tag:theconversation.com,2011:/ca-fr/topics/shia-17207/articlesShia – La Conversation2024-02-07T17:35:23Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2215202024-02-07T17:35:23Z2024-02-07T17:35:23ZHow Iran controls a network of armed groups to pursue its regional strategy<p>It took the US several days <a href="https://theconversation.com/middle-east-crisis-us-airstrikes-against-iran-backed-armed-groups-explained-222768">to respond</a> to the January 28 attack on its military base in Jordan that killed three of its service personnel. But when it did, it hit at least 85 targets across Iraq and <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/02/us-strike-retaliates-jordan-attack/">Syria</a>. </p>
<p>The Pentagon was careful not to directly attack Iran itself, but it targeted Iranian-backed groups which have been conducting raids on US military assets in the region since before Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7.</p>
<p>The US strikes were carefully calibrated to avoid <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/austin-vows-all-necessary-actions-after-us-troop-deaths-2024-01-29/">escalation</a>. The five days between the attack on the Tower 22 US base in Jordan and the US airstrikes on February 2 gave Iran and its proxies time to move people and high-value assets. </p>
<p>This retaliation wasn’t about body counts, it was about US president Joe Biden showing Iran – and the American electorate – that it doesn’t do to mess with the US. It was a classic shot across the bows.</p>
<p>But who are these groups that Iran can rely on to act in its interests and how much of a threat do they pose to regional security?</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Graphic showing Middle East and the varioujs armed groups operating there on behalf of Iran" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=1031&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/573823/original/file-20240206-20-bg1uq.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1295&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iran’s network of armed groups.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Council for Foreign Relations</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iran’s foreign policy over nearly five decades since the 1979 revolution has had <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47321#">several key objectives</a>. It wants to remove the US from the Middle East and to replace it as the guarantor of regional security. </p>
<p>It has worked to boost the fortunes of Shia groups in the region, working directly against Saudi Arabia’s Sunni proxies, as seen in the conflict in Yemen. And it refuses to recognise the state of Israel, instead working with Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to pressure the Jewish state.</p>
<h2>Quds Force</h2>
<p>The Quds Force is part of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and is the IRGC’s primary vehicle for foreign affairs. According to the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards">Council on Foreign Relations</a>, Quds is largely responsible for providing training, weapons, money and military advice to a range of groups in the so-called <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-much-influence-does-iran-have-over-its-proxy-axis-of-resistance-hezbollah-hamas-and-the-houthis-221269">“Axis of Resistance”</a>. </p>
<p>Quds was led by General Qasem Soleimani, who had oversight of Shia armed groups in Iraq and Syria as well as wielding a significant amount of influence with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, on January 3 2020. </p>
<p>He was succeeded by his longtime deputy <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-s-new-quds-force-leader-has-a-long-history-with-afghanistan/30379354.html">Ismail Qaani</a>, who had gained extensive experience in organising and supporting insurgent groups in Afghanistan.</p>
<h2>Syria</h2>
<p>In 2021, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">estimated that</a> the IRGC had established 82 fighting units in Syria with up to 70,000 fighters. Many of these have been recruited since 2011 to help the Shia regime of Bashar al-Assad combat insurgents there.</p>
<p>Quds activities in Syria are reportedly overseen by <a href="https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/">Khalil Zahedi</a>, nicknamed Abu Mahdi al-Zahdi. Working through regional subordinates, he controls a number of armed groups, including Liwa al-Quds, Lebanese Hezbollah, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Zainebiyoun Brigade, Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Liwa al-Baqir and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali.</p>
<p>Iran’s principal aims in Syria are to keep the Assad regime in power, maximise Iranian influence, protect Shia minorities and reduce and – if possible – eliminate the US presence in Syria. It also aims to create the conditions for a possible encirclement of Israel by occupying strategic position around the Golan heights.</p>
<h2>Iraq</h2>
<p>In Iraq, since the US invasion, Iran-backed armed groups come under an <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/10/profiles-pro-iran-militias-iraq">umbrella organisation</a> called the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) or <em>Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī</em>. The PMF claims to have as many as 230,000 fighters, mainly Shia. The PMF was founded in 2014 when Iraq’s Shia religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/shiite_militias_iraq_english.pdf">issued a fatwa</a> calling on Iraqis to defend their country after the Iraqi army collapsed and Islamic State took the northern province of Mosul. </p>
<p>In 2018 the PMF was incorporated into Iraq’s armed forces as an auxiliary force. As a result its wages are paid by the Iraqi military, but the Iranian government lacks proper command and control over the PMF. The same year PMF’s political wing contested elections in Iraq, coming second in the poll. It also performed well in Iraq’s 2023 regional elections and is now believed to wield considerable control in both the Iraqi parliament and the country’s supreme court. </p>
<p>Its military forces are now believed to be <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-popular-mobilization-force-is-turning-iraq-into-an-iranian-client-state/">active in Kurdistan</a> as part of an overall strategy to force the US to withdraw from the region.</p>
<h2>Lebanon</h2>
<p>North of Israel’s border with Lebanon, Hezbollah has been conducting military operations against Israel for many years and since October 7 clashes between Hezbollah forces and the Israel Defence Forces have become <a href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-6-2024">almost daily occurences</a>.</p>
<p>Hezbollah (Party of God) was formed in 1982 to fight against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It was trained and equipped by Iran, which continues to provide practically all of its <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies">financial and military resources</a>. In its <a href="https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf">1985 manifesto</a>, it vowed to expel western powers from Lebanon, called for the destruction of Israel state and pledged allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader.</p>
<p>In 2021 Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed that the organisation has <a href="https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-lebanon-beirut-civil-wars-hassan-nasrallah-a3c10d99cca2ef1c3d58dae135297025">100,000 trained fighters</a>, but estimates as to its actual strength vary considerably.</p>
<p>While heavily involved both politically and economically in Lebanon, Hezbollah is also active throughout the region, <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollahs-regional-activities-support-irans-proxy-networks">doing Iran’s business</a> rather than looking after Lebanese interests.</p>
<h2>Major headache for the west</h2>
<p>As can be seen with the recent attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen on shipping in the Red Sea (the Houthis are armed and trained by Iran as part of a civil war against the Sunni national government backed by Saudi Arabia), dealing with Iran’s proxies throughout the Middle East is a serious challenge. </p>
<p>Many of these groups now wield significant political influence in the countries in which they are embedded, so confronting them is not simply a military exercise. And, as the dramatic rise in tensions in the region following the assault by Hamas on Israel (also planned with Iranian help) suggests, Iran is capable of fomenting trouble for the west almost at will across the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/221520/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Christoph Bluth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Iran funds a large network of armed groups across the Middle East as part of its ambition to replace the US as regional power.Christoph Bluth, Professor of International Relations and Security, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2131482023-09-25T04:02:27Z2023-09-25T04:02:27ZHow popular music videos drove the fight against the Islamic State<p>Almost a decade ago, the Sunni jihadist network known as the Islamic State (IS) declared the formation of an Islamic Caliphate after they <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_Mosul">captured the Iraqi city of Mosul in June 2014</a>.</p>
<p>In response, tens of thousands of Shia men joined a complex patchwork of militias to fight against IS. Many of these militias are notoriously violent and directly loyal to Iran’s theocratic state.</p>
<p>But very little is known about how these Shia militias were so quickly and so effectively mobilised. In <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2023.2196875">our research</a>, we have taken a novel approach, examining the many popular music videos produced by these militias.</p>
<p>These music videos drew on a complex cocktail of historical myths and contemporary clergymen to mobilise Iraq’s Shia population to fight the IS.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/understanding-islamic-state-where-does-it-come-from-and-what-does-it-want-52155">Understanding Islamic State: where does it come from and what does it want?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Foundational myths, historical grievances</h2>
<p>The popular music videos explicitly reference a deeply held set of religious myths and symbols that have informed Shia politics since its inception.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LUUGLiTzUSY">One video</a> shows images of militiamen driving towards the front-lines and firing from a bunker at IS targets. </p>
<p>The singer extols the religious virtues of fighting the IS by comparing those killed today with the Shia martyrs at the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karbala">Battle of Karbala</a>: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>We fight our enemies. Our martyrs are similar to the martyrs of Karbala. Our people are supporters of Hussein.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The divide between the Sunni and Shia sects dates back to the early years of Islam. </p>
<p>A debate emerged after the Prophet Muhammad’s death about who should lead the Islamic community. The majority accepted the authority of the Prophet’s senior companion, Abu Bakr. A minority, later identified as Shiites, believed only a blood relative of the Prophet – in particular, his cousin Ali – had the right to lead.</p>
<p>In the year 680, the division between the two sects escalated at the Battle of Karbala, where Ali’s son Hussein and many of his followers were defeated and executed by Sunni forces.</p>
<p>The legend of the Battle of Karbala has come to symbolise the historical injustice of the Shia faithful at the hands of the Sunni majority. It is commemorated at the annual <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashura">Ashura</a> festival in which Shiites reenact the battle, including by self-flagellation. </p>
<p>The emotive lyrics and tone of the song are specifically designed to resonate with this history of suffering. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">What is the Shia-Sunni divide?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>The Shia jihad against the IS</h2>
<p>The popular music videos produced by different Shia militias also draw on fatwas (religious edicts) issued by several prominent Shia clerics in response to the violence of the IS.</p>
<p>In 2014, Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_al-Sistani">Grand Ayatollah Sistani</a> issued a fatwa announcing <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7by5almGhA">a jihad (holy war) against the IS</a>.</p>
<p>He called for a mass Shia mobilisation, arguing </p>
<blockquote>
<p>It is the legal and national responsibility of whoever can hold a weapon to take up arms to defend the country, the citizens and the holy sites.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Some popular music videos explicitly cite the fatwas of Sistani and other clerics, encouraging their young supporters to heed these calls. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpvDC9XTRcU.">A short clip</a> shows armed members of one militia chanting: “Al-Sistani is like a crown on our heads. Your wish is our command.”</p>
<p>One very slickly produced <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6DMWC93po8">music video</a> refers to both historical grievances over the failure to recognise Ali as the legitimate heir of the Prophet Muhammad and to the centrality of Sistani’s fatwa to their decision to fight the IS:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We are the Turkmen [of Iraq] <br>
We follow Ali’s path <br>
Iraq must live in peace and happiness <br>
When Sistani orders us, we obey. We will defeat and destroy the IS <br>
We believe in the fatwas of our religious authorities, and we defend our holy sites.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As the singer recites each verse, the footage shows heavily armed Shia men posing in front of a tank. It also features live action footage from various battles against the IS, including advancing on key targets, firing machine guns and heavy artillery. </p>
<h2>Mobilising young men</h2>
<p>These videos serve as a unique archive of the war against the IS, demonstrating the ways in which these militias found novel ways to mobilise young men to fight by drawing on a rich catalogue of Shia religious symbolism as well as the fatwas of clerics like Sistani.</p>
<p>Slick popular music videos draw on a rich catalogue of historical motifs of suffering as well as the contemporary edicts of key clergymen, produced by different Shia militias and shared on YouTube and other social media platforms. </p>
<p>These evocative and poignant songs played an underappreciated and under-examined part in mobilising young men to fight back against the horrors of the IS, indicating the powerful role popular culture plays in contemporary warfare.</p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/the-islamic-state-flag-hijacks-muslim-words-of-faith-banning-it-could-cause-confusion-and-unfair-targeting-of-muslims-209042">The Islamic State flag hijacks Muslim words of faith. Banning it could cause confusion and unfair targeting of Muslims</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/213148/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Benjamin Isakhan receives funding from the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ali Akbar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In our new research we examined popular music videos which drew on historical myths and contemporary clergymen to mobilise Iraq’s Shia population to fight the Islamic State.Benjamin Isakhan, Professor of International Politics, Deakin UniversityAli Akbar, Sessional lecturer and researcher, The University of MelbourneLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/2016922023-03-13T16:29:19Z2023-03-13T16:29:19ZSaudi-Iran deal won’t bring peace to the Middle East but will enhance China’s role as power broker<p>After more than four decades as seemingly implacable enemies on either side of a deep political-religious divide in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-64906996">restore diplomatic relations</a> and reopen embassies. The deal, which was signed in Beijing, comes seven years after diplomatic relations were severed in the aftermath of the execution in Saudi Arabia of <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/10/iran-saudi-arabia-middle-east-war-nimr-al-nimr-execution">Shia cleric Nimr Al Nimr</a> and has been heralded as a “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/11/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-normalization-china-analysis-intl/index.html">game-changing moment</a>” for the Middle East. </p>
<p>While undeniably a positive move, the agreement will not end conflict in the region – with serious domestic issues continuing to drive conflict and violence in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Yet serious economic challenges have prompted the Saudis and Iranians to engage in diplomatic talks over the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/10/iran-and-saudi-arabia-from-rivalry-to-mending-ties-a-timeline">past few years</a> to create a more stable regional order, allowing their countries to engage in domestic reform programmes as a result.</p>
<p>The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has fractious roots, shaped by the interplay of security concerns, claims to leadership over the Muslim world, ethno-sectarian rivalries, and differing relationships with Washington. Lazy analysis has often reduced the rivalry to a sectarian conflict, a consequence of “ancient hatreds”. But such a reading of events is xenophobic and orientalist and ignores the context and contingencies shaping relations between the two states. </p>
<p>Despite the fractious roots, relations between the two states have oscillated between overt hostility and burgeoning detente since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, playing out in different ways across the Middle East.</p>
<h2>Troubled region</h2>
