tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/nelson-chamisa-46879/articlesNelson Chamisa – La Conversation2023-09-08T14:22:22Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2117552023-09-08T14:22:22Z2023-09-08T14:22:22ZZimbabwe elections 2023: a textbook case of how the ruling party has clung to power for 43 years<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543488/original/file-20230818-29-34nlfh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Opposition supporters calling for free and fair elections outside the offices of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission in Harare in 2018.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Jeksai Njikizana/AFP via Getty Images.</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Few were surprised as, near midnight on 26 August, the <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/2023-presidential-elections-results/">Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</a> announced incumbent president Emmerson Mnangagwa’s reelection in yet another of Zimbabwe’s tendentious contests. His <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/snubbed-by-most-regional-leaders-emmerson-mnangagwa-parties-on-with-ex-adversaries-instead-20230904">inauguration</a> on 4 September sanctified his return to power.</p>
<p>Fewer still were shocked when South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, attended Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/ramaphosa-warned-not-to-undermine-sadc-ahead-of-mnangagwas-inauguration-4fd42c99-fdf2-4070-be0c-69b5117b8962">inauguration</a> regardless of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) election observation team’s <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/87928/zimbabwes-troubled-election-might-southern-african-leaders-follow-the-example-of-their-observers/">critical report</a> and the absence of most of <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/mnangagwa-inauguration-ramaphosa-expected-to-attend-along-with-a-few-regional-leaders-20230903">his peers</a> from the SADC and the African Union.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa gained 52.6% of the 4,561,221 votes cast. Nelson Chamisa, head of the main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), garnered 1,967,343 or 44%. Zanu-PF’s 136 of parliament’s 210 seats is just under the two-thirds needed to change the constitution. </p>
<p>I’ve observed and written about all <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/000203971404900106">Zimbabwe’s elections</a> since 2000, when Zanu-PF first faced strong opposition from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. My <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">book</a> Mugabe’s Legacy: Coups, Conspiracies, and the Conceits of Power in Zimbabwe covers nearly 50 years of Zanu-PF’s propensity to gain power by any means - even <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-president-was-security-minister-when-genocidal-rape-was-state-policy-in-1983-4-now-he-seeks-another-term-211633">genocide</a>.</p>
<p>This election displayed many of these patterns. However, each election has registered variations as Zimbabwe hovers between open democracy and fully shut authoritarianism. Zanu-PF’s score, with contemporary variants, ranges from pre- and post-election intimidation to electoral “management” and playing off its regional neighbours. The CCC and civil society choirs also shift their tone in response: from outright rejection and court challenges to pleas for reruns and transitional governments.</p>
<h2>Long-term, immediate and post-election intimidation</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/99/article/703839">post-2017 coup period</a> foreshadowed many of Zanu-PF’s contemporary strategies. First was the soldiers killing at least six demonstrators (and bystanders) just after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">mid-2018 elections</a>. In January 2019, a “stayaway” kicked in just after Mnangagwa announced a 150% increase in fuel prices. Planned chaos ensued as riots, looting and protests were encouraged by a multitude of unidentified forces. More than 17 people were killed. As many women were raped. Nearly 1,800 other bodily violations ensued amid <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv2s0jd56">mass trials and convictions</a>. </p>
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<p>Since then, Zanu-PF has reminded many people not to engage in opposition. </p>
<p>By mid-2020 the targets moved towards <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2020/12/the-gendering-of-violence-in-zimbabwean-politics/">women in the MDC</a>. The case of CCC activist <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXsUkP00M9k">Moreblessing Ali’s</a> murder in May 2022 indicates a new variant on “silent murder”. Ali’s brother, Washington, a long-time MDC-CCC activist in the UK, gained the help of CCC MP and lawyer Job Sikhala to publicise his sister’s murder. Sikhala has been imprisoned since his campaign on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">behalf of Ali</a>. </p>
<p>I examine this horrific assassination in the next issue of the journal <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/198">Transformation</a>. It illustrates how the move towards <a href="https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/18/sweets-for-the-people-zimbabwe-elections-housing-voters-lured-promises-land-barons-zanu-pf">land-baron-led gangsterism</a> in Harare connects with Zanu-PF hierarchies of power.</p>
<p>The August 2023 pre-election murder by stoning of <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/7210805.html">CCC activist Tinashe Chitsunge</a> indicated this sort of politics running wild. </p>
<p>After the election, demonstrators and soldiers did not encounter each other <em>en masse</em>: no shootings. However, residents visiting pubs in “high density suburbs” encountered rough treatment from unidentified people with guns and brand-new uniforms. Later, Glen Norah councillor Womberaishe Nhende and fellow activist Sonele Mukuhlani were left naked after their abduction, whipping and injection with poison on 3 September. Their lawyers, Douglas Coltart and Tapiwa Muchineripi, were arrested when visiting them <a href="https://allafrica.com/stories/202309060001.html">in hospital</a>.</p>
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<p>The well-funded “Forever Associates of Zimbabwe” (FAZ) earned its keep by intimidating folks during the pre-election phases. FAZ is a <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/if-it-still-breaks-dont-fix-it-time-for-another-election-in-zimbabwe/">Zanu-PF</a> mix of semi-intellectuals and aspirant entrepreneurs. They are Mnangagwa enthusiasts needing connections to the Zanu-PF state. </p>
<p>They ran illegal <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/zimbabwes-vote-is-well-short-of-free-and-fair-standards-say-foreign-observers-20230825">“exit polls” at the stations</a>. FAZ’s members, purportedly <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2023/03/11/wife-of-cio-boss-accused-of-terrorising-zanu-pf-and-cio-members/">paid by the Central Intelligence Organisation</a>, kept their promise to “dominate and saturate the environment while <a href="https://faztrust.com/">denying the same to opponents</a>” – including those within Zanu-PF during its primary <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/311011/zimbabwe-how-intelligence-and-military-are-running-the-upcoming-general-polls/">nomination contests</a>. </p>
<h2>Judicial and electoral ‘management’</h2>
<p>The clouds over liberal horizons darkened further in the legal spheres of repression. The “<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-patriotic-act-erodes-freedoms-and-may-be-a-tool-for-repression-209984">Patriotic Act</a>”, passed ahead of the elections, makes too much opposition-talk with foreigners treasonous. The still unsigned amendment to the Private Voluntary Organisations Bill promises to end all hints of civil society support for <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-01-23-zimbabwean-government-passes-law-designed-to-throttle-independent-civil-society/">opposition parties</a>. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6099">gerrymandered delimitation exercise</a> remapped mostly urban constituencies so they stretch to peri-urban and nearly rural areas. Zanu-PF hoped the majority would thus support it, as in the countryside. This tactic linked well to election day’s improprieties. Up to 75 urban polling stations experienced unexpected and unprecedented <a href="https://www.zawya.com/en/world/africa/polling-delays-and-extension-of-time-for-voting-zimbabwe-e39rl0b4">shortages of ballot papers</a>. This caused long and uncertain waits. Some stations extended voting to the next day. </p>
<p>In Glenview, a Harare suburb, hundreds of poor voters walked kilometres to vote by 7am. They waited – peacefully, fortunately – eight hours for the ballot papers. </p>
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<a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-patriotic-act-erodes-freedoms-and-may-be-a-tool-for-repression-209984">Zimbabwe’s ‘Patriotic Act’ erodes freedoms and may be a tool for repression</a>
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<p>At other stations, night-time voting added to voters’ roll problems due to the hasty delimitation exercise that left <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/mnangagwas-son-turned-away-from-polling-station-as-logistical-troubles-and-fear-mar-zim-voting-20230823">many in the wrong constituency</a>. They were advised to find the correct one. </p>
<p>Where voting continued to 24 August, how many returned? </p>
<h2>The V11 forms</h2>
<p>Widespread concerns about the <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6544">V11 forms</a> came on top of worries about the thousands of people giving up on the lost ballot papers. These sheets are posted on the outside walls of the 12,000 polling stations. They show all the votes. They are meant to enable anyone to keep score at the first polling stage. Then the official counting moves on to ward, constituency, and provincial counting centres, and finally to the national “command centre” where the presidential vote is tallied and announced. Suspicion runs rampant about what happens at the links in this chain.</p>
<p>Election NGOs and other organisations were collecting and tabulating images of the V11 forms for digital release. Too late: Zanu-PF conducted on-the-night <a href="https://paradigmhq.org/press-release-the-netrights-coalition-condemns-raids-of-digital-technologies-of-civil-society-actors-in-zimbabwe-during-the-2023-elections/">raids</a> as they were at work. </p>
<p>As the Institute for Security Studies’ southern Africa programme head Piers Pigou noted in conversation with me, if the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was worried about the election’s legitimacy, the V11 forms would have been on its website immediately. But they are not there – or anywhere. </p>
<h2>Regional responses, CCC plans and democracy’s future</h2>
<p>As noted, the election observers’ reports do not paint a pretty picture of the election. The Citizens Coalition for Change hoped to exploit the split between the SADC observers and their <a href="https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/analysis/in-depth-zimbabwe-elections-analysts-on-why-sas-response-legitimises-an-authoritarian-regime-20230830">SADC masters</a>. But the SADC’s council of elders seems unable to help the CCC’s plans to arrange a rerun guided by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQQi1Xu_dts">an international committee</a>. South Africa’s enthusiasm for its neighbour gives little solace <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-09-05-ancs-fikile-mbalula-dismisses-talk-of-fresh-poll-in-zimbabwe/">to northern democrats</a>. Given Zimbabwe’s courts’ past biases on the legality of elections, the CCC did not bother taking <a href="https://zimfact.org/fact-check-has-chamisa-filed-an-election-court-challenge/">the judicial route</a>. </p>
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<p>Mnangagwa’s inauguration has put all those plans to rest. No reruns. No new versions of government of “<a href="https://africanarguments.org/2013/07/review-the-hard-road-to-reform-the-politics-of-zimbabwes-global-political-agreement-reviewed-by-timothy-scarnecchia/">national unity</a>”, modelled after the disputed, violence-marred 2008 contest, or <a href="https://gga.org/please-sign-petition-for-a-transitional-government-in-zimbabwe/">transitional councils</a>. At most, the election observers’ reports portend further critique. The Zimbabwean democratic forces have to think again, and harder, about ways to a better future. </p>
<p>In sum, if Zimbabwe’s 2023 election foreshadows future battles between authoritarianism and liberal democracy, the former has gained the upper hand. Zanu-PF’S iron fist remains, with a velvet coating, albeit fraying. As a woman overheard discussing this election observed, the only hope may be Zanu-PF destroying itself as it almost did in 2017.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211755/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore watched Zimbabwe's 2023 election as a non-accredited observer.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s 2023 elections look like their predecessors: stolen. But this one is a bit different. Opposition strategies and regional responses have changed too. What does this mean for the future?David B. Moore, Research Associate, Dept of Anthropology & Development Studies and Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2121312023-08-30T12:40:58Z2023-08-30T12:40:58ZZimbabwe’s election was a fight between men – women are sidelined in politics despite quotas<p>Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65775996">2023 harmonised elections</a> have largely been depicted as a battle between the two “Big Men” – President <a href="https://apnews.com/article/zimbabwe-elections-emerson-mnangagwa-president-crocodile-56668e87d9459980b9d38b57175c31ce">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a> of the ruling Zanu-PF and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/who-is-nelson-chamisa-can-he-win-zimbabwes-election-2023-08-23/">Nelson Chamisa</a> of the leading opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). Significant media attention focused on the <a href="https://www.theafricareport.com/315335/zimbabwe-police-ban-92-ccc-opposition-party-campaign-rallies/">uneven playing field</a> between the ruling party and the opposition.</p>
<p>The election results announced on the 26 August are <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/us-embassy-joins-others-voicing-concern-about-zimbabwe-election/7242392.html">being disputed</a> due to <a href="https://www.sadc.int/slide-item/sadc-electoral-observation-mission-2023-harmonised-elections-zimbabwe-launched">reports</a> of delayed voting, voter intimidation and ballot paper irregularities. <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/2023-presidential-elections-results/">Mnangagwa</a> has been announced as the official winner of the presidential poll, but the CCC has <a href="https://twitter.com/ccczimbabwe/status/1695576909839487050?s=46&t=knTMoeo4WZETacMv4PIpAw">rejected these results</a>. </p>
<p>Another concern distinct to this election was the stark decline in the number of women candidates nominated by the main political parties for direct election. </p>
<p>We are working on a three year research <a href="https://nai.uu.se/research-and-policy-advice/project/making-politics-safer---gendered-violence-and-electoral-temporalities-in-africa.html">project</a> with a focus on the representation of women in politics in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe as well as gendered electoral violence. This project seeks to explore barriers to women’s participation in politics in Africa and pathways forward, initially researched in the book <a href="https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/gendered-institutions-and-womens-political-representation-in-africa-9781913441210/">Gendered Institutions and Women’s Political Representation in Africa</a>.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe ranks low in measures of gender parity in southern Africa. South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique boast <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS">46%, 44% and 42% women’s participation</a> in parliament, respectively. Zimbabwe’s political parties need to field more women for direct election, outside the confines of the quota, in order to reach gender parity. </p>
<h2>Gender quota</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20Updated%20to%202021.pdf">constitution in 2013</a> introduced a gender quota to ensure the equitable representation of women in parliament. Zimbabwe’s parliament is composed of a National Assembly (lower house) and a Senate (upper house). The <a href="https://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/Constitution%20Updated%20to%202021.pdf">quota requires</a> that the lower house reserve 60 of its 270 seats (22%) for women representatives. The upper house is to appoint 60 of its 80 senators from a list that alternates between female and male candidates, called the “zebra-list”. </p>
<p>The purpose of the quota is to push the country towards gender parity – 50/50 female/male representation – as directed by the <a href="https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights-rights-women-africa">2003 Maputo Protocol</a> and the Southern African Development Community’s 2008 <a href="https://www.sadc.int/sites/default/files/2021-08/Protocol_on_Gender_and_Development_2008.pdf">Protocol on Gender and Development</a>.</p>
<p>However, women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined since 2013, in spite of the quota. <a href="https://wpp-africa.net/sites/default/files/2021-05/English%20Policy%20brief%20on%20women%20participation%20in%20politics%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf">In 2013</a> women made up 33% of the National Assembly and 48% of the Senate. Only 12% of these women were elected directly. In <a href="https://wpp-africa.net/sites/default/files/2021-05/English%20Policy%20brief%20on%20women%20participation%20in%20politics%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf">2018</a> the numbers in the National Assembly and Senate fell to 31% and 44%, respectively. </p>
<p>There was a significant decline in the number of women nominated to contest the 2023 elections. Only 68 (11%) of 633 aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. </p>
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<p>In spite of these challenges, <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download-category/national_assembly/">23 women were elected into parliament</a> (against 26 in <a href="https://www.womenpoliticalleaders.org/women-make-up-more-than-one-third-of-zimbabwe-s-new-parliament-un-women-1447/">2013</a> and 25 in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">2018</a>). The 23 newly elected women will be added to the 60 women appointed through the quota, making a total of 83, or 30.7% representation of women, in the lower house. After the appointment of senators, as <a href="https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/zw/zw038en.pdf#page=52">stipulated by the constitution</a>, the number of women in the full parliament will increase. Though commendable, this still places Zimbabwe below average within the region. </p>
<p>These gains may fail to go beyond the 31% representation achieved in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">2018</a>. The women in the National Assembly will still be less than 50% of parliamentarians and have limited decision making powers. Moreover, there is little indication of the substantive impact these women will have to empower Zimbabwean women, considering their limited numbers. The country’s record of democratic deficits is another important challenge. </p>
<p>The newly elected women MPs may have limited room for manoeuvre to promote gender equality in this political context. But they are still important as decision makers, legislators and role models for other women to enter politics. </p>
<h2>Looking beyond the quota</h2>
<p>A gendered audit of the <a href="https://www.zec.org.zw/download/government-gazette-extraordinary-vol-64-30-06-2023-electoral-act-2/">published list of nominated candidates</a> for direct elections reveals that Zimbabwe’s political parties did not field enough women to reach gender parity in 2023. </p>
<p>Data shows that 633 registered candidates contested 210 seats through direct election. Of these candidates only 68 were women. That is, only 11% of aspiring parliamentarians for direct election were women. Of these 68, Zanu-PF fielded 23 women (34%), the CCC fielded 20 (29%), and the remaining 25 women were from small minority parties (27%) and independent candidates (10%).</p>
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Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/animal-farm-has-been-translated-into-shona-why-a-group-of-zimbabwean-writers-undertook-the-task-206966">Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task</a>
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<p>Harare and Bulawayo provinces nominated the highest number of women candidates for election. In Mashonaland Central only one woman was nominated across 18 constituencies. Only two women were nominated in Matebeleland South across 12 constituencies.</p>
<p>It is important to ask why political parties are not fielding more women for direct election. And what this means for the future of representative politics in Zimbabwe. </p>
<h2>Gender bias within political parties</h2>
<p>The data above indicates a bias against woman candidates that permeates across political parties. Apart from the women nominated through the obligations of the quota, neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF fielded enough women to make gender parity a reality in the 2023 elections. </p>
<p>The active exclusion of women from politics is driven by gendered prejudices. These are informed by social, cultural and religious beliefs <a href="https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/29600">rooted in patriarchal values </a> that view women as inherently weak and untrustworthy. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/women-bear-brunt-of-political-violence/">threat and use of violence against women candidates</a> continues to be used to coerce and discourage women from contesting elections. As argued by Zimbabwean scholars <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909620986576?journalCode=jasa">Sandra Bhatasara and Manase Chiweshe</a>, </p>
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<p>patriarchy, intertwined with the increase in militarised masculinities, is producing exclusion with limited spaces for women’s participation. </p>
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<p>A negative perception is also linked to “quota women” as they were not elected by “the people”. These women are often subjected to <a href="https://core.ac.uk/reader/188770530">elite patriarchal bargaining</a>. They primarily serve the needs of their party, rather than representing Zimbabwean women.</p>
<h2>Gatekeeping</h2>
<p>The presence of a gender quota system provides a facade of progress. This conceals the stark reality that neither the CCC nor Zanu-PF is committed to increasing women’s representation outside the confines of the quota. Political parties function as “election gatekeepers”. They determine the level of women’s inclusion in representative politics, outside the quota system.</p>
