tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/israel-360/articlesIsrael – La Conversation2024-03-27T23:15:57Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248652024-03-27T23:15:57Z2024-03-27T23:15:57ZWhen does anti-Zionism become antisemitism? A Jewish historian’s perspective<p>In his latest book, <a href="https://www.pennpress.org/9781512823837/jewish-life-in-medieval-spain/">Jewish Life in Medieval Spain</a>, Jonathan Ray focuses on the tumult of the 14th century in Spain – a time of the plague, civil strife and war between the two largest kingdoms, Aragon and Castile, with frequent attacks against Jews. This culminated in riots in 1391, which resulted in deaths, destruction of property, rapes and forced conversions.</p>
<p>Ray describes an appeal the Jewish community made to the Spanish king in 1354, describing the hatred they faced: </p>
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<p>[…]the people made the earth tremble with their cries of: “all this is happening because of the sins of Jacob [later renamed Israel]. Let us destroy this nation! Let us kill them!”</p>
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<p>Treating Jews as scapegoats during times of hardship is an ongoing feature of Jewish history. Some <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/20-years-before-the-holocaust-pogroms-killed-100000-jews-then-were-forgotten/">100,000 Jews were murdered</a> in eastern Europe as part of the struggles following the 1917 Russian Revolution. These attacks were followed by the tragedy of the Holocaust. </p>
<p>Jews were also targeted in riots in the Middle East and North Africa during the second world war. During the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13610702">Farhud of 1941</a>, for example, a violent mob attacked the Jews of Baghdad, killing up to 180 people, raping women and looting properties.</p>
<p>An awareness of this ongoing history of persecution is important to understand the trauma of the October 7 attack by Hamas in southern Israel, during which 1,200 people were killed (and some sexually assaulted) and around 240 people abducted. It was a watershed moment for Israelis, as well as the Jewish diaspora. </p>
<p>It also helps to understand the Jewish perspective on some of the rhetoric heard at global protests against Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza – and more broadly against Zionism – since October 7. To many, this equates to antisemitism. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-long-dark-history-of-antisemitism-in-australia-217908">The long, dark history of antisemitism in Australia</a>
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<h2>When anti-Zionism leads to antisemitism</h2>
<p>Much ink has been spilt on the issue of whether protests against Zionism, or anti-Zionism, are inherently antisemitic. </p>
<p>Certainly, within the academic realm, anti-Zionism does not necessarily conflate with antisemitism. As Michelle Goldberg <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/11/opinion/antisemitism-vs-anti-zionism.html">recently wrote</a>, anti-Zionism can emerge from those who believe in the potential for Israelis and Palestinians to live together in the same state, or from well-intentioned concerns for Palestinian suffering, among other reasons.</p>
<p>However, when the real-life impact of anti-Zionism results in cries advocating for the killing of Jews, then it can only be understood as antisemitism. As is any criticism of Zionism or Israel that crosses the line into blatant racism or discrimination, demands to de-platform or exclude Zionists, the resurfacing of tropes and conspiracy theories about Jewish people, or the questioning of Israel’s right to exist as a state.</p>
<p>On October 9, just two days after Israel’s declaration of war against Hamas, a pro-Palestinian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/oct/09/pro-palestinian-rally-in-sydney-calls-for-australia-to-drop-support-for-israel">rally</a> took place in Sydney with clear parallels to 1354. </p>
<p>While the police may <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/02/afternoon-update-expert-finds-no-evidence-of-gas-the-jews-chant-at-rally-two-killed-by-sydney-freight-train-and-amazons-profits-surge#:%7E:text=Initial%20reports%20of%20the%20chant,%E2%80%9Cwhere's%20the%20Jews%3F%E2%80%9D.">quibble</a> as to whether the protesters’ chants were “gas the Jews” or “where’s the Jews”, for Jewish people, the intent was the same.</p>
<p>The crowd at <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/i-have-never-experienced-a-more-challenging-period-to-live-as-a-jew-20231101-p5egvc.html">another rally</a> at the Victoria parliament chanted “Khaybar, Khaybar, the armies of Muhammed are coming”. This refers to attacks by the Muslim army against the Jewish tribe in Arabia in 628, when Jews were subjugated, expelled or slaughtered.</p>
<p>These hateful messages coincided with an unprecedented upsurge of antisemitism in Australia – an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/mar/13/julian-leeser-accuses-australian-human-rights-commission-of-failing-to-address-antisemitism">increase of 738%</a> since October 7, according to the Executive Council of Australian Jewry. These acts included vile graffiti messages, the boycotting of Jewish businesses deemed “Zionist”, verbal abuse (including death threats), physical abuse and attacks on social media. </p>
<p>This rising antisemitism – as well as the lack of empathy and support many Jewish people felt in Australia following the October 7 attack – is what led to the formation of the Jewish creatives and academics WhatsApp group. </p>
<p>Its members were later shocked at the leaking of their chat with personal details and photos, as well as the threats and abuse some experienced. As Jewish historian David Slucki <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/religion/zionism-anti-zionism-doxxing-and-whatsapp-zio600-group/103472344">stressed</a>, such doxxing has no justification. </p>
<p>Some have argued the release of the chat messages was <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-jewish-creatives-whatsapp-leak-was-more-whistleblowing-than-doxing-heres-why-223552">whistleblowing</a> because the group was trying to suppress pro-Palestinian voices. To Jewish members, however, this argument <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/national/hundreds-of-jewish-creatives-have-names-details-taken-in-leak-published-online-20240208-p5f3if.html">evokes</a> ancient tropes of secret Jewish cabals. It also suggests that being Zionist automatically means one is anti-Palestinian. Such assumptions foster antisemitism, the clear outcome of the leak.</p>
<p>For example, the ongoing idea of Jews having “tentacles” that reach far and wide to control people was recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/07/chris-minns-jenny-leong-antisemitic-trope-octupus-greens-mp">resurrected</a> by Jenny Leong, a Greens MP for Newtown (who later <a href="https://www.smh.com.au/politics/nsw/nsw-mp-apologises-for-inappropriate-words-at-pro-palestine-event-20240206-p5f2pn.html">apologised</a>).</p>
<h2>Where Zionism comes from and how it’s evolved</h2>
<p>To understand what anti-Zionism is, one needs first to understand what Zionism means. </p>
<p>The word “Zion” stems from the bible. It refers to a mountain in Jerusalem where <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/David">King David</a>, one of the most revered figures in Jewish history who conquered Jerusalem in the 10th century, is believed to be buried. </p>
<p>Over millennia, “Zion” has come to refer to Jerusalem itself, as well as the Land of Israel. Zionism is also the Jewish national self-determination movement, which emerged in the 19th century to create a Jewish state in the Jews’ ancestral homeland, Israel. This goal was achieved in 1948. </p>
<p>Before 1948, there were Jews who opposed the Zionist movement for different reasons. The ultra-Orthodox believed Jews had to wait for the coming of the Messiah and creation of a theocratic state. Secular socialists, meanwhile, <a href="https://www.monash.edu/arts/acjc/yiddish-melbourne/organisations/bund">believed</a> Jews needed to fight for full equality and self-determination in their own countries. </p>
<p>As he discusses in his <a href="https://scribepublications.com.au/books-authors/books/my-life-as-a-jew-9781761380471">autobiography</a>, Jewish journalist Michael Gawenda grew up with such an anti-Zionist viewpoint, but gradually shifted his views on Israel. Then, he says, the world changed on October 7. As he suggests in a <a href="https://fathomjournal.org/after-the-pogrom-an-australian-journalist-reflects/">recent article</a>, some of those criticising Israel on the left today see the state as “the bastard child of an evil ideology”. He writes:</p>
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<p>The Hamas pogrom and its aftermath — the explosion of antisemitism and Jew hatred [around the world] — reminded Jews like me that in Jewish history, what may have seemed to be a golden age for Jews can end suddenly, violently, inexplicably and with devastating and sometimes murderous consequences.</p>
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<p>In a recent <a href="https://plus61j.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Crossroads23_Survey_Report_June_2023_2-1.pdf">survey</a>, 77% of Australian Jewry identified as Zionist and 86% agreed the existence of Israel was essential for the future of the Jewish people.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/universalism-or-tribalism-michael-gawendas-memoir-considers-what-it-means-to-be-a-jew-in-contemporary-australia-213459">Universalism or tribalism? Michael Gawenda's memoir considers what it means to be a Jew in contemporary Australia</a>
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<p>Many anti-Zionists today, particularly among the progressive left, however, believe Israel was “born in sin” as a racist, settler-colonial state. In their view, Zionists are pursuing ethnic cleansing, expulsions, theft, apartheid and genocide against the Palestinians. </p>
<p>These beliefs were also <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-long-dark-history-of-antisemitism-in-australia-217908">propagated by the Soviets</a> from the early 1960s as part of their efforts to win over the Arab world.</p>
<p>It is important to stress that criticising the Israeli government’s actions towards the Palestinians is not inherently anti-Zionist. This includes legitimate criticism of Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza and the government’s failure to set out clear plans for the aftermath of the war. </p>
<p>For example, US Senator Chuck Schumer, who is Jewish, recently <a href="https://apnews.com/article/schumer-netanyahu-israel-poland-hamas-3c86e541396fda36b0ef05b2d36c28e5">strongly criticised</a> the actions of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Schumer is <a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-israel-but-anti-netanyahu-democratic-party-leaders-try-to-find-the-middle-ground-226050">one of the most pro-Israel senators</a> in US history. He cannot be considered an anti-Zionist.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Excerpt from Schumer’s speech in Congress on March 14.</span></figcaption>
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<h2>Conflicting definitions on antisemitism</h2>
<p>In recent years, efforts have been made to define antisemitism to show how it intersects with attitudes towards Israel and to draw clearer lines explaining when anti-Zionism becomes antisemitism. </p>
<p>This culminated in the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s adoption of a <a href="https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism">working definition of antisemitism</a> in 2016. While stressing that legitimate criticism of Israel is <em>not</em> antisemitism, seven of its 11 examples of antisemitic behaviour relate to Israel. These include:</p>
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<li><p>denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, for example, by claiming the existence of a state of Israel is a racist endeavour</p></li>
<li><p>drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis</p></li>
<li><p>holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel. </p></li>
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<p>To date, 38 nations have accepted this definition of antisemitism, including Australia in 2021.</p>
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<p>Some scholars, including those who would consider themselves anti-Zionists, however, have rejected the definition and developed and signed another, known as <a href="https://jerusalemdeclaration.org/">the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism</a>. </p>
<p>A small minority of Jews who oppose Israel’s existence as a Zionist state adhere to this definition. For other Jews it is seen as more accurate because it is less prescriptive than the IHRA definition and also seeks to “clarify when criticism of (or hostility to) Israel or Zionism crosses the line into antisemitism and when it does not”. </p>
<p>For instance, it says criticising or opposing Zionism “as a form of nationalism” is not antisemitic, while “denying the right of Jews in the state of Israel to exist and flourish” would be. </p>
<p>As Jewish historian Derek Penslar <a href="https://fathomjournal.org/why-i-signed-the-jda-a-response-to-cary-nelson-2/">explains</a> in terms of why he signed it: </p>
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<p>There are a great many people in the world who bear no animus against Jews but who are troubled by Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and want it to change. Such critics include Jews who are deeply attached to Zionism as an ideal and Israel as the fulfilment of that ideal. </p>
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<p>Without an historical lens, it’s not possible to fully understand the complex interconnections between anti-Zionism and antisemitism today. </p>
<p>Instead of the polarising pro-Palestinian and anti-Zionist narratives we are currently seeing, our aim should be to work towards understanding each other’s pain and learning to listen to each other with respect, even if we choose to agree to disagree. We seem to have a long way to go to achieve this goal.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224865/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Suzanne Rutland has received an Australian Research Council grant for her research on the Australian Jewry and funding from the Pratt Foundation, as well as an Australian Prime Ministers Centre (APMC) fellowship for her research on Soviet Jewry and Australia. She is also involved with numerous NGOs, including the Australian Jewish Historical Society (patron), the Australian Association for Jewish Studies (past president and committee member), and the Australian government’s expert delegation to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. In addition, she is a board member of the Freilich Project for the Study of Bigotry at ANU; she is on an academic advisory committee at the Sydney Jewish Museum; she has joined the Australian Academic Alliance Against Antisemitism; and she is an Australian board member for Boys Town Jerusalem. These roles are all undertaken in an honorary capacity. She is also writing the history of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry in an honorary capacity.</span></em></p>When the real-life impact of anti-Zionism results in cries advocating for the killing of Jews, then anti-Zionism can only be understood as antisemitism.Suzanne Rutland, Professor Emerita, University of SydneyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2266532024-03-26T18:10:35Z2024-03-26T18:10:35ZHow will the UN security council’s call for a Gaza ceasefire affect Israeli politics and relations with the US? Expert Q&A<p><em>Washington’s decision to abstain from voting on a UN security council resolution which calls for a ceasefire and an exchange of hostages with Hamas has angered Israel, which has traditionally counted on the US for unwavering support in international forums. We spoke with John Strawson, a Middle East expert at the University of East London, who has been researching and publishing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several decades.</em></p>
<p><strong>The United Nations security council has passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and the return of the hostages held by Hamas. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated that Israel’s military campaign will continue. Does he have the full support of his government in this or is there a risk that any of his more moderate coalition partners will break ranks?</strong></p>
<p>UN security council <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147931">resolution 2728</a> is a testimony to ambiguous drafting. It calls for an immediate ceasefire but only to cover the rest of Ramadan, which is only about two weeks. It also seems to link the ceasefire to the return of “all hostages” but is silent as to whether this is a condition for the ceasefire. </p>
<p>It should also be noted that Hamas is not mentioned nor are Israeli hostages. At the conclusion of the relevant paragraph there is a reference to all who are detained – again without reference to their identity. It’s also important to note that Hamas and other Palestinian sources refer to all Palestinian prisoners detained by Israel as “hostages”. As a result there are many possible interpretations of the obligations the resolution seeks to create. </p>
<p>Netanyahu <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/25/world/middleeast/israel-ceasefire-rafah-netanyahu.html">has denounced</a> the US for not vetoing the resolution. Any responsible Israeli leader would have used the ambiguities to say that Israel was already negotiating such a ceasefire and was waiting on Hamas’s reply to their proposals. But Netanyahu’s stance is about keeping his coalition going with the support of the far-right which will enable him to keep his job. </p>
<p><strong>New Hope party leader Gideon Saar has already quit after Netanyahu refused to appoint him to the war cabinet. Obviously this doesn’t bring down the government, but what does it mean in terms of the power dynamic in Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, particularly when it comes to the far-right parties?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">Gideon Saar</a> is effectively launching his campaign to be prime minister. He has been a long-term opponent of Netanyahu on the right. He stood for the leadership of Likud, Netanyahu’s party, in 2019. Then in 2021 he broke away and sided in the Knesset with the broad anti-Netanyahu coalition that was able to govern for 12 months before being defeated in November 2022.</p>
<p>Saar wanted to be in the war cabinet where the key decisions are being taken. But the far-right minister of national security, Itamar Ben Gvir, insisted that if Saar was appointed he would need to be as well. But Benny Gantz, one of three voting members of emergency war cabinet had made it a condition that no one from the far-right would be allowed to join.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">Gaza conflict: Washington's patience is wearing thin over the lack of leadership from both Israel and Palestine</a>
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<p>Netanyahu is not yet ready to break relations with Gantz whose moderate politics plays well with foreign politicians. Saar knows this but wants to position himself to be the next leader of the right when the Netanyahu era is over. In the medium term it just illustrates how febrile Israeli politics are. </p>
<p><strong>Benny Gantz, who is a member of the war cabinet, has threatened to quit over proposed legislation that would exempt ultra-orthodox Jews from being conscripted into the army. The law would also put the government at loggerheads with Israel’s high court. What are the risks for the legitimacy of Netanyahu’s leadership?</strong></p>
<p>It is quite clear that Benny Gantz is trying to break up to the coalition. The ultra-orthodox parties in the ruling coalition really have one aim, which is to maintain the huge government financing of their communities. This is resented by the majority of Israelis especially given their general exemption from military service. </p>
<p>This is particularly stark when Israel is at war and more than 250 soldiers have been killed in action and thousands injured. Gantz knows that the last thing the Israel Defense Forces needs are thousands of reluctant recruits, but he also knows that it is a question of fairness that appeals to the vast majority of Israelis. Gantz is still <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240308-israel-poll-shows-gantzs-national-unity-party-leading-over-netanyahus-likud/">popular in the polls</a> and undoubtedly sees this issue as a weak spot for Netanyahu’s alliance.</p>
<p>Both the Sephardic and Ashkenazi chief rabbis have said that should the exemption be ended those affected should leave the country. Such statements give Gantz the opportunity of being seen as a patriot and taking the shine off Netanyahu’s nationalist credentials. So Netanyahu faces pressure from the ultra-orthodox, the far right, the more moderate right of Gideon Saar and from Benny Gantz at the centre. But the more these forces circle, the more Netanyahu doubles down on his rhetoric for complete victory over Hamas, seeing the war as his route to political survival. </p>
<p><strong>Netanyahu reacted to the US abstention by cancelling a visit from a high-level Israeli delegation to Washington for talks. But defence minister Yoav Gallant was already in Washington and is reportedly meeting with US officials. How does this affect the Israeli government’s unity?</strong></p>
<p>The Israeli delegation was asked by the Biden administration to discuss in detail the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/18/israeli-delegation-us-officials-plan-offensive-rafah-gaza-war">plans for the proposed Rafah operation</a> that Netanyahu has been talking about for weeks. The Americans wanted to know how it could be achieved without causing catastrophic civilian causalities among the 1.2 million people – mostly displaced – sheltering there. But instead of sending military experts, the delegation was headed by the minister for strategic affairs <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/07/world/middleeast/netanyahu-dermer-israel-war.html">Ron Dermer</a> (a Netanyahu confidant) and <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/tzachi-hanegbi">Tzachi Henegbi</a>, a former right-wing rabble rouser now serving as national security adviser.</p>
<p>Neither are military experts and Dermer has not even served in the IDF. What they could have told the US military team they were there to brief would be interesting to hear. But these armchair generals will now be staying at home. </p>
<p>Gallant, meanwhile, continues his Washington talks as if nothing has happened. Despite being a member of Likud, Gallant has steered his course especially carefully since March last year when Netanyahu tried but failed to sack him over his opposition to the government’s unpopular judicial reforms, which Gallant said would endanger national security. </p>
<p>Having survived in part due to mass demonstrations in his support, Gallant has occupied a unique position in the cabinet, as someone who stood up to Netanyahu and survived. He is liked in Washington and Netanyahu is probably relieved that he is keeping lines of communication open with the Biden administration. But it’s hard to hide the contrast between Gallant’s meetings and Netanyahu’s pique at Washington’s decision to abstain on the security council vote.</p>
<p><strong>What does this say about the future of US-Israeli relations?</strong> </p>
<p>The US has only really seen Israel as strategic ally since the early 1970s. Until then relations had been more problematic. When Israel declared independence in 1948 a US arms embargo was in force. In the 1948 war it was Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia that gave Israel its military advantage. </p>
<p>In the 1950s and 1960s it was mainly France who supplied Israel with arms – <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-us-discovery-israels-secret-nuclear-project">including nuclear weapons</a>. The 1956 <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez">Suez affair</a> – in which Israel attacked Egypt in coordination with Britain and France – was denounced by the US. But after the six-day war in 1967, the US became more engaged and interestingly has always promoted normalisation between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The 1978 <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david">Camp David Accords</a> when Israel and Egypt recognised each other underlined this. </p>
<p>My reading of this is the US entanglement with Israel since the 1970s has been about promoting a particular Middle East order. So we need to understand Israel-US relations in a regional context. </p>
<p>The Biden administration knows you can’t end a war without a peace plan – and that must mean a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, began his recent Middle East visit to Saudi Arabia, seeing Riyadh as central to a stable Middle East. Saudi recognition of Israel comes at the price of concrete steps to a Palestinian state. </p>
<p>The longer Netanyahu resists paying that price the more the agony of Gaza will continue. And all the while the US will have to ratchet up its pressure on the Israeli government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226653/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>John Strawson, a UK-based researcher on Israeli politics, answers questions about the US decision to abstain from voting on a UN security council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza.John Strawson, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2082122024-03-25T18:23:53Z2024-03-25T18:23:53ZGaza conflict: snapshot of a population being starved into submission<p>Israel has <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147916">banned the UN aid-coordinating agency, Unrwa</a>, from accessing the population of northern Gaza where a major famine is now believed to be imminent. The country <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/no-evidence-israel-back-unrwa-accusations-says-eu-humanitarian-chief-2024-03-14/">has accused</a> UNWRA staff of involvement in the October 7 Hamas attack but has provided no evidence this was the case and the agency <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/27/middleeast/unrwa-israel-hamas-october-7-allegations-intl/index.html">denies the allegations</a>. </p>
<p>Across the whole 141-square-mile Palestinian enclave, there are now high levels of <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-97/en/">critical food insecurity</a>. But the situation is worst in the <a href="https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/governorates/">governorates</a> of North Gaza and Gaza, where the situation is assessed at the highest level under <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/famine-facts/en">international standard</a> IPC 5, which represents “catastrophe/famine”. </p>
<p>This is defined as “an area has at least 20% of households facing an extreme lack of food, at least 30% of children suffering from acute malnutrition, and two people for every 10,000 dying each day due to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease”.</p>
<p>The middle governorates of Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis, and Rafah in the south, are presently classed as being IPC 4, or “emergency”. This means the areas have large food consumption gaps, which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality. </p>
<h2>Developing catastrophe</h2>
<p>The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification or IPC was originally developed by the UN in 2004 for use in Somalia. It is administered and implemented by a global partnership of 15 organisations. </p>
<p>It enables both governmental and non-governmental organisations to assess situations using a scientific measure, allowing decision-makers to reach informed decisions quickly and accurately in situations of extreme urgency – as in Gaza at the moment. </p>
<p>According to the <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Strip_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Feb_July2024_Special_Brief.pdf">most recent IPC rankings</a> published on March 18 and based on data taken during the month to March 15, 677,000 people in Gaza were in IPC 5 – that is, a “catastrophic” situation. Another 876,000 people were in IPC 4, or an “emergency”. </p>
<p>Some 578,000 people were judged to be in IPC 3 or “crisis” and 90,000 were in IPC 2 or “stressed”. There were no people in Gaza judged to be “food secure”.</p>
<p>But the situation is worsening by the day. By July the projections are that 1,107,000 people will face an IPC 5 catastrophe, another 854,000 people are expected to face an IPC 4 emergency and 265,000 people will be in an IPC 3 crisis. </p>
<p>In addition to the lack of access to sufficient food, the quality of the available food is also a major concern. There is a significant worry about <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33896431/#:%7E:text=Hidden%20hunger%20is%20the%20presence,%2C%20but%20nutrient%2Dpoor%20diet.">“hidden hunger”</a>. This is when, even when people have some access to food supplies, they are getting an insufficient quantity of essential nutrients. </p>
<p>The report goes into detail about the urgency of the <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Gaza_Strip_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Feb_July2024_Special_Brief.pdf">nutrition situation</a> in northern Gaza, where in January 2024 is was estimated that 98% of children consume two or fewer food groups, these being breast milk and eggs. </p>
<p>The report found that in the children they examined, legumes, vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables, other vegetables, grains, meat and dairy products, had “almost completely disappeared from their daily diet”.</p>
<p>It’s worth noting that 95% of pregnant and breastfeeding women had themselves consumed two or fewer food groups the previous day. Eating a well-balanced diet is crucial for pregnant and lactating women, as it directly impacts their health, the healthy growth and development of unborn babies and infants, postpartum recovery, and the quality of breast milk produced. </p>
<p>While most critical in northern Gaza, these conditions are repeated across the whole of the strip with varying severity.</p>
<h2>Collapsing healthcare</h2>
<p>The results of this lack of nutritious foods is increasingly manifest in a rise in preventable health problems, particularly among children. Given the breakdown in services across most of Gaza, the report said it had been unable to obtain sufficient information about the health of the population to “reach a minimum sample allowing exploitation of the information”.</p>
<p>Nonetheless the World Health Organization <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/12/middleeast/gaza-diseases-spread-what-we-know-intl/index.html">has reported</a> steep rises in acute jaundice, acute respiratory infections, bloody diarrhoea, diarrhoea, meningitis and skin diseases. Attacks on <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/12/middleeast/gaza-diseases-spread-what-we-know-intl/index.html">hospitals and clinics</a>, such as the sieges on Al-Amal and Nasser hospitals in the southern city of Khan Younis and the attack on Al-Shifa earlier in the month, will only exacerbate the situation. </p>
<p>Unwra’s commissioner-general, Philippe Lazzarini, called Israel’s closure of aid deliveries into northern Gaza “outrageous” and said it was an intentional plan to “obstruct lifesaving assistance during a man made famine”.</p>
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<h2>What can be done?</h2>
<p>The IPC’s famine review committee (FRC) says a <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Committee_Review_Report_Gaza_Strip_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Feb_July2024_Special_Brief.pdf">ceasefire</a> is the only way to alleviate this imminent famine. Provision of food and medical aid must be scaled up as a matter of urgency. </p>
<p>Attacks on hospitals and sanitation facilities must be halted. And any humanitarian intervention must ensure that in addition to aid provision, commercial access to food and medicines must be restored as a matter of urgency. </p>
<p>It’s also vital that aid organisations be protected and allowed to collect up-to-date information about the state of the crisis, so that resources can be directed to where they are needed most. But there’s little sign of this happening at the moment.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/208212/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Nnenna Awah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The situation in Gaza grows more desperate by the day.Nnenna Awah, PhD candidate, Department of Food and Nutrition, Sheffield Hallam UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255232024-03-25T15:23:27Z2024-03-25T15:23:27ZDoes the destruction of homes in Gaza constitute genocide?<p>The intentional destruction of homes — by a government or private entity, during war or peacetime, on an individual or communal basis — is referred to as “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/0267303032000087766">domicide</a>” <a href="https://www.ubcpress.ca/from-bureaucracy-to-bullets">by scholars</a> and by Balakrishnan Rajagopal, the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a77190-right-adequate-housing-during-violent-conflict-report-special">United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing</a>.</p>
<p>Domicide <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/83825/the-case-for-the-international-crime-of-domicide/">can constitute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes</a>. It has been used in armed conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Myanmar and now in Gaza, where Israel has destroyed <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-day-158">more than 60 per cent of homes</a>. The bombings of Gazan homes have also killed <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/21/gaza-death-toll-25000-un-antonio-guterres">tens of thousands</a> of Palestinians.</p>
<p>In the wake of Russia’s demolition of homes in Ukraine in 2022, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a77190-right-adequate-housing-during-violent-conflict-report-special">Rajagopal argued</a> that domicide goes <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a77190-right-adequate-housing-during-violent-conflict-report-special">beyond collateral damage and deserves stand-alone prohibition and punishment</a> in international law.</p>
<h2>Cutting homeland ties</h2>
<p>Homes are <a href="https://thefunambulist.net/magazine/the-land/colonial-lives-of-property-in-south-australia-british-columbia-and-palestine">more than physical dwellings or property</a>. Widespread domicide extinguishes individual and collective identity, memory and ties to homeland. </p>
<p>The deep connection of homes in Gaza to Palestinian land, territory and nationhood renders Israel’s destruction of them a genocidal tactic. Israel’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1068/d">long history</a> <a href="https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/435686">of intentional</a> and <a href="https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/from-bureaucracy-to-bullets/9781978802711/">arbitrary destruction of Palestinian homes</a>, and the <a href="https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1649445">subsequent displacement of Palestinians</a>, have been accompanied by the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2017.47.1.18">legalized annexation of Palestinian land</a>.</p>
<p>This history reveals a <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2022/02/israels-system-of-apartheid/">strategy of deliberately targeting homes</a> to harm Palestinians as a <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf#page=72">national, racial and ethnic group</a>. </p>
<p>The home is a crucial site of Palestinian group identity and national belonging. </p>
<p>In the words of social work scholar Nuha Dwaikat-Shaer: “<a href="https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/concern/theses/ww72bh72r">Palestinians see the home as a symbol of existence and as a means that connects them to the land</a>.” The UN Commission on Human Rights further makes note of the <a href="https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/2001/121">deep attachment of Palestinians to their homes and agricultural land</a>, including <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1555-2934.2009.01061.x">olive and citrus trees</a>.</p>
<h2>Home is critical to Palestinians as a group</h2>
<p>While the home is central to many communities, it holds a particular significance to the continued existence of Palestinians as a national group. The home is where <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316159927">identities, localities, social relations, cultures and nationhood</a> are produced, as feminist historian <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/palestinians-9781848132573/">Rosemary Sayigh</a> has argued.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://cup.columbia.edu/book/nakba/9780231135795">volume of studies into the 1948 <em>Nakba</em></a> — the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/5/23/the-nakba-did-not-start-or-end-in-1948">mass dispossession and displacement</a> of more than 750,000 Palestinians during the creation of Israel — by political scientist Ahmad Sa’di and anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod, ethnographic accounts document how the Palestinian home is a site of individual and collective memory passed on generationally. In the face of the ongoing erasure of Palestinian experiences, culture and places, that memory is also political.</p>
<p>Memories of the Nakba continue to infuse present-day Palestinian life. Subsequent displacements are being <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/14/a-second-nakba-echoes-of-1948-as-israel-orders-palestinians-to-leave">collectively experienced as a continuation of Nakba</a>.</p>
<p>Under constant threat and attack by Israel, the security and meaning of the home have become central to Palestinian national existence and identity. As Palestinian legal scholar <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/434/article/829323/summary">Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian</a> explains, the Palestinian home is “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316159927">responsible for the preservation of psychological and social life and the prevention of social death</a>.”</p>
<p>As a site of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2009.00352.x">collective memory-making</a>, the home is also essential to the preservation of Palestine as a <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2201473X.2013.859979">national homeland with territorial sovereignty</a> and the continuation of Palestinians as a <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/ca/palestinians-9781848132573/">distinct national group</a> protected by the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide-convention.shtml">United Nations Genocide Convention</a>.</p>
<h2>Domicide as genocide</h2>
<p>Under the 1948 Genocide Convention, when “<a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/1948-convention.shtml">committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group</a>,” acts causing serious bodily or mental harm or deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a protected group’s physical destruction constitute genocide. </p>
<p>Both of these prohibited acts are implicated by the destruction of Palestinian homes in Gaza. As South Africa argued at the International Court of Justice in November 2023 — in reference to crimes committed by Hamas and militants from other armed groups on Oct. 7, 2023 and the continued holding of Israeli hostages — “<a href="https://www.jewishvoiceforlabour.org.uk/article/icj-hearing-the-south-african-case-in-full/">no matter how outrageous or appalling an attack or provocation, genocide is never a permissible response</a>.”</p>
<p>Domicide inflicts deep emotional trauma that <a href="https://www.nybooks.com/online/2024/01/27/gaza-two-rights-of-return/">is passed on to future generations</a>. In Gaza, the tragic last public words of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/10/at-least-six-palestinian-journalists-killed-in-israeli-strikes-on-gaza">journalists</a>, <a href="https://lithub.com/read-the-last-words-of-writer-heba-abu-nada-who-was-killed-last-week-by-an-israeli-airstrike/">poets</a>, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/11/middleeast/refaat-alareer-gaza-professor-killed-in-airstrike-intl/index.html">academics</a>, <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/11/13/remembering_hammam_alloh">doctors</a> and <a href="https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/patients-medical-staff-trapped-in-hospitals-under-fire/">medical personnel</a>, <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-12-19/farewells-from-gaza">residents</a> and <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/in-gaza-thousands-of-aid-workers-risk-their-lives-on-mission-to-ensure-the-well-being-of-others-1.7066053">international aid workers</a> bear witness to Israel’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2024/jan/30/how-war-destroyed-gazas-neighbourhoods-visual-investigation">widespread destruction of homes</a>, forcible displacement and the mental and physical suffering in the ensuing long journeys to the southern Gaza Strip.</p>
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<p>Israel has displaced <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-day-158">75 per cent of Gaza’s 2.3 million people</a> at a <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/mass-exodus-begins-in-gaza-as-israel-tells-people-to-leave-ahead-of-more-raids">staggering pace</a>.
