tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/demographics-4150/articlesDemographics – La Conversation2024-03-18T12:23:59Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2251532024-03-18T12:23:59Z2024-03-18T12:23:59ZBiden and Trump, though old, are both likely to survive to the end of the next president’s term, demographers explain<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581396/original/file-20240312-16-ug5e1v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C6%2C4247%2C2965&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Both Joe Biden and Donald Trump are nearly twice the median age of the U.S. population.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Election2024ChinaUnitedStates/46152c599dd14340abc0595fca447682/photo">AP Photo</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3890">In a recent poll</a>, 67% of Americans surveyed believe that President Joe Biden, 81, is too old to serve another term as president. But only 41% of respondents said they feel that way about former President Donald Trump, who is 77. Both men have stumbled around and have forgotten or mixed up names and events, <a href="https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/memory-loss-and-forgetfulness/memory-problems-forgetfulness-and-aging">which are behaviors that characterize some older people</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">We</a> are <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=OBIxsGQAAAAJ&hl=en">demographers</a> – not <a href="https://www.salon.com/2024/02/23/dr-john-gartner-on-a-tale-of-two-brains-bidens-brain-is-aging-brain-is-dementing/">scholars of brain function</a> considering people’s cognitive abilities. But there is a question we can answer, one that speaks to concerns about both men’s ages: their life expectancy.</p>
<p>And it turns out that the four-year age difference between Biden and Trump isn’t really much of a difference when it comes to their respective odds of surviving. The statistical odds are good that both would complete a four-year term as president.</p>
<p>We know this because of one of the most versatile <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/population-and-society/5D47EB8139ED72FD59F7379F7D41B4FB">tools of demography</a>, which is called a life table. It’s a table of age groups, usually from 0 to 100 years, showing the <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr72/nvsr72-12.pdf#page=14">percentages of the population at any age</a> surviving to a later age. It is based on the age-specific death rates of the population.</p>
<h2>Early record-keeping</h2>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581391/original/file-20240312-28-kj30q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A table of figures representing births and deaths." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581391/original/file-20240312-28-kj30q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581391/original/file-20240312-28-kj30q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581391/original/file-20240312-28-kj30q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581391/original/file-20240312-28-kj30q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=716&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581391/original/file-20240312-28-kj30q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581391/original/file-20240312-28-kj30q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581391/original/file-20240312-28-kj30q1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=899&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A bill of mortality for 1605 and 1606, by John Graunt, an early version of what is now known as a life table.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bill_of_Mortality_1606.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The life table dates back to <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Graunt">John Graunt, a self-educated citizen of London</a> in the 17th century who is known by many as the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/population-and-society/references/35C31BCEC27E2B0448B160414E1893BF">founder of demography</a>. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41138862">In 1662, Graunt produced and distributed the first life table</a>, showing the probabilities of London’s population surviving from one age to the next.</p>
<p>There are two kinds of life tables. The first is a cohort life table, which represents the death rates and ages for a specific group of people. A cohort table could, for example, document the deaths of all males born in the U.S. in 1940. That table would be very precise, but it wouldn’t be complete until every member of the group had died – so it’s not especially useful for examining the prospects of the living.</p>
<p>As a result, demographers more often use life tables for a current time period, such as the year 2021, which is the date of the most <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr72/nvsr72-12.pdf">current period life table for the U.S.</a></p>
<p>It shows the probabilities of surviving from one age to another age based on the death rates in 2021. </p>
<h2>Statistical documentation</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr72/nvsr72-12.pdf">A period life table for 2021</a> indicates that almost 99% of all people born in the U.S. survive from age 0 to age 20; just over 95% of them survive to age 40, and over 85% to age 60. More than 51% of them live to age 80.</p>
<p>But life tables get much more specific. It’s important to examine life tables’ data for each age, race and gender combination. This is because males don’t live as long as females, Black people don’t live as long as white people, and non-Hispanic people don’t live as long as Hispanic people. There are more specialized life tables that focus on education level and income, but they are not as current and complete as the broader tables.</p>
<p>Biden and Trump are both non-Hispanic white men. Biden is 81 and Trump is 77.</p>
<p>Based on the age-specific death rates of non-Hispanic white men in the U.S. in 2021, Biden has a 92.9% probability of surviving at least to age 82. Trump has a 95.1% probability of surviving to at least age 78. These odds are nearly identical, so each man is very likely to be alive on Inauguration Day 2025, regardless of which of them is being sworn in as president.</p>
<p>What about finishing out that four-year term? <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr72/nvsr72-12.pdf#page=47">Our calculations from the life tables</a> reveal that there is a 63.3% probability that Biden will survive another five years – to at least 86. And there is a 73.6% probability for Trump to survive that period – to at least age 82. Of course, it’s possible either or both will die, but their odds of death are much lower than their odds of survival.</p>
<p>In general, the chances are a bit more favorable for Trump, because he is slightly younger.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581097/original/file-20240311-20-hc2ous.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A table of figures showing how many people of one age survive to a future age." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581097/original/file-20240311-20-hc2ous.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/581097/original/file-20240311-20-hc2ous.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581097/original/file-20240311-20-hc2ous.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581097/original/file-20240311-20-hc2ous.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=297&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581097/original/file-20240311-20-hc2ous.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581097/original/file-20240311-20-hc2ous.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/581097/original/file-20240311-20-hc2ous.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=373&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 2021 life table for the U.S. is the most recent available.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr72/nvsr72-12.pdf#page=10">U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Precise calculations</h2>
<p>There are two factors that let us demographers get even more specific. </p>
<p>First, we measure age as exact years. Their age gap is not four years, but 3.5: <a href="https://www.whitehousehistory.org/bios/joseph-r-biden-jr">Biden was born on Nov. 20, 1942</a>, and <a href="https://www.whitehousehistory.org/bios/donald-j-trump">Trump on June 14, 1946</a>. That 10 percentage-point survival advantage for Trump over Biden was based on a four-year age difference. The real difference drops one or two points because they’re not quite so far apart in age.</p>
<p>Second, demographers have shown that <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2648114">people who attend church regularly live longer</a> than those who don’t. This is not because of some divine favor but because churchgoers tend to have more optimistic attitudes, clearer senses of purpose and more regular social interactions and connections. All of these factors extend people’s lives. Biden is a Catholic and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2AC1X6/">attends Mass weekly, in general</a>. Trump was raised as a Presbyterian but now considers himself to be a “<a href="https://www.deseret.com/2023/10/22/23922731/biden-trump-faith-and-presidential-candidates/">nondenominational Christian</a>,” and he attends religious services very irregularly. So, Biden gets the survival advantage associated with churchgoing. </p>
<p>Other factors come into play with longevity as well, such as marital status, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10936-2">body mass index scores</a>, diets and levels of physical fitness and exercise. </p>
<h2>A comparison with the American people</h2>
<p>Biden and Trump are <a href="https://theconversation.com/candidates-aging-brains-are-factors-in-the-presidential-race-4-essential-reads-223419">two of the three oldest people</a> ever to serve as president. The population they are seeking to lead is also older than ever before.</p>
<p>The median age of the nation’s population was <a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-estimates-characteristics.html">38.9 in 2022</a> compared with <a href="https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1972/dec/pc-s1-10.html">28.1 in 1970</a> and just <a href="https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2000/phc/phc-t-09/tab07.pdf">16.7 in 1820</a>. </p>
<p>“<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/06/opinion/biden-aging-america-population.html">Relative to the age of the population</a>, President Biden is no older than the country’s first presidents,” including Thomas Jefferson, wrote James Chappel, a scholar of aging and history at Duke University, in The New York Times. More recently, Reagan was older than the median American of his time than Biden and Trump are today.</p>
<p>At their second inaugurations, Jefferson was roughly 45 years older than the median age of the U.S. population then, and Reagan 43 years older. If Biden wins a second term, he will be 42 years older than today’s median. If Trump wins in 2024, he will be 38 years older than the current median. </p>
<p>As demographers, we can say it is likely that both Biden and Trump will be alive when the presidential term that begins in 2025 comes to an end in 2029. But as the U.S. population gets older too, the age factor may become less important to voters. This is not an immediate change, however, but one that will likely occur over the next decade or so.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225153/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Detailed data on the ages at which people die can give good indications of a person’s remaining life span.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityRogelio Sáenz, Professor of Demography, The University of Texas at San AntonioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2201922024-03-07T13:32:14Z2024-03-07T13:32:14ZA Barbie dollhouse and a field trip led me to become an architect − now I lead a program that teaches architecture to mostly young women in South Central Los Angeles<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578670/original/file-20240228-7861-7ydzy1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C10%2C6669%2C4426&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Do dollhouses possess the potential to inspire young girls to design and build?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/curious-playful-girl-arranging-her-doll-house-while-royalty-free-image/1267317545?phrase=girl+dollhouse+purple&adppopup=true">Kosamtu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As a kid growing up in the suburbs of St. Louis, Missouri, in the ’80s, my sister and I spent a lot of time playing with Barbie in the basement of our single-family home. I loved dressing her and imagining her life. But the best part about Barbie was her house.</p>
<p>I learned recently that the Barbie house I had was the Dreamhouse A-frame <a href="https://creations.mattel.com/products/barbie-dreamhouse-an-architectural-survey-limited-run-edition-hvy37">designed in 1979</a>. The house takes its name from the fact that the front view of the steep roof looks like the capital letter “A.”</p>
<p>I clearly remember the distinctive yellow, orange and white color scheme and the sloping roof. But the best part was that the house could be configured in different ways. The house opened and closed, and walls and rooms could switch places. I could change Barbie’s whole world by changing her space. That was a powerful discovery. </p>
<p>Perhaps for many girls who grew up playing with a Barbie doll, it was doing her hair that might be the most memorable. But for me looking back – and as Barbie enthusiasts celebrate <a href="https://www.nationaldaycalendar.com/national-day/national-barbie-day-march-9#:%7E:text=On%20March%209th%2C%20National%20Barbie,Toy%20Fair%20in%20New%20York.">National Barbie Day</a> on March 9, 2024, the iconic doll’s 65th year – it was playing with Barbie’s house that stands out. It was probably the first time I realized that the places where we live, work and play all serve to shape who we are.</p>
<p>Today, I am an <a href="https://arch.usc.edu/error">architect and professor</a>. I lead a program for high school students in South Central Los Angeles at the University of Southern California School of Architecture. The program, called the <a href="https://arch.usc.edu/a-lab">A-LAB Architecture Development Program</a>, provides a pathway for young people – and especially for young women – into architecture as a field.</p>
<p>Only 25% of people working as architects in the U.S. are women. For comparison, 36% of lawyers are women and 41% of physicians and surgeons are women. This figure, and other facts about women in architecture, can be found in “<a href="https://www.acsa-arch.org/resource/where-are-the-women-measuring-progress-on-gender-in-architecture-2/">Where are the Women? Measuring Progress on Gender in Architecture</a>,” written by <a href="https://www.acsa-arch.org/leadership/staff/">Kendall A. Nicholson</a>, director of research, equity and education at Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture. </p>
<h2>Having fun at work</h2>
<p>A few years after my Barbie house experience, I took a school field trip to visit an architecture office in St. Louis. There I saw people who seemed like they were having fun at work. </p>
<p>Everywhere I looked, I saw pencils, markers, scissors, glue, cardboard and plenty of other tools I had never seen before. The office was full of creative people making drawings and models of new buildings and landscapes. The energy I felt there was exciting and palpable. These people had purpose. I decided that day that I would become an architect.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two women look at a miniature model of a building." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578674/original/file-20240228-24-172pg4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578674/original/file-20240228-24-172pg4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578674/original/file-20240228-24-172pg4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578674/original/file-20240228-24-172pg4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578674/original/file-20240228-24-172pg4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578674/original/file-20240228-24-172pg4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578674/original/file-20240228-24-172pg4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Only 25% of architects are women.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/shoreditch-office-royalty-free-image/549776575?phrase=architectural+firm&adppopup=true">Kelvin Murray via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I didn’t realize it then, but looking back, I can connect the fun I had with Barbie’s Dreamhouse to the work people were doing in the architecture firm. We were both using architecture and design to shape the world around us. </p>
<h2>Providing practical experience</h2>
<p>In the A-LAB program that I run, students spend time learning how to see, draw and design. They use those skills to develop conceptual design projects in their own neighborhoods in South Central Los Angeles.</p>
<p>Students are asked to think about and research the needs of their communities and to propose a new project that fulfills a need that has not yet been met. One student proposed an outdoor community pool with a shade structure. The shade structure is for fresh air, exercise and a place for people of all ages to hang out. Another student proposed a small theater with a stage and snack bar, where students in bands could practice in the evening when the high school is closed. Yet another proposed a homework and day care hub, so that students and younger siblings could have a safe place to go after school. Overall, each of these design projects aim to emphasize architecture’s role in positively shaping culture and community. </p>
<p>So far, over 80 local students have participated in A-LAB. They also earned four units of college credit in the process. </p>
<p>The majority of students tell us that A-LAB has changed the way they see the buildings and places we use to live our lives. The program attracts both young men and women, yet with each new A-LAB cohort, we see an increase in the percentage of young women participating. Over the past three years, 65% of A-LAB students have been young women. And this semester alone, a whopping 85% of A-LAB students are young women.</p>
<p>This trend could be part of the <a href="https://www.acsa-arch.org/resource/where-are-the-women-measuring-progress-on-gender-in-architecture-2/">steady increase</a> in women entering architecture schools. Or it could be that successful female students are sharing their experiences with younger female students and encouraging them to apply. </p>
<p>I also think it doesn’t hurt that I show up to the schools and talk about the program and invite students to consider joining it. I think there is really something about a female representing the outward face of A-LAB that makes it seem more welcoming to young women. And to think it all started with a little girl playing with a Barbie dollhouse in her basement some 40 years ago.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220192/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lauren Matchison does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Women are underrepresented in architecture, occupying just 25% of jobs in the field. An architecture professor shares insights from her childhood on how those numbers can be turned around.Lauren Matchison, Associate Professor of Practice, University of Southern CaliforniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2186552024-02-12T13:58:39Z2024-02-12T13:58:39ZFears about falling birthrate in England and Wales are misplaced – the population is due to grow for years to come<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/564946/original/file-20231211-21-wqu4sa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=366%2C1633%2C5276%2C2497&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/row-multiethnic-babies-sitting-side-by-144900970">sirtravelalot/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The number of babies born in England and Wales in 2022 <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/livebirths/bulletins/birthsummarytablesenglandandwales/2022">fell by 3.1%</a> compared to the previous year. The average age of parents is also at a record high, as people choose to delay having children. The average age of mothers <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/livebirths/bulletins/birthcharacteristicsinenglandandwales/2021">is now nearly 31</a>.</p>
<p>To some, this is alarming. MP Miriam Cates, for example, <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/11/06/give-women-the-choice-to-have-more-babies/">has written that</a> “the economic consequences of this shift are mind blowing”. </p>
<p>Worries about a low birthrate often include that there won’t be enough young people to support an ageing population through pensions and social care, or that a population decline will <a href="https://www.cityam.com/britain-birth-rates-economy-risk-men/">affect the economy</a>. Some worry that a falling population will lead to higher immigration, and present this as <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/11/06/give-women-the-choice-to-have-more-babies/">something to be avoided</a> by increasing the birth rate. </p>
<p>But the population of the UK <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/bulletins/nationalpopulationprojections/2021basedinterim">is rising</a>, as is the world’s population, and they will probably both continue to rise for years to come. </p>
<p>Everyone has the right to decide when and if they want children. Policies should enable free and informed choices. But individuals shouldn’t be responsible for controlling a country’s future population and economic prospects through childbearing.</p>
<p>Instead of targeting specific birth numbers, we should focus on supporting parents and planning for future population changes.</p>
<h2>Long-term trends</h2>
<p>The figure of 2.1 children is often given as the average number of children required in order for a population to replace itself over the long term. In fact, fertility rates in England and Wales have not been that high <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/livebirths/bulletins/birthsummarytablesenglandandwales/2022">since 1972</a> – more than 50 years ago – and yet the population has not decreased. </p>
<p>The birth rates in the UK are similar to long-term trends experienced by many places in the world. In Europe, the highest fertility rate according to 2021 data is <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics#live_births_per_woman_in_the_EU_in_2021">1.84 in France</a>. In England and Wales <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/livebirths/bulletins/birthsummarytablesenglandandwales/2021">the average is 1.61</a>, which is actually higher than the EU average of 1.53. </p>
<p>Within this context it is clear that current birth rates, while low, are not wildly out of the ordinary. And in fact, projections suggest <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/bulletins/nationalpopulationprojections/2021basedinterim">an extra 6.6 million people</a> will be living in the UK by 2036. </p>
<p>But it’s important to note that this is a projection based on assumptions about future births, deaths and migration. Projections are not predictions – and migration is particularly hard to predict given how much it depends upon changing policies. </p>
<h2>The role of immigration</h2>
<p>The growth in the UK’s population will be driven largely by immigration, as it has been since the 1990s. Immigration has played a hugely important role in sustaining the UK’s population, economic growth, and workforce. Some people are concerned that immigration contributes to housing shortages and puts pressure on public services. </p>
<p>But evidence suggests that <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/internationalmigrationandthechangingnatureofhousinginenglandwhatdoestheavailableevidenceshow/2017-05-25">there is no direct relationship</a> between international migration and housing demand. And while it is hard to estimate the impact of migrants on the economy, we do know that <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/income-tax-national-insurance-contributions-tax-credits-and-child-benefit-statistics-for-non-uk-nationals-2019-to-2020/income-tax-national-insurance-contributions-tax-credits-and-child-benefit-statistics-for-non-uk-nationals-2019-to-2020">migrants pay more</a> in income tax and national insurance than they claim in tax credits and child benefits; many migrants are <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-funds/public-funds-accessible">not actually eligible to claim public funds</a> due to their immigration status.</p>
<p>Dismissing immigrants erroneously places more value on the lives of those who are born in the UK, despite the fact that <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/ethnicity/bulletins/ethnicgroupenglandandwales/census2021#ethnic-groups-in-england-and-wales">one in four people</a> in England and Wales do not classify themselves as “white British”. <a href="https://www.kcl.ac.uk/news/uk-attitudes-to-immigration-among-most-positive-internationally-1018742-pub01-115">Survey data also suggests</a> that public attitudes to immigration have become much more positive in recent years. </p>
<p>In addition, many fears about a falling birth rate concern its impact on an ageing population and the economy. The foundation of our pensions and social support system is that a society needs enough people of working age to support the needs of those who are too old (or too young) to work.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Grandmother holding baby" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565775/original/file-20231214-19-oit2hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/565775/original/file-20231214-19-oit2hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565775/original/file-20231214-19-oit2hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565775/original/file-20231214-19-oit2hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565775/original/file-20231214-19-oit2hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565775/original/file-20231214-19-oit2hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/565775/original/file-20231214-19-oit2hi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Babies born today won’t contribute to the pensions of the elderly for around two decades.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/grandmother-kissing-her-baby-grandson-indoors-404522878">Martin Novak/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the UK, most “baby boomers” – the people born in a post-war peak in the birth rate – have reached pension age, requiring more working people to support them. </p>
<p>Higher fertility rates might be a long-term solution to this issue, but it takes a very long time for babies to reach working age, and in the meantime they require a great deal of social support in the form of childcare, healthcare and education. An increase in the fertility rate today would not have much impact on the working age population for at least 20 years. </p>
<h2>Returning to work</h2>
<p>Labour shortages are not always a result of a lack of births, either. Indeed, the prohibitive cost of childcare means that many parents, especially women, struggle to return to work after having children or do not return in their full capacity. </p>
<p>Over <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/economicinactivity/datasets/economicinactivitybyreasonseasonallyadjustedinac01sa">1.5 million people</a> are economically inactive, 85% of them women, because they are looking after family. This means that having more babies might even exacerbate labour shortages, or lead to people with important skills not making use of them in the workforce. </p>
<p>It is notoriously hard, not to mention ethically problematic, to change fertility rates through direct government policy. And, importantly, the ability to decide if, when and how often to have children is a fundamental human right. </p>
<p>Instead, policies should focus on supporting children and families. The demographic future is not easy to manipulate, so we must plan for it rather than attempt to tinker with fertility rates.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/218655/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melanie Channon receives funding from UKRI. She is Honorary Secretary of the British Society for Population Studies and a non-exec director of Bath Social and Development Research Ltd. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bernice Kuang works on an Economic and Social Research Council funded project.</span></em></p>Birth rates are falling – but the population in England will continue to rise.Melanie Channon, Reader in Social Policy, University of BathBernice Kuang, Postdoctoral research associate, University of SouthamptonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2176612024-01-08T13:35:39Z2024-01-08T13:35:39ZSouth Korea’s gender imbalance is bad news for men − outnumbering women, many face bleak marriage prospects<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563900/original/file-20231206-21-smw7n5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C5573%2C3699&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">In South Korea, there are nor enough young Korean women for young Korean men to marry.