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<p>The number of women elected indicates that, unlike in <a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/312/35">past elections</a>, Zimbabweans seem more willing to vote for women representatives. Political parties should build on these small gains and nominate more women for elections. This will allow the country to move closer to the goals of gender parity, gender equality and democratic plurality.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/212131/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Diana Højlund Madsen is a project leader for the project 'Making Politics Safer - Gendered Violence and Electoral Temporalities in Africa' funded by the Swedish Research Council.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Shingirai Mtero works for the Nordic Africa Institute on the project Making Politics Safer. This project receives funding from the Swedish Research Council. </span></em></p>Women’s representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament has declined in spite of a quota imposed in 2013.Diana Højlund Madsen, Senior Gender Researcher, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, The Nordic Africa InstituteShingirai Mtero, Postdoctoral Researcher, The Nordic Africa InstituteLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2116152023-08-22T13:19:50Z2023-08-22T13:19:50ZZimbabwe election: Can Nelson Chamisa win? He appeals to young voters but the odds are stacked against him<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/543288/original/file-20230817-27-gcauag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change, addresses supporters at a rally.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/28/profile-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa">Nelson Chamisa</a>, the 45-year-old leader of Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), is making a second bid to be Zimbabwe’s next president. </p>
<p>A lawyer and a pastor, Chamisa is the most formidable candidate against the ruling Zanu-PF led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The incumbent took over after the coup that ousted the country’s founding president Robert Mugabe in 2017. </p>
<p>Chamisa is over three decades younger than his (<a href="https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/03/profile-emmerson-mnangagwa-zimbabwe-s-crocodile-president//">81-year-old</a>) opponent, and the youngest person running for president in this election. His youthfulness has been a major issue in this election, as it was in the last. </p>
<p>At least 62% of the population is <a href="https://zimbabwe.unfpa.org/en/topics/young-people-2">under 25</a>. They are <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-youth-speak-out-independence-day/2718352.html">“born-frees”</a> who feel the brunt of Zimbabwe’s failing economy. The actual unemployment rate is <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42116932">unclear</a>; some claim it is as high as <a href="https://worldhelp.net/zimbabwe-unemployment-as-high-as-80-amid-pandemic/">80%</a>. The government claims it is <a href="https://www.zimstat.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/2021_Fourth_Quarter_QLFS_Report_8032022.pdf#page=13">18%</a>. What is true is that many of Zimbabwe’s youth eke a living in the informal sector, estimated to be <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-informal-sector-organisations-in-zimbabwe-shape-notions-of-citizenship-180455">90% of the economy</a>. </p>
<p>Many young graduates have settled for being street vendors or have taken the dangerous <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-precarious-road-zimbabweans-travel-to-seek-a-new-life-in-south-africa-58911">illegal track</a> across the crocodile infested Limpopo River to find work in neighbouring <a href="https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/zimbabwe-immigration/">South Africa</a>. Others with some financial means seek work overseas, even if it’s below their qualifications.</p>
<p>It is to this demographic that Chamisa is speaking directly. He promises the young a <a href="https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2023/08/gift-mugano-unpacking-the-ccc-manifesto-launched-by-nelson-chamisa/">total revamp of the economy</a>. His messaging often includes glossy pictures of high-rise buildings and modernised highway networks that stand in contrast to many dilapidated roads and buildings in Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>As a political scientist who focuses on voting behaviour, migration and social media, I think Chamisa would have a more than fair chance to win in a truly free and fair election. He resonates with the country’s large disenchanted youth, mainly because of the poor state of the economy. However, campaigning in autocratic conditions is not ideal for the opposition. His and his party’s weakness are also serious hurdles.</p>
<h2>Youth appeal</h2>
<p>According to the independent African surveys network <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/">Afrobarometer</a>, 67% of Zimbabweans are <a href="https://www.afrobarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/zimbabwe_r8_diss1-zs-bh-11june21-v2_17june2021finalreleaseversion.pdf">unsatisfied with the direction the country is taking</a>. </p>
<p>In its recently released <a href="https://www.zimeye.net/2023/08/09/download-ccc-manifesto-a-new-great-zimbabwe-blueprint/">election manifesto</a>, the Citizens Coalition for Change promises to transform Zimbabwe into a US$100 billion economy over the next 10 years. The World Bank puts the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-heads-to-the-polls-amid-high-inflation-a-slumping-currency-and-a-cost-of-living-crisis-209841">battered economy</a> at just under <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/country/ZW">US$ 21 billion</a>. </p>
<p>Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare. His party’s manifesto promises universal healthcare and basic education. He also promises to open Zimbabwe to international trade and re-engagement, ending over 20 years of <a href="https://www.commonwealthroundtable.co.uk/commonwealth/africa/zimbabwe/opinion-zimbabwes-continued-isolation/">isolation</a>. The country was suspended from the Commonwealth and excluded from debt relief programmes due to ongoing human rights abuses. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe was once Africa’s breadbasket but can no longer <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/dec/15/we-could-have-lost-her-zimbabwes-children-go-hungry-as-crisis-deepens">feed</a> its small population of <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZW">just over 16 million</a> people.</p>
<p>Chamisa’s appeal to the youth vote has been received along partisan lines. For supporters of the ruling party, he is too young, too naïve, <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/chamisa-incompetent-western-puppet-faking-political-bravery/">too western-leaning</a>, and lacks liberation credentials. For his support base of mostly young urbanites, Chamisa’s youth is his <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-07-zimbabwes-voters-favour-nelson-chamisa-over-president-mnangagwa-survey-shows/">trump card</a>. They have turned the age mockery from Zanu-PF into a campaign slogan, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uxqs4l0RGaA">Ngapinde Hake Mukomana</a>” (let the young man enter the state house). </p>
<p>Chamisa is popular, as shown by huge attendance at his rallies. But will this be enough to help him win his first election as the founding leader of CCC? </p>
<h2>Voter apathy, funding and harassment</h2>
<p>Chamisa and his party face a number of hurdles. The first is getting the youth to vote. </p>
<p>Youth political participation in Zimbabwe has historically been very <a href="https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/2023-08-12-zimbabwes-2023-elections-who-votes-and-why/">low</a>. Although the election body, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, is still to release a full voter’s roll, analysis by the Election Resource Center shows that <a href="https://twitter.com/ercafrica/status/1692100040196575545?s=20">while 85%</a> (6.6 million) of eligible voters are registered, only a third are under the age of 35. </p>
<p>In addition to voter apathy, Chamisa must contend with other hurdles within the opposition movement and the usual obstacles of running for office in electoral authoritarian state. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">founded</a> the CCC following his forced exit from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2021. The married father of three had been mentored by the opposition movement’s founder, the late <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/19/zimbabwes-opposition-leader-died-heres-what-you-need-to-know/">Morgan Tsvangirai</a>. But Tsvangirai’s death <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43066175">in 2018</a> ended Chamisa’s career in the party as divisions grew between him and the old guard. </p>
<p>The formation of the CCC helped him draw in a younger generation of politicians like <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2022/7/7/the-zimbabwean-political-leader-fighting-for-her-countrys-future">Fadzayi Mahere</a>. But it also opened up Chamisa to new problems. The CCC has <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/politics-zimbabwe-elections-economy-human-rights-violations/">little money</a> against Zanu-PF’s elections war chest.</p>
<p>Chamisa lost access to state funds and opposition institutions when he left the MDC. His departure also left him with few friends at home or abroad. </p>
<p>He argues that what some see as disorganisation and isolation is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/theindependent/local-news/article/200013680/chamisa-its-time-for-clarity-not-ambiguity">strategic ambiguity</a>. He claims that his party keeps its cards closely guarded against infiltration and manipulation.</p>
<p>Chamisa has valid reasons to do so. The ruling party has successfully co-opted opposition leadership by offering patronage. The ruling party also uses courts to their advantage and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/45b09177-bfbe-41ea-9cbd-ea4c0218f447">violence against</a> opponents. </p>
<p>In 2007, in the months leading up to the election, Chamisa suffered a <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17646957">fractured skull</a>. In 2021, his party reported threats to his life when his envoy was attacked using a <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-assailants-attack-nelson-chamisa-vehicle-leader-safe/6277026.html">homemade bomb</a>. Members of his party have been beaten up, and others have even lost <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/local-news/article/200014816/ccc-member-stoned-to-death-in-harare-violence">their lives</a>. Job Sikhala, a senior member of the opposition, has been in jail for over a year on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/zimbabwe-conviction-and-sentencing-of-opposition-leader/">unclear charges</a>. </p>
<h2>One man show</h2>
<p>Chamisa’s vagueness on policy adds to his challenges. On the social platform X, where he has more than a <a href="https://twitter.com/nelsonchamisa?s=20">million followers</a>, he regularly only shares <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/chamisas-followers-says-they-are-tired-of-bible-verses/">Bible verses</a> or ambiguous messages. This is a lost opportunity for a candidate counting on the youth vote.</p>
<p>His party structures are unclear and it has yet to release its constitution. The only formal position in the party is his position of president. Everyone else is known only as a change agent. </p>
<p>Chamisa has not announced a running mate. This feeds into rumours that he has weak leadership skills and prefers to centre power on himself. One might even wonder if he does not trust his supporters.</p>
<p>Still, those supporting him say they do not need to know his structures. Zimbabweans are hungry for change after four decades of Zanu-PF rule. Many who hoped for change after Mugabe’s ouster are dismayed by the continuing economic challenges and increasing militarisation of the Zimbabwean politics. For these voters, Chamisa is the change they hope to see.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/211615/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Chipo Dendere receives funding from the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and Wellesley College to support research. </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa defines himself as a social democrat who believes in providing substantial welfare to support healthcare and basic education.Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor, Africana Studies, Wellesley CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2028582023-04-20T15:06:01Z2023-04-20T15:06:01ZZimbabwe’s ruling party vilifies the opposition as American puppets. But the party itself had strong ties to the US<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521045/original/file-20230414-16-97marz.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's President Emmerson Mnangagwa addressing a rally in Bulawayo recently. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony/AFP via Getty Images</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), which has governed Zimbabwe since independence in 1980, is well known for denouncing the United States’ role as a superpower that polices the world. </p>
<p>In a 2007 address at the United Nations, then Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-zimbabwe-mugabe/mugabe-slams-bush-hypocrisy-on-human-rights-idUSN2627903020070926">assailed</a> his American counterpart, George W. Bush. Mugabe charged:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>his hands drip with innocent blood of many nationalities. He kills in Iraq. He kills in Afghanistan. And this is supposed to be our master on human rights? </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Confrontation with the US, a recurrent feature of Zimbabwe’s political history since <a href="https://roape.net/2020/01/17/one-who-preferred-death-to-imperialism/">the 1960s</a>, surged after Washington adopted a bipartisan <a href="https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/11/2019/post-mugabe-zimbabwe-retreats-western-outreach-embraces-africa">sanctions package</a> in 2001. The European Union also imposed sanctions. </p>
<p>US officials have <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1158">repeatedly stated</a> that the sanctions target specific individuals or entities that have abused human rights or undermined democracy. <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/20200924-zimbabwe-leader-tells-un-that-sanctions-hurt-development">Zanu-PF has responded</a> by pointing to UN reporting which notes that the sanctions have weakened the country’s economy and impeded national development.</p>
<p>I am a historian of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. My <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Pan-Africanism-Versus-Partnership-Decolonisation-Rhodesian-ebook/dp/B0BSKNHMYH/ref=sr_1_2?qid=1681393772&refinements=p_n_publication_date%3A1250228011&s=books&sr=1-2">forthcoming book</a> focuses on its formative stages in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This was when Mugabe first became active in politics and the US got more involved in the politics of what was then Rhodesia, a British colony. In my view, the 21st century hostility obscures a nuanced historical relationship between the US and Zanu-PF.</p>
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<p>At first, the fledgling liberation movement valued American support. Zanu-PF <a href="https://www.africabib.org/rec.php?RID=18593742X">broke away</a> from the Soviet-aligned Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in August 1963. Zanu-PF was originally known as Zanu, but adopted the “PF” suffix <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/zanu-pf-wins-first-free-elections-zimbabwe">ahead of elections in 1980</a>.</p>
<p>This context is relevant now because Zanu-PF efforts to consolidate both domestic and pan-African support selectively overlook more compatible aspects of its historical relations with the US.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s anti-American bluster</h2>
<p>Zanu-PF has exploited sanctions to its advantage.</p>
<p>Emmerson Mnangagwa, previously Mugabe’s deputy, <a href="https://www.sardc.net/en/southern-african-news-features/sadc-mobilizes-anti-sanctions-day-25-october/">came to power</a> in a factional coup in late 2017. He has successfully mobilised pan-African support against sanctions.</p>
<p>Since 2019, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union have observed 25 October as <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/10/26/zimbabwe-regime-sanctions-zanupf">“Anti-Sanctions Day”</a> in solidarity with the Zanu-PF leadership.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/25/thousands-in-zimbabwe-denounce-evil-western-sanctions">anti-American rhetoric</a> is not only deployed to win friends abroad. It is also a prominent campaign tactic at home. </p>
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<p>With general elections expected <a href="https://www.eisa.org/calendar2023.php">in July</a> or August, Zanu-PF is following the strategy again. It’s discrediting its leading opponent, Nelson Chamisa of the Citizens Coalition for Change, as a <a href="https://twitter.com/TafadzwaMugwadi/status/1631150059122221056">“US pawn”</a>. </p>
<p>His predecessor, Morgan Tsvangirai, faced <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election/mugabe-belittles-opponents-as-frog-and-puppet-idUSL2321227420080223">similar treatment</a>.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="A man points ahead with his right index finger in front of banners bearing the acronym 'CCC'." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/521059/original/file-20230414-16-s56de3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Nelson Chamisa, leader of the opposition Citizens Coalition for Change party.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Zinyange Auntony / AFP via Getty Images)</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zimbabwe’s partisan state media routinely employ such terms as <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/us-president-exposes-puppets-in-zim/">“puppets”, “pawns” and “lackeys”</a> to describe Chamisa and his party. These jibes are intended to convince Zimbabwean voters that Chamisa would prioritise foreign interests.</p>
<p>The rhetoric conceals ZANU-PF’s own American ties.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF’s American connections</h2>
<p>Historically, relations between the US and Zanu-PF have fluctuated. Mugabe formed a <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/a-walk-down-memory-lane-with-andrew-young/">close bond</a> with Andrew Young, the US ambassador to the UN during <a href="https://theconversation.com/jimmy-carters-african-legacy-peacemaker-negotiator-and-defender-of-rights-200744">Jimmy Carter’s presidency</a>. Carter’s government was the <a href="https://diplomacy.state.gov/encyclopedia/u-s-embassy-harare-zimbabwe/">first to open an embassy</a> in independent Zimbabwe. </p>
<p>Solid relations continued during the early years of the Reagan administration. Harare was one of the <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/12/20/us-slashes-aid-to-zimbabwe-by-almost-half/e67886cf-9f52-4fde-beee-83ba1b40c3e0/">top three African recipients</a> of US aid in the early 1980s. </p>
<p>US vice-president <a href="https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/11/18/Vice-President-George-Bush-arrived-today-for-talks-with/7630406443600/">George H.W. Bush travelled to Harare</a> in 1982. In 1997, first lady Hillary Clinton made a <a href="https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1997/03/1997-03-11-first-lady-travels-in-africa-later-this-month.html">goodwill visit</a> to Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Ties were even deeper in the early 1960s when the US government encouraged the party’s very establishment. Historian <a href="https://www.kent.edu/history/profile/timothy-scarnecchia">Timothy Scarnecchia</a>, who has mined records in the US national archives, has <a href="https://boydellandbrewer.com/9781580463638/the-urban-roots-of-democracy-and-political-violence-in-zimbabwe/">documented the ties</a> that Zanu forged with American officials 60 years ago. </p>
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<p>The organisation’s core leadership in temporary exile in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (then Tanganyika), regularly consulted with US embassy officials in that country. Its leading representatives, <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137543462_5">including Mugabe</a>, lobbied the US government for funding. (There is no evidence that the new party received any directly.) </p>
<p>Zanu’s first president, <a href="https://www.sithole.org/biography.php">Ndabaningi Sithole</a>, received theological education in the US in the late 1950s. Archival records show that on the eve of Zanu’s formation he met with State Department officials in Washington DC who connected him to private American funders. In another archived account of a meeting with the US ambassador in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in July 1963, Leopold Takawira, subsequently Zanu’s first vice-president, relayed that Sithole regarded the US as his second home.</p>
<p>Herbert Chitepo, who became Zanu’s national chair, visited the US in July 1963 and also met with American diplomats. According to a record of their conversation in the US national archives, Chitepo expressed his desire to accept US funding and defied</p>
<blockquote>
<p>anyone to call him an American stooge.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The 11 July 1963 issue of Zimbabwe Today, a periodical produced by Zapu in Tanzania, declared that following Sithole’s return from the US,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the American dollar and its ugly imperialist head is clearly visible in the actions of Mr. Sithole. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on Chamisa and his party’s supposed American connections is a repackaging of the very attacks Mnangagwa’s party faced from Zapu when it was formed 60 years ago. </p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>Although it has not been well documented, the US provided critical support during Zanu’s founding in 1963. It also helped the party consolidate its authority following independence in 1980. Since the US government imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2001, these ties have been overshadowed. </p>
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<p>As elections approach in Zimbabwe, the role of the US looms large. Zanu-PF overlooks historical aspects of its own relations with the US as it seeks to undermine its domestic opposition and appeal to continental allies.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/202858/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zanu-PF’s anti-American rhetoric is not only deployed to win friends abroad. As elections approach, it is also a prominent campaign tactic at home.Brooks Marmon, Post-doctoral Scholar, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1796832022-03-23T11:21:13Z2022-03-23T11:21:13ZZimbabwe by-elections are attracting huge crowds, but don’t read too much into them<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/453646/original/file-20220322-302-js9i5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's opposition Citizens Coalition for Change supporters attend an election campaign rally in Harare, in February. Zimbabwe, 20 February.