Approximately <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/02/urgent-statement-from-chief-executives-of-humanitarian-agencies-and-human-rights-organizations-on-rafah-gaza/">1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza are concentrated under abominable conditions in Rafah</a>, forced to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gaza-destruction-bombing-israel-aa528542">sleep in the street and burn garbage to cook</a> while <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/2/9/israeli-bombs-target-gazas-overcrowded-rafah">being subjected to frequent bombings</a>.</p>
<p>Domicide and mass displacement have also created conditions for greater suffering and loss of life due to inadequate shelter, disease, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/18/israel-starvation-used-weapon-war-gaza">starvation</a> and lack of medical care. </p>
<p>It has exacerbated the <a href="https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/document/trapped-the-impact-of-15-years-of-blockade-on-the-mental-health-of-gazas-children/">vulnerability of children</a>, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/01/gaza-israeli-attacks-blockade-devastating-people-disabilities">disabled people</a>, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/two-months-war-gaza-leave-elderly-newborns-destitute-displaced-2023-12-07/">the elderly</a>, <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/world/gaza-queering-the-map/">LGBTQ2A+ people</a> <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2024/01/gender-alert-the-gendered-impact-of-the-crisis-in-gaza">and women</a>, exposing them to <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/a-pediatricians-two-weeks-inside-a-hospital-in-gaza">severe physical</a> and <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/01/01/a-palestinian-poets-perilous-journey-out-of-gaza">mental harm</a>. </p>
<p>Doctors have described the <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/a-pediatricians-two-weeks-inside-a-hospital-in-gaza">horrors of Gazan children losing limbs and being operated on without supplies or anesthesia</a> and losing their entire families — now referred to by the acronym WCNSF <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614139">(wounded child, no surviving family)</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf#page=72">dehumanizing statements by senior Israeli officials about Palestinians</a> along with the staggering violence in Gaza — sometimes graphically <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/videos-of-israeli-soldiers-acting-maliciously-emerge-amid-international-outcry-against-tactics-in-gaza">celebrated by Israeli soldiers</a> — suggests an intention to bring about the total or partial destruction of Palestinian life.</p>
<h2>Recognizing domicide in Gaza</h2>
<p>The illegality of disproportionate destruction of civilian property and dwellings is currently recognized under international law. However, the significance of the destruction of the home warrants further attention. Whether through its existing role in international crimes or additionally as a separate crime, the atrocities in Gaza highlight the need to recognize domicide as deliberately furthering the destruction of a group. </p>
<p>When Israel attacks Palestinian homes in Gaza, it is doing more than destroying property — it is demonstrating a genocidal intention to destroy Palestinians as a group. </p>
<p>Given the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gaza-destruction-bombing-israel-aa528542">widespread current destruction</a>, <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf#page=72">the indications of an intent to destroy Palestinians as a group</a> and the <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf">International Court of Justice’s ruling on the plausibility of genocide</a> in Gaza, there are compelling reasons to assess Israel’s destruction of Palestinian homes as genocide.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225523/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Priya Gupta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The deep connection of homes in Gaza to Palestinian land, territory and nationhood makes Israel’s destruction of them a genocidal tactic.Priya Gupta, Associate Professor of Law, McGill UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2264282024-03-22T17:59:06Z2024-03-22T17:59:06ZUS calls for UN vote on immediate ceasefire in Gaza – what this shift says about America’s relationship with Israel<p>The United States has significantly shifted its position on Gaza by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/21/us-calls-for-immediate-ceasefire-in-gaza-with-draft-un-resolution">submitting a UN security council resolution</a> calling for an “immediate and sustained ceasefire”, tied to the release of the hostages kidnapped by Hamas. </p>
<p>This is the first time that the US has supported calls for an an immediate ceasefire, and indicates a further chilling of its relationship with Israel. It has previously vetoed <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/22/un-security-council-does-not-pass-us-resolution-calling-for-gaza-ceasefire">three attempts</a> at the UN to vote for a ceasefire.</p>
<p>Although US secretary of state Antony Blinken was in Israel ahead of the vote, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/22/un-security-council-does-not-pass-us-resolution-calling-for-gaza-ceasefire">which was vetoed by Russia, China and Algeria</a>, the rift between the US and Israeli positions seems to be growing. Speaking during the Blinken visit, Israel’s prime minister <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-68631712">Benjamin Netanyahu said</a>: “I hope we will do it with the support of the United States, but if we have to, we will do it alone.” </p>
<p>The US has upped its pressure on Israel in recent weeks, with President Joe Biden outlining plans to send aid to Gaza in his recent <a href="https://theconversation.com/state-of-the-union-biden-hits-back-at-critics-as-he-warns-of-threats-to-democracy-at-home-and-overseas-224913">State of the Union annual address</a>. </p>
<p>He said in the speech that Israel “had a fundamental responsibility to protect innocent victims in Gaza” and reiterated his call for six-week long ceasefire. He also announced that the US would be building a temporary pier in Gaza to receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters.</p>
<p>The US has historically been one of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/22/un-security-council-does-not-pass-us-resolution-calling-for-gaza-ceasefire">Israel’s closest allies</a>, something that has been put to the test with Israel’s conflict in Gaza. As a humanitarian crisis has unfolded, Biden, under increasing pressure from various voting blocs in the US has made important rhetorical shifts in his language about Israel and the war in Gaza. </p>
<p>Only <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/19/politics/biden-poll-israel-gaza-young-voters/index.html">20% of US voters under 30</a> approve of Biden’s handling of the conflict based on polling from December. Support for Biden from Arab-Americans fell to <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/31/gaza-war-biden-support-plummets-to-17-percent-among-arab-americans">just 17% based on polling</a> taken at the start of the conflict, a 42% drop.</p>
<p>Public opinion in the US has certainly shifted on the issue. Half of Americans, according to a February Associated Press poll, think that Israel has gone too far in its <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-poll-biden-war-gaza-4159b28d313c6c37abdb7f14162bcdd1">handling of the conflict</a>. </p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/2024/03/21/views-of-the-u-s-role-in-the-israel-hamas-war/#:%7E:text=About%20as%20many%20Americans%20favor,favor%20and%20just%2019%25%20opposed">Pew Research poll</a> from March showed that the US is evenly split on sending military aid to Israel, with only 36% of Americans supporting this compared to 34% who oppose. Half of those polled also support providing humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians in Gaza.</p>
<p>This marks a remarkable shift in US public opinion. Israel has been one of the biggest recipients of US aid, receiving <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts">about US$300 billion (£238 billion) adjusted for inflation</a> since its independence. </p>
<p>The US-Israeli partnership was initially mutually beneficial. During the cold war, Israeli assistance in discovering Soviet capabilities was so helpful that a retired US Air Force intelligence chief, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/09/books/better-than-5-cia-s.html">George Keegan, remarked</a> that it was the equivalent of having five CIAs. </p>
<p>When it appeared Arab states had become closer to the Soviet Union, the US adopted a policy of ensuring that Israel had a qualitative military edge (an ability to defend itself from credible military threats). This led to decades of arms sales under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.</p>
<p>The need to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge was even enshrined in US <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/11/17/ensuring-israels-qualitative-military-edge#:%7E:text=This%20commitment%20was%20written%20into,military%20edge%20is%20security%20assistance.">law in 2008</a>. It means that the US cannot provide weapons to any other country in the Middle East that would compromise Israel’s advantage.</p>
<p>With US assistance, Israel emerged with one of the most sophisticated military and intelligence units in the world.</p>
<h2>US veto power</h2>
<p>Historically, the US has used its veto power in the United Nations <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/how-us-has-used-its-power-un-support-israel-decades">to veto 45 resolutions</a> (out of 89 total security council resolution vetoes) that were critical of Israel – more than any other security council member). Thirty-three of these vetoed resolutions concerned the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Even under the Barack Obama administration, which notably had a fractious relationship with Netanyahu, US support remained unwavering. Though Obama prioritised visiting Cairo instead of Tel Aviv, and promised the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/nov/16/why-israel-allies-explainer">Muslim world a “new beginning”</a>, he oversaw Israel’s largest military package to Israel, worth US$38 billion over a decade.</p>
<p>But things have changed since Israel became more autocratic under Netanyahu’s leadership, most notably in the last few years. Netanyahu has been attempting personalise power into his own hands, undercutting the judiciary and filling the state with loyalists, all while fighting <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/04/06/trump-netanyahu-playbook-00090445">off corruption charges</a>. </p>
<p>Hamas’s shocking and brazen attack on October 7 may have been made more possible due to <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-israels-intelligence-chiefs-failed-to-listen-to-october-7-warnings-and-the-lessons-to-be-learned-219346">lapses in Israeli intelligence</a>.</p>
<p>Though the US understood that Israel would have to respond in some way after over 200 Israeli civilians were taken hostage, the humanitarian crisis and over <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/29/1234159514/gaza-death-toll-30000-palestinians-israel-hamas-war#:%7E:text=Health-,Gaza%20death%20toll%20surpasses%2030%2C000%20but%20it's%20an%20incomplete%20count,under%20the%20weight%20of%20war">30,000 civilians deaths</a> that have resulted from the military assault on Gaza have caused the Biden administration to change its tack. Most recently Biden has railed that Israel’s actions <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/09/biden-criticises-israel-gaza-military-campaign-over-the-top">are “over the top”</a>.</p>
<p>And it’s not just Biden that has found fault with Israel’s approach to Gaza. Other high level members of government have voiced their concerns. Most notably, Senate majority leader Chuck Schumer, the highest ranking Jewish member of Congress, publicly rebuked <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/15/schumer-israel-rebuke-aipac-00147430">Israel’s leadership</a> marking a significant turn in US foreign policy. </p>
<p>Continuing to aid Israel poses a dilemma as US foreign aid is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/18/us-supply-weapons-israel-alleged-abuses-human-rights#:%7E:text=In%20a%20statement%20to%20the,aid%20and%20deter%20future%20violations">legally contingent</a> on the recipient state not committing gross human rights violation. The Biden administration announced in February of last year that it would not arm states that violated <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/02/23/memorandum-on-united-states-conventional-arms-transfer-policy/">this principle</a>. </p>
<p>But it’s unlikely that this kind of cancellation of US aid at scale will happen. This would require the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts">US Congress and the president</a> to agree to obstruct the sale of military aid through a joint resolution. </p>
<p>For now, the Biden’s administration’s UN resolution marks a <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/27/its-time-to-end-the-special-relationship-with-israel/">remarkable shift in US policy</a>, and demonstrates the incredible strain of the “special relationship”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226428/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Biden is unlikely to cut Israel off altogether but a remarkable change has taken place.Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor, Department of Government, University of EssexLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2255242024-03-21T17:53:21Z2024-03-21T17:53:21ZWhether it’s Trump or Biden as president, U.S. foreign policy endangers the world<p>Many observers of American politics are understandably terrified at the prospect of Donald Trump being re-elected president of the United States in November.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/11/9/has-us-democracy-failed-for-good">The U.S.</a> is already showing signs of a <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis">failed democracy</a>. <a href="https://www.citizen.org/news/twelve-years-since-citizens-united-big-money-corruption-keeps-getting-worse/">Its government</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/9/28/corruption-is-as-american-as-apple-pie">and politics</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/us/politics/government-dysfunction-normal.html">are often dysfunctional</a> and plagued <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/28/report-transparency-international-corruption-worst-decade-united-states/">with corruption</a>. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/canada-should-be-preparing-for-the-end-of-american-democracy-176930">Canada should be preparing for the end of American democracy</a>
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<p>A Trump victory would raise fears of a new level of decline into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/20/us/politics/trump-rhetoric-fascism.html">fascist authoritarianism</a>. However, a second Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the U.S. </p>
<h2>Violence part of U.S. foreign policy</h2>
<p>Since the start of the 21st century, the U.S. has unleashed enormous violence and instability on the global stage. This is a feature of American foreign policy, regardless of who’s president. </p>
<p>In 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched its “war on terror.” It invaded and <a href="https://theconversation.com/by-not-investigating-the-u-s-for-war-crimes-the-international-criminal-court-shows-colonialism-still-thrives-in-international-law-115269">occupied Afghanistan</a>, then illegally invaded and occupied Iraq. </p>
<p>These actions <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/">caused the deaths of 4.6 million people over the next 20 years, destabilized the Middle East and caused massive refugee migrations</a>. </p>
<p>In 2007-2008, <a href="https://www.economicsobservatory.com/why-did-the-global-financial-crisis-of-2007-09-happen">the under-regulated U.S. economy caused a global financial crisis</a>. The <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2018/10/03/blog-lasting-effects-the-global-economic-recovery-10-years-after-the-crisis">associated political and economic fallout</a> <a href="https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-social-and-political-costs-of-the-financial-crisis-10-years-later">continues to resonate</a>. </p>
<p>In 2011, <a href="https://www.globalvillagespace.com/consequences-of-us-nato-military-intervention-in-libya/">the U.S. and its</a> <a href="https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-nato-pushed-us-libya-fiasco">NATO allies intervened in Libya</a>, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-floods-nato/">collapsing that state, destabilizing northern Africa</a> and creating more refugees. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html">The U.S. tried to</a> <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2023/06/why-are-we-in-ukraine/">consolidate its dominance in Europe by expanding NATO</a>, despite Russia <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine">warning against this for decades</a>. This strategy played a role in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. </p>
<p>President Joe Biden’s administration <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/30/why-the-us-and-nato-have-long-wanted-russia-to-attack-ukraine/">has been accused both of helping to provoke the war</a> in the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/">hopes of permanently weakening Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/why-peace-talks-but-no-peace/">of resisting peace negotiations</a>.</p>
<p>Today, <a href="https://time.com/6695261/ukraine-forever-war-danger/">Ukraine appears to stand on the verge of defeat</a> and territorial division, and U.S. Congress <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/01/us-congress-support-ukraine-war/677256/">seems set to abandon it.</a></p>
<h2>Fuelling global tensions</h2>
<p>The U.S. has provoked tensions with China <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/11/harvard-guru-gives-biden-a-d-for-china-policy/">by reneging on American commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) to refrain from having official relations or an “alliance” with Taiwan</a>. <a href="https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/proposals-for-us-action-in-s-china-sea-should-worry-everyone/">The U.S. has also been accused</a> of <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/20/us-pundits-and-politicians-pushing-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/">encouraging conflict in the South China Sea</a> as it has <a href="https://www.democracynow.org/2023/2/14/david_vine_us_bases_china_philippines">surrounded China with hundreds of military bases.</a> </p>
<p>Israel’s assault on Gaza is partly the culmination of decades of misguided U.S. foreign policy. Unconditional American support of Israel has helped enable <a href="https://www.amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/?psafe_param=1&gad_source=1&gclid=CjwKCAjw7-SvBhB6EiwAwYdCAVW84WyFFiEvbjzsIp5pPDN5CDlYOCBM52mCC6X6HGC6u52iuTDyyxoCM7MQAvD_BwE">the country’s degeneration</a> into what human rights organizations have called <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution">apartheid</a>, as the state has built illegal settlements on Palestinian land and violently suppressed Palestinian self-determination. </p>
<p>As Israel is accused <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68550937">of using starvation as a weapon against 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza</a>, half of them children, the U.S. is fully <a href="https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/ccr-news/building-case-us-complicity">complicit in the Israeli war crimes</a> and <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/south-african-lawyers-preparing-lawsuit-against-us-uk-for-complicity-in-israels-war-crimes-in-gaza/3109201">for facilitating a conflict</a> that is further inflaming a critically important region. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-strikes-against-houthis-risk-igniting-a-powderkeg-in-the-middle-east-221392">Western strikes against Houthis risk igniting a powderkeg in the Middle East</a>
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<p>Israel is of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/israel-strategic-liability">little to no strategic value</a> <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230804-israel-no-longer-serves-us-interest-says-ex-senior-white-house-official/">to the U.S</a>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3167/isf.2007.220205">American politicians contend that its overwhelming support for Israel reflects moral and cultural ties,</a> <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/us-ignores-israeli-war-crimes-domestic-politics-ex-official">but it’s mainly</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/13/us/politics/aipac-israel-gaza-democrats-republicans.html">driven by domestic politics</a>. </p>
<p>That suggests that for <a href="https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/5929705/us-israel-friends">domestic political reasons</a>, the U.S. has endangered global stability and supported atrocities. </p>
<h2>Biden/Trump foreign policy</h2>
<p>The Biden administration has continued many of the foreign policy initiatives it inherited from Trump. </p>
<p>Biden doubled down on <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2022/12/25/biden-escalates-the-economic-war-with-china/?sh=1f1caa1412f3">Trump’s economic</a>, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3253917/no-end-us-trade-war-china-biden-administration-pledges-policy-document">technological and political war against China</a>. </p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-american-technological-war-against-china-could-backfire-219158">Why the American technological war against China could backfire</a>
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<p>He <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/biden-administration-continues-be-wrong-about-wto">reinforced Trump’s trade protectionism</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/08/wto-flops-usa-shrugs-00145691">left the World Trade Organization hobbled</a>. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/07/09/1110109088/biden-is-building-on-the-abraham-accords-part-of-trumps-legacy-in-the-middle-eas">He built on Trump’s “Abraham Accords,”</a> an initiative to convince Arab states to normalize their relations with Israel without a resolution to the Palestine question. </p>
<p>The Biden administration’s efforts to push normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/11/analysis-why-did-hamas-attack-now-and-what-is-next">is considered part of Hamas’s motivation to attack Israel on Oct. 7, 2023</a>.</p>
<p>None of this inspires confidence in U.S. “global leadership.”</p>
<p>Biden and Trump share the same goal: <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/americas-plot-for-world-domination/">permanent American global domination</a>. They only differ in how to achieve this. </p>
<p>Trump <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/">believes the U.S.</a> can <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/20/key-moments-in-trumps-foreign-policy">use economic and military might</a> <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_2020_the_year_of_economic_coercion_under_trump/">to coerce the world</a> into acquiescing to American desires, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-strong-arm-foreign-policy-tactics-create-tensions-with-both-us-friends-and-foes/2020/01/18/ddb76364-3991-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html">regardless of the costs to everyone else</a> and without the U.S. assuming any obligations to others. </p>
<p>In office, <a href="https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/01/20/trump-the-anti-war-president-was-always-a-myth/">Trump tried to present himself as “anti-war.”</a> But his inclination to use of threats and violence reflected established American behaviour.</p>
<p>Biden <a href="https://jacobin.com/2022/10/biden-national-security-strategy-us-hegemony">follows a more diplomatic strategy</a> that tries to control international institutions and convince key states their interests are best served by accepting and co-operating with American domination. However, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/biden-warns-us-military-may-get-pulled-direct-conflict-russia-1856613">Biden readily resorts to economic and military coercion</a>, too. </p>
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<h2>Reality check?</h2>
<p>The silver lining to a Trump presidency is that it might force U.S. allies to confront reality.</p>
<p>American allies convinced themselves that <a href="https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-biden-doctrine-our-long-international-nightmare-is-over/">the Biden presidency was a return to normalcy</a>, but they’re still accepting and supporting American global violence. They’re also wilfully ignoring the ongoing American political decay that could not be masked by Biden’s defeat of Trump in 2020.</p>
<p>Trump is a <a href="https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/trump-symptom-diseased-american-democracy">symptom of American political dysfunction, not a cause</a>. Even if he loses in November, the Republican Party will continue its slide towards fascism and American politics will remain toxic.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/18/1232263785/generations-after-its-heyday-isolationism-is-alive-and-kicking-up-controversy">A second Trump presidency may convince American allies that the U.S. is unreliable and inconsistent</a>. It may undermine the mostly <a href="https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2024/03/14/how-europe-and-australia-can-end-our-slide-into-irrelevance-servility-national-press-club-of-australia-speech-13-march-2024/">western coalition that has dominated and damaged the world so profoundly</a>. </p>
<p>If Trump returns, traditional U.S. allies may recognize that their interests lie in reconsidering their relations with the U.S. </p>
<p>For American neighbours Canada and Mexico, a Trump presidency is only bad news. They’ll <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/joly-us-authoritarian-game-plan-1.6939369#:%7E:text=Politics-,Canada%20mulling%20'game%20plan'%20if%20U.S.%20takes%20far%2Dright,after%20next%20year's%20presidential%20elections.">have to somehow protect themselves from creeping U.S. fascism</a>. For the rest of the world, it may herald the start of a dynamic multipolar order.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225524/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shaun Narine has contributed to Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East and Jewish Voice for Peace.</span></em></p>A second Donald Trump presidency would not necessarily implement a foreign policy any more destructive than what is normal for the United States.Shaun Narine, Professor of International Relations and Political Science, St. Thomas University (Canada)Licensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2262682024-03-21T17:11:46Z2024-03-21T17:11:46ZGaza update: the prospect of mass famine is beginning to change minds in Washington<p>As the casualty count on the Gaza Strip approaches 32,000 people, in itself a terrible and distressing statistic, another number also stood out this week. It <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/19/israels-war-on-gaza-live-israel-holds-al-jazeera-reporter-for-12-hours?update=2784185">is reported</a> that in the past week, more than 100 aid workers <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/war-gaza-israeli-forces-target-aid-workers-string-killings-imminent-famine">have been killed</a>. Twenty-three on March 19 as they waited at the Kuwait roundabout in Gaza City to receive an aid convoy, but others in raids which have reportedly focused on aid distribution centres and warehouses, <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240320-israel-is-targeting-anybody-involved-in-organising-and-coordinating-the-arrival-of-aid-into-the-north-of-gaza/">according to the Middle East Monitor</a>.</p>
<p>In a situation such as the one unfolding in Gaza, with millions facing critical shortages of food, fuel and medicines, aid agency staff are precious frontline workers. They perform the vital – and very dangerous – task of coordinating aid distribution to 2 million desperate people. Like medical staff in a conflict situation, they are protected by the Geneva conventions.</p>
<p>As always against the background of a chaotic and politically sensitive conflict, it should be noted that these reports – like the overall death toll reports – originate with the authorities in Gaza and must be treated with due caution. But UNRWA, the United Nations relief agency for Palestinian refugees, reports that 165 of its workers have been killed in the five months of the conflict. </p>
<p>This is complicated by Israel’s claims that UNRWA workers were involved in the vicious October 7 attacks on Israel by Hamas, leading it to go so far as calling UNRWA an active participant in the conflict on the side of Hamas – although so far it has offered no evidence to support these claims. Despite this, the agency – which has an estimated 13,000 workers in Gaza – has had its funding paused by several countries, including the US and UK.</p>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
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<p>All of which makes for distressing viewing on the nightly news. It’s fair to say that in many western countries – judging by the massive and regular protests calling for a ceasefire and humanitarian intervention in Gaza – the views of significant numbers of people are out of sync with the actions of their political leaders. </p>
<p>Which sets up an interesting dynamic in an election year for the US. Last week, a speech by Chuck Schumer, a senior Democrat who is the US Senate majority leader and a vociferous, longtime supporter of Israel – and, until recently at least, friend of its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu – called for Netanyahu to resign and make way for an election, adding:</p>
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<p>Nobody expects Prime Minister Netanyahu to do the things that must be done to break the cycle of violence, to preserve his credibility on the world stage, to work to a two-state solution.</p>
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<p>Schumer’s boss, Joe Biden, commented that he had made “a good speech”, adding that: “I think he expressed a serious concern shared not only by him but by many Americans.”</p>
<p>But, as John Strawson – an expert in Israeli politics at the University of East London – <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">writes here</a>, all indications are that this is highly unlikely. Manoeuvrings inside Netanyahu’s ruling coalition, Strawson believes, have actually shored up the prime minister’s position when compared with his main rival Benny Gantz. </p>
<p>Schumer also called for the Palestinian Authority to make changes at the top to usher in “a new generation of Palestinian leaders who will work towards attaining peace with a Jewish state”. But this looks highly unlikely too, given that the PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, has just appointed a decidedly old-school prime minister: Muhammad Mustafa is a 69-year-old political ally who hardly represents a new generation of leadership.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-washingtons-patience-is-wearing-thin-over-the-lack-of-leadership-from-both-israel-and-palestine-225915">Gaza conflict: Washington's patience is wearing thin over the lack of leadership from both Israel and Palestine</a>
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<p>Schumer’s speech also bears examination for what it tells us about Washington’s attitude towards the Israeli government – at least on the Democrat side. As Dov Waxman, professor of Israel Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, tells Naomi Schalit, political editor of The Conversation US, Schumer’s speech marks “the culmination of a process that’s been underway for some time, whereby the Democratic Party has increasingly turned against Netanyahu”.</p>
<p>In this <a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-israel-but-anti-netanyahu-democratic-party-leaders-try-to-find-the-middle-ground-226050">illuminating interview</a>, Waxman sets out the nuances in the speech which, he believes, was aimed as much at a domestic audience of Democrat voters as at Israelis, Palestinians or the watching international community, with Schumer deliberately positioning the Democrats as pro-Israel but against the Netanyahu government and what it is doing in Gaza.</p>
<p>Hidden in the speech was a key phrase warning that if this goes on much longer, it will force the Biden administration to “play a more active role in shaping Israeli policy by using our leverage to change the present course”. By this, says Waxman, Schumer means that US military aid to Israel could be on the line. Now that would be a game-changer.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/pro-israel-but-anti-netanyahu-democratic-party-leaders-try-to-find-the-middle-ground-226050">Pro-Israel but anti-Netanyahu: Democratic Party leaders try to find the middle ground</a>
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<h2>By sea? By air?</h2>
<p>As you would expect, Biden made Gaza one of the key segments of his recent State of the Union address. With a view to voters on both sides of the spectrum, he apportioned blame carefully, noting that the conflict had begun with the Hamas assault on October 7 but adding that the overwhelming majority of the victims of Israel’s reprisal operation in Gaza have been innocent civilians.</p>
<p>Declaring that “it’s heartbreaking”, Biden announced that he had instructed the US military to build a temporary pier in the Mediterranean to enable the delivery of aid by sea. “No US boots will be on the ground,” he noted, adding that the pier would enable a “massive increase in the amount of humanitarian assistance getting into Gaza every day”.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">‘It’s heartbreaking’: Joe Biden’s 2024 State of the Union address.</span></figcaption>
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<p>But Foteini Stavropoulou of Liverpool John Moores University and Sarah Schiffling of Hanken School of Economics – both experts in aid distribution – believe this will fall far short of the capacity required to meet the urgent needs of the starving population of Gaza. Here, <a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-plan-to-build-a-pier-to-get-aid-into-gaza-isnt-enough-here-are-six-issues-needed-for-an-effective-aid-strategy-225369">they outline six steps</a> which could help get the required volumes of humanitarian aid into the besieged enclave.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-plan-to-build-a-pier-to-get-aid-into-gaza-isnt-enough-here-are-six-issues-needed-for-an-effective-aid-strategy-225369">Joe Biden's plan to build a pier to get aid into Gaza isn't enough – here are six issues needed for an effective aid strategy</a>
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<p>There have been airdrops of aid over the past weeks. Stavropoulou and Schiffling believe this is a delivery option of last resort, but for 12 months from 1948, the US and UK maintained an airlift into blockaded west Berlin, feeding more than 2 million people cut off by Soviet forces.</p>
<p>Claudia Milena Adler, an expert in humanitarianism with the University of York, and Abdullah Yusuf, an expert in international relations at the University of Dundee, compare what was achieved during the Berlin airlift with what is required now, and ask whether the west can perform the same miraculous service in Gaza. </p>
