic growth. He will need to restore the rule of law, badly eroded in Mugabe’s time, put some true meaning into his <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-11-20-socialites-laying-low-as-zimbabwes-government-cracks-down-on-big-spenders/">“back to honest business”</a> promise, and widely open up the economy. That would mean eliminating most Reserve Bank restrictions on the free flow of currency and allowing the entire Zimbabwean economy once again to float.</p>
<p>Most of all, Mnangagwa needs to rush home from Russia and Asia and rescind or greatly reduce the price of petrol. After so many years of repression and hardship, Zimbabweans are out of patience.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109890/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Rotberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s decision to double the price of petrol shows very poor judgement and bad leadership.
Robert Rotberg, Founding Director of Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard Kennedy School
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/89177
2017-12-29T08:23:21Z
2017-12-29T08:23:21Z
The three barriers blocking Zimbabwe’s progress: Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the military
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199889/original/file-20171219-27557-8tx029.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=206%2C577%2C5544%2C3026&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s new President <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41995876">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> has been cautiously welcomed with the hope that he will place Zimbabwe on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-has-the-capacity-to-focus-on-the-new-zimbabwe-but-will-he-88254">more democratic trajectory</a>. He has spoken of a <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/can-emmerson-mnangagwa-a-mugabe-ally-bring-change-to-zimbabwe-12134023">new democracy “unfolding”</a> in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>But this is wishful thinking.</p>
<p>There are three major barriers to a decisive break from the corrupt and dysfunctional political system that has been playing out in Zimbabwe: the ruling <a href="http://www.zanupf.org.zw/">Zanu-PF</a>, its president and what’s been their main sustainer – the military. </p>
<p>None would want to oversee real change because facilitating democratic rule with real contestation for power would mean running the risk of electoral defeat. This would endanger the networks of self enrichment that have been put in place over decades. </p>
<p>Instead, the next few months will see Zanu-PF, Mnangagwa and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-beware-the-military-is-looking-after-its-own-interests-not-democracy-87712">military</a> continue to block democracy as they seek to hold onto the power. </p>
<h2>The nature of Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF presents a formidable obstacle to democratic progress in the country. Zimbabwe has maintained the outward appearance of a multiparty democracy since <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/4/newsid_2515000/2515145.stm">independence in 1980</a>. But it’s effectively been a <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/towards-the-oneparty-state-in-zimbabwe-a-study-in-african-political-thought/BD356807617492EBE85877DB6CD815C7">one-party dictatorship</a>. </p>
<p>The party brings a zero-sum game mindset to politics: it must always prevail, and its <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/09/bullets-each-you/state-sponsored-violence-zimbabwes-march-29-elections">opponents must be crushed</a> rather than accommodated. Opposition parties formally exist but they have not been allowed to win an election. Should such a possibility arise – as it did in <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">2002, 2008 and 2013</a> – elections will be rigged to preserve the status quo. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF provides the most egregious example of the culture of exceptionalism which has characterised the liberation party in power. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>the belief that its entitled to rule indefinitely, </p></li>
<li><p>its refusal to view itself as an ordinary political party, </p></li>
<li><p>its conflating of party and state, and </p></li>
<li><p>its demonising of other parties as ‘enemies of liberation’ seeking to restore colonialism or white minority rule. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>The way in which Zanu-PF has colonised the state over almost four decades means that there is a vast web of <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2013.862100?src=recsys">patronage networks</a> that have been entrenched to facilitate the looting of the state’s resources. Democratic change and clean government pose a mortal threat to these networks and such privileges are unlikely to be surrendered without intense resistance.</p>
<h2>The new president</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa’s ominous record makes it difficult to build a persuasive case that he represents a new beginning. </p>
