tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/g20-bali-119012/articlesG20 Bali – La Conversation2022-11-16T10:07:00Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1946332022-11-16T10:07:00Z2022-11-16T10:07:00ZG20 scientists urge pandemic preparedness and climate action: 4 steps countries can take following Bali summit<p>As the <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-a-climate-scientist-wants-world-leaders-to-know-ahead-of-cop27-193534">climate crisis worsens</a>, and after being <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid-19-recovery-some-economies-will-take-longer-to-rebound-this-is-bad-for-everyone-162023">ravaged by the COVID-19</a>, the world is becoming more aware of the importance of pandemic preparedness and the need for immediate climate action. However, despite their <a href="https://theconversation.com/one-health-why-we-need-to-combine-disease-surveillance-and-climate-modelling-to-preempt-future-pandemics-187923">wide-ranging and interrelated impacts</a> on us all, there are still relatively few effective and collaborative science-based solutions from countries in place to address these two challenges.</p>
<p>Indonesia’s role in <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-g20-summit-in-bali-whos-there-and-what-are-the-top-3-topics-on-the-agenda-194593">this year’s G20 events</a> provides strategic momentum for the country, along with G20 member states and the global scientific community, to continue and intensify this effort.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-g20-summit-in-bali-whos-there-and-what-are-the-top-3-topics-on-the-agenda-194593">What is the G20 summit in Bali? Who’s there? And what are the top 3 topics on the agenda?</a>
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<p>Pandemic preparedness and global climate resilience are key priorities of the <a href="https://s20indonesia.org"><em>Science20</em> (S20)</a> – one of many G20 engagement groups – whose leadership this year is held by the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (AIPI). Through a series of official forums between G20 members’ scientific communities, we S20 scientists have published a number of global health and climate policy recommendations outlined in the <a href="https://www.science.org.au/files/userfiles/about/documents/%20s20-communique-final-22-sept-2022.pdf">S20 Communique</a>.</p>
<p>We recommend several priorities for G20 leaders, including: building a resilient global health system, bolstering the use of multidisciplinary science and technology, and strengthening evidence-based policies on climate, pandemics, and the economy.</p>
<p>As the holder of this year’s G20 presidency, how can Indonesia encourage the international community to make good on this critical agenda? Together with S20 scientists, I recommend four steps that Indonesia and other countries can take.</p>
<p><strong>1. Declare commitment to science-based policies</strong></p>
<p>In this year’s G20, Indonesia needs to call on other state leaders to commit to implementing the recommendations of S20 scientists. Without a shared vow from world leaders, the thoughts and consensus of world scientists gathered during the long process of the G20 will lack bite.</p>
<p>Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, in particular, must also commit to putting an end to the <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/indonesia-bans-five-foreign-scientists-shelves-conservation-data">anti-science trend</a> that has occured during his administration – including the repression of criticism from scientists regarding the government’s <a href="https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/08/20/epidemiologist-pandu-rionos-twitter-account-hacked.html">handling of the pandemic</a> and also <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/wildfire-researcher-deported-amid-growing-rift-between-indonesian-government-and">deforestation</a> and <a href="https://www.science.org/content/article/indonesia-bans-five-foreign-scientists-shelves-conservation-data">conservation</a> efforts.</p>
<p>Amid stark warnings from global scientists regarding the earth’s worsening climate during <a href="https://theconversation.com/3-things-a-climate-scientist-wants-world-leaders-to-know-ahead-of-cop27-193534">the UN’s climate conference (COP27)</a> currently taking place in parallel to the G20, in addition to our experience with the COVID-19 pandemic, it is paramount for Indonesia and other countries to place science at the centre of health and climate policies.</p>
<p><strong>2. Establish a resilient global health system</strong></p>
<p>As stated in our S20 Communique, the COVID-19 pandemic is an alarm telling us that our health infrastructure – from the national to the global level – is <a href="https://theconversation.com/we-were-on-a-global-panel-looking-at-the-staggering-costs-of-covid-17-7m-deaths-and-counting-here-are-11-ways-to-stop-history-repeating-itself-190658">pretty fragile</a>.</p>
<p>Reliance on reactive policies, rather than global prevention and preparedness, has prevented many countries from being able to control the recent global health crisis.</p>
<p>Indonesia needs to encourage G20 countries and the global scientific community to ensure that the World Health Organization (WHO) establishes and coordinates a resilient health system able to counter global health threats.</p>