<p>They are not optimistic. Feeding Berlin in 1948 took a clear effort of <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-if-theres-a-lesson-from-the-berlin-airlift-its-that-political-will-is-required-to-avoid-a-humanitarian-catastrophe-226243">political will</a> and western unity to achieve. It’s far from clear, they write, that the same political will exists today when it comes to Israel and Palestine.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-if-theres-a-lesson-from-the-berlin-airlift-its-that-political-will-is-required-to-avoid-a-humanitarian-catastrophe-226243">Gaza war: if there's a lesson from the Berlin airlift it's that political will is required to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe</a>
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<h2>Ramadan in Rafah</h2>
<p>Back in January, the aforementioned Benny Gantz – a member of Israel’s war cabinet – said that unless all hostages were released, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would commence an assault on the city of Rafah by March 10 – which would coincide with the start of Ramadan. This, as the director of the Middle East Institute’s program on Palestine, Khaled Elgindy, said at the time, “adds a layer of distastefulness and outrage to an already pretty horrendous situation”.</p>
<p>In the event, the assault has not begun. Now we have a situation where almost daily, Biden and other senior world leaders warn Israel not to go into Rafah – where more than a million Palestinian refugees from the rest of the Gaza Strip are huddling and close to starvation. Meanwhile, Israel doubles down on its insistence that it still plans to carry out the assault.</p>
<p>Carlo Aldrovandi, a professor in international peace studies at Trinity College Dublin, <a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-conflict-ramadan-brings-fresh-fears-of-escalation-on-both-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-225367">explains the significance of Ramadan</a>, not only to the 2 million Palestinians trapped in Gaza but the wider Islamic world. And he warns that Islam’s holiest month could see increased violence on the West Bank, where tensions remain high.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-conflict-ramadan-brings-fresh-fears-of-escalation-on-both-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-225367">Israel-Hamas conflict: Ramadan brings fresh fears of escalation on both Gaza Strip and West Bank</a>
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<p><em>Gaza Update is available as a fortnightly email newsletter. <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/newsletters/gaza-update-159?utm_source=TCUK&utm_medium=linkback&utm_campaign=Gaza">Click here to get our updates directly in your inbox</a>.</em></p>
<hr><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226268/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
A selection of our coverage of the conflict in Gaza from the past fortnight.Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate EditorLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2260862024-03-21T14:42:07Z2024-03-21T14:42:07ZStarvation is a weapon of war: Gazans are paying the price<iframe height="200px" width="100%" frameborder="no" scrolling="no" seamless="" src="https://player.simplecast.com/a0ebccbd-65af-4884-ae7e-49ae086cd98f?dark=true"></iframe>
<p>On Monday, the European Union’s foreign policy chief <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ipc-gaza-famine-report-1.7146974">accused Israel of using starvation as a weapon of war</a> and provoking famine in Gaza. </p>
<p>Israel <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-asks-world-court-not-order-new-measures-over-gaza-hunger-2024-03-18/">denies the allegations</a>, which are some of the strongest words we have heard from a western power about the situation in Gaza since October. The EU statement comes on the heels of a <a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-97/en/">UN-backed report</a> that warns that more than one million people — half of Gaza’s population — face catastrophic starvation conditions. </p>
<p>The report compiled through a partnership of more than 19 international agencies, including the United Nations and the Canadian International Development Agency, goes on to say that without an immediate ceasefire and a major influx of food especially into areas cut off by fighting, famine and mass death in Gaza are imminent.</p>
<p>In response to Monday’s report, the United Nations Secretary-General, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2024/3/18/un-backed-report-says-famine-imminent-in-northern-gaza">António Guterres said</a> Palestinians in Gaza are “enduring horrifying levels of hunger and suffering” and called the findings an “appalling indictment of conditions on the ground for civilians.”</p>
<p>“We must act now to prevent the unthinkable, the unacceptable and the unjustifiable,” he said.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/video/famine-expert-analyzes-gaza-humanitarian-crisis/">Scholars of famine</a> say this is the worst food deprivation they have observed in war time since the Second World War. And according to international law, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/31/israel-gaza-starvation-international-law">intentional starvation of a population is a war crime</a>.</p>
<p>Hilal Elver joined us to share her extensive expertise on the issue. Prof. Elver is the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, a position she held for six years, from 2014 to 2020. She is also a research professor of Global Studies at the University of California Santa Barbara and a Global Distinguished Fellow at the Resnick Center for Food Law and Policy at UCLA School of Law. Elver currently serves on the committee of experts at the Committee on World Food Security.</p>
<p>With almost 50 per cent of Gaza’s population under 18, Elver says children are forced to grow up quickly in Gaza. She worries for their future. She says even if we stop the war right now, “we’re going to lose this generation.” </p>
<h2>Listen and follow</h2>
<p>You can listen to or follow <a href="https://dont-call-me-resilient.simplecast.com/"><em>Don’t Call Me Resilient</em></a> on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/dont-call-me-resilient/id1549798876">Apple Podcasts</a> <a href="https://www.apple.com/ca/newsroom/2024/03/apple-introduces-transcripts-for-apple-podcasts/">(transcripts available)</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/37tK4zmjWvq2Sh6jLIpzp7">Spotify</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL_mJBLBznANz6ID9rBCUk7gv_ZRC4Og9-">YouTube</a> or wherever you listen to your favourite podcasts. </p>
<p><a href="mailto:dcmr@theconversation.com">We’d love to hear from you</a>, including any ideas for future episodes.</p>
<p>Join the Conversation on <a href="https://www.instagram.com/dontcallmeresilientpodcast/">Instagram</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/ConversationCA">X</a>, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/theconversationcanada">LinkedIn</a> and use #DontCallMeResilient.</p>
<h2>Resources</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Committee_Review_Report_Gaza_Strip_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Feb_July2024_Special_Brief.pdf">Famine Review Committee Report: Gaza Strip Acute Food Insecurity March 2024</a> — Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</p>
<p><a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662"><em>Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine</em></a> by Alex de Waal</p>
<p><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/un-chief-pushes-get-aid-into-gaza-process-is-slow-2023-10-20/">U.N. chief pleads for Gaza lifeline at Egypt border crossing</a></p>
<h2>From the archives - in The Conversation</h2>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/western-moral-credibility-is-dying-along-with-thousands-of-gaza-citizens-220449">Western moral credibility is dying along with thousands of Gaza citizens</a>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/ramadan-will-be-difficult-for-those-in-gaza-or-other-war-zones-what-does-fasting-mean-for-those-who-might-be-already-starving-225152">Ramadan will be difficult for those in Gaza or other war zones – what does fasting mean for those who might be already starving?</a>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-siege-has-placed-gazans-at-risk-of-starvation-prewar-policies-made-them-vulnerable-in-the-first-place-222657">Israeli siege has placed Gazans at risk of starvation − prewar policies made them vulnerable in the first place</a>
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<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226086/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
We speak with Hilal Elver, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and current University of California professor about the looming famine in Gaza after months of Israeli attacks.Vinita Srivastava, Host + Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientAteqah Khaki, Associate Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientHusein Haveliwala, Student Journalist/Assistant Producer, Don't Call Me ResilientLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2260502024-03-19T15:56:18Z2024-03-19T15:56:18ZPro-Israel but anti-Netanyahu: Democratic Party leaders try to find the middle ground<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582591/original/file-20240318-24-wbahpo.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=16%2C8%2C5590%2C3724&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has come under unusual criticism from Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-looks-on-as-the-news-photo/1719686694?adppopup=true"> Jacquelyn Martin / POOL / AFP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer <a href="https://apnews.com/article/schumer-netanyahu-israel-palestinians-elections-1ebf21e4c9c0f6f42478bb26e1db7a9b">said on March 14, 2024</a>, “The Netanyahu coalition no longer fits the needs of Israel.” It was an extraordinary public criticism of a longtime ally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, by an American government official.</em> </p>
<p><em>Against the background of <a href="https://apnews.com/article/gaza-malnutrition-famine-children-dying-israel-palestinians-2f938b1a82d7822c7da67cc162da1a37">imminent famine in Gaza</a>, Schumer, the top Democrat in Congress and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/14/us/politics/schumer-netanyahu-israel-elections.html">highest-ranking Jewish elected official in the U.S.</a>, said Netanyahu was “an obstacle to peace” and called for new elections in Israel.</em> </p>
<p><em>Leading <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-03-15/ty-article/.premium/schumer-clears-path-for-democrats-to-disavow-netanyahu-will-biden-follow/0000018e-425d-d95b-a7bf-e75fd3f40000">Democratic senators praised</a> Schumer’s speech, while <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4532827-republicans-seethe-over-schumer-call-for-israeli-elections/">the GOP panned it</a>. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/15/us/politics/biden-netanyahu-schumer-speech.html">President Joe Biden said it</a> was “a good speech” that raised concerns “shared not only by him but by many Americans.”</em></p>
<p><em>The Conversation’s senior politics and democracy editor, Naomi Schalit, interviewed <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=pgpEt8MAAAAJ&hl=en">scholar Dov Waxman</a> about Schumer’s speech. Waxman, an expert on both Israeli politics and the <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691181158/trouble-in-the-tribe">American Jewish community’s relationship with Israel</a>, described the speech as a watershed moment in the U.S.-Israel relationship.</em> </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer gives a speech in which he calls for new elections in Israel.</span></figcaption>
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<p><strong><a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-03-17-2024-ab0b75fdd8f0ab51c5e38b1870afecd8">Netanyahu’s response to Schumer</a> was, “The people of Israel will choose when they will have elections, and who they’ll elect.” What does Schumer’s speech mean for Netanyahu, both in the U.S. and in Israel?</strong></p>
<p>I don’t think most Israelis are paying much attention to what Schumer said. They’re focused on the war and especially on the current negotiations to secure a cease-fire and hostage agreement. </p>
<p>But Schumer is right that the vast majority of Israelis have <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">completely lost confidence in Netanyahu</a> and his government and want him to be replaced as prime minister. Yet there isn’t majority support for immediate elections. <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/articles/52742">A plurality of Israelis want early elections to take place after the war ends</a>. At the same time, I think the positions Schumer was putting forward – particularly about the need to create a Palestinian state – are not ones that are widely shared by most Israelis. </p>
<p>Schumer’s speech matters more for American politics than for Israeli politics. It marks the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/15/politics/schumer-israel-speech-analysis/index.html">culmination of a process</a> that’s been underway for some time, whereby the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/03/15/schumer-biden-democrats-shift-gaza/">Democratic Party has increasingly turned against Netanyahu</a>. This is not just the progressive wing of the Democratic Party <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/16/1213406754/jewish-voters-biden-israel-hamas-war">but also the moderate wing and the most pro-Israel Democrats</a>. <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-03-15/ty-article/.premium/schumer-clears-path-for-democrats-to-disavow-netanyahu-will-biden-follow/0000018e-425d-d95b-a7bf-e75fd3f40000">Schumer is one of the most pro-Israel senators</a> in American history. He’s had a long relationship with Netanyahu and was considered a friend of Netanyahu. So, the break between Democrats and Netanyahu is now complete. Netanyahu has clearly become persona non grata for the Democrats.</p>
<p><strong>What was Schumer’s strategy in giving the speech?</strong></p>
<p>What Schumer, and to some extent the Biden administration, are doing is trying to position the Democratic Party as anti-Netanyahu but not anti-Israel. They want to make a distinction that it is possible and indeed necessary to take issue with Netanyahu’s policies, but that doesn’t mean that you’re not supporting Israel. </p>
<p>That’s an attempt to triangulate between the different political pressures that the Democrats are under and the political risks that Democrats now face. President Biden’s strong support for the war in Gaza has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza-poll.html">become a domestic political liability for him</a> and for the Democratic Party as a whole. On the one hand, they need to try to win back support among progressives, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/11/16/1213406754/jewish-voters-biden-israel-hamas-war">younger Democrats</a> and especially among <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/will-angry-arab-american-voters-swing-michigan-away-from-biden-/7519681.html">the Arab American voters who are outraged</a> over the Biden administration’s support for the war. But they need to do that without alienating Jewish American voters and moderate Democrats who support the war and, broadly speaking, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/12/08/americans-views-of-the-israel-hamas-war/">support Israel</a>. </p>
<p>This is an attempt to find that balance without incurring major domestic political costs.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man holds a sign that reads, 'Chuck Schumer, thanks' during a protest." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582561/original/file-20240318-22-o4ra9x.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
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<span class="caption">A man expresses his gratitude toward U.S. Sen. Chuck Schumer during a protest calling for the release of hostages and against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government on March 16, 2024, in Tel Aviv, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-holds-a-sign-that-reads-chuck-schumer-thanks-news-photo/2089768566?adppopup=true">Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images</a></span>
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<p><strong>Schumer can say what he wants, Biden can say what he wants, and Netanyahu keeps doing what he wants. If what Schumer and Biden say doesn’t affect the behavior of the Israeli government, can it be effective domestically in the U.S.?</strong> </p>
<p><a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-senator-chuck-schumers-speech-israeli-elections-are-the-only-way/">Buried in the speech</a> is a real political bombshell. Schumer said that if Netanyahu and his coalition remain in power and continue to pursue “dangerous and inflammatory policies that test existing U.S. standards for assistance,” then the U.S. will be forced to “play a more active role in shaping Israeli policy by using our leverage to change the present course.”</p>
<p>It’s not the first time that a U.S. senator or policymaker is raising the threat of <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4453366-democrats-propose-amendment-conditioning-aid-to-israel-over-delivery-of-humanitarian-assistance-to-gaza/">potentially conditioning U.S. military aid</a>. But Schumer doing so sends a message to Israeli policymakers that mainstream, pro-Israel Democrats are now willing to consider something that was previously politically taboo, namely conditioning U.S. aid to Israel. That could induce changes in Israeli policy. </p>
<p><strong>What kind of changes?</strong></p>
<p>Specifically, the provision of humanitarian aid to Gaza, which has become a major public <a href="https://apnews.com/article/biden-netanyahu-hot-mic-gaza-885b97a75d15d15ae7f7a47d0125c918">dispute between the U.S. and Israel</a>. But whatever changes it does bring about in Israeli policy toward Gaza and the Palestinians, I don’t think it’s going to be nearly enough to satisfy the left or progressives and others who oppose the Biden administration’s policy. </p>
<p>But there’s a moderate middle, <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/05/11/u-s-jews-connections-with-and-attitudes-toward-israel/">particularly many American Jews</a>, who don’t want the Biden administration to stop supporting Israel but <a href="https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-781227">dislike Netanyahu</a> and his right-wing policies. What Schumer is saying is that the Democratic Party is the party for them, that it is a place for people who, while supporting Israel, have deep concerns about the Israeli military’s conduct in Gaza, and are frustrated with the Israeli government’s refusal to present a real plan for the day after, and its stonewalling on any prospect for a Palestinian state. </p>
<p>Schumer is expressing the sentiments of those voters, who we often don’t hear about because it’s often those on the left and the right whose voices drown out that silent majority in the middle.</p>
<p><strong>Are Schumer and Biden ahead of American public opinion or behind it?</strong></p>
<p>I think they are, as is typical of politicians, behind public opinion. The distinction between supporting Israel while criticizing its government has already been largely accepted for some time now among Jewish Americans. But it hasn’t always been reflected among politicians, who felt that when they supported Israel, they had to uncritically support the Israeli government.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/226050/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
What does it mean when a staunch supporter of Israel in Congress says he no longer supports Israel’s leadership? It’s a new kind of relationship between the longtime allies.Naomi Schalit, Senior Editor, Politics + Democracy, The Conversation USLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2259152024-03-18T17:08:04Z2024-03-18T17:08:04ZGaza conflict: Washington’s patience is wearing thin over the lack of leadership from both Israel and Palestine<p>The US senate majority leader Chuck Schumer – a Democrat and the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/14/us/politics/schumer-netanyahu-israel-elections.html">highest-ranking Jewish official</a> in US history – has called for the removal of both Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, seeing both as representing the politics of the past. </p>
<p>In an incendiary intervention, Schumer – a longtime and stalwart supporter of Israel – <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/2024-03-14/ty-article/.premium/senate-majority-leader-calls-for-new-elections-in-israel/0000018e-3d65-d67c-a18e-ff6d1f4a0000">told the Senate</a> that the continuing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza is testing US patience and that the lack of vision by both current Israeli and Palestinian leaders for the future beyond the war is also at variance with US policy.</p>
<p>Of the Israeli prime minister, he said: “Nobody expects Prime Minister Netanyahu to do the things that must be done to break the cycle of violence, to preserve his credibility on the world stage, to work to a two-state solution.” </p>
<p>Turning to Netanyahu’s counterpart in Ramallah, Schumer was equally forthright: “For there to be any hope of peace in the future, Abbas must step down and be replaced by a new generation of Palestinian leaders who will work towards attaining peace with a Jewish state.”</p>
<p>Reflecting on his fellow Democrat’s comments, US president Joe Biden said Schumer had made <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/15/schumer-netanyahu-speech-biden-reaction">“a good speech”</a>, adding that: “I think he expressed a serious concern shared not only by him, but by many Americans.”</p>
<p>Schumer’s speech came at the end of a week where Israeli and Palestinian politics showed how far away they are from the kind of change that Schumer rightly says is necessary.</p>
<p>Shifting factional politics has made Netanyahu’s position more secure. On March 12, Gideon Saar – a key powerbroker in the ruling coalition and an ally of Netanyahu’s biggest rival Benny Gantz – announced he was <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/a-statesmanlike-right-why-gideon-saar-has-decamped-gantzs-national-unity-party/">pulling out of his alliance with Gantz</a> and demanded that Netanyahu appoint him to the war cabinet. This has weakened Gantz while strengthening Netanyahu’s position. </p>
<p>The last opinion poll taken before Saar’s announcement showed Gantz with a <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-finds-44-of-israelis-prefer-trump-over-biden-as-next-us-president/">12-point lead over Netanyahu</a> and the opposition winning 74 seats out of the 120 Knesset seat if there were an election. But, with Saar’s change of allegiance, an election that could bring about the change that Schumer wants to see now appears further away.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, in Ramallah, the Palestinian president called on Muhammad Mustafa, a close associate, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-03-14/ty-article/.premium/pa-president-abbas-to-ask-mohammad-mustafa-to-form-new-palestinian-government/0000018e-3cac-d30d-a7de-7cbf89b70000">to be prime minister</a> after the resignation of Mohammad Shtayyeh in February. </p>
<p>Washington had expressed the hope that Abbas would reach outside his circle and appoint a fresh face, maybe choosing a candidate from the next generation that could project the hope of a revitalised Palestinian Authority (PA). While Mustafa is two decades younger than Abbas, at 69 he hardly qualifies as someone who can relate to a Palestinian population with a median age is <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2023-11-14/population-religion-and-poverty-the-demographics-of-israel-and-gaza#">21.9 years</a>.</p>
<p>Schumer’s frustration with the regional politics reflects a long-held view in Washington. Many US presidents have found Benjamin Netanyahu difficult to deal with, going back to Bill Clinton in the 1990s. Even Donald Trump had problems with Netanyahu, as the then US president’s <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/deal-of-the-century-what-is-it-and-why-now/">“deal of the century”</a> provided for a Palestinian state – small and weak though it would have been.</p>
<h2>Testing US support</h2>
<p>The Biden administration had thought that its solidarity with Israel after the October 7 atrocities would at least give it some influence over Israel’s response. </p>
<p>It has provided significant financial and human resources to Israel over the past five months. It has been resupplying much-needed military equipment while providing a diplomatic safety net through its veto at the UN security council. </p>
<p>This has been backed by the assiduous efforts of US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, to achieve a ceasefire and the return of the Israeli hostages. But Washington has watched in horror as its ally flattened Gaza and exacted a terrible civilian death toll.</p>
<p>Schumer is right when he says that Netanyahu’s alliance with Israel’s far-right is driving the country towards pariah status. The Gaza tragedy is accompanied by a <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-occupied-west-bank-since-october-7-movement-restrictions-and-collective-punishment/">vicious conflict in the occupied West Bank</a>, which has seen a rising number of Palestinian civilian deaths as a result of both IDF action and settler violence. All of this is aimed at undermining any moves towards reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians and a two-state solution.</p>
<p>Abbas succeeded Yasser Arafat as the president of the PA on Arafat’s death in 2004. He won the election in 2005 but has not held elections since. His administration lacks legitimacy and is widely seen as corrupt. </p>
<p>The combination of inefficiency and corruption of the PA and the continuing inhumanities of more than five decades of Israeli occupation alienates many Palestinians from any idea of peaceful coexistence with Israel and increases the attractiveness of extremist views. Schumer is right that there are extremists on both sides who want the destruction of the other,</p>
<p>But the US administration and leaders like Schumer are unable to change the politics of either Israel or Palestine, all they can do is call for new leaders. </p>
<p>Indeed, some might argue that all this noise about replacing leaders of other countries not only smacks of colonialism but could have the opposite effect. Netanyahu and Abbas – who are both beleaguered at home – might find it useful to have a foreign adversary as a foil to shore up domestic support. Both will pose as defenders of the nation. </p>
<p>With conflict resolution, the challenge is to bring together leaders who are often deeply flawed and who advance reprehensible policies. If they weren’t so flawed and unable to see the other side’s point there would not be a conflict. Schumer has shone a light on the extremist politics in both Israel and Palestine. The political developments in both countries this week make the vision of a peaceful future look more difficult. </p>
<p>And that’s why the US and the international community need to rise to the challenge. Less rhetoric and more practical peacebuilding would be a good start.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225915/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>But there is little sign that either side is listening.John Strawson, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2258472024-03-15T12:10:50Z2024-03-15T12:10:50ZIsrael’s army exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox are part of a bigger challenge: The Jewish state is divided over the Jewish religion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582023/original/file-20240314-26-32enhe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=51%2C0%2C5760%2C3828&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Israeli police scuffle with ultra-Orthodox Jews as they block a main road in Jerusalem during an October 2017 protest against Israeli army conscription.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelUltraOrthodoxDraft/76efc6b6fbbb42f1adbf903862cc7401/photo?Query=israel%20army%20ultra-orthodox&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=63&currentItemNo=21">AP Photo/Ariel Schalit, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just when you think nothing can surprise you anymore in Israeli politics, someone always comes along with a new twist. </p>
<p>This time it was Yitzhak Yosef, one of Israel’s two chief rabbis. In response to debates over whether ultra-Orthodox Jews should be required to serve in the military, or continue to be excused to study religious texts full time, he had a simple answer:</p>
<p>“If they force us to go to the army, we’ll all go abroad,” <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-03-10/ty-article/.premium/chief-sephardic-rabbi-if-they-force-us-to-go-to-the-army-well-leave-israel/0000018e-2768-d152-ad8e-2fe86ad80000">he declared</a> on March 9, 2024.</p>
<p>Ultra-Orthodox resistance to conscription is nothing new.</p>
<p>But the forcefulness of this declaration is new, especially coming in the midst of a war. And Yosef is not any random rabbi. He is the son of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/ovadia-yosef-outspoken-spiritual-leader-of-israels-sephardi-jews-dies-at-93/">Ovadia Yosef</a>, who was the spiritual leader of the Shas Party: an important partner in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-benjamin-netanyahu-government-and-politics-64d6cfb38a9b7e3b3681c6a80194a98b">right-wing and religious</a> governing coalition.</p>
<p>Ever since the state of Israel’s founding in 1948, ultra-Orthodox Jews – those who take the strictest approach toward following Jewish law, and are <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/haredim-are-fastest-growing-population-will-be-16-of-israelis-by-decades-end/">now around 14%</a> of the population – have been exempt from military service. Among all other Jewish citizens, from the secular to the modern Orthodox, men are required to serve 32 months, and women 24, plus reserve duty.</p>
<p>In 2017, the country’s Supreme Court <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2017-09-12/ty-article/israels-high-court-strikes-down-exemption-of-ultra-orthodox-from-military-service/0000017f-da83-dc0c-afff-dbdb4d4c0000">ruled against the exemptions</a>, but they have continued through a series of legislative workarounds. The latest is due to <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-boycotts-meeting-on-haredi-draft-with-pm-after-cabinet-ignores-his-proposal/">expire at the end of March 2024</a>, however – and other Israelis’ <a href="https://forward.com/news/591020/survey-large-majority-of-israeli-jews-want-haredim-to-serve-in-the-military/">resentment toward the ultra-Orthodox exemption</a> is at a high.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.american.edu/cas/faculty/mbrenner.cfm">a historian</a>, I see the conscription debate as more than a political crisis for Israel’s government. The question is so sensitive because it opens up fundamental questions about the cohesion of Israeli society in general, and of the ultra-Orthodox, or “Haredi,” population’s attitude toward the Jewish state in particular.</p>
<p>It also illustrates the complexity of a country that is not as easily explained as many of its supporters and critics alike believe.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582036/original/file-20240314-18-nf0rc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A crowd of men wearing head coverings, with one man seated in front wearing an ornate gold and black robe." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582036/original/file-20240314-18-nf0rc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582036/original/file-20240314-18-nf0rc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582036/original/file-20240314-18-nf0rc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582036/original/file-20240314-18-nf0rc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582036/original/file-20240314-18-nf0rc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582036/original/file-20240314-18-nf0rc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582036/original/file-20240314-18-nf0rc6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yitzhak Yosef, center, the Sephardi chief rabbi of Israel, attends a protest against religious reforms in Jerusalem in 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Israel%20Kosher%20Wars/2b2ca692403d41ac971b6ae2a7b3c303?Query=chief%20rabbinate%20israel&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:asc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=17&currentItemNo=12">AP Photo/Mahmoud Illean</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Initial compromise</h2>
<p>Historically, Orthodox Jews struggled to justify the idea of a Jewish state. They prayed for centuries to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the temple, but had a specific return in mind: <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2016/may/12/for-haredi-jews-secular-zionism-remains-a-religious-heresy">a Jewish state established by the Messiah</a>. Any other kind of Jewish sovereignty, they believed, would be blasphemy.</p>
<p>Theodor Herzl, who founded modern political Zionism in the late 1800s, had a long beard and looked like a Biblical prophet. Yet he was thoroughly secular and assimilated – he even <a href="https://forward.com/israel/356767/when-theodor-herzl-lit-his-christmas-tree/">lit a Christmas tree</a> with his family. Herzl’s movement to encourage more European Jews to migrate to the Holy Land had little appeal for the Orthodox. </p>
<p>There was, however, always a minority among the Orthodox who identified with Zionism, the belief that Jewish people should have a sovereign political state in the land of Israel. According to the Talmud, the central source of Jewish law, <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/saving-a-life-pikuach-nefesh/">saving lives is more important than other commandments</a> – and Zionism saved Jews from pogroms and other anti-Jewish violence in Europe. </p>
<p>During the Holocaust, the vast majority of observant Jews in Eastern Europe <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400889198-032">were murdered</a>. Afterward, many survivors who had previously opposed Zionism sought refuge in the new state of Israel.</p>
<p>On the eve of Israel’s independence, David Ben-Gurion, the prime minister of the state-to-be, <a href="https://israelpolicyforum.org/2023/07/11/the-haredi-exemption/">entered an agreement</a> with the leaders of the two camps of Orthodox Jews.</p>
<p>The Haredim, or ultra-Orthodox, still refused to recognize the legitimacy of a secular Jewish state. The so-called national religious camp, on the other hand, embraced it.</p>
<p>Among other concessions, the new state <a href="https://israelpolicyforum.org/2023/07/11/the-haredi-exemption/">granted exemption</a> to young Haredi Jews who wanted to study religious texts full time instead of joining the army. That hardly seemed consequential, as the young men in question numbered only a few hundred.</p>
<h2>Shifting views</h2>