<p>He served as <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-has-the-capacity-to-focus-on-the-new-zimbabwe-but-will-he-88254">Mugabe’s “chief enforcer”</a> until November 2017. He was pivotal to the collapse of the rule of law and the implosion of the Zimbabwean economy. And he has been a central player in the <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20161116-Zimbabwe-Early-Warning-Report.pdf">gross human rights abuses</a> that have characterised Zanu-PF rule. This includes the killings in <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Matabeleland killings</a> in the 1980s. This is a past for which he has refused to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-27-op-ed-mnangagwa-and-the-gukurahundi-fact-and-fiction/#.WjFR4Ux2trQ">acknowledge any responsibility</a>. </p>
<p>His more conciliatory language has not matched his actions. After becoming president he appointed an administration of cronies, <a href="http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-40875-Chiwenga+appointed+defence+minister/news.aspx">military hardliners</a> and ‘war veterans’. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=364&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199891/original/file-20171219-27591-gl6nvf.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=457&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at his inauguration.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The appointments appeared to consolidate the power of the now dominant faction of Zanu-PF: the old guard securocrats who routed Grace Mugabe’s equally malign <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_(Zanu-PF_Faction)">G40 faction</a> through the barrel of a gun rather than democratic processes. </p>
<p>Having waited such a seemingly interminable length of time to land the top job, it is difficult to envisage Mnangagwa now placing his hard earned spoils at the mercy of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-11-20-justice-malala-dont-fool-yourself-zimbabwe-wont-be-fixed-by-mugabes-ex-cronies/">a programme of democratisation</a>.</p>
<h2>The military</h2>
<p>The Zimbabwean Defence Force’s role in the removal of the president means that it has secured a place for itself as a privileged political actor and overseer of the entire political system. </p>
<p>The defence force has never been a neutral custodian of constitutional rule. Instead it has always been a highly politicised extension of the ruling party, a party militia in effect. </p>
<p>Previously its role was confined to repressing the ruling party’s opponents and maintaining the party’s dominance. The principle of civilian rule was respected even if this model of civil-military relations failed to meet any reasonable democratic standards. But with the coup, the military crossed a line. They determined the outcome of power struggles within the ruling party itself. </p>
<p>In the same way that the military has been politicised, the political system has been heavily militarised. This can be seen in the several key military veterans who have been appointed to the cabinet as well as Mnangagwa being the military’s candidate for the presidency. Essentially this is the civilian face of quasi-military rule in Zimbabwe. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/199886/original/file-20171219-27568-zgjuxw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe National Army commander Constantino Chiwenga, second from left, addressing a press conference in Harare, in November.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What this points to is an effective “barracks democracy” emerging in Zimbabwe. The military has secured a veto over the leadership of the ruling party and over the wider political process. It also reserves the right to reject election results that it does not approve of, or to take action that could prevent such results materialising in the first place. </p>
<p>To see the military’s removal of Mugabe as an overriding good ignores the fact that it has no concept of the national interest, or that it views that national interest as synonymous with its own and Zanu-PF’s. </p>
<p>It is dangerously naïve to expect such a force to help facilitate genuine democratic transition when its entire raison d’etre has been to preserve one-party rule (under a leadership of its choosing), to disable meaningful opposition and to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/09/15/military-looted-diamonds-report/">preserve its own corruption networks</a>.</p>
<h2>Unsettling prospects</h2>
<p>True democratisation – as opposed to merely maintaining the procedural forms of democratic government – is anathema to Zimbabwe’s ruling party, its president and the military. </p>
<p>It is evident that their task is threefold over the next few months. They have to secure support for a measure of liberalisation; arrest political enemies for corruption rather than tackling corruption <em>per se</em>; and provide a smokescreen of a largely vacuous democratic rhetoric. </p>
<p>The hope is that this will be sufficient to secure aid, investment and an endorsement by external donors while virtually nothing changes in the actual power relations inside the country. </p>
<p>Anyone committed to democracy in Zimbabwe -– whether inside or outside the country – should begin mobilising against this project sooner rather than later.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/89177/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Robert Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe is over. But the country’s road to democracy remains a bumpy one as Zanu-PF, the new president and the military go about entrenching power.
