tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/baltic-states-43627/articlesBaltic states – La Conversation2024-03-22T10:15:51Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259442024-03-22T10:15:51Z2024-03-22T10:15:51ZUkraine war: Russia’s Baltic neighbours to create massive border defences as Trump continues undermining Nato<p>With Donald Trump leading in <a href="https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/">many of the polls</a> for the upcoming US presidential election, his comments about global security and foreign policy have to be taken seriously.</p>
<p>In February, Trump flippantly remarked that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wanted to Nato states that failed to pay their <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html#:%7E:text=As%20president%2C%20Trump%20privately%20threatened,wants%20to%20weaken%20the%20alliance">bills</a>. In a follow-up interview on GB News this week he <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-nato-interview-nigel-farage-gb-news-6mmjhv3vr">warned allies</a> “not to take advantage” of the US. </p>
<p>Nowhere is this causing more concern than for the countries in the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.</p>
<p>Not only does Trump, sometimes, say he wants to halt all US military aid to Ukraine, but Trump wants to undercut article 5 of Nato’s <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-trump-spending-wesley-clark-treaty-article-5-2019-12?r=US&IR=T">treaty</a> – the principle of collective defence – something that has become increasingly important in the wake of Russia’s aggression. British military <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/donald-trump-nato-interview-nigel-farage-gb-news-6mmjhv3vr">sources are worried that</a> Trump’s remarks will strengthen Putin’s resolve over Ukraine, and could result in him advancing on even more territory.</p>
<p>Even before Trump emerged on the US political scene, the Baltic countries have been especially concerned about Russia’s growing ambitions. They have, after all, been <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states/Soviet-occupation">invaded and occupied by Russia before</a>, in 1940, and then forced to become part of <a href="https://brill.com/display/book/9789004464896/BP000015.xml">the Soviet Union</a>. There’s plenty of people who can still remember life in the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Baltic states have been the loudest voices sounding the alarm about the existential threat posed by <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-eu-should-stop-westsplaining-and-listen-to-its-smaller-eastern-members-they-saw-the-ukraine-war-coming-226165">Russia</a>, and all three countries increased their military spending to more than 2% of their GDP, and recently agreed to raise it to <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1841298/baltics-agree-on-need-to-raise-defence-spending-to-3-of-gdp">3%</a>.</p>
<h2>Building shared defences</h2>
<p>Amid growing security concerns, the defence ministers in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia also agreed in January to set up a common Baltic defence zone on their borders with Russia and <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/01/19/baltic-nations-to-build-defense-network-along-borders-with-russia-belarus-a83786">Belarus</a>. This would consist of building physical defensive structures such as bunkers.</p>
<p>Estonia will begin construction of 600 bunkers in early <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/02/baltic-nations-prepare-600-strong-bunker-defensive-line-with-russian-threat-in-mind/">2025</a>. The nations will also cooperate in developing missile artillery, and ensuring that their equipment, ammunition and manpower is <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-lithuania-estonia-common-defense-zone-russia-border-security-concerns/">updated</a>.</p>
<p>Estonia has also doubled the size of its territorial defence force to 20,000 <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332">people</a>, while Latvia reintroduced conscription in 2023 after becoming the only Baltic state to stop mandatory military service in 2006.</p>
<p>Latvia also plans to double the size of its armed forces to 61,000 by the year <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-the-baltic-states-on-natos-frontline-with-russia-are-urging-their-allies-to-wake-up-13084332">2032</a>. Meanwhile, Lithuania has made an agreement with Germany to allow a permanent brigade of 4,800 of its troops to be combat ready on the Russian border by <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-brigade-be-combat-ready-lithuania-russian-border-2027-2023-12-18/">2027</a>.</p>
<h2>Putin’s pledge to Russian speakers</h2>
<p>But given that Russia borders 14 countries, why are the Baltic states especially concerned about their security? In addition to being geographically close, a notable number of ethnic Russians live in the Baltic countries (5% in Lithuania; 25% in Estonia and 36% in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight/disquiet-in-baltics-over-sympathies-of-russian-speakers-idUSBREA2K07S20140323/">Latvia</a>. In the eastern Estonian city of Narva, 95.7% of the population are native Russian speakers and 87.7% are ethnic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/22/always-looking-shoulder-anxiety-estonia-russians-tallinn">Russians</a>. </p>
<p>This matters as Putin has argued that having substantial numbers of ethnic Russians living outside of Russia, due to the “catastrophic” dissolution of the Soviet Union, represents a “humanitarian <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2023.2162329">disaster</a> of epic proportions” as it left Russians cut off from “their motherland”. Putin has vowed to actively protect all “Russians” living <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/putin-vows-to-actively-defend-russians-living-abroad/">abroad</a>. </p>
<p>In particular, Putin has said he was concerned about how ethnic Russians are being treated in the Baltics, remarking that the deportation of ethnic Russians (most notably in Latvia where there have been recent changes to its immigration laws), poses a threat to Russian national <a href="https://tass.com/politics/1733169?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com">security</a>.</p>
<p>The Kremlin has also protested the demolition of Soviet monuments in the <a href="https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/russia-protests-dismantling-of-soviet-monument.a198914/">Baltics</a>, placing Estonia’s prime minster, Kaja Kallas, <a href="https://news.err.ee/1609251885/kallas-on-russia-s-wanted-list-this-is-a-familiar-scare-tactic">on its wanted list</a> for doing so. </p>
<p>But these claims about wanting to protect Russians abroad, are really just a pretext to justify escalation with the Baltics, which will test Nato’s alliance and destabilise the <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2024">organisation</a>. So it’s not just important that there are ethnic Russians living there – there are strategic reasons as well that make them an easy target.</p>
<p>Even with the Baltic countries strengthening their troop numbers, Russia currently has 1.32 million active military personnel, and two million active <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1296573/russia-ukraine-military-comparison/">reserve</a>. Combined this is greater that Lithuania’s entire population of 2.8 million people, and far greater than Estonia and Latvia which have populations of 1.3 million and 1.8 million people, respectively.</p>
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<p>For Lithuania, which borders Belarus and Russian-run mini-state Kaliningrad, there are concerns that it could be taken over first by Russian forces, which would then physically isolate Lithuania from the rest of the Baltics. The Kaliningrad region has become increasingly militarised in recent years, with Iskander ballistic missiles and S-400 <a href="https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/reports/2022-12-05-BalticRussia-FINALweb.pdf">systems</a> installed. With Trump suggesting he would weaken the US’s commitment to Nato if elected, there won’t be much of a deterrent for Putin to grab low-hanging fruit.</p>
<p>The current Nato response force consists of approximately <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-increase-high-readiness-force-300000/">40,000 troops</a>, with plans to upgrade to 300,000 <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61954516">troops</a>. But quick-reaction units could still be too slow to protect the Baltics from Russian forces as, ironically, moving large units, vehicles and ammunition <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/18/is-baltic-sea-nato-lake-pub-91263">across borders is bureaucratic and takes time</a>. It would be important to have excellent intelligence and to move quickly, something that will be made more difficult with the US potentially opting out of its commitments.</p>
<p>Though Russia has plunged much of its resources into winning the Ukraine war, Putin still aims to expand Russian sovereignty across the post-Soviet states and to effectively dismantle Nato, something that Trump takes no issue with. As Russia has been ramping up its war machine, the Baltic states firmly believe that Russian aggression will not stop at Ukraine, and that they <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1717545/if-ukraine-falls-baltic-states-will-be-next-says-russia-s-former-pm#:%7E:text=In%20Kasyanov%2C%20view%2C%20the%20war,be%20next%2C%E2%80%9D%20he%20said.&text=Kasyanov%2C%2064%2C%20was%20sacked%20by,People's%20Freedom%20party%2C%20or%20Parnas">could be next</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225944/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Baltic states have high numbers of Russian speakers, who Putin has vowed to ‘protect’.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2053982023-07-23T19:58:23Z2023-07-23T19:58:23ZNational pride and sorrow: attending the 150th Latvian Song and Dance Festival as the daughter of refugees<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537636/original/file-20230717-97949-yzqhp8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C3%2C2041%2C1358&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ilmārs Znotiņš and The Latvian Centre of National Culture</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>“With song we have achieved freedom. With song we have gone to war. With song we have been victorious.” </p>
<p>These were the words of the newly elected president of Latvia, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66141706">Edgars Rinkēvičs</a>, at the closing ceremony of the 150th Latvian Song and Dance festival, held from June 30 to July 9. </p>
<p>Rinkēvičs was greeted by an audience of 50,000 members of the public and 21,000 performers who cheered and waved Latvian flags. He spoke about the power of song to unite and give hope to the Latvian people and to reinforce its centuries old cultural traditions. </p>
<p>Upward Together, the five-hour finale of this ten-day festival, was held in Silver Grove: an enormous, brand new, crescent-shaped arena amid tall pines in Mežaparks forest on the outskirts of Latvia’s capital, Rīga. </p>
<p>Upward Together was not just a celebration of Latvia’s rich culture: it was an emotional outpouring of both individual and collective national pride and sorrow. It reflected Latvia’s strong pagan roots and its deep love of nature which features in most of its <a href="https://kulturaskanons.lv/en/archive/latvju-dainas/">folk songs</a>. Here, the gods reside in trees, rivers, the sun, the moon and the stars. </p>
<p>But more significantly, the festival asserted the power of song as a peaceful form of protest against a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Latvia">long history</a> of occupation by Germans, Poles, Swedes and Russians, culminating last century in almost 45 years of Soviet rule. </p>
<h2>Joy about culture; sadness about history</h2>
<p>As the daughter of refugees who escaped the Soviet occupation of Latvia during the second world war, I fought back tears as I listened to a choir of 17,000 champion the sun, the Daugava river and thunder – Latvia’s guardians against evil and oppression. </p>
<p>Next to me, two Ukrainian journalists wept as the orchestra played their national anthem. In the televised replays of the festival, cameras zoomed in on teary singers, dancers and musicians of all ages. </p>
<p>“Why does everyone cry?” I asked one of the participants. </p>
<p>“Because we feel great joy about our culture,” she said, “but also great sadness about our history.” </p>
<p>With the war in Ukraine on Latvia’s doorstep echoing its own battle with Russia during the second world war, the performances I saw over the ten day festival took on an added poignancy, offering a reminder of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singing_Revolution">Singing Revolution</a> of 1987-91, when the three Baltic States raised their voices in song against their Soviet occupiers.</p>
<p>On August 23 1989, two million people from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia <a href="https://www.thebalticway.eu/en/history/">formed a human</a> chain over 600 kilometres long to join their capital cities. They held hands, sang folk songs and waved flowers, in a peaceful demonstration of solidarity that saw each state finally gain independence in the early 1990s. </p>
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<h2>A free Latvia</h2>
<p>Latvia’s Song and Dance festival was first held in 1873 with 1,000 performers, and was <a href="https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/baltic-song-and-dance-celebrations-000870">recognised by UNESCO</a> in 2003.</p>
<p>After the second world war, when Latvia was part of the USSR, the festival was used to promote Soviet ideology. Certain songs particularly dear to Latvians could not be performed because they proclaimed the nation’s longing for independence. <em>Gaismas Pils</em> (The Castle of Light), composed in 1899 by Jāzeps Vītols, tells of a sunken castle that rises to announce the rebirth of a free Latvia. Despite being banned from the program, it was sung with defiance at the 1985 festival. </p>
<p>This year, 32 years after Latvia’s independence, the festival boasted over 40,000 participants including almost 3,000 from Latvia’s diaspora. </p>
<p>Participants from Latvia and from abroad paraded in national costume along Freedom Boulevard, cheered on by enthusiastic crowds and unfazed by downpours of rain. They performed in over 60 events in sport stadiums, theatres, churches and parks as well as the new arena in Mezaparks. They sang, danced and played the <a href="https://eaff.eu/en/news/2020-04-22-kokle-the-national-music-symbol-of-latvia">kokle</a>, a traditional wooden instrument. </p>
<p>Ethnic groups from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Germany, Poland, the Jewish community and smaller regions of Latvia were featured in a special concert in the beautiful Chekhov Theatre; seniors gave a moving performance in the circus; 17,000 dancers formed constantly moving patterns of traditional Latvian symbols in a football stadium. </p>
<p>Riga’s central parks were transformed into art and craft markets selling silver, bronze and amber jewellery, hand-woven textiles, woodcarving, ceramics and leatherwork. Food stalls sold rye bread, sauerkraut and traditional pastries. Choirs, bands and theatre groups performed well into the night on outdoor stages and two giant traditional skirts spun continuously in the Esplanade as if unable to stop dancing. </p>
<p>The whole of Riga was alive.</p>
<p>Although I have been to Latvia many times, this was my very first experience of the Song and Dance Festival. I cried at every performance because every performance manifested the joy and the sorrow of what it is to be Latvian. When I was there, I truly understood the festival’s motto, <em>Kopā būt, kopā just</em>. Being together, feeling together. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/remembering-minorities-amid-eastern-europes-nation-state-centenary-celebrations-113174">Remembering minorities amid eastern Europe's nation-state centenary celebrations</a>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brigita Ozolins does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>This year, 32 years after Latvia’s independence, the festival boasted over 40,000 participants including almost 3,000 from Latvia’s diaspora.Brigita Ozolins, Adjunct Senior Lecturer, Fine Arts, University of TasmaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1972212023-01-05T20:33:11Z2023-01-05T20:33:11ZDNA reveals large migration into Scandinavia during the Viking age<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503216/original/file-20230105-20-c8gnzd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">More people moved into Scandinavia in Viking times than at any other time period analysed in the study.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/old-wooden-viking-snekkja-longship-type-2044280747">Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>We often think of the Vikings as ultimate explorers, taking their culture with them to far-off lands. But we may not typically think of Viking age Scandinavia as a hub for migration from all over Europe.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cell.com/cell/fulltext/S0092-8674(22)01468-4">In a study published in Cell</a>, we show this is exactly what happened. The Viking period (late 8th century to mid 11th century) was the catalyst for an exceptional inflow of people into Scandinavia. These movements were greater than for any other period we analysed.</p>
<p>What’s also striking is that later Scandinavians don’t show the same high levels of non-local ancestry present in their Viking-era counterparts. We don’t completely understand why the migrants’ genetic impact was reduced in later Scandinavians, but there are some possibilities.</p>
<p>We analysed genomes (the full complement of DNA contained in human cells) from around 17,000 Scandinavian individuals, including nearly 300 from ancient burials. We combined <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982218308443">existing datasets</a> with new samples. These were analysed together in a dataset spanning 2,000 years.</p>
<p>We used these genomes to explore when people arrived in the region from outside and where they came from. New DNA samples were collected from several iconic Swedish archaeological sites. </p>
<p>These included Sandby borg, which is a “ring fortress” <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/antiquity/article/moment-frozen-in-time-evidence-of-a-late-fifthcentury-massacre-at-sandby-borg/5C803B7E77A41439BC3B50D4BF96560E">where a massacre occurred just before 500 AD</a>, and the Vendel cemetery, which features several burials contained in large boats and dating to between the 6th and 8th centuries AD. We also used samples from Viking chamber burials and remains from Kronan, a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1095-9270.1990.tb00276.x">warship that capsized with more than 800 men</a> in 1676.</p>
<p>Two previous studies <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982218308443">noted extensive migration</a> into Scandinavia <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2688-8">during the Viking age</a>. But in our latest study, we have clarified some of the details about this flow of genes into the region.</p>
<p>We found that movements of people from western Europe impacted all of Scandinavia, while migration from the east was more localised, with peaks in the Lake Mälaren Valley and Gotland. Finally, gene flow from southern Europe largely affected the south of Scandinavia. </p>
<p>Since the study was based on a 2,000-year chronology, it was not only possible to see there was an increase in migration during the Viking era, but also that it starts to fall with the onset of the medieval period.</p>
<p>The non-local ancestry that arrives in the region at this time falls away in later periods. Much of the genetic influence from eastern Europe disappears and the western and southern influence becomes significantly diluted. The best way to explain this is that people who arrived in Scandinavia during Viking times did not have as many children as the people who were already living there.</p>
<p>There are different possible reasons for this. The migrants could have belonged to groups that did not intend to settle down in Scandinavia, instead aiming to return to where they came from. Tradespeople and diplomats are examples in this category. Additionally, the migrants could also have belonged to groups that were not allowed to have families or children, such as slaves and priests.</p>
<p>We also looked at influences that began at earlier periods in time. For example, the DNA of modern Scandinavians <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41431-021-00899-6">changes gradually as you travel from north to south</a>. This genetic “cline”, or gradient, is due to migrations into the region of people carrying shared genetic similarities known as the Uralic component.</p>
<p>Modern examples of where the Uralic genetic component can be found are among Sami people, people in modern Finland, some Native Americans and some central Asian groups. </p>
<p>In our dataset, we found occasional instances of people with Uralic ancestry – mainly in northern Scandinavia – during the Viking period and medieval times. But the Uralic influence seems to increase after this time, since individuals from our 17th century sample have similar levels of this ancestry to people living today.</p>