<p>The presence of shared religious, ethnic and ideological identities across the region has also prompted others to view conflict across the region through the lens of “proxy wars”. Various groups in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and elsewhere have been seen as merely doing the bidding of paymasters in Riyadh or Tehran. This ignores the internal drivers of conflict and division, reducing analysis to a simplistic binary pitting Sunni against Shia. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Map of Middle East, 2023" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=552&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/514911/original/file-20230313-14-i2004q.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=694&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Middle East is riven with conflict, both political and sectarian. Reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran is unlikely to fundamentally change that.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://picryl.com/media/middle-east-graphic">Library of Congress</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Across the region, states where Saudi and Iranian interests have clashed, have also been beset by a range of their own complex socioeconomic and political challenges. </p>
<p>Since Saddam Hussein was deposed, Iraq has been characterised by a struggle among various factions to dominate the state. Shia parties, representing the country’s majority, have typically won elections, often with the support of Iran and much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia. Yet to think of Iraqi politics purely as representing a proxy war between its two neighbours would be wrong. It ignores the domestic concerns of many and efforts to create a political landscape that works for Iraqis and is not just an arena for Riyadh and Tehran to increase their power. </p>
<p>In Yemen, while Saudi Arabia and Iran have both played a prominent role in the civil war, the key drivers of conflict are domestic, amid a broader struggle over territory, politics, visions of order, tribalism, resources and sectarian difference. The involvement of Riyadh and Tehran – in different ways – exacerbates these tensions. Fears about gains by Iran-backed Houthi rebels across Yemen prompted Saudi Arabia to embark on a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/">devastating bombing campaign</a> to curtail the group’s actions.</p>
<p>Tehran’s <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis">support for the Houthis</a> – and the group’s attacks on the Saudi mainland – exacerbated the kingdom’s fears. Yet the war in Yemen is also a consequence of the fragmentation of the state and the emergence of several different groups vying for influence across a landscape beset by serious environmental challenges and food shortages.</p>
<p>In Lebanon, a devastating socioeconomic crisis plays out in the shell of the state, with sectarian groups providing support and protection to their constituencies in place of a functioning government. Key groups have received support from Saudi Arabia and Iran – most notably <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, which possesses strong ideological links with the Islamic Republic, and the <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/can-lebanon-s-future-movement-provide-moderate-sunni-alternative">Future Movement</a> the party of government across most of the past decade, which has a complex relationship with Saudi Arabia. </p>
<p>Clearly the Saudis and Iranians have a keen interest in Lebanese politics. But in reality any conflict here is driven by competition between local groups seeking to impose their visions of order on a precarious political, social and economic landscape.</p>
<p>While there is little doubt that Saudi Arabia and Iran have the means to exert influence on politics across the region, local groups have their own agendas, aspirations and pressures. It remains to be seen how the reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran will resonate in spaces beset by division. </p>
<p>There are undeniably positives for regional security. The reconciliation improves the possibility of a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-revival-nuclear-deal-political-victory-over-west/32004644.html">revived nuclear deal with Tehran</a> – although it remains to be seen what Saudi Arabia has offered Iran to facilitate the agreement, and vice versa. Also, there are questions as to what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms have been put in place by China.</p>
<h2>The role of China</h2>
<p>Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of all of this concerns <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/12/china-saudi-iran-middle-east-united-states-relations-peace/">China’s role in proceedings</a>. While diplomatic efforts aimed at improving relations between the two rivals have been taking place for several years, China’s ability to forge an agreement out of these talks points to Beijing’s growing influence in the region. </p>
<p>China has long had <a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/02/25/iran-china-cooperation-fraught-with-contradictions/">close economic ties with Iran</a>, but in recent years Beijing has sought to <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221130-pentagon-china-significantly-increased-engagement-with-middle-east-in-2021/">increase its engagement with Arab states</a>, notably Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Deteriorating relations between the two major Gulf powers would have had a negative impact on Chinese engagement and investment across the Middle East, both in terms of its infrastructure projects and the broader Belt and Road Initiative. </p>
<p>Although the US has <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/47e26a9f-0943-4e65-b8a0-604da6289153">publicly celebrated the initiative</a>, privately there are several concerns about the broader implications for the Middle East and for global politics. This comes at a time when relations between Riyadh and Washington are tense. </p>
<p>This was perhaps best seen in the visit of the US president, Joe Biden, to Saudi Arabia after his vocal criticism of the kingdom’s human rights record and the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/26/jamal-khashoggi-mohammed-bin-salman-us-report">publication of a report</a> stating that Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman approved the operation to kill journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a US citizen. During the visit, Biden and bin Salman endured a tense meeting which <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87662">largely failed to improve relations</a> and highlighted the precarious nature of relations. </p>
<p>In such an environment, rising Chinese influence in the kingdom and across the Middle East is hardly surprising. China’s move into mediation offers some semblance of hope that an agreement can also be reached to end the war in Ukraine, but at what cost? The Chinese model of investment and the provision of “untied aid” – the provision of financial support without conditions – has long ignored concerns about democracy and human rights. So the agreement between the Saudis and the Iranians has been read by some as a victory for authoritarianism, further marginalising reform movements in both countries.</p>
<p><div data-react-class="Tweet" data-react-props="{"tweetId":"1634608154112835585"}"></div></p>
<p>Much like the US, Israel is also concerned about the deal. For successive Israeli governments, Iran has long occupied the role of regional
bete noire, ultimately feeding into the <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/two-years-what-state-abraham-accords">signing of the Abraham Accords</a> in the summer of 2020 which normalised relations between Israel, the UEA, Bahrain and Morocco as a strategic alliance against Tehran. The Netanyahu government has long sought to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia and hoped to use the Iranian threat as a means of achieving this goal. </p>
<p>Additionally, the deal raises questions about the future of regional security. The US has long been a mediator in regional disputes and has been viewed as a security guarantor by Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. China’s actions here suggest that it is seeking to assert itself more keenly in the region’s politics. Reports suggest that Beijing is to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-plans-summit-of-persian-gulf-arab-and-iranian-leaders-as-new-middle-east-role-takes-shape-357cfd7e">host a meeting of Arab and Iranian leaders</a> later in the year. If accurate, it positions China firmly as a – if not <em>the</em> – dominant actor across the Middle East.</p>
<p>A reconciliation between the Saudis and the Iranians is certainly good for regional order. But it will not address the causes of conflict in Yemen or elsewhere across the region. It also raises several serious issues around regional security and global order, the salience of democracy and human rights, and the future of US engagement with the Middle East. </p>
<p>While the initiative is a positive step, it is not a solution for the region’s conflicts. This Beijing-mediated agreement may in fact lead to further significant challenges for the people of the region.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/201692/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Simon Mabon receives funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Henry Luce Foundation. He is a Senior Fellow atthe Foreign Policy Centre. </span></em></p>Detente between Tehran and Riyadh will not magically solve all the political and sectarian tensions in the Middle East.Simon Mabon, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1986472023-02-06T13:27:21Z2023-02-06T13:27:21ZThe politics of blasphemy: Why Pakistan and some other Muslim countries are passing new blasphemy laws<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/506698/original/file-20230126-24317-zg6pjr.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=30%2C38%2C5111%2C3472&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">People gather around the body of a man who was killed when an enraged mob stoned him to death for allegedly desecrating the Quran, in eastern Pakistan in February 2022.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/PakistanBlasphemy/627a5c4fb72347f4b181cbe63397b031/photo?Query=pakistan%20blasphemy%202022&mediaType=photo&sortBy=&dateRange=Anytime&totalCount=15&currentItemNo=13">AP Photo/Asim Tanveer</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>On Jan. 17, 2023, Pakistan’s National Assembly unanimously voted to expand the country’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-muslim-countries-are-quick-at-condemning-defamation-but-often-ignore-rights-violations-against-muslim-minorities-184624">laws on blasphemy</a>, which carries the death penalty for insulting the Prophet Muhammad. The new law now extends the punishment to those deemed to have insulted the prophet’s companions, which could include thousands of early Muslims, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/21/world/asia/pakistan-blasphemy-laws.html">with 10 years in prison or life imprisonment</a>.</p>
<p>Human rights activists <a href="https://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/amendments-to-blasphemy-laws-create-further-room-for-persecution/">are concerned that the expanded laws could target minorities</a>, particularly Shiite Muslims who are critical of many leading early Muslims. </p>
<p>Pakistan has the world’s <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Blasphemy%20Laws%20Report.pdf">second-strictest blasphemy laws after Iran</a>. About <a href="https://herald.dawn.com/news/1154036">1,500 Pakistanis</a> have been charged with blasphemy over the past three decades. In a case covered by the international media, Junaid Hafeez, a university lecturer, was <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/junaid-hafeez-pakistani-academic-given-death-sentence-for-blasphemy/a-51762475">sentenced to death</a> on the charge of insulting the prophet on Facebook in 2019. His sentence has been under <a href="https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN1YP07F?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews">appeal</a>.</p>
<p>Although no executions have ever taken place, extrajudicial killings related to blasphemy have occurred in Pakistan. Since 1990, more than <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46465247">70 people have been murdered</a> by mobs and vigilantes over allegations of insulting Islam.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">My research</a> shows that blasphemy laws historically emerged to serve the political and religious authorities, and they continue to have a role in silencing dissent in many Muslim countries. </p>
<h2>Blasphemy and apostasy</h2>
<p>Of the <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Legislation%20Factsheet%20-%20Blasphemy_3.pdf">71 countries</a> that criminalize blasphemy, 32 are majority Muslim. Punishment and enforcement of these laws <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php">vary</a>. </p>
<p>Blasphemy is punishable by death in Iran, Pakistan, <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php#Afghanistan">Afghanistan</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/asia/brunei-stoning-gay-sex.html">Brunei</a>, <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Africa%20Speech%20Laws%20FINAL_0.pdf">Mauritania</a> and <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/national-laws-on-blasphemy-saudi-arabia">Saudi Arabia</a>. Among non-Muslim-majority countries, the <a href="https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Blasphemy%20Laws%20Report.pdf">harshest blasphemy laws are in Italy</a>, where the maximum penalty is two years in prison.</p>
<p>Half of the world’s 49 Muslim-majority countries have additional laws <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-countries-still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/">banning apostasy</a>, meaning people may be <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/apostasy/index.php">punished for leaving Islam</a>. All countries with <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/29/which-countries-still-outlaw-apostasy-and-blasphemy/">apostasy laws</a> are Muslim-majority. Apostasy is often <a href="https://www.loc.gov/law/help/blasphemy/index.php">charged along with blasphemy</a>. </p>
<p>Laws on apostasy are quite popular in some Muslim countries. According to a 2013 <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/">Pew survey</a>, about 75% of respondents in Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia favor making sharia, or Islamic law, the official law of the land. Among those who support sharia, around 25% in Southeast Asia, 50% in the Middle East and North Africa and 75% in South Asia say they support “executing those who leave Islam” – that is, they support laws punishing apostasy with death.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="Two firefighters stand in puddles in a burned-out between ." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436800/original/file-20211209-13-y067fe.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Firefighters in a factory torched by an angry mob in Jhelum, Pakistan, after one of the factory’s employees was accused of desecrating the Quran, Nov. 21, 2015.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/pakistani-firefighters-stand-in-a-burnt-out-factory-torched-news-photo/498134476?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The ulema and the state</h2>
<p>My 2019 book “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/comparative-politics/islam-authoritarianism-and-underdevelopment-global-and-historical-comparison?format=PB">Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment</a>” traces the roots of blasphemy and apostasy laws in the Muslim world back to a historic alliance between Islamic scholars and government.</p>
<p>Starting around the year 1050, certain Sunni scholars of law and theology, called the “ulema,” began working closely with <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/V/bo5951736.html">political rulers</a> to challenge what they considered to be the sacrilegious influence of <a href="https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/s1784m135#toc">Muslim philosophers</a> on society. </p>
<p>Muslim philosophers had for three centuries been making major contributions to <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691135267/the-crest-of-the-peacock">mathematics</a>, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/T/bo28119973.html">physics</a> and <a href="http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/medieval-islamic-medicine">medicine</a>. They developed the <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/305233/the-house-of-wisdom-by-jim-al-khalili/">Arabic number system</a> used across the West today and invented a forerunner of the modern <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674050044&content=toc">camera</a>.</p>
<p>The conservative ulema felt that these philosophers were inappropriately influenced by <a href="http://cup.columbia.edu/book/a-history-of-islamic-philosophy/9780231132206">Greek philosophy</a> and <a href="https://archive.org/stream/renaissanceofisl029336mbp/renaissanceofisl029336mbp_djvu.txt">Shiite Islam</a> against Sunni beliefs. The most prominent name in consolidating Sunni orthodoxy was the respected Islamic scholar <a href="https://fonsvitae.com/product/the-book-of-knowledge/">Ghazali</a>, who died in the year 1111.</p>
<p>In several <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo16220536.html">influential books</a> still widely read today, Ghazali declared two long-dead leading Muslim philosophers, <a href="https://fonsvitae.com/product/hardback-al-ghazali-deliverance-error-al-munqidh-min-al-dalal-works-copy/">Farabi and Ibn Sina</a>, as apostates for their unorthodox views on God’s power and the nature of resurrection. Their followers, Ghazali wrote, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/I/bo3624354.html">could be punished with death</a>. </p>