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/airport-business-man-royalty-free-image/166973187?phrase=south+korea+men+together&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">RUNSTUDIO/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Korea’s bachelor time bomb is about to really go off. Following a historic 30-year-long imbalance in the male-to-female sex ratio at birth, young men far outnumber young women in the country. As a result, some 700,000 to 800,000 “extra” South Korean boys born since the mid-1980s may not be able to find South Korean girls to marry.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">demographer</a> who over the past four decades has conducted extensive research on East Asian populations, I know that this increased number of South Korean boys will have huge impacts throughout South Korean society. Coincidentally, similar trends are <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17450128.2011.630428">playing out in China</a>, Taiwan and India. </p>
<p><iframe id="matBO" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/matBO/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>The reasons</h2>
<p>In most countries, more boys are born than girls – around 105 to 107 boys per 100 girls. That sex ratio at birth (SRB) is a near constant. The gender imbalance is likely an evolutionary adaptation to the biological fact that females live longer than males. At every year of life, men have higher death rates than women. Hence an SRB of between 105 and 107 boys <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/population-and-society/5D47EB8139ED72FD59F7379F7D41B4FB">allows for there to be roughly equal numbers of men and women </a> when the groups reach childbearing ages.</p>
<p>The SRB in the United States in 1950 was 105 and was still 105 in 2021; in fact, it has been stable in the U.S. for as long as SRB data has been gathered. In contrast, in South Korea the SRB was at the normal range from 1950 to around 1980, but increased to 110 in 1985 and to 115 in 1990.</p>
<p>After fluctuating a bit at elevated levels through the 1990s and early 2000s, it returned to the biologically normal range by 2010. In 2022, South Korea’s SRB was 105 – well within the normal level. But by then, the seeds for today’s imbalance of marriage-age South Koreans was set.</p>
<h2>A preference for sons</h2>
<p>There are several reasons why South Korea’s SRB was out of balance for 30 years.</p>
<p>South Korea experienced a rapid fertility decline in a 20- to 30-year period beginning in the 1960s. From six children per woman in 1960, fertility fell to four children in 1972, then to two children in 1984. By 2022, South Korea’s fertility rate had dropped to 0.82 – <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-korea-has-the-lowest-fertility-rate-in-the-world-and-that-doesnt-bode-well-for-its-economy-207107">the lowest fertility rate in the world</a> and far below the rate of 2.1 needed to replace the population.</p>
<p><iframe id="FNa7q" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/FNa7q/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Yet, South Korea’s long-held <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2584733">cultural preference for sons</a> did not shift as quickly as childbearing declined. Having at least one son was a strong desire influencing fertility preferences in South Korea, especially up through the early years of the 21st century. </p>
<p>And the declining fertility rate posed a problem. When women have many children, the probability that at least one will be a boy is high. With only two children, the probability that neither will be a son is around 25%, and when women have only one child, it is less than 50%.</p>
<p>In order to ensure that families would continue to have boys, many South Koreans turned to readily available techniques to identify the gender of the fetus, such as screening in the early stages of pregnancy. Abortion, which is legal and socially acceptable in South Korea, was then often used to allow families to select the sex of their child. </p>
<h2>Sex by the numbers</h2>
<p>In South Korea, beginning in around 1980 and lasting up to around 2010 or so, many more extra boys were born than girls. When these extra boys reach adulthood and start looking for South Korean girls to marry, many will be unsuccessful.</p>
<p>The extra boys born in the 1980s and 1990s are now of marriage age, and many will be looking to marry and start a family. Many more will be reaching marriage age in the next two decades.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man kisses pregnant wife's belly." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563902/original/file-20231206-21-k1wz8w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A deeply rooted cultural preference for sons was still influential in South Korea up through the early years of this century.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/asian-man-kissing-pregnant-wifes-belly-royalty-free-image/174522589?phrase=south+korea+abortion&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">Greg Samborski via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I have calculated that owing to the unbalanced SRBs in South Korea between 1980 and 2010, approximately 700,000 to 800,000 extra boys were born.</p>
<p>Already this is having an effect in a society where over the centuries virtually everyone was expected to marry, and where marriage was nearly universal. Recent <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/south-koreans-losing-interest-in-marriage-report-finds-630642">research by Statistics Korea</a> showed that in 2023, over 36% of South Koreans between the ages of 19 and 34 intended to get married; this is a decline from over 56% in 2012.</p>
<h2>Foreign brides and ‘bachelor ghettos’</h2>
<p>The immigration of foreign-born women might help address the imbalance. Research by demographers <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X18756640">Guy Abel and Nayoung Heo</a> has shown that financial assistance from the South Korean government is already supporting the immigration to South Korea of Korean women from northeastern China and of foreign women from some less wealthy countries, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and some Eastern European countries. </p>
<p>If the extra bachelors do not marry immigrant brides, they will have no alternative but to develop their own lives and livelihoods. Some might settle in “bachelor ghettos” in Seoul and in South Korea’s other big cities of Busan and Daegu, where commercial sex outlets are more prevalent. Such “ghettos” have already been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/7/20/gender-imbalance-threatens-china">observed in other Asian cities</a> where men outnumber women, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou in China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Bridegroom flashes victory sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/563903/original/file-20231206-27-z2krp3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">While the desire for sons has been relaxed, the social issues, especially regarding the marriage market, remain.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/bridegroom-showing-victory-sign-royalty-free-image/903472740?phrase=south+korea+wedding&searchscope=image%2Cfilm&adppopup=true">RUNSTUDIO/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The consequences for South Korean society of the higher than biologically normal SRBs is a problem of the country’s own making. South Korea’s high fertility of the mid-20th century was holding the country back economically. Its program to bring down a fertility rate of nearly six children per woman was hugely successful. But its very success has been problematic. </p>
<p>The speed of South Korea’s fertility transition meant that the evolution to a more modern familial normative structure – that is, with about two children per family and with less preference given to boys – lagged behind. Today, the SRB imbalances appear to be <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38362474">a thing of the past</a>. Women in South Korea have greater access to education and employment, and there is less pressure for men to be sole wage earners. Together with the South Korean government’s efforts to reduce sex selection beginning in the late 1980s, the premium for boys over girls has dropped. </p>
<p>Yet despite the relaxed desire for sons, long-term social issues related to gender imbalance, especially regarding the marriage market, will remain in South Korea for decades to come.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217661/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Following a 30-year boy-to-girl birth rate imbalance, up to 800,000 ‘extra’ men born since the mid-1980s will be unable to find a South Korean woman to marry. That has big demographic consequences.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2178932023-11-30T13:36:43Z2023-11-30T13:36:43ZIsrael’s mosaic of Jewish ethnic groups is key to understanding the country<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561744/original/file-20231127-21-ym0xyg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=9%2C1%2C1013%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People cheer as a vehicle carrying hostages released by Hamas drives toward an army base in Ofakim, southern Israel, on Nov. 26, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-cheer-as-a-vehicle-carrying-hostages-released-by-news-photo/1803642237?adppopup=true">Menahem Kahana/AFP via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Some 16 million people worldwide identify as Jewish – and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/global-jewish-population-hits-15-7-million-ahead-of-new-year-46-of-them-in-israel/">more than 7 million</a> of them live in Israel.</p>
<p>The country is home to more than 2 million people who are not Jewish, as well – primarily Arab Israelis, who make up 20% to 25% of the population, and more than 100,000 <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Israel-Hamas-war/How-Thai-workers-became-integral-to-Israel-s-economy">foreign workers</a>. Most Arab Israeli citizens are Muslim, but small minorities adhere to various Christian denominations, as well as <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/03/21/5-facts-about-israeli-druze-a-unique-religious-and-ethnic-group/">the Druze religion</a>.</p>
<p>Even within Israel’s Jewish population, however, there is dizzying diversity. As <a href="https://judaic.arizona.edu/person/david-l-graizbord">a historian of Jewish identity</a>, I believe that understanding that diversity is key to understanding Israelis’ behavior amid the current war in Gaza, as well as the country’s long-term resilience. </p>
<h2>Many cultures, one people</h2>
<p>Jews are not a “race,” but constitute <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511499067">a people or nation</a>. Traditionally, Jewish texts often refer to the Jewish people as “Israel.”</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajhg.2010.04.015">DNA studies</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Who_Were_the_Early_Israelites_and_Where.html?id=A_ByXkpofAgC">archaeological evidence</a> show that the Jewish people originated in the Middle East. Owing to Jews’ historical dispersion around the world however, Jews also belong to <a href="https://archive.jewishagency.org/society-and-politics/content/36171/">several Jewish ethnic groups</a>, all of which are represented in the modern state of Israel.</p>
<p>The largest Jewish ethnic group in Israel, <a href="https://people.socsci.tau.ac.il/mu/noah/files/2018/07/Ethnic-origin-and-identity-in-Israel-JEMS-2018.pdf">about 40% to 45% of the country’s total population</a>, <a href="https://katz.sas.upenn.edu/resources/blog/what-do-you-know-sephardi-vs-mizrahi">is called Mizrahi</a>, which means “Eastern” in Hebrew. Mizrahi Jews’ ancestors hailed from Jewish communities in the Middle East, including Israel itself. </p>
<p>The word Mizrahi often describes Jews from North Africa, too. However, these <a href="https://www.mahj.org/en/permanent-collection/9-jews-levant-and-maghreb">Maghrebi Jews</a> descend from different groups than other Mizrahi Jews. Some North African Jews’ ancestors came from local communities. Others migrated there from the Iberian Peninsula after Spain expelled its Jewish population in 1492.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561787/original/file-20231127-17-y5hf0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of people smile as they gather inside a building, many of them wearing white headcoverings." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561787/original/file-20231127-17-y5hf0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561787/original/file-20231127-17-y5hf0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561787/original/file-20231127-17-y5hf0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561787/original/file-20231127-17-y5hf0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561787/original/file-20231127-17-y5hf0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561787/original/file-20231127-17-y5hf0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561787/original/file-20231127-17-y5hf0j.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Pilgrims have lunch at El Ghriba Synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba, the oldest Jewish monument built in Africa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pilgrims-have-lunch-at-el-ghriba-synagogue-in-tunisian-news-photo/491690053?adppopup=true">Amine Landoulsi/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The expulsion of these Sephardic communities, as Iberian Jews are called, <a href="https://nyupress.org/9780814729113/after-expulsion/">scattered Sephardi culture</a> throughout areas such as Greece, Turkey, the Balkans, Italy and Morocco. Thus, many Jews whose families came to these regions are genealogically and culturally Sephardi. Yet, Sephardi Jews also include people whose Jewish ancestors adopted the traditions of Iberian Jews.</p>
<p>The Israeli government’s record-keeping tends to lump Sephardi Jews under the Mizrahi category as well.</p>
<p>The second-largest <a href="https://people.socsci.tau.ac.il/mu/noah/files/2018/07/Ethnic-origin-and-identity-in-Israel-JEMS-2018.pdf">ethnic Jewish group in Israel</a>, about 32% of the population, is Ashkenazi. <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-ashkenazi-jews/">Ashkenazi Jews</a> trace their ancestry to central Europe, most often via Eastern Europe.</p>
<p>Alongside these two dominant groups – Mizrahi and Ashkenazi – are Jews from unique communities that do not fit neatly into the two major subdivisions, yet sometimes find themselves included under the Mizrahi umbrella. </p>
<p>These include <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/bene-israel">the Bene Israel</a> of India; several groups of <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1878-9781_ejiw_COM_0005160">Kavkazi, or Caucasus Jews</a>, referring to their origins in the Caucasus region of Central Asia; and <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/bukharan-jews">Bukharan Jews</a> of Uzbekistan. Other <a href="https://forward.com/opinion/407472/neither-ashkenazi-nor-sephardi-italian-jews-are-a-mystery/">unique groups</a> include <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/lu/podcast/italkim-the-jews-of-italy/id450251365?i=1000095640385&l=de">Italian Jews</a> and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=xBQ2YgEACAAJ&">Ethiopian Jews</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561788/original/file-20231127-23-wlbspg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young man in a white suit dances on a red carpet as older men in ornate robes play instruments around him." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561788/original/file-20231127-23-wlbspg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561788/original/file-20231127-23-wlbspg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561788/original/file-20231127-23-wlbspg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561788/original/file-20231127-23-wlbspg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561788/original/file-20231127-23-wlbspg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561788/original/file-20231127-23-wlbspg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561788/original/file-20231127-23-wlbspg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dancers perform during a celebration of the Ohr Natan congregation of Bukharan Jews in the Rego Park section of Queens in New York in 2011.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/dancers-perform-during-a-celebration-of-the-ohr-natan-news-photo/123136917?adppopup=true">Tom Williams/Roll Call via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Modern migrations</h2>
<p>Modern times have witnessed sweeping migrations of Jews across the diaspora – and also migration <a href="https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403983473">to modern Israel</a>.</p>
<p>For example, many Jews migrated from Europe and the Ottoman Empire to the Americas before and after the world wars: not only to the United States, <a href="https://mjhnyc.org/blog/the-jewish-diaspora-latin-american-stories/">but Latin America</a>, especially Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.</p>
<p>Since the state of Israel’s founding in 1948, <a href="https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/2016/2.ShnatonPopulation/st02_08x.pdf">migration has flowed the other way</a> as well. Today in Israel there are approximately 200,000 Jews from English-speaking countries and some 100,000 from Latin American countries.</p>
<p>Since the final years of of the Soviet Union, about 1 million people with Jewish roots have immigrated to Israel <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-other-tribe-israels-russian-speaking-community-and-how-it-is-changing-the-country/">from Russia and the former Soviet bloc countries</a>. They and their children now make up about 15% to 18% of the Israeli population.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561794/original/file-20231127-19-ptdh63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman with yellow ribbons and red and white flowers in her hair looks solemnly at the camera amid a protest." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561794/original/file-20231127-19-ptdh63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561794/original/file-20231127-19-ptdh63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561794/original/file-20231127-19-ptdh63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561794/original/file-20231127-19-ptdh63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561794/original/file-20231127-19-ptdh63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561794/original/file-20231127-19-ptdh63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561794/original/file-20231127-19-ptdh63.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ukrainians and Israelis who support them gather during a protest against Russian attacks on Ukraine, on March 12, 2022, in Tel Aviv, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/ukrainians-and-israelis-who-support-them-gather-during-a-news-photo/1239137503?adppopup=true">Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As regards their approach to Jewish traditions and rabbinic law, Israelis <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/#:%7E:text=Overwhelmingly%2C%20Haredi%20and%20Dati%20Jews,of%20religion%20from%20government%20policy.">range from the ultrasecularist to the Haredi</a>, whose name means “trembling” before God – often referred to as ultra-Orthodox. There is no hard-and-fast correspondence, though, between Israelis’ ethnic identity and their level of traditional observance.</p>
<p>Some 50% of <a href="https://ij.jppi.org.il/english/book">Israeli Jews</a> may belong to ethnically mixed families. Nevertheless, in an age of identity politics, a trend toward <a href="https://doi.org/10.2979/israelstudies.23.3.10">ethnic tribalism</a> has gripped Israel, complicating an older <a href="https://wid.world/document/inequality-identity-and-the-long-run-evolution-of-political-cleavages-in-israel-1949-2019-world-inequality-lab-wp-2020-17/">divide between left and right</a>. Although the center-right Likud party of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been led mostly by Ashkenazi Jews, it <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/how-ethnic-tensions-helped-fuel-netanyahus-victory/">openly appeals to Sephardi and Mizrahi pride</a>, as does <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-and-parties/parties/shas/">the ultra-Orthodox Shas party</a>.</p>
<p>Appeals to Mizrahi and Sephardi voters reflect a long-standing sense of discrimination among non-Ashkenazi Israelis. In Israel’s first few decades, predominantly Ashkenazi, socialist governments channeled hundreds of thousands of Mizrahi and Sephardi immigrants toward unskilled labor <a href="https://www.972mag.com/anti-mizrahi-discrimination-was-official-israeli-policy/">and peripheral development towns</a>.</p>
<p>The phrase “<a href="https://fathomjournal.org/culture-wars-ethnicity-and-the-future-of-israels-democracy/">The Second Israel</a>” refers to the idea that non-Ashkenazi citizens <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.23.3.17">are still marginalized</a> by an Ashkenazi cultural establishment.</p>
<h2>Tensions – and unity</h2>
<p>Tribal factionalism, however, has a countervailing force: Zionism, the cultural and political ideology on which the country was founded. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/Z/bo43636872.html">an ideology of national liberation</a>, Zionism advocates Jews’ collective sovereignty and cultural renaissance in their ancestral homeland. Despite its diversity of political beliefs, ethnicities and religious observance, Jewish Israeli society ultimately holds together because of a widely shared Zionist patriotism. </p>
<p>This is expressed in what Israeli scholars <a href="https://jppi.org.il/en/staff/staff/">Shmuel Rosner</a> and <a href="http://www.math.tau.ac.il/%7Efuchs/">Camil Fuchs</a> call the civic culture of “Jewsraelis”: a largely secular yet semitraditional Jewishness <a href="https://ij.jppi.org.il/english/book">that shapes public life in Israel</a>. Jewsraelis, they argue, are proud citizens who are comfortable mixing Jewish tradition and modernity – from family meals on the Jewish Sabbath and Passover to beach barbecues and serving in the Israel Defense Forces, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-israel-army-service-is-required-for-all-that-could-now-change-2c76624d">which is mandatory for most citizens</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561797/original/file-20231127-21-1imqpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A handful of young men in t-shirts crowd around a table, unseen, to receive laminated cards." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561797/original/file-20231127-21-1imqpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/561797/original/file-20231127-21-1imqpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561797/original/file-20231127-21-1imqpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561797/original/file-20231127-21-1imqpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561797/original/file-20231127-21-1imqpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561797/original/file-20231127-21-1imqpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/561797/original/file-20231127-21-1imqpp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Israeli recruit gets his army identification card after reporting for the draft on July 22, 2012, near Tel Aviv, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-israeli-army-recruit-gets-his-army-identification-card-news-photo/149047434?adppopup=true">Uriel Sinai/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Before the current war, Jewish Israelis by the hundreds of thousands had marched in the streets for nearly a year over <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65086871">government proposals to curtail the power of Israel’s Supreme Court</a>. In the wake of Hamas’ horrific attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, however, those considerable tensions have been tabled. High numbers of Israelis have <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-a-huge-number-of-reservists-have-reported-for-duty-including-those-not-summoned/">volunteered to go to the front</a> or <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/13/world/middleeast/israel-volunteer-unity.html">assist each other</a> <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/study-nearly-50-of-israeli-citizens-volunteered-during-first-weeks-of-war/">in other ways</a>, such as donations or working on farms.</p>
<p>Notably, Jewish commandments <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691161747/rescue-the-surviving-souls">and traditions</a> put an emphasis <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/ransoming-captive-jews/">on freeing Jewish captives</a>, such as the people held hostage in Gaza. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-far-right-hostage-families-cease-fire-negotiation-rcna126486">Sharp debate</a> continues among Jewish Israelis over the goals and scope of the war in Gaza. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, as has been true in other moments of national crisis, they have largely banded together for what they perceive to be the common national good. Although diverse and often divided from within, most Israeli Jews embrace the idea expressed in <a href="https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-song-that-made-a-country/">a popular song</a> penned in the 1980s: “Ein li eretz aḥeret” – “I have no other (home)land.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217893/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David L. Graizbord does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The diversity of Israel’s Jewish population has been a source of tensions, but also strength, over the decades.David L. Graizbord, Director of the Arizona Center for Judaic Studies, University of ArizonaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2155602023-10-13T12:17:30Z2023-10-13T12:17:30ZSouth Africa’s 2022 census missed 31% of people - big data could help in future<p>No census is ever exact: as academics Tom Moultrie and Rob Dorrington at the University of Cape Town have <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/files/documents/2020/Oct/undesa_pd_tp_2020_tp_population_estimates.pdf#page=8">noted previously</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a census is not, in reality, a full and accurate count of the number of people in a country; rather, it is itself an estimate of the size of the population at a moment in time. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>South Africa has announced the results of its fourth census as a democracy – <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16711">Census 2022</a>. I have been involved in the process for the last four years as chair of South Africa’s National Statistics Council. As outgoing chair, my last task was to <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15192">take part</a> in the release of Census 2022.</p>
<p>The census found that the national population has grown to <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16711">62 million</a>, up 10.3 million from the last census <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03014/P030142011.pdf">in 2011</a>. Gauteng is now clearly the most populous province in the country, with 15.1 million people, overtaking KwaZulu-Natal (12.4 million). The Western Cape jumped from fifth to being the third largest province, with 7.4 million people. These figures are important because they inform resource allocation by government.</p>
<p>What is perhaps most striking about Census 2022 is the very high <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03015/P030152022.pdf#page=11">undercount</a> – 31% of people and 30% of households were missed (or chose not to self-enumerate, either online or via zero-rated telephone methods). This is the highest undercount of any post-apartheid census; sadly, it may set a new international record. </p>
<p>A census is immediately followed by a <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03015/P030152022.pdf">Post Enumeration Survey</a>, which identifies where the census missed people. This allows Statistics SA to develop adjustment factors, or weights, so that the final data represents an adjusted final tally. The Post Enumeration Survey is used to manage the undercount. Census undercounts are the norm, <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/files/documents/2020/Oct/undesa_pd_tp_2020_tp_population_estimates.pdf#page=8">not the exception</a>. But it is safe to assume that with weighting on this scale – adjusting for an undercount of 31.06% – analysts may identify some confounding results. </p>
<p>At aggregate level, <a href="https://census.statssa.gov.za/#/">Census 2022</a> is robust. At sub-national – and especially sub-provincial – levels, however, it may be less so. Only time and data analysis will tell.</p>
<p>The census confirmed the global trend of <a href="https://www.icf.com/insights/health/declining-survey-response-rate-problem">declining survey response rates</a>. People are less and less inclined to be involved in the process. This raises the question: does a fieldwork-based census have a future? Given the challenges that faced Census 2022, I believe the census may need to be re-imagined as a very different exercise. This requires <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/">Statistics South Africa</a>, which conducts the census, to fully engage with big data to bring the process into the 21st century.</p>
<h2>The process</h2>
<p>South Africa’s National Statistics Council, an independent body of experts that advises the statistician-general and the minister in the presidency regarding statistics, had secured a number of local and international experts – as had Stats SA – to stress test the census and the Post Enumeration Survey. Council never has prior sight of the data: its job is to focus on methods and process.</p>
<p>The experts do engage with the data and flagged only a few variables (mortality data, and some service and asset questions which had too many non-responses to be reliable) as requiring a cautionary note. Council engaged vigorously with the experts and Stats SA, and with no red flag raised by any, we declared the census <a href="https://census.statssa.gov.za/#/">“fit for purpose”</a>.</p>
<p>It is notable that Stats SA routinely conducts a post enumeration survey. Many countries do not, even when there is systematic undercounting of particular groups (often young men, children and minorities). Moreover, Stats SA will make available both the weighted and the raw data for analysts to examine in detail. This transparency should be welcomed, given that (as previously noted by the <a href="https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/wphc/QA.htm">United Nations Statistics Division</a>) issues of undercounting affect all countries, and estimating the undercount and whether to adjust the data is a political issue “throughout the world”. The undercount was high, but not as a result of any lack of effort or commitment from Stats SA.</p>
<h2>Why the undercount</h2>
<p>The undercount is the result of many factors. </p>
<p>First, the context matters. This time round it was as bad as it could be, with the COVID-19 pandemic affecting training and supply chains for equipment. The pandemic also generated anxiety in a populace that had been avoiding contact with strangers as part of social distancing. Census planning usually starts three or four years prior to fieldwork. Training about 100,000 enumerators is a major effort in its own right, combined with the shift to digital platforms for the first time. All were affected by the pandemic.</p>
<p>The fieldwork took place after the devastating <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-deadly-july-2021-riots-may-recur-if-theres-no-change-186397">July 2021 insurrection</a>, and after the hard-fought <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/pw/Elections-and-results/Municipal-Elections-2021">local elections</a>. The process also coincided with xenophobic violence meted out by the anti-migrant pressure group-<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/sep/26/south-africa-anti-migrant-vigilante-operation-dudula-registers-as-party-2024-elections">turned-political party</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/rising-vigilantism-south-africa-is-reaping-the-fruits-of-misrule-179891">Operation Dudula</a> in Johannesburg. Taken together, the effect was a deep-seated reluctance to open doors to strangers, particularly those asking lots of questions.</p>
<p>A second factor that affected the gathering of data was the fact that there is <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated/files/publications/Dispatches/ad474-south_africans_trust_in_institutions_reaches_new_low-afrobarometer-20aug21.pdf">very low trust in the government</a>. Although the census is conducted by Stats SA, which is an independent entity, it is seen as “government”. This label didn’t make it easy to persuade people to allow an enumerator into their dwellings and answer questions. </p>
<p>People in the Western Cape, the only province not run by the African National Congress, were particularly resistant to being enumerated or self-enumerating. This was true even after the provincial premier and Cape Town mayor made public calls for people to comply. The undercount in the Western Cape stands at 35.58% of people and 36.3% of households. In the Free State, by comparison, the undercount is 20.95% of people and 17.93% of households.</p>
<p>A third factor was that response rates have been getting consistently lower over at least the last decade. This has been true for Stats SA and other entities undertaking primary research. The decision to go digital was an attempt to open different avenues for people to complete the questionnaire online, or by phone, to improve response rates.</p>
<p>People appear to be sick and tired of being polled by everyone, from their local supermarket to endless tele-marketers and others. They also appear much more wary of sharing their data. What, then, is the future for the census?</p>
<h2>Enter big data</h2>
<p>Countries around the world are facing the same challenge of low response rates. </p>
<p>The advent of big data opens intriguing possibilities. </p>
<p>A first step would be to harvest data from the records kept by government departments (assuming they are run well). In addition, data could be unlocked if a working relationship was developed with private sector entities, such as suppliers and banks. </p>
<p>Becoming far more tech-savvy, and encouraging people to engage with Stats SA digitally, could be combined with other options to compile a national population dataset. It would also represent a significant cost-saving. This approach – harvesting data rather than gathering it directly – is being considered by many countries, but has not yet been attempted, and Stats SA needs to carefully consider this option.</p>
<p>Stats SA needs to fully engage with the world of big data, and the key players in that data ecosystem. It has convening authority, and should be engaging all key players, whether they are academic, private sector or others. </p>
<p>At the very least, an alternative way of conducting the next census in 2032 must be rigorously examined and tested. </p>