</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabweans are set to cast their votes in key parliamentary and local government by-elections on 26 March 2022. The by-elections have the potential to set the tone for next year’s national elections. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s national assembly has <a href="https://parlzim.gov.zw/members/">270 parliamentarians</a> of which 210 are elected. The 60 additional parliamentarians are brought into the house through a quota system reserved for women. </p>
<p>The 28 parliamentary and 105 local government council seats that are up for grabs in these by-elections were left vacant due to recalls and deaths of representatives. The empty seats constitute 13.3% of Zimbabwe’s <a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2773/">210 elective parliamentary seats</a>. The council positions represent <a href="https://genderlinks.org.za/news/zimbabwe-local-govt-quota-takes-shape-ahead-of-2023-elections/">5.4% of the 1,958 local government seats</a>. </p>
<p>Parliament is currently overly dominated by members of the governing Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). The election of new parliamentarians will bring new voices. </p>
<p>The polls were initially due to take place in December 2020 but were <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chiwenga-suspends-by-elections-indefinitely/">postponed</a> because of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>The by-elections have attracted huge national and regional focus. They will give communities that have gone without representation for almost two years a chance to choose their candidates. They also provide an opportunity for the youthful and charismatic Nelson Chamisa to showcase the party he recently rebranded after breaking away from the leading opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This followed a <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-lack-of-a-succession-plan-has-left-morgan-tsvangirais-party-in-disarray-91714">bitter leadership struggle</a> after the death of its founder Morgan Tsvangirai in February 2018. </p>
<p>Chamisa <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2022-01-25-zimbabwe-opposition-leader-nelson-chamisa-forms-new-political-party/">raised the political stakes</a> by leaving the original party and rebranding his political grouping to the “Citizens Coalition for Change” at the end of January 2022.</p>
<h2>Hopes for the opposition</h2>
<p>Twenty of the 28 parliamentary seats being contested – 71.4% – <a href="https://zimfact.org/factsheet-who-previously-held-seats-to-be-filled-on-march-26/">became vacant</a> after the controversial recall of the representatives by a faction of the Movement for Democratic Change party led by Douglas Mwonzora between May and October 2020.</p>
<p>The significance of these by-elections is also evident from the way the two main parties, ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change, have invested huge human and financial resources in organising campaign rallies across the country. </p>
<p>Rallies have attracted huge crowds and ignited political excitement in the country. They have also fuelled speculation that the 2023 national elections, due in less than a year, will be a tight political contest between the two main parties. Some even say Citizens for Coalition for Change poses an <a href="https://thisisafrica.me/politics-and-society/bsr-what-happens-when-zanu-pf-faces-an-existential-threat/">existential threat to ZANU-PF</a>. </p>
<p>The by-elections <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-02-28-zimbabwes-new-political-party-citizens-coalition-for-change-sparks-fear-and-violence-from-zanu-pf/">have even been described</a> as a dress rehearsal for the 2023 elections which some think could be a watershed poll.</p>
<p>There are <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58270973">wide expectations</a> that Zimbabwe’s opposition will be able to build on its earlier successes and capitalise on the deteriorating political and economic conditions in the country to break ZANU-PF’s authoritarian control since 1980. </p>
<p>There are, nevertheless, some caveats.</p>
<h2>Need for circumspection</h2>
<p>It’s important not to exaggerate the impact of the poll.</p>
<p>First, it is unlikely that the huge public turnout at the rallies is going to translate into a huge voter turnout. That’s partly because by-elections in Zimbabwe have always had a low voter turnout. For example, the 2018 general election showed a very low turnout. In some areas, <a href="https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ZESN-Cowdray-Park-By-election-Report.pdf">not even a quarter of the registered voters</a> showed up.</p>
<p>Second, political violence <a href="https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/elections-in-zimbabwe-a-recipe-for-tension-or-a-remedy-for-reconciliation/">has spoiled Zimbabwe’s elections</a> since 1980, and even more so <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/04/elephant-room/reforming-zimbabwes-security-sector-ahead-elections">since 2000</a>. This is likely to dissuade some voters from turning up.</p>
<p>Most recently, there have been clashes between ZANU-PF and Citizens Coalition for Change supporters in the mining town of Kwekwe on 27 February 2022. One <a href="https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/elections-in-zimbabwe-a-recipe-for-tension-or-a-remedy-for-reconciliation/">person was killed and ten injured</a>. </p>
<p>Since then, media and human rights watchdog reports have <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/rights-groups-bemoan-escalating-political-violence/">noted</a> that some supporters and leaders of Citizens Coalition for Change have been violently attacked by ZANU-PF and state security agencies. This has included including candidates for the by-elections.</p>
<p>The violence could deter voters on election day.</p>
<p>Third, evidence from recent surveys suggest that Zimbabweans have become more politically disengaged since the 2018 elections. An example is <a href="https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20of%20results/summary_of_results-zimbabwe-afrobarometer_round_8-21jul21.pdf">one done in June by the independent pan-African network Afrobarometer</a>. Instead, they’re turning their focus on economic survival in the deteriorating economy. </p>
<p>The International Republican Institute’s survey on public perceptions of local government <a href="https://www.iri.org/news/iri-zimbabwe-poll-in-bulawayo-and-mashonaland-east-shows-concerns-over-corruption-and-the-economy-approval-of-basic-services/">of October 2021</a> also shows an increase in citizen apathy towards political parties and community leaders. This is especially so for local government councillors and members of parliament, due to loss of trust in representative leadership. The growing trust deficit is strongly linked to increased corruption and irresponsible leadership among parliamentary and local officials. </p>
<p>Fourth, a growing number of Zimbabweans are losing confidence in elections as a mechanism for bringing leadership change at both national and local levels. This is mainly because of <a href="https://kubatana.net/2018/06/04/electoral-irregularities-point-2018-electoral-fraud/">strong allegations of electoral fraud</a> and the <a href="https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/coup-constitution-and-the-count-zimbabwes-disputed-elections/">growing list of disputed election results since 2000</a>.</p>
<p>The disillusionment is fuelling voter apathy. Most citizens feel that it is pointless to vote because it won’t change anything.</p>
<p>Fifth, attendance at political rallies cannot be taken as an indicator of likely voter turnout. Most people who attend rallies <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/27/politics/2016-election-crowd-size/index.html">don’t necessarily turn out to vote</a>. </p>
<p>Evidence from past elections indicates that crowd size is frequently not a good indicator of success on election day. Attendance of rallies is often motivated by <a href="https://nation.africa/kenya/news/inside-shadowy-world-political-crowds-for-hire-3754652">different factors</a>. These include a range of incentives on offer, such as free music entertainment, alcohol, food, t-shirts and other items of clothing. All are absent on election day.</p>
<p>And most people who have been attending campaign rallies, especially in urban areas, are young. But a significant proportion of Zimbabwean youth – most of whom are unemployed and frustrated with the current political and economic status quo – are still not registered as voters. Analysis conducted by Pachedu (a group of data experts that has been analysing the Zimbabwe Voters Roll since 2018) showed that in 2018, 39% of Zimbabweans aged between 18 and 34 <a href="https://twitter.com/PacheduZW/status/1475526009017544709?t=_gzhe_EpIYvsKgWdIZm43A&s=08">were not registered and nearly 50% eligible young voters didn’t vote</a>. </p>
<p>The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission recently pointed out that <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2022/01/zec-revises-figure-on-registered-voters/">only 2,971 new voters</a> registered countrywide in 2021, and that <a href="https://www.zimlive.com/2022/02/23/zec-registered-50000-new-voters-between-february-1-and-february-20/">just under 50 000</a> people registered during the Commission’s registration blitz conducted in January and February 2022.</p>
<p>For all these challenges, the upcoming poll cannot be dismissed. Coming a few months before the country goes for the 2023 national elections, the elections create an opportunity for electoral stakeholders, including political parties, the electoral management body, security sector agencies, civil society and citizens, to review opportunities and challenges ahead of the milestone elections. </p>
<p>The elections are coming at a time when the country, which has been experiencing political and economic crisis for the last two decades, is going through its <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2021/12/17/notable-risks-for-zim-economy-in-2022/">worst crisis since 2007-2008</a>, with unemployment and poverty soaring and political divisions worsening. </p>
<p>A peaceful and credible election is needed to restore political and economic normalcy in the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/179683/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Muzondidya is also an independent political and development analyst.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Munyaradzi Mushonga does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Most citizens feel that it is pointless to vote because it won’t change anything.James Muzondidya, Part-time Lecturer, African History and Politics, University of ZimbabweMunyaradzi Mushonga, Senior Lecturer and Programme Director for Africa Studies in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1624532021-06-10T14:44:35Z2021-06-10T14:44:35ZA new film about Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections is worth watching, but flawed<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405442/original/file-20210609-14813-1i0akh7.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A still featuring opposition leader Nelson Chamisa from the film President (2021).</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louverture Films/President/Encounters South African International Documentary Festival</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Danish director <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm1600828/">Camilla Nielsson</a>’s documentary <a href="https://www.encounters.co.za/film/president/#jp-carousel-242670"><em>President</em></a> (2021) is an up-close, intimate tale. It follows the election travails of Zimbabwe’s main <a href="https://www.mdcallianceparty.org">opposition party</a> the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance and its leader, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa</a>.</p>
<p>Winner of the prestigious Sundance Film Festival’s Special Jury <a href="https://www.sundance.org/blogs/news/2021-sundance-film-festival-awards-announced">Award</a> for Verité Filmmaking, the film deploys an “in the moment” technique as it follows the lead-up to the 2018 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">general elections</a>. </p>
<p>It documents Chamisa’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-mdc-faces-a-leadership-contest-but-can-it-be-peaceful-112967">battle</a> against the governing Zanu-PF party leader and acting Zimbabwean president <a href="https://theconversation.com/mnangagwa-and-the-military-may-mean-more-bad-news-for-zimbabwe-87646">Emmerson Mnangagwa</a>. Mnangagwa ousted Zimbabwe’s 37-year ruler <a href="https://theconversation.com/robert-mugabe-as-divisive-in-death-as-he-was-in-life-108103">Robert Mugabe</a> in 2017. As the film’s promotional material explains: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>As the election looms closer, it becomes increasingly clear that … an election is no guarantee of a democratic outcome.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If you have lingering hopes that the Zanu-PF soldiers’ coup replacing the doddering nonagenerian would leave <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">Mugabe’s legacy</a> behind, settle down for an intense viewing. </p>
<p>Your hopes will crash, with the opposition troops that <em>President</em> follows. They will die, shot down as brutally as the six demonstrators – and bystanders – displaying their anger at the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s delayed <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">election tallies</a>.</p>
<p>But perhaps enough Zimbabwean politics-watchers in southern Africa can move the discussion beyond the liberal <a href="https://www.screendaily.com/reviews/president-sundance-review/5156629.article">good vs evil</a> <a href="https://variety.com/2021/film/reviews/president-review-sundance-1234895097/">platitudes</a> repeated by the film’s reviewers to date. A local audience should offer critical and nuanced views.</p>
<h2>Political thriller?</h2>
<p>A Fulbright graduate of visual anthropology and filmmaking at New York University, director Nielsson has several socially conscious films under her belt, often about the plight of children, in <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0408818/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_8">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2115303/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_7">Darfur</a> and <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1641626/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_6">India</a>. Her <a href="https://variety.com/2014/film/festivals/film-review-democrats-1201361085/">famed</a> documentary <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt4143306/?ref_=nm_flmg_dr_4"><em>Democrats</em></a> (2014) covered Zimbabwe’s 2010-2013 constitution-making excursion. </p>
<p><em>President</em> avoids feeding the audience a lot of background history and politics. Nielsson <a href="https://cineuropa.org/en/interview/397158/">says</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We … try to be there when things happen, instead of telling it all backwards and coming up with some sort of analysis. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>The film is sold as a political thriller. But as Eric Kohn – perhaps the sole, though mild, critical voice – <a href="https://www.indiewire.com/2021/02/president-review-documentary-zimbabwe-election-1234614636/">writes</a>: the long meetings with Chamisa and company debating how to beat the unbeatable are “less thrilling than exhaustive, a kind of informational activism in feature form”.</p>
<p>Maybe 45 wasted minutes covering meetings could have been used to fill in some glaring gaps that local audiences will notice. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/hthioiO6i0A?wmode=transparent&start=41" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">The trailer for the documentary, released in 2021.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Classic documentary moments</h2>
<p>One such moment might have followed the (unnamed) academic <a href="https://www.plaas.org.za/staff/phillan-zamchiya/">Phillan Zamchiya</a>. (The film does not identify enough of its characters.) In a hotel room, Chamisa’s lawyerly team debates the next steps. It becomes starkly apparent that this election will go down the drain too. </p>
<p>The camera catches Zamchiya from behind. No polite critic, he <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03057070.2013.858546">argues</a> that Zanu-PF are military. They are guerrillas, he says:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>If people are not prepared to die, to go to prison … you are not going to take power away from this regime, believe me or not. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He might have qualified that Zanu-PF is especially so after the coup, when the pro-Mugabe ‘intelligentsia’ faction was dumped.</p>
<p>Once a student leader severely battered during the early struggles for Zimbabwe’s democracy – as is true for Chamisa, the film shows – Zamchiya knows of what he speaks.</p>
<p>The tortured polling agents filing affidavits about their beatings as they posted ballot reports speak eloquently of that plight. However, the film is silent about how ill-prepared they were for their crucial task. The deceased 1 August demonstrators, angry at the deliberately slow counting of the vote, speak for their last time. The timid <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-motlanthe-commissions-anniversary-of-shame">commission of inquiry</a> into their deaths muted them further.</p>
<p><em>President</em>’s filming of those moments is classic. It’s clear why a good documentary can beat the stills. Watch very closely as the officer claps the back of the soldier who shot at the dispersing crowd. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="A chaotic street scene featuring half eight soldiers in camouflage and a policeman. One soldier has kneeled and is shooting his rifle. Behind him another has his hand up to slap him on the back, laughing." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=338&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/405624/original/file-20210610-15-inlvz8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=424&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A screen grab showing a soldier clapping the back of another who has fired on the crowd.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Louverture Films/President</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Yet Zamchiya’s challenge, if pursued, could have raised more questions of the film’s unfolding events.</p>
<h2>Ignored issues</h2>
<p>Like what other forces shaped this moment? During <a href="https://www.britannica.com/place/Rhodesia">Rhodesia</a>’s white rule the liberation armies’ military pressure forced the racist regime to the <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/race-and-diplomacy-in-zimbabwe/0598BE6A7E9C4D1F0F1DCE36291EB473">negotiating table</a>. This would not have happened without the West because of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/event/Cold-War">Cold War</a>. But the West’s post-1989 enthusiasm for democracy-lite <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597">waned</a>. By 2017 it seemed the once opposition-friendly Brits were <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2017/11/08/zimbabwe-the-uks-misguided-role-in-the-rise-and-fall-of-mnangagwa/">backing</a> the sluggish thug Emmerson Mnangagwa who took over the country. </p>
<p>Or the context of how the original opposition’s <a href="https://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/store/history,-politics-and-development/building-from-the-rubble-the-labour-movement-in-zimbabwe-since-2000-by-lloyd-sachikonye-et-al-detail">trade union</a> roots disappeared due to devastating de-industrialisation after the fast track land reform started in the early 2000s – leading to the opposition party’s takeover by lawyers and neo-liberal fantasies.</p>
<p>Lawyers do argue well. <a href="https://lawyersforlawyers.org/en/thabani-mpofu-released-on-bail/">Thabani Mpofu</a>’s valiant, expertly filmed, attempts at the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe to challenge the vote counting amounted to nothing in the end. It was pleasurable, though, to watch electoral commission bosses and judges trying not to squirm. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/fantasy-that-mnangagwa-would-fix-zimbabwe-now-fully-exposed-110197">Fantasy that Mnangagwa would fix Zimbabwe now fully exposed</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>But those who adored Nielsson’s previous film <em>Democrats</em> and its hero, the lawyer Douglas Mwonzora, will know that he has become a leader of a splinter opposition faction <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/mwonzora-dumped-accused-of-duping-supporters-to-join-zanu-pf/">allegedly</a> working with Zanu-PF. They will wonder how long this move brewed. </p>
<p>The Movement for Democratic Change’s earlier splits, patched up in the alliance only as elections approached, are ignored too. So too Chamisa’s rapid and contested <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/mdc-t-does-succession-the-zanu-pf-way">moves</a> to the top of the party after former opposition leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai</a> died.</p>
<p>Those 45 minutes could have offered much more meaning. Aside from avoiding Chamisa’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6hfvMP7IE8">religious side</a> <em>President</em> could have screened its footage of Chamisa’s press conference in the wake of Zanu-PF’s chaotic <a href="https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/mugabes-legacy/">coup consolidator</a>, as 2019 began. </p>
<p>Dead: at least 17 demonstrators and bystanders. Raped: the same number. Meanwhile, Zanu-PF ‘youth’ set the opposition headquarters alight. The charred walls said it all. They would answer the question of why Chamisa’s pursuit of free and fair elections will not go far in 2023, but also why there are no other choices.</p>
<p><em>President</em> zooms in on the moment at the cost of the big picture. Zooming out could have helped.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>President opens the <a href="https://www.encounters.co.za">Encounters</a> South African International Documentary Festival in Johannesburg on 10 June and then plays in select South African cinemas from 11-21 June.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/162453/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The award-winning documentary - now on in South Africa - follows opposition leader Nelson Chamisa. But it spends too much time in meetings instead of giving insight into the bigger picture.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1236112019-09-17T12:32:18Z2019-09-17T12:32:18ZMugabe is dead, but old men still run southern Africa<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/292643/original/file-20190916-19030-ryoxe2.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at the funeral of his predecessor, Robert Mugabe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The death of Robert Gabriel Mugabe (95) saw another of the first-generation leaders of newly independent southern African states leave the world stage. </p>
<p>Southern Africa was the last region on the continent to obtain majority rule. The independence of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and democracy in South Africa (1994) ended white settler minority regimes. They were <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24487678?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">replaced in power by liberation movements</a>. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu, later Zanu-PF), the South West African People’s Organisation (Swapo) and the African National Congress (ANC) have been in government since then. </p>
<p>Mugabe’s death invites a look at the succession – or lack of – in these three countries.</p>
<p>Despite the cultivation of heroic narratives and patriotic history, the first-generation freedom fighters who took over the state offices are not immortal. <a href="https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/gerontocratic">Mugabe’s</a> male-dominated leadership structures based on liberation struggle credentials remain entrenched.</p>
<p>In all three countries a second struggle generation is gradually entering the higher echelons of party and state. But the “born free” – people who were born after liberation – as well as women have hardly made significant inroads into the meritocratic, male-dominated core structures of power. </p>
<p>The question is how much longer the “old men syndrome” will remain alive and kicking in the three countries, despite growing frustration among the politically powerless.</p>
<h2>Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>Celebrated by many as an <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/obituary-zimbabwes-robert-mugabe-a-revolutionary-20190906">icon of the anti-colonial struggle</a>, Mugabe was nevertheless an autocratic ruler who overstayed his time in office. The military finally replaced him with his longtime confidante Emmerson Mnangagwa in <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2017/11/16/understanding-the-military-takeover-in-zimbabwe/">a soft coup</a> in November 2017.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/06/zimbabwe-robert-mugabe-vice-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-grace-mugabe">sidelining</a> was initiated by Mugabe’s younger wife Grace (born in 1965, she was 40 years his junior) to hijack the succession of her husband. She led a group of Zanu-PF members, dubbed the <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/13/Thinking-after-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-ConCoup-Now-Then-and-Then-Again">G40</a> (for Generation 40). The name referred to a constitutional clause that everyone above the age of 40 qualified as a presidential candidate. But, the military and security apparatus and its leadership was still firmly rooted in the struggle generation and opted for <a href="https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/11/21/what-is-behind-the-military-coup-in-zimbabwe/">“Team Lacoste”</a> named after “the Crocodile”, which is Mnangagwa’s nickname. </p>
<p>This ended the political careers of the G40. So far, the “elders” remain in charge and in firm control.</p>
<p>Morgan Tsvangirai (born 1952) founded the <a href="http://democracyinafrica.org/zimbabwe-went-wrong-mdc/">Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai</a> in 1999. The opposition party has been denied electoral victory several times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/obituaries/morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-dead.html">since 2002</a>. </p>