<p>There were many other fascinating stories from our study. For example, at the Viking age burial site of Sala, by the river Sagån, we find a woman that seems to be fully British or Irish in her genomic composition. This woman was buried in a prestigious Viking period boat burial. We don’t know exactly what position she held in society, but she would not have been a slave or a priest. </p>
<p>Among the individuals found on the wreck of the Kronan, there were two people who came from what is now Finland and another who has a genetic affinity with people from the Baltic states, such as Lithuania and Latvia (though this identification is not conclusive). At the time of the Kronan incident in 1676, these areas were part of the Swedish Empire, though they are independent today.</p>
<p>The work sheds more light on the historical events that shaped the populations of Scandinavia over time. The Viking age was marked by Scandinavians’ curiosity of the world outside their home region. But, from our results, it also appears that the world outside this region was curious enough about the Vikings to travel to Scandinavia.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197221/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anders Götherström receives funding from VR, KVA, and EU. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ricardo Rodriguez Varela does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>DNA analysis reveals a large migration of people into Scandinavia during Viking times.Anders Götherström, Professor in Molecular Archaeology, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Stockholm UniversityRicardo Rodriguez Varela, Research in Molecular Archaeology, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Stockholm University, Stockholm UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1900222022-09-05T16:53:46Z2022-09-05T16:53:46ZSoviet monuments are being toppled – this gives the spaces they occupied a new meaning<p>In the Latvian capital of Riga, an 80-metre concrete obelisk <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/25/latvia-topples-soviet-era-obelisk-amid-backlash-against-russia">came crashing down</a> in late August to the loud cheers of a nearby crowd. It was created to commemorate the Soviet Army’s capture of Latvia in 1944. Days earlier in Estonia, another Soviet monument, this time of a tank adorned with the communist red star, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/16/estonia-removes-soviet-era-tank-monument-amid-russia-tensions-narva">removed and taken to reside in a museum</a>. </p>
<p>Such scenes are happening all over central and eastern Europe – in Poland, Lithuania and Czechia. The removal or destruction of Soviet-era monuments is a powerful reminder of the complex relationship that exists between history, memory and politics.</p>
<p>Monuments are powerful instruments of propaganda, making the events of the past visible in the present. Public art of this type defines the heroes of history and writes the story of a nation’s identity. But these objects being removed reflect (and create) conflicting histories and interpretations of the aftermath of war. Public memory is not uniform or static.</p>
<p>Statues and memorials erected in the years after the second world war are prime examples. Intended to commemorate liberation from Nazism, they were also <a href="https://www.politika.io/en/article/what-has-happened-to-soviet-war-memorials-since-198991-an-overview">symbols of</a> Soviet power and presence in eastern Europe and political and military occupation.</p>
<p>As a result, memorials, statues and monuments that appear to propagate communism or commemorate the Soviet past have also been subject either to government-sanctioned removal or, more commonly, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/soviet-war-memorials-take-a-hit-across-central-and-eastern-europe/">defacement, marginalisation or repurposing</a>. Their removal is not a destruction or an erasure of history, but a creation of a new way of remembering. </p>
<h2>De-communisation of public space</h2>
<p>In Ukraine, the “<a href="http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=54670">de-communisation</a>” law passed in April 2015 prohibited the use of communist symbols and propaganda in monuments, places and street names. More than 2,000 monuments to Ukraine’s communist past were removed between 2015 and 2020, following the Russian annexation of Crimea.</p>
<p>An updated law on de-communisation in Poland in 2017 enforced the removal of monuments and memorials to individuals and events that symbolised communism or other forms of totalitarianism. Driven by the Russian war in Ukraine, the Polish Institute of National Remembrance intensified its efforts to de-communise public spaces. In March 2022 its head, Karol Nawrocki, called for <a href="https://polishnews.co.uk/chrzowice-the-monument-in-honor-of-the-red-army-was-dismantled/">swift action to remove symbols</a> that might promote communism from public spaces.</p>
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<p>Soviet-era monuments have also been removed from public places in Estonia, to ensure – in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62562909">words of the prime minister</a>, Kaja Kallas – that Russia would be denied any opportunity to “use the past to disturb the peace”.</p>
<p>In Latvia’s capital, Riga, as the Soviet <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/25/latvia-topples-soviet-era-obelisk-amid-backlash-against-russia">war memorial</a> was demolished, The city’s mayor, Mārtiņš Staķis, argued that the monument had glorified Russian war crimes, and should be demolished physically and “in the hearts as well”.</p>
<p>But the removal of visible memorials to the Soviet era has been divisive. Such monuments and imagery were a prominent part of the landscape, and their removal has fuelled arguments about national identity and history. For some observers, de-communisation was necessary to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-soviet-monuments-what-the-west-can-learn/%5d">prevent the rise of oppressive regimes</a>. </p>
<p>For others, the disappearance of statues and military monuments was a visible, forceful and unjustified attempt to erase a nation’s past, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-prompts-baltic-states-to-remove-soviet-memorials-188388">however troubled it was</a>. Among them was a spokesman for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, who condemned the removal of Soviet-era monuments as a “<a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/europe/tensions-rise-as-estonia-looks-to-remove-soviet-tank-memorial-close-to-russia-border/news-story/9998d479e0ed8d06baacd8b416a7ba7a">war against history</a>”.</p>
<h2>The condemnation of memory</h2>
<p>When statues are toppled and monuments are torn down, we witness a physical assault on both the object and the people and events that it symbolises. Destruction is intended to break our link with the past, defacement shows the object – and what or who it symbolises – to be powerless, unable to defend itself.</p>
<p>The destruction of public monuments has a long history. “<em>Damnatio memoriae</em>” (the condemnation of memory) summarises the practice of the Roman world, in which the emperor, Senate or wider populace could act to condemn the actions and memory of previous rulers. </p>
<p>Statues were pulled down, coins melted, and written records destroyed. In the <a href="https://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/panegyric/">Panegyrici Latini</a>, the writer and philosopher Pliny the Elder describes participants’ delight when vengeance was enacted upon the hated dead.</p>
<p>But were the condemned dead forgotten, their memory and history “<a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-south-dakotas-2020-mount-rushmore-fireworks-celebration-keystone-south-dakota/">wiped out</a>” by such actions? Or do we remember them, just in a different interpretation of the past?</p>
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<p>We can observe such competing narratives in the interpretation of the ruins of medieval monasteries that remain visible on the English landscape. For many Protestant reformers of the 16th and 17th centuries, these “bare ruined choirs” were a monument to the successful suppression of “false religion” (Catholicism) in England. But opponents of religious change viewed those same ruins with nostalgia, and <a href="https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/Dissolution-of-the-Monasteries/">mourned the lost monastic life</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Painting depicting the pulling down of a statue." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482772/original/file-20220905-14-j7iuee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/482772/original/file-20220905-14-j7iuee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482772/original/file-20220905-14-j7iuee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482772/original/file-20220905-14-j7iuee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=468&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482772/original/file-20220905-14-j7iuee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482772/original/file-20220905-14-j7iuee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/482772/original/file-20220905-14-j7iuee.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Pulling Down the Statue of King George III by Johannes Adam Simon Oertel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bowling_Green_(New_York_City)#/media/File:Johannes_Adam_Simon_Oertel_Pulling_Down_the_Statue_of_King_George_III,_N.Y.C._ca._1859.jpg">Wikimedia</a></span>
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<p>Likewise, the statue of King George III, installed by the British in Bowling Green park in New York, was toppled and melted in 1776 after the reading of the Declaration of Independence. But the empty plinth and surrounding fence remain as a monument to a <a href="https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/the-oldest-fence-in-new-york-new-york-new-york">different historical narrative</a>, that commemorates the revolutionaries’ successful defeat of an oppressive British state.</p>
<p>“De-communisation” in Ukraine created new physical and mental spaces, with some monuments destroyed and others replaced with religious figures, flowers, or <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20170720-interview-sebastien-gobert-looking-lenin-ukraine-statues-poroshenko-russia-stalin-ussr">left empty</a>. Dust and rubble remind us of what once stood on that same spot.</p>
<p>Statues and monuments commemorate the past for a present and future audience. They build a landscape and environment that is made up of layers of human culture and memory, which can be <a href="https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20210904.16.pdf">both created and destroyed</a>. But empty spaces left by statues communicate a message that is as powerful as the propaganda of the statue itself.</p>
<p>The destruction of material objects and the destruction of human memory are not the same. History, memory and politics are, and always have been, closely intertwined and the link between remembering and forgetting is stronger than we might think.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190022/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Helen Parish does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>History is not being destroyed but the way people remember is being changed.Helen Parish, Professor of History, University of ReadingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1883882022-08-17T16:25:18Z2022-08-17T16:25:18ZUkraine war prompts Baltic states to remove Soviet memorials<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478061/original/file-20220808-3141-ph0zqz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1599%2C998&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Soviet-era monument in Riga, Latvia, which was splashed with the colours of the Ukraine flag the day after Russia invaded in February 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/janitors/51911428821/in/album-72177720297042353/">Kārlis Dambrāns/ Flickr.</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Estonia is to remove all of its Soviet-era war monuments, the latest in a line of eastern European countries to go down this path. There are <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608667843/government-office-creating-communist-monuments-register">reportedly</a> 200 to 400 Soviet-era memorials or monuments still standing across Estonia. </p>
<p>The prime minister, Kaja Kallas, said these would now be relocated “<a href="https://news.err.ee/1608675571/kallas-soviet-monuments-will-be-moved-as-soon-as-possible">as quickly as possible</a>”, adding: “It is clear that Russian aggression in Ukraine has torn open the wounds in our society that these communist monuments remind us of and therefore their removal from public space is necessary to avoid additional tensions.” </p>
<p>The move is not without its controversy. The discussed removal of a T-34 tank monument outside the city of Narva near the border with Russia has met with some opposition from the local population, 90% of whom are <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781793631381/Everyday-Belonging-in-the-Post-Soviet-Borderlands-Russian-Speakers-in-Estonia-and-Kazakhstan">Russian speakers</a>. </p>
<p>But Kallas <a href="https://news.err.ee/1608675571/kallas-soviet-monuments-will-be-moved-as-soon-as-possible">stressed that</a> it is not the “right place” for commemorating the dead: “A tank is a murder weapon, it is not a memorial, and these same tanks are killing people on the streets of Ukraine right now.” </p>
<p>Over the past few years, some former Soviet bloc countries have debated the future of their Soviet-era war monuments, many of which celebrate the part played by the Red Army in the second world war and, specifically, the battle against fascism. But – beyond a few notable instances of monuments being removed from countries making the transition from communism to a liberal market economy (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-review/article/abs/persistent-legacies-of-communism-or-the-ongoing-purification-of-public-space-in-post1989-poland/FCF74311250B1A2C17BD7BFE0573519E">Poland springs to mind</a>) – not many war monuments have <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/iph-2018-0014/html?lang=en">actually been removed</a>.</p>
<p>Instead they have more often been <a href="https://www.politika.io/en/article/what-has-happened-to-soviet-war-memorials-since-198991-an-overview">neglected, defaced or otherwise altered</a>. But now the invasion of Ukraine appears to be prompting countries in eastern Europe and the Baltic states to consider getting rid of the remaining Soviet war monuments altogether.</p>
<p>In the early days and weeks of the invasion, Soviet war monuments made the news as activists and supporters of Ukraine painted some statues in the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/soviet-war-memorials-take-a-hit-across-central-and-eastern-europe/">colours of the national flag</a> as an expression of solidarity – something they <a href="https://theconversation.com/soviet-war-memorials-in-eastern-europe-continue-to-strain-relations-with-russia-101687">have done</a> since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. </p>
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<img alt="Memorial with freize of soldiers, one painted yellow and blue." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478506/original/file-20220810-20-tzkp3o.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia, Bulgaria, painted overnight on February 24 2014 by unknown activists in solidarity with anti-Russian protests in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wikimedia Commons</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
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<p>As the war extended into the spring and summer months, campaigns to remove the Soviet monuments <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/8/latvia-leads-charge-to-fell-soviet-memorials-in-europe">resurfaced</a> in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. All three regained their independence in 1991 and later joined Nato and the EU.</p>
<p>In June, a law on the prohibition of promoting totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and their ideologies – dubbed the “<a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1711669/new-desovietisation-law-takes-aim-at-lithuania-s-remaining-soviet-era-signs">deSovietisation” law</a> – was drafted by the Lithuanian parliament. At the same time, in neighbouring Latvia, the <a href="https://www.saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/31206-saeima-passes-a-law-to-dismantle-sites-glorifying-the-soviet-and-nazi-regimes">parliament adopted</a> its own similar law. Now Estonia is following suit. </p>
<p>Interestingly, while the focus is on second world war Red Army monuments, there is clear impetus for a debate on the history of the Soviet control of these countries.</p>
<h2>Liberation or occupation?</h2>
<p>Despite the title of Latvia’s recent law, you’d be hard put to find any kind of monument glorifying the Nazi regime, there or anywhere else in the Baltic states. The key thing here is the equivalence drawn between the Soviet and Nazi regimes as they are remembered.</p>
<p>From the perspective of east European states, the origins of the second world war can be traced back to the secret protocols of the <a href="https://www.basicbooks.com/titles/roger-moorhouse/the-devils-alliance/9780465030750/">Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact</a> in 1939 which divided Europe into spheres of influence between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. As a result, both are considered to bear responsibility for the war that turned much of eastern Europe into what historian Timothy Snyder has referred to as “<a href="https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/396350/bloodlands-by-snyder-timothy/9780099551799">bloodlands</a>”.</p>
<p>In the recent discussion of the Soviet-era monuments, it is the associated interpretation of the aftermath of the second world war that is at stake. The Soviet war monuments are nothing if not ambiguous, “<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01629770802461225">symbolising liberation, aggression and occupation</a>”. While these monuments refer to the liberation from the Nazi German occupations, the rescue simultaneously brought with it a long period of communist rule, accompanied by the presence of the Soviet Army across eastern Europe. </p>
<p>The removal in Prague of a <a href="https://www.cultures-of-history.uni-jena.de/debates/controversies-surrounding-the-removal-of-the-marshal-konev-statue">statue of Ivan Konev</a> in 2020 is a good example of this ambiguity. Konev led the liberation of Prague from the Nazis in 1945, but also contributed to the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968. </p>
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<img alt="Tank on a plinth of stones with bouquets on the ground in front" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/478063/original/file-20220808-16-i6m16q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Angelina Ivanova/ Flickr.</span></span>
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<h2>New meaning</h2>
<p>The war in Ukraine gave Estonia new impetus and “<a href="https://news.err.ee/1608669412/riina-solman-the-time-to-remove-symbols-of-occupation-is-now">the moral right to look at the wounds that have not yet healed</a>”, according to the minister of public administration. Soviet war monuments have become a proxy through which to seemingly achieve this task.</p>
<p>Memories of <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1750698018784116">Soviet occupation</a> also became a filter through which the partial occupation of Ukraine by Russian troops is understood. Soviet war monuments are now seen by many as “<a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1670910/pending-state-decision-on-cultural-heritage-lithuania-s-raseiniai-hides-soviet-monuments">glorifying Soviet imperialism</a>”, something that now extends to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. They are “<a href="https://www.saeima.lv/en/news/saeima-news/31027-saeima-suspends-bilateral-agreement-between-latvia-and-russia-on-memorial-buildings-and-monuments">Soviet occupation monuments</a>” that now equally stand for what Russia is doing to its neighbouring country.</p>
<p>The linking of Soviet and Nazi regimes in the Latvia’s law is also not accidental. Rather, the removal and relocation of Soviet war monuments is framed within the Baltic and <a href="https://eng.lsm.lv/article/culture/history/baltic-states-poland-romania-urge-eu-to-counter-russian-falsification-of-history.a466447/">more broadly east European memory</a> of the second world war and that of the 20th century. It appears to be a step towards making this position <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010614552549">secure</a> in the background of Vladimir Putin’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-russias-fixation-on-the-second-world-war-helps-explain-its-ukraine-invasion-181296">misuse of history</a> to justify the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>While public opinion in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is far from uniform, one thing seems to be clear. Against the backdrop of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the removal and relocation of these statues and monuments is not just an expression of solidarity with Ukraine. It’s a way of settling how the history of the Soviet era is to be remembered.</p>
