tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/election-factcheck-6296/articlesElection FactCheck – La Conversation2019-05-10T05:21:30Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1167262019-05-10T05:21:30Z2019-05-10T05:21:30ZFactCheck: do 86% of people visit the doctor for free?<blockquote>
<p>The number of people who attend the doctor for free has gone from 82% under Labor to 86% under us.</p>
<p><strong>– Health minister Greg Hunt, during the <a href="https://www.npc.org.au/speakers/the-hon-greg-hunt-mp-the-hon-catherine-king-mp/">health policy federal election debate</a> at the National Press Club, May 2, 2019.</strong></p>
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<p>During a debate with shadow health minister Catherine King, Hunt was defending the Coalition government’s track record on bulk-billing, claiming the number of people who visit their doctor without having to pay any out-of-pocket expense has risen since Labor’s time in power.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>The figures are accurate, but bulk-billing rates for GPs have been rising since a low point of 68.6% in 2004, meaning rates have risen during Labor’s time in office as well as since the Coalition won power in 2013. </p>
<p>Bulk-billing rates for specialist consultations are much lower than for GP visits, although they too have risen during the past decade.</p>
<h2>Checking the source</h2>
<p>In response to a request for a source on which the claim was based, a spokesperson for Hunt provided The Conversation with a spreadsheet of Department of Health data documenting annual Medicare statistics from 1984-85 to 2017-18.</p>
<p>It shows that 86.3% of “non-referred attendances (excluding practice nurse items)” at doctors’ surgeries were bulk-billed in 2017-18. In 2012-13, the last full financial year of the Labor government, the rate was 82.5%.</p>
<h2>Free doctor visits</h2>
<p>Patients who are <a href="https://www.humanservices.gov.au/individuals/subjects/how-claim-medicare-benefit/bulk-billing">bulk-billed</a> when they visit the doctor do not pay a fee; the doctor accepts the Medicare rebate as full payment. In this sense, bulk-billed patients can be said to be visiting the doctor “for free”.</p>
<p>Bulk-billing rates are <a href="http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/Annual-Medicare-Statistics">published annually by the Department of Health</a>, and so are easy to compare over time. (The spreadsheet referenced by Hunt’s office can be downloaded via this <a href="http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/Annual-Medicare-Statistics">page</a>.)</p>
<p>The bulk-billing rate for GP consultations over the past 20 years has been steadily increasing, from a low of 68.6% in 2003-4 to the most recent figure of 86.3% in 2017-18. In the last full financial year of the Labor government, in 2012-13, the rate was 82.5%.</p>
<p>There is no specific entry for “GP visits” in the government figures. The closest approximation is the data for “total non-referred attendances (excluding practice nurse items) out of hospital”. The bulk-billing rates for these services are shown in the upper line of the graph below.</p>
<iframe title="Bulk-billing rates" aria-label="Interactive line chart" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/irnP8/1/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" width="100%" height="400"></iframe>
<p>The lower line in the graph shows bulk-billing rates for specialists. Patients visit non-hospital specialists (such as dermatologists) when referred by a GP, but bulk-billing is less common for these consultations. </p>
<p>Bulk-billing rates for these services have increased over the past decade, but are still quite low at 41.3%. This means most patients who use these specialist consultations make an out-of-pocket payment for them. </p>
<h2>Why is GP bulk-billing on the rise?</h2>
<p>The long-run increase in bulk-billing rates for GPs (and to a lesser extent, for specialists) is a bit of a mystery. In the mid-2000s, when the rising trend began, it seems likely this was spurred by the introduction of <a href="http://www9.health.gov.au/mbs/fullDisplay.cfm?type=item&q=10991&qt=item">bulk-billing incentives</a> which offer extra payments to GPs who don’t charge an out-of-pocket fee to patients, and <a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-were-just-67-of-gp-visits-bulk-billed-when-tony-abbott-was-health-minister-17652">the increase in the Medicare benefit</a> to 100% of the Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS) fee for GP services – this was a one-off A$4.60 increase in the Medicare rebate for a standard patient visit.</p>
<p>However, when government funding for GP services began to be cut in real terms by the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-medicare-rebate-freeze-and-what-does-it-mean-for-you-114169">medicare rebate freeze in 2013</a>, bulk-billing rates nevertheless continued to rise. </p>
<p>One possible explanation is that <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/joie.12098">competition between GPs</a> is keeping bulk-billing rates high. This theory is supported by the fact that the number of GPs in Australia is <a href="https://hwd.health.gov.au/summary.html#part-1">growing faster than the population</a>.</p>
<p>Also worth noting is that while the proportion of GP consultations that are bulk-billed has continued to rise, the <a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-have-average-out-of-pocket-costs-for-gp-visits-risen-almost-20-under-the-coalition-66278">fees paid</a> by the minority of patients who aren’t bulk-billed has continued to rise faster than inflation. - <strong>Peter Sivey</strong></p>
<h2>Blind review</h2>
<p>This FactCheck is fair and accurate with respect to the data presented on the percentage of GP consultations that are bulk-billed. However, the minister’s quote referred to the <em>percentage of people</em> who are bulk-billed. This is a slightly different metric to the <em>percentage of consultations</em>. </p>
<p>This is because the people who are more likely to be bulk-billed (such as concession card holders) are also more frequent users of GP services. In fact, there is <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/hec.3376">evidence</a> that the reforms in the mid-2000s, referred to above, led to higher costs for patients who were not concession card holders. This is further evidenced by a <a href="https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/f6dfa5f0-1249-4b1e-974a-047795d08223/aihw-mhc-hpf-35-patients-out-of-pocket-spending-Aug-2018.pdf.aspx?inline=true">2018 report</a> from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW, which compiles official government statistics on health benefits) showing that in the 2016-17 financial year, 34% of patients who made at least one Medicare-subsidised GP visit incurred an out-of-pocket cost. In other words, only 66% of people were consistently bulk-billed during that year. </p>
<p>As these data have not been routinely reported by the AIHW, we cannot judge whether the percentage of people bulk-billed rose or fell during the Coalition’s term in office. We can say that in 2016-17 this percentage was much lower than that claimed by the health minister. - <strong>Kees Van Gool</strong></p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">The Conversation FactCheck is accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network.</span>
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<p><em>The Conversation’s FactCheck unit was the first fact-checking team in Australia and one of the first worldwide to be accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network, an alliance of fact-checkers hosted at the Poynter Institute in the US. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversations-factcheck-granted-accreditation-by-international-fact-checking-network-at-poynter-74363">Read more here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Have you seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">checkit@theconversation.edu.au</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/116726/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Sivey receives funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kees Van Gool receives funding from Australian Research Council and the Australian Government.</span></em></p>Yes, 86% of GP visits were bulk-billed in 2017-18, up from 82% when Labor was in power. But they also rose under Labor, while the percentage for “patients” seems to be lower than the percentage for “visits”.Peter Sivey, Associate Professor, School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/929282018-03-13T10:33:48Z2018-03-13T10:33:48ZFactCheck: does South Australia have the ‘highest energy prices’ in the nation and ‘the least reliable grid’?<blockquote>
<p>Look, this is probably the single most important issue to most households in South Australia — what they’ve been left with now are the highest energy prices in Australia — some say in the world — and the least reliable grid.</p>
<p>And it’s all because this government decided we had to go headlong into intermittent renewable energy without the baseload to support that transition.</p>
<p><strong>– SA Liberal Party leader Steven Marshall, speaking at the <a href="http://iview.abc.net.au/programs/sa-votes-leaders-debate/NS1806S001S00">SA Votes: Leaders’ Debate</a>, Adelaide, March 5, 2018</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Electricity prices and the reliability of South Australia’s energy grid will be key issues for voters in this Saturday’s state election. </p>
<p>During a public leaders’ debate, SA Liberal Party leader Steven Marshall claimed that, under the Weatherill Labor government, South Australians had been left with “the highest energy prices in Australia – some say in the world – and the least reliable grid”.</p>
<p>Marshall said this was “all because this [Labor] government decided we had to go headlong into intermittent renewable energy without the baseload to support that transition”.</p>
<p>Let’s look at the evidence.</p>
<h2>Checking the source</h2>
<p>A spokesperson for Marshall told The Conversation that when the opposition leader said energy prices, he was referring to retail electricity prices.</p>
<p>To support Marshall’s statement, the spokesperson provided The Conversation with <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/45/ESOO_2017_AEMO20180326-22189-ni1kvl.PDF?1522072784">two</a> <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/46/SA_System_Strength_201720180326-22189-lnq050.pdf?1522072786">2017 documents</a> from the Australian Energy Market Operator, one 2015 document from the <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/47/AER_State_of_the_energy_market20180326-22189-3tnyfb.pdf?1522072788">Australian Energy Regulator</a>, <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/48/20170609-Electricity-1July2016SAElectricityPriceIncreases-AdviceToTreasu.._20180326-22189-16wvsmj.pdf?1522072790">a letter</a> from the Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA) to the SA Minister for Energy Tom Koutsantonis, and a <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/49/highest_prices_AFR20180326-22189-lq1iyd.PDF?1522072792">2017 article</a> from the Australian Financial Review.</p>
<p>Regarding the reliability of South Australia’s grid, the spokesperson said the Australian Energy Market Operator’s <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/45/ESOO_2017_AEMO20180326-22189-ni1kvl.PDF?1522072784">Electricity Statement of Opportunities</a> shows that “in 2017-18 South Australia has the highest percentage of unserved energy at 0.0025%”, adding that “the reliability standard is 0.0020%”. </p>
<p>You can read the full response from Marshall’s office <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-response-from-steven-marshall-for-a-factcheck-on-electricity-prices-in-south-australia-93131">here</a>.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>SA Liberal Party leader Steven Marshall said South Australia has “the highest energy prices in Australia — some say in the world”.</p>
<p>It’s true that South Australia has the highest retail electricity prices in Australia (although not in the world). </p>
<p>Marshall also said South Australia has the “the least reliable grid”. </p>
<p>In the energy industry, the word “reliability” means having enough energy generation capacity and inter-regional network capacity to supply customers.</p>
<p>The Australian Energy Market Operator is currently preparing estimates of unserved energy (the measure of reliability) for 2016-17. It is possible that there will be unserved energy for South Australia over this period.</p>
<p>However, it’s far from clear that South Australia would have had the highest level of unserved energy in the National Electricity Market.</p>
<p>People in South Australia do experience interruptions to their electricity supply. </p>
<p>But more than 97% of these are due to distribution outages (caused by things like trees falling on power lines) and are unrelated to the source of electricity – renewable or otherwise – flowing through the power lines.</p>
<p>There are many factors that affect electricity prices, grid reliability and power outages. Increasing levels of renewable energy generation is one factor. </p>
<p>Therefore, Marshall’s assertion that these outcomes are “all because this [Labor] government decided we had to go headlong into intermittent renewable energy without the baseload to support that transition” is incorrect.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Responding to the sources</h2>
<p>The sources provided by Marshall’s spokesperson are from reputable government agencies. However, it’s far from clear that the sources support the conclusions Marshall drew in the leaders’ debate. </p>
<p>For example, the spokesperson cited an Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) report stating that South Australia would breach the regulator’s reliability standard in 2017-18.</p>
<p>But this is a projection, and doesn’t include some measures that have already been taken to ensure that the grid is reliable in 2017-18. </p>
<p>You can read more analysis of the sources provided by Marshall’s office <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-response-from-a-spokesperson-for-steven-marshall-for-a-factcheck-on-electricity-issues-in-south-australia-93131">here</a>.</p>
<h2>‘Energy’ vs ‘electricity’ prices</h2>
<p>In making his statement, Marshall referred to “energy” prices. Energy and electricity prices are different things. Marshall’s spokesperson later told The Conversation that the MP was referring to “household electricity prices”.</p>
<p>Energy is a broad term that includes sources such as petrol, diesel, gas and renewables, among other things. Electricity is a specific form of energy that can be produced from many different sources.</p>
<p>The retail electricity price is what you’ll typically see in your home electricity bill, and is usually expressed in cents per kilowatt-hour (c/kWh). </p>
<h2>Does South Australia have the highest retail electricity prices in the nation?</h2>
<p>According the Australian Energy Market <a href="https://www.aemc.gov.au/markets-reviews-advice/2017-residential-electricity-price-trends">2017 Residential Electricity Price Trends</a> report, South Australia does indeed have the highest retail prices in the nation. Current prices for the typical SA customer are 37.79c/kWh.</p>
<p>According to that report, the Australian Capital Territory has the lowest retail electricity prices in Australia, at around 23.68 c/kWh.</p>
<p>The retail electricity price includes the wholesale price of the electricity, the network costs (or the “poles and wires” that bring the electricity to your home), retailing costs, and levies related to “green schemes” (such as the renewable energy target or solar feed-in tariffs). </p>
<p>The chart below shows how the different components contributed the electricity price increase in South Australia between 2007-08 and 2015-16.</p>
<iframe src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/NujQW/5/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" width="100%" height="450"></iframe>
<p>For many years the drivers for retail prices have been network costs – which have very little to do with renewables.</p>
<p>But over the past 18 months, there has also been a increase in <em>wholesale</em> electricity prices across the entire National Electricity Market. A range of factors have contributed to this. These include the increase in gas prices, and the tightening of the supply-demand balance.</p>
<p>The closures of South Australia’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Power_Station_(South_Australia)">Northern Power Station</a> in 2016 and Victoria’s <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hazelwood_Power_Station">Hazelwood Power Station</a> have contributed to a reduction in electricity supply (capacity).</p>
<p>The ACCC is also <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Retail%20Electricity%20Inquiry%20-%20Preliminary%20report%20-%2013%20November%202017.pdf">investigating</a> “transfer pricing” – which is when a business that’s an energy generator as well as a retailer shifts costs from one part of its business to another. </p>
<p>But as I’ll explain below, even if wholesale prices become the main driver of retail prices, it’s not accurate to place the blame squarely on renewables.</p>
<h2>Does South Australia have the highest retail electricity prices in the world?</h2>
<p>Because of differences in tax structures and energy systems, it’s no simple matter to compare energy and electricity prices between countries. </p>
<p>A 2017 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission report <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Retail%20Electricity%20Inquiry%20-%20Preliminary%20report%20-%2013%20November%202017.pdf">compared retail electricity prices</a> among countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).</p>
<p>Australian prices were in the lower end of the range, but above the OECD total. While SA prices are above the Australian national average, they would still not be the most expensive in the OECD on a <a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-are-australians-paying-twice-as-much-for-electricity-as-americans-69980">purchasing power parity</a> basis. </p>
<h2>Does South Australia have the ‘least reliable grid’?</h2>
<p>In the context of energy supply, the word “reliable” will mean different things to different people. </p>
<p>The Australian Energy Market Commission defines “reliability” as having sufficient generation, demand side response, and interconnector capacity in the system to generate and transport electricity to meet consumer demand.</p>
<p>Under this definition, the National Energy Market meets a <a href="https://www.aemc.gov.au/markets-reviews-advice/reliability-standard-and-settings-review-2018">reliability standard</a> as long as the maximum expected amount of “unserved energy” in any region doesn’t exceed 0.002% of the region’s annual energy consumption.</p>
<p>“Unserved energy” means the amount of customer demand that can’t be supplied within a region of the National Electricity Market, <em>specifically</em> due to a shortage of generation or interconnector capacity.</p>
<p>Marshall’s office did refer The Conversation to the AEMO’s <a href="https://cdn.theconversation.com/static_files/files/45/ESOO_2017_AEMO20180326-22189-ni1kvl.PDF?1522072784">Electricity Statement of Opportunities</a>, which predicts South Australia’s unserved energy over 2017-18 at 0.0025%, just above the reliability standard.</p>
<p>However, and crucially, these projections do not include the new state-owned diesel generators (which can provide up to 276 megawatts) <a href="https://theconversation.com/full-response-from-steven-marshall-for-a-factcheck-on-electricity-prices-in-south-australia-93131">among other things</a>. And these projections are made in order for the market to respond, and prevent the shortfall from occurring.</p>
<p>Between 2010-11 and 2015-16, the amount of unserved energy in the National Electricity Market was zero. </p>
<p>AEMO is currently preparing estimates of unserved energy for 2016-17. It is possible that there will be unserved energy for South Australia over this period.</p>
<p>However, it’s far from clear that South Australia would have had the highest level of unserved energy.</p>
<p>In fact, AEMO directed more <a href="https://www.aemo.com.au/media/Files/About%20the%20industry/Fact%20sheets/AEMO_FactSheet_LoadShedding_2015.pdf">load-shedding</a> in New South Wales than South Australia on proportional basis. If this load-shedding were to be considered unserved energy, then New South Wales may technically have been less reliable.</p>
<h2>Then why has South Australia had so many blackouts?</h2>
<p>The technical definition above might not be of much comfort to South Australians experiencing power outages.</p>
<p>The average South Australian experienced <a href="https://www.aer.gov.au/networks-pipelines/network-performance/sa-power-networks-network-information-rin-responses">970 cumulative minutes of blackout in 2016-17</a>. This was extraordinarily high due to the statewide blackouts in September 2016 caused by extreme weather. In 2015-16, the average total was <a href="https://www.aer.gov.au/networks-pipelines/network-performance/sa-power-networks-network-information-rin-responses">173 minutes</a>. </p>
<p>But across the National Electricity Market the vast majority of these – over 97% – are due to distribution outages, which can be caused by anything from trees falling on power lines to “<a href="https://www.sapowernetworks.com.au/centric/customers/power_outages_information/high_voltage_interruptions_and_causes.jsp">possum flashovers</a>”. These occur regardless of the source of electricity flowing through the power lines.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209478/original/file-20180308-146675-yz0t0t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/209478/original/file-20180308-146675-yz0t0t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209478/original/file-20180308-146675-yz0t0t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209478/original/file-20180308-146675-yz0t0t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=369&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209478/original/file-20180308-146675-yz0t0t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209478/original/file-20180308-146675-yz0t0t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/209478/original/file-20180308-146675-yz0t0t.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
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<span class="caption">Sources of supply interruptions in the NEM: 2007-08 to 2015-16.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">AEMC 2017, Reliability Frameworks Review, Interim Report (page 54)</span></span>
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</figure>
<p>South Australia may have the highest number of supply interruptions, but this is essentially unrelated to electricity supply mix. </p>
<h2>Is this ‘all because’ of state Labor policy?</h2>
<p>No. Even if wholesale prices become the main driver of retail prices, it’s not accurate to place the blame squarely on renewables. </p>
<p>Increased renewable energy generation may have contributed to decisions for some power plants to close. But so would other factors – such the <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-01/worksafe-notices-detail-extent-of-repairs-needed-at-hazelwood/8082318">A$400 million safety upgrade</a> required for the Hazelwood power plant to have stayed open.</p>
<p>As mentioned above, other factors such as gas prices and competition issues have also contributed to increases in wholesale electricity prices. And as shown below, these are not confined to South Australia.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210029/original/file-20180313-30979-jg4ezc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/210029/original/file-20180313-30979-jg4ezc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210029/original/file-20180313-30979-jg4ezc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210029/original/file-20180313-30979-jg4ezc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210029/original/file-20180313-30979-jg4ezc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210029/original/file-20180313-30979-jg4ezc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/210029/original/file-20180313-30979-jg4ezc.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=473&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Electricity futures prices for 2017–18.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">ACCC 2017, Retail Electricity Pricing
Inquiry, Preliminary report (page 56)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Gas prices are particularly important in the South Australian context, which is the most gas-dependent region in the National Electricity Market. </p>
<p>In addition, the SA market is the <a href="https://www.aer.gov.au/publications/state-of-the-energy-market-reports/state-of-the-energy-market-may-2017">most concentrated in terms of competition</a>.</p>
<p>In this sense, Marshall was not correct to say that price increases are “all because this [Labor] government decided we had to go headlong into intermittent renewable energy without the baseload to support that transition”. </p>
<p>Indeed, a large proportion of the existing renewable investment in South Australia has been financed as a result of the federal Renewable Energy Target, introduced by the Howard government, rather than state policy. <strong>– Dylan McConnell</strong></p>
<h2>Blind review</h2>
<p>I broadly agree with the verdict.</p>
<p>The price question is not contentious. South Australia has the highest retail electricity prices in Australia – but not in the world.</p>
<p>An argument could be made for South Australia being the least reliable system in the National Energy Market – if you look beyond the technical definition. A series of power losses and near misses in 2016-17 clearly raise questions for SA residents.</p>
<p>But, as the author rightly points out, the vast majority of these were caused by storms and other technical issues – not by renewables. <strong>– David Blowers</strong></p>
<hr>
<p><strong>The Conversation is fact-checking the South Australian election. If you see a ‘fact’ you’d like checked, let us know by sending a note via <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">email</a>, <a href="http://www.twitter.com/conversationEDU">Twitter</a> or <a href="http://www.facebook.com/conversationEDU">Facebook</a>.</strong></p>
<p><strong>The Conversation thanks <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-is-fact-checking-the-south-australian-election-and-we-want-to-hear-from-you-92809">The University of South Australia</a> for its support.</strong></p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Conversation FactCheck is accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network.</span>
</figcaption>
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<p><em>The Conversation’s FactCheck unit is the first fact-checking team in Australia and one of the first worldwide to be accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network, an alliance of fact-checkers hosted at the Poynter Institute in the US. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversations-factcheck-granted-accreditation-by-international-fact-checking-network-at-poynter-74363">Read more here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Have you seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">checkit@theconversation.edu.au</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92928/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dylan McConnell has received funding from the AEMC's Consumer Advocacy Panel and Energy Consumers Australia.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Blowers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>SA Liberal Party leader Steven Marshall said that state Labor policy had left South Australians with ‘the highest energy prices in Australia’ and ‘the least reliable grid’. Is that right?Dylan McConnell, Researcher at the Australian German Climate and Energy College, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/928092018-03-04T19:27:31Z2018-03-04T19:27:31ZThe Conversation is fact checking the South Australian election — and we want to hear from you<p>South Australians will head to the polls on March 17, with the Liberal and Labor parties facing new competition from Nick Xenophon’s SA Best and Cory Bernardi’s Australian Conservatives.</p>
<p>Thanks to the support of The University of South Australia, The Conversation will be on the ground in Adelaide to hear exactly what claims are being made by politicians of all stripes in the lead up to polling day. </p>
<p>With your help, we’ll identify the most questionable claims and test them against the evidence, working with some of Australia’s leading academic experts to cut through the spin and misinformation to bring South Australians information they can trust. </p>
<p>Importantly, we want to hear from you, our readers. What’s the most pressing issue for you in this election campaign? What claims do you want to see fact checked?</p>
