tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/east-asia-17135/articles
East Asia – La Conversation
2024-03-20T19:55:20Z
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/226186
2024-03-20T19:55:20Z
2024-03-20T19:55:20Z
What Article 23 means for the future of Hong Kong and its once vibrant pro-democracy movement
<p><em>Lawmakers in Hong Kong <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/19/hong-kong-article-23-security-law/">passed new security legislation</a> on March 19, 2024, handing authorities in the semi-autonomous city-state further power to clamp down on dissent.</em></p>
<p><em>The law, under <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/what-is-article-23-hong-kongs-new-draconian-national-security-law">Article 23</a>, has been decades in the making but was resisted for a long time by protesters who feared the legislation’s effect on civil liberties in Hong Kong, a special administrative region in China that has become increasingly under the thumb of Beijing.</em></p>
<p><em>To explain what the adoption of Article 23, which is set to be signed into law on March 23, 2024, means for the future of Hong Kong, The Conversation turned to Michael C. Davis, a <a href="https://jgu.edu.in/jgls/prof-michael-c-davis/">law professor</a> who taught constitutional law and human rights in Hong Kong for more than 30 years, most recently at the University of Hong Kong, and is the author of “<a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/freedom-undone/9781952636448">Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values in Hong Kong</a>.”</em></p>
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<h2>What is the background to Article 23?</h2>
<p>Article 23 has a lengthy backstory. It is an article in the <a href="https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/index/">Basic Law of Hong Kong</a> requiring the Hong Kong government to enact a local ordinance governing national security. The Basic Law itself is effectively the constitution of Hong Kong. Its promulgation by the central government was part of China’s obligation under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 – the treaty providing for Hong Kong’s return to China. Thirteen years later, in 1997, the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-40426827">territory was transferred to Chinese rule</a> after more than a century under the British. </p>
<p>The Basic Law established a largely liberal constitutional order for post-handover Hong Kong. This included guarantees of the rule of law and basic freedoms, as well as a promise of ultimate universal suffrage. It was formally adopted by China’s National People’s Congress in 1990.</p>
<p>Basic Law Article 23 requires the Hong Kong government to “on its own” enact certain national security laws relating to treason, secession, sedition, subversion or theft of state secrets, and to regulate foreign organizations.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government first put forward an Article 23 bill in 2003. But due to concerns over the implications for press and organizational freedoms, as well as expanded police powers, the proposed bill <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68594448">met with widespread opposition</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A uniformed police officer puts his fingers in his ears in front of a sign that has the number 23 crossed out." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583128/original/file-20240320-16-thmm5q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Noisy protests help defeat an earlier version of Article 23 in 2003.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/police-officer-puts-his-fingers-in-his-ears-to-protect-news-photo/1258921548?adppopup=true">Peter Parks/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span>
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<p>A group of seven leading lawyers and two legal academics, including myself, challenged the proposed bill in a collection of pamphlets that highlighted its deficiencies under international human rights standards. Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3178339/july-1-2003-500000-take-hong-kongs-streets-protest-against">half a million protesters</a> took to the streets of Hong Kong. </p>
<p>In the face of such opposition and the consequent withdrawal of support by a leading pro-goverment party, the bill was withdrawn. </p>
<p>Rather than come forward with a replacement bill that would address human rights concerns, the government opted to let Article 23 languish for two decades.</p>
<p>Then, in 2020, Beijing <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/">imposed a national security law</a> that gave Hong Kong authorities greater power. It led to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/one-year-hong-kong-arrests-117-people-under-new-security-law-2021-06-30/">arrest and repression of opposition figures</a> in Hong Kong, silencing the once-vibrant democracy movement. </p>
<p>With no effective opposition left and the threat of arrest for anyone who speaks out, the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government decided now was the time to ram through a more extreme version of the bill.</p>
<p>The Hong Kong government, with Beijing’s encouragement, was able to open up a short consultation on the new Article 23 legislative proposal with little or no opposition expressed. </p>
<p>The process was facilitated by a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/hong-kong-patriots-only-election-falls-flat-with-record-low-turnout-2023-12-11">patriots only” electoral system</a> imposed by Beijing in 2021 that has tightened Beijing’s grip over the Hong Kong legislature, leading to unanimous support for the bill.</p>
<h2>How will it affect civil liberties in Hong Kong?</h2>
<p>In tandem with the 2020 Beijing-imposed national security law, the new Article 23 legislation will have a dramatic effect on civil liberties.</p>
<p>The national security law – with its vague provisions on secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion – has already been used along with a colonial-era sedition law to arrest and silence dissent in Hong Kong. Many opposition figures <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/20/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-leaders.html">are in prison or have fled into exile</a>. And those with dissenting views who remain have largely gone silent. </p>
<p>The draft bill expands on the national security law in key areas: the stealing of state secrets, insurrection, sabotage and external interference in Hong Kong.</p>
<p>It essentially embraces mainland China’s comprehensive national security regime, which has long focused on suppressing internal opposition, targeting numerous areas of local civil life, impacting organizational, press and academic freedoms.</p>
<p>Included in Article 23 is the adoption of the mainland’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/world/asia/china-state-secrets-law.html">broad definition of “state secrets</a>,” which can even include reporting or writing on social and economic development policies. </p>
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<p>The legislation expands the potential use of incarceration with both lengthy sentences upon conviction and longer holding of suspects before trial.</p>
<p>Article 23 also intensifies <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/30/hong-kong-article-23-new-national-security-laws-explained-what-do-they-mean">scrutiny of “foreign influence</a>” – making working with outsiders risky for Hong Kong citizens.</p>
<p>The draft legislation speaks disparagingly of activism under the guises of fighting for or monitoring human rights and is critical of “so-called” nongovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>All of this makes working with or supporting international human rights organizations perilous. </p>
<p>In short, in the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a national security order with weak or no protections for basic freedoms.</p>
<h2>What is the wider context to Article 23?</h2>
<p>To understand this legislation, one must appreciate the Chinese Communist Party’s deep hostility to liberal values and institutions, such as the rule of law, civil liberties, independent courts, a free press and public accountability. Such liberal ideas are viewed as an existential threat to party rule. </p>
<p>This mindset has led to a dramatic expansion of the party’s <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-vows-to-safeguard-national-security-with-new-laws-at-conclave-/7520474.html">national security agenda</a> under current leader Xi Jinping. </p>
<p>Beijing has emphasized economic development in recent decades, staking its legitimacy on economic growth – betting that people will care more about their standard of living than about political freedoms. But as <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/15/china-needs-reforms-to-halt-significant-growth-declines-imf-chief.html">growth declines</a>, leaders’ concerns about security and dissent have grown, placing such security even above economic development.</p>
<p>This has led to the comprehensive national security concept now being imposed on Hong Kong. </p>
<p>With Beijing advancing an agenda that casts liberal, democratic ideas as a threat, a liberal Hong Kong on the country’s border became impossible for the Chinese Communist Party to ignore.</p>
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<img alt="A group of protesters shelter under umbrellas" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/583131/original/file-20240320-18-8saqyx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Protestors in Hong Kong use umbrellas as improvised shields in 2019.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/protestors-using-improvise-shield-to-push-toward-police-news-photo/1191713262?adppopup=true">Kwan Wong/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Widespread <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48607723">protests in Hong Kong in 2019</a> both exacerbated this concern and offered an opportunity for Beijing to address the perceived threat under the <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202112/1240540.shtml">claim that protesters were advancing a so-called “color revolution</a>.”</p>
<p>Having long nurtured its loyalist camp to rule Hong Kong, these loyal officials became the instrument of the crackdown.</p>
<h2>What does the lack of protest now say about the pro-democracy movement?</h2>
<p>It tells us that the mainland national security regime imposed on Hong Kong has effectively intimidated the society, especially those with opposition views, into silence. </p>
<p>Hong Kong’s pro-democratic camp had <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.5563">historically enjoyed majority support, at around 60%</a> of the voters in the direct elections that were allowed for half of the legislative seats.</p>
<p>The introduction of loyalists-only elections led to a dramatically reduced turnout.</p>
<p>This and emigration patterns tend to show that the majority of Hong Kong people do not support this new illiberal order.</p>
<p>Be that as it may, with most of their pro-democratic leaders either in jail or exile, they dare not speak out against the new national security regime.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226186/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael C. Davis does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
In the space of two decades, Hong Kong’s liberal constitutional order has been transformed into a security regime that grants citizens few civil liberties
Michael C. Davis, Professor of Law and International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/225098
2024-03-19T18:17:40Z
2024-03-19T18:17:40Z
Japan has abandoned decades of pacifism in response to Ukraine invasion and increased Chinese pressure on Taiwan
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, have left tens of thousands dead and sent shockwaves across Europe and the Middle East. But – brutal and tragic as they are – the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are regionally bounded, meaning that most of the rest of the world rolls along, largely unaffected. This will not be the case if armed conflict breaks out in east Asia.</p>
<p>Thanks to rising tensions in the Taiwan Straits, Kim Jong Un’s sabre-rattling on the Korean Peninsula, Sino-US rivalry and China’s developing alliance with Russia the risks of armed conflict shattering this region are growing, with far-reaching ramifications. </p>
<p>East Asia <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/05/01/asia-poised-to-drive-global-economic-growth-boosted-by-chinas-reopening">drives the global economy</a>. Taiwan is pivotal to the global semiconductor industry – essential to modern life. Taiwanese semiconductors power everything from TVs to cars, guided missiles to AI-bots. After Taiwan, neighbouring South Korea has the second-highest market share. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, despite the US and EU’s efforts to reduce their dependency on China, it remains by far the world’s biggest manufacturer. Global supply chains bring commodities, components, and finished goods in and out of the region through major sea-trade routes south to the straits of Malacca and east across the Pacific to the Americas. </p>
<p>Against this tense backdrop, later this year the US will elect a new president. As the incumbent, Joe Biden, struggles in the polls, his rival Donald Trump’s prospects are improving. This is leading to grave and growing concerns in Europe that Trump will abandon Ukraine – and perhaps even Nato itself, overturning decades of security stability in Europe. But what of east Asia? </p>
<h2>Cornerstone for Asian security</h2>
<p>The security of east Asia – and thus the stability of the global economy – is predicated on a country we have yet to mention: Japan. The US-Japanese alliance has defined Asian security since the early days of the cold war and US troops have had a continuous presence on Japanese soil since 1945. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance">1960 treaty</a> on which it is based, if Japan is attacked, the US must come to its defence. The obligation is not mutual, however, thanks to the pacifist clause US officials inserted into <a href="https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html">Japan’s postwar constitution</a>. </p>
<p>The intention was to prevent Japan becoming a future threat, and the result is that Japan became an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, with US military bases scattered across the archipelago. </p>
<p>This “Pax Americana” enabled decades of regional peace and economic growth – albeit on terms dictated by the US. For decades, Japan was a sleeping partner in all this: enjoying the peace and prosperity without spending much on its own military or getting involved in US adventurism.</p>
<p>But after years of <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/11/japan-prime-minister-rearmament-china-north-korea/">US pressure to remilitarise</a>, today Japan is <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/12/22/japanese-cabinet-approves-largest-ever-defense-budget">increasing military spending</a> and taking a regional leadership role. This is Japan’s response to a rising China, relative US decline, and increasingly isolationist American public opinion – not to mention Trump’s “America first” rhetoric. </p>
<h2>‘Proactive Pacifism’</h2>
<p>Today’s changes are the culmination of decades of drift from pacifism to “normality”. Following Shinzo Abe’s return to power in 2012, Japan rolled out a new security doctrine in the form of its <a href="https://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/ejcjs/vol18/iss3/envall.html">“proactive pacifism”</a>. </p>
<p>As part of this shift, in December 2022 Japan introduced a revised <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/guideline/pdf/security_strategy_en.pdf">national security strategy</a> and new security institutions such as a <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000080.html">National Security Council</a>. It has lifted a long-standing <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/22/japan-eases-curbs-on-weapons-exports-raises-defence-budget-to-record-56bn">ban on arms exports</a>, initiated new <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-role-advancing-networked-regional-security-architecture">regional security partnerships</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/13/japans-pm-vows-to-modernise-military-for-new-era-of-threats">modernised</a> its military, and reinterpreted the postwar pacifist constitution to allow for Japan’s participation in <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/japans-evolving-position-use-force-collective-self-defense">collective self-defence</a> operations alongside allies. </p>
<p>Most importantly, Abe’s government crafted its <a href="https://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000352880.pdf">“Free and Open Indo-Pacific”</a> vision, thus engineering a new geopolitical space that has defined the parameters for rebalancing China’s rise.</p>
<p>These changes were designed to increase Japan’s influence within the context of the US alliance. Then came Trump’s 2016 presidential election. The rhetoric of “America first” increased fears of abandonment in Tokyo. Given the alternative scenario – facing China alone – the Abe government worked hard to keep Trump onside, making trade and diplomatic concessions, and pledging to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2020.1838486">“make the alliance even greater”</a>. </p>
<h2>After Ukraine</h2>
<p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was the final nail in the coffin of Japan’s postwar pacifism. On the first anniversary of the invasion, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/02/25/japan/politics/japan-ukraine-anniversary-g7/">warned,</a> “Ukraine today could be east Asia tomorrow,” implying that Taiwan could be next. </p>
<p>Continuing where Abe left off, he pledged to increase military spending as well as lifting the remaining restrictions on arms exports, while <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01442872.2024.2309218">strengthening Japan’s relations with Nato</a>.</p>
<p>Increasing global instability has prompted Japan to abandon its low-profile, economy-first approach, seeking instead to shape regional and even global geopolitics. By expanding its security role, it has made itself even more indispensable to the US, which sees China as the primary long-term threat. </p>
<p>So, while Japan may fear a second Trump presidency, the risk of abandonment is lower than that faced by America’s allies in Europe. Still, the long-term trend would appear to be that the US is pulling back and expecting its allies to do more. Meanwhile the instability of US politics in an election year means that nothing can be taken for granted.</p>
<p>As the US recedes, can Japan fill the gap? Or will its ambitions exceed its capabilities? Already, plans to further develop its military are hampered by a shrinking economy and a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/26/japan-population-how-many-people-drops-first-time-births-deaths">shrinking population</a>. While China faces similar issues, its economy is over four times bigger than that of Japan’s, and its population is ten times the size. </p>
<p>Thus, the only realistic way for Japan to balance China, manage North Korea, and maintain its regional position, is for the US to stay engaged. And even that might not be enough to prevent China from invading Taiwan. The future of the region, and of the global economy, hangs in the balance.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225098/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
The invasion of Ukraine and increased Chinese pressure on Taiwan have prompted Japan to abandon decades of pacifism.
Paul O'Shea, Senior Lecturer, Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University
Sebastian Maslow, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Sendai Shirayuri Women’s College
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/220898
2024-03-06T13:35:55Z
2024-03-06T13:35:55Z
President Yoon is lauded in West for embracing Japan − in South Korea it fits a conservative agenda that is proving less popular
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576051/original/file-20240215-17705-dcmnsd.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=6%2C0%2C4486%2C2991&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">South Korea's Yoon Suk Yeol, left, and Fumio Kishida of Japan.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yoon-suk-yeol-south-koreas-president-left-and-fumio-kishida-news-photo/1248372073?adppopup=true">Kiyoshi Otal/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol broke out into an impromptu performance of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/south-korea-president-yoon-sings-american-pie-white-house-dinner-biden-rcna81712">the song “American Pie”</a> at a gala White House dinner in 2023, it was more than just a musical interlude. It was symbolic of how on the big Indo-Pacific issues of the day, Washington and Seoul are singing from the same songbook.</p>
<p>But so, too, is Japan. And for South Korea’s <a href="https://twitter.com/richardaeden/status/1709999502373867817">karaoke-loving leader</a>, that means humming a different tune to predecessors on the international stage – and risking hitting a sour note back at home.</p>
<p>Yoon, who <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/world/asia/south-korea-yoon-president.html">took office in May 2022</a>, has embraced closer ties with Japan, South Korea’s former colonizer, as part of an alignment with <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/01/15/south-koreas-global-geopolitical-pivot/">U.S.-led security cooperation</a> in the Indo-Pacific region. It entails a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/05/south-korea-mood-north-korea-weapons/1d4d0884-c495-11ee-bbc9-9b5ca9b20779_story.html">more demanding stance toward North Korea’s</a> denuclearization and a watchful eye on China and its <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-chinese-warships-near-miss-in-taiwan-strait-hints-at-ongoing-troubled-diplomatic-waters-despite-chatter-about-talks-207099">increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea</a>. </p>
<p>The approach culminated in a historic Camp David summit in 2023 aimed at solidifying relations between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-south-korea-japan-agree-crisis-consultations-camp-david-summit-2023-08-18/">South Korea and Japan</a>.</p>
<p>Such rapprochement with Japan has <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230712000396">won Yoon plaudits in the U.S</a>.</p>
<p>But it has done nothing to improve his popularity back home. In South Korea there is growing disapproval of Yoon’s leadership. Critics point to an illiberal streak in his <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3233552/south-korea-us-japan-ties-deepen-yoon-uses-anti-communist-rhetoric-decide-whos-friend-or-foe">rhetoric and policies</a>, which has included attacks on his critics and the media. It has, they contend, contributed to a <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-worrying-democratic-erosions-in-south-korea">worrying trend of democratic erosion</a> in Korea. Yoon’s <a href="https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/south-korean-president-sees-support-slide-after-dior-bag-uproar-1.2029826">poll ratings are sinking</a> at a time when his conservative party seeks control of parliament in elections slated for April 10, 2024.</p>
<p>As scholars who study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=eKMLsOoAAAAJ&hl=en">democratization and authoritarian politics</a> and <a href="https://search.asu.edu/profile/4857318">modern Korea</a>,
we are watching as these concerns grow in the run-up to the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/South-Korea-opposition-wins-by-election-in-blow-to-Yoon">parliamentary elections</a>. That vote will prove a test of the popular support for Yoon, his domestic agenda and his vision for South Korea’s more outward-looking international role. </p>
<h2>Japan is ‘now our partner’</h2>
<p>Yoon struck a raw nerve in an Aug. 15, 2023, speech celebrating National Liberation Day in Korea, in which he <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230815002000315">affirmed the country’s partnership with neighboring Japan</a>. He said the country’s former colonial occupier is “now our partner, sharing universal values and pursuing common interests,” and emphasized that “as security and economic partners, Korea and Japan will cooperate with a forward-looking approach, contributing to global peace and prosperity.”</p>
<p>His remarks were <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-South-Korea-ties/Yoon-riles-foes-by-extending-olive-branch-to-Japan-in-speech">met with public outrage</a>, especially given their timing: National Liberation Day commemorates Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, which lasted from 1910 to 1945. </p>
<p>The Japanese occupation was brutal, simultaneously exploiting Korean women – as evident in the use of so-called “<a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/guide-understanding-history-comfort-women-issue">comfort women</a>,” or military sexual slaves – and treating Koreans generally as second-class citizens, all the while pushing obligatory assimilation into Japanese civilization on the occupied population.</p>
<p>Attempts by the Japanese colonial regime at erasing a separate Korean identity and culture – this included banning the teaching of the Korean language and coercing Koreans to adopt Japanese names, along with the violent suppression of independence movements – left deep scars on the collective Korean psyche.</p>
<p>For many Koreans, watching their country join Japan in <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/">a trilateral partnership</a> with the U.S. is too much to accept. </p>
<h2>Emergence of pro-Japan voices</h2>
<p>Yoon and his conservative administration’s foreign policy goals are based not on nationalism but on what has been described as “<a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/05/yoon-vows-to-build-a-value-based-alliance-with-washington/">a value-based alliance” with Washington</a>. This stance is at odds with the nationalist focus often seen in the right-wing politics of other countries.</p>
<p>Indeed, in South Korea it is the political left that <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.103039">increasingly identifies with a form of nationalism</a>. Meanwhile, the “New Right” in South Korea has correspondingly embraced an anti-nationalist stance, specifically <a href="https://read.dukeupress.edu/journal-of-asian-studies/article-abstract/80/4/889/320818/An-Old-Right-in-New-Bottles-State-without-Nation">attacking anti-Japanese sentiment</a>.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, Korean conservatives have increasingly distanced themselves from nationalism, particularly of the anti-Japanese variety. If, as theorists such as <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nations_and_Nationalism.html?id=jl7t2yMfxwIC">Ernest Gellner</a> have argued, modern nationalism is based on the presumed unity of state and nation, political developments in Korea since 1980 have destabilized this relationship.</p>
<p>After the <a href="https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/gi-wook-shin-gwangju-and-south-korea%E2%80%99s-democracy">bloodshed of the Gwangju Massacre in 1980</a>, during which the state killed hundreds of its own citizens, leftist nationalists argued that the South Korean state was neither the representative or defender of the Korean nation.</p>
<p>Rather, they saw the South Korean state’s inheritance of institutions and personnel from the Japanese colonial government, alongside the hegemonic presence of the United States in Korea – <a href="https://www.hamptonthink.org/read/from-stolen-land-to-riches-us-neo-colonialism-in-south-korea">characterized as “neocolonial</a>” by some – as diluting the state’s nationalist credentials.</p>
<p>In contrast, conservatives defended the South Korean authoritarian state’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-asian-studies/article/abs/an-old-right-in-new-bottles-state-without-nation-in-south-korean-new-right-historiography/E9951071B74D329266F850B11874FC62">legitimacy and its legacies</a>. They argued that authoritarian rule was responsible for the rapid economic growth that allowed South Koreans to live in prosperity.</p>
<p>As part of their defense of Korea’s legacy and attack on a political left increasingly identified with nationalism, conservatives embraced an anti-nationalist stance, specifically <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-South-Korea-rift/South-Korean-bestseller-attacking-anti-Japan-tribalism-stirs-debate">attacking anti-Japanese rhetoric</a>. This has involved downplaying the negative effects of Japan’s colonial rule in Korea between 1910 and 1945 and even rejecting the validity of Korean comfort women testimonies. One additional motivation for conservatives has been to justify the achievements of right-wing heroes such as former dictator Park Chung Hee. Park, who has been credited with jump-starting Korea’s economic growth, has been <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20190307-enemy-within-shadow-japanese-past-hangs-over-korea">castigated by nationalists as a pro-Japanese collaborator</a> due to his having been <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674659865">trained in the Manchurian and Japanese military academies during the 1940s</a>.</p>
<p>Starting around the turn of the century, there has been a gradual increase in the frequency and intensity of pro-Japan voices. Far-right organizations, such as the <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/647783.html">Republic of Korea Mom’s Brigade</a>, have since the 2010s organized rallies in defense of Japanese colonialism. More recently, far-right groups have <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1026135.html">systematically disrupted</a> so-called <a href="https://thesoulofseoul.net/korean-comfort-women-wednesday-protests/">Wednesday Demonstrations</a> – a protest that has been continually held for over 30 years in front of the Japanese embassy in Korea to demand that Japan address the comfort women issue.</p>
<p>In a 2019 bestselling book, conservatives even attacked anti-Japanese nationalism as <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/911772.html">a form of “tribalism” on the left</a>. It is in this context of the growing prominence of pro-Japan voices that Yoon, in a 2023 <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/24/south-korea-president-yoon-biden-summit/">interview with The Washington Post</a>, expressed that he “could not accept the notion that Japan must kneel because of what happened 100 years ago.”</p>
<h2>Attacks on critics and fake news</h2>
<p>Yoon embodies this reorientation of Korean conservative ideology and foreign policy that rejects nationalism in favor of closer relations with Japan, especially in the context of alignment with the U.S. against the threat of North Korea and China. The approach has seen Yoon <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/U.S.-Congress-to-invite-South-Korea-s-Yoon-for-address-with-eye-on-China">embraced by American policymakers</a>.</p>
<p>Yet his popularity at home has fallen from an approval rating of above 50% in mid-2022 to <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-02-02/national/politics/President-Yoons-approval-rating-hits-ninemonth-low/1973331">29% at the beginning of February 2024</a>, although it has since picked up a little. </p>
<p>At first glance, his foreign policy seems to support liberal and democratic values. However, in domestic matters there has been growing concern that his rhetoric and policies reflect an <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1104533.html">illiberal character</a>.</p>
<p>Examples include <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/09/22/asia-pacific/politics/yoon-rally-conservative-base/">labeling his opponents as “communists</a>” and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/under-yoon-south-korea-defamation-cases-against-media-rise-/7388864.html">attacks on the media and “fake news</a>.”</p>
<p>This is perhaps unsurprising; the nature of Korean conservatism is <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2023.2301330?src=">deeply rooted in authoritarianism</a>. </p>
<p>The Biden administration is keen to present Yoon differently – as an ally, along with Japan, in the protection of Asia’s democracies. But this says more about a U.S. foreign policy that centers China as a threat than it does Yoon’s actual commitment to democratic freedoms.</p>
<p>To a South Korea audience, however, Yoon’s position on Japan only adds to general concern over his <a href="https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1104533.html">illiberal tendencies</a> ahead of April’s vote – the first general parliamentary elections during Yoon’s tenure.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: The article was updated on March 7, 2024 to clarify Park Chung Hee’s World War II record.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/220898/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Critics of the South Korean leader accuse him of eroding democracy at home while embracing a historic enemy on the international stage.