<p>After Tsvangirai’s death earlier this year the much younger Nelson Chamisa (born in 1978) won the internal party <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-t-endorses-nelson-chamisa-as-morgan-tsvangirais-successor-13558886">power struggle</a>. He challenged Mnangagwa in the elections in July last year. </p>
<p>Thanks mainly to rural area results, Zanu-PF recorded a landslide victory in the <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimelections2018-full-details-of-parliament-results-16378869">parliamentary elections</a>. Mnangagwa also secured a (disputed) and much more narrow first term in office as elected head of state. </p>
<p>This is partly due to a continued stricter social control in rural areas. Political interaction and activities in villages can be much more easily monitored than in urban areas. But it also suggests that traditional values – such as respect for elders – remain alive. This gives the generation in power a comparative advantage over younger competitors. </p>
<p>Similar generational constellations also benefited the governing parties in Namibia and South Africa.</p>
<h2>Namibia</h2>
<p>Namibia has had three state presidents <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290429183_From_Nujoma_to_Geingob_25_years_of_presidential_democracy">since independence in 1990</a>. Sam Nujoma, co-founder of Swapo in 1960, was its president until 2007 and the country’s first head of state for three terms until 2005. In May he celebrated his 90th birthday in seemingly good health. Though he remains influential, he has been less visible lately.</p>
<p>In a heavy-handed inner-party battle he ensured that his crown prince Hifikepunye Pohamba (born 1936) followed for <a href="https://brill.com/view/title/33326">two terms</a>. Pohamba was succeeded by Namibia’s first Prime Minister Hage Geingob (born 1941).</p>
<p>After a <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2002-09-01-geingob-out-in-the-cold-before-demotion">clash with Nujoma</a>, Geingob left Namibia to <a href="http://ahibo.com/ticad/en/LP2_8GlobalCoalition_E.pdf">head the Global Coalition for Africa</a> in Washington. Returning to Namibia’s parliament, he made a comeback under Pohamba. Reappointed as Prime Minister <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-07-namibias-geingobs-comeback-paves-way-for-swapo-moderates">in 2012</a>, he became state president in 2015 and party leader in 2017.</p>
<p>Geingob is tipped to be reelected as head of state for another five-year term in the next presidential and parliamentary elections <a href="https://www.nbc.na/news/namibias-general-elections-be-held-27-november.20811">in November</a>. His current Vice President <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=axBhO1aqECg">Nangolo Mbumba</a> is the same age. In the Swapo electoral college on 7 September he secured another top ranking on the party’s candidate list for the National Assembly and will remain in the inner circle of <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/82885/read/Geingobs-loyalists-win-big-at-the-pot">“Team Hage”</a>.</p>
<p>Five years ago the delegates, in a surprise move, ousted some of the old party cadres. But the elders remained <a href="https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/116/463/284/2760214">dominant in cabinet</a>. This time the expected further <a href="https://www.namibian.com.na/82880/read/Swapo-concludes-electoral-college">generational shift did not happen</a>.</p>
<p>Party president Geingob could also fill ten secure seats on the electoral list and brought some of those seniors back, who <a href="https://www.nbc.na/news/president-geingob-throws-old-guard-party-list-lifeline.23864">did not make the cut</a>. As the head of state <a href="http://www.tfd.org.tw/export/sites/tfd/files/publication/journal/155-173-How-Democratic-Is-Namibias-Democracy.pdf">he can appoint</a> another eight non-voting members to parliament. This will allow him to retain several more of the trusted old cadres.</p>
<p>Despite this, Namibia’s second struggle generation (those who went into exile in the mid-1970s) is gradually taking over. </p>
<h2>South Africa</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/nelson-rolihlahla-mandela">Nelson Mandela,(1918-2013)</a> served only one term as state president. His successors <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/thabo-mvuyelwa-mbeki">Thabo Mbeki</a> and <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma">Jacob Zuma</a> (both born 1942) were recalled by the ANC and did not survive the full two terms in office. </p>
<p>Zuma was succeeded by <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/cyril-matamela-ramaphosa">Cyril Ramaphosa</a>. Born in 1952, he is ten years younger than his predecessor.</p>
<p>Inter-generational tensions have begun to show in South Africa. In the latest national elections young South Africans, or “born frees”, showed their disdain for the ANC’s old guard and agenda by staying away from the polls as a <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1614389/south-africa-election-young-voters-stay-away-from-polls/">form of protest</a>. </p>
<p>This younger generation has shown its frustration with the limits to liberation. Many <a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">dismiss formal politics</a>. Their preference is to engage in social movements or other parties.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/study-shows-young-south-africans-have-no-faith-in-democracy-and-politicians-118404">Study shows young South Africans have no faith in democracy and politicians</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<p>One such choice is to support Julius Malema (born 1981) and his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) which was <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/economic-freedom-fighters-eff">founded in 2013</a> and appeals to a smaller pan-African segment of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/south-africas-eff-excellent-politics-of-props-and-imagination-59918">younger generation</a>. But the party’s election results remained behind its expectations and kept it in a distant third place, garnering <a href="https://www.elections.org.za/NPEDashboard/App/dashboard.html">only 10,80% in the latest polls</a>.</p>
<h2>The future</h2>
<p>For obvious reasons, the first-generation freedom fighters, who took over the state offices after liberation, continue to place a high value on seniority in age. </p>
<p>Younger generations of leaders and women make only limited inroads into the structures of power, and the “born free” are not represented. </p>
<p>Rather, the second struggle generation is moving upward to take over, maintaining a system which leaves little room for renewal beyond the confines of individual credentials within the ranks of the former liberation movements.</p>
<p>The continued cultivation of a heroic narrative and patriotic history includes the internalised conception that freedom fighters never retire. Theirs is a lifelong struggle. <em>“A luta continua”</em> remains alive as long as they are. </p>
<p>But this is a backward looking perspective, nurtured by a romanticised past. It blocks new ideas and visions by younger generations contributing to governance, which would create ownership and make them feel represented. It prevents rather than creating a common future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/123611/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Henning Melber has been a member of Swapo since 1974. </span></em></p>It remains to be seen how much longer the ‘old men syndrome’ will persist in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, despite growing frustration among the politically powerless.Henning Melber, Extraordinary Professor, Department of Political Sciences, University of PretoriaLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1221392019-08-21T09:42:34Z2019-08-21T09:42:34ZRepression and dialogue in Zimbabwe: twin strategies that aren’t working<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/288885/original/file-20190821-170927-slrpli.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's crisis is deepening on all fronts.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">globalnewsart.com/Shutterstock</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Since the November 2017 coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the elections in 2018, the regime of President Emmerson Mnangagwa has forged two forms of rule. These have been based on coercion on the one hand, and on the other dialogue.</p>
<p>Following the 2018 general elections and <a href="http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/1800/Zimbabwe-the-2018-elections-and-their-aftermath/">the violence that marked its aftermath</a>, the Mnangagwa regime once again resorted to coercion in the face of the protests in January 2019. The protests were in response to the deepening <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-06-zimbabwe-hikes-fuel-prices-by-26-percent/">economic crisis in the country</a>, and part of the opposition strategy to contest the legitimacy of the government. </p>
<p>The response of the state to the protests was swift and brutal. Seventeen people were killed and 954 jailed nationwide. In May the state turned its attention to civic leaders, arresting seven for “subverting” a constitutional government. The repressive state response was felt once again on 16 and 19 August, when the main opposition Movement for Democratic Chance (MDC) and civic activists were once again prevented from marching against the <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/police-soldiers-deploy-in-zimbabwe's-bulawayo-as-opposition-challenges-protest-ban/">rapid deterioration of Zimbabwe’s economy</a>. </p>
<p>These coercive acts represent a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era.</p>
<p>At the same time Mnangagwa has pursued his objective of global re-engagement and selective national dialogue. This is in line with the narrative that has characterised the post-coup regime.</p>
<p>In tracking the dialogue strategy of the Mnangagwa government, it is apparent that it was no accident that key elements of it were set in motion in the same period as the agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new staff monitored programme. </p>
<p>The purported objective is to move the Zimbabwe Government towards an economic stabilisation programme. This would result in a more balanced budget, in a context in which excessive printing of money, rampant issuing of treasury bills and high inflation, were the <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/05/31/Zimbabwe-Staff-Monitored-Program-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-46952">hallmarks of Mugabe’s economic policies</a>. </p>
<p>The dialogue initiatives also took place in the context of renewed discussions on re-engagement with the European Union (EU) in June this year.</p>
<p>But, Mnangagwa’s strategy of coercion and dialogue has hit a series of hurdles. These include the continued opposition by the MDC. Another is the on-going scepticism of the international players about the regime’s so-called reformist narrative.</p>
<h2>Dialogues</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has launched four dialogue initiatives. </p>
<ul>
<li><p>Political Actors: This involves about 17 political parties that participated in the 2018 elections. They all have negligible electoral support and are not represented in parliament. The purported intent is to build a national political consensus. The main opposition party, the MDC, boycotted the dialogue, dismissing it as a public relations exercise controlled by the ruling Zanu-PF. </p></li>
<li><p>The Presidential Advisory Council: This was established in January to provide ideas and suggestions on key reforms and measures needed to improve the investment and business climate for economic recovery. This body is largely composed of Mnangagwa allies. </p></li>
<li><p>The Matabeleland collective: This is aimed at building consensus and an effective social movement in Matabeleland to influence national and regional policy in support of healing, peace and reconciliation in this region. But it has come in for some criticisms. One is that it has been drawn into Mnangagwa’s attempt to control the narrative around the <a href="https://africanarguments.org/2019/06/04/gukurahundi-zimbabwe-mnangagwa/">Gukurahundi massacres</a>. These claimed an estimated 20 000 victims in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions in the early 1980’s. Another criticism is that it has exacerbated the divisions within an already weakened civic movement by regionalising what should be viewed as the national issue of the Gukurahundi state violence. </p></li>
<li><p>The Tripartite National Forum. This was launched in June, 20 years after it was <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/building-from-the-rubble">first suggested by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</a>. The functions of this body set out in an <a href="https://www.greengazette.co.za/documents/national-gazette-42554-of-28-june-2019-vol-648_20190628-GGN-42554">Act of Parliament</a>, include the requirement to consult and negotiate over social and economic issues and submit recommendations to Cabinet; negotiate a social contract; and generate and promote a shared national socio-economic vision.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>The establishment of the forum could provide a good platform for debate and consensus. But there are dangers. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions warned of the long history of the lack of “broad based consultation on past development programmes”. It <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/tnf-launched-20-years-later-amid-visible-tensions">insists that</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>reforms must never be deemed as tantamount to erosion of workers’ rights.</p>
</blockquote>
<h2>The strategy</h2>
<p>In assessing the central objectives of the various strands of Mnangagwa’s dialogue strategy, three factors stand out.</p>
<p>The first is that the Political Actors Dialogue, the Presidential Advisory Council and the Matabeleland Collective were developed to control the pace and narrative around the process of partnership with those players considered “reliable”. Major opposition and civic forces that continued to question the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa boycotted these processes.</p>
<p>Secondly, the formal establishment of the long awaited Tripartite National Forum may serve the purpose of locking the MDC’s major political ally, the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions, into a legally constructed economic consensus. The major parameters of this will likely be determined by the macro-economic stabalisation framework of the IMF programme.</p>
<p>When brought together, all these processes place increased pressure on the political opposition to move towards an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Mnangagwa regime, and into a new political consensus dominated by the ruling Zanu-PF’s political and military forces, thus earning them the seal of approval by major international forces.</p>
<p>The MDC has responded with a combined strategy of denying Mnangagwa legitimacy, protests as well as calls for continued global and regional pressure. The MDC believes that the continued decline of the economy will eventually end the dominance of the Mnangagwa regime. </p>
<p>As part of its 2018 election campaign, the MDC made it clear it would accept no other result than a victory for itself and Chamisa. That message has persisted and is a central part of the de-legitimation discourse of the opposition and many civic organisations. The MDC has regularly <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/sikhala-mnangagwa-faces-overthrow-through-citizen-mass-protests/">threatened protests since 2018</a>.</p>
<h2>What next</h2>
<p>The MDCs strategies have not resulted in any significant progress. The hope that the economic crisis and attempts at mass protests to force Zanu-PF into a dialogue are, for the moment, likely to be met with growing repression. Moreover, the deepening economic crisis is likely to further thwart attempts to mobilise on a mass basis.</p>
<p>The EU, for its part, is still keen on finding a more substantive basis for increased re-engagement with Mnangagwa and will keep the door open. Regarding the US, given the toxic politics of the Trump administration at a global level, and the ongoing <a href="https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/trump-administration-condemns-latest-govt-abductions-and-torture-of-opposition-in-zimbabwe/">strictures of the US on the Zimbabwe government</a>, there has been a closing of ranks <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">around a fellow liberation movement</a> in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/sadc-declares-anti-sanctions-day/">recent appointment</a> as Chair of the SADC Troika on Politics, Peace and Security in Tanzania will only further cement this solidarity.</p>
<p>There is clearly a strong need for a national dialogue between the major political players in Zimbabwean politics. But there is little sign that this will proceed. Moreover, the current position of regional players means that there is unlikely to be any sustained regional pressure for such talks in the near future.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122139/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brian Raftopoulos is affiliated with a Zimbabwean NGO Ukuthula Trust. </span></em></p>The Mnangagwa regime’s coercive acts are a continuation of the violence and brutality of the Mugabe era, while he seeks global re-engagement and selective national dialogue.Brian Raftopoulos, Research Fellow, International Studies Group, University of the Free StateLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1129672019-03-11T14:18:25Z2019-03-11T14:18:25ZZimbabwe’s MDC faces a leadership contest. But can it be peaceful?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/262465/original/file-20190306-100793-m9f32.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of MDC's Nelson Chamisa believe he could win Zimbabwe's 2023 elections.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE-EPA/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance, Zimbabwe’s largest opposition party, has announced that it will hold its elective congress in May 2019. The announcement has stirred interest – inside and outside the party. This is because there could be an intriguing contest for the presidency of the party between the incumbent <a href="https://informationcradle.com/africa/nelson-chamisa/">Nelson Chamisa</a> and the secretary-general <a href="https://pindula.co.zw/Douglas_Mwonzora">Douglas Mwonzora</a>. The two have a history of rivalry.</p>
<p>Mwonzora is Chamisa’s political nemesis. In 2014 Mwonzora unexpectedly won a contest for the position of secretary-general even though Chamisa, as organising secretary, was in a position to influence party structures in his favour and had been nominated by 11 out of 12 provinces. One theory is that the MDC’s former leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who died of cancer in <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">February 2018</a>, engineered Mwonzora’s victory by influencing the voting patterns of congress delegates. The reason given for this is that he wanted to curtail Chamisa’s political ambitions because of his perceived role in the MDC’s surprising poor showing in the 2013 national elections.</p>
<p>After his defeat, Chamisa was relegated to an ordinary party member, until Tsvangirai brought him back into the MDC’s executive. The speculation is that Tsvangirai did this because he sensed that Chamisa was still popular within the party’s structures, especially among younger members. </p>
<p>A Mwonzora victory is worrying for some of Chamisa’s most fervent supporters. This is because they believe Chamisa is the future of the party. He’s only 41 years old. Also, they believe he gave Zanu-Pf candidate Emmerson Mnangagwa a run for his money in the 2018 presidential elections. Chamisa’s camp believes he’s better placed to defeat Mnangagwa in the 2023 elections because of his <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-who-is-nelson-chamisa-16237399">widespread national appeal</a>. </p>
<p>Mwonzora too has his fair share of supporters. He’s also widely respected within the MDC because of his easy going temperament. </p>
<p>What this all adds up to is that a victory by either candidate could split the party for the umpteenth time. Even a contest carries risks because the MDC has a chequered history in which violence has been used regularly against opposing factions. If the two do contest the party presidency in May – and Mwonzora in the past few days has <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/i-will-be-tougher-for-zanu-pf-says-mwonzora/">hinted that he might</a> – their supporters’ tactics could heighten the danger of violence and intimidation. This could further divide or damage the party and set Zimbabwean democracy back after decades of authoritarian rule. </p>
<h2>Troubled past</h2>
<p>Tsvangirai’s MDC had a “T” at the end – which stood for Tsvangirai himself. This was to distinguish his MDC from the <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/MDC-Welshman_Ncube">Welshman Ncube MDC</a> which had cut ties with Tsvangirai. Ncube was the founding secretary-general of the MDC. </p>
<p>Just before he died Tsvangirai had agreed to bring back former “rebels” who had been founding members of the party. This included Welshman Ncube, Tendai Biti and Job Sikhala. For his part, Chamisa agreed to accommodate and rope in his former “comrades-in-arms” into his election campaign. </p>
<p>The coalition under their umbrella became known as <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-chamisa-forced-to-register-mdc-alliance-as-a-political-party-amid-squabbles-20180616">the MDC-Alliance party</a> just before Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections. The reason for the name change was that former MDC member Thokozani Khupe was arguing in the courts that her formation was the bona fide MDC-T. </p>
<p>A succession puzzle was created in the MDC-Alliance when Tsvangirai, as president and before his death, appointed Chamisa as head of policy and research and then as one of three deputy presidents of the party. This muddying of the waters appears to have been deliberate. It meant that Tsvangirai could easily play his deputies against each other if he felt threatened by any one of them. </p>
<p>But having three vice-presidents – Chamisa, Elias Mudzuri and Thokozani Khupe – didn’t do the party any favours. After Tsvangirai’s death a bloody battle for succession ensued, and led to another split in the party.</p>
<h2>The contest hots up</h2>
<p>The MDC’s May congress has inevitably sucked in the ruling Zanu-PF. The two have been at loggerheads since 1999 when the <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad8338.html">original MDC was formed</a>. A succession of bruising electoral contests, including the highly disputed 2008 elections which the MDC-T was <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-are-elections-really-rigged-mr-trump-consult-robert-mugabe-68440">widely believed to have won</a>, galvanised the ruling Zanu-PF party into resolving to weaken, if not destroy, the MDC brand. </p>
<p>It’s against this backdrop that Zanu-PF is being accused of having a role in the unfolding MDC-Alliance drama ahead of the impending congress. </p>
<p>Some top MDC-Alliance leaders in Chamisa’s camp have been claiming that the governing Zanu-PF has set aside between US$ 4 million to US$6 million to pay MDC delegates to vote for Mwonzora <a href="https://nehandaradio.com/2019/03/03/zanu-pf-pouring-millions-to-influence-mdc-congress/">at the party congress</a>. Biti, who is currently the party’s vice-chairperson, has said he will reject any candidates sponsored by Zanu-PF.</p>
<h2>Best case scenario</h2>
<p>As party leader Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy. He should make sure that the lead up to the congress is violence- free and that party members who are in good standing can contest any post without being intimidated.</p>
<p>He needs to be wary of political sycophants within his party who want to turn him into a demigod, as was the case during Mugabe’s long reign as the leader of Zanu-PF. Chamisa has already shown that he has nothing to fear from a fair contest.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/112967/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Tapiwa Chagonda has previously received funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF). </span></em></p>Nelson Chamisa has the opportunity to foster peace, tolerance and democracy within Zimbabwe’s main opposition party.Tapiwa Chagonda, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1022142018-08-28T08:49:08Z2018-08-28T08:49:08ZZimbabwe: a future finely balanced between democracy and militarisation<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233680/original/file-20180827-75972-16eekkp.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Emmerson Mnangagwa being sworn-in as the second president of Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xo4V9qjvQ04">inauguration</a> as Zimbabwe’s second president and commander-in-chief consummated power for the main beneficiary of the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-coup/index.html">November 2017 coup</a> that forced Robert Mugabe’s long delayed retirement.</p>
<p>Zimbabwean scholar and activist Brian Raftopoulos’ remarks during a public meeting at the University of Cape Town five years ago come to mind. As all were wondering what would happen in the weeks before the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2018.1474379">much-marred</a> <a href="https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/Strategic%20Review/Vol%2036(1)/05-moore_pp47-71.zp39515.pdf">2013 Zimbabwean election</a>, <a href="http://www.africanbookscollective.com/authors-editors/brian-raftopoulos">Raftopoulos</a> <a href="http://africanarguments.org/2013/06/18/11-theses-with-appropriate-apologies-on-zimbabwes-moment-of-magical-realism-waiting-for-elections-in-2013-by-david-moore/">argued that</a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>Zimbabwe’s military-economic élite – a new capitalist class at an early stage – will not be removed just with elections.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mnangagwa’s next five years may see this prediction reach its endpoint. His
billboards said he would deliver the new country Zimbabweans want: the promise remains poised on tenterhooks. <a href="https://transformationjournal.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/T84_Part7.pdf">The classic dynamic</a> in politics everywhere – the interplay between militarisation and democratisation – looms large. </p>
<p>Raftopoulos’ proviso that a “partnership to prevent militaristic moves” was necessary in 2013 may be more apposite (and trickier) now than ever. The prospects for the next elections in 2023 (barring constitutional changes – possible because Zanu-PF MPs make up more than the two-thirds in Parliament needed to change that hard-won <a href="http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/democrats/">document</a>) could take stark contours. </p>