<p>During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel captured the Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem as well as <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54116567">the Gaza Strip, West Bank, Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula</a>. Since then, the national religious camp, once a moderate force, has developed into <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/national-religious-camps-path-from-denying-settlements-to-merging-with-radicals/">the spearhead of the right-wing settler movement</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582026/original/file-20240314-20-maslyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Young men sit at tables in a dimly lit temporary structure." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582026/original/file-20240314-20-maslyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582026/original/file-20240314-20-maslyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582026/original/file-20240314-20-maslyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582026/original/file-20240314-20-maslyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582026/original/file-20240314-20-maslyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582026/original/file-20240314-20-maslyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582026/original/file-20240314-20-maslyy.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jewish settlers study the Torah in a tent at the West Bank outpost of Homesh, near the Palestinian village of Burqa, Jan. 17, 2022.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelSettlerStrength/2504708583b44bb4a3e11e8556775a82/photo?Query=israel%20settler&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2483&currentItemNo=455">AP Photo/Ariel Schalit</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Unlike the first generations of Orthodox Zionists, national religious Israelis today are Zionists not despite but because of messianism. Israel, they believe, will help bring about the messianic age. Therefore, right-wing religious Zionists – like Netanyahu’s cabinet ministers <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/15/israel-ben-gvir-netanyahu-government/">Itamar Ben-Gvir</a> and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-presses-with-settlement-plans-despite-us-criticism-2024-02-28/">Bezalel Smotrich</a> – are enthusiastic proponents of army service.</p>
<p>Not so the Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox. </p>
<p>To be clear, <a href="https://www.harediresearchgroup.org/haredi-demography/">Haredi Jews are very diverse</a>. This demographic includes families with roots everywhere from Poland and Romania to Morocco and Iraq. It includes people who support Israel’s existence, and opponents who <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/group-of-ultra-orthodox-jews-marks-independence-day-by-burning-israeli-flag/#:%7E:text=TV%20footage%20shows%20men%20and,back%20and%20forth%20in%20bonfire&text=Ultra%2Dorthodox%20Jews%20in%20the,(Channel%2010%20screenshot.)">burn the flag</a> on Independence Day. It includes men who join the workforce and men who dedicate their life to religious study. </p>
<p>The majority of Haredim living in Israel are not Zionists, yet live there because it is the Holy Land and <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-10-04/ty-article/.premium/for-israels-ultra-orthodox-taxpayer-money-is-flooding-in/0000018a-faf4-d12f-afbf-fbf531fb0000">the state subsidizes their study</a>. Anything else – secular education, army service, and often paid work – is seen as a distraction.</p>
<p>A minority of Haredi Jews serve in the armed forces voluntarily, and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-israel-at-war-150-haredi-men-draft-into-idf-thousands-expected-to-follow/">more have enlisted</a> since the beginning of the latest Israel-Hamas war. But they have no legal obligation to do so; nor do Israel’s Arab citizens. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582025/original/file-20240314-22-5knfek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four men in black hats and jackets, as well as a child, stand near a blue fence on a street, as they men look down at books in their hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582025/original/file-20240314-22-5knfek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/582025/original/file-20240314-22-5knfek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582025/original/file-20240314-22-5knfek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582025/original/file-20240314-22-5knfek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582025/original/file-20240314-22-5knfek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582025/original/file-20240314-22-5knfek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/582025/original/file-20240314-22-5knfek.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Jewish men pray in Jerusalem for the success of the Israeli army and for the return of the Israeli hostages, on Nov. 9, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestiniansUltra-OrthodoxProtest/a02f5e31545649699ba3eb59b62b6b35/photo?Query=israel%20army%20ultra-orthodox&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=63&currentItemNo=13">AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Growing Haredi sector</h2>
<p>Israel’s governments have continued to <a href="https://israelpolicyforum.org/2023/07/11/the-haredi-exemption/">tolerate this situation</a> as ultra-Orthodox political parties became much-needed partners.</p>
<p>Yet legal and popular opposition has increased.</p>
<p>In 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that the defense minister <a href="https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/rubinstein-v-minister-defense">has no right to exempt Haredi Jews from military service</a> and asked the government to find ways to draft them. In 2014, a center-right government under Netanyahu <a href="https://apnews.com/general-news-edae47d44f084d6a90a741050caaa3c9">passed a law</a> aiming to have 60% of Haredi men serving within three years. But the 2015 elections brought Haredi parties back in power, and implementation was effectively abandoned. </p>
<p>Since then, Haredi parties have become more powerful as their population grows. Yet the Supreme Court has made clear that by the end of March 2024, the government either <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-21/ty-article/.premium/state-to-top-court-haredim-will-be-drafted-if-conscription-law-isnt-passed-by-april/0000018d-cd43-d2b4-a9bf-cf77a2cb0000">needs to draft Haredim</a>, or the legislature has to come up with a new law to excuse them.</p>
<p>Seven in 10 Israeli Jews <a href="https://forward.com/news/591020/survey-large-majority-of-israeli-jews-want-haredim-to-serve-in-the-military/">oppose the blanket exemption</a>, meaning another exemption might jeopardize Netanyahu’s government. Frustration is also rising over plans to raise the military service of men to three years and to double the duty of reservists to <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-08/ty-article/.premium/bill-extending-israeli-army-service-draws-ire-for-exempting-haredim/0000018d-8a40-d443-a19f-fed132dc0000">42 days a year</a> during emergencies.</p>
<p>None of this would matter if the Haredim were still the same tiny segment of society they were in 1948. Today, however, ultra-Orthodox women have <a href="https://en.idi.org.il/haredi/2022/?chapter=48263">6.5 children on average</a>, compared with 2.5 among other Jewish Israeli women, and 1 in 4 young children <a href="https://shoresh.institute/graphs.html">are ultra-Orthodox</a>. </p>
<p>The resulting <a href="https://theconversation.com/israels-new-hard-line-government-has-made-headlines-the-bigger-demographic-changes-that-caused-it-not-so-much-197263">transformation of Israeli society</a> is easy to see. If the trend continues, Israel will become a very different, very religious society – one that can hardly survive economically. </p>
<p>On average, a non-Haredi household pays nine times more income tax than a Haredi one, while the latter receives <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-03-11/ty-article/.premium/in-israel-non-orthodox-citizens-serve-the-state-and-the-state-serves-the-ultra-orthodox/0000018e-1adb-d1cc-abfe-dfffd7bd0000">over 50% more state support</a>. Even if they were ready to work, most Haredim would have a hard time finding well-paid jobs, as their state-subsidized private schools teach hardly any secular topics.</p>
<p>For Israeli society, this portends further fragmentation and a weakening of the economy – to say nothing of the army.</p>
<p>But, Chief Rabbi Yitzhak says, this will never happen. In his and other Haredim’s eyes, Israel’s soldiers succeed only <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-03-10/ty-article/.premium/chief-sephardic-rabbi-if-they-force-us-to-go-to-the-army-well-leave-israel/0000018e-2768-d152-ad8e-2fe86ad80000">because religious Jews study and pray for them</a>. </p>
<p>“They need to understand that without the Torah, without the yeshivas, there’d be nothing, no success for the army,” he said.</p>
<p><em>This article has been updated to correct the date that the military exemption is due to expire.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225847/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Brenner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Israel-Hamas war has fueled tensions around military exemptions, but the issue has long roiled Israeli politics.Michael Brenner, Professor of Jewish History and Culture at Ludwig Maximilian University and Abensohn Chair in Israel Studies, American UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250672024-03-12T18:38:37Z2024-03-12T18:38:37ZCanada’s inaction in Gaza marks a failure of its feminist foreign policy<p><a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/iap2-eng.pdf?_ga=2.63794223.1840653675.1709657832-2101566470.1701624369">“Peace and prosperity are every person’s birthright.”</a> So opened then Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland’s introduction to Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP).</p>
<p>Launched in 2017, the policy stated that Canada would take an explicitly feminist approach to international assistance, including a commitment to protecting women’s sexual and reproductive rights. Many considered it to be a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020960120">forward-thinking policy that builds on the past work of NGOs and other international partners.</a></p>
<p>However, the policy also revealed shortcomings. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020953424">It was criticized</a> for its <a href="https://www.e-ir.info/2020/02/10/the-growth-of-feminist-foreign-policy/">fuzzy definition of feminism,</a> its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2019.1592002">surface-level engagement</a> with the <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039">overlapping forms of inequality</a> women actually face and for its <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz027">neoliberal approach to feminism</a> that seeks to fix problems within the Global South, with little engagement with how these problems arose in the first place.</p>
<p>And now, as Israel’s offensive on Gaza marches on unabated and the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/29/gaza-death-toll-surpasses-30000-with-no-let-up-in-israeli-bombardment#:%7E:text=The%20death%20toll%20in%20%23Gaza,large%20majority%20women%20and%20children.">civilian death toll mounts</a>, Canada’s tepid response calls the strength and sincerity of its feminist commitments into doubt. Furthermore, the country’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-lawsuit-israel-military-exports-1.7134664">continued sale of military equipment to Israel</a> suggests where Canada’s stated feminist values conflict with other political interests leaving Palestinians by the wayside. </p>
<p>On a recent visit to Israel, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly expressed solidarity with Israeli victims of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/oct-7-sexual-violence-united-nations-reasonable-grounds-1.7133305">sexual violence committed by Hamas</a> and announced <a href="https://x.com/melaniejoly/status/1767189501208666293?s=20">$1 million dollars</a> in support. In addition to funding, Joly also offered RCMP support to help investigate the crimes of sexual violence against Israeli women. </p>
<p>In December, Joly issued <a href="https://www.cp24.com/news/joly-condemns-hamas-rapes-of-israeli-women-after-weeks-of-pressure-1.6677943">strong condemnations</a> in response to allegations of rape committed by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023. </p>
<p>In February 2023, Joly <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9491196/canada-joly-ukraine-visit/">also pledged millions for Ukrainian victims of sexual assault</a> along with Canada’s support for the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence committed during Russia’s war against Ukraine.</p>
<p>Will Canada do the same for Palestinian women affected by military and sexual violence?</p>
<h2>Palestinian women’s rights long ignored</h2>
<p>Joly <a href="https://twitter.com/melaniejoly/status/1760435093342986384?s=20">condemned</a> the sexual and gender-based violence being committed against Palestinian women in Gaza in February 2024, but without explicitly naming who the perpetrators of violence are. </p>
<p>Her statement came after <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/02/israelopt-un-experts-appalled-reported-human-rights-violations-against">United Nations experts</a> expressed alarm over “credible allegations of egregious human rights violations to which Palestinian women and girls continue to be subjected in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.” They cited reports of arbitrary executions, killings, detentions and sexual abuse of Palestinian women and girls by Israeli forces.</p>
<p>Even before the current escalation of violence, Canada’s support of Israel’s actions have long been identified as a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2020.1805340">significant limitation of FIAP</a>.</p>
<p>In the policy’s peace and security section, Canada commits to advocate for the “respect and protection of the human rights of women and girls in its international and multilateral engagements.” It also says that ensuring the safety and security of women and girls is one of the key steps to ensuring peace.</p>
<p>In Gaza, this security is not being assured. Israel’s bombardment and tightened blockade has killed more than 31,000 people, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pentagon-walks-back-austins-gaza-casualty-figures-2024-02-29/">most of whom are women and children</a>. Those who survive live under constant threat and without access to basic medical aid, food and water. Over 85 per cent of the total population of Gaza — about 1.9 million civilians — <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15564.doc.htm#:%7E:text=A%20staggering%2085%20per%20cent,proposing%20that%20Palestinians%20should%20be">have been displaced</a> from their homes.</p>
<p>Palestinian women also face increased risk of sexual violence. There <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/22/claims-of-israeli-sexual-assault-of-palestinian-women-are-credible-un-panel-says">are credible</a> reports of sexual violence being used as a tool of war against both Israeli and Palestinian women. </p>
<h2>Reproductive health in Gaza in a dire state</h2>
<p>FIAP identifies a full range of reproductive healthcare <a href="https://globalnews.ca/news/9491196/canada-joly-ukraine-visit/#:%7E:text=Canada%20is%20pledging%20millions%20of,Russia%27s%20war%20on%20Ukraine%20nears.">as key to ensuring women and girls’ equality and empowerment</a>.</p>
<p>In Gaza, these rights are besieged daily. </p>
<p>An estimated <a href="https://prismreports.org/2024/02/13/reproductive-rights-organizations-failing-palestinians/">50,000 pregnant women in Gaza</a> are at <a href="https://jezebel.com/miscarriages-in-gaza-have-increased-300-under-israeli-1851168680">increased risk of miscarriage</a>, stillbirth and maternal death. This is in part due to <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-uncertain-fate-of-patients-needing-life-saving-dialysis-treatment-in-gaza-220941">Israeli attacks on health-care facilities</a>. These attacks have led not only to direct casualties, but have also severely restricted access to prenatal and natal care. </p>
<p>Women are <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/21/gaza-childbirth/">giving birth without appropriate medical care</a>. This puts their lives and the lives of their babies at risk, contributing to higher rates of maternal and infant death.</p>
<p>The widespread food crisis has also had dire implications for reproductive and maternal health. The <a href="https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/intensifying-conflict-malnutrition-and-disease-gaza-strip-creates-deadly-cycle">United Nations Children’s Fund has voiced concern</a> over the nutritional vulnerability of over 155,000 pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers. </p>
<p>Malnutrition can make breastfeeding difficult, if not impossible, and yet <a href="https://apnews.com/article/gaza-aid-babies-hamas-israel-war-e0f843a8f5f1af49efc45f6cb02005a6">formula has been difficult</a> (and for some, impossible) to access. This has been exacerbated by high prices and delays and restrictions on delivery of humanitarian aid. Malnutrition affects maternal health, and can also have long-term consequences for the health of mothers and their children.</p>
<h2>Canada must act</h2>
<p>After mounting public pressure, including country-wide protests, Canadian officials first uttered the word “ceasefire” in December, two months after the start of the war. They did so on Dec. 12, 2023, in a non-binding <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/un-onu/statements-declarations/2023-12-12-explanation-vote-explication.aspx?lang=eng">UN resolution vote</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Canadian exports of military equipment to Israel have not only continued, but have <a href="https://www.readthemaple.com/trudeau-government-authorized-28-million-of-new-military-exports-to-israel-since-october/">increased since October</a>. Global Affairs Canada claims these exports are only for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/9/demands-for-canada-to-stop-supplying-weapons-to-israel-grow-louder">non-lethal equipment</a>. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, they contribute to Israel’s military capacity. They undermine the legitimacy of Canada’s commitments to peacebuilding, and call into question whether its commitments to protecting the rights of women and girls extend to Palestinians.</p>
<p>Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng">claims to be</a> “a reflection of who we are as Canadians.” It expresses the belief that “it is possible to build a more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world… A world where no one is left behind.” </p>
<p>By its own standards, Canada has a responsibility to do more than verbalize support for a humanitarian ceasefire and <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/03/canada-announces-continued-assistance-for-people-in-gaza.html">provide humanitarian aid</a>. </p>
<p>Canada’s <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/london/israel-gaza-london-ceasefire-ontario-families-1.7056926">delayed</a> and <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/30/canada-clarifies-its-stand-on-a-humanitarian-truce-00124372">inconsistent response</a> to Israel’s military violence in Gaza represents a failure to evenly apply its own foreign policy.</p>
<p>Canada’s current strategy of <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canada-aid-gaza">providing humanitarian aid</a> to assuage the effects of military violence, while simultaneously continuing to <a href="https://www.readthemaple.com/trudeau-government-authorized-28-million-of-new-military-exports-to-israel-since-october/">sell military equipment</a>, points to paradoxes within its foreign policy. An effective feminist foreign aid policy needs political action to address the root causes of poverty, violence and sexual and reproductive harm. In Gaza, this includes military occupation, violence and blockade. </p>
<p>If Canada truly wants to create a more peaceful and prosperous world, they must not leave Palestinian women behind.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225067/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jacqueline Potvin previously received funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mayme Lefurgey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Canada’s tepid response to the war in Gaza and the severe harm caused to Palestinian women casts doubt on the sincerity of the government’s Feminist International Assistance Policy.Jacqueline Potvin, Research Associate, School of Nursing, Western UniversityMayme Lefurgey, Research Fellow, Department of Sociology, University of New BrunswickLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2246902024-03-11T19:32:30Z2024-03-11T19:32:30ZUS attempt to ‘revitalize’ Palestinian Authority risks making the PA less legitimate, more unpopular<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580863/original/file-20240311-24-7bkwnl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C23%2C5235%2C3461&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas meet on Nov. 30, 2023.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestinians/f6460a47ee174da48d6a3dabc0527453/photo?Query=Palestinian%20authority&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=1602&currentItemNo=15">Saul Loeb/Pool via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Gaza is still very much in the midst of war, yet discussion is turning to “<a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/01/29/israel-gaza-saudi-egypt-jordan-palestine-meeting">the day after</a>” the conflict – and who will govern the war-ravaged territory.</p>
<p>The Biden administration has said that a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/7/us-says-doesnt-support-israeli-occupation-of-gaza-after-war">full Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip</a> would be unacceptable. Instead, White House officials have discussed “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/05/palestinian-authority-security-forces-gaza/">revitalizing</a>” the Palestinian Authority, or PA, the governing apparatus of parts of the West Bank, to take over in Gaza. </p>
<p>Seemingly as an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinian-authority-government-explainer-aefe041e045f2c60918b42f42185f41e">initial step to enable this</a>, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-abbas-israel-hamas-war-resignation-1c13eb3c2ded20cc14397e71b5b1dea5">PA cabinet resigned</a> on Feb. 26, 2024. This begins the process of overhauling the authority and setting up a “<a href="https://www.mei.edu/blog/monday-briefing-biden-administration-highlights-humanitarian-crisis-palestinians-gaza">technocratic government</a>” tasked with basic, short-term governance objectives, presumably in Gaza as well as the West Bank. </p>
<p>But analysts and researchers have questioned what role the PA could have, given that the body has <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-problem-of-legitimacy-for-the-palestinian-authority/">struggled with a legitimacy crisis</a> for well over a decade. And Israel has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-rebuffs-calls-for-palestinian-authority-to-rule-gaza-6e5509fe">refused to countenance any PA involvement</a> in post-conflict Gaza. </p>
<p>Moreover, PA officials are wary of entering Gaza “<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/palestinian-authority-not-going-to-gaza-on-an-israeli-military-tank-pm-says">on the back of an Israeli tank</a>,” in the words of resigning Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh.</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://mei.edu/profile/dana-el-kurd">scholar of Palestinian politics</a>, I believe any possible solution to the war in Gaza involving the PA will face significant challenges over its legitimacy, public support and ability to govern. </p>
<p>But why do Palestinians have such a negative assessment of the PA, and is that justified? To answer that, it is important to understand the shift within the Palestinian national movement since the creation of the PA in 1994 and the international community’s role in those transformations.</p>
<h2>What is the Palestinian Authority?</h2>
<p>The PA was created as a result of the Oslo Accords. The accords, a framework for negotiated peace that took place in the early 1990s, represented the first time in which the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, and the state of Israel formally accepted <a href="https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/97181.htm#:%7E:text=Along%20with%20the%20DOP%2C%20the,representative%20of%20the%20Palestinian%20people.">mutual recognition</a>. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three men two in suits one wearing a traditional Palestinian headscarf stand. Two shake hands." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=444&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580806/original/file-20240309-26-1zkmdr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=558&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Oslo Accords were negotiated by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IsraelPalestiniansControllingGazaExplainer/533873b1296c4dbb8c2d3d583014a7c6/photo?Query=oslo%20accords%20arafat&mediaType=photo&sortBy=creationdatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=6&currentItemNo=4">AP Photo/Ron Edmonds</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The accords were intended to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and achieve some sort of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-two-state-solution-israel-palestinian-conflict-2024-01-25/">two-state solution</a>.</p>
<p>In anticipation of a future Palestinian state, the PA was established as a governing body. Elections were held, and the dominant party within the PLO, Fatah, also came to dominate the PA.</p>
<p>The goal was that by 1999, the Palestinians would have a state in the West Bank and Gaza. Negotiations would continue as the PA built out the institutions of the state, under the optimistic assumption that both could be arrived at concurrently. </p>
<p>But this shift from seeking liberation to state-building signaled compromises on the <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/resolution-194">right of Palestinian refugees to return</a> to the land they were expelled from during the creation of Israel.</p>
<p>Despite this, <a href="https://pij.org/articles/677/palestinian-public-opinion-polls-on-the-peace-process">many Palestinians were</a> supportive of having some pathway forward in which they might achieve self-determination and sovereignty. </p>
<p>The state-building project reoriented a great deal of energy and resources to the institutions of the Palestinian Authority and attempts by Palestinian leadership to achieve a viable Palestinian state.</p>
<h2>The second intifada’s aftermath</h2>
<p>When a state was not achieved by 1999, the second intifada, or uprising, <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/node/31123">broke out</a>.</p>
<p>The Palestinian Authority struggled to maintain order and stability during the period, crucially because the Israeli military raided urban centers and attacked PA infrastructure. Analysts refer to the intifada as a moment of “<a href="https://www.ichr.ps/cached_uploads/download/ichr-files/files/000000436.pdf">infilaat amni</a>,” or a collapse of order. It saw <a href="https://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20100927">massive disruption</a> to Palestinians and Israelis and many lives lost.</p>
<p>For the remnants of the PA and its American benefactors, the lesson learned from the second intifada was that such a collapse could never be allowed to happen again.</p>
<p>In the aftermath, the focus of the U.S. and the international community turned to restructuring the PA, expanding and “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/11/palestinian-authority-secuirty-forces-west-bank-faq/">professionalizing</a>” its security forces and ensuring that the PA would be a stalwart partner to Israel in maintaining security in the occupied territories.</p>
<p>But to an increasing number of Palestinians, this focus on security coordination and restructuring did not serve the needs of a people living under occupation. In fact, in the name of security, Palestinians saw themselves more and more repressed not just by the occupation forces but by <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2013/09/palestinian-authority-must-end-use-excessive-force-policing-protests-2013-0/">their own government</a>. </p>
<p>By the mid-2000s, after the intifada tapered off, it was clear the <a href="https://theconversation.com/30-years-after-arafat-rabin-handshake-clear-flaws-in-oslo-accords-doomed-peace-talks-to-failure-211362">peace process was going nowhere</a>; the Israeli government had become increasingly right wing, and Palestinian leadership seemed both less willing and less capable to represent its people’s interests.</p>
<p>In what amounted to a <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-palestinian-elections-sweeping-victory-uncertain-mandate/">referendum on the status quo</a>, <a href="https://www.palquest.org/en/node/31125">Hamas beat Fatah and won</a> in the 2006 parliamentary elections for the territories. But the results immediately led to instability and conflict between the two main Palestinian political factions: Fatah, which until then dominated the PA, and Hamas.</p>
<p>The international community also did not support the election results and empowered <a href="https://www.npr.org/2007/01/19/6923812/abbas-gets-money-support-and-distrust">Fatah to remain in power</a>.</p>
<p>This led to a split in governance between the West Bank and Gaza, with the PA losing control of Gaza entirely in the aftermath of infighting between the two parties. </p>
<p><iframe id="4sJq8" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4sJq8/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In response, the international community – led by the U.S. – worked to bolster the PA once again.</p>
<p>The PA has not held elections since, with the president of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, remaining in office well past his term limit.</p>
<p>Over the years, the PA has continued to play a security coordination role in the West Bank but is perceived <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2089%20English%20Full%20Text%20September%202023.pdf">as a burden</a> by Palestinians and as having achieved little in improving their living conditions. </p>
<p>Rather, repression and fragmentation have only worsened within Palestinian society, even as the challenges imposed by the occupation have only amplified with a now 17-year-long <a href="https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-strip-the-humanitarian-impact-of-15-years-of-the-blockade-june-2022-ocha-factsheet/">blockade on Gaza</a> and continued <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/09/israeli-settlements-expand-by-record-amount-un-rights-chief-says.html">settlement building in the West Bank</a>. </p>
<p>Many Palestinian today see the PA as little more than a “<a href="https://www.972mag.com/palestinian-authority-nablus-occupation-subcontractor/">subcontractor of occupation</a> in the West Bank.</p>
<h2>Public opinion today</h2>
<p>It is, then, perhaps unsurprising that the Palestinian Authority has faced an ongoing legitimacy crisis. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2089%20English%20Full%20Text%20September%202023.pdf">September 2023 poll</a> by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 76% of Palestinians polled within both territories expressed dissatisfaction with the PA’s governance. </p>
<p>This lack of support for the PA does not necessarily signal support for Hamas either; in questions about possible parliamentary elections, Hamas garnered only 34% of the potential vote – second to Fatah.</p>
<p>These low approval trends are echoed in other polling. The <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/what-palestinians-really-think-hamas">Arab Barometer</a>, for example, conducted polling merely days before Oct. 7 and found only 27% of respondents in Gaza selected Hamas as their preferred party. Comparatively, only 30% favored Fatah. Although subsequent <a href="https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2090%20English%20press%20release%2013%20Dec%202023%20Final%20New.pdf">polling in December</a> shows a bump for Hamas, this is much more pronounced in the West Bank than in Gaza. And the majority of Palestinians still are unsupportive.</p>
<p>It is clear that most Palestinians are fed up with <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/94d888ce-9efc-4e65-b93c-bea952e83824">their political options</a>. Furthermore, the PA has long abandoned attempting to reflect Palestinian public opinion – in no small part because of the international community and the role it wants the PA to play.</p>
<p>Revitalizing the PA, as the U.S. appears intent on doing, looks to be a Herculean task, given how low the body is held in the eyes of many Palestinians. Moreover, any outside attempt to empower unaccountable leadership – and ignore Palestinian public demands and input – risks repeating history. After all, this was precisely how the PA lost its legitimacy to begin with.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224690/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dana El Kurd is affiliated with the Middle East Institute and the Arab Center Washington.</span></em></p>Israel has made it clear that Hamas should have no role in Gaza after the war. But seeking an alternative in the Palestinian Authority is fraught with problems.Dana El Kurd, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of RichmondLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245572024-03-10T13:17:48Z2024-03-10T13:17:48ZGaza war: The displaced survivors of the Oct. 7 attack remain in need of support<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580809/original/file-20240309-29-vprdfs.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C6000%2C3997&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Evidence of arson during the attack on Kibbutz Be’eri, Israel on Oct. 7, 2023.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>On the morning of Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas orchestrated <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-rockets-airstrikes-tel-aviv-11fb98655c256d54ecb5329284fc37d2">a series of attacks on Israeli communities</a>. This was the deadliest attack Israel had experienced since the state was established in 1948. An <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data#:%7E:text=Hamas's%20October%207%20terrorist%20attack,years%20of%20the%20Second%20Intifada">estimated 1,200 people</a> were killed, hundreds were taken hostage and approximately <a href="https://unwatch.org/report-un-silent-on-israeli-idps/">30,000 displaced</a>.</p>
<p>As an associate professor of disaster and emergency management who studies terrorism, I travelled to Kibbutz Be'eri in February, where I had the opportunity to bear witness to survivors of the atrocity.</p>
<p>As a matter of respect for Israel’s dead, survivors <a href="https://stories.bringthemhomenow.net/">and remaining hostages</a>, a certain moral obligation seems clear: <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/religion/representing-evil-the-moral-paradoxes-of-bearing-witness-to-atro/10098410">atrocity requires representation</a>. Bearing witness means taking on a <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276418776366">burden of responsibility</a> to observe and document.</p>
<p>Bearing witness can <a href="https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/syria/syria">serve multiple purposes</a>. Attempting to understand the toll of the conflict on survivors of violence and documenting atrocity to call attention to the criminality of terrorism can all be results of bearing witness.</p>
<p>I was embedded in an environment that was still in disaster response mode. Conducting research in communities affected by the attack required delicate manoeuvreing due to the precarious security situation and general unpredictability. </p>
<p>To navigate such challenges, my co-ordination with organizations having intimate local knowledge of ground conditions was of utmost importance. Arrangements for bearing witness were facilitated by the <a href="https://apfmed.org/">American Healthcare Professionals and Friends for Medicine in Israel (APF)</a>, who organized the Israel Solidarity Mission, which I participated in.</p>