<p>Several global health initiatives that align with this principle have started to emerge. One example is the <a href="https://www.who.int/news/item/17-10-2022-one-health-joint-plan-of-action-launched-to-address-health-threats-to-humans--animals--plants-and-environment"><em>‘One Health’ Joint Plan of Action</em></a> initiated by the WHO and other UN agencies aimed at addressing threats to human, animal, and environmental health in an integrated way. The principles contained in the S20 Communique could strengthen similar initiatives and lay the foundation for others.</p>
<p>The WHO also needs to map out centres of excellence for health research in each country and ensure connectivity between these health systems. During the pandemic, for instance, we began to see a variety of collaborations that were crucial in containing COVID-19 – from <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/research-and-innovation/en/horizon-magazine/covid-19-how-unprecedented-data-sharing-has-led-faster-ever-outbreak-research">the rapid sharing of viral genome data</a> via genetic banks to <a href="https://myhealth.ucsd.edu/Coronavirus/134,263">collaborative vaccine development</a>.</p>
<p>Along with other principles in the S20 Communique, such as the need of a global “pandemic alarm system”, accessibility to open data between various research institutions, and a more robust vaccine and mediicine supply chain, we hope that countries can respond more quickly to crises at the local level.</p>
<p><strong>3. Build a sustainable post-pandemic economy</strong></p>
<p>The third step that Indonesia and world leaders must take, particlularly in building global climate resilience, is to emphasise sustainability in the rebuilding of G20 economies following the pandemic.</p>
<p>World leaders need to strengthen and enforce <a href="https://theconversation.com/inequality-and-climate-change-the-rich-must-step-up-119074">their respective climate commitments</a> – for instance, as described in each country’s climate pledge (<a href="https://theconversation.com/kesepakatan-cop26-glasgow-memuat-4-poin-penting-apakah-aksi-iklim-indonesia-sudah-sesuai-jalur-172206"><em>National Determined Contribution</em></a>, or NDC) – to ensure cuts to carbon emissions and a green transition in all economic activities that are also tailored to local situations.</p>
<p>The climate crisis is an existential threat, as we have outlined in the S20 Communique, and this must serve as a reminder to G20 countries to fulfil the climate targets of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/cop27-explained-by-experts-what-is-it-and-why-should-i-care-193727https://theconversation.com/apa-itu-cop27-ini-penjelasan-istilah-istilah-rumit-dalam-konferensi-iklim-tahunan-dunia-193744">Paris Agreement</a> and the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals">Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 2030)</a>.</p>
<p>This year’s G20 slogan – “Recover Together, Recover Stronger” – would be difficult to achieve if in their attempt to boost productivity and build infrastructure, policymakers don’t also pursue a state of carbon-free emissions (<em>net-zero</em>).</p>
<p><strong>4. Initiate a multidisciplinary health and climate research funding network</strong></p>
<p>Preventing, anticipating, and responding to complex challenges such as pandemics and climate change, requires a multisectoral and <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-one-health-concept-must-prevail-to-allow-us-to-prevent-pandemics-148378">multidisciplinary</a> approach. Research funding among G20 countries and around the world needs to do more to support interdisciplinary health, energy, and climate research initiatives.</p>
<p>Indonesia, through its science academy that sits as the leader of this year’s S20, can push for the creation of a multidisciplinary research consortium and funding system between G20 countries and beyond, particularly for research aiming to mitigate the climate crisis and support pandemic preparedness.</p>
<p>This is vital as climate and pandemic policies require <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-science-needs-the-humanities-to-solve-climate-change-113832">perspectives from the social sciences and humanities</a> to remain inclusive and ensure that <a href="https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-524-The-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Minorities-and-Indigenous-Peoples.pdf">no one is left behind</a>.</p>
<p>Sharing financial, knowledge, and technological resources – in addition to principles of openness and data access – is a crucial step to support a multidisciplinary research agenda to tackle global health and climate issues.</p>