<p>The contest is, and will be, far beyond a battle of two parties and their main protagonists. It will be between increasing democratic participation – starting with the classic precepts of free and fair elections – or a securitisation process <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/04/08/securocrat-state-zim-transition/">much less stealthy</a> than before.</p>
<p>This is the most important point to consider about Zimbabwe’s <a href="http://sites.clas.ufl.edu/africa-asq/files/Moore-Vol-7-Issues-23.pdf">medium-term prospects</a>. The others are moves within Zanu-PF itself, dynamics within the MDC-Alliance and what happens to the economy.</p>
<h2>MDC-Alliance</h2>
<p>After the Constitutional Court’s ruling confirming Mnangagwa as the “duly” <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-court-to-rule-on-oppositions-election-challenge/2018/08/24/e51d7fdc-a778-11e8-ad6f-080770dcddc2_story.html?utm_term=.aad1db3b10a7">elected president</a>, MDC-Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3FAS5WOdZIw">suggested</a> that he and Mnangagwa needed a serious discussion that would lead to the breaking of Zimbabwe’s legacy of violent and jimmied elections. </p>
<p>It’s still an open question whether such a discussion would lead to a coalition government, or the space for the faction-ridden MDC-Alliance to flex the muscles of a loyal opposition and to rebuild. Its bad experience during the <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/index.php/store/history-and-%20politics/the-hard-road-to-reform-detail">2009-2013 “government of national unity”</a> might militate against a repeat. But the wider need to cushion the new régime from militarisation is worth considering. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233681/original/file-20180827-75990-19ciyf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/233681/original/file-20180827-75990-19ciyf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=951&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233681/original/file-20180827-75990-19ciyf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=951&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233681/original/file-20180827-75990-19ciyf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=951&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233681/original/file-20180827-75990-19ciyf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233681/original/file-20180827-75990-19ciyf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/233681/original/file-20180827-75990-19ciyf3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1194&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean opposition leader Nelson Chamisa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The cautionary note to the MDC-Alliance about any such new dispensation might be: don’t neglect your badly fractured party and its allies needing to be in the fold; and don’t sideline your <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/21/chamisa-khupe-in-fresh-war-of-words">enemies within precipitously</a>. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, many among the MDC-Alliance and its supporters fear the Zanu-PF machine is poised to wipe them out permanently.</p>
<h2>Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Much related to the above and perhaps the key, is Zanu-PF itself. The battle between Mnangagwa and Vice-President Constantino Chiwenga <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/zimbabweNews/idAFL5N1V520O">could be overdrawn</a>, but the <a href="https://theconversation.com/will-zimbabwes-messy-election-get-messier-or-will-a-new-path-be-taken-101196">tragic killings of August 1</a> have thrown it into stark relief. </p>
<p>Can no one in power know who shot the demonstrators and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-07/zimbabwe-army-chief-is-said-to-demand-who-ordered-crackdown">innocent bystanders?</a> Could Chiwenga really say that news of the shootings was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-07/zimbabwe-army-chief-is-said-to-demand-who-ordered-crackdown">“fake”</a> and aver the MDC-Alliance deployed cadres to do the shooting to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/08/17/zims-cold-blooded-killings-great-leap-to-global-isolation/">discredit Zanu-PF</a>? </p>
<p>In any case, a military unit came in, because - so says “the state” - the police <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election-police/zimbabwe-police-requested-army-help-to-quell-post-election-protests-spokeswoman-idUSKBN1KM5L3">could not contain the violence</a>. On site observers, however, attest that the police and the demonstrators were enjoying a friendly encounter, including selfies and dancing. Then the soldiers arrived. </p>
<p>The journalists who were there say the men with guns were the Presidential Guard, under Chiwenga’s control: after they arrived and started killing, the violence and car burning ensued.<br>
One analysis says this tragedy has exposed Zimbabwe’s <a href="http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52861&catid=74&Itemid=30">parallel states</a>. Furthermore, the senior soldiers have just had their <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-vp-chiwenga-extends-soldiers-retirement-age-report-20180811">retirements deferred</a>. Perhaps Mnangagwa’s inaugural Freudian slip – when he failed to acknowledge his vice- presidents – revealed his inner desire to be rid of Chiwenga. </p>
<p>One can only hope that the promised <a href="https://ewn.co.za/2018/08/26/watch-live-emmerson-mnangagwa-sworn-in-gives-inaugural-address">commission of inquiry</a> will unearth what happened, and deal with it summarily. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.thepatriot.co.zw/top-news/unmasking-csu/">The Patriot</a>, one of the fractured ruling party’s media mouthpieces, reveals some party propagandists’ thinking about democracy and human rights. ‘Unmasking CSU’ (Counselling Services Unit, a long-serving source of succour for wounded democracy activists, as well as an advocacy NGO) paints the CSU and other human rights organisations writing “fake reports” to fan “tribalism and violence to achieve regime change”. Only words? If they turn into bullets Zimbabwe will have stepped down the ladder a long, long way.</p>
<h2>The economy</h2>
<p>Ticking like a time bomb is the ruined economy. No real <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00083968.2017.1411285">money</a> and a gargantuan number of unemployed embedded in the precarious “informal sector”, if they’re not eking out a penurious peasant’s existence. Their situation is so miserable that they are easily bribed – with flour and <a href="https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/12/22/bumper-zimbabwe-harvest-prompts-bigger-bet-command-agriculture">subsidised prices for their maize</a> backed by <a href="http://www.customcontested.co.za/chiefs-and-zanu-pf/.">intimidation from the chiefs</a> – to vote.</p>
<p>Help from elsewhere might not be forthcoming either, or not helpful if it is. The rulers’ faux pas against the demonstrators has worried even its dedicated <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/02/zimbabwe-edge-ahead-election-results-three-opposition-protesters/">supporters in the wider world</a>, imperilling even the demanding strictures of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank re-engagement. The “West” dangled the slightly less rigorous chalice of <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-05-25-how-theres-hope-for-zimbabwe-as-it-starts-tackling-legacy-debt/">Heavily Indebted Poor Country status</a> in front of Mnangagwa’s finance bureaucrats before the elections. Even though Zimbabwe is considered “too rich” for the easier debt-relief packages that comes with the status, broad hints were made. It’s doubtful if those whispers will get louder now. </p>
<p>In any case, as civil society activist Takura Zhangazha <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/05/zim-2018-election-trading-democracy-for-neoliberal-foreign-policy/">has written</a>, IMF and World Bank policies are woefully inadequate for Zimbabwe’s problems: it is highly unlikely that its poor majority will be lifted to a decent life under their aegis.</p>
<p>As for private investment: Zimbabwe will again be fair game for <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/18/africa/looting-machine-tom-burgis-africa/index.html">the cowboys</a> - from the east as well as the west these days.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe is in a precarious position. Its immediate future rests under the sword of Damocles. The threads of democracy have to be thickened. One hopes the chronicle of its demise cannot be foretold.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/102214/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s new president promised to deliver the country citizens want but the nation remains on edge.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1015102018-08-16T10:36:47Z2018-08-16T10:36:47ZZimbabwe’s coup did not create democracy from dictatorship<p>Many citizens and international observers <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">cautiously hoped</a> that the southern African nation of Zimbabwe would find its way from dictatorship to democracy this year. President Robert Mugabe was militarily removed from office in November 2017 <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-coup-will-zimbabwe-see-democracy-or-dictatorship-87563">after 37 years in office</a>, opening the door for the country’s first real leadership transition since 1980.</p>
<p>Elections were set for July 30. And, for the first time in many Zimbabweans’ lives, Mugabe was not on the ballot. </p>
<p>Election turnout was high, with over 70 percent of the country’s 16 million eligible voters participating. Zimbabweans waited in <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/zimbabwe-votes-for-first-time-without-mugabe-on-ballot-long-lines-at-some-polling-stations/">long lines</a> to choose between Mugabe’s replacement, the 75-year-old acting President Emmerson Mnangagwa, and a young lawyer named Nelson Chamisa who promised <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-election-chamisa-newsmaker/young-contender-chamisa-promises-zimbabwe-break-from-the-past-idUSKBN1KG1R0">economic revival and political change</a>.</p>
<p>“What everyone had hoped for was a turning of the page in Zimbabwe,” observed Michelle Gavin, an Africa specialist at the <a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/08/zimbabwe-is-free-from-mugabe-but-that-doesnt-mean-its-a-democracy-yet.html">Council on Foreign Relations</a>.</p>
<h2>A quick crackdown</h2>
<p>Election day was peaceful enough, but the high spirits wouldn’t last long. </p>
<p>After Chamisa’s party <a href="http://time.com/5354721/zimbabwe-election-results/">alleged fraud</a>, the election commission said it would take days to finalize the vote count. When people in the capital of Harare protested the delay, police and soldiers fired, <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/zimbabwe-holds-funerals-for-victims-of-election-violence/a-44961507">killing seven unarmed citizens</a>. </p>
<p>On Aug. 2, the election commission <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45053412">declared Mnangagwa president</a> with 50.8 percent of the vote – just enough to avoid a run-off. Chamisa’s party rejected the results and, a week later, filed a legal challenge in court.</p>
<p>Mugabe was a violent, repressive ruler. And Mnangagwa – whose nickname is “the Crocodile” – was <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-coup-will-zimbabwe-see-democracy-or-dictatorship-87563">his vice president and enforcer</a>. In the weeks since the election, the government has ruthlessly cracked down on the opposition. </p>
<p>Police have <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/05/zimbabwean-opposition-reports-human-rights-abuses">beaten and arrested</a> dozens of Chamisa supporters, and groups of Mnangagwa’s backers have conducted house-to-house searches for opposition leaders. </p>
<p>Tendai Biti, a well-known opposition figure, fled to Zambia, but was turned over by the Zambian government to Zimbabwe’s security forces. Mnangagwa’s government <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/zimbabwe-opposition-tendai-biti-charged-asylum-bid-fails-180809162846974.html">charged him with inciting public violence</a>. He was released on a US $5,000 bond only after a global outcry. </p>
<p>Today, Zimbabwe remains tense as it awaits the results of the <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-historic-elections-a-case-of-leopards-not-changing-their-spots-100956">court battle over the presidency</a>. Most observers expect Chamisa’s case will fail, and that Mnangagwa will officially be installed as Zimbabwe’s third president since 1963.</p>
<h2>Mnangagwa’s political pantomime</h2>
<p>Having spent considerable time studying Zimbabwe’s politics as a <a href="https://zw.usembassy.gov/senior-state-department-officials-visit-zimbabwe/">U.S. State Department official</a>, I found the contested result and election-day violence saddening but not surprising. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa struck a conciliatory tone in the months leading up to the election. Declaring that Zimbabwe was “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-says-new-investment-law-to-open-economy-idUSKBN1HP1S6">open for business</a>,” he amended a law requiring local ownership of diamond and platinum mines. He signaled his intent to end farm seizures and vowed to sell off failing state enterprises. </p>
<p>He even wrote a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/11/opinion/zimbabwe-emmerson-mnangagwa.html">New York Times op-ed</a> calling for democracy and equal rights for all citizens. </p>
<p>But Mnangagwa is tied to numerous human rights abuses, including overseeing a series of government-ordered massacres between 1982 and 1986 known as the “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/mugabe-zimbabwe-gukurahundi-massacre-matabeleland">Gukurahundi</a>.” An estimated 20,000 civilians from Zimbabwe’s Ndebele ethnic group were killed.</p>
<p>And behind his seemingly reasonable rhetoric, there were signs that Mnangagwa would stoop to win Zimbabwe’s election at any cost.</p>
<p>Human rights groups reported <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/zimbabwe/2018-07-25/zimbabwes-upcoming-election-political-charade">widespread voter intimidation</a>, especially in rural areas, where the government deployed plainclothes security forces to “remind” people to vote – for Mnangagwa. Zimbabwe’s state-controlled media relentlessly broadcast pro-Mnangagwa messages. </p>
<p>And, according to civil society groups, the election commission kept the voter registration roll under wraps until it was <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/07/01/battle-lines-drawn-over-voters-roll/">too late</a> for voters who discovered their names were missing to re-register.</p>
<h2>Electoral autocracy</h2>
<p>Zimbabwe’s recent history mirrors a pattern familiar to other authoritarian countries undergoing a transition.</p>
<p>Research shows that authoritarian leaders almost always contend with <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/politics-authoritarian-rule?format=HB&isbn=9781107024793">two major political pressures</a>: challenges from within their regime, which <a href="https://theconversation.com/latin-american-history-suggests-zimbabwes-military-coup-will-turn-violent-87648">rarely trigger a democratic transition</a>, and popular challenges from outside the system, which might.</p>
<p>Mugabe succumbed to pressure from within his party last year after a succession battle between his wife, Grace, and Mnangagwa’s faction. The military settled this struggle decisively in November 2017, putting Mugabe under house arrest. Grace fled the country, and <a href="https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00040824.html">Mnangagwa was installed as acting president</a>.</p>
<p>Once he assumed office, Mnangagwa worked resolutely to guarantee he could quash the next challenge facing him: popular opposition.</p>
<p>Even as he cited the importance of human rights and invited international observers to monitor Zimbabwe’s presidential election, he was methodically working with allies to <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/zimbabwe/2018-07-25/zimbabwes-upcoming-election-political-charade">lay a repressive groundwork</a> that would ensure he stayed in power as the standard-bearer of the ruling ZANU-PF party. </p>
<p>After the electoral commission announced his tenuous victory, Mnangagwa reacted in classic authoritarian fashion: he deployed police and military forces to repress street protests, driving would-be challengers into hiding.</p>
<p>Zimbabwe held an election without Mugabe. Unfortunately, all it got was another despot in Mugabe’s mold.</p>
<h2>What’s next for Zimbabwe</h2>
<p>It wasn’t crazy to imagine things turning out differently. </p>
<p>Zimbabwe’s political system had actually been getting slightly more democratic in Mugabe’s final years. According to the <a href="https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf">Varieties of Democracy index</a>, one of the world’s largest social science databases on democracy, Zimbabwe’s electoral system remains squarely in the “illiberal” category. But its score has improved 20 percent since 2007, particularly on freedom of expression. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/">Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index</a> shows Zimbabwe making similar modest progress since 2006.</p>
<p>These small improvements in Zimbabwe’s political system, coupled with Mugabe’s demise, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/we-have-a-new-chance-zimbabwe-gears-up-for-elections-after-mugabe">convinced some diplomats and experts</a> that the July 31 election might open the door for real democratic change rather than a continuation of electoral autocracy.</p>
<p>But recent events have confirmed that Mnangagwa and his allies did not force the ailing Robert Mugabe out of office to transform Zimbabwe’s political system. Rather, they sought to ensure their continued control over the nation. </p>
<p>After 38 years of authoritarian rule, one election simply does not create democracy from dictatorship.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101510/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Steven Feldstein is a nonresident fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</span></em></p>Violence and uncertainty has followed Zimbabwe’s first modern election without Robert Mugabe. That’s not surprising: After 38 years of dictatorship, it takes more than a vote to build democracy.Steven Feldstein, Frank and Bethine Church Chair of Public Affairs & Associate Professor, School of Public Service, Boise State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1011962018-08-07T11:31:17Z2018-08-07T11:31:17ZWill Zimbabwe’s messy election get messier – or will a new path be taken?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230868/original/file-20180807-191019-1v7huj9.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabwe's "The NewsDay" after violent protests in Harare.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>This is no way to end an election that promised to bring a bright new post-coup and post Robert Mugabe <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/24/emmerson-mnangagwa-sworn-in-as-zimbabwes-president">dawn</a> to a blighted Zimbabwe – 50.8% for Zanu-PF’s Emmerson Mnangagwa to 44.3% for the contending Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance’s (MDC-Alliance) Nelson Chamisa. </p>
<p>After a drawn out count for the last constituency, <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-tense-zimbabwe-awaits-vote-results-after-troops-fire-on-protesters-20180802">a suspect tally</a> for the supreme ruler. As for the Zanu-PF MPs’ sweeps across the rural areas resulting in a more than two thirds majority in the lower house of assembly (155 to 53), fears triggered by memories <a href="https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008eom.htm">of the violent 2008 run-off</a> remain real. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa has been making gestures to Chamisa <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/2018zimelections-mnangagwa-calls-for-unity-as-chamisa-cries-foul-16400187">for “unity”</a> <a href="https://harareblitz.com/2018/08/06/watch-video-ed-laughs-at-idea-of-gnu-with-chamisa/">or to</a> play a </p>
<blockquote>
<p>crucial role in Zimbabwe’s present and in its unfolding future. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>He seemed furious when the police converged on journalists attending Chamisa’s presser at the subtly luxurious Bronte Hotel: the police <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkjOG-xFcEk">apologised</a> on Twitter very quickly.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/05/zimbabwean-opposition-reports-human-rights-abuses">dozens or more MDC-Alliance supporters</a> are running for their lives, or hiding in safe houses. This, just days after <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-false-new-dawn-for-zimbabwe-what-i-got-right-and-wrong-about-the-mood-100971">soldiers</a> – not police – <a href="https://www.enca.com/news/three-victims-zimbabwe-post-election-violence-buried">shot and killed</a> at least six protesters and innocent bystanders. Some were shot in the back.</p>
<p>What start is this for a regime promising <a href="http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/life-lessons-for-a-man/">Lazarus-like</a> revival for the ruling party and <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-03-16-00-lord-hains-zimbabwe-hypocrisy">its friends</a> around the world – not to mention ordinary Zimbabweans?</p>
<p>Yet there is an alternative: if Mnangagwa actually has the power he could call off the attack dogs and let the courts decide the merits, or not, of Chamisa’s case that the poll was rigged. This might not itself result in a peaceful resolution, given rumblings that a coup is in the making led by Vice-President and (unconstitutionally) Minister of Defence, Constantino Chiwenga. But it would be better than allowing the soldiers out onto the streets in force. </p>
<p>And it just could be that this is the tack. The MDC-Alliance’s lawyers will present their case <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-lawyers-to-challenge-zim-presidential-poll-results-16408858">on August 10</a>. Mnangagwa is facing a sharp fork in the road. One hope he takes the right one.</p>
<h2>The crackdown</h2>
<p>The crackdown’s current phase started on August 2. As the election results were trickling in, drunken soldiers beat up equally inebriated MDC-Alliance supporters in the “high density suburbs” (poverty-riddled townships or locations) <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/soldiers-go-berserk-beat-up-revellers-in-harare-chitungwiza/">around Harare</a>, where the opposition party did <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/vimbayi-tsvangirai-java-a-chip-off-the-old-block/">overwhelmingly well</a>. </p>
<p>So much for the hypothesis that the poor soldiers would support their <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/27/So-what%E2%80%99s-a-post-coup-pre-election-like-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-Democracy-after-Mugabe-%E2%80%93-Phase-I">equally suffering</a> brothers and sisters with the long-struggling opposition, poised to take the chalice only a few months after <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Morgan Tsvangirai’s death</a>.</p>
<p>The crackdown continued the next day. An MDC-Alliance candidate in Chegutu challenged his loss, won on the recount, and proceeded to run away <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/28995-just-in-zanu-pf-chegutu-west-candidate-dexter-ndunas-win-reversed.html">from rabid soldiers</a>. Many more <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mnangagwa-opponents-disappear-after-election-h079sksf7">were chased</a> in Harare’s townships, Marondera, and Manicaland. The Financial Times <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/7c3463b8-98bf-11e8-ab77-f854c65a4465">reported</a> over 60 arrests, pointing to Chiwenga as the leader of the shakedown. It hinted at a coup – no surprise to many Zimbabweans.</p>
<h2>A vice-president’s coup?</h2>
<p>Chiwenga has been the elephant in the room for a very long time. Many Zimbabweans say that Mnangagwa lives in fear of him. Lower ranking members of Zanu-PF in propaganda and intelligence don’t dare challenge this mercurial man <a href="http://www.kentonline.co.uk/sittingbourne/news/zimbabwe-takeovers-kent-connection-135528/">with a history of suicide attempts</a>, and <a href="https://robertrotberg.wordpress.com/2012/02/14/who-killed-solomon-mujuru-the-mystery-in-zimbabwe-deepens/">more</a>. </p>
<p>Promoted to armed forces head by Mugabe well beyond his seniority and capability, but kept to one-year contracts to ensure his fealty, he waited until Grace Mugabe pushed her doddering husband into firing his long-time ally <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVxZ-DAsDZY">Mnangagwa</a> – who was then vice-president – in early November last year. </p>
<p>Chiwenga returned from a China trip and then helped Mnangagwa in what the American Jesuit magazine <a href="https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2017/12/14/interview-zimbabwean-jesuit-who-mediated-mugabes-fall-power">called the</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>unexpected, but peaceful, transition </p>
</blockquote>
<p>away from the <a href="http://transformationjournal.org.za/">nonagenarian ruler</a>.</p>
<p>Chiwenga has kicked out a good number of Central Intelligence Organisation operatives, suspected of loyalty to the <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics-g40-factbox/factbox-key-figures-in-zimbabwe-first-lady-grace-mugabes-g40-faction-idUSKBN1DF1DX?il=0">“Generation-40”</a> faction, which lost out with the coup. So too with the police, pared down through the year, That’s why the soldiers <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/chamisa-divides-police-military/">were called in last week</a>.</p>
<p>He’s been awaiting his due – the presidency – ever since, and he might be in a hurry. A demotion could ensue if Mnangagwa takes the royal road to respectability via a pleasant deal with the MDC-Alliance, whom the recalcitrant “war-vets” consider a cabal of <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/running-to-america-mdc-t-exposes-its-puppet-nature/">imperialist puppets</a>. </p>
<p>It’s surprising that the local and international cheerleaders for the “military assisted transition”, with a lot riding on peace and goodwill after the election, seemed blissfully unaware of the power behind the already tarnished throne. </p>