<p>The question is whether these processes will facilitate the healing of the wounds left by the complex 20th-century history of former Soviet bloc countries. Or if they are just as likely to entrench the existing memory fault lines.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188388/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dmitrijs Andrejevs was in receipt of funding from the University of Manchester (Post-Submission Career Development Award) at the time this article was written. </span></em></p>In much of eastern Europe historical memory of communist rule has been brought into sharp focus by the war in Ukraine.Dmitrijs Andrejevs, PhD candidate in Russian and East European Studies, University of ManchesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1857202022-06-23T13:41:36Z2022-06-23T13:41:36ZUkraine war: all eyes on Lithuania as sanctions close Russian land access to Kaliningrad<p>Tensions between Russia and Nato, already stretched considerably by the invasion of Ukraine, have ratcheted up even further over Kaliningrad, a small piece of Russian territory sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic coast and cut off from mainland Russia.</p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/kaliningrad-russias-unsinkable-aircraft-carrier-deep-in-nato-territory-182541">Kaliningrad</a> is a Russian <em>oblast</em> (region), of just under half a million people on the Baltic sea. It sits between Lithuania to its north and east and Poland to its south and is about 1,300km from Moscow. It was claimed by the Soviet Union from Germany after the second world war and has been controlled by Moscow ever since.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/kaliningrad-russias-unsinkable-aircraft-carrier-deep-in-nato-territory-182541">Kaliningrad: Russia's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' deep in Nato territory</a>
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<p>When the sixth round of EU sanctions on Russia came into effect on June 17, Lithuania announced that sanctioned Russian goods to Kaliningrad would be banned from transit through Lithuania. The <a href="https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-belarus/">sanctions affect</a> oil and refined oil products, and any technology that could be used for military purposes. Other products <a href="https://intellinews.com/russia-demands-end-to-kaliningrad-transit-restrictions-248155/">on the list</a> were cement, construction materials and metal goods. </p>
<p>The decision jeopardises an agreement signed in April 2003 between the EU and Russia which allowed people and goods from Kaliningrad to obtain a <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/10991">transit document</a> for train travel across Lithuania to Russia. The EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/eu-says-lithuania-acted-by-the-book-in-kaliningrad-standoff-with-russia/">Josep Borell</a>, backed the decision, saying that Lithuania was correctly implementing EU sanctions.</p>
<p>Moscow reacted immediately and strongly, threatening “<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/russia-threatens-lithuania-over-kaliningrad-blockade/av-62214326">serious consequences</a>”, which, as yet, have not been specified.</p>
<p>On June 20, Lithuania’s chargé d’affaires was summoned to the Foreign Ministry and told to cancel the restrictions or face the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/50631fd9-d5c6-4c97-890d-902ab36a57f1">consequences</a>. A senator on Russia’s upper house – the <a href="http://www.council.gov.ru/en/">Federation Council</a> – Andrey Klimov, called on the EU to “<a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/20/more-than-serious">correct Vilnius’s impudent little stunt</a>”, while the head of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, stated that “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/21/kaliningrad-russia-threatens-serious-consequences-as-lithuania-blocks-rail-goods">appropriate measures</a>” that would have a “serious negative impact on the population of Lithuania”.</p>
<p>The heightened tensions between Vilnius and Moscow follow hot on the heels of a discussion in Russia’s State Duma on June 8 – the lower house of parliament – about revoking the Soviet Union’s <a href="https://euobserver.com/world/155227">recognition</a> of Lithuania’s independence. By making a stand over transiting goods to Kaliningrad, Lithuania is also highlighting its sovereignty.</p>
<h2>Threat in the Baltic</h2>
<p>The deteriorating relationship between Russia and the west after the former’s invasion of the Donbas in 2014 saw Russia deploy short-range Iskander missiles in <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37600426">Kaliningrad in 2016</a> that could reach the Baltic State capitals and two-thirds of Poland. In April 2022, the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet air force ran simulated bombing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-stages-war-games-kaliningrad-enclave-ifax-says-2022-04-09/">campaigns</a>in Kaliningrad. With more than 1,000 personnel – and at a time of heightened conflict over Ukraine – this was a big concern for Vilnius.</p>
<p>On June 22, the Russian military <a href="https://twitter.com/IuliiaMendel/status/1539509466672021504">simulated missile attacks</a> on Estonia with the Baltic Sea Fleet heavily <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-21/nato-s-estonia-says-it-s-targeted-by-russian-missile-simulations">involved</a> and helicopters violating Estonian <a href="https://twitter.com/haynesdeborah/status/1539359995984330753">airspace</a>. Understandably, the Lithuanian authorities fear being <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/lithuania-kaliningrad-cut-off-ukraine-war-nato-territory-1516337">cut off</a>. </p>
<p>The Suwałki gap is a stretch of land 100 kilometres long stretching along the Lithuanian and Polish border dividing Belarus from <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/suwalki-gap-russia-war-nato-lithuania-poland-border/">Kaliningrad</a>. The Suwałki gap has long been Nato’s weak point as Russia could quickly isolate the Baltic States. Although still <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/03/nato-must-prepare-to-defend-its-weakest-point-the-suwalki-corridor/">an unlikely prospect</a> this would be Nato’s weakest point. So Russian military drills in Kaliningrad are viewed with alarm in Vilnius.</p>
<p>And, while Lithuania has the smallest Russian minority in the Baltic States, Moscow’s propaganda makes much of the <a href="https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-09/pC_V9N2_en_Burdulli.pdf">ethnic Russian population</a> in a similar way to its insistence that Crimea and the Donbas region are intimately tied through cultural and linguistic links to the Russian “motherland”.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470530/original/file-20220623-51933-q6rxsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map showing Russia's exclave of Kaliningrad sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470530/original/file-20220623-51933-q6rxsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/470530/original/file-20220623-51933-q6rxsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470530/original/file-20220623-51933-q6rxsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470530/original/file-20220623-51933-q6rxsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470530/original/file-20220623-51933-q6rxsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470530/original/file-20220623-51933-q6rxsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/470530/original/file-20220623-51933-q6rxsk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Why Kaliningrad matters.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Rokas Tenys via Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>So the ban on the transit of certain goods to Kaliningrad represents an important stand by Lithuania against Russia. While the original ban was on the transit of sanctioned goods by train, Vilnius extended the ban to <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/80485/">goods moved by lorry</a> on June 21.</p>
<p>There is little Russia can do as it is <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-where-is-kaliningrad-russias-exclave-in-europe-and-how-will-lithuanian-sanctions-affect-western-relations-12637787">unlikely to attack</a> a Nato member. Russian flights were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60539303">banned from EU airspace</a> three days after invading Ukraine and shipping companies quickly stopped <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-shipping-deliveries-suspended-ukraine/31730936.html">working in Russian ports</a>. Russia will be left looking for available domestic shipping, which could take months.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-as-the-conflict-at-sea-intensifies-russias-prospects-of-victory-look-further-off-than-ever-185640">Ukraine war: as the conflict at sea intensifies, Russia's prospects of victory look further off than ever</a>
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<p>For Lithuania, it is a calculated risk. Since mid-2021 Lithuania no longer directly relies on Russia for energy, having connected to the European <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-lithuania-nato-kaliningrad-rail-link-threat/">power grid</a>. Therefore, it is a targeted action by Lithuania that leaves Russia with little scope for action.</p>
<h2>Vilnius versus Moscow</h2>
<p>Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Lithuania has sent more than €115 million (£99 million) in <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1702318/lithuania-among-top-15-of-ukraine-s-military-donors-mp">military aid</a> By comparison, Italy has sent <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27278/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/">€152 million</a> in military aid, and its GDP is higher at <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IT">US$1.89 trillion (£1.54 trillion)</a> in 2020. If you combine its humanitarian and military support to Ukraine, Lithuania has sent <a href="https://www.statista.com/chart/27331/countries-committing-the-most-of-their-gdp-to-ukraine-aid/">0.2%</a> of its GDP. This is 0.02% less than the US. In 2020, Lithuania’s GDP stood at <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/lithuania/gdp">US$56 billion</a>. By contrast, America’s GDP in 2021 was <a href="https://www.bea.gov/news/2022/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2021-advance-estimate">US$23 trillion</a>.</p>
<p>Well before the Russian invasion – in July 2021 – Lithuania called for Ukraine to be <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/poland-lithuania-ukraine-signed-declaration-on-support-for-ukraine-joining-nato-and-the-eu.html">given Nato membership</a>. It has repeated this call since the conflict started in February. Lithuania was also among the first EU states to request that Brussels provide <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lithuania-calls-eu-provide-cash-ukrainian-refugees-2022-05-23/">funding for Ukrainian refugees</a>. Lithuania has been a principal advocate for Ukraine becoming an EU member and campaigned for Brussels to <a href="https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1630115/lithuania-joins-eu-countries-to-voice-support-for-ukraine-membership">begin talks</a> to facilitate that move.</p>
<p>The Russian government has called Lithuania’s actions a “blockade”. But <a href="https://twitter.com/LithuanianGovt/status/1539244822237782020">people and unsanctioned goods</a> can still transit across Lithuania and people from Kaliningrad can still enter Poland and Lithuania <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-borders-open-to-kaliningrad-citizens/">without a visa</a>.</p>
<p>Reflecting Russia’s often surreal worldview, the authorities claim that it is <a href="https://twitter.com/anneapplebaum/status/1539562061642010624">illegal by international law to blockade Kaliningrad</a>. But if it’s really a blockade, it’s a poor one – and Moscow knows all about blockades, having cut off Ukrainian ports, causing the current <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d144a7d4-eba1-4377-9179-88d247688b1e">global food crisis</a>. Lithuania has yet again shown that it is prepared to <a href="https://twitter.com/mrsorokaa/status/1539283153231257602">stand up to autocrats</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185720/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A small piece of Russian territory on the Baltic coast has become the focus of heightened tensions on Nato’s fringe.Stephen Hall, Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Politics, International Relations and Russia, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1837942022-05-31T13:58:24Z2022-05-31T13:58:24Z3 ways Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is affecting the former Soviet region<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466031/original/file-20220530-24-79tlc8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=1401%2C62%2C4491%2C3206&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A demonstrator holds a pro-Ukraine sign during a protest against Russia's invasion of Ukraine in Almaty, Kazakhstan — a former Soviet republic that has largely stayed neutral during the conflict — in March 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vladimir Tretyakov)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The war in Ukraine is dividing the former Soviet region, making it poorer and less secure. Russia will take advantage of this. </p>
<p>As a student three decades ago, I watched <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/the-collapse-of-the-Soviet-Union">the Soviet Union collapse and 15 new states</a>, including Ukraine, escape its grip. Now, three months into Vladimir Putin’s brutal assault on Ukraine, the other post-Soviet countries are being transformed in three ways that will change the course of the region’s future.</p>
<p>Here’s how.</p>
<h2>1. Altering geopolitics</h2>
<p>The war is changing the geopolitics of the region. The Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — are already members of NATO and the European Union, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/17/baltics-russia-ukraine-latvia-lithuania-estonia/">and have solidified their anti-Putin stance and bolstered their national identities</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://cepa.org/the-kremlins-next-targets-georgia-and-moldova/">Georgia and Moldova</a> are now more interested <a href="https://inews.co.uk/news/world/could-moldova-georgia-join-nato-experts-growing-russian-aggression-1599659">in fully joining western organizations</a> but are treading carefully to avoid provoking Russia. Russia’s only strong ally, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/03/11/1085548867/belarus-ukraine-russia-invasion-lukashenko-putin">Belarus, has enabled Russia’s invasion</a> and effectively lost its sovereignty to Moscow. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two balding men, one taller with a moustache, shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466028/original/file-20220530-26-qd370i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466028/original/file-20220530-26-qd370i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466028/original/file-20220530-26-qd370i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466028/original/file-20220530-26-qd370i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=417&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466028/original/file-20220530-26-qd370i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466028/original/file-20220530-26-qd370i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466028/original/file-20220530-26-qd370i.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=524&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko shake hands during their meeting in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia, on May 23, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Ramil Sitdikov, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The other former Soviet regimes — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/03/26/the-stans-want-nothing-to-do-with-vladimir-putins-invasion-of-ukraine">have remained mostly silent</a>, neither supporting the war nor vigorously condemning Putin. Like much of the non-western world, they abstained or did not vote on the <a href="https://unric.org/en/the-un-and-the-war-in-ukraine-key-information/">UN votes</a> condemning Russia. </p>
<p>They have not recognized the two eastern Ukrainian republics, nor have they sent Putin troops or military equipment. Tellingly, none of the region’s presidents were at <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/8819755/russia-victory-day-vladimir-putin-in-photos/">Putin’s Victory Day parade.</a></p>
<p>However, because they’re adept at walking a balancing act between the West and Russia, they neither support nor evade western sanctions and are sometimes weary of NATO’s military role in eastern Europe. The longer the war goes on, the more pressure some will face to take sides.</p>
<h2>2. Impoverishing nations</h2>
<p>The post-Soviet states are becoming poorer. The war is harming the region’s interlinked economies. Ukraine has lost <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/10/russian-invasion-to-shrink-ukraine-economy-by-45-percent-this-year">45 per cent of its GDP</a>. Trade has halted; infrastructure is crippled and Ukraine’s Black Sea ports are blocked. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/05/06/how-war-is-hitting-ukraine-s-farmers-and-threatening-world-food-supplies">Destroyed agricultural production</a> has regional and global implications due to dependence on Ukrainian grains and sunflower oil. If Russia remains in the eastern Donbas region, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/28/ukraine-war-russia-resources-energy-oil-gas-commodities-agriculture/">future production and investment in hydrocarbons and mineral exploitation are at risk</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Bare-chested soldiers sit in the sun atop a military vehicle adorned with a Ukrainian flag. Sunflowers are in the foreground." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466029/original/file-20220530-24-r2pjb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466029/original/file-20220530-24-r2pjb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466029/original/file-20220530-24-r2pjb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466029/original/file-20220530-24-r2pjb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466029/original/file-20220530-24-r2pjb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466029/original/file-20220530-24-r2pjb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466029/original/file-20220530-24-r2pjb3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainian soldiers ride on a military vehicle adorned with a Ukrainian flag in a sunflower field in eastern Ukraine in 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Western sanctions and countermeasures don’t just hurt Russia and Russians. Throughout the region, inflation is rising, and <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/26/food-and-energy-price-shocks-from-ukraine-war">food and fuel costs</a> are soaring. Those most dependent upon Russia, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, may suffer dramatically from <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/05/11/remittances-to-reach-630-billion-in-2022-with-record-flows-into-ukraine">decreasing remittances</a> — money sent back home from those who work in Russia.</p>
<p><a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/what-will-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-mean-for-chinas-belt-and-road/">China’s One Belt One Road</a> regional infrastructure projects, such as railway lines, are on hold. A negative impact on trade, tourism and investment is anticipated.</p>
<h2>3. Fuelling dissent</h2>
<p>The war is exacerbating societal and political challenges. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/what-will-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-mean-for-chinas-belt-and-road/">Protesters in Georgia</a> and <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-russia-ukraine-protest/31738906.html">Kazakhstan</a> are calling for their governments to take stronger pro-Ukraine stances. </p>
<p>Throughout the region, civil society has rallied to send humanitarian aid. <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/24/ukraine-legion-foreign-soldiers-00020233">Volunteers and mercenaries from Georgia and elsewhere have gone to Ukraine to fight.</a> </p>
<p>Large numbers of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472">Ukrainian refugees</a> have fled for Moldova, but also Belarus and Georgia. Smaller numbers of <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/05/06/nearly-4m-russians-left-russia-in-early-2022-fsb-a77603">Russians are fleeing Russia</a> to Georgia, Tajikistan and elsewhere due to their opposition to the war, the negative effects of sanctions and growing repression. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="An elderly woman eats soup while a boy in a red parka sips on a juice box." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466036/original/file-20220530-12-yx23wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466036/original/file-20220530-12-yx23wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466036/original/file-20220530-12-yx23wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466036/original/file-20220530-12-yx23wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466036/original/file-20220530-12-yx23wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466036/original/file-20220530-12-yx23wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466036/original/file-20220530-12-yx23wp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An elderly refugee from the Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv has a meal with her grandson after fleeing the war from neighbouring Ukraine at the border crossing in Palanca, Moldova, in March 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Sergei Grits)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Repercussions for Russia</h2>