Myunghee Lee, Assistant Professor, Michigan State University
Sungik Yang, Assistant Professor of History, Arizona State University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/221457
2024-01-24T13:29:26Z
2024-01-24T13:29:26Z
Domestic woes put Kim Jong Un on the defensive – and the offensive – in the Korean Peninsula
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570985/original/file-20240123-29-kr6fby.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=5%2C0%2C3595%2C2396&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on a screen at the Seoul Railway Station on Aug. 24, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-watch-a-television-broadcast-showing-a-file-image-of-news-photo/1634983526?adppopup=true">Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Kim Jong Un has had a busy and bellicose start to 2024. </p>
<p>On Jan. 14, the North Korean leader presided over the test of a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-defines-south-korea-most-hostile-state-kcna-2024-01-09/">new solid-fuel hypersonic missile with intermediate range</a>.” Two days later, during a speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly meeting in Pyongyang, Kim declared South Korea “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/16/asia/north-korea-kim-unification-arch-intl-hnk/index.html">the North’s primary foe and invariable principal enemy</a>.” He also vowed to “<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/north-korea-to-destroy-inter-korean-links-redefine-borders-in-constitution/">purge unification language from the constitution</a>” and called for the destruction of “inter-Korean symbols,” such as the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-tears-down-monument-symbolizing-union-with-south-report-2024-01-23/">Arch of Reunification monument</a>, which has since been torn down in Pyongyang.</p>
<p>Then Kim went a step further: He spoke of war. </p>
<p>Noting that while North Korea does not want conflict, the communist country nevertheless had no “<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/01/north-korea-to-destroy-inter-korean-links-redefine-borders-in-constitution/">intention of avoiding it</a>.” Kim went on to disclose the North’s plans to “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-calls-change-status-south-warns-war-2024-01-15/">occupy, subjugate and reclaim</a>” South Korea in the event of war. </p>
<p>Kim’s remarks served to escalate inter-Korean tensions in a way familiar to observers of relations on the peninsula, <a href="https://www.ubalt.edu/cpa/faculty/alphabetical-directory/nusta-carranza-ko.cfm">like myself</a>. Kim has a tendency to issue threats directed at the South <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-year-same-old-story-korean-peninsula-2024">at regular intervals</a>. </p>
<p>The difference, this time, was the backstory behind Kim’s threats. Understanding that shines a light on North Koreans’ awareness of deficiencies in their leadership – and on Kim’s desire to deflect from domestic problems.</p>
<h2>A train wreck</h2>
<p>On Jan. 16, 2024, <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/trainaccident-01162024092147.html">Radio Free Asia</a> published a news story about a train accident in North Korea. According to the outlet, a Hamkyung Province-bound passenger train departing from Pyongyang overturned due to a power shortage while traveling up a steep slope on Dec. 26, 2023.</p>
<p>North Korean passenger trains typically <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/trainaccident-01162024092147.html">consist of nine to 11 carriages</a>, with the first two carriages reserved for high-level government officials. In this accident, the last seven carriages – loaded with everyday Koreans – derailed, according to reports. It is believed that <a href="https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25222782#home">hundreds died as a result</a>.</p>
<p>The details of the accident remain murky because news in North Korea is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16255126">tightly controlled</a>. Some <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1NuHt88WV8">South Korean reports</a> suggest that it may have been a bus and not a train accident. But Kim was careful to point out the need to “<a href="https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25222782#home">improve safety of train rides</a>, during his Jan. 16 address, lending further weight to the train accident account.</p>
<h2>From crash to war threats</h2>
<p>The reported accident comes at a time of increased <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/19/north-korean-defectors-to-south-tripled-in-2023-seoul-says">awareness and discontent</a> among North Koreans that their leadership is not doing much to improve conditions, address the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-struggles-with-food-shortage-despite-import-rebound">scarcity of resources</a> or enhance the safety of average citizens. This is particularly true for those who are not part of the <a href="https://www.bushcenter.org/freedom-collection/kim-seong-min-songbun">ruling elite</a>. </p>
<p>In various surveys conducted by human rights groups of <a href="https://nkdb.org/publication/?q=YToxOntzOjEyOiJrZXl3b3JkX3R5cGUiO3M6MzoiYWxsIjt9&bmode=view&idx=6613026&t=board">North Koreans who have fled to South Korea</a>, escapees mentioned both the dire living conditions of average North Koreans and the gap between their lives and those of high-level government officials.</p>
<p>The current crisis facing North Koreans may not be as acute as the <a href="https://www.38north.org/2023/01/food-insecurity-in-north-korea-is-at-its-worst-since-the-1990s-famine">period of severe famine</a> during the 1990s, during which an estimated
<a href="https://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/7850/1/0000599140.pdf">600,000 to 1 million</a> people died.</p>
<p>But power shortages and food insecurity continue to blight North Koreans. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15387.doc.htm">highlighted in a 2023 report</a> conditions in which "some people are starving” and others are dying “"due to a combination of malnutrition, diseases and lack of access to health care.”</p>
<p>In such circumstances, the train accident may serve as a catalyst or focal point for discontent.</p>
<p>As social change scholar Jack Goldstone has noted, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199858507.003.0002">societal unrest builds on</a> “some form of increasingly widespread popular anger at injustice” and when people feel “they are losing their proper place in society for reasons that are not inevitable and not their fault.”</p>
<h2>A master of deflection</h2>
<p>Worryingly for Kim, disquiet over both the train crash report and food and energy shortages comes as North Korea enters what experts have noted is “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure">a critical period of change</a>” in the state. Kim is faced with a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/music-ap-top-news-north-korea-international-news-kim-jong-un-32ef1db725824060bbed9074128d6875">younger generation</a> more used to market economics – typified by the “<a href="https://austriancenter.com/north-korea-black-markets-saving-lives/">jangmadang” black markets</a> – and with greater access to external information. This clashes with the regime’s official ideology of economic <a href="https://www.time.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/korea1.pdf">self-reliance, or “juche</a>,” and an isolationist approach that cuts off much of the outside world.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A missile is seen being fired into the air trailed by a plume of smoke." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=326&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/570986/original/file-20240123-23-w2j1u4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=410&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspecting the launch of a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/at-seouls-yongsan-railway-station-shows-north-korean-leader-news-photo/1859975434?adppopup=true">Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Kim is aware of this new frontier in governance. To confront it, he has readopted the “<a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/byungjin.htm">byungjin” policy</a> he first rolled out in 2013 — a two-pillared approach based on building up both the military and the economy in a bid to reduce chances for domestic discontent. </p>
<p>To successfully carry out this policy, Kim has had to become a master of deflection.</p>
<p>He is aware that the train incident comes amid <a href="https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/peoplecontrol-01162024091639.html">discontent and protest</a> over policies that have seen increased government surveillance and people’s homes raided over suspicion of anti-socialist tendencies.</p>
<p>As such, Kim appears to be deflecting domestic anger by signaling war and creating uncertainty for North Koreans’ future. This is similar to what <a href="https://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Economics/Seminarsevents/Guriev-Micro.pdf">scholars explain</a> is a characteristic of new-style dictators who “manipulate beliefs” about the state of the world to make it look like outside threats are greater than domestic problems.</p>
<h2>International playbook</h2>
<p>The truth is, for Kim this deflection appears to be working. The war rhetoric has resulted in U.S., Japan and South Korea conducting combined naval exercises involving <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/us-south-korea-japan-conduct-naval-drills-tensions-106434423">American aircraft carriers</a>. Meanwhile, North Korea sent its foreign minister to Russia to cultivate bilateral relations that involve North Korean <a href="https://www.voakorea.com/a/7444240.html">weaponry used in the war against Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>No one – North Korean news outlets, foreign journalists or world leaders – is mentioning the hundreds of people that likely died in the train accident, or those starving in the country.</p>
<p>Kim’s deflection also has an intended audience outside of North Korea itself: U.S. politicians and the South Korean public.</p>
<p>The Biden administration has <a href="https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1089850.html">adopted a more hawkish</a> stance toward North Korea, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/13/trump-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-plan-00131469">moving closer to allies</a> Japan and South Korea to ensure a coordinated approach to North Korea. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Biden’s likely challenger in the upcoming presidential vote is Donald Trump – who as president met Kim during a 2018 Singapore summit and has since touted the idea of allowing North Korea to keep its nuclear weapons while offering financial incentives to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/13/trump-north-korea-nuclear-weapons-plan-00131469">stop making new bombs</a>.</p>
<p>Trump has stressed how much he has gotten to know the North Korean leader and the “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/09/trump-book-kim-jong-un-00086410">great relationship</a>” he has formed with him. There is a scenario where Kim’s belligerent rhetoric could be seized by Trump as evidence that Biden’s approach is not working.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, South Korea’s legislative <a href="https://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2024011601070130103001">elections are also impacted</a> by Kim’s deflection tactics. The declaration of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/16/asia/north-korea-kim-unification-arch-intl-hnk/index.html">South Korea as the “enemy</a>,” and the launch of missiles are designed, in part, to influence the South Korean public’s perception about security on the peninsula. </p>
<p>Evans Revere, a former State Department official, explains that Kim’s remarks are “<a href="https://www.voakorea.com/a/7443247.html">designed to exploit political divisions</a>” in South Korea. In this kind of environment of war rhetoric, voters could be persuaded to support political parties that stress engagement and are less likely to support current President Yoon Suk Yeol’s party’s <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/South-Korea-picks-hard-liner-as-new-North-Korea-point-man">hardline approach</a> to North Korean matters.</p>
<p>For Kim, a South Korean legislative body that is willing to tolerate his whims is more favorable than one critical of its regime, as is a friendlier man in the White House.</p>
<p>Kim Jong Un’s deflection certainly has more than one audience, but only one aim: to keep him in power.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221457/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ñusta Carranza Ko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Amid signs of growing domestic disquiet over his repressive regime, North Korea’s leader is trying to deflect scrutiny by upping war rhetoric.
Ñusta Carranza Ko, Assistant Professor of Global Affairs and Human Security, University of Baltimore
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/217955
2024-01-09T13:44:22Z
2024-01-09T13:44:22Z
Taiwanese election may determine whether Beijing opts to force the issue of reunification
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568309/original/file-20240108-19-kmxh2e.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3988&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Posters of presidential candidate William Lai and his running mate, Hsiao Bi-khim.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/posters-of-presidential-candidate-lai-ching-te-and-his-news-photo/1905136679?adppopup=true">Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the votes are being tallied in <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/1/6/24026992/taiwan-china-president-war-xi-jinping-asia-semiconductors-chips">Taiwan’s presidential election</a>, it won’t be only the <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/taiwan/">23.6 million inhabitants of the island</a> eagerly awaiting a result – in Beijing and Washington, too, there will be some anxious faces.</p>
<p>The vote of Jan. 13, 2024, is seen as a litmus test for the future of cross-strait relations, coming at a time when the status quo over Taiwan – a territory <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-taiwan-a-country-or-not-213638">Beijing claims as an integral part of “one China</a>” – is being challenged. If Taiwan’s incumbent, independence-oriented party stays in power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping might feel he has no choice but to force the issue of reunification.</p>
<p>Conversely, if the opposition – which agrees with Beijing that Taiwan and the mainland are part of “one China” but not about who governs it – wins, Beijing might feel it has more space to be patient on the issue.</p>
<p>In the run-up to the vote, Beijing has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-says-taiwan-is-hyping-up-military-threat-its-own-gain-2023-12-28/">ramped up military exercises</a> in and around the Taiwan Strait in an apparent warning to Taiwanese voters. On Jan. 6, in one of the most recent incidents, China <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taiwan-chinese-balloons-harassment-threat-air-safety-106154165">sent a series of balloons</a> over the island, which the Taiwan government cited as a threat to air travel and an attempt at intimidation.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in his <a href="https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202312/t20231231_11215608.html">annual New Year’s address</a>, Xi stated that “China will surely be reunified,” raising fears internationally that he intends to pursue the issue militarily if necessary. </p>
<p>For Washington, too, the outcome of the vote <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/2/us-watching-taiwan-elections-closely-as-beijing-reiterates-claim-to-island">will have implications</a>. The United States has cultivated strong ties with the current leadership of Taiwan. But recent tensions in the strait have raised the risk of war. U.S. actions deemed provocative by Beijing, such as the 2022 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-puts-the-white-house-in-delicate-straits-of-diplomacy-with-china-188116">visit of then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan</a>, have resulted in China upping its military threats in the strait. And this has raised speculation that China’s patience is growing thin and its timeline for reunification is growing shorter. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/but-can-the-united-states-defend-taiwan/">questions about the U.S. capacity</a> to respond to any Chinese aggression over Taiwan have risen; the specter of war in a third region of the world – after Ukraine and Israel – <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/top-us-general-warns-everyone-should-worried-about-war-china-1849085">worries national security leadership</a> in Washington.</p>
<h2>Independence on the ballot?</h2>
<p>The presidential election in Taiwan has come down to a three-way race. The front-runner is <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions">current Vice President William Lai</a>, who is the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP views Taiwan as a sovereign country and does not seek reunification with China.</p>
<p>Lai’s challengers are New Taipei City mayor Hou Yu-ih, of the Kuomintang (KMT), and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei running for the center-left Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). The KMT embraces the idea of future reunification with China under a democratic government. The TPP criticizes both DPP and KMT platforms on cross-strait relations as too extreme and seeks a middle ground that maintains the status quo: A Taiwan that is de facto sovereign, but with strong economic and cultural ties with China. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A woman makes a heart shape with her arms, behind her are people carrying flags and placards." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/568313/original/file-20240108-17-qkzx3b.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Supporters of Kuomintang at a campaign rally in Taichung, Taiwan, on Jan. 8, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/supporters-listen-kuomintang-presidential-candidate-hou-yu-news-photo/1910638618?adppopup=true">Man Hei Leung/Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Taiwan law mandates that no polls are published in the 10 days before the election. As of Jan. 3, when the final polls were published, <a href="https://www.economist.com/interactive/2024-taiwan-election">averages had Lai leading</a> with 36%, with Hou at 31% and Ko at 24%.</p>
<p>Lai has consistently led in the polls, prompting the KMT and TPP to earlier <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwans-opposition-parties-decide-joint-presidential-ticket-2023-11-15/">consider running on a joint ticket</a>. But the two parties <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67471139">failed to agree on terms</a>, and the coalition attempt imploded. </p>
<p>This may prove crucial, as joining forces may have represented the best chance of a KMT candidate being elected – an outcome that may have cooled tensions with Beijing.</p>
<h2>Taiwanese democracy</h2>
<p>The island of Taiwan has been governed as the “Republic of China” since 1949, when the KMT <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">lost a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party</a>. The CCP set up the People’s Republic of China on the mainland, and the KMT retreated to Taiwan.</p>
<p>For decades, both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China diverged on every possible policy except one: Both governments agreed that there was <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-the-one-china-policy/">only one China</a>, and that Taiwan was a part of China. They each sought to unite Taiwan and the mainland – but under their own rule.</p>
<p>Although that remains the goal in Beijing today, for Taiwan the outlook has started to change. </p>
<p>The change began with <a href="https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/-democratic-transition-and-consolidation-in-taiwan_122745967872.pdf">Taiwanese democratization</a> – a process that began in the early 1990s after decades of autocratic rule. After gradually rolling out direct elections for the legislature, governors and mayors, the island held its <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/world/taiwan-s-leader-wins-its-election-and-a-mandate.html">first democratic election for president in 1996</a>. Despite Beijing holding military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to interfere with the vote, the KMT-affiliated incumbent won against a DPP candidate with strong ties to the Taiwan independence movement.</p>
<p>Four years later, the DPP’s candidate won and started the first of two consecutive terms. In 2008, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.3423">KMT candidate returned to power</a>. But since 2016, Taiwan has been led by Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP. </p>
<h2>Uneasy consensus</h2>
<p>Cross-strait tensions tend to rise when the DPP is in office and calm somewhat when the KMT is in power. This isn’t because the KMT agrees with Beijing over the status of Taiwan – the party has always been clear that unification could happen only under its own government and never under the leadership of the Communist Party in Beijing. But the KMT affirms the idea that eventual unification with China is its goal for Taiwan. </p>
<p>In 1992, representatives of the KMT and the CCP met in Hong Kong and reached the “<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/the-1992-consensus-why-it-worked-and-why-it-fell-apart/">1992 Consensus</a>.” Despite the name, the two sides do not fully agree on what it meant. The KMT affirmed the idea of one China but noted disagreement on what the government of that China should be; the People’s Republic of China interpreted it as affirming one China under CCP rule. </p>
<p>Still, the 1992 Consensus became the basis of a series of policies strengthening cross-strait ties, and it made KMT-led governments easier for the PRC to tolerate.</p>
<h2>Pro-independence sentiment</h2>
<p>Though speculation about the geopolitical fallout and China’s reaction to the election has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-election-poses-early-2024-test-us-aim-steady-china-ties-2024-01-05/">dominated coverage</a> <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/world/china-tells-taiwan-vote-right-side-history-election-could-determine-cross-strait-relations">of the vote</a> <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/article/3247604/global-impact-taiwan-heads-polls-what-does-islands-presidential-election-mean-cross-strait-and-us">around the world</a>, for Taiwan voters, independence is one of several critical issues the island faces. The <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-are-the-key-issues-in-taiwans-2024-presidential-election/">economy frequently rises even above cross-strait issues</a> in importance, with many voters expressing concern over the rapid rise of housing prices, stagnating salaries, slow economic growth and how the incumbent party handled the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>On the issue of independence itself, Taiwanese polls have shown a creep toward pro-independence sentiment. As of September 2023, <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/09/02/2003805648">nearly half of Taiwanese voters</a> said they preferred independence (48.9%) for the island, while 26.9% sought a continuation of the status quo. A shrinking minority – now just 11.8% – said they hoped for future reunification.</p>
<p>If the DPP remains in power, Beijing may feel the pressure to force the issue of reunification. Xi has called for the Chinese military to be capable of <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-AMONSON%20&%20EGLI_FEATURE%20IWD.PDF">a successful cross-strait invasion by 2027</a>, though a forceful reunification effort might include a combination of economic blockade and military pressure. </p>
<p>If that were to be the case, U.S. commitments to Taiwan – along with U.S. credibility among its Asian allies – could be on the line. President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that he is <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-again-indicates-that-us-will-defend-taiwan-militarily-does-this-constitute-a-change-in-policy-190946">prepared to defend the island militarily</a> against an attack from mainland China.</p>
<p>Already in 2024, the U.S. is having to contend with two significant conflicts that are demanding its attention. How Taiwanese voters mark their ballot – and how policymakers in Beijing respond – may determine whether a third war is more or less likely.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/217955/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A candidate from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party looks set to win the presidency despite Beijing’s pressure and rhetoric.
Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/211576
2023-08-17T15:45:18Z
2023-08-17T15:45:18Z
Solidarity and symbolism the order of the day as US, Japan and South Korea leaders meet at Camp David
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543080/original/file-20230816-21-r0c5o2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=23%2C106%2C7898%2C5166&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">US President Joe Biden, Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korea's President Yoon Suk Yeol hold a side meeting at the G7 summit.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-japans-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-and-news-photo/1256659186?adppopup=true">Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Camp David is associated with some <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-grounds/camp-david/">special moments in diplomacy</a>. In 1978, the presidential retreat in Maryland hosted Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin – leading to the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david">first peace treaty</a> between Israel and an Arab state.</p>
<p>Although not quite on that level, the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/08/14/biden-summit-camp-david-japan-south-korea-alliance">trilateral meeting being held</a> at the location on Aug. 18, 2023 – between President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida – is nonetheless of great significance.</p>
<p>It represents a culmination of substantial advancements in the relationship between the three countries over the past year, based on the furthering of reconciliation between <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-49330531">two historically antagonistic</a> East Asian nations, and a commitment by all three countries to a common vision for the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf">future of the Indo-Pacific region</a>. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.drake.edu/polsci/facultystaff/marymmccarthy/">expert on U.S.-East Asian foreign relations</a>, I believe the importance of this meeting cannot be overestimated – both for reasons symbolic and strategic; domestic and global. For many observers in Japan and South Korea, images of the two nations’ leaders standing together and putting aside their political differences at such a venue will be deeply meaningful, if controversial for some. Meanwhile the show of solidarity between all three men will be geared towards outside countries, notably China.</p>
<h2>A united front</h2>
<p>This first standalone meeting among the three leaders is a follow-up to their brief gathering in May on the sidelines of the <a href="https://www.g7hiroshima.go.jp/en/">G7 summit in Hiroshima</a>. It is also the <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asia/us-japan-south-korea-reveal-new-joint-defenses-chinese-north-korean-mi-rcna100331">first visit of any foreign leader to Camp David since 2015</a>.</p>
<p>The summit takes place at a time of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations">heightened U.S.-China rivalry</a> and an undermining of global norms by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/ukraine-invasion-2022-117045">Russian invasion of Ukraine</a>. </p>
<p>With that in mind, expect a heavy focus on the symbolism of the meeting. Pictures and videos of the three leaders together will likely be carefully staged and scrutinized not only in the U.S., Japan and South Korea but also in China, Russia and North Korea.</p>
<p>The message that Biden, Yoon and Kishida want to send is clear: The three nations stand solidly against any and all threats to the region.</p>
<p>And although there likely won’t be a formal security alliance established among the three countries, due to reluctance in Tokyo and Seoul, the summit will result in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-korea-japan-set-launch-new-steps-defense-tech-camp-david-officials-2023-08-14/">steps toward greater coordination</a>. This will reportedly include a “<a href="https://news.yahoo.com/us-set-hotline-japan-south-015140363.html">three-way hotline</a>” and plans for an annual leaders summit.</p>
<h2>Playing to a domestic crowd</h2>
<p>While presenting a unified front to current or potential common adversaries, all three leaders will also have an eye towards their domestic audiences.</p>
<p>President Yoon <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/9/south-korean-opposition-candidate-yoon-wins-presidential-election">entered office in May 2022</a> prioritizing improvement in Japan-South Korea relations. This came at significant political risk domestically. Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been at a low point in recent years – as has <a href="https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5562.html">public opinion towards Japan</a> within South Korea. </p>
<p>The points of antagonism are both deep-rooted and recent. Underscoring it are unresolved historical legacy issues relating to <a href="https://www.history.com/news/japan-colonization-korea">Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945</a>. During that time Koreans endured cultural oppression, forced labor and sexual slavery at the hands of the Japanese.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Senior citizens hold signs at a rally" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/543142/original/file-20230817-21-65q9rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">South Korean victims of Japan’s wartime forced labor and sexual slavery attend a rally in Seoul in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/yang-geum-deok-a-south-korean-victim-of-japans-wartime-news-photo/1247573314">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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<p>Recent moves in South Korea to address those wrongs have led to resentment in Japan, not least when the South Korean Supreme Court issued a series of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/asia/south-korea-wartime-compensation-japan.html">rulings in 2018</a> in favor of plaintiffs seeking compensation from Japanese businesses for forced labor during the colonial period.</p>
<p>Since coming to power, Yoon has taken concrete steps to bolster relations between the two East Asian nations, including highlighting Japan as a “partner that shares the same universal values with us” in his <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230301002300315">2023 speech marking the 1919 independence movement against colonial Japan</a>.</p>
<p>In a further olive branch aimed at mitigating ill feelings over the court decisions, Foreign Minister Park Jin announced in March that the South Korean government was <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/06/1161250054/u-s-allies-south-korea-and-japan-move-closer-to-resolve-forced-labor-feud">creating a foundation</a> to collect donations and pay the compensation to forced labor survivors, rather than making demands of Japanese companies or the Japanese government. </p>
<p>This announcement was timed to come right before <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skoreas-yoon-visit-japan-first-such-trip-12-years-2023-03-09/">President Yoon’s visit to Tokyo</a> – the first such visit of a South Korean leader to Japan in 12 years.</p>
<p>Prime Minister Kishida, who entered office in October 2021, initially approached President Yoon’s overtures with caution. Yet, by this May, relations had improved to such an extent that Kishida returned Yoon’s visit with <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/7/japans-kishida-visits-s-korea-to-boost-ties-amid-n-korea-threat">his own trip to Seoul</a> for a bilateral summit.</p>
<h2>Diplomatic niceties</h2>
<p>Better relations between Japan and South Korea benefits U.S. foreign policy goals in Asia. It forms the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china">backbone of the U.S.’s attempt</a> to counter China’s influence in the region. As such, Washington has been working behind the scenes to pressure Japan and South Korea to improve bilateral ties.</p>
<p>Yet, the show of solidarity expected at Camp David does not mean that there aren’t ongoing issues that need to be addressed – or politely ignored in the name of diplomacy.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023">Global uncertainties</a>, for example over the geopolitical fallout of the Ukraine war and a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/25/politics/mark-milley-china-aggression/index.html">seemingly more aggressive China</a> could lead the U.S. to play a more stabilizing role in East Asia. But it could also pull allies of Washington reluctantly into a conflict between the U.S. and other great powers. </p>
<p>And Japan and South Korea are also competitors, both economically and in courting the favor and attention of the U.S. Both East Asian nations are keen to leverage their relationship with the U.S to achieve their own goals in the region and globally.</p>
<p>There will also be critics of the meeting between Kishida and Yoon in both Japan and South Korea, for historical, diplomatic and political reasons. </p>
<p>The presence of the U.S. president and the location of the summit in such a famous venue will likely mitigate some of the criticism. This is especially the case if organizers can showcase Kishida and Yoon as equals in term of their partnership with the Biden administration, without one seeming to outshine the other.</p>
<h2>Biden’s place in the world</h2>
<p>In the U.S., the domestic audience will likely be less attentive than in Asia. But Biden still has much to gain. First, he can illustrate the value of his own vision for global leadership as one that successfully brings together allies – in contrast to that of the Trump administration and any other Republican White House contenders who seek to <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/10/donald-trump-foreign-policy-america-first/616872/">downplay the importance of alliances</a>. Second, it will help convey an image of Biden as a strong world leader. </p>
<p>All three leaders face unprecedented challenges as they navigate their country’s role in a changing international system. Yet the symbolism of standing shoulder to shoulder at such a historic location should not be discounted. As the White House has said, this meeting is intended to open a “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/28/statement-from-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-the-upcoming-trilateral-leaders-summit-of-the-united-states-japan-and-the-republic-of-korea/">new chapter</a>” in trilateral cooperation – displaying solidarity on the basis of the common values of democracy, freedom and international norms. It is a strong pitch. If followed through, the lasting legacy of the summit could go beyond the symbolic.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211576/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary M. McCarthy has received funding or other financial support from the Japan Foundation, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, the Korea Economic Institute of America, and the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.</span></em></p>
President Biden has an opportunity to show himself as a global leader who can bring historically antagonistic U.S. allies together.