<p>Facebook posts and advertisements, pamphlets, posters, robo-calls and town hall speeches: all of these are fertile grounds for fact checks. With your help, we can weed out the claims most urgently in need of verification.</p>
<p>When you see a “fact” you’d like checked, let us know. <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">Send us</a> the claim, the date it was made and a source, if possible. That might be a link, a screen-shot or a photo. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/aYLdaZWt9H8?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
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<p>The Conversation’s FactCheck unit has been running since 2013, and we’re proud of our method. Our experienced journalists work closely with some of Australia’s most respected academic experts to test leaders’ claims against the best available data and scientific research. Our FactCheck authors bring years, and often decades, of subject-level expertise to the task.</p>
<p>After being rigorously researched, verified and tested from all angles, each FactCheck is subject to a blind review from another academic expert, who analyses the article without knowing the author’s identity. This is a valuable process that ensures the integrity and accuracy of The Conversation’s FactChecks.</p>
<p>These are just some of the reasons our FactCheck unit was the first in Australia and one of the first two worldwide <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversations-factcheck-granted-accreditation-by-international-fact-checking-network-at-poynter-74363">accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network</a>, an alliance of fact-checkers hosted at the Poynter Institute in the US.</p>
<p>We adhere to a code of principles which require non-partisanship, fairness, transparency of funding, sources and methods, and a commitment to open and honest corrections.</p>
<p>We’re not about the “gotcha” moment. We go to these lengths because we want to provide accurate information, and correct the record if we’re being misled. We’ll be closely watching all the players in this South Australian election campaign, and as always, every politician and public figure checked will be given the right of reply. </p>
<p>Please spread the word, and help make sure misinformation doesn’t play a role in the South Australian election.</p>
<hr>
<p>The Conversation thanks <a href="https://www.unisa.edu.au/">The University of South Australia</a> for its support.</p>
<hr>
<figure class="align-left zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/162128/original/image-20170323-13486-72k52f.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Conversation FactCheck is accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>The Conversation’s FactCheck unit was the first fact-checking team in Australia and one of the first worldwide to be accredited by the International Fact-Checking Network, an alliance of fact-checkers hosted at the Poynter Institute in the US. <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-conversations-factcheck-granted-accreditation-by-international-fact-checking-network-at-poynter-74363">Read more here</a>.</em></p>
<p><em>Have you seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">checkit@theconversation.edu.au</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link or a photo if possible.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/92809/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
The Conversation’s FactCheck team will be in Adelaide for the next two weeks, working with academics to test politicians’ claims against the evidence as South Australians prepare to vote on March 17.Lucinda Beaman, FactCheck EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/616772016-06-30T01:42:32Z2016-06-30T01:42:32ZElection FactCheck: Does the government spend $3 billion each year on the offshore asylum seeker detention system?<blockquote>
<p>The Greens will reinvest the $3 billion the government spends each year on its cruel offshore detention centre regime. <strong>– The Greens’ leader, Senator Richard Di Natale, <a href="http://greens.org.au/news/vic/beyond-two-party-system">speaking</a> at the National Press Club, June 23, 2016.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Greens leader Richard Di Natale used his National Press Club speech to highlight a key area of policy difference between the Greens and the major parties, describing as “cruel” the offshore asylum seeker detention system supported by the Labor and Liberal parties.</p>
<p>Di Natale said the government spends $3 billion each year on the “offshore detention centre regime”. </p>
<p>Is that right?</p>
<h2>Checking the source</h2>
<p>When asked for a source to support Di Natale’s figure of $3 billion, a spokesperson for The Greens readily admitted it was an error. She said Di Natale meant to say offshore detention cost about $3 billion over the forward estimates (the next four years).</p>
<blockquote>
<p>A good catch by The Conversation. We’ve had a look and that was a genuine error in the speech. It should read “over the forward estimates” not “each year”. We’ll be correcting it online, to reflect our other materials <a href="http://greens.org.au/sites/greens.org.au/files/20160607_A%20Better%20Way%20for%20People%20Seeking%20Asylum_1.pdf">here</a> and <a href="http://greens.org.au/sites/greens.org.au/files/A%20Better%20Way.pdf">here</a>, which have the correct figure.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>What are the real numbers on the cost of offshore detention each year?</p>
<h2>How much does offshore detention cost?</h2>
<p>For every federal budget, each government department produces a portfolio budget statement outlining its costs and spending plans. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/budget/2016-17-pbs-full.pdf">Portfolio Budget Statements 2016-17 for the Immigration and Border Protection Portfolio</a>, shown in the table below, put estimated actual spending for offshore management of IMAs (illegal maritime arrivals, which is what the government calls asylum seekers who arrive by boat) at $1.078 billion for the 2015-16 financial year.</p>
<p>It is expected to fall to about $880 million in the 2016-17 financial year, the document says.</p>
<p>This table shows how much the department intends to spend (on an accrual basis) on some of the programs involved in achieving what it calls Outcome 1.</p>
<p>Outcome 1 is defined as:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Protect Australia’s sovereignty, security and safety by managing its border, including through managing the stay and departure of all noncitizens.</p>
</blockquote>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128450/original/image-20160628-7857-1rlkc9e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128450/original/image-20160628-7857-1rlkc9e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128450/original/image-20160628-7857-1rlkc9e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128450/original/image-20160628-7857-1rlkc9e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128450/original/image-20160628-7857-1rlkc9e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=795&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128450/original/image-20160628-7857-1rlkc9e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=999&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128450/original/image-20160628-7857-1rlkc9e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=999&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128450/original/image-20160628-7857-1rlkc9e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=999&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Some of the budgeted expenses for Outcome 1.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/budget/2016-17-pbs-full.pdf">Department of Immigration and Border Protection Portfolio Budget Statements 2016-17.</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Please note that the above table is just a portion of budgeted expenses for achieving Outcome 1. You can see the full table on page 27 of <a href="https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/budget/2016-17-pbs-full.pdf">the report</a>. Total expenses for Outcome 1 for the year 2015-16 are budgeted to be about $4.15 billion.</p>
<p>Adding together the projected cost of offshore detention for the years 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, 2019-20 gets you a figure of about $3 billion for the forward estimates. </p>
<p>That is the figure of “$3 billion” Di Natale’s speech referred to, but as his spokesperson points out, he erroneously described it as an annual figure instead of the cost over the forward estimates. </p>
<p>So the real annual cost of offshore detention is currently about $1.078 billion.</p>
<p>That estimate is supported by this Parliamentary Library <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReview201617/Immigration">document</a>, which shows a figure of around $1.1 billion for offshore management of IMAs.</p>
<p>The latest annual <a href="https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/annual-reports/DIBP-Annual-Report-2014-15.pdf">report</a> for the Department of Immigration and Border Protection puts the actual spending for offshore management of IMAs at $1.034 billion in 2014-15.</p>
<h2>Onshore management</h2>
<p>As outlined in the table above, the department also estimates that for the year 2015-16 it will spend about $1.24 billion on <em>onshore</em> management of asylum seekers who arrive by boat.</p>
<p>It’s worth noting that from July 2016 onwards, it will be harder to see at a glance how much the government spends on onshore management of asylum seekers. That’s due to budget restructuring, meaning there will no longer be a separate budget item called “onshore management of IMAs”. As the figure below shows, that funding will now be reported, together with some other costs, under the broader “Program 1.3 Onshore Compliance and Detention”. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128791/original/image-20160630-15282-l498l6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128791/original/image-20160630-15282-l498l6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/128791/original/image-20160630-15282-l498l6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128791/original/image-20160630-15282-l498l6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128791/original/image-20160630-15282-l498l6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128791/original/image-20160630-15282-l498l6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128791/original/image-20160630-15282-l498l6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/128791/original/image-20160630-15282-l498l6.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=676&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">How the Immigration and Border Protection Portfolio will report slightly differently in the 2016-2017 budget, compared to 2015-2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/budget/2016-17-pbs-full.pdf">Portfolio Budget Statements 2016-17, Budget Related Paper No. 1.11 Immigration and Border Protection Portfolio, page 25</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>You can read more about that change on pages 24-25 of the <a href="https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/budget/2016-17-pbs-full.pdf">Portfolio Budget Statement</a>.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>As his spokesperson readily admitted, Richard Di Natale was wrong to say that the government spends $3 billion each year on the offshore detention centre scheme. The figure is closer to $1.078 billion for the year 2015-16. </p>
<p>Spending on offshore management of boat arrivals is estimated to be close to $3 billion over the forward estimates. <strong>– Fabrizio Carmignani</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This is a sound analysis of the budget for processing and management of asylum seekers and refugees in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. It is important to note that the government is also spending large amounts of money on other operations falling within <a href="https://www.border.gov.au/about/operation-sovereign-borders">Operation Sovereign Borders</a> such as disruption of people smuggling operations, border patrols, interceptions and boat turnbacks.</p>
<p>Australia also <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/56715cb79.html">contributes</a> <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/575e74567.pdf">to</a> the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which has said it is <a href="http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2015/12/56711bf96/donors-promise-initial-6872-million-unhcr-operations-2016-highest-amount.html">struggling to cover the cost of assisting</a> high numbers of displaced people. <strong>– Mary Anne Kenny.</strong></p>
<p><em>*Correction and Editor’s note: This article was corrected on July 1 to replace the figure of “$880,509” for offshore detention of IMAs for 2016-17 with the real figure of “$880 million”. We also corrected the figure of offshore cost of offshore management of IMAs in 2014-15 from “$1.034” to at “$1.034 billion”. The Conversation apologises for these editing errors and thanks reader Glenn Wilson for alerting us to them. The verdict remains unchanged. This story was updated on June 30 at 1:20pm to add additional information about how onshore management costs will be reported differently in the federal budget from July 2016 onwards (the section beginning with “It’s worth noting…”).</em></p>
<hr>
<p><div class="callout"> Have you ever seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at checkit@theconversation.edu.au. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61677/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fabrizio Carmignani receives funding from the Australian Research Council for a project on the estimation of the piecewise continuous linear model and its macroeconomic applications.
</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mary Anne Kenny receives sitting fees from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. She has received grant funding from the Australian Research Council.</span></em></p>Was Greens leader Richard Di Natale right to say the government spends $3 billion each year on the “offshore detention centre regime”?Fabrizio Carmignani, Professor, Griffith Business School, Griffith UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/612182016-06-27T06:04:32Z2016-06-27T06:04:32ZElection FactCheck: Have 300,000 new jobs been created in the last calendar year and were almost two-thirds held by women?<blockquote>
<p>In the last calendar year, 300,000 new jobs were created; almost two-thirds of these were women. – Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, <a href="https://www.liberal.org.au/latest-news/2016/06/10/stronger-new-economy-secure-our-future">speaking</a> to the Menzies Research Centre, June 10, 2016.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As part of his pitch to voters about “jobs and growth”, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said that 300,000 new jobs had been created in the last calendar year, with women holding almost two-thirds of them.</p>
<p>Is he right?</p>
<h2>Checking the source</h2>
<p>The Conversation asked the PM’s spokesman for sources to support his statement, but did not receive an on-the-record response before deadline. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, it is possible to check his statement against data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/6202.0May%202016?OpenDocument">Labour Force Survey</a>.</p>
<h2>Were 300,000 new jobs created in the last calendar year?</h2>
<p>Yes. ABS trend <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/6202.0May%202016?OpenDocument">Labour Force Statistics</a> show an increase of 298,000 in the total number of persons employed between December 2014 and December 2015, as shown in the chart below:</p>
<p><strong>Figure 1: Change in the number of people employed (year to date)</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127669/original/image-20160622-19764-f6loj3.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127669/original/image-20160622-19764-f6loj3.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127669/original/image-20160622-19764-f6loj3.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127669/original/image-20160622-19764-f6loj3.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127669/original/image-20160622-19764-f6loj3.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127669/original/image-20160622-19764-f6loj3.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127669/original/image-20160622-19764-f6loj3.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The job numbers from between December 2014 and December 2015 also show the greatest year to date improvement in employment numbers since the start of Turnbull’s tenure as prime minister (Turnbull became PM in September 2015). </p>
<p>Looking at the trend figures from the ABS Labour Force statistics released in June 2016, we see an increase of around 217,000 in the total number of people employed over the year to May 2016. </p>
<p>It is true that more jobs are being created, but the rate of growth has been on a steady decline since the start of the year, as the chart above shows. And importantly, the composition of employment is also changing, with a definite shift from full-time to part-time jobs. </p>
<h2>Are almost two-thirds of the jobs created held by women?</h2>
<p>Turnbull’s statement that almost two-thirds of jobs created were held by women is correct. </p>
<p>Out of the additional 298,000 people employed during the 2015 calendar year, 61% were women, close to the two-thirds claimed by Turnbull. </p>
<p>Further, the biggest growth in employment over the year to December 2015 was among women working full-time - a net increase of 111,300, as this chart shows: </p>
<p><strong>Figure 2: Change in the number of people employed full and part-time</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127670/original/image-20160622-19786-12nyown.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127670/original/image-20160622-19786-12nyown.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127670/original/image-20160622-19786-12nyown.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127670/original/image-20160622-19786-12nyown.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=306&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127670/original/image-20160622-19786-12nyown.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127670/original/image-20160622-19786-12nyown.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127670/original/image-20160622-19786-12nyown.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, if we again take the ABS Labour Force Statistics released in June and look at employment growth in the year to May 2016, we see a different picture. </p>
<p>As before, nearly two-thirds of the employment growth across this period has been due to increases in the number of women working both full-time and part-time. But it is no longer full-time work that has seen the greatest increase for women. </p>
<p>Part-time employment now plays a greater role, with a net increase of 74,800 in the number of women working part-time. This compares with growth of 66,000 in the number of women in full-time employment.</p>
<p>The changes in full-time and part-time employment are even more marked for men. There have been an additional 81,600 men employed part-time over the year to May 2016. At the same time, the number of men employed full-time has decreased by 5,400.</p>
<p>Overall, most of the growth in employment over the last 12 months to May 2016 has been driven by growth in part-time jobs for both men and women. In fact, we have seen a fall in the number of men employed full-time in every month since the start of the year. And for women the growth in full-time jobs has disappeared, as this chart shows:</p>
<p><strong>Figure 3: Monthly change in number of full and part-time employees, men and women</strong></p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127671/original/image-20160622-19764-1w94a9o.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127671/original/image-20160622-19764-1w94a9o.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/127671/original/image-20160622-19764-1w94a9o.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127671/original/image-20160622-19764-1w94a9o.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127671/original/image-20160622-19764-1w94a9o.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=214&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127671/original/image-20160622-19764-1w94a9o.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127671/original/image-20160622-19764-1w94a9o.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/127671/original/image-20160622-19764-1w94a9o.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=269&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>What’s really happening in the Australian labour market?</h2>
<p>Over the election period, both the Labor and Liberal parties have put forward conflicting views of what’s currently happening in the Australian labour market.</p>
<p>The commitment to “jobs and growth” has been one of the most prominent pillars of the Coalition’s election campaign to date. </p>
<p>Turnbull has zeroed in on the figure of 300,000, but that figure represents employment growth that occurred in 2015 – and obscures the slower rate of employment growth we’ve seen since the start of 2016.</p>
<p>Labor has also been selective in their numbers in putting forward a worse-case scenario picture of the Australian labour market, claiming <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-factcheck-have-50-000-full-time-jobs-been-lost-this-year-and-are-over-a-million-people-underemployed-60709">a large fall in full-time jobs since the start of the year</a>. </p>
<p>The real story is more complex and somewhere in between what the two parties are putting forward. Here’s what the numbers show:</p>
<ul>
<li>The number of people employed over the 2015 calendar year rose by about 300,000.</li>
<li>The rate of employment growth has eased off considerably since the start of 2016.</li>
<li>Nearly three-quarters of recent employment growth stems from part-time jobs.</li>
<li>The underemployment rate is the <a href="https://theconversation.com/election-factcheck-have-50-000-full-time-jobs-been-lost-this-year-and-are-over-a-million-people-underemployed-60709">highest it has been in the last 20 years</a>. </li>
<li>People are working fewer hours overall since the start of the current year.</li>
<li>The decline in aggregate monthly hours has been greater for women than for men over the last three months. </li>
</ul>
<p>Taken together, all of these signals point to a labour market that is weakening.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Turnbull’s statement that “In the last calendar year, 300,000 new jobs were created; almost two-thirds of these were women” is correct – but he’s selectively chosen a time frame that shows strong employment growth. </p>
<p>He did not use the most recent ABS Labour Force statistics available at the time of his speech (which would have shown a less impressive rate of employment growth).</p>
<p>It is also true that nearly two-thirds of the 300,000 jobs created went to women, and most of these were full-time. </p>
<p>However, while this is true in relation to 2015, May 2016 ABS labour market statistics show that more of the growth in employment now stems from part-time work. <strong>– Rebecca Cassells and Alan Duncan</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This is a sound analysis of Prime Minister Turnbull’s claims about the nature of recent employment growth. The authors rightly point out the differences of interpretation that are possible depending on precisely which time periods are considered. During this election campaign, both major political parties have made radically different claims about the state of the labour market by selectively comparing different data series and time periods. There are dangers in reading too much into any narrow time period; a full understanding requires a longer-term view.</p>
<p>The authors could have noted that any increase in employment is only meaningful when expressed relative to other changes. If 300,000 new jobs are created, but 600,000 additional people want to work, then the labour market is not performing well. What matters is the rate of jobs growth relative to population and labour force growth. </p>
<p>A key indicator is the employment-to-population ratio, which measures the proportion of the population in employment at any time. The Labour Force Survey data show that the overall employment-to-population ratio has fallen on a trend basis for four of the past five calendar years (2011-2014). It rose steadily through 2015, but fell again in the first five months of 2016. </p>
<p>Even in 2015, the full-time share of employment continued to fall. This has mostly affected men, who hold the majority of full-time jobs. As of May 2016, the male trend employment-to-population ratio (66.6%) remains well below its recent peak in early 2008 (69.9%) and also well below its long-term average since 1980 (68.5%). <strong>– Joshua Healy</strong></p>
<hr>
<p><div class="callout"> Have you ever seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at checkit@theconversation.edu.au. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/61218/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rebecca Cassells is Principal Research Fellow at the Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre. The Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre is an independent economic and social research organisation located within Curtin Business School at Curtin University. The Centre was established in 2012 with support from Bankwest (a division of Commonwealth Bank of Australia) and Curtin University. The views in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of Curtin University and/or Bankwest or any of their affiliates.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alan Duncan is the Director of the Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre. The Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre is an independent economic and social research organisation located within Curtin Business School at Curtin University. The Centre was established in 2012 with support from Bankwest (a division of Commonwealth Bank of Australia) and Curtin University. The views in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views of Curtin University and/or Bankwest or any of their affiliates.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Joshua Healy is a researcher at the Centre for Workplace Leadership, which receives funding from the Australian Government Department of Employment.</span></em></p>Was Malcolm Turnbull right to say that 300,000 new jobs created in the last calendar year, with almost two-thirds held by women?Rebecca Cassells, Associate Professor, Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre, Curtin UniversityAlan Duncan, Director, Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre and Bankwest Research Chair in Economic Policy, Curtin UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/599062016-05-30T04:18:48Z2016-05-30T04:18:48ZElection FactCheck Q&A: has the NBN been delayed?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/124254/original/image-20160527-22060-1bhju09.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Was Christopher Pyne right about the NBN?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Q&A</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Conversation is fact-checking claims made on Q&A, broadcast Mondays on the ABC at 9:35pm. Thank you to everyone who sent us quotes for checking via <a href="http://www.twitter.com/conversationEDU">Twitter</a> using hashtags #FactCheck and #QandA, on <a href="http://www.facebook.com/conversationEDU">Facebook</a> or by <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">email</a>.</strong></p>
<hr>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ORmCk6OEOn4?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Excerpt from Q&A, May 23, 2016.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<blockquote>
<p>And there has not been a delay of the NBN … Because of Malcolm Turnbull’s management of the NBN, it will all be finished by 2020, not 2024 as Labor was promising, with speeds that people want and need. – Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science Christopher Pyne, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4445605.htm">speaking on Q&A</a>, May 23, 2016.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The election campaign has brought national broadband network (NBN) policy back into the spotlight, particularly as the incumbent prime minister was responsible for the NBN in his previous role as communications minister. </p>
<p>Minister for Industry, Innovation and Science Christopher Pyne told Q&A there has not been a delay of the NBN. Is that right?</p>
<h2>2013: the year of election promises and reviews</h2>