James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/88085
2017-12-03T10:19:57Z
2017-12-03T10:19:57Z
A clean break with Mugabe’s past will have to wait - even beyond elections
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196676/original/file-20171128-7447-t1w0v1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa has officially been sworn in as interim Zimbabwean President.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Who would have thought that this year would end with <a href="http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/robert-mugabe">Robert Mugabe</a> having lost the presidency of both the governing Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe? None could have foreseen such a development being the work of his ruling party’s inner circle.</p>
<p>The whole development is clearly a product of internal Zanu-PF tensions and actions. The military top brass involved are old standing Zanu-PF cadres that have <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112460/JUL09SSRZIMBABWE.pdf">propped Mugabe up</a> for decades. Emerson Mnangagwa, who has been sworn in as his successor, has been Mugabe’s right hand man for <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/profile-zimbabwe-president-robert-mugabe-20171115">37 years</a>. </p>
<p>Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems. The same Zanu-PF leadership has taken control of this transition, making it an intra-party matter rather than a national opportunity for deepening democracy as many hope. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s first priority will be to ensure consolidation of Zanu-PF power. He may do so by positioning Zanu-PF as a born again party committed to change. He may seize the opportunity to introduce real changes in the conduct of Zanu-PF and government leadership, in economic policies and in rebuilding the social compact by showing greater maturity in relations with other political parties and civil society.</p>
<p>But, as reports surface about the harassment of some of Mugabe appointed ministers and their families at the hands of <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/zimbabwe-judge-military-action-mugabe-legal-51375327">men in uniform</a>, we are reminded that the military should never be encouraged to manage political problems because they are likely to cross the line of civil-military relations. Excessive use of military power is likely to follow.</p>
<h2>Mugabe the survivor</h2>
<p>Mugabe has survived many attempts to get rid of him before. These include the efforts of the previous opposition Zimbabwean African People’s Union <a href="http://africaresearchinstitute.org/newsite/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/How-intellectuals-made-history-in-zimbabwe.pdf">(Zapu)</a> under Joshua Nkomo in the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Joshua_Nkomo">1980s</a>, through to the <a href="https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Laakso-Vol-7-Issues-23.pdf">Zimbabwe Unity Movement in the 1990s</a> and to Movement for Democratic Change <a href="http://www.mdc.co.zw">(MDC) in the 2000s</a>. All these efforts failed because Mugabe has, at times, been popular, at times cunning and at times ruthless in preserving power – for himself and the Zanu-PF. </p>
<p>At times reliance on patronage of <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/politics/mdc-t-says-chiefs-not-zanu-pf-political-commissars/">indigenous systems of leadership</a> helped Mugabe and the party ward off challenges. Over the past 15 years, Zanu-PF has relied on the crude use of state power, <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2012/01/securitization-will-be-an-ill/">draconian security measures</a> and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">brutality on the streets</a>.</p>
<p>It has also resorted to buying popularity through measures such as the violent land restitution process between <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/pdf/JAE13.2Magure.pdf">2001 and 2007</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/196677/original/file-20171128-7442-1bi6f8y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=534&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabweans at the inauguration of Emmerson Mnangagwa in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>After 2007, Zanu-PF and Mugabe had to contend with a regional mediation process by the Southern African Development Community after an election they lost, but which the MDC did not win by margins needed to <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">form its own government</a>. Zanu-PF responded by unleashing violence and <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008postd.htm">brutality on opponents</a>. Power sharing, which gave the MDC and its leader <a href="https://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPOLISJ/TOPOLISJ-5-28.pdf">Morgan Tsvangarai</a> an opportunity to position themselves as alternatives, saw Mugabe and Zanu-PF play every trick in the book to preserve power.</p>