Mary M. McCarthy, Professor of Political Science, Drake University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/208911
2023-07-18T12:29:26Z
2023-07-18T12:29:26Z
China needs immigrants
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/537900/original/file-20230717-245914-r0vcf2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C44%2C4977%2C3263&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Too few children means China needs to look outside the country for new blood.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/little-girl-walk-with-her-parents-on-the-city-street-in-news-photo/958880156?adppopup=true">Zhang Peng/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>China is entering a <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-shrinking-population-is-a-big-deal-counting-the-social-economic-and-political-costs-of-an-aging-smaller-society-198056">severe demographic crisis</a>. </p>
<p>For several centuries, the Asian nation has been the most populous country in the world. But it is now shrinking. In 2022, the country registered <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/16/business/china-birth-rate.html">more deaths than births</a>, and it will soon be surpassed by India in total population size – indeed, many demographers <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/24/india-overtakes-china-to-become-worlds-most-populous-country">believe this has already occurred</a>.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar who has studied</a> China’s demography for almost 40 years, I know the likelihood is this falling population will lead to an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-chinas-shrinking-population-is-a-big-deal-counting-the-social-economic-and-political-costs-of-an-aging-smaller-society-198056">economic slowdown</a>, with a greater number of dependents and fewer workers to support them. Yet attempts to reverse the trend through policy that <a href="https://www.wionews.com/world/china-comes-up-with-20-recommendations-to-encourage-families-to-have-more-children-572313">encourages couples to have more children</a> have proved ineffective. China will need to turn to other measures to solve its population problem. In short, China needs immigrants.</p>
<h2>More babies or more immigrants?</h2>
<p>The scale of the demographic task facing policymakers in Beijing is vast.</p>
<p>In 2022, the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/01/17/1149453055/china-records-1st-population-fall-in-decades-as-births-drop">Chinese government reported</a> 10.41 million deaths in the country and 9.56 million births. This was the first time China has seen more annual deaths than births since the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/03/giving-historys-greatest-mass-murderer-his-due/">Great Leap Forward</a> of 1958 to 1962 – during which a severe famine resulting from bad economic policies contributed to 30 million to 40 million more deaths than would have been expected.</p>
<p>If present trends continue, China is expected to lose more than a third of its 1.4 billion population. Some projections have the country dropping to a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/15/population-in-more-than-20-countries-to-halve-by-2100-study">population of 800 million by the year 2100</a>.</p>
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<p>The impact of this change will be felt across Chinese society. The country is already aging. The <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/median-age-china-surpassed-united-states">median age in China is now 38</a> compared to 28 just two decades ago. In contrast, India today has <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/india-population/">a median age of 28</a>. People of age 65 and over <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/02/09/key-facts-as-india-surpasses-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/">now comprise 14% of China’s population</a> compared to 7% of India’s.</p>
<p>Once a nation’s population is in decline, there are only two ways to reverse the trend: encourage people to have more children or get people from outside the country to move in.</p>
<p>Many Chinese leaders believe that they can increase China’s population by changing the nation’s fertility policies. In 2015, the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/china-abandons-one-child-policy">government abandoned the one-child policy</a>, permitting all couples in China to have two children. In 2021, the two-child policy was abandoned <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html">in favor of a three-child policy</a>. The hope was these changes would result in sizable increases in the national fertility rate, which now stands at 1.2 – well below the level of 2.1 children per woman of childbearing age that is needed to replace the population. </p>
<p>But these policy changes have not led to fertility increases in China, and there is little reason to think they will result in any dramatic uptick in the years ahead. This is because most of China’s fertility reduction, especially since the 1990s, has been voluntary and more a result of modernization than fertility control policies. Chinese couples are having fewer children <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/6/9/despite-three-child-policy-many-in-china-cant-afford-more-kids">due to the higher living costs and educational expenses</a> involved in having more than one child.</p>
<h2>Entering the ‘low fertility trap’</h2>
<p>The total fertility rate in China might go up over the next decade by 0.1 or 0.2 at best, in my opinion. But demographers largely agree that it will never go up by 1.0 or 2.0 – the kind of increase needed if China is to reach the replacement level.</p>
<p>And then there is what demographers refer to as the “<a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/17/europe/italy-record-low-birth-rate-intl-cmd/index.html">low fertility trap</a>.” This hypothesis, advanced by demographers in the early 2000s, holds that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4 – and China’s is now at 1.2 – it is very difficult to increase it by a significant amount. The argument goes that fertility declines to these low levels are largely the result of changes in living standards and increasing opportunities for women.</p>
<p>As a result, it is most unlikely that the three-child policy will have any influence at all on raising the fertility rate.</p>
<p>Which leaves immigration. China right now has few residents who were born in a foreign country – there are <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/04/china-needs-foreign-workers-so-why-wont-it-embrace-immigration">now only around 1 million foreign-born residents</a> in China, or less than 0.1% of the population.</p>
<p>In fact, China has the smallest number of international migrants of <a href="https://qz.com/1163632/china-still-has-the-smallest-share-of-incoming-migrants-in-the-world">any major country in the world</a>. Compare its 0.1% of immigrants with <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/15/us/where-immigrants-come-from-cec/index.html">near 14% in the U.S.</a> and <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/germany-immigrants-made-up-over-18-of-2022-population/a-65383249">18% in Germany</a>. Even Japan and South Korea – which historically have not been high-immigration countries – have higher percentages of foreign-born population, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/23/japan-immigration-policy-xenophobia-migration/">2% in Japan</a> and <a href="https://inmykorea.com/how-many-foreigners-in-korea/#:%7E:text=Currently%2C%20foreign%20residents%20make%20up,increase%20to%204.3%25%20by%202040.">3% in South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>It isn’t just the low numbers of immigrants that is a problem. China also faces the problem of growing numbers of its population moving to other countries, including the U.S. In 2017, for example, an <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf">estimated 10 million people moved from China</a> to live and work in other countries.</p>
<h2>Overcoming racial purity</h2>
<p>China must change its immigration policies if it is to reverse its demographic trend. </p>
<p>Currently, foreign-born people cannot attain Chinese citizenship unless they are children of Chinese nationals. Also, foreigners are only allowed to purchase one piece of property in China, and it must be their residence.</p>
<p>But changing immigration policy will likely require a change in mindset. </p>
<p>In a recent story in The Economist, the <a href="https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/04/china-needs-foreign-workers-so-why-wont-it-embrace-immigration">reporter notes that Chinese</a> “officials boast of a single Chinese bloodline dating back thousands of years.” And that taps into a seemingly <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/racism-is-alive-and-well-in-china/">deep-rooted belief in racial purity</a> held by <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/world/asia/china-sperm-communist-party.html">many leaders in</a> the Chinese Communist Party. In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/4/ksac070/6947853">told Donald Trump</a>, then America’s president: “We people are the original people, black hair, yellow skin, inherited onwards. We call ourselves the descendants of the dragon.”</p>
<p>The best way to maintain this racial purity, <a href="https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005267">many in China believe</a>, is to limit or prohibit migration into China.</p>
<p>But relaxing immigration policy will not only boost numbers, it will also offset any drop in productivity caused by an aging population. Immigrants are typically of prime working age and <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/immigrants-outperform-native-born-americans-two-key-measures-financial-success-n1020291">very productive</a>; they also tend to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/10/26/5-facts-about-immigrant-mothers-and-u-s-fertility-trends/">have more babies</a> than native-born residents.</p>
<p>The U.S. and many European countries have relied for decades on international migration to <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/03/08/immigration-projected-to-drive-growth-in-u-s-working-age-population-through-at-least-2035/">bolster their working-age population</a>. For immigration to have any reasonable impacts in China, the numbers of people coming into China will need to increase tremendously in the next decade or so – to around 50 million, perhaps higher. Otherwise, in the coming decades, China’s demographic destiny will be one of population losses every year, with more deaths than births, and the country will soon have one of the oldest populations in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208911/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Chinese politicians have looked toward policies to encourage couples to have more children to offset population decline. It hasn’t worked.
Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/207107
2023-06-27T12:23:02Z
2023-06-27T12:23:02Z
South Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world – and that doesn’t bode well for its economy
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/534163/original/file-20230626-5418-k0jzlq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C11%2C7842%2C4032&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An aging population, a tired economy.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-elderly-lady-rests-near-her-street-stall-as-pedestrians-news-photo/1251981087?adppopup=true">Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Around <a href="https://www.livescience.com/worlds-population-could-plummet-to-six-billion-by-the-end-of-the-century-new-study-suggests">the world</a>, nations are looking at the <a href="https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2023/06/20/what-does-a-shrinking-population-mean-for-china">prospect of shrinking</a>, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/wellness/2023/02/14/aging-boomers-more-older-americans/">aging populations</a> – but none more so than <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/22/s-korea-breaks-record-for-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-again">South Korea</a>.</p>
<p>Over the last 60 years, South Korea has undergone the most rapid fertility decline in recorded human history. In 1960, the nation’s total fertility rate – the number of children, on average, that a woman has during her reproductive years – stood at just under six children per woman. In 2022, that figure was 0.78. South Korea is the only country in the world to register a fertility rate of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/03/19/1163341684/south-korea-fertility-rate">less than one child per woman</a>, although others – <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/02/22/1155943055/ukraine-low-birth-rate-russia-war">Ukraine</a>, <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-low-fertility-rate-population-decline-by-yi-fuxian-2023-02">China</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/births-in-spain-drop-to-lowest-level-on-record/2614667">Spain</a> – are close.</p>
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<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jAfhO2YAAAAJ&hl=en">a demographer</a> who over the past four decades has conducted extensive research on Asian populations, I know that this prolonged and steep decline will have huge impacts on South Korea. It may <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230102000602">slow down economic growth</a>, contributing to a shift that will see the country <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/29/south-korea-s-demographic-crisis-is-challenging-its-national-story-pub-84820">end up less rich and with a smaller population</a>.</p>
<h2>Older, poorer, more dependent</h2>
<p>Countries need a total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman to replace their population, when the effects of immigration and emigration aren’t considered. And South Korea’s fertility rate has been consistently below that number since 1984, when it dropped to 1.93, from 2.17 the year before.</p>
<p>What makes the South Korean fertility rate decline more astonishing is the relatively short period in which it has occurred.</p>
<p>Back in 1800, the U.S. total fertility rate was <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1033027/fertility-rate-us-1800-2020/">well over 6.0</a>. But it took the U.S. around 170 years to consistently drop below the replacement level. Moreover, in the little over 60 years in which South Korea’s fertility rate fell from 6.0 to 0.8, the U.S. saw a more gradual decline from 3.0 to 1.7.</p>
<p>Fertility decline can have a positive effect in certain circumstances, via something demographers refer to as “<a href="https://www.prb.org/resources/fact-sheet-attaining-the-demographic-dividend/">the demographic dividend</a>.” This dividend refers to accelerated increases in a country’s economy that follow a decline in birth rates and subsequent changes in its age composition that result in more working-age people and fewer dependent young children and elderly people.</p>
<p>And that is what happened in South Korea – a decline in fertility helped convert South Korea from a very poor country <a href="https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/miracle-maturity-growth-korean-economy">to a very rich one</a>.</p>
<h2>Behind the economic miracle</h2>
<p>South Korea’s fertility decline began in the early 1960s when the government adopted an <a href="https://countrystudies.us/south-korea/47.htm">economic planning program</a> and a <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">population and family planning program</a>.</p>
<p>By that time, South Korea was languishing, having seen its <a href="https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ijoks/v5i1/f_0013337_10833.pdf">economy and society destroyed</a> by the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. Indeed by the late-1950s, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1961, its annual per capita income <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796954.003.0006">was only about US$82</a>. </p>
<p>But dramatic increases in economic growth began in 1962, when the South Korean government introduced a five-year economic development plan. </p>
<p>Crucially, the government also introduced a population planning program in a bid to bring down the nation’s fertility rate. This included a goal of getting <a href="https://doi.org//10.3349/ymj.1971.12.1.55">45% of married couples</a> to use contraception – until then, very few Koreans used contraception.</p>
<p>This further contributed to the fertility reduction, as many couples realized that having fewer children would often lead to improvements in family living standards. </p>
<p>Both the economic and family planning programs were instrumental in moving South Korea from one with a high fertility rate to one with a low fertility rate.</p>
<p>As a result, the country’s dependent population – the young and the elderly – grew smaller in relation to its working-age population.</p>
<p>The demographic change kick-started economic growth that continued well into the mid-1990s. Increases in productivity, combined with an increasing labor force and a gradual reduction of unemployment, produced average annual growth rates in gross domestic product <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/gnp-gross-national-product">of between 6% and 10% for many years</a>.</p>
<p>South Korea today is <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true">one of the richest countries</a>
in the world with a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=KR">per capita income of $35,000</a>.</p>
<h2>Losing people every year</h2>
<p>Much of this transformation of South Korea from a poor country to a rich country has been due to the demographic dividend realized during the country’s fertility decline. But the demographic dividend only works in the short term. Long-term fertility declines are often <a href="https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2022/12/the-long-term-decline-in-fertility-and-what-it-means-for-state-budgets">disastrous for a nation’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>With an extremely low fertility rate of 0.78, South Korea is losing population each year and experiencing more deaths than births. The once-vibrant nation is on the way to becoming a country with lots of elderly people and fewer workers.</p>
<p>The Korean Statistical Office reported recently that the <a href="https://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1B8000F&language=en">country lost population</a> in the past three years: It was down by 32,611 people in 2020, 57,118 in 2021 and 123,800 in 2022.</p>
<p>If this trend continues, and if the country doesn’t welcome millions of immigrants, South Korea’s present population of 51 million <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2023/06/602_335593.html">will drop to under 38 million</a> in the next four or five decades.</p>
<p>And a growing proportion of the society will be over the age of 65.</p>
<p>South Korea’s population aged 65 and over comprised under 7% of the population in 2000. Today, <a href="https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south/#people-and-society">nearly 17% of South Koreans</a> are older people.</p>
<p>The older people population is projected to be 20% of the country by 2025 and could reach an unprecedented and astoundingly high 46% in 2067. South Korea’s working-age population will then be smaller in size than its population of people over the age of 65.</p>
<p>In a bid to avert a demographic nightmare, the South Korean government is <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/south-korea-families-770-month-183500253.html">providing financial incentives</a> for couples to have children and is boosting the monthly allowance already in place for parents. President Yoon Suk Yeol has also <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/28/national/politics/Korea-birth-rate-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230328184849297.html">established a new government team</a> to establish policies to increase the birth rate.</p>
<p>But to date, programs to increase the low fertility rate have had little effect. Since 2006, the South Korean government has already <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/asia/south-korea-worlds-lowest-fertility-rate-intl-hnk-dst/index.html">spent over $200 billion</a> in programs to increase the birth rate, with virtually no impact.</p>
<h2>Opening the trapdoor</h2>
<p>The South Korean fertility rate has not increased in the past 16 years. Rather, it has continued to decrease. This is due to what demographers refer to as the “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025482">low-fertility trap</a>.” The principle, set forth by demographers in the early 2000s, states that once a country’s fertility rate drops below 1.5 or 1.4, it is difficult – if not impossible – to increase it significantly. </p>
<p>South Korea, along with many other countries – including France, Australia and Russia – have developed policies to encourage fertility rate increases, but with little to no success. </p>
<p>The only real way for South Korea to turn this around would be to rely heavily on immigration.</p>
<p>Migrants are <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2020/06/19/blog-weo-chapter4-migration-to-advanced-economies-can-raise-growth">typically young and productive</a> and usually have more children than the native-born population. But South Korea has a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/16/upshot/comparing-immigration-policies-across-countries.html">very restrictive immigration policy</a> with no path for immigrants to become citizens or permanent residents unless they marry South Koreans.</p>
<p>Indeed, the foreign-born population in 2022 was just over 1.6 million, which is around <a href="https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220414000692">3.1% of the population</a>. In contrast, the U.S. has always relied on immigration to bolster its working population, with foreign-born residents now <a href="https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigrants-in-the-united-states">comprising over 14%</a> of the population.</p>
<p>For immigration to offset South Korea’s declining fertility rate, the number of foreign workers would likely need to rise almost tenfold.</p>
<p>Without that, South Korea’s demographic destiny will have the nation continuing to lose population every year and becoming one of the oldest – if not the oldest – country in the world.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207107/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dudley L. Poston Jr. does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
South Korea’s fertility rate fell below the level needed to sustain a population in the mid-1980s – and it never recovered. It is now below one child per woman during her reproductive years.
Dudley L. Poston Jr., Professor of Sociology, Texas A&M University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/207063
2023-06-20T13:12:31Z
2023-06-20T13:12:31Z
England’s plan to introduce east Asia-style maths textbooks widely rejected by primary schools
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531598/original/file-20230613-26-m9x1lj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C23%2C5184%2C3422&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/group-school-children-can-be-seen-298453535">DGLimages/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Prime Minister Rishi Sunak recently <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-outlines-his-vision-for-maths-to-18#:%7E:text=Prime%20Minister%20Rishi%20Sunak%20outlines,skills%20they%20need%20to%20succeed.&text=We%20must%20change%20our%20anti,today%20%5BMonday%2017%20April%5D">outlined a plan</a> to improve maths skills in England, which will see young people study the subject at school until they are 18. This sounds straightforward but it’s worth considering how tricky new educational policy is to get right. </p>
<p>Take, for example, a previous attempt by the UK government to improve children’s maths skills. In 2016, a multi-million pound initiative was launched offering more than 8,000 primary schools in England funding to buy maths textbooks featuring teaching methods based on those used in some east Asian countries.</p>
<p>We don’t yet know if the schools who used the textbooks saw any effect on their pupils’ attainment. The results of SATs – tests taken at the end of primary school – haven’t been published since 2019 due to the COVID pandemic.</p>
<p>However, <a href="https://research.brighton.ac.uk/en/publications/the-prevalence-and-use-of-textbooks-and-curriculum-resources-in-p">my research with colleagues</a> shows this initiative, which ran until the 2021-22 academic year, was not widely popular with teachers and school leaders – and that the majority of English primary schools did not take up the funding. Of those that did, more than a third have subsequently stopped using the textbooks completely.</p>
<p>Data suggests that on average, children in England do pretty well at maths compared with other countries. The <a href="https://timss2019.org/reports/achievement/#math-4">latest international study</a> shows the performance of England’s nine- to ten-year-olds has increased steadily, now ranking eighth out of 58 jurisdictions. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530566/original/file-20230607-19-idyoc2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Chart showing England's international standing in mathematics attainment for nine- to ten-year-olds, with England in eighth position and well above the centerpoint for all jurisdictions." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530566/original/file-20230607-19-idyoc2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/530566/original/file-20230607-19-idyoc2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530566/original/file-20230607-19-idyoc2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530566/original/file-20230607-19-idyoc2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=330&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530566/original/file-20230607-19-idyoc2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530566/original/file-20230607-19-idyoc2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/530566/original/file-20230607-19-idyoc2.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=414&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">England’s international standing in mathematics attainment for nine- to ten-year-olds (data extracted from TIMSS 2019 report).</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author created from publicly available data.</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But challenge lies behind the averages. England has one of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/maths-challenge-england-has-one-of-the-biggest-gaps-between-high-and-low-performing-pupils-in-the-developed-world-88678">largest gaps in the world</a> between the highest and lowest performers, and a <a href="https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/research/groups/crme/documents/maths-pipeline-report.pdf">persistent gap in maths attainment</a> between pupils from disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged backgrounds.</p>
<p>Wanting to change these patterns for our youngest learners, the government looked to the teaching practices of the highest performers internationally – predominantly east Asian regions – to see what England could “borrow”. </p>
<p>Several <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/773320/MTE_main_report.pdf">exchange projects</a> later saw the “<a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-mastery-model-of-teaching-maths-25636">mastery</a>” teaching approach <a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7102/8/4/202">pushed in English primary schools</a>. The mastery method breaks learning down into small blocks and requires that a pupil is competent in a topic before they can move on to another. </p>
<p>Schools minister Nick Gibb <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/south-asian-method-of-teaching-maths-to-be-rolled-out-in-schools">announced extended funding</a> in 2016 supporting this push, with a central strand being provision for around 8,000 eligible schools to purchase maths textbooks through matched-funding grants of £2,000.</p>
<p>Schools could choose from two government-approved <a href="https://www.ncetm.org.uk/teaching-for-mastery/mastery-explained/textbooks/">textbook schemes</a>: <a href="https://mathsnoproblem.com/">Maths – No Problem!</a> and <a href="https://www.pearson.com/international-schools/british-curriculum/primary-curriculum/power-maths.html">Power Maths</a>. Each scheme included physical textbooks, workbooks for pupils to write in (which must be renewed each year), and subscription-accessed online material including lessons and teacher guides.</p>
<p>To assess the popularity and effectiveness of this approach, we distributed a <a href="https://research.brighton.ac.uk/en/publications/the-prevalence-and-use-of-textbooks-and-curriculum-resources-in-p">nationwide survey</a> to all 17,038 state primary schools in England in 2021-22. We received 664 responses, a representative sample. We wanted to find out more about the resources teachers were using to teach maths and how far this included the government-approved mastery textbooks. </p>
<p>We were taken aback to discover that more than 100 different maths resources are in use in primary schools across England. These vary from complete schemes to topic-focused resources, from online to physical and from free to pay-per-view. </p>
<p>We also found that teachers spend considerable time sourcing and adapting material, with more than a third of primary teachers spending their own money purchasing resources. This clearly clashes with the government aspiration that schools should move to teaching predominantly through textbooks.</p>
<h2>A mismatched approach</h2>
<p>Our survey found that two-thirds of the schools eligible for textbook funding under the scheme launched in 2016 did not take it up. While some were unaware they were eligible, others made a resolved choice not to participate. </p>
<p>Participants from these schools told us of an ideological dislike of textbook-based teaching. A quarter of schools felt they couldn’t meet the matched-funding element, or the ongoing costs. This shouldn’t come as a surprise, given that <a href="https://ifs.org.uk/publications/school-spending-and-costs-coming-crunch">costs to schools are growing more quickly</a> than previously experienced.</p>
<p>Of greater concern – especially looked at from a value-for-money perspective – was that 37% of primary schools that took up the funding have since completely stopped using the textbooks. A further 24% are only using the purchased textbook schemes in a partial way – for example, still using the physical textbooks but not purchasing pupil workbooks or renewing their online subscriptions to support materials.</p>
<p>In all, only just over 10% of primary schools that were eligible for the textbook scheme took it up and are still using it in full.</p>
<p><strong>Summary of our survey results:</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531704/original/file-20230613-2513-ghz533.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Infographic illustrating percentages outlined in previous paragraph." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531704/original/file-20230613-2513-ghz533.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/531704/original/file-20230613-2513-ghz533.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531704/original/file-20230613-2513-ghz533.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531704/original/file-20230613-2513-ghz533.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=278&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531704/original/file-20230613-2513-ghz533.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531704/original/file-20230613-2513-ghz533.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/531704/original/file-20230613-2513-ghz533.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=349&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author created from survey data</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The government’s shift to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/world/asia/china-textbooks-britain.html">learning from the east Asian education system</a> was a complete about-turn. It meant importing practices that sat at odds with primary school approaches in England, where teachers look after all needs of their class, rather than being subject specialists.</p>
<p>Textbooks, particularly in primary maths, have <a href="https://www.cambridgeassessment.org.uk/Images/181744-why-textbooks-count-tim-oates.pdf">not been popular</a> in primary schools for some time. As well as being costly, they can be seen as <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738059307000685#aep-section-id18">a threat to professional identity</a> by taking away teacher control.</p>
<p>Our research underlines that we need a solid understanding of how maths teaching is done in England before adding in any new initiatives or policy – not only what’s happening in classrooms, but the complex reasons behind why it is happening. We hope governments learn from the inefficient administration reported here before implementing further new or borrowed policies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/207063/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rachel Marks received funding for this project from The Nuffield Foundation. She is affiliated with the University of Brighton and was supported in this research by Dr Nancy Barclay and Dr Alison Barnes.</span></em></p>
Our research found a multi-million pound scheme to boost maths learning was under-used and had minimal impact on practice.