<p>Big data is not the answer to all the challenges that faced Census 2022, but it may be a key enabler for gathering reliable national data in the future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/215560/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Everatt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Big data is not the answer to all the challenges that faced Census 2022, but it may be a key enabler for gathering reliable national data in the future.David Everatt, Professor of Urban Governance, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2089112023-07-18T12:29:26Z2023-07-18T12:29:26ZChina needs immigrants<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537900/original/file-20230717-245914-r0vcf2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C44%2C4977%2C3263&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Too few children means China needs to look outside the country for new blood.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/little-girl-walk-with-her-parents-on-the-city-street-in-news-photo/958880156?adppopup=true">Zhang Peng/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China is entering a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-shrinking-population-is-a-big-deal-counting-the-social-economic-and-political-costs-of-an-aging-smaller-society-198056">severe demographic crisis</a>. </p>
<p>For several centuries, the Asian nation has been the most populous country in the world. But it is now shrinking. In 2022, the country registered <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/business/china-birth-rate.html">more deaths than births</a>, and it will soon be surpassed by India in total population size – indeed, many demographers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/24/india-overtakes-china-to-become-worlds-most-populous-country">believe this has already occurred</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar who has studied</a> China’s demography for almost 40 years, I know the likelihood is this falling population will lead to an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-shrinking-population-is-a-big-deal-counting-the-social-economic-and-political-costs-of-an-aging-smaller-society-198056">economic slowdown</a>, with a greater number of dependents and fewer workers to support them. Yet attempts to reverse the trend through policy that <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/china-comes-up-with-20-recommendations-to-encourage-families-to-have-more-children-572313">encourages couples to have more children</a> have proved ineffective. China will need to turn to other measures to solve its population problem. In short, China needs immigrants.</p>
<h2>More babies or more immigrants?</h2>
<p>The scale of the demographic task facing policymakers in Beijing is vast.</p>
<p>In 2022, the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/17/1149453055/china-records-1st-population-fall-in-decades-as-births-drop">Chinese government reported</a> 10.41 million deaths in the country and 9.56 million births. This was the first time China has seen more annual deaths than births since the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/giving-historys-greatest-mass-murderer-his-due/">Great Leap Forward</a> of 1958 to 1962 – during which a severe famine resulting from bad economic policies contributed to 30 million to 40 million more deaths than would have been expected.</p>
<p>If present trends continue, China is expected to lose more than a third of its 1.4 billion population. Some projections have the country dropping to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/15/population-in-more-than-20-countries-to-halve-by-2100-study">population of 800 million by the year 2100</a>.</p>
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<p>The impact of this change will be felt across Chinese society. The country is already aging. The <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/median-age-china-surpassed-united-states">median age in China is now 38</a> compared to 28 just two decades ago. In contrast, India today has <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/india-population/">a median age of 28</a>. People of age 65 and over <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/02/09/key-facts-as-india-surpasses-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/">now comprise 14% of China’s population</a> compared to 7% of India’s.</p>
<p>Once a nation’s population is in decline, there are only two ways to reverse the trend: encourage people to have more children or get people from outside the country to move in.</p>
<p>Many Chinese leaders believe that they can increase China’s population by changing the nation’s fertility policies. In 2015, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/china-abandons-one-child-policy">government abandoned the one-child policy</a>, permitting all couples in China to have two children. In 2021, the two-child policy was abandoned <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html">in favor of a three-child policy</a>. The hope was these changes would result in sizable increases in the national fertility rate, which now stands at 1.2 – well below the level of 2.1 children per woman of childbearing age that is needed to replace the population. </p>
<p>But these policy changes have not led to fertility increases in China, and there is little reason to think they will result in any dramatic uptick in the years ahead. This is because most of China’s fertility reduction, especially since the 1990s, has been voluntary and more a result of modernization than fertility control policies. Chinese couples are having fewer children <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/6/9/despite-three-child-policy-many-in-china-cant-afford-more-kids">due to the higher living costs and educational expenses</a> involved in having more than one child.</p>
<h2>Entering the ‘low fertility trap’</h2>
<p>The total fertility rate in China might go up over the next decade by 0.1 or 0.2 at best, in my opinion. But demographers largely agree that it will never go up by 1.0 or 2.0 – the kind of increase needed if China is to reach the replacement level.</p>
<p>And then there is what demographers refer to as the “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/17/europe/italy-record-low-birth-rate-intl-cmd/index.html">low fertility trap</a>.” This hypothesis, advanced by demographers in the early 2000s, holds that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4 – and China’s is now at 1.2 – it is very difficult to increase it by a significant amount. The argument goes that fertility declines to these low levels are largely the result of changes in living standards and increasing opportunities for women.</p>
<p>As a result, it is most unlikely that the three-child policy will have any influence at all on raising the fertility rate.</p>
<p>Which leaves immigration. China right now has few residents who were born in a foreign country – there are <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/04/china-needs-foreign-workers-so-why-wont-it-embrace-immigration">now only around 1 million foreign-born residents</a> in China, or less than 0.1% of the population.</p>
<p>In fact, China has the smallest number of international migrants of <a href="https://qz.com/1163632/china-still-has-the-smallest-share-of-incoming-migrants-in-the-world">any major country in the world</a>. Compare its 0.1% of immigrants with <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/15/us/where-immigrants-come-from-cec/index.html">near 14% in the U.S.</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-immigrants-made-up-over-18-of-2022-population/a-65383249">18% in Germany</a>. Even Japan and South Korea – which historically have not been high-immigration countries – have higher percentages of foreign-born population, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/23/japan-immigration-policy-xenophobia-migration/">2% in Japan</a> and <a href="https://inmykorea.com/how-many-foreigners-in-korea/#:%7E:text=Currently%2C%20foreign%20residents%20make%20up,increase%20to%204.3%25%20by%202040.">3% in South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>It isn’t just the low numbers of immigrants that is a problem. China also faces the problem of growing numbers of its population moving to other countries, including the U.S. In 2017, for example, an <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf">estimated 10 million people moved from China</a> to live and work in other countries.</p>
<h2>Overcoming racial purity</h2>
<p>China must change its immigration policies if it is to reverse its demographic trend. </p>
<p>Currently, foreign-born people cannot attain Chinese citizenship unless they are children of Chinese nationals. Also, foreigners are only allowed to purchase one piece of property in China, and it must be their residence.</p>
<p>But changing immigration policy will likely require a change in mindset. </p>
<p>In a recent story in The Economist, the <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/04/china-needs-foreign-workers-so-why-wont-it-embrace-immigration">reporter notes that Chinese</a> “officials boast of a single Chinese bloodline dating back thousands of years.” And that taps into a seemingly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/racism-is-alive-and-well-in-china/">deep-rooted belief in racial purity</a> held by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/world/asia/china-sperm-communist-party.html">many leaders in</a> the Chinese Communist Party. In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/4/ksac070/6947853">told Donald Trump</a>, then America’s president: “We people are the original people, black hair, yellow skin, inherited onwards. We call ourselves the descendants of the dragon.”</p>
<p>The best way to maintain this racial purity, <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005267">many in China believe</a>, is to limit or prohibit migration into China.</p>
<p>But relaxing immigration policy will not only boost numbers, it will also offset any drop in productivity caused by an aging population. Immigrants are typically of prime working age and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/immigrants-outperform-native-born-americans-two-key-measures-financial-success-n1020291">very productive</a>; they also tend to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/10/26/5-facts-about-immigrant-mothers-and-u-s-fertility-trends/">have more babies</a> than native-born residents.</p>
<p>The U.S. and many European countries have relied for decades on international migration to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/03/08/immigration-projected-to-drive-growth-in-u-s-working-age-population-through-at-least-2035/">bolster their working-age population</a>. For immigration to have any reasonable impacts in China, the numbers of people coming into China will need to increase tremendously in the next decade or so – to around 50 million, perhaps higher. Otherwise, in the coming decades, China’s demographic destiny will be one of population losses every year, with more deaths than births, and the country will soon have one of the oldest populations in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Chinese politicians have looked toward policies to encourage couples to have more children to offset population decline. It hasn’t worked.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2094202023-07-11T16:37:32Z2023-07-11T16:37:32ZDRC has one of the fastest growing populations in the world – why this isn’t good news<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/536580/original/file-20230710-16123-co1r02.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>The demographic profile of a country matters because it sets its development pace – it creates opportunities and presents risks. For many developing countries, the challenge is to manage a demographic profile that puts pressure on particular cohorts of people. One country that needs to manage this challenge is the Democratic Republic of Congo. Jacques Emina, who has <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jacques-Emina">studied demography</a> in the country for the last two decades, unpacks the numbers.</em> </p>
<h2>What are the DRC’s demographic challenges? What’s driving them?</h2>
<p>With <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COD/democratic-republic-of-congo/population">102 million</a> people in 2023, the Democratic Republic of Congo is the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-in-africa">fourth most populous country in Africa</a> after Nigeria, Ethiopia and Egypt. It’s the <a href="https://worldpopulationreview.com/">15th most populous</a> country in the world. </p>
<p>It’s estimated that by 2050, the DRC will have <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf#page=9">215 million people</a> and join the world’s 10 most populated countries. This isn’t so surprising, given the size of the country: <a href="https://ins.cd/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ANNUAIRE-STATISTIQUE-2020.pdf#page=30">2.3 million square kilometres</a>, making it the second-largest country in Africa (behind Algeria).</p>
<p>The country’s population reflects higher-than-average growth compared to other countries on the continent. The DRC’s population grew by <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/COD/democratic-republic-of-congo/population-growth-rate">3.3% in 2022</a>. The continent’s average was <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf#page=17">2.5%</a>. The average world population growth rate was <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf#page=17">0.8% in 2022</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC’s growing population has serious consequences for the wellbeing of its people. Without policies that take account of the country’s demographic profile – a growing population and <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Republic-of-the-Congo/Demographic-trends">a very high number of young people versus working age people</a> – social conditions like poverty and hunger will increase.</p>
<p>There are two main reasons for the high population growth: a decrease in deaths and a high number of births. </p>
<p>Over the past decades, the DRC has seen a consistent drop in <a href="https://data.unicef.org/country/cod/">under-five mortality</a>, though this is still relatively high compared to the world average. In 1995, under-five mortality was estimated at 175 deaths per 1,000 births. This dropped to 87 deaths per 1,000 births in 2018. In the same year the <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-survival/under-five-mortality/">global under-five mortality rate</a> stood at 40 deaths per 1,000 births.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-demographics/#life-exp">Life expectancy in the DRC</a> has also increased from 49 years in 1995 to 62 years in 2023. The current global life expectancy is <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/life-expectancy/">73 years</a>.</p>
<p>When it comes to numbers of births, Congolese women average <a href="https://www.prb.org/international/indicator/fertility/table">6.2 babies</a> in their lifetimes. This is four births more than the global average of 2.3 babies. </p>
<p>The DRC’s fertility rate is driven by four major factors.</p>
<p>Firstly, cultural values encourage people to have children. Large families are celebrated. The country’s most recent <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf">demographic and health survey</a> found that Congolese women on average wanted <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf#page=6">six children</a>; men wanted seven. </p>
<p>Secondly, an early start to childbearing means more years of giving birth. <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf#page=6">More than 30% of girls</a> in the DRC are married before they turn 18. About a quarter of young women give birth by their 18th birthday compared to <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-health/adolescent-health/">14% worldwide</a>. And <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf#page=5">27%</a> of adolescent Congolese girls aged 15-19 have children. </p>
<p>Thirdly, <a href="https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/sr218/sr218.e.pdf#page=7">very few women use contraception</a> in the DRC. The percentage of women of reproductive age who use an effective form of modern contraception was estimated at around <a href="https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/media/3646/file/COD-MICS-Palu-2018.pdf#page=107">7% in 2018</a>. This was up from 4% in 2007. </p>
<p>The fourth factor driving population growth is the absence of a national population policy. This typically includes a set of measures designed to influence population dynamics. </p>
<h2>What impact is this having?</h2>
<p>The DRC’s galloping demography has several implications.</p>
<p>The first is a high dependency ratio. This is when there are far more economically dependent people than economically active ones because of the demographic age profile of the country. The economically active population faces a greater burden to support economically dependent people, particularly children. Children under the age of 15 account for <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Republic-of-the-Congo/Demographic-trends">41.6%</a> of the DRC’s total population. This indicates that employed people aged 15-64 bear a heavy burden amid <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">low incomes</a>. </p>
<p>The country also faces significant planning challenges. <a href="https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/en/what-we-do/education">School attendance rates</a> increased from 52% in 2001 to 78% in 2018. Nevertheless, <a href="https://www.unicef.org/drcongo/en/what-we-do/education">7.6 million children aged 5-17 are still out of school</a>. </p>
<p>The DRC lags behind in other key human development measures.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>It’s among the five poorest nations in the world. In 2022, <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">62% of Congolese (60 million people)</a> lived under the poverty line (less than US$2.15 a day). About one in six people living in extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa lives in the DRC. </p></li>
<li><p>The country has faced <a href="https://theconversation.com/military-interventions-have-failed-to-end-drcs-conflict-whats-gone-wrong-205586">political unrest and armed conflicts</a> for six decades. The <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf">2023 Global Peace Index</a> – which measures the relative peacefulness of nations and regions – lists the DRC as <a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf#page=11">one of the least peaceful countries</a> in the world after Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and South Sudan.</p></li>
<li><p>The country has one of the <a href="https://data.unicef.org/topic/maternal-health/maternal-mortality/">world’s highest maternal mortality ratios</a> at 547 deaths per 100,000 live births. The global average is 223 deaths per 100,000 live births. </p></li>
<li><p>It’s one of the world’s hungriest countries. Its <a href="https://www.globalhungerindex.org/">Global Hunger Index</a> score – which measures and tracks levels of hunger globally – stands at <a href="https://www.globalhungerindex.org/drc.html">37.8</a>, which is tagged as “alarming”. </p></li>
</ul>
<h2>What interventions are needed?</h2>
<p>A country’s population profile can offer opportunities, or what’s known as a demographic dividend. This is when a high percentage of people are young and there are jobs for them. </p>
<p>But the DRC is missing out on this opportunity and will continue to do so unless it:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>invests in human capital by improving its education and health systems. Most Congolese are <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/can-t-afford-be-sick-assessing-cost-ill-health-north-kivu-eastern">paying out of their own pockets</a> for healthcare. Education is free, but the <a href="https://2017-2020.usaid.gov/democratic-republic-congo/education">system is weak</a> due to low budget allocations.</p></li>
<li><p>designs a population policy to guide population dynamics. This would include policies on birth, migration and where people live. These should be linked to an integrated national development policy.</p></li>
<li><p>makes progress on gender equality. This should include increasing the enrolment of girls in high schools, discouraging child marriage and enabling young mothers to attend school.</p></li>
<li><p>improves governance and tackles corruption to promote investment in education, health and employment.</p></li>
<li><p>creates data systems that can underpin evidence-based policies.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/209420/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacques Emina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Without policies that take account of a growing population with few working-age people, DRC risks seeing an increase in poverty and hunger.Jacques Emina, Professor of population and development studies, University of Kinshasa Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2071072023-06-27T12:23:02Z2023-06-27T12:23:02ZSouth Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world – and that doesn’t bode well for its economy<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534163/original/file-20230626-5418-k0jzlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C7842%2C4032&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An aging population, a tired economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-elderly-lady-rests-near-her-street-stall-as-pedestrians-news-photo/1251981087?adppopup=true">Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around <a href="https://www.livescience.com/worlds-population-could-plummet-to-six-billion-by-the-end-of-the-century-new-study-suggests">the world</a>, nations are looking at the <a href="https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2023/06/20/what-does-a-shrinking-population-mean-for-china">prospect of shrinking</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness/2023/02/14/aging-boomers-more-older-americans/">aging populations</a> – but none more so than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/22/s-korea-breaks-record-for-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-again">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Over the last 60 years, South Korea has undergone the most rapid fertility decline in recorded human history. In 1960, the nation’s total fertility rate – the number of children, on average, that a woman has during her reproductive years – stood at just under six children per woman. In 2022, that figure was 0.78. South Korea is the only country in the world to register a fertility rate of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/19/1163341684/south-korea-fertility-rate">less than one child per woman</a>, although others – <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1155943055/ukraine-low-birth-rate-russia-war">Ukraine</a>, <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-low-fertility-rate-population-decline-by-yi-fuxian-2023-02">China</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/births-in-spain-drop-to-lowest-level-on-record/2614667">Spain</a> – are close.</p>
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<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">a demographer</a> who over the past four decades has conducted extensive research on Asian populations, I know that this prolonged and steep decline will have huge impacts on South Korea. It may <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230102000602">slow down economic growth</a>, contributing to a shift that will see the country <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/29/south-korea-s-demographic-crisis-is-challenging-its-national-story-pub-84820">end up less rich and with a smaller population</a>.</p>
<h2>Older, poorer, more dependent</h2>
<p>Countries need a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman to replace their population, when the effects of immigration and emigration aren’t considered. And South Korea’s fertility rate has been consistently below that number since 1984, when it dropped to 1.93, from 2.17 the year before.</p>
<p>What makes the South Korean fertility rate decline more astonishing is the relatively short period in which it has occurred.</p>
<p>Back in 1800, the U.S. total fertility rate was <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1033027/fertility-rate-us-1800-2020/">well over 6.0</a>. But it took the U.S. around 170 years to consistently drop below the replacement level. Moreover, in the little over 60 years in which South Korea’s fertility rate fell from 6.0 to 0.8, the U.S. saw a more gradual decline from 3.0 to 1.7.</p>
<p>Fertility decline can have a positive effect in certain circumstances, via something demographers refer to as “<a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/fact-sheet-attaining-the-demographic-dividend/">the demographic dividend</a>.” This dividend refers to accelerated increases in a country’s economy that follow a decline in birth rates and subsequent changes in its age composition that result in more working-age people and fewer dependent young children and elderly people.</p>
<p>And that is what happened in South Korea – a decline in fertility helped convert South Korea from a very poor country <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/miracle-maturity-growth-korean-economy">to a very rich one</a>.</p>
<h2>Behind the economic miracle</h2>
<p>South Korea’s fertility decline began in the early 1960s when the government adopted an <a href="https://countrystudies.us/south-korea/47.htm">economic planning program</a> and a <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">population and family planning program</a>.</p>
<p>By that time, South Korea was languishing, having seen its <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf">economy and society destroyed</a> by the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. Indeed by the late-1950s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1961, its annual per capita income <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796954.003.0006">was only about US$82</a>. </p>
<p>But dramatic increases in economic growth began in 1962, when the South Korean government introduced a five-year economic development plan. </p>
<p>Crucially, the government also introduced a population planning program in a bid to bring down the nation’s fertility rate. This included a goal of getting <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">45% of married couples</a> to use contraception – until then, very few Koreans used contraception.</p>
<p>This further contributed to the fertility reduction, as many couples realized that having fewer children would often lead to improvements in family living standards. </p>
<p>Both the economic and family planning programs were instrumental in moving South Korea from one with a high fertility rate to one with a low fertility rate.</p>
<p>As a result, the country’s dependent population – the young and the elderly – grew smaller in relation to its working-age population.</p>
<p>The demographic change kick-started economic growth that continued well into the mid-1990s. Increases in productivity, combined with an increasing labor force and a gradual reduction of unemployment, produced average annual growth rates in gross domestic product <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/gnp-gross-national-product">of between 6% and 10% for many years</a>.</p>
<p>South Korea today is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true">one of the richest countries</a>
in the world with a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KR">per capita income of $35,000</a>.</p>
<h2>Losing people every year</h2>
<p>Much of this transformation of South Korea from a poor country to a rich country has been due to the demographic dividend realized during the country’s fertility decline. But the demographic dividend only works in the short term. Long-term fertility declines are often <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2022/12/the-long-term-decline-in-fertility-and-what-it-means-for-state-budgets">disastrous for a nation’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>With an extremely low fertility rate of 0.78, South Korea is losing population each year and experiencing more deaths than births. The once-vibrant nation is on the way to becoming a country with lots of elderly people and fewer workers.</p>
<p>The Korean Statistical Office reported recently that the <a href="https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1B8000F&language=en">country lost population</a> in the past three years: It was down by 32,611 people in 2020, 57,118 in 2021 and 123,800 in 2022.</p>
<p>If this trend continues, and if the country doesn’t welcome millions of immigrants, South Korea’s present population of 51 million <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2023/06/602_335593.html">will drop to under 38 million</a> in the next four or five decades.</p>
<p>And a growing proportion of the society will be over the age of 65.</p>
<p>South Korea’s population aged 65 and over comprised under 7% of the population in 2000. Today, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south/#people-and-society">nearly 17% of South Koreans</a> are older people.</p>
<p>The older people population is projected to be 20% of the country by 2025 and could reach an unprecedented and astoundingly high 46% in 2067. South Korea’s working-age population will then be smaller in size than its population of people over the age of 65.</p>
<p>In a bid to avert a demographic nightmare, the South Korean government is <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/south-korea-families-770-month-183500253.html">providing financial incentives</a> for couples to have children and is boosting the monthly allowance already in place for parents. President Yoon Suk Yeol has also <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/28/national/politics/Korea-birth-rate-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230328184849297.html">established a new government team</a> to establish policies to increase the birth rate.</p>
<p>But to date, programs to increase the low fertility rate have had little effect. Since 2006, the South Korean government has already <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/asia/south-korea-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">spent over $200 billion</a> in programs to increase the birth rate, with virtually no impact.</p>
<h2>Opening the trapdoor</h2>
<p>The South Korean fertility rate has not increased in the past 16 years. Rather, it has continued to decrease. This is due to what demographers refer to as the “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025482">low-fertility trap</a>.” The principle, set forth by demographers in the early 2000s, states that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4, it is difficult – if not impossible – to increase it significantly. </p>
<p>South Korea, along with many other countries – including France, Australia and Russia – have developed policies to encourage fertility rate increases, but with little to no success. </p>
<p>The only real way for South Korea to turn this around would be to rely heavily on immigration.</p>
<p>Migrants are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2020/06/19/blog-weo-chapter4-migration-to-advanced-economies-can-raise-growth">typically young and productive</a> and usually have more children than the native-born population. But South Korea has a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/16/upshot/comparing-immigration-policies-across-countries.html">very restrictive immigration policy</a> with no path for immigrants to become citizens or permanent residents unless they marry South Koreans.</p>
<p>Indeed, the foreign-born population in 2022 was just over 1.6 million, which is around <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220414000692">3.1% of the population</a>. In contrast, the U.S. has always relied on immigration to bolster its working population, with foreign-born residents now <a href="https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigrants-in-the-united-states">comprising over 14%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>For immigration to offset South Korea’s declining fertility rate, the number of foreign workers would likely need to rise almost tenfold.</p>
<p>Without that, South Korea’s demographic destiny will have the nation continuing to lose population every year and becoming one of the oldest – if not the oldest – country in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>South Korea’s fertility rate fell below the level needed to sustain a population in the mid-1980s – and it never recovered. It is now below one child per woman during her reproductive years.Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1950862023-04-05T17:52:00Z2023-04-05T17:52:00ZBlack singles with college education embrace life without marriage<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/519412/original/file-20230404-20-6snpsz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A new book titled 'The Love Jones Cohort' examines the lifestyles of middle-class Black Americans.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/african-american-woman-using-social-media-on-smart-royalty-free-image/1432253560">Morsa Images/DigitalVision Collection/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Why is it seemingly OK to ask single people “Why are you single?” when married people are rarely asked “Why are you married?”</em></p>
<p><em><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EhVdUK4AAAAJ&hl=en">Sociologist Kris Marsh</a> hopes to break this double-standard with her new book “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316672754">The Love Jones Cohort: Single and Living Alone in the Black Middle Class</a>.” In it, she examines the lifestyles of single people and explores the stigma that can come with their decision to not marry.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the story behind the title?</h2>
<p>My mentor and I coined the expression “The Love Jones Cohort” over coffee on a hot and humid summer day in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. We were discussing how my idea to study Black middle class men and women who are single and living alone came from both media and my own life experiences. </p>
<p>I said that I was noticing – in both film and TV – a demographic shift in Black characters away from married couples to single adults. I believed this started with the 1997 romance drama “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0119572/">Love Jones</a>,” starring Larenz Tate as an up-and-coming poet, and Nia Long as a talented but recently unemployed photographer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Movie still of group of young adults smoking and drinking at a table" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518593/original/file-20230330-390-elezol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518593/original/file-20230330-390-elezol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518593/original/file-20230330-390-elezol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518593/original/file-20230330-390-elezol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=405&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518593/original/file-20230330-390-elezol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518593/original/file-20230330-390-elezol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518593/original/file-20230330-390-elezol.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The 1997 film ‘Love Jones’ is a story of Black love, life and friendship that still resonates today.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/larenz-tate-and-nia-long-having-drinks-with-another-couples-news-photo/159840963">Addis Wechsler Pictures/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The film follows the two characters, as well as their friends and acquaintances, as they pursue careers and lovers. It deals with relationships, premarital sex, choosing partners, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-women-still-earn-a-lot-less-than-men-109128">gender pay gap</a> and the realization that growing old and single might affect one’s health. More than 25 years later, the film remains a <a href="https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/la-et-mn-love-jones-oral-history-20170313-htmlstory.html">staple within Black culture</a>.</p>