<p>South African military intelligence are supposed to be well-connected with their counterparts to the north, and should not be prone to think like the British. The defenders of diminishing empire are more likely to think like Lord Soames, temporary governor of Rhodesia as Zimbabwe was on the cusp. His comments as Robert Mugabe came to power on the wave of a violent election in 1980 included the fact that he wasn’t surprised <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-zim-parliament-begins-session-to-remove-mugabe-20171121">at bit of bloodshed</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This isn’t Puddleton-on-the-Marsh. Africans think nothing of sticking poles up each others whatnot and doing filthy things. It’s a very wild thing an (African) election.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>British officials, and their global compatriots, presumably don’t think like that anymore. But even if they don’t, they should have known that coups are prone to eat their own children.</p>
<p>Yet there could be another road to take.</p>
<h2>The other fork</h2>
<p>There is still time for Mnangagwa to change tack. The MDC-Alliance’s contention that the election was cooked will be tested in the courts. </p>
<p>This, say Zimbabweans on the run, is what the soldiers are after: they are chasing copies of the V11 forms. These are the results of every polling station that were posted after the local count: they can be captured by anyone on site but are also transported to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s headquarters for the final count. The V11s might be Chamisa’s ace: he claims to possess a tally that will invalidate Mnangagwa’s <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1988993/nelson-chamisa-claims-zecs-results-are-unverified-and-fake/">slim victory</a>. </p>
<p>If the presidential praetorians are sure their man has won, why didn’t they allow Chamisa to present the papers to the constitutional court – <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/08/legal-ramifications-of-the-july-30-elections/">stacked with Zanu-PF judges as it is</a>? In any case this will happen at the end of the week and the presidential inauguration should be postponed.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa is used to waiting for the right moment. He will have to move faster against Chiwenga than he did against Mugabe.</p>
<p>If he’s too slow there could be a real coup, soldiers running rampant again. Or an electoral rerun? The choice might be Mnangagwa’s. Or it could be Chiwenga’s. No matter: it will be a game-changer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101196/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>What start is this for a regime promising Lazarus-like revival for the ruling party and its friends around the world – not to mention ordinary Zimbabweans?David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1010472018-08-04T12:31:57Z2018-08-04T12:31:57ZTwo narratives are being spun about Zimbabwe’s poll. Which one will win the day?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230639/original/file-20180803-41357-qy8nh5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A triumphant Zanu-PF supporter celebrates the Emmerson Mnangagwa's victory in the presidential race.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>It is said that two things are inevitable in life: death and taxes. To these a third might be added – election victories for former southern African liberation parties. This is especially true in Zimbabwe, whose governing Zanu-PF party is steeped in the politics of entitlement. One with a <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">brutal history</a> whenever it is confronted by dissent and opposition.</p>
<p>It came as no great surprise, therefore, that it secured a resounding victory in the recent <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/997207/Zimbabwe-election-results-2018-Mnangagwa-Chamisa-who-won">parliamentary elections</a>, followed by a narrower but still decisive win for Emmerson Mnangagwa over Nelson Chamisa in the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45053412">presidential poll</a>. But – 50.8% to 44.3% – was suspiciously convenient, just nudging Mnangagwa past the point required to avoid a <a href="https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-08-03-zanu-pfs-emmerson-mnangagwa-wins-zimbabwean-election/">run-off contest</a>. This was akin to the contrived result of 2008, which denied Morgan Tsvangirai the presidency by pushing him <a href="https://eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008results5.htm">below 50%</a>. </p>
<p>The standard features of Zimbabwean elections were all evident again. A slavish state media acting as praise singers for Zanu-PF, rather than as a forum for diverse opinions, the open allegiance of the security forces, and the misuse of the state apparatus for <a href="https://www.biznews.com/briefs/2018/05/03/life-mugabe-zim-opposition-credible-election">party purposes</a>. </p>
<p>What was missing this time was a full-blown campaign of state intimidation and violence to ensure that voters ‘did the right thing’. The post-Robert Mugabe administration is astute enough to understand that such tactics would drive a coach and horses through its key policy objectives. These are to secure global rehabilitation, gain access to International Monetary Fund and World Bank support, and to entice investors and business back to the country.</p>
<p>Thus, the balancing act was to retain power while still doing enough to convince the global community that Zimbabwe was on an upward curve. The kind of approach used in previous elections could only be deployed in extreme circumstances. It posed a fundamental threat to the wider national interest, and shows how the <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/economic-analysis/zimbabwe-dire-need-economic-reform-nation-must-act-quickly-post-mugabe-say-imf/">precarious economic situation</a> has compelled a political reappraisal within Zanu-PF about strategy and tactics.</p>
<p>There has been no Damascene conversion here. Mnangagwa was an architect of previous election campaigns rooted in intimidation and he has been implicated in the atrocities of the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi</a>. </p>
<p>His was merely a pragmatic recognition that less crude tactics were necessary due to the country’s untenable economic situation. </p>
<p>Will this strategy work? It is currently too early to say. What’s clear though is that two narratives have already begun to emerge. Mnangagwa’s is that there <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/03/africa/zimbabwe-election-mnangagwa-chamisa-intl/index.html">needs to be</a> national unity, that he’s a centrist and pragmatist and needs the West’s support to get the country back on its feet. For his part, Chamisa has already begun to write his script: <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/03/africa/zimbabwe-election-mnangagwa-chamisa-intl/index.html">the election was rigged</a> and Zimbabweans were robbed of a fair election. </p>
<h2>Election observers</h2>
<p>While the Southern African Development Community and African Union monitors have <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/sadc-au-comesa-endorse-zim-elections-16352866">approved the elections</a>, those endorsements must be placed in their proper historical context. Both bodies have a long history of endorsing Zimbabwean elections in the face of the most egregious vote rigging and violence. And both have a structural bias towards protecting the interests of incumbents. </p>
<p>There is a strong ‘leaders club’ mentality in both organisations. And a ‘liberation club’ mentality remains exceptionally strong within the SADC. These organisations still lack a thorough democratic character and remain unable to translate the noble aspirations of their charters into a consistent defence of democratic principles on the ground. </p>
<p>For its part, the European Union was less generous. The EU was allowed to monitor a Zimbabwean election for the first time <a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/eu-observe-zimbabwe-polls-first-time-16-years-182429480.html?guccounter=1">in 16 years</a> and it highlighted structural inequalities in the electoral process, <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-08-01-history-is-repeating-itself-in-zimbabwe/">concluding that </a></p>
<blockquote>
<p>a truly level playing field was not achieved which negatively impacted on the democratic character of the electoral environment. </p>
</blockquote>
<p>One must also place explanations for any Zimbabwean election in the wider context of a dominant party state which is highly authoritarian. Zanu-PF has embedded itself in power over almost four decades. It has entrenched itself in the state and its behaviour has shown that any result defying ‘the revolution’ - that is its own defeat - is unacceptable and will be resisted with the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">full might of the state</a> </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=429&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230642/original/file-20180803-41354-1lt3dwv.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=539&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwe police outside the Bronte Hotel during the opposition MDC- Alliance leader Nelson Chamisa’s press conference in Harare.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In short, everything can change in Zimbabwe except the rule of the dominant party. That is the limit of its ‘reform process’. This inevitably affects the wider population, it grinds a people down, exhausts them and compels them to make their own often resigned and unhappy accommodation with a status quo which seems immovable. This is particularly so as people struggle daily to make ends meet.</p>
<p>People have learned what a serious challenge to Zanu-PF power actally entails, and naturally flinch from inviting such retribution on themselves. In short, there is an awareness that behind Mnangagwa’s conciliatory discourse is a steely <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/mnangagwas-zanu-pf-on-track-to-pull-off-narrow-win-in-zimbabwe-election">determination never to yield power</a>.</p>
<h2>How should the West respond?</h2>
<p>Western support is needed to unlock the doors to the main global financial institutions whose support Zimbabwe desperately needs to pull it from the economic abyss. </p>
<p>Two contrasting narratives are being spun, each seeking to shape the Zimbabwean reality for a Western audience. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s pitch is that Zimbabwe is moving on after the disasters of the Mugabe era. While the election may be acknowledged as imperfect, it’s a good start and a clear advance on previous polls. In the coming days and weeks he will suggest that, with strong external support and by fully welcoming Zimbabwe back into the family of nations, further progress is likely. </p>
<p>The opposition MDC-Alliance and Chamisa, by contrast, has already begun to advance a narrative that this is simply more of the same – <a href="https://citizen.co.za/news/news-africa/1988993/nelson-chamisa-claims-zecs-results-are-unverified-and-fake/">rigged elections</a> falling lamentably short of democratic standards. Their argument is that behind the smokescreen of soothing rhetoric is the same implacable determination by Zanu-PF to remain in power at any cost, as shown by the deadly shooting of <a href="https://www.news.com.au/world/africa/army-opens-fire-on-opposition-protests-in-zimbabwe-capital-during-wait-for-election-results/news-story/197e63b58f92e98d15f25aee087a7dd9">unarmed protesters</a>. </p>
<p>In short, Mnangagwa is a wolf in sheep’s clothing and Western states should hold him at arm’s length and deny him the legitimacy he craves. Saying this, of course, will open the MDC-Alliance to the familiar Zanu-PF charge that it is ‘treasonous’ and is collaborating with foreign powers and ‘imperialist forces’. </p>
<p>Which of these proves to be the more compelling narrative will turn on whether Western states insist on full respect for the democratic process, and on certain democratic benchmarks as being non-negotiable; or whether they will view Mnangagwa and Zanu-PF as the only game in town and deal with them, albeit reluctantly. </p>
<p>In that event, like the Zimbabwean population, they too will have been worn down by the attritional politics of Zanu-PF.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/101047/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James Hamill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Winners and losers are both trying to win the West’s support for their view.James Hamill, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of LeicesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009712018-08-02T12:41:25Z2018-08-02T12:41:25ZA false new dawn for Zimbabwe: what I got right, and wrong, about the mood<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230374/original/file-20180802-136676-1oflqw5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zanu-PF banners being burnt during a protests against parliamentary polling results in Harare, Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>The afternoon after Zimbabwe’s historic <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-poll-the-bar-for-success-is-low-the-stakes-are-high-and-its-a-close-race-100100">Monday July 30 elections</a>, I was trying to assuage the fears of Jason Burke, the correspondent for the London newspaper, the Guardian, that chaos and violence would <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/31/zimbabwe-opposition-leader-claims-he-is-on-course-for-election-win">ensue any time</a>. </p>
<p>The military-dominated Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was <a href="https://263chat.com/mdc-piles-more-pressure-on-zec/">dragging out the counting</a>. Meanwhile civil society election monitoring networks were filling the information void. Their preliminary reports said that 21% of the presidential results meant to be posted on the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/29/election-results-to-be-posted-outside-polling-stations">polling stations’ walls</a> were not available: this was against the law and warranted the election <a href="https://twitter.com/DavidColtart/status/1024248453583593473">nullified</a>. The parliamentary and municipal ward results, however, were pasted for all to see.</p>
<p>Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance (MDC-Alliance) leaders were calling foul – and coming too close to comfort to <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07-31-weve-won-say-both-the-opposition-mdc-and-ruling-zanu-pf/">declaring a win</a> that they would defend. This too fell foul of the country’s electoral laws. </p>
<p>Folks were rumbling. But I repeated the cliché to Burke that Zimbabweans were too peaceful to mount a full-fledged revolt, and that anyway their equally suffering brothers in the lower ranks of the military would not shoot them if they did resort to a war of the poor and disenfranchised.</p>
<p>The electoral commission had by that relatively quiet Tuesday afternoon announced only seven results for the MPs – resounding successes in very rural constituencies for the governing Zanu-PF. However, within 24 hours (Tuesday August 1), the electoral commission was able to release all the parliamentary results, proclaiming a massive victory in the national parliament: 155 seats for Zanu-PF and only 53 for the long-time aspirants,<a href="https://zwnews.com/zim-latest-voting-winners-results-zec-elections/">the MDC-Alliance</a>. All were still on tenterhooks for the presidential results.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230382/original/file-20180802-136667-bcf9cj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A man fires a catapult outside the gates of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zanu-PF thus had more than the two thirds majority in parliament needed to change the constitution – again – so the renewed Zanu-PF president might be able to continue in power for ever. That is what Mugabe thought would be his destiny, until the coup only eight months ago changed his mind. </p>
<p>The long <a href="http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/democrats/">participatory process</a> from 2010 until 2013 that produced the lovely liberalism of the <a href="http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/constitutions/zimbabwe_constitution.pdf">contemporary constitution</a> could be for naught. That whole legal framework - albeit barely implemented by the last regime - could be replaced by one more amenable to a dictatorship. </p>
<p>On Wednesday August 1 the electoral commission postponed announcing the presidential results. Later it said it was ready to announce them, but had to wait until all the presidential candidates were <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/polling-agents-to-verify-presidential-returns-zec/">present</a>. By evening the MDC-Alliance’s Nelson Chamisa and some of the 21 motley crew of candidates finally arrived to bow to the final straw, opening the way to the electoral commission being able to release the results which it did the next day.</p>
<p>But by Wednesday evening the carnage on the streets had been waged.</p>
<p>Thus my attempt to calm the British journalist was partly right – the people did not launch a war. They did, however, lunge at the gates surrounding the electoral commission centre at the Rainbow Towers, demonstrated at the commission’s headquarters in town, hit out at the <a href="http://www.702.co.za/shows/109/karima-brown-show">Zanu-PF headquarters</a>, threw rocks at cars and scared away some informal vendors. </p>
<p>But I was wrong in my belief – <a href="https://www.zimbabwebriefing.org/single-post/2018/07/27/So-what%E2%80%99s-a-post-coup-pre-election-like-Zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-Democracy-after-Mugabe-%E2%80%93-Phase-I">based on</a> mid-July chats with newspaper vendors, car-park security guards, petrol attendants, liberation guerrilla soldiers who had borne the brunt of Mugabe’s wrath in the seventies, and those higher up the divided Zimbabwe hierarchy in MDC circles – that soldiers would refuse orders to shoot their compatriots. The junior officers submitted indeed. Zimbabwe’s history of ruling group violence against the slightest signs of a shift against it rose once again to stifle democratic challenge.</p>
<p>The police – decimated because they were on the wrong side of the security split <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-military-coup-is-afoot-in-zimbabwe-whats-next-for-the-embattled-nation-87528">during the coup</a> and, so we were told, out around the country securitising the election – decided to bow out, calling in their military superiors. </p>
<p>By the end of the day only blood remained. At least three people had <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/latest-zimbabwes-presidential-results-expected-shortly-56958220">been killed</a> (friends in Harare told me five) and many, many more beaten and injured. By Thursday the soldiers were called to their barracks.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=399&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/230380/original/file-20180802-136670-4qfvn8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">MDC-Alliance supporters vent their anger after losing the parliamentary poll.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">. EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The MDC-Alliance leaders were no more angelic than their competitors, even though Chamisa may think he has <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6hfvMP7IE8">divine guidance</a>. One wonders: what leverage would have been gained by sending their followers to death? As the violence waned I hoped that they would not unleash the fabled “hot squads” purportedly trained in Rwanda and Uganda (Mugabe preferred the <em><a href="https://networks.h-net.org/node/10670/reviews/11050/kriger-campbell-reclaiming-zimbabwe-exhaustion-patriarchal-model">interahamwe</a></em>). </p>
<p>The presidential results were due to be <a href="https://zwnews.com/zim-votes-latest-winners-elections-2018/">announced</a> by Thursday afternoon. Advance copies were sent to me, and the NGO monitors have them <a href="https://erczim.org/#1523430338575-54c77f69-8af4">too</a>. It’s expected to be a Mnangagwa win.</p>
<p>What should the MDC-Alliance do when the loss is digested?</p>
<p>If, as is widely discussed, both Mnangagwa and Guveya Dominic Nyikadzino Chiwenga, his co-director in the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-coup/index.html">coup against Robert Mugabe</a>, are sick men, would it not be better to consolidate the poorly organised MDC-Alliance to prepare for the next elections in 2023? Zanu-PF could quite well implode (again) by then. </p>
<p>For now, there are two destroyed parties to leave space for the ever-strengthened military-business conglomerate.</p>
<p>Lastly, how will the regional neighbours and global powers react? They seem to have been foiled by the crafty Zimbabwean comrades once again.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100971/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zanu-PF’s more than two-thirds majority win in the parliament poll gives it the power to change the constitution if it wishes.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1009562018-08-02T08:46:52Z2018-08-02T08:46:52ZZimbabwe’s historic elections: a case of leopards not changing their spots<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/230371/original/file-20180802-136664-1fjyzcn.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A protest against polling results in Harare, Zimbabwe.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Yeshiel Panchia</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s general elections on July 30 <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-zimbabwes-first-elections-after-the-mugabe-ouster-are-so-significant-100505">were being labelled</a> as “historic”. For the first time since independence in 1980, the ballot paper featured the faces of new presidential candidates, Emmerson Mnangagwa and Nelson Chamisa. And, prior to the poll, there was no large scale violence by security institutions and youth militia, as had happened previously.</p>
<p>Indeed, the elections were peaceful and voters turned out in large numbers. But that’s where the good news ended <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/01/zanu-pf-wins-majority-of-seats-in-zimbabwe-parliament-elections">as violence broke out</a> after the release of the parliamentary results. </p>
<p>Supporters of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)- Alliance led by Chamisa marched to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s command centre protesting against the slow release of the presidential election results. The parliamentary results were released early in the day, <a href="https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/997207/Zimbabwe-election-results-2018-Mnangagwa-Chamisa-who-won">giving Zanu-PF (68%) of the seats</a>. The MDC-Alliance was insinuating that the presidential results were being rigged. </p>
<p>The day before any results were released MDC-Alliance leaders had upped the ante <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mdc-alliance-has-won-zimbabwe-elections-says-proud-chamisa-16330459">by announcing they’d won</a>, and saying that they wouldn’t accept any other result.</p>
<p>The army and police responded to protesters with the familiar brutality, leaving <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/latest-zimbabwes-presidential-results-expected-shortly-56958220">three people dead</a>. In the space of two hours Zimbabwe went from having peaceful, free and fair elections, to ones marred by violence and accusations of fraud. The promise of a new dawn seemed to vanish instantaneously. </p>
<p>What went wrong? Are the parliamentary election results a reflection of voter rigging or of the MDC-Alliance’s own weaknesses?</p>
<p>Zimbabwe needed these elections to be credible, no matter who won. A legitimate government – with a strong mandate – can develop and implement a much needed national development plan to fix the country’s shattered economy. </p>
<p>Both presidential candidates and political parties promised peace and a new beginning. But, when the chips were down and the votes began to show a familiar trend of Zanu-PF dominance, both parties resorted to old tactics. MDC-Alliance resorted to disruption and discrediting the elections while Zanu-PF, through the security establishment, used undue force.</p>
<p>Accusations and counter accusations of who was to blame became the order of the day as they both plunged the country back into familiar chaos. These leopards were now revealing that they had not changed their spots, in full view of an international community they were hoping would come and invest after an election. </p>
<h2>Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Last November the governing Zanu-PF ushered in a new political dispensation, via a military assisted transition that <a href="https://theconversation.com/after-mugabe-why-the-role-of-zimbabwes-army-cant-be-trusted-87872">ousted former president Robert Mugabe</a>. The party was never going to hand over power on a silver platter and would have been preparing for a win in what they no doubt expected to be a competitive race. </p>
<p>Zanu-PF always had the upper hand given its 38 years in power since independence. It had access to more funding, including state resources, that enabled it to run a more effective campaign. Its many huge billboards, advertising a re-imaged Mnangagwa, new vehicles and a flood of green party paraphernalia all indicated that it had invested large amounts of money in these elections. </p>
<p>The party also benefited from a <a href="https://theconversation.com/a-vicious-online-propaganda-war-that-includes-fake-news-is-being-waged-in-zimbabwe-99402">biased state media</a>. And it could also still ride on the wave of the sweeping changes it had brought about from November 2017, which included opening up the democratic space in terms of freedom of speech and association and movement. </p>
<p>The fact that these elections were held in full view of international and regional observers, that political parties were allowed to campaign freely, and that the run up to the polling day was largely peaceful, could all be credited to their new form of governance.</p>
<h2>MDC-Alliance</h2>
<p>The MDC-Alliance went into the elections on a weak footing. They were fractured, having brought five parties together very recently in an alliance through the efforts of the young Chamisa. They didn’t have enough resources, nor time to mobilise effectively, though they still attracted thousands to their rallies in urban areas.</p>
<p>But the MDC-Alliance ran a campaign that focused mainly on the presidential elections. They pinned their hopes on Chamisa being able to woo a predominantly young Zimbabwean population eager to see change. </p>