<p>As modern-day historians <a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9780807856574/the-politics-of-knowledge-in-premodern-islam/">Omid Safi</a> and <a href="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/al-ghazalis-philosophical-theology-9780195331622?cc=us&lang=en&">Frank Griffel</a> assert, Ghazali’s declaration provided justification to Muslim sultans from the 12th century onward who wished to <a href="https://www.iep.utm.edu/ibnrushd/">persecute</a> – even <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/as-Suhrawardi">execute</a> – <a href="https://criticalmuslim.com/issues/12-dangerous-freethinkers/abbasid-freethinking-humanism-aziz-al-azmeh">thinkers</a> seen as threats to conservative religious rule. </p>
<p>This “ulema-state alliance,” <a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Islam_Authoritarianism_and_Underdevelopm/xjCdDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=%22ulema-state%22">as I call it</a>, began in the <a href="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/V/bo5951736.html">mid-11th century</a> in <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691165851/lost-enlightenment">Central Asia</a>, <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/continuity-and-change-in-medieval-persia-aspects-of-administrative-economic-and-social-history-11th-14th-century/oclc/16095227">Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.sunypress.edu/p-3207-a-learned-society-in-a-period-o.aspx">Iraq</a> and a century later spread to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/middle-east-history/knowledge-and-social-practice-medieval-damascus-11901350?format=PB">Syria</a>, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/muslim-cities-in-the-later-middle-ages/02685655C9C18404192B9FE3E43E75D5">Egypt</a> and <a href="https://www.worldcat.org/title/muqaddimah-an-introduction-to-history/oclc/307867">North Africa</a>. In these regimes, questioning religious orthodoxy and political authority wasn’t merely dissent – it was apostasy.</p>
<h2>Wrong direction</h2>
<p>Parts of <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/history/european-history-general-interest/rise-western-world-new-economic-history?format=PB">Western Europe</a> were ruled by a similar alliance between the Catholic Church and monarchs. These governments assaulted free thinking, too. During the Spanish Inquisition, between the 16th and 18th centuries, <a href="https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/2150452">thousands of people</a> were tortured and killed for apostasy.</p>
<p>Blasphemy laws were also in place, if infrequently used, in various European countries until recently. <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/quran-burner-denmark-facebook-blasphemy-laws-repeal-a7771041.html">Denmark</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/27/ireland-votes-to-oust-blasphemy-ban-from-constitution">Ireland</a> and <a href="https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160714/local/repealing-blasphemy-law-a-victory-for-freedom-of-speech-says-humanist.618859">Malta</a> all recently repealed their blasphemy laws. But they persist in many parts of the Muslim world. </p>
<p>In Pakistan, the military dictator <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/opinion/pakistans-tyranny-of-blasphemy.html">Zia-ul-Haq</a>, who ruled the country from 1978 to 1988, is responsible for its harsh blasphemy laws. An ally of the <a href="https://nation.com.pk/14-Oct-2016/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-pakistan-s-blasphemy-law">ulema</a>, Zia <a href="https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/565da4824.pdf">updated blasphemy laws</a> – written by British colonizers to avoid interreligious conflict – to defend specifically Sunni Islam and increased the maximum punishment to death. </p>
<p>From the 1920s until Zia, these laws had been applied <a href="https://nation.com.pk/14-Oct-2016/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-pakistan-s-blasphemy-law">only about a dozen times</a>. Since then, they have become a powerful tool for crushing dissent.</p>
<p>Some dozen Muslim countries, including <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/world/iran-drops-death-penalty-for-professor-guilty-of-blasphemy.html">Iran</a> and <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/egypt-atheism-illegal-crackdown-non-believers-religion-islam-772471">Egypt</a>, have undergone a <a href="https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812264.001.0001/acprof-9780199812264">similar process</a> over the past four decades. </p>
<h2>Dissenting voices in Islam</h2>
<p>The conservative ulema base their case for blasphemy and apostasy laws on a few reported sayings of the prophet, known as hadith, primarily: “<a href="https://www.google.com/books/edition/Freedom_of_Religion_Apostasy_and_Islam/MrhBDgAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=apostasy+hadith+change+religion+kill&pg=PT87&printsec=frontcover">Whoever changes his religion, kill him</a>.” </p>
<p>But many <a href="https://english.kadivar.com/2006/09/29/the-freedom-of-thought-and-religion-in-islam-2/">Islamic scholars</a> and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/opinion/islams-problem-with-blasphemy.html">Muslim intellectuals</a> reject <a href="https://yaqeeninstitute.org/jonathan-brown/the-issue-of-apostasy-in-islam/#.XjcRFy2ZNKN">this view as radical</a>. They argue that Prophet Muhammad never <a href="https://yaqeeninstitute.org/jonathan-brown/the-issue-of-apostasy-in-islam/#.XjcRFy2ZNKN">executed</a> anyone for apostasy, nor <a href="https://archive.org/details/MuhammadAndTheJewsAReExaminationByBarakatAhmad_201702">encouraged</a> his followers to do so. Criminalizing sacrilege isn’t based on Islam’s main sacred text, the Quran, either. It contains over <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315255002">100 verses</a> encouraging peace, freedom of conscience and religious tolerance. </p>
<p>In Chapter 2, Verse 256, the Quran states, “There is no coercion in religion.” Chapter 4, Verse 140 urges Muslims to simply leave blasphemous conversations: “When you hear the verses of God being rejected and mocked, do not sit with them.”</p>
<p>By using their political connections and <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691130705/the-ulama-in-contemporary-islam">historical authority</a> to interpret Islam, however, the conservative ulema have marginalized more <a href="https://oneworld-publications.com/progressive-muslims-pb.html">moderate voices</a>. </p>
<h2>Reaction to global Islamophobia</h2>
<p>Debates about blasphemy and apostasy laws among Muslims are influenced by international affairs.</p>
<p>Across the globe, Muslim minorities – including the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/israel/palestine">Palestinians</a> under Israeli occupation, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/10/world/europe/photos-chechen-war-russia.html">Chechens</a> of Russia, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/16/india-free-kashmiris-arbitrarily-detained">Muslim Kashmiris</a> of India, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis?gclid=CjwKCAiAsIDxBRAsEiwAV76N8zrlJqhi65w6DzRLwTrDYleM8U7DFswwKp61f3Oiav1Bq4schYpKzhoCfh4QAvD_BwE">Rohingya</a> of Myanmar and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html">Uyghurs</a> of China – have experienced persecution. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="Several men and women, with faces covered, walk on a beach after being arrested." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/436802/original/file-20211209-15-1mrl73n.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Rohingya of Myanmar are among several Muslim minorities facing persecution worldwide. Rakhine state, Myanmar, Jan. 13, 2020.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/rohingya-people-who-were-arrested-at-sea-in-december-walk-news-photo/1193446518?adppopup=true">STR/AFP via Getty Images</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Alongside persecution are some <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/german-court-allows-courtroom-headscarf-ban/a-42857656">Western policies</a> that discriminate against certain Muslims, such as laws prohibiting <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/9781108476942">headscarves in schools</a>.</p>
<p>Such laws and policies can create the impression that Muslims are <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/157082/islamophobia-understanding-anti-muslim-sentiment-west.aspx">under siege</a> and provide an <a href="https://lb.boell.org/en/2012/08/15/muslim-political-theology-defamation-apostasy-and-anathema">excuse</a> for the belief that punishing sacrilege is a defense of the faith.</p>
<p>Instead, blasphemy laws have served political agendas of populist politicians and their <a href="https://www.populismstudies.org/religious-populism-and-vigilantism-the-case-of-the-tehreek-e-labbaik-pakistan/">religious supporters in Pakistan</a> and some <a href="https://religiousfreedominstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/FORIS2_Blasphemy_ONLINE.pdf">other Muslim countries</a>.</p>
<p>Moreover, these laws contribute to <a href="https://deadline.com/2014/10/ben-affleck-comes-to-blows-with-bill-maher-over-his-opinions-toward-islam-video-845912/">anti-Muslim stereotypes</a> about religious intolerance. Some of my Turkish relatives even discourage my work on this topic, fearing it fuels Islamophobia. </p>
<p>But my research shows that criminalizing blasphemy and apostasy is more political than it is religious. The Quran does not require punishing sacrilege: Authoritarian politics do.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of a <a href="https://theconversation.com/execution-for-a-facebook-post-why-blasphemy-is-a-capital-offense-in-some-muslim-countries-129685">piece first published on February 20, 2020</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/198647/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ahmet T. Kuru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>A political scientist explains the history of blasphemy laws in Muslim-majority nations and how they play a role in silencing dissent.Ahmet T. Kuru, Professor of Political Science, San Diego State UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1550242021-08-30T21:08:59Z2021-08-30T21:08:59ZAmerica’s Muslims come from many traditions and cultures<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/416847/original/file-20210818-23-d2hr8k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&rect=0%2C0%2C3600%2C2403&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">According to Islamic studies professor Abbas Barzegar, there are many ways Muslims practice their faith, with some young American Muslims even developing new interpretations of Islamic law.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/participants-in-the-iftar-at-trump-tower-event-of-the-m-news-photo/691710772?adppopup=true">Joana Toro/VIEWpress/Corbis via Getty Images</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>For people who would like to learn more about Islam, The Conversation is publishing <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/understanding-islam-108919">a series of articles</a>, available on our website or as <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/understanding-islam-79">six emails delivered every other day</a>, written by Senior Religion and Ethics Editor Kalpana Jain. Over the past few years she has commissioned dozens of articles on Islam written by academics. These articles draw from that archive and have been checked for accuracy by religion scholars.</em></p>
<p></p><hr><p></p>
<p>In the last installment of this series, you learned about some of the basic tenets of Islam that your neighbors, friends or colleagues may be practicing. In this newsletter, we will cover some of the different Muslim sects and the interesting ways they mix in the United States.</p>
<p>Journalists and scholars have pointed out how Muslims in the U.S. are often cast simplistically either as <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/are-you-good-or-bad-muslim-these-two-will-help-n302866">good or bad</a>: The good ones are raising their voices against terrorism and the bad ones are violent, or likely to be.</p>
<p>This view blocks out an “otherwise fascinating spectrum” of American Muslims, <a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">writes</a> scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/abbas-barzegar-276672">Abbas Barzegar</a>. “Outside of Mecca itself,” he says, “there exists no other Muslim population that displays the theological, ideological, class and ethnic diversity as that which resides here” in the U.S.</p>
<p>So, what are the different ways of being a Muslim?</p>
<p>Many American Muslims belong to one of the two main sects in Islam – Sunni and Shiite. Each draws its faith and practice from the Quran and the life of the Prophet Muhammad. The two agree on most of the fundamentals of Islam.</p>
<p>But the two groups split after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">death of Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632</a>, when issues over leadership emerged, writes religion scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/ken-chitwood-160245">Ken Chitwood</a>. The majority of the Muslim community sided with Abu Bakr, one of the prophet’s closest companions. A minority, however, opted for the prophet’s cousin – Ali.</p>
<p>Muslims who rallied around Abu Bakr came to be called Sunni – meaning those who follow the Sunna, or sayings, deeds and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad.</p>
<p>Those who trusted in Ali came to be known as Shiite. The name comes from a contraction of “Shiat Ali,” meaning “partisans of Ali.” There are three main branches of Shiite Muslims: Zaydi, Twelver and Ismaili. Other Shiite-associated sects or movements include the Alawi in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">Houthi</a> in Yemen. </p>
<p>Among Sunni Muslims there are four principal schools: Shafi'i, Hanbali, Maliki and Hanafi. There are also Sunni-associated religious reform movements like the Salafis and Wahhabis and political organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. </p>
<p><iframe id="aPo6N" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/aPo6N/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Other than these sects, the Islamic tradition has other ways of approaching the divine.</p>
<p>Sufis believe in a more “inward, contemplative focus than many other forms of Islamic practice,” <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">explains</a> scholar <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/peter-gottschalk-340446">Peter Gottschalk</a>. The 13th-century Persian poet and Sufi leader Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī communicated the yearning for a heartfelt relationship with God and believed contemplation was the way to achieve it.</p>
<p>Gottschalk explains that many Muslims and non-Muslims around the globe celebrate Sufi saints and gather together for worship in their shrines. Many Sufi saints are believed to be “friends of God” and have the power to perform miracles. The graves of these saints often become pilgrimage sites. However, militant groups, such as the Islamic State Group, do not embrace the traditions, and Sufi shrines have often been attacked in such countries as Afghanistan and Pakistan.</p>
<p>Another sect, the Ahmadiyya, was founded in the Punjab region of India by a Muslim religious leader, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, in 1889. Ahmadis believe Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was the promised Messiah of Islam. However, because of disagreements over who counts as a prophet in Islam, Ahmadis often face persecution from other Muslims. They have been declared heretics, or non-Muslim, in multiple countries. In Pakistan, the country with the largest number of Ahmadis, <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-pakistans-ahmadis-and-why-havent-they-voted-in-30-years-100797">they represent about 0.2% of the population of 208 million</a>. Because they are targeted for their beliefs, many Ahmadis come to the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/12/ahmadi-ahmadiyya-muslims-islam-jalsa-salana-hampshire">United Kingdom</a>, <a href="https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-06-20/ahmadi-muslims-facing-persecution-abroad-finding-home-us">Canada, or the U.S.</a> to escape violence in their countries of origin. </p>
<p>All these global religious traditions are present in the U.S. <a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">As Barzegar points out</a>, small mosques in the United States may bring together different ethnic communities such as Bosnians, Turks, Bangladeshis and so on. Other large and diverse congregations may include both immigrants and Black Muslims.</p>
<p>Among these mosques is one in Harlem that was founded in 1964 by Malcolm X when he left the Nation of Islam. <a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">Bargezar writes</a> that the current spiritual leader of the mosque, Imam Talib Abdur Rashid, “champions” the fight against “institutional discrimination and structural inequality” as he joins hands with other “oppressed groups.”</p>
<p>American Muslims today are part of many traditions, beliefs and culture. In addition, they are developing new interpretations of Islamic law. For example, says Bargezar, an emerging number “lovingly accept queer and gay Muslims” and “<a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">allow for unconventional practices of women’s religious leadership</a>.” And a younger generation of Muslims are less likely to be affiliated with mosques. Instead, “you will find them in Silicon Valley, Syrian refugee camps and at the same time on Snapchat,” he adds.</p>
<p><em>This article was reviewed for accuracy by <a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/ken-chitwood-160245">Ken Chitwood</a>, a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Berlin Graduate School of Muslim Cultures & Societies at Freie Universität Berlin. He is also a journalist-fellow at the University of Southern California’s Center for Religion and Civic Culture.</em></p>
<p><strong><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">Fact</a>:</strong> An eighth-century female Sufi saint, known popularly as Rabia al-Adawiyya, is said to have walked through her hometown of Basra, in modern-day Iraq, with a lit torch in one hand and a bucket of water in another. When asked why, she replied that she hoped to burn down heaven and douse hell’s fire so people would – without concern for reward or punishment – love God.