<p>The Conversation contacted a spokesperson for Christopher Pyne seeking comment and sources to support his statement, but did not hear back before deadline. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, most of the documents on the recent history of the NBN can be found online. </p>
<p>As acknowledged in <a href="https://www.communications.gov.au/file/315/download?token=8OjaNaNc">this Coalition document</a>, the previous Labor government promised to deliver an NBN by a deadline of 2021 (not 2024 as Pyne stated on Q&A).</p>
<p>Prior to the 2013 federal election, the nbn co under the then-Labor government <a href="http://www.nbnco.com.au/content/dam/nbnco/documents/nbn-co-3-year-gbe-corporate-plan-final-17-dec-10.pdf">said</a> it planned to deliver a predominantly fibre-to-the-premises (FTTP) network by 2021. </p>
<p>But there were <a href="http://www.afr.com/business/telecommunications/telstra-boss-says-nbn-deal-delayed-to-2015-20141014-11cpmp">delays in negotiating with Telstra</a> for access to ducts and pits, the discovery of asbestos in some of Telstra’s network and other <a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-will-the-nbn-take-another-20-years-to-complete-16962">teething problems</a>.</p>
<p>In its 2013 pre-election promises, the Coalition said its <a href="http://lpa.webcontent.s3.amazonaws.com/NBN/The%20Coalition%E2%80%99s%20Plan%20for%20Fast%20Broadband%20and%20an%20Affordable%20NBN.pdf">goal</a> was to provide everyone in the nation with access to broadband with download data rates of between 25 and 100 megabits per second by 2016. The Coalition also planned to deliver between <a href="http://lpa.webcontent.s3.amazonaws.com/NBN/The%20Coalition%E2%80%99s%20Plan%20for%20Fast%20Broadband%20and%20an%20Affordable%20NBN.pdf">50 and 100 megabits per second</a> to 90% of the fixed-line footprint by the end of 2019. That election commitment, the Coalition said, “assumes the current NBN Co satellite and fixed wireless networks are deployed on schedule”.</p>
<p>But after the election, the Coalition <a href="http://www.minister.communications.gov.au/malcolm_turnbull/news/strategic_review_of_the_national_broadband_network#.V0UKJPl96Wi">dropped</a> its promise to deliver 25 to 100 megabits per second to everyone in the nation by 2016. </p>
<p>Then communications minister Malcolm Turnbull <a href="http://www.financeminister.gov.au/media-release/2013/12/12/strategic-review-national-broadband-network">said</a> that a December 2013 <a href="http://www.nbnco.com.au/content/dam/nbnco/documents/NBN-Co-Strategic-Review-Report.pdf">Strategic Review</a> of the NBN commissioned by the new government had found that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>the NBN is in a fundamentally worse position than the Labor Government at any time disclosed to Parliament or the Australian public.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The strategic review also said that Labor’s NBN would not have been completed until 2024.</p>
<h2>2015: New plans</h2>
<p>In 2015, nbn co issued its 2016 <a href="http://www.nbnco.com.au/content/dam/nbnco2/documents/nbn-corporate-plan-2016.pdf">corporate plan</a>.</p>
<p>In this document, the company now estimated that Labor’s plan for </p>
<blockquote>
<p>an all-FTTP fixed-line rollout could be completed by 2026 but possibly as late as 2028.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, former nbn co CEO Mike Quigley has <a href="http://www.zdnet.com/article/quigley-pins-turnbull-nbn-cost-blowout-on-mtm-delays-report/">challenged</a> this revised estimate. <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/cm/lb/6907464/data/mike-quigley-article-data.pdf">In a 2015 article</a>, he wrote:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For that to be correct, one has to assume that, for the next 13 years, nbn co will roll out just 12,300 premises per week on average. Fewer premises than it regularly passes each week today. It is almost certainly true that an all-FTTP NBN would take longer to complete than its inferior MTM counterpart [the Multi-Technology Mix proposed by the Coalition]. But it would likely only be longer by one to three years…</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In late 2015, an nbn co spokesman was <a href="https://delimiter.com.au/2015/08/24/nbn-co-delays-fttn-rollout-for-further-testing/">reported as</a> saying that the company had </p>
<blockquote>
<p>deliberately chosen to take a more gradual approach to [fibre to the node or FTTN] activations than was originally flagged.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The 2016 leaks</h2>
<p>Early in 2016, internal nbn co <a href="https://11217-presscdn-0-50-pagely.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Scale-the-Deployment-Weekly-Sponsor-Meeting_19Feb2016.pdf">documents</a> were leaked to the <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/nbn-malcolm-turnbulls-faster-cheaper-rollout-falters-20160228-gn5l0s.html">media</a>. </p>
<p>These and other leaked documents – which were at the centre of a recent <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-20/election-2016-why-did-australian-federal-police-raided-labor/7432210">Australian Federal Police raid on Labor offices</a> and a staffer’s home in an effort to find the leaker – were reported as showing bottlenecks and delays in the fibre to the node (FTTN) and hybrid fibre coax (HFC) components of the rollout.</p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.nbnco.com.au/corporate-information/media-centre/media-releases/response-to-media-reports-today-monday-29-February-2016.html">response</a>, nbn co said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>NBN has met or exceeded every key target for six quarters in a row.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Current nbn co chair Ziggy Switkowski <a href="http://www.smh.com.au/comment/nbn-co-makes-no-apologies-for-reporting-document-theft-to-the-afp-20160527-gp5g2g.html">wrote</a> on May 28, 2016, that: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The company will meet its targets for the ninth quarter in a row … There are no “cost blowouts” or “rollout delays” to the publicly released plans.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>It’s beyond the scope of FactCheck to say with any certainty whether the leaked documents accurately reflect the full picture. </p>
<p>It’s important to note that as any technical and other teething problems are resolved, nbn co should be able to ramp up the roll-out rate to improve its chances of meeting a 2020 project completion date.</p>
<p>Internet access speeds around the world are <a href="https://content.akamai.com/PG5679-Q4-2015-SOTI-Connectivity-Report.html?gclid=CJqs-fOr9MwCFQGbvAodRUQI0Q">growing rapidly</a> and this growth is <a href="http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/ip-ngn-ip-next-generation-network/white_paper_c11-481360.html">expected to continue</a> for the foreseeable future. Australia’s internet speeds are <a href="http://www.news.com.au/technology/online/nbn/as-australias-global-internet-ranking-slips-critics-of-fttn-grow-louder/news-story/179031f43ad8053b959ca92177996ee8">slow</a> compared to other developed countries.</p>
<p><em>Infographic: <a href="https://theconversation.com/infographic-how-fast-is-the-nbn-54392">How fast is the NBN?</a></em></p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Christopher Pyne’s assertion that there have been “no delays” in the implementation of the NBN is inaccurate. Some delays occurred under the Labor government, and the early stages of the FTTN rollout under the current government have been slower than the Coalition originally envisaged. </p>
<p>Leaked documents and reported statements by an nbn co spokesperson also suggest delays occurred under the Coalition government. However, nbn co rejects that, saying it has met or exceeded its key targets.</p>
<p>Labor promised a completion date of 2021, not 2024 as Pyne said. It was the December 2013 <a href="http://www.nbnco.com.au/content/dam/nbnco/documents/NBN-Co-Strategic-Review-Report.pdf">strategic review</a> of the NBN commissioned by the Coalition government that said Labor’s NBN would not have been completed until 2024. <strong>– Rod Tucker</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This article is factual and correct. As stated in the article, delays in nbn co’s rollout is also self-evident by comparing the original deployment date promises made before the 2013 federal election with the revised schedule outlined in the December 2013 strategic review of the NBN, initiated by the Coalition government. <strong>– Thas Ampalavanapillai Nirmalathas</strong></p>
<hr>
<p><div class="callout"> Have you ever seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at checkit@theconversation.edu.au. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59906/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rod Tucker has received funding from the ARC and a number of telecommunications companies. He was a member of the Panel of Experts that advised the Labor Government on the establishment of the original FTTP-based NBN.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Thas Ampalavanapillai Nirmalathas receives funding from the Australian Research Council, Nokia Bell Labs, Google and the Victorian State Government and leads an interdisciplinary institute - Melbourne Networked Society Institute which has received funding from both state and federal governments as well as a range of industry partners. </span></em></p>Was Christopher Pyne right to say that “there has not been a delay of the NBN”?Rod Tucker, Laureate Emeritus Professor, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/592502016-05-16T10:37:19Z2016-05-16T10:37:19ZElection FactCheck Q&A: is it true Australia’s unemployment payment level hasn’t increased in over 20 years?<p><strong>The Conversation is fact-checking claims made on Q&A, broadcast Mondays on the ABC at 9:35pm. Thank you to everyone who sent us quotes for checking via <a href="http://www.twitter.com/conversationEDU">Twitter</a> using hashtags #FactCheck and #QandA, on <a href="http://www.facebook.com/conversationEDU">Facebook</a> or by <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">email</a>.</strong></p>
<hr>
<blockquote>
<p>… the level of the unemployment payment, which hasn’t been increased in over two decades… – Cassandra Goldie, Australian Council of Social Service chief executive, <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4432624.htm">speaking on Q&A</a> on Monday May 9, 2016.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As part of her response to Q&A audience member Duncan Storrar’s <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-36263711">now famous question</a> about the impact of the 2016-17 budget on low income people, ACOSS chief executive Cassandra Goldie said that the level of unemployment payment hasn’t been increased in Australia in over 20 years. </p>
<p>Is that true?</p>
<h2>Then and now</h2>
<p>ACOSS CEO Cassandra Goldie told The Conversation that </p>
<blockquote>
<p>The base rate of the Newstart Allowance has not been increased in real terms since 1994. It was excluded from the increase to pensions in the 2009 budget, and is indexed to prices only, unlike pensions which are indexed to wages. As a result, the payment is falling further and further behind the pension and community living standards. The Energy Supplement, introduced in 2012, provides an additional A$4.40 a week on top of the base rate but will no longer be paid to new payment recipients, following the recent budget. This decision will further undermine the adequacy of income support for people who are unemployed.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Keating government provided a discretionary <a href="https://www.dss.gov.au/about-the-department/publications-articles/research-publications/occasional-paper-series/number-13-a-compendium-of-legislative-changes-in-social-security-1983-2000">real increase in Newstart</a> in March <a href="http://www.acoss.org.au/media_release/raising_newstart_for_the_first_time_in_20_years_a_legacy_for_43rd_parliamen/">1994</a>. </p>
<p>Since that time, Newstart rates have continued to be indexed to the CPI but there have been no specific policy decisions to increase the real level of Newstart payments. (By contrast, rates of pensions were formally indexed to average earnings from 1997).</p>
<p>Government data on historic rates of Newstart payments <a href="http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/5/2/1/20">show</a> <a href="http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/5/2/1/30">that</a> in March 1996, the single rate of Newstart was A$316.70 per fortnight. The rate for a single parent with children was $346.40 per fortnight and the partnered rate was $285.90 per fortnight (each).</p>
<p>Current rates of Newstart show <a href="http://guides.dss.gov.au/guide-social-security-law/5/1/8/20">that</a> since March 2016, the single rate is $527.60 per fortnight. The rate for a lone parent is $570.80 per fortnight and the partnered rate is $476.40 per fortnight.</p>
<p>According to Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) the <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/PrimaryMainFeatures/6401.0?OpenDocument">Consumer Price Index</a> (CPI) for all groups for Australia increased from 66.2 to 108.2 between March 1996 and March 2016. </p>
<p>Multiplying the March 1996 Newstart rates by 108.2 (the March 2016 CPI) over 66.2 (the March 1996 CPI) gives benefit levels in 1996 in current terms of $517.65 for a single person. It would be $566.20 for a lone parent and $467.10 for a couple.</p>
<h2>Appearances can be deceiving</h2>
<p>These comparisons make it look, at first, like there have been very small real increases in benefit rates – a boost of between 0.8% and 1.9% over the 20 year period.</p>
<p>However, this is due to what economists call the “indexation lag effect”.</p>
<p>By way of illustration, the March 2016 indexation was based on the CPI change from June to December 2015. When the inflation rate is declining, this means that the Newstart rate appears to rise in real terms – but that’s not a real rise.</p>
<p>Some may say the CPI does not accurately capture the expenditure patterns of low income groups, so let’s test the purchasing power of a Newstart recipient against another index.</p>
<p>Since 2009, the ABS has published a <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/6467.0Mar%202016?OpenDocument">Pensioner and Beneficiary Living Cost Index</a>, but with estimates going back to 1998. </p>
<p>Using this index for “other government transfer recipient households” (which includes Newstart beneficiaries), the real level of Newstart appears to fall by about $10 per fortnight since June 1998, or by about 2%.</p>
<h2>The Energy Supplement</h2>
<p>There is a further complication. In 2012, the Gillard government introduced <a href="http://insidestory.org.au/carbon-pricing-and-household-compensation-is-it-enough">separate payments</a> to protect pensioners and beneficiaries from the effect of introducing a price on carbon. </p>
<p>Initially, allowance recipients got up to $218 per year for singles and $390 per year for couples. There was a small amount of “over-compensation” built into this payment. Currently this Energy Supplement for single people on Newstart would just offset the real declines measured using the ABS’s <a href="http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/6467.0Mar%202016?OpenDocument">Pensioner and Beneficiary Living Cost Index</a>, putting them about 40 cents a fortnight better off than in 1998.</p>
<p>However, in the 2016-17 budget, the government announced that the Energy Supplement would <a href="https://www.humanservices.gov.au/corporate/budget/budget-2016-17/other-payments-and-services/national-disability-insurance-scheme-savings-fund-abolish-energy-supplement-all-new">not be available for new recipients of social security payments</a> from September 2016.</p>
<p>Some policy-watchers have argued that rates of payments for new Newstart applicants will <a href="http://ravebydave.blogspot.com.au/2016/05/malice-or-misunderstanding.html">actually be less than if compensation for carbon pricing had never been introduced</a>.</p>
<p>In 2010, the <a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-australia-2010_eco_surveys-aus-2010-en%22%22">OECD Economic Survey of Australia</a> recommended that the government examine the <a href="http://insidestory.org.au/why-unemployment-benefits-need-to-be-increased">adequacy of the Newstart</a> allowance and look at options to increase it.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Cassandra Goldie was correct if she meant that there have been no legislated changes to real Newstart rates in over 20 years. However, if the Energy Supplement is taken into account, it could be argued that there was a marginal increase in real payment rates (less than one tenth of 1%). <strong>– Peter Whiteford</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>The analysis is generally sound, and comes to the same conclusion that I would come to – that rates of Newstart have not increased substantially in real terms since 1996.</p>
<p>It might be added that over most of the period since 1996, neither Labor nor Coalition governments have been particularly sympathetic to calls to increase Newstart. It has languished, while most other payments have, from time to time, been boosted, either by above-inflation rate increases (for example, the standard rate age pension in 2009), or with one-off “bonuses”.</p>
<p>One such bonus was the Household Stimulus Package introduced by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2009, under which recipients of age and disability pensions, carer payments and Family Tax Benefit all received substantial amounts – but recipients of Newstart allowance received nothing. <strong>– Gerry Redmond</strong></p>
<p><em>UPDATE: This article was updated on May 17 to include a comment from Cassandra Goldie.</em> </p>
<hr>
<p><div class="callout"> Have you ever seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at checkit@theconversation.edu.au. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59250/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Whiteford has received funding from the Australian Research Council and Jobs Australia. He is affiliated with the Commission for Inclusive Prosperity of the Chifley Research Centre and is a Fellow of the Centre for Policy Development. He is an independent member of the Sustainability Committee of the Board of the National Disability Insurance Agency.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Gerry Redmond receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Government and UNICEF.</span></em></p>ACOSS chief executive Cassandra Goldie said that the level of unemployment payment hasn’t been increased in Australia in over 20 years. Is that true?Peter Whiteford, Professor, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/593712016-05-13T05:42:14Z2016-05-13T05:42:14ZWelcome to Election FactCheck 2016<p>Strap in and hold on, Australia: the longest election campaign in decades has begun. Voters are in for eight weeks of political claims and counterclaims, myriad facts and figures, a flurry of accusations and self-congratulations.</p>
<p>The good news is voters don’t have to weather this alone. The Conversation’s Election FactCheck team is here to make sense of it all.</p>
<p>In the weeks leading up to voting day on July 2, our academic experts will separate fact from fiction by testing against the evidence statements by politicians and other influential figures. </p>
<p>The Conversation’s FactCheck format is unique. These articles are written by academic experts with years of specialist knowledge behind them. Each FactCheck article is then blind reviewed by a second expert who doesn’t know the identity of the lead author, to ensure the article fairly and accurately represents the facts.</p>
<p>As FactCheck Editor, it’s my job to commission and edit FactChecks penned by our academic experts. I’ll be joined by Deputy FactCheck Editor, Jennifer Cooke, a multi-award-winning journalist experienced in the art of fact-checking. </p>
<p>We’ll need all the help we can get from readers in spotting “facts” to check. If you hear or read an assertion you’d like to see tested against the evidence, request a check at <a href="mailto:checkit@theconversation.edu.au">checkit@theconversation.edu.au</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a web link if possible.</p>
<p>Some claims will be true, but worth explaining via a FactCheck. Some will be false (politicians are smart, so that’s rare, but it does happen). Many will be somewhere in between – claims that are based on real facts but framed in a way that is misleading. </p>
<p>All of our Election FactChecks will explain key issues in the political debate, while aiming to keep politicians honest and voters better informed. </p>
<p>And, lofty as it sounds, we will seek to leave Australian democracy in better shape than we found it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59371/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Election FactCheck will explain key issues in the 2016 campaign, while aiming to keep politicians honest and voters better informed.Sunanda Creagh, Senior EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/591592016-05-11T04:39:01Z2016-05-11T04:39:01ZElection FactCheck: is Labor planning to increase taxes by $100 billion over ten years?<blockquote>
<p>Labor has no plan for Australia except to increase taxes by $100 billion over ten years. <strong>- Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Liberal Party of Australia email to subscribers, May 8, 2016.</strong></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Tax is shaping up to be a hot button issue in this election, with both <a href="http://www.afr.com/news/politics/election/election-2016-scott-morrison-steps-up-high-tax-attack-on-labor-20160504-gommwl">major parties</a> aiming to <a href="https://www.pennywong.com.au/transcripts/sky-news-to-the-point-2/">paint their opponents</a> as high taxers. So is Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull right to say that Labor plans to increase taxes by A$100 billion over ten years?</p>
<p>It all depends on the question: what exactly is that “increase” based on?</p>
<h2>Where does the figure of $100 billion come from?</h2>
<p>In his <a href="https://theconversation.com/shorten-budget-reply-labor-finds-big-dollars-by-rejecting-most-of-budgets-company-tax-cut-58947">budget reply speech</a>, Opposition Leader Bill Shorten promised to deliver savings of A$71 billion over ten years, chiefly by rejecting almost all the budget’s company tax cut.</p>
<p>But in an <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2015/s4443619.htm">interview with the ABC</a> in April, Shadow Treasurer Chris Bowen said</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Our fiscal rule is very clear and we’ve led the way with $100 billion - more than $100 billion worth of improvements to the budget bottom line.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Conversation understands that prime minister’s statement about the $100 billion was based on Labor’s own numbers relative to the Coalition’s position. The policies that would add up to a A$100 billion increase include:</p>
<ol>
<li> Labor’s policy to <a href="http://www.alp.org.au/negativegearing?_ga=1.238618245.480909297.1462849443">limit negative gearing</a> to new residential housing</li>
<li> Labor’s policy to increase Australia’s <a href="http://www.100positivepolicies.org.au/positive_plan_on_housing_affordability_capital_gains_tax_reform">capital gains tax</a> rate by 50% </li>
<li> Labor’s policy to leave Australia’s top marginal <a href="http://www.100positivepolicies.org.au/fair_income_taxes_for_budget_repair_thats_fair">income tax</a> rate at 47% (49% including the Medicare Levy)</li>
<li> Labor’s policy to <a href="https://theconversation.com/shorten-budget-reply-labor-finds-big-dollars-by-rejecting-most-of-budgets-company-tax-cut-58947">reject the reduction in company taxes</a> laid out under the Coalition’s <a href="http://www.budget.gov.au/2016-17/content/bp2/html/bp2_revenue-10.htm">Enterprise Tax Plan</a></li>
<li> Labor’s <a href="http://www.100positivepolicies.org.au/keeping_super_fair">superannuation</a> policies.</li>
</ol>
<p>So the PM is arguing that Labor’s plan is a $100 billion increase on what the Coalition has promised; it’s <em>not</em> $100 billion more than what the federal government currently collects in taxes. </p>
<p>Note that the only appearance of the word “increase” in this list is in item two, on the capital gains tax rate. I think it’s also fair enough to think of a proposed limit on negative gearing in item one as a “tax increase”, although it would really be a removal of a tax subsidy, not an increase in a tax rate. (You can read more <a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-has-the-government-introduced-17-new-taxes-46875">here</a> on what meets the official definition of a tax.)</p>
<p>But to suggest Labor’s rejection of the Coalition’s plan to reduce company taxes in item four is a “tax increase” is a bit rich (pardon the pun).</p>
<p>In the typical use of the English language, an “increase” refers to a positive change in something relative to a well-established reality, not relative to a hypothetical scenario. </p>
<p>If my boss doesn’t give me a pay raise when I ask for one, I might be disappointed. But I can’t really call it a “pay cut” just because I asked for a raise. My current pay is the baseline reality. My requested raise is a pure hypothetical.</p>
<p>In terms of an “increase in taxes”, a reasonable baseline reality would be projected tax receipts under existing tax rates prior to the recent budget. </p>
<p>But the Coalition’s position that includes cuts to company taxes is really a hypothetical scenario until passed by parliament.</p>
<p>Labor’s plan is not to “increase taxes by $100 billion” from current levels, but rather it is to limit negative gearing; raise capital gains taxes; maintain the current top marginal income tax rate; not cut company taxes in the way proposed by the Coalition; and apply different policies to superannuation than the Coalition. </p>
<p>This is clearly a more complex set of policies than just a simple tax increase. </p>
<h2>A more accurate statement</h2>
<p>It would be fair to say that Labor’s plan could lead to $100 billion more (or thereabouts) in taxes than the Coalition’s plan over the next ten years. But, once again, the difference is not all due to an actual <em>increase</em> in taxes. Some of it is due to <em>not decreasing</em> taxes.</p>
<p>Perhaps I am asking for too much precision of language from our politicians who have been trained to produce highly simplified sound bites. But “increase” is a widely used and well understood word. So its misuse here is problematic.</p>
<p>Finally, it’s worth noting that an average of $10 billion more a year in taxes equals only about 0.6% of current total income in the Australian economy. It is a near certainty than any projection will be off by far more than this at some point in the next decade, regardless of who wins the election. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>The PM’s statement is misleading. As I interpret it, his quote makes it sound as though Labor plans to increases taxes from the <em>current</em> levels by $100 billion over ten years.</p>
<p>It would be fairer to say that Labor’s plan could lead to $100 billion more in taxes than the Coalition’s plan over the next ten years. But the difference is not all due to an actual <em>increase</em> in taxes. Some of it is due to <em>not decreasing</em> taxes. <strong>– James Morley.</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>I like this article and its attempt to diagnose a difficult issue. I am not sure that arguing over long projections such as ten year horizons is all that useful. No one knows what the future holds so far out, and future governments can chop and change these measures in subsequent budgets or economic statements.</p>
<p>This FactCheck also makes the valid point that “saving measures” are not inherently “tax increases”. Not providing or matching a promised tax cut is not necessarily a “tax increase”. </p>
<p>Take, for example, business company tax: Labor’s plan would keep the tax take at about the same level as now, so that’s not a tax increase in any normal sense. However, it would imply that Labor would have business paying more tax than the Coalition under the current proposals. </p>
<p>I am not sure that the verdict is accurate that Turnbull is being “misleading”. If you add up the impact over four years Labor’s proposed negative gearing changes, superannuation changes, capital gains tax increase, plus the higher income supercharge on high income earners, and the hike in the tobacco tax, then Labor may be raising $100 billion more in revenue in the medium to longer term. </p>
<p>However, while Labor has announced it is increasing these taxes, the Coalition is also increasing superannuation taxation (with three coordinated changes to current arrangements) and increasing the tobacco tax. That said, the Coalition has also announced tax reductions to business, those earning above A$80,000, and the very high income earners who currently pay the extra levy. So the comparable “net effect” of the tax proposals from both sides is likely to be far less than the $100 billion Turnbull claims.</p>