<p>What do these changes mean for Russia’s role in the region? It depends on when and how the war ends and sanctions are lifted, but current events indicate likely trends. </p>
<p>Firstly, Russia’s battered economy will be oriented eastward. Russia will have less influence on its western periphery. Putin’s dream of creating a regional economic organization, the <a href="http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en">Eurasian Economic Union</a>, is no longer as viable if it can’t generate growth. </p>
<p>Countries facing economic and societal challenges, and dependent on Russian trade and transit routes, may retain ties with Russia. Central Asian states will continue to pursue <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24533965">multi-vectored policies</a> — in other words, equal and pragmatic relations with European and Asian states. </p>
<p>Russia will look further east, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-31/putin-needs-help-from-china-and-india-on-oil-europe-doesn-t-want">to China and India,</a> for trade partners and markets for its energy resources. In the long term, a weakened Russia, detached from the West, will likely be more dependent upon China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A balding man in a suit is embraced by another man with a white beard." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466038/original/file-20220530-22-rv5ghl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/466038/original/file-20220530-22-rv5ghl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466038/original/file-20220530-22-rv5ghl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466038/original/file-20220530-22-rv5ghl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=470&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466038/original/file-20220530-22-rv5ghl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466038/original/file-20220530-22-rv5ghl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/466038/original/file-20220530-22-rv5ghl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=590&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi greet each other before their meeting in New Delhi, India, in December 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Manish Swarup)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Russia will also turn to non-western political regional alignments. <a href="http://eng.sectsco.org/">The Shanghai Cooperation Organization</a> includes Russia, four central Asian states, China, India and Pakistan. Iran is also seeking membership. </p>
<p>These countries are reluctant to condemn Putin. <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/multipolarity-in-practice-understanding-russia-s-engagement-with-regional-institutions-pub-80717">They support multipolarity</a> — a geopolitical landscape that involves several powerful nations balancing each other out — and criticize U.S. unilateralism, calling out double standards. </p>
<p>China wants stability for its economy and generally avoids controversy, but does not want to see Russia collapse. India is democratic but reliant on Russian arms, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-04/india-wants-russia-to-discount-its-oil-to-less-than-70-a-barrel">discounted oil</a>, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/russia-increases-export-quota-of-fertilizers-easing-supply-to-india/articleshow/90953487.cms">gas and fertilizer.</a> </p>
<h2>Russian military presence</h2>
<p>Russia will also remain the key provider of security — and insecurity — in a more volatile and divided region. Russia’s military vulnerabilities are exposed, but its troops remain stationed in <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-world-can-understand-the-new-russia-through-three-decades-of/">frozen conflicts</a> inside Moldova and Georgia — countries that have expressed a desire to embrace western ideals. Russia also has peacekeepers between Armenia and Azerbaijan.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-actions-in-post-soviet-wars-provide-clues-to-its-brutal-ukraine-invasion-177952">Russia's actions in post-Soviet wars provide clues to its brutal Ukraine invasion</a>
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<p>Putin’s war in Ukraine has shown the dangers that these troops may pose. To the east, Russia maintains bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, near the <a href="https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sgsm21288.doc.htm">Taliban-controlled, famine-stricken Afghanistan</a> recently abandoned by the U.S.</p>
<p><a href="https://mailchi.mp/2216f0d8c47e/our-first-edition-of-central-asia-in-focus-9393432?e=7058e1c05c">The worst violence since Tajikistan’s civil war in the 1990s</a> recently erupted in eastern Tajikistan.</p>
<p>Putin could also use Russia’s regional security organization, <a href="https://en.odkb-csto.org/">the Cooperative Security Treaty Organization</a>, to legitimize actions in other states. Russia is acting unilaterally in Ukraine, but a month before the invasion, the organization responded to calls from the Kazakh government to control protests, casting a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/13569771003593920">chilling effect on civil society</a> there.</p>
<p>The war is a seismic event. A weakened Russia will try to take advantage of a poorer, more divided and less secure post-Soviet region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/183794/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war in Ukraine is a seismic event. A weakened Russia will try to take advantage of a poorer, more divided and less secure post-Soviet region.Nicole Jackson, Associate Professor of International Studies, Simon Fraser UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1791592022-03-14T12:21:02Z2022-03-14T12:21:02ZRussia’s false claims about biological weapons in Ukraine demonstrate the dangers of disinformation and how hard it is to counter – 4 essential reads<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451666/original/file-20220311-28-1kd1bst.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C24%2C5414%2C3582&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Russian disinformation, amplified by China, is raising fears that the war in Ukraine could escalate.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarBiolabClaims/527539296f334863b392d4fd298ee7ec/photo">AP Photo/Vincent Yu</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On March 11, 2022, Vasily Nebenzya, Russia’s U.N. ambassador, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/11/un-council-ukraine-russia-chemical-weapons-zelensky/">told the U.N. Security Council</a> that Russia had discovered evidence of U.S.-funded biological weapons research in Ukraine. U.S. officials denied the claims, accused Russia of <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/security-council-hear-russian-claim-us-labs-ukraine-83383215">using the U.N. to spread disinformation</a>, and warned that Russia’s accusations could be a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/10/us/politics/russia-ukraine-china-bioweapons.html">prelude to it using biological weapons</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451668/original/file-20220311-14-1r8ryvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="a man in a dark business suit speaks at a podium with a red and gold emblem on the front" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451668/original/file-20220311-14-1r8ryvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451668/original/file-20220311-14-1r8ryvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451668/original/file-20220311-14-1r8ryvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451668/original/file-20220311-14-1r8ryvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451668/original/file-20220311-14-1r8ryvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451668/original/file-20220311-14-1r8ryvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451668/original/file-20220311-14-1r8ryvl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian echoed unsupported claims by Russian officials that the U.S. is engaged in illegal chemical weapons development in Ukraine.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/RussiaUkraineWarBioLabClaims/ad5706d5fd5b49a6bb111aa0dd347403/photo">AP Photo</a></span>
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<p>The statements followed several days of Russian officials making the claim, and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-covid-health-biological-weapons-china-39eeee023efdf7ea59c4a20b7e018169">Chinese officials echoing it</a>. Several prominent right-wing figures in the U.S. amplified the claims by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/11/us/politics/us-bioweapons-ukraine-misinformation.html">mischaracterizing Senate testimony</a> from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland about U.S. support for biological research in Ukraine. </p>
<p>Russia’s claims are part of a strategy of spreading disinformation before and during the invasion of Ukraine. The disinformation aims to bolster support for the war within Russia, undermine Ukrainian morale and sow confusion and discord in the U.S. and Europe. The biological warfare claims show how pernicious disinformation can be: difficult to counter and highly consequential. </p>
<p>Here are four articles from our archive to help you understand how Russia used disinformation to justify the invasion, how disinformation fits into Russia’s use of technology in warfare, what makes disinformation so challenging, and how targets of Russia’s disinformation have learned to respond.</p>
<h2>1. False flags, provocations and disinformation</h2>
<p>In the run-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. officials warned that Russia was preparing false flag attacks, that is attacks on its own forces to create the appearance of aggression by Ukraine. University of Washington’s <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=kRZXqz4AAAAJ&hl=en">Scott Radnitz</a> explains the long history of false flag attacks and how difficult they are to pull off in the age of satellites, smart phones and the internet.</p>
<p>Radnitz also <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-false-flag-attacks-and-did-russia-stage-any-to-claim-justification-for-invading-ukraine-177879">explains that false flag attacks are just one of many tools</a> in Russia’s propaganda toolkit. Ubiquitous information technologies are fertile ground for disinformation campaigns. “With the prevalence of disinformation campaigns, manufacturing a justification for war doesn’t require the expense or risk of a false flag – let alone an actual attack,” he writes.</p>
<p>“At the start of its incursion into Crimea in 2014, the Kremlin used ‘active measures,’ including disinformation and deception, to prevent Ukrainian resistance and secure domestic approval,” he writes. “Russia and other post-Soviet states are also prone to claim a ‘provocation,’ which frames any military action as a justified response rather than a first move.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-are-false-flag-attacks-and-did-russia-stage-any-to-claim-justification-for-invading-ukraine-177879">What are false flag attacks – and did Russia stage any to claim justification for invading Ukraine?</a>
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<h2>2. Information warfare</h2>
<p>Disinformation campaigns are part of a constellation of Russian high-tech warfare methods, including intelligence gathering, information warfare, cyberwarfare and electronic warfare. Rochester Institute of Technology’s <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=nNlgxmMAAAAJ&hl=en">Justin Pelletier</a> explains how these overlapping modes of warfare work and how Russia is using them in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Disinformation is <a href="https://theconversation.com/intelligence-information-warfare-cyber-warfare-electronic-warfare-what-they-are-and-how-russia-is-using-them-in-ukraine-177899">part of Russia’s information warfare strategy</a>. “There is an ongoing contest to control the narrative about what is happening in Ukraine,” he writes.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="five men carry a pregnant woman on a stretcher across a plaza strewn with tree limbs with smoke and bomb blasted buildings in the background" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/451673/original/file-20220311-21-1d9g0u9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Russian government is using disinformation to deflect responsibility for shelling a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine. This pregnant woman, wounded in the shelling, and her baby later died, according to a report from the AP.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/ADVANCERussiaUkraineWarAirpower/8fd70792482249e69c8d97d32d37bd30/photo">AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka</a></span>
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<p>There is a flood of information about Ukraine on social media, and much of it is neither verified nor debunked. “This underscores how difficult it is to be certain of the truth with a high volume of fast-changing information in an emotionally charged, high-stakes situation like warfare,” he writes.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/intelligence-information-warfare-cyber-warfare-electronic-warfare-what-they-are-and-how-russia-is-using-them-in-ukraine-177899">Intelligence, information warfare, cyber warfare, electronic warfare – what they are and how Russia is using them in Ukraine</a>
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<h2>3. The murky nature of disinformation</h2>
<p>This difficulty in determining the truth is by design, explains University of Washington’s <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=C6KSF5gAAAAJ&hl=en">Kate Starbird</a>. Disinformation campaigns are blends of truth, lies and beliefs that can have particular strategic aims but are also <a href="https://theconversation.com/disinformation-campaigns-are-murky-blends-of-truth-lies-and-sincere-beliefs-lessons-from-the-pandemic-140677">designed to undermine democratic societies</a>, she writes.</p>
<p>“The notion of disinformation often brings to mind easy-to-spot propaganda peddled by totalitarian states, but the reality is much more complex,” she writes. “Though disinformation does serve an agenda, it is often camouflaged in facts and advanced by innocent and often well-meaning individuals.”</p>
<p>“Disinformation has its roots in the practice of dezinformatsiya used by the Soviet Union’s intelligence agencies to attempt to change how people understood and interpreted events in the world,” she writes. “It’s useful to think of disinformation not as a single piece of information or even a single narrative, but as a campaign, a set of actions and narratives produced and spread to deceive for political purpose.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/disinformation-campaigns-are-murky-blends-of-truth-lies-and-sincere-beliefs-lessons-from-the-pandemic-140677">Disinformation campaigns are murky blends of truth, lies and sincere beliefs – lessons from the pandemic</a>
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<h2>4. Baltic elves</h2>
<p>Disinformation is difficult but not impossible to counter. Decades of Russian disinformation campaigns have given its targets experience in responding. <a href="https://sais.jhu.edu/users/tthomp83">Terry Thompson</a> of Johns Hopkins University describes how the Baltic states <a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-russian-disinformation-the-baltic-nations-way-109366">have defended themselves</a> in recent years.</p>
<p>Latvia is home to the Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, a NATO organization that counters Russian influence, including by publishing reports on Russian disinformation activities. The people of the Baltics have also taken up the cause. “‘Baltic elves’ – volunteers who monitor the internet for Russian disinformation – became active in 2015 after the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement">Maidan Square events</a> in Ukraine,” Thompson writes. </p>
<p>[<em>Over 150,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-150ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>“Disinformation is a key part of Russia’s overall effort to undermine Western governments. As a result, the battle is ever-changing, with Russians constantly trying new angles of attack and target countries like the Baltic nations identifying and thwarting those efforts,” he writes. “The most effective responses will involve coordination between governments, commercial technology companies and the news industry and social media platforms to identify and address disinformation.”</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-russian-disinformation-the-baltic-nations-way-109366">Countering Russian disinformation the Baltic nations' way</a>
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<p><em>Editor’s note: This story is a roundup of articles from The Conversation’s archives.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The Russian government used disinformation to fabricate a justification for invading Ukraine. A new campaign focused on biowarfare claims threatens to escalate the conflict.Eric Smalley, Science + Technology EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1771782022-02-16T21:38:33Z2022-02-16T21:38:33ZInvading Ukraine may never have been Putin’s aim – the threat alone could advance Russia’s goals<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446787/original/file-20220216-16-1kac8mx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=27%2C18%2C6035%2C4008&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">What he wants. What he really, really wants?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/russian-president-vladimir-putin-speaks-during-a-joint-news-photo/1238505332?adppopup=true">Mikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>An invasion is not the only way the crisis in Ukraine can play out.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/14/diplomatic-solution-putin-biden-ukraine/">diplomatic solution</a> may yet provide an off-ramp for Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose placement of <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-chief-russia-continuing-military-buildup-at-ukraine-border/">tens of thousands of troops</a> along Russia’s border with its smaller neighbor kicked off the current crisis.</p>
<p>Indeed, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine.html">leaders of Russia</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/02/13/1080464148/ukraine-leader-says-u-s-panic-is-playing-into-russias-strategy">and Ukraine</a> have throughout the weeks-long crisis accused the U.S. and U.K. of stirring panic with talk of an imminent invasion.</p>
<p>Invasion may <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/2/9/no-russia-will-not-invade-ukraine">never have been the point</a>. One interpretation is that President Putin mobilized his soldiers and sailors primarily to force a dialogue with the West over what the spheres of influence and interest in Eastern Europe should be.</p>
<p>As a scholar who has <a href="https://lsa.umich.edu/history/people/faculty/rgsuny.html">spent his entire career</a> studying Russian history, I see the current crisis in a broader context. If you zoom out from the events of the past few weeks, it is possible to see this dangerous standoff as part of the continuing fallout from the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Some 30 years on, the architecture of what is supposed to be the “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/03/opinion/after-the-cold-war-we-need-to-build-a-new-world-order.html">new world order</a>” is still being built.</p>
<p>Russia is a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/us-intel-russia-declining-disruptive-power-/31194504.html">regional power in decline</a> and feels insecure. If countries were able to experience emotions, Russia’s dominant feeling would be, I believe, humiliation. It feels it is a victim of Western expansion and wants a restoration of its lost influence.</p>
<p>This weakened but still ambitious regional power faces a global one, the United States, that is similarly fearful of losing its sway around the world in the face of a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/does-the-great-retreat-from-afghanistan-mark-the-end-of-the-american-era">recent military retreat from Afghanistan</a> and the economic threat of China. That standoff – between two hegemons, one regional, the other global – leaves Ukraine as the pawn in the middle.</p>
<h2>Preserving ‘strategic depth’</h2>
<p>What is going on in Ukraine fits with a military concept called “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4284512">strategic depth</a>.” This refers to the territory between a country and what it perceives to be hostile enemies.</p>
<p>During <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history">the Cold War</a>, the Soviet Union had extensive strategic depth. The <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw-treaty">Warsaw Pact</a> provided an alliance of pro-Soviet states in Eastern Europe that constituted a barrier between the Soviets and the West.</p>