<p>I made field observations at Kibbutz Be’eri at a point in time 130 days after the massacre. When <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hamas">Hamas attacked</a>, the ensuing <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-devastation-of-beeri">devastation at Be'eri</a> resulted in <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/israels-ground-zero-beeri-kibbutz-bloodiest-scenes-hamas/story?id=103936668">112 residents of the kibbutz</a> being murdered.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="two photographs showing damage caused by weapons and fire to a wall and a window" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=300&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580788/original/file-20240308-30-6ofgo4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=377&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Detail showing damages to structures in Kibbutz Be’eri, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Among those <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/vivian-silver-thought-to-be-taken-captive-from-beeri-confirmed-killed-by-hamas/">killed</a> at Be'eri was <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/vivian-silver-friends-mourn-israel-death-manitoba-1.7027813">Vivian Silver</a>, a prominent Canadian Jewish humanitarian originally from Winnipeg.</p>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/israel-hamas-war-will-the-murder-of-peace-activists-mean-the-end-of-the-peace-movement-215973">Israel-Hamas war: will the murder of peace activists mean the end of the peace movement?</a>
</strong>
</em>
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<h2>Physical ruins</h2>
<p>One observation that repeatedly stood out was arson. Observable burn scorch marks surrounding windows of bedrooms and safe rooms were apparent. Exterior walls of dwellings were pockmarked by automatic weapon fire. Interior walls of dwellings were scarred with blast effects from anti-personnel grenades.</p>
<p>The locations and characteristics of physical evidence of ruins, directly corresponded with descriptions of deaths as remembered by survivors and other <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/22/world/europe/beeri-massacre.html">third-party analysis</a> describing the mechanics of how the massacre took place.</p>
<p>Overall, my observations — made on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis in Be'eri — indicated the attackers had no apparent tactical objectives to their <a href="https://doi.org/10.4088/pcc.v01n0302">running amok</a>, other than killing and taking hostages.</p>
<h2>The fate of evacuees</h2>
<p>Intertwined with the sites of atrocity are locations where response is taking place. Hotels serve as shelters for those who cannot yet return. Approximately five months after the Oct. 7 attacks, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-makes-the-plight-of-israels-displaced-citizens-different/0000018d-ea95-d1e0-a1dd-fbf529ed0000">135,000 Israelis</a> remain displaced. </p>
<p>In meeting with emergency management officials at the city of <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Ramat-Gan">Ramat Gan</a>, east of Tel Aviv, I learned that providing emergency social social services to evacuees has become a new responsibility for the city’s disaster workers. In late February, <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-02-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-makes-the-plight-of-israels-displaced-citizens-different/0000018d-ea95-d1e0-a1dd-fbf529ed0000">15,100 evacuees</a> still reside in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.</p>
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<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="shiny blue hotel building in a city" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=452&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580786/original/file-20240308-26-h383ap.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=568&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hotels in Ramat Gan continue to temporarily house persons who evacuated cities in southern Israel after the Oct. 7 attacks.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">(J. Rozdilsky)</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>For evacuees, their sense of security has been shattered, and their responses to the trauma they witnessed on Oct. 7 stretches their capacity to cope. Whether and how they can return to their homes in the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/gaza-envelope-communities-case-study-societal-resilience-israel-2006-2016/">Gaza Envelope</a> is a decision fraught with emotion.</p>
<p>The coming months will be a pivotal point for evacuees. The government has <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/government-says-evacuees-from-south-can-return-march-1-or-stay-in-subsidized-hotels-through-july/">announced two options</a>. As of March 1, evacuees may start to return home with the approval of the Israel Defense Forces. Or, if they are not ready to return, they can receive funding to remain in hotels until July 7.</p>
<h2>The suffering of others</h2>
<p>On the five-month anniversary of the attacks, attempting to digest and analyze recent events in Israel remains challenging, given the depth of the tragedy. Relevant questions are raised in <a href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780312422196/regarding-the-pain-of-others"><em>Regarding the Pain of Others</em></a>, in which American writer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/dec/29/guardianobituaries.booksobituaries">Susan Sontag</a> asks: “What does it mean to care about the sufferings of others far away?” </p>
<p>After the visceral experience of bearing witness to atrocity by setting two feet on the ground at Be'eri, I am left with more questions than answers concerning what it means to care about far away suffering. After the more mundane experience of witnessing evacuees having an uncertain future living in hotels, I am thinking about how local disaster response actions play into national crises. </p>
<p>For survivors in Israel, the displacement and trauma are ongoing and it will take the time that it takes for their lives to normalize. A timeline cannot be put on the social and psychological repair of their lives. Experiences of survivors and evacuees should inform emergency measures by suggesting the timeline for evacuees to return home should remain as flexible as possible.</p>
<p><em>Edward Snowden, a graduate of the Master’s in Disaster and Emergency Management Program at York University who specializes in mass casualty management, contributed his observations from Israel.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224557/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jack L. Rozdilsky receives support for research communication and public scholarship from York University. He also has received research support from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research.</span></em></p>Bearing witness to the displaced victims of the Oct. 7 attack on Kibbutz Be'eri carries a burden of responsibility to observe and documentJack L. Rozdilsky, Associate Professor of Disaster and Emergency Management, York University, CanadaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2253692024-03-08T17:10:51Z2024-03-08T17:10:51ZJoe Biden’s plan to build a pier to get aid into Gaza isn’t enough – here are six issues needed for an effective aid strategy<p>In his <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-2024/">State of the Union address</a>, Joe Biden announced an idea to alleviate the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/factbox-what-is-humanitarian-situation-war-torn-gaza-2024-03-05/">desperate humanitarian situation</a> in Gaza. The American president said he is “directing the US military to lead an emergency mission to establish a temporary pier in the Mediterranean on the Gaza coast that can receive large ships carrying food, water, medicine and temporary shelters”. </p>
<p>Hopes of a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/07/politics/us-military-aid-port-gaza-biden/index.html">humanitarian ceasefire</a>, which seemed within reach only recently, have dwindled once again as both Israel and Hamas have doubled down on their incompatible positions. So Biden’s announcement represents the latest desperate attempt to get around the Israeli blockade that severely limits the flow of supplies into Gaza. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiZTVkYmEwNmMtZWYxNy00ODhlLWI2ZjctNjIzMzQ5OGQxNzY5IiwidCI6IjI2MmY2YTQxLTIwZTktNDE0MC04ZDNlLWZkZjVlZWNiNDE1NyIsImMiOjl9&pageName=ReportSection3306863add46319dc574">number of trucks</a> going through the two opened border crossings has been particularly low lately – with an average of 100 trucks a day in February to supply millions of people.</p>
<p>More aid is desperately needed. Children are dying of <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-conflict-rising-death-toll-from-hunger-a-stark-reminder-of-starvation-as-a-weapon-of-war-225197">malnutrition and dehydration</a> in Gaza. Overcrowded shelters offer very little space and <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/regional-response-crisis-occupied-palestinian-territory-situation-report-20-7-march-2024">most people in Gaza live</a> with limited access to water and poor sanitation facilities. The few operational <a href="https://www.rescue.org/article/collapse-gazas-health-system">hospitals are struggling</a> with a lack of staff, electricity and medical supplies. </p>
<p>Recent <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68457937">air drops</a> by the Jordanian and US air forces and now Biden’s plans for a pier for aid deliveries may look spectacular, but they can have only limited impact. </p>
<p>Air drops are an <a href="https://blogs.hanken.fi/humlog/2023/10/20/humanitarian-air-drops-an-option-of-last-resort/">option of last resort</a>, delivering very few supplies at high cost. Meanwhile, sea transport can handle large volumes at reasonable costs, so opening a sea route would be beneficial. </p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">Joe Biden announces the US will build a temporary pier to allow more aid into Gaza.</span></figcaption>
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<p>But any cargo reaching Gaza on this route would encounter the same issues that are plaguing humanitarian deliveries by road. The Israeli blockade requires strict checks on goods, which in the <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240308-eu-commission-chief-hopes-aid-route-from-cyprus-to-gaza-opens-sunday">new maritime channel</a> will be carried out in Cyprus. </p>
<p>In a <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-ec-cyprus-uae-us-and-uk-endorsing-activation-maritime-corridor-deliver-humanitarian-2024-03-08_en">joint statement</a>, the European Commission, Cyprus, the UAE, the US, and the UK stressed that “efforts will be closely coordinated with the Government of Israel”.</p>
<p>As humanitarian logistics researchers who have been following the Gaza response of the <a href="https://logcluster.org/en/ops/pse23a">Logistics Cluster</a>, the coordination mechanism of a number of humanitarian agencies, we believe a workable plan for aid logistics in Gaza should include the following points.</p>
<h2>1. Safe access guarantee</h2>
<p>All parties need to agree to ensure the safety of humanitarian convoys. Aid, no matter how it arrives, needs to be distributed to the population. Aid organisations are warning that <a href="https://www.msf.org/attacks-humanitarian-workers-gaza-make-vital-assistance-nearly-impossible">attacks on humanitarian workers</a> make their work nearly impossible. </p>
<p>Aid convoys <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/new-incident-medical-evacuation-al-amal-hospital-marks-unacceptable-security-conditions-humanitarian-aid">have come under fire</a> <a href="https://palestine.un.org/en/259747-food-convoy-waiting-move-northern-gaza-was-hit-israeli-naval-gunfire">from Israel</a> and are denied access to those in need. As a result, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-struck-palestinian-police-escorting-gaza-aid-says-us-envoy-2024-02-16/">Palestinian police</a> have become hesitant to escort aid deliveries. </p>
<p>Receiving aid can also be deadly. In the recent so-called <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/un-experts-condemn-flour-massacre-urge-israel-end-campaign-starvation-gaza">“flour massacre”</a>, at least 112 Palestinians died as they gathered to collect basic food aid. <a href="https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unmiss-peacekeepers-provide-protective-escort-to-world-food-programme-convoy">UN peacekeepers</a> should be allowed to provide protective escorts for aid convoys. </p>
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<h2>2. Eliminate bottlenecks</h2>
<p>More entry points into Gaza need to be opened. The planned pier is a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/07/biden-us-port-gaza-aid-delivery">step in the right direction</a>, but it will take weeks to be operational. Opening more road crossings would be much faster and alleviate pressure on the <a href="https://logie.logcluster.org/?op=pse">two operational crossings</a>, Rafah and Kerem Shalom. </p>
<p>At the moment, aid deliveries encounter <a href="https://www.wfp.org/stories/hungers-border-why-aid-trucks-taking-humanitarian-gear-and-food-gaza-face-long-waits">long waits</a> at checkpoints. In Gaza, roads need to be open and any checks on humanitarian workers and their cargo minimised to limit delays. </p>
<p>Trucks being <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/06/food-aid-convoy-bound-for-northern-gaza-looted-after-being-stopped-at-israeli-checkpoint">held for hours</a> at Israeli military checkpoints can mean they don’t reach areas further away from the border crossings and have to turn back. This has resulted in looting by desperate Palestinians.</p>
<h2>3. Access to northern Gaza</h2>
<p>Humanitarian aid has to be delivered to all parts of Gaza, but access to the north has been particularly challenging. Humanitarian operations to the north were <a href="https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-access-snapshot-gaza-strip-end-february-2024">halted on February 5</a> after a UN-coordinated food convoy was hit by Israeli naval fire and humanitarian workers reported intimidation by soldiers at an Israeli checkpoint. </p>
<p>Opening a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/03/07/background-press-call-on-humanitarian-aid-for-gaza-ahead-of-the-state-of-the-union/">border crossing</a> giving aid convoys access to the northern part of Gaza is currently being discussed between the USA and Israel. The UN is also exploring the use of an <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-test-israeli-military-road-get-aid-gazas-north-2024-03-06/">Israeli military road</a> along the border fence to get aid to the north and checking new potential routes to make sure they are free of unexploded ordnance. </p>
<h2>4. Restricted items</h2>
<p>Not all humanitarian supplies are allowed into Gaza. Items are restricted, especially where Israel is citing concerns about <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/civilians-or-hamas-dual-use-issue-complicates-gaza-aid-efforts-2024-01-05/">potential use by Hamas</a>. Various items, including filtration systems and even sleeping bags, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/01/middleeast/gaza-aid-israel-restrictions-investigation-intl-cmd/index.html">have been blocked</a> while others have been stuck in bureaucratic limbo, waiting weeks for clearance.</p>
<p>Even with clearance, there is no guarantee items will be allowed into Gaza. To scale up humanitarian aid, restrictions have to be lifted. Rules need to be clear and consistent. Allowing sufficient quantities of fuel to enter is critical to operate trucks, hospital equipment and water-purification plants. </p>
<h2>5. Humanitarian visas</h2>
<p>Humanitarian work also requires humanitarian workers. While many are local staff, international personnel are also essential for such a large-scale aid effort. Recently, Israel <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-25/israel-is-denying-visas-to-aid-groups-working-with-palestinians?embedded-checkout=true">has ceased issuing visas</a> for international humanitarian personnel working in the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Dozens of international humanitarian workers have left, while some are <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/29/humanitarian-workers-face-deportation-from-israel-after-freeze-on-visas">risking deportation</a> by outstaying their visa limits. At least <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-war-hamas-humanitarian-visas-5d306d367e6522495a4ee8045859a3b8">99 humanitarian workers’ visas</a> have either expired or will expire in the next six months. This is impeding endeavours to deliver essential supplies to Gaza.</p>
<h2>6. Commercial trade</h2>
<p>In the longer term, it is both impossible and undesirable to support a population as large as Gaza’s entirely through humanitarian aid. It is important that the movement of goods also includes the resumption of trade to complement the humanitarian response. </p>
<p>Currently, there is very limited <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/4737126-us-first-commercial-trucks-enter-gaza-war">commercial traffic</a> across the border. But a functioning local market is paramount for any <a href="https://unctad.org/publication/preliminary-assessment-economic-impact-destruction-gaza-and-prospects-economic-recovery">prospects of economic recovery</a> in Gaza. </p>
<p>A minimum target for trucks entering Gaza every day should be the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/03/03/gaza-aid-convoy-israel-war/">pre-war average of 500</a>. Given the scale of destruction and destitution, the aim for combined traffic of commercial vehicles as well as those operated by the United Nations and other non-government organisations should now be even higher.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225369/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US president has ordered a pier to be built so that it can supply aid to Gaza. But it will not be enough.Sarah Schiffling, Deputy Director of the HUMLOG (Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management Research) Institute, Hanken School of EconomicsFoteini Stavropoulou, Senior Lecturer in Operations and Supply Chain Management, Liverpool John Moores UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2228322024-03-07T13:32:50Z2024-03-07T13:32:50ZLebanese-Israeli fighting looks set to scuttle plans for historic land border settlement<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578661/original/file-20240228-16-mpt54u.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=40%2C0%2C5414%2C3645&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A U.N. navy vessel seen through barbed wire patrols the Mediterranean Sea off the Lebanese coast.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonIsraelBorderDealFallout/ceaec2b4d98b426fa4f13dba93f04cb5/photo?Query=lebanon%20israel%20maritime&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=228&currentItemNo=15">AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In October 2022, Lebanon and Israel signed a <a href="https://www.state.gov/historic-agreement-establishing-a-permanent-israel-lebanon-maritime-boundary/">maritime border agreement</a> brokered by the U.S., a move interpreted as the beginning of normalizing relations between <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/war-decades-lebanon-israel-edge-towards-rare-deal-2022-10-11/">two countries technically at war</a>. </p>
<p>The next step would have been the settlement of the long-running <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/13/why-is-there-a-disputed-border-between-lebanon-and-israel">land border dispute</a>.</p>
<p>But then came the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s response in bombing Gaza. The following day, <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nasrallah-hezbollah-leader-gaza-war">Hassan Nasrallah</a>, secretary general of Lebanon’s political party and militant group Hezbollah, announced the faction had “entered the battle,” effectively dragging Lebanon into fresh, intensified fighting with Israel. </p>
<p>Since then, near-daily tit-for-tat strikes have seen Hezbollah fighters <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/15/hezbollah-warns-israel-will-pay-price-after-fighters-civilians-killed#:%7E:text=The%20Lebanese%20armed%20group%20Hezbollah,Hezbollah%20fighters%20in%20southern%20Lebanon.">fire missiles into northern Israel</a> and Israel Defense Forces <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-airstrikes-balbek-drone-ed15c8275fa47e6214784f5ed99649f8">responding in kind</a>. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.dickinson.edu/site/custom_scripts/dc_faculty_profile_index.php?fac=rebeizm">scholar who researches</a> <a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Gendering_Civil_War.html?id=mJXZzwEACAAJ&source=kp_author_description">evolving issues in Lebanon and the Middle East</a>, I worry that as regional violence escalates, the long simmering conflict between Israel and Lebanon is heading toward an unavoidable <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-war-preparedness-civilians-military-aafd7a0048dceb810456b93ceecf543c">full-blown war</a>. In such circumstances, hopes for a land settlement to accompany the historic maritime deal look, for now at least, dead in the water.</p>
<h2>Lebanese–Israeli relations</h2>
<p>For over 75 years, Israel’s border with Lebanon has been a source of conflict. Following the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-at-75-palestinians-struggle-to-get-recognition-for-their-catastrophe-204782">expelled or fled their land</a>; many ended up as refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. </p>
<p><iframe id="wuf3I" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/wuf3I/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was created and began to operate cells and recruit members from the Palestinian refugee camps in those three countries. In 1970, the PLO was <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/content/black-september">expelled from Jordan</a>.</p>
<p>It moved its headquarters into Lebanon, and by the mid-1970s over <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1976/08/18/archives/palestinian-groups-fight-for-survival-in-lebanon.html">20,000 PLO</a> fighters were in Lebanon launching attacks on Israel. Their armed presence divided Lebanese public opinion between those who wanted to make peace with Israel and those who wanted to defend the Palestinian cause. </p>
<p>On <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Lebanese-Civil-War">April 13, 1975</a>, violence erupted over the issue of Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, and the country descended into chaos. </p>
<p>It resulted in a messy civil war in which Palestinian insurgents in Lebanon fought the country’s Christian population while also continuing to fire rockets into Israel. Lebanon thus became an unstable political and security threat to Israel. </p>
<p>In 1982, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon launched <a href="https://embassies.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Operation-Peace-for-Galilee.aspx">Operation Peace for Galilee</a>. On June 6 of that year, Israel Defense Forces invaded Lebanon with the intent to eliminate PLO fighters. Nearly <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/09/03/war-casualties-put-at-48000-in-lebanon/cf593941-6067-4239-a453-71bdcaf9eba0/">18,000 people were killed and another 30,000 wounded</a> during the invasion. </p>
<p>The Lebanese authorities called for help, and a <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/middle-east/lebanon.html">multinational peacekeeping force</a> composed of American, French, British and Italian troops arrived in August 1982. Its mission was to evacuate PLO fighters out of Lebanon into Tunisia. </p>
<p>But on Sept. 14, Lebanese President-elect <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/15/world/gemayel-of-lebanon-is-killed-in-bomb-blast-at-party-offices.html">Bashir Gemayel</a> was assassinated. In retaliation, the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and killed over 2,000 civilians. <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/massacres-at-sabra-and-shatila">Evidence suggests</a> Israel played a role in these massacres and was indirectly responsible for them. </p>
<p>Israel officially retreated from Beirut in September 1982, but it occupied southern Lebanon until 2000. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A groupd of mourners carry a coffin." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578672/original/file-20240228-26-warkla.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Mourners at a funeral procession on Feb. 17, 2024, in Nabatiyeh, Lebanon.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/LebanonIsraelPalestinians/28e1c8a9206b40b1a7662a0fe0b6ed6c/photo?Query=Lebanon%20%20Israel%20border&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=2301&currentItemNo=18">AP Photo/Mohammed Zaatari</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It was during this Israeli occupation that <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, a Shiite political party in Lebanon and militant organization backed by Iran, was born. Hezbollah and the IDF have been engaged in fierce fighting ever since, including a 1996 war known as <a href="https://www.hrw.org/legacy/summaries/s.israel-lebanon979.html">Operation Grapes of Wrath</a>, in which an estimated 200 were killed. </p>
<h2>Land and maritime border disputes</h2>
<p>Much of the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel takes place along a border that has been contested since the creation of Israel. Matters became more complicated with the occupation of the Golan Heights – a former Syrian territory that borders Israel and Lebanon and was taken by Israeli forces during the 1967 <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461">Six-Day War</a>.</p>
<p>In the past, there have been attempts to settle land disputes. In 1949, Israel and Lebanon signed the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-generalarmistice49#:%7E:text=Summary%3A,to%20permanent%20peace%20in%20Palestine.">general armistice agreement</a>, which adopted the boundaries of the mandatory territories of Palestine and Lebanon. This agreement continues to exist on paper. </p>
<p>In May 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement calling for the establishment of peaceful diplomatic relations between the two states. However, after the assassination of Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the agreement was not implemented. </p>
<p>Following the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, a <a href="https://unifil.unmissions.org/it%E2%80%99s-time-talk-about-blue-line-constructive-re-engagement-key-stability">“Blue Line” was established</a> by the U.N. It is not a real border but rather an imagined line separating the two states and monitored by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. </p>
<p>Although the Blue Line acts as a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel, it does not offer an accurate drawing of land boundaries and does not solve the issue of a key source of contention: the disputed <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/shebaa-farms-why-hezbollah-uses-israel-s-occupation-of-a-tiny-strip-of-land-to-justify-its-arsenal-1.857998">Shebaa Farms</a>. </p>
<p>Located between Israel, Syria and southern Lebanon, the Shebaa Farms have been contested lands for over two decades. While Lebanon and Hezbollah claim that it is Lebanese territory, Israel asserts that it is part of the Golan Heights, which it continues to occupy.</p>
<p>After appointing cartographers, the United Nations declared the Shebaa Farms Syrian territory <a href="https://newlinesmag.com/first-person/assad-the-shebaa-farms-are-syrian-whatever-hezbollah-claims/">captured by Israel in 1967</a>.</p>
<p>In 2011, Syrian leader <a href="https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/84303">Bashar Assad recognized that the Shebaa Farms</a> are Syrian, refuting Hezbollah’s claim over this land and Israel’s jurisdiction in the occupied Golan Heights. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, efforts led by the U.S. began to look at the issue of Lebanon and Israel’s disputed maritime boundary, starting in earnest in 2010. </p>
<p>The discovery of the Leviathan field, <a href="https://newmedenergy.com/operations/leviathan/#:%7E:text=Leviathan%2C%20with%2022.9%20TCF%20of,producing%20assets%20in%20the%20region.">the largest gas reservoir in the Mediterranean</a>, made it urgent to address the question of the maritime borders. With gas exploitation and economic growth a possibility, it was deemed important to lower security risks for investors. </p>
<p>In 2022, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us-special-envoy-hopes-diplomacy-will-calm-lebanon-israel-border-2024-01-11/">Amos Hochstein</a>, the American envoy for energy affairs, met separately at the Blue Line with Israeli and Lebanese officials. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/27/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-maritime-deal/">Hezbollah was involved</a> in the negotiations and gave the green light for the deal to be sealed. In October of that year, the <a href="https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/mzn_s/MZN161.pdf">U.N. was notified</a> of the new Israeli and Lebanese maritime borders. </p>
<p>It came amid other signs of a lessening in tensions between Israel and Arab states. In September 2020, the United Arab Emirates signed the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/">Abraham Accords</a> in which it recognized Israeli statehood. Soon after, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/israeli-foreign-minister-heads-delegation-discuss-sudan-normalisation-2023-02-02/">Sudan and Bahrain</a> followed suit. </p>
<h2>Moving forward</h2>
<p>The maritime border agreement carried a potential for peace in the region, a deal that would, potentially, benefit both Lebanon and Israel. </p>
<p>The next step would have been drawing land boundaries. In fact, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/22/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-lebanon-hezbollah-talks.html">Hochstein</a> had already held preliminary discussions over 13 land border points, including the Shebaa Farms, and had explicitly said that the U.S. is ready to help mediate between the two countries.</p>
<p>Hamas’ terrorist attack on <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/31/interview-building-evidence-crimes-committed-israel-october-7">Oct. 7, 2023</a>, and the ongoing Israeli war in Gaza have, however, derailed the process.</p>
<p>It is hard to envision a land border deal in such circumstances, especially after <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/assassination-of-hamas-leader-in-lebanon-deepens-concerns-of-broader-regional-conflict">the January 2024 assassination of</a> Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut and Hezbollah’s vow to avenge the death.</p>
<p>The final nail in the coffin looks to be Saudi Arabia’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-says-there-will-be-no-diplomatic-relations-with-israel-without-an-2024-02-07/">statement on Feb. 7, 2024</a>, that it can have no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital. </p>
<p>It has ended hopes, for now at least, that Saudi Arabia will follow the UAE’s lead and normalize diplomatic relations with Israel. </p>
<p>The U.S. is still desperately trying to keep the land deal alive. Recently, <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/lebanon/2024/03/05/amos-hochstein-meets-anti-hezbollah-parties-in-lebanon-for-first-time/">Hochstein visited Lebanon</a> and met with anti-Hezbollah parties in an attempt to end hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and move forward with a land agreement. </p>
<p>One voice often neglected in all this is that of the Lebanese public. <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/lebanons-political-forces-oppose-a-war-with-israel/">Many Lebanese</a> have expressed their opposition to war. In one <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/shadow-hezbollah-israel-escalation-poll-shows-slim-majority-lebanese-still-want">recent poll</a>, a majority agreed that what the country needed was domestic and economic reforms more than involvement in foreign policy issues. A historic land deal accompanying the maritime settlement may have gone some way to achieve those goals. Instead, the danger now is a full-scale war that will scuttle any negotiations.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222832/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mireille Rebeiz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A maritime border agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel seemed like a step toward peaceful relations. But now both countries are getting ready for what looks like an unavoidable war.Mireille Rebeiz, Chair of Middle East Studies & Associate Professor of Francophone & Women's, Gender & Sexuality Studies, Dickinson CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247122024-03-07T13:03:42Z2024-03-07T13:03:42ZWhy Israel’s economy is resilient in spite of the war<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580093/original/file-20240306-18-g3idi5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=648%2C0%2C2356%2C2005&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/back-shot-several-soldiers-israel-army-1423050641">Melnikov Dmitriy/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel’s war in Gaza and more limited conflict with Hezbollah on its northern border with Lebanon is taking a toll on the Israeli economy. </p>
<p>In the final quarter of 2023, Israel’s gross domestic product (GDP) – a measure of a country’s economic health – <a href="https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/publications/Pages/2024/Monthly-Bulletin-of-Statistics-February-2024.aspx">shrank by almost 20%</a>. Consumption dropped by 27% and investment by 70%.</p>
<p>It’s important to note that these are annualised figures relative to the same period a year ago. The 5.2% drop in GDP from the third quarter was substantial, but it is likely to be a temporary setback unless the war with Hezbollah intensifies.</p>
<p>The outbreak of war disrupted <a href="https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/a09-11-23/">around 18%</a> of Israel’s workforce. In October, 250,000 civilians fled or were evacuated from border communities. Meanwhile, around 4% of the workforce – some 300,000 people – were called up as reservists as Israel mobilised for its military offensive.</p>
<p>Over the next few years, the war will cost Israel an estimated <a href="https://boi.org.il/media/ruuby3mw/%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%92%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%92%D7%99%D7%93-%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9D-22124.pdf">255 billion shekels</a> (£56.6 billion) due to reduced economic activity and increased expenses. But the <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-Israels-ratings-to-A2-changes-outlook-to-negative-Rating-Action--PR_484801">projected rise</a> in national debt from 60% to 67% of GDP by 2025 is manageable, as is the plan to raise annual military spending from 4% of GDP to <a href="https://boi.org.il/media/ruuby3mw/%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%92%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A0%D7%92%D7%99%D7%93-%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%9D-22124.pdf">6%</a> or <a href="https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/s15g7mett">7%</a> by the end of the decade. </p>
<p>Israel entered the war with a relatively low national debt and foreign currency reserves equivalent to about 40% of annual GDP. Its population is young and still growing, and <a href="https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/2022/def20_1857/h_print.pdf">data</a> reveals that Israel has surpassed current military spending levels before. Between 1967 and 1972, military spending averaged 20.3% of GDP, rising to 28.7% from 1973 to 1975 before stabilising at 20.8% between 1976 and 1985.</p>
<p>The years following the Yom Kippur war in 1973 and through the first Lebanon war (1982–85) are often referred to as “lost years” for Israel’s economy. Per-capita GDP growth averaged <a href="https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/?lang=en">4.8%</a> in the 12 years before this period; over the following 12 years it dropped to just 0.8%. Inflation gradually rose, <a href="https://www.globes.co.il/finance/indexprice/inflation.asp?Lang=HE">peaking at 445%</a> during 1984.</p>