<p>The last statement in this FactCheck article is a fair representation of the facts. <strong>– John Wanna</strong></p>
<hr>
<p><div class="callout"> Have you ever seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at checkit@theconversation.edu.au. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/59159/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Morley receives funding from the ARC.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Wanna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull right to say that Labor plans to increase taxes by A$100 billion over ten years?James Morley, Professor of Economics and Associate Dean (Research), UNSW SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/587732016-05-10T07:15:56Z2016-05-10T07:15:56ZElection FactCheck: does Labor have a $19.5b black hole in its funding plan?<blockquote>
<p>But Shorten is short by $19.5 billion. Shorten’s black hole just got bigger. – <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOOwrkb4muo">Advertisement</a> authorised by the Liberal Party of Australia. </p>
</blockquote>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ZOOwrkb4muo?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Liberal Party of Australia ad.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both the Coalition and the ALP have committed to raising tobacco excise by 12.5% a year for four years, starting on September 1, 2017. However, both sides have produced vastly different estimates of the revenue gain over the next decade. </p>
<p>Ads authorised by the Liberal Party claim that the ALP faces a $19.5 billion “black hole” arising from the differences in the costings between the two parties.</p>
<p>Is that assertion correct?</p>
<h2>What are the major parties proposing for tobacco tax?</h2>
<p>The federal government imposes a tobacco excise on locally produced and imported tobacco products, raising an estimated $10.2 billion in 2016-17.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.alp.org.au/bestpracticetobaccopolicy">ALP’s tobacco policy</a>, released in November 2015, outlines a plan to increase the tobacco excise by 12.5% a year, each year, from September 2017 until September 2020. The ALP says that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The policy has been independently costed by the Parliamentary Budget Office to raise $3.8 billion over the current forward estimate period and $47.7 billion over the medium term.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In his 2016-17 <a href="http://www.budget.gov.au/2016-17/content/speech/html/speech.htm">budget speech</a> on May 3, federal Treasurer Scott Morrison announced that the Coalition would also </p>
<blockquote>
<p>implement a further four annual 12.5% increases in tobacco excise, with the first increase to take effect on 1 September 2017.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In the 2016-17 <a href="http://www.budget.gov.au/2016-17/content/bp2/download/BP2_consolidated.pdf">Budget Paper 2</a>, on page 16, the Coalition government states that the increases in tobacco excise would raise $4.7 billion over the four years of the forward estimates – from 2016-17 to 2019-20.</p>
<p>However, we have no published figure in the budget papers for the government’s 10-year costing of the tobacco excise hike. Instead, <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/budget-2016-labor-faces-claim-of-20-billion-black-hole/news-story/de59d292bab141971a8a22e577da9c0b?nk=21bd5293c6c9bf91e73e578611f79538-1462358087">news reports</a> quoting the Treasury’s 10-year costings refer to a separate leaked Treasury document, circulated prior to the release of the budget, that reported its forecasts for the government. </p>
<p>Under both Coalition and ALP policy, the tobacco excise rate is expected to rise from around $0.54 per cigarette this year to about $1.10 per cigarette in 2020, as shown in the chart below. This includes continued <a href="https://www.ato.gov.au/business/excise-and-excise-equivalent-goods/tobacco-excise/excise-rates-for-tobacco/">indexation</a> of the tobacco excise rate to wages. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121847/original/image-20160510-20742-1v3z65a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121847/original/image-20160510-20742-1v3z65a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121847/original/image-20160510-20742-1v3z65a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121847/original/image-20160510-20742-1v3z65a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121847/original/image-20160510-20742-1v3z65a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121847/original/image-20160510-20742-1v3z65a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121847/original/image-20160510-20742-1v3z65a.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Why are there two different revenue estimates for the same policy?</h2>
<p>The government and opposition parties use different public institutions to estimate the fiscal impact of their policies.</p>
<p>The government’s tobacco excise policy was costed by <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.au/">Treasury</a>, and the revenue estimates published in the 2016-17 Budget. Treasury estimates the policy will raise $28.2 billion over ten years. </p>
<p>The ALP’s revenue estimate was prepared by the <a href="http://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_budget_office">Parliamentary Budget Office</a> (PBO), which costs policies submitted to it by parliamentarians. The PBO estimated the same policy will raise $47.7 billion over the same period. </p>
<p>The ALP have not publicly released the full PBO response. However, a PBO response to what appears to be a very <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lqvvtazn6qrimj6/PBO%20Costing%20response.pdf?dl=0">similar policy request by Liberal Democratic Party Senator David Leyonhjelm</a> reveals estimates in line with those cited by the ALP.</p>
<p>The difference between the PBO’s $47.7 billion estimate and Treasury’s $28.2 billion estimate is $19.5 billion. </p>
<h2>How can the revenue estimates be so different?</h2>
<p>Over very long time periods, small differences in assumptions can compound to large differences in revenue estimates over a decade.</p>
<p>But even over the four years to 2019-20 – a relatively short period of time – there is a 25% difference between Treasury’s estimate in the Budget papers ($4.7 billion) and the PBO estimate published by Senator Leyonhjelm ($6.3 billion). </p>
<p>The chart below shows tobacco excise revenue forecasts for the last two budgets are similar, after subtracting the impact of the new increase to the excise rate from the 2016-17 forecast. So use of different underlying forecasts, absent any policy change, doesn’t seem to be the most likely explanation for the $19.5 billion discrepancy between the PBO’s estimate and Treasury’s estimate. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121837/original/image-20160510-20734-14xdpi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121837/original/image-20160510-20734-14xdpi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121837/original/image-20160510-20734-14xdpi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121837/original/image-20160510-20734-14xdpi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121837/original/image-20160510-20734-14xdpi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=472&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121837/original/image-20160510-20734-14xdpi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121837/original/image-20160510-20734-14xdpi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121837/original/image-20160510-20734-14xdpi3.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=593&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Grattan Institute</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The most likely source of difference between the revenue estimates is differing assumptions about how increases in tobacco excise will reduce demand for cigarettes. Past increases in tobacco excise rate have clearly reduced tobacco consumption. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121838/original/image-20160510-20746-cz1q8e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121838/original/image-20160510-20746-cz1q8e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121838/original/image-20160510-20746-cz1q8e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121838/original/image-20160510-20746-cz1q8e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121838/original/image-20160510-20746-cz1q8e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=476&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121838/original/image-20160510-20746-cz1q8e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121838/original/image-20160510-20746-cz1q8e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121838/original/image-20160510-20746-cz1q8e.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=599&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Grattan Institute</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As Treasury has <a href="http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1304/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=02_Treasury_costings_of_taxation_policy.asp">noted before</a>, estimating how people will respond to changes in taxes is notoriously difficult, especially in the long term. </p>
<p>It’s hard to isolate the impact of tobacco excise on the level of smoking. For example, changes to policy – plain packaging reforms or the <a href="http://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/15-7-legislation">many expansions</a> of smoking bans – and to social norms have occurred at the same time as excise increases.</p>
<h2>Comparing the estimates</h2>
<p>To see whether differences exist between the behavioural assumptions in the Treasury and PBO costings, we compared the forecast increase in revenue to the planned increase in the excise rate. </p>
<p>If there were no change in behaviour, every 10% increase in the excise rate would lead to a 10% increase in revenue. But if people are assumed to smoke less or quit as a result of the increase, a 10% rise in the excise rate will generate a smaller increase in revenue.</p>
<p>In the third year after the tobacco excise hikes begin (2019-20), the PBO costing expects each 10% rise in the excise rate to increase excise revenue by 7.8%. By comparison, Treasury expects excise revenue to rise by just 5.6% in that year. </p>
<p>So the Treasury estimates clearly assume that the tobacco excise hike will have a larger impact on consumption than has been assumed by the PBO.</p>
<p>Shadow Finance Minister Tony Burke <a href="http://www.tonyburke.com.au/tony_burke_transcript_abc_rn_breakfast_tuesday_3_may_2016">told the ABC</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We used the long-held Treasury assumptions that had previously been used. Those were the assumptions determined by the Parliamentary Budget Office and they go through to previous assumptions used by Treasury. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, a similar increase in tobacco excise was costed by Treasury for the former ALP government and published in the previous government’s 2013 <a href="http://www.budget.gov.au/2013-14/content/economic_statement/download/2013_EconomicStatement.pdf">Economic Statement</a>. </p>
<p>In the third year after the 2013 tobacco excise hikes began, the Treasury expected each 10% rise in the tobacco excise rate to lead to a 5.4% increase in revenue. This suggests the Treasury is using a very similar behaviour change assumption in 2013 to the one it used when costing this year’s budget.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121839/original/image-20160510-20742-1qoo878.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121839/original/image-20160510-20742-1qoo878.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/121839/original/image-20160510-20742-1qoo878.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121839/original/image-20160510-20742-1qoo878.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121839/original/image-20160510-20742-1qoo878.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=449&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121839/original/image-20160510-20742-1qoo878.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121839/original/image-20160510-20742-1qoo878.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/121839/original/image-20160510-20742-1qoo878.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=564&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Grattan Institute</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Treasury <a href="http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/estimate/b70c2618-6c93-4663-9c4a-26d392a8b0a4/toc_pdf/Economics%20Legislation%20Committee_2016_05_06_4415.pdf;fileType=application/pdf">confirmed at Senate Estimates</a> last Friday that the behavioural assumption used in the 2016-17 Budget costing was a “minor variation” from the 2013 estimate. Treasury’s assumption is based on the range of estimates published by the <a href="http://www.who.int/tobacco/economics/2_2estimatingpriceincomeelasticities.pdf">World Health Organization</a>.</p>
<h2>Treasury has the final say</h2>
<p>Treasury is responsible for estimating the budgetary impact of revenue policy changes according to the <a href="http://www.treasury.gov.au/%7E/media/Treasury/Publications%20and%20Media/Publications/2016/Charter%20of%20Budget%20Honesty%20Policy%20Guidelines/Downloads/PDF/charter-of-budget-honesty-guidelines.ashx">Charter of Budget Honesty</a>. If elected, an ALP government would have to rely on Treasury’s estimate of the revenue gain from its tobacco excise policy when preparing the budget.</p>
<p>Shadow Treasurer Chris Bowen has already <a href="http://www.afr.com/news/politics/election/budget-2016-tobacco-revelation-is-an-embarrassment-for-labor-20160502-goklg6?login_token=hxs1D0prqpV97LU1oix6343N3ya4p3wwP0JcimZU2qEZzwGJeNBcVB3mdZbabdyAwyMVCEMK6qTN8YadOU_txQ&expiry=1462500090&single_use_token=TWqbadwNNRjRNHGgsMp-CEEUR9H929eOg8sx-lvxAdtFH6omygtHFgV-GI00zkSxA3tV3MDnu4UlcxnmoHQXRw">pledged</a> to accept the Treasury estimates over those produced by the PBO. </p>
<p>Labor has played down the impact the discrepancy will have on their spending plans. Asked about the revised figure of $28.2 billion in tobacco tax revenue produced by Treasury modelling, <a href="http://www.tonyburke.com.au/tony_burke_transcript_abc_rn_breakfast_tuesday_3_may_2016">Burke told the ABC</a> that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… if you go through the commitments Labor has so far announced, we were already well south of even that revised figure. We have already more than the improvements to the budget bottom line to pay for everything we have put forward.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>It is true that there’s a $19.5 billion discrepancy between Labor and Treasury’s revenue estimates. The Parliamentary Budget Office, which costed Labor’s plan, said the tobacco tax hike would rake in $47.7 billion. Treasury estimated the tobacco excise increase would bring in just $28.2 billion. $47.7 billion - $28.2 billion = $19.5 billion.</p>
<p>Treasury estimates clearly assume that the tobacco excise hike will have a larger impact on cigarette consumption than has been assumed by the PBO modelling.</p>
<p>Even though it has relied on independent costings from the PBO, the ALP now has to accept its tobacco excise policy is predicted to raise nearly $20 billion less revenue over ten years than it had expected. However, Labor has said that it can comfortably budget for the lower Treasury forecasts. <strong>– Brendan Coates</strong></p>
<hr>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This FactCheck provides a sound overview of tobacco taxation in Australia. It correctly identifies that the likely main difference between the Federal Treasury estimate and the Parliamentary Budget Office estimate of tobacco revenue relates to the assumption made around behavioural change resulting from the increased tobacco excise rates - what economists call the “<a href="http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/demand-elasticity.asp">demand elasticity</a>”. </p>
<p>The author makes a fair judgement that the difference between the two costings is likely to mean that Labor will have $20 billion less revenue over the next ten years. <strong>– Ben Phillips.</strong></p>
<hr>
<p><div class="callout"> Have you ever seen a “fact” worth checking? The Conversation’s FactCheck asks academic experts to test claims and see how true they are. We then ask a second academic to review an anonymous copy of the article. You can request a check at checkit@theconversation.edu.au. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible.</div></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/58773/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>FactCheck unpacks claims that Labor has a $19.5 billion black hole in its economic plan.Brendan Coates, Fellow, Grattan InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/412122015-05-06T14:25:29Z2015-05-06T14:25:29ZFact Check: do job centres have a target for ‘benefit sanctions’?<blockquote>
<p>There’s a deliberate target, for no matter what your behaviour, you will get sanctioned by the job centre. You don’t then find out about it until you go to the hole in the wall in the bank … to get your money out. You go there, you get no money, you go to a high street money lender that you can’t afford, or you go to a food bank because you can’t feed your kids. It’s utterly unacceptable.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Jim Murphy, Labour leader in Scotland, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05tv6dm/the-leaders-debate">BBC Scottish Leaders Debate</a>.</strong></p>
<p>Jim Murphy’s comments on job centres led to a heated exchange between him and Ruth Davidson, the Conservative leader in Scotland, who said he was lying. To check out the veracity of Murphy’s comment – which the Labour party confirmed to The Conversation refers to the whole of the UK, not just Scotland – we need to look back at the history of how and when benefits are taken away from people. </p>
<p>Benefit sanctions – or the cessation of payments for a period where claimants fail to meet a range of jobsearch conditions – have been part of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) regime since it was introduced in 1996. The stringency of JSA sanctions regime increased under the Labour government. In its third term for example, Labour <a href="http://ner.sagepub.com/content/231/1/R44.full.pdf+html">introduced</a> worksearch requirements for lone parents whose youngest child was aged over 12, subsequently reducing this age threshold to seven.</p>
<p>Under the coalition government, both the severity of sanctions and the opportunities for falling foul of the conditionality regime have increased. Following the <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/5/contents/enacted/data.htm">Welfare Reform Act 2012</a>, claimants can be required to undertake a greater number and greater range of actions to find work. </p>
<p>The graph below shows the number of JSA sanctions made by JobCentre Plus offices each month since April 2000 (left hand axis and red dashed line) and expresses these as a proportion of all JSA claimants (right-hand axis, dark blue line).</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80658/original/image-20150506-22652-1urublq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80658/original/image-20150506-22652-1urublq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80658/original/image-20150506-22652-1urublq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80658/original/image-20150506-22652-1urublq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80658/original/image-20150506-22652-1urublq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80658/original/image-20150506-22652-1urublq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80658/original/image-20150506-22652-1urublq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80658/original/image-20150506-22652-1urublq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Left-hand axis shows number of ‘adverse’ sanctions, i.e. decisions found against the claimant (not the number of claimants sanctioned) Source: DWP. Right-hand axis shows sanctions as a proportion of claimants in each month. Note that there is a lag between a claimant being referred for a sanction decision, and the decision being taken. This lag can range from a few weeks to several months, depending on appeals. Data here is likely to underestimate very slightly the sanctions as a proportion of JSA claimants.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/jobseekers-allowance-and-employment-and-support-allowance-sanctions-decisions-made-to-september-2014">Source: DWP and NOMIS</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Sanctions have risen in both numbers and proportion terms from the late 2000s. The temporary fall in the proportion of sanctions during the recession was, <a href="http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Job-Centres-Full-report.pdf">according to the National Audit Office</a>, due to the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) relaxing service requirements to cope with increased claimant numbers and limited resources. </p>
<p>Sanctions increased under the coalition government, particularly following the introduction of the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jobseekers-allowance-overview-of-sanctions-rules">new sanctions regime</a> in October 2012. It has been <a href="http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/Welfare-conditionality-UK-Summary.pdf">suggested</a> that the fall in sanctions in 2011-12 may reflect the introduction of the Work Programme in June 2011. </p>
<p>The Work Programme involves the contracting out of some jobcentre activity to private and third sector organisations. These organisations cannot impose sanctions, but report compliance doubts to DWP, who may then decide to impose a sanction. Thus the introduction of the Work Programme may have resulted in a temporary reduction in the number of sanctions issued. <a href="http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/Welfare-conditionality-UK-Summary.pdf">Evidence suggests</a> that the young and vulnerable groups are particularly likely to be sanctioned. </p>
<p>The sanctions regime now also affects <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmworpen/814/814.pdf">an increasing number</a> of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) claimants – who are too ill or disabled to work currently, but whom the DWP consider will be capable of work at some time in the future.</p>
<h2>Implicit targets?</h2>
<p>In regards to Murphy’s specific allegation about a target, there is no official target for the number of JSA sanctions achieved, either nationally or for individual JobCentrePlus (JCP) offices. However, concerns have been expressed in relation to both the JCP’s performance framework, and whether JCP advisers face an implicit target relating to sanctions. The Scottish Labour party pointed The Conversation towards a <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmworpen/814/814.pdf">report by parliament’s Work and Pensions Committee</a>, published in March 2015, highlighting the issue and calling for a review. </p>
<p>Since its new performance monitoring regime was introduced in April 2011, JCP’s performance is primarily measured by the proportion of claimants who have left benefit, regardless as to whether the claimant entered employment or not. The Work and Pensions Select Committee raised concerns in <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmworpen/479/47907.htm#a17">paragraph 92 of its report</a> that Jobcentre staff might see sanctioning as a route to achieving some performance targets.</p>
<p>In addition, in evidence to the Work and Pensions Committee (<a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmworpen/479/47907.htm#a17">paragraph 89</a>), the PCS union – which represents Jobcentre staff – reported that JCP advisers were being put under pressure by management to increase sanctioning rates. PCS argues that the DWP had “expectations” about the appropriate level of sanctioning, that these were “targets by another name”, and that Jobcentre staff whose sanctioning rates were not meeting expectations were subject to an “improvement plan”. The DWP denied the existence of any national or local targets for sanctioning in its evidence to the committee. </p>
<h2>In the dark</h2>
<p>What about Jim Murphy’s point that claimants sometimes don’t know that they have been sanctioned until they try to withdraw money? In fact, this point was made in the 2014 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335144/jsa-sanctions-independent-review.pdf">Oakley Review</a> into the operation of JSA sanctions. It reported that there were cases in which: “the first that claimants knew of adverse decisions was when they tried to get their benefit payment out of a cash point but could not”. </p>
<p>There is an ongoing debate around the likely effectiveness of a stricter sanctions regime in getting people into work, as opposed to simply reducing benefit spending. This is particularly the case given that the increased use of sanctions has coincided with a <a href="http://ner.sagepub.com/content/221/1/F4.short?rss=1&ssource=mfr">reduction</a> in other forms of support for jobseekers. The Work and Pensions Committee notes that evidence on the effectiveness of financial sanctions in getting people into work is “very limited and far from clear-cut”. Short-term benefits in getting people off benefits may hide less favourable long-term outcomes on <a href="http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/Welfare-conditionality-UK-Summary.pdf">employment retention</a>, health, and <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmworpen/479/479vw36.htm">financial circumstances</a>.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Jim Murphy was arguably somewhat disingenuous in implying that there is a target for the number of sanctions made by job centres. However, there is some evidence that the publication of statistics on sanctions, together with a pressure to reduce welfare spending, creates the sense among advisers that there is an implicit target. Furthermore, the JCP performance framework may create perverse incentives for benefit off-flow, partly induced by sanctions, to be perceived as a positive outcome.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>It seems very clear to me that there are no centrally imposed targets for sanctions: certainly the legislation and regulations do not specify targets, and I am happy to take DWP at their word when they say that they do not set targets for Job Centre Plus.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the PCS union have presented evidence to MPs that show that sanction rates are monitored at the level of the adviser, the team, the office and the district, and that some individual managers take action with their staff if sanction rates are “too low”. This seems to be to be evidence that (at least) some managers do have implicit targets; what we don’t know for sure, though, is how widespread is this practice within Jobcentre Plus. – <strong>Mike Brewer</strong></p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41212/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Eiser receives funding from Economic and Social Research Council, but the views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect those of the research council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Brewer has had several contracts to undertake researched funded by the Department for Work and Pensions; the most recent of these were to undertake (separate) evaluations of the impact of In Work Credit, Lone Parent Obligations, and reforms to Local Housing Allowance. He has also received funding from the ESRC, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Nuffield Foundation. He is currently on a Task Group assisting the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in formulating an Anti-Poverty Strategy for the UK, and was previously been a member of two Expert Working Groups advising the Scottish Government on issues to do with welfare policy in a (hypoethetically) independent Scotland.</span></em></p>Labour’s Jim Murphy and the Conservatives’ Ruth Davidson clashed over targets for sanctioning people on benefits. Who was right?David Eiser, Research Fellow, Economics , University of StirlingLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/412252015-05-06T13:48:23Z2015-05-06T13:48:23ZFact Check: would the UK be better off leaving the EU?<blockquote>
<p>We would be substantially better off not being in the EU because the opportunity cost of us not being able to make our own trade deals with the emerging economies of the world is holding back British business. In terms of trade, the EU is now a millstone around our neck. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>*<em>Nigel Farage, UKIP leader, on the BBC Radio 4’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02qmttw">World at One</a> on May 4.