<p>After Zanu-PF narrowly won the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf">2013 elections</a>, it seemed that Mugabe and his party had finally prevailed. But the power battles turned inward, as party factions jostled over who would succeed Mugabe. </p>
<h2>Zanu-PF power struggles</h2>
<p>Various factions in the Zanu-PF have crystallised into two main camps. </p>
<p>The first is Mugabe and his henchmen of the so-called <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-122610.html">Zezuru group</a>, including top heads of security forces who had wanted Mugabe to continue for a long time. They favoured Solomon Mujuru before he died and later Mnangagwa as a successor. </p>
<p>The second was made up of younger, rather flamboyant group of mainly men around Mugabe Zanu-PF politicians who had gained power and influence in the civil service. This group was known as the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/11/17/unpacking-the-g40">G-40</a>. In the past few years this group backed Grace Mugabe as her husband’s successor. </p>
<p>Things have hung in the balance with the G40 gaining momentum because they could influence Mugabe’s judgement and decisions through his wife and nephews. This group could make a call who needed to be fired or isolated – and the president would act accordingly. </p>
<p>For example, when moderates in the Zanu-PF and war veterans touted Vice President Joice Mujuru as possible successor to Mugabe, the G40 aimed a barrage of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/11241242/Grace-Mugabe-claims-Joice-Mujuru-plans-to-kill-her-Gaddafi-style.html">insults against her</a> and publicly declared that her time was up. Shortly afterwards Mugabe fired her and got her <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/i-was-a-clear-successor-to-mugabe-says-former-vp-joice-mujuru-20170309">expelled from the party</a>. This deepened divisions within Zanu-PF and intensified concern about the G40 and Grace Mugabe. </p>
<p>The last straw was the <a href="http://ewn.co.za/2017/11/06/mugabe-fires-deputy-mnangagwa">firing of Mnangagwa</a> and threats against chiefs of armed forces.</p>
<p>Believing that Mugabe was being manipulated by the G40, the military stepped in to weed out those around the president. What they wanted was to persuade Mugabe to go and for Mnangagwa to replace him in as peaceful a process as possible so as not to destabilise Zanu-PF’s hold on power. The military showed great patience as it set about achieving this outcome. </p>
<p>In the end – and after citizens had taken to the streets calling for Mugabe, and the G40, <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-19-today-we-have-won-zimbabweans-cheer-during-mass-rally">to go</a> – the old man <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">resigned</a>, thus avoiding an embarrassing impeachment process. </p>
<h2>New forces versus old</h2>
<p>Mugabe is gone. A faction of the Zanu-PF that had gained currency around him is being squeezed out of every space in Zimbabwe. A new faction under Mnangagwa is in place. </p>
<p>Mugabe stands as a shadow of continuity behind leaders who have been around him for decades and who have now been entrusted with the renewal agenda. Mugabe has left, but what’s been called <a href="http://www.palgrave.com/la/book/9781137543448">Mugabeism</a> remains: both the positive side of vehemently defending the sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the negative side of the brutality of state power. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa and the military have lavished him with generous post-retirement packages, honoured with a <a href="http://nairobinews.nation.co.ke/life/happy-sunset-awaits-mugabe-with-sh1billion-golden-handshake/">holiday in his name and praise</a>. The interim president has warned the deposed G-40 faction of Zanu-PF to return stolen state monies or <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/three-month-zimbabwe-amnesty-for-cash-stashed-abroad-12183516">face the law</a>. </p>
<p>A clean break with Mugabe’s heritage of violence and crude dominance will have to wait even beyond <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">elections next year</a>. Zimbabwean citizens have been energised by their role in removing Mugabe. They would do well to remain vigilant, to press for more fundamental changes in the way the state behaves and insisting on democratic processes in economic policies. Otherwise they will continue to live under one Zanu-PF faction to another without real change in their lives.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88085/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Siphamandla Zondi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Zimbabweans have every right to celebrate the end of Robert Mugabe’s long and disastrous reign, but they would be wrong to assume that this is the end of their political problems.