<p>But from 1991, <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-the-history-behind-russias-claim-that-nato-promised-not-to-expand-to-the-east-177085">NATO expanded eastward</a> until it enveloped most of those formerly Warsaw Pact countries. Poland, Romania and Bulgaria <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm">all became NATO members</a>, as did the three former Soviet Baltic republics of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/baltics-talks-increase-nato-troops-their-soil-estonian-pm-2022-01-12/#:%7E:text=Estonia%2C%20Latvia%20and%20Lithuania%2C%20once,long%20sought%20more%20NATO%20involvement.">Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia</a>.</p>
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<p>And then came the <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm">Bucharest conference</a> in April 2008. The NATO heads of states at that meeting “welcomed” the aspirations displayed by Ukraine and Georgia and said it would hold the door open to future membership for both countries, though it pointedly did not invite Ukraine and Georgia to join the alliance.</p>
<p>When, a few months after that conference, Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia/russia-georgia-seek-control-of-south-ossetia-capital-idUSL768040420080808">attempted to take back</a> the rebellious pro-Russian region South Ossetia, Russia sent in its troops – a clear signal that no further expansion of NATO into the former Soviet Union would be tolerated. Discussion subsided for the next 13 years.</p>
<p>Russia’s strategic depth had by that time already shrunk considerably since the early 1990s. Putin now seems to fear it will be further eroded.</p>
<p>Indeed, U.S. rockets have been <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/08/31/poland-readies-for-short-range-air-defense-deal-as-trade-show-approaches/">placed in Poland</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield/u-s-activates-romanian-missile-defense-site-angering-russia-idUSKCN0Y30JX">and Romania</a>. NATO member Turkey has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-03/ukraine-buys-more-armed-drones-from-turkey-than-disclosed-and-angers-russia">sold its powerful Bayraktar drones</a> – which pounded Armenia into defeat during a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/18/the-nagorno-karabakh-settlement-and-turkish-russian-relations">short war in restive Nagorno-Karabakh</a> in 2020 – to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the United States carries out <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-russia-suwalki-gap/nato-war-game-defends-baltic-weak-spot-for-first-time-idUSKBN1990L2">war games in the Baltic States</a>, and its troops are now <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-troops-head-to-eastern-europe-4-essential-reads-on-the-ukraine-crisis-175412">heading to Eastern Europe</a>.</p>
<p>In the same way that the U.S. reacts to any signs of Russian or Chinese military <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/world/americas/russia-putin-latin-america-bolsonaro.html">presence in Latin America</a>, so too is Moscow keen to keep its strategic depth. Putin does not want a neighboring state falling under the military influence of what he sees as unfriendly nations. He wants a buffer.</p>
<h2>Avoiding rash moves</h2>
<p>Putin tends to be cautious and realistic in foreign policy. He is not as erratic as sometimes portrayed in the West. He knows that he isn’t playing a strong hand.</p>
<p>Russia’s defense budget, as he is well aware, is <a href="https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2021/world-military-spending-rises-almost-2-trillion-2020">roughly 8% that of the U.S.’s alone</a>, never mind NATO as a whole, which spends almost 20 times what Russia spends on defense.</p>
<p>Economically, Russia is a declining power. Its <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=RU">GDP</a> is about half of that of the <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/248023/us-gross-domestic-product-gdp-by-state/">state of California</a>. A petrostate dependent on exports of gas and oil, Russia is <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-impact-of-western-sanctions-on-russia/">suffering from the sanctions</a> the West imposed after Russia’s precipitous seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.</p>
<p>Russians also know what it means to bogged down in a ground war as they <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/">were in Afghanistan</a> for 10 years and as they are currently in the Donbass, in the eastern Ukraine. A full invasion would be a catastrophe for Russia.</p>
<p>The view of some in the West that <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/16/romney-russia-ukraine-nato-527207">Putin wants to rebuild</a> <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/19/russia-needs-to-stop-clinging-to-idea-of-reviving-soviet-union-ukraine.html">the Soviet Union</a> is, I believe, a fantasy that a realist like Putin has himself rejected. Yes, in 2005 Putin commented that the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057">collapse of the Soviet Union</a> was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century” and “a genuine tragedy” – a sentiment he <a href="https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/24/75-of-russians-say-soviet-era-was-greatest-time-in-countrys-history-poll-a69735">shares with a majority</a> of Russians. But pundits in the West are less eager to reference Putin’s <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=Ox99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA225&lpg=PA225&dq=He+who+does+not+regret+the+break-up+of+the+Soviet+Union+has+no+heart;+he+who+wants+to+revive+it+in+its+previous+form+has+no+head&source=bl&ots=6M_mZewx8a&sig=ACfU3U2fa33xb33ENHHb-ecdn0asTkMWXA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwir7pmigIX2AhWHdt8KHfcKAKIQ6AF6BAgxEAM#v=onepage&q=He%20who%20does%20not%20regret%20the%20break-up%20of%20the%20Soviet%20Union%20has%20no%20heart%3B%20he%20who%20wants%20to%20revive%20it%20in%20its%20previous%20form%20has%20no%20head&f=false">other pronouncement</a> that “He who does not regret the break-up of the Soviet Union has no heart; he who wants to revive it in its previous form has no head.”</p>
<p>Governments have been proved wrong recently when it comes to Putin’s desire to station troops in neighboring countries. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/blinken-warns-kazakhstan-that-russians-may-stay-01641581408">warned Kazakhstan</a> that inviting Russian troops in to quell unrest would lead to a lasting presence only to see those troops march back to Russia days later.</p>
<p>On the other hand, when it comes to Ukraine, the Russian president has in the past made rash moves. If he had hoped for a pro-Russian or neutral Ukraine, his precipitous seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbass <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/22/ukraine-looking-forward-five-years-after-the-maidan-revolution/">after the Maidan revolution of 2014</a> produced a more anti-Russian, nationalist Ukraine and inclined Ukrainians to throw their lot in with NATO and the West.</p>
<h2>A road map out of crisis?</h2>
<p>Russia and Ukraine, working with European partners, tried to lay out a new structure for Russian-Ukrainian relations during the 2015 <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement">discussions over the Minsk II protocols</a>, which were agreed to by Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany but never fully implemented. The breakaway Ukrainian regions bordering Russia were to be autonomous under a federal relationship with Kyiv. To Moscow, at least, Minsk II would have also provided assurances that Ukraine remain out of NATO. In June 2021 U.S. President Joe Biden and Putin “agreed to pursue diplomacy related to the Minsk agreement.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A tank sits by the side of an open road with a flag visible." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=384&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/446847/original/file-20220216-22668-etzaa4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=482&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukraine’s Donbass region.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/view-of-a-tank-being-exhibited-as-diplomatic-efforts-to-news-photo/1238520260?adppopup=true">Ali Atmaca/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the protocol never came into effect – Ukraine and Russia never agreed on what was being agreed to.</p>
<p>The current threat of invasion could be Putin’s attempt to refocus minds around such an agreement and force parties back to a dialogue. Indeed, French President Emmanuel Macron <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/9/what-is-the-minsk-agreement-and-why-is-it-relevant-now">recently described Minsk II</a> as the “only path on which peace can be built.”</p>
<p>But if forcing a return to Minsk II, or something similar, was Putin’s intention, doing so by threatening invasion is a risky game. With nationalist feelings growing in Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky might not be able to agree to Minsk II and remain in power. Similarly, in the U.S. any concessions to Russia by Biden is already <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/sen-joni-ernst-calls-strong-response-russia/story?id=82415824">being characterized as appeasement</a>. In both states foreign policy is hostage to domestic politics.</p>
<p>Putin himself is facing hardliners back home. The Russian parliament has already given permission to recognize the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-parliament-asks-putin-recognise-breakaway-east-ukrainian-regions-2022-02-15">independence of Ukraine’s separatist regions</a>. And compared with some of the most rabid politicians and pundits jockeying for space on Russian media, Putin comes across as serious, sober and competent.</p>
<p>Mixed in with these domestic political dynamics is the ever-present struggle of two hegemons – one regional, one global – trying to reassert influence at a time of perceived decline. In so doing, they appear, to me at least, to be talking across each other.</p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/177178/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ronald Suny does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A scholar of Russian history breaks down what Putin’s aim might be in threatening military invasion, and why that might backfire.Ronald Suny, Professor of History and Political Science, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1136312019-04-19T10:46:16Z2019-04-19T10:46:16ZWar games shed light on real-world strategies<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268469/original/file-20190409-2931-2n3fgx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C1024%2C768&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A board for the Prussian wargame of 'Kriegsspiel.'</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kriegsspiel_1824.jpg">Matthew Kirschenbaum/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Want to try your hand at negotiating during a crisis? Think you have a plan that could get the U.S. out of Afghanistan? Confident you could keep a nation secure when multi-party international diplomacy is more important than warfare? Strategy-based board games let you test your political and military acumen right at your kitchen table – while also helping you appreciate how decision-makers are limited by the choices of others.</p>
<p>For centuries, military trainers have used board games as tools to help recruits and leaders alike understand fundamental principles of warfare. In the early 19th century, for instance, the Prussian military required its officers to play a board game called “<a href="https://militaryhistorynow.com/2018/05/01/kriegsspiel-the-19th-century-war-game-that-changed-history/">Kriegsspiel</a>.” The high command realized that while individual officers might understand the principles of combat, they might not know how to apply them when facing an actual opponent. And in stepping back and analyzing what happened after a game was over, they might see what factors really mattered, and how the players’ choices influenced each other. </p>
<p>In the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. Navy used war games to design military plans against potential adversaries. By the time World War II arrived, U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz observed, the conflict “<a href="https://news.usni.org/2013/09/24/brief-history-naval-wargames">had been reenacted in the game rooms</a> at the Naval War College by so many people and in so many different ways, that nothing happened during the war that was a surprise … absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268468/original/file-20190409-2927-4byb6b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268468/original/file-20190409-2927-4byb6b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268468/original/file-20190409-2927-4byb6b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268468/original/file-20190409-2927-4byb6b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268468/original/file-20190409-2927-4byb6b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268468/original/file-20190409-2927-4byb6b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268468/original/file-20190409-2927-4byb6b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268468/original/file-20190409-2927-4byb6b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=501&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Military officials and scholars use war games regularly to evaluate strategies and tactics.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.doncio.navy.mil/CHIPS/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=7350">U.S. Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Shawn J. Stewart</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>War gaming continues to offer opportunities for scholars to <a href="http://doi.org/10.1126/science.aav2135">better understand security dynamics</a>. A growing cadre of experts have turned to war games to show how a <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html">Russian invasion of the Baltics</a> might play out or how a <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/game-of-drones-what-experimental-wargames-reveal-about-drones-and-escalation/">shift to robotic warfare</a> might lead to fewer military crises. In <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/banks.cfm">my own research</a>, I have used war games to better understand and prepare for what are sometimes called “low-frequency, multi-factor” events – security scenarios that have lots of variables but have rarely, or never, happened, such as a full-scale cyber-conflict between the U.S. and China. </p>
<p>War games are useful intellectual aids because they force players to <a href="http://doi.org/10.1126/science.aav2135">make decisions under pressure</a>. While people may intellectually understand a problem, gaming forces them to think even harder. As the Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling put it, “<a href="https://www.prgs.edu/research/methods-centers/gaming.html">one thing a person cannot do</a>, no matter how rigorous his analysis or heroic his imagination, is to draw up a list of things that would never occur to him.” By facing off against opponents over a well-designed war game, people can come to see how <a href="https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2017/03/the-cia-uses-board-games-to-train-officers-and-i-got-to-play-them/">political and military structures interact</a> and appreciate the trade-offs and complications that come with <a href="https://slideplayer.com/slide/9739077/">making decisions in a competitive environment</a>.</p>
<p>With this in mind, I present some of my favorite war games. They not only are gripping to play but also offer players a window into some core elements of modern security politics. They are rated for players, time and complexity (where “Monopoly” would score a 1 out of 5). I have no financial or professional relationships with any of the game publishers listed; these games are just personal favorites.</p>
<h2>Asymmetric warfare – ‘Washington’s War’</h2>
<p><strong>2 players, 2-3 hours, complexity: 2.5</strong></p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268470/original/file-20190409-2914-191y58h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268470/original/file-20190409-2914-191y58h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268470/original/file-20190409-2914-191y58h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268470/original/file-20190409-2914-191y58h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268470/original/file-20190409-2914-191y58h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=743&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268470/original/file-20190409-2914-191y58h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268470/original/file-20190409-2914-191y58h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268470/original/file-20190409-2914-191y58h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=933&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Washington’s War.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gmtgames.com/p-735-washingtons-war-3rd-printing.aspx">GMT Games</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Wars between big global powers and smaller nations don’t always go the way planners expect. For instance, the Trump administration has decided to take a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/24/the-day-after-the-iranian-nuclear-deal/">very hard line with Iran</a>, and there is an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/02/07/trump-is-moving-us-closer-war-with-iran/">increased possibility of war</a>. But assuming the U.S. goliath would automatically win underestimates the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753212868">advantages that invaded states have</a>. In “<a href="https://www.gmtgames.com/p-735-washingtons-war-3rd-printing.aspx">Washington’s War</a>,” the British player has a large army and purse, and the ability to bludgeon almost any colonist on the board – if only he could engage them. The problem is that the colonial player can move across the board like a fish through water and needs to do less to win. “<a href="https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/38996/washingtons-war">Washington’s War</a>” shows that warfare is fundamentally about domestic and international political support, and that given the right leadership and hit-and-run tactics, smaller players can run out the clock and prevail.</p>
<h2>Nuclear brinkmanship – ‘13 Days’</h2>
<p><strong>2 players, 45 minutes, complexity: 2</strong></p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268472/original/file-20190409-2901-14a33ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268472/original/file-20190409-2901-14a33ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268472/original/file-20190409-2901-14a33ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268472/original/file-20190409-2901-14a33ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268472/original/file-20190409-2901-14a33ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=521&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268472/original/file-20190409-2901-14a33ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=654&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268472/original/file-20190409-2901-14a33ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=654&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268472/original/file-20190409-2901-14a33ob.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=654&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘13 Days.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://jollyrogergames.com/game/13-days/">Jolly Roger Games</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Continued U.S. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-u-s-and-north-korea-on-the-brink-a-timeline/">concerns about North Korean</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/world/europe/russia-missile-threat.html">Russian threats</a> mean that the terror of nuclear annihilation sadly remains present. But this threat is also puzzling. Considering the <a href="http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-mutual-assured-destruction.htm">suicidal damage of a full exchange</a>, how can anyone make <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300143379/arms-and-influence">believable threats with nuclear weapons</a>? “<a href="http://jollyrogergames.com/game/13-days/">13 Days</a>” offers a <a href="https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/177590/13-days-cuban-missile-crisis">window into this process</a>. Playing the role of either the USSR or the U.S. during the <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</a>, players attempt to take control of the political, military and media situation and emerge with the most prestige at the end of three rounds. But beware! Overplay your hand in any of the three areas without holding back, and you may go over the brink into full nuclear war.</p>
<h2>Modern infantry combat – ‘Combat Commander: Europe’</h2>