<p>But after votes had been caste, the behaviour of the alliance’s two leaders left a lot to be desired. Tendai Biti and Chamisa <a href="https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07-31-weve-won-say-both-the-opposition-mdc-and-ruling-zanu-pf/">declared themselves</a> the winners of the presidential poll well before election results were announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. They also said they would not accept any result that did not declare them the victors.</p>
<p>This could have been partly responsible for the violence that erupted.</p>
<p>At a time when they needed to show good leadership, they employed the usual tactics of discrediting electoral processes before results were even announced. The situation wasn’t helped by the fact that the electoral commission took a long time to release the presidential results (citing procedures for the delay). This was bound to exacerbate tensions in a country with such very low trust in the electoral process. </p>
<p>The electoral commission has always been accused of being <a href="https://zwnews.com/chigumba-wears-ed-mnangagwas-scarf/">biased towards Zanu-PF</a>. It should have developed mechanisms to alleviate distrust, and come up with a strategy to ensure that results were released without delay and through proper channels, and not through social media.</p>
<p>There were a few irregularities that were noted by all the observer missions. These included the voters’ roll not being available on time, too many assisted voters, the lack of an effective communication strategy by the electoral commission, media bias, and intimidation of voters, especially of women candidates.</p>
<p>It was certainly not a level playing field. But, the environment and irregularities were not deemed to be at a scale big enough to jeopardise the credibility of the elections. </p>
<h2>What now?</h2>
<p>It’s time political parties and individuals put their narrow self interests aside and act on behalf of Zimbabwe as a whole. This is the only way for the country to move forward. </p>
<p>If the MDC-Alliance claims Zanu-PF rigged the elections with the help of the electoral commission, the onus is on them to prove it. Till then, both parties need to sort out their differences as quickly and as peacefully as possible for the sake of the people of Zimbabwe, who have endured much hardship because of political elites intent on serving their own interests.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100956/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cheryl Hendricks does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>If the MDC-Alliance claims Zanu-PF and Zimbabwe’s electoral commission rigged the elections, the onus is on them to prove it.Cheryl Hendricks, Executive director, Africa Institute of South Africa, Human Sciences Research CouncilLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1006792018-07-27T16:17:05Z2018-07-27T16:17:05ZZimbabwe poll explained: ballot papers galore, and loads of new politicians<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/229580/original/file-20180727-106517-sf0fv6.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">MDC-Alliance supporters at a campaign rally addressed by the party leader Nelson Chamisa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>When Zimbabeans go to the polls they will be voting in what’s been dubbed <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwes-harmonised-elections-too-close-to-call-15411721">“harmonised” elections</a>.</p>
<p>When I see the word “harmony” used in the context of Zimbabwean politics, I shudder a bit. Instead of turning my gaze to the complicated combination of votes to be cast in this election, the term takes my mind back to the Zimbabwe African National Union’s (Zanu) guerrilla camps based in Mozambique in <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070.2017.1273537?src=recsys">mid-1977</a>. </p>
<p>Zanu had been through some tough years. In early 1975, the Lusaka-based national chairman Herbert Chitepo and his Volkswagen Beetle were <a href="http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=21858">blown to bits</a> – just after a rebellion had been quelled. Robert Mugabe used the word “harmony” chillingly at the historic Chimoio central committee meeting as he took a large and nearly final step towards consolidating his rule over the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/rMgI4U3XnXMEkDA33t4X/full">fractious party and its army</a>.</p>
<p>Mugabe was referring to the 1974 rebellion and another perceived one in 1976 when he uttered these chilling words, to be printed and published in Zimbabwe News, Zanu’s globally circulated magazine. He <a href="http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197707_final.pdf">warned</a> that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>the Zanu axe must continue to fall upon the necks of rebels when we find it no longer possible to persuade them into the harmony that binds us all.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Well, we can forget these menacing words now, when those striving to change the country’s leadership can do so via the ballot box (as long as the slips deposited in it are counted correctly) and a vigorously debated campaign (given no intimidation and open violence). </p>
<p>But the process is complicated. Voters much chose the next president from 23 candidates. They must also choose MPS from over 1 600 candidates for 210 parliamentary seats. Then they will have to chose from thousands more contenders for municipal councillors’ <a href="http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/rau_mayor_ele_zim_legisl_131029.pdf">posts</a>. There are also 60 senators – each of the 10 provinces have six each, half of whom are women. But the voters don’t have to choose them: they are on party lists and will fit in according to proportional representation. </p>
<p>All make for a huge number of ballot papers, and a large contingent of new politicians. </p>
<h2>What is a ‘harmonised’ election?</h2>
<p>From 1980 to 2008 Zimbabwean voters experienced a plethora of electoral forms, but not a lot of real choice. There was a prime minister and his ceremonial president surrounded by MPs. Until 1987, 20 of the parliament’s 100 seats were reserved for whites.</p>
<p>After 1987 things became close to one-partyism. Robert Mugabe assumed far-reaching powers and soon had no limits to his terms. This was after the <a href="https://books.google.co.za/books?id=zi-tWekXbD8C&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=%22the+early+rain+which+washes+away+the+chaff+before+the+spring+rains%22&source=bl&ots=dWX2SIUj7r&sig=0aDLpmmQfN93e_RNJuKcBmGGEYI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwioi-joj6LWAhWE7hoKHRF_C7wQ6AEIOTAD#v=onepage&q=%22the%20early%20rain%20which%20washes%20away%20the%20chaff%20before%20the%20spring%20rains%22&f=false">Gukurahundi massacre</a> of thousands of Matabeleland-and Midland-based Zimbabweans in which current President Emmerson Mnangagwa played a key <a href="https://www.sithatha.com/books">role</a>. It also followed Joshua Nkomo’s <a href="https://www.sahistory.org.za/content/chapter-two-brief-history-context-zapu-guerrillas">Zapu-PF</a>, the long-time opposition party overwhelmed by Zanu’s violence, being swallowed into Zanu. </p>
<p>By 1990 the presidential race took place every six years and parliament’s twice per decade, including a Senate reinstated after 2005.</p>
<p>The system changed again in 2008 – a game changer year in many respects. Since then, Zimbabwe’s voters have made many electoral choices with one visit to the polling station every five years. They have deposited their choices for presidents, the 210 MPs as well as local councillors in their separate boxes. </p>
<p>The presidential choices in the first round of the 2008 election resulted in less than the 50%+1 majority needed for either Mugabe (at about 43%) or Morgan Tsvangirai (at around 48%) to claim victory. Thus a run-off was <a href="http://concernedafricascholars.org/docs/acasbulletin80.pdf">required</a>. </p>
<p>The vengeance wreaked by Mugabe’s henchmen was so bad – at least 170 MDC, and some Zanu-PF voters who split their presidential and assembly votes, were killed and hundreds more <a href="http://www.hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/200812MPVR.pdf">abducted or beaten</a> – that Tsvangirai withdrew. This led the Southern African Development Community to push for a <a href="http://weaverpresszimbabwe.com/index.php/store/history-and-%20politics/the-hard-road-to-reform-detail">government of national unity</a>. </p>
<p>Violence like this wasn’t repeated in 2013, although that election was <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/717/715">suspect in many ways</a>.</p>
<h2>New goalposts</h2>
<p>Now we have another contest, with new goalposts. No more <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/16/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-disgraceful-coup-must-be-undone">Mugabe</a>. No more <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwes-morgan-tsvangirai-heroic-herald-of-an-epoch-foretold-91845">Tsvangirai</a>. At last count Nelson Chamisa and Mnangagwa were only separated by <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-poll-the-bar-for-success-is-low-the-stakes-are-high-and-its-a-close-race-100100">three percentage points</a>. </p>
<p>The other 21 runners – some more or less planted by Zanu-PF to confuse things while others are angry splinters from the main <a href="https://www.myzimbabwe.co.zw/news/24888-full-list-of-all-the-133-political-parties-that-are-going-to-contest-in-zimbabwes-2018-elections.html">contenders</a> – do not amount to much, unless they help keep the winner’s margin down under 50%. </p>
<p>A runoff? Such a nuisance and so scary. Maybe a wee fudge of counting would make a respectable win for the incumbent amid lots of horsetrading to cool the ardour of the increasingly fiery aspirant.</p>
<p>Aside from the big race, the over 1 600 candidates for MPs (including less than 250 women) were chosen at some fairly shambolic primaries. Some constituencies, such as Bulawayo’s Pelandaba Mpopoma, host 17 candidates including two from the MDC-Alliance (which does not include Thokozani Khuphe’s MDC-T) and Strike Mkandla - who has experienced many bruising moments in his political <a href="https://www.amazon.com/My-Life-Struggle-Liberation-Zimbabwe/dp/1496983238">history</a> - for Zapu. </p>
<p>If the election will be judged by the hundreds of international observers as credible and the parties accept the verdict, then harmony won peaceably – not by a falling axe – would have won. </p>
<p>That would be no small victory in itself.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabweans face a complicated array of choices at the polls.David B. Moore, Fellow, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge; Professor of Development Studies, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/994022018-07-24T10:00:45Z2018-07-24T10:00:45ZA vicious online propaganda war that includes fake news is being waged in Zimbabwe<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228219/original/file-20180718-142408-1pgb4gt.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Protesters from the MDC-Alliance march in Harare demanding electoral reforms. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fake news is <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/03/2018-elections-of-fake-news-social-media/">on the upsurge</a> as Zimbabwe gears up for its watershed elections on 30 July. Mobile internet and social media have become vehicles for spreading a mix of fake news, rumour, hatred, disinformation and misinformation. This has happened because there are no explicit official rules on the use of social media in an election.</p>
<p>Coming soon after the 2017 military coup that ended Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42071488">37 years in power</a>, these are the first elections <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/30/africa/zimbabwe-elections-july-intl/index.html">since independence</a> without his towering and domineering figure. They are also the first elections in many years without opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, who <a href="https://www.enca.com/africa/zimbabwean-opposition-leader-tsvangirai-dies">died in February</a>. </p>
<p>The polls therefore potentially mark the beginning of a new order in Zimbabwe. The stakes are extremely high. </p>
<p>For the ruling Zanu-PF, the elections are crucial for legitimising President Emmerson Mnangagwa (75)‘s reign, and restoring constitutionalism. The opposition, particularly the MDC-Alliance led by Tsvangirai’s youthful successor, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44741062">Nelson Chamisa (40)</a>, views the elections as a real chance to capture power after Mugabe’s departure.</p>
<p>The intensity of the fight has seen the two parties use desperate measures in a battle for the hearts and minds of voters. They have teams of spin-doctors and “online warriors” (a combination of bots, paid or volunteering youths) to manufacture and disseminate party propaganda on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp. </p>
<p>Known as <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/eds-office-speaks-on-sms-campaign/?PageSpeed=noscript">“<em>Varakashi</em>”</a>, (Shona for “destroyers”) Zanu-PF’s “online warriors” are pitted against the <a href="http://www.thegwerutimes.com/2018/05/15/of-zimbabwe-and-toxic-politics/">MDC’s “<em>Nerrorists</em>”</a> (after Chamisa’s nickname, “Nero”) in the unprecedented online propaganda war to discredit each other.</p>
<p>Besides the fundamental shifts in the Zimbabwean political field, the one thing that distinguishes this election from previous ones is the explosion in mobile internet and <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Annual-Sector-Perfomance-Report-2017-abridged-rev15Mar2018-003.pdf">social media</a>. Information is generated far more easily. It also spreads much more rapidly and widely than before. </p>
<p>What’s happening in the run-up to the polls should be a warning for those responsible for ensuring the elections are credible. </p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Images shared on social media platforms have become a dominant feature in the spread of fake news ahead of the elections. Both political parties have used doctored images of rallies from the past, or from totally different contexts, to project the false impression of overwhelming support. </p>
<p>Supporters of the MDC-Alliance, which shares the red colour with South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters <a href="https://www.effonline.org/">EFF</a>, have been sharing doctored images of EFF rallies – and claiming them as their own – to give the impression of large crowds, according to journalists I interviewed in Harare.</p>
<p>Doctored documents bearing logos of either government, political parties or the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission are being circulated on social media to drive particular agendas. Examples include:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>A purported official letter announcing the resignation of the president of the newly formed <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chaos-rock-mugabe-party-spokesman-denies-interim-leader-resignation/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p></li>
<li><p>The circulation of a fake sample of a ballot paper aimed at discrediting the <a href="http://www.chronicle.co.zw/fake-ballot-paper-sample-in-circulation/">electoral commission</a>, and</p></li>
<li><p>A sensational claim that Chamisa had offered to make controversial former first Lady Grace Mugabe his <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/ill-never-appoint-grace-mugabe-as-my-deputy-says-mdc-leader-chamisa-20180710">vice president</a> if he wins. </p></li>
</ul>
<p>A number of these fake images and documents have gained credibility, after they were picked up as news by the mainstream media. This speaks to the diminishing capacity of newsrooms to <a href="https://www.sla.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Information-Verification.pdf">verify information</a> from social media, in the race to be first with the news.</p>
<p>And, contrary to electoral <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/new-guidelines-prepare-zimbabwean-media-for-up-coming-elections/">guidelines for public media</a> partisan reporting continues unabated. The state media houses are endorsing Mnangagwa while the private media largely roots for the <a href="https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MONITORS-BASELINE-REPORT-3.pdf">MDC-Alliance</a>. </p>
<h2>Explosion of the internet</h2>
<p>These are the first elections in a significantly developed social media environment in Zimbabwe. Mobile internet and social media have been rapidly growing over the years. </p>
<p>Internet penetration has increased by 41.1% (from 11% of the population to 52.1%) <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Mar-2014-Zimbabwe-telecoms-report-POTRAZ.pdf">between 2010 and 2018</a>, while mobile phone penetration has risen by 43.8% from 58.8% to 102.7% <a href="https://t3n9sm.c2.acecdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Sector-Perfomance-report-First-Quarter-2018-Abridged-9-July-2018.pdf">over the same period</a>.</p>
<p>That means half the population now has internet access, compared to 11% in 2010. </p>
<p>Ideally, these technologies should be harnessed for the greater good – such as voter education. Instead, they are being used by different interest groups in a way that poses a great danger to the electoral process. This can potentially cloud the electoral field, and even jeopardise the entire process. </p>
<p>A good example are the attacks on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which has become a major target of fake news. These attacks threaten to erode its <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/03/african-agriculture-expresses-differences-men-women/">credibility as a neutral arbiter</a>. For example, an app bearing its logo, prompting users to “click to vote”, went viral on WhatsApp. But, responding to the prompt led to a message congratulating the user on <a href="https://www.techzim.co.zw/2018/05/zimbabwe-electoral-commission-distances-itself-from-fake-whatsapp-message/">voting for Mnangagwa</a>, suggesting that the supposedly independent electoral body had endorsed the Zanu-PF leader.</p>
<p>Numerous other unverified stories have also been doing the rounds on social media, <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/its-a-fake-voters-roll/">labelling the voters’ roll “shambolic”</a>. This, and claims of bias against it, have forced the commission to persistently issue statements refuting what it dismisses as “fake news”.</p>
<p>Events in Zimbabwe and <a href="https://portland-communications.com/pdf/How-Africa-Tweets-2018.pdf">elsewhere on the continent</a> point to the need for measures to guard against the abuse of social media, and bots to subvert democratic processes. There’s also a need for social media literacy to ensure that citizens appreciate the power the internet gives them - and to use it responsibly.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dumisani Moyo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s upcoming elections potentially marks the start of a new order in the country, where the stakes are extremely high.Dumisani Moyo, Associate Professor, Department of Journalism, Film and Television, and Vice Dean Faculty of Humanities, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1001002018-07-20T11:06:31Z2018-07-20T11:06:31ZZimbabwe poll: the bar for success is low, the stakes are high and it’s a close race<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/228455/original/file-20180719-142432-1pyjir6.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of the opposition MDC Alliance in Unity Square before marching to protest outside the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">David Moore</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the ruling Zanu-PF hope a credible victory in the <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/top-africa-stories-zim-election-date-set-kagame-on-chamisa-20180531">July 30 election</a> will legitimise the power (both party and state) they gained from the “soft coup” that toppled his predecessor Robert Mugabe <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabweans-must-draw-on-years-of-democratic-struggle-to-stop-a-repeat-of-mugabes-militarism-87961">last November</a>.</p>
<p>With victory, they say, the <a href="http://nehandaradio.com/2018/07/14/infighting-between-mnangagwa-and-chiwenga-factions-frustrating-eager-investors/">donors and dollars</a> will flood in to the country they have resurrected from <a href="http://country.eiu.com/zimbabwe">nearly two moribund decades</a>. Zimbabwe is now <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwe-is-open-for-business-says-mnangagwa-12913367">“open for business”</a> and will thrive. Zanu-PF’s resurrection will thus be complete.</p>
<p>But a new <a href="http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno223_zimbabwe_presidential_race_tightens.pdf">survey</a> suggests Zanu-PF should stall any premature celebration plans. The latest one showed that, in the space of one month, Nelson Chamisa’s MDC-Alliance has closed the gap with Zanu-PF. The surveys are conducted by Afrobarometer, an independent research network that conducts public attitude surveys across Africa and its Zimbabwean partner, Mass Public Opinion Institute, a non-profit, non-governmental research organisation.</p>
<p>If the respondents were to cast their ballot now Mnangagwa would take 40% of the votes and opposition leader Nelson Chamisa would take 37%. The still undecided or not-saying potential voters are at 20%. Split that and you get a 50/47 race. </p>
<p>The numbers are very close indeed. If not a victory for the MDC-Alliance, this looks like a presidential runoff. The MDC-Allaince has a 49% to 26% lead in the cities and towns and in the countryside the figures are 30% for the opposition to Zanu-PF’s 48%. In parliament Zanu-PF would get 41% to the MDC-Alliance’s 36. This is a big change from <a href="http://www.afrobarometer.org/media-briefings/findings-pre-election-baseline-survey-zimbabwe-aprilmay-2018">May’s survey</a>.</p>
<p>Given the MDC-Alliance momentum, the post-Mugabe Zanu-PF’s hopes of a resurrection may be dashed. A great deal hangs on both parties’ ability to manage this interregnum.</p>
<p>Big trade-offs will be negotiated, ranging from coalition governments, which the poll shows has the backing from 60% of respondents, to amnesties for the chief crooks and killers.</p>
<p>Striking deals might indeed lie at the centre of whether or not the election is a success. That’s because this election is about grabbing back the core of hardwon democracy from a military dominated regime. It’s about cleansing out <a href="https://theconversation.com/can-zimbabwe-finally-ditch-a-history-of-violence-and-media-repression-99859">generations of fear</a>. </p>
<p>That is a hard task at any time. It’s harder still when it took a coup to retire its prime source.</p>
<h2>A divided Zanu-PF</h2>
<p>Mnangagwa has been spectacularly unsuccessful at winning past elections in <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2015/05/26/mnangagwa-cannot-win-elections">his own constituencies</a>, standing for parliament three times and losing twice. </p>
<p>The factions in Zanu-PF that squared up against one another prior to the coup - the <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/03/18/what-does-g40-want/">Generation-40 group</a> that supported Grace Mugabe for the party and state president and <a href="https://www.pindula.co.zw/Lacoste,_Zanu-PF_Faction">Lacoste</a>, which supported Mnangagwa – are <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/zimbabwes-mnangagwa-says-zanu-pf-legislators-plotting-to-impeach-him-15237903">still battling</a> along lines more ethnically drawn <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/02/19/ethnicity-zanu-pfs-messy-predicament/">than ever</a>. Some of the losers in the Generation-40 group have left the party to form the <a href="https://news.pindula.co.zw/2018/07/14/mugabes-offered-24-million-12-cars-for-chamisas-campaign-in-exchange-of-82-parliamentary-seats-vice-presidents-post/">National Patriotic Front</a>. </p>
<p>Although the perpetrators have not been found, the <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/zimbabwe-blast-feared-to-herald-pre-election-violence-1.3543607">blast</a> at Zanu-PF’s Bulawayo rally in late June that killed two people and only narrowly missed a whole stage of luminaries, could suggest that the party’s wounds have yet to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2018/06/29/bulawayo-bomb-blast-escalates-mnangagwa-chiwenga-tensions/">heal</a>. </p>
<p>And the soldiers are not of one mind. </p>
<p>If the military side of the somewhat shaky post-coup pact in Zanu-PF fears losing an election, and thus access to more of the wealth more power can bring, the free and fair dimensions of the electoral contest would be <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2018-05-23-fears-of-armys-readiness-to-influence-zimbabwes-elections/">drastically diminished</a>. Would a repeat of <a href="https://public.tableau.com/profile/acled6590#!/vizhome/Zimbabwe_1/ProportionZiminTotal">mid-2008’s post-electoral mayhem</a>, when at least 170 people were killed and nearly 800 beaten or raped, ensue?</p>
<p>To make matters more complex, there are no guarantees that <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/07/15/military-pay-hike-angers-teachers">hungry and angry junior army officers</a> would follow their seniors’ attempts to alter the peoples’ will.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa could be at some of the soldier’s mercy. Some suggest that Constantino Chiwenga, the <a href="https://minbane.wordpress.com/2018/04/19/https-wp-me-p1xtjg-6lv/">mercurial vice-president</a> and – unconstitutionally – defence minister <a href="https://www.newzimbabwe.com/chiwenga-exposes-mnangagwas-great-escape-yarn/">might be among them</a>. </p>
<p>Others argue that the two leaders need each other if the régime is going to deliver on promises of a clean <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/05/zim-2018-election-trading-democracy-for-neoliberal-foreign-policy/">election</a> </p>
<p>And as George Charamba, Zimbabwe’s permanent secretary for information, put it:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>This election is about restoring international re-engagement and legitimacy …. It must be flawless, it must be transparent, it must be free, it must be fair, it must meet international standards, it must be violence free and therefore it must be universally endorsed because it is an instrument of foreign policy … It’s about re-engagement and legitimacy; we are playing politics at a higher level.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This is a clarion call for a free and fair poll. If the election fails to meet these expectations and its results are tight, legitimacy could be maintained with carefully calculated deals. Perhaps the unity government widely expected during the coup could <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1DG1RL-OZATP">reappear</a>. </p>