<h2>Tell us more about this shift in TV and film</h2>
<p>In the 1980s and 1990s, the media prototype for the middle class – whether Black or white – had been a married couple with children. For the Black middle class, this was exemplified by the Huxtable family from “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086687/">The Cosby Show</a>,” a sitcom starring Bill Cosby that ran from 1984 to 1992 about an obstetrician father, a corporate attorney and their four happy, intelligent and adorable children. </p>
<p>After “The Cosby Show,” a surge of sitcoms and films depicted Black middle-class characters of a quite different demographic profile. These characters were 20-something, educated professionals who had never been married, were child-free and lived alone or with an unmarried friend or two. “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0106056">Living Single</a>,” a sitcom that ran from 1993 to 1998, centered on six Black friends living in a Brooklyn brownstone. “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0247102">Girlfriends</a>,” another popular sitcom, ran from 2000 to 2008 and followed the career and dating lives of four single Black women. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="Issa Rae and Yvonne Orji laugh while getting photographed at an event" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518828/original/file-20230331-18-6kwvv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/518828/original/file-20230331-18-6kwvv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518828/original/file-20230331-18-6kwvv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518828/original/file-20230331-18-6kwvv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518828/original/file-20230331-18-6kwvv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=858&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518828/original/file-20230331-18-6kwvv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=858&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/518828/original/file-20230331-18-6kwvv7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=858&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Issa Rae and Yvonne Orji starred in ‘Insecure,’ which followed a group of young Black women living and dating in Los Angeles.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/issa-rae-and-yvonne-orji-attend-vulture-festival-2021-at-news-photo/1353132110">David Livingston/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>More recent TV shows that represent the Love Jones cohort include “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2345481">Being Mary Jane</a>,” which ran from 2013 to 2019 and was about a young Black female news anchor and her career and family, and “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5024912">Insecure</a>,” which ended in 2021 after six seasons. “Insecure” followed four Black women who are best friends as they deal with insecurities and uncomfortable everyday experiences, career and relationship challenges, and a variety of social and racial issues relating to the contemporary Black experience.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, on the big screen, films depicting this demographic profile include “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0250274/">The Brothers</a>” and “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0269341">Two Can Play That Game</a>” in 2001, and “<a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0301181">Deliver Us From Eva</a>” in 2003.</p>
<p>This shift in Hollywood, it turns out, was also grounded in the real world – where a <a href="http://www.doi.org/10.1093/sf/86.2.735">growing number of middle-class Black Americans</a> in recent decades are single and living alone. Looking at Census data, I learned that the number of middle-class Black people age 25-44 that were single and living alone jumped from <a href="http://www.doi.org/10.1093/sf/86.2.735">6% in 1980 to 14% in 2000</a>, where it remains today. </p>
<h2>What are some of your most interesting findings?</h2>
<p>Several findings stand out from my interviews with members of the Love Jones Cohort in the summer of 2015.</p>
<p>A number of the men and women – who were all identified by pseudonyms in the study – actively chose singlehood. For example, Genesis, who works in brand management, had decided to not date for the immediate future. “Right now I’m more content with being single due to other priorities,” she said.</p>
<p>Many also enjoyed the economic autonomy that accompanied being single. “I decide what I want to do, if it’s political, if it’s social, I decide, and I don’t have to answer to anyone,” said Joanna, a 47-year-old communications specialist. However, they also reported that buying a home on a single income can be an economic hurdle. </p>
<p>While freedom and self-reliance were central aspects of the cohort’s lifestyle, so was – in many cases – what I call “situational loneliness.” This refers to bouts of mild to moderate loneliness that ebb and flow over short periods of time, such as Valentine’s Day. As a result, members in the cohort tended to place high value on interactions with family, friends and social networks.</p>
<p>In fact, friends were often perceived as a direct extension of their families, and both men and women expressed how friends met various social needs – whether this be workout partners, golf buddies or fellow foodies.</p>
<p>The women in the cohort saw their female friends as sources of emotional support, and these nurturing, nonromantic relationships were central to their single and living alone lifestyle. The cohort’s men, meanwhile, talked about their circle of friends in more pragmatic terms. “My friends come over. … We have a rooftop pool and different stuff like that. They’ll come over and want to hang out and chill,” noted Reggie, a 30-year-old financial analyst.</p>
<h2>What’s driving single life?</h2>
<p>When people talk about the driving factors of Black singlehood, the discussion often involves suggesting that Black singles – usually Black women – are too picky and need to lower or modify their standards to be partnered or married.</p>
<p>The Love Jones Cohort’s women were hopeful that if they did decide to partner, it would be with an educated Black man. Research supports the tendency for people to want to marry or partner with people in their same <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.395">social and economic class</a>. However, Black women are <a href="https://www.jbhe.com/2019/03/the-gender-gap-in-african-american-educational-attainment-2/">outpacing Black men in higher education</a>. According to <a href="https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/education-attainment/cps-detailed-tables.html">2018 Census data</a>, <a href="https://www.jbhe.com/2019/03/the-gender-gap-in-african-american-educational-attainment-2/">19% of Black men</a> between the ages of 25 and 29 held a bachelor’s degree compared to 26% of Black women. This can lead to a disparity in resources and social standing. </p>
<p>In the book, I argue that racism and gendered racism constrain personal choices and also need to be taken into consideration when discussing Black singlehood. </p>
<p>For example, sociologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=TcTbU6oAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">Celeste Vaughn Curington</a> and her colleagues coined the term “<a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520293458/the-dating-divide">digital-sexual racism</a>” after they conducted a comprehensive study of a diverse group of daters. According to Curington, the term refers to how Black daters are rendered “simultaneously hyper-visible and invisible. … They are contacted on dating sites specifically because they are Black but also ignored on other user sites entirely because they are Black.”</p>
<p>I’m asking readers to consider how singlehood is not simply because of an individual deficit, choice or behavior. I hope for the book to challenge readers to consider how structural forces and social contexts also fit into the conversation on singlehood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kris Marsh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A sociologist interviewed dozens of middle-class Black singles about their friendships, freedom and dating lives.Kris Marsh, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of MarylandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1956352023-03-16T12:34:43Z2023-03-16T12:34:43ZNeighbors Ohio and Michigan are moving further apart in politics – differences in ballot access may explain why<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505728/original/file-20230122-35731-uvi2qt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=22%2C7%2C4970%2C3293&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Voters cast their ballots at a polling station in Detroit during the 2022 midterm elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/voters-cast-their-ballots-at-a-polling-station-in-detroit-news-photo/1244697629?adppopup=true">Matthew Hatcher/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It may seem that the midterm elections are firmly behind us.</p>
<p>Pollsters are already measuring likely outcomes in <a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/2024_republican_presidential_nomination-7548.html">2024 presidential matchups</a>. And announced candidates and possible contenders for the Republican presidential nomination <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/10/desantis-trump-iowa-biden-european-commission/">are taking trips to Iowa</a>, the party’s first nominating state.</p>
<p>But 2022 election results from two key states tell us a lot about how voting laws and issues on the ballot influence the way people vote. </p>
<p>At first glance, it’s not easy to understand why Michigan, a <a href="https://usafacts.org/articles/what-are-the-current-swing-states-and-how-have-they-changed-over-time/">left-leaning swing state</a>, and Ohio, a <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/ohio-political-transformation">Republican stronghold and former swing state</a>, had such different electoral outcomes in the midterms. Their <a href="https://data.census.gov/table?g=0400000US26,39">similar demographic makeups</a> and past similar voting patterns – such as electing Republicans statewide over several election cycles – suggest they would tend to have similar results at the ballot box. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=T9fkYCIAAAAJ&hl=en">scholars of electoral politics</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=tEffT2gAAAAJ&hl=en">state policy</a> in Ohio, we explored recent elections in both states and found a divergence after 2016, with Michigan voting more blue and Ohio voting more red. Our analysis suggests differences in voter registration laws and ballot initiatives may explain why these two states have taken different electoral paths. This preliminary research has not yet been peer-reviewed.</p>
<p>Between 2000 and 2012, the states had similar voting results more than half the time. But they did diverge slightly. During the period, <a href="https://www.270towin.com/states/Michigan">Michigan voters picked the Democratic presidential</a> candidate in each of the four contests. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.270towin.com/states/Ohio">in Ohio, voters went twice each for Republican</a> President George W. Bush and Democratic President Barack Obama. At the gubernatorial level, for three elections during this period – 2002, 2006 and 2010 – Michigan elected one Republican and elected and reelected one Democrat, while Ohio elected two Republicans and one Democrat.</p>
<p>In the 2016 presidential election, voters in both Michigan and Ohio chose Republican <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/michigan">candidate Donald Trump</a>. That year, there was no U.S. Senate election in Michigan, but Ohio voters returned Republican U.S. Sen. <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/portman-wins-reelection-in-ohio-230970">Rob Portman for another term</a>. And voters in both states sent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/house">more Republicans than Democrats to the U.S. House of Representatives</a> and both houses of their state legislatures. </p>
<p>While the two states had been slowly moving apart for a couple of decades, they <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president">converged in the 2016 presidential election</a> for Trump. </p>
<h2>Michigan goes blue, Ohio stays red</h2>
<p>Since 2016, however, voters in the two states have followed drastically different political paths. In 2018, 2020 and 2022, Michigan voters elected Democratic <a href="https://www.politico.com/election-results/2018/michigan/">candidates for governor, U.S. Senate</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/results/state/michigan">president</a> as well as a majority in <a href="https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2022/11/09/michigan-house-senate-democrats-election-results/69632658007/">both houses of the state legislature</a>. And they voted for ballot initiatives that <a href="https://mielections.us/election/results/2018GEN_CENR.html">legalized marijuana, reformed redistricting and legalized same-day voter registration</a>, which included straight-ticket voting, automatic voter registration, same-day voter registration and no-excuse absentee voting. They also voted to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/09/us/abortion-rights-ballot-proposals.html">modify the state constitution</a> to protect abortion and contraception rights – all policies typically supported by Democratic candidates.</p>
<p>During the same three election cycles in Ohio, residents cast their ballots for Republican candidates and policy initiatives favored by Republicans. Voters <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_2018_ballot_measures">rejected drug-related criminal justice reform</a>, approved a referendum that could <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_2022_ballot_measures">make bail more punitive</a> and affirmed that only U.S. citizens could vote in Ohio elections. <a href="https://www.politico.com/election-results/2018/ohio/">Republicans actually dominated electoral politics</a> in both federal and state races, with one exception: in 2018, voters <a href="https://www.politico.com/election-results/2018/ohio/">sent Democrat Sherrod Brown</a> back to the U.S. Senate.</p>
<p>Beyond that, Ohioans voted for a Republican governor, presidential candidate, all statewide executive offices, in addition to the governor, the <a href="https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2022/11/09/republicans-headed-for-sweep-of-ohio-supreme-court-elections/">three open seats on the state supreme court</a> and a <a href="https://www.bricker.com/insights-resources/publications/2022-general-election-update">super majority in the state legislature</a>. The U.S. Senate seat vacated by a Republican stayed in Republican control.</p>
<h2>It’s not demographics</h2>
<p>Analysts suggest that <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/ohio-has-taken-different-turn-ohio-no-longer-appears-be-n1247507">Ohio is no longer a swing state because it is overwhelmingly white and working-class</a>. But, as we examined the populations, we learned demographic differences were not the reason Michigan and Ohio voters diverged politically. Data from the <a href="https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data.html">American Community Survey</a>, a demographic study from the U.S. Census Bureau, shows that these two Midwest states are remarkably similar demographically.</p>
<p>Michigan and Ohio have similar white populations, 78% and 80%, respectively; Black populations, 14% and 12%; bachelor’s degree recipients, both 18%; people over 65, both 17%; median household incomes, both $59,000 in 2020 dollars; and <a href="http://unionstats.com/">workers belonging to unions</a>, 13% and 12%. </p>
<p>But state-specific exit polls of early and 2022 Election Day <a href="https://www.cnn.com/election/2022/exit-polls/michigan/governor/0">voters in Michigan</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/election/2022/exit-polls/ohio/senate/0?fbclid=IwAR2bMJXuRmSzcmSKFY1E61HrUUg-Uji9PBuMiLWxmtZJ_716x1ktdPcrAlw">Ohio show there are differences</a> in the electorate. Ohio voters were a little more likely to be male – 52% to 50% – and white, 83% to 80%, than Michigan voters.</p>
<p>Ohio voters were less likely to reside in a union household – 21% to 27% – and were much more likely to identify as Republicans, 41% to 32%. </p>
<h2>Early voter registration may play a part</h2>
<p>In 2018, Michigan approved same-day registration, <a href="https://mvic.sos.state.mi.us/Home/RegisterToVote#how">which allows voters to register on Election Day</a>, and <a href="https://www.mlive.com/news/2019/09/secretary-of-state-unveils-automatic-voter-registration.html">automatic voter registration</a>, which makes voter registration automatic with driver’s license applications and renewal for those eligible. Ohio requires voters to <a href="https://www.ohiosos.gov/elections/voters/current-voting-schedule/2022-schedule/">register nearly a month prior to Election Day</a>. </p>
<p>Registration data for Michigan shows these easier methods of registration may have corresponded with <a href="https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/election-results-and-data">higher voter participation</a> in the state. The increase in total votes cast in Michigan, from <a href="https://mielections.us/election/results/2016GEN_CENR.html">4.8 million in 2016</a> to <a href="https://mielections.us/election/results/2016GEN_CENR.html">5.5 million in 2020</a>, suggests the 2018 registration changes had an effect. While there may be other factors related to Michigan’s increased turnout, the changes in the state’s laws suggest same-day and automatic registration played a part.</p>
<p>What’s more, there was a higher number of <a href="https://mvic.sos.state.mi.us/VoterCount/Index">registered voters in Michigan</a> than <a href="https://www.ohiosos.gov/media-center/week-in-review-archive/2022-10-14/">in Ohio</a>, even though Ohio has 1.7 million more people than Michigan. And, according to the <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/05/06/2021-09422/estimates-of-the-voting-age-population-for-2020">Federal Register</a>, Ohio has 1.3 million more residents of voting age than Michigan. The data also indicates Ohio historically had a larger number of registered voters than Michigan until Michigan approved same-day and automatic voter registration. </p>
<p><iframe id="rHwcm" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/rHwcm/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>According to the Michigan secretary of state’s official election results, <a href="https://mielections.us/election/results/2022GEN_CENR.html">there were 4.5 million total votes</a> in the gubernatorial election, the highest office contested in 2022. Meanwhile in Ohio, the secretary of state reported <a href="https://www.ohiosos.gov/elections/election-results-and-data/2022-official-election-results/">4.2 million total official votes</a> cast for governor. </p>
<h2>Issues may affect voter participation</h2>
<p>There is some indication that when <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9113-1">social issues that people care about</a> are on the ballot, more people vote. In 2022, Michigan had a proposal that called for adding the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/09/us/abortion-rights-ballot-proposals.html">right to abortion and contraceptive use to the state constitution</a>. That year, according to data from the Michigan secretary of state’s office, the total number of voters in the state <a href="https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/election-results-and-data">was up by 159,060</a> from 2018. Ohio, though, had ballot issues in 2022 related to <a href="https://spectrumnews1.com/oh/columbus/news/2022/09/29/issues-1-and-2-are-on-the-november-ballot--what-they-mean">setting bail for criminal defendants and prohibiting noncitizens from voting in local elections</a>. The total number of voters in <a href="https://www.ohiosos.gov/elections/election-results-and-data/">Ohio dropped by 295,466</a> between 2018 and 2022.</p>
<p>Before candidates work to mobilize and persuade voters, campaigns try to influence the pool of potential voters, acting within the rules of their states. Changes in the registration rules in Michigan, along with social issues on the ballot and other factors, may have created a different electoral environment there than exists in Ohio, where none of these changes have taken place. This suggests the possibility that writing off Ohio as a noncompetitive state may be premature.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195635/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Jackson is affiliated with the Bowling Green State Faculty Association (AAUP/AFT).</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominic D. Wells does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Voters in Michigan and Ohio once voted similarly in statewide and federal elections. Now, Michigan swings blue and Ohio is red.David Jackson, Professor of Political Science, Bowling Green State UniversityDominic D. Wells, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Bowling Green State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1960582023-03-09T14:31:04Z2023-03-09T14:31:04ZDepression, anxiety and childhood trauma: South African study explores links, prevalence and who’s most at risk<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/508890/original/file-20230208-16-mlr1kw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Africans need targeted and accessible interventions and counselling programmes.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">AJ Watt/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Mental health problems among adults are an ever-increasing <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30925-9/fulltext">public health concern</a>. These include depression, anxiety, and conditions associated with bad childhood experiences such as abuse. </p>
<p>Several factors are known to influence the development of mental illness. These include <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24917433/">anxiety</a>, <a href="https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-13-835">early</a> <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20520546/">adversity</a>, <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25789499/">socio-economic</a> <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12522017/">status</a>, and some <a href="https://ijmhs.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1752-4458-1-4">demographic</a> <a href="http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1999-76712018000400014">characteristics</a> such as where a person lives. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2022.986531/full">recent study</a> we assessed the prevalence of mental health problems among South African adults. We also explored socioeconomic and demographic associations with depression, anxiety and adverse childhood experiences. </p>
<p>We found that South Africans who were exposed to adverse experiences in early childhood had a higher risk of probable depression or probable anxiety in adulthood than people who did not face adversity in childhood. (We say “probable” because our study recorded the presence of symptoms. The respondents weren’t diagnosed by a trained mental health professional.)</p>
<p>We also found that the symptoms of mental illness were more commonly reported by people with certain demographic characteristics. Probable depression and probable anxiety were more frequently reported among adults who were: retired and older than 65 years; widowed, divorced or separated; living in metropolitan areas; and with only primary school education. The characteristics that were significant in our study tend to be associated with relative poverty. </p>
<p>This confirms what has <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33303583/">previously</a> been suggested. That <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1497743/">poverty</a> and <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17009190/">rural-urban differences</a> are associated with <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6678738/">mental health</a> risk. </p>
<p>In 2009, nearly <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3191537/">20%</a> of South African adults suffered from impaired mental health. According to a <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23890669/">2013</a> study, the prevalence of depression was highest in the Eastern Cape (<a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23890669/">31.4%</a>) – one of the country’s poorest provinces. Research done among informal settlement residents in 2021 found that nearly one in every five women reported <a href="https://www.whatworks.co.za/resources/peer-review-journal-articles/item/747-risk-factors-for-generalized-anxiety-disorder-among-young-women-and-men-in-informal-settlements-in-south-africa-a-cross-sectional-study">moderate to severe levels</a> of anxiety. And <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2981623/">more than half</a> of South African adults have been exposed to adverse experiences in childhood and adolescence.</p>
<p>The prevalence of mental illness risk varies across the provinces. The socioeconomic and demographic determinants of mental illness also vary across the provinces. These findings underscore a need for targeted and accessible interventions and counselling programmes. </p>
<h2>Mental health problems</h2>
<p>We interviewed 3,402 adults across the nine provinces of South Africa between September and October 2021. Most of the participants were under the age of 44. We used clinically validated <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20633738/">screening surveys</a> to detect symptoms of depression, anxiety and adverse childhood experiences. Respondents were asked questions about how often – in the previous two-week period – they had been bothered by problems listed in the screening survey. </p>
<p>Probable depression had five levels: minimal, mild, moderate, moderately severe and severe.</p>
<p>More than a quarter (25.7%) of respondents reported moderate to severe symptoms of probable depression. The Northern Cape province reported the highest prevalence (38.8%). The Free State province reported the lowest prevalence (14.7%). </p>
<p>The prevalence of probable depression was highest among: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>respondents 65 years or older (39% of this age group showed signs of probable depression)</p></li>
<li><p>respondents who were widowed, divorced or separated (32.6%)</p></li>
<li><p>those with only primary school education (32.1%)</p></li>
<li><p>those who were retired (30.6%)</p></li>
<li><p>respondents residing in metropolitan areas (27.0%)</p></li>
<li><p>women (26.7%) </p></li>
<li><p>those with lower household assets (26.4%).</p></li>
</ul>
<p>To estimate probable anxiety, we asked the respondents questions about how often they had experienced general anxiety symptoms. </p>
<p>Our survey suggests that 17.8% of South African respondents had probable anxiety. Once again, the Northern Cape province reported the highest prevalence (29.3%). KwaZulu-Natal province had the lowest prevalence (8.6%). </p>
<p>Probable anxiety was highest among: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>respondents aged 65 or older (22.6% of these respondents had probable anxiety)</p></li>
<li><p>the unemployed (21.9%)</p></li>
<li><p>respondents who had only completed primary school (20.4%)</p></li>
<li><p>the widowed, divorced or separated (20.4%)</p></li>
<li><p>those living in metropolitan areas (19.7%).</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Adverse childhood experiences are potentially traumatic events that occur before the age of 18 years. They can be emotional, physical or sexual abuse, or household dysfunction.</p>
<p>More than one in five respondents reported high exposure to adverse childhood events (23.6%). The Western and Eastern Cape provinces reported the highest mean scores. </p>
<p>High exposure to adverse childhood experiences was also more prevalent among respondents who: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>had only a basic level of education (35.1%)</p></li>
<li><p>were unemployed (30.8%)</p></li>
<li><p>had fewer resources (28.9%) </p></li>
<li><p>were aged 45-54 (28.2%)</p></li>
<li><p>were married or co-habiting (25.1%)</p></li>
<li><p>lived in rural settings (24.9%).</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Our findings are in line with existing research. For example the Eastern Cape – one of the poorest provinces in South Africa, with 67.3% of adults living below the <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03101/P031012021.pdf">poverty line</a> – reported the highest prevalence of adverse childhood experiences. </p>
<h2>The importance of our findings</h2>
<p>This study provides important evidence of factors linked to depression and anxiety. Our findings could help identify how these associations work, and how to intervene. </p>
<p>Overall, the study found that probable depression, probable anxiety and adverse childhood experience prevalence varied across the nine provinces. </p>
<p>The provincial breakdown of data can inform provincial service provision. </p>
<p>Reports of probable depression, probable anxiety and adverse childhood experiences were drivers. The reports differed markedly based on people’s socioeconomic and demographic characteristics like marital status, age, education attained, employment status and living circumstances. Our evidence suggests that these factors increase the frequency and extent of depression and anxiety independently of one another.</p>
<p>Probable depression and anxiety were associated with adverse childhood experiences and with each other. More than half – 58.1% – of respondents with probable depression also reported probable anxiety. </p>
<p>Our findings, therefore, suggest that reported adverse childhood experiences put people at greater risk of mental health problems in adulthood. That’s another reason to intervene in early childhood.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196058/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ashleigh Craig does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Adverse childhood experiences are associated with an increased risk of mental health problems in adulthood.Ashleigh Craig, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1968712023-02-15T13:23:22Z2023-02-15T13:23:22ZHow records of life’s milestones help solve cold cases, pinpoint health risks and allocate public resources<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510099/original/file-20230214-2190-iexpcg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C2117%2C1412&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Civil registries in the U.S. are spread across different local jurisdictions.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/several-certificate-of-vital-records-for-birth-royalty-free-image/1197564062">eric1513/iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>After 65 years, Philadelphia police announced in December 2022 that they had identified the remains of <a href="https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/investigators/after-65-years-philadelphia-police-identify-the-boy-in-the-box/3445387/">Joseph Augustus Zarelli</a>, a 4-year-old boy who was murdered in 1957. Because no one had ever come forward to reliably identify Joseph, he became “<a href="https://www.hmdb.org/m.asp?m=194953">America’s Unknown Child</a>,” a moniker that captured the tragic anonymity of his early death.</p>
<p>Recent advances in DNA analysis and forensic genealogy <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/philadelphia/news/boy-in-box-joseph-zarelli/">provided the needed breakthrough</a> to build a genetic profile that connected the boy to surviving members of his mother’s family. But linking that genetic profile to Joseph’s identity required finding his name, a piece of information stored alongside his mother’s on his nearly <a href="https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia/joseph-zarelli-boy-in-the-box-dna-genealogy-cold-case-20221216.html">70-year-old birth record</a> in the Pennsylvania Department of Health’s vital records system. </p>
<p>While the revolutionary science of genetic genealogy has received <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/philadelphia/news/boy-in-the-box-philadelphia-murder-mystery-dna-explainer/">well-earned recognition</a> for its contribution to solving this long-standing mystery, the integral role of the more staid vital records system has mostly gone unnoticed. </p>
<p>Vital records are the stalwart administrative backdrop to life’s milestone events: birth, adoption, marriage, divorce and death. When a child is born in the U.S., the parents and hospital staff complete and sign a <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/birth11-03final-acc.pdf">certificate of live birth</a> that includes nearly 60 questions about the parents, the pregnancy and the newborn. A local registrar issues a formal birth certificate upon receiving the record as proof of a live birth.</p>
<p>Other vital events follow a similar process. Collectively, the U.S. vital records system comprises <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK219884/">records of hundreds of millions of events</a> dating back to the beginning of the 20th century.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=J2RmiawAAAAJ">family demographer</a>, I use information from these vital records to understand how childbirth, marriage and divorce are changing in the United States over time. The scope and quality of these records reflect remarkable administrative coordination from the local to the national level, but examples from other countries illustrate how much more the records could yet tell us. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/E087KJy5f64?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">While DNA evidence was instrumental to identify “America’s Unknown Child,” vital records also played an important role.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Vital records mark unique events</h2>
<p>Originally, vital records were intended to publicly register events in order to <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK219870/">legally recognize</a> the status of the people involved. The two people named on a valid marriage certificate, for example, share the legal protections and obligations of marriage until death or divorce. But over time, vital records have also come to serve as proof of identity. For both purposes, the integrity of the vital records system is critical. </p>
<p>Practically speaking, the system requires a perfect symmetry between people and events. Every recorded event needs to be associated with a unique person or pair of people, in the case of marriage and divorce, and every person or pair needs to be associated with a unique recorded event. Because of this singularity, a <a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/how-apply/citizenship-evidence.html">valid birth certificate</a> is required as proof of an individual’s unique identity to obtain a Social Security card, driver’s license or passport. </p>
<p>The uniqueness of each event also underlies <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/births.htm">how birth, marriage, divorce and death rates are calculated</a>. Double-counted events will artificially inflate these rates, while uncounted events will reduce them. Valid rates are important because governments and businesses rely on accurate measures of population change for <a href="https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/NCVHS_Vital_Records_Uses_Costs_Feb_23_2018-1.pdf">planning and investment</a>. </p>