<p><strong>1-2 players, 2-4 hours, complexity: 4</strong></p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268474/original/file-20190409-2931-12edk4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268474/original/file-20190409-2931-12edk4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268474/original/file-20190409-2931-12edk4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268474/original/file-20190409-2931-12edk4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268474/original/file-20190409-2931-12edk4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268474/original/file-20190409-2931-12edk4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268474/original/file-20190409-2931-12edk4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268474/original/file-20190409-2931-12edk4z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Combat Commander: Europe.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gmtgames.com/p-703-combat-commander-europe-4th-printing.aspx">GMT Games</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although set during World War II, this game gives the player an insight into the chaos of tactical combat. Taking the role of U.S., Soviet or German commanders leading units of about 120 soldiers, players draw cards and play them to maneuver and engage their squads of men. Although the presentation is a little dry, “<a href="https://www.gmtgames.com/p-703-combat-commander-europe-4th-printing.aspx">Combat Commander: Europe</a>” has many <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/7764.html">features of modern warfare</a>: suppression fire, mortars, snipers, machine gun nests, smoke, artillery call-ins and command confusion. The <a href="https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/21050/combat-commander-europe">rules are intricate</a> but clear and logical, while hands of cards help to simulate the strengths and weaknesses of each side. For instance, the tactically adaptive German player can adjust on the fly by discarding her whole hand, while the aggressive Soviet player receives more ambush cards. Ultimately, the game forces players to work with the resources they have, not the ones they wish for.</p>
<h2>Counterinsurgency operations – ‘A Distant Plain’</h2>
<p><strong>1-4 players, 4 hours, complexity: 5</strong></p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268476/original/file-20190409-2931-3urd2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268476/original/file-20190409-2931-3urd2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268476/original/file-20190409-2931-3urd2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268476/original/file-20190409-2931-3urd2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268476/original/file-20190409-2931-3urd2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268476/original/file-20190409-2931-3urd2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=999&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268476/original/file-20190409-2931-3urd2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=999&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268476/original/file-20190409-2931-3urd2w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=999&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘A Distant Plain.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gmtgames.com/p-656-a-distant-plain-3rd-printing.aspx">GMT Games</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite recent talks with the Taliban, there appears no easy way out for forces participating in <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-peace-deal.html">the U.S.’s longest war</a>. Why? Designed by a former CIA operative, “<a href="https://www.gmtgames.com/p-656-a-distant-plain-3rd-printing.aspx">A Distant Plain</a>” offers an answer. Players take on the roles of the Kabul regime, warlords, the Taliban or U.S.-led NATO forces, each able to engage in different tasks and each subject to <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26469109">different</a> – but <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/counterinsurgency-9780199737499?cc=us&lang=en&">interlinked – pressures</a>. Should the local government agree to allow the warlords to grow opium so long as they agree not to ambush travelers on the roads? Should the Taliban try to move deep into the interior or hover at the Pakistani border? And how can the coalition player meet her competing goals of stabilizing the local regime while also drawing down troops? Undoubtedly a <a href="https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/127518/distant-plain">complex game</a> and not recommended for beginners, this game makes it clear that “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29wwln_safire.html">whack-a-mole</a>” is not a meaningful strategy.</p>
<h2>Emerging bipolarity – ‘Twilight Struggle’</h2>
<p><strong>2 players, 4 hours, complexity: 3.5</strong></p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268478/original/file-20190409-2927-127wduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268478/original/file-20190409-2927-127wduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/268478/original/file-20190409-2927-127wduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268478/original/file-20190409-2927-127wduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268478/original/file-20190409-2927-127wduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268478/original/file-20190409-2927-127wduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268478/original/file-20190409-2927-127wduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/268478/original/file-20190409-2927-127wduc.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=491&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">‘Twilight Struggle.’</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gmtgames.com/p-588-twilight-struggle-deluxe-edition-2016-reprint.aspx">GMT Games</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many war gamers consider this <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/the-cold-war-themed-board-game-that-feels-more-relevant-than-ever/2018/07/16/45be9be4-7a4e-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story.html">the very best game</a> ever made. The U.S. and USSR square off over 40 years of history and attempt to dominate as much of the rest of the world as possible while avoiding coming to blows directly. Drawing from three decks of cards over the course of play – early, middle and late <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war">Cold War</a> – players receive a history lesson replete with <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/23/the-cia-says-russia-hacked-the-u-s-election-here-are-6-things-to-learn-from-cold-war-attempts-to-change-regimes/">coups</a>, communist revolutions, <a href="https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan-1">Marshall Plan aid</a>, proxy wars, oil crises, space races and the all-important <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-jan-04-mn-60348-story.html">China card</a> (literally, <a href="https://twilightstrategy.com/2012/10/31/the-china-card/">a card</a>). Rising tensions on the “DEFCON” track make it harder and harder to make big changes to the <a href="https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/12333/twilight-struggle">game board</a> without also triggering nuclear war. Perhaps, in 80 years, “<a href="https://www.gmtgames.com/p-588-twilight-struggle-deluxe-edition-2016-reprint.aspx">Twilight Struggle</a>” will be republished with the U.S. and China as the antagonists.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113631/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Banks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>War games let you test your political and military acumen right at your kitchen table – while also helping you appreciate how decision-makers are limited by the choices of others.David Banks, Professorial Lecturer of International Politics, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1131742019-04-01T20:43:18Z2019-04-01T20:43:18ZRemembering minorities amid eastern Europe’s nation-state centenary celebrations<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266923/original/file-20190401-177163-1sbgb56.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather in the streets in Vilnius, Lithuania to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the country's statehood.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Facebook)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past year, states across central and eastern Europe have been celebrating the 100th anniversary of the creation or re-creation of their countries. </p>
<p>Some will continue to do so through 2019 and 2020 as they mark 100 years since maps were redrawn and nation-state status was granted to groups that were formerly part of vast, diverse empires. </p>
<p>Amid the festivities and fanfare, let’s not forget to include minority views and voices in the dialogue. A centenary is an important moment for these states, no doubt. It is also important for citizens — including minority citizens, many of whom remember the events of 1918 to 1920 from a different perspective. What they tend to remember of those years are grievances, losses of status, forced migration and <a href="https://dailynewshungary.com/hungary-96-years-after-the-treaty-of-trianon/">changed homelands.</a> </p>
<h2>Different memories</h2>
<p>During my field work in the region, speaking with minority and majority groups, I learned that minority members tend have different interpretations and contrasting memories of the events of 1918-20, many of them painful. So they were not likely to participate in the centenary celebrations. More often, they were celebrating occasions of national and cultural significance to their particular group.</p>
<p>There are about 400 minority communities in Europe today, comprising more than <a href="https://www.fuen.org/european-minorities/general/">100 million people</a>. “Minority” refers to groups that are distinct in ethnicity, culture and language from the group that is numerically dominant in the state. They are also in a politically non-dominant position <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268417231_Ethnic_Minorities_in_Europe_The_Basic_Facts">within the state</a>. </p>
<p>Some of these groups became minorities through displacement and forced migration amid the upheaval of war. Some became minorities through the arbitrary redrawing of lines on maps, meaning they suddenly found themselves living in another country as <a href="http://aei.pitt.edu/32402/">“accidental diasporas”</a>. In other words, minorities can arise when people move across borders, or when borders are redrawn around people.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/PkpMEkC1WcI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Border changes: How Europe went from empires to nation-states after the First World War by Business Insider.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The First World War brought about the collapse of large multi-ethnic empires and the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/how-wwi-changed-the-map-of-europe/1970075.html">formation of several nation-states in their wake</a>. </p>
<p>Recognition of these new states was based upon the famous, or perhaps infamous, idea of self-determination, promoted at the Paris Peace Conference and in post-war treaties. Recognition was also based on the principle of nationality, which advocated and justified the notion of states created <em>of</em> and <em>for</em> <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nationalism-reframed/85DFC802FE96095F938638873DA92F3D#fndtn-information">particular nations</a>. The logic was: one ethno-cultural group per country, one nation per state. In reality, none of these states was entirely homogenous.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=335&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/264423/original/file-20190318-28496-e83yn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=421&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Map of Europe, post WWI.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The European Institute, copyright 2009</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Stately celebrations</h2>
<p>For <a href="https://www.ev100.ee/en/main-events">Estonia</a>, <a href="https://lv100.lv/en/news/the-100th-anniversary-of-the-proclamation-of-the-republic-of-latvia/">Latvia,</a> <a href="http://www.lietuva.lt/100/en/lithuania-celebrates-100">Lithuania</a>, Poland and <a href="https://www.uncover-romania.com/romania-100/">Romania</a>, the events of 1918-20 signify the recognition of statehood. The years 2018-2020, therefore, mark the centenary of this stately occasion. The governments of these countries have put a lot of time and resources into the celebrations. </p>
<p>There are <a href="http://www.vilnius-tourism.lt/en/nemokamose-ekskursijose-idomiausios-valstybes-atkurimo-istorijos/">countless special events</a> <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2018/11/18/latvia-at-100-baltic-country-smitten-as-it-toasts-independence-anniversary">and programming</a> such as “100 Years” walking tours, speeches, concerts, flag and firework displays, museum exhibitions, patriotic parades, youth marches, military tributes and bonfires. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=433&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266223/original/file-20190327-139341-1ad9vey.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=544&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man clings to a tree trying to get a glimpse of the military parade in Bucharest, Romania, in December 2018 as thousands turned out to celebrate 100 years since Romania became a modern-day state.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The national colours of each state are visible in public squares and streets, <a href="https://www.romania-insider.com/historical-buildings-romania-lit-up">and at night</a> they light up <a href="https://polska.pl/politics/home/historic-sites-lit-mark-100-years-polands-independence/">historic buildings and landmarks</a>. National anthems are played, and national poetry and literature recited, as each nation-statehood is observed. </p>
<p>The Pope visited the three Baltic states in September 2018 in a gesture seen to <a href="https://warsawinstitute.org/pope-franciss-apostolic-visit-baltic-states/">acknowledge their struggle for independence</a>. There have even been <a href="https://society4romanianstudies.org/2018-conference/">Twitter hashtags</a>, 100 Year playlists <a href="https://open.spotify.com/user/dp5de9axh6bs7kjpvhv4hm2ps/playlist/1DW2TXzPlKItt0pgJLeoSy">on Spotify</a> and restaurants serving centennial meal specials. It’s the spectacle of a national holiday but amped up several times. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=337&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266607/original/file-20190329-71009-1hsym4s.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">In a creative display outside a school in Vilnius, several countries express their congratulations and greetings to Lithuania on its 100th anniversary of statehood. Atkurtai Lietuvai means Restored Lithuania.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What about the minorities?</h2>
<p>The fanfare is exciting for the dominant groups in these states. But what about the groups that are not dominant — the minorities? Where do they fit in all of this? Are they celebrating?</p>
<p>In Romania, members of the Hungarian minority view the 100th anniversary of Romania’s “Great Unification” <a href="https://dailynewshungary.com/100-year-anniversary-the-loss-of-transylvania/">as more of a division</a> – as a <a href="https://rmx.news/hungary/100-years-romania-hungarian-perspective">historical tragedy rather than triumph</a>. The 1.2 million Hungarians in Romania today are there mainly because lines on the map were redrawn. </p>
<p>In 1920, Hungary was carved up by the Treaty of Trianon, and some Hungarians suddenly found themselves living in the new state of Romania. The Hungarian minority now constitutes 6.5 per cent of the population of Romania, concentrated in the northwest in the region of Transylvania. </p>
<p>This community tends to celebrate Hungary’s annual <a href="https://balkaninsight.com/2018/03/15/hungary-marks-national-day-in-neighboring-communities-03-15-2018/">National Day over Romanian national days</a>, and to partake in <a href="https://magyarnapok.ro/2018/en/about-the-event/">Hungarian Cultural Days</a>. </p>
<p>An anniversary that may resonate for Romania’s Hungarians in 2020 is the proposed and very political <a href="https://hungarytoday.hu/jobbik-moves-to-declare-2020-trianon-memorial-year/">Trianon Memorial Year</a>. Trianon resulted in Hungary losing two-thirds of its territory and population. Today, many Hungarians still view the Trianon “dismemberment” as a violation of Hungary’s sovereignty and national integrity. </p>
<p>It remains one of the most traumatic events in Hungary’s <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/envispacplac.8.2.0069?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">collective memories</a>, and a recurring issue in Hungary’s domestic politics and <a href="https://kafkadesk.org/2018/12/05/hungary-why-is-the-trianon-treaty-so-controversial/">regional relations.</a> </p>
<p>In Lithuania, members of the Polish minority associate the years 1918-20 more with the re-emergence of the Polish state than the restoration of the Lithuanian state. Poland experienced three territorial partitions, in 1772, 1793 and 1795, and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Partitions-of-Poland">effectively disappeared from the map until 1918</a>.</p>
<p>Similar to Hungarians and Romanians, Poles and Lithuanians have had a long and contested relationship over borders, history and identity. The Polish minority constitutes 6.6 per cent of the population in Lithuania, concentrated in the southeast in the Vilnius region. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/266637/original/file-20190330-70989-uvpz5t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=497&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fireworks light the sky during celebrations for the 101st anniversary of the restoration of the state of Lithuania in Vilnius in February 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This community strongly celebrates the annual <a href="http://www.polnisches-institut.at/4,4,1148,de,Polish_Diaspora_and_Poles_Abroad_Day?m=">Polish Diaspora and Poles Abroad Day</a> with a ceremonial march through the <a href="http://media.efhr.eu/2016/04/30/polish-diaspora-poles-abroad-day-polish-march-vilnius/">streets of Vilnius </a>. Though the parade is a sea of red-and-white Polish flags, the red, yellow and green of the Lithuanian flag can be seen as well. There are celebrations <a href="https://visegradpost.com/en/2018/05/03/may-3-a-national-holiday-in-poland/">on May 3</a>, the day when the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth proclaimed a Constitution in 1791, and also <a href="http://media.efhr.eu/2012/11/19/impressive-polish-culture-days-vilnius/">Polish Culture Days in Vilnius</a>.</p>
<p>The Russian-speaking minorities in <a href="https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ethnic-russians-baltics">the Baltic states</a> haven’t had much of a presence at the centenary celebrations. These groups have different memories of the years following the First World War. Russia withdrew from the war in 1917 and then <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/eastern_front_01.shtml">civil war broke out between the Bolsheviks and the White Guard</a>.</p>
<p>Amid these grand celebrations in places like Bucharest, Riga, Tallinn, Vilnius and Warsaw, let’s look for whether and how minorities are celebrating. Their voices and perspectives are an important part of the story. Just as the armistice is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/06/europeans-war-1918-armistice-empires">commemorated differently in western Europe and eastern Europe,</a> the years 1918-1920 mean different things to different national groups across the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/113174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexandra Liebich receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).</span></em></p>While many countries across Eastern Europe celebrate 100 years since they were born or restored as nation-states after the First World War, not everyone in these states are celebrating.Alexandra Liebich, PhD Candidate & Teaching Fellow, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1092222019-03-28T10:39:46Z2019-03-28T10:39:46ZAttacks against elections are inevitable – Estonia shows what can be done<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262480/original/file-20190306-100784-kt0a86.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=395%2C38%2C3928%2C2871&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The March 3, 2019, elections in Estonia were well-defended against anti-democracy influences.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Estonia-Election/f4fdedf50d734c688b0702fbaaad65e9/11/0">AP Photo/Raul Mee</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kremlin-backed attackers are <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-warning-russian-hacking-groups-step-up-attacks-ahead-of-european-elections/">working to influence the upcoming</a> <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/elections">European Parliament elections</a>, according to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/21/russian-hackers-target-european-governments-ahead-of-election-fireeye.html">cybersecurity firm FireEye</a>. A hacking campaign has <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-espionage-warning-russian-hacking-groups-step-up-attacks-ahead-of-european-elections/">targeted governments and political organizations</a> as well as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-microsoft-cyber-europe/microsoft-says-discovers-hacking-targeting-democratic-institutions-in-europe-idUSKCN1Q90GF">think tanks and nonprofits</a>, including prominent ones such as the <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2019/02/20/accountguard-expands-to-europe">German Council on Foreign Relations, the Aspen Institute and the German Marshall Fund</a>, as Microsoft has reported.</p>