Rachel Marks, Principal Lecturer in Mathematics Education (Primary), University of Brighton
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/206908
2023-06-17T10:57:57Z
2023-06-17T10:57:57Z
Watered-down LGBTQ ‘understanding’ bill shows how far Japan’s parliament is out of step with its society – and history
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532474/original/file-20230616-25-gw5spa.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=7%2C1905%2C2657%2C2089&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Rainbow ears, but is Japan's parliament listening?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/YBkx0zzHaMM"> Lucas Calloch/@dreiimos/Unsplash</a>, <a class="license" href="http://artlibre.org/licence/lal/en">FAL</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Japan has <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/16/asia/japan-lgbt-bill-passed-intl-hnk/index.html">passed legislation</a> aimed at “promoting the understanding” of members of the LGBTQ community – a watered-down bill that will do little to put the Asian country <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/17/japan-g7-summit-lgbt-rights/">in line with fellow liberal democracies</a> on the issue.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/japanese-fete-lgbtq-progress-demand-marriage-rights-as-g7-summit-looms/yj8l56ktj">many reports</a> <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-to-submit-LGBTQ-bill-in-time-for-G-7-after-long-delay">of the bill’s passage</a> on June 16, 2023, have noted, Japan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-parliament-passes-watered-down-lgbt-understanding-bill-2023-06-16/">lags far behind other G7 countries</a> when it comes to the legal protection of sexual minorities.</p>
<p>There has been less discussion of how the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/lower-house-japans-parliament-passes-bill-promote-lgbtq-100033835">limits of the new law</a> – and the prolonged battle to get it passed – highlight how national politicians are out of step with <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/gender-and-sexuality-in-modern-japan/A6C886093F2ECE3693FC445053448BEA">Japanese society at large</a>. </p>
<p>Despite Japan’s international stereotype as a socially conservative nation – a view swayed by the <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/05/10/commentary/world-commentary/conservative-japan/">political leanings of the national government</a> – both corporate Japan and regional authorities in the country have long been out in front of parliament on the rights of LGBTQ people. Moreover, Japan’s <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/gender-and-sexuality-in-modern-japan/A6C886093F2ECE3693FC445053448BEA">history on same-sex relationships</a> is decidedly more mixed than many in the country’s national politics, or in the West, would acknowledge.</p>
<h2>Changes in society, courts and corporate Japan</h2>
<p>The bill passed by both houses of Japan’s parliament does little to move the needle for the rights of sexual minorities in the country. There are no additional legal protections included. And a vague stipulation in the bill that “all citizens can live with peace of mind” has been <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/06/16/national/crime-legal/lgbtq-bill-passed/">criticized by LGBTQ activists</a> for de-prioritizing the rights of sexual minorities.</p>
<p>The fact that even such modest proposals faced a battle to be passed is indicative of the stubbornness of the national parliament to seriously address LGBTQ rights.</p>
<p>Yet outside the national parliament, the political and legal struggles for equal rights for sexual minorities have achieved a series of successes in recent years in Japan, especially at the regional and municipal levels. </p>
<p>In March 2019, legislation banning discrimination against sexual minorities was <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/06/fef8d29dfc5e-japan-prefecture-to-recognize-partnerships-for-lgbt-couples-from-july.html?phrase=Nabi%20Tajima&words=">passed in Ibaraki prefecture</a>. A month later, a Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly law prohibited all discrimination <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/05/tokyo-new-law-bars-lgbt-discrimination">on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity</a>. The Tokyo law also committed the city government to raising awareness of LGBTQ people and outlawed the expression of hateful anti-LGBTQ rhetoric in public. </p>
<p>Polling <a href="https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/02/d95968c3f7d5-urgent-64-favor-recognizing-same-sex-marriage-in-japan-kyodo-poll.html">in February 2023</a> found that 64.3% of Japanese respondents backed laws that promoted a better understanding of sexual minorities. A similar percentage of the population also support the legal recognition of same-sex marriage.</p>
<p>And on the issue of same-sex marriage, it is again at the local level where strides are being made.</p>
<p>Several district courts have now ruled that the Japan’s ban on same-sex marriage <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-lower-court-rules-that-not-allowing-same-sex-marriage-is-unconstitutional-2023-05-30/">violates Article 14 of its constitution</a>, which guarantees equality of all people before the law. </p>
<h2>Pushback at national level</h2>
<p>Yet the conservative Liberal Democratic Party government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida disagrees, pointing to Article 24 of the Constitution, which states that <a href="https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html">marriage is based only on</a> “the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife.”</p>
<p>In the absence of a national law to overturn the ban on same-sex marriage, local authorities have turned to civil partnerships. Although these do not provide legal protection against discrimination more broadly, they do offer some benefits, including the option to apply for public housing. </p>
<p>More than <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/japan-court-rules-that-not-allowing-same-sex-marriage-is-state-2023-06-08/">300 municipalities</a> – representing around two-thirds of the population – already allow same-sex couples to enter partnership agreements which are recognized at the local level.</p>
<p>Some temples have begun to offer same-sex wedding ceremonies. While Shinto, Japan’s ancient and influential religious tradition, is perceived to be staunchly conservative, at least one Shinto sect <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/29/what-does-japan-shinto-think-of-gay-marriage/">has expressed support of the LGTBQ community</a>.</p>
<p>Picking up on both public sentiment and evolving regional policies, an increasing number of corporations in Japan have begun to recognize sexual minorities as an important segment of both their staff and customers.</p>
<p>In 2019, a total of <a href="http://workwithpride.jp">200 Japanese corporations established guidelines</a> which prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and sexual identity and extend customary benefits for marriage, childbirth and other life-changing events to same-sex couples.</p>
<h2>Long-standing queer culture</h2>
<p>The resistance of national politicians to establish legal protections for sexual minorities is also out of step with Japan’s long and widely acknowledged history of diverse sexual cultures.</p>
<p>From the Middle Ages to the end of the 19th century, an elaborate male-male sexual culture could be found among the country’s warrior class, Buddhist monks, and in the theater and entertainment world.</p>
<p>Warriors typically married and had children, but they also thought nothing of demanding complete devotion from their male underlings, often including sexual favors and even romance. A variant of such male-male sexual relations could also be found in Buddhist monasteries, where it was couched in spiritual terms.</p>
<p>This male-male sexuality did not amount to an identity; it was simply a facet of the loyalty expected from boys, desired by their masters but <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/hcy.2023.0025">having little agency of their own</a>.</p>
<p>Such relations were famously explored in Ihara Saikaku’s “<a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=3056">Great Mirror of Male Love</a>,” a collection of 40 same-sex stories published in the 17th century. The collection remained a point of reference for several generations of men: those who maintained these practices, those who strove to curtail the mainstreaming of them, and the scholars keen on studying both. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="A Japanese woman in a white hat." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532429/original/file-20230616-27-y1ry1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/532429/original/file-20230616-27-y1ry1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532429/original/file-20230616-27-y1ry1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532429/original/file-20230616-27-y1ry1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=683&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532429/original/file-20230616-27-y1ry1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532429/original/file-20230616-27-y1ry1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/532429/original/file-20230616-27-y1ry1w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=859&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Writer and and same-sex marriage campaigner Yoshiya Nobuko.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yoshiya_Nobuko.jpg">Kamakura Museum of Literature archives/Wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, the push for same-sex marriage predates that of many of the liberal democracies in which it is now established. In 1925, the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/42771984">Japanese writer Yoshiya Nobuko</a> first pursued a traditional marriage with another woman and the legalization of such unions. Yoshiya was unsuccessful, but instead adopted her partner so that she’d be a legal member of her household.</p>
<p>At that point, same-sex sexuality had become the object of medical diagnosis and “treatment.” But same-sex acts were only subjected to a ban for a short period, from 1872 to 1880. </p>
<h2>‘Press on till Japan changes’</h2>
<p>Similar to the U.S., the LGBTQ movement in Japan has gained momentum over the last half century.</p>
<p>In the 1980s, the HIV/AIDS crisis instigated major strides in activism. Newly founded LGBTQ organizations in Japan worked to reframe how people thought about sexual minority rights, emphasizing that they were human rights. In 1997, one such group, OCCUR, won its <a href="https://www.icj.org/sogicasebook/in-re-futyu-hostel-tokyo-high-court-civil-4th-division-japan-16-september-1997/">first high-profile case</a>, resulting in the end of restrictions on gay individuals’ presence at a youth hostel in Tokyo.</p>
<p>In the wake of that landmark case, OCCUR also successfully prompted the Japanese Society of Psychiatry and Neurology to <a href="http://www.qrd.org/qrd/orgs/IGLHRC/1995/japan.action.alert-06.28.95">drop “homosexuality” from its diagnostic manual</a> and instead acknowledge that homosexuality is not a perversion, sexual orientation is not a disorder, and homosexuals do not simply “perform the opposite role of one’s sex.” </p>
<p>OCCUR was also the driving force behind the <a href="https://freedmanlabqssfc.wixsite.com/qssfc/single-post/2017/05/18/the-development-of-tokyo-lgbt-pride-%EF%BC%881994-2009%EF%BC%89?lightbox=dataItem-imzx8lf2&_amp_=">first Tokyo Gay and Lesbian Pride Parade, in 1994</a>, which advocated acceptance with slogans such as “Japan with a big heart.” </p>
<p>This year, the <a href="https://tokyorainbowpride.com/english/">Tokyo Rainbow Pride</a> event – Asia’s largest Pride event – returned to full capacity for the first time in four years, after pandemic disruptions.</p>
<p>Its theme is “Press on Till Japan Changes.” Society already is – the question is will the national government follow.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/206908/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sabine Frühstück does not currently receive funding from external sources. Due to her research areas, history and ethnography of modern and contemporary Japanese culture, she has personally known some of the individuals that this article concerns although none of the individuals that are mentioned by name.</span></em></p>
Japan has a rich queer history and is seeing societal changes in favor of greater LGBTQ recognition. That said, national politicians have yet to catch up.
Sabine Frühstück, Professor of Modern Japanese Cultural Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/200953
2023-03-01T20:37:03Z
2023-03-01T20:37:03Z
A more hawkish China policy? 5 takeaways from House committee’s inaugural hearing on confronting Beijing
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/512995/original/file-20230301-26-fkv0ly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=14%2C67%2C4977%2C3255&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Bipartisan committee with Beijing in its sights.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/63de0b1c563247e89d38f83e447affdf?ext=true">AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>In a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/chinese-communist-party-committee-hearing/index.html">rare show of bipartisanship</a>, Republican and Democratic House members put on a united front as they probed how to respond to the perceived growing threat of China.</em></p>
<p><em>The inaugural hearing of the <a href="https://clerk.house.gov/committees/ZS00">Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party</a> comes at a delicate time – amid concerns in the U.S. over <a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-spy-balloon-inflatable-eyes-in-the-sky-have-been-used-in-war-for-centuries-199268">Chinese espionage</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-why-beijing-has-decided-this-is-the-year-to-unify-with-taiwan-199726">tensions over Taiwan</a> and <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/us-china-relations-ukraine-covid/index.html">China’s position on the Ukraine war</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Michael Beckley, an <a href="https://facultyprofiles.tufts.edu/michael-beckley/about">expert on U.S.-China relations</a> at Tufts University, was among those watching on as witnesses gave evidence during the committee’s prime-time session. Here are his takeaways from what was discussed.</em></p>
<h2>1. The days of engagement are over</h2>
<p>What was abundantly clear from the lawmakers was the message that the <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/12/getting-china-wrong-engagement-change/">era of engagement</a> with China is long past its sell-by date.</p>
<p>Engagement had been the policy of successive government from <a href="https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/nixons-trip-china">Nixon’s landmark visit to China in 1972</a> onward. But there was a general acceptance among committee members that the policy is outdated and that it is time to adopt if not outright containment then certainly a more competitive policy. This would include “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/5ca525f7-cb40-468a-a294-5938d11af6a5">selective decoupling</a>” – that is, the disentangling – of technology and economic interests, along with a more robust stance on confronting China’s military and providing a barrier to Chinese conquest in East Asia.</p>
<p>This proposed hardening of the U.S. policy is driven by internal developments in China as well as any perceived external threat. President Xi Jinping is viewed as having installed himself as “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/17/xi-jinping-chinas-dictator-for-life-00056783">dictator for life</a>” and created an Orwellian internal control system, complete with <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/new-details-torture-cover-ups-china-s-internment-camps-revealed-n1270014">concentration camps</a> and <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/surveillance-cameras-made-by-china-are-hanging-all-over-the-u-s-1510513949">hundreds of millions of security cameras</a> all over the country; this is a regime that is only becoming more authoritarian as the years go by. It has dispelled any idea that with its economic opening China would also become a more open society.</p>
<p>And the committee appears to want to set course for the long term, not just for the near future. The general idea is U.S. policy over the next 10 years could determine the relationship between the U.S. and China for the next century. Rep. Mike Gallagher, the panel’s Republican chair, <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-house-select-committee-hearing-tiktok-hr-mcmaster-matthew-pottinger/">said as much</a> in his opening comments: “This is an existential struggle over what life will look like in the 21st century – and the most fundamental freedoms are at stake.”</p>
<h2>2. Reframing the debate</h2>
<p>As Gallagher’s remarks suggest, the panel implied that U.S. issues with China do not boil down to just disagreement over a few issues. Rather, it was framed as a battle between two very different visions of society.</p>
<p>The committee is clearly modeled on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/house-select-committee-to-investigate-the-january-6th-attack-on-the-united-states-capitol-108166">Jan. 6 House panel</a> – for example, by airing hearings in prime time and with dramatic testimony from witnesses. The idea seems to be that the issue is of such importance that to pursue it successfully the U.S. public needs to be educated, invested and mobilized. To that end, the inaugural session had testimony from an activist jailed for two years for supporting pro-democracy movements. The point was to get across the idea that the way of life that the U.S. is trying to promote – both at home and abroad – is antithetical to that of the Chinese Communist Party.</p>
<p>President Joe Biden has similarly framed his administration’s policy around the idea that this is an <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/us/politics/biden-china-democracy.html">epic struggle between democracy and autocracy</a>. Indeed, in some ways Biden has been more hawkish than previous presidents on China. In terms of tightening economic restrictions on China and stressing U.S. concerns over China’s human rights record, Biden has <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/live/is-americas-china-policy-too-hawkish/">picked up the baton</a> from his predecessors and run with it.</p>
<p>But the panel was keen to stress this as a bipartisan push for a more hawkish policy. And this is important. It gives the panel’s recommendations more heft, especially as the U.S. heads into the 2024 presidential race, during which both parties will be looking to stress how tough they are on the U.S.’s adversaries.</p>
<h2>3. Confronting China’s leaders, not its people</h2>
<p>Although framed as a battle between democracy and autocracy, the panel appears conscious that the debate shouldn’t be framed as a clash of Western and Asian civilizations. </p>
<p>With anti-Asian sentiment having risen during the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. lawmakers are walking a fine line here – they will need to focus any criticism on Chinese leaders rather than its people. Gallagher <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/chinese-communist-party-committee-hearing">made this point</a>, noting: “We must constantly distinguish between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people themselves, who have always been the party’s primary victims.”</p>
<p>This balancing act may be more difficult in future hearings when issues of Chinese students at U.S. universities, immigration and cooperation with China on certain scientific issues come up. That is when they will need to weigh concerns over Chinese espionage against not coming across as anti-Chinese visitors and immigrants.</p>
<h2>4. Reshaping policy on three fronts</h2>
<p>Although this first hearing was very much a table-setter, there were three broad policy recommendations implicit in the testimony:</p>
<ul>
<li><p><strong>Taiwan</strong> – The panel heard evidence suggesting that the U.S. needs to mobilize for the potential of a hot war with China over the island of Taiwan, the status of which is contested. Former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/politics/mcmaster-warns-next-two-years-could-dangerous-period-us-china-taiwan-during-debut-china-cmte-hearing">told the panel</a> that in regards to China, the next two years would be a particularly “dangerous” period. He suggested that U.S. capabilities to deter an invasion of Taiwan were not adequate. Meanwhile, there were mentions of a backlog in weapon sales to Taiwan. And as the war in Ukraine has underscored, there is an imperative to get weapons on the ground before any shooting starts.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Economic competitiveness</strong> – The panel heard evidence from the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers pointing out how China had stacked global trade in its favor through unfair subsidies and corporate espionage. To improve America’s competitiveness, the panel could look at recommending the expansion of export controls or tax reforms to make U.S. products more competitive. The U.S. is also eyeing a strategic decoupling with China on the economic front, which is encouraging U.S. businesses to divest from Chinese operations and restricting Chinese businesses operating in the U.S., such as the social media platform TikTok.</p></li>
<li><p><strong>Human rights</strong> – The committee made it clear that human rights should be front and center in the U.S. China policy going forward. The hearing repeatedly stressed that this was not just an economic and security disagreement but a clash of values.</p></li>
</ul>
<h2>5. A boilerplate response from Beijing</h2>
<p>China’s response to the committee’s inaugural hearing was standard. </p>
<p>In a statement, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-criticizes-new-congress-committee-ae52d13b740dee3495c7ba4e41f520a8">foreign ministry in Beijing</a> said it rejected Washington’s attempt to engage in what it called a “Cold War” mindset. Chinese media also tried to make it sound as if anti-China policy is driven by special interests, including defense contractors and members of the Taiwanese diaspora.</p>
<p>The narrative that the U.S. is warmongering was aided by the interjection of two protesters from the <a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/feb/28/code-pink-protesters-disrupt-inaugural-house-china/">Code Pink activist group</a>, who held up a sign during the hearing stating that “China is not our enemy.”</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/200953/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Beckley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
US lawmakers heard testimony that suggests the era of engagement with China is over. Rather, policy may be hardening.
Michael Beckley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/198056
2023-01-18T16:08:18Z
2023-01-18T16:08:18Z
Why China’s shrinking population is a big deal – counting the social, economic and political costs of an aging, smaller society
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/505050/original/file-20230118-14-dfw8cm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3995%2C2667&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will an aging, shrinking population put the brakes on economic growth?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/an-elderly-man-rides-a-tricycle-on-a-street-in-hangzhou-news-photo/1246295312?phrase=china%20population&adppopup=true">CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images.</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Throughout much of recorded human history, China has <a href="http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_population.htm">boasted the largest population in the world</a> – and until recently, by some margin.</p>
<p>So news that the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-population-shrinks-first-time-since-1961-2023-01-17/">Chinese population is now in decline</a>, and will sometime later this year be <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-set-overtake-china-worlds-most-populous-nation-2023-01-17/">surpassed by that of India</a>, is big news even if long predicted. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=5098">scholar of Chinese demographics</a>, I know that the figures released by Chinese government on Jan. 17, 2023, showing that for the <a href="https://www.asiaone.com/china/chinas-population-shrinks-first-time-1961">first time in six decades</a>, deaths in the previous year outnumbered births is no mere blip. While that previous year of shrinkage, 1961 – during the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/key_people_events/html/3.stm">Great Leap Forward</a> economic failure, in which <a href="https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/chinas-great-leap-forward/#:%7E:text=From%201960%E2%80%931962%2C%20an%20estimated,this%20disaster%20was%20largely%20preventable.">an estimated 30 million people died of starvation</a> – represented a deviation from the trend, 2022 is a pivot. It is the onset of what is likely to be a long-term decline. By the end of the century, the Chinese population is <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/">expected to shrink by 45%</a>, according to the United Nations. And that is under the assumption that China maintains its current fertility rate of around 1.3 children per couple, which it may not.</p>
<p><iframe id="jbJAh" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/jbJAh/4/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>This decline in numbers will spur a trend that already concerns demographers in China: a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(22)02410-2">rapidly aging society</a>. By 2040, around a quarter of the Chinese population is <a href="https://globalcoalitiononaging.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/China%E2%80%99s-Demographic-Outlook.pdf">predicted to be over the age of 65</a>.</p>
<p>In short, this is a seismic shift. It will have huge symbolic and substantive impacts on China in three main areas. </p>
<h2>Economy</h2>
<p>In the space of 40 years, China has largely completed a historic transformation from an agrarian economy to one <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/april-2016/chinas-rapid-rise-from-backward-agrarian-society-to-industrial-powerhouse-in-just-35-years">based on manufacturing and the service industry</a>. This has been accompanied by <a href="https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/january/income-living-standards-china">increases in the standard of living and income levels</a>. But the Chinese government has long recognized that the country can no longer rely on the labor-intensive economic growth model of the past. Technological advances and competition from countries that can provide a cheaper workforce such as Vietnam and India have rendered this old model largely obsolete.</p>
<p>This historical turning point in China’s population trend serves as a further wake-up call to move the country’s model more quickly to a post-manufacturing, post-industrial economy – an aging, shrinking population does not fit the purposes of a labor-intensive economic model.</p>
<p>As to what it means for China’s economy, and <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2023/01/17/china-population-decline-birth-rate-global-economy-impact/11066270002/">that of the world</a>, population decline and an aging society will certainly provide Beijing with short-term and long-term challenges. In short, it means there will be fewer workers able to feed the economy and spur further economic growth on one side of the ledger; on the other, a growing post-work population will need potentially costly support.</p>
<p>It is perhaps no coincidence then that 2022, as well as being a pivotal year for China in terms of demographics, also saw one of the worst economic performances <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-economy-slows-sharply-q4-2022-growth-one-worst-record-2023-01-17/">the country has experienced since 1976</a>, according to data released on Jan. 17.</p>
<h2>Society</h2>
<p>The rising share of elderly people in China’s population is more than an economic issue – it will also reshape Chinese society. Many of these elderly people only have one child, due to the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3135510/chinas-one-child-policy-what-was-it-and-what-impact-did-it">one-child policy</a> in place for three and a half decades <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-end-of-chinas-one-child-policy/">before being relaxed in 2016</a>. </p>
<p>The large number of aging parents with only one child to rely on for support will likely impose severe constraints – not least for the elderly parents, who will need financial support. They will also need emotional and social support for longer as a result of <a href="https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/life-expectancy">extended life expectancy</a>.</p>
<p>It will also impose constraints on those children themselves, who will need to fulfill obligations to their career, provide for their own children and support their elderly parents simultaneously.</p>
<p>Responsibility will fall on the Chinese government to provide adequate health care and pensions. But unlike in Western democracies that have by now had many decades to develop social safety nets, the speed of the demographic and economic change in China has meant that Beijing struggled to keep pace.</p>
<p>As China’s economy <a href="https://theconversation.com/jiang-zemin-propelled-chinas-economic-rise-in-the-world-leaving-his-successors-to-deal-with-the-massive-inequality-that-followed-195675">underwent rapid growth after 2000</a>, the Chinese government responded by investing tremendously in <a href="https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ752324.pdf">education</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1186/1475-9276-12-40">health care facilities</a>, as well as <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5301df5d4.pdf">extending universal pension coverage</a>. But the demographic shift was so rapid that it meant that political reforms to improve the safety net were always playing catch-up. Even with the vast expansion in coverage, the country’s health care system is still highly inefficient, unequally distributed and inadequate given the growing need.</p>
<p>Similarly, social pension systems are <a href="https://doi.org//10.1016/j.jeoa.2019.100194">highly segmented and unequally distributed</a>.</p>
<h2>Politics</h2>
<p>How the Chinese government responds to the challenges presented by this dramatic demographic shift will be key. Failure to live up to the expectations of the public in its response could result in a crisis for the Chinese Communist Party, whose legitimacy is tied closely to economic growth. Any economic decline could have severe consequences for the Chinese Communist Party. It will also be judged on how well the state is able to fix its social support system.</p>
<p>Indeed, there is already a strong case to be made that the Chinese government has moved too slowly. The one-child policy that <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-costs-and-benefits-of-chinas-one-child-policy-20467">played a significant role</a> in the slowing growth, and now decline, in population was a government policy for more than three decades. It has been known since the 1990s that <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=CN">the Chinese fertility rate was too low</a> to sustain current population numbers. Yet it was only in 2016 that Beijing acted and relaxed the policy to allow more couples to have a second, and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2021/05/31/1001846355/confronted-by-aging-population-china-allows-couples-to-have-three-children">then in 2021 a third</a>, child.</p>
<p>This action to spur population growth, or at least slow its decline, came too late to prevent China from soon losing its crown as the world’s largest nation. Loss of prestige is one thing though, the political impact of any economic downturn resulting from a shrinking population is quite another.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/chinas-population-is-now-inexorably-shrinking-bringing-forward-the-day-the-planets-population-turns-down-198061">China's population is now inexorably shrinking, bringing forward the day the planet's population turns down</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198056/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Feng Wang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
For the first time since 1961, deaths in China have outpaced births – and unlike that one-year decline, the downward trend is likely to continue.
Feng Wang, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Irvine
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/197608
2023-01-12T13:20:55Z
2023-01-12T13:20:55Z
China looms large as President Biden and Japan’s PM Kishida sit down to discuss defense shift, regional tensions
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/504084/original/file-20230111-46330-883wtq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C48%2C3995%2C2619&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Biden and Kishida: A relationship far from flagging.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/president-joe-biden-reviews-an-honour-guard-with-japanese-news-photo/1398731732?phrase=Kishida%20Biden&adppopup=true">Eugene Hoshiko/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/01/10/national/politics-diplomacy/kishida-biden-summit-preview/">set to sit down with President Joe Biden</a> at the White House on Jan. 13, 2023.</p>
<p>The bilateral meeting in the U.S. is the final stop for Kishida in <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230109-japan-pm-leaves-on-tour-of-european-north-american-allies">a five-day tour</a> of allies that has also seen him visit France, Italy, the U.K. and Canada. It comes as Japan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/japan-will-use-g7-un-roles-pressure-russia-ukraine-foreign-minister-2022-12-01/">takes over the presidency of the G-7</a>, with leaders of the seven largest economies due to meet in Hiroshima in May.</p>
<p>It also marks the first visit to the White House by a Japanese prime minister since the country revamped its defense priorities with the release of its <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html">National Security Strategy</a> in December 2022. The new strategy supports a more robust and assertive security stance by Japan in the face of shifting geopolitical and domestic realities. The new defense plan forms the backdrop to the meeting with Biden. </p>
<p>As an <a href="https://www.drake.edu/polsci/facultystaff/marymmccarthy/">expert on U.S.-Japan relations</a>, I believe the National Security Strategy is the lens through which the meeting should be viewed, with a focus on four key items.</p>
<h2>1. Underscoring the US-Japan alliance</h2>
<p>The preeminent goal of the leaders’ meeting will be to emphasize the strength and importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, both rhetorically and in substance.</p>
<p>The two governments will likely seek to display to both foreign and domestic audiences that Japan and the U.S. are in lockstep on foreign policy priorities. Both countries <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/japan-u-s-joint-leaders-statement-strengthening-the-free-and-open-international-order/">have framed “democracy” and “the rule of law”</a> as common values underpinning the U.S.-Japan alliance, and there is no reason to believe that Biden or Kishida will deviate from that line, especially regarding their shared vision of a “<a href="https://www.state.gov/a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/">free and open Indo-Pacific</a>.”</p>
<p>Given the context of the meeting, such rhetoric can have substantive consequences and shed some light on how the alliance is being positioned within, and may evolve after, Japan’s latest shift in its defense strategy. Japan’s National Security Strategy is ambitious in its development of new strategic capabilities, including counterstrike measures, and represents unprecedented financial commitments from the Japanese government. Yet Japan can only achieve its new defense goals in close cooperation with the U.S. As a result, Japan will be looking for Biden’s fulsome show of support for both the bilateral alliance and Japan’s new defense strategy.</p>
<p>But the meeting isn’t all about satisfying Japanese concerns – framing the U.S.-Japan alliance as solid and stable supports Biden’s <a href="https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/#">objective of reinvigorating relationships</a> with U.S. allies and acts as a deterrence to any country seeking to disrupt the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region.</p>
<h2>2. Addressing regional tensions</h2>
<p>Over the past decade, the <a href="https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/06/rsa-2021-introduction">security environment in Asia</a> has become more dangerous.</p>
<p>Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this is even more so the case. North Korea has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-seoul-united-nations-nuclear-weapons-ab71f575cf671bb4661368d8633b1234">become emboldened</a>, knowing that Russia and China <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-china-unlikely-to-sway-north-korea-on-missile-nuclear-tests/6877236.html">are unlikely to act against its provocations</a> in the current geopolitical environment. It is telling that North Korea <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/26/asia/north-korea-missile-testing-year-end-intl-hnk/index.html#:%7E:text=In%202022%2C%20the%20isolated%20nation,nuclear%20test%20on%20the%20horizon.">tested more missiles in 2022</a> than in any previous year. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Chinese president Xi Jinping has <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-reunification-with-taiwan-must-will-be-realised-2021-10-09/">reasserted his desire of reuniting Taiwan</a> with the mainland during his tenure, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/asia/china-taiwan-combat-drills-intl-hnk-ml/index.html">holding large-scale military exercises</a> around the island mere days before the U.S.-Japan meeting.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.state.gov/welcoming-japans-new-national-security-strategy-national-defense-strategy-and-defense-buildup-program/">views the steps being laid out</a> in Japan’s new defense strategy to be important for regional security as a form of deterrence against aggression from China and North Korea and as a means for the U.S. and Japanese militaries to work together more seamlessly in the event of conflict in the region. The White House meeting provides an opportunity for Biden and Kishida to reiterate their common regional concerns and display a united resolve against any saber-rattling in the region.</p>
<h2>3. Confronting Russian aggression</h2>
<p>As both the current G-7 president and as a non-permanent <a href="https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/sc/japan-unsc2023-2024/index.html">member of the United Nations Security Council</a> for 2023-24, Japan will have to confront the main geopolitical drama playing out on the global stage: the Russian war in Ukraine. The new National Security Strategy illustrates how the Japanese government’s view of Russia has shifted, from a potential strategic partner to a strategic threat. Japan has also voiced concerns that Russia could join forces with China in ways that undermine regional security. </p>
<p>These changes in the Japanese government’s perception of Russia bring it more in line with the U.S. position and will likely be reflected in the way in which the Russian invasion of Ukraine is addressed between the two leaders at the White House meeting.</p>
<h2>4. Economic security</h2>
<p>In 2021, Japan created a cabinet-level post of <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/10/03/national/politics-diplomacy/kishida-economic-security-cabinet/">economic security minister</a>, and the importance of insulating the economy from outside threats was reiterated in the National Security Strategy. </p>
<p>A priority is working toward securing supply chain resilience in the face of <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-big-challenges-for-supply-chains-in-2022-174420">existing – or potential – disruptions</a> from pandemics, climate change, military conflict or politically motivated actions, such as withholding needed goods or services by other governments.</p>
<p>Both the U.S. and Japan have emphasized that a crucial part of supply chain resilience is partnering with like-minded nations. As such, a plan for enhanced economic and technological cooperation is among the topics likely to be discussed by the two leaders.</p>
<h2>… so how much of this is about China?</h2>
<p>The U.S.-Japan bilateral summit is not all about China – conspicuously, China was not mentioned by name in either the White House announcement of the planned content of Friday’s meeting between Biden and Kishida or in the White House overview of the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/phnom-penh-statement-on-trilateral-partnership-for-the-indo-pacific/">two leader’s last meeting</a> in Cambodia in November 2022. </p>
<p>Yet, China looms large for the U.S. and Japan in each of these four areas, as both seek to enhance the two nations’ defense, diplomatic and economic ties – and will likely never be far from the surface of what is being discussed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/197608/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary M. McCarthy has received funding from:
Mansfield Foundation Bridging the Divide Program in South Korea (2018)
Guest Lecture Support Grant, The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (2017)
East-West Center in Washington Japan Studies Fellowship (2014)
Mansfield Foundation US-Japan Network for the Future Scholar (2012-2014)
Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation Grant for traveling atomic bomb exhibit (2010)
Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leader (2006, 2005)
Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship (2004-2005, 2000-2001)
Mary McCarthy is currently or has been a member of:
American Political Science Association
ASIANetwork
Association of Asian Studies
International Studies Association
Memory Studies Association
</span></em></p>
The meeting is the first between the leaders since Japan outlined a more assertive defense strategy in December.