<em>– From an <a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">article</a> written by Peter Gottschalk, Professor of Religion, Wesleyan University</em></p>
<p><strong>In the next issue: <a href="https://theconversation.com/four-understanding-islam-its-contribution-to-the-world-155107">Islam’s contributions to the world</a></strong></p>
<p></p><hr><p></p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/418527/original/file-20210830-17-1ssshg1.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><em>You can read all six articles in this <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/topics/understanding-islam-108919">Understanding Islam series on TheConversation.com</a>, or we can deliver them straight to your inbox if you <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters/understanding-islam-79">sign up for our email newsletter course</a>.</em></p>
<p></p><hr><p></p>
<h2>Articles from The Conversation in this edition:</h2>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/eid-al-fitr-2016-understanding-the-differences-among-americas-muslims-61347">Eid al-Fitr 2016: Understanding the differences among America’s Muslims</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-the-sufis-and-why-does-is-see-them-as-threatening-73431">Who are the Sufis and why does IS see them as threatening?</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-pakistans-ahmadis-and-why-havent-they-voted-in-30-years-100797">Who are Pakistan’s Ahmadis and why haven’t they voted in 30 years</a></p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">What is the Shia-Sunni divide</a> </p></li>
<li><p><a href="https://theconversation.com/who-are-yemens-houthis-106423">Who are Yemen’s Houthis?</a></p></li>
</ul>
<h2>Further Reading and Resources:</h2>
<ul>
<li><p><a href="https://reportingislam.org/">Reporting Islam Project</a>: Based in Australia, the website provides information to journalists and others to help them understand Islam and to clear stereotypes and misconceptions.</p></li>
<li><p>“<a href="https://uncpress.org/book/9780807899762/mystical-dimensions-of-islam/">Mystical Dimensions of Islam</a>,” by influential Islamic scholar Annemarie Schimmel. She was a professor at Harvard University from 1967 to 1992. This book provides valuable introduction to Sufism, the main form of Islamic mysticism.</p></li>
</ul><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/155024/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
Day 3 of our Understanding Islam series. Many Muslims belong to one of two sects of Islam, which agree on most of the fundamentals of Islam but vary in others.Kalpana Jain, Senior Religion + Ethics Editor/ Director of the Global Religion Journalism InitiativeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1474022020-10-07T11:28:15Z2020-10-07T11:28:15ZNagorno-Karabakh: why Iran is trying to remain neutral over the conflict on its doorstep<p>Fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-54418901">intensified</a> in early October over Nagorno-Karabakh, the disputed region in the South Caucasus at the centre of a conflict that has lasted for more than three decades. </p>
<p>The South Caucasus is sandwiched between Russia to the north, Iran to the south and Turkey to the west. Out of these three regional powers, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/turkey-territorial-disputes-azerbaijan-ankara-armenia-9a95d9690569623adedffe8c16f3588d">Turkey’s vocal and military support</a> for Azerbaijan has bolstered Baku’s confidence to refuse mediation in the conflict. Meanwhile, Moscow – which has historically been an important mediator in this conflict – is also committed to protect Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a regional security alliance. </p>
<p>Iran, however, has adopted an official neutral stance and has repeatedly offered to mediate over the past three decades. It’s doing the same today, with Iranian <a href="https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/europe/nagorno-karabakh-armenia-azerbaijan-iran-peace-plan-b819259.html">officials stating</a> they are working on a peace plan. </p>
<hr>
<p>
<em>
<strong>
Read more:
<a href="https://theconversation.com/nagorno-karabakh-are-armenia-and-azerbaijan-sliding-towards-all-out-war-147066">Nagorno-Karabakh: are Armenia and Azerbaijan sliding towards all-out war?</a>
</strong>
</em>
</p>
<hr>
<h2>Mediation efforts</h2>
<p>The first war over Nagorno-Karabakh broke out in the late 1980s, resulting in Azerbaijan losing 20% of its territory to Armenia. </p>
<p>Tehran made an extensive effort to broker <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25739638.2017.1404259">a ceasefire in 1992</a>, only to see it violated by the Armenian militia within hours, discrediting Iran’s role as a mediator.</p>
<p>Although another ceasefire was eventually brokered in 1994, numerous rounds of negotiations, as well as regional and international mediation, most notably by the OSCE Minsk group, have not led to peace – or even a partial resolution of the dispute. While conflict has repeatedly flared up along the front line since then, for <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35949991">example in 2016</a>, the current escalation, which began on September 27, is by far the most serious. </p>
<p>Iran is in no real position to mediate now, particularly given its own <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/middleeast/iran-and-azerbaijan-wary-neighbors-find-less-to-agree-on.html">turbulent relationship with Baku</a>, as well as international sensitivity over Iran’s increased regional influence. The only reason Iran repeats its offer of mediation is to confirm to Armenia and Azerbaijan – and their respective ethnic minorities and supporters inside Iran – that Tehran remains neutral. Such <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/5/iran-nk">neutrality is important</a> for Iran’s own domestic stability.</p>
<h2>Historic ties</h2>
<p>Until the early 19th century, Georgia, Armenia and the territories of the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan (known then as Arran) were under Persian control. Iran then lost these territories to Russia following its defeats in two wars. </p>
<p>The 1918 collapse of Russia’s Tsarist empire and the weakening of Moscow’s hold on Arran provided the opportunity for nationalist parties. Supported by the Ottoman Empire, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Azerbaijan_Since_Independence.html?id=4aZzCQAAQBAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y">they created the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic</a>, which was integrated into the Soviet Union in 1920. </p>
<p>While, prior to 1918, there had been no political entity on the north of the Aras river with the name Azerbaijan, the people of Arran shared Turkic ethnicity and language with those in the north-western provinces of Iran, historically called Eastern and Western Azarbaijan. </p>
<p>This makes today’s 9 million population of Azerbaijan brethren of <a href="https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/sep/03/iran-minorities-2-ethnic-diversity#:%7E:text=Azeris%20are%20Iran's%20largest%20ethnic,closer%20to%20Turkish%20than%20Persian">16% of Iran’s population</a> – another 20 million people. Iran is also home to <a href="https://financialtribune.com/articles/people/8808/a-look-at-the-vibrant-iranian-armenian-community">more than 100,000</a> highly respected and well-integrated Armenians. They have strong and at times useful connections to the global Armenian diaspora, which has <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-the-armenian-diaspora-forged-coalitions-to-push-for-genocide-recognition-126703">influential lobbies</a> in western countries, especially the US.</p>
<p>With such an ethnic mix, any official support by Tehran for either Armenia or Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabach conflict could deepen the social faultlines to the point of conflict. It would also add to the various social dilemmas that the Iranian state is already facing, arising from <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48119109">economic hardship</a> caused by US sanctions, rampant corruption and mismanagement, as well as <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html">public dissatisfaction</a> with the state’s repressive policies.</p>
<p>At a time when social cohesion is in tatters, taking sides could easily result in widening ethnic divisions that could put Iran’s political and territorial integrity at risk. </p>
<h2>Wary of Baku</h2>
<p>As I have explained in <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Irans-Foreign-Policy-in-the-South-Caucasus-Relations-with-Azerbaijan-and/Kouhi-Esfahani/p/book/9781138309081">my own research</a>, with a shared Shia religion and civilisational background, Iran could have been Azerbaijan’s natural ally – especially as Armenia is a non-Muslim country. But Azerbaijan’s constant expansionist approach towards Iranian territories since its independence makes such an alliance highly unlikely, no matter who rules Iran. </p>
<p>Azerbaijan has made <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326403901_The_clash_of_nationalisms_Iranian_response_to_Baku's_Irredentism">significant investments</a>
in promoting separatist ideas among Turkic Iranians and maintained an appetite for integrating the Iranian provinces of Eastern and Western Azarbaijan into the republic. This has been one of the main reasons why Iran’s ruling Shia theocracy is reluctant to take Azerbaijan’s side, despite the fact that the majority of Azerbaijan’s population is also Shia.</p>
<p>Baku’s partnerships with the US and Israel, as well as its secular government with an adamant resistance to any influence from Iran, also increase the Islamic Republic’s hesitance to support Azerbaijan. </p>
<p>Armenia, on the other hand, has not demonstrated any expansionist policies towards Iranian territories. Nor has it developed relations with Iran’s nemeses – the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia – to a degree that undermines its cordial relations with Tehran. Still, it would be counter-intuitive for Iran’s Shia theocracy to overtly ally with a Christian republic against another Shia majority country. </p>
<p>This is why the best option for protecting Iran’s security and stability is for Tehran to maintain its neutral stance while supporting international initiatives to resolve the conflict.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/147402/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Marzieh Kouhi-Esfahani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>As fighting continues between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, neighbouring Iran has offered to mediate.Marzieh Kouhi-Esfahani, Teaching Fellow, Durham UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1452532020-09-10T11:14:17Z2020-09-10T11:14:17ZIran’s secular shift: new survey reveals huge changes in religious beliefs<p>Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution was a defining event that changed how we think about the relationship between religion and modernity. Ayatollah Khomeini’s mass mobilisation of Islam showed that modernisation by no means implies <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/global-religious-and-secular-dynamics-the-modern-system-of-classification">a linear process of religious decline</a>. </p>
<p>Reliable large-scale data on Iranians’ post-revolutionary religious beliefs, however, has always been lacking. Over the years, <a href="https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780198788553.001.0001/oso-9780198788553-chapter-10">research</a> and waves of protests and crackdowns indicated <a href="https://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/15645.html">massive disappointment</a> among Iranians with their political system. This steadily turned into a deeply felt disillusionment with institutional religion. </p>
<p>In June 2020, our research institute, the Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in IRAN (<a href="https://gamaan.org">GAMAAN</a>), conducted an online survey with the collaboration of <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/authors/ladan-boroumand/">Ladan Boroumand</a>, co-founder of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in Iran. </p>
<p><a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/GAMAAN-Iran-Religion-Survey-2020-English.pdf">The results verify</a> Iranian society’s unprecedented secularisation.</p>
<h2>Reaching Iranians online</h2>
<p>Iran’s <a href="https://www.amar.org.ir/Portals/1/census/2016/Census_2016_Selected_Findings.pdf">census claims that 99.5% of the population are Muslim</a>, a figure that hides the state’s active hostility toward irreligiosity, conversion and unrecognised religious minorities. </p>
<p>Iranians live with an ever-present fear of retribution for speaking against the state. In Iran, one cannot simply call people or <a href="https://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/11/iranians-views-mixed-on-political-role-for-religious-figures/">knock on doors</a> seeking answers to politically sensitive questions. That’s why the anonymity of digital surveys offers an opportunity to capture what Iranians really think about religion.</p>
<p>Since the revolution, literacy rates have risen sharply and the urban population has grown substantially. Levels of internet penetration in Iran are comparable to those in Italy, with <a href="https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-iran">around 60 million users</a> and the number grows relentlessly: 70% of adults <a href="http://ispa.ir/Default/Details/fa/2094/70">are members</a> of at least one social media platform. </p>
<p>For our survey on religious belief in Iran, we targeted diverse digital channels after analysing which groups showed lower participation rates in our previous large-scale <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/gamaan-referendum-survey-report-english-2019.pdf">surveys</a>. The link to the survey was shared by Kurdish, Arab, Sufi and other networks. And our research assistant successfully convinced Shia pro-regime channels to spread it among their followers, too. We reached mass audiences by sharing the survey on Instagram pages and Telegram channels, some of which had a few million followers.</p>
<p>After cleaning our data, we were left with a sample of almost 40,000 Iranians living in Iran. The sample was <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2018/01/26/how-different-weighting-methods-work/">weighted</a> and balanced to the target population of literate Iranians aged above 19, using five demographic variables and voting behaviour in the 2017 presidential elections.</p>
<h2>A secular and diverse Iran</h2>
<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UiIUbXNWeU&ab_channel=GAMAAN">Our results</a> reveal dramatic changes in Iranian religiosity, with an increase in secularisation and a diversity of faiths and beliefs. Compared with Iran’s 99.5% census figure, we found that only 40% identified as Muslim.</p>
<p>In contrast with <a href="https://books.google.nl/books/about/Staging_a_Revolution.html?id=urnBAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y">state propaganda that portrays</a> Iran as a Shia nation, only 32% explicitly identified as such, while 5% said they were Sunni Muslim and 3% Sufi Muslim. Another 9% said they were atheists, along with 7% who prefer the label of spirituality. Among the other selected religions, 8% said they were Zoroastrians – which we interpret as a reflection of <a href="https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64581/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_shared_repository_Content_LSE%20Middle%20East%20Centre%20Papers_Abdolmohammadi_Revival%20of%20nationalism%20Iran_2015.pdf">Persian nationalism</a> and a desire for an alternative to Islam, rather than strict adherence to the Zoroastrian faith – while 1.5% said they were Christian. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=509&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356406/original/file-20200903-16-qml66z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=640&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GAMAAN Religion in Iran 2020 - identifications.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Most Iranians, 78%, believe in God, but only 37% believe in life after death and only 30% believe in heaven and hell. In line with other <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691163789/the-iranian-metaphysicals">anthropological research</a>, a quarter of our respondents said they believed in jinns or genies. Around 20% said they did not believe in any of the options, including God.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=438&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356408/original/file-20200903-18-haj133.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=551&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GAMAAN Religion in Iran 2020 - beliefs.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>These numbers demonstrate that a general process of secularisation, known to encourage <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/323835">religious diversity,</a> is taking place in Iran. An overwhelming majority, 90%, described themselves as hailing from believing or practising religious families. Yet 47% reported losing their religion in their lifetime, and 6% said they changed from one religious orientation to another. Younger people reported higher levels of irreligiosity and conversion to Christianity than older respondents.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=464&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/357073/original/file-20200908-18-f7azhb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=583&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GAMAAN religion in Iran 2020 - changing orientations.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A third said they occasionally drank alcohol in a country that legally enforces temperance. Over 60% said they did not perform the obligatory Muslim daily prayers, synchronous with a 2020 state-backed poll in which <a href="http://ispa.ir/Content/image_project/image_gallery/241820172434(0).jpg">60% reported</a> not observing the fast during Ramadan (the majority due to being “sick”). In comparison, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41420721?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">in a comprehensive survey conducted in 1975</a> before the Islamic Revolution, over 80% said they always prayed and observed the fast. </p>
<h2>Religion and legislation</h2>
<p>We found that societal secularisation was also linked to a critical view of the religious governance system: 68% agreed that religious prescriptions should be excluded from legislation, even if believers hold a parliamentary majority, and 72% opposed the law mandating all women wear the hijab, the Islamic veil. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=341&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/356410/original/file-20200903-20-126bklt.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">GAMAAN Religion in Iran 2020 - hijab.</span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Iranians also harbour illiberal secularist opinions regarding religious diversity: 43% said that no religions should have the right to proselytise in public. However, 41% believed that every religion should be able to manifest in public.</p>
<p>Four decades ago, the Islamic Revolution taught sociologists that European-style secularisation is not followed universally around the world. The subsequent secularisation of Iran confirmed by our survey demonstrates that Europe is not exceptional either, but rather part of complex, global interactions between religious and secular forces.</p>