<p>These new reports highlight <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/eu-prepares-for-major-international-cyber-attacks-ahead-of-elections-11669438">rising fears</a> of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html">digital attacks on democracy</a> around the world, including on the U.S. presidential elections in 2020.</p>
<p>Potential targets include election technology such as voter lists, computers that tally the votes and websites that report results to the public. But the threats go farther, to cyber campaigns against institutions supporting democratic processes like political parties, think tanks and the media, as well as information warfare targeting <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-russian-government-used-disinformation-and-cyber-warfare-in-2016-election-an-ethical-hacker-explains-99989">public opinion</a>.</p>
<h2>Old problem of election interference</h2>
<p>Russian interference in the West is <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/the-long-history-of-russian-disinformation-targeting-the-u-s">not new</a>. The experiences of Estonia – the <a href="https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/component/content/article?id=67:cyber-war-i-estonia-attacked-from-russia">first country ever victim</a> to a clearly coordinated and politically motivated cyber operation – can inform American and European defenses to these complex threats.</p>
<p>Together with its neighbors Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has won international recognition for the <a href="https://theconversation.com/countering-russian-disinformation-the-baltic-nations-way-109366">effectiveness of its defenses</a> against politically motivated hacking and disinformation, which combine government, industry and public efforts. In the parliamentary elections of March 3, 2019, Estonians showcased the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/opinion/what-estonias-record-number-of-i-voters-teaches-us-about-election-trust">confidence they have in their country’s digital security</a>. </p>
<p>Three days before Election Day, close to 40 percent of those eligible had already cast their vote. <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/en/news/393-voted-during-advance-poll-ended-today">Most of those early voters</a> did so online, and <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/et/valimiste-arhiiv/elektroonilise-h%C3%A4%C3%A4letamise-statistika">44 percent of the total votes</a> were cast over the internet.</p>
<p><iframe id="8AVRn" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/8AVRn/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Preparing to defend</h2>
<p>This recent Estonian election was largely unaffected by cyberattacks or coordinated information operations. Some of the reason is likely because the country and its people have improved their understanding of the problems, and their defenses against it, over the past couple of decades. </p>
<p>Back in 2007, the relocation of a Soviet-era memorial in the Estonian capital Tallinn resulted in public protests and <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/legalconsiderations_0.pdf">several waves of coordinated distributed denial of service</a> attacks. These did not steal citizens’ data, but they did <a href="https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/">shut down many digital services</a> for a number of hours on each of several days. This highlighted both the public’s increasing reliance on digital technology and the weaknesses of online systems.</p>
<p>The digital systems that Estonian governments and businesses have developed in the years since 2007 are strong, secure and trusted by users – who welcome further digitization of their lives because it is convenient and safe. Electronic banking systems, <a href="https://www.haigekassa.ee/en/people/digital-prescription/faq-digital-prescription">digital medication prescriptions</a>, <a href="https://www.kyivpost.com/technology/estonia-ditches-paper-model-e-governance-services-infographic.html">e-schools</a> and thousands of other online services rely heavily on <a href="https://www.id.ee/?lang=en&id=">government-backed secure digital identity</a>, a <a href="https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/population-register">digital population registry</a> and a <a href="https://www.ria.ee/en/state-information-system/x-tee.html">robust data exchange layer</a> between databases and services.</p>
<p>These systems also facilitate the digital elements of <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/en">elections</a>, <a href="https://www.valimised.ee/en/internet-voting/internet-voting-estonia">including internet voting</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265973/original/file-20190326-36267-kwan51.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Election security experts from around the world examine, in public, the computer used to tally the online votes from Estonia’s parliamentary elections in March 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Erik Peinar/Estonia State Electoral Office</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Comprehensive cyber defenses</h2>
<p>A key lesson from Estonia is that with so many different threats, no single defense can protect every part of a democratic system and society. Rather, defenders must evaluate what attackers are likely to be after – and what’s at stake.</p>
<p>In 2017, two Estonian government agencies, the State Electoral Office and the Information System Authority – where one of us, Liisa Past, was chief research officer for cybersecurity – joined forces to comprehensively analyze the threats and risks to local elections. In addition to the technical risks, like failures in connections or flaws in software, the team paid close attention to issues in management as well as the <a href="https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats-what-are-we-talking-about">possibilities for information warfare</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=870&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1094&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1094&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/265691/original/file-20190325-36273-16s0bg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1094&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 64-page document assessed many of the online risks to Estonia’s cybersecurity.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/kuberturve/ria-csa-2018.pdf">Estonia Information System Authority</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Estonian government engaged in similar analyses in the lead-up to the 2019 elections. In addition, the agencies took a lesson <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-hacking-attack-what-we-know-and-dont-know.html">from the French</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index.html">U.S. experience in 2016</a> and taught political parties and individual candidates how to protect themselves and their information online.</p>
<p>Similarly, <a href="https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/kuberturve/cyber_security_of_election_technology.pdf">governments across the European Union are sharing their best ideas</a> about designing trustworthy election systems. Logging and monitoring network access, for example, can help computer administrators quickly detect and respond to unauthorized activity.</p>
<h2>Understanding the double threat of information operations</h2>
<p>Estonia’s lessons may be useful elsewhere. In the past five years, Russian attacks have targeted both election-specific systems, like the Ukrainian <a href="https://phys.org/news/2014-10-hackers-ukraine-election-website.html">national election commission website</a> in 2014, and the <a href="https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Strategic-Analysis-2018-8-Past.pdf">larger public discussion</a> around the election and current political issues. </p>
<p>Online efforts seeking to <a href="https://theconversation.com/weaponized-information-seeks-a-new-target-in-cyberspace-users-minds-100069">manipulate people’s views</a> in the run-up to the 2016 <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/10/17/russian-iranian-twitter-trolls-sent-10-million-tweets-fake-news/">Brexit vote</a>, as well as during presidential campaigns in the U.S. and <a href="https://firstmonday.org/article/view/8005/6516">France</a>, are quite similar to Cold War tactics known as “<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/cold-war-2-0-russian-information-warfare/">information operations</a>.” </p>
<p>The practitioners use 21st-century tools like <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html">social media</a> and <a href="https://www.recode.net/2017/11/2/16598312/russia-twitter-trump-twitter-deactivated-handle-list">automation</a> to plant false stories and <a href="https://hub.jhu.edu/2018/08/24/russian-trolls-bots-spread-vaccine-misinformation/">exploit social divisions</a>. They don’t necessarily seek to break through network firewalls or compromise any secure government systems, but rather appear to unwitting online audiences as <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-twitter-bots-help-fuel-political-feuds/">authentic fellow contributors</a> in a free, open debate. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.sotrender.com/blog/2018/10/quick-guide-identifying-bots-and-trolls/">Bots’ characteristic behaviors</a> can give them away. Yet there are <a href="https://qz.com/1422395/how-many-of-donald-trumps-twitter-followers-are-fake/">so many of them</a> that they can crowd out human voices and undermine the democratic principle of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/dec/23/social-media-existential-threat-idea-democracy">real participation by actual people</a>. </p>
<h2>Defense in depth</h2>
<p>Elections’ legitimacy depends on more than just technical security. They must also be seen to be free of external influence. Governments should take comprehensive views of their security, and threats to it – accounting for elements as diverse as cyber defenses of essential systems and the effects of information warfare on voters. </p>
<p>It’s a worldwide problem, with Russia exerting influence not just in the U.S. and Estonia but <a href="https://theconversation.com/russian-influence-operations-extend-into-egypt-111167">also Egypt</a>, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-australia-can-help-the-us-make-democracy-harder-to-hack-102954">China attacking Australia</a>’s political system. </p>
<p>The response, therefore, has to include <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-tackling-online-disinformation-european-approach">open, healthy public debate and media literacy</a> as well as preventing, detecting and mitigating the effects of cyberattacks on the <a href="https://www.ria.ee/public/Cyber_security_of_Election_Technology.pdf">confidentiality, availability and integrity</a> at the very core of democratic systems.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109222/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liisa Past worked as a Chief Research Officer of the Estonian Information System Authority and in this capacity focused on cybersecurity of election technology, including being in charge of comprehensive risk assessment for the 2017 local elections and spearheading the effort behind EU Compendium On Cyber Security of Election Technology, She continues to work with the Estonian National Elections Office and the European Commission. In 2018/19 she is a Next Generation Leader at the McCain Institute at Arizona State University.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Keith Brown does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>An Estonian cybersecurity leader explains how her country defends itself, its society and its elections from Russian interference.Liisa Past, Next Generation Leader, McCain Institute for International Leadership, Arizona State UniversityKeith Brown, Professor of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1093662019-01-09T11:47:02Z2019-01-09T11:47:02ZCountering Russian disinformation the Baltic nations’ way<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252878/original/file-20190108-32133-m3cw4t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=636%2C404%2C3660%2C3473&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Look out for Russian influence.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-vector/russia-russian-tv-media-press-channel-760486486">M-SUR/Shutterstock.com</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the new Congress begins, it will soon discuss the <a href="https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/ira-political-polarization/">comprehensive reports</a> to the U.S. Senate on the <a href="https://www.newknowledge.com/disinforeport">disinformation campaign</a> of half-truths, outright fabrications and misleading posts made by agents of the Russian government on social media in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election.</p>
<p>After years of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/04/opinion/cyber-war-russia-china.html">anemic responses to Russian influence efforts</a>, official U.S. government policy now includes taking action to combat disinformation campaigns sponsored by Russia or other countries. In May 2018, the <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/russia-inquiry">Senate Intelligence Committee endorsed</a> the concept of treating attacks on the nation’s election infrastructure as hostile acts to which the U.S. “will respond accordingly.” In June, the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/us/politics/cyber-command-trump.html">Pentagon unleashed U.S. Cyber Command</a> to respond to cyberattacks more aggressively, and the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf">National Cyber Strategy</a> published in September 2018 clarified that “all instruments of national power are available to prevent, respond to, and deter malicious cyber activity against the United States.”</p>
<p>There are already indications that <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html">Cyber Command conducted operations</a> against Russian disinformation on social media, including warning specific Russians not to interfere with the 2018 elections. However, low-level cyberwarfare is not necessarily the best way. European countries, especially the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have confronted Russian disinformation campaigns for decades. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2018/03/10/592566026/baltic-countries-on-countering-russian-disinformation">Their experience</a> may offer useful lessons as the U.S. joins the battle.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=525&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252765/original/file-20190107-32145-1iuqxhk.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=659&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Baltic Sea region of northern Europe. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in light green in the center, west of Russia in blue.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baltic_Sea.png">Stefan Ertmann/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The Baltic experience</h2>
<p>Beginning in 1940 and continuing until they declared independence in the early 1990s, the Baltic countries were subjected to systematic <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/gatis-krumins-soviet-economic-gaslighting-latvia-and-baltic-states">Russian gaslighting</a> designed to make people doubt their national history, culture and economic development. </p>
<p>The Soviets rewrote history books to falsely emphasize Russian protection of the Baltic people from invading hordes in the Middle Ages, and to convey the impression that the cultural evolution of the three countries was enabled by their allegiance and close ties to Russia. Even their <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/gatis-krumins-soviet-economic-gaslighting-latvia-and-baltic-states">national anthems were rewritten</a> to pay homage to Soviet influence.</p>
<p>Soviet leaders devalued Baltic currencies and manipulated economic data to <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/gatis-krumins-soviet-economic-gaslighting-latvia-and-baltic-states">falsely suggest that Soviet occupation</a> was boosting the Baltic economies. Further, Soviet authorities settled ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries, and <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/ideology-and-policy-the-political-uses-of-doctrine-in-the-soviet-union/oclc/16951330">made Russian the primary language</a> used in schools. </p>
<p>Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Baltic countries, the Russian Federation has continued to deliver disinformation to the region, making extensive use of <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/virtual-russian-world-baltics">Russian-language social media</a>. Some themes characterize the Baltic people as ungrateful for Soviet investment and aid after World War II. Another common message <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/gatis-krumins-soviet-economic-gaslighting-latvia-and-baltic-states">criticizes Baltic historians</a> for “falsification of history” when really they are describing the real nature of the Soviet occupation.</p>
<h2>A massive Russian attack</h2>
<p>After independence, and as the internet grew, Estonia led the way in <a href="https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2013/07/30/how-did-estonia-become-a-leader-in-technology">applying technology to accelerate economic development</a>. The country created systems for a wide range of government and commercial services, including voting, banking and filing tax returns electronically. Today, Estonia’s innovative <a href="https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/07/06/estonia-is-trying-to-convert-the-eu-to-its-digital-creed">e-residency system</a> is being adopted in many other countries.</p>
<p>These advances made the Baltics a prime target for cyberattacks. In the spring of 2007, the Russians struck. When Estonia <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/deadly-riots-in-tallinn-soviet-memorial-causes-rift-between-estonia-and-russia-a-479809.html">moved a monument memorializing Soviet soldiers</a> from downtown Tallinn, the country’s capital, to a military cemetery a couple of miles away, it provoked the ire of ethnic Russians living in Estonia as well as the Russian government. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/252754/original/file-20190107-32139-gz1jgy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn sparked a Russian cyberattack on Estonia in 2007.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/99437479@N00/680737463">Keith Ruffles/Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For three weeks, Estonian government, financial and media computer systems were <a href="https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/">bombarded with enormous amounts of internet traffic</a> in a “distributed denial of service” attack. In these situations, an attacker sends overwhelming amounts of data to the targeted internet servers, clogging them up with traffic and either slowing them down or knocking them offline entirely. Despite concerns about the first “cyber war,” however, these attacks resulted in <a href="https://www.cfr.org/book/hacked-world-order">little damage</a>. Although Estonia was cut off from the global internet temporarily, the country’s economy suffered no lasting harm.</p>
<p>These attacks could have severely damaged the country’s financial system or power grid. But <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CDU_Analysis.pdf">Estonia was prepared</a>. The country’s history with Russian disinformation had led Estonia to expect Russian attacks on computer and information systems. In anticipation, the government spearheaded partnerships with banks, internet service providers and other organizations to coordinate responses to cyberattacks. In 2006, Estonia was one of the first countries to create a <a href="https://www.ria.ee/en/cyber-security/cert-ee.html">Computer Emergency Response Team</a> to manage security incidents. </p>
<h2>The Baltic response</h2>
<p>After the 2007 attack, the Baltic countries <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/estonias-approach-cyber-defense-feasible-united-states/">upped their game even more</a>. For example, Estonia created the Cyber Defense League, an army of volunteer specialists in information technology. These <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CDU_Analysis.pdf">experts focus on</a> sharing threat information, preparing society for responding to cyber incidents and participating in international cyber defense activities. </p>
<p>Internationally, Estonia gained approval in 2008 to establish NATO’s <a href="https://ccdcoe.org/history.html">Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence</a> in Tallinn. Its comprehensive research into global cyber activities helps identify best practices in cyber defense and training for NATO members. </p>