Mary M. McCarthy, Professor of Political Science, Drake University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/192073
2022-10-13T12:20:54Z
2022-10-13T12:20:54Z
It’s time to take Kim Jong Un and his nuclear threats seriously
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489416/original/file-20221012-24-qqu6fp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=55%2C0%2C6224%2C4108&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Kim Jong Un remains focused on reunifying Korea – on his terms.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-sit-near-a-television-showing-a-news-broadcast-with-news-photo/1243858058?phrase=Kim%20Jong-un&adppopup=true">Anthony Wallace/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>As the West <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/europe-putin-russia-ukraine-nuclear-weapons/?gclid=Cj0KCQjwy5maBhDdARIsAMxrkw2wuyAJLM02kr0vxVRKirNQ-y_cuOz9wDxrH_on-x1N016jXqt8pKMaAmz2EALw_wcB">frets over the possibility</a> of Vladimir Putin <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/how-close-is-vladimir-putin-to-using-a-nuclear-bomb">turning to nuclear weapons</a> in Ukraine, there is a risk that similar threats posed by another pariah leader are not being treated as seriously – those of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/business-seoul-south-korea-nuclear-weapons-north-6ce0a8da47f8eb9228d4b33223ebfa3b">North Korea’s Kim Jong Un</a>.</p>
<p>The isolationist East Asian nation has <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20221010000654325">conducted seven nuclear-capable missile blasts</a> over the course of 15 days, from Sept. 25 to Oct. 9, 2022. One <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/03/world/asia/japan-north-korea-missile.html">flew over Japan</a>, plunging into the Pacific after flying 2,800 miles – a distance that puts the U.S. military base in Guam within range. </p>
<p>Then, on Oct. 10 – the <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2022/10/510_337657.html">77th anniversary</a> of the founding of North Korea’s communist Workers Party – state media announced that Kim had <a href="https://apnews.com/article/business-seoul-south-korea-nuclear-weapons-north-6ce0a8da47f8eb9228d4b33223ebfa3b">personally conducted field guidance</a> of his nation’s “tactical nuclear operation units,” which displayed the capacity to “hit and wipe out” enemy targets.</p>
<p>True, Russia’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/05/russia-nuclear-weapons-military-arsenal/">enormous nuclear arsenal</a> make its threats more credible than North Korea’s. Moscow has the means, and fear over defeat in Ukraine could provide the motive.</p>
<p>There is another reason that Kim’s nuclear threats may sound less ominous, if not entirely hollow. North Korea’s leader strikes many in the West <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/01/06/kim-jong-un-funny-until-hes-not/">almost as a laughable figure</a> – a narcissistic, well-nourished dictator with, to many, <a href="https://sg.news.yahoo.com/kim-jong-un-outfit-gets-085243780.html">a comical look</a>. Yes, he harbors worrying nuclear bomb ambitions and presides over a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/1/humanitarian-disaster-looms-in-north-korea">desperate state facing widespread hunger</a>. But his occasional threats to nuke his southern neighbor – South Korea – are greeted by many as little more than buffoonish bellicosity. Take, for example, then-President Donald Trump’s 2017 speech at the United Nations in which <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/world/asia/kim-trump-rocketman-dotard.html">he belittled Kim</a> as a “Rocket Man on a suicide mission.”</p>
<p>But as a <a href="https://fletcher.tufts.edu/people/faculty/sung-yoon-lee">scholar of Korean history</a> who has watched as the North’s regime has threatened to destabilize the region, I believe Kim must be taken seriously. He is deadly serious about completing his grandfather’s and father’s <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/4047.pdf">mission of reunification of the Korean peninsula</a>. It is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/opinion/north-korea-south-korea-peace.html">the dynasty’s “supreme national task</a>,” and there is little to suggest that Kim won’t resort to any length to make that happen.</p>
<h2>Preemptive nuclear strikes</h2>
<p>In 2022 alone, North Korea has fired over 30 missiles, including six intercontinental ballistic projectiles. These activities are in “open breach of United Nations sanctions,” as the <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/608/53/PDF/N2260853.pdf?OpenElement">U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korea reported</a> in September.</p>
<p>Yet, there has not been a single new United Nations Security Council Resolution passed in response to these serial violations. And I doubt one will be forthcoming even in the wake of a <a href="https://www.axios.com/2022/06/23/north-korea-nuclear-test-looms-us-south-defense">major nuclear test</a>, which is looming. Security Council members Russia and China, which supported previous U.N. sanctions following North Korean missiles and nuclear tests, are unlikely to do so again this time amid the growing geopolitical rift with the West. Both countries <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-china-japan-north-korea-c2814192ae7890d7cf08cbed76845336">actively blocked such moves</a> led by the U.S. earlier in the year.</p>
<p>Worse, recent remarks by Putin and Kim have brought back the once unthinkable notion of a nation preemptively nuking a neighboring state.</p>
<p>In September, North Korea <a href="https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1662721725-307939464/dprk%E2%80%99s-law-on-policy-of-nuclear-forces-promulgated/">promulgated a new</a> “law on the state policy on the nuclear forces.” It sets out the conditions under which North Korea would use nuclear weapons. In broad and vague terms, the law cites “taking an upper hand in a war” and being “inevitably compelled and cannot help but use nuclear weapons” as reasons to resort to the ultimate weapon.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A TV screen shows a map of North Korea with the trajectory of missiles on it." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489427/original/file-20221012-20-u7i2zu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/489427/original/file-20221012-20-u7i2zu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489427/original/file-20221012-20-u7i2zu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489427/original/file-20221012-20-u7i2zu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489427/original/file-20221012-20-u7i2zu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489427/original/file-20221012-20-u7i2zu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/489427/original/file-20221012-20-u7i2zu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Reporting of North Korea’s missile launches.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/screen-shows-a-news-program-reporting-north-koreas-missile-news-photo/1243843558?phrase=North%20Korea%20missile&adppopup=true">Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In outlining a fairly open-ended approach to nuclear action, Kim has escalated the rhetoric and attempted to normalize the right to strike first. It lays the groundwork for using any “hostile” move by South Korea – which the regime defines broadly as anything between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-rights/north-korea-warns-u-s-could-pay-dearly-for-human-rights-criticism-idUSKBN1YP01Y">criticism of its human rights violations</a> to <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2021/08/10/nkorea-Kim-Yo-Jong-United-States-South-Korea-joint-military-drills/3601628577978/">combined defensive military exercises with the United States</a> – as as a pretext for preemptive nuclear strikes.</p>
<p>Kim appears to be arguing that it is his right to use nuclear weapons whenever he deems it necessary. It is a truly frightening prospect.</p>
<h2>A cycle of escalation</h2>
<p>The recent nuclear-capable missile launches, coming just weeks after a new nuclear doctrine and coinciding with Putin’s escalation in Ukraine, looks to paint the U.S. into a corner and seize on the growing Cold War split. Kim is forging new norms in the politics of the region.</p>
<p>It may be hard to accept that North Korea – a small economic actor compared with the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and South Korea – has outmaneuvered its bigger interlocutors. But, over the past 30 years of nuclear diplomacy, it has been North Korea that has mostly called the shots – from proposing talks, agenda-setting and agenda-shifting to <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/north-korea-reportedly-cancels-high-level-talks-south-n874396">deciding when to walk away</a>.</p>
<p>In the process, Pyongyang has wrested away <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27033552">billions of U.S. dollars’ worth</a> of cash, food, fuel and other goods from other countries while building approximately 50 nuclear bombs, ICBMs and other strategic weapons. </p>
<p>From the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations alone, North Korea <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R40095.pdf">received over US$1.3 billion worth in aid</a> in return for repeated false pledges of denuclearization.</p>
<p>North Korea’s strategy throughout has been one that combines calculated provocations, graduated escalation and a post-provocation peace ploy. But the end game for Kim, like his father and grandfather before him, remains the same: triumphing over South Korea and incorporating its people and territory under the North’s jurisdiction. </p>
<p>To enable this, North Korea will need to repeat its cycles of provocations and deescalation while continuing to grow its military arsenal to the extent that it becomes a clear and present nuclear threat to the U.S. mainland and an unbearable regional liability. At that point, so the strategy goes, it can push the U.S. to withdraw forces in South Korea, rendering the South vulnerable to submission to the North’s plans.</p>
<h2>Kim’s grand strategy</h2>
<p>Reunification under the North’s terms is central to Kim’s plan. As such, international observers might be wise to focus more on the purpose of Kim’s provocations, rather than the cause.</p>
<p>Pondering “What caused Kim to test a nuke?” may lead some into the same trap as asking, “What caused Putin to invade Ukraine?”</p>
<p>Both questions assume the aggressor to be reactive rather than proactive and ignore his grandiose intentions. </p>
<p>Kim Jong Un has a grand strategy. As long as South Korea exists as a richer and more democratically legitimate Korean state that serves as a magnet for his own people, the specter of <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/german-reunification-it-was-nothing-short-miracle">the German model of reunification</a> – under which the richer Germany absorbed the poorer one – hovers ominously for Kim. And that, he cannot allow.</p>
<p>As such, world leaders must beware: When narcissistic tyrants make nuclear threats, they carry menacing meaning – even when uttered by unusually odd-looking despots.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/192073/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sung-Yoon Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
A recent barrage of nuclear-capable missile tests and a change in law setting out the conditions for a nuclear strike show that North Korea’s leader is intent on reunification on his terms.
Sung-Yoon Lee, Professor in Korean Studies, Tufts University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/191270
2022-09-29T14:07:11Z
2022-09-29T14:07:11Z
Africa risks losing out on trade as rich countries cement relationships with trusted partners
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/487250/original/file-20220929-26-4j7um0.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida greets US Vice President Kamala in Tokyo. Washington is focused on moving close to partners it can trust.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by David Mareuil/Pool/Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past few years, the world’s supply chains have been strained and disrupted by the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-22/what-friend-shoring-means-for-the-future-of-trade-quicktake">COVID pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and rising geopolitical tensions</a>. These started with the US-China trade war and then intensified following the war in Ukraine. </p>
<p>In response to the cumulative economic and security fallout that has ensued, some advanced countries are now ramping up efforts to divert their supply chains away from countries that are not like-minded and that don’t have shared common values.</p>
<p>This new supply chain strategy is called “<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0714">friend-shoring</a>.” Advanced countries are creating friend-shoring alliances which are, in turn, reshaping our global economy. </p>
<p>These shifts have adverse implications for Africa. The approaches to reconfiguring supply chains currently unfolding threaten to heap more stress on a continent already weighed down by multiple crises. </p>
<p>Africa stands to lose out because the current reshaping of supply chains is not intended to shift trade, investments and jobs towards African trade partners. Rather it’s got to do with efforts by the EU and US to insulate their supply chains from being disrupted for geopolitical reasons by less trusted partners with significant global market share in key raw materials, commodities and other essential products.</p>
<p>Steps can be taken to mitigate the negative economic effects that will be imposed on Africa by this supply chain reorientation. These include forging strong and effective friend -shoring alliances with the advanced economies and defending the rules-based multilateral trading system.</p>
<h2>The push for a friend-shoring strategy</h2>
<p>In the US, friend-shoring as a policy goal <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-us-treasury-secretary-janet-yellen-on-the-next-steps-for-russia-sanctions-and-friend-shoring-supply-chains/">was first proposed</a> by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in April this year. In her remarks on the way forward for the global economy, she identified friend-shoring of supply chains as a strategy that could achieve two outcomes. Firstly it could securely extend market access. Secondly it could simultaneously lower the risks to the US economy and its trusted trade partners. </p>
<p>Then <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-18/yellen-touts-friend-shoring-as-fix-for-global-supply-chains">during a tour</a> of East Asia in July, Yellen sought to promote the US administration’s proposed friend-shoring policy first in Tokyo and later on in a speech delivered in Seoul. She said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In so doing, we can help to insulate both American and Korean households from the price increases and disruptions caused by geopolitical and economic risks.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And during a recent visit to Japan and South Korea, Vice President Kamala Harris emphasised the importance of friend-shoring. Speaking in Tokyo <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-28/harris-says-japan-plays-critical-role-in-chips-supply-chain">she said</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>…it is important that we and our allies partner in a way that allows us to grow, and in a way that allows us to function at a very practical level. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>US President Joe Biden has been pushing the same supply-chain strategy in Asia. A centerpiece of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework he <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pacific-partners-launch-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/">unveiled</a> in Asia is bolstering regional supply chains as part of Washington’s efforts to strengthen ties with trusted Asian partners. And to counter China. </p>
<p>The framework is also a big deal for the US because it brings together economies that contribute nearly <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-07/us-starts-broad-economic-talks-with-13-nations-to-counter-china">40% of global GDP</a>. Along with the US, its other key members include Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and several Southeast Asian countries.</p>
<p>The Biden administration also unveiled a new <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/08/fact-sheet-u-s-strategy-toward-sub-saharan-africa/">US strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa</a> in August. But, in sharp contrast to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, it does not include any specific and concrete friend-shoring commitments for African countries. And appears mainly to be another counter play against China and Russia—the US’s two top adversaries.</p>
<p>The push to diversify supply chains is also underway in Europe. According to European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp220422%7Ec43af3db20.en.html">nearly half of companies</a> had diversified their supplier base by the end of 2021. As the world’s largest single market, the EU is able to use its strong regional base to diversify supply chains within the bloc. </p>
<p>While the COVID pandemic certainly played an important role in spurring the shift from dependence to diversification, the war in Ukraine was a tipping point for Europe from an economic and security standpoint. It further intensified the drive to diversify supply lines away from Russian suppliers of critical commodities, especially energy, food, and fertiliser. The strategy is to friend-shore them to countries deemed reliable and with shared strategic interests.</p>
<h2>Africa stands to lose out</h2>
<p>Africa has nothing to gain from the current reshaping of supply chains. This is because US and EU friend-shoring initiatives heavily favour Asian and Indo-pacific partners. Winners from these initiatives include Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and other Indo-Pacific countries deemed to be trustworthy. Their economies will benefit from the boost given to trade, production plants, jobs and investments.</p>
<p>In addition, friend-shoring also threatens to undermine the World Trade Organisation’s <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm">Aid for Trade initiative</a>. This was launched in 2005 to assist developing countries reduce trade costs and thereby enhance export competitiveness. Its significance has steadily increased in the years after it was launched. At this year’s WTO meeting in July, Aid for Trade discussions focused on helping Africa and other developing countries recover and build long-term sustainable development by supporting priority needs they had identified.</p>
<p>These needs include trade facilitation, digital connectivity, export diversification, connecting to value chains, and women’s economic empowerment. They also focused on how environmentally sustainable development can contribute to achieving these priority needs. </p>
<p>Reconfiguring supply chains in ways that exclusively lend a helping hand to current US and EU manoeuvring will only make it more difficult for Africa to benefit from WTO support in these important areas.</p>
<h2>What’s to be done?</h2>
<p>Looking forward, there are at least three essential things that can be done to mitigate negative impacts on Africa. </p>
<p>First, effective friend-shoring alliances should be included as a centerpiece of the new US strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa. African policy makers should strongly urge the Biden administration to do this and demonstrate commitment on their part to be trusted partners. </p>
<p>Second, the EU should also develop an effective friend-shoring strategy with African partners, even as it pushes for an expansion of intra-bloc supply chains. Again, it is paramount that African policy makers take the lead and justify the importance of entering into a strong friend -shoring relationship with the EU. </p>
<p>Finally, defending the rules-based multilateral trading system is important to ensure that it continues to deliver benefits for developing and least developed countries, including those in Africa.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/191270/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Munemo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Africa must focus on building strong alliances with advanced economies to mitigate the steps being taken by the European Union and US.
Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/190946
2022-09-19T18:14:40Z
2022-09-19T18:14:40Z
Biden again indicates that US will defend Taiwan ‘militarily’ – does this constitute a change in policy?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/485381/original/file-20220919-20-ffwav1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=12%2C64%2C4297%2C2804&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Are Biden's comments on Taiwan an accidental or deliberate pivot?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/BritainRoyalsBiden/c500cee205ea45289051ace49190427f/photo?Query=Biden&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=86632&currentItemNo=0">AP Photo/Susan Walsh</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>President Joe Biden has – <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/23/politics/biden-taiwan-china-japan-intl-hnk/index.html">not for the first time</a> – suggested that the U.S. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/19/biden-taiwan-china-defense/">would intervene “militarily”</a> should China attempt an invasion of Taiwan._</p>
<p><em>In an <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-joe-biden-60-minutes-interview-transcript-2022-09-18/">interview with CBS’s “60 Minutes”</a> on Sept. 18, 2022, Biden vowed to protect the island in the face of any attack. Pressed if that meant the U.S. getting “involved militarily,” the president replied: “Yes.”</em></p>
<p><em>The comments <a href="https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202209190005">appear to deviate</a> from the official U.S. line on Taiwan, in place for decades. But White House officials said the remarks <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/09/19/1123759127/biden-again-says-u-s-would-help-taiwan-if-china-attacks">did not represent any change in Taiwan policy</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Meredith Oyen, an <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">expert on U.S.-China relations</a> at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, helps explain the background to Biden’s comments and untangles what should be read into his remarks – and what shouldn’t.</em></p>
<h2>What did Biden say and why was it significant?</h2>
<p>In an exchange on “60 Minutes,” Biden <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/19/biden-taiwan-china-defense/">was asked directly</a> if the U.S. would “come to Taiwan’s defense” if it were attacked by China. He replied: “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.” He also confirmed that U.S. intervention would be military. </p>
<p>By my count, this is the fourth time Biden as president has suggested that the U.S. will come to Taiwan’s aid militarily if the island is attacked. In 2021 he made similar remarks in an <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/20/us-position-on-taiwan-unchanged-despite-biden-comment-official-says.html">interview with ABC News</a> and then again <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/10/22/remarks-by-president-biden-in-a-cnn-town-hall-with-anderson-cooper-2/">while taking part in a CNN town hall event</a>. And earlier this year he said something similar while in Japan, marking the first time he has made the assertion while in Asia.</p>
<p>On each occasion he has made such a comment, it has been followed quite quickly by the White House’s walking back the remarks, by issuing statements along the lines of “what the president actually means is …” and stressing that this isn’t a shift away from the official U.S. policy on China or Taiwan. </p>
<p>But I think that with each incident it is harder to prevaricate about Biden’s comments being an accident, or suggest that he in some way misspoke. I think it is clear at this point that Biden’s interpretation of the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479">Taiwan Relations Act</a> – which since 1979 has set out the parameters of U.S. policy on the island – is that it allows for a U.S. military response should China invade. And despite White House claims to the contrary, I believe that does represent a departure from the long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan.</p>
<h2>What does ‘strategic ambiguity’ mean?</h2>
<p><a href="https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-strategic-ambiguity-trumps-strategic-clarity-taiwan/">Strategic ambiguity</a> has long been the U.S. policy toward Taiwan – really since the 1950s, but certainly from 1979 onward. While it does not explicitly commit the U.S. to defending Taiwan in every circumstance, it does leave open the option of American defensive support to Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack by China.</p>
<p><iframe id="NS3cP" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NS3cP/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Crucially, the U.S. hasn’t really said what it will do – so does this support mean economic aid, supply of weapons or U.S. boots on the ground? China and Taiwan are left guessing if – and to what extent – the U.S. will be involved in any China-Taiwan conflict.</p>
<p>By leaving the answer to that question ambiguous, the U.S. holds a threat over China: Invade Taiwan and find out if you face the U.S. as well. </p>
<p>Traditionally, this has been a useful policy for the U.S., but things have changed since it was first rolled out. It was certainly effective when the U.S. was in a much stronger position militarily compared with China. But it might be less effective as a threat now that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-22/china-is-catching-up-to-the-u-s-when-it-comes-to-military-power">China’s military is catching up</a> with the U.S.</p>
<p>Leading voices from U.S. allies in Asia, <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/U.S.-should-abandon-ambiguity-on-Taiwan-defense-Japan-s-Abe">such as Japan</a>, believe that “strategic clarity” might be a better option now – with the U.S. stating outright that it would defend Taiwan if the island were attacked.</p>
<h2>What is the history of US relations with Taiwan?</h2>
<p>After the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949</a>, the defeated Republic of China government withdrew to the island of Taiwan, located just 100 miles off the shore of Fujian province. And until the 1970s, the U.S. recognized only this exiled Republic of China on Taiwan as the government of China.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="President Richard Nixon confers with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong as they sit in comfy chairs." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=188&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/464888/original/file-20220523-16-bx4rvg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=237&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nixon in China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/peking-china-president-richard-m-nixon-confers-with-chinese-news-photo/515401848?adppopup=true">Bettmann/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But in 1971, the <a href="https://web-archive-2017.ait.org.tw/en/un-res-2758-voted-to-admit-communist-china.html">United Nations shifted recognition</a> to the People’s Republic of China on the mainland. In 1972, President Richard Nixon made a <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/nixons-1972-visit-china-50">now-famous trip to China</a> to announce a rapprochement and sign the Shanghai Communique, a joint statement from Communist China and the U.S. signaling a commitment to pursue formal diplomatic relations. A <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325">critical section of that document</a> stated: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.”</p>
<p>The wording was crucial: The U.S. was not formally committing to a position on whether Taiwan was part of the China nation. Instead, it was acknowledging what the governments of either territory asserted – that there is “one China.” </p>
<h2>Where does US commitment of military support for Taiwan come from?</h2>
<p>After establishing formal diplomatic relations with China in 1979, the U.S. built an informal relationship with the ROC on Taiwan. In part to push back against President Jimmy Carter’s decision to recognize Communist China, U.S. lawmakers passed the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479#:%7E:text=Taiwan%20Relations%20Act%20%2D%20Declares%20it,other%20people%20of%20the%20Western">Taiwan Relations Act in 1979</a>. That act outlined a plan to maintain close ties between the U.S. and Taiwan and included provisions for the U.S. to sell military items to help the island maintain its defense – setting the path for the policy of strategic ambiguity. </p>
<h2>What has changed recently?</h2>
<p>China has long maintained its desire for an eventual <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2021/10/09/chinas-xi-jinping-calls-peaceful-reunification-taiwan/6072388001/">peaceful reunification</a> of its country with the island it considers a rogue province. But the commitment to the principle of “one China” has become increasingly one-sided. It is an absolute for Beijing. In Taiwan, however, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/07/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/">resistance to the idea of reunification has grown</a> amid a <a href="https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6963/Tondu202112.jpg">surge of support for moving the island toward independence</a>.</p>
<p>Beijing has become more aggressive of late in asserting that Taiwan must be “returned to China.” Domestic politics plays a role in this. At times of internal instability in China, Beijing has sounded a more belligerent tone on relations between the two entities separated by the Taiwan Strait. We have seen this over the past year with Beijing sending <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-taiwan-warplanes-fly-incursions-air-defense-zone/">military aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Zone</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Chinese <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-11/Chapter_5--Hong_Kongs_Government_Embraces_Authoritarianism.pdf">assertion of increased authority over Hong Kong</a> has damaged the argument for “one country, two systems” as a means of peaceful reunification with Taiwan.</p>
<h2>How has the US position shifted in the face of Beijing’s stance?</h2>
<p>Biden has definitely been more openly supportive of Taiwan than previous presidents. He <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-taiwan/taiwan-biden-ties-off-to-strong-start-with-invite-for-top-diplomat-idUSKBN29Q01N">officially invited a representative from Taiwan to his inauguration</a> – a first for an incoming president – and has repeatedly made it clear that he views Taiwan as an ally.</p>
<p>He also didn’t overturn the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535">Taiwan Travel Act</a> passed under the the previous administration of Donald Trump. This legislation allows U.S. officials to visit Taiwan in an official capacity.</p>
<p>In August 2022, <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-puts-the-white-house-in-delicate-straits-of-diplomacy-with-china-188116">U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan</a>, making her the highest-profile U.S. politician to go to the island in decades.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/16/politics/biden-china-taiwan/index.html">for the second time</a>, Biden in his “60 Minutes” interview indicated a belief that it was up to Taiwan to decide its future, departing slightly from the usual line that the U.S. doesn’t support changes to the status quo. However, Biden has also said he does not support a unilateral declaration of independence from Taiwan.</p>
<p>So there has been a shift to a degree. But the White House is keen not to overstate any change. At heart, there is a desire by the U.S. to not stray from the Shanghai Communique. </p>
<h2>So is an invasion of Taiwan likely?</h2>
<p>The current rhetoric from the U.S. and response from China do raise the risk of conflict, but I don’t think we are at that point yet. Any invasion across the Taiwan Strait would be militarily complex. It also comes with risks of backlash from the international community. Taiwan would receive support from not only the U.S. – in an unclear capacity, given Biden’s remarks – but also Japan and likely other countries in the region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, China maintains that it wants to see reintegration through peaceful means. As long as Taiwan doesn’t force the issue and declare independence unilaterally, I think there is tolerance in Beijing to wait it out. And despite <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3462914-russias-war-on-ukraine-makes-chinas-attack-on-taiwan-more-likely/">some commentary to the contrary</a>, I don’t think the invasion of Ukraine has raised the prospects of a similar move on Taiwan. In fact, given that Russia is now bogged down in a monthslong conflict that has hit its military credibility and economy, the Ukraine invasion may actually serve as a warning to Beijing.</p>
<p><em>This is an update to an <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">article that was originally published</a> on May 24, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/190946/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Remarks by the US president come amid heightened tensions between Washington and Beijing and follow a contentious visit to Taiwan by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.
Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/188584
2022-08-16T20:02:59Z
2022-08-16T20:02:59Z
Explainer: the complex question of Taiwanese independence
<p>“Strategic ambiguity” – the policy that has underpinned the West’s defence of Taiwan for half a century or more – rests on another ambiguity: Taiwan’s status in international law. And that status matters because it could help us answer three questions: </p>
<ul>
<li><p>does China have a legal right to restore control over its own territory by force? </p></li>
<li><p>do Taiwan and its allies have a legal right to resist such an attack? </p></li>
<li><p>might Taiwan even have the right to declare independence?</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The islands we know as Taiwan have been inhabited for 30,000 years, including by successive waves of peoples from mainland China. Taiwan was subject to partial Dutch and Spanish colonisation from the early 17th century, was partly controlled by the remnants of the mainland Ming dynasty from 1661, then colonised by the mainland Qing dynasty from 1683. The main island was incorporated as a Chinese province in 1887.</p>
<p>After the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894–95, Taiwan was ceded by treaty to Japan. (At the time, and up until <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp">1928</a>, a country could legally acquire sovereignty over foreign territory by war or colonisation.) Then, after Japan’s defeat in 1945, the United Nations placed Taiwan under the control of the Republic of China. The ROC, founded in 1912, was led by the nationalist Kuomintang, a wartime ally of major Western countries.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479069/original/file-20220815-66152-gpzhuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/479069/original/file-20220815-66152-gpzhuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479069/original/file-20220815-66152-gpzhuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479069/original/file-20220815-66152-gpzhuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479069/original/file-20220815-66152-gpzhuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479069/original/file-20220815-66152-gpzhuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/479069/original/file-20220815-66152-gpzhuu.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (centre) and UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Cairo in late 1943.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://catalog.archives.gov/id/196609">US National Archives</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Japan renounced its claim to Taiwan under the <a href="https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20136/volume-136-i-1832-english.pdf">1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty</a>, but neither that agreement nor any other resolved the future sovereignty of Taiwan. However, in the non-binding <a href="https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122101.pdf?v=d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e">Cairo Declaration</a> of 1943, the allied powers had agreed Taiwan would be returned to the ROC.</p>
<h2>One China, two rival governments</h2>
<p>The context changed again in 1949, when communist forces won the Chinese civil war and proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the successor state to the defeated ROC. Both the ROC, which had retreated to Taiwan, and the PRC claimed to be the single legal “state” and so the lawful government of all of China.</p>
<p>The ROC was accepted as a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 and treated as the representative of all China for the next quarter-century. In 1971, however, the UN General Assembly <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en">recognised</a> the PRC as China’s “only legitimate representatives” at the UN and expelled the ROC representatives. The UN decision resolved which entity was competent to represent China as a UN member state but didn’t deal with sovereignty over Taiwan.</p>
<p>From the beginning, both the PRC and ROC claimed that Taiwan was part of “their” China. Despite never having governed Taiwan, the PRC maintains the same “one China” principle today. For many decades, the ROC also claimed all of China, despite having lost control of the mainland in 1949 and being expelled from the UN in 1971.</p>
<p>Since the 1990s, Taiwanese leaders have pragmatically accepted that mainland China is governed by the PRC, but Taiwan’s <a href="https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0000001">Constitution</a> still formally claims all of China. Taiwan has also increasingly seen itself as a de facto independent country, separate from the mainland. Partly for fear of triggering a military response, Taiwan hasn’t formally declared itself to be a new, legally independent state.</p>
<h2>International opinion</h2>
<p>Since the shift at the UN in 1971, the United States and Australia have recognised the PRC as the sole legal government of “one China”. The US initially <a href="http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26012.htm">accepted</a> that Taiwan was part of China, but later followed the Australian <a href="https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-3119">position</a> of simply “acknowledging” the PRC’s sovereign claim to Taiwan.</p>
<p>The US, Australia and various other states have called for the dispute over statehood to be resolved peacefully by the governments in Beijing and Taipei. But that position is hard to reconcile with US <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479">legislation</a> enabling sales of arms for Taiwan to use in its defence.</p>
<p>Most states haven’t recognised Taiwan as an independent state or lawful government. Instead, they have dealt pragmatically with Taiwan – through unofficial diplomacy, trade and environmental cooperation, or for other purposes – as an entity with a unique international legal status. While 139 countries recognise Palestine, for example, just 15 recognise Taiwan as a state.</p>
<h2>Part of China?</h2>
<p>Legally, Taiwan isn’t a state. But it satisfies many of the <a href="https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp">legal criteria</a> of statehood by having a population, a defined territory and an independent, effective government. The fourth criterion, a capacity to enter into legal relations with other states, is more problematic, precisely because most other states don’t accept that Taiwan enjoys the legal rights of a state.</p>
<p>The rights Taiwan lacks include full diplomatic representation, the capacity to enter into multilateral treaties, and membership of international organisations like the UN. Decisively, though, an entity can’t be a state if the entity itself doesn’t claim to be a state. Taiwan does not make that claim.</p>
<p>Where does this leave Taiwan? Legally, five factors weigh in favour of Taiwan being part of China:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>for more than 40 years, both the PRC and the ROC have agreed Taiwan is part of “one China” (while disputing rightful governance over it), and the ROC’s Constitution still says so</p></li>
<li><p>no foreign state (including Japan) has asserted any competing claim to Taiwan, let alone a better one</p></li>
<li><p>the allied powers and the UN entrusted Taiwan to the then government of China after the second world war</p></li>
<li><p>the UN (perhaps expediently) didn’t regard Taiwan as a colonised territory, subject to the right of self-determination, after 1945</p></li>
<li><p>few states (including the West) explicitly deny Taiwan is part of China, and most have acquiesced in the Chinese territorial claim.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>One of Australia’s most distinguished international lawyers, the late James Crawford, former Judge of the International Court of Justice, likewise <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/3288">concluded</a> Taiwan was Chinese territory, with governance disputed.</p>
<p>If Taiwan has been Chinese territory since 1945, it doesn’t matter that the PRC has never governed it. State sovereignty over territory is distinct from the capacity of a particular government to control that territory at a given point in time. In civil wars, insurgent forces often hold territory without affecting the state’s sovereignty.</p>
<h2>Suppressing rebellion?</h2>
<p>Indeed, this is the basis of China’s claim to be entitled to retake Taiwan by force: that it wishes to restore control over Chinese territory held by insurgents in an unfinished civil war. Governments normally have a right under international law to suppress rebellion in their territory, including by remnant forces of a defeated previous government. In this light, recent Chinese behaviour could not be seen as aggression, as so often depicted in the West, but as lawful enforcement of its rights.</p>
<p>Further, if Taiwan is part of China then other states have no lawful right to interfere in what is an internal matter. On this view, Taiwan, not being a state, has no right to self-defence against China’s efforts to restore order in its own territory, and other states would violate international law by assisting Taiwan to resist.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-how-far-will-china-go-la-trobes-nick-bisley-says-its-risk-appetite-has-gone-up-188536">Politics with Michelle Grattan: How far will China go? La Trobe's Nick Bisley says its 'risk appetite' has gone up</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Countering this view are several powerful arguments:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>unique disputes like this must be settled peacefully, not by force</p></li>
<li><p>de facto states like Taiwan also benefit from the international prohibition on the use of military force, and enjoy a de facto right of self-defence</p></li>
<li><p>Taiwan’s possible right to self-determination, discussed below, includes freedom from military repression. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>These arguments sit uneasily with Chinese sovereignty over its own territory, and the Security Council - where China has a veto - has not supported these arguments (despite doing so in some other situations). But peace is arguably a higher value than formal territorial rights in this case.</p>
<p>However, no right exists under international law to protect non-state entities simply to “defend democracy” or “defend freedom”. No right of humanitarian intervention exists to respond to likely Chinese atrocities. And no right exists to interfere in foreign territorial disputes to contain an adversary, or for other geostrategic reasons.</p>
<h2>Not part of China?</h2>
<p>Some factors weigh against Taiwan being part of China. </p>
<p>The sovereignty issue was not formally settled in the postwar transition from Japanese rule, and allied strategic preferences don’t necessarily make good law. The UN didn’t regard Taiwan as a Japanese colony ripe to be decolonised through self-determination – though it probably should have – and instead let the allies give Taiwan to China to reward their ROC wartime ally. Most of the population was not then associated with the ROC, including the Austronesian indigenous peoples and millions of descendants of earlier Chinese settlers.</p>
<p>A more contemporary legal argument suggests that, even if Taiwan is legally part of China, its people now have a fresh right to exercise “remedial” self-determination. This right rests in their de facto independence from the mainland for over 70 years, their apparent desire to be ruled separately, and their distinctive identity.</p>
<p>On this view, they would be free to choose some form of accommodation with China, including the status quo, autonomy within China, or full independence – though China would likely reject all of these. From a progressive, human rights perspective, this is an appealing way forward. However, it is a legally controversial expansion of self-determination, which historically applied mainly to colonies. The law is not always just.</p>
<p>If Taiwan were to declare independence in the future, its success in becoming a state depends on whether it can maintain control over its territory and people, to the exclusion of China, and be accepted by the international community. Kosovo is an example of an entity still undergoing that process of separation from the former Yugoslavia, with just over half of other countries recognising it.</p>
<h2>The risks of ambiguity</h2>
<p>Strategic ambiguity, designed to maintain the status quo in Taiwan, is sometimes described as the least worst option (for Taiwan and the West, though not for China). Side-stepping the legal dispute has enabled the Taiwanese to prosper and, belatedly since the 1980s, democratise. It has served the Western strategic imperative of containing China. And it has enabled peace during a long postwar period of relative Chinese military weakness.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/taiwans-rocky-road-to-independence-and-democracy-188378">Taiwan's rocky road to independence and democracy</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>It isn’t surprising that China has become more assertive about its claimed rights. If Taiwan is legally part of China, the West’s desire to avoid settling the dispute according to uncertain international law – and its insistence on maintaining strategic and legal ambiguity – isn’t surprising either.</p>
<p>The problem is that legal disputes can’t be left to fester indefinitely without consequences (in the absence of a miraculous regime change in China). Eventually they must be settled either peacefully – according to law or by equitable negotiation – or by resort to (possibly illegal) war. Neither path is guaranteed to produce a result favourable to Taiwan or the West. </p>
<p>Strategic ambiguity may buy a little more time for peace, but also risks endangering peace in the long term.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188584/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ben Saul is affiliated with Chatham House, London.</span></em></p>
Is “strategic ambiguity” still the least-worst option for dealing with competing claims about Taiwan?
Ben Saul, Challis Chair of International Law, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/187873
2022-08-14T08:07:38Z
2022-08-14T08:07:38Z
South Africa doesn’t need new cities: it needs to focus on fixing what it’s got
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/476515/original/file-20220728-28742-9v621.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Shenzhen, in China's southern Guangdong province. A village until 1980, it's a rare new city success story. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Photo by Jade Gao / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>South Africa is a dominantly urban country, with almost <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/455931/urbanization-in-south-africa/">70%</a> of the population living in cities and towns. But urban services and infrastructures are coming under increasing strain from the <a href="https://theconversation.com/small-towns-are-collapsing-across-south-africa-how-its-starting-to-affect-farming-162697">collapse of infrastructure</a> in many smaller and medium sized towns and <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-06-19-more-than-quarter-of-sas-municipalities-are-on-brink-of-financial-collapse-warns-ag/">deteriorating levels in the large cities</a>. </p>
<p>A common response to a gathering urban crisis is to imagine starting afresh with new cities. The impulse crosses the political spectrum. </p>
<p>In his 2019 state of the nation address, <a href="https://www.gov.za/speeches/2SONA2019">President Cyril Ramaphosa envisioned the construction of a new smart city</a>. He has since announced new cities at <a href="https://businesstech.co.za/news/property/560744/government-announced-plans-for-3-new-cities-in-south-africa-what-you-should-know/">Lanseria</a> (north of Johannesburg), Mooikloof (east of Pretoria), and along the Wild Coast of the Eastern Cape. </p>
<p>In April 2022, former opposition leader Mmusi Maimane argued that <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-04-24-we-need-new-cities-now-to-address-urbanisation-and-its-housing-and-poverty-crises/">South Africa should be building many new cities</a>, doubling the number of metros from eight to 16. </p>
<p>New cities are a catchy idea. But that doesn’t make them a good one.</p>
<p>What would it take to create a sustainable new city without bankrupting the national fiscus? Are they a viable prospect or white elephants in the making? </p>
<p>There is, fortunately, a history of new city thought and practice that we can draw lessons from. </p>
<p>New cities may be appealing since newer, smarter, more sustainable infrastructure can be put in place. But in South Africa, this expenditure competes with the need to improve the deteriorating infrastructure of existing cities, which do in fact have the capacity to accommodate projected urban growth for decades to come. </p>
<p>While carefully planned new city development may play a role in South Africa’s urban future, it would be a critical error to divert attention and resources from the country’s primary urban challenges. </p>
<h2>New cities</h2>
<p>Most large cities globally have evolved over long periods of time, responding to growth in the local economy. But there are cities that have been consciously designed from scratch for many different reasons – including political egos, land speculation, colonial expansion, post-colonial developmentalism, and attempts to relieve existing cities of over-population and congestion. </p>
<p>In modern times, there was a surge of <a href="http://transformationjournal.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/T95-6-Harrison-and-Todes.pdf">new city (or, rather, new town) development in Europe after the second world war</a>. This was done to decentralise development from heavily bombed large cities and to create better living environments for working class families as part of a larger welfarist programme. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/may/15/sterile-or-stirring-britains-love-hate-relationship-with-new-towns">British new town programme</a> was the most extensive and well known, but new towns were also built in France, Italy, Sweden and elsewhere. </p>
<p>Western countries turned away from new town development but, from around the 1990s, new city development gained momentum in other parts of the world, including <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2019/jul/09/cities-from-scratch-100-and-counting-new-cities-rise-from-the-desert-jungle-and-sea">East Asia and the Middle East</a>. </p>
<p>In China, for example, new cities were built to accommodate some of the additional 590 million people in cities from the 1980s. Saudi Arabia has an astonishing plan to build a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/27/saudis-unveil-eye-popping-plan-for-mirrored-skyscraper-eco-city">100-mile-long megacity called Neom</a> which would be only 200 metres wide.</p>
<p>In Africa, Egypt has a long history of new city development. </p>
<p>Elsewhere there were three recent waves of new city development. Just prior to the <a href="https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-recession-and-its-aftermath">2008/09 financial bust</a>, an ambitious first wave was launched (for example, Konza Tech which is 64km south of Nairobi, Eco Atlantic on land reclaimed from the sea outside Lagos, Cité du Fleuve on an island in the Congo River outside Kinshasa, and Kigamboni across a large estuary north of Dar es Salaam).</p>
<p>Most faltered. The late South African academic Vanessa Watson called them “<a href="https://www.africancentreforcities.net/african-urban-fantasies/">urban fantasies</a>”. </p>
<p>The second wave was initiated by property developer <a href="https://www.rendeavour.com/">Rendeavour</a>, which targeted the rising black African middle class (for example, Tatu City outside Nairobi, King City near Takoradi port in Ghana, and Appolonia City near Accra). The developments were more modest in size and have had some market-based success. </p>
<p>The third, most recent wave is diverse, ranging from Lanseria Smart City in South Africa to Akon City in Senegal, an attempt by an African American rapper to recreate the fictional Wakanda. Most recently, in May 2022, <a href="https://elonmuskpower.com/elon-musk-is-building-a-20b-city-in-africa/">Elon Musk made an extraordinary announcement</a>. He intends to build a US$20 billion new city, called Neo Gardens, outside Gaborone in Botswana. </p>
<p>This international story offers many lessons, but so does an earlier South African history which includes the establishment of nearly 80 new towns under apartheid for ideological reasons. These included Welkom, Vanderbijlpark, Sasolburg and Secunda, which were created to support new single-industry economies.</p>
<p>These did well for a time. But they did not diversify substantially and their industries have suffered in recent years from international competition. </p>
<p>These patterns mirror those evident internationally, where the picture is more often economic vulnerability and instability over the long term. </p>
<h2>Conditions for success</h2>
<p>There are some places where new town economies have thrived – such as Shenzhen in China, Abuja in Nigeria, and Milton Keynes in the UK. These are quite specific cases: Shenzhen was one China’s first initiatives to open up to the private sector in the 1980s and is close to Hong Kong; Abuja is a national capital; Milton Keynes houses a major university and a cluster of dynamic industries. </p>
<p>New places do sometimes develop around new or emerging economic activities, although often the attraction of existing economic cores remains strong. </p>
<p>New towns have had a better track record in places of rapid economic and population growth such as in east Asian countries, where large-scale resources have been available for infrastructure development and growth is rapid enough to divert some economic activity into new cities. </p>
<p>So the prospects for new cities depend significantly on the context in which they are developed. </p>
<p>New cities are costly as new infrastructure must be developed from scratch. And they have high risks in terms of outcome. At the same time, they do not replace existing cities, which continue to grow.</p>
<p>In our view, South Africa needs to engage with the realities of existing towns and cities and make them work better for their residents and the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187873/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Philip Harrison receives funding from the National Research Foundation</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alison Todes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
New towns have had a better track record in places of rapid economic and population growth, such as east Asian countries.
Philip Harrison, Professor School of Architecture and Planning, University of the Witwatersrand
Alison Todes, Professor, University of the Witwatersrand
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/187759
2022-08-04T12:19:58Z
2022-08-04T12:19:58Z
Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki left survivors wrestling with spiritual questions – here’s how Buddhists and Catholics responded
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477002/original/file-20220801-62374-upy1cz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C6%2C1013%2C633&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Priests from several religions pray for the victims of the atomic bomb in Nagasaki upon the 60th anniversary.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/priests-from-a-variety-of-religions-pray-for-the-victims-of-news-photo/53347778?adppopup=true">Koichi Kamoshida/Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>It has been over seven decades since the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on Aug. 6 and Aug. 9, 1945. The U.S. attack left <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2020/08/counting-the-dead-at-hiroshima-and-nagasaki/">between 110,000 and 220,000 people dead</a>, and hundreds of thousands more who survived the bomb but suffered its effects – people known in Japan as “hibakusha,” many of whom died of related illnesses.</p>
<p>Yet the production and possession of nuclear weapons <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat">has not stopped</a>. In the United States, they hold <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/people-of-the-bomb">an important place</a> in the national psyche, regarded as ultimate protection. </p>
<p>For years, hibakusha have shared their testimonies and memories with the public. However, as <a href="https://las.depaul.edu/academics/religious-studies/faculty/Pages/yuki-miyamoto.aspx">an ethicist</a> working on <a href="https://www.iwanami.co.jp/book/b515759.html">nuclear discourses in the U.S. and Japan</a>, I have been frustrated to see that their philosophical, religious and spiritual perspectives on the matter are largely overlooked in English-language literature. Popular culture seems to value their tragic stories, but not their struggle to come to terms with the event.</p>
<p>Religious leaders’ understandings, rooted in their own experiences living in post-atomic Hiroshima and Nagasaki, <a href="https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823240517/beyond-the-mushroom-cloud/">offer insights into our violent world</a>. At times, their interpretations of the bombings have been used to promote political agendas. Nonetheless, their interpretations allow people today to reconsider the ethics of responsibility in the atomic age.</p>
<h2>Punishment from above</h2>
<p>Hiroshima, where the first of the two bombs was dropped in Japan, has historically been known for the <a href="https://tricycle.org/magazine/shin-buddhist-practice/">True Pure Land school of Buddhism</a>, or Shin Buddhism, the largest Buddhist institution in Japan. Its Hiroshima adherents are called “<a href="https://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/nfile/2865">aki monto</a>.”</p>
<p>One of them was Kōji Shigenobu, who grew up to become a Shin Buddhist priest. He and other schoolchildren had been evacuated from the city during the war but lost family members in the inferno. Eventually, he developed a perspective on the bombing that represented many Hiroshima residents’ frame of mind, as I describe in my book “<a href="https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823240517/beyond-the-mushroom-cloud/">Beyond the Mushroom Cloud</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="A black and white photo shows a man looking sad sitting in front of small boxes with Japanese script." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477008/original/file-20220801-13716-wpqlv2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477008/original/file-20220801-13716-wpqlv2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=631&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477008/original/file-20220801-13716-wpqlv2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=631&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477008/original/file-20220801-13716-wpqlv2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=631&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477008/original/file-20220801-13716-wpqlv2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=794&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477008/original/file-20220801-13716-wpqlv2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=794&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477008/original/file-20220801-13716-wpqlv2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=794&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Japanese man sits in a Buddhist temple in Hiroshima in front of ceremonial boxes containing ashes of victims of the blast.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/japanese-man-sits-in-a-buddhist-temple-in-front-of-news-photo/615307608?adppopup=true">Corbis Historical via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/%E4%BA%BA%E9%96%93%E3%81%AE%E5%BF%83%E3%83%92%E3%83%AD%E3%82%B7%E3%83%9E%E3%81%AE%E5%BF%83/cZZOAAAAMAAJ?hl=en">In his essay</a>, Kōji viewed the atomic bombing as representing three circles of sins: the sins of Hiroshima residents, of Japanese nationals and of humanity as a whole. He failed to mention that the city was one of Japan’s military bases sending soldiers to occupied lands and battlefields across Asia. However, Kōji criticized Hiroshima citizens as selfish, writing that they had abandoned the injured after the bombing; condemned Japan for its military aggression; and lamented that humans had become warmongers. Such human nature, according to Kōji, invited the atomic bombing. </p>
<p>His critical self-reflection and attempts to go beyond a black-and-white understanding of good and evil – such as Japanese vs. Americans or victims vs. victimizers – may offer an insightful perspective on how to escape cycles of violence.</p>
<p>On the other hand, his understanding of Buddhist doctrine, which interpreted a particular historical incident as a universal sin of humankind, may have diverted attention from the Japanese government’s responsibility. Moreover, it exonerated the U.S. of its responsibility for using indiscriminate weapons – which continued <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/nuclear-tests-have-changed-but-they-never-really-stopped/">to be tested</a> and produced in the U.S. mainland <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/11/27/a-ground-zero-forgotten/">and its territories</a>. </p>
<h2>Sacrificial lambs</h2>
<p>Nagasaki, about 200 miles west of Hiroshima, has a long history of Catholicism. In the 16th century, in many parts of the Japanese archipelagos, local lords converted to Christianity, leading to mass conversions in their domains. But the following 250 years saw foreign priests expelled and converts <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50414472">persecuted for their faith</a>.</p>
<p>Even after Christianity was forbidden, as worship of a “foreign” god, political leaders viewed Catholics as posing a high risk to the stability of the country. Hence, the Catholic community in Nagasaki, which clandestinely carried on its faith, was forced to live next to that of the “<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34615972">burakumin</a>,” a social group that was traditionally outcast as “untouchables.” </p>
<p>This history helps to explain the particular interpretation presented by one Catholic convert, a medical doctor and professor in Nagasaki: <a href="https://nagaitakashi.nagasakipeace.jp/english/overview.html">Nagai Takashi</a>. </p>
<p>Three months after the bombing, a requiem Mass for the dead was held at the site of the Urakami Cathedral, the closest landmark to the center of the blast, and Nagai was asked to deliver a speech. He crafted his remarks on a conversation he had with a former student who was agonized by people telling him that he lost his family and community because of his faith in a foreign god, disrespecting Japanese gods and the emperor. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two women kneel as they tend to a child injured by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477009/original/file-20220801-82236-5s4ysz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477009/original/file-20220801-82236-5s4ysz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477009/original/file-20220801-82236-5s4ysz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477009/original/file-20220801-82236-5s4ysz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=554&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477009/original/file-20220801-82236-5s4ysz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477009/original/file-20220801-82236-5s4ysz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/477009/original/file-20220801-82236-5s4ysz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=697&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A child hurt in the atomic bomb blast at Hiroshima, Japan, receives care from her mother and a nurse’s aide.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/bandaged-child-hurt-in-the-atomic-bomb-blast-at-hiroshima-news-photo/615316474?adppopup=true">Corbis Historial via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In the speech, Nagai responded that <a href="https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1030303.The_Bells_of_Nagasaki">those killed by the bombs were sacrificial lambs, chosen by God because of their unblemished nature</a>. Thanks to their sacrifice, he noted, the war ended – whereas those who survived, like him, had to endure defeat and destruction. Nagai portrayed the hardships as an entrance exam to heaven to reunite with loved ones. </p>
<p>Perhaps it is understandable that the Nagasaki Catholics, whose history is rife with persecution and martyrdom, <a href="https://www.nagasaki-np.co.jp/peace_article/2121/">embraced Nagai’s message</a> to help them come to terms with the loss of their loved ones. And it is not entirely far off from the Catholic approach to <a href="https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1984/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_11021984_salvifici-doloris.html">theodicy – the question of why God allows human suffering</a>. </p>
<p>Like Kōji’s interpretation, however, this one could invite a victim-blaming attitude, disregarding the effort to assign responsibility to the actual perpetrators. If their message of self-critical reflection had been adopted not by the victims alone, but also by those who inflicted the harm, perhaps the world could have avoided creating more victims from the production and tests of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>On this anniversary, we should remember not only those who suffered from the atomic bombing in Japan – including <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-a-hiroshima-survivor-helped-remember-12-u-s-pows-killed-by-bomb">12 American prisoners of war</a>, <a href="https://apjjf.org/2015/13/32/Mick-Broderick/4358.html">other POWs</a> and people from <a href="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520085879/hiroshima-traces">Japan’s colonies in the Korean Peninsula</a>. We should remember all who have suffered the effects of this atomic age, including <a href="https://fas.org/pir-pubs/uranium-mining-u-s-nuclear-weapons-program-3/">uranium miners</a> in New Mexico, Americans living downwind of <a href="https://www.deseret.com/utah/2022/5/12/23068706/utah-nuclear-testing-downwinders-john-curtis-chris-stewart-nevada-cold-war-radition-exposure-cancer#:%7E:text=for%20his%20signature.-,Downwinders%2C%20or%20victims%20of%20radiation%20exposure%20from%20aboveground%20testing%20of,The%20legislation%2C%20sponsored%20by%20Sen.">test sites in Nevada</a> and <a href="https://www.whitman.edu/newsroom/whitman-magazine/whitman-magazine-summer-2015/wm-featured-stories-summer-2015/the-downwinders">Washington state</a>, and citizens of <a href="https://theconversation.com/75-years-after-nuclear-testing-in-the-pacific-began-the-fallout-continues-to-wreak-havoc-158208">the Marshall Islands</a>.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/187759/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Yuki Miyamoto receives funding from DePaul University's Humanity Center fellowship, DePaul's University Council Research summer grant, and a board member of an NPO group, named CORE (Consequences of Radiation Exposure), founded by Hanford downwinders. </span></em></p>
As Japanese victims struggled to process the nuclear attack, many turned to religion. The way they understood the horror still has consequences today.