<p>Other research on population growth, whose decline <a href="https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/pvwpy/">has been linked</a> to higher levels of secularisation, also suggests a decline in religiosity in Iran. In 2020, Iran recorded its <a href="https://www.isna.ir/news/99023122614/%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B4-%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AE">lowest population growth, below 1%</a>. </p>
<p>Greater access to the world via the internet, but also through interactions with the global Iranian diaspora in the past 50 years, has generated new communities and forms of religious experience inside the country. A future disentangling of state power and religious authority would likely exacerbate these societal transformations. Iran as we think we know it is changing, in fundamental ways.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/145253/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pooyan Tamimi Arab is the secretary of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ammar Maleki is the director of the non-profit research institute GAMAAN. GAMAAN (gamaan.org) collaborated with and received funding for this research from Ladan Boroumand.</span></em></p>A huge new online survey of Iranians reveals only 40% identify as Muslim.Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, Utrecht UniversityAmmar Maleki, Assistant Professor, Public Law and Governance, Tilburg UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1256362019-11-21T20:15:55Z2019-11-21T20:15:55ZBroken trust: How Iraqis lost their faith in Washington, long before the Kurds did<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302762/original/file-20191120-479-15lbg25.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">A mass grave is excavated in Khan Al-Rubea in 2003 that witnesses say is filled with the remains of Shia whom Saddam executed in 1991. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iraq-IRAQ-M-/7ad839139fe5da11af9f0014c2589dfb/8/0">AP/Hasan Sarbakhshian</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In all the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/trump-betray-kurds-support/599737/">hand-wringing</a> that critics and commentators have done since President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from northern Syria, one of the common refrains emphasizes the breach of trust between Washington and its Kurdish militia partners.</p>
<p>Some scholars of <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/foreign_pol_walt.pdf">international relations</a> put little stock in trust. Countries are selfish, after all. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.princeton.edu/%7Eamoravcs/library/liberalism_working.pdf">Others</a> see trust in impersonal terms, embedded in the rules, norms, institutions and alliances that bind countries to each other. </p>
<p>It turns out, though, that trust does matter in international relations. And in the Middle East, trust is often seen in personal terms. </p>
<p>For the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/opinion/trump-turkey-kurds-syria.html">American personnel</a> who worked, ate and lived with the Syrian Kurds, trust-building was also a deeply personal experience. Trust underpinned the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/28/world/middleeast/isis-kurds-baghdadi.html">crucial intelligence cooperation</a> between the U.S. and its Kurdish partners. That cooperation helped plan and execute the raid that led to the capture killing of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.</p>
<p>As one former American special operator has <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/11/abandoning-kurds-america-hurt-itself/161201/">written</a>, “Trust is a powerful commodity that has saved many lives in shadowy battlefields across the Middle East. But it takes a long time to build and can be gone in an instant.”</p>
<p>By contrast, mistrust, even if it is based on perception alone, can linger for decades, thwarting Washington’s foreign policy goals.</p>
<h2>Defeating the Islamic State</h2>
<p>I observed the long-term consequences of broken trust next door to Syria, in Iraq. </p>
<p>I served as a U.S. diplomat in the southern Iraqi city of Basrah during 2015 and 2016, the height of the war against the Islamic State group, also known as IS.</p>
<p>At the time, after years of sectarian strife, dishonest governments and their broken promises, Iraqis seemed united around the common purpose of defeating IS. The <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/what-we-left-behind">corrupt and sectarian regime</a> of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had been ousted. And the U.S. was leading an international coalition to help the Iraqi government in the fight against IS, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in <a href="https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-13-2017-united-states-announces-additional-humanitarian-assistance-iraqi-people">humanitarian assistance</a>. </p>
<p>You might think that a war that the U.S. was fighting on behalf of the Iraqi people, a war that was truly an existential one for the majority Iraqi Shia, would have produced at least some goodwill toward the United States.</p>
<p>Instead, when I arrived in Basrah in 2015, I discovered that many Iraqis, including the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-27945271/iraq-crisis-the-sunni-shia-divide-explained">majority Shia Muslim</a> population among whom I lived, believed that the United States was somehow in cahoots with the Islamic State. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=432&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302757/original/file-20191120-483-1simnl2.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=543&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">U.S. tacit support for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s made Iraqis cynical about U.S. trustworthiness after Hussein was deposed.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Associated-Press-International-News-Iraq-SADDAM-/3b22e19e04f2da11af9f0014c2589dfb/42/0">AP photo</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>Mistrust for decades</h2>
<p>The Middle East is rife with conspiracy theories. But this one was particularly jarring given that the United States was then engaged in a costly and very public effort to defeat the Islamic State, a terrorist group which declared the Shia apostates and said they must be killed.</p>
<p>Over time, I began to understand the roots of these attitudes. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT">Disinformation</a> and propaganda, especially from Iran, fueled them to some extent. </p>
<p>But there were deeper issues at play. </p>
<p>“The United States defeated Saddam’s armies in a matter of weeks,” incredulous Iraqis I met would say to me. “So how is it that you can’t defeat a ragtag army of jihadists in two years?” </p>
<p>Iranian <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iran-spreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT">disinformation campaigns</a> blaming the U.S. for the Islamic State were effective because of a deep gulf of mistrust between the U.S. and Iraqis, which led to widespread cynicism among ordinary Iraqis about U.S. motives. </p>
<p>The origins of this mistrust go back decades, from tacit U.S. support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, when Washington turned a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/14/books/turning-a-blind-eye.html">blind eye</a> to the dictatorship’s atrocities against Iraqi Kurds. </p>
<p>The lack of trust helps explain why the U.S. had such a hard time stabilizing Iraq after 2003, despite toppling a feared despot and despite investing billions of dollars in the country. </p>
<h2>Roots in betrayal</h2>
<p>Iraqi Shia are the largest Muslim sect in the country, but have less political power than Sunni Muslims. The Shia in particular have painful memories of an event that they see as a massive breach of trust between them and the U.S. </p>
<p>In 1991, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-iraqi-uprising-twenty-five-years-ago">encouraged</a> by then-President George H.W. Bush, the Shia rose up against Saddam, only to be abandoned by the U.S. </p>
<p>Tens of thousands of Iraqi Shia were <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2888989.stm">slaughtered</a>. </p>
<p>I visited a memorial to the victims of Saddam’s suppression of the uprising, where I saw a leaflet displayed that was dropped by U.S. and coalition aircraft calling on Iraqi soldiers and civilians to “fill the streets and alleys and bring down Saddam Hussein and his aides.” </p>
<p>“We thought this meant that the Americans would help us,” my guide at the museum told me.</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/302756/original/file-20191120-515-1b9h28k.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">President Trump visited U.S. troops at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, Dec. 26, 2018.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Trump-Iraq/0c7bb5c680f7487b954c45e5c87a1d5d/11/0">AP/Andrew Harnik</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many Iraqis I met also recalled the devastating 1990s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/were-sanctions-right.html">sanctions</a> on their country that were championed by the United States. Others talked of Washington’s <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraq-without-a-plan/">failure to stabilize</a> the country after 2003. Then there was the perception that the Obama administration came late to the war against the Islamic State. </p>
<p>Other Iraqis I met – young ones – told me of their resentment at U.S. support for a political class in Baghdad that is seen as deeply corrupt. Some of them are no doubt <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/protesters-tahrir-square-iraq-191111195848776.html">protesting</a> in the streets and squares of Iraqi cities today. </p>
<p>I attended lots of meetings with Iraqi Sunni tribal leaders in the south. They saw the Obama administration’s <a href="https://www.npr.org/2015/12/19/459850716/fact-check-did-obama-withdraw-from-iraq-too-soon-allowing-isis-to-grow">2011 withdrawal of U.S. troops</a> and general disengagement from Iraq as a betrayal of trust. They saw it as handing over Iraq to Iranian influence, which they fear. </p>
<p>Ultimately, Iraqis did not see the U.S. as a credible, consistent or committed partner. Some <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/18/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-spy-cables.html">turned to Iran for assistance</a>, while turning against the United States. Perhaps it is no surprise that <a href="https://www.ndi.org/Poll_Points_Path_Forward_Iraq_Reconciliation">polls taken</a> at the time I worked in Basrah showed that Iraqis saw Iran and Russia as more favorable security partners.</p>
<h2>Can’t escape the past</h2>
<p>Iraq is by no means a perfect analogy for the shattered trust between <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/world/middleeast/kurds-sense-of-betrayal-compounded-by-empowerment-of-unsavory-rivals.html">Washington and its Syrian Kurdish allies</a>. Yet the the Iraqi experience shows that distrust of the United States has deep roots in past U.S. actions. </p>
<p>In Syria, too, the U.S. has left a legacy of mistrust since 2011, from <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/04/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-syrian-red-line-incident/">Obama’s failure</a> to follow through on his call for Assad to step down, to his <a href="https://www.vox.com/2018/4/15/17238568/syria-bomb-trump-obama-russia">failure to impose meaningful costs</a> on the Syrian regime for its use of chemical weapons. Trump’s withdrawal is just one episode in a longer story.</p>
<p>Despite breaches of trust, <a href="https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/iraqi-official-us-support-vital-lasting-defeat">Iraqis continued to need U.S. support</a>. But that need paired with a lack of trust makes things difficult for American diplomats in Iraq. For me, it was often overwhelming to be at the receiving end of the immense disappointment, frustration and more rarely, hope, that the Iraqis have in the United States. </p>
<p>The Syrian Kurds, like the Iraqis, will still need the United States and continue to work with Washington. But the breach of trust will complicate cooperation, as it did in Iraq.</p>
<p>Not everything that Iraqis blame the United States for is fair. And it would be impossible for even the best-crafted U.S. policies to satisfy all of Iraq’s diverse people. </p>
<p>At times I tried to remind my unfailingly hospitable Iraqi interlocutors, especially those in the government, to be a bit more introspective about their own failings and responsibility for Iraq’s post-Saddam ills. I tried to remind them that the United States invested a lot in Iraq, with limited results. </p>
<p>In the end, the credibility of the message was undercut by a lack of trust in the messenger.</p>
<p>[ <em>You’re smart and curious about the world. So are The Conversation’s authors and editors.</em> <a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=youresmart">You can read us daily by subscribing to our newsletter</a>. ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/125636/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski has previously received funding from the United States government through a Fulbright grant.</span></em></p>Distrust of the US – even if misplaced – can linger for decades, thwarting Washington’s foreign policy goals. A former US diplomat in Iraq reflects on that country’s skepticism of US aid efforts.Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, Assistant Professor of Politics, Pomona CollegeLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1261752019-11-13T13:10:03Z2019-11-13T13:10:03ZWhat is a caliph? The Islamic State tries to boost its legitimacy by hijacking a historic institution<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300751/original/file-20191107-10930-39lr05.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">An image of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who died on Oct. 26, 2019..</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/US-Islamic-State/fee3c4433beb4f088323b85b942a5c0c/38/0">Department of Defense via AP</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Just days after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/27/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis-leader-killed-us-donald-trump">death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a> on Oct. 27, the Islamic State named <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50254785">Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi</a> as the new “caliph.” </p>
<p>In 2014, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2014/jun/30/isis-declares-caliphate-in-iraq-and-syria-live-updates">IS conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria</a> and declared itself to be the “caliphate.” </p>
<p>Defined and applied in different ways over the centuries, the fundamental idea behind the caliphate is the <a href="https://www.hachettebookgroup.com/titles/hugh-kennedy/caliphate/9780465094394/?lens=perseus">just ordering of society</a> according to the will of God. </p>
<p>The Islamic State’s caliphate was never widely recognized among the global Muslim community and no longer has significant territory. But the Islamic State still uses the history of the caliphate to push their claims.</p>
<p>As <a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=cQRzNv8AAAAJ&hl=en">a scholar of global Islam</a>, every time I teach my “Introduction to Islam” class, questions about the caliphate come up, in part because of IS’s claims. </p>
<h2>Caliph conundrums</h2>
<p>The leader of a caliphate is called the caliph, meaning deputy or representative. All caliphs are believed to be the successor to Prophet Muhammad. Muhammad was not a caliph; <a href="https://quran.com/33/40">according to the Quran</a> he was the last and greatest of the prophets. </p>
<p>That means no one can replace Muhammad as the messenger of God. The caliph, for example, is not always seen as holding special spiritual authority. But he is meant to preside over the caliphate in the absence of Muhammad.</p>
<p>The debate over who was the rightful representative of the prophet began immediately after his death. <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=islam+a+brief+history&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false">While the majority supported Abu Bakr</a> – one of the prophet’s closest companions – a minority opted for his young son-in-law and cousin, Ali. </p>
<p>Abu Bakr’s supporters would come to be known as <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Sunni Muslims</a>, who believe that Muhammad did not leave instructions regarding his successor. Those who felt Ali was appointed by the prophet to be the political and spiritual leader of the fledgling Muslim community became known as Shiite Muslims. </p>
<p>Abu Bakr was the first caliph and Ali the fourth. </p>
<p><a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=EmN8tCx_jR4C&pg=PA9&dq=the+rashidun&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwisvPS13uHlAhUGjqQKHeqGB_0Q6AEIWjAH#v=onepage&q=the%20rashidun&f=false">The second and third caliphs were Umar and Uthman</a>. Under Umar, the caliphate expanded to include many regions of the world such as the lands of the former Byzantine and Sassanian empires in Asia Minor, Persia and Central Asia. Uthman is credited with compiling the Quran. </p>
<p>That al-Baghdadi adopted the name of the first caliph was no coincidence. Together, Sunni Muslims call the first four caliphs <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoe277">the Rashidun, or the “Rightly Guided Caliphs,”</a> because they were close companions or relations of Muhammad. They are also believed to be extraordinarily pious. This period lasted about 30 years. </p>
<h2>The complex history of the caliphate</h2>
<p>After rebels assassinated Uthman in A.D. 656, Ali was elected caliph. However, a civil war soon broke out between Ali and Muʿawiya ibn Abi Sufyan. The civil war ended in Sufyan’s victory and the formation of the Umayyad caliphate in A.D. 661. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/isru/hd_isru.htm">The Umayyad dynasty lasted 89 years</a>.</p>
<p>The Abbasid dynasty descended from Muhammad’s uncle, Abbas ibn Abdul-Muttalib, and succeeded the Umayyads.</p>
<p>These two caliphates oversaw the continuing expansion of the empire. <a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-24774-8_2">Under them architecture, the arts and sciences flourished</a>.</p>
<p>For example, the “Dome of the Rock,” a shrine in the Old City of Jerusalem, was built under an Umayyad caliph as <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233604991_The_Dome_of_the_Rock_Origin_of_its_Octagonal_Plan">a monument</a> to the rising supremacy of their empire.</p>