<h2>America’s local approach to vital records</h2>
<p>In the U.S., the vital records system isn’t a single entity. Rather, there is a collection of state and local vital records offices operating independently but in cooperation with the federal government. </p>
<p>Each U.S. state and territory, as well as New York City and Washington, D.C., is its own vital registration jurisdiction, amounting to <a href="https://www.naphsis.org/systems">57 areas in all</a>. And within each jurisdiction, local offices receive and process records and issue certificates. Nationally there are <a href="https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-07-99-00570.pdf">over 6,000 local registrar offices</a> issuing birth certificates in the city or county where a birth occurred. </p>
<p>In nearly all states, marriage licenses and divorce decrees are certified and filed at the courthouse in the county where the event happened. This local registration system explains why Nevada has the highest marriage rate in the nation: of the <a href="https://weddings.vegas/marriage-services/marriage-statistics/">over 77,000 marriage licenses issued</a> in 2021 in Clark County – home to Las Vegas, America’s wedding capital – more than 60,000 couples provided a home mailing address outside of Nevada.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510128/original/file-20230214-18-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Marriage license of Elvis and Priscilla Presley, with Elvis' portrait printed in the center" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510128/original/file-20230214-18-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510128/original/file-20230214-18-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510128/original/file-20230214-18-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510128/original/file-20230214-18-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510128/original/file-20230214-18-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510128/original/file-20230214-18-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510128/original/file-20230214-18-l8wspj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=596&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Couples who flocked to get married in Las Vegas on 7/7/07 got a copy of Elvis and Priscilla Presley’s marriage license.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/detail-view-of-a-copy-of-elvis-and-priscilla-presleys-las-news-photo/75259026">Ethan Miller/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This highly decentralized approach has at least two significant implications. First, because different agencies are responsible for recording different events, there is no straightforward way to assemble an administrative profile for an individual over a lifetime. This challenge is further complicated when records are stored in different jurisdictions as people move and experience events in different places. Name changes – for example, through marriage – and inconsistencies in spellings, dates or other details also potentially impede record matching.</p>
<p>Second, in the absence of a single national repository for vital records, it takes substantial coordination to produce national statistics about vital events. Currently, U.S. jurisdictions send individual-level birth and death records to the <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/index.htm">National Center for Health Statistics</a> annually, and these records provide the basis for national birth and death statistics overall, including demographic characteristics like age, sex, race and ethnicity. This coordination is costly, time-consuming and often delayed. </p>
<p>In part because of the administrative burden, <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage-divorce.htm">states stopped sending</a> detailed individual-level marriage and divorce records to the National Center for Health Statistics in 1995, and now provide only annual counts of these events. As a result, the only accessible way to examine national demographic patterns in marriage or divorce is through surveys, which are subject to nonresponse and reporting errors.</p>
<h2>Centralized approaches to vital recordkeeping</h2>
<p>In contrast to America’s decentralized system, <a href="https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/popreg/popregmethods.htm">many countries in Northern Europe</a> have centralized and integrated the collection and maintenance of administrative records related not only to vital events but also to circumstances like change in residence, employment and health care. This approach ensures that residents are <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Children/BirthRegistration/SwedenPopulationRegistration.pdf">continuously registered</a> to receive mail, vote, pay taxes, enroll in school and receive benefits such as housing subsidies at the correct address. It also means that public agencies have full information about their population to inform planning and budgeting.</p>
<p>A centralized system also facilitates rapid turnaround of population statistics. At peak periods during the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the U.S. <a href="https://covidtracking.com/analysis-updates/how-lagging-death-counts-muddied-our-view-of-the-pandemic">lagged behind many other countries</a> in estimating national death rates as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention awaited reported counts from public health offices in individual states overwhelmed by the pace and volume of deaths. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510118/original/file-20230214-28-1q5c7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Close-up of infant's footprints on birth certificate" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510118/original/file-20230214-28-1q5c7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/510118/original/file-20230214-28-1q5c7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510118/original/file-20230214-28-1q5c7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510118/original/file-20230214-28-1q5c7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510118/original/file-20230214-28-1q5c7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510118/original/file-20230214-28-1q5c7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/510118/original/file-20230214-28-1q5c7c.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Vital records like birth certificates document your singularity as an individual.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/infants-footprints-on-birth-certificate-royalty-free-image/79250940">Tetra images/Getty Images Plus</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Vital records integrated with population register data also allow
social scientists, epidemiologists and other researchers to use deidentified linked records to study how <a href="https://ncrr.au.dk/danish-registers">early life conditions shape an individual’s life over time</a>. Using linked records from the Netherlands, for example, researchers have demonstrated that children who were in utero <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/09603123.2021.1888894">during the 1944 Dutch famine</a> were more likely to have health problems throughout their lives than those born earlier or later.</p>
<p>The U.S. has made some progress toward developing a more centralized and integrated vital records system. A <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/linked-birth.htm">national file linking births to infant deaths</a> has helped scientists study how risk factors like preterm birth and low birth weight contribute to infant mortality. And public health and medical research studies can obtain cause of death information for participants in the <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ndi/index.htm">National Death Index</a>, a compilation over 100 million death records since 1979. </p>
<p>But further progress is unlikely to happen any time soon. The current system, while cumbersome and incomplete, is well established and reliable. And at a time when the majority of Americans <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/06/06/americans-views-of-government-decades-of-distrust-enduring-support-for-its-role/">lack trust in government</a>, there is little political will or public enthusiasm for a change. </p>
<p>For Joseph Zarelli, the durability of the local vital records system in Philadelphia was enough to answer a question that went unanswered for 65 years: A certificate of live birth registered in 1953 reconnected America’s Unknown Child to his name.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/196871/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paula Fomby receives funding from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. </span></em></p>Vital records document the birth, death, marriage and divorce of every individual. A more centralized system in the US could help public health researchers better study pandemics and disease.Paula Fomby, Professor of Sociology and Research Associate in Population Studies, University of PennsylvaniaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1980562023-01-18T16:08:18Z2023-01-18T16:08:18ZWhy China’s shrinking population is a big deal – counting the social, economic and political costs of an aging, smaller society<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505050/original/file-20230118-14-dfw8cm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3995%2C2667&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will an aging, shrinking population put the brakes on economic growth?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-elderly-man-rides-a-tricycle-on-a-street-in-hangzhou-news-photo/1246295312?phrase=china%20population&adppopup=true">CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Throughout much of recorded human history, China has <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_population.htm">boasted the largest population in the world</a> – and until recently, by some margin.</p>
<p>So news that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-population-shrinks-first-time-since-1961-2023-01-17/">Chinese population is now in decline</a>, and will sometime later this year be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-set-overtake-china-worlds-most-populous-nation-2023-01-17/">surpassed by that of India</a>, is big news even if long predicted. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=5098">scholar of Chinese demographics</a>, I know that the figures released by Chinese government on Jan. 17, 2023, showing that for the <a href="https://www.asiaone.com/china/chinas-population-shrinks-first-time-1961">first time in six decades</a>, deaths in the previous year outnumbered births is no mere blip. While that previous year of shrinkage, 1961 – during the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/key_people_events/html/3.stm">Great Leap Forward</a> economic failure, in which <a href="https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/chinas-great-leap-forward/#:%7E:text=From%201960%E2%80%931962%2C%20an%20estimated,this%20disaster%20was%20largely%20preventable.">an estimated 30 million people died of starvation</a> – represented a deviation from the trend, 2022 is a pivot. It is the onset of what is likely to be a long-term decline. By the end of the century, the Chinese population is <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/">expected to shrink by 45%</a>, according to the United Nations. And that is under the assumption that China maintains its current fertility rate of around 1.3 children per couple, which it may not.</p>
<p><iframe id="jbJAh" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/jbJAh/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>This decline in numbers will spur a trend that already concerns demographers in China: a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(22)02410-2">rapidly aging society</a>. By 2040, around a quarter of the Chinese population is <a href="https://globalcoalitiononaging.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/China%E2%80%99s-Demographic-Outlook.pdf">predicted to be over the age of 65</a>.</p>
<p>In short, this is a seismic shift. It will have huge symbolic and substantive impacts on China in three main areas. </p>
<h2>Economy</h2>
<p>In the space of 40 years, China has largely completed a historic transformation from an agrarian economy to one <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/april-2016/chinas-rapid-rise-from-backward-agrarian-society-to-industrial-powerhouse-in-just-35-years">based on manufacturing and the service industry</a>. This has been accompanied by <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/january/income-living-standards-china">increases in the standard of living and income levels</a>. But the Chinese government has long recognized that the country can no longer rely on the labor-intensive economic growth model of the past. Technological advances and competition from countries that can provide a cheaper workforce such as Vietnam and India have rendered this old model largely obsolete.</p>
<p>This historical turning point in China’s population trend serves as a further wake-up call to move the country’s model more quickly to a post-manufacturing, post-industrial economy – an aging, shrinking population does not fit the purposes of a labor-intensive economic model.</p>
<p>As to what it means for China’s economy, and <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2023/01/17/china-population-decline-birth-rate-global-economy-impact/11066270002/">that of the world</a>, population decline and an aging society will certainly provide Beijing with short-term and long-term challenges. In short, it means there will be fewer workers able to feed the economy and spur further economic growth on one side of the ledger; on the other, a growing post-work population will need potentially costly support.</p>
<p>It is perhaps no coincidence then that 2022, as well as being a pivotal year for China in terms of demographics, also saw one of the worst economic performances <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-economy-slows-sharply-q4-2022-growth-one-worst-record-2023-01-17/">the country has experienced since 1976</a>, according to data released on Jan. 17.</p>
<h2>Society</h2>
<p>The rising share of elderly people in China’s population is more than an economic issue – it will also reshape Chinese society. Many of these elderly people only have one child, due to the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3135510/chinas-one-child-policy-what-was-it-and-what-impact-did-it">one-child policy</a> in place for three and a half decades <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-chinas-one-child-policy/">before being relaxed in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>The large number of aging parents with only one child to rely on for support will likely impose severe constraints – not least for the elderly parents, who will need financial support. They will also need emotional and social support for longer as a result of <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/life-expectancy">extended life expectancy</a>.</p>
<p>It will also impose constraints on those children themselves, who will need to fulfill obligations to their career, provide for their own children and support their elderly parents simultaneously.</p>
<p>Responsibility will fall on the Chinese government to provide adequate health care and pensions. But unlike in Western democracies that have by now had many decades to develop social safety nets, the speed of the demographic and economic change in China has meant that Beijing struggled to keep pace.</p>
<p>As China’s economy <a href="https://theconversation.com/jiang-zemin-propelled-chinas-economic-rise-in-the-world-leaving-his-successors-to-deal-with-the-massive-inequality-that-followed-195675">underwent rapid growth after 2000</a>, the Chinese government responded by investing tremendously in <a href="https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ752324.pdf">education</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/1475-9276-12-40">health care facilities</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5301df5d4.pdf">extending universal pension coverage</a>. But the demographic shift was so rapid that it meant that political reforms to improve the safety net were always playing catch-up. Even with the vast expansion in coverage, the country’s health care system is still highly inefficient, unequally distributed and inadequate given the growing need.</p>
<p>Similarly, social pension systems are <a href="https://doi.org//10.1016/j.jeoa.2019.100194">highly segmented and unequally distributed</a>.</p>
<h2>Politics</h2>
<p>How the Chinese government responds to the challenges presented by this dramatic demographic shift will be key. Failure to live up to the expectations of the public in its response could result in a crisis for the Chinese Communist Party, whose legitimacy is tied closely to economic growth. Any economic decline could have severe consequences for the Chinese Communist Party. It will also be judged on how well the state is able to fix its social support system.</p>
<p>Indeed, there is already a strong case to be made that the Chinese government has moved too slowly. The one-child policy that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-costs-and-benefits-of-chinas-one-child-policy-20467">played a significant role</a> in the slowing growth, and now decline, in population was a government policy for more than three decades. It has been known since the 1990s that <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=CN">the Chinese fertility rate was too low</a> to sustain current population numbers. Yet it was only in 2016 that Beijing acted and relaxed the policy to allow more couples to have a second, and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/05/31/1001846355/confronted-by-aging-population-china-allows-couples-to-have-three-children">then in 2021 a third</a>, child.</p>
<p>This action to spur population growth, or at least slow its decline, came too late to prevent China from soon losing its crown as the world’s largest nation. Loss of prestige is one thing though, the political impact of any economic downturn resulting from a shrinking population is quite another.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-population-is-now-inexorably-shrinking-bringing-forward-the-day-the-planets-population-turns-down-198061">China's population is now inexorably shrinking, bringing forward the day the planet's population turns down</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198056/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Feng Wang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>For the first time since 1961, deaths in China have outpaced births – and unlike that one-year decline, the downward trend is likely to continue.Feng Wang, Professor of Sociology, University of California, IrvineLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1972632023-01-09T13:17:24Z2023-01-09T13:17:24ZIsrael’s new hard-line government has made headlines – the bigger demographic changes that caused it, not so much<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503373/original/file-20230106-11-750vf8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=3%2C3%2C1019%2C679&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People wait at a bus stop at the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-wait-at-a-bus-stop-at-the-mahane-yehuda-market-on-news-photo/1400881265?phrase=jerusalem%20shop&adppopup=true">Alexi Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-stunning-political-comeback-for-israels-netanyahu-may-give-way-to-governing-nightmare-ahead-193892">new goverment</a> is <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israel-swears-in-netanyahu-as-prime-minister-most-right-wing-government-in-countrys-history">the most right-wing and religious leadership</a> the country has had in the 75 years of its existence, as many observers have <a href="https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/12/29/israels-new-government-is-the-most-right-wing-ever">pointed out</a>. And this style of leadership may last because it represents the next generation of Israelis. </p>
<p>You don’t have to look far to see that the religiously observant Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox sectors of Israel’s population are growing quickly. The new <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gamliel-and-porush-approved-as-ministers-bringing-cabinet-to-31-members/">minister of Jerusalem affairs</a> has 12 children. The <a href="https://zionutdatit.org.il/en/-/strock-2/">minister of national missions</a> – one of the few women in the cabinet – has 11, the housing minister 10, the interior minister nine, the <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/1672257176-portrait-bezalel-smotrich-the-controversial-and-feared-ally-of-israel-s-netanyahu">finance minister</a> and the <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/meet-the-new-mk-ofir-sofer-urp-587561">minister of immigration</a> have seven each and the <a href="https://www.jewishpress.com/news/israel/religious-secular-in-israel-israel/ben-gvir-pulls-a-coup-recruiting-rabbi-shmuel-eliyahus-son/2022/08/22/">minister of heritage</a> has six.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/haredi-population-growing-twice-as-fast-as-total-israeli-population-report/">rapid growth</a> of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox population has profound consequences for the rest of society, especially Israel’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9780857288073.005">delicate status quo</a> between religion and secularism. Moreover, ultra-Orthodox voters and politicians are increasingly allied with parties from another religious demographic whose influence is growing: Orthodox nationalists.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.american.edu/cas/faculty/mbrenner.cfm">a professor of Israel Studies</a>, I would argue that Israel’s future may look less like the cosmopolitan, secular Tel Aviv than the nearby <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/bnei-brak">ultra-Orthodox city of Bnei Brak</a> or one of the satellite towns outside Jerusalem that are centers of Orthodox nationalism.</p>
<h2>Four tribes</h2>
<p>In 2015, then-President Reuven Rivlin gave <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ci5zZi5Zpb0">a famous speech</a> in which he called Israel a society of “four tribes.” </p>
<p>There are secular or moderately religious Jews, who constituted the vast majority of the country’s founders and until today make up most of its political, economic and cultural elite. Though estimates vary, around half of Israel’s Jewish population <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b1ykzxpzs">consider themselves secular</a>, and 19% are marginally observant.</p>
<p>Then there is the group usually called National Religious, or Religious Zionist. These Israelis combine Orthodox Judaism with commitment to political Zionism, and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/national-religious-camps-path-from-denying-settlements-to-merging-with-radicals/">now constitute the core</a> of the settler movement in the West Bank. They constitute <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/as-many-as-one-fifth-of-israeli-jews-identify-as-national-religious-study-finds-389291">around 20%</a> of Israel’s Jewish population, or about 15% of its total population.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A large group of men standing in rows concentrate in prayer." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503374/original/file-20230106-19-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503374/original/file-20230106-19-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503374/original/file-20230106-19-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503374/original/file-20230106-19-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=382&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503374/original/file-20230106-19-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503374/original/file-20230106-19-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503374/original/file-20230106-19-dl05sk.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=480&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Hard-line national religious Israeli Jews attend a mass prayer at the Western Wall in 2014 against Israeli-Palestinian talks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/hardline-national-religious-israeli-jews-attend-a-mass-at-news-photo/465908865?phrase=%22national%20religious%22%20israel&adppopup=true">Ahmad Gharabli/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>A third group is called Haredim, or ultra-Orthodox in English. Unlike other Orthodox Jews, who are integrated into mainstream neighborhoods and workplaces, many Haredi groups try to separate themselves <a href="https://www.academicstudiespress.com/jewishidentities/a-well-worn-tallis-for-a-new-ceremony-trends-in-israeli-haredi-culture">to an extent</a> from secular society. Originally, they <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/ultra-orthodox-anti-zionist/">did not support</a> the creation of the State of Israel, which they believed should come about only through the Messiah. Today, however, Haredi communities are <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-religion-jerusalem-israel-29fa429e432e87bdb2f62f7a5a1d95d7">politically associated</a> with right-wing parties.</p>
<p>The fourth group Rivlin mentioned are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/palestinian-arab-israeli-citizens-identity/2021/06/10/2591ef56-c861-11eb-8708-64991f2acf28_story.html">Israeli Arabs</a>, or as they increasingly call themselves, Palestinian citizens of Israel.</p>
<p>These four groups rarely interact in everyday life. Each has its own school system, and they marry and socialize within each other – which Rivlin warned could weaken the country. </p>
<h2>Haredim today</h2>
<p>Over time, there has been a population shift between the four sectors. When Rivlin <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ci5zZi5Zpb0">delivered his speech</a> in 2015, he reported that for the first time, most of Israel’s first graders were not admitted to secular Jewish schools, but to one of the three other systems.</p>
<p>The ultra-Orthodox population is growing quickly. Haredi families have an average of about <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/articles/25385">seven children</a>, compared with <a href="https://mercatornet.com/israel-natalism-and-nationalism/80954/">just three</a> in the general population and two among secular Jews. According to a recent study of the Israel Democracy Institute, the ultra-Orthodox sector constitutes 13.5% of Israel’s population today and will <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/culture/article-726394">rise to 16%</a> by the end of the decade, with further increases expected. They already constitute about <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/articles/47009">a quarter</a> of all Jewish pupils in Israel’s schools today.</p>
<p>These demographic changes pose challenges for Israel’s society and economy. For example, the poverty rate among the ultra-Orthodox is <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/culture/article-726394">twice as high</a> as among other Israelis due to a culture that emphasizes intensive religious study over paid employment, and schools that prize religious learning over secular subjects. The unemployment rate among Haredi men is almost 47%, compared to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-unemployment-rate-drops-to-its-lowest-since-onset-of-covid/">less than 5%</a> in the total population.</p>
<p>Unlike most other Jewish Israelis, most Haredi youth do not serve in the army, which is based on exemptions the secular founder of the state, David Ben-Gurion, <a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/rules-of-engagement">made 75 years ago</a>. At the time, the ultra-Orthodox were a marginal group, and Ben-Gurion was convinced they would remain so.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Teenage boys in white shirts and black slacks look at a political poster." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503375/original/file-20230106-26-1shn4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/503375/original/file-20230106-26-1shn4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503375/original/file-20230106-26-1shn4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503375/original/file-20230106-26-1shn4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503375/original/file-20230106-26-1shn4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503375/original/file-20230106-26-1shn4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/503375/original/file-20230106-26-1shn4k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A poster showing Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu after a 2022 campaign event in Bnei Brak, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-look-at-the-likud-party-campaign-modified-truck-news-photo/1244330524?phrase=bnei%20brak&adppopup=true">Amir Levy/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Young Arab men and women are not required to serve in the army, either. Added to the number of Haredi youth, this means that <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2019-09-03/ty-article/.premium/should-israel-scrap-its-peoples-army-model/0000017f-f264-da6f-a77f-fa6e09bd0000">almost half</a> of Israel’s eligible population are not drafted today.</p>
<h2>National Religious</h2>
<p>The second-fastest growing “tribe” in Israel, <a href="https://mercatornet.com/israel-natalism-and-nationalism/80954/">based on birth rate</a> – with families of four children, on average – are the Orthodox National Religious, whose current political leaders represent the settlers of the West Bank. </p>
<p>Religious voters who support these groups often prioritize Israel’s character as a Jewish state over its character as <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2018/7/31/17623978/israel-jewish-nation-state-law-bill-explained-apartheid-netanyahu-democracy">a liberal democracy</a>. For example, 65% of Jewish Israelis who identify as “religious” and 89% of ultra-Orthodox say that Jewish law should take precedence over democratic principles in the case of a contradiction, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/">according to a Pew survey</a>.</p>
<p>National Religious parties, which have proved popular with <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgymww/israel-elections-right-wing-ben-gvir">young voters</a>, were the real surprise winner of the November 2022 election – particularly their more radicalized leadership. Whereas former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, for example, was ready to enter a coalition with left-wing and Arab partners, <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgymww/israel-elections-right-wing-ben-gvir">new leaders</a> Bezalel Smotrich and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-01-03/ty-article/.premium/ben-gvir-visits-the-temple-mount/00000185-760e-de47-afdf-f6bf34c40000?utm_source=mailchimp&utm_medium=Content&utm_campaign=daily-brief&utm_content=7a5ff0e961">Itamar Ben-Gvir</a> reject any cooperation with parties left of center and would not be welcome by those parties, anyway.</p>
<h2>Political consequences</h2>
<p>What both religious sectors have in common is a growing outspokenness about making Israeli society more in line with Orthodox principles. For example, Israel is the most LGBTQ-friendly state in the Middle East, yet many government ministers and their spiritual leaders <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/video/israeli-school-officials-fear-anti-173021187.html">have used derogatory language</a> toward the LGBTQ community. There have been calls to permit <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/orthodox-parties-demand-legalization-of-gender-segregated-public-events/">separate seating</a> for men and women at public events and to allow doctors <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-discrimination-benjamin-netanyahu-lgbtq-people-78bcd332053aa26c3c9949eac2264d1c">to refuse patients</a> whom they do not want to treat on religious grounds. </p>
<p>These shifts have the potential to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2022/12/28/hundreds-us-rabbis-protest-new-israeli-government-public-letter/">alienate American Jews</a> who are, apart from Israelis, the largest Jewish community in the world but mainly <a href="https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/the-american-jewish-community-will-look-different-in-50-years">identify with the more liberal Reform or Conservative movements</a>.</p>
<p>The different types of Orthodox Jews have come a long way from rejecting political Zionism or from keeping religion out of politics. Smotrich, the National Zionist new minister of transportation, has openly stated that his ideal is <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-says-israel-should-follow-torah-law-again-drawing-ire-of-liberman">a Torah state</a>, meaning a Jewish state founded on Jewish religious laws.</p>
<p>His supporters are still far from fulfilling that dream, but well aware that the country’s demographic changes may be on their side – a challenge to Israel’s delicate status quo. Overcoming the gaps in Israel’s increasingly segmented society will require serious bridge-building efforts on both sides – even more than at the time of Rivlin’s warning.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197263/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Brenner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Two religiously observant groups of Jews in Israel, the ultra-Orthodox and Religious Zionists, are increasingly acting as political allies. The consequences could be profound.Michael Brenner, Professor of Jewish History and Culture at Ludwig Maximilian University and Abensohn Chair in Israel Studies, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1950632022-12-08T13:37:31Z2022-12-08T13:37:31ZClimate change is not what South Africans see as their main problem: a survey breaks it down<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/499313/original/file-20221206-11-5skv9v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Climate change is slowly getting on the political agenda in Africa</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Gallo Images via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Climate change is a major threat to <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/srccl/chapter/chapter-5/">food production</a>, and is <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html">displacing people</a> and increasing the risks to <a href="https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health#:%7E:text=Climate%20change%20is%20already%20impacting,diseases%2C%20and%20mental%20health%20issues.">health</a> globally. Addressing climate change requires vast resources, including <a href="https://unfccc.int/topics/introduction-to-climate-finance">financial</a> investment to decarbonise economies and produce food sustainably. Above all, it requires international cooperation and commitment – based on an accurate understanding of the relevant issues.</p>
<p>However, less developed countries also have competing challenges. In South Africa, for example, <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=739&id=1">poverty</a>, inequality, <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-general-bheki-cele-quarter-two-crime-statistics-20222023-23-nov-2022-0000">violence</a> and access to education and <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15407">employment</a> tend to overshadow climate change efforts.</p>