*</em></p>
<p>Nigel Farage’s statement about UK trade repeats arguments regularly made by UKIP. As an EU member, the UK does not negotiate trade deals independently. Rather, the European Commission negotiates to a mandate set by the member states. His reference to “emerging economies” is because several of these countries are growing faster than, for example, most EU countries, offering growing export opportunities. Beyond this, the statement involves points presented as fact, but which are opinion – and questionable opinion at that.</p>
<p>Does the EU hold back UK trade? Referring to data freely available from the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat">Eurostat website</a>, total UK merchandise exports to non-EU countries grew in value by about 130% between 2000 and 2013. This is less than exports with Germany grew (168%) but considerably more than France (68%). So trade is growing, and different EU countries show different performances – there is no single “EU factor”.</p>
<p>It is amazing to think that the UK exports more to Ireland than to China – twice as much in 2011, 60% more in 2013. It’s no wonder <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/06/uk-ireland-brexit-idUKKBN0M21Y620150306">Ireland is concerned</a> over a possible Brexit.</p>
<p>So, is EU membership holding us back with countries like China? No. German merchandise exports to the BRICS (Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa), are four times the value of UK exports. Germany is a bigger economy than the UK – but German exports to the BRICS are also a higher share of total German exports than the equivalent UK exports to the BRICS. And it is not just Germany. France exports more to the BRICS than the UK. So, EU membership cannot be to blame.</p>
<p>How else might EU membership hinder the UK? The World Bank ranks the UK <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders">15th in the world for ease and cost of trading across borders</a>. Seven of the 14 countries ranked higher than the UK are also EU countries – so EU membership is not a problem here. The World Economic Forum ranks the UK <a href="http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015">9th in the world for Global Competitiveness</a> – with four other EU countries in the top 10. Again, EU membership is not a problem.</p>
<p>But what would happen if the UK negotiated its own trade agreements outside the EU? The truth is we cannot be sure. What we can do is to look at trade and trade negotiations, and try to ascertain how the talks might go. But the starting point should be the principal conclusions from above: EU membership has not obviously hindered UK exports to non-EU countries. </p>
<p>In a <a href="http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ukipdev/pages/96/attachments/original/1396261328/EFd_doc_2.0.pdf?1396261328">document co-published by UKIP</a>, which UKIP directed The Conversation to, the author, UKIP MEP William Dartmouth, confirms that the UK is already running a trade surplus with non-EU countries. Despite this, other EU countries are able to export even more to those fast-growing non-EU countries. Also, Dartmouth argues that because we run a trade deficit with the EU overall, they need us more than we need them. This is a total misrepresentation of such data. UK trade with the other EU countries is much more significant to us than other EU countries’ trade with the UK is to them. </p>
<p><a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149622.jpg">The map below</a> from the European Commission shows the extent of EU trade agreements with the rest of the world in June 2012. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80439/original/image-20150505-16654-cnf5ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80439/original/image-20150505-16654-cnf5ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80439/original/image-20150505-16654-cnf5ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80439/original/image-20150505-16654-cnf5ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=474&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80439/original/image-20150505-16654-cnf5ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80439/original/image-20150505-16654-cnf5ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80439/original/image-20150505-16654-cnf5ix.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=595&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">How the EU trades with the world.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149622.jpg">European Commission</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>EU trade agreements <a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150129.pdf">are being negotiated</a> with China, with several members of the Association of South East Asian Nations, and separately with Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand. Were we to exit the EU and try to replace these negotiations with our own, or to adapt agreements in place, there would be considerable costs to the UK undertaking all of these negotiations unilaterally – in money and time. In any negotiation, the UK on its own cannot offer as much as the EU of 28 countries can in total. This provides a much larger bargaining chip and the opportunity to obtain a better deal from the other countries.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>The economic concept of opportunity cost puts a value on one thing by comparing it with the next best alternative. Nigel Farage claims that EU membership harms UK trade. Yet our trade with non-EU countries continues to grow strongly, and the World Bank and World Economic Forum rate our and other EU countries’ economies very favourably. Despite this, we are under-performing on exports to fast-growing emerging countries – when compared with other EU countries. Farage favours the UK taking on board the entire costs of trade negotiations, for uncertain outcomes – but outcomes which are arguably likely to be less beneficial than doing so collectively in the EU.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>In general terms the fact checking piece is well balanced and accurate in the data it deploys and the arguments it makes. I would make a few minor comments. First the title is a bit general since it deals with only the external trade policy aspect of British Exit rather than a complete impact assessment. It’s also worth pointing <a href="https://www.gov.uk/regional-trade-agreements-with-korea-india-central-america-andean-community-asean-ukraine-and-canada">out that the EU is negotiating</a> with India, Brazil and Japan and has signed agreements recently with Korea and Canada. </p>
<p>I also think that the piece is restrictive in its approach by dealing with only trade in goods. Services are a major element in our trade performance with rest of the world – though note that <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/itis/international-trade-in-services/2011/sty-international-trade-in-services.html">50% of our services exports went to the EU</a> in 2011. This is relevant to the type of trade agreements that suit the UK best, since they need to include services and that means covering regulatory issues. This would mean engaging in the type of deep integration worldwide that Nigel Farage and UKIP seem to abhor the most in relations with the EU. The EU in its approach to trade agreements is already paying close attention to these issues notably in negotiations with the US but also more widely. – <strong>Jim Rollo</strong></p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41225/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Ackrill has previously received funding from the EU Lifelong Learning Programme to support his teaching.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jim Rollo has received funding from the EU Commission (various Directorates General including DG Trade) and from the Economic and Social Research Council for reserach into aspects of EU integration and external economic policy. The views expressed in this article are his own. He is also a director of InterAnalysis, a trade policy analysis service, developed with the support of University of Sussex and the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills. </span></em></p>Nigel Farage has argued that the EU is a millstone around Britain’s neck when it comes to trade.Robert Ackrill, Professor of European Economics and Policy, Nottingham Trent UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/411182015-05-05T13:44:42Z2015-05-05T13:44:42ZFact Check: did Labour overspend and leave a deficit that was out of control?<blockquote>
<p>No I don’t [accept that Labour overspent when it was last in power] … There was a global financial crisis which caused the deficit to rise. President Obama isn’t dealing with a high deficit because we built more schools and hospitals. He’s dealing with a high deficit because there was that global financial crisis. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Ed Miliband, Labour leader, in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05t2k80/question-time-election-leaders-special">BBC Question Time</a> Election Leaders Special.</strong> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Gordon Brown piled up debts, took us into the recession when we had a structural deficit that was out of control. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Michael Gove, Conservative party chief whip, speaking on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05s35ww">BBC Radio 4’s World at One</a>.</strong> </p>
<p>First, and it is important to state this, the Labour government was not responsible for the 2008 recession. The recession was caused by the housing bubble bursting in the US which led to subsequent financial crises in other countries.</p>
<p>One could argue, as the BBC’s <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32549892">Robert Peston</a> does, that banks should have been under stricter regulation in the UK under the Labour government. However, this is easy to say with the benefit of hindsight and no other political party was arguing in favour of more regulation of the banking sector at the time. In fact, the <a href="http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2007/08/17/ECPGcomplete.pdf">Conservative party argued</a> for less regulation of the banking sector.</p>
<h2>What is a structural deficit?</h2>
<p>The government is said to be running a deficit if within a year it spends more than it receives in taxes. This deficit must be funded by borrowing which adds to the total amount of debt that the UK currently owes.</p>
<p>A deficit is not necessarily a problem – it is a way of keeping your spending constant. When you pay your heating by direct debit you are more than likely going to have deficit in winter when it is colder and be in credit in summer when it is warmer.</p>
<p>The problem comes when you have a structural deficit. This is when over the economic cycle, the UK is still running a deficit. Or to put it another way, we still have heating bills to pay even after completing our direct debit payments.</p>
<h2>Let’s talk about debt</h2>
<p>Talking about debt, without talking about our ability to pay it back is completely <a href="http://davidchivers.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/stop-hammering-nails-in-with-shoes-why_19.html">useless</a>. This is why economists talk about debt as a percentage of GDP and as the Oxford economist <a href="http://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/mediamacro-myth-2-labour-profligacy.html">Simon Wren-Lewis</a> points out, the debt to GDP ratio was not particularly high historically when the financial crisis hit in 2008.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80284/original/image-20150504-23505-1w6nidj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80284/original/image-20150504-23505-1w6nidj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/80284/original/image-20150504-23505-1w6nidj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80284/original/image-20150504-23505-1w6nidj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80284/original/image-20150504-23505-1w6nidj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=360&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80284/original/image-20150504-23505-1w6nidj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80284/original/image-20150504-23505-1w6nidj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/80284/original/image-20150504-23505-1w6nidj.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=453&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/mediamacro-myth-2-labour-profligacy.html">Simon Wren-Lewis</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The reason why this ratio increased post-2008 was largely due to the recession. In fact, post-2010 when the Conservative coalition took over, <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/psa/maast-supplementary-data-tables/q4-2014/rft---m1-9-tables.xls">this ratio increased</a> from 78% to over 90%. Although the coalition has brought the deficit down, there is <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/psa/maast-supplementary-data-tables/q4-2014/rft---m1-9-tables.xls">still a deficit</a> which we must pay off. Naturally, this extra borrowing increases the overall size of the UK debt. Furthermore, by bringing the deficit down too quickly it <a href="http://niesr.ac.uk/blog/fiscal-consolidation-and-growth-whats-going#.VUh_WBc0yY1">has reduced our ability</a> to pay back the debt by lowering GDP.</p>
<p>This is not to say the <a href="http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/29/1/25.full.pdf+html">Labour government</a> behaved fiscally responsibly during its term in office with over-optimistic forecasts and problems with fiscal rules. In fact, some praise needs to be given to the coalition for <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-by-the-chancellor-of-the-exchequer-rt-hon-george-osborne-mp-on-the-obr-and-spending-announcements">setting up the Office of Budget Responsibility</a> in May 2010 to combat some of these issues.</p>
<p>However, the coalition’s narrative – emphasised by Michael Gove – that somehow the Labour government was “out of control” with its spending is inaccurate. The reason this narrative is still persisting has as much to do with Labour’s ineptitude to dispel this myth as the <a href="http://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/on-mediamacro.html">media coverage</a> of the issue.</p>
<p>Most importantly, even if we consider the debt to GDP ratio too high under Labour, this is not a reasonable justification for the coalition to impose austerity in a recession where interest rates are at their <a href="https://longandvariable.wordpress.com/2014/12/18/money-inflation-and-the-zero-bound-krugman-evans-pritchard-revisited/">lowest point</a>. To go back to the <a href="http://davidchivers.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/air-conditioning-is-useless-when-it-is.html">heating analogy</a>, air conditioning is useless when it is freezing outside.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>If we knew that the financial crisis was about to happen then one could argue that Labour would have delayed some of the pre-crisis spending to help in buffering the impact of the recession. But this is easy to say with the benefit of hindsight. So on this basis, it is unfair to say that Labour “overspent”.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This is a clear piece which sets out the key developments in spending and borrowing during the last Labour government. It clears up a good deal of confusion about these developments which, as the pieces notes, has been prevalent in much of the recent discussion.</p>
<p>It may be worth adding that any claims about the structural deficit need to be treated with caution. In principle, a country is running a structural deficit if the economy was operating at (or around) full capacity with no output gap – which the <a href="http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/wordpress/docs/WorkingPaperNo1-Estimating-the-UKs-historical-output-gap.pdf">Office of Budget Responsibility describes as</a> “the difference between the current level of activity in the economy and the potential level it could sustain while keeping inflation stable in the long term”. In practice, estimating the output gap for the UK is difficult. The OBR notes three different methodologies for doing so and estimates of the UK’s output gap vary considerably between economic forecasters. </p>
<p>For a complex modern economy, with a large services sector, it is far harder to estimate what full capacity is than for, say, an old-style production line factory. Claims that the UK had a structural deficit at a particular time are critically dependent on estimates of the output gap, and such estimates are subject to margins of error. – <strong>Jonathan Perraton</strong></p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41118/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Chivers receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, but the ideas expressed in this article are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jonathan Perraton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Ed Miliband says Labour did not overspend when it was last in office. He’s right.David Chivers, Lecturer in Economics, Exeter College, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/410482015-05-04T14:46:44Z2015-05-04T14:46:44ZFact Check: has the number of rough sleepers gone down?<blockquote>
<p>We’ve got to also help those people who are sleeping rough and their numbers are down under this government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>David Cameron, prime minister, in answer to question from a member of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/p02p8nl8/newsbeat-david-cameron#group=p02n2q2y">audience on BBC Newsbeat</a>.</strong> </p>
<p>Street homelessness has remained a policy priority under the coalition government, but there has not been a reduction in the number of people sleeping rough as David Cameron claimed. On the contrary, official figures indicate that rough sleeping has <a href="http://www.homeless.org.uk/facts/homelessness-in-numbers/rough-sleeping/rough-sleeping-explore-data">increased by 55%</a> in England since the current coalition came into power. </p>
<p>Despite requesting clarification from The Conservative party, The Conversation has not managed to establish what time period or geographical area Cameron is referring to. But even with clearly defined parameters his claim would be hard to defend, as available figures indicate that national rough sleeper numbers have risen year-on-year since 2010. </p>
<p>Rough sleeper numbers are difficult to calculate accurately given the often episodic, transient and hidden nature of street homelessness. Official rough sleeper statistics published by central government are based on local authority counts and estimates on a single night. They are mere snapshots and significantly underestimate the true numbers of individuals affected. Imperfect as they are, these figures are nevertheless useful for gauging trends over time.</p>
<p>As the graph below shows, the latest <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407030/Rough_Sleeping_Statistics_England_-_Autumn_2014.pdf">official figures</a> indicate that rough sleeper numbers increased very rapidly (rising by 23%) in England between 2010 and 2011. The pace of increase then slowed in 2012 and 2013 (to 6% and 5% respectively). </p>
<p>The number of rough sleepers then rose more quickly once again, increasing by 14% between 2013 and 2014. The overall increase in rough sleeping has been particularly dramatic in London, where numbers have risen by 79% since 2010.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79985/original/image-20150430-30726-sty9q7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79985/original/image-20150430-30726-sty9q7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79985/original/image-20150430-30726-sty9q7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79985/original/image-20150430-30726-sty9q7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79985/original/image-20150430-30726-sty9q7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=315&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79985/original/image-20150430-30726-sty9q7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79985/original/image-20150430-30726-sty9q7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79985/original/image-20150430-30726-sty9q7.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=395&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Rough sleeping counts and estimates by London and Rest of England.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407030/Rough_Sleeping_Statistics_England_-_Autumn_2014.pdf">DCLG, Rough Sleeping Statistics England - Autumn 2014 Official Statistics</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>This upward trend is also reflected in statistics collected by service providers, most notably in <a href="http://www.mungosbroadway.org.uk/chain">CHAIN data</a> in London which is the most comprehensive and robust information source on rough sleeping in the UK. This records details regarding all verified rough sleepers (that is, those seen “bedded down” by street outreach workers), rather than those just counted (or estimated) on a single night. CHAIN indicates that rough sleeper numbers increased by <a href="http://www.mungosbroadway.org.uk/chain/street_home_annual_reports">64% between 2010-11 and 2013-14</a>.</p>
<p>Levels of rough sleeping fluctuate, so if you look hard enough it is possible to observe short-term deviations from this general trend, especially when examining data for particular subgroups. For example, the <a href="http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/chain-quarterly-reports/resource/1303b754-21fb-481f-9173-81b9fbbb9bfb">most recent CHAIN Quarterly Report </a>covering the period October-December 2014 indicates that the number of “new” rough sleepers in London (defined as those who were seen by outreach teams for the first time) was 13% lower than in the previous (July-September) quarter; also, the overall total of rough sleepers (which includes those “living on the streets” and “intermittent rough sleepers”) reduced by 5%. </p>
<p>A Conservative party spokesperson pointed The Conversation to these particular figures, but did not say this was what Cameron was referring to. </p>
<p>Yet, the <a href="http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/chain-quarterly-reports/resource/1303b754-21fb-481f-9173-81b9fbbb9bfb">same statistical release</a> also reports that the number of new rough sleepers and total rough sleepers recorded in that period (October-December 2014) had increased by 17% and 13% respectively as compared with the same quarter in 2013. <a href="http://www.mungosbroadway.org.uk/chain/street_home_quarterly_reports">Successive CHAIN quarterly reports</a> indicate that rough sleeper numbers are always lower in October-December than in the preceding three months. </p>
<p>To latch onto what are in fact recurrent seasonal variations in one city and imply that they are representative of a general trend during the coalition’s term of office, if this is in fact what Cameron has done, is to misrepresent the bigger picture of a persistent annual increase in the prevalence of rough sleeping at the national level. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.crisis.org.uk/data/files/publications/Homelessness_Monitor_England_2015_final_web.pdf">Homelessness Monitor</a>, an independent report published in February 2015 by Crisis and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, points out that the increase in rough sleeper numbers pre-dates the election of the coalition government and that the pace of increase is likely to have been moderated by government initiatives such as <a href="http://www.nosecondnightout.org.uk/">No Second Night Out</a>, launched in 2011. </p>
<p>The monitor also documents that the increase in figures results in part from growing representation of non-UK (especially Central and Eastern European) nationals within the street homeless population. However, it suggests that funding cuts to preventative services and the impacts of welfare reform (increased benefit sanctions, housing benefit caps and the bedroom tax) are also implicated. </p>
<p>There are no signs of this upward trend reversing any time soon. As the Monitor reports, many key players in the homelessness sector fear that levels of rough sleeping will continue to rise given the ongoing impact of austerity measures and welfare reform. They are united in <a href="http://www.homeless.org.uk/connect/news/2015/mar/16/charities-call-for-better-homelessness-support-for-single-people">calling for improvements in the support available</a> to homeless people so that they need not resort to sleeping rough.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>David Cameron’s claim that rough sleeper numbers “are down” under the coalition government is indefensible. Existing evidence indicates consistently that rough sleeper numbers in England have risen significantly since the coalition government came into power. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This fact check is very good, and I endorse its verdict. Problems of homelessness have received very little attention in the election campaign thus far so it is important to examine this claim in detail. Homelessness figures are often disputed, in part because homelessness takes different forms (and so figures can refer to different things) and in part because certain forms of homelessness, especially rough sleeping, are notoriously difficult to count.</p>
<p>But even with these provisos in place, it is remarkably difficult to understand how David Cameron could make such a claim. By the government’s own figures, levels of homelessness (however defined) have risen dramatically over the past five years, and continue to do so; with the most recent rises confirmed by the Department for Communities and Local Government as recently as March this year.</p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417133/201412_Statutory_Homelessness_v2.pdf">period between October 1 and December 31 2014</a>, 13,650 households were accepted as homeless by local authorities in England, a 6% rise on the same period in 2013. Of these, 8,660 (63% of those accepted) were placed in temporary accommodation, with a total of 61,970 households in temporary accommodation awaiting re-housing on 31st December 2014; 9% more households than on the same date in 2013.</p>
<p>The Department for Communities and Local Government <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407030/Rough_Sleeping_Statistics_England_-_Autumn_2014.pdf">also estimate</a> numbers sleeping rough. They report that on a single night in the autumn of 2014, 2,744 people were sleeping rough in England, an increase of 330 people (14%) from autumn 2013. As with levels of statutory homelessness, the number of people sleeping rough have also increased in England as a whole year on year over the past five years: from 1,768 in 2010 to 2,744 in 2014. The only exception to this general rise was in London in 2013, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407030/Rough_Sleeping_Statistics_England_-_Autumn_2014.pdf">when numbers dropped by 3%</a>; though over the longer term levels of rough sleeping in London have also risen – from 415 people on a single night in London in 2010, to 742 people in 2014.</p>
<p>With so many figures flying around, it might be that Cameron was referring to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407030/Rough_Sleeping_Statistics_England_-_Autumn_2014.pdf">Department for Communities and Local Government figures</a> estimates of the number of people sleeping rough in London on a single night in 2013. If so, and it would show a remarkable grip of his material to have done so, it was misleading to make this argument based on a single outlier. According to all other data, levels of both statutory homelessness and rough sleeping continue to rise both in London and across England as a whole.</p>
<p>A more plausible explanation for his statement is perhaps simply that he thought he could get away with it, precisely because problems of homelessness have received so little attention recently. Perhaps it is time they received more. – <strong>Jon May</strong></p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/41048/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sarah Johnsen has received research funding from central government departments (Communities and Local Government and Department for Education), research councils (Economic and Social Research Council and Arts and Humanities Research Council), and a range of voluntary sector organisations and campaigning bodies (including amongst others the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and Crisis). The views expressed in this article are her own and not those of the research councils.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jon May received funding from an Economic and Social Research Council grant 2003-7 to study homelessness in the UK, and currently has a British Academy small grant to investigate food banking in Britain. He is on the Board of Trustees of Bow Foodbank in East London. The views expressed in this review are his own and not those of the research council. </span></em></p>David Cameron has said the number of people sleeping rough has gone down under the coalition. That isn’t backed up by the evidence.Sarah Johnsen, Professorial Fellow, Institute for Social Policy, Housing, Environment and Real Estate (I-SPHERE), Heriot-Watt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/409152015-04-30T05:16:37Z2015-04-30T05:16:37ZFact Check: has violent crime gone up?<blockquote>
<p>In the last 12 months, reports of violent crime have gone up very substantially. It is a very significant increase in violent crime reported in the last 12 months. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Yvette Cooper, Labour shadow home secretary, speaking on the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05sjbbc/daily-politics-2015-election-debates-home-affairs">Daily Politics Home Affairs</a> debate.</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p>This is pure scaremongering. The fact is that crime has gone down, it’s now at record low levels … both under police recorded crime and the independent crime survey which started in 1981. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Norman Baker, Liberal Democrat, former minister for crime prevention in the same debate.</strong></p>
<p>Labour also came under fire in this Daily Politics debate for a claim in <a href="http://b.3cdn.net/labouruk/e1d45da42456423b8c_vwm6brbvb.pdf">its manifesto</a> that “violent crimes have gone up”. To check whether violent crime is going up or down, it’s important to note that we have two means of measuring crime. </p>
<p>First, <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specific/crime-statistics-methodology/guide-to-finding-crime-statistics/police-recorded-crime/index.html">police-recorded crime</a> statistics: these include incidents that come to the attention of the police and are recorded by them as “crimes”. Second, the <a href="http://www.crimesurvey.co.uk/">Crime Survey for England and Wales</a> (CSEW): this is a very large, rolling annual survey of sizeable sample of the population. Both sources have their problems, but it is generally the crime survey that is considered the more reliable indicator of the two. </p>