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<p><em>Zalfa Imani Trijatna from Universitas Indonesia (UI) translated this article from Indonesian.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194633/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Berry Juliandi tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.</span></em></p>As the climate crisis worsens, and after being ravaged by the COVID-19, it is paramount for Indonesia and G20 countries to strengthen global pandemic preparedness and climate action.Berry Juliandi, Dean, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, IPB UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1944712022-11-15T14:32:41Z2022-11-15T14:32:41ZUS-China talks: Biden and Xi attempt to play down superpower tensions but Ukraine and Taiwan loom large<p>Presidents Xi Jinping of China and Joe Biden of the United States have held their first face-to-face <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/ahead-tense-g20-summit-biden-xi-meet-talks-2022-11-14/">meeting</a> since 2017. The pair met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, to discuss their joint obligation for charting a new course towards a better a bilateral relationship. </p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/14/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-before-bilateral-meeting/">emphasised</a> their shared responsibility to “prevent competition from becoming anything ever near conflict”. Xi, in turn, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221114/923108c461a54a9daab22a63803de343/c.html">acknowledged</a> that “the two presidents need to play the leadership role, set the right course for the China-US relationship and put it on an upward trajectory”. </p>
<p>This, of course, is easier said than done given the key areas of bilateral disagreement: Taiwan, North Korea and Ukraine, to name but the top three. The two leaders also face a raft of pressing global challenges in the climate, economic, food and energy crises. And while the tone of the their opening remarks was amicable enough, it cannot disguise the fact that US-China relations have been <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-53517439">at their lowest</a> point in decades. </p>
<p>Taiwan is a particularly sensitive issue. The US remains committed to its <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/">one-China policy</a> of not having diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but has provocatively strengthened its unofficial relationship. From Beijing’s perspective, supporting the status quo is one thing. But it’s quite another when the speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, makes a <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/pelosis-taiwan-visit-the-substance-and-the-aftermath/">highly publicised visit</a> to Taipei in which she reiterates US security guarantees for Taiwan. </p>
<p>Washington, in turn, takes a dim view of <a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000183-e6a2-d425-a58b-e6ebcc840000">Xi’s statement</a> in his report to the <a href="https://theconversation.com/china-echoes-of-authoritarian-past-as-xi-jinping-cements-his-place-at-the-heart-of-a-communist-party-now-entirely-built-around-him-193122">20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party</a> last month that: “Resolving the Taiwan question and realising China’s complete reunification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakeable commitment.” </p>
<p>According to China’s Xinhua news agency, Xi reiterated this point in his meeting with Biden, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">adding</a> that: “The Taiwan question is at the very core of China’s core interests, the bedrock of the political foundation of China-US relations, and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations.” Biden, in response, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">assured</a> Xi that the one-China policy had not changed and that the US continued to oppose “any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side”.</p>
<p>North Korea is similarly contentious for Beijing and Washington, and arguably more prone to unwanted escalation. North Korea’s reclusive regime is hard to predict and even harder to control, including for its Chinese allies. A series of missile tests since late September led to <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/experts-north-korea-s-expected-nuclear-missile-test-likely-to-involve-miniature-warheads-/6805278.html">speculation</a> that Pyongyang could also test nuclear warheads themselves, not just the missiles capable of carrying them. </p>
<p>This fear has not materialised so far. But it triggered the <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/05/north-korea-launches-more-missiles-as-us-flies-supersonic-bombers-in-support-of-south_6003057_4.html">largest-ever</a> joint US-South Korean air force drills, including supersonic bombers. This prompted more North Korean missile tests. It also <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/asia-and-pacific/article/2022/11/13/biden-huddles-with-japan-and-south-korea-in-the-face-of-china-and-north-korea_6004084_153.html">led</a> to intensified defence cooperation between the US, South Korea and Japan.</p>
<p>In the context of the existing three-way strategic defence pact between Australia, the UK and US (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/sep/16/what-is-the-aukus-alliance-and-what-are-its-implications">Aukus</a>) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of the US, Australia, India and Japan (the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/24/what-is-the-quad-and-how-did-it-come-about">Quad</a>), it is easy to see how an increase in US military presence and activities in China’s neighbourhood at a time of already tense bilateral relations with the US is perceived as more than just a potential threat in Beijing. This is the case even if it is related to North Korea rather than directly to China.</p>
<h2>Focus on Ukraine</h2>