<p>The Grand Library of Baghdad, also known as the “House of Wisdom,” was supported by Abbasid patronage. The “House of Wisdom” is credited with being a center of translation, scientific study and academic exchange. This period of flourishing, from the eighth to the 14th century, is often referred to as the <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=O36yXxCMiQIC&pg=PA39&dq=islamic+golden+age&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiGvsuz4OHlAhU9wAIHHdFcBmo4FBDoAQgvMAE#v=onepage&q=islamic%20golden%20age&f=false">“Islamic Golden Age</a>.”</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=411&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/300754/original/file-20191107-10961-19h1cn3.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=517&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Dome of The Rock, in Jerusalem.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rayinmanila/24665287394">Ray in Manila</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Both before and after the fall of the Abbasids in A.D. 1258, a succession of various empires <a href="http://teachmideast.org/articles/timeline-of-islamic-dynasties/">made overlapping and competing claims</a> to the caliphate. These included the Mamluks of Cairo and the Umayyads in Cordóba, Spain. </p>
<p>In 1517, the Turkish Ottomans amassed enough land and power throughout Asia Minor, North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Eastern Europe to claim the title “caliphate.” Ottoman sultans, however, were not universally recognized as caliphs. <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/declaring-caliphate-doesnt-make-one-caliph">Many Muslims believe</a> that the caliphate effectively ended after the Mongol conquest of Abbasid Baghdad in A.D. 1258.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the Ottomans effectively held on to that title until 1924, when the Turkish nationalist and secularist Kemal Ataturk <a href="https://books.google.de/books?id=R3SYDwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=ataturk+abolished+caliphate&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi_tJ-e4eHlAhVS2KQKHTeXA4kQ6AEISDAE#v=onepage&q=ataturk%20abolished%20caliphate&f=false">abolished the caliphate</a>. </p>
<h2>Resurrecting the caliphate?</h2>
<p>The idea of the caliphate, which the Islamic State has forcefully promoted, recalls a time and a place when Islamic states flourished politically, economically and socially. It also summons up a spiritual vision of a supposedly more devout and dedicated Muslim community than exists today. </p>
<p>Other modern-day Islamists have called for a <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4287&context=gc_etds">resurrection of the caliphate,</a> or at least its ideals, as a way to recapture the vibrancy of the past. However, only violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida or the Islamic State have tried to make it a tangible reality.</p>
<p>Killing al-Baghdadi has not quashed the Islamic State’s version of the caliphate. The idea <a href="https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state">lives on and continues to motivate</a> its members in enclaves across the globe. It is worth mentioning that the name of their new caliph is an honorific title for a member of Prophet Muhammad’s family – “al-Qurashi.” This prophetic lineage is one more way IS is trying to resurrect the history of the caliphate for its destructive purposes. </p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/126175/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ken Chitwood does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Islamic State has appointed yet another ‘caliph’ after the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What is the idea behind the caliphate?Ken Chitwood, Lecturer, Concordia College New York, Concordia College New YorkLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1226102019-09-06T11:18:17Z2019-09-06T11:18:17ZWhat is Ashura? How this Shiite Muslim holiday inspires millions<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/290796/original/file-20190903-175673-8bwl2v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ashura in Syria</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ashura_in_Syria-_2017_01_(2).jpg">Tasnim News Agency</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Thousands of Shiite Muslims from around the world will <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/93yvgy/look-at-these-spectacular-images-of-shia-muslims-marking-ashura-in-iraq">visit Iraq this month to see the shrines</a> of Hussain, grandson of Prophet Mohammed, and his brother Abbas on the day of “Ashura.” </p>
<p>This annual pilgrimage marks the 10th day of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic new year. As the Islamic calendar is a lunar one, the day of Ashura changes from year to year.</p>
<p>Muslims visit the shrines to observe the martyrdom day of Hussain, who was killed in the desert of Karbala in today’s Iraq in A.D. 680. Shiite Muslims believe that Hussain was their third imam – a line of 12 divinely appointed spiritual and political successors. </p>
<p>Muharram may be an ancient festival, but as <a href="https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1169/">my research</a> tracing the modern-day impact of Islamic pilgrimage shows, its meaning has changed over the centuries. What was once a commemoration of martyrdom today inspires much more, including social justice work around the globe. </p>
<h2>Martyrdom of Hussain</h2>
<p>The story of Muharram dates back 13 centuries, to events that followed the death of Prophet Mohammed.</p>
<p>After the prophet’s death in A.D. 632, <a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">a dispute emerged</a> over who would inherit the leadership of the Muslim community and the title of caliph, or “deputy of God.” A majority of Muslims backed Abu Bakr, a close companion of the prophet, to become the first caliph. A minority wanted the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali. Those that supported his claim later came to be called Shiite Muslims. </p>
<p>Even if Ali was not made the caliph, Shiite Muslims would consider Ali their first imam – a leader divinely appointed by God. The title of imam would be passed on to his sons and his descendants.</p>
<p>Political leadership largely remained out of the hands of Shiite Imams. They would not be caliphs, but Shiites came to believe that their imam was the true leader to be followed. </p>
<p>By the time Ali’s second son, Hussain, came to be the third imam, divisions between the caliph and the imam had further deepened.</p>
<p>In A.D. 680, during the holy month of Muharram, a caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, Yazīd, ordered Hussain to pledge allegiance to him and his <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780203137000">caliphate</a> – a dynasty that ruled the Islamic world from A.D. 661 to 750. </p>
<p>Hussain refused because he believed Yazīd’s rule to be unjust and illegitimate. </p>
<p>His rejection resulted in a massive 10-day standoff at Karbala, in modern-day Iraq, between Umayyad’s large army and <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=egGgUM_YdL8C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=A%20Brief%20Historical%20Background&f=false">Hussain’s small band</a>, which included his half-brother, wives, children, sisters and closest followers. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=403&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/291000/original/file-20190904-175700-nsjgco.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=506&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/akocman/4598825877">Alessandra Kocman</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>The Umayyad army cut off food and water for Hussain and his companions. And on the day of Ashura, Hussain was brutally killed. Among the men, only Hussain’s sick son was spared. Women were unveiled – a violation of their honor as the family members of the prophet – and paraded to Damascus, the seat of Umayyad rule. </p>
<h2>Passion plays and performances</h2>
<p>This history is reenacted throughout the world on the day of Ashura. </p>
<p>In Iraq, millions of pilgrims fill the streets to visit the shrines, chanting poems of lamentation, and witness a reenactment of violence in Karbala and the capture of the women and children. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/tc4tZTEQ3VA?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Lights of Hussain’s shrine, in Karbala, present-day Iraq, change from white to red, the color of martyrdom, on the first night of Muharram, while the crowds chant ‘Labbayk Ya Husayn,’ meaning ‘I am here, Hussain,’ answering the call he is believed to have made centuries earlier.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>From New York and London to Hyderabad and Melbourne, thousands take part in Ashura processions carrying replicas of Hussain’s battle standard and following a white horse. This symbolizes Hussain’s riderless horse returning to the camp after his martyrdom. </p>
<p>Persian passion plays known as “taziyeh,” music dramas of the many martyrs and tragedies of Karbala, are performed across Iran and many other countries. Taziyeh performances are <a href="https://asiasociety.org/time-out-memory-taziyeh-total-drama">meant to evoke deep emotions</a> of grief in the audience. </p>
<h2>A powerful set of themes</h2>
<p>Numerous historians and anthropologists have explored how communities across time and space have <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=_62A00tLaygC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=Contents&f=false">adapted the story</a> of <a href="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300035537/shiism-and-social-protest">Karbala</a> or the <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=bd3Mst27MlkC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=Karbala&f=false">rituals around Ashūrā</a>. </p>
<p>In the 16th century, <a href="https://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/E/bo8922300.html">a vast majority of the population</a> across Persia, or today’s Iran, would be converted to Shiite Muslims. In this region, the passion plays evolved into a popular form of religious and artistic expression. </p>
<p>The character of Zainab, the Prophet Mohammed’s granddaughter, has also come to play a central role in remembrance of the Karbala story. </p>
<p>Scholars have <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=MntMCAAAQBAJ&pg=PT144&lpg=PT144&dq=khutba+zainab&source=bl&ots=FhwAf7KvCs&sig=ACfU3U1_74Uk5WVpfDYT8LedFn4YKNP9aA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjlmfiUxLXkAhUxq1kKHXxcBHQ4ChDoATAHegQIBxAB#v=onepage&q=khutba%20zainab&f=false">drawn attention</a> to speeches in which Zainab denounced the violence in Karbala and lauded Hussain’s “martyrdom.” </p>
<p>Today, Zainab is seen as a strong female model of resistance. </p>
<p>In the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the story of Karbala became a <a href="http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/ashariati/works/red_black_shiism.php">rallying point</a> for opponents of the shah, who were fighting against the shah’s brutal and oppressive regime. They compared the shah to the caliph Yazīd and argued that ordinary Iranians had to stand up to an oppressor, just like Hussain had.</p>
<p>Zainab’s resistance to oppression <a href="https://utpress.utexas.edu/books/aghwom">helped emphasize the role of women</a> in Islamic society. </p>
<p>Anthropologist <a href="https://anthropology.mit.edu/people/faculty/michael-fischer">Michael Fischer</a> calls this the “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=QzDMzTWRnFIC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=paradigm&f=false">Karbala paradigm</a>” – a story that captures a powerful set of themes, including people standing up to the state and fighting for justice and morality.</p>
<h2>Inspiring change?</h2>
<p>Today the story of Karbala has become a powerful tool of fight for social justice in Muslim communities. </p>
<p><a href="https://whoishussain.org/">“Who is Hussain?,”</a> a social movement with chapters in over 60 cities worldwide, carries out charitable activities and blood donations in the name of Hussain. Volunteers are encouraged to organize around events that will be meaningful in their communities and will tie into social justice issues that Hussain is believed to have fought for. </p>
<p>In 2018, <a href="https://whoishussain.org/tag/michigan/">local volunteers donated</a> tens of thousands of bottles of water in Flint, Michigan in remembrance of Hussain and his companions, who were denied water for three days before they were killed. </p>
<p>As historian <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/yitzhak-nakash">Yitzhak Nakash</a> points out, the tragedy of Karbala gives Shiite Muslims a <a href="https://brill.com/view/journals/wdi/33/2/article-p161_1.xml">common narrative</a> to pass on to the next generations. And commemorating it in multiple ways is an part of their unique identity.</p>
<p>[ <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/us/newsletters?utm_source=TCUS&utm_medium=inline-link&utm_campaign=newsletter-text&utm_content=expertise">Expertise in your inbox. Sign up for The Conversation’s newsletter and get a digest of academic takes on today’s news, every day.</a></em> ]</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/122610/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Noorzehra Zaidi received funding from Gerda Henkel Stiftung to carry out research on transnational Ashūra rituals. </span></em></p>For Muslims, Ashura marks the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammed’s grandson Hussain.Noorzehra Zaidi, Assistant Professor of HIstory, University of Maryland, Baltimore CountyLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1119522019-02-15T18:24:20Z2019-02-15T18:24:20ZSenate vote could end US complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/259331/original/file-20190215-56215-kyv5id.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Severe malnutrition, like this Yemeni boy experienced, is one of the results of the Yemen conflict. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Yemen-Malnutrition/ab4969ee717245b8ac36b4dd034437c0/91/0">AP/Hani Mohammed</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>The U.S. House of Representatives has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/us/politics/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html">voted overwhelmingly</a> to pass legislation to deny further military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.</p>
<p>The bipartisan vote for the bill was a repudiation of the Obama and Trump administrations’ support for the Saudis and a war that many charge includes violations of human rights. A Saudi-led coalition of states has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?marker=36#!/conflict/war-in-yemen">aggressively bombing Yemen</a> and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">to describe</a> Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”</p>
<p>The legislation now goes to the Senate. <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/429894-house-passes-bill-to-end-us-military-support-to-saudis-in-yemen">President Trump has said that he would veto</a> it if passed. </p>
<p>Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/bachman.cfm">scholar of genocide and human rights</a>, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide.</p>
<p>Based on my research, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2018.1539910">published online</a> by Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations.</p>
<h2>A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’</h2>
<p>Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">Shia Houthi movement</a> – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423">a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia</a>. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one. </p>
<p>That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/houthis-deny-u-s-saudi-claim-that-they-are-irans-puppets">assertions</a> that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/?utm_term=.cc639b2c69c8">uncontested</a>. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S. administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.</p>
<p>Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.</p>
<p>During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the <a href="http://yemendataproject.org/">Yemen Data Project</a>, which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.” </p>
<p><iframe id="gHIiB" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/gHIiB/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Based on the information available to it using open sources, the Yemen Data Project reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against nonmilitary and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately. </p>
<p>That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl">rules</a> of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons.</p>
<p><iframe id="zYNNl" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/zYNNl/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked. </p>
<p>Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too. </p>
<p><iframe id="s7FOm" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/s7FOm/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance.</p>
<p><iframe id="JxS3p" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/JxS3p/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How to make a crisis</h2>
<p>The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1800513.pdf">according</a> to the U.N. panel of experts on Yemen.</p>
<p>The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-017-0092-3">analysis of the blockade’s legality</a>, <a href="http://www.uva.nl/en/profile/f/i/m.d.fink/m.d.fink.html">Dutch military scholar Martin Fink</a> writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.” </p>
<p>Despite U.N. efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether.</p>
<p>In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/376891524812213584/Securing-imports-of-essential-food-commodities-to-Yemen-an-assessment-of-constraints-and-options-for-intervention">notes</a>, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.” </p>
<p>Similarly, Tufts University scholar <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/mass-starvation-political-weapon">Alex de Waal describes Yemen</a> as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662">deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure</a>.” </p>
<p>The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/response-plans/2017/yemen/en/">only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen</a> were functional. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">Secretary-General Guterres put it</a>, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.”</p>
<p>As of February 2018, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22651&LangID=E">according</a> to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more. </p>
<p>Yet, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-famine-children-deaths-1.4914179">estimated</a> 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/opinion/yemen-al-hudaydah-famine-houthis.html">50,000 child deaths</a> in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes.</p>
<p>Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide</a>,” referred to as a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=bEcTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=#v=onepage&q&f=false">“synchronized attack on different aspects of life</a>.” </p>
<h2>The US contribution</h2>
<p>The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the U.S. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen">the Obama</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/12/trumps-one-step-back-on-yemen-wont-satisfy-critics/">Trump administrations</a>.</p>
<p>U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. <a href="https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/US%20Arms%20Sales%202017%20Report.pdf">In 2016</a>, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition.</p>