<h2>A rising opposition</h2>
<p>Chamisa and the MDC (the alliance is made up of seven parties, most having split from the late Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC), appear to be building on the <a href="https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/nelson-chamisa-threatens-to-take-zec-headon-elections-zimbabwe/4486127.html">momentum</a> they seem to have gained by challenging the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s management of the contest. The alliance has challenged the commission’s neutrality and raised concerns over the accuracy of the voters’ <a href="https://mg.co.za/article/2018-07-19-new-rules-and-ghost-voters-threaten-zimbabwes-vote">roll</a>.</p>
<p>Not all its allegations necessarily stand up to scrutiny. The 250,000 alleged ghosts may be a canard, but as Derek Matyszak, the Institute for Security Studies man in Harare, argues, the roll was not released in time for the primaries so none of the candidates are constitutionally valid. </p>
<p>Emboldened by the lack of police, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-politics/zimbabwe-opposition-marches-on-electoral-agency-to-demand-reforms-idUSKBN1K11FW">thousands of protesters</a> led by the MDC-Alliance marched to the commission’s headquarters on July 11, showing no fear. </p>
<p>If this impetus keeps building over the next week, a victory is conceivable. So is a presidential run-off. To be sure, the ruling party might win fairly, but the opposition will have to be convinced of that. The mode of politics for the next round should be peacemaking, not war. </p>
<h2>Low bars, high stakes</h2>
<p>The <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/zimbabwes-elections-a-turning-point/">bars are low</a> – ‘the west’, led in this case by the UK, seemed to be happy with the winners of the coup, perhaps hoping for a <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/zimbabwes-future-rests-on-a-free-and-fair-election-speech-by-ambassador-catriona-laing">renewed Zanu-PF</a>. <a href="https://www.newdawnmagazine.com/articles/perfidious-albion-an-introduction-to-the-secret-history-of-the-british-empire">Perfidious Albion</a> (Treacherous England) could end its schizophrenic career in Zimbabwe with a whimper about the <a href="https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/25597">end of a liberal democratic dream</a>. But the stakes are high for Zimbabweans: much higher than the reputation of a minor global power past its glory. </p>
<p>The people of Zimbabwe face a lot more than reputational damage: maybe the former colonial power will have a Plan B that helps more than hinders.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/100100/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David B. Moore does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A new survey suggests opposition Zimbabwean leader Nelson Chamisa is closing in on the ruling Zanu-PF’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa.David B. Moore, Professor of Development Studies and Visiting Researcher, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of JohannesburgLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/998592018-07-16T14:15:04Z2018-07-16T14:15:04ZCan Zimbabwe finally ditch a history of violence and media repression?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227563/original/file-20180713-27045-2alah.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zanu-PF supporters at a peace rally in Harare.</span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Zimbabwe’s governing Zanu-PF is earnestly courting international legitimacy as the country approaches its first post-independence elections <a href="https://www.apnews.com/baee38cf5cd24282be5d7c332848a8b2">without Robert Mugabe</a>. </p>
<p>The party frequently uses clichés like “fresh start”, “new dispensation”, and “open for business” to signal its willingness to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/24/africa/zimbabwe-president-emmerson-mnangagwa-davos-intl/index.html">engage with the West</a>. The talk has been matched by some action.</p>
<p>The government has repudiated most of its <a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/govt-amends-indigenisation-law/">indigenisation legislation</a>, and recently <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/62f28a38-5d0a-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04">applied to re-join</a> The Commonwealth. Additionally, <a href="https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimbabwe-invites-46-countries-to-observe-2018-polls/">46 countries and 15 regional bodies</a> have been invited to observe the elections. This includes many Western nations that had been excluded in recent years.</p>
<p>Their assessments will probably not be decided by technical factors. It seems unlikely that ongoing debates over <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/zec-under-fire-over-undelivered-voters-roll/">the voter’s roll</a> or the prominence of ex-military personnel in the <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/02/soldiers-make-15-zec-staff/">Zimbabwe Electoral Commission</a> will have much impact on the final judgements passed by the monitoring missions.</p>
<p>It’s more likely that the credibility of the elections will be shaped by issues such as political violence and media freedom. In both spheres, the legacy of colonialism and the liberation struggle weigh heavily. </p>
<p>As a <a href="https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-opinion-sc-columnist-byo-71015.html">breakaway party</a> from the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) in 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu) emerged in a very fragile position. It endured violence against its members and was denied access to a free media. In later years, the party perpetrated and perpetuated the same tactics under which it was conceived – both as a liberation movement and in government.</p>
<p>There are a number of examples of how Zanu-PF drew on colonial-era repressive tactics in its post-independence quest for political primacy. These include the <a href="https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2018/01/31/gukurahundi-is-mugabe-s-baby">Gukurahundi violence</a> under the Mugabe led government in the 1980s against areas predominantly supporting Zapu, the government’s 2005 <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/zimbabwe/zimbabwe-operation-murambatsvina-overview-and-summary">Operation Murambatsvina</a> which targeted properties belonging mostly to urban opposition supporters, and the 2008 <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1">election run-off violence</a> after Mugabe lost the first round of voting.</p>
<p>As Zimbabweans head to the polls on July 30, this history looms large over the electorate and those responsible for overseeing its successful execution.</p>
<h2>History of political violence</h2>
<p>In July 1960, unprecedented protests in Zimbabwe’s two largest cities ushered in a new era of political violence in the British colony. A year later violence erupted within the liberation movement itself. In June 1961, the first significant attempt to form a breakaway nationalist movement in Zimbabwe was thwarted. Members of the <a href="https://zimhistassociation.wordpress.com/2018/03/27/the-first-split-in-zimbabwes-anti-colonial-struggle-continues-to-cast-shadows-over-contemporary-politics/">Zimbabwe National Party</a> (ZNP) were physically prevented from launching the party at their own press conference by <a href="http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/events-leading-to-banning-of-ndp/">National Democratic Party</a> (NDP) sympathisers.</p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/227581/original/file-20180713-27024-1a70nja.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The ill-fated efforts of the ZNP would have been prominent in the minds of Zanu founders when it was formed two years later. </p>
<p>Zapu, which replaced the NDP after it was banned, went to great lengths to beat Zanu into submission. The houses of Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole, the top leaders in Zanu, <a href="http://cba1415.web.unc.edu/files/2014/07/zapu.pdf">were stoned</a> after the new party was launched.</p>
<p>As other African nations became independent and Zimbabwe remained under minority rule, frustration mounted. This led to a determination to achieve majority rule by any means. A <a href="https://www.pambazuka.org/arts/roots-political-violence-go-deep-zimbabwe">culture of political violence</a> became institutionalised.</p>
<h2>Media Repression</h2>
<p>Assaults on the media were particularly prominent under white minority rule following the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. <a href="https://www.scotsman.com/news/40-years-on-from-udi-zimbabwe-is-still-paying-the-price-1-1101979">Censors </a> redacted broad swathes of news stories, littering papers with blank pages.</p>
<p>This overt censorship was but a new manifestation of a repressive media heritage. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/blcas/welensky.html">Political papers</a> of <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/07/world/sir-roy-welensky-84-premier-of-african-federation-is-dead.html">Roy Welensky</a>, the second Prime Minister of the Federation to which Southern Rhodesia belonged from 1953 - 1963, reveal the invidious nature of attempts to control the press. His government covertly worked with journalists and editors to produce articles critical of the white opposition in newspapers that were nominally independent. He also consulted with the white publishers of newspapers geared toward a black audience about ways to promote his government.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol23n2/juz023002004.pdf"><em>Central African Examiner</em></a>, a news magazine that was theoretically independent and had links with <em>The Economist</em>, changed editors in the middle of the 1958 elections. The new editor, David Cole, was Welensky’s public relations adviser. </p>
<p>In 1961 the government considered blocking the sale of the colony’s newspaper titles catering to a predominantly black audience to the Thomson Newspaper Group. The concern was that it would be difficult to influence the editorial policy of papers with foreign ownership. Meanwhile, newspapers geared toward a predominantly white audience and owned by the South African based Argus Press were not seen as posing a threat.</p>
<p>The sale went ahead. But in August 1964 both the African Daily News (which had a pro-Zapu bias) and Zanu <a href="http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Journal%20of%20the%20University%20of%20Zimbabwe/vol6n2/juz006002015.pdf">were banned</a>. </p>
<p>Zanu learnt the importance of media control in its early years. Once in power it exerted its own influence. Forty years after Zanu and the <em>African Daily News</em> were proscribed, Zanu-PF replicated the tactics when it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/jan/22/pressandpublishing.Zimbabwenews">banned a newspaper, also known as the Daily News</a> amid a media clampdown.</p>
<h2>Eyes on Mnangagwa</h2>
<p>While President Emmerson Mnangagwa has backtracked from Mugabe’s more confrontational rhetoric, his political career is nearly as long as his predecessor’s. His political upbringing was profoundly shaped by the repressive measures the nationalists endured and took up in the 1960s to dismantle the unjust system that governed them.</p>
<p>Zanu-PF’s assaults on the media and penchant for violence are reflective of similar tactics that were used against the party during the colonial era. And they have been critical to its ability to <a href="https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/06/10/violence-dominates-zim-political-history/">obtain and retain power</a> for 37 years. </p>
<p>Will Zimbabwe be able to turn the corner and move toward a more equitable election campaign in which the historic trajectory of media repression and political violence is fundamentally altered? If the answer is yes, Mnangagwa will have made a significant stride in truly ushering in a “<a href="https://www.herald.co.zw/the-first-100-days-of-the-new-dispensation/">new dispensation</a>”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99859/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Brooks Marmon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The credibility of Zimbabwe’s elections will depend on issues like political violence and media freedom.Brooks Marmon, PhD Student, Centre of African Studies, The University of EdinburghLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/992282018-07-04T13:45:31Z2018-07-04T13:45:31ZZimbabwe’s first Mugabe-free election: Mnangagwa promises Western cash, but little else<p>Zimbabwe’s elections on July 30 will be the first Robert Mugabe has not contested. At the time of writing, he is in Singapore receiving medical treatment – as he was so often during the later years of his presidency. Rumours abound as to what type of medical care he receives there, ranging from simple treatment for eye complaints to radical cancer therapy. </p>
<p>Meanwhile, his successor, Emerson Mnangagwa, is running strong in a campaign to earn an electoral mandate of his own. He recently survived a <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2018/06/mnangagwa-bombing-claim-a-life/">bomb attempt on his life</a> during a rally in the city of Bulawayo, and responded by pointing the finger at <a href="https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/mnangagwas-govt-not-in-a-hurry-to-arrest-grace-mugabe-ally-says-aide-20180530">Grace Mugabe and her allies</a>. He has provided no evidence that she was involved.</p>
<p>Without Mugabe on the ballot in an election she was once keen to contest, Mnangagwa’s main opponent is instead an opposition alliance led by Nelson Chamisa of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Chamisa has brought along with him many senior MDC figures who were alienated by his predecessor as opposition leader, the late Morgan Tsvangirai. But his party is far from fully united. And among those excluded are leaders from the Ndebele-speaking west of the country, an area with its own grievances against Mnangagwa for his involvement in the violent pogroms of the 1980s – the <a href="https://theconversation.com/british-policy-towards-zimbabwe-during-matabeleland-massacre-licence-to-kill-81574">Gukurahundi</a> – which left many thousands dead.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s would-be assassins in Bulawayo, capital of the western provinces, could just have easily have been Ndebele separatists as supporters of Grace Mugabe. Whatever the truth, Mnangagwa will be happy to leave the opposition divided – but nonetheless, ZANU-PF is not going to roll over and die just because the Mugabes are out of the picture.</p>
<p>In fact, Mnangagwa has made a virtue of not being Mugabe, promising a new start and making the claim that only he has the authoritative standing to persuade the West to reinvest in his country’s battered economy. The West, however, has made it clear that the key precondition for any major reinvestment would be a clean election.</p>
<h2>Above board</h2>
<p>This will probably be the cleanest election for many years in Zimbabwe. Chamisa and his MDC Alliance have gone largely unmolested, and Chamisa has held rallies in what were once no-go regions for the opposition. The MDC platform has been covered on state television, and a real effort has been made to give public indications of a fair campaign.</p>
<p>But questions still linger over the integrity of the electoral roll, the printing and vetting of the ballot papers, and how any biometric element of the election would work. And there are still plenty of senior military figures in Mnangagwa’s cabinet and inner circle.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa is certainly outspending his rivals, allocating huge sums to transport his candidates and cadres around rural areas – his ZANU-PF party’s traditional heartlands – and spending heavily on advertising in the cities. Where did this money come from? Chamisa has accused Mnangagwa of receiving <a href="http://www.thezimbabwemail.com/main/i-will-kick-out-chinese-investors-chamisa/">Chinese funding</a> for his campaign, but the truth is probably that state resources were funnelled into party coffers.</p>
<p>If Chamisa makes a late surge, will Mnangagwa and his comrades have enough leeway to get away with a rig? It’s not beyond imagining, nor beyond ZANU-PF’s capacity for contingency planning. But Mnangagwa is <a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/201806080069.html">ahead in the opinion polls</a> and most foreign diplomats feel he will win, even though Chamisa will push him hard.</p>
<p>What could Chamisa use to mount a late surge? Public opinion, for one thing; the government’s popular anti-corruption drive has seriously stalled, and the ZANU-PF elite’s flair for conspicuous consumption is untamed. Mnangagwa has no real plan, except to promise an influx of Western reinvestment. But then again, Chamisa has no plan either.</p>
<p>The West, in the spirit of “better the devil you know”, would probably prefer a Mnangagwa victory. Chamisa, for all his energy, is an unknown quantity – the various factions among his opposition alliance would have to be represented in his cabinet, and not all its leaders have exhibited much ministerial potential. </p>
<p>There is a huge field of presidential candidates apart from Mnangagwa and Chamisa, but none has secured much support. But their number, at least, does indicate that Zimbabwe’s political space is liberalising. The question is whether the election will continue that process – or whether a last-minute panic on the part of ZANU-PF will send it into reverse.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/99228/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Stephen Chan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As Emmerson Mnangagwa blames Grace Mugabe for a failed bombing at a rally, his rivals try to find a way to close the gap.Stephen Chan, Professor of World Politics, SOAS, University of LondonLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/882542017-11-29T15:09:28Z2017-11-29T15:09:28ZMnangagwa has the capacity to focus on the new Zimbabwe. But will he?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/196956/original/file-20171129-29117-1f64oim.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Zimbabweans welcome Emmerson Mnangagwa back from his brief exile in South Africa. </span> <span class="attribution"><span class="source">EPA-EFE/Aaron Ufumeli</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Emmerson “Crocodile” Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe’s crafty new interim President, is known as a ruthless, deeply unprincipled and a political infighter. He has lost several recent parliamentary elections but retained his party positions over four decades largely because he was ex-President Robert Mugabe’s <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/can-emmerson-mnangagwa-a-mugabe-ally-bring-change-to-zimbabwe-12134023">chief enforcer</a> and tribute collector. </p>
<p>But now President Mnangagwa has a golden opportunity to leave that unsavoury reputation behind and revive Zimbabwe’s economy and spirit. It is not unlikely that he could recast his legacy and even become genuinely electable in next year’s national <a href="https://theconversation.com/zimbabwe-needs-wide-reforms-to-have-credible-elections-but-it-may-be-too-late-83473">presidential poll</a>.</p>
<p>Governance in Zimbabwe is terrible and the rule of law is mostly only honoured in the breach. Mismanagement throughout the entire apparatus of administration, and outright theft by <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/zimbabwes-vast-diamond-riches-exploited-secretive-political-and-military-elites-report-shows/">political and military elites</a> are the ingrained, Mugabe-imposed, impediments to Zimbabwe’s regrowth. </p>
<p>If Mnangagwa can truly break from those inherited modes of rule – and if he has the inner strength to do so – his interim presidency could really become a leadership that all Zimbabweans, even nominal opponents, could celebrate.</p>
<p>To achieve this transformation Zimbabwe’s new leader needs to shake off his infamous reputation and the suspicion that he is merely another Mugabe in a younger frame. He would need to appoint a cabinet of all talents rather than one composed of compromised politicians from his side of Zanu-PF’s recent internal succession sweepstakes. </p>
<p>If Mnangagwa foreswore business as usual and appointed, say, opposition leader Tendai Biti as finance minister and Nelson Chamisa, another opposition leader, as minister of home affairs, he would depart strikingly from the desolate, destructive path followed by the Mugabe regime. </p>
<p>He would exit from this path followed by Mugabe if he also reached out to former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangerai, leader of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Giving prominence to some of his own key Zanu-PF supporters like former finance and justice minister Patrick Chinamasa and Chris Mutsvangwa, leader of the War Veterans Association, would be easier but also important. It’s telling that he’s appointed Chinamasa as <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/mnangagwa-gives-sacked-zim-finance-minister-chinamasa-his-job-back-12171719">acting finance minister</a>.</p>
<p>Making those, or analogous, appointments would give support and substance to his <a href="https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/11/mnangagwa-pledges-wide-reforms/">inaugural pledges</a> to end the country’s appalling cash shortages and “ensure financial sector stability.” </p>
<p>He also promised to crack down on corruption, one of the leading causes of Zimbabwe’s fiscal instability and its widespread <a href="http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2016/06/the-liquidity-cum-cash-challenges-in-zimbabwe-a-fiscal-policy-crisis/">loss of liquidity</a>. Further, as he has hinted, Mnangagwa could compensate the 4 000 or so white farmers who were <a href="https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/mnangagwa-vows-to-tackle-graft-compensate-white-farmers-12143032">driven off their land</a>.</p>
<h2>Seeing is believing</h2>
<p>Seeing is believing, of course, so Mnangagwa’s early moves will be watched closely. If the government-owned press and national broadcaster lose some of their shackles, that would also be an encouraging sign. </p>
<p>But an even more significant indication of whether the new Mnangagwa will be strikingly different than the old Mnangagwa is what relationship he has with <a href="https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2017-11-22-zim-2-a-general-with-political-aspirations/">General Constantine Chiwenga</a>. The head of the armed forces was the chief architect of the military coup that ended Robert and Grace Mugabe’s gambit and brought Mnangagwa back from the outer rings of purgatory. The ouster of the Mugabes was precipitated by Grace’s intention to deprive Chiwenga and Mnangagwa of the privileges and lavish perquisites. And, since the coup cemented their continued control of illicitly-derived riches, how can Mnangagwa’s promise to curb corruption be achieved? He promised</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Swift action will be taken … to weed out corrupt elements.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>If he cracks down only on the small fry, Zimbabweans will lose heart. But, if he really means to weed out the main malefactors, then he will have trouble with his generals and many of his own close followers. </p>
<p>Mnangagwa’s potential break with the past, and with his own service to Mugabe, could transform his interim presidency from a mere cynical holding operation into a major transformative revival of Zimbabwe’s much battered sense of itself. He could infuse the country with a sense of purpose, and with the ability to resume its rightful place as Africa’s agricultural and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/16/zimbabwe-economic-growth-could-be-huge-after-mugabe-.html">industrial success story</a>. Zimbabwe could rise from the ashes, but only if Mnangagwa clearly rejects the ways of Mugabe.</p>
<p>As Deng Xiaoping <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/20/world/deng-xiaoping-a-political-wizard-who-put-china-on-the-capitalist-road.html">rewrote</a> Mao Tse-tung’s baleful prescription for China and Mikhael Gorbachev realised that Soviet Communism <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mikhail-Gorbachev">was a fraud</a>, Mnangagwa has the capacity as a determined pragmatist to focus forward on the new Zimbabwe, not the old. </p>
<h2>Well placed</h2>
<p>With the securocrats behind him and his party position buttressed by a Zanu-PF vote of confidence, he can immediately take progressive steps to right the economy and lift the curtain of fear that has long enveloped his country. If so, he will begin the arduous trek back toward national stability and prosperity, and be regarded as the saviour of the nation.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa could indeed be such a man for all seasons. That would surprise longtime observers of Zimbabwean political machinations (like myself). But, he possesses the inner grit and the inner sense that, post-Mugabe, he and Zimbabwe can only advance if there is a decisive, open, and firm departure from the sleaze and sheer opportunism of the past. </p>
<p>In an important sense, no one else at this time has the stature to build the new Zimbabwe effectively. No one else can rely on military support. No one else can face down those in the ruling party and the police who backed Grace Mugabe, and lost. It is not that Mnangagwa will suddenly regain a long lost sense of commonweal, but instead, it is that he knows that Mugabe’s removal must mark the end of the bad old ways that Mugabe orchestrated and from which he himself profited.</p>
<p>Mnangagwa knows what Zimbabwe desperately now requires. Having struggled to ascend to the top of the country’s political tree, he may well be poised to perform responsibly in ways that, a few weeks ago, would have been wholly unexpected and wildly out of character. But it is never too late to change.</p>
<p><em>The author’s most recent book is <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/titles/10975.html">The Corruption Cure: How Citizens and Leaders Can Combat Graft (Princeton, 2017)</a>. He was in Zimbabwe in October</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88254/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Robert Rotberg is President Emeritus, World Peace Foundation.</span></em></p>Zimbabwe’s new leader needs to shake off his infamous reputation and the suspicion that he is merely another Mugabe in a younger frame.Robert Rotberg, Founding Director of Program on Intrastate Conflict, Harvard Kennedy SchoolLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.