Yuki Miyamoto, Professor of Religious Studies, DePaul University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/188116
2022-08-02T16:54:12Z
2022-08-02T16:54:12Z
Why Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan puts the White House in delicate straits of diplomacy with China
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/477209/original/file-20220802-11-dgun2t.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=26%2C143%2C5964%2C4203&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Not everyone is so thrilled by the visit.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/TaiwanAsiaPelosi/9de571a85ea94764b42c8468f79e6bbe/photo?Query=Pelosi&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=15306&currentItemNo=3">AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/08/02/world/pelosi-taiwan">arrived in Taiwan</a> on Aug. 2, 2022 – a highly controversial trip that has been strongly opposed by China.</p>
<p>Such is the sensitivity over the island’s status that even before Pelosi’s plane touched down in the capital of Taipei, mere reports of the proposed trip prompted a <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-07-25/china-confirms-warnings-to-u-s-on-pelosis-possible-taiwan-visit">warning by China</a> of “serious consequences.” In the hours before she set foot on the island, Chinese fighter jets <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pelosi-expected-arrive-taiwan-tuesday-sources-say-2022-08-02/">flew close to the median line separating Taiwan and China</a>, while Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi commented that U.S. politicians who “play with fire” on Taiwan would “come to no good end.”</p>
<p>For its part, the U.S. has distanced itself from the visit. Before the trip <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/20/biden-pelosi-trip-taiwan-china-military-00047031">President Joe Biden</a> said it was “not a good idea.” </p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3LqBuPEAAAAJ&hl=en">someone who has long studied</a> the U.S.’s delicate diplomatic dance over Taiwan, I understand why this trip has sparked reaction in both Washington and Beijing, given the current tensions in the region. It also marks the continuation of a process that has seen growing U.S. political engagement with Taiwan – much to China’s annoyance.</p>
<h2>Cutting diplomatic ties</h2>
<p>The controversy over Pelosi’s visit stems from the “<a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter">one China” policy</a> – the diplomatic stance under which the U.S. recognizes China and acknowledges Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China. The policy has governed U.S. relations with Taiwan for the past 40-plus years. </p>
<p>In 1979, the U.S. abandoned its previous policy of recognizing the government of Taiwan as that of all of China, instead <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy">shifting recognition</a> to the government on the mainland.</p>
<p>As part of this change, the U.S. cut off formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, with the U.S. embassy in Taiwan replaced by a nongovernmental entity called the <a href="https://www.ait.org.tw/">American Institute in Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>The institute was a de facto embassy – though until 2002, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/1646">Americans assigned to the institute</a> would have to <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2019/02/ex-diplomat-calls-for-oversight-of-us-office-in-taiwan/">resign from U.S. State Department</a> to go there, only to be rehired once their term was over. And contact between the two governments was technically unofficial.</p>
<p><iframe id="NS3cP" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NS3cP/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>As the government in Taiwan <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/taiwans-democracy-and-the-china-challenge/">pursued democracy</a> – starting from the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/end-martial-law-important-anniversary-taiwan">lifting of martial law in 1987</a> through the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/opinion/taiwan-s-democratic-election.html">first fully democratic elections in 1996</a> – it shifted away from the assumption once held by governments in both China and Taiwan of eventual reunification with the mainland. The government in China, however, has never abandoned the idea of “one China” and rejects the legitimacy of Taiwanese self-government. That has made direct contact between Taiwan and U.S. representatives contentious to Chinese officials. </p>
<p>Indeed, in 1995, when Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s first democratically elected president, touched down in Hawaii en route to Central America, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1999/01/10/between-china-and-the-us/b540ea0c-3bdb-4b1a-8152-8230b7a47184/">didn’t even set foot on the tarmac</a>. The U.S. State Department had already warned that the president would be refused an entry visa to the U.S., but had allowed for a brief, low-level reception in the airport lounge during refueling. Apparently feeling snubbed, Lee refused to leave the airplane.</p>
<h2>Previous political visits</h2>
<p>Two years after this incident came a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/03/31/gingrich-tells-china-us-to-defend-taiwan/e6baa8f8-58fa-4119-8c0d-c936d36e9850/">visit to Taiwan by then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich</a>.</p>
<p>Similarly to the Pelosi visit, the one by Gingrich <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/03/31/gingrich-tells-china-us-to-defend-taiwan/e6baa8f8-58fa-4119-8c0d-c936d36e9850/">annoyed Beijing</a>. But it was easier for the White House to distance itself from Gingrich – he was a Republican politician visiting Taiwan in his own capacity, and clearly not on behalf of then-President Bill Clinton.</p>
<p>Pelosi’s visit my be viewed differently by Beijing, because she is a member of the same party as President Joe Biden. China may assume she has Biden’s blessing, despite his comments to the contrary.</p>
<p>Asked on July 20 about his views on the potential Pelosi trip, <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/20/biden-pelosi-trip-taiwan-china-military-00047031">Biden responded</a> that the “military thinks it’s not a good idea right now.” </p>
<p>The comment echoes the <a href="https://theconversation.com/biden-on-taiwan-did-he-really-commit-us-forces-to-stopping-any-invasion-by-china-an-expert-explains-why-on-balance-probably-not-176765">White House’s earlier handling of a comment by Biden</a> in which he suggested in May 2022 that the U.S. would intervene “militarily” should China invade Taiwan. Officials in the Biden administration rolled back the comment, which would have broken a long-standing policy of ambiguity over what the U.S. would do if China tried to take Taiwan by force.</p>
<p>Similarly with Pelosi, the White House is distancing itself from a position that suggests a shift in U.S.-Taiwanese relations following a period in which the U.S. had already been trying to <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/11/after-lifting-restrictions-on-us-taiwan-relations-what-comes-next/">rethink how it interacts</a> with Taiwan.</p>
<h2>Shifting policy?</h2>
<p>In 2018, Congress passed the bipartisan <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/535">Taiwan Travel Act</a>. This departed from previous policy in that it allowed bilateral official visits between the U.S. and Taiwan, although they are still considered to be subdiplomatic.</p>
<p>In the wake of that act, Donald Trump’s Health and Human Services secretary, Alex Azar, became the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/09/politics/alex-azar-taiwan/index.html">highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Taiwan</a> since 1979. Then in 2020, Keith Krach, undersecretary for economic growth, energy and the environment, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/world/asia/us-official-taiwan-china.html">visited Taiwan</a>.</p>
<p>And in April 2022, a U.S. <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/19/pelosi-trip-to-taiwan-00046495">congressional delegation visited Taiwan</a>. Pelosi herself was reportedly due to visit the island that same month, but canceled after <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/08/asia/nancy-pelosi-covid-19-taiwan-us-asia-intl-hnk/index.html">testing positive for COVID-19</a>. </p>
<p>Each of these visits has provoked angry statements from Beijing.</p>
<p>A high-profile visit – even one without the public backing of the White House – would signal support to the island at a time when the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has raised questions over the international community’s commitment to protect smaller states from more powerful neighbors.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the erosion of democracy in Hong Kong has undermined China’s commitment to the idea of “one nation, two systems.” The principle, which allowed Hong Kong to maintain its economic, political and social systems while returning to the mainland after the end of British rule, had been cited as a model for reunification with Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party also plans to hold its <a href="https://www.scmp.com/topics/chinas-20th-party-congress">20th congress</a> in the coming months, making the timing sensitive for a Taiwan visit from a high-profile U.S. political figure such as Pelosi.</p>
<p><em>Editor’s note: This is an updated version of an <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-big-fuss-over-nancy-pelosis-possible-visit-to-taiwan-187657">article originally published</a> on July 26, 2022.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/188116/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Chinese fighter jets buzzed the line separating China and Taiwan just hours before the US House speaker arrived on the island.
Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/175895
2022-02-02T13:07:09Z
2022-02-02T13:07:09Z
Why is Taiwan competing in the Olympics under ‘Chinese Taipei’?
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443832/original/file-20220201-21-13igsg7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C4992%2C3323&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Taiwanese independence activists call for a boycott of the Beijing Games.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/activists-holding-signs-and-olympic-rings-calling-for-the-news-photo/1237989217?adppopup=true">Walid Berrazeg/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>When the Beijing Olympics opens with <a href="https://olympics.com/en/beijing-2022/ceremonies">a glitzy ceremony on Feb. 4, 2022</a>, a tiny contingent of Taiwanese athletes will be in attendance. But they won’t be marching under the Taiwanese flag. And they will be announced as the team from “Chinese Taipei.” </p>
<p>They almost weren’t going to be there at all. Officials from the island <a href="https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/team-taiwan-wont-be-winter-games-opening-ceremony-2022-01-28/">had intended their athletes to be absent</a> from the opening or closing ceremony, citing the complexity of pandemic travel. But on Feb. 1, at the behest of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/team-taiwan-says-it-will-be-beijing-games-opening-ceremony-2022-02-01/">Taiwanese authorities reversed course</a>.</p>
<p>COVID-19 isn’t the main issue. Behind the changing plans is a <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Sports/Beijing-Winter-Olympics/Team-Taiwan-to-skip-Olympic-ceremonies-amid-name-row">dispute</a> over the name of the Taiwanese delegation in Olympic competition. It has its roots in the long history of contention over the status of Taiwan.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://history.umbc.edu/facultystaff/full-time/meredith-oyen/">scholar of relations between the United States and East Asia</a>, I also know that it is a particularly sensitive time. World attention on the Beijing Games comes amid heightened tension over Taiwan’s status, with <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/01/28/1076246311/chinas-ambassador-to-the-u-s-warns-of-military-conflict-over-taiwan">warnings of “military conflict</a>” if the contested island moves toward formal independence.</p>
<h2>Competing Chinas</h2>
<p>The status of Taiwan has been disputed since the founding of modern Communist China.</p>
<p>The Chinese Communist Party <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev">won its civil war</a> against the Nationalist Party then governing as the “Republic of China” in 1949. The latter fled across the approximately 100-mile strait to the island of Taiwan, which was then still <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/liao13798">transitioning from decades of Japanese colonization</a>.</p>
<p>There, the exiled Republic of China enjoyed <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/biding-time-the-challenge-of-taiwans-international-status/">two decades of international support</a> as the government of “Free China.”</p>
<p>Led by the United States, many countries <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/25/chinas-un-seat-50-years-on#:%7E:text=Taipei%2C%20Taiwan%20%E2%80%93%20Fifty%20years%20ago,the%20country's%20civil%20war%20in">and the United Nations</a> recognized this government on Taiwan as “China,” while refusing to recognize the new People’s Republic of China controlling the far larger mainland.</p>
<p>The IOC similarly only recognized the Taiwan-based government. As a result, the mainland was not represented at the Olympics throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The only Chinese team competing came from Taiwan.</p>
<p>In the 1970s, however, the tide began to shift. Until then, recognition of Communist China had been limited to Soviet bloc countries and newly decolonized nations in Asia and Africa.</p>
<p>First, in 1971, the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/25/chinas-un-seat-50-years-on#:%7E:text=Taipei%2C%20Taiwan%20%E2%80%93%20Fifty%20years%20ago,the%20country's%20civil%20war%20in">U.N shifted recognition</a> from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. Nation after nation followed suit over the course of the decade, with the U.S. switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing in 1979.</p>
<p>Throughout this period, both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan agreed on <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354">the principle of “one China</a>.” Both governments argued that Taiwan was part of China, and neither would allow countries or organizations to recognize both.</p>
<p>When the UN chose to admit the People’s Republic of China, the government in Taiwan ceased membership in the international body.</p>
<p>When Beijing sought admission into the IOC, it was clear that any formula that allowed athletes from both territories to compete would have to take into account the commitment to the principle of “one China.”</p>
<p>In 1979, the executive committee of the IOC <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1979/11/27/ioc-gives-approval-to-china/1d8f1d65-c1c4-4d68-8afa-a2e35c29d703/">passed a resolution</a> that both governments ultimately agreed to follow. It admitted the People’s Republic of China under the name “Chinese Olympic Committee” and the government of Taiwan as the “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A flag-bearer at the 2018 Winter Olympic Games holds aloft the emblem of the Chinese Taipei team." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=383&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/443835/original/file-20220201-27-1ltzg0o.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=481&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Flying the flag of Chinese Taipei.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/flag-bearer-te-an-lien-of-chinese-taipei-leads-the-team-news-photo/916136592?adppopup=true">Ronald Martinez/Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This arrangement allowed Beijing to accept Taiwan’s inclusion in the Games by framing the island contingent as a regional branch of its national team, even though their medal counts were separate. </p>
<p>Taiwanese athletes would be required to compete under an alternate anthem and flag to that used by Taiwan, so as not to display Republic of China emblems.</p>
<p>The Republic of China in Taiwan finally agreed to compete under these terms in 1981. It had few other options, given its own past recalcitrance on the issue of allowing both governments in any formal organization. A similar formula was later adopted to allow an independent Olympic team from Hong Kong to compete after the British handed its former colony back to China in 1997.</p>
<h2>Pushback to independence</h2>
<p>Over the last four decades, the Republic of China on Taiwan has <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/taiwans-democracy-and-the-china-challenge/">transformed from a colonial authoritarian regime to a democracy</a>.</p>
<p>But at the same time, its international recognition as an independent government has dwindled. From 2000 to 2008 and again starting in 2016, political parties advocating Taiwan’s independence achieved electoral success at the highest levels. But this served to trigger a pushback from Beijing as it seeks to stave off what it views as growing separatism.</p>
<p>These tensions have spilled out into the Olympic arena.</p>
<p>Just last year, during the opening ceremony of the Tokyo Games, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/hong-kong/article/3142403/tokyo-olympics-taiwan-happy-not-being-called-chinese-taipei-opening">a Japanese announcer referred to</a> the “Chinese Taipei” Olympic team as “the team from Taiwan,” lining up in the opening ceremony under “Taipei” instead of “Chinese.”</p>
<p>This angered mainland Chinese officials concerned about a shift away from the one China principle.</p>
<p>And in the run-up to the 2022 Beijing Olympics, Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Sports/Beijing-Winter-Olympics/Team-Taiwan-to-skip-Olympic-ceremonies-amid-name-row">used a slight variation</a> in the Chinese name for the team from “Chinese Taipei” to stress that it considered Taiwan to be a part of China. They used “zhongguo” (China) instead of “zhonghua” (Chinese). While “Zhonghua” is a broad term that refers to anything Chinese by ethnicity or heritage, “Zhongguo” refers to the country itself.</p>
<p>[<em>Over 140,000 readers rely on The Conversation’s newsletters to understand the world.</em> <a href="https://memberservices.theconversation.com/newsletters/?source=inline-140ksignup">Sign up today</a>.]</p>
<p>The Taiwan government vehemently opposed the altered name. </p>
<p>Because Taiwan is a subtropical island, it does not have a significant presence at the Winter Olympics – only four of its athletes have qualified for the forthcoming competition. </p>
<p>Regardless of the team’s size, Chinese authorities will be keen not to allow the issue to be a media distraction during the Beijing Games.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/175895/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Meredith Oyen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Taiwanese authorities are allowing its tiny contingent to attend the opening ceremony in Beijing despite a long-running dispute over its name in the Olympics.
Meredith Oyen, Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/154634
2021-02-09T20:13:18Z
2021-02-09T20:13:18Z
Hundreds of fish species, including many that humans eat, are consuming plastic
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383173/original/file-20210209-19-mk7rt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=50%2C8%2C5568%2C3659&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A biologist examines microplastics found in sea species at the Hellenic Centre for Marine Research in Greece, Nov. 26, 2019.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/biologist-looks-at-microplastics-found-in-sea-species-at-news-photo/1185691931?adppopup=true">Louisa Gouliamaki/AFP via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Trillions of <a href="https://theconversation.com/far-more-microplastics-floating-in-oceans-than-thought-51974">barely visible pieces of plastic</a> are floating in the world’s oceans, from surface waters to the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-44117-2">deep seas</a>. These particles, known as microplastics, typically form when larger plastic objects such as shopping bags and food containers break down. </p>
<p>Researchers are concerned about microplastics because they are minuscule, widely distributed and easy for wildlife to consume, <a href="https://theconversation.com/bait-and-switch-anchovies-eat-plastic-because-it-smells-like-prey-81607">accidentally or intentionally</a>. We study <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=uo1sSBwAAAAJ&hl=en">marine science</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=8Gb9COIAAAAJ&hl=en">animal behavior</a>, and wanted to understand the scale of this problem. In a newly published study that we conducted with ecologist <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=mI9gJxIAAAAJ&hl=en">Elliott Hazen</a>, we examined how marine fish – including species consumed by humans – are ingesting synthetic particles of all sizes. </p>
<p>In the broadest review on this topic that has been carried out to date, we found that, so far, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/gcb.15533">386 marine fish species are known to have ingested plastic debris</a>, including 210 species that are commercially important. But findings of fish consuming plastic are on the rise. We speculate that this could be happening both because detection methods for microplastics are improving and because ocean plastic pollution continues to increase.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/LiH3f6AKFbc?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Researchers at California’s Monterey Bay Aquarium have found microplastic particles from the surface to the seafloor, where they can be ingested by a wide range of sea creatures.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Solving the plastics puzzle</h2>
<p>It’s not news that wild creatures ingest plastic. The first scientific observation of this problem came <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/4083505">from the stomach of a seabird in 1969</a>. Three years later, scientists reported that fish off the coast of southern New England were <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.178.4062.749">consuming tiny plastic particles</a>.</p>
<p>Since then, well over 100 scientific papers have described plastic ingestion in numerous species of fish. But each study has only contributed a small piece of a very important puzzle. To see the problem more clearly, we had to put those pieces together.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=401&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/369797/original/file-20201117-13-180ibt9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=504&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong><em>This story is part of <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/oceans-21-96784">Oceans 21</a></em></strong>
<br>Our series on the global ocean opened with <a href="https://oceans21.netlify.app/">five in depth profiles</a>. Look out for new articles on the state of our oceans in the lead up to the UN’s next climate conference, COP26. The series is brought to you by The Conversation’s international network.</p>
<hr>
<p>We did this by creating the largest existing database on plastic ingestion by marine fish, drawing on every scientific study of the problem published from 1972 to 2019. We collected a range of information from each study, including what fish species it examined, the number of fish that had eaten plastic and when those fish were caught. Because some regions of the ocean have more plastic pollution than others, we also examined where the fish were found. </p>
<p>For each species in our database, we identified its diet, habitat and feeding behaviors – for example, whether it preyed on other fish or grazed on algae. By analyzing this data as a whole, we wanted to understand not only how many fish were eating plastic, but also what factors might cause them to do so. The trends that we found were surprising and concerning.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383117/original/file-20210208-17-6vwa8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Plastic bag drifting in shallow water." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383117/original/file-20210208-17-6vwa8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/383117/original/file-20210208-17-6vwa8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383117/original/file-20210208-17-6vwa8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383117/original/file-20210208-17-6vwa8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383117/original/file-20210208-17-6vwa8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383117/original/file-20210208-17-6vwa8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/383117/original/file-20210208-17-6vwa8h.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Leopard sharks swim past plastic debris in shallow water off southern California.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.ralphpace.com">Ralph Pace</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>A global problem</h2>
<p>Our research revealed that marine fish are ingesting plastic around the globe. According to the 129 scientific papers in our database, researchers have studied this problem in 555 fish species worldwide. We were alarmed to find that more than two-thirds of those species had ingested plastic.</p>
<p>One important caveat is that not all of these studies looked for microplastics. This is likely because finding microplastics requires specialized equipment, like microscopes, or use of more complex techniques. But when researchers did look for microplastics, they found five times more plastic per individual fish than when they only looked for larger pieces. Studies that were able to detect this previously invisible threat revealed that plastic ingestion was higher than we had originally anticipated.</p>
<p>Our review of four decades of research indicates that fish consumption of plastic is increasing. Just since an international <a href="http://www.gesamp.org/publications/microplastics-in-the-marine-environment-part-2">assessment conducted for the United Nations in 2016</a>, the number of marine fish species found with plastic has quadrupled. </p>
<p>Similarly, in the last decade alone, the proportion of fish consuming plastic has doubled across all species. Studies published from 2010-2013 found that an average of 15% of the fish sampled contained plastic; in studies published from 2017-2019, that share rose to 33%.</p>
<p>We think there are two reasons for this trend. First, scientific techniques for detecting microplastics have improved substantially in the past five years. Many of the earlier studies we examined may not have found microplastics because researchers couldn’t see them. </p>
<p>Second, it is also likely that fish are actually consuming more plastic over time as ocean plastic pollution <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aba9475">increases globally</a>. If this is true, we expect the situation to worsen. Multiple studies that have sought to quantify plastic waste project that the amount of plastic pollution in the ocean will <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aba3656">continue to increase</a> over the <a href="http://dx.doi.org/%2010.1126/sciadv.1700782">next several decades</a>.</p>
<p><iframe id="vmUzZ" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/vmUzZ/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>Risk factors</h2>
<p>While our findings may make it seem as though fish in the ocean are stuffed to the gills with plastic, the situation is more complex. In our review, almost one-third of the species studied were not found to have consumed plastic. And even in studies that did report plastic ingestion, researchers did not find plastic in every individual fish. Across studies and species, about one in four fish contained plastics – a fraction that seems to be growing with time. Fish that did consume plastic typically had only one or two pieces in their stomachs. </p>
<p>In our view, this indicates that plastic ingestion by fish may be widespread, but it does not seem to be universal. Nor does it appear random. On the contrary, we were able to predict which species were more likely to eat plastic based on their environment, habitat and feeding behavior. </p>
<p>For example, fishes such as sharks, grouper and tuna that hunt other fishes or marine organisms as food were more likely to ingest plastic. Consequently, species higher on the food chain were at greater risk. </p>
<p>We were not surprised that the amount of plastic that fish consumed also seemed to depend on how much plastic was in their environment. Species that live in ocean regions known to have a lot of plastic pollution, such as the Mediterranean Sea and the coasts of East Asia, were found with more plastic in their stomachs. </p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1339067730306031618"}"></div></p>
<h2>Effects of a plastic diet</h2>
<p>This is not just a wildlife conservation issue. Researchers don’t know very much about the effects of ingesting plastic on fish or humans. However, there is evidence that that microplastics and even smaller particles called <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41565-019-0437-7">nanoplastics</a> can move from a fish’s stomach to its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.134625">muscle tissue</a>, which is the part that humans typically eat. Our findings highlight the need for studies analyzing how frequently plastics transfer from fish to humans, and their potential effects on the human body.</p>
<p>[<em>Deep knowledge, daily.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/the-daily-3?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=deepknowledge">Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter</a>.]</p>
<p>Our review is a step toward understanding the global problem of ocean plastic pollution. Of more than 20,000 marine fish species, only roughly 2% have been tested for plastic consumption. And many reaches of the ocean remain to be examined. Nonetheless, what’s now clear to us is that “out of sight, out of mind” is not an effective response to ocean pollution – especially when it may end up on our plates.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/154634/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alexandra McInturf is affiliated with The Ethogram (<a href="https://theethogram.com/">https://theethogram.com/</a>). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Matthew Savoca receives funding from The National Geographic Society and the National Science Foundation. </span></em></p>
As more and more plastic trash permeates the oceans, fragments are making their way into fish and shellfish – and potentially into humans.