<p><iframe id="duz6t" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/duz6t/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance. </p>
<p>Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and midair refueling of coalition warplanes, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-refueling-for-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen/2018/11/09/d08ff6c3-babd-4958-bcca-cdb1caa9d5b4_story.html?utm_term=.b66185ea63b1">which was halted in early November 2018</a>. By the middle of 2017, the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times. </p>
<h2>Shared responsibility for genocide</h2>
<p>As a genocide scholar, I believe that under <a href="http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/documents/Book25/Book25.pdf">international law</a>, the U.S. shares responsibility with the coalition for genocide in Yemen. </p>
<p>What does this mean? It means that the U.S. must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for coalition action. The legislation passed by the House would largely accomplish this, though the House bill would allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.” </p>
<p>However, even if the Senate passes it, the president’s likely veto of the bill will mean no change in the deadly status quo unless the legislation garners enough support to override a presidential veto. </p>
<p>In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide. </p>
<p>Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen. </p>
<p>Of course, this is not an ideal world. </p>
<p>The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.html">authority</a> to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s <a href="https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/06/15/on-the-failed-authority-of-the-international-criminal-court/">authority</a> to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a U.N. Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort.</p>
<p>All that is left, then, is for the people of the U.S. to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names.</p>
<p><em>This is an updated version of <a href="https://theconversation.com/us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-trump-administrations-106896">an article</a> originally published on November 26, 2018.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/111952/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Bachman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The US has supported a Saudi-led military coalition that has inflicted profound and deadly damage on Yemen. A Senate vote could end what a human rights scholar says is US complicity in genocide.Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1104062019-01-29T11:44:32Z2019-01-29T11:44:32ZWhat are Muslim prayer rugs?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255439/original/file-20190124-196228-1sikc3y.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Muslims can pray anywhere in the world using the prayer carpet.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Muslims-in-Hollywood/a7d6715d97494b5eb17fe03347a25bb9/212/0">AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>In a <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1086252588088082432?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fd-1599397641671435474.ampproject.net%2F1901081935550%2Fframe.html">recent tweet</a>, President Trump stated that ranchers have been finding prayer rugs scattered along the U.S.-Mexico border. Late last year, <a href="https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1054351078328885248">he tweeted</a> that “criminals and unknown Middle Easterners” were mixed in with the caravan heading to the U.S.</p>
<p><a href="https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=FvTDlCsAAAAJ&hl=en">My research</a> indicates that Islamophobia often targets visible signs of Muslimness, such as modest clothing like headscarves, as well as prayer rituals and mosques. This time it is the prayer rug.</p>
<p>These fearmongering tweets bear an uncanny resemblance to a 2018 action film, <a href="http://www.philly.com/philly/entertainment/movies/sicario-day-of-the-soldado-movie-review-20180627.html">“Sicario: Day of the Soldado</a>.” Its trailer shows a scene of a Muslim man praying and a row of prayer rugs at the border. In the movie, U.S. officials who find the rugs use them as “evidence” that Muslims are entering the U.S. illegally in order to expand the jurisdiction of the war on terror.</p>
<p>Other than these recent mentions, carpets found fame through Disney’s “Aladdin,” where they were imagined to have the power to fly. However, prayer carpets actually have a much more mundane daily use among Muslims. </p>
<h2>Much more than a plain carpet</h2>
<p>Ritual purity is extremely important for Muslim prayers practices. As Islamic studies scholar <a href="https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/marion-h-katz.html">Marion Katz</a> explains, prayer carpets <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=allSNvtTpZwC&lpg=PR9&ots=GBfhgR7H4P&dq=islamic%20prayer%20carpet&lr&pg=PA23#v=onepage&q=%20carpet&f=false">provide a protective layer</a> between the worshiper and the ground, protecting the clothing from anything on ground that is polluting.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=451&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255632/original/file-20190125-108334-1ylx7pg.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=567&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A prayer niche in a mosque.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/royluck/31897950555">Roy Luck</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><a href="http://muslimheritage.com/article/muslim-carpet">Muslim carpets</a> have been traditionally produced for centuries in Muslim majority regions, sometimes known as “the rug belt,” spanning from Morocco to Central Asia and northern India. There is a wide variety of designs and materials. Islamic art historian <a href="https://www.umass.edu/arthistory/member/walter-denny">Walter B. Denny</a>, in <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=D7vDBQAAQBAJ&lpg=PA5&ots=WFU05K0dne&dq=islamic%20prayer%20rug&lr&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q=islamic%20prayer%20rug&f=false">“How to Read Islamic Carpets,”</a> explains the different materials and symbolism in weaves used in these carpets. </p>
<p>For example, it is common to find symbols such as the prayer niche, a recess in the wall indicating the direction of Mecca; also a lamp, which is a reference to God; as well as flowers and trees that symbolize the abundance of nature in God’s paradise. </p>
<p>Prayer carpets that are used in homes are generally sized for one individual. Those used in mosques are much bigger, <a href="http://islamicart.museumwnf.org/database_item.php?id=object;ISL;tr;Mus01;17;en">often with a motif showing a row of arches</a> to indicate where each worshiper should stand in prayer.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=435&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/255438/original/file-20190124-196250-2tb7dw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=547&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Prayer carpets in mosques have a row of arches.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Muslim-Day-Oklahoma/539b10997667400897d9e9f7aaf5c65c/139/0">AP Photo/Sue Ogrocki</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Islamic carpets have been popular for centuries in Europe and beyond, often picking up symbolism, social meaning and ways of being used. Islamic carpets <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/isca/hd_isca.htm">were popular</a> among the wealthy of Europe, displayed proudly on the floor of their living rooms and on the walls. </p>
<p>Carpets designs have come down through generations. Some depict simple geometric patterns in rough wool, while other are <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/452553">produced by professional artisans</a> for the elite and show hunting scenes and elaborate scenes of paradise. </p>
<h2>Different costs and forms of practice</h2>
<p>Practices vary according to personal and sectarian preference among Muslims. </p>
<p>For everyday use, Muslims purchase simple prayer carpets, mass-produced in Turkey, throughout the Middle East and even China. For use outside, they often carry a thinner travel rug. There are also high-priced versions. An antique carpet was auctioned for <a href="https://www.architecturaldigest.com/gallery/most-expensive-carpets-at-auction-slideshow">US$4.3 million in 2009</a> and an <a href="http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2015/carpets-textiles-n09323/lot.51.html">Ottoman-era prayer rug</a> sold for $30,000 in 2015. </p>
<p>Not all sects of Muslims use the prayer carpet. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=YF4BAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PR1&pg=PR8#v=onepage&q&f=false">Shiite Muslims usually pray</a> on a clay disk called a “turba” in Arabic and “mohr” in Persian. This disk is often made from <a href="https://www.al-islam.org/articles/why-prostrate-karbalas-turba-yasin-t-al-jibouri">soil from Karbala</a>, the place of martyrdom of Hussein, Prophet Muhammad’s grandson in today’s Iraq, or another sacred site. </p>
<figure>
<iframe width="440" height="260" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/utn94yJIAdU?wmode=transparent&start=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>
<figcaption><span class="caption">Shiite Muslims use a clay disk.</span></figcaption>
</figure>
<p>They often place the disk on top of a prayer carpet. When Shiites prostrate their foreheads on the floor during prayer, they want their forehead to be in contact with an organic material rather than the synthetic fibers of a carpet. So, depending on circumstance, they might also place any natural material such as a small straw mat where they pray.</p>
<p>It is highly unlikely for Muslims to leave behind their prayer rugs or to even carry one on a perilous journey through the harsh desert.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/110406/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rose S. Aslan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Trump recently tweeted about prayer rugs being left along the border. Many may not know the role and history of Muslim prayer rugs and why they are not likely to be left behind.Rose S. Aslan, Assistant Professor of Religion, California Lutheran UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1064232018-12-14T11:44:59Z2018-12-14T11:44:59ZWho are Yemen’s Houthis?<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250550/original/file-20181213-178570-rs5rzo.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Supporters of Shiite Houthi rebels attend a rally in Sanaa, Yemen, in 2017.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Yemen/5e3dba120f09431cb34025096ffbadca/71/0">AP Photo/Hani Mohammed, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Fully half of Yemen’s population – <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/world/middleeast/famine-yemen-saudi-arabia-hudaydah.html">14 million people</a> – are on the brink of starvation. Some analysts blame their inability to access basic foodstuff on escalating conflict between two religious factions: the country’s Sunni Muslims and its Houthis. The Houthis belong to the Shiite branch of Islam. </p>
<p>Saudi Arabia, which shares a border with <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/these-maps-show-where-yemens-conflict-could-be-heading-2015-3">Yemen</a> and is predominantly Sunni, has been helping Yemen’s government forces try to regain control over Houthi-held parts of the country. For several weeks, a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/world/middleeast/famine-yemen-saudi-arabia-hudaydah.html">Saudi-led coalition</a> has unleashed near-continuous airstrikes on Houthi strongholds including access points for the majority of humanitarian aid coming into country. </p>
<p>What are the Houthis’ religious beliefs? </p>
<h2>Roots of Houthi movement</h2>
<p>Just as the Protestant tradition is subdivided into Methodists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists and others, Shiite Islam is also subdivided. Houthis belong to the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249485351_Zaydism_A_Theological_and_Political_Survey_Zaydism">Zaydi branch</a>. </p>
<p>From the ninth century onward, or for a thousand years, <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2567">a state ruled by Zaydi</a> religious leaders and politicians existed in northern Yemen. Then, in 1962, Egyptian-trained Yemeni military officers <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">toppled the Zaydi monarchy</a> and replaced it with a republic. Because of their ties to the ancient regime, Zaydis were perceived as a threat to the new government and were subjected to <a href="http://www.mei.edu/publications/huthi-ascent-power">severe repression</a>. </p>
<p>Nearly three decades later, in 1990, the region known as south Yemen merged with north Yemen to become the <a href="https://blog.oup.com/2010/11/yemen/">Republic of Yemen</a>. Zaydis remained <a href="https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen">a majority in the north and west</a> of the country, and also in the capital city of Sanaa. However, in terms of the overall population, they became a minority.</p>
<p>According to a <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html">2010 CIA estimate</a>, 65 percent of Yemen’s people are Sunnis and 35 percent are Shiites. The majority of those Shiites are Zaydis. Jews, Bahais, Hindus and Christians make up less than 1 percent of inhabitants, many of whom are refugees or temporary foreign residents.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=392&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250556/original/file-20181213-178573-1mffisw.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=492&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yemen: 2015 Civil War map. The section in green is controlled by the Houthis.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yemen_war_detailed_map.png#/media/File:Yemen_war_detailed_map.png">0ali1,via Wikimedia Commons</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">CC BY-SA</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>To reduce the dominance of Zaydis in the north, government authorities encouraged Muslims belonging to two Sunni branches with links to Saudi Arabia – Salafis and Wahhabis – <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100903262716?src=recsys&journalCode=uter20">to settle</a> in the heart of the Zaydis’ traditional territories. </p>
<h2>Start of Houthi insurgency</h2>
<p>Contributing to this trend, in the early 1990s, a Yemeni cleric founded a <a href="https://ctc.usma.edu/deconstructing-salafism-in-yemen-2/">teaching institute</a> in the Zaydis’ heartland. This cleric, educated in Saudi Arabia, developed a version of Salafi Islam.</p>
<p>His institute proselytized with the goal of reforming Muslims through conversion. It educated thousands of Yemeni students and, in less than three decades, the new religious group grew large enough to compete with older groups such as the Zaydis.</p>
<p>According to scholar <a href="https://www.towson.edu/cla/departments/geography/cschmitz.html">Charles Schmitz</a>, the Houthi insurgency began in the early 1990s, spurred, in part, by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31645145">Zaydi resistance</a> to growing Salafi and Wahhabi <a href="https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/what-houthi-movement">influence</a> in the north. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.academia.edu/4818151/A_Portrait_of_Tunisia_s_Ansar_al-_Shari_a_Leader_Abu_Iyad_al-Tunisi_His_Strategy_on_Jihad">Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi</a>, son of a prominent Zaydi cleric, gave the grassroots movement its name. He coalesced support among his followers around a narrative of Houthis as defenders and revivers of Zaydi religion and culture. </p>
<h2>Sunni vs. Zaydi Shiite beliefs</h2>
<p>What beliefs set Zaydis apart from Sunni Muslims? That is an old story, dating back to the seventh century when the Prophet Muhammad died. </p>
<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216">Shiites and Sunnis disagree</a> about who should have been selected to succeed Muhammad as head of the Muslim community. Two groups emerged after his death. One group of the Prophet’s followers – later called Sunnis – recognized four of his companions as <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2018">“rightly guided” leaders</a> In contrast, another group – later called Shiites – recognized only Ali, the fourth of these leaders, as legitimate.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Ali_ibn_Abi_Talib">Ali</a> was the Prophet’s first cousin and closest male blood relative. He was also married to Fatima, Muhammad’s youngest daughter. For these and other reasons, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/616187">Shiites believe that Ali was uniquely qualified</a> to lead. In support of this claim, they cite sources describing Muhammad’s wish that Ali succeed him. Shiites consider Ali second in importance only to the Prophet. </p>
<p><iframe id="lPEaI" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/lPEaI/5/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Over time, <a href="https://iis.ac.uk/academic-articles/what-shi-islam#zaydi%20shiism">further divisions</a> took place. Allegiances to different descendants of Ali and his two sons, Hassan and Hussein, split Shiites into sub-branches. A grandson of Hussein called <a href="http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2566">Zayd</a> gave the Zaydis their name. To them, he is the fifth imam after Muhammad, giving the Zaydis their other name: “Fivers.”</p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=407&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/250562/original/file-20181213-178573-1qa8jnb.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=511&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">The family genealogy of the Zaydi Shiites’ first five imams.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">The Conversation, CC-BY-ND</span>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Zayd earned the respect of his followers when he rose up against the powerful Muslim rulers of his time, whom he believed to be tyrannical and corrupt. Though his rebellion was ill-fated, his fight against oppression and injustice inspires Zaydis to actively resist. </p>
<p>A key Zaydi belief is that only blood relatives of Ali and Fatima are eligible to serve as religious leaders, or imams. In Yemen, these relatives form a notable class of people called <a href="https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/war-in-yemen-who-is-involved">Sada</a>. Hussein al-Houthi, the first leader of the Houthis, came from a prestigious clan of Sada. </p>
<h2>Impact of sectarian differences</h2>
<p>Not all Zaydis have a favorable view of Sada elites. When north and south Yemen merged in 1990, the republican government, led by a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/former-yemen-president-saleh-killed-in-fresh-fighting">Zaydi president</a> sought to reduce their outsized influence and limit their privileges.</p>
<p>Some members of the Sada reacted to the country’s changing political landscape by joining electoral politics to secure honor and exercise power. This path was initially followed by Hussein al-Houthi but, after he decided it was ineffective, he abandoned it. </p>