Siphamandla Zondi, Professor and head of department of Political Sciences and acting head of the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs, University of Pretoria
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/87868
2017-11-21T13:35:37Z
2017-11-21T13:35:37Z
When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195591/original/file-20171121-6051-ntf8kb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters at a rally outside parliament in preparation ahead of the proposed impeachment of President Robert Mugabe. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kim Ludbrook/EPA</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The parliamentary impeachment of beleaguered President Robert Mugabe - in terms of section 97 of <a href="https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zimbabwe_2013.pdf">Zimbabwe’s constitution</a> – could be the culminating moment of a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-11-17-hope-remains-that-the-soft-coup-in-zimbabwe-could-lead-to-nine-easy-victories/">soft coup</a> that staves off the indignity of slipshod regional interventions, while saving the legitimacy of a régime sans a <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/is-zimbabwe-set-for-a-mugabe-dynasty-with-first-lady-grace-as-vp-20171113">disgraced Mugabe dynasty</a>.</p>
<p>It <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/globe-in-zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-era-ends/article37015276/?utm_medium=Referrer:+Social+Network+/+Media&utm_campaign=Shared+Web+Article+Links">might just work</a>. But it might not.</p>
<p>Events have not transpired as the faction loyal to Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former vice president of Zanu-PF and of the country who was deposed by Mugabe earlier this month, had planned. The aim of the faction – known as the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste faction</a> because of Mnangagwa’s nickname “The Crocodile” – was to get their leader back on the road to power. That was after his derailment by the Zanu-PF Generation 40 group <a href="http://www.pindula.co.zw/G40_">(aka G-40)</a>
that ostensibly rallies younger, savvy party members to take the lead, but favours Grace Mugabe to succeed her husband.</p>
<p>A number of unintended developments have led to a situation in which, a week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place and a new avenue - parliamentary impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.</p>
<p>It is by no means certain that Zanu-PF’s crocodiles can pull off the next stage. When the state is the man and that man is Mugabe, a new era begins with his fall.</p>
<h2>The plans that didn’t quite go to plan</h2>
<p>First, the army chiefs’ warning to Mugabe on the <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/13/BSR-General-Chiwenga%E2%80%99s-statement---all-bark-and-no-bite">night of November 13</a> that he vacate office, wasn’t met with the desired response. Rather than Mugabe taking the hint and welcoming Mnangagwa back, or telling G-40 to stop their shenanigans, Zanu-PF accused the Military Chief General Constantino Chiwenga <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41991425">of treason</a>.</p>
<p>Second, the effect of this was to trigger a real coup. The military’s round-up and detention of their enemies in G-40 was not quite bloodless: at least one of <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2017/11/17/mugabes-chief-security-battered/">security guards</a> protecting finance minister Ignatius Chombo was killed. The Central Intelligence Organisation’s security director Albert Ngulube came within a few inches of the same fate. And there was no ambiguity about the fact that the Commander-in-Chief had been detained by his underlings – albeit in his own chintzy <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/inside-robert-mugabes-lavish-blue-11552658?service=responsive">“Blue Roof” mansion</a>. </p>
<p>Third, the delight displayed for the well-organised war vets’ <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2017/nov/18/protesters-in-zimbabwe-call-for-mugabe-to-step-down-in-pictures">demonstrations</a> on Saturday was never going to last long. On Saturday it served the purpose of providing the army with a veneer of legitimacy. But by Monday the patience of the soldiers had begun to wear thin. They warned students <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2017-11-20-students-shut-down-university-of-zimbabwe/">who had closed down</a> the university to return to classes, encouraging them to: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>be calm and to proceed with their <a href="http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-122553.html">educational programmes</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And when Christopher Mutsvangwa, head of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association, <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/organise-sit-in-as-calls-for-president-to-resign-intensify/">announced</a> that the war vets want “the whole population to descend upon Harare”, the putschists soon released a document entitling their project <a href="http://zimbabwedigitalnews.com/2017/11/20/calm-down-zimbabwe-operation-restore-legacy-is-on-track-mugabe-and-mnangagwa-now-talking/">“Operation Restore Legacy”</a>, as if to dampen the masses’ enthusiasm. </p>