Alexandra McInturf, PhD Candidate in Animal Behavior, University of California, Davis
Matthew Savoca, Postdoctoral researcher, Stanford University
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/139458
2020-09-15T19:28:35Z
2020-09-15T19:28:35Z
Ancient DNA is revealing the genetic landscape of people who first settled East Asia
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/352993/original/file-20200814-22-dg3488.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=310%2C222%2C3016%2C2074&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Pulverized ancient bone can provide DNA to scientists for analysis.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Xin Xu Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The very first human beings originally emerged in Africa before <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/evan.21455">spreading across Eurasia</a> about 60,000 years ago. After that, the story of humankind heads down many different paths, some more well-studied than others.</p>
<p>Eastern regions of Eurasia are home to approximately 2.3 billion people today – roughly 30% of the world’s population. Archaeologists know <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quaint.2011.02.017">from fossils</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat8824">and artifacts</a> that modern humans have occupied <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/nature23452">Southeast Asia for 60,000 years</a> and East Asia for 40,000 years.</p>
<p>But there’s a lot left to untangle. Who were the people who first came to these regions and eventually developed agriculture? Where did different populations come from? Which groups ended up predominant and which died out?</p>
<p>Ancient DNA is helping to answer some of these questions. By sequencing the genomes of people who lived many millennia ago, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=3sRfg2sAAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao">scientists like me</a>
are starting to fill in the picture of how Asia was populated.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353009/original/file-20200814-20-otal1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Ancient skull without bottom jaw" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353009/original/file-20200814-20-otal1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353009/original/file-20200814-20-otal1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353009/original/file-20200814-20-otal1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353009/original/file-20200814-20-otal1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=398&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353009/original/file-20200814-20-otal1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353009/original/file-20200814-20-otal1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353009/original/file-20200814-20-otal1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=500&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Well-preserved DNA from ancient bones holds clues about how human beings spread into East Asia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Wei Gao, Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Analyzing ancient genomes</h2>
<p>In 2016, I joined Dr. Qiaomei Fu’s Molecular Paleontology Lab at the Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology, Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Our challenge: Resolve the history of humans in East Asia, with the help of collaborators who were long dead – ancient humans who lived up to tens of thousands of years ago in the region. </p>
<p>Members of the lab extracted and sequenced ancient DNA using human remains from archaeological sites. Then Dr. Fu and I used computational genomic tools to assess how their DNA related to that of previously sequenced ancient and present-day humans.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357984/original/file-20200914-24-1frozem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="map where aDNA samples were excavated in Asia" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357984/original/file-20200914-24-1frozem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357984/original/file-20200914-24-1frozem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357984/original/file-20200914-24-1frozem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357984/original/file-20200914-24-1frozem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357984/original/file-20200914-24-1frozem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357984/original/file-20200914-24-1frozem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357984/original/file-20200914-24-1frozem.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tianyuan Man, from near present-day Beijing, and Hòabìnhian people, from present-day Laos and Malaysia, represent two very old lineages that are distinct from today’s East Asians.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Map © OpenStreetMap contributors, modified by The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>One of our sequences came from ancient DNA extracted from the <a href="https://www.pnas.org/content/110/6/2223">leg bones</a> of the Tianyuan Man, a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2017.09.030">40,000-year-old individual</a> discovered near <a href="https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/449/">a famous paleoanthropological site</a> in western Beijing. One of the earliest modern humans found in East Asia, his genetic sequence marks him as an early ancestor of today’s Asians and Native Americans. That he lived where China’s current capital stands indicates that the ancestors of today’s Asians began placing roots in East Asia as early as 40,000 years ago. </p>
<p>Farther south, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat3628">two 8,000- to 4,000-year-old Southeast Asian hunter-gatherers</a> from Laos and Malaysia associated with the Hòabìnhian culture have DNA that, like the Tianyuan Man, shows they’re early ancestors of Asians and Native Americans. These two came from a completely different lineage than the Tianyuan Man, which suggested that many genetically distinct populations occupied Asia in the past. </p>
<p>But no humans today share the same genetic makeup as either Hòabìnhians or the Tianyuan Man, in both East and Southeast Asia. Why did ancestries that persisted for so long vanish from the gene pool of people alive now? Ancient farmers carry the key to that answer. </p>
<h2>DNA carries marks of ancient migrations</h2>
<p>Based on plant remains found at archaeological sites, scientists know that <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/12/151214084754.htm">people domesticated millet</a> in northern China’s Yellow River region about 10,000 years ago. Around the same time, people in southern China’s Yangtze River region <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1308942110">domesticated rice</a>.</p>
<p>Unlike in Europe, plant domestication began locally and was not introduced from elsewhere. The process took thousands of years, and societies in East Asia grew increasingly complex, with the rise of the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-091908-164513">first dynasties</a> around 4,000 years ago.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357986/original/file-20200914-18-z19zh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="map showing migration of ancient people north from Yellow River area and south from Yangtze River area" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357986/original/file-20200914-18-z19zh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357986/original/file-20200914-18-z19zh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357986/original/file-20200914-18-z19zh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357986/original/file-20200914-18-z19zh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357986/original/file-20200914-18-z19zh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357986/original/file-20200914-18-z19zh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357986/original/file-20200914-18-z19zh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rice farmers, possibly from around the Yangtze River, moved south into Southeast Asia, while millet farmers from around the Yellow River moved north into Siberia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Map © OpenStreetMap contributors, modified by The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>That’s also when rice cultivation appears to have spread from its origins to areas farther south, including lands that are today’s Southeast Asian countries. DNA helps tell the story. When rice farmers from southern China expanded southward, they introduced not only their farming technology but also their genetics to local populations of Southeast Asian hunter-gatherers. </p>
<p>The overpowering influx of their DNA ended up swamping the local gene pool. Today, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat3628">little trace of hunter-gatherer ancestry</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat3188">remains in the genes of people</a> who live in Southeast Asia. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353002/original/file-20200814-24-czv093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Excavation of human skeleton" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353002/original/file-20200814-24-czv093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353002/original/file-20200814-24-czv093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353002/original/file-20200814-24-czv093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353002/original/file-20200814-24-czv093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=333&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353002/original/file-20200814-24-czv093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353002/original/file-20200814-24-czv093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353002/original/file-20200814-24-czv093.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=419&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The skeleton of a person who lived about 8,700 years ago in Xiaogao, Shandong, China near the Yellow River. This individual’s northern East Asian ancestry can be found in the remains of people who lived up into the eastern steppes of Siberia.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jianfeng Lang, Shandong University</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Farther north, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1279-z">a similar story played out</a>. Ancient Siberian hunter-gatherers show little relationship with East Asians today, but later Siberian farmers are closely related to today’s East Asians. Farmers from northern China moved northward into Siberia bringing their DNA with them, leading to a sharp decrease in prevalence of the previous local hunter-gatherer ancestry.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353000/original/file-20200814-14-1aipm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Scientist in protective gear pipetting under a hood" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353000/original/file-20200814-14-1aipm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353000/original/file-20200814-14-1aipm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353000/original/file-20200814-14-1aipm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353000/original/file-20200814-14-1aipm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353000/original/file-20200814-14-1aipm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353000/original/file-20200814-14-1aipm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353000/original/file-20200814-14-1aipm61.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Professor Qiaomei Fu, head of the Molecular Paleontology Lab at the Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology in Beijing, prepares samples for ancient DNA extraction.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Past populations were more diverse than today’s</h2>
<p>Genetically speaking, today’s East Asians are not very different from each other. A lot of DNA is needed to start genetically distinguishing between people with different cultural histories.</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353004/original/file-20200814-18-mdsmzw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Folded up ancient skeleton being excavated" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353004/original/file-20200814-18-mdsmzw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/353004/original/file-20200814-18-mdsmzw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=868&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353004/original/file-20200814-18-mdsmzw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=868&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353004/original/file-20200814-18-mdsmzw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=868&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353004/original/file-20200814-18-mdsmzw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1091&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353004/original/file-20200814-18-mdsmzw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1091&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/353004/original/file-20200814-18-mdsmzw.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1091&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">This individual, who lived about 8,300 years ago on Liang island in the Taiwan Strait, has the southern ancestry found in inhabitants of coastal mainland southern China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Hunglin Chiu, Institute of Anthropology, National Tsinghua University</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>What surprised Dr. Fu and me was how different the DNA of various ancient populations were in China. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aba0909">We</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.03.25.004606">and</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16557-2">others</a> found shared DNA across the Yellow River region, a place important to the development of Chinese civilization. This shared DNA represents a northern East Asian ancestry, distinct from a southern East Asian ancestry <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aba0909">we found in coastal southern China</a>. </p>
<p>When we analyzed the DNA of people who lived in coastal southern China 9,000-8,500 years ago, we realized that already by then much of China shared a common heritage. Because their <a href="http://www.kaogu.cn/en/Research_work/Excavation_Report/2018/0122/60804.html">archaeology</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-35426-z">morphology</a> was different from that of the Yellow River farmers, we had thought these coastal people might come from a lineage not closely related to those first agricultural East Asians. Maybe this group’s ancestry would be similar to the Tianyuan Man or Hòabìnhians.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357988/original/file-20200914-18-160rygb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="map showing different ancestral populations in Asia based on aDNA" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357988/original/file-20200914-18-160rygb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357988/original/file-20200914-18-160rygb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357988/original/file-20200914-18-160rygb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357988/original/file-20200914-18-160rygb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=353&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357988/original/file-20200914-18-160rygb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357988/original/file-20200914-18-160rygb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357988/original/file-20200914-18-160rygb.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">People with different lifestyles who lived far apart in northern China near the Yellow River and along the southern China coast as far back as 9,000 years ago both passed their distinct DNA down to present-day East Asians and Southeast Asians. Austronesians are the closest descendants of the ancient population from coastal southern China.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Map © OpenStreetMap contributors, modified by The Conversation</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But instead, every person we sampled was closely related to present-day East Asians. That means that by 9,000 years ago, DNA common to all present-day East Asians was widespread across China.</p>
<p>Today’s northern and southern Chinese populations share more in common with ancient Yellow River populations than with ancient coastal southern Chinese. Thus, early Yellow River farmers migrated both north and south, contributing to the gene pool of humans across East and Southeast Asia. </p>
<p>The coastal southern Chinese ancestry did not vanish, though. It persisted in small amounts and did increase in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-16557-2">northern China’s Yellow River region over time</a>. The influence of ancient southern East Asians is low on the mainland, but they had a huge impact elsewhere. On islands spanning from the Taiwan Strait to Polynesia live the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00439-015-1620-z">Austronesians</a>, best known for their seafaring. They possess the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aba0909">highest amount of southern East Asian ancestry today</a>, highlighting their ancestry’s roots in coastal southern China.</p>
<p><a href="https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.03.25.004606">Other emerging</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aba0909">genetic patterns</a> show connections between Tibetans and ancient individuals from Mongolia and northern China, raising questions about the peopling of the Tibetan Plateau.</p>
<p>Ancient DNA reveals rapid shifts in ancestry over the last 10,000 years across Asia, likely due to migration and cultural exchange. Until more ancient human DNA is retrieved, scientists can only speculate as to exactly who, genetically speaking, lived in East Asia prior to that.</p>
<p>[<em>Understand new developments in science, health and technology, each week.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/science-editors-picks-71/?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=science-understand">Subscribe to The Conversation’s science newsletter</a>.]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/139458/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Melinda A. Yang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
By studying the DNA of people who lived in East Asia thousands of years ago, scientists are starting to untangle how the region was populated.
Melinda A. Yang, Assistant Professor of Biology, University of Richmond
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/124017
2019-09-25T14:03:37Z
2019-09-25T14:03:37Z
Shinzo Abe’s latest cabinet reshuffle could transform Japan
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293567/original/file-20190923-54793-qgzp78.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Japanese Prime Minister's Cabinet reshuffle reveals his strategy for final two years in office.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/csis_er/8509605345/in/photolist-dXXXcx-soLxNT-jqhBjF-jqheGJ-DMkHJK-RV1MVv-jqjsfK-22o5Wd1-jqjPjE-qdsypM-dXXXav-2fHZEEF-2ejZNNp-RXuFMK-jqgSPk-TzHA15-dY4CvW-2fHZGaK-dY4BS3-dY4CHE-2ejZN74-2ejZNpZ-DNLx52-qSGn5y-DNQ8wx-2cZ6X8g-nTaonk-qSQjRM-22mBodj-23rfQHK-SeNwPo-oav7qm-22mBmwJ-23pZjmj-e4Lieo-2enSH9F-dXXWhZ-dY4Ccw-dY4BZA-dY4BLs-2fEd9ry-dXXWzi-2ewZARq-2fEd9cA-2ewZG5b-kUxHpT-2fJSVVP-2fJKSDH-2ex8ezS-2588SU6">CSIS/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>With just two years until he will likely step down, the time left to Shinzo Abe, Japan’s very soon-to-be longest serving postwar prime minister, is <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/what-japans-elections-tell-us-about-a-post-abe-ldp/">limited</a>. But if his latest cabinet reshuffle is anything to go by, it seems Abe is bent on realising his goal of <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/11/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-set-carry-major-revamp-cabinet-bid-ensure-stability-tackle-new-challenges/#.XYoE8i2ZMUE">historic constitutional reform</a> – whether as sitting premier or by laying the groundwork for a successor to complete.</p>
<p>At the heart of Abe’s planned reforms is a desire to “normalise” Japan’s military forces. Currently under <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php">article 9</a> – the so called peace clause – of the US-mandated postwar constitution, Japan has renounced armed conflict as a means of settling international disputes. But with <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/japan-south-korea-tensions-are-eroding-security-northeast-asia">tensions running high in north-east Asia</a> and relations between Abe and Trump <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/09/18/shinzo-abes-desperate-bet-trump-is-backfiring-japan/">characterised as a “friendship without benefits”</a>, the time may be right to reassess Japan’s military status.</p>
<p>It is with this in mind that Abe’s cabinet reshuffle on September 11 has to be considered.</p>
<p>First, spicing-up the sex appeal. No, not Abe’s own. In spite of the rise to prominence of a small number of youthful members of the Diet, Japan’s houses of parliament, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315703213">dominated Japanese politics since 1955</a>, is still seen as an old dinosaur. </p>
<p>Enter Shinjiro Koizumi, son of charismatic former prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi junior’s selection as minister of the environment has suddenly given Abe’s cabinet <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-49675193">a future star</a> with a glamorous TV personality spouse and a gift of the gab. True to his brief, Koizumi has promised to make action on climate change “<a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/09/23/national/politics-diplomacy/new-environment-minister-shinjiro-koizumi-climate-change-sexy/#.XYiShi2ZMUE">sexy</a>”.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293574/original/file-20190923-54759-16boerx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293574/original/file-20190923-54759-16boerx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=806&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293574/original/file-20190923-54759-16boerx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=806&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293574/original/file-20190923-54759-16boerx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=806&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293574/original/file-20190923-54759-16boerx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1013&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293574/original/file-20190923-54759-16boerx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1013&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293574/original/file-20190923-54759-16boerx.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1013&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Shinjiro Koizumi, new minister of environment, injects much needed youth and stardom into Abe’s government.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shinjiro.jpg">黄泉改/wikimedia</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>But the choice of Koizumi is more than just a superficial gimmick to freshen up the LDP’s image. Since Abe suddenly ended his first premiership in 2007, he has often <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/1889773/former-japanese-prime-minister-junichiro-koizumi-accuses-shinzo">not seen eye-to-eye with Koizumi senior</a>, who retains substantial influence across several of the ruling party’s <a href="https://www.huffingtonpost.jp/2013/11/13/junichiro-koizumi-anti-nuclear-power_n_4271374.html">rival factions</a>. It is in this context that Abe appointed Koizumi junior, the third-youngest postwar cabinet minister, to a high-profile post. </p>
<p>Koizumi faces some big challenges. He wants to make good on his father’s wish to close down Japan’s nuclear industry to avoid a repetition of the 2011 disaster at Fukushima. This will mean securing the country’s energy from other sources. Meanwhile he is shortly to become a father and has announced he is considering taking paternity leave in line with the government’s aim to double the number of men taking leave after they become fathers. But <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/09/22/editorials/time-encourage-lawmakers-take-paternity-leave/#.XYszWEZKg2w">commentators are warning</a> that any absence will severely limit what he can achieve while in the job. </p>
<p>By handing him the environment role now, Abe has sent a message to both the Koizumis – with whom he’d ultimately like to restore what was a powerful alliance – and the rest of the party. A message that if the time – and political price – is right, Abe is willing to set aside old differences, such as over the use of nuclear power, in order to get things done. But this is where one should not be deceived by Abe’s pragmatism and presentation of a unified party and power structure. The LDP remains a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YE7NZl6szSw">notoriously factional beast</a>.</p>
<h2>Punishing rivals and rewarding friends</h2>
<p>Within government, one of Abe’s toughest internal opponents has been the former defence minister and LDP secretary general, <a href="https://bunshun.jp/articles/-/12671">Ishiba Shigeru</a>. Ishiba hails from a rival faction and <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Abe-rival-Ishiba-says-differences-lie-in-political-style">previously ran against Abe in party leadership elections</a>. So the decision not to appoint him to a more prominent cabinet position reinforces Abe’s desire to eliminate any potential challenges to his authority. Even when, as in Ishiba’s case, their ultimate goals for defence and constitutional reform largely align, despite public <a href="https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180818/p2a/00m/0na/021000c">disagreement over how best to realise them</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293568/original/file-20190923-54749-go9qov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293568/original/file-20190923-54749-go9qov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293568/original/file-20190923-54749-go9qov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293568/original/file-20190923-54749-go9qov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293568/original/file-20190923-54749-go9qov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293568/original/file-20190923-54749-go9qov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293568/original/file-20190923-54749-go9qov.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Abe’s political rival within the LDP, Ishiba Shigeru, was dropped in the reshuffle.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shigeru_Ishiba_in_Yamanashi_City_September_2017.jpg">さかおり via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Meanwhile, Abe has appointed the hawkish, Harvard-educated, Toshimitsu Motegi, to <a href="https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/meibo/daijin/motegi_toshimitsu.html">foreign minister</a>, and retained some of his most loyal supporters in chief cabinet secretary, Yoshihide Suga, and deputy prime minister and finance minister, Taro Aso. This highlights Abe’s consistent desire to surround himself with those least likely to rock the boat against his leadership. </p>
<h2>Securing a legacy</h2>
<p>Abe’s past, in particular the [highly nationalistic ideology] associated with his grandfather and former prime minister, <a href="https://www.clinic-nishikawa.com/archives/1948">Nobusuke Kishi, and controversial figures such as Iki Kita</a>, has often been focused on more than his post-prime ministerial future. Yet all of these moves come in the context of Abe’s likely departure in 2021, with an eye on implementing constitutional reform before that happens. Abe has long sought to be remembered as the prime minister that transformed Japan into a “<a href="https://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?9090291&uuid=5bd299d9-78e7-4cef-b008-4bf6a6a2ae5a">normal nation</a>” in military and geopolitical terms. </p>
<p>Proof of that pudding would come if Abe could persuade his peers in the Diet, and the Japanese public, to revise the peace clause of the constitution. Abe wants recognition of the Japan Self-Defense Forces written into the constitution. Although land, air and sea forces are supposedly prohibited under Article 9, Japan currently boasts one of the <a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/190510b.pdf">best-equipped militaries</a> on the planet, not to mention a coast guard that could <a href="http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201805200037.html">confidently take on many navies</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293569/original/file-20190923-54767-43sb9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/293569/original/file-20190923-54767-43sb9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293569/original/file-20190923-54767-43sb9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293569/original/file-20190923-54767-43sb9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293569/original/file-20190923-54767-43sb9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293569/original/file-20190923-54767-43sb9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/293569/original/file-20190923-54767-43sb9w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Despite constitutional restraints, Japan boasts one of the most well-equipped militaries on the planet.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/japanese-soldier-japan-ground-self-defense-1403670857">Josiah_S/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Despite such sabre rattling – and in contrast to many of his current European and North American counterparts – Abe has skilfully avoided the tag of populist. Instead, he has massaged his domestic and international audiences to project an image of <a href="http://www.theasanforum.org/category/alternative-scenarios/?post_id=9619">statesmanship, stability and pragmatism</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/profile-japans-controversial-shrewd-and-ambitious-shinzo-abe-84876">Profile: Japan's controversial, shrewd and ambitious Shinzo Abe</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Nevertheless, with opinion polls suggesting that only <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cn-ZxBMMLBU">just over 50%</a> of the Japanese public are in favour of even debating constitutional reform, time may be running out for Abe.</p>
<p>His carefully considered cabinet reshuffle appears to reflect this stark political reality, as he seeks to manoeuvre around political opponents and coalition partners. In that sense this latest move represents Abe’s resolve to pursue constitutional reform, even if it has to be after he steps down in September 2021. </p>
<p>Abe has championed strong leadership. He has pioneered <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/abenomics.asp">Abenomics</a>, a three-pronged strategy for tackling Japan’s long-running economic stagnation, and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-19/what-is-womenomics-and-is-it-working-for-japan-quicktake">womenomics</a>, a proposal to encourage more Japanese women to enter the workforce. However, it now seems that Abe is playing a long-game, fostering the next generation to carry forward his vision of realising a normal Japan.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/124017/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ra Mason does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet reshuffle is an exercise in illusion. Yet it reveals some unwelcome truths about his political present - and future.
Ra Mason, Lecturer in International Relations and Japanese Foreign Policy, University of East Anglia
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.
tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/118470
2019-07-11T12:28:18Z
2019-07-11T12:28:18Z
How a Hong Kong tax assessment decision could influence attitudes towards LGBT+ rights across Asia
<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283677/original/file-20190711-173342-drdi7w.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/couple-gay-lgbt-concept-asia-smart-1285040218?studio=1">Anusak rojpeetipongsakorn/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just days after same-sex marriage was legalised <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/24/taiwan-holds-first-gay-marriages-in-historic-day-for-asia">in neighbouring Taiwan</a>, Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal handed down its own landmark decision. A judgment which has – arguably – laid the first stones in the yellow brick road for further recognition and legalisation of same-sex marriage across Asia.</p>
<p>But the June 6 ruling was not a challenge against marriage laws in Hong Kong. It simply granted the application of spousal benefits and joint tax assessment to gay civil servant <a href="http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfa/2019/19.html">Angus Leung</a> and his British husband Scott Adams, who were married in New Zealand in 2014. The significance of this case lies in the fact that it pierces the “Asian values” argument against same-sex marriage and relationships in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283675/original/file-20190711-173366-1b0ldms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/283675/original/file-20190711-173366-1b0ldms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283675/original/file-20190711-173366-1b0ldms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283675/original/file-20190711-173366-1b0ldms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283675/original/file-20190711-173366-1b0ldms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283675/original/file-20190711-173366-1b0ldms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/283675/original/file-20190711-173366-1b0ldms.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/crime-law-and-justice-photos/judiciary-system-of-justice-photos/court-of-final-appeal-rules-in-favor-of-lifelong-same-sex-couples-spousal-visas-photos-54464449">EPA-EFE/Jerome Favre</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This argument basically recognises Confucian values which sacrifice individual freedom in favour of filial piety, or loyalty towards family, corporation, government or nation. Though based on ancient principles, this particular set of values has been particularly promoted by political leaders and intellectuals since the late 20th century as an alternative to the Western ideals that some think are <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art30.shtml">being imposed on the region</a>.</p>
<p>Resistance to changing LGBT+ rights across different Asian countries mostly centres on Asian values arguments. These “values” have been <a href="https://www.gaystarnews.com/article/how-southeast-asian-values-play-villain-to-lgbt-progress/#gs.ovy9wq">used repeatedly</a> in Asia to resist the so-called Western “postcolonialism” of LGBT+ rights. Malaysian prime minister <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oyq4WuOEHHU&t=1s">Mahathir Mohamad</a>, for example – a promoter of Asian values during the 1990s – has repeatedly made comments similar to this from 2018: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>In Malaysia there are some things we cannot accept, even though it is seen as human rights in Western countries … We cannot accept LGBT marriage between men and men, women and women.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>But by arriving at this decision the Hong Kong court has essentially pierced this argument. It pointed out that protection of the institution of heterosexual marriage is not the business of the state. The government’s job is to ensure “efficient administration of government” and “the raising of revenue through the taxation system”. Essentially, this confirms that differential treatment between same-sex and opposite-sex couples without justification in Hong Kong cannot be allowed, no matter what society’s “values” are.</p>
<h2>The problem with values</h2>
<p>The Asian values argument against same-sex marriage is based on the presumption that there is only one set of Asian values, the one endorsed by the ruling class. But this oversimplified view of society is far from reality – it would be a fallacy to assume that the cultures of Asian countries are stagnant and unchangeable. </p>
<p>In fact, the region has had sexual diversity for many centuries. Journalist Sarah Ngu has recently suggested (and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1300/J236v07n01_08">researchers have previously written</a>) that relationships between consenting same-sex adults have existed in China <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3011750/china-embraced-gay-marriage-long-taiwans-law-west-perverted">for thousands of years</a> – although whether same-sex marriage has ever been embraced in China is debatable. </p>
<p>Fortunately, not all believe the Asian values argument. Even Mahathir’s daughter, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rKL_rHbuj_4">Marina</a>, has a somewhat different interpretation from her father of LGBT+ rights, thanks to her experience of working with the LGBT+ community in Malaysia. She argues that “LGBTs just want the same rights as everyone, nothing more”. </p>
<p>While it may take another couple of generations to shift views entirely across the region, already the argument based on cultural relativism against same-sex marriage is becoming less and less convincing. And moves like the one recently seen in Hong Kong are now happening in other Asian countries. In <a href="https://qz.com/1651298/ibaraki-is-the-first-prefecture-in-japan-to-recognize-same-sex-couples/">Japan</a>, gay and transgender partnerships are being increasingly recognised at regional levels. <a href="https://saigoneer.com/vietnam-news/10706-after-taiwan,-vietnam-among-asia-s-most-progressive-in-lgbt-rights">Vietnam</a> has repealed its heteronormative definition of marriage and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2017/05/25/after-same-sex-marriage-in-taiwan-spotlight-turns-to-this-asian-country/#59e7fcd73b4f">Thailand</a> became the first Asian country <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-lgbt-lawmaking-feature/gay-couples-to-live-more-freely-with-thai-civil-unions-idUSKCN1PX00E">to recognise same-sex civil partnerships</a> in early 2019.</p>
<h2>Influencing China</h2>
<p>While Hong Kong is a relatively small city, it is already home to many international marriages and intercultural relationships, straight and gay. The success of Leung and Adams perhaps comes as no surprise, but it could very well be a catalyst for LGBT+ rights reform in neighbouring China. </p>
<p>Following Taiwan’s legalisation of same-sex marriage, renowned Chinese scholar and activist <a href="http://phtv.ifeng.com/a/20170526/44626351_0.shtml">Li Yinhe</a> noted:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>People say the western sex culture is not like ours. Their social custom is not like ours. These are all excuses. If Taiwan can legalise same-sex marriage, then it proves that same-sex marriage can be accepted by Chinese culture and in Chinese societies.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With this “if Taiwan can, so can we” attitude already changing the way some in China think, the Leung case may very well push the cause further. China’s increasing influence and more frequent and closer ties in the Pearl River Delta – the region where the Pearl River flows into the South China Sea, near Hong Kong which has become <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/may/10/china-pearl-river-delta-then-and-now-photographs">rapidly urbanised in recent decades</a> – will likely shift the country’s culture, and this will have a ripple effect across the whole of Asia. </p>
<p>While the Leung case may appear to be a simple tax ruling for Hong Kong, it could very well be a catalyst for a new chapter in LGBT+ rights across the whole continent.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/118470/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Erich Hou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>
While some argue that Western LGBT+ ideals have no place in Asia, a new ruling in Hong Kong shows that these values have no bearing on the law.
Erich Hou, Lecturer in Law, University of South Wales
Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.