<p>In 2022, the South African government started thinking about how to incorporate environmental challenges in the <a href="https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/south-africa-aims-to-factor-climate-related-spending-into-budget-2022-05-30">national budget</a> using evidence from 11 ongoing projects. This is an important step towards treating climate change as a national priority. However, at present other socioeconomic challenges plaguing the population are at the centre of the government’s national spending.</p>
<p>This is understandable. In South Africa, <a href="https://journals.co.za/doi/pdf/10.7196/SAMJ.2016.v106i12.12126">one in every four women</a> aged 18–49 years old has experienced violence from an intimate partner. HIV prevalence is at <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022021.pdf#page=23">13.5%</a> and current unemployment is the highest in many years at <a href="https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=15685#:%7E:text=The%20official%20unemployment%20rate%20was,the%20second%20quarter%20of%202022">33.9%</a>. South Africans regard these as urgent issues warranting immediate attention. They are reflected in the country’s <a href="https://www.gov.za/issues/key-issues">National Development Plan</a>.</p>
<p>All these concerns are linked, however. Climate change poses an additional risk to current and future endeavours to protect livelihoods, grow the economy, and prevent disease and loss of life. It’s therefore important to know what the public thinks about environmental issues and the value of addressing them.</p>
<p>This was the motivation for my study of the attitudes of South Africans towards environmental issues in relation to competing socioeconomic challenges.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0376835X.2022.2142520?journalCode=cdsa20">study</a> used the 2017 <a href="https://hsrc.ac.za/special-projects/sasas/">South African Social Attitudes Survey</a> of a nationally representative sample of people. In the survey, 3,173 adults chose what they saw as the three most important challenges in South Africa at the time. Environmental issues were on the list they could choose from.</p>
<p>Environmental issues did not appear in the top 10 most important challenges they identified. Only 0.09% of the respondents reported environmental issues as the most important priority in the country. The environment ranked 17th among respondents’ top priorities. The highest ranked issues were unemployment, HIV and crime. </p>
<p>Analysis of responses revealed that 77.62% of respondents had negative attitudes towards the environment and 22.37% had positive attitudes.</p>
<p>The survey results suggest that South Africans would rather see efforts go into tackling other challenges – even though climate change will intensify those challenges. The results also suggest where efforts to change perceptions could focus. </p>
<p>The survey was carried out five years ago and the COVID-19 pandemic has since had a huge impact on people’s lives. So it is possible that if asked today, climate concerns might rank even lower in the list of priorities for the South African population. </p>
<h2>Attitudes and perceptions about environmental concerns</h2>
<p>The study population were adults, aged 16 years and older, of both sexes and all races, geographical locations and nationalities. Results were controlled for these demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.</p>
<p>Participants responded to three questions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>what they saw as South Africa’s three most important challenges (in order)</p></li>
<li><p>whether “people’s taxes” were being used for the environment</p></li>
<li><p>whether more taxes should be spent on the environment.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>Out of all the respondents, 65% listed unemployment (1st), 15% stated HIV/AIDS (2nd) and 11% cited crime and safety (3rd) as the top three challenges in the country. Only 0.09% of the respondents listed the environment as their top priority. This last group of respondents were all male.</p>
<p>Environmental issues did not appear in the top 10 of the second or third most important challenges either. </p>
<p>The list of second most important priorities was led by: crime and safety; service provision; corruption. Here, environment came in at 15th (1.04%). Of those who ranked environment 2nd, 69% were female.</p>
<p>The list of third most important issues was dominated by: poverty; corruption; education. Environment was 10th (3.18%), with a more even mix of male and female.</p>
<p>Participants who ranked social challenges as a main priority were also more likely to have positive attitudes towards environmental challenges. This shows there is a common group within the population that could be targeted for environmental and social change movements.</p>
<p>Among respondents who believed that more tax money should be spent on the environment, 62.28% were male and 37.72% female.</p>
<p>Males and urban residents were more likely to have negative attitudes to environmental issues than females and rural residents. </p>
<p>The groups that were inclined to be negative about the environment were: older than 16-19; female; black; less educated; unemployed. </p>
<p>The finding that females do not prioritise environmental challenges as much as males is an opportunity to inform females about the immediate benefits that climate change strategies could present to the care and daily functioning of their households. About <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1114301/distribution-of-female-headed-households-in-south-africa-by-province/">42% of households</a> in South Africa are headed by females. </p>
<h2>Implications for climate change efforts</h2>
<p>These results tell us that economic, social and health competing interests currently overshadow environmental interests in South Africa. This is justifiable at present, but many of these issues will be exacerbated by climate change in the future, adding another challenge to the country’s development prospects. </p>
<p>Second, efforts to reduce the competing challenges could create an opportunity for more awareness around environmental change and development concerns. </p>
<p>Strategies that focus on including females and rural residents, among others, should be developed to inform and assist the public to reduce carbon footprints and create sustainable technologies. </p>
<p>In doing so, there are two important factors to remember. Interventions should not cost the public more and make the population more vulnerable. And the solutions sought and information communicated should be suited to the population’s livelihoods, food production and consumption needs, and economies. That is, an African led strategy and solution is required.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/195063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nicole De Wet- Billings receives funding from the DST-NRF Center of Excellence in Human Development. </span></em></p>South Africans would rather see efforts go into tackling other challenges – but climate change will intensify those challenges.Nicole De Wet- Billings, Senior Lecturer, Demography and Population Studies, Schools of Social Sciences and Public Health, University of the WitwatersrandLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1909072022-11-15T05:39:24Z2022-11-15T05:39:24ZYou are now one of 8 billion humans alive today. Let’s talk overpopulation – and why low income countries aren’t the issue<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495242/original/file-20221115-26-vovka5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=44%2C35%2C5946%2C3332&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Today is the Day of Eight Billion, according to the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/dayof8billion#:%7E:text=Day%20of%20Eight%20Billion&text=On%2015%20November%202022%2C%20the,a%20milestone%20in%20human%20development">United Nations</a>.</p>
<p>That’s an incredible number of humans, considering our population was around 2.5 billion in 1950. Watching our numbers <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/">tick over</a> milestones can <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-should-be-wary-of-blaming-overpopulation-for-the-climate-crisis-130709">provoke anxiety</a>. Do we have enough food? What does this mean for nature? Are more humans a catastrophe for climate change? </p>
<p>The answers are counterintuitive. Because rich countries use vastly more <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-020-0579-8">resources and energy</a>, greening and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0006320722002518">reducing consumption</a> in these countries is more effective and equitable than calling for population control in low income nations. Fertility rates in most of the world have fallen sharply. As countries get richer, they tend to have fewer children. </p>
<p>We can choose to adequately and equitably feed a population of <a href="https://research.wri.org/wrr-food">10 billion by 2050</a> – even as we reduce or eliminate global greenhouse gas emissions and staunch biodiversity loss.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495289/original/file-20221115-12-yqy903.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495289/original/file-20221115-12-yqy903.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495289/original/file-20221115-12-yqy903.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495289/original/file-20221115-12-yqy903.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495289/original/file-20221115-12-yqy903.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495289/original/file-20221115-12-yqy903.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495289/original/file-20221115-12-yqy903.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">For most high income countries, population growth has fallen below the replacement rate of 2.1 children.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Unsplash.com</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why is the world’s population still growing?</h2>
<p>We hit 7 billion people just 11 years ago, in October 2011, and 6 billion in October 1999. And we’re still growing – the UN predicts 9.7 billion humans by 2050 before potentially topping out at 10.3 billion at the end of the century. But <a href="https://vizhub.healthdata.org/population-forecast/">modelling</a> by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts the population peak much earlier, in 2064, and falling below 9 billion by century’s end. </p>
<p>Why is it still growing? Momentum. The number of women entering child-bearing age is growing, even as the average number of children each woman is having falls. Plus, we are generally living longer. </p>
<p>In 1950, the world’s population was growing at almost 2% a year. That growth rate is now less than 1%, and <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/WLD/world/population">predicted to keep falling</a>. There’s little we can do to change population trends. Researchers have found even if we introduced harsh one-child policies worldwide, our population trajectories <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1410465111">would not change</a> markedly. </p>
<p>In many ways, the story of population growth is evidence of improvement. Better farming techniques and better medicine made the population boom possible. And slowing population growth has come from falling rates of poverty, as well as better health and education systems, especially for women. </p>
<p>Increased gender equality and women’s empowerment have also helped. Put simply, if women can choose their own paths, they still have children – just fewer of them. That’s why climate solutions group Project Drawdown ranks female education and family planning as <a href="https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-02-24/educating-girls-is-more-effective-in-the-climate-emergency-than-many-green-technologies/">one of the top ways</a> to tackle climate change. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492921/original/file-20221102-26714-8nk68c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Chart of world population in numbers and growth rate" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492921/original/file-20221102-26714-8nk68c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/492921/original/file-20221102-26714-8nk68c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492921/original/file-20221102-26714-8nk68c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492921/original/file-20221102-26714-8nk68c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=355&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492921/original/file-20221102-26714-8nk68c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492921/original/file-20221102-26714-8nk68c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/492921/original/file-20221102-26714-8nk68c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=446&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trends in world population (top) and rate of population growth (bottom)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Macrotrends.net</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Should we worry about overpopulation at all?</h2>
<p>You are now one of 8,000,000,000 humans alive today. How should we feel about this?</p>
<p>The modern fear of overpopulation has old roots. In 1798, Reverend Thomas Malthus warned population grows exponentially while food supply does not. Close to two centuries later, Paul and Anne Erlich’s 1968 book The Population Bomb triggered a new wave of concern. As our numbers skyrocketed, they argued, we would inevitably hit a Malthusian cliff and run out of food. Famine and war would follow. It didn’t happen. </p>
<p>What resulted was inhumane population control policies. The book – replete with racially charged passages about a crowded Delhi “slum” – <a href="https://pulitzercenter.org/projects/india-grappling-legacy-population-bomb">directly influenced</a> India’s 1970s forced sterilisation policies. China’s notorious one-child policy emerged from similar concerns. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/overpopulation-and-the-environment-three-ideas-on-how-to-discuss-it-in-a-sensitive-way-98361">'Overpopulation' and the environment: three ideas on how to discuss it in a sensitive way</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Low- or middle-income countries are most often called on to tackle overpopulation. And the people calling for action tend to be from high-income, high-consumption countries. Even David Attenborough <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/10/david-attenborough-warns-planet-cant-cope-with-overpopulation/">is concerned</a>. </p>
<p>Recent calls by Western conservation researchers <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006320722001999?casa_token=OcLNMonV7L0AAAAA:LXiqCy58-IRs3ve_FyVRNIvNV7M243kkWlThLMAwuf6DxttW7LSHsy5MTrX5prYmExpPoT7dzQ">to tackle</a> environmental degradation by slowing population growth repeat the same issue, focusing on the parts of the world where populations are still growing strongly – sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and some Asian countries. </p>
<p>People from lower income countries reject these calls. Pakistani academic Adil Najam <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40230082">has observed</a> these countries are “weary of international population policy in the name of the environment.” </p>
<p>Overall, the world’s wealthiest 1% <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-020-0579-8">account for 15%</a> of the world’s carbon emissions. That’s more than double the emissions of the poorest 50% of the planet – who are the most vulnerable to climate change. </p>
<p>Prince William, for instance, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/prince-william-blames-african-population-growth-for-wildlife-loss-d7rtjlp3d">has linked</a> African population growth to wildlife loss – even though he has three children and comes from a family with a carbon footprint <a href="https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/09/10/from-plastics-to-planes-how-has-the-planet-changed-in-queen-elizabeth-iis-70-years-on-the-#:%7E:text=According%20to%20their%20research%2C%20the,just%2010%20tonnes%20per%20year">almost 1,600 times</a> higher than the average Nigerian family. </p>
<p>What about saving wildlife? Again, a mirror may be useful here. It turns out demand from rich countries is the single largest driver of biodiversity loss globally. How? Your beef burger may have been made possible by burning the Amazon for pasture for cows, as well as many other <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature11145">global supply chain issues</a>. Rich countries like Australia are also <a href="https://conbio.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/csp2.117">notoriously bad</a> at protecting their own wildlife from agriculture and land clearing. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495257/original/file-20221115-20-pt3tsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="clearing for palm oil" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495257/original/file-20221115-20-pt3tsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/495257/original/file-20221115-20-pt3tsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495257/original/file-20221115-20-pt3tsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495257/original/file-20221115-20-pt3tsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495257/original/file-20221115-20-pt3tsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495257/original/file-20221115-20-pt3tsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/495257/original/file-20221115-20-pt3tsq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Destroying rainforest is bad - but what if it’s being destroyed to make beef or palm oil for richer countries, as in this photo of clearing for oil palms in South-East Asia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This is not to say population growth in lower income countries isn’t worth discussing. While many countries have seen their populations taper off naturally as they get wealthier, countries like Nigeria are showing <a href="https://theconversation.com/nigerias-large-youthful-population-could-be-an-asset-or-a-burden-186574">signs of strain</a> from very fast population growth. Many young Nigerians move to cities seeking opportunities, but infrastructure and job creation has not kept pace. </p>
<p>For Western environmentalists and policymakers, however, it would be better to shift away from a blame mentality and tackle <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-environ-102017-025949">drivers of inequality</a> between and within nations. These <a href="https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/">include</a> support for family planning, removing barriers to girls’ education, better regulation of global financial markets, reduced transaction costs for global remittances, and safe migration for people seeking work or refuge in higher income countries.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491217/original/file-20221023-24525-aow3uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491217/original/file-20221023-24525-aow3uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/491217/original/file-20221023-24525-aow3uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491217/original/file-20221023-24525-aow3uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491217/original/file-20221023-24525-aow3uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=291&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491217/original/file-20221023-24525-aow3uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491217/original/file-20221023-24525-aow3uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/491217/original/file-20221023-24525-aow3uz.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=366&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This graph shows what fair use of the world’s resources would look like (green line) and what proportion is actually used by high and low income countries.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://goodlife.leeds.ac.uk/related-research/ecological-breakdown/">Goodlife.leeds.ac.uk</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As we pass the eight billion mark, let’s reconsider our reaction. Blaming low-consumption, high-population growth countries for environmental issues ignores our role. Worse, it takes our attention away from the real work ahead of transforming society and reducing our collective impact on the planet. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-we-should-be-wary-of-blaming-overpopulation-for-the-climate-crisis-130709">Why we should be wary of blaming 'overpopulation' for the climate crisis</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190907/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Selinske receives funding from the Australian Research Council and is a board member of the Society for Conservation Biology's Social Science Working Group.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Leejiah Dorward is a researcher at Bangor University and receives funding from the European Research Council</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul Barnes has received funding from the UK Natural Environment Research Council . He is affiliated with The Zoological Society of London. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephanie Brittain is a researcher at the University of Oxford. She receives funding from the German government's international Climate Initiative and is a board member of the Society for Conservation Biology's Social Science Working Group.</span></em></p>For many environmentalists, overpopulation is a real concern. But the planet will benefit more from tackling overconsumption by rich countries.Matthew Selinske, Senior research fellow, RMIT UniversityLeejiah Dorward, Postdoctoral research associate, Bangor UniversityPaul Barnes, Visiting researcher, UCLStephanie Brittain, Conservation scientist, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1940672022-11-14T13:07:18Z2022-11-14T13:07:18ZAs the 8 billionth person is born, here’s how Africa will shape the future of the planet’s population<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/494071/original/file-20221108-26-rjbg6o.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In mid-November 2022 the eight billionth person will be born, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/dayof8billion#:%7E:text=On%2015%20November%202022%2C%20the,nutrition%2C%20personal%20hygiene%20and%20medicine">according to the United Nations</a>. In its analysis of this milestone, the UN makes two key observations. The first is that the global population has been expanding at its slowest rate since 1950. The growth rate dropped below 1% in 2020, a trend that is likely to continue. The second is that the growth in population has been due to the gradual increase in human lifespan owing to improvements in public health, nutrition, personal hygiene and medicine. It’s also the result of high and persistent levels of fertility in some countries. According to the UN, just eight countries are <a href="https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-population-reach-8-billion-15-november-2022">expected</a> to be behind 50% of the population growth over the next 30 years. Five are in Africa: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tanzania. Demographers Akanni Akinyemi, Jacques Emina and Esther Dungumaro unpack these dynamics.</em></p>
<h2>What’s the significance of the eight billionth birth?</h2>
<p>It raises concerns – <a href="https://worldpopulationhistory.org/carrying-capacity/">scientists estimate</a> that Earth’s maximum carrying capacity is between nine billion and 10 billion people. </p>
<p>Appreciating these numbers requires an understanding of the distribution and demographic structure of the population. Where are these people across regions, countries, and rural and urban geographies?</p>
<p>There is a potential upside to growing populations. It’s known as a <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/demographic-dividend#0">demographic dividend</a>. Population growth can be a blessing, spurring economic growth from shifts in a population’s age structure. This is a prospect if working-age people have good health, quality education, decent employment and a lower proportion of young dependants. </p>
<p>But realising this dividend depends on a host of things. They include the structure of the population by age, level of education and skills, and living conditions, as well as the distribution of available resources. </p>
<p>The consequences of population growth are socioeconomic, political and environmental. Some of them can be negative. How these unfold is determined by the characteristics of the population and its distribution. </p>
<h2>Why are birth rates so high in five African countries?</h2>
<p>The major factors driving population growth in these countries include low contraceptive use, high adolescent fertility rates and a prevalence of polygamous marriages. There’s also the low education status of women, low to poor investment in children’s education, and factors related to religion and ideas. </p>
<p>The use of modern contraceptives is <a href="https://reproductive-health-journal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12978-022-01332-x#:%7E:text=The%20use%20of%20modern%20contraceptives,%2DSaharan%20Africa%20(SSA);%20%20un_2019_contraceptiveusebymethod_databooklet.pdf">generally low</a> across sub-Saharan Africa. The overall prevalence is 22%. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, however, the uptake of short-acting contraceptives is at 8.1%. In Nigeria, it is at 10.5%. The uptake in Ethiopia is 25%, in Tanzania it’s 27.1% and in Egypt 43%.</p>
<p>For long-acting family planning methods, apart from Egypt with over 20% uptake, the other four countries driving population growth in the region recorded very poor uptake. This low uptake will logically lead to a population explosion. </p>
<p>Some of the factors <a href="https://contraceptionmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40834-021-00165-6">associated</a> with high contraceptive use in Africa are women’s education, exposure to news and mass media, good economic status and urban residency.</p>
<p>The adolescent fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa – while showing a downward trend – is still relatively high. The adolescent fertility rate captures the number of births per 1,000 girls aged 15 to 19. In sub-Saharan Africa, it stands at an average of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT?locations=ZG">98 births per 1,000 girls</a>.</p>
<p>There is a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.ADO.TFRT?locations=ZG">wide variation</a> in this rate across the five countries: from 52 in Egypt and 62 in Ethiopia to 102 in Nigeria, 114 in Tanzania and 119 in the DRC. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1228319/adolescent-fertility-rate-worldwide/">Outside the continent</a>, the adolescent fertility rate is 21 in Asia and the Pacific, and 26 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In the US, it’s at 15, five in France and 42 globally. </p>
<p>The adolescent fertility rate has huge implications for population growth because of the number of years between the start of childbearing and the end of a woman’s reproductive age. A high fertility rate in this age group also has a negative influence on the health, economic and educational potential of women and their children. </p>
<p>Another factor driving population growth in these five African countries is polygamous marriage. Women in polygamous unions living in rural areas with low socio-economic status are likely to have higher fertility rates than women in other areas. </p>
<p>Polygamy is <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2022/04/05/polygamy-in-drc-illegal-but-not-uncommon//">illegal in the DRC</a>. Nevertheless, it’s common. About 36% of married women in <a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/polygamy-in-west-africa-impacts-on-fertility-fertility-intentions-and-family-planning/">Nigeria</a>, one-quarter of married women in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-marriage-idINKCN0SL0CP20151027">rural Tanzania</a> and 11% of those in <a href="https://bmcpsychology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40359-022-00753-4#:%7E:text=Regarding%20Ethiopia%2C%20polygamy%20is%20practiced,co%2Dwives%20%5B10%5D">Ethiopia</a> are in polygamous marriages.</p>
<p>Finally, a woman’s education status has a significant impact on fertility. For instance, in Tanzania, women with no formal education have as many as <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-marriage-idINKCN0SL0CP20151027">3.3 more children</a> than women with secondary or tertiary education. </p>
<h2>Are rising populations a cause for major concern in these countries?</h2>
<p>Yes. </p>
<p>One of the biggest concerns is the scale of these countries’ development.</p>
<p>The World Bank classifies the DRC among the <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview">five poorest nations in the world</a>, with nearly 64% of the population living on less than US$2.15 a day. One in six of sub-Saharan Africa’s poorest people is found in the DRC. </p>
<p>In Nigeria, about <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview">40% of the population</a> lives below the poverty line. The west African nation also faces issues of insecurity, poor infrastructure and high unemployment.</p>
<p>Steady population growth in these five countries will exert further stress on already inadequate infrastructure and services.</p>
<p>Also, the age structure of the populations of these five countries reflects high levels of dependency. The population of young people who aren’t in the labour force and that of older people is far higher than of those in their prime ages (18 to 64) who are gainfully employed. </p>
<p>There is also a potential shortage of working-age people with high skills compared with the population of those who depend on them for survival in these five countries. </p>
<p>This is because these countries have a <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1121264/median-age-in-africa-by-county/">very youthful population</a>. The median age ranges from 17 in the DRC to 17.7 in Tanzania and 18.8 in Nigeria. There is also the prospect of many young people living in unfavourable socioeconomic realities and poverty.</p>
<h2>In most countries, population growth is the slowest since 1950. Why?</h2>
<p>Most countries, particularly in America, Asia, Europe, Oceania and North Africa, have completed the fertility transition. In other words, they are experiencing below-replacement fertility levels – fewer than two children are being born per woman. </p>
<p>The main drivers of low fertility include the increased use of modern contraceptives, increased age at first marriage and higher numbers of educated women.</p>
<h2>What should the next steps be for African countries with high fertility rates?</h2>
<p>Government policies and programmes need to take into account population growth and align interventions with sustainable use and access to resources. </p>
<p>Governments at regional, national and sub-national levels also need to invest in infrastructure and education. They need to create employment if they are to benefit from a growing population. There is also need to continue investing in family planning. </p>
<p>The age structure of the population is also of concern. The expected growth in population numbers is <a href="https://www.unfpa.org/8billion/8trends">likely to increase</a> the concentration of young people and those of prime ages. With limited socio-economic opportunities for young people, countries are more likely to be subject to the forces of international migration. </p>
<p>The proportion of older people is also likely to increase in the five countries in focus. This increases the need for investment in social security, infrastructure and innovative support for older people. Unfortunately, issues around older people have not gained prominence on the continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacques Emina
Population and Health Research Institute
and with
School of Population and Development Studies, University of Kinshasa</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Akanni Ibukun Akinyemi and Esther William Dungumaro do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Eight countries are projected to be behind 50% of the growth in population over the next three decades. Five are in Africa.Akanni Ibukun Akinyemi, Professor of Demography and Social Statistics., Obafemi Awolowo UniversityEsther William Dungumaro, Associate Professor of Demography, University of Dar es SalaamJacques Emina, Professor of population and development studies, University of Kinshasa Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1914822022-09-29T12:32:09Z2022-09-29T12:32:09ZRussia plans to annex parts of Eastern Ukraine – an Eastern European expert explains 3 key things to know about the regions at stake<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487158/original/file-20220928-22-wck8q5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A woman votes in the controversial referendum in Donetsk, Ukraine on Sept. 27, 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/people-cast-their-votes-in-controversial-referendums-in-donetsk-on-picture-id1243546788">Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Russia is set to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/entire-villages-empty-out-ukrainians-flee-russian-annexation-refugees-say-2022-09-28/">formally annex</a> four occupied territories in eastern Ukraine, claiming the region as its own more than six months after it first invaded its neighboring country. </p>
<p>Russia announced on Sept. 27, 2022, that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moscows-proxies-occupied-ukraine-regions-report-big-votes-join-russia-2022-09-27/">more than 85%</a> of people in the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic, as well as parts of two other occupied regions in Ukraine – Kherson and Zaporizhshia – voted to become part of Russia.</p>
<p>But <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/so-called-referenda-during-armed-conflict-ukraine-illegal-not-expression-popular-will-united-nations-political-affairs-chief-tells-security-council">the United Nations</a>, the United States and <a href="https://english.nv.ua/nation/population-drain-in-occupied-zaporizhzhia-oblast-renders-sham-vote-even-more-fraudulent-ukraine-wa-50272302.html">Ukrainian officials</a> have all decried the process as a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/09/28/russia-ukraine-referendum-sham-results-putin-un">“sham”</a> and illegal. </p>
<p>The Group of Seven, an international political coalition with Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the U.S. as members, also <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-09-23/g7-condemns-russias-scam-ukraine-referendums">condemned Russia’s referendums</a> as “illegitimate.” The G7 leaders have promised to impose sanctions on Russia if it proceeds with the annexation.</p>
<p>There <a href="https://twitter.com/sumlenny/status/1573473284884115456">are reports</a> that Russian and Chechen soldiers <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63013356">have pressured</a> people at their homes and at voting sites to align with Russia. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.usf.edu/arts-sciences/departments/school-of-interdisciplinary-global-studies/people/tkulakevich.aspx">a researcher</a> of Eastern Europe, I think it’s important to understand that people in these four regions are not a single political bloc, even though most of the people in these territories do not want to join Russia.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A group of older looking people sit on a train, looking distressed." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=406&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487154/original/file-20220928-22-8h2bet.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People board an evacuation train from the Donbas region heading to western Ukraine in August 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/people-board-on-an-evacuation-train-from-donbas-region-to-the-west-of-picture-id1242543446">Anatolii Stepanov/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The four Ukrainian regions have distinct relationships with Russia</h2>