<p>So the question is not if Israel can weather the current storm, but whether the burden of higher military spending will be offset by budget cuts elsewhere to ensure economic growth resumes and public debt returns to a sustainable trajectory. </p>
<p>So far, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, and other members of his coalition have resisted <a href="https://economists-for-israeli-democracy.com/">advice</a> from economists to change the government’s spending priorities. They have done so for fear of upsetting the small but influential constituencies whose votes keep them in power.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Benjamin Netanyahu speaking in front of an Israel flag with his right hand outstretched." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=339&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580092/original/file-20240306-20-xvroza.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=427&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Benjamin Netanyahu speaking at a meeting in Berlin, Germany, in March 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/berlin-germany-20230316-prime-minister-benjamin-2276731307">photocosmos1/Shutterstock</a></span>
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<h2>Political opportunism</h2>
<p>Netanyahu has demonstrated a good grasp of market economics. As finance minister between 2003 and 2005, Netanyahu implemented <a href="https://www.nevo.co.il/FilesFolderPermalink.aspx?b=books&r=%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99+%D7%A2%D7%AA%5C%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99+%D7%A2%D7%AA%5C%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A4%D7%98+%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%91%D7%95%D7%93%D7%94%5C%D7%9B%D7%A8%D7%9A+%D7%99">sweeping reforms</a> that lowered tax rates, <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/543634">privatised state companies</a> and raised the state pension age. He also used his tenure to curtail the country’s bloated benefits system and introduce requirements for job training.</p>
<p>Yet since the start of Netanyahu’s second term as prime minister in 2009 (the first was 1996–99), many of these reforms have been <a href="https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/government/documents/addCoalition2009_2.pdf">scaled back or eliminated</a>, particularly the cuts to the benefits system. This benefits system disproportionately advantages the ultra-Orthodox Haredi community, whose parties form part of Netanyahu’s governing coalition.</p>
<p>Netanyahu was once again elected as prime minister in November 2022. Though a proponent of a limited role for the state, his new government included a record 34 different ministries. This was to satisfy the appetite for patronage and ministerial salaries among the different coalition partners as well as factions within his own Likud party. </p>
<p>To secure the continued support of ultra-Orthodox parties he also promised unprecedented <a href="https://www.idi.org.il/articles/49642">levels of funding</a> for religious schools and seminaries. In seminaries, grown men spend their lives studying religious texts at the public’s expense and are exempt from military service. Despite the need to fund the war and for more young men in uniform, Netanyahu and Bezalel Smotrich, the finance minister, have <a href="https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/bkerxsacp">resisted</a> nearly all suggestions that these budget items be reduced.</p>
<p>Here we have a case study where political opportunism easily defeats ideology. We know what Netanyahu believes and what he understands about good economic policy, and we can isolate these from what he is willing to do to remain in office. </p>
<p>Will he choose to defray some of the costs the war will impose on the budget by eliminating wasteful spending on useless ministries? Or will he introduce policies that grow the economy by incentivising higher labour-force participation among the ultra-Orthodox community? The plan for the moment is to borrow more.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two ultra-Orthodox men holding signs written in hebrew." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/580090/original/file-20240306-18-4nzv1y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Ultra-Orthodox men protesting for the release of a religious youth who was jailed for refusing to serve in the military in 2017.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/safed-israel-oct-19-2017-ultra-1026922030">David Cohen 156/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Strong civil society</h2>
<p>We may also overestimate the role politicians and governments play in ensuring a country’s success. Since its founding in 1948, Israel’s electoral system of proportional representation has yielded weak, unstable coalitions.</p>
<p>Historically, the Likud party has strongly supported the independence of the country’s judiciary. But after the last election, Netanyahu’s government introduced <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-65086871">new legislation</a> that, among other things, would have given the Knesset (parliament) the power to override Supreme Court decisions with a simple majority vote. </p>
<p>Had these changes been implemented they would have further magnified the worst properties of the country’s dysfunctional (unwritten) constitution. People do not invest money in countries where court decisions can be overturned by politicians and property rights are not secure.</p>
<p>Yet, despite the weaknesses of its government institutions, Israel has absorbed millions of poor refugees from every corner of the Earth, has fought back when attacked and has defeated far larger neighbours over its 75-year history. It has done so all while transforming itself from an impoverished backwater to a first-world economy and a centre of high-tech innovation. </p>
<p>In the first nine months of 2023, hundreds of thousands of Israelis <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/12/israel-protests-judicial-curbs-supreme-court-challenge">demonstrated</a> in the streets to defend the rule of law and the independence of the country’s judiciary. Many of those same people rushed to join their reserve units on October 7 to defend the country’s borders. Others, acting without any government direction, <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/bjd1lrmlp">organised relief</a> for the survivors and displaced while ministers dithered or disappeared from view.</p>
<p>Countries with strong civil societies and highly engaged populations survive and even prosper not because of their political leaders, but despite them.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224712/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Michael Ben-Gad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>War is taking a toll on Israel’s economy.Michael Ben-Gad, Professor of Economics, City, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2210882024-03-05T20:11:23Z2024-03-05T20:11:23ZPlight of migrant laborers killed, held hostage in Middle East exposes Israel’s reliance on overseas workforce<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579960/original/file-20240305-21577-9fmlrl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=11%2C143%2C7961%2C4984&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A Thai foreign worker tends to an agriculture field in Beersheba, Israel.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.de/detail/nachrichtenfoto/thai-foreign-worker-tends-to-an-agriculture-field-near-nachrichtenfoto/1231752520?adppopup=true">Emmanuel Dunand/AFP via Getty Images)</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>An Indian laborer in Israel was killed and several other migrant workers injured on March 4, 2024, in <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/india/indian-killed-injured-anti-tank-missile-attack-israel-north-9195933/">a missile attack launched from Lebanon</a> by Hamas-aligned Hezbollah.</p>
<p>They are not the first migrant workers in Israel to get caught up in the monthslong fighting. Dozens of other farmworkers, agricultural apprentices and caregivers from countries including Thailand, Nepal, Tanzania, Cambodia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Moldova were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jpeua8qUHmY&ab_channel=DWNews">murdered or taken hostage</a> during the Hamas attack of Oct. 7.</p>
<p>The sizable number of non-Israeli workers affected by the current war has <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-so-many-thai-workers-became-hamas-victims/a-67266701">surprised some onlookers</a> while shining a light on Israel’s reliance on temporary migrant workers.</p>
<p>But as researchers who study the <a href="https://cas.uoregon.edu/directory/global/all/jweise">proliferation of migrant workers</a> around the world, we know how labor migration programs have transformed nearly all societies, including <a href="https://hu-berlin.academia.edu/SShoham">Israel’s</a>. The long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shaped Israel’s migrant worker history – and has contributed to the globalization of the workforce in the Middle East.</p>
<h2>A global story</h2>
<p>The initial recruitment of overseas workers to Israel, which began as early as the 1970s, followed a <a href="https://www.law.uchicago.edu/bilateral-labor-agreements-dataset">post-World War II trend</a> that saw higher-income countries – such as the U.S., France and West Germany – sign labor migration recruitment agreements with poorer nations. These poorer countries, which at the time included Mexico, Spain and Turkey, among others, overcame an initial reluctance to lose part of their populace and began to see emigration as a strategy for modernization. The idea was that emigrants could learn modern farming or industrial skills overseas, while sending money back to boost development in their home communities.</p>
<p>In the 1970s and 1980s, <a href="https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/migrants-for-export">many South and Southeast Asian countries</a> began to promote the export of migrant workers as a key piece of their economic development strategies. At the same time, receiving countries <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.1080/0023656032000057010">became hooked</a> on the idea of a flexible, temporary labor force that would not inflame anti-immigrant sentiment as much as more settled migrants seemingly did.</p>
<p>Israel’s relationship with Thai workers came initially by way of the United States’ support for the 1979 peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The U.S. government <a href="https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16021coll4/id/353">recruited Thai workers</a> who had once worked on Vietnam War-era U.S. military bases in northeastern Thailand to help build a new air force base in Israel.</p>
<p>The arrival of the Thai migrant workers, along with Portuguese workers, prompted public controversy among Israeli lawmakers, trade unionists and the media about the creation of a split labor market, as research done by <a href="https://hu-berlin.academia.edu/SShoham">one of us</a> has shown. Meanwhile, others worried that the workers’ presence cut against Zionist imperatives to guarantee a Jewish majority.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man in a hat handles crates being loaded onto the back of a tractor." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=10%2C391%2C7241%2C4436&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579954/original/file-20240305-22-j0m1i7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Thai worker labors in the field adjacent to the Gaza Strip.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/october-2023-israel-sde-nitzan-a-thai-worker-continues-to-news-photo/1719823925?adppopup=true">Ilia Yefimovich/picture alliance via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Attempting to resolve these contradictions, the Israeli government <a href="https://www.trafflab.org/shahar-shoham">started to experiment</a> with migration policies designed for a new category of workers – neither Jewish nor Palestinian – who were intended to remain separate from Israeli society.</p>
<p>A decade later, in a different political moment, these policy ideas would become concrete in a new category of person in Israel: the “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/imre.12109">foreign worker</a>.”</p>
<h2>Growing recruitment</h2>
<p>The Israeli-Palestinian conflict drove the “foreign worker” policy forward. Though Israel was founded on the ideology of “avoda ivrit,” or Hebrew labor, Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 has led to the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian workers, who became an attractive <a href="https://cris.tau.ac.il/en/publications/power-breaking-or-power-entrenching-law-the-regulation-of-palesti">low-wage labor force</a>.</p>
<p>They soon came to <a href="https://cris.tau.ac.il/en/publications/power-breaking-or-power-entrenching-law-the-regulation-of-palesti">compose 7% of the workers</a> in the Israeli labor market as a whole, 24% of workers in the agricultural sector and 60% in the construction sector.</p>
<p>The non-citizen Palestinian workers commuted daily from the West Bank and Gaza, controlled by a <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=25698">regime of permits</a> and regulations.</p>
<p>When the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, began in 1987, some members of the Israeli public came to see such workers as a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2547185">security risk</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/oslo-accords-30-years-on-the-dream-of-a-two-state-solution-seems-further-away-than-ever-213003">1993 Oslo Accords</a>, which sought to foment “separation” between Israelis and Palestinians, further pushed Israel to minimize the dependency on non-citizen Palestinian workers.</p>
<p>To make up for the shortfall, <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362022418_On_the_Establishment_of_Agricultural_Migration_Industry_in_Israel%27s_Countryside">Israeli employers</a> convinced the government to vastly expand the recruitment of temporary workers to take their place. In addition to Thailand, countries including China, India, Nepal, the Philippines, Romania and Turkey spotted an opportunity and allowed Israeli employers to recruit within their borders. By 2003, migrant workers <a href="https://journals.openedition.org/remi/2691">made up 10% of the labor force</a> in Israel.</p>
<h2>Creating marginal workers</h2>
<p>Migrant workers in Israel, like their counterparts the world over, have long since been <a href="https://www.trafflab.org/_files/ugd/11e1f0_861945c9ea904d57a359c89d44424869.pdf">vulnerable to exploitation</a>.</p>
<p>Many of their origin countries did not demand a commitment to secure their citizens’ rights in the form of a <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4168983">bilateral labor recruitment agreement</a>. And workers migrating via <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1350463042000227380">private recruitment</a> channels had to pay thousands of dollars in illegal “sign-up” fees, causing them to begin their journeys deep in debt. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, Israeli government policies have attempted to <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jols.12366">keep migrants outside of society by confining</a> them to specific industries, obligating them to leave the country upon completion of their labor contract, excluding them from the <a href="https://www.kavlaoved.org.il/en/a-land-devouring-its-workers-neglect-and-violations-of-migrant-agricultural-workers-right-to-health-in-israel/">public health system</a> and <a href="https://academic.oup.com/socpro/article-abstract/63/3/373/2468875?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=false">prohibiting</a> them from marrying or engaging in romantic relations while in Israel.</p>
<p>And authorities have paid little attention to labor standards, leaving farmworkers, for example, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/21/raw-deal/abuse-thai-workers-israels-agricultural-sector">vulnerable</a> to <a href="https://www.academia.edu/42386415/Giving_them_the_slip_Israeli_employers_strategic_falsification_of_pay_slips_to_disguise_the_violation_of_Thai_farmworkers_right_to_the_minimum_wage">wage theft</a>, terrible housing and exposure to pesticides without proper protection. </p>
<p>Under pressure from the U.S. government and Israeli civil society, over the past decade Israel began to sign <a href="https://www.cimi-eng.org/_files/ugd/5d35de_16d441738d06413184ba6dfa94cb0135.pdf">bilateral agreements</a> with countries sending migrants. These eliminated exorbitant recruitment fees, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4167016">even if they failed</a> to meaningfully improve labor conditions. </p>
<p>Even so, the number of migrant workers has <a href="https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/foreign_workers_stats/he/zarim2022.pdf">grown slowly</a> but steadily. In 2022, a total of 73,000 migrants in Israel worked as caregivers, in addition to nearly 50,000 in the construction and agriculture sectors combined. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man stands in a bombs shelter." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579974/original/file-20240305-26-efvsos.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A Thai worker takes shelter in an underground bunker in Metula, Israel.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/thai-workers-take-shelter-in-an-underground-bunker-after-news-photo/1720607203?adppopup=true">Marcus Yam/ LA Times via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet these migrants did not obviate the need to also have <a href="https://kavlaoved.org.il/en/areasofactivity/palestinian-workers/">Palestinian labor</a> in the mix. By Oct. 7, 2023, about 100,000 Palestinian workers crossed the border daily from Gaza and the West Bank.</p>
<h2>In harm’s way</h2>
<p>Since Oct. 7, Israeli authorities have ended those Palestinians’ work permits and tried to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-plans-bring-more-foreign-workers-construction-sector-report-2024-01-01/">recruit thousands of new workers</a> to the fields and construction sites to make up for the shortfall. </p>
<p>Malawi, a country that <a href="https://www.academia.edu/8987110/Independent_Africans_Migration_from_Colonial_Malawi_to_South_Africa_c_1935_1961">came to depend</a> on migrants’ economic remittances decades before Thailand did, has sent 700 farmworkers and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/malawi-parliament-allows-labor-export-to-israel-/7490863.html">promises</a> another 9,000 on the way – notwithstanding <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLjNqFY4_Dk">criticism</a> from voices within the African nation itself. </p>
<p>In India, which had long sent caregivers to Israel, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi <a href="https://www.bwint.org/cms/india-unions-denounce-govt-plan-to-send-migrant-construction-workers-to-israel-3017">ignored internal criticism</a> and sent Israel more workers in the aftermath of the Oct. 7 attack, including <a href="https://www.livemint.com/news/india/who-was-pat-nibin-maxwell-indian-from-kerala-killed-as-hezbollah-launches-airstrikes-in-israel-11709631189269.html">Pat Nibin Maxwell</a>, the man killed in the March 4 Hezbollah attack.</p>
<p>Workers like Maxwell are now being sent to work near the borders of Lebanon and Gaza, laboring in agricultural communities vulnerable to Hamas and Hezbollah attacks that have been <a href="https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2024-03-04/ty-article/0000018e-09d0-d6be-afff-4dd174310000">depleted by the evacuation</a> of Israeli residents.</p>
<p>Though foreign governments are able to guarantee their citizens few protections in Israel, <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/17/1229525320/india-israel-hamas-war-jobs-migrant-workers">thousands have queued up</a> in their home countries in search of a contract. </p>
<p>Once in Israel, they join the vast majority of migrant workers who have elected to remain in the country despite the Oct. 7 attack and its aftermath.</p>
<p>Like millions of migrant workers the world over in search of economic progress or survival, they have calculated, for now, that earning higher wages abroad is worth taking significant personal risks. </p>
<p>While helping keep the Israeli economy running during wartime, these migrant workers remain in the path of rockets – as the death of Pat Nibin Maxwell has illustrated.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221088/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shahar Shoham previously worked at Physicians for Human Rights-Israel </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Julie Weise does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The contours of the Middle East conflict have long influenced Israel’s migrant worker policy.Julie Weise, Associate Professor of History, University of OregonShahar Shoham, Doctoral Candidate in Global and Area Studies at the Institute for Asian and African Studies, Humboldt University of BerlinLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2250792024-03-05T06:15:22Z2024-03-05T06:15:22ZWhy have Anthony Albanese and other politicians been referred to the ICC over the Gaza war?<p>In an unprecedented legal development, senior Australian politicians, including Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, have been referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation into whether they have aided or supported Israel’s actions in Gaza. </p>
<p>The referral, made by the Sydney law firm <a href="https://birchgrovelegal.com.au/2024/03/01/birchgrove-legal-files-case-for-complicity-to-genocide-to-the-hague-international-criminal-court-media-release/?fbclid=IwAR1mfkJ08SSs3rmZW7inOLNaPnwJ3SsKHXVyIw57usvRpGuyang4x0TCA7c">Birchgrove Legal</a> on behalf of their clients, is the first time any serving Australian political leaders have been formally referred to the ICC for investigation. </p>
<p>The referral asserts that Albanese, Foreign Minister Penny Wong, Opposition Leader Peter Dutton and other members of the government have violated the <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf">Rome Statute</a>, the 1998 treaty that established the ICC to investigate and prosecute allegations of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.</p>
<p>Specifically, the law firm references:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Australia’s freezing of aid to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the aid agency that operates in Gaza</p></li>
<li><p>the provision of military aid to Israel that could have been used in the alleged commission of genocide and crimes against humanity </p></li>
<li><p>permitting Australians to travel to Israel to take part in attacks in Gaza </p></li>
<li><p>providing “unequivocal political support” for Israel’s actions in Gaza. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A key aspect of the referral is the assertion, under Article 25 of the Rome Statute, that Albanese and the others bear individual criminal responsibility for aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission (or attempted commission) of alleged crimes by Israel in Gaza.</p>
<p>At a news conference today, Albanese <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/live/2024/mar/05/australia-news-live-anthony-albanese-asean-green-energy-investment-south-east-asia-cook-kennedy-women-liberals-peter-dutton?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with:block-65e678228f08826910dd03dd#block-65e678228f08826910dd03dd">said the letter</a> had “no credibility” and was an example of “misinformation”. He said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Australia joined a majority in the UN to call for an immediate ceasefire and to advocate for the release of hostages, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the upholding of international law and the protection of civilians.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/there-has-been-much-talk-of-war-crimes-in-the-israel-gaza-conflict-but-will-anyone-actually-be-prosecuted-217785">There has been much talk of war crimes in the Israel-Gaza conflict. But will anyone actually be prosecuted?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>How the referral process works</h2>
<p>There are a couple of key questions here: can anyone be referred to the ICC, and how often do these referrals lead to an investigation?</p>
<p><a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp">Referrals to the ICC prosecutor</a> are most commonly made by individual countries – as has occurred following <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/ukraine">Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022</a> – or by the UN Security Council. However, it is also possible for referrals to be made by “intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations, or other reliable sources”, according to Article 15 of the Rome Statute. </p>
<p>The ICC prosecutor’s office has received <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp">12,000 such referrals</a> to date. These must go through a preliminary examination before the office decides whether there are “reasonable grounds” to start an investigation. </p>
<p>The court has issued arrest warrants for numerous leaders over the past two decades, including Russian President <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/17/icc-arrest-warrant-vladimir-putin-explainer">Vladimir Putin</a> and his commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova; former Sudanese President <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/26/sudan-former-president-accused-of-genocide-may-be-free-after-prison-attack">Omar al-Bashir</a>; and now-deceased Libyan leader <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/6/28/icc-issues-gaddafi-arrest-warrant">Muammar Gaddafi</a>.</p>
<h2>Why this referral is unlikely to go anywhere</h2>
<p>Putting aside the merit of the allegations themselves, it is unlikely the Australian referrals will go any further for legal and practical reasons. </p>
<p>First, the ICC was established as an <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works">international court of last resort</a>. This means it would only be used to prosecute international crimes when courts at a national level are unwilling or unable to do so.</p>
<p>As such, the threat of possible ICC prosecution was intended to act as a deterrent for those considering committing international crimes, as well as an incentive for national authorities and courts to prosecute them. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/why-is-accountability-for-alleged-war-crimes-so-hard-to-achieve-in-the-israel-palestinian-conflict-160864">Why is accountability for alleged war crimes so hard to achieve in the Israel-Palestinian conflict?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>Australia has such a process in place to investigate potential war crimes and other international crimes through the <a href="https://www.osi.gov.au/">Office of the Special Investigator</a> (OSI).</p>
<p>The OSI was created in the wake of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/nov/19/key-findings-of-the-brereton-report-into-allegations-of-australian-war-crimes-in-afghanistan">2020 Brereton Report</a> into allegations of Australian war crimes in Afghanistan. In <a href="https://www.osi.gov.au/news-resources/former-australian-soldier-charged-war-crime">March 2023</a>, the office announced its first prosecution.</p>
<p>Because Australia has this legal framework in place, the ICC prosecutor would likely deem it unnecessary to refer Australian politicians to the ICC for prosecution, unless Australia was unwilling to start such a prosecution itself. At present, there is no evidence that is the case. </p>
<p>Another reason this referral is likely to go nowhere: the ICC prosecutor, Karim Khan, is <a href="https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases">currently focusing on a range of investigations</a> related to alleged war crimes committed by Russia, Hamas and Israel, in addition to other historical investigations. </p>
<p>Given the significance of these investigations – and the political pressure the ICC faces to act with speed – it is unlikely the court would divert limited resources to investigate Australian politicians.</p>
<h2>Increasing prominence of international courts</h2>
<p>This referral to the ICC, however, needs to be seen in a wider context. The Israel-Hamas conflict has resulted in an unprecedented flurry of legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN’s top court. </p>
<p>Unlike the ICC, the ICJ does not deal with individual criminal responsibility. The ICJ does, however, have jurisdiction over whether countries violate international law, such as the <a href="https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf">Genocide Convention</a>. </p>
<p>This was the basis for <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192">South Africa</a> to launch its case against Israel in the ICJ, claiming its actions against the Palestinian people amounted to genocide. The ICJ issued a provisional ruling against Israel in January which said it’s “plausible” Israel had committed genocide in Gaza and ordered Israel to take immediate steps to prevent acts of genocide. </p>
<p>In addition, earlier this week, a new case was launched in the ICJ by <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/193">Nicaragua</a>, alleging Germany has supported acts of genocide by providing military support for Israel and freezing aid for UNRWA.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1763633881939427400"}"></div></p>
<p>All of these developments in recent months amount to what experts call “<a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-israel-pans-nicaraguas-world-court-suit-experts-see-new-lawfare-front-in-war/">lawfare</a>”. This refers to the use of international or domestic courts to seek accountability for alleged state-sanctioned acts of genocide and support or complicity in such acts. Some of these cases have merit, others are very weak. </p>
<p>As one international law expert <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/26/lawfare-on-israels-war-on-gaza-reaches-germany-will-the-case-succeed">described the purpose</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>It’s […] a way of raising awareness, getting media attention and showing your own political base you’re doing something. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>These cases do succeed in increasing public awareness of these conflicts. And they make clear the desire of many around the world to hold to account those seen as being responsible for gross violations of international law.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/225079/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Donald Rothwell receives funding from Australian Research Council</span></em></p>The war has resulted in a flurry of legal proceedings in international courts. Some cases have merit, while others are very weak.Donald Rothwell, Professor of International Law, Australian National UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247112024-03-04T20:47:47Z2024-03-04T20:47:47ZSelf-immolation and other ‘spectacular’ protests: How impactful are they?<p>On Feb. 25, United States Air Force member Aaron Bushnell <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-airman-self-immolation-israel-embassy-1.7126137">set himself on fire outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C.</a>. The 25-year-old, who was in uniform, live-streamed what he called his “extreme act of protest against the genocide of the Palestinian people.” </p>
<p>His startling and fatal act quickly went viral on social media <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13127485/Air-Force-engineer-Aaron-Bushnell-set-fire-outside-Israeli-embassy-pro-Palestine-protest-belonged-Christian-cult-SUPPORTS-airstrikes.html">while the public</a>, and his <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68455401">friends and family have struggled to make sense</a> of Bushnell’s painful sacrifice. How can we begin to make sense of such an extreme act? And, will his actions have any impact on public opinion?</p>
<p>While undeniably remarkable, Bushnell’s actions begin to make a little more sense when seen in broader context. Self-immolation, the act of setting oneself on fire, can be seen as an extreme form of a modern repertoire of protest that is both common and familiar, not just in the U.S. but in many parts of the globe.</p>
<p>For example, in <a href="https://www-sup.stanford.edu/books/title/?id=35102">my research with frontline women workers in Pakistan</a>, I found self-immolation was part of a broader set of attention-grabbing tools women used in an effort to attract both attention and allies for what they saw as an otherwise lost cause. I call this broad set of publicity seeking efforts “spectacular agency,” a set of stunning dramas people stage to publicize abuse, critique injustice, censure abusers and protect the vulnerable. </p>
<h2>Spectacular agency</h2>
<p>Spectacular agency, including extreme forms like self-immolation, is not new. Many people from the 1960s generation will be familiar with the <a href="https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/the-burning-monk-1963/">photograph of Thich Quang Duc, the Buddhist monk</a> who self-immolated to protest the South Vietnamese government’s persecution of Buddhists. His unthinkable gesture <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176056.003.0013">brought international attention to the plight of Buddhists</a> in South Vietnam.</p>
<p>Now, since the advent of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/27/1233985097/self-immolation-political-protesters-history-aaron-bushnell">globalized broadcast media,</a> such actions can quickly gain attention across the globe. Indeed, with the wider availability of social media and the possibility of going viral, such protests have become more common than you would think. </p>
<p>Not all spectacular actions include the extreme act of self-immolation, but many examples exist within its realm. They have included the use of hashtags like <a href="https://canadianwomen.org/the-facts/the-metoo-movement-in-canada/">#metoo,</a> the circulation of leaked <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/you-dont-belong-here-canadian-teacher-lambastes-muslim-student-for-eschewing-pride">videos</a>, the practice of <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/mcmaster-divestment-project-hunger-strike-ends-1.6793248">hunger strikes</a>, the use of <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/pro-palestinian-protesters-return-to-union-station-for-rush-hour-sit-in/article_21490aa0-93ee-11ee-bb99-032a49e54b60.html">inflammatory posters</a>, the burning of effigies (for example when U.S. protestors <a href="https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/draft-card-protest/">burnt their draft cards</a> in 1965) and also attempted <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/366731/lhws-protest-pushed-to-limits-man-sets-himself-on-fire">self-immolation</a>. </p>
<p>And as I found in Pakistan, this also includes the organization of <a href="https://archive.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/03/21/lady-health-workers-protest/">dharnas</a> (sit-ins). Sit-ins have also been recently used as a protest technique to call for a ceasefire in Gaza <a href="https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/pro-palestinian-protesters-return-to-union-station-for-rush-hour-sit-in/article_21490aa0-93ee-11ee-bb99-032a49e54b60.html">at Toronto’s Union Station</a> and in Washington, D.C. in October.</p>
<p>While such acts may generate attention, this kind of agency is often costly, requiring the protesters involved to make considerable personal investments of time, money, comfort, privacy, dignity and even life. </p>
<p>Yet, despite the costs, the outcomes of spectacular agency are frequently uncertain. </p>
<p>This is because spectacular agency requires recruiting others, such as audiences, who need to buy into a message, an idea or a point of view. But no matter how carefully they stage their dramatic contention, protesters have limited control over the way their vivid efforts will be read and interpreted by others.</p>