<p>The data from the crime survey is very clear. Violent crime <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_401896.pdf">has been in almost continual decline</a> since the mid-1990s and current estimates suggest it is at its lowest level since the survey was instituted at the beginning of the 1980s. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79625/original/image-20150428-3080-1uqav8w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79625/original/image-20150428-3080-1uqav8w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79625/original/image-20150428-3080-1uqav8w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79625/original/image-20150428-3080-1uqav8w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79625/original/image-20150428-3080-1uqav8w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79625/original/image-20150428-3080-1uqav8w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79625/original/image-20150428-3080-1uqav8w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79625/original/image-20150428-3080-1uqav8w.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Trends in violence 1981 – 2014.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_401896.pdf">Crime Survey England & Wales</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As with all sources of statistics, the CSEW comes with various “health warnings”. It is a household survey and therefore misses a lot of people who live in institutional settings such as prisons or student halls of residence. Until very recently it excluded people below the age of 16. It relies on victims’ reports and therefore cannot deal with so-called “victimless crimes” but, with the exception of homicide, this doesn’t affect violence. </p>
<p>In reality, the care and consistency with which the CSEW is undertaken undoubtedly makes it a reasonable medium to long-term indicator of crime trends. Any remaining doubts about what is happening to violent crime can be dispelled by turning to two other sources of data, both of which lend credence to the picture painted by the crime survey. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/focus-on-violent-crime-and-sexual-offences--2013-14/rpt-chapter-1.html?format=print">National Health Service</a> data on assault admissions to hospitals in England suggested a 5% drop over the past year. The impressive survey work in hospital emergency departments and walk-in centres, undertaken by the Cardiff University Violence Research Group, <a href="http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/news/view/95161-serious-violence-in-england-and-wales-drops-10-in-2014">found a 10% drop</a> between 2013 and 2014 in serious violence-related attendances. This research from A&E also supports the longer-term trend indicated by the CSEW, suggesting that with the exception of 2008, there had been decreases in serious violence every year since 2001. </p>
<p>At this point we should return to Yvette Cooper’s statement for it is important to note that what she actually claimed was that reports of violent crime have gone up very substantially. To check this we need to look at the latest <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_401896.pdf%20">police-recorded crime statistics</a>. Additionally taking Yvette Cooper’s much shorter time period – the last 12 months only – they do support the idea that violent crime generally, and sexual offences in particular, have increased. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79624/original/image-20150428-3098-1i0os8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79624/original/image-20150428-3098-1i0os8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79624/original/image-20150428-3098-1i0os8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79624/original/image-20150428-3098-1i0os8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=385&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79624/original/image-20150428-3098-1i0os8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79624/original/image-20150428-3098-1i0os8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79624/original/image-20150428-3098-1i0os8z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=483&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Selected victim-based recorded crime categories – percentage change 2013-14.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_401896.pdf">ONS</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Why might this be the case and how might we explain the difference between the two data sources? The answer, in short, is that these statistics tell us more about recording trends, especially in the short-term, than they do about crime trends. </p>
<p>It’s likely that they are illustrating increased compliance with the rules that govern how the police record crime – so they probably reflect improved recording. These improvements come in the wake of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/15/police-crime-figures-status-claims-fiddling">decision in early 2014</a> by the UK Statistics Authority to cease to designate recorded crime statistics as “national statistics” given their unreliability. </p>
<p>However, it seems likely that the increased emphasis that has been placed on improving police activity in the area of domestic violence has also contributed to increased reporting and recording in that area in particular. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Although the data is reasonably clear, the verdict is complicated. There is some evidence, albeit limited, of increased reports of violent crime, certainly domestic violence, over the past year. However, there is little evidence to support the claim more generally of reports of violent crime going up very substantially. Much more likely is that they are being recorded more accurately by the police.</p>
<p>The real problem, however, lies in using police-recorded crime statistics, especially over very short time periods, to make claims about crime trends. In fact, more reliable measures like the CSEW show violent crime to have fallen over a very long time period, and by a substantial amount – just as Norman Baker indicated in his reply to Yvette Cooper, though he then ruined it by overstepping the mark with his claim that recorded crime was also at an all time low (it is not). </p>
<p>So, Yvette Cooper’s claim is technically correct, though she is on very thin ice. What she could not easily defend is the claim in the Labour Party election manifesto which states quite baldly that: “Violent crimes have gone up”. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This is a balanced assessment of Yvette Cooper’s claim. It is generous in describing this as technically correct.</p>
<p>It is clear that once the Audit Commission stopped auditing police recording practice in 2007 the overall recording rate fell. What caused the police to improve their recording rate in 2013-14? The UK Statistics Authority removal of the “National Statistics” designation was clearly one factor. But there was also the highly <a href="http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-administration-select-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/crime-statistics/">critical inquiry</a> of the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, and a <a href="http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/publication/crime-recording-in-kent/">series</a> of critical <a href="https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/publication/crime-data-integrity-force-reports/">reports</a> by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). </p>
<p>So long as HMIC maintains pressure on the police to record crime more fully, we can expect to see a divergence between the crime survey trend and police statistics. – <strong>Mike Hough</strong></p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tim Newburn has received funding from a number of government departments, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Nuffield Foundation and Open Society Foundations. He is a trustee of the Howard League for Penal Reform. The views expressed in this article are his own. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mike Hough was involved in designing the British Crime Survey at the Home Office. He has worked for and advised the Home Office and other organisations including HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, the College of Policing, the Prison Reform Trust and the Howard League for Penal Reform. The views expressed in this article are his own. </span></em></p>Labour and the Lib Dems have clashed over whether crime is going up or down. Which is it?Tim Newburn, Professor of Criminology and Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/406592015-04-28T11:25:15Z2015-04-28T11:25:15ZFact Check: are disadvantaged young people 12 times less likely to go to university?<blockquote>
<p>What I know is that there are about 12 times more people from advantaged, privileged backgrounds going to university than disadvantaged backgrounds and that isn’t good enough for me. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Ed Miliband, Labour party leader, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05rhjjv/the-leader-interviews-ed-miliband">in an interview</a> with Evan Davis on the BBC.</strong></p>
<p>We are fortunate in England to have access to <a href="https://www.hesa.ac.uk/hesa-latest-news/313-statistics/statistics-content/2832-npd-ilr-hesa">administrative data</a> which links the children in our school system with the students in our university system. This enables us to examine how much more likely those from advantaged backgrounds are to go to university than those from less advantaged backgrounds, and hence to check whether Ed Miliband’s statement holds in England. (It is not clear whether his figures refer to England or the UK; requests for further information have not yet been answered by the Labour Party.) </p>
<p>The data for pupils in England include very rich information on attainment at different points in the education system. But they are less good in terms of information on socio-economic background. We can see whether pupils who attended state-funded schools are eligible for free school meals; but this only allows us to differentiate those from relatively poor backgrounds from other pupils. </p>
<p>To identify those from the most advantaged families, we rely instead on information about the local neighbourhoods in which pupils live, including the proportion of residents with the highest educational qualifications, from the highest social classes, and who are most likely to own their own homes. Again, we can only observe this information for students from state-funded schools. Our analysis combines this geographic information with free school meal eligibility at age 16 to <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-985X.2012.01043.x/full">create an index</a> of socio-economic background among state school students.</p>
<p>Using data on all state school pupils in England who took their GCSEs in 2008, we can see how many went to university at age 18 or 19 in 2010-11 or 2011-12. Comparisons between the most and least advantaged in this field often focus on the top 20% versus the bottom 20%. Following this lead, we compared the percentage of state school students in the top 20% of our index of socio-economic status who went to university with the percentage of those from the bottom 20% of our index who went to university. This should give an indication of how much more likely state school students from the most advantaged backgrounds in England are to go to university than state school students from the least advantaged backgrounds. </p>
<p>The figures in this piece are similar to those estimated in previously published work by myself and colleagues which used a wider range of cohorts. Our research has looked at the socio-economic differences in <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-985X.2012.01043.x/full">higher education participation</a> overall and at elite universities, and at socio-economic differences in <a href="http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7420">dropout, degree completion and degree class</a>. </p>
<h2>Three times more likely</h2>
<p>Our analysis showed that around 56% of state school students in England from the top 20% of our index went to university at age 18 or 19, compared to about 19% of those from the bottom 20% of our index. This is a substantial difference; but it suggests that state school students from the most advantaged backgrounds are around three times more likely to go to university than those from the least advantaged backgrounds. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79075/original/image-20150423-25581-1c14fe8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79075/original/image-20150423-25581-1c14fe8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79075/original/image-20150423-25581-1c14fe8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=166&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79075/original/image-20150423-25581-1c14fe8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=166&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79075/original/image-20150423-25581-1c14fe8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=166&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79075/original/image-20150423-25581-1c14fe8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=209&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79075/original/image-20150423-25581-1c14fe8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=209&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79075/original/image-20150423-25581-1c14fe8.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=209&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even if we were to compare the 1% most and least advantaged state school students – or the 1% most deprived state school students with private school students – we find that those from the richest backgrounds would be around six times more likely to go to university than those from the poorest backgrounds. </p>
<p>These figures come from before the most recent changes to higher education fees were introduced in 2012. But <a href="https://www.ucas.com/sites/default/files/2014-end-of-cycle-report-dec-14.pdf">the evidence to date</a> suggests that, if anything, the gap in higher education participation between those from the richest and poorest backgrounds may have narrowed somewhat since then. </p>
<p>There are two important points to note. First, the benefits of going to university generally accrue only to those who complete their qualifications. They also <a href="http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=8363">tend to vary</a> according to where you go to university and <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51562/">what degree class</a> you receive – a third or a first, for example.</p>
<p>Our analysis suggests that there are substantial socio-economic differences in these outcomes as well. For example, state school students from the most well-off 20% of our index of socio-economic background are around nine times more likely to go to a Russell Group institution than those from the least well-off 20% of our index – 14% versus 1.6%. </p>
<p>Even among the relatively selected group who go to university, those from lower socio-economic backgrounds seem to do less well, on average, than those from higher socio-economic backgrounds. For example, using the same administrative data described above, but for slightly earlier cohorts, our analysis suggests that the 20% least well-off students are almost twice as likely to drop-out within two years (19% versus 10%) as the 20% most well-off students. Among those who complete their degrees, those from a lower socio-economic background <a href="http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7420">are around a third less likely</a> to graduate with a first or 2:1 (43% vs. 67%).</p>
<p>Second, a key driver of the socio-economic differences in university participation – and the differences in degree outcomes – is how well students do earlier on in the school system. We <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-985X.2012.01043.x/full">know that</a> how well young people do in their GCSEs and A-levels is strongly predictive of whether or not they will go to university. Our analysis suggests the fact that young people from the most and least deprived backgrounds have very different GCSE results can explain almost all of the reason why they have very different university participation rates.</p>
<p>This highlights that substantially reducing or eliminating the socio-economic gap in university participation is likely to require interventions that address the very large differences that exist in attainment earlier in the school system. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Our analysis suggests that, among state school students in England, those from the 20% most advantaged backgrounds are around three times more likely to go to university than state school students from the 20% least advantaged backgrounds – a lot less than the 12 times that Ed Miliband suggested. But they are also around nine times more likely to go to a Russell Group institution and around 50% more likely to receive a first or 2:1.</p>
<p>Thus, while the socio-economic gap in university participation is not as large as Ed Miliband suggested – and has narrowed somewhat in recent years – there is still much work to do to level the playing field completely between those from different socio-economic backgrounds.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This analysis shows the very stark difference in the probability of going to university between young people from the most and least advantaged backgrounds. Depending on how one defines “advantaged”, the least privileged are between three and six times less likely to go to university than the most privileged. And the gap is much larger if one only considers elite universities. </p>
<p>One important point is that the gap is mostly explained by results at GCSE. So if we want the gap to be removed, more attention needs to be given to what impedes children from disadvantaged backgrounds from progressing up to age 16 – it is not mainly a question of improving access for 18 or 19-year-olds. This fact check supports the spirit of Ed Miliband’s remarks, but not his actual numbers. It is a great illustration of the use to which the excellent English administrative data can be put by researchers. <strong>– Sandra McNally</strong></p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40659/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Claire Crawford receives funding for her research from a range of government departments, research councils, charitable trusts and other organisations, including the Economic and Social Research Council, the Nuffield Foundation, the Department for Education, Universities UK, the Education Endowment Foundation and the Sutton Trust. All of her research is independent and the views expressed in this article are entirely her own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sandra McNally has received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the government to do independent research, but the views in this article are her own. </span></em></p>Labour’s Ed Miliband says that advantaged pupils are much more likely to go to university. Is he right?Claire Crawford, Assistant Professor, Economics Department, University of WarwickSandra McNally, Professor in the School of Economics, University of SurreyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/407742015-04-27T13:48:45Z2015-04-27T13:48:45ZFact Check: are A&E waiting times in England the shortest in the world?<blockquote>
<p>Even A&E where the pressure is at its greatest, we are seeing and treating people faster than any country anywhere in the world that measures A&E performance.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Jeremy Hunt, health minister, speaking at the <a href="http://www.healthdebate.net/">Health Debate</a> election hustings, echoing comments he <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11327043/AandE-crisis-NHS-posts-worst-waiting-time-figures-in-a-decade.html">made in January</a> on the NHS in England.</strong></p>
<p>International definitions of health service performance are generally incomparable. All countries have systems that have evolved independently and have different descriptors of priority.</p>
<p>In many countries, access to emergency health care is achieved through the strength of the patient’s insurance or the contents of their wallet. A&E arrangements take significantly different forms internationally and many countries don’t have dedicated emergency medicine personnel. For example, in Germany and Sweden emergencies are treated by assorted specialists from around the hospital. </p>
<p>Systems are considerably different from the UK model, <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/382847/Annex_5_AandE.pdf">as outlined in the annex to a 2014 evidence report</a> published by <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/exploring-international-acute-care-models">Monitor</a>, the sector regulator for health services in England. Arrangements for 24/7 cover are common to Australia, some parts of Canada, the US and some Nordic countries, although these are often staffed by on call medical staff and not permanent cover. GPs also play a larger part in some countries, such as the Netherlands. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79258/original/image-20150424-14535-rjlqg5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79258/original/image-20150424-14535-rjlqg5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79258/original/image-20150424-14535-rjlqg5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79258/original/image-20150424-14535-rjlqg5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79258/original/image-20150424-14535-rjlqg5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=588&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79258/original/image-20150424-14535-rjlqg5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79258/original/image-20150424-14535-rjlqg5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79258/original/image-20150424-14535-rjlqg5.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=739&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/382847/Annex_5_AandE.pdf">Monitor</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In citing the good performance of NHS waiting times, Jeremy Hunt is likely to be referring to this evidence report, which includes a graph showing that in comparison with Victoria in Australia, the Canadian province of Ontario and the city of Stockholm, a higher percentage of people in England left A&E within four hours. </p>
<p>It’s clear that this is not a comprehensive international comparison of the speed of A&E waiting times around the world. </p>
<p>It’s also worth pointing out that waiting times and targets vary around the UK. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-25055444">BBC helpfully tracks</a> the latest data on A&E waiting times in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. </p>
<p>In England the expectation is that 95% of patients will be seen, assessed, admitted or discharged within four hours. In England, data on this target is released each Friday, and for <a href="http://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ae-waiting-times-and-activity/statistical-work-areasae-waiting-times-and-activityweekly-ae-sitreps-2015-16/">the year to date</a>, 92.7% of people in all A&E departments were seen within four hours. In <a href="https://isdscotland.scot.nhs.uk/Health-Topics/Emergency-Care/Publications/2015-04-07/2015-04-07-ED-Summary.pdf?99079531432">Scotland</a>, where the target is to <a href="http://www.gov.scot/About/Performance/scotPerforms/partnerstories/NHSScotlandperformance/4hrAEStandard">see 98%</a> of patients within four hours, for the month of February, 87.9% were seen and subsequently admitted, transferred or discharged within four hours. </p>
<p>In January in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-30414705">Wales, 82.3%</a> met the 95% target, and in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-30415390">Northern Ireland, 74.8%</a> were seen within four hours. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Regrettably Jeremy Hunt is not comparing like with like in his comparisons so his assertion of international excellence on A&E waiting times is dubious. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>Jeremy Hunt’s statement is probably the only way to put positive spin on the English A&E waiting time figures. Even then there is little comfort in the claim because, as the author points out, few countries measure A&E performance as the NHS does. We should not be reassured by comparison with three regions elsewhere.</p>
<p>A&E performance in England has been deteriorating under the coalition. Labour <a href="http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/projects/urgent-emergency-care/urgent-and-emergency-care-mythbusters">introduced a target</a> that no more than 2% of patients should wait more than four hours in A&E from arrival to admission, transfer or discharge. From 2005, this target was usually met, though A&E departments struggled over the winter. The coalition <a href="http://www.pulsetoday.co.uk/ae-waiting-times-jump-after-government-scales-back-target/11046598.article">relaxed the target to 5%</a>, but even this less demanding target was not met this winter.</p>
<p>A&E departments take the pressure when other parts of the system aren’t working properly. People turn to A&E if their social care support <a href="http://www.pssru.ac.uk/publication-details.php?id=4561">has been cut back</a>, or they <a href="https://theconversation.com/fact-check-is-it-now-harder-to-see-a-gp-39839">can’t get a GP appointment</a>, or because the new 111 service <a href="http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/3/11/e003451.short">advises more people</a> to go to A&E than the old NHS Direct did. </p>
<p>Patients stay in A&E longer than necessary because there <a href="http://emj.bmj.com/content/19/3/234.short">aren’t enough</a> consultants willing to work in this stressful environment and because hospital beds are filled with patients <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hec.3150/epdf">facing delayed discharge</a> because social care support has been cut.</p>
<p>A&E departments are at the centre of a complex system but <a href="https://theconversation.com/aande-is-in-crisis-because-we-all-take-it-for-granted-14458">past calls</a> to address the A&E crisis have gone unheeded. The problems are simply getting worse. – <strong>Andrew Street</strong></p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40774/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrew Street receives funding from the National Institute of Health Research and the Department of Health's Policy Research Programme but the views expressed are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Peter Bradshaw does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Health secretary Jeremy Hunt says A&Es are seeing and treating people faster than any other country that measures performance. Is he right?Peter Bradshaw, Emeritus Professor in Health Policy, University of HuddersfieldLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/407392015-04-24T16:51:56Z2015-04-24T16:51:56ZFact Check: does any country in Europe other than Britain want to renegotiate the EU treaty?<blockquote>
<p>There are … Germans, like the finance minister, who say that treaty change will be essential to secure Germany’s objectives around the governance of the eurozone. We believe that treaty change will have to happen, not just because of Britain’s demands, but because of the German requirements around governance of the eurozone. That gives us our opportunity. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Philip Hammond, Conservative foreign secretary, speaking during a <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05s4wmy/daily-politics-2015-election-debates-foreign-affairs">BBC Daily Politics debate</a> on foreign policy.</strong> </p>
<p>If he is re-elected as prime minister, David Cameron <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/04/cameron-early-referendum-britain-eu-membership">has promised</a> to carry out a renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU. While he has been <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/821a8364-df9c-11e4-a6c4-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Y9YoCRy5">systematically vague</a> about the nature of his demands, a similar ambiguity shrouds the question of how any such renegotiation would be carried out. </p>
<p>For many Conservative MPs, only a revision of the EU treaties will suffice. And the prime minister himself <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303851804579555491821367858">has hinted</a> on more than one occasion that he will seek such a treaty change. The Conservative Party manifesto <a href="http://issuu.com/conservativeparty/docs/ge_manifesto_low_res_bdecb3a47a0faf?e=16696947/12362115#search">also pledges</a> that: “We will negotiate a new settlement for Britain in the EU.” </p>
<p>Meanwhile Hammond, in the recent debate on Daily Politics, suggested that there are good reasons to believe a treaty change will happen and can be used to secure British aims. </p>
<p>There are, however, equally good, if not better, reasons to doubt such claims. It is true that some in Berlin would, in an ideal world, like to see the treaties revised to improve the governance of the eurozone. Yet the pressures militating against any renegotiation of the founding EU treaties appear overwhelming. </p>
<p>First, other member states are all too aware that the British demand stems largely from political rather than substantive concerns. They have all read the various reports issued by the recent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/review-of-the-balance-of-competences">review of the balance of competences</a> carried out by the government, and are aware that these concluded that there are few areas where the EU treaties need reform. </p>
<p>Second, even if negotiations were started, it is not only the British that would have demands. Eurozone members <a href="http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780190233242.do">have very different ideas</a> as to what kinds of reform would make the single currency work more effectively – from the stricter fiscal rules favoured by some northern nations such as Germany, to the debt mutualisation in the form of eurobonds demanded by their southern partners Greece and Italy. </p>