<p>While Taiwan and North Korea have been on the US-China agenda for some time, Ukraine is a more recent problem on which the two sides do not see eye-to-eye either over whose fault the war is or how to end it. On the one hand, China – and Xi personally – has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/04/xi-jinping-meets-vladimir-putin-china-russia-tensions-grow-west">supported</a> Mosocow’s narrative of a western threat to Russia. But China has also <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-premier-li-emphasised-irresponsibility-nuclear-threats-asia-summit-us-2022-11-14/">repeatedly emphasised</a> the need to respect countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity and has spoken out against irresponsible threats to use nuclear weapons. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/">US account</a> of the meeting, Biden and Xi “reiterated their agreement that a nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won and underscored their opposition to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine”. Chinese state media <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">additionally reported</a> that: “China supports and looks forward to a resumption of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, and hopes that the United States, Nato and the European Union will conduct comprehensive dialogues with Russia.” </p>
<p>This is a far from unequivocal condemnation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Nor is it a sign that China will abandon a position that it considers as “balanced”. This much was obvious when China voted against a subsequent <a href="https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N22/679/12/PDF/N2267912.pdf?OpenElement">draft resolution</a> at the UN general assembly that had proposed to impose reparations on Russia “for damage, loss or injury, and arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine”. </p>
<p>But what it does demonstrate is that, under Vladimir Putin – and especially since the invasion of Ukraine – Russia has lost more of its former great-power status. It is now a problem for the only two remaining major powers to manage rather than to accommodate.</p>
<h2>A road to détente?</h2>
<p>There are three key takeaways from the Biden-Xi meeting. First, neither side has an interest in the further escalation of tensions in their bilateral relations. On the contrary, the statements by both leaders before and after their meeting point towards efforts to improve relations.</p>
<p>Second, there are areas where both countries will be able to work together. The resumption of the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/57aad7fd-de16-4f76-bac0-7db5b4863698">US-China climate security dialogue</a> is a clear sign of this. Planned follow-up talks during a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/state-dept-says-blinken-visit-china-tentatively-planned-early-next-year-2022-11-14/">visit of US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to China</a> next year indicate that both sides see scope for further cooperation elsewhere.</p>
<p>Third, relations between the US and China may be heading towards more stability and cooperation, but this will not end competition between them. While Xi <a href="https://english.news.cn/20221115/72c2d122221e4c9e94cc483654981aea/c.html">outwardly opposes</a> the “democracy versus authoritarianism” narrative, it is equally clear from the Biden-Xi meeting that the US-China relationship will remain the defining feature of the international system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194471/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grants from the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>Ukraine was just one of a number of potential areas of conflict that the two leaders discussed at their face-to-face meeting in Bali.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1941562022-11-14T19:00:46Z2022-11-14T19:00:46ZThe G20 may be a talk fest, but it’s a talk fest we need at a time of growing division<p>Last Friday, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese jetted off for a marathon of international summits, the most significant of which will be the G20, held in Bali. </p>
<p>Forged during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) – allegedly on <a href="https://theconversation.com/factcheck-did-kevin-rudd-help-create-the-g20-17049">Kevin Rudd’s own initiative</a> – the G20 brings together 20 of the world’s largest economies, styling itself as the premier forum for international economic cooperation. </p>
<p>While attention focuses on the annual leaders’ summit, much of the G20’s work happens quietly behind the scenes, with economic ministers and officials meeting throughout the year under a rotating presidency to address global economic challenges. </p>
<p>Yet, this is probably not why you’ve heard of the G20 recently. Rather, the focus has been on Vladimir Putin. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Western leaders have made it clear they would not accept <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/11/leaders-forgo-g20-russia-family-photo">sitting in the same room as Putin</a>. Yet, the host, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, has rejected calls to <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-vladimir-putin-stays-invited-to-g20-summit-indonesian-ambassador-says/">disinvite Russia</a>, offering a compromise by also inviting Volodymyr Zelensky, even though Ukraine is not part of the G20. </p>