<h2>How audiences interpret protests</h2>
<p>When the public sees spectacular acts, they may focus on the symbols protesters use, such as military uniforms, that may be both symbolically loaded and multivocal. People invest a lot of meaning into military uniforms and they may read their use in many different ways depending on their different points of view. While symbols like uniforms can be arresting, their use may not always produce the interpretation the protester desired. Instead, the use of a loaded symbol may be taken by spectators as sacrilegious, and their use, therefore, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/29/aaron-bushnell-suicide-protest/">can lead audiences to question the protester’s sanity</a>.</p>
<p>The meanings audiences draw from spectacular performance, moreover, often interact with broader currents of inequality in society. An actor’s race, gender or age can be important factors that determine whether they have the authority, in an audience’s eyes, to use a particular symbol or to spectacularly tell a story that is important to them. </p>
<p>Women engaging in spectacular agency to draw attention to sexual assault, <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/trending/columbia-student-brings-rape-protest-mattress-to-graduation-1.3079582">like the Columbia student who carried a mattress</a> around campus to draw attention to sexual abuse, may find audiences either blame the victim or <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/columbia-university-mattress-girl-emmas-sulkowicz-paul-nungesser-lawsuit-rape-accusation-exonerated/">refuse to believe her account</a>.</p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/HRaw1A7REzs?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Emma Sulkowicz, walks across the stage at Columbia College, 2015, with her mattress as audience members cheered and clapped. Two years later, the accused was cleared of any wrongdoing in a settled lawsuit.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Selflessly fighting for a better future</h2>
<p>In Pakistan, women frontline workers’ spectacular actions also brought mixed results. When I say frontline workers, I mean people who provide face-to-face service to citizens. One airline attendant <a href="https://www.edition.pk/news/1006210/pia-air-hostess-sabira-rizvi-talks-age-and-being-internet-famous">took to social media in an effort to protest against the ageism and sexism of some passengers</a> and found supportive and allies <a href="https://twitter.com/ammarawrites/status/882899735690039296?lang=en">among other social media users</a>. </p>
<p>But other women workers were not so fortunate.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/4/10/the-plight-of-pakistans-lady-health-workers">Pakistani Lady Health Workers</a>, who travelled from city to city across Pakistan engaging in long running spectacular efforts to grab attention for their poor working conditions, succeeded in getting the Pakistani Supreme Court’s attention and intervention. </p>
<p>However, the women then had to confront a slowly moving bureaucratic administration that found ways to delay or limit the women’s gains. Some of these women said the reforms they had worked so hard for would not benefit them directly. They were on the verge of retirement and were told by their bosses that their hard-won gains in wages and pensions would not apply to them.</p>
<p>Yet, most of these women said they did not regret having made the effort. </p>
<p>Speaking about her own inability to reap the rewards of spectacular agency, Nuzhat, a frontline health worker said:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“It doesn’t matter. The next generation will get it. One person grows a tree so that the next generation can sit in its shade…What is important is that you plant it.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Spectacular agency is costly, requiring the surrender of money, time, comfort and also, at times privacy and dignity. Therefore, people who engage in it, often see it as an altruistic sacrifice made in the name of others. </p>
<p>Rehana, a health worker said: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>“I don’t feel sad that I derived little benefit from that effort…I feel that you should do whatever you can do. Whatever we can do for the next generation, we do it. You can’t control the outcome, but you can say: ‘O Allah, I have fulfilled my obligations. I spared no effort to create a better world for the next people who will take my place. Now it’s up to them and you.’</p>
</blockquote><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224711/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Fauzia Husain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Aaron Bushnell’s self-immolation is an example of ‘spectacular agency,’ a form of attention-grabbing but costly protest. And, it is uncertain how the public will perceive such protests.Fauzia Husain, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Queen's University, OntarioLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2248332024-03-04T13:37:27Z2024-03-04T13:37:27ZCommander of Iran’s elite Quds Force is expanding predecessor’s vision of chaos in the Middle East<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579281/original/file-20240301-50192-65mwly.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=8%2C0%2C2966%2C1853&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani, head of Iran's expeditionary Quds Force, speaks at a ceremony in Tehran on April 14, 2022. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/IranIsrael/7769f2ccb99244898fcb9149111c664d/photo?Query=quds%20force&mediaType=photo&sortBy=arrivaldatetime:desc&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=200&currentItemNo=47">AP Photo/Vahid Salemi</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Most Americans have likely never heard of <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/who-is-esmail-ghaani-the-successor-to-slain-iranian-general-soleimani/">Esmail Ghaani</a>, despite his fingerprints being over a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">slew of recent attacks</a> on U.S. targets.</p>
<p>As the powerful chief of the Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps</a>, Ghaani is charged with overseeing Tehran’s network of allied and proxy groups across the Middle East.</p>
<p>But despite <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/esmail-qaani-commander-of-the-axis/article67808742.ece">recent media attention</a> following a significant increase in attacks by Quds-backed militants since the Oct. 7, 2023, attack in Israel, Ghaani remains a figure who largely shuns the public spotlight.</p>
<p>This is both like and unlike his predecessor Qassem Soleimani, who died in a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/airport-informants-overhead-drones-how-u-s-killed-soleimani-n1113726">controversial 2020 U.S. strike in Iraq</a>.</p>
<p>For the first decade of his stint as Quds Force commander, which began <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20190925041643/http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/suleimani.pdf">in the late 1990s</a>, Soleimani also kept a low profile. But in the years leading up to his death in 2020, he promoted his accomplishments <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/esmail-ghaani-iran-announces-new-military-leader-after-commander-killed-in-us-airstrike-11901047">openly on social media</a>.</p>
<p>Soleimani’s loss was seen as a massive blow to the Quds Force and Iran’s national security agenda overall given his popularity in Iran and his achievements, making the task of replacing him daunting. Ghaani had been <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/profile-the-canny-general-quds-force-commander-ghasem-soleimani.html">Soleimani’s deputy</a>, and the two had known each other since the early 1980s during their <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-esmail-qaani-new-chief-commander-irans-qods-force">military service in the Iran-Iraq War.</a> </p>
<p>In the initial aftermath of Soleimani’s death, experts questioned <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/1/20/esmaii-qaani-new-shadow-commander-of-irans-quds-force">whether Ghaani would be a capable replacement</a>.</p>
<p>But despite differing from Soleimani in both personality and attitude toward publicity, Ghaani has managed to expand upon the foundation that Soleimani carefully cultivated over a 20-year period.</p>
<p>Under Ghaani, the Quds Force has doubled down on the strategy of supporting, arming and funding terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories. </p>
<p>Building from Soleimani’s legacy, Ghaani is responsible for developing the network into what Iranian officials call the “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15/">Axis of Resistance</a>.”</p>
<p>It is a coalition that cuts across ethnic and religious divides in the region, despite Iran itself remaining a hard-line theocracy with an ethnic Persian and Shia Muslim identity. In cultivating the network, first Soleimani and now Ghaani have displayed a degree of pragmatism and flexibility at odds with the extreme ideological position of Iran’s ruling ayatollahs. And Ghaani, like Soleimani before him, appears to have done this with the full trust and support of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.</p>
<h2>Pressuring Iran’s enemies</h2>
<p>As <a href="https://fordschool.umich.edu/faculty/javed-ali">an expert in national security issues</a> with a focus on counterterrorism, I have observed how the Quds Force’s <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/02/07/iran-unleashed-forces-that-it-can-no-longer-control/">unconventional warfare strategy</a> has changed the security landscape in the region. It is premised on creating pressure against Iran’s enemies — Israel, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — through partnering with groups within the axis.</p>
<p>As Quds Force commander, Ghaani has to manage his organization’s relationships with each of these groups. This is made all the more tricky as each maintains its own agendas, decision-making calculations and, at times, independence despite Iran’s influence and largesse.</p>
<p>Take the Quds Force’s relationship with Hamas. Despite the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/04/hamas-drew-detailed-attack-plans-for-years-with-help-of-spies-idf-says">long planning involved</a> with the horrific Hamas attacks in Israel in October 2023, the Quds Force <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/28/Iran-s-IRGC-retracts-statement-on-Oct-7-attacks-after-rare-public-spat-with-Hamas">does not appear to have had a direct role</a>.</p>
<p>Not that the assault wasn’t welcomed by Ghaani, in public at least. In late December 2023, he <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-780069">was reported as saying</a> on Iran’s official news agency that, “Due to the extensive crimes committed by the Zionist regime against the Muslim people of Palestine, [Hamas] themselves took action. … Everything they did was beautifully planned and executed.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Man speaking in front of image of two men." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=415&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579283/original/file-20240301-22-9av044.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=522&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Esmail Ghaani speaks at event commemorating the death of former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani on Jan. 3, 2024.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/commander-esmail-qaani-of-the-islamic-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1898123764?adppopup=true">Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>With other militant groups in the region, Ghaani appears to have a more hands-on approach. The deadly <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/28/politics/us-troops-drone-attack-jordan/index.html">Jan. 28, 2024, drone attack</a> against a U.S. military outpost in Jordan, launched by the Iraq-based and Iran-supported <a href="https://theconversation.com/drone-attack-on-american-troops-risks-widening-middle-east-conflict-and-drawing-in-iran-us-tensions-222216">Islamic Resistance in Iraq</a> network, significantly escalated tensions in the region.</p>
<p>It provoked a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/middleeast/us-iran-militias.html">significant U.S. and British response</a> in Iraq and Syria. After the incident, it was reported that <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-armed-groups-dial-down-us-attacks-request-iran-commander-2024-02-18/">Ghaani spent considerable effort</a> getting the Iraqi groups responsible to temporarily pause anti-U.S. attacks. </p>
<p>Whether that pause lasts for an extended period or if attacks resume will be a test of Ghaani’s ability to wield his influence in Iraq.</p>
<p>Ghaani’s calculus in regard to Yemen, where the Houthis have emerged as a dangerous insurgent group, looks less clear.</p>
<p>Having been armed throughout a decadelong civil war by Iran, the Houthis responded to Israel’s campaign in the Gaza Strip <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf">by launching hundreds of rocket, missile and drone attacks</a> against commercial and military shipping in the Red Sea. </p>
<p>Retaliatory strikes by the U.S. and other coalition members <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/24/politics/us-uk-strikes-houthi-targets-yemen/index.html">on Houthi targets</a> have destroyed a significant amount of the capability that Iran had provided. Yet the Houthis seem undeterred and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/02/stricken-ship-attacked-by-houthi-rebels-sinks-in-red-sea">have continued anti-shipping operations</a>. </p>
<p>It is unclear if Ghaani has attempted to dial those operations back or if he has encouraged the Houthis to maintain their pace, given the shared goals between Iran and the Houthis to keep pressure on the United States and Israel.</p>
<h2>Relationship with Hezbollah</h2>
<p>Beyond Israel, Iraq and Yemen, Ghaani is also likely attempting to manage the Quds Force’s relationship with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, <a href="https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hizballah-and-the-qods-force-in-irans-shadow-war-with-the-west">arguably Iran’s strongest partner</a> in the Axis of Resistance. The partnership stretches back to the early 1980s and has transformed Hezbollah into a powerful force in Lebanon and a serious security concern in the region.</p>
<p>Since Oct. 7, the group has engaged in near daily conflict with Israel, with both sides conducting cross-border strikes. Hezbollah’s general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, seems wary of engaging in a broader war with Israel, but at the same time he has not reined in the attacks and <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/16/hezbollah-warns-that-israel-will-pay-in-blood-for-killing-civilians">has vowed to retaliate against Israel</a> for the death of civilians in Lebanon. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Three Iranian leaders, two in military fatigues stand and talk." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/579285/original/file-20240301-51872-or5k22.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, left, meets with Esmail Ghaani, right, and Revolutionary Guards General Commander Hossein Salami, center, on Dec. 28, 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com.mx/detail/fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/iranian-leader-ali-khamenei-iranian-fotograf%C3%ADa-de-noticias/1883329738?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although Iran may well welcome Hezbollah becoming a persistent irritant to Israel, Tehran is also wary of a full-blown conflict. In such a scenario, Nasrallah, Ghaani and Supreme Leader Khamenei would have to worry about whether the United States would get directly involved – as, reportedly, the White House <a href="https://www.axios.com/2023/10/17/israel-news-us-military-hezbollah-attacks">had been considering</a> in the days after the Oct. 7 attack on Israel.</p>
<p>Any future statements by Ghaani regarding Hezbollah will be a strong indicator of Iran’s intent in regard to how it sees this volatile aspect of tensions in the Middle East developing.</p>
<h2>Walking a tightrope</h2>
<p>To date, Ghaani seems to have successfully navigated the transition between replacing the charismatic figure of Qassem Soleimani and advancing Iran’s interests through Quds Force operations with the full backing of Khameini.</p>
<p>He may never be as revered in Iran as Soleimani, but by managing the Quds Force’s relationship with Axis of Resistance groups, Ghaani has proved to be a formidable and capable adversary who should not be underestimated. </p>
<p>The recent escalation of multifaceted tensions across the Middle East has provided both opportunities and potential pitfalls for Ghaani’s strategy – how to encourage the activities of its Axis of Rrsistance while insulating Iran from any direct blowback from the United States.</p>
<p>But one thing is becoming clear: Reversing the Quds Force’s influence while bolstering U.S. interests is likely to be a top policy priority for Washington as it attempts to manage the developing conflict in the Middle East.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224833/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Esmail Ghaani took control of the unconventional warfare wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps following the killing of predecessor Qassem Soleimani.Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of MichiganLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2232732024-03-04T13:35:14Z2024-03-04T13:35:14ZIsraeli peace activists are more anguished than ever − in a movement that has always been diverse and divided, with differing visions of ‘peace’<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578455/original/file-20240227-18-cypqgm.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C1%2C1024%2C680&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A demonstration on Dec. 28, 2023, in Tel Aviv, organized by the peace group Standing Together, calls for a cease-fire. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/people-gather-to-stage-demonstration-calling-for-peace-and-news-photo/1883324720?adppopup=true">Anadolu via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The months since Hamas’ attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, have been excruciating ones for Israeli peace activists. As the country rallies behind the war effort, critics <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/13/it-is-a-time-of-witch-hunts-in-israel-teacher-held-in-solitary-confinement-for-posting-concern-about-gaza-deaths">have been arrested</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/world/middleeast/israel-oct-7-left-wing-peace.html">and condemned</a> by opponents who say the attacks proved how misguided the peace movement is.</p>
<p>But in activists’ eyes, the horrific violence of Oct. 7 and Israel’s sweeping military response only prove its urgency. Vivian Silver, who spent a decade leading Women Wage Peace – a solidarity group of Israelis and Palestinians – was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/peace-activists-killed-israel.html">one of several peace activists</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/sections/pictureshow/2023/11/17/1213523321/israel-gaza-peace-activist-vivian-silver-funeral-service">murdered that day</a>. “If we want a future here, we have to make the conflict a thing of the past,” her son Yonatan Zeigen <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-02-11/ty-article/.premium/my-mother-vivian-silver-is-gone-who-carries-her-flag/0000018d-9974-d92c-a9ed-fbfd75300000">wrote in an op-ed</a> after her death.</p>
<p>For some activists, in other words, Oct. 7 only underscored the urgency of their cause. Yet the peace movement has always been diverse and often fragmented. In reality, there are multiple movements, each with its own definition of peace. As <a href="https://kroc.nd.edu/faculty-and-staff/atalia-omer/">a scholar of religion, ethics and politics</a>, I have traced how divergent accounts of Israel’s founding connect to <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo15288847.html">different visions of justice</a>.</p>
<h2>The ‘peace camp’</h2>
<p>The Israeli demographics most associated with the “peace camp” are predominately <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-ashkenazi-jews/">Ashkenazi Jews</a>, meaning they are descended from communities in Central and Eastern Europe. They also tend to be secular, meaning they do not closely observe traditional Jewish religious law.</p>
<p>Even within this larger camp, however, there are divergent perceptions of justice, shaped by how people understand the root causes of the conflict. Did it truly start in 1917, when a British lord <a href="https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/text-of-the-balfour-declaration#google_vignette">promised a home for Jews</a>? In 1948, with Israel’s War of Independence – which Palestinians experienced as <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-at-75-palestinians-struggle-to-get-recognition-for-their-catastrophe-204782">the Nakba, their “catastrophe</a>”? Or is the most important date 1967, when Israel occupied the Golan Heights, east Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?</p>
<p>For the most part, this “peace camp” believes “Israel proper” consists of <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54116567">land within the “Green Line</a>,” set by the armistice agreements at the end of the 1948 war. The Green Line does not include the territories Israel has occupied since the end of the 1967 war, which most of the peace camp considers <a href="https://peacenow.org.il/en/about-us/who-are-we">a morally wrong occupation</a>.</p>
<p>More broadly, their vision is grounded in preserving Israel as a democracy with a Jewish majority. This necessitates the creation of a sovereign Palestinian nation-state in the occupied territories.</p>
<p>A prominent example of a secular group <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Beyond+the+Two+State+Solution%3A+A+Jewish+Political+Essay-p-9780745662947">accepting the Green Line as a peace premise</a> is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30246797?seq=3">the once-robust Peace Now movement</a>, created in 1978 by Israeli veterans. They argue, using human rights and international law, that a permanent occupation will threaten the character of Israel as a Jewish democracy. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Four adults and a child walk together, leading a march with city buildings in the background, in a black and white photo." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=409&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578464/original/file-20240228-26-h0r0mi.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=514&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Members of the Peace Now movement arrive in Tel Aviv, finishing a 1983 march for peace that began at Israel’s northern border.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/moshe-ben-baruch-gives-the-peace-sign-to-applauding-members-news-photo/516513418?adppopup=true">Bettmann via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>… and its dissenters</h2>
<p>Ever since the early days of Zionism, however, other Jews have challenged the movement’s basic objective of creating a Jewish-majority state, given <a href="https://fathomjournal.org/the-bride-is-beautiful-but-she-is-married-to-another-man-the-tenacity-of-an-anti-zionist-fable/">the reality that other groups of people, in addition to Jews, already lived</a> in historic Palestine. For example, <a href="https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/brit-shalom-a-covenant-of-peace/">the group Brit Shalom</a>, established in 1926 by European Jewish intellectuals, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27917784?casa_token=a5y8GUrm5WIAAAAA%3AW1hlB5xoTqIhVXHUbp0eaVzhED1b8N5_M4_z3pYUN7Dv4FXzKJfiSNL9UBLM4Db07JqnB8YwESoc_zCyXJTIuboUoGpypsNHrv5metvIOk0oLcTC5mQ">envisioned a binational state</a> that would include equality for non-Jewish Palestinian communities. </p>
<p>In Brit Shalom’s view, a commitment to democratic principles contradicted ambitions for creating a majoritarian Jewish state, which they predicted would depend on driving out Palestinians and <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2002.31.3.36">preventing their return</a>.</p>
<p>Other contemporary secular groups that are mostly made up of Jewish Israelis also oppose the Green Line as a basis for peace building. <a href="https://www.zochrot.org/articles/view/17/en?Our_Story">Zochrot, for example</a>, emphasizes <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-nakba-at-75-palestinians-struggle-to-get-recognition-for-their-catastrophe-204782">the Nakba</a> of 1948 as a root cause of the conflict. Therefore, they advocate for Palestinian refugees’ <a href="https://www.zochrot.org/sections/view/19/en?Return_Vision">right of return</a>, which is central to Palestinians’ own conceptions of justice.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A black and white photograph of a long line of people, including women and children, walking uphill as they hold bags of possessions." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=448&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578747/original/file-20240228-22-juzwz.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=563&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 war, often referred to as the Nakba, is central in shaping some activists’ ideas of justice.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Refugees_in_Galilee.jpg">Fred Csasznik/'Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem' via Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Other critics of the mainstream peace movement have criticized it for ignoring <a href="https://doi.org/10.2979/jmiddeastwomstud.7.2.56">the social justice struggles of non-Ashkenazi Jewish Israelis</a>, such as Arab Jews or “Mizrahim” and Ethiopian Jews, or connecting those issues with Palestinians’ experience.</p>
<h2>Palestinian voices</h2>
<p>The continuous expansion of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/29/world/middleeast/israel-west-bank-settlements-expansion.html">Israeli settlements in the West Bank</a> has eroded the Green Line as the basis for peace. This <a href="https://jstreet.org/de-facto-annexation-the-israeli-rights-plan-for-permanent-occupation/">de facto annexation</a>, <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/08/israel-palestine-west-bank-annexation-netanyahu-smotrich-far-right/">as many analysts call it</a>, makes it increasingly unlikely that “peace” could mean most Israelis living within the line and most Palestinians outside it.</p>
<p>Yet with the erosion of the Green Line, various organizations are reemphasizing a binational vision of a single state, or two states joined in a confederation. Compared with the “mainstream” peace camp, some of these groups have more Palestinian representation, coming mostly from Palestinian citizens of Israel.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.alandforall.org/english/?d=ltr">A Land for All: Two States One Homeland</a>, known as ALFA, was formed in 2012 and is co-led by Palestinian and Jewish Israelis. In <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rDKmPvsywEM">events after Oct. 7</a>, members <a href="https://www.alandforall.org/pain-and-opportunity/?d=ltr">grappled with their grief</a> by resolving to imagine a political future together.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A woman in a white shirt kisses the forehead of another woman in a headscarf, whose eyes are closed, as they stand in front of a purple sign." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578751/original/file-20240228-30-nubrrn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Israeli activist Yael Admi embraces Arab Israeli activist Ghadir Hani following a speech during a Dec. 28, 2023, demonstration in Tel Aviv organized by the group Standing Together.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/israeli-activist-yael-admi-embraces-arab-israeli-activist-news-photo/1883322050?adppopup=true">Ahmad Gharabli/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>ALFA’s foundational assumption is that “<a href="https://www.alandforall.org/english/?d=ltr">both people belong in the whole land</a>.” While it believes that, realistically, Jewish settlers will remain in the territories occupied in 1967, it envisions them becoming Israeli residents of a future State of Palestine – one half of a larger confederation with the state of Israel.</p>
<p>Similarly, the organization <a href="https://www.standing-together.org/about-us">Standing Together</a> sent two representatives – one Jewish Israeli, one Palestinian Israeli – to the United States together to hold events with the message that “both Jewish people and Palestinians are going to stay on this land. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/17/world/middleeast/israel-palestinians-standing-together.html">No one is going anywhere</a>.”</p>
<p>Notably, the Palestinian members of groups seeking Palestinian-Israeli dialogues tend to be Israeli citizens from within the Green Line, with a few exceptions, such as <a href="https://cfpeace.org/">Combatants for Peace</a> – a group of Palestinians and Jews committed to nonviolence but made up of former fighters.</p>
<p>However, after decades of “peace process,” many Palestinians interpret coexistence initiatives as a form of <a href="https://www.972mag.com/what-is-normalization/">normalizing the occupation</a>.</p>
<h2>The Faithful Left</h2>
<p>The tension between Israel’s Jewish and democratic identities has been present since before the state’s founding. Under the current hard-line government, however, critics fear the state has been <a href="https://www.btselem.org/publications/fulltext/202101_this_is_apartheid">relinquishing the democratic part</a> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/26410478-9355297">in favor of Jewish supremacy</a>.</p>
<p>Religious politicians have been <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-ministers-join-ultranationalist-conference-urging-gaza-resettlement-2024-01-29/">some of the most visible advocates</a> for measures that decrease the likelihood of a contiguous Palestinian sovereign state, such as by <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-settlements-hamas-gaza-war-netanyahu-smotrich-1d2306d55c24c8559b630d9f20db30e2">constructing new settlements</a>. Yet the <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/israels-winning-coalition">current right-wing coalition</a> has provided an impetus for more Israelis who are observant Jews to join peace efforts: <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/eyeing-their-communitys-rightward-shift-left-wing-religious-jews-form-new-movement/">the “Faithful Left</a>,” or Smol Emuni in Hebrew. </p>
<p>The movement was born when hundreds showed up to <a href="https://www.972mag.com/religious-jewish-left-israel/">a Jerusalem conference</a> in January 2023, discussing their discomfort with how Jewish tradition was being used politically, and <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/under-shadow-of-war-conference-of-left-wing-religious-jews-grows-its-numbers/">a second conference</a> was held in February 2024. Because many of the Faithful Left are products of religious Zionist schools, their key advantage within the peace movement is the ability <a href="https://www.academicstudiespress.com/9798887193243/">to challenge</a> arguments for annexation or domination on religious grounds.</p>
<p>Older groups such as <a href="https://www.rhr.org.il/eng?lang=en">Rabbis for Human Rights</a>, whose members range from humanist to Orthodox, have also drawn on religious ideas for decades.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A man wearing blue, with a white beard and black hair, carries a large bundle through a dry grove of small trees." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/578756/original/file-20240228-9454-66bbn5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S.-born Israeli Reform Rabbi Arik Ascherman, a member of Rabbis for Human Rights, helps Palestinians during the olive harvest outside Ramallah in November 2023.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/born-israeli-reform-jewish-rabbi-arik-ascherman-a-member-of-news-photo/1777936330?adppopup=true">Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
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</figure>
<p>Some activists within the Faithful Left have also been a part of <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2022-12-04/ty-article/.premium/whos-an-anarchist/00000184-d9c3-dc05-adae-fff3834a0000">Bnei Avraham</a>, a group that <a href="https://www.mekomit.co.il/%D7%99%D7%A9-%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%93%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%A0%D7%95-%D7%95%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F/">shows solidarity with Palestinians</a> by building relationships in the West Bank – specifically Hebron, where Palestinians routinely experience <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/09/west-bank-israel-settlers-violence/">violence and harassment</a>.</p>
<p>Secular anti-occupation groups such as <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2017-01-08/ty-article/.premium/masked-israelis-attack-activists-accompanying-palestinian-farmers/0000017f-ecd3-d3be-ad7f-fefb6cda0000">Ta'ayush</a> take this idea one step further by trying to provide in-person protection against violence. For example, Ta'ayush activists walk kids to school or accompany Palestinian shepherds as a buffer to prevent harassment.</p>
<p>The erosion of the Green Line has challenged many peace groups’ visions for peace and justice, as diverse as those are. Even more fundamentally, it has reopened the question of what it means for Israel to be Jewish and democratic – a question at the heart of Israeli peace activists’ challenges today.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/223273/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Atalia Omer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Secular Jewish groups have historically made up the majority of solidarity and peace groups. But Palestinian citizens and observant Jews are also key.Atalia Omer, Professor of Religion, Conflict and Peace Studies, University of Notre DameLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2220922024-02-29T17:37:32Z2024-02-29T17:37:32ZIndians are fleeing their growing economy to work abroad – even in conflict zones. Here’s how to create more jobs at home<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576217/original/file-20240216-18-l70jpr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C59%2C7951%2C5237&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">
</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/people-workers-standing-line-outside-construction-728813566">Rahul Ramachandram/Shutterstock</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-68027582">plans</a> to bring in 70,000 workers from abroad, including 10,000 from India, to boost its construction sector. A labour shortage has emerged after 80,000 Palestinian workers were barred from entering the country after the October 7 Hamas-led attacks.</p>
<p>Figures suggest that India is one of the <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/research-analysis/india-seizes-crown-of-fastest-growing-g20-economy-dec23.html">fastest-growing</a> economies in the world. Between July and September of 2023, it grew at a pace of 7.6%. If it continues along this current growth trajectory, India will become the world’s <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/benjaminlaker/2024/02/23/india-to-become-third-largest-economy-by-2027-implications-for-leaders/">third-largest</a> economy by 2027.</p>
<p>The fact that thousands of Indian workers are nonetheless queuing up to secure a job in a conflict zone abroad is a consequence of a jobs crisis at home. Despite the country’s apparent economic growth, many Indians – even those with a university degree – are struggling to secure stable employment.</p>