<p>Even beyond the management of the single currency, many member states – and this is a fact too easily forgotten in London – have reform ideas of their own. For some of them, albeit increasingly few, these involve deepening integration rather than the repatriation of power desired by the Conservatives. This variety of different demands also militates against claims that it might be possible to undertake a “quick and dirty” reform. Why, after all, would other member states undertake such a politically difficult undertaking without expecting anything tangible for themselves in return? </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79291/original/image-20150424-14535-t6b9la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/79291/original/image-20150424-14535-t6b9la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79291/original/image-20150424-14535-t6b9la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79291/original/image-20150424-14535-t6b9la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79291/original/image-20150424-14535-t6b9la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79291/original/image-20150424-14535-t6b9la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/79291/original/image-20150424-14535-t6b9la.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ready for change?</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">European Parliament</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Even if a negotiation were to be successfully concluded, it is hard to see how a new treaty could be successfully ratified. Britain is not the only country affected by the rise of insurgent parties and a growing wave of <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-britain-should-learn-from-syriza-and-greek-eurosceptics-40653">eurosceptic feeling</a>. In some of these countries, ratification of a new treaty would imply a popular referendum. Case law and precedent <a href="http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/IIEA%20Economic%20Governance%20Paper%204%20v2%20%281%29.pdf">in Ireland</a> provide powerful incentives to ratify treaties via referendum. Recent EU history suggests that this would be far from straightforward – both the <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1376379.stm">Nice Treaty</a> and the constitutional treaty were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6901353.stm">rejected by referenda</a> in some member states. </p>
<p>So both negotiation and ratification would pose significant problems. And even in the unlikely event that both could be achieved, it is hard to see how this could be done ahead of Cameron’s self-imposed <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/22/eu-referendum-2017-david-cameron">deadline of the end of 2017</a>. If nothing else, the fact that both France and Germany have elections in that year militates against either of them wanting to try to ratify a new European treaty anywhere near their respective election campaigns. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>While the current UK government might not be alone in wanting a treaty change, the practical hurdles standing in the way of this happening are of a scale that seriously undermines any faith that this might actually be attempted. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>The article rightly sets out the key difficulties with any EU treaty renegotiation and the basic process that it contains of seeking broad compromises. This clearly stands at odds with Conservative policy as it has been presented. One might also add that the process of renegotiation also needs to be agreed by a majority of member states before it can even begin, so matters might fall at that early stage. </p>
<p>In short, it is not for the UK alone to decide to enter the process, something that might ultimately play into the hands of those who seek British withdrawal from Europe. Such difficulties further highlight the extent to which Cameron has developed European policy primarily as a function of managing his backbenches.</p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40739/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anand Menon receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council, but the article does not represent the views of the research councils.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Usherwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Conservatives argue that the rest of Europe wants reform too. Is this true?Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King's College LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/406662015-04-23T14:09:10Z2015-04-23T14:09:10ZFact Check: has the amount of renewable electricity trebled?<blockquote>
<p>Renewable electricity has nearly trebled under this government. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Ed Davey, Liberal Democrat energy and climate change minister, during an environment debate held by <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05s4tgp/daily-politics-2015-election-debates-environment-and-climate-change">the Daily Politics show</a>.</strong></p>
<p>Amid the climate of mistrust about claims made by politicians that tends to accompany election campaigns, it is reassuring to report that the evidence supports the minister’s statement.</p>
<p>According to <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/energy-trends-section-6-renewables">official figures</a> on renewable electricity, installed generation capacity in the UK in 2014 was 2.6 times higher than in 2010, while actual generation of renewable electricity was 2.5 times higher. For further detail see the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65849/renewable_methodology_note.pdf">methodology for data collection</a> by the Department of Energy and Climate Change. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78963/original/image-20150422-1858-1ypctsw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78963/original/image-20150422-1858-1ypctsw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78963/original/image-20150422-1858-1ypctsw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78963/original/image-20150422-1858-1ypctsw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78963/original/image-20150422-1858-1ypctsw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78963/original/image-20150422-1858-1ypctsw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78963/original/image-20150422-1858-1ypctsw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78963/original/image-20150422-1858-1ypctsw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=425&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>As well as electricity generated by onshore and offshore wind, solar photovoltaic, hydro, and shoreline wave/tidal energy, these figures include electricity generated by organic material. This includes landfill gas, sewage sludge, waste, animal biomass (poultry litter, meat and bone), wet biomass waste (such as animal manure and slurry), and plant biomass (including straw and energy crops). </p>
<p>Although most of this involves generating electricity by combustion, which yields CO<sub>2</sub> as a byproduct in the same way as fossil fuel combustion, these organic materials decompose naturally to produce CO<sub>2</sub> and other greenhouse gases anyway, so using them to generate electricity has little effect on net greenhouse gas emissions.</p>
<p>The main growth area was wind, which accounts for about half of Britain’s renewable electricity, followed by photovoltaic and plant biomass.</p>
<p>Provisional <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415998/renewables.pdf">data</a> shows that renewables contributed a record 19.2% of electricity generation in 2014. </p>
<p>This increase in renewable electricity can be attributed in part to the <a href="https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/renewables-obligation-ro">Renewables Obligation</a> set up by the previous Labour government in 2002, which obliged electricity supply companies to source an increasing proportion of their electricity from renewable sources. However, the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/electricity-market-reform-contracts-for-difference">Contracts for Difference</a> feed-in tariff system introduced by the coalition for large-scale energy generation – which established a set price that is high enough to enable investors to make a profit – is probably responsible for increasing the rate of growth. Expert studies have shown that <a href="http://iet.jrc.ec.europa.eu/remea/sites/remea/files/files/documents/sec_2008_57_support_res_electricity.pdf">feed-in tariffs are more effective</a> than quota systems in encouraging investment in renewable electricity.</p>
<p>The flaw in the coalition’s strategy is that while in <a href="http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf">other countries</a>, electricity supply companies are obliged to buy all the electricity generated by renewable sources at the feed-in tariff price, which is higher than the market price, in Britain, supply companies buy at the market price and the government pays the difference. As a consequence, expansion of renewable electricity is limited not only by investors’ willingness to invest and planning issues, but also by budgetary constraints.</p>
<p>As spending cuts are the order of the day, this means that we cannot be sure that the current rate of expansion will be sustained.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Ed Davey’s claim that renewable electricity has almost trebled during the coalition’s term of office is accurate, but flaws in Britain’s feed-in tariff system mean that further expansion may be limited.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>The coalition certainly deserves some credit for its record on creating new sources of renewable electricity, and it is also true that the fear of electoral unpopularity regarding high energy bills has hampered the efficacy of its achievements. These could have been even higher if the energy companies had been required to purchase higher tariff renewable energy from distributed sources.</p>
<p>However, when energy for heating and transport (which still depends primarily on fossil fuels) is taken into account, renewables represent only 5% of energy supply in the UK, according to the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/337684/chapter_6.pdf">2014 Digest of UK Energy Statistics</a>. There is widespread acceptance, including by the UK government, that greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced to keep global temperatures from rising beyond 2°C. </p>
<p>The Centre for Alternative Technology’s report <a href="http://zerocarbonbritain.com/zcb-latest-report">Zero Carbon Britain</a> suggests that it is helpful to think the world has a finite amount of greenhouse gases it can emit to keep within the 2°C threshold. This is known as the emissions budget. The report predicts the UK’s share of the global emissions budget (offering a 75% chance of keeping below 2°C) at about 10,000 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e between now and 2050. At the current emission rate the country will produce 16,000 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e by the middle of the century. </p>
<p>Voters would do well to avoid the rhetoric over renewable electricity and ask which party’s policies are most likely to decarbonise all parts of the country’s energy budget, and how quickly they say they can do this. – <strong>Erik Bichard</strong> </p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40666/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Lib Dem energy minister Ed Davey says renewable electricity has soared under the coalition. Is he right?Hugh Compston, Professor of Climate Politics, Cardiff UniversityIan Bailey, Professor of Environmental Politics, University of PlymouthLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/405782015-04-21T14:24:23Z2015-04-21T14:24:23ZFact Check: has austerity held back economic growth?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78780/original/image-20150421-9008-l0dfh1.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Too much of a squeeze?</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/teegardin/6097066382/sizes/l">keenteegardin/flickr</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>In the last five years, austerity has undermined our public services, lowered the living standards of working people, pushed more children into poverty and held back economic growth.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Nicola Sturgeon, Scottish first minister and Scottish National Party leader <a href="http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/scottish-politics/in-full-nicola-sturgeons-snp-manifesto-launch-speech.1429531266">at the party’s manifesto</a> launch.</strong></p>
<p>It is easiest to start at the end. Conventional macroeconomics would agree that fiscal austerity and cuts to government spending did hold back growth. The Office for Budget Responsibility <a href="http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/forecast-evaluation-report-october-2014/">estimate</a> that austerity reduced growth by 1% in each of the financial years 2010-11 and 2011-12. In the graph below, the orange bars show the impacts on growth of austerity expected in 2010 and the blue bar how they have changed. Others <a href="http://mainlymacro.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/the-size-of-recent-macro-policy-failure.html">have higher estimates</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78753/original/image-20150421-9017-tl5ze9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78753/original/image-20150421-9017-tl5ze9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78753/original/image-20150421-9017-tl5ze9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78753/original/image-20150421-9017-tl5ze9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78753/original/image-20150421-9017-tl5ze9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=316&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78753/original/image-20150421-9017-tl5ze9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78753/original/image-20150421-9017-tl5ze9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78753/original/image-20150421-9017-tl5ze9.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Implied impacts of discretionary fiscal policy on GDP growth.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/wordpress/docs/Forecast_evaluation_report_2014_dn4H.pdf">OBR</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The key point here is that because short-term interest rates had fallen as far as the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England thought they could go (0.5%), monetary policy was not able to offset the impact of fiscal contraction – cuts to government spending, or austerity. Instead, monetary policy had to resort to Quantitative Easing: creating money to buy long term assets in order to put downward pressure on long term interest rates. Quantitative Easing probably had some effect on the growth rate, but almost certainly not enough to counter the impact of fiscal austerity.</p>
<p>Lower growth caused by fiscal austerity would normally mean one of two things: higher unemployment or lower living standards. An unusual feature of the past five years is <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/lms/labour-market-statistics/october-2014/sty-labour-market-statistics.html">how quickly unemployment has fallen</a>, even though GDP growth has not been strong. As a result, the main impact of lower growth – including that caused by fiscal austerity – has been on living standards.</p>
<p>Fiscal austerity has involved reduced public spending in many areas, including welfare payments. The general consensus among economists such as those <a href="http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7584">at the Institute for Fiscal Studies</a> is that fiscal consolidation has hit two groups more than most: the rich and the poor. It is therefore reasonable to say austerity in itself has increased child poverty. As living standards have fallen generally, then relative levels of poverty in general – which measure the poverty gap – have not increased over the last few years, although absolute levels of poverty have. However, Sturgeon is careful in her statement to talk about the impact of fiscal austerity.</p>
<p>The assertion that fiscal austerity has “undermined our public services” comes close to being a tautology. To suggest otherwise you would have to argue that spending less on public services has only increased the efficiency with which they were delivered.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Nicola Sturgeon’s statement on the economic impact of austerity on the UK is correct, with no qualifications.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>I don’t have any major disagreements with the author’s analysis. There are two particular provisos that may be worth raising. The first is that the stagnation in standards of living under the coalition period (and from before that) partly reflects the UK’s very poor productivity performance at this time. It could be argued that this largely reflects austerity: had demand been higher, companies would have been able to sell more which would probably have resulted in higher productivity. For example, if a factory is idle, workers are under-employed or not able to get jobs in relatively high productivity sectors because of lack of demand. Alternatively the author may simply be arguing the austerity isn’t the only problem here, but it is one problem and so Sturgeon is correct.</p>
<p>Second, Sturgeon’s comment about child poverty might be worthy of some specific reference to what has happened to it. It is not my particular area of expertise, but the previous decline in child poverty appears to have been reversed around 2011, although <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325416/households-below-average-income-1994-1995-2012-2013.pdf">has remained flat since</a>, and this may be worth noting. </p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40578/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The SNP’s Nicola Sturgeon says austerity has held the economy back. Is she right?Simon Wren-Lewis, Professor of Economics, and Fellow of Merton College, University of OxfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/404092015-04-20T17:02:57Z2015-04-20T17:02:57ZFact Check: how much of the UK budget is spent on defence?<blockquote>
<p>We already spend 6% of our budget on defence. I think that that proportion can be spent more wisely.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Leanne Wood, Plaid Cymru leader, during the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05r87pr/bbc-election-debate-2015">BBC Challenger’s debate</a></strong>. </p>
<p>The claim that the UK spends 6% of its national budget on defence can be readily checked. Looking at past expenditure, the claim was on the low side: the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/391109/20141212-Departmental-ResourcesJM_Version_7-U.pdf">actual figure for 2013-2014</a> put defence spending at 7.5% of UK public expenditure – or £49.9 billion of a total £664.1 billion.</p>
<p>Plaid Cymru have pointed to the government’s total managed expenditure, which <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/330717/PESA_2014_-_print.pdf">was at £714.3 billion</a> in 2013-14, putting the percentage spent on defence 7%. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/416330/47881_Budget_2015_Web_Accessible.pdf">2015 budget</a>, chancellor George Osborne set out figures from the Office for Budget Responsibility looking at the proportion of £743 billion in total managed expenditure for 2015-16 spent on different sectors. Defence spending is estimated at £45 billion – just over 6% of the total.</p>
<p>However, defence spending data is usually presented differently, with the share of GDP often used as an indicator of a nation’s defence burden. In 2014, UK defence <a href="http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database">spending was at 2.2% of GDP</a>, according to the 2015 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. </p>
<p>In the UK, the long-term trend for defence spending as a share of GDP has been downwards. In 1953, during the Korean War, the UK share was 9.9%; by 1982, during the Falklands conflict, it was 5.3% and at the end of the Cold War in 1990, it stood at 3.8%. The declining share figures have resulted from a succession of defence reviews as the UK has adjusted its role and commitments. </p>
<p>The UK’s 2014 share figure compares favourably with other NATO nations as the graph below shows. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78577/original/image-20150420-25679-17wp37c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78577/original/image-20150420-25679-17wp37c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78577/original/image-20150420-25679-17wp37c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78577/original/image-20150420-25679-17wp37c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78577/original/image-20150420-25679-17wp37c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=289&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78577/original/image-20150420-25679-17wp37c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78577/original/image-20150420-25679-17wp37c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78577/original/image-20150420-25679-17wp37c.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=363&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The relatively high share of GDP spent by the UK on defence reflects the country’s world military role. This has led to the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent (Trident), nuclear-powered submarines, Type 45 destroyer warships, aircraft carriers, F-35 carrier-based aircraft together with strategic air tankers, Typhoon jets, heavy lift and attack helicopters and an army with an expeditionary role. </p>
<p>These are costly capabilities. For example, the Typhoon programme <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-defence-statistics-compendium-2014">will cost</a> £18.1 billion, the strategic air tanker £11.4 billion, the Astute submarines £9.4 billion and the total equipment procurement programme is estimated to cost some £69 billion between 2014 and 2024. </p>
<p>The share of GDP spent on defence is just one measure of a nation’s defence effort. Other measures include the level of defence spending in real terms (adjusted for inflation), the numbers of military personnel and the numbers of front-line equipment such as fast jet squadrons, warships and tanks. International comparisons can be made using the levels of defence spending in real terms as shown in the table below. On this basis, the UK ranks sixth in the world. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78580/original/image-20150420-25708-s6vn0g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78580/original/image-20150420-25708-s6vn0g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/78580/original/image-20150420-25708-s6vn0g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=267&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78580/original/image-20150420-25708-s6vn0g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=267&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78580/original/image-20150420-25708-s6vn0g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=267&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78580/original/image-20150420-25708-s6vn0g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78580/original/image-20150420-25708-s6vn0g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/78580/original/image-20150420-25708-s6vn0g.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=336&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>However, levels of defence spending and the share of GDP do not measure UK defence output in the form of peace, protection and security. There is a complete absence of any indicator of the monetary value of defence output for any nation in the world. Instead, defence output is often assumed to be equivalent to defence expenditure. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>The claim that the UK spends 6% of its budget on defence is on the low side and for 2013-14, it was actually 7%. Going by OBR estimations, the UK could spend 6% of its public expenditure for 2015-16 on defence. But usually, defence burdens are measured by the share of national output or GDP spent on defence, rather than shares of the national budget. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This response to the question is careful and I agree with the verdict. At first sight the 6% figure looks high because most of the debate in the election has been around the commitment to spend <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-31857044">2% of GDP</a> on defence made to NATO. But the 2% is a percentage of GDP and the 6% is a percentage of the budget: government expenditure. The difference indicates the importance of knowing what is in the bottom line of a percentage. </p>
<p>Whether that money could be spent more wisely is a matter of judgement and there has been considerable debate about the appropriate structure of the forces: how much should be spent on army, navy and air force. And within those totals, there are also debates on the relative importance of different elements such as Trident replacement and purchase of F35 aircraft for the carriers. </p>
<p><em>This article was updated on April 21 with additional information on total managed expenditure for 2013-14.</em> </p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40409/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Plaid Cymru’s Leanne Wood has questioned whether the UK should spent 6% of its budget on defence. Has she got her numbers right?Keith Hartley, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/401942015-04-16T15:16:31Z2015-04-16T15:16:31ZFact Check: are cold homes bigger killers than road accidents or alcohol?<blockquote>
<p><em>Around 9,000 people die prematurely each year in the UK because they cannot afford to heat their homes. That’s more than the number killed on our roads, or through alcohol.</em> </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Caroline Lucas, Green Party candidate for Brighton Pavilion, <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/update/2015-04-14/watch-live-green-party-launch-revolution-manifesto/">speaking at the launch</a> of the Green party manifesto.</strong></p>
<p>The Green Party has pledged £45 billion to end the <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/update/2015-04-14/greens-45bn-pledge-to-end-cold-homes-crisis/">“cold homes crisis”</a>. In particular, Caroline Lucas has claimed that fuel poverty is blighting the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who are struggling to pay high fuel bills. The party has highlighted figures from Age UK which estimated that cold homes could have <a href="http://www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/EN-GB/Campaigns/The_cost_of_cold_2012.pdf?dtrk=true">cost the NHS around £1.3 billion</a> each year.</p>
<p>The Green Party indicates the numbers on deaths come from a <a href="http://www.ukace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACE-and-EBR-fact-file-2015-03-Chilled-to-death.pdf">recent report</a> published by Association for the Conservation of Energy (ACE) in March 2015, in which researchers estimated that in the past five years, 46,700 people in the UK have died due to living in a cold home. </p>
<p>The average number of “excess winter deaths” in the five years since 2010 is 27,830, of which it says around <a href="http://www.ukace.org/?s=cold+home">8,350 are due to cold homes</a>. According to ACE, this analysis used official data from the <a href="http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html">Office for National Statistics</a>, <a href="http://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/">National Records of Scotland</a> and <a href="http://www.nisra.gov.uk/">Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency</a>. The method defines the winter period as December to March, and compares the number of deaths that occurred in this winter period with the average number of deaths occurring in the preceding August to November and the following April to July. In other words, to calculate excess winter mortality, they have taken the number of winter deaths minus the average non-winter deaths. </p>
<p>As a comparison, ACE says that in the UK in 2013, 7,400 deaths were related to cold homes, 7,059 were related to alcohol and 1,575 were related to road or rail accidents.</p>
<p>In the same report, it also indicated that cold housing could contribute to <a href="http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/142077/e95004.pdf">roughly 30% of excess winter deaths</a> based on the World Health Organisation’s crude estimates in 2011, although there is little firm evidence for this. </p>
<h2>Impact on health</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://whqlibdoc.who.int/euro/pre-wholis/ICP_BSM_002%283%29.pdf">World Health Organisation</a> has recommended a minimal indoor temperature of 18°C and a 2-3°C warmer minimal temperature for rooms occupied by sedentary elderly, young children and the handicapped. Below 16°C, resistance to respiratory infections may be diminished. There is also higher risk of high blood pressure for those living in cold homes. </p>
<p>What does the current scientific evidence tell us about the health impact of living in a colder home? Using the national representative <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/oby.20546/abstract">Health Survey for England in 1995-2007</a>, it was observed that the body mass index (BMI) levels of English adults older than 16 residing in air temperature above 23°C were lower than those living in an ambient temperature of under 19°C. This shows that those living in colder houses have higher BMI. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.internationaljournalofcardiology.com/article/S0167-5273%2813%2902058-5/abstract">In Scotland</a>, indoor temperature below 18°C could account for 9% of the population risk for high blood pressure in Scottish adults aged 16 and above. </p>
<p>Both high BMI levels and hypertension are strong risk factors for many chronic, un-communicable diseases including cardiovascular disease (such as heart attack and stroke), metabolic disease such as diabetes, respiratory disease such as asthma and even cancer and dementia. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nice.org.uk/advice/lgb26">Premature deaths</a> are avoidable. They are <a href="http://www.poverty.org.uk/s60/index.shtml">more common</a> in Scotland than in England and Wales, although the number has been declining over years. In England, <a href="http://www.nhs.uk/Livewell/over60s/Pages/The-top-five-causes-of-premature-death.aspx">one in three deaths</a> are before the age of 75, and the top five causes are cancer, heart disease, stroke, respiratory disease and liver disease. Hypertension plays an important role in these diseases too. </p>
<p>In the UK, <a href="http://ageing.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/4/212.abstract">since the 1980s</a>, many homes did not or could not meet the recommended threshold, 18°C. Until today, population-based research in this area <a href="http://rsh.sagepub.com/content/133/3/158.long">is limited</a>, particularly <a href="http://jech.bmj.com/content/43/1/7.short">for children</a>. Monitoring the relationship of indoor temperature and health over the longer term needs more research to fill in this knowledge gap. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Scientific evidence proves that cold homes are associated with hypertension, which can lead to diseases such as heart disease and other chronic illnesses. But the numbers for the real impact of this in the UK are difficult to pin down. </p>
<p>Therefore, the figures mentioned by Caroline Lucas and the Green party could be perceived as accurate, although not necessarily precise. There is a big knowledge gap in understanding the effect of low indoor temperature on human health, whether physically or mentally. </p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This response vividly illustrates why and how poorly insulated and energy-inefficient cold homes link to livelihood and health. Cold homes due to fuel poverty, especially in deprived communities, are one of the most critical causes of excess winter deaths. Although initiatives such as <a href="https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/energy-company-obligation-eco">ECO</a> and <a href="https://www.gov.uk/green-deal-energy-saving-measures/overview">Green Deal</a> have helped dampen the effect, resulting in positive change in lives and communities, their direct and indirect effect on health implication has not been fully understood. </p>