<p>Jokowi’s stance stems partially from the nature of the G20 – it’s not a “by invitation” organisation – and partially to do with Indonesia. The country has a proud history of geopolitical <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/04/27/rethinking-indonesias-non-aligned-foreign-policy/">non-alignment</a>, and its position is actually closer to the rest of the Global South. While critical of the war, developing countries <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/10/russia-ukraine-west-global-south-sanctions-war">don’t see it in such existential terms</a> as the West, and have called for a negotiated solution that would involve compromises on both sides.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the fiasco over Putin has frustrated the Indonesians, who saw it as ruining their big moment on the international stage. In the end, Putin solved the problem by <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-11-14/g20-leaders-meeting-bali-indonesia-australia-putin-musk/101639184">deciding to stay home</a>, sending his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov instead. Nevertheless, Lavrov is likely to get an icy reception. Last time he met with his G20 counterparts, he <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/08/lavrov-leaves-g20-talks-early-denying-russia-causing-food-crisis">walked out</a> after facing criticism over the war. </p>
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<h2>Can the G20 can actually make progress on its policy agenda?</h2>
<p>There’s plenty to deal with. The pandemic has wrecked the global economy – crippling supply chains, slowing global trade and leaving numerous developing countries on the verge of bankruptcy. </p>
<p>More recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created a global energy crisis and runaway inflation, prompting central banks to drastically raise interest rates. This, however, has only increased global financial volatility, as investors flood to the US bond market, triggering an arms race over rates.</p>
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<p>All this is adding up to what the International Monetary Fund is predicting will be <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/10/11/policymakers-need-steady-hand-as-storm-clouds-gather-over-global-economy">a bad 2023 for the global economy</a>, with around one third of countries likely to enter recession, including, potentially, Australia.</p>
<p>Yet, the G20 is unlikely to make much progress on these issues. The summit comes at a time of deep divisions between the world’s powers, not only over Russia-Ukraine, but also between the US and China, the US and its Middle Eastern allies, and within the EU following the surge of populist parties in places <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-will-its-first-far-right-leader-since-wwii-mean-for-italy-190655">such as Italy</a>.</p>
<p>In this context, there’s little consensus on how to address these problems. It seems the best the G20 can hope for is to try to stabilise these tensions by offering world leaders a chance to meet and talk face to face. </p>
<p>The main event will be the meeting between US President Joe Biden and China’s Xi Jinping, their first as leaders. Again, there’s plenty to discuss: China’s sabre rattling over Taiwan, the human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the continuing tariffs on China’s exports imposed by Donald Trump, and Biden’s more recent efforts to effectively <a href="https://theconversation.com/clampdown-on-chip-exports-is-the-most-consequential-us-move-against-china-yet-192738">kill off China’s computer chip industry</a>.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/clampdown-on-chip-exports-is-the-most-consequential-us-move-against-china-yet-192738">Clampdown on chip exports is the most consequential US move against China yet</a>
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<p>Don’t expect much progress on these thorny issues, which are at the core of a fledgling Cold War between the two superpowers. But at the very least, the aim will be to take the tensions down a notch or two, and see if cooperation is still possible in areas of mutual interest, like climate change.</p>
<h2>Thawing the relationship with China</h2>
<p>Australia is also aiming for its own rapprochement with China. Albanese <a href="https://twitter.com/murpharoo/status/1592038072660930561">confirmed</a> he’ll be meeting with Xi on Tuesday afternoon, the first such meeting since 2017. The new Labor government has worked behind the scenes to thaw the relationship put in the diplomatic freezer under the Coalition, following spats over foreign interference and the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. </p>
<p>Albanese will be asking for <a href="https://thewest.com.au/politics/pm-prepares-to-touch-down-for-g20-c-8846952">a removal of $20 billion worth of tariffs</a> on Australia’s exports, as well as pushing for the release of two Australians currently <a href="https://www.thechinastory.org/perspectives-detention-of-australians-in-china/">imprisoned on spurious spying charges</a>.</p>
<p>China has its own sources of discontent, not least the AUKUS pact, and the recently announced <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-31/china-tensions-taiwan-us-military-deploy-bombers-to-australia/101585380">expansion of the military facilities in Darwin</a> to make them capable of hosting US B52 bombers. The two sides are also locked in an escalating competition over influence in the Pacific, with Solomon Islands as the biggest flashpoint. </p>