<p>Russian forces first occupied parts of Kherson, a port city, and Zaporizhzhia, a city that’s home to the <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/why-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-mattersfor-whole-world">largest nuclear facility</a> in Europe, earlier in 2022. </p>
<p>But even before Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it also controlled parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The Kremlin has supported and armed two <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/21/donetsk-and-lugansk-heres-what-we-know-about-rebel-regions">puppet separatist governments</a> in this region, known as Donbas, since 2014.</p>
<p>In May 2014, breakaway Ukrainian politicians <a href="https://theprint.in/world/why-donetsk-luhansk-ukraines-rebel-territories-recognised-by-russia-matter/842664/">proclaimed</a> that Donetsk and Luhansk were not part of Ukraine, but actually were independent “republics.” </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A map shows the region of Donbas in Ukraine." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=592&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487177/original/file-20220928-26-9x5ajp.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=744&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The two self-proclaimed republics in the Donbas region, as well as the regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, voted in controversial referendums to be annexed by Russia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/00/Map_of_Donbas_region.svg/1214px-Map_of_Donbas_region.svg.png?20220313190341">Goran_tek-en/Creative Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Kremlin did not officially recognize these <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/05/12/311808832/separatists-vote-to-split-from-ukraine-russia-respects-decision">newly proclaimed republics</a> until February 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched its invasion of Ukraine days later.</p>
<p>As Russia turned to <a href="https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/02/27/stay-hidden-or-get-drafted">conscript fighters in these breakaway regions</a> to fill front lines, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson have been <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/6/ukraine-partisans-wont-win-war-but-can-wreak-havoc-analysts">fighting against</a> Russia since the start of the war.</p>
<p>In March 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky awarded the honorary title of <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/zelensky-gives-the-honorary-title-hero-city-to-kharkiv-chernihiv-mariupol-kherson-hostomel-and-volnovakha">“Hero City” to Kherson</a> for its <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/09/ukraine-counteroffensive-battle-of-kherson/671364/">fierce defense</a> against Russian forces during the early days of the war. </p>
<p>Russia still does not fully control any of the four regions. <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-talks-referendums-zelensky/31977628.html">Zelensky vowed</a> in August 2022 to not hold any peace talks if the Kremlin proceeded with the referendums in the occupied areas.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A large mural on the side of a run-down looking building shows the side of a woman holding a baby to the sky, with both baby and woman wearing wreath garlands on their heads." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487163/original/file-20220928-17-vmp8pd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A mural is shown on a residential building in Bakhmut, Donetsk, in September 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/this-picture-shows-a-mural-on-a-residential-building-in-bakhmut-on-picture-id1243505235">Juan Barreto/AFP via Getty images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Demographics in eastern Ukraine have shifted during the war</h2>
<p>Most Ukrainians who live in the Donbas region speak Russian. But before the full-scale war in 2022, many of these people still preferred to identify as having <a href="https://theconversation.com/most-people-in-separatist-held-areas-of-donbas-prefer-reintegration-with-ukraine-new-survey-124849">mixed Ukrainian and Russian identities</a> – or, otherwise, as a person from the Donbas or a Ukrainian citizen. </p>
<p>The Donbas region was home to about <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/eastern-donbas/freedom-world/2022">6.5 million</a> people before the 2022 invasion, out of a total <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ukraine-population/">43 million</a> in Ukraine. </p>
<p>The region was once known for its <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-the-donbas-so-important-for-russia/a-61547512">industrial output</a> and coal mines, <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/05/04/donbas-coal-mines-are-the-sinews-of-the-war-in-ukraine_5982385_4.html">some of which</a> Russia has seized control of during the war.</p>
<p>Today, all four of the occupied regions are active war zones that many residents have fled. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine">over 11 million Ukrainians</a> have left the country since February 2022. </p>
<p>There are also up to 7 million Ukrainians who have been uprooted from their homes but still live in Ukraine, making them internally displaced. More than <a href="https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/95314">60% of the internally displaced Ukrainians</a> are from the eastern regions. </p>
<p>As a result, the Russian referendum votes were conducted without accounting for the opinion of half – or even the majority – of the population in these territories.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="The back of a solider carrying a gun is shown, while a woman in the background appears to vote in a plain room with blue and white walls." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=440&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/487161/original/file-20220928-22-qdwtw8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=553&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Residents cast their votes in the referendum to join Russia in Donetsk, Ukraine, on Sept. 23, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://media.gettyimages.com/photos/residents-cast-their-votes-in-controversial-referendums-in-donetsk-picture-id1243452349">Stringer/Andalou Agency via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Most Ukrainians in the occupied territories don’t want to be part of Russia</h2>
<p>In 2014, when Luhansk and Donetsk first proclaimed their independence, the majority of the people there said they preferred to be part of their own republic, rather than becoming a part of Russia. Approximately <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">52% of people in these regions</a> at the time said they were against joining Russia, while 28% in Donetsk and 30% in Luhansk supported it, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, a private research group in Ukraine that conducts sociological and marketing research. </p>
<p>At the same time, both Kherson and Zaporizhzhia were overwhelmingly against joining Russia. Approximately <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">85% of people in Kherson</a> and 82% in Zaporizhzhia said they wanted to remain separate, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.</p>
<p>After eight years of fighting, which has led to destruction of houses and infrastructure, as well as <a href="https://tass.com/world/1289095">thousands of civilian deaths</a> in eastern Ukraine, the number of Russian sympathizers in the Donbas decreased. </p>
<p>The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1138&page=1">reported that</a> in late 2021 and early 2022, less than 22% of people in the Donbas region and less than 12% in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia wanted to become part of Russia. </p>
<p>Over 52% of Donbas residents, meanwhile, said in separate surveys conducted by American polling experts in early 2022 that they <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/17/russia-wants-recognize-independence-two-eastern-ukraine-republics-what-do-people-there-think/">were apathetic</a> about where to live, whether in Russia or in Ukraine. What most people cared about was their financial stability and family’s overall well-being. </p>
<p>Since the 2022 invasion, <a href="https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1133&page=2">92% of polled residents in the Donbas</a> said that there should be no territorial concessions for the earliest possible end of the war, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. </p>
<p>These figures contradict Putin’s justification to launch the so-called “special military operation” to <a href="https://www.vox.com/2022/2/23/22948534/russia-ukraine-war-putin-explosions-invasion-explained">defend a Russian-speaking population</a> that Ukraine is allegedly persecuting.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191482/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tatsiana Kulakevich does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>While some parts of eastern Ukraine have been under partial Russian control since 2014, other sections continue to fight back. Most residents overall have said they don’t want to be part of Russia.Tatsiana Kulakevich, Assistant Professor of Instruction at School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies, Affiliate Professor at the Institute on Russia, University of South FloridaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1867002022-07-14T18:37:22Z2022-07-14T18:37:22ZResearch and patient services need to reflect that Canadians from diverse communities are living with dementia<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473960/original/file-20220713-9415-h06cib.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=171%2C50%2C6398%2C4275&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Communities that are underrepresented in research may also be at increased risk for dementia, or tend to experience dementia differently, often with poorer quality of care, later diagnoses and at possibly higher rates than the general population.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Recent data from <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/daily-quotidien/220427/dq220427a-eng.pdf?st=4UsRLXA6">Statistics Canada</a> on our country’s demographic shift to an aging population highlights Canada’s <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-2021-census-statscanada-aging-society/">evolving future</a>. How we respond to these changes will determine our long-term success as a nation, especially for future generations of older individuals.</p>
<p>As our population continues to age, more people will be affected by age-related health conditions, including dementia. More than 500,000 Canadians are <a href="https://alzheimer.ca/en/about-dementia/what-dementia/dementia-numbers-canada">living with dementia</a> and this number is forecast to <a href="https://www.cihi.ca/en/dementia-in-canada/dementia-in-canada-summary">at least double</a> over the next two decades. These figures do not include potential cases of <a href="https://alzheimer.ca/en/about-dementia/other-types-dementia/young-onset-dementia">young onset dementia</a>, which is not tracked for people who are diagnosed under the age of 65, an omission that should be rectified immediately.</p>
<h2>Unique research challenges</h2>
<p>Canada’s multicultural population, which has been fuelled by <a href="https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2016006-eng.htm">successive waves of immigrants since the 1960s</a>, means a much larger percentage of people living with dementia in the future will be those from diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Recent <a href="https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/about-us/policy-and-influencing/what-we-think/demography">research from the United Kingdom</a> shows a sharp surge in the number of racialized people with dementia based on changing demographics.</p>
<p>This presents a unique challenge for those involved in dementia research. Much of this work has not included individuals from underrepresented groups, such as those from <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trci.2019.09.018">ethnically diverse populations</a>. Studies that are used to make important policy, clinical and investment decisions in dementia lack the appropriate data representing a diverse Canadian population, leading to a one-size-fits-all approach that, in the end, serves no one well.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473961/original/file-20220713-20-a0lb0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young woman and an older woman pointing at a calendar" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473961/original/file-20220713-20-a0lb0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473961/original/file-20220713-20-a0lb0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473961/original/file-20220713-20-a0lb0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473961/original/file-20220713-20-a0lb0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473961/original/file-20220713-20-a0lb0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473961/original/file-20220713-20-a0lb0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473961/original/file-20220713-20-a0lb0l.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Canada’s multicultural population presents a unique challenge for those involved in dementia research.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This drawback has significant consequences in the future, as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1097/WAD.0b013e318211c6c9">research from other countries</a> has shown underrepresented groups are often at increased risk, tend to experience dementia differently, often with poorer quality of care, later diagnoses and at possibly higher rates than the general population. </p>
<p>We have already witnessed the challenge arising from the absence of this type of data during the COVID-19 pandemic as individuals from <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/alz.050539">underrepresented groups</a> who <a href="https://doi.org/10.7202/1077989ar">live with dementia are disproportionately</a> and <a href="https://alzheimer.ca/en/help-support/dementia-resources/managing-through-covid-19/covid-19-dementia-task-force">adversely affected by the pandemic</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A younger man smiling with his arm around an older man" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474150/original/file-20220714-33068-7799by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/474150/original/file-20220714-33068-7799by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474150/original/file-20220714-33068-7799by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474150/original/file-20220714-33068-7799by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474150/original/file-20220714-33068-7799by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474150/original/file-20220714-33068-7799by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/474150/original/file-20220714-33068-7799by.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Canada’s national dementia strategy includes the key principle of respecting the diversity of those living with dementia to meet their distinct needs.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Culturally sensitive care</h2>
<p>But it doesn’t have to be this way. <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/publications/diseases-conditions/dementia-strategy.html">Canada’s national dementia strategy</a> contains two key principles we must embrace: respecting the diversity of those living with dementia to meet their distinct needs, while also supporting their basic human right to autonomy and dignity.</p>
<p>Efforts to provide culturally sensitive and diverse educational materials on dementia and its effects on individuals of all ages and their families must be increased. This will support Canadians who are affected by dementia to make informed choices on care plans and treatment options, which in turn can encourage participation in research to transform care. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://alzheimer.ca/en/whats-happening/news/understanding-how-dementia-affecting-culturally-diverse-communities-across-Canada">Alzheimer Society of Canada</a> and its provincial partners have already begun to make materials available in various languages, such as Hindi, Spanish and Chinese that also take a <a href="https://alzheimer.ca/en/help-support/dementia-resources/other-languages">culture-first approach</a>. This important work should be supported, amplified and resourced by the federal and provincial governments.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473962/original/file-20220713-20-9akftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A young man pushing an older man's wheelchair between two trees in a grassy area" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473962/original/file-20220713-20-9akftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/473962/original/file-20220713-20-9akftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473962/original/file-20220713-20-9akftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473962/original/file-20220713-20-9akftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473962/original/file-20220713-20-9akftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473962/original/file-20220713-20-9akftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/473962/original/file-20220713-20-9akftr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">We must increase the efforts to provide culturally sensitive and diverse educational materials on dementia and its effects on individuals of all ages and their families.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(Shutterstock)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Interventions and representation</h2>
<p>Community-based interventions are urgently needed. While many people with dementia can live long and fulfilling lives after their initial diagnosis, as the disease progresses, some will lose their grasp of English or French <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(18)30184-1">if those are not their first language</a>. For those people, the presence of experienced individuals living in the community who can address them in their native language or who are sensitive to their specific needs will help break cultural barriers and barriers to accessing services.</p>
<p>There also needs to be more dialogue with Canada’s underrepresented populations on how to best provide services and how to engage them in research. Recognizing the expertise within local communities and co-designing programs with and for people living with dementia will result in the best possible design, outcomes and buy-in.</p>
<p>We firmly believe that empathy, better representation and a broader set of data will help us care for all Canadians living with dementia. As our population ages, providing the best quality of life possible for all older adults living with dementia should be prioritized as an important national strategic goal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186700/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Roger Wong is a member of the Board of Directors of the Alzheimer Society of Canada. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr. Saskia Sivananthan works for the Alzheimer Society of Canada as Chief Research & KTE Officer.</span></em></p>Much dementia research does not reflect ethnically diverse communities. Studies used to make policy, clinical and investment decisions in dementia should reflect the diverse Canadian population.Roger Wong, Vice Dean, Education & Clinical Professor of Geriatric Medicine, University of British ColumbiaSaskia Sivananthan, Affiliate Professor, Department of Family Medicine, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1859502022-06-28T05:24:31Z2022-06-28T05:24:31ZThe 2021 Australian census in 8 charts<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/471322/original/file-20220628-16-k101si.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=532%2C0%2C3029%2C2000&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>More than 25 million people Australians sat down on (or around) Tuesday August 20 last year to complete their census. </p>
<p>Despite our borders still largely being closed, that was an 8.6% increase in the number of people completing the census in 2021 compared to the last time <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-its-unlikely-there-will-be-another-censusfail-tonight-165806">we broke the internet</a> to do it (in 2016). </p>
<p>And the population has been steadily increasing, largely thanks to migration, over the past 25 years.</p>
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<p>So what did the average respondent look like? </p>
<p>They were most likely to be 38 (37 if male, 39 if female), with a slightly larger chance of it being a woman (50.7%).</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/australians-are-more-millennial-multilingual-and-less-religious-what-the-census-reveals-185845">Australians are more millennial, multilingual and less religious: what the census reveals</a>
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<h2>Millennials and Boomers battle it out</h2>
<p>This census saw a generational shift in who was filling out the census. </p>
<p>While there has been little change in the total size of the Boomer population, the proportion of the population has dropped since 2016 – making way for their traditional generational rivals. </p>
<p>Millennials are now on equal footing, which could tells us something about <a href="https://theconversation.com/young-australian-voters-helped-swing-the-election-and-could-do-it-again-next-time-184159">recent (and future) elections</a>, as well as potential culture wars.</p>
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<h2>We’re an increasingly diverse country</h2>
<p>More than half of Australians (51.5%) reported either being born overseas or having a parent who was. </p>
<p>This is the first time since the question was added to the census this has been the case, and it will be interesting to see if this number continues to increase given the impact border closures have had over the past two years.</p>
<p>While England remains the number one source of new Australians, India, New Zealand and China were not far behind – and growing – as the most common countries of birth.</p>
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<h2>The First Nations population also continues to grow</h2>
<p>Since 2016 there’s been a 25% increase in the number of Australians who identify as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander, with 812,728 people (or 3.2% of the population) indicating it on their census form.</p>
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<p>The 2021 data also revealed a shift in First Nations demographics, with a growing population of Indigenous people now aged over 65 – a more than 150% increase (from 31,000 to 47,000 people) on 2016.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-population-has-increased-but-the-census-lacks-detail-in-other-facets-of-indigenous-lives-185692">Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population has increased, but the census lacks detail in other facets of Indigenous lives</a>
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</p>
<hr>
<h2>Imagine ‘no religion’</h2>
<p>The number of Australians who <a href="https://theconversation.com/no-religion-is-australias-second-largest-religious-group-and-its-having-a-profound-effect-on-our-laws-185697">identified as having no religion</a> increased again this census (38.9%), rocketing up from 30.1% in 2016. </p>
<p>While Christians as a whole remained the number one religious group – with 43.9% of the population identify with some form of Christianity – “no religion” was the number one individual religious affiliation, with Catholic a distant second.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/no-religion-is-australias-second-largest-religious-group-and-its-having-a-profound-effect-on-our-laws-185697">'No religion' is Australia's second-largest religious group – and it's having a profound effect on our laws</a>
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<hr>
<h2>A population-wide look at our long-term health</h2>
<p>For the first time, the Australian Bureau of Statistics asked Australians about long-term health conditions, which gives us a population-level view of the self-reported health of the nation.</p>
<p>While just under 15.3 million (60.1%) Australians reported no conditions, 2.2 million reported having some kind of long-term mental health condition (including depression or anxiety), with arthritis and asthma not far behind.</p>
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<p>An ageing population, as well as reports of the impact of COVID and lockdowns on <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/search?q=mental+health+covid">mental health</a> across <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-has-increased-anxiety-and-depression-rates-among-university-students-and-they-were-already-higher-than-average-167787">multiple</a> <a href="https://theconversation.com/63-5-of-australias-performing-artists-reported-worsening-mental-health-during-covid-174610">populations</a>, suggest it’s unlikely the number of people with a long-term health condition is going to decrease over time.</p>
<p>The data also show that women are more likely than men to have multiple long-term conditions.</p>
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<h2>Women are still doing (much) more housework than men</h2>
<p>Finally, the census showed – again – that <a href="https://theconversation.com/yet-again-the-census-shows-women-are-doing-more-housework-now-is-the-time-to-invest-in-interventions-185488">women are doing the lion’s share of unpaid domestic work</a>. </p>
<p>Women were much more likely than men to be doing more than 30 hours of unpaid domestic work in the week prior to census night, and men were more likely to have done none at all.</p>
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<p>Our first – and hopefully last – COVID census shows that we still have a lot of progress to make in the way labour is shared in the home.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/185950/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A growing, more diverse population, less religion, more First Nations people and a picture of the long-term health of Australians. But who’s doing the housework?Wes Mountain, Social Media + Visual Storytelling EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1761242022-02-10T13:40:24Z2022-02-10T13:40:24ZHow Joe Rogan became podcasting’s Goliath<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445472/original/file-20220209-19-1ov6x30.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=31%2C13%2C2964%2C2011&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Joe Rogan’s ability to attract young male listeners is particularly powerful in today's fractured media environment.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/commentator-joe-rogan-prepares-to-interview-michael-graves-news-photo/521597722?adppopup=true">Jeff Bottari/Zuffa LLC via Getty Image</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Comedian and podcaster Joe Rogan is caught in a spiral of controversies.</p>
<p>It began when “The Joe Rogan Experience” <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/01/24/robert-malone-vaccine-misinformation-rogan-mandates/">hosted COVID-19 vaccine skeptic Robert Malone</a> and a number of musicians pulled their music off of Spotify in protest. It has continued with Rogan <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/05/arts/music/joe-rogan-spotify-apology-slur.html">apologizing for using racial slurs in past years</a>, which prompted the streaming service to remove scores of his old episodes from the streaming platform.</p>
<p>Given the thousands of hours of content that Rogan has produced, the scrutiny is unlikely to stop there. As we argue <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520382138/thats-not-funny">in our forthcoming book</a>, Rogan’s podcast has long promoted right-wing comedy and libertarian political voices, including some who trade quite gleefully in <a href="https://www.mixcloud.com/TheJoeRoganExperience/702-milo-yiannopoulos/">racism</a> and <a href="https://jrelibrary.com/1336-legion-of-skanks/">misogyny</a>. </p>
<p>However, what makes Rogan’s rise particularly important is that it goes beyond the standard partisan political battling that Americans have grown accustomed to in social and broadcast media.</p>
<p>Rogan is not just a purveyor of right-wing ideologies. He is also someone who has built an empire by introducing these ideas – and a wide range of others – to listeners from across the political spectrum. His truly unique skill is drawing in from that spectrum <a href="https://www.mediamonitors.com/audience-demographic-variations-specific-to-genre/">a massive, young, largely male audience</a> that advertisers highly covet.</p>
<h2>Ideological whiplash</h2>
<p>When the Federal Communications Commission introduced <a href="https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/955/fairness-doctrine">the Fairness Doctrine</a> in 1949, radio and television broadcasters were required to present controversial ideas in a manner that reflected multiple perspectives. However, the combination of cable television, niche consumer targeting and President Ronald Reagan’s deregulatory FCC <a href="https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/955/fairness-doctrine">succeeded in toppling the mandate</a>.</p>
<p>By 1987, conservative talk radio figures such as <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/rush-limbaughs-complicated-legacy-11613692155">Rush Limbaugh embraced fully partisan approaches</a> to content creation and audience accumulation. Ignoring their political opponents as potential listeners, they veered further and further to the right, garnering an increasingly homogeneous audience whom advertisers could easily target.</p>
<p>Later, as Fox News’ popularity and reach grew, it took a similar tack, promoting conservative media personalities like Bill O'Reilly, Sean Hannity, Tucker Carlson and <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-conservative-comic-greg-gutfeld-overtook-stephen-colbert-in-ratings-to-become-the-most-popular-late-night-tv-host-166867">Greg Gutfeld</a> to preach to the right-wing choir.</p>
<p>Today, some conservative voices such as <a href="https://www.economist.com/open-future/2019/03/28/inside-the-mind-of-ben-shapiro-a-radical-conservative">Ben Shapiro</a> and <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/conservative-youtuber-steven-crowder-slammed-for-disgusting-attack-on-asian-newscaster">Steven Crowder</a> take this logic a technological step further, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/07/19/1013793067/outrage-as-a-business-model-how-ben-shapiro-is-using-facebook-to-build-an-empire">embracing the silo-ing effects of social media algorithms</a> to connect with those users most likely to engage with and disseminate their content. Although such figures certainly offend those who disagree with them, their place in the mediasphere is well-established and mostly ignored by opponents.</p>
<p>Rogan, by contrast, is prone to ideological whiplash. </p>
<p>Initially, <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/24/21080234/bernie-sanders-joe-rogan-experience-endorsement-controversy">he supported Bernie Sanders for president in 2020</a>. Then <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/04/joe-rogan-donald-trump-joe-biden-bernie-sanders">he flipped to Donald Trump</a>. He interviews and asks open-ended questions to figures ranging from staunchly left-leaning voices such as <a href="http://www.cornelwest.com/bio.html#.YgQKRGBOlp8">Cornel West</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/books/review/michael-pollan-how-to-change-your-mind.html">Michael Pollan</a> to right-wing charlatans including <a href="https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/stefan-molyneux">Stefan Molyneux</a> and <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/alex-jones-infowars-store-165-million-1281059/">Alex Jones</a>. </p>
<p>There is no political commonality among these people. But there is a demographic connection. For one, they are all men, <a href="https://www.dailydot.com/irl/joe-rogan-experience-podcast-women-problem/">as are the vast majority of guests</a> on “The Joe Rogan Experience.”</p>
<p>They are also provocative guests that appeal to young people and particularly young men, <a href="https://www.wired.com/2004/08/lostboys/">a group that is notoriously difficult to aggregate</a>, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/11/young-adult-households-are-earning-more-than-most-older-americans-did-at-the-same-age/">often has disposable income</a> and has a tendency <a href="https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/civic-and-political-attitudes-young-white-men">to believe that mainstream political ideas don’t reflect their own</a>.</p>
<p>While Fox News sells politics to TV watchers, Rogan sells a sense of edgy authenticity to podcast listeners. His blend of comedy and controversy certainly has political implications, but from his perspective, it isn’t politics. It’s demographics.</p>
<h2>Spotify’s main attraction</h2>
<p>Rogan’s economic model of accumulating young male listeners, who make up a good chunk of his <a href="https://twitter.com/Lukewearechange/status/1478050635597721600?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">11 million listeners per episode</a>, is particularly powerful in today’s <a href="https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/polarized-media-landscape-erodes-chances-effective-covid-response">fractured media environment</a>. </p>
<p>Rogan is, for worse and for better, a true outlier in the world of contemporary talk media. Most political and many comedy podcasts employ the business model of finding an ideological space, connecting via cross-promotion and guest selection with similar shows, and <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520382138/thats-not-funny">allowing the algorithms of social media to drive traffic their way</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Closeup of hand holding smartphone with 'The Joe Rogan Experience' pulled up." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445470/original/file-20220209-23-7udz5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/445470/original/file-20220209-23-7udz5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445470/original/file-20220209-23-7udz5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445470/original/file-20220209-23-7udz5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445470/original/file-20220209-23-7udz5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445470/original/file-20220209-23-7udz5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/445470/original/file-20220209-23-7udz5x.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">It’s estimated that ‘The Joe Rogan Experience’ attracts 11 million listeners per episode.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/in-this-photo-illustration-the-joe-rogan-experience-podcast-news-photo/1367950760?adppopup=true">Cindy Ord/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>“The Joe Rogan Experience” takes this idea and pulls it in multiple, contradictory directions. Media figures left and right have – until now, at least – coveted opportunities to appear on the show. Once a comedian or podcaster has saturated their own political space, Rogan offers a chance to win over new converts and, in principle, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WPKIudzwJmM">have a discussion that breaks free of partisan constraints</a>. For many Rogan fans, this breadth of discussion and freedom from norms is the heart of the show. </p>