<p>These premature deaths must be eliminated. With more research and if addressed correctly, this critical “silent killer” will alleviate significant pressure away from the NHS, and provide a sustainable, efficient and healthy society.</p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40194/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Professor Siau Ching Lenny Koh has received fundng from the European Regional Development Fund, Department of Energy and Climate Change and Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC). This article does not represent the views of the research councils. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ivy Shiue (Scthiue) does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Green Party says fuel poverty is causing a high number of winter deaths due to people living in the cold. Are they right?Ivy Shiue (Scthiue), Assistant Professor, Heriot-Watt UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/400372015-04-15T15:47:42Z2015-04-15T15:47:42ZFact Check: has arts funding been decimated or protected?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77915/original/image-20150414-24654-1lw6xdq.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">The Lowry Centre in Salford has seen cuts to its regular arts budget.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:LowryCentre.jpg">Andrew Dunn/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>Although we’ve had to make cuts in grant-in-aid, we’ve increased the amount of money going into the arts through the National Lottery. Take those two sums of money together, and you’ll see that roughly the same amount of money has gone into the arts as went into the arts at the peak of the last Labour government.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Ed Vaizey, Conservative culture minister, in an interview on <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b05p">BBC Radio 4’s Front Row</a></strong></p>
<p>Grant-in-aid, the annual budget that Arts Council England receives from Department of Culture Media and Sport, has decreased from £453m in 2009-10 to £350m in 2014-15, according to the <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmcumeds/464/46405.htm">Culture Select Committee</a>. The Arts Council quantifies this as a real terms reduction of 36%. </p>
<p>In his radio interview on BBC 4’s Front Row last week, Ed Vaizey claimed all of these cuts have been offset by increases in National Lottery funding to the arts. In fact, as the graph below shows, the peak of the former Labour government’s arts funding in 2009-10 was £625m, and by 2014-15 this had fallen to £617m, representing an overall cut of £8m (not accounting for inflation, so a real terms cut of over £9m).</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77954/original/image-20150414-24658-vuywqr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77954/original/image-20150414-24658-vuywqr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77954/original/image-20150414-24658-vuywqr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77954/original/image-20150414-24658-vuywqr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=250&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77954/original/image-20150414-24658-vuywqr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77954/original/image-20150414-24658-vuywqr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77954/original/image-20150414-24658-vuywqr.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=314&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The politics of arts funding</h2>
<p>From 2015, even more Lottery funding will be used to support the arts in England. The use of Lottery funding to compensate for cuts in core funding is highly controversial as it appears to contravene the so-called “additionality principle”, which holds that government funding decisions shouldn’t be influenced by lottery contributions. <a href="http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/23/section/12">Section 12 of the Lottery Act (2006)</a> states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Proceeds of the National Lottery should be used to fund projects … for which funds would be unlikely to made available by a government department [or its equivalent]. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Lottery funding of the arts has also <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/27/national-lottery-regressive-poverty">been accused</a> of acting as a regressive form of taxation, whereby working class northerners subsidise the cultural hobbies of middle-class southerners.</p>
<p>When the coalition government came into power, there were 854 regularly funded arts organisations. There are now only 664, which represents a decrease of 22% over the past five years. </p>
<p>However, any voters placing their hope in Labour to reverse the coalition’s cuts spending are likely to be disappointed, following the party’s <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/chorus-of-disapprovalartists-attack-labour-over-funding-cuts-9961402.html">denial</a> in January of Conservative claims that Labour would spend an additional £83m cancelling previous cuts to culture.</p>
<p>On top of DCMS’s cuts to funding, what Vaizey failed to mention is the increasingly negative and disproportionate impact of local government cuts to culture. Shadow Minister for Culture, <a href="http://www.artsprofessional.co.uk/news/poor-areas-suffer-highest-local-authority-arts-cuts">Helen Goodman, pointed out</a> last May that the most deprived of England’s local authority areas have faced an average funding cut of 18%, which has translated to a cut to arts, libraries and heritage of 22%. </p>
<p>So, it is important to remember, as highlighted in the recent <a href="http://www.gpsculture.co.uk/rocc.php">Rebalancing Our Cultural Capital</a> report, that arts funding is not distributed proportionately around the country. Indeed claims of regional imbalances in funding led to a recent <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmcumeds/279/27902.htm">parliamentary inquiry</a>, which ultimately determined that London receives a share of arts funding which is “out of all proportion to its population” and that this “clear funding imbalance … must be urgently rectified”.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/media/uploads/portfolio_summaries/local_government.pdf">ACE reports</a> that in 2009-10, local authorities invested £102m in their regularly funded arts organisations and that central government funding to local authorities has been cut by 28% over the four years between 2011-15. </p>
<p>In the course of this parliament, some councils (like Somerset) have imposed 100% cuts on their arts budgets, which means that <a href="http://www.artsprofessional.co.uk/sites/artsprofessional.co.uk/files/administrator/table_4.pdf">13 local authorities</a>, including Gloucestershire, Selby, Wigan, Westminster and Wandsworth, now allocate no funding whatsoever to culture and heritage.</p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>The veracity of Ed Vaizey’s claim hinges on his qualifier “roughly”: the figures show that more than £9m less is now being spent on the arts than at the peak of the last Labour government, and £103m less government or public money.</p>
<p>Recent history teaches us that Labour governments fund the arts more generously than their Conservative counterparts – under the last Labour government, grant-in-aid almost trebled from <a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmcumeds/464/46405.htm">£179m to £453m</a>. Regardless of who wins on May 7, the figures illustrate that the future of arts funding seems increasingly reliant on the spin of a national wheel of fortune.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>The crucial question for arts funding, as this fact check identifies, will be what happens to the budget of the Department for Communities and Local Government. It is unlikely that, even with reductions in arts funding to come from both of the major parties, organisations such as the National Theatre or British Museum will see an end to state investment.</p>
<p>As a result, the role of DCMS and Arts Council England will continue to support the “crown jewels” in major metropolitan areas. It is the fate of smaller, local, organisations that should be the major concern for discussions of art policy. There is a genuine risk that art and culture that cannot be organised into a form fundable under ACE’s current systems will have no funding, as Local Authorities are forced to choose between cultural activities and their statutory responsibilities towards vulnerable communities, such as children or the elderly. </p>
<p>The fate of the arts outside of major cities may well be decided not by Ed Vaizey’s successor, but rather by the next minister at DCLG. </p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/40037/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dr Ben Walmsley receives funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council and Nesta and acts as an Artistic Assessor for Arts Council England. The views expressed in this article do not reflect the views of the research councils. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dave O'Brien has received grants from the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the Economic and Social Research Council, but this article does not represent the views of the research councils. He has also peer reviewed projects for Arts Council England.</span></em></p>Conservative culture minister Ed Vaizey says ‘roughly’ the same amount of money is going into the arts as it did under Labour. Is he right?Ben Walmsley, Lecturer in Audience Engagement, University of LeedsLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/399662015-04-14T19:11:03Z2015-04-14T19:11:03ZFact Check: is 80% of UK fish given away to the rest of Europe?<blockquote>
<p>As a result of membership of the Common Fisheries Policy, we are now allowed to catch less than 20% of the fish that swim in British waters. The other 80% we have given away to the rest of Europe. </p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Nigel Farage, UKIP leader, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-32220052">on the campaign trail</a></strong></p>
<p>When fact checking this statement, it is first of all worth pointing out that if the UK was allowed to catch 20% of the fish that swim in British waters and the EU took the rest, then there would be no fish left in the sea.</p>
<p>In attempting to check the facts behind this assertion, one must assume, therefore, that <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yn4x-4RcGnY">Nigel Farage is referring to</a> the allocations of fishing quotas which are determined by the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).</p>
<p>In 2015, the <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R0104&from=EN">CFP allocated</a> the United Kingdom a total of 612,612 tonnes of quota from more than 100 different fish and shellfish stocks. The total EU quota for these stocks was 2,069,202 tonnes, so the UK was allocated 30% of these fish (and shellfish) quotas. </p>
<p>These figures include various fish which live beyond the boundaries of UK waters, such as Arctic cod and west of Ireland sole. If one considers the 73 different fish stocks which live in UK waters, the total EU quota was 1,920,915 tonnes, of which 585,211 tonnes was allocated to the UK (which also happens to be 30%). Individual quota allocations differ according to stock, as figure one below shows. For example, the UK gets 84% of the North Sea haddock quota, 81% of North Sea monkfish quota and 98% of west of Scotland prawn quota; but only 4% of North Sea sprat quota, 18% of northern hake and 28% of North Sea plaice.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77698/original/image-20150412-4090-18e0g7w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77698/original/image-20150412-4090-18e0g7w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77698/original/image-20150412-4090-18e0g7w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77698/original/image-20150412-4090-18e0g7w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77698/original/image-20150412-4090-18e0g7w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=343&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77698/original/image-20150412-4090-18e0g7w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77698/original/image-20150412-4090-18e0g7w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77698/original/image-20150412-4090-18e0g7w.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=431&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 1. 2015 quota allocations for 73 stocks which live in UK waters, grouped by region (% in brackets refers to the proportion of total quota the UK received in each region). The numbers on each bar refer to the percentage of EU quota allocated to the UK (note West of Scotland Mackerel is off the scale, as EU quota was over 420,000 tonnes).</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although UK waters are extensive, as the map below shows, the fish stocks which live in our waters are by no means confined to them. Some, like mackerel, make <a href="http://www.trawlerphotos.co.uk/gallery/showphoto.php?photo=75944">extensive migrations</a> and only pass through our waters for a short period. Others are more sedentary, like <a href="http://blogs.scotland.gov.uk/coastal-monitoring/files/2014/06/Scotia-survey-pic.png">prawns</a> which stay close to their burrows in muddy habitats. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77697/original/image-20150412-4058-y1b0iu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77697/original/image-20150412-4058-y1b0iu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77697/original/image-20150412-4058-y1b0iu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77697/original/image-20150412-4058-y1b0iu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=825&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77697/original/image-20150412-4058-y1b0iu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1036&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77697/original/image-20150412-4058-y1b0iu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1036&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77697/original/image-20150412-4058-y1b0iu.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1036&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Figure 2. Map of the British Isles showing UK waters. The UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is in red, EU member states’ EEZ in blue and other EEZs in green. The five main regions referred to in Figure 1 are labelled in white.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many species live in different places either at different times of the year or in different phases of their life cycle. In the case of <a href="http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2013/09/6505/8">North Sea herring</a> for example, most of the juveniles live in the south east corner around the German bight, whereas the adults tend to congregate around the Shetland Isles prior to spawning at various sites along the British coast. <a href="http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royprsb/275/1642/1543/F4.large.jpg">North Sea cod</a> are found throughout the North Sea but prefer spawning along the border between UK and Norwegian waters. </p>
<p>So despite the UK having quite extensive waters, fish stocks do not respect political boundaries, and many are mobile at some stage in their life: these fish are exclusive to neither the UK, the EU, nor the bordering Scandinavian states, but are a shared resource. It would be a major undertaking to establish exactly which proportions of each fish stock would occupy any national waters. These are also likely to change throughout the year, and from year to year. The CFP was designed to manage the mobile fishing fleets that pursue these common, mobile resources.</p>
<p>Although the majority of fish stocks around the UK are managed under the CFP, some important stocks, mainly local shellfish species such as crabs, lobsters and scallops, are also managed under national jurisdictions and bilateral agreements, for example between the EU and states such as Norway and Iceland. </p>
<p>The status of all stocks is determined by the <a href="http://www.ices.dk/community/advisory-process/Pages/default.aspx">International Council for the Exploration of the Sea</a> (ICES), the recognised authority that provides scientific advice to managers. This advice is updated annually and, where possible, includes measures of stock status such as the total biomass of adults and the rate of exploitation the stock has been subjected to by the fishery. </p>
<p>Although the CFP is much derided, various reforms have actually resulted in <a href="http://www.cell.com/current-biology/abstract/S0960-9822%2813%2900707-0">improvements in the status of many fish stocks</a> in the last decade or so: exploitation rates are down, and in most cases, to levels which are sustainable. The ICES advice also includes recommendations for total allowable catches (TACs) for each stock. Each TAC is then considered by the EU and divided into the quotas which are allocated among the member states according to fixed percentages, under allocation keys known as “relative stability”, which are based on historic fishing patterns. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>In 2015, the UK was allocated 30% of the EU quota for fishing ground stocks which occur in UK waters. The area of UK waters relative to other member states is certainly high, but the exact proportions depend on the region and which components of member state waters should be considered. </p>
<p>If Farage’s point is that most of the quota for fish stocks that live in UK waters are fished by other member states, then he is correct; but the figure is not 80%, more like 70%. However, these are not “our” fish, the fish that live in UK waters are no more British than they are German, Dutch, Belgian, Irish or Norwegian: they are in fact European.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>This is a thorough and well-illustrated response which uses the most reliable and up-to-date information available. By demonstrating that the majority of fish in our waters are in fact European rather than British it highlights a key point – even if Britain left the EU we would still need to negotiate quotas which took this into account. There is no guarantee this would ensure any more of the catch.</p>
<p>It’s also interesting to look at these figures in terms of value rather than just landings. Three of the top five most valuable UK fisheries are for shellfish: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-sea-fisheries-statistics-2013">prawns, scallops and crabs</a>. For these more sedentary species we already have almost complete control. Although some fish, such as haddock are mainly eaten in the UK, a lot of shellfish from British waters is exported to EU countries. The vast majority of our scallop catch – the UK’s third most valuable fishery – goes to France and Belgium. Likewise Spain and Portugal take a lot of our crabs and prawns. Let’s concentrate on looking after what we are responsible for, more wisely.</p>
<div class="callout">The Conversation is fact checking political statements in the lead-up to the May UK general election. Statements are checked by an academic with expertise in the area. A second academic expert reviews an anonymous copy of the article.<br><br><a href="https://theconversation.com/factchecks/new">Click here to request a check</a>. Please include the statement you would like us to check, the date it was made, and a link if possible. You can also email factcheck@theconversation.com </div><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/39966/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Paul G Fernandes receives funding from Fisheries Innovation Scotland, the Marine Alliance for Science and Technology Scotland and the European Commission. He is affiliated with Fisheries Innovation Scotland and the Fishing Industry Science Alliance. Thanks to Coby Needle from Marine Scotland Science for help in compiling the list of 2015 EU & UK quotas.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Bryce Stewart has previously received funding from Fauna and Flora International, the Community of Arran Seabed Trust, Natural Environment Research Council and Natural England, but this article does not represent the views of the research councils. He is a member of the Yorkshire Wildlife Trust and on the steering committee of the Sustainable Inshore Fisheries Trust.</span></em></p>UKIP leader Nigel Farage has said EU fisheries policies means the UK gives away the majority of its fish. Is he right?Paul G Fernandes, MASTS Reader in Fisheries Science, School of Biological Science, University of AberdeenLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/399612015-04-13T16:30:18Z2015-04-13T16:30:18ZFact Check: would abolishing non-dom status raise more tax?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77764/original/image-20150413-24294-14zhlwt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Will non-doms be driven away?</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Kamira/www.shutterstock.com </span></span></figcaption></figure><blockquote>
<p>There are now 116,000 non-doms. It is costing at least hundreds of millions of pounds to our country. And it cannot be justified. It makes Britain an offshore tax haven for a few.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Ed Miliband, Labour party leader in <a href="http://press.labour.org.uk/post/115841294434/the-fabric-of-our-country-speech-by-ed-miliband">a speech</a> at the University of Warwick</strong></p>
<p>The Labour party wants to abolish the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32216346">non-domiciled (non-dom) resident status</a> for UK tax purpose. This includes removal of some or all of the tax advantages that non-doms enjoy, including the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/residence-domicile-and-remittance-basis-rules-uk-tax-liability">“remittance basis”</a> which means they can avoid paying tax on income outside the UK. </p>
<p>People can claim non-dom status if they were born outside the UK, but now live here. The status, which has been around for 200 years, can also be inherited through the father. Ed Miliband, the leader of the Labour party, claimed that the reform would raise “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/32213003">hundreds of millions</a>” for the UK. However, in January 2015 shadow chancellor Ed Balls contradicted the campaign by saying that scrapping the rule “<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/32213003">would cost Britain money</a>”. If the non-dom status is abolished using a cold-turkey approach, many non-doms may leave Britain, which could result in huge losses to the economy. </p>
<p>Miliband later explained that the Labour party proposes to scrap the rule giving non-doms a transition period of around two years to “<a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3a1257a0-dd3e-11e4-bc0d-00144feab7de.html">get their affairs in order</a>”.</p>
<h2>Current non-dom tax policy</h2>
<p>UK residents with non-dom status can currently choose whether to pay taxes in Britain on their overseas earnings. Although they are already taxed in full on their UK income and capital gains, they can opt to be taxed on the remittance basis, which allows them to pay an annual fee to avoid tax on their overseas earnings. </p>
<p>In particular, claiming the remittance basis implies that the non-dom loses tax-free allowance for income and capital gains in the UK, and pays an annual charge depending on how long they have been in the country. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/tax-foreign-income/non-domiciled-residents">fee is</a> £30,000 if resident in the UK for at least seven of the previous nine years, £60,000 for 12 of the previous 14 years, or £90,000 for longer stays. Non-doms also enjoy favourable treatment of non-resident trusts.</p>
<p>According to the most recent <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/404153/Table_2.4.pdf">available data from 2012-13 from HMRC</a>, the <a href="http://election2015.ifs.org.uk/article/unknown-quantities-labour-s-non-dom-proposal">Institute of Fiscal Studies</a>, and law firm <a href="http://www.pinsentmasons.com/en/media/press-releases/2014/income-tax-paid-by-non-doms-hits-record-high-of-68billion/">Pinset Masons</a>, the HMRC raised £8.2 billion from the 114,800 people who claimed non-dom status in the UK, which amounts to 5% of the total revenue from income tax collected by the HMRC. </p>
<p>Only 46,700 non-doms took advantage of the remittance basis and 5,100 of them are paying the fees. More of them are not paying the charges presumably because they have lived in the UK for less than seven years. Only 19% of the total £226m total HMRC received in charges were paid by 3,700 non-doms who had lived in the UK for seven to 12 years. The remaining £183m was paid by 1,400 non-doms who had lived in the UK for more than 12 years. </p>
<p>According to figures released with the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/384071/AS2014_policy_costings_final.pdf">2014 autumn statement</a>, a recent increase to the fees from April 2015 will raise a further £90m a year from those who have lived in the UK for more than 12 years. </p>
<p>In the UK, the number of non-doms in 2013 was 6.7% less than that in 2008, the year when the remittance basis and the charges were introduced. Between 2008 and 2013, the total revenue and the average revenue per person in taxes from non-doms increased by 39% and 51.6%, respectively. Following the introduction of the charge, in the past six years the UK has experienced a 1.7% average decline in the number of non-doms per year, together with 8.8% average growth in the total tax revenue from them, as the graph below shows.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77765/original/image-20150413-24318-11xp6yt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77765/original/image-20150413-24318-11xp6yt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/77765/original/image-20150413-24318-11xp6yt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77765/original/image-20150413-24318-11xp6yt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77765/original/image-20150413-24318-11xp6yt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=325&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77765/original/image-20150413-24318-11xp6yt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77765/original/image-20150413-24318-11xp6yt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/77765/original/image-20150413-24318-11xp6yt.PNG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=408&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Growth rates from non-doms, tax revenue from non-doms and average taxes paid by non-doms (2009-2013)</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Author's calculations using data from HMRC, IFS and Pinset Masons.</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Abolishing non-dom status</h2>
<p>There are some potential sources of additional revenue from Labour’s proposed reform. The 5,100 non-doms who had lived in the UK between seven and 12 years who pay the fees do so because it is less than the taxes on their unremitted income or capital gains would be if they were domiciled in the UK. </p>
<p>The majority of this group of non-doms have lived in the UK for a relatively short period and therefore may face a high cost of migration, because their “sunk cost” is high and they have not lived long enough to recover it. So the proposed reform, if implemented effectively, is likely to collect higher revenue than the total proceeds from the charges paid by this group – currently £43m. </p>
<p>The relatively more settled fee-paying non-doms – currently 27.5% of the total – can leave the UK incurring very low cost – because they have already spent more than 12 years in the UK to recover their sunk costs. If the majority of the fee-paying non-doms – the ones who have lived less than 12 years – remain in the UK and pay taxes accordingly, it is likely to increase the total proceeds from this group.</p>
<p>However, this depends largely on HMRC’s set of information on the unremitted income and gains of non-doms in other countries, which is not available because currently the fee-paying non-doms do not have to disclose these. Similar uncertainty (due to lack of information) is associated with the removal of the tax advantages on non-resident trusts. </p>
<h2>Verdict</h2>
<p>Whether the proposed reform will generate “hundreds of millions of pounds” for the UK remains uncertain. Apart from the extreme response of leaving the UK, it is likely that the non-doms will pay accountants to avoid taxes. That will add to the existing costs of foregone revenue from and tax compliance of the non-doms, and therefore may result in loss of total revenue. </p>
<p>Other behavioural responses, such as transferring assets to family members abroad, spending more time abroad, or utilising the non-resident trusts more, may also add to this loss. The “higher end” non-doms, who can explore any other tax-haven and can buy a good life in any other location (such as the Middle East) can leave the UK at any stage of their residency. It is therefore very likely that following the reform, HMRC will not be able to raise the projected £90m every year from the charges.</p>
<p>The net revenue effect of this proposed reform remains uncertain, and the claims made by the Labour party are too premature, and to some extent, misleading. We need more details before assessing the credibility of the projection of revenue-gains from this reform.</p>
<h2>Review</h2>
<p>There is no question that this is extremely difficult to calculate with any precision for two reasons. First, a lack of relevant information about offshore assets owned by non-doms. It is such assets that give rise to the income and capital gains which are potentially to be brought into the UK tax net under the proposed changes. It’s also not known to what extent such income and gains will be sheltered by double tax relief for tax paid in the country of origin. </p>
<p>Second is the behavioural response of the non-doms, which will be mixed depending on the circumstances. Non-doms are not a homogeneous population and their motivation for remaining in the UK either physically or for tax purposes is not uniform, so their response to any change won’t be either. </p>
<p>To suggest, however, that being a non-dom who at present is claiming the remittance basis indicates a propensity to avoid tax (“will pay accountants to avoid taxes”) is not entirely appropriate.</p>
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<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Lynne Oats receives research funding from the European Union, the Economic and Social Research Council, HMRC and HMT but the views expressed in this article are her own personal opinion. She has previously received research funding from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Sheikh Selim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Labour has pledged to get rid of the centuries-old non-dom rule.Sheikh Selim, Senior lecturer, University of WestminsterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.