<p>Yet Sunday’s setback – the fourth – was the most severe. Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKTmqKswH-E">press conference</a> shocked just about <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2017-11-19-zimbabwes-mugabe-defies-expectations-of-immediate-resignation/">everybody</a>. He studiously ignored the issue on everyone’s minds: his resignation. Instead, Mugabe noted that the soldiers had raised the concerns causing all of the fuss with “comradeship and collegiality”. This issue was the, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>open public spurts [sic] between high ranking officials in party and government exacerbated by multiple conflicting messages from both the party and government [that] made the criticisms [of lack of unity] levelled against us inescapable.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There we had it. The curse of Zanu-PF’s history: disunity. It was in our faces once again. “It has to stop,” Mugabe warned, and scoled: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The way forward cannot be based on swapping by cliques that ride roughshod over party rules and procedures.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zimbabweans must resolve their “inter-generation conflict … through a harmonised melding of old established players as they embrace and welcome new ones through a well-defined sense of hierarchy and succession”. The party must go “back to the guiding principles”, he said.</p>
<h2>Last-ditch attempt to repeat history</h2>
<p>Mugabe was not going anywhere. He was determined to preside over December’s extraordinary Zanu-PF conference that had hastened this crisis. In his view, he and only he could ensure the “processes that must not be prepossessed by any acts calculated to undermine [the congress] or to compromise the outcomes in the eyes of the public”. Only he could resolve the tensions of the last few months, ensuring “no bitterness or vengefulness” to mar “our hallowed ideas of reconciliation”. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/195594/original/file-20171121-6072-1ti74qn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe addressing the nation at the State House in Harare, on Sunday night.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/The Herald handout.</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>If in the 1980s Zimbabweans could reconcile with,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>those who oppressed us… surely this cannot be unavailable to our own… we must learn to forgive and resolve contradictions real or perceived in our Zimbabwean spirit.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Consciously or not, Mugabe was repeating a history of at least 40 years, albeit in almost mirror image. The coup makers had not forgotten: their Monday Manifesto referred clearly to the <a href="https://openparly.co.zw/2017/11/13/full-press-statement-general-chiwenga-there-is-instability-in-zanu-pf-today/">vashandi moment</a>. This was when in early 1977 Mugabe and others in the “old guard” squashed a group of young and rebellious “political soldiers” who were proving far too threatening to his liking. He sent them to <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.1995.10804395">Mozambique’s prisons</a>. </p>
<p>This too was “inter-generation” conflict. But four decades ago he was on the dominant side, and dealt with the disunity somewhat differently than on November 19 2017. In 1977 he said that “we must negate” those who, </p>
<blockquote>
<p>arduously strive in any direction that militates against the party or who, in any way, seeks… to bring about change in the leadership or structure of the party by maliciously planting contradictions within our ranks. This is… the negation of the negation… the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">that binds us all</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The intervening years have borne much of Mugabe’s ideology of <a href="https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/news/archive/2017/zimbabwe-cameron/">dealing with dissent</a>. Yet, with a Panglossian view, one could believe that Mugabe has learned something over the past four decades. Now he wants all the older generations in Zanu-PF to embrace and welcome the new contenders for power. Forgiveness and reconciliation, with no bitterness or vengeance, shall prevail – under his leadership of course.</p>
<h2>Too little, too late</h2>
<p>Unfortunately, this self-interested repentance is too late for most members of Zanu-PF. Mugabe’s rhetoric is falling on deaf ears. Impeachment through parliamentary means is not a hard landing, although many hitches could <a href="https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/20/BSR-presidential-impeachment-in-Zimbabwe">still arise</a>, including a messier militaristic denouement. </p>
<p>Yet, as political scientist Ralph Mathekga <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2017/11/mugabe-outsmarted-generals-not-resign/">puts it</a>, if we assume the impeachment’s success and a relatively smooth Zanu-PF congress, only fully free and fair elections can resolve the contradictions unleashed by the half-measured coup that started as even less than that.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/87868/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A week after the army issued its limp-wristed and ambiguous statement that Mugabe should go, he remains in place, and a new avenue - impeachment - is being pursued to get rid of him.
David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies, University of Johannesburg
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.