<p>Again, it’s unlikely these issues will be resolved in Bali, given the two countries are at opposite sides of the Cold War standoff. Still, it’s good to talk; the last six years have shown how the lack of regular dialogue leads to escalating tensions.</p>
<p>It seems that in a world of fragmenting power blocs, rising tensions and deepening economic crisis, creating a platform for the biggest players to talk is the best the G20 can do.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/194156/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tom Chodor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The G20 comes at a time of deep divisions between the world’s powers, so it’s unlikely to make much progress on its policy agenda - but it’s still good to talk.Tom Chodor, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Monash UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1866502022-07-12T14:11:43Z2022-07-12T14:11:43ZUkraine war: Russia’s G20 walkout heightens tensions at fractious summit as China’s rise continues<p>While G20 foreign ministers were meeting in Bali, Indonesia, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, threatened further escalation in his war against Ukraine, <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68836">announcing</a> to the world that “by and large, we have not started anything in earnest yet”. What he meant became quickly clear when a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/12/chasiv-yar-death-toll-rises-to-33-in-one-of-russias-deadliest-attacks-so-far">missile attack</a> hit an apartment building in Chasiv Yar in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, killing 33 people. Further indiscriminate attacks <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62106446">followed</a> against Kharkiv in northern Ukraine and Mykolaiv in the south. </p>
<p>Against this background, the <a href="https://g20.org/g20-foreign-ministers-meeting-to-be-held-in-bali/">G20 summit</a> on July 7 and 8 was the first time the foreign ministers of Russia, China and leading western democracies have come face-to-face with each other since the invasion of Ukraine in February.</p>
<p>The gathering followed a round of high-level meetings between western leaders in the wake of the invasion. These included the G7 and Nato <a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-and-nato-summits-lay-bare-deep-and-hostile-divide-between-russia-and-china-and-the-west-185964">summits</a> in Germany and Spain at the end of June, the virtual <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-61894760">meeting</a> of the BRICS leaders, and the Quad’s face-to-face <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-61547082">conference</a> a month earlier. </p>
<p>The participants may have been different at the G20, but the agenda items were very similar, including the war in Ukraine and the global food and energy crisis that it has further exacerbated. </p>
<p>But, contrary to earlier G20 summits, the prospects for any concrete outcomes were negligible. The G20 managed to agree the <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/210629-matera-declaration.html">Matera Declaration</a> on food security only a year ago in June 2021 and reached consensus on their <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/211012-chairs-summary.html">approach to the crisis in Afghanistan</a> at an extraordinary summit in October 2021. But the war in Ukraine has had such a divisive impact that it was clear from the beginning that the foreign ministers’ meeting in Bali would not even produce the kind of <a href="http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2022/220218-finance.html">joint communique</a> that the G20 finance ministers managed to conclude at their meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, just a week before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.</p>
<p>These low expectations were all easily <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/war-looms-large-over-g20-event-russia-meets-rivals-bali-2022-07-07/">met</a>. Foreign ministers from the G7 boycotted the welcome reception on Thursday, to make clear that the meeting was not a return to “business as usual” with Russia, but <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/not-business-usual-g20-foreign-ministers-meeting-bali-2022-07-06/">decided</a> to participate in all formal sessions so as not to leave the stage to Russia. </p>
<p>The first session on Friday was, predictably, highly confrontational, with western leaders challenging the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lawrov, on Ukraine. Lavrov’s subsequent press conference <a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1821243/">gave a flavour</a> of the ill-tempered encounters he had.</p>
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<p>It was to get no better. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/tension-simmer-at-g20-as-foreign-ministers-refuse-to-be-photographed-with-russias-lavrov/">Lavrov walked out</a> of the second session as soon as he had delivered his prepared remarks and did not attend any subsequent discussions, while western leaders refused to share the stage with him for a summit photograph. </p>
<h2>China to the fore</h2>