<p>In 2014, Riga, the capital of neighboring Latvia, became home to another NATO organization combating Russian influence, the <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/">Strategic Communications Center of Excellence</a>. It publishes reports on Russian disinformation activities, such as the May 2018 study of the “<a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/virtual-russian-world-baltics">Virtual Russian World in the Baltics</a>.” That report analyzes Russian social media activities targeting Baltic nations with a “toxic mix of disinformation and propaganda.” It also provides insight into identifying and detecting Russian disinformation campaigns.</p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.dw.com/en/baltics-battle-russia-in-online-disinformation-war/a-40828834">Baltic elves</a>” – volunteers who monitor the internet for Russian disinformation – became active in 2015 after the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/poroshenko-calls-maidan-a-victorious-battle-in-war-for-independence/a-18271774">Maidan Square events</a> in the Ukraine. And the Baltic nations have <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/fighting-disinformation-baltic-states/">fined or suspended media channels</a> that display bias. </p>
<p>The Baltic countries also rely on a European Union agency formed in 2015 <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/2116/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en">to combat Russian disinformation campaigns</a> directed against the EU. The agency identifies disinformation efforts and publicizes accurate information that the Russians are seeking to undermine. A new effort will <a href="https://www.baltictimes.com/estonia_welcomes_eu_action_plan_for_tackling_disinformation/">issue rapid alerts to the public</a> when potential disinformation is directed against the 2019 European Parliament elections.</p>
<h2>Will the ‘Baltic model’ work in the US?</h2>
<p>Because of their political acknowledgment of threats and actions taken by their governments to fight disinformation, a 2018 study rated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the three European Union members <a href="https://www.europeanvalues.net/vyzkum/prague-manual/">best at responding to Russian disinformation</a>.</p>
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<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/xSIkkza9TVI?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">A look inside Russia’s propaganda machine.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some former U.S. officials have suggested <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/four-steps-to-fight-foreign-interference-in-us-elections/2018/02/14/fb99b7a0-11c1-11e8-8ea1-c1d91fcec3fe_story.html">adopting similar practices</a>, including publicizing disinformation efforts and evidence tying them to Russia. The <a href="https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/russia-inquiry">Senate Intelligence Committee</a> has called for that too, as has <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/the-kremlins-trojan-horses-3-0">the Atlantic Council, an independent think tank</a> that focuses on international affairs.</p>
<p>The U.S. could also mobilize volunteers to <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/estonias-approach-cyber-defense-feasible-united-states/">boost citizens’ and businesses’ cyberdefenses</a> and teach people to identify and combat disinformation.</p>
<p>Disinformation is a <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/russian-propaganda-disinformation-and-estonias-experience/">key part of Russia’s overall effort</a> to undermine Western governments. As a result, the battle is ever-changing, with Russians constantly trying new angles of attack and target countries like the Baltic nations identifying and thwarting those efforts. The most effective responses will involve coordination between <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/government-responses-malicious-use-social-media">governments</a>, <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/industry-responses-malicious-use-social-media">commercial technology companies</a> and the <a href="https://www.stratcomcoe.org/role-communicators-countering-malicious-use-social-media">news industry and social media platforms</a> to identify and address disinformation. </p>
<p>A similar approach may work in the U.S., though it would require far more collaboration than has existed so far. But backed by the new government motivation to <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf">strike back when provoked</a>, the methods used in the Baltic states and across Europe could provide a powerful new <a href="https://theconversation.com/cybersecuritys-next-phase-cyber-deterrence-67090">deterrent against Russian influence</a> in the West.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/109366/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Terry Thompson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>European countries, especially the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have confronted Russian disinformation campaigns for decades. The US can learn from their experience.Terry Thompson, Adjunct Instructor in Cybersecurity, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/958932018-05-13T18:20:34Z2018-05-13T18:20:34ZWhat I learned about Eastern European democracy from Lithuania’s youth<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218614/original/file-20180511-34027-yc0l97.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Lithuania's soldiers are seen during a celebration of Lithuanian Independence Day in Vilnius, Lithuania, on March 11, 2018. The country was marking the 28th anniversary of its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> (AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The term <a href="http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Competitive_markets/Transition_economies.html"><em>transition economies</em></a> is what we now use to describe Eastern European countries that, until 1991, were under the grip of the Soviet Union before moving away from a centrally planned and Communist economic system and towards a free enterprise and market economy. </p>
<p>An invitation from the <a href="https://www.lcc.lt/">LCC International University of Lithuania</a> to spend three months as a visiting professor on its campus afforded me the opportunity to visit Lithuania, one of those Eastern European countries, as it continues that transition.</p>
<p>Two factors weighed in my decision to accept their invitation. First, it would be an intellectual adventure and an opportunity to play an academic James Bond in a country that few academics have seen. </p>
<p>The second reason was to analyze the transitional phase of the Lithuanian economy from a Communist economy to a free market, entrepreneurial Western economy.</p>
<h2>Lithuania’s strategic importance</h2>
<p>What’s happening in Lithuania right now is in sharp contrast to what transpired in the past. </p>
<p>In one of his most famous speeches during the Cold War period, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked in his signature growly voice: <a href="https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/churchill-delivers-iron-curtain-speech">“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.”</a></p>
<p>Lithuania has always had a strategic military importance because of its geopolitical position on the Baltic Sea. It’s attracted <a href="https://www.draugas.org/news/napoleons-lithuanian-adventure/">Napoleon Bonaparte</a>, <a href="http://vilnews.com/2010-12-the-tragic-story-of-how-one-third-of-lithuania%E2%80%99s-population-became-victims-of-soviet-terror">Josef Stalin</a> and <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1939/03/22/Lithuania-under-martial-law-gives-up-Memel-to-Germany/5841170445183/">Adolf Hitler</a>, succumbing to military conquests from Prussia, Germany, the Nazis and the Soviet Union over the centuries.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, its cultural vitality has prevailed and it’s received international accolades in music, theatre, literature and the visual arts, among them <a href="https://www.interviewmagazine.com/film/jonas-mekas-dance-with-fred-astaire-interview">Jonas Mekas</a>, a filmmaker, poet and artist who received the Los Angeles Film Critics Association’s Award in 2007, and <a href="http://lithuanianculture.lt/atlikejai/oskaras-korsunovas/?lang=en">Oskaras Koršunovas,</a> the noted contemporary Lithuanian theatre director, playwright and choreographer.</p>
<p>My overarching impression of Lithuania is that it’s impatient. It seems to be in a hurry to make up for the lost time that it spent as a member of the Soviet Bloc. It wants to sprint to a Western-style economy in weeks instead of years. </p>
<p>It’s economically ambitious but politically fragile. Every day Lithuanians keep <a href="http://www.newsweek.com/european-union-army-vs-russia-lithuanians-and-latvians-back-idea-uk-and-sweden-629099">looking over their shoulders</a> to make sure the Russians haven’t invaded and crossed the border. </p>
<h2>Generational divide</h2>
<p>During my time in Lithuania, I asked many Lithuanians: “Are you better off now than you were under the Soviet Union?” I received two different answers depending on the age and generation of the person answering the question. </p>
<p>On the one hand, seniors and pensioners said they were better off during the Soviet occupation and the Communist economic system. That’s because, they said, even though they were severely limited in the choice of goods and products available, they could nevertheless afford to buy them. Now, they said, they have more choice of goods but they’re priced beyond reach.</p>
<p>The response from the younger generation was much different. Clearly they valued their economic freedom in a free-market economy. They were pre-disposed to being more entrepreneurial risk-takers. They embraced the fact that the free enterprise capitalist economy provided them with more opportunities, but they were also cognizant that their success was going to be determined by their ambition and smarts.</p>
<h2>Future leaders</h2>
<p>University professors have a unique, daunting and exciting responsibility. They are tasked with educating, empowering and inspiring the next generation of leaders — not just political leaders, but those in all fields of human endeavour, including the arts and sciences, business and technology, agriculture and trade, fisheries and medicine, engineering and community service. </p>
<p>As the temporary custodians of our most valuable economic asset, university professors are directed to shape, develop and nurture the hearts and minds of our young women and men.</p>
<p>My greatest apprehension in Lithuania was teaching a student body that was very different from my Canadian students.</p>
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<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218682/original/file-20180513-34021-ryi8br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/218682/original/file-20180513-34021-ryi8br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218682/original/file-20180513-34021-ryi8br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218682/original/file-20180513-34021-ryi8br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218682/original/file-20180513-34021-ryi8br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218682/original/file-20180513-34021-ryi8br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/218682/original/file-20180513-34021-ryi8br.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Young Lithuanians march in celebration of Lithuania’s Restoration of the State Day in February 2018, marking the country’s independence from Germany in 1918.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>My students came from Russia, Chechnya, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, Albania, Armenia and Kazakhstan. It turns out my fears were unnecessary. The young women and men who are poised to become the new leaders of Eastern Europe were a delight to teach.</p>
<p>All of them were fluently trilingual. They spoke their native language, Russian and English. They were engaged in their studies, disciplined in their academic pursuits, bright, resourceful and critical thinkers. They had an insatiable desire to learn about the West and in particular how free enterprise worked in North America. </p>
<p>They were academically well-prepared. Their high schools had performed a stellar job in preparing them for university. They were conversant in current affairs and had a global mindset. I was astounded to learn that Lithuania has a <a href="https://knoema.com/atlas/Lithuania/topics/Education/Literacy/Adult-literacy-rate">literacy rate of 99.8 per cent.</a></p>
<p>There’s no denying they’re determined to chart a new course of transformational change from a centrally planned economy to a free market system.</p>
<p>Corruption is a word that was often repeated during frank conversations in describing the Communist system and also the current economic and political environment. My students were averse to corruption, determined to wipe it out if they’re ever in positions of authority and leadership. </p>
<p>I pressed them to give me concrete examples of the corruption that they encountered. One of the examples most often cited was their friends who landed jobs because their fathers were politicians. I joked: This happens in Canada too, but we call it <em>networking.</em></p>
<p>They mentioned more serious violations, including bribes to government officials and the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moldova-corruption-banks/moldova-seeks-to-solve-riddle-of-missing-1-billion-idUSKBN0NQ1XD20150505">US$1 billion still missing from several Moldovan banks.</a></p>
<h2>Economic realignments</h2>
<p>One of the visible changes taking place in Lithuania right now is the reconfiguration of the country’s transportation infrastructure. </p>
<p>This involves re-engineering roads, railways and plane destinations away from the Soviet system where “all roads lead to Moscow” to a more modern outreach, with new destinations towards central and western Europe.</p>
<p>The ultimate prize for transition economies is full membership in the European Union. Indeed, some of them, <a href="https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en">including Lithuania and also Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Slovenia</a>, have already received that coveted reward, mostly for geopolitical strategic reasons. </p>
<p>However, most remain in a holding pattern in order to give them time to renovate their machinery of economic governance, remove systemic corruption, improve their public finances and construct a welcoming foreign investment environment.</p>
<p>I left Lithuania with a deep sense of optimism. It was based on the fact that transition economies are poised for a successful future — one that will be driven by the young women and men who are currently at university. </p>
<p>I am confident that they are capable of providing the leadership, energy and vision to confront the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities in their Eastern European countries for the remainder of the 21st century.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/95893/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Constantine Passaris does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A stint teaching university students in Lithuania leaves a longtime economics professor optimistic about the future of Eastern Europe as it continues its transition to a free-market economy.Constantine Passaris, Professor of Economics, University of New BrunswickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/838522017-09-21T12:30:21Z2017-09-21T12:30:21ZIf Russia gets its war games wrong, Europe could be in big trouble<p>Tensions are running high in a region with a history of paranoia and mistrust. The rhetoric being used raises the concern of a military escalation. And now there are massive war games that will only add to the combustible situation. No, this isn’t the Korean peninsula: it’s the northeastern corner of Europe.</p>
<p>Flying deep under the radar amid the ongoing crisis in Asia, the Russian “war games” known as <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/19/16330004/zapad-2017-photos-russia-belarus-putin-cold-war">Zapad 2017</a> have been largely overlooked. Conducted across Belarus, which borders several EU states, the exercises have by some estimates involved <a href="https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21726089-instead-biggest-exercises-europe-cold-war-will-be-conducted-amid-secrecy-and">more than 100,000 troops</a>, raising hackles among NATO military planners and Eastern European governments who fear that military exercises could be cover for an offensive deployment of Russian power.</p>
<p>This worry about a Russian threat has only risen in recent years. Russia used war games as cover for the beginning of the war with Georgia in 2008, and did so again during its annexation of Crimea, from Ukraine, in 2014. During these engagements, it was the subversive nature of Russia’s non-traditional military actions that unnerved many EU states. The use of irregular military forces and special forces operating without insignia to infiltrate and annex parts of Ukraine has led both the Baltic states and Poland to bolster their own military activities.</p>
<p>In response, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/us-special-forces-russia-border-lithuania-latvia-estonia-putin-scared-to-death-a7509736.html">NATO has stationed troops</a> and military hardware in the Baltic States as a message to Russia. The abiding principle of NATO is that an attack on one is an attack on all – and recent history seems to support the need for this deterrent. </p>
<p>The hysteria surrounding the potential sudden appearance of so-called <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26532154">“little green men”</a> on the borders of the EU was compounded by Russia’s refusal to allow NATO military personnel to observe Zapad in action. Claiming that Zapad 2017 involves fewer than 13,000 soldiers, Russia argues it is not in breach of the OSCE’s Vienna convention, which stipulates military observers must be present in the event of war games conducted on a larger scale.</p>
<p>But these concerns about an intentional Russian military attack are misguided. When it comes to NATO member states, Vladimir Putin’s attempts to reestablish the Soviet sphere of influence will not be conducted by force. Putin is a realist; he understands that even after a decade of modernisation, the Russian military is clearly outgunned by NATO. </p>
<p>No, the real risk of conflict comes from secrecy and miscalculation by those on the other side. Again, history can provide us with a warning that many in eastern EU and NATO member states seem to have forgotten. </p>
<h2>To the edge and back</h2>
<p>In 1983, at the height of the Cold War, the world came terrifyingly close to nuclear conflict when NATO members engaged in their own large-scale war games. Codenamed <a href="http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2016-5e13/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-december-2016-january-2017-4557/58-6-02-barrass-5ba9">Able Archer</a>, the exercise was designed to simulate a response to a Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe. </p>
<p>In the build-up to Able Archer, the US and its NATO allies had been probing the Soviet Union’s airspace and testing their military’s response. Combined with the imminent arrival of the American Pershing II nuclear missiles in Europe, this had left Soviet leaders increasingly paranoid about NATO’s intentions.</p>
<p>When Able Archer began, the sheer size and scale of the operation led Soviet leaders to believe it was a ruse designed to cover a preemptive strike by NATO against the Soviet Union. In response, Soviet leaders prepared to strike first. Barring the Cuban Missile Crisis, this incident is seen by many as the closest the world has come to nuclear war.</p>
<p>Today, Russia has been probing NATO members’ airspace and possibly making <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/27/sweden-wreckage-russian-submarine">submarine incursions</a> into EU countries’ territorial waters. Combined with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the scale of Zapad 2017, this has brought eastern NATO members to a level of paranoia not seen since Cold War days.</p>
<p>The real risk is not a Russian attack, but a misunderstanding of Russian intentions. The war games have already shown a risk of human error, with the Russians <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/19/russian-helicopter-accidentally-fires-rocket-onlookers-zapad-war-games">accidentally firing live rounds on their own military observers</a>. A misdirected armoured column or accidental missile launch could be misinterpreted by tense military forces in Poland, Lithuania or Latvia as the start of an attack, resulting in a military response by a NATO member. That would put Europe in a whole new ball game. </p>
<p>Paranoia, secrecy and fear are all catalysts for crisis. But <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/18/russia-zapad-military-drill-enters-final-phase">Vladimir Putin’s real intentions</a> are clear enough. Just like the actions of NATO and Able Archer in 1983, the Zapad war games were not designed to provoke a conflict, they were designed to send a message: the Russian bear is back, and the West should not forget that it has claws.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/83852/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gregory Stiles receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>A round of ominous war games might not be cover for military action, but it could raise tensions to an explosive level.Gregory Stiles, PhD Researcher in Politics, University of SheffieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.