<p>Casual work makes up <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/04/10/indias-workforce-woes/#:%7E:text=About%2052%20per%20cent%20of,cent%20are%20regular%20salaried%20workers.">25% of the workforce</a>, while only 23% of workers are paid a regular salary. The remainder are self-employed, and quite vulnerable to irregular and insecure income too.</p>
<p>But India has a large working-age population (people between 15 and 64 years of age), so the demand for jobs is immense. India needs to create an <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/04/10/indias-workforce-woes/">estimated</a> 10 million to 12 million jobs each year for the unemployed, new workforce entrants, and surplus agricultural workers to be able to secure non-farm work.</p>
<p>How can India provide jobs for its increasingly educated young? It needs even faster economic growth and for this growth to be labour intensive. This will, in turn, generate demand in the economy from all sections of society (not just the middle class and above).</p>
<h2>Structural change</h2>
<p>Between 2004 and 2014, India’s economy grew at a rate of <a href="https://thewire.in/economy/modi-claims-india-saw-a-lost-decade-between-2004-and-14-is-that-true">nearly 8% per year</a> (despite the global financial crisis in 2008). This rapid growth was accompanied by a hastening of structural change in employment.</p>
<p>During that period, the economy created on average <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ijlaec/v64y2021i2d10.1007_s41027-021-00317-x.html">7.5 million</a> new non-farm jobs every year. The number of manufacturing jobs in India rose from 53 million in 2004 to 60 million by 2012.</p>
<p>However, ₹500 (£4.78) and ₹1000 (£9.56) notes were <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.1.55">taken out of circulation</a> in 2016, making 86% of India’s currency illegal. The cash recall was intended to accelerate the country’s transition towards a formal economy. But it led to acute shortages of cash, destroying jobs in the construction and manufacturing sectors.</p>
<p>Growth slowed to 2020 when, at the beginning of the COVID pandemic, the Indian government imposed a nationwide lockdown at <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-52081396">four hours’ notice</a>. The lockdown caused India’s gross domestic product (GDP) to <a href="https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/">contract by 5.8%</a> – more than twice the rate at which the global economy shrank.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Six Indian police officers wearing masks and standing on a city street." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576586/original/file-20240219-22-2qhktj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Police in Gujarat, India, enforcing the COVID lockdown.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bharuch-gujarat-india-april-05-2020-1702650391">Kunal Mahto/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Employment in manufacturing jobs fell again, especially in labour-intensive manufacturing where employment had already been in decline for five years following the botched implementation of demonetisation. Around <a href="https://thewire.in/economy/what-we-know-about-indias-post-covid-economy-recovery-and-rising-inequality">60 million workers</a> returned to jobs in agriculture, reversing the structural change in employment that had been underway for 15 years.</p>
<p>To take advantage of its bulging working-age population, India needs to create more non-farm jobs. In his new book, “Breaking the Mould”, the former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Raghuram Rajan, <a href="https://www.penguin.co.in/book/breaking-the-mould/">says</a> that India needs to focus on exports of services, drawing on the country’s new digital infrastructure and IT-based services growth for the domestic (and export) market.</p>
<p>But a focus on services alone will not suffice. This “New India” economy currently constitutes <a href="https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indian-economy-gdp-growth-capex-global-market-share-digital-public-infrastructure-9073549/">less than 15%</a> of the country’s economy and a fraction of that in employment. Such a strategy will generate jobs mainly for highly skilled people, rather than the millions of Indian workers that are searching for non-farm jobs.</p>
<p>What India needs is a <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/02/03/make-in-india-a-work-in-progress/">manufacturing strategy</a> akin to China’s that focuses on labour-intensive manufacturing. China has pursued an industrial policy since the 1950s, which has become even more evolved since the 1980s, helping the country establish dominance in global high-tech manufacturing.</p>
<h2>Creating jobs in India</h2>
<p>In India, the demand for jobs will only be met if several different factors come together. Construction activity needs to continue at its current brisk pace. But, for the next year or two, it must be led by public sector investment as private investment remains sluggish. </p>
<p>India’s investment-to-GDP ratio is <a href="https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/">still below 30%</a>, and has remained below the 31% inherited by the current government when it came to power ten years ago. The potential for a twofold increase in construction employment (a trend that was observed between 2004 and 2012) over the next five years hinges on the revival of private investment.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A group of workers in hi-vis jackets at a construction site." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=397&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/576587/original/file-20240219-28-phmg80.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=499&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Labour workers building an overhead metro in Bangalore, India.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.shutterstock.com/image-photo/bangalore-karnataka-india-january-21-2014-282302282">PI/Shutterstock</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Labour-intensive manufacturing by micro, small and medium enterprises also needs a sustained fillip. The government’s focus is currently on large companies – so-called “national champions” like industrial conglomerates Tata and Mahindra – which are being encouraged through <a href="https://thewire.in/political-economy/why-the-modi-government-policy-of-national-champions-is-unravelling">subsidies</a>.</p>
<p>If these subsidies were instead redirected towards smaller enterprises, they might do more for employment generation. Large corporations <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/planning-in-the-20th-century-and-beyond/817DA53ABC693583B3E3D052CA5B2CE5#fndtn-information">typically</a> use highly capital-intensive methods of production, whereas smaller ones tend to absorb more labour. Historically, it is the latter that has generated <a href="https://archive.org/details/developmentwithh0000unse/mode/2up">most</a> of the non-farm jobs in developing countries.</p>
<p>The third area where employment can be generated is, indeed, services. Public expenditure should prioritise public health, education, vocational training and universities.</p>
<p>These sectors are labour-intensive, contribute to the creation of public goods, and will build the human capital needed by both manufacturing and modern export-oriented services. That is the only way India’s health and education services can reach the <a href="https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/385696/hcd-sa.pdf">levels observed</a> in east Asia and attract more foreign investment.</p>
<p>A renewed focus on smaller enterprises across these sectors is needed. Inclusive growth requires providing jobs rapidly at the bottom of the pyramid, not only at the top of the wage – and skill – distribution.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/222092/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Santosh Mehrotra does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>India needs to follow a path akin to China’s to find answers to its job woes.Santosh Mehrotra, Visiting Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, University of BathLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2247642024-02-29T12:55:31Z2024-02-29T12:55:31ZWhat is Netanyahu’s plan for a post-conflict Gaza and does it rule out a workable ceasefire? Expert Q&A<p><em>In recent days Joe Biden has been promising that a deal for a ceasefire is very close to agreement. But at the same time the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has revealed his vision for Gaza once the fighting stops, which appears to rule out Palestinian sovereignty on the strip. We spoke with John Strawson, a Middle East expert at the University of East London, who has been researching and publishing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several decades.</em></p>
<p><strong>After weeks of wrangling, Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has published his vision for a post-conflict Gaza. How compatible is it with the idea of a two-state solution? To what extent is his tough line influenced by the more hawkish members of his government who take a hardline attitude to Palestinian sovereignty?</strong></p>
<p>Netanyahu’s <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/27/post-war-gaza-plan-netanyahu-israel-day-after-future-abbas/">plan for a post-war Gaza</a> is simply not practical and does not rise to the political challenges of the times. It is based on two principles: Israeli security control over Gaza and a civil administration run by non-Hamas officials. </p>
<p>But there has been Israeli security control over Gaza in one form since 1967 and it has not brought security for either Israel or Palestinians. There is no reason to think that the Israel Defense Forces can do better now, especially after this catastrophic war. At the same time, it is difficult to see where the non-Hamas Palestinian officials will come from. Hamas has had a tight grip of Gaza since 2007 and anyone with any experience of administration is likely to be a member of Hamas, a sympathiser or someone used to working with Hamas. </p>
<p>While there is opposition to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, there is little organised political opposition that could replace them. Like the US and Britain in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, when they <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/29/usa.iraq">banned officials from the Ba'athist party</a> from the administration, chaos will follow. The only realistic option is to extend the power of the Palestinian Authority – presently <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/11/what-is-the-palestinian-authority-and-how-is-it-viewed-by-palestinians">based in Ramallah</a> – into Gaza. But Netanyahu and his <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-elections-benjamin-netanhayu-set-to-return-with-some-extreme-new-partners-193814">far-right allies</a> think it will advance pressure for a two-state solution – something they are opposed to. </p>
<p><strong>To what extent is this a starting point for Netanyahu? Has he left himself the political space to manoeuvre given pressure from the US and other international allies?</strong></p>
<p>The plan was provided mainly due to international pressure – especially by the Americans. It should be noted that the US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, has been raising the issue of post-conflict Gaza with the Israelis since November and it still took months to produce this flimsy document. </p>
<p>This gives us an insight into how difficult it is in practice for the US administration to use its apparent power over the Israeli government. Netanyahu has much experience of dealing with American politicians and plays the system very well. He knows that Biden needs a calmer Middle East as a background to his re-election bid in November. As a result, the bargaining relationship is quite complex. </p>
<p>Netanyahu clearly thinks he has time on his side. The nearer it gets to the US election the more difficult it gets for Biden to please the progressive Democrats who want a ceasefire and the more traditional Democrats who have Israel’s back. What Netanyahu is doing is the minimum in the hope of hanging on hoping for a Trump win. </p>
<p><strong>Does Netanyahu’s vision reflect the feelings of the Jewish community in Israel? What about Arab voters? The prime minister appears deeply unpopular among most voter groups – is his intransigence more about maintaining his hold on power than on seeking a workable long term solution?</strong></p>
<p>While Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/only-15-israelis-want-netanyahu-keep-job-after-gaza-war-poll-finds-2024-01-02/">deeply unpopular</a> with all sections of the Israeli public, we have to be careful in reading the public mood on policies for a post-war dispensation. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/opinion/israel-hostage-negotiations-entebbe.html">Polling suggests</a> that support for a two-state solution is declining. Israelis have been <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-blaming-israel-for-october-7-hamas-attack-makes-peace-less-not-more-likely-223934">so traumatised by October 7</a> that there is little support for Palestinian empowerment. </p>
<p>To some extent this is the result of the way that the Israelis view their country’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005. It is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/a-decade-later-israelis-see-gaza-pullout-as-big-mistake/2015/08/14/21c06518-3480-11e5-b835-61ddaa99c73e_story.html">often presented</a> as an example of what happens when Israel ceases to occupy Palestinian land. In this account Israel leaves Gaza and Gaza becomes an armed encampment with the aim of destroying Israel – and indeed this <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-67039975">remains Hamas’s policy</a>, despite the group releasing an <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/doctrine-hamas">amended charter in 2017</a>. </p>
<p>But the 2005 disengagement which included dismantling all Israeli settlements in the strip was not the result of negotiations, but a unilateral act. The then prime minister, Ariel Sharon, did not want to hand over power to the elected Palestinian Authority, thinking it would boost the PA’s for statehood. Instead, Israel just left – and that allowed Hamas, the major political force in Gaza, to claim that Israel has <a href="https://academic.oup.com/book/45870/chapter-abstract/400820054?redirectedFrom=fulltext">“retreated under fire”</a>. Hamas then capitalised on the situation and went on to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/26/israel1">win the Palestinian legislative</a> elections in 2006. </p>
<p>The lesson of this is that Israel needs proper negotiations that can lead to a sustainable future – and that can only mean a Palestinian state alongside Israel. That is not merely right for the Palestinians but essential in any plan to defeat Hamas. It’s not only a military operation but a political one and Palestinians need to be offered a peaceful and just alternative.</p>
<p><strong>The US president, Joe Biden, has been talking up the idea of a ceasefire deal in recent days. But Netanyahu’s plan seems to make the deal brokered in Qatar an impossibility. Is Netanyahu serious about bringing an end to the conflict? Or is talk about a possible deal more about Israel’s need to be seen to be playing the game as well as optimism from a US president who needs to be able to show to his own voter base that he is getting results?</strong></p>
<p>Former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert argues that Netanyahu is <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-02-22/ty-article-opinion/.premium/netanyahus-messianic-coalition-partners-want-an-all-out-regional-war/0000018d-d237-d06c-abbd-daf733870000">dragging Israel into a long term war</a> to save himself. Olmert draws some drastic conclusions from his analysis suggesting that Netanyahu and his far-right allies want a permanent war that would also see Palestinians driven out of the West Bank. That might seem too apocalyptic – but it does convey a sense of the mismatch between US aims and the Israeli political dynamic.</p>
<p>Talks are going on simultaneously in Qatar, in Paris and in Cairo. It is evident that the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/27/what-we-know-so-far-about-the-draft-israel-hamas-ceasefire-deal#:%7E:text=It%20envisions%20a%2040%2Dday,and%20fuel%20to%20start%20rebuilding.">formula for a 40-day ceasefire</a> has been agreed but there is now <a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-palestinian-prisoners-will-be-a-key-condition-of-any-ceasefire-deal-heres-why-224700">wrangling over the details</a>. Much of this focuses on the grizzly trading over how many Palestinian prisoners will be exchanged for which Israeli hostages – both those still alive and those dead. </p>
<hr>
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<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-palestinian-prisoners-will-be-a-key-condition-of-any-ceasefire-deal-heres-why-224700">Gaza war: Palestinian prisoners will be a key condition of any ceasefire deal – here's why</a>
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<p>What is quite clear is that both Israel and Hamas have been dragging their feet as each thinks it is gaining the advantage by continuing the fighting. But with the arrival of the month of Ramadan (beginning March 10 – the date that Israel <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68334510">plans to begin</a> its ground assault on the city of Rafah) there is some likelihood of a Ramadan truce. </p>
<p>Netanyahu is under <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/19/pressure-building-netanyahu-hostages-hamas-israel">massive popular pressure</a> in Israel to move on the hostages even if that means painful concessions. Hamas is also under pressure by the masses of displaced Gazans who just want a semblance of a bearable existence for their families. So while Washington is exerting maximum pressure on Israel and its Arab allies, it is likely to be factors in Israel and Gaza that will lead to at least a temporary ceasefire. The challenge will then be to use the time to produce something permanent. </p>
<p><strong>Is it even feasible for the Israeli government to continue with its policy of refusing to deal with Hamas?</strong></p>
<p>In effect Israel has been dealing with Hamas indirectly all along. If the Israeli war aims were being successful it would not have to be negotiating with them over the hostage release issue. But I think that it’s now no longer possible for Israel to talk to Hamas politically. In 2009 I thought <a href="https://www.dissentmagazine.org/author/michael-walzer-john-strawson-ghada-karmi-donna-rob/">it was still possible</a> At the time it seemed possible that Hamas and Israel could agree a <em>Hudna</em>, an Islamic legal term for a long-term truce. But October 7 and subsequent Hamas statements and actions show that its real policy is the annihilation of Israel. So there is nothing to speak about. The real question is Israel speaking to the Palestinian Authority and having a viable plan for Gaza after the war rather than a renewed occupation. </p>
<p>The key to the next stage is to create a security mechanism that can replace the IDF and ensure the security of both Israel <em>and</em> the Palestinians. The international community – in particular the UN – has to stop being rhetorical and start being practical about peacemaking. What is needed is a security force that will give both Israelis and Palestinians confidence that the situation will change. Both sides must be able to feel secure – no more atrocities like October 7 and the Israeli response which has now killed 30,000 Palestinians, most of them civilians – and a high proportion of which have been women and children. </p>
<p>What is required is a multinational force that combines Arab League and Nato forces under perhaps Saudi command. Unless there is movement on this issue, there is little chance of a framework where any meaningful talks can take place.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224764/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>John Strawson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>John Strawson, a UK-based researcher of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, answers questions about the Israeli prime minister’s plan for Gaza.John Strawson, Emeritus professor of Law, University of East LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2245202024-02-29T00:30:44Z2024-02-29T00:30:44ZAustralian writers festivals are engulfed in controversy over the war in Gaza. How can they uphold their duty to public debate?<p>A string of controversies are engulfing Melbourne Writers’ Festival, the Perth Festival’s Writers’ Weekend, the Sydney Opera House’s All About Women and Adelaide Writers Week. There’s a high-profile resignation, calls to cancel speakers and allegations of the spread of “historically untrue” facts and of normalising violence. </p>
<p>All, in one way or another, have been generated by divisions over the war in Gaza.</p>
<p>Writers’ festivals are in a fraught position. They navigate the frontier between social media’s echo chambers of outrage and the traditional public square’s conventions, where restraint, reason and tolerance in the face of opposing views are the basis for civilised debate.</p>
<p>How is it all playing out, and what are the consequences for the public exchange of ideas?</p>
<h2>‘Historically untrue’?</h2>
<p>At <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/gaza-conflict-engulfs-melbourne-writers-%20festival-as-leaders-quit-over-program-row-20240222-p5f757.html">Melbourne Writers Festival</a>, the deputy chair of the board, Dr Leslie Reti, has resigned over a poetry session that will involve Aboriginal and Palestinian poets reading their work.</p>
<p>The session is guest-curated by Koori-Lebanese writer Mykaela Saunders. It is based on the proposition Aboriginal and Palestinian people have a shared experience of having been colonised, becoming victims of atrocities by the colonising power. </p>
<p>Melbourne Writers Festival artistic director Michaela McGuire has confirmed the dispute is centred on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2024/feb/27/melbourne-writers-festival-deputy-chair-resigns-aboriginal-palestinian-solidarity-poetry-event-gaza-conflict">a line of program copy that reads</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Aboriginal and Palestinian solidarity has a long history, a relationship that is more vital than ever in the movement to resist colonialism and speak out against atrocities.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a historically contentious proposition. Dr Reti, a retired Jewish clinician, said he respected McGuire’s curatorial independence, but described the material in the draft program as “historically untrue and deeply offensive”.</p>
<p>Prominent Aboriginal scholar Professor Marcia Langton, of the University of Melbourne, has also rejected proposed similarity between the experience of Aboriginal and Palestinian people, <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/gaza-conflict-engulfs-melbourne-writers-festival-as-leaders-quit-over-program-row-20240222-p5f757.html">saying</a>, “there is very little comparable in our respective situations, other than our humanity”.</p>
<p>Saunders was one of 132 Indigenous activists, artists and intellectuals who signed <a href="https://therednation.org/statement-of-indigenous-solidarity-with-palestine/">a petition released on October 27 last year</a> that claimed: “The past two weeks of horrific violence in Gaza resulted from 75 years of Israeli settler colonial dispossession”. </p>
<p>McGuire has defended her decision not to change the copy for Saunders’ event, titled Let it Bring Hope, saying “I completely support the right to self-determined programming”. </p>
<p>She <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/melbourne-mornings/melbourne-writers-festival-split-over-war-in-gaza/103512224">told ABC Radio on Monday</a>: “This entire event is about Aboriginal and Palestinian solidarity. It’s not for or about anyone who doesn’t subscribe to that, and so it doesn’t make any sense to not mention that in the event copy.”</p>
<p><a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/gaza-conflict-engulfs-melbourne-writers-festival-as-leaders-quit-over-program-row-20240222-p5f757.html">Last year</a>, the Melbourne Writers Festival board decided “while writers should be free to express their views, the festival should not take a public position on the war”.</p>
<p>The Age <a href="https://www.theage.com.au/national/gaza-conflict-engulfs-melbourne-writers-%20festival-as-leaders-quit-over-program-row-20240222-p5f757.html">reported on Monday</a> that Fiona Menzies, the festival’s interim chief executive, also resigned over the festival’s program. But Alice Hill, chair of the board, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2024/feb/27/melbourne-writers-festival-deputy-chair-resigns-aboriginal-palestinian-solidarity-poetry-event-gaza-conflict">told the Guardian</a> that Menzies had resigned “for personal reasons, and would continue her relationship with the festival in a consultancy capacity”.</p>
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<em>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/a-palestinian-authors-award-ceremony-has-been-cancelled-at-frankfurt-book-fair-this-sends-the-wrong-signals-at-the-wrong-time-215712">A Palestinian author's award ceremony has been cancelled at Frankfurt Book Fair. This sends the wrong signals at the wrong time</a>
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<h2>Normalising violence?</h2>
<p>In Perth, the argument was over the inclusion of Jewish singer-songwriter Deborah Conway in the opening night of the Perth Festival’s Writers’ Weekend last week. In <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/radionational-breakfast/israel-gaza-arts-protests-deborah-conway/103231158">an interview on ABC Radio National</a>, she had questioned whether Palestinian children killed by the Israeli Defence Forces were really children. (“It depends on what you really call kids.”)</p>
<p>Conway contextualised her remarks to me this week, saying: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>I was trying to tell listeners, in the cut and thrust of a live interview situation, that when Hamas put guns in the hands of their adolescent sons to point at the enemy, Hamas steals their childhood, turns them into fighters & then turns them into casualty figures. It’s unbearably cruel. I wasn’t talking about babies or little children, nor was I defining what I think to be a child, it goes without saying that the deaths of innocents are always tragic.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In an <a href="https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfUvUWq0GLIbhstqVzFMsxguiWjawr__aTI-CeKuZQoZUfJng/viewform">open letter to the festival</a>, more than 500 writers and arts workers said that by including Conway, the festival was putting safety at risk and giving a platform to someone whose comments on the radio “seek to normalise the ongoing genocide enacted by the state of Israel against the Palestinian people”.</p>
<p>This provoked a response from Dr Nick Dyrenfurth, executive director of the John Curtin Research Centre, a left-of-centre think tank, in which he said Conway’s “crime of being Jewish” was the reason <a href="https://independentaustralia.net/politics/politics-display/festival-slammed-for-promoting-%20deborah-conway-after-palestine-comments,18359">this attempt was being made to “deplatform” her</a>.</p>
<p>In Sydney, a petition protesting against the appointment of the feminist author Clementine Ford as a co-curator of the Opera House’s <a href="https://www.sydneyoperahouse.com/all-about-women">All About Women</a> festival has garnered about 6,700 signatures since it was started on 6 February. Ford has programmed three events at the festival.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.australianjewishnews.com/petition-against-%20opera-house-appearance/">petition alleges</a> Ford’s public communications since the attacks by Hamas on Israel on 7 October 2023 have made “a direct and harmful” contribution to the “hateful climate” that has developed in Australia since those attacks, exemplified by a <a href="https://www.news.com.au/national/australian-jews-suffer-738-per-cent-spike-in-antisemitic-abuse/news-story/33ed1f60ff568d31ce399b325bbc03a2">738% increase</a> in anti-Semitic incidents, as recorded by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry.</p>
<p>Ford has not called for violence against Jewish people.</p>
<p>The MP for the Sydney seat of Vaucluse in the New South Wales Parliament, Kellie Sloane, and some Jewish community leaders have raised their concerns about Ford’s curatorship, following her involvement in <a href="https://theconversation.com/doxing-or-in-the-public-interest-free-speech-cancelling-and-the-ethics-of-the-jewish-creatives-whatsapp-group-leak-223323">the alleged “doxing”</a> of about 600 Jewish writers, artists and academics. This involved the social media sharing of personal details, including names and professions, leaked from a WhatsApp group, without their consent.</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/doxing-or-in-the-public-interest-free-speech-cancelling-and-the-ethics-of-the-jewish-creatives-whatsapp-group-leak-223323">Doxing or in the public interest? Free speech, 'cancelling' and the ethics of the Jewish creatives' WhatsApp group leak</a>
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<p>The president of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, Daniel Aghion, <a href="https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/political-and-jewish-leaders-raise-clementine-ford-%20curatorship-red-flag-after-creatives-doxxing/news-story/aae6e8abdd09fb3393711c3c3c9bb544">was reported as saying</a> it was “baffling” someone who had caused this kind of harm should be appearing at one of Australia’s “most prestigious forums”.</p>
<p>Some Jewish leaders, including Anti-Defamation Commission chairman, Dr Dvir Abramovich, want Ford <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/jewish-leaders-have-called-for-clementine-ford-to-be-banned-%20from-adelaide-writers-week/news-story/8252b039c71c87c80afae3fe012d03f9%20So%20far,%20none%20of%20the%20protests%20have%20resulted%20in%20any%20of%20these%20people%20being%20banned.">banned from the Adelaide Festival’s Writers’ Week</a>, which starts this weekend, on 2 March.</p>
<p>Louise Adler, director of Adelaide Writers Week, <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/entertainment/adelaide-festival/adelaide-writers-week-2024-festival-hit-with-new-backlash-as-organisers-strongly-defend-program/news-story/c56fcae109190ffa206c55119d756b59">resisted calls to remove Ford</a> from the program, saying “I chose Clementine Ford because of her writing on contemporary Australian sexual politics and about her current book about marriage, which I thought was interesting.” She called her views on “other issues” on social media “immaterial”.</p>
<p>South Australian Premier Peter Malinauskas <a href="https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/jewish-leaders-have-called-for-clementine-ford-to-be-banned-from-adelaide-writers-week/news-story/8252b039c71c87c80afae3fe012d03f9">declined to get involved</a>, saying he would not be a “premier that engages in censorship at arts festivals”.</p>
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<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/are-calls-to-cancel-two-palestinian-writers-from-adelaide-writers-week-justified-200165">Are calls to cancel two Palestinian writers from Adelaide Writers' Week justified?</a>
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<h2>Freedom of speech challenged</h2>
<p>Each of these cases presents a challenge to freedom of speech, for different reasons and in different ways.</p>
<p>Writers’ festivals are opportunities for the public to see and hear from people who are presumed to have thought deeply about complex issues, and who have written about them. They are also forums for the writers themselves to challenge and be challenged on their points of view.</p>
<p>In a world conditioned by the emotive views and intolerant habits of social media, where those who hold opposing views are often seen as irredeemable and even illegitimate, it requires a demanding intellectual effort to adjust to the world of the public square.</p>
<p>There, by convention, opposing views are tolerated, even respected, and questions are decided by reasoned argument based on evidence – rather than emotive, sometimes insulting, rhetoric.</p>
<p>The current debates around these festivals show our society is a fair way from making this adjustment.</p>
<p>In the Melbourne case, the problem arises because of a contestable claim in the draft program that “Aboriginal and Palestinian solidarity has a long history, a relationship that is more vital than ever in the movement to resist colonialism and speak out against atrocities”.</p>
<p>Whether or not there is a long history of solidarity between Aboriginal and Palestinian people – which Professor Langton, for one, rejects – might be debated. But the wording of the draft program presents the debate as already decided in the affirmative. That might represent the view of curator Mykaela Saunders and some other First Nations people, but clearly not all of them.</p>
<p>In the Perth case, Conway’s statement questioning whether the children killed by the Israel Defence Forces are really children is, for the most part, demonstrably false, as we see nightly on the television news. This does harm. A falsehood pollutes the community’s information pool. </p>
<p>In the Sydney and Adelaide cases, Ford’s participation in the Whatsapp leak is likewise harmful. The leak violated people’s privacy and put people’s safety at risk. The harm principle sets the boundary at which the individual’s right of free speech gives way to the larger public interest in harm prevention.</p>
<p>The case in principle against Ford is particularly strong because of the obvious harm caused by the public dissemination of people’s private information. The fact that she is not programmed to speak about the war in Gaza at her events – she is speaking about her anti-marriage book in both <a href="https://www.sydneyoperahouse.com/all-about-women/play-the-girl">Sydney</a> and <a href="https://www.adelaidefestival.com.au/events/2024-writers-week/i-do-i-don-t/">Adelaide</a> – makes no difference to this point of principle. In practice, however, banning her would risk making her into a martyr. </p>
<p>None of these festivals have responded to public pressure to change their programs, speakers or even the wording of their copy. Better still, rather than banning speakers or changing programs, festivals could arrange to include challenges on these controversial actions and words. For example, someone in Ford’s position could be invited to make the case for the WhatsApp leak and be challenged on its violation of privacy principles.</p>
<p>That way, the festivals would do their job of promoting debate. A festival where the outcome is a foregone conclusion, or where the openmindedness of the organisers is in question, is just another echo chamber.</p>
<p>Against that, there is the question of public safety, which has been raised by those who wanted Conway banned in Perth and Ford in Adelaide. The exact threat to public safety is not spelt out, but the debate shows we urgently need to learn to better negotiate this frontier between social media and the world of flesh and blood.</p>
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<p><em>This article has been amended to clarify the context of Deborah Conway’s remarks during her earlier radio interview.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/224520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Denis Muller does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Writers festivals navigate the fraught frontier between social media’s echo chambers of outrage and the civilised public debate of the public square. What’s the way forward in this heated atmosphere?Denis Muller, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancing Journalism, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.