<p>Yet, despite the failure to deliver a joint message on anything much, the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting should not be dismissed as an outright failure. On the contrary, the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Bali is noteworthy for the bilateral meetings that occurred at its margins at a time when diplomatic encounters in other multilateral forums such as the UN or the OSCE are not taking place or are unproductive.</p>
<p>Predictably, the meeting between the Lavrov and Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister on the evening before the summit, confirmed both sides’ commitment to continuing cooperation, according to a <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220708_10717317.html">statement</a> from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Wang’s <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220710_10718093.html">subsequent statement</a> in the first session of the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting reiterated China’s stance on the need to find a negotiated exit from the war. He urged Nato and the EU to engage with Russia on a “balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture for Europe”, rather than imposing “limitless unilateral sanctions” which “heighten tensions and stoke confrontation”. Yet, Wang also emphasised that “Russia and Ukraine are both friends of China” and that Beijing will continue to deliver humanitarian aid to Ukraine.</p>
<p>The Chinese foreign minister also met, among others, with his <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220708_10717362.html">Indian</a>, <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220710_10718115.html">Australian</a> and <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220710_10718070.html">German</a> counterparts. While these meetings provided few substantive outcomes, they are indicative of the importance that China continues to attach to bilateral diplomacy. This at a time when China also persists with its policy of not condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine and, alongside India, Brazil and South Africa, offered Moscow a major international platform at the BRICS summit <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202206/t20220623_10709037.html#:%7E:text=1.,on%2023%2D24%20June%202022.">in Beijing in June</a>. </p>
<p>Perhaps the most important bilateral meeting was that <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220709_10718037.html">between</a> Wang and the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, which lasted for more than five hours. Blinken <a href="https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-21/">described the discussions</a> as “useful and constructive”. While disagreements between the sides remain, the Chinese <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220709_10718037.html">statement</a> on the meeting also noted several areas of agreement and a commitment by Washington and Beijing to improve cooperation on issues such as climate change and public health.</p>
<h2>No easy answers</h2>
<p>If there were any hopes that two months of global summitry would be able to fix a deep crisis in the current international order, these were sorely disappointed. The G20 did, however, bring together the world’s leading powers, which are currently effectively locked into their respective silos, with the G7, Nato, the EU and the Quad on one side, and the BRICS on the other. India is the only major power to partially straddle this divide through its membership in both the Quad and the BRICS. </p>
<p>At the end of a succession of these summits, the G20 meeting in Bali is further evidence of the trend towards a <a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-and-nato-summits-lay-bare-deep-and-hostile-divide-between-russia-and-china-and-the-west-185964">new bipolar system</a> dominated by the US and China and replacing the liberal international order of the post-cold war period. While China may appreciate the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine as hastening the rise of this new order, it also has an interest in ensuring that Russia emerges weakened from its aggression and unable to become an independent power centre.</p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/g7-and-nato-summits-lay-bare-deep-and-hostile-divide-between-russia-and-china-and-the-west-185964">G7 and Nato summits lay bare deep and hostile divide between Russia and China and the west</a>
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<p>Beijing also recognises that in the bipolar system, there is a clear need for diplomacy. This, in turn, creates an opportunity for the US and its allies to engage with China and shape a transition to a new international order that reforms – rather than replaces – the current system.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/186650/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stefan Wolff receives funding from the United States Institute of Peace. He is a past recipient of grants from the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Senior Research Fellow of the Foreign Policy Centre in London and Co-Coordinator of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions.</span></em></p>This was the first time Russia, China and the west have come face to face since the invasion of Ukraine. It did not go well.Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.