<p>Rogan, however, is far from a neutral host of a new public sphere. His feigned naiveté is all too often a cover to promote edgy, offensive and irresponsible theories that appeal to his audience’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bL5RzI5LyVc">self-styled suspicion of authority</a>.</p>
<p>He pushes the boundaries of political discourse by “just asking questions,” but then hides behind <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/danidiplacido/2022/02/06/spotifys-joe-rogan-controversy-sparks-an-absurd-debate/?sh=3bceca2c5dd3">his background as just a comedian</a> to distance himself from any undesirable repercussions. </p>
<p>Spotify, like other streaming services, is primarily built on a wide range of content creators, each of whom attracts a small, dedicated audience, but none of whom are, on their own, particularly powerful.</p>
<p>Rogan is the closest thing to a mass cultural product to be found in the podcast world. He is also one of the only names in podcasting big enough to garner headlines, good or bad. For a company like Spotify trying to boost subscriptions, Rogan’s cross-partisan, youthful, mass appeal is very hard to resist. </p>
<p>Rogan’s recent apologies, however, prove that he is not impervious to pressure. We suspect Spotify will try to thread the needle: covering up Rogan’s penchant for misinformation and offensive provocation just enough to meet the minimum standard of acceptable corporate citizenship without tarnishing the comedian’s brand and demographic appeal.</p>
<p>[<em>Like what you’ve read? Want more?</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-likethis">Sign up for The Conversation’s daily newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/176124/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>By sidestepping partisan pigeonholing and appealing to the anti-establishment impulses of young men, Rogan has brought together an audience that advertisers have long coveted.Matt Sienkiewicz, Associate Professor of Communication and International Studies, Boston CollegeNick Marx, Associate Professor of Film and Media Studies, Colorado State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1659782021-08-22T08:11:54Z2021-08-22T08:11:54ZSeeking jobs abroad isn’t an option for young Nigerians: they don’t have the right skills<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416336/original/file-20210816-19-uha3fx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Millions of young Nigerians live on the streets of Lagos and survive through street trading.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source"> Pius Utomi EkpeI/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Nigeria is sitting on a demographic goldmine which could transform the economy. About 60% of Nigeria’s 200 million people are under the age of 25, and that number is expected to <a href="https://www.gcca.eu/stories/nigerias-youth-asset-or-consumer-time-bomb">increase significantly</a> by 2050. </p>
<p>Instead of being an asset, the country’s burgeoning youth population has become an albatross. It poses risks for the economy and social cohesion. </p>
<p>Among Nigeria’s economic challenges, youth unemployment remains the most formidable. The World Bank <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS">estimates</a> Nigeria’s youth unemployment at 17.7% in 2019 compared with <a href="https://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_737670.pdf">10.8% for Africa</a>. Nigeria’s youth unemployment rate is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS">double</a> the national rate of unemployment.</p>
<p>Official statistics on unemployment in Nigeria often underestimate the severity of the problem. For example, they don’t account for the fact that over 80% of Nigerians with primary education or more who are regarded as employed are grossly under-employed in <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ar/736731468194635805/pdf/Improving-skills-development-in-the-informal-sector-strategies-for-Sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf">low-productivity informal-sector</a> work.</p>
<p>Activities in this sector typically consist of street hawking, petty trading, tailoring, shoe mending, domestic work, roadside food vending, transportation and subsistence agriculture. </p>
<p>The federal and state governments have introduced various measures to address youth unemployment. These include <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/policy/economy/national-social-investment-programme/">social investment programmes</a> that encourage youth entrepreneurship and support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Others are skills development programmes, direct labour for public works projects, loans for agriculture and various initiatives to spur entrepreneurship. Despite all these efforts 65 million young Nigerians, or one in three, <a href="https://leadership.ng/economic-disruptions-will-make-1-in-3-nigerians-jobless-in-4-years-fg/">are expected</a> to be unemployed in the next four years. </p>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35995/Of-Roads-Less-Traveled-Assessing-the-Potential-of-Economic-Migration-to-Provide-Overseas-Jobs-for-Nigeria-s-Youth.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.">report</a> the World Bank proposed strategies for addressing youth unemployment in Nigeria. </p>
<p>One is the creation of safe and legal labour migration pathways for young Nigerians to seek job opportunities in other countries. This would be in contrast with the <a href="https://www.themigrantproject.org/nigeria/risks-migrants-ngeria/">current</a> illegal and perilous migration patterns. </p>
<p>The proposals are laudable, as there are <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/07/countries-facing-greatest-skills-shortages/">acute shortages</a> of skilled workers in some developed countries. The <a href="https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/employment-based-immigrant-visas.html">US</a>, <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/express-entry/eligibility/federal-skilled-workers.html">Canada</a> and the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/skilled-worker-visa">UK</a> have introduced special visas for attracting skilled workers from other countries. Workers from Asia, <a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/RAD-IndiaII-FINAL.pdf">especially India</a>, have benefited from these opportunities. </p>
<p>The World Bank proposes that countries of destination looking to fill labour shortages provide high-quality and industry-relevant training to potential migrants and nonimmigrants in Nigeria. This, it argues, would increase the global stock of workers and contribute to a brain gain.</p>
<p>The onus would need to be on the companies. This is because many young Nigerians <a href="https://businessday.ng/interview/article/nigerian-unemployed-graduates-do-not-have-skillset-necessary-for-this-21st-century/">lack</a> 21st century skills desired by global corporations. </p>
<p>This proposal is theoretically sound. But it poses a number of questions.</p>
<h2>What’s missing</h2>
<p>Innovation and disruptive technologies have <a href="https://acetforafrica.org/publications/policy-briefs-and-discussion-papers/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-will-africa-be-ready/">become salient</a> components of industrialised economies. Robotics, 3-D printing, precision machining, data analytics, bioinformatics, digital imaging, design and animation all feature prominently. Not many young Nigerian possess these frontier skills.</p>
<p>This lack of skills is not only a Nigerian problem; it is pervasive across Africa. This explains it why much of labour migration – about 80% – in Africa is intra-regional, rather than international. It <a href="https://www.ilo.org/africa/areas-of-work/youth-employment/lang--en/index.htm.">consists</a> mainly of unskilled workers.</p>
<p>Global corporations are looking for workers with <a href="https://unctad.org/topic/least-developed-countries/productive-capacities-index">“productive capacities”</a> that can be used in manufacturing, science and technology-intensive sectors, as well as information technologies. </p>
<p>The World Bank proposal is based on the old paradigm of competition in which labour abundance is a major driver of competitive advantage. But this is no longer the case, as technology, knowledge, innovation and skills have replaced labour as the major pillars of competition. The World Economic Forum <a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2020.pdf">suggests</a> that 85 million jobs worldwide will be at risk because the current job holders lack relevant skills. </p>
<p>Thus, attempts at addressing youth unemployment in Nigeria should focus on raising the skills and productive capacities of young Nigerians.</p>
<h2>Local opportunities</h2>
<p>In addition to exploring opportunities in the global labour market, the World Bank has suggested the creation of domestic job opportunities. This may be accomplished if Nigeria is able to attract employment-intensive global corporations. </p>
<p>But Nigeria is not very attractive to global value chains and foreign investors. Foreign direct investment in the country has been <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=NG.-NG&name_desc=false">declining</a> inexorably, from 6% of GDP in the mid-1990s to about 0.5% in 2019. </p>
<p>Why do global IT and pharmaceutical corporations prefer to locate in India and not in Nigeria? Why does Apple manufacture iPhones and iPads in Taiwan? Why do global textile corporations prefer Vietnam, China and the Philippines? Why has Malaysia, and not Nigeria, become a major hub for solar equipment manufacturing? </p>
<p>The answer is simple: their young people possess a critical mass of the needed scientific and technical skills.</p>
<h2>The way out</h2>
<p>Creating safe and legal pathways for the migration of young Nigerians will only be effective if the following measures are taken. </p>
<p>First, the ongoing de-industrialisation of the Nigerian economy must be reversed. Over the past four decades <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS?locations=NG.-NG&name_desc=false">there has been a steady decline</a> in manufacturing value added in Nigeria – from over 20% of GDP in the early 1980s to less than 10% in 2019. </p>
<p>As a result many young Nigerians have not had the opportunity to acquire industrial, technological and innovative capacities. </p>
<p>Another effect of de-industrialisation is that it has foreclosed opportunities for students in Nigeria’s tertiary institutions to apply their classroom learning in industrial contexts. In a survey of companies in Nigeria, <a href="https://tech.africa/stem-graduates-women-dr-joe-abah/0">81% said they had difficulty finding workers with the relevant skills</a>. It is also a reason why global corporations do not find Nigeria an attractive location. </p>
<h2>The problem with proposed solution</h2>
<p>The World Bank proposes a model in which the private sector and the government in destination countries would provide high-quality and industry-relevant training to potential migrants and nonimmigrants within Nigeria. </p>
<p>This proposal is theoretically sound. But it poses a number of questions.</p>
<p>First, how would this training be financed? There may be political resistance by taxpayers in destination countries to finance training programmes that benefit the private sector and foreign countries. </p>
<p>Second, private enterprises are often reluctant to invest in training new workers. Investment in training is costly. In addition, it would be difficult to prevent trained workers from taking newly acquired skills to other enterprises or destination countries that did not incur the training costs. </p>
<p>Third, industrial and technical training is a long-term process, but firms are more interested in short-term returns on investment. </p>
<p>Finally, given the bureaucracy and inefficiency of Nigeria’s public sector, it may be challenging to implement a training partnership between firms in destination countries and the Nigerian government. </p>
<p>The World Bank report also notes that Nigerians with relevant skills have found their way to the US where they thrive in various fields. This suggests that the problem of youth unemployment is more about increasing the number of young Nigerians with 21st century skills, and not just about creating more legal migration routes. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s “informal-sector trap” needs to be addressed before promoting a pathway to jobs abroad. Easy entry into the informal sector disincentivises young people from acquiring high-order skills to enable them to obtain high-paying formal-sector jobs. </p>
<p>Young people are attracted to the informal sector because there are no skills requirements. This can be a blessing and a curse. It is a blessing in that it easily absorbs the teeming population of Nigeria’s unemployed and underemployed young people. But it’s a curse because it provides only a temporary succour, and young people are unwittingly discouraged from acquiring skills desired by global corporations. </p>
<p>Nigeria’s outdated tertiary educational system should be revamped. Tertiary institutions in Nigeria produce thousands of scientists, engineers and technologists every year, but <a href="https://qz.com/africa/603967/about-half-of-the-university-graduates-in-nigeria-cannot-find-jobs/">many </a> end up <a href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1058.5208&rep=rep1&type=pdf">unemployed</a>. This is because their training and education are not relevant in the contemporary labour market. </p>
<p>Without addressing the problems of skills mismatch and the lack of digital skills, young Nigerians will continue to miss out on opportunities in the global labour market.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/165978/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Onyeiwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Youth unemployment in Nigeria is a skills mismatch problem – corporations can’t find suitable workers in the midst of a large pool of unemployed workers.Stephen Onyeiwu, Andrew Wells Robertson Professor of Economics, Allegheny CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1649552021-08-17T14:39:22Z2021-08-17T14:39:22ZThe impact of COVID-19 has been lower in Africa. We explore the reasons<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416328/original/file-20210816-19-15c8jel.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">International efforts should prioritise equitable access to vaccines. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Immanuel A.Afolabi/Majority World/Universal Images Group via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>There’s been an <a href="https://www.afro.who.int/news/covid-19-deaths-africa-surge-more-40-over-previous-week">increase</a> in COVID-19 deaths across Africa since mid-July 2021. But the <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7410455/pdf/tpmd200474.pdf">impact</a> of the pandemic in <a href="https://www.ghspjournal.org/content/ghsp/early/2021/07/15/GHSP-D-21-00172.full.pdf">sub-Saharan Africa</a> remains <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X20303788?via%3Dihub">markedly lower</a> compared to the Americas, Europe and Asia. </p>
<p>The reasons for this are not yet clear. Several factors <a href="https://www.ghspjournal.org/content/early/2021/07/15/GHSP-D-21-00172">have been suggested</a> as potentially influencing the low burden of COVID-19 illness. These include age demographics, lack of long-term care facilities, potential cross-protection from previous exposure to circulating coronaviruses, limitations of SARS-CoV-2 testing which may have resulted in an undercounting of deaths, and effective government public health responses. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.ghspjournal.org/content/early/2021/07/28/GHSP-D-21-00172">recent paper</a> our team of public health researchers, led by health analyst Janica Adams, examined these possible explanations by reviewing the scientific literature. The aim was to help guide public health decision making to contain COVID-19. </p>
<h2>Common theories</h2>
<p>A number of hypotheses emerged from the literature review. In this article we explore the most common ones. More research is needed to better understand how these factors contribute to the lower burden of COVID-19 disease in the African context.</p>
<p><strong>The young age demographic of sub-Saharan Africa</strong></p>
<p>Age has been observed as a <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-adults.html">significant risk factor</a> for severe COVID-19 illness. Most deaths occur in those aged 65 or older. The median age in <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/northern-america-population/">North</a> and <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/south-america-population/">South</a> America, <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/europe-population/">Europe</a> and <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/asia-population/">Asia</a> ranges from 32 to 42.5 years. The age demographic structure of sub-Saharan Africa is much younger – the median age is 18. </p>
<p>The stark difference in age demographics can be demonstrated by comparing Canada and Uganda, which are similar in population size. In Canada, the median age is <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/canada-population/">41.1</a>. Around <a href="https://www.populationpyramid.net/canada/2020/">18%</a> of the population is 65 or older. In contrast, the median age of Uganda is <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uganda-population/">16.7</a>. Only <a href="https://www.populationpyramid.net/uganda/2020/">2%</a> of the population is 65 or older. Canada has recorded nearly 1.5 million <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/canada/">COVID-19 cases</a> and 27,000 deaths compared to fewer than 100,000 cases and 3,000 deaths <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/uganda/">in Uganda</a>. COVID-19 has a significant impact on older people. Countries with larger proportions of older people are more likely to be hardest hit. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416479/original/file-20210817-6629-rasuz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Global map of confirmed COVID-19 deaths" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416479/original/file-20210817-6629-rasuz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416479/original/file-20210817-6629-rasuz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416479/original/file-20210817-6629-rasuz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416479/original/file-20210817-6629-rasuz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416479/original/file-20210817-6629-rasuz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416479/original/file-20210817-6629-rasuz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/416479/original/file-20210817-6629-rasuz9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Global COVID-19 death estimates as of 15 August 2021.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths">Africa Data Hub and Our World in Data</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Lack of long-term care facilities</strong></p>
<p>Most elderly people in sub-Saharan Africa don’t live in <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/longtermcare/index.html">long-term care facilities</a>. These facilities pose significant risks for infectious diseases. COVID-19 has substantially affected those living in long-term care facilities. During the first wave of the pandemic, about 81% of deaths in Canada occurred in those facilities. </p>
<p>In sub-Saharan Africa, provision of care is mostly left to families. This limits the number of formal caregivers and thus reduces the chance of transmission. An exception to this is <a href="https://www.who.int/ageing/long-term-care/WHO-LTC-series-subsaharan-africa.pdf?ua=1">South Africa</a>, which has an established long-term care sector. South Africa was the worst affected country in sub-Saharan Africa. And <a href="https://ltccovid.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Covid-19-and-Long-Term-Care-Facilities-in-South-Africa-survey.pdf">33% of COVID-19 outbreaks</a> in South Africa occurred in long-term care facilities during the first wave.</p>
<p><strong>Potential cross-protection from local circulating coronaviruses</strong></p>
<p>It’s been suggested that prior exposure to circulating coronaviruses could reduce the severity of COVID-19 illness if people have developed antibodies. A <a href="https://www.jci.org/articles/view/143380#SEC3">previous study</a> demonstrated that prior exposure to endemic coronaviruses resulted in lower chance of death and lower disease severity compared to those who were not previously exposed. <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26177344/">Human-bat</a> interactions are common in some rural areas of Africa. </p>
<p><strong>Limitations of SARS-CoV-2 testing</strong></p>
<p>There are concerns that the limited SARS-CoV-2 testing may have resulted in an undercounting of COVID-19-related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa. Insufficient data collection may mean we don’t really know the incidence and prevalence of COVID-19. Though varying across sub-Saharan Africa, testing levels have been <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-testing">low</a> compared to other areas of the world.</p>
<p><strong>Effective government public health response</strong></p>
<p>The rapid response of several African governments and health organisations may have played a significant role. At the beginning of the pandemic, several measures were taken: <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32528154/">screening</a>, establishment of the Africa Task Force for Novel Coronavirus, suspension of flights from China and <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32528154/">closure of borders in 40 African nations</a>. New programmes also promote sharing of COVID-19 information across sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>In contrast to high-income countries which focus on non-communicable diseases, health organisations in sub-Saharan Africa focus on infectious diseases. The formation of <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30858557/">national public health institutions</a> has been key in curbing infectious diseases in Africa through disease surveillance, diagnostics and rapid response to outbreaks.</p>
<p>But stringent lockdowns have taken a serious economic and societal toll across sub-Saharan Africa. Lockdowns resulted in increased <a href="https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/tracking-socioeconomic-impacts-pandemic-nigeria-results-first-three-rounds-nigeria-covid">food insecurity</a>, <a href="https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.09.20191247v1">teenage pregnancy, gender-based violence</a>, and disruptions in treatment of <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-1025-y">malaria</a>, <a href="http://www.stoptb.org/assets/documents/resources/publications/acsm/Civil%20Society%20Report%20on%20TB%20and%20COVID.pdf">TB</a> and <a href="https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanhiv/article/PIIS2352-3018(20)30211-3/fulltext">HIV</a>. Africa’s 54 nations are not all the same, and local responses should be tailored to the health, social and economic realities in specific countries. </p>
<p><strong>South Africa: the outlier</strong></p>
<p>In contrast to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has experienced higher proportions of COVID-related hospitalisations and deaths. South Africa has a remarkably <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/south-africa-population/">higher median age</a> and a long-term care sector. In addition, the higher rates of HIV and TB in South Africa have been associated with <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32860699/">higher COVID-19 death rates</a>. The prevalence of noncommunicable disease in South Africa is higher than in other regions, which may contribute to the higher burden of COVID-19 disease. South Africa also has better diagnostic capabilities and healthcare documentation than other sub-Saharan African countries. This may contribute to higher reporting rates. </p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>We believe that the low median age and a small percentage of vulnerable elderly contribute significantly to sub-Saharan Africa’s lower COVID-19 death rates.</p>
<p>Based on our research, we propose several policy prescriptions to help improve health practice. </p>
<p>Lockdowns lead to severe health consequences for the young and the poor in the African context. Therefore, reduced emphasis on lockdowns should be considered. </p>
<p>Better communication with the public is required to help curb COVID-19. </p>
<p>Governments should find adequate financial support for vulnerable sectors, possibly from external agencies. </p>
<p>Governments and health agencies should ensure that medical infrastructure is available in the case of a severe outbreak, as seen with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56940595">oxygen shortage in India</a>. </p>
<p>International efforts should prioritise developing vaccines that are effective against virus variants of concern and ensuring equitable access to such vaccines. </p>
<p>The emergence of variants of concern with increased potential for transmission and more severe disease in the younger population could make Africa more susceptible to a severe COVID-19 epidemic. These variants need to be monitored through molecular epidemiologic surveillance. And further studies are needed to better understand potential mechanisms of severe disease in the African context.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/164955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alex Ezeh is affiliated with School of Public Health, University of the Witwatersrand, as Honorary Professor of Public Health. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Janica Adams, Michael Silverman, and Saverio Stranges do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The emergence of variants of concern with increased potential for transmission and more severe disease in the younger population could make Africa more susceptible to a severe COVID-19 epidemic.Alex Ezeh, Dornsife Endowed Professor of Global Health, Drexel UniversityMichael Silverman, Chair of Infectious Diseases, Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry, Western UniversitySaverio Stranges, Professor & Chair of Epidemiology, Western UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1645422021-08-10T12:28:08Z2021-08-10T12:28:08ZThe maximum human life span will likely increase this century, but not by more than a decade<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/412474/original/file-20210721-19-1cw069.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C25%2C5590%2C3707&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Biologists and demographers are actively debating whether there is a natural cap on the human life span, and how high that might be.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/photo/young-and-old-hands-royalty-free-image/183297590?adppopup=true">eucyln/iStock via Getty Images Plus</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49746060">Jeanne Calment of France died in 1997</a> at the age of 122 years and 164 days, she set a record for oldest human. That record still stands. </p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=2nGjQFsAAAAJ&hl=en">As statisticians</a> who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=QN9RQAYAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">study demography</a>, we expect that record will be broken by 2100. </p>
<p>We study the maximum human life span using a data-driven approach. <a href="https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol44/52/default.htm">Our peer-reviewed study</a>, published in June 2021, models and combines two key components: how the risk of dying flattens after age 110, and growth in the number of people to reach age 110 this century. </p>
<p>Our analysis of these two factors, which we did before the COVID-19 pandemic, suggests it’s nearly inevitable that someone will break Calment’s record during the 21st century, with an 89% chance that someone will live to at least 126, but only a 3% chance that someone will reach age 132. </p>
<h2>Debate around maximum human life span</h2>
<p>Scientists are actively debating whether there is <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-150-years-really-the-limit-of-human-lifespan-162209">a fixed limit to the human life span</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1395.001">Some biologists</a> think the data shows that aging is not a disease that can be treated, but instead an inevitable process that cannot be fully stopped, whether through medical breakthroughs or other means. <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/2237414/">Some demographers</a> have argued that there is a natural limit to life expectancy, implying that maximum ages will level off as well. </p>
<p>But others think there’s good evidence that life spans will continue to lengthen - at least for a lucky few. Several <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1365-2">prominent biologists</a> and <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30545477/">medical experts</a> have recently published findings suggesting there is some hope for extending life spans dramatically via medical interventions. Ultrawealthy tech titans like Tesla’s Elon Musk and Google co-founder Sergey Brin <a href="https://futurism.com/live-forever-silicon-valley">are investing heavily</a> in such research.</p>
<p>In 2002, two demographers named <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1069675">Jim Oeppen and James Vaupel observed</a> that between 1928 and 1990, limits to life expectancy proposed by leading demographers were broken just five years after the prediction on average. They also noted that flattening gains to life expectancy should not determine our view of maximum life span, as they are quite different things – the maximum is not the average! </p>
<p>Even a pair of prominent demographers who come down on the side of a fixed limit to human life, S. Jay Olshansky and Bruce A. Carnes, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8356-3_33">acknowledged that</a> there is no age at which death is absolutely certain, leaving open the possibility of continually broken life span records.</p>
<h2>Challenges studying supercentenarians</h2>
<p>Data on “supercentenarians,” or those who reach age 110, are limited and often of poor quality. There is the <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-11520-2_1">problem of “age-attainment bias”</a>, or the tendency of very old individuals to misstate or exaggerate their age. For this reason, we’ve used only data from the <a href="https://www.supercentenarians.org/">International Database on Longevity</a>, a collection of rigorously verified death records for supercentenarians.</p>
<p>Since these individuals died before 2020, they were all born no later than 1910. Because of record-keeping limitations throughout the world at that time, only records from 13 countries could be included in the database. For that reason, our study is limited to individuals from those 13 countries. </p>
<p><iframe id="r7G3r" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/r7G3r/9/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Basic demography of super-agers</h2>
<p>Yearly mortality rates generally increase as people age. For example, individuals are more likely to die at age 80 than age 20. </p>
<p>But this changes for those who make it to 110 years old. The <a href="https://www.supercentenarians.org/">best available data</a> suggests that mortality rates for these “supercentenarians,” while high, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10687-017-0305-5">do not increase</a> as they continue to age. In a sense, this means that supercentenarians stop aging. </p>
<p>Instead, supercentenarians as a group have a steady but very high mortality rate of about 50% per year. This means that for every 1,000 individuals who have reached age 110, we expect approximately 500 of them will have died before their 111th birthday, and 250 more by age 112. Taken to its logical end point, this pattern suggests only 1 of the 1,000 would reach age 120, and only 1 in a million supercentenarians would reach age 130. </p>
<p>Even more, such traditional demographic factors as <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10687-017-0305-5">sex and nationality that affect mortality rates also appear to not affect supercentenarians</a>. But scientists have yet to figure out what factors lead supercentenarians to live as long as they do. Do they benefit from excellent genetics? Or healthy environments? Or some other factor as yet unidentified? They appear to be extraordinary individuals, but the exact reason is unclear.</p>
<p>That pattern led us to the second component of our study: projecting how many people will reach age 110 during the 21st century, which ends in the year 2100. Using <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1211452109">population forecasting methods developed by our research group</a> that are used by the United Nations, we found that large mid-20th-century population growth will likely lead to an orders-of-magnitude increase in the supercentenarian population by 2100. Our estimates suggest that about 300,000 people will reach age 110 by 2080, give or take about 100,000. Although this range is well below a million, it makes the one-in-a-million chance that at least one of them will reach age 130 a real possibility.</p>
<h2>Practical limit to human life span this century</h2>
<p>Predicting the extremes of humanity is a challenging task filled with unknowns. Just as it’s conceivable that a medical breakthrough could let humans live indefinitely, every individual to reach age 123 could simply die the next day. Instead, our study has taken a statistical, data-driven approach focused on what will be observed this century rather than on untestable hypotheses about absolute limits to life span. Our results indicate there’s only a 13% chance any individual will reach age 130, and a very tiny chance anyone lives to age 135 this century. </p>
<p>In other words, the data suggests that life span may not have a hard limit, but a practical one. Humans will almost certainly break Calment’s record of 122 this century, but probably not by more than a decade.</p>
<p>While we carried out our analysis using data collected before the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n1343">impact on life expectancy</a>, we believe our overall findings remain accurate. The pandemic may lead to a somewhat smaller total number of 21st-century supercentenarians. But that reduction is unlikely to be very large, and any big effect on their mortality past 110 is unlikely to last many years into the future. </p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adrian Raftery receives funding from NICHD. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Pearce does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Jeanne Calment of France died in 1997 at the age of 122 years and 164 days. That record will be broken this century, statistical models suggest.Michael Pearce, PhD Candidate in Statistics, University of WashingtonAdrian Raftery, Boeing International Professor of Statistics and Sociology, University of WashingtonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.