<p>Other members of the Sada, particularly the youth, reacted by pledging to teach and promote Zaydism among their peers who had forgotten their ancestors’ religion. To accomplish this, they founded the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100903262716?src=recsys&journalCode=uter20">Believing Youth organization</a> and set up a cultural education program based on a network of summer camps in the north. Hussein al-Houthi joined this organization in the early 2000s and later transformed it into a political movement critical of the Yemeni government’s ties to the West.</p>
<p>Security forces sent to arrest Hussein al-Houthi touched off the first war with the Houthis. Hussein was killed during the conflict and <a href="https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/what-houthi-movement">leadership</a> passed to Hussein’s father and then to Hussein’s youngest brother, Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi. Abdul-Malik helped transform the Houthi movement into a powerful fighting force. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.academia.edu/4818151/A_Portrait_of_Tunisia_s_Ansar_al-_Shari_a_Leader_Abu_Iyad_al-Tunisi_His_Strategy_on_Jihad">Five additional wars</a> followed over the next six years until, in 2010, the rebels had grown strong enough to repel a ground and aerial offensive launched against them by Saudi Arabia. During these wars, the <a href="https://cfr.org/interview/who-are-yemens-houthis">Houthis</a> pushed beyond their traditional base and captured vast sections of territory.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/244002/original/file-20181105-74775-tcslag.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=503&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Yemeni women and children at a camp in north Yemen.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/irinphotos/4437447101/in/photolist-7LbBas-7L85qD-7KTgRD-7L85qV-r9xKk3-V1rFYe-FVXHwd-244XFAY-S991QM-pXsjFW-26KRXzQ-F3ZFHT-HaNyf4-22oWX1e-23Lrqqk-FCty1E-FCqegb-ryxv8k-ryrExv-22oWWmD-qBLbnB-E7fq1K-23HuKuA-278Vcw2-FSoMgM-ryrWCC-23LrpMM-244XFUU-JPpdox-244XDzJ-FCqekE-275e39G-Kv6DzP-25seAwc">IRIN Photos/Flickr.com</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/">CC BY-NC-ND</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Many Yemenis, <a href="https://civiliansinconflict.org/dt_team/nadwa-al-dawsari/">according to one expert</a>, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/houthis-endgame-yemen-171221082107181.html">believe</a> that the Houthis are fighting to restore a state like the one prior to 1962, led by imams who came exclusively from Sada families. </p>
<h2>Complex factors today</h2>
<p>Houthis continue to focus on protecting the Zaydi region of north Yemen from state control. However, they have also forged <a href="http://www.mei.edu/publications/huthi-ascent-power">coalitions</a> with other groups – some of them Sunni – unhappy with Yemen’s persistent high <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-13917706/yemen-s-unemployment-crisis">unemployment and corruption</a>.</p>
<p>A 2015 U.N. <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/wp-content/uploads/s_2015_125.pdf">Security Council report</a> estimates that the Houthi movement includes 75,000 armed fighters. However, if unarmed loyalists are taken into account, they could number between 100,000 and 120,000.</p>
<p>Sectarian tension is only one factor in the complex set of <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/yemens-spiraling-crisis">interlocking factors</a> responsible for violence and starvation in Yemen. But it is, without a doubt, a contributing factor.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106423/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Myriam Renaud is affiliated with the Parliament of the World's Religions. </span></em></p>The Houthis belong to the Shiite branch of Islam. The Houthi insurgency began in the early 1990s, spurred in part by growing influence of different Sunni branches of Islam.Myriam Renaud, Principal Investigator and Project Director of the Global Ethic Project, Parliament of the World's Religions, University of ChicagoLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1068962018-11-26T11:36:31Z2018-11-26T11:36:31ZUS complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen spans Obama, Trump administrations<p>A Saudi-led coalition of states has been <a href="https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?marker=36#!/conflict/war-in-yemen">aggressively bombing Yemen</a> and imposing an air and naval blockade of its ports for more than three years, leading UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">to describe</a> Yemen as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.”</p>
<p>Guterres put the crisis in stark perspective, emphasizing the near complete lack of security for the Yemeni people. More than 22 million people out of a total population of 28 million are in need of humanitarian aid and protection. Eighteen million people lack reliable access to food; 8.4 million people “do not know how they will obtain their next meal.”</p>
<p>As a <a href="https://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/bachman.cfm">scholar of genocide and human rights</a>, I believe the destruction brought about by these attacks combined with the blockade amounts to genocide.</p>
<p>Based on my research, to be published in an upcoming issue of Third World Quarterly, I believe the coalition would not be capable of committing this crime without the material and logistical support of both the Obama and Trump administrations.</p>
<h2>A ‘storm’ recast as ‘hope’</h2>
<p>Yemen has been gripped by a civil war since 2015, pitting the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/">Shia Houthi movement</a> – which has fought for centuries for control of parts of Yemen – against <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423">a government backed by Sunni Saudi Arabia</a>. Because of these religious differences, it would be easy to recast what is largely a political conflict in Yemen as a sectarian one. </p>
<p>That characterization fits Saudi and U.S. <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/houthis-deny-u-s-saudi-claim-that-they-are-irans-puppets">assertions</a> that the Houthis are controlled by Shiite Iran, a claim that has not gone <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/16/contrary-to-popular-belief-houthis-arent-iranian-proxies/?utm_term=.cc639b2c69c8">uncontested</a>. Both the Saudis and the U.S. are hostile to Iran, so U.S. support of Saudia Arabia in Yemen represents what U.S. administrations have said are strategic interests in the region.</p>
<p>Besides Saudi Arabia, the coalition attacking Yemen includes the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain. Qatar was part of the coalition but is no longer.</p>
<p>During the first three years of “Operation Decisive Storm,” later renamed “Operation Renewal of Hope,” 16,749 coalition air attacks in Yemen were documented by the <a href="http://yemendataproject.org/">Yemen Data Project (YDP)</a>, which describes itself as an “independent data collection project aimed at collecting and disseminating data on the conduct of the war in Yemen.” </p>
<p><iframe id="gHIiB" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/gHIiB/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Based on the information available to it using open sources, YDP reports that two-thirds of the coalition’s bombing attacks have been against non-military and unknown targets. The coalition isn’t accidentally attacking civilians and civilian infrastructure – it’s doing it deliberately. </p>
<p>That’s evident from the kind – and volume – of civilian targets documented. They include places that are generally protected against attack even under the lax <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl">rules</a> of international humanitarian law: Residential areas, vehicles, marketplaces and mosques as well as boats, social gatherings and camps for internally displaced persons.</p>
<p><iframe id="zYNNl" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/zYNNl/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Because of the role it plays in movement of people, food and medicine, Yemen’s transportation infrastructure is especially important. Airports, ports, bridges and roads have all been repeatedly attacked. </p>
<p>Yemen’s economic infrastructure – farms, private businesses and factories, oil and gas facilities, water and electricity lines and food storage – have also been hit. And the coalition has targeted and destroyed schools and medical facilities, too. </p>
<p><iframe id="s7FOm" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/s7FOm/3/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>Finally, Yemen’s cultural heritage has been attacked. In all, at least 78 cultural sites have been damaged or destroyed, including archaeological sites, museums, mosques, churches and tombs, as well as numerous other monuments and residences that have great historical and cultural significance.</p>
<p><iframe id="JxS3p" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/JxS3p/1/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<h2>How to make a crisis</h2>
<p>The attacks aren’t the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis.</p>
<p>The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, “is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,” <a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1800513.pdf">according</a> to the UN panel of experts on Yemen.</p>
<p>The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen’s ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis’ access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid. </p>
<p>In his <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-017-0092-3">analysis of the blockade’s legality</a>, <a href="http://www.uva.nl/en/profile/f/i/m.d.fink/m.d.fink.html">Dutch military scholar Martin Fink</a> writes that the blockade means “massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter.” </p>
<p>Despite UN efforts to alleviate some of the worst delays, imports are often held up for a long time. In some cases, food that makes it through the blockade has already spoiled, if entry is not denied altogether.</p>
<p>In some ways, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented and can be tied directly to the conflict. As the World Bank <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/376891524812213584/Securing-imports-of-essential-food-commodities-to-Yemen-an-assessment-of-constraints-and-options-for-intervention">notes</a>, “Yemen’s very difficult economic challenges before the current conflict cannot be compared to the intensely critical situation the country is facing today.” </p>
<p>Similarly, Tufts University scholar <a href="https://now.tufts.edu/articles/mass-starvation-political-weapon">Alex de Waal describes Yemen</a> as “the greatest famine atrocity of our lifetimes.” It was caused, writes de Waal, by the coalition “<a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Mass+Starvation%3A+The+History+and+Future+of+Famine-p-9781509524662">deliberately destroying the country’s food-producing infrastructure</a>.” </p>
<p>The failing security for the people of Yemen has been compounded by a failing health system. The World Health Organization reported in September 2017 that <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/response-plans/2017/yemen/en/">only 45 percent of health facilities in Yemen</a> were functional. </p>
<p>As <a href="https://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/27F6CCAD7178F3E9C1258264003311FA?OpenDocument">Secretary-General Guterres put it</a>, “Treatable illnesses become a death sentence when local health services are suspended and it is impossible to travel outside the country.”</p>
<p>As of February 2018, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22651&LangID=E">according</a> to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the coalition had killed 6,000 people in airstrikes and wounded nearly 10,000 more. </p>
<p>Yet, according to the OHCHR report, these counts are conservative. Tens of thousands of Yemenis have also died from causes related to the war. According to Save the Children, an <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yemen-famine-children-deaths-1.4914179">estimated</a> 85,000 children under five may have died since 2015, with more than <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/opinion/yemen-al-hudaydah-famine-houthis.html">50,000 child deaths</a> in 2017 alone from hunger and related causes.</p>
<p>Coalition actions in Yemen amount to nothing short of what <a href="https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/coining-a-word-and-championing-a-cause-the-story-of-raphael-lemkin">Raphael Lemkin, the individual who coined the term “genocide</a>,” referred to as a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=bEcTDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=#v=onepage&q&f=false">“synchronized attack on different aspects of life</a>.” </p>
<h2>The US contribution</h2>
<p>The coalition’s genocide in Yemen would not be possible without the complicity of the U.S. This has been a bipartisan presidential effort, covering both <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen">the Obama</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/12/trumps-one-step-back-on-yemen-wont-satisfy-critics/">Trump administrations</a>.</p>
<p>U.S. arms are being used to kill Yemenis and destroy their country. <a href="https://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/actions/MAR_6--US_Arms_Sales_2017_Report_manual_footnotes_%281%29_1.pdf">In 2016</a>, well after the coalition began its genocidal assault on Yemen, four of the top five recipients of U.S. arms sales were members of the coalition.</p>
<p><iframe id="duz6t" class="tc-infographic-datawrapper" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/duz6t/2/" height="400px" width="100%" style="border: none" frameborder="0"></iframe></p>
<p>The U.S. has also provided the coalition with logistical support, including mid-air refueling, targeting advice and support, intelligence, expedited munitions resupply and maintenance. </p>
<p>Other than the sale of arms, perhaps the most significant contribution to the coalition’s ability to commit genocide in Yemen has been the provision of fuel and mid-air refueling of Coalition warplanes, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-to-end-refueling-for-saudi-coalition-aircraft-in-yemen/2018/11/09/d08ff6c3-babd-4958-bcca-cdb1caa9d5b4_story.html?utm_term=.b66185ea63b1">which was halted in early November, 2018</a>. By the middle of 2017, the U.S. had delivered over 67 million pounds of fuel to the coalition and refueled coalition aircraft more than 9,000 times. </p>
<h2>Shared responsibility for genocide</h2>
<p>As a genocide scholar, I believe that under <a href="http://legal.un.org/legislativeseries/documents/Book25/Book25.pdf">international law</a>, the U.S. shares responsibility with the Coalition for genocide in Yemen. </p>
<p>What does this mean? It means that the U.S. must cease and desist all activities that facilitate genocide in Yemen. This would include stopping all sales of weapons and ending logistical support for Coalition action.</p>
<p>In an ideal world, one in which all states are equally subjects before international law, the U.S. would also seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding what restitution it owes the people of Yemen for its role in the coalition’s genocide. </p>
<p>Similarly, the U.S. would request an International Criminal Court investigation into individual culpability of U.S. officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations for their role in facilitating the crimes committed in Yemen. </p>
<p>Of course, this is not an ideal world. </p>
<p>The U.S. recognizes neither the International Court of Justice’s <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.html">authority</a> to judge the legality of its actions, nor the International Criminal Court’s <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol30_2003/winter2003/irr_hr_winter03_usopposition/">authority</a> to investigate the suspected criminal acts of individual U.S. officials. Such an investigation could be triggered by a UN Security Council referral, but the U.S. would simply veto any such effort.</p>
<p>All that is left, then, is for the people of the U.S. to hold their own to account for the crimes committed in their names.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/106896/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jeff Bachman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The Obama and Trump administrations have supported a military coalition that has inflicted profound and deadly damage on Yemen. A human rights scholar says the US is complicit in genocide.Jeff Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights; Director, Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, American University School of International ServiceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/1048892018-11-05T11:40:55Z2018-11-05T11:40:55ZThree things we can learn from contemporary Muslim women’s fashion<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/244579/original/file-20181108-74754-1y4ouv4.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Ilhan Omar, a Somali American, who was elected from Minnesota’s 5th congressional district, will be the first woman in U.S. Congress to wear a hijab.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Minnesota-Somali-Lawmaker-Harassed/beaa99bc05ae4dcaa1d59f32cc5df55a/27/0">AP Photo/Jim Mone, File</a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Major art museums have realized there is much to learn from clothing that is both religiously coded and fashion forward.</p>
<p>In 2018, the Metropolitan Museum of Art hosted a fashion exhibition inspired by the Catholic faith titled <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/exhibitions/listings/2018/heavenly-bodies">“Heavenly Bodies: Fashion and Catholic Imagination</a>.” With more than 1.6 million visitors, it was the <a href="https://www.metmuseum.org/press/news/2018/heavenly-bodies-most-visited-exhibition">most popular exhibit</a> in the Met’s history.</p>
<p>That same year the de Young Museum of San Francisco had the first major exhibit devoted to the Islamic fashion scene. <a href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">“Contemporary Muslim Fashions”</a> displayed 80 swoon-worthy ensembles – glamorous gowns, edgy streetwear, conceptual couture – loosely organized by region and emphasizing distinct textile traditions. This exhibit wa a bold statement of cultural appreciation during a time of heightened <a href="https://www.cair.com/cair_report_anti_muslim_bias_incidents_hate_crimes_spike_in_second_quarter_of_2018">anti-Muslim rhetoric</a>. </p>
<p>In studying <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674976160&content=bios">how Muslim women dress</a> for over a decade, I realized a deeper understanding of Muslim women’s clothing can challenge popular stereotypes about Islam. Here are three takeaways. </p>
<h2>1. Modesty is not one thing</h2>
<p>While there are <a href="https://quran.com/24/31">scattered references to modest dress</a> in the sacred written sources of Islam, these religious texts do not spend a lot of time discussing the ethics of Muslim attire. And once I started to pay attention to how Muslims dress, I quickly realized that modesty does not look the same everywhere. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=600&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243701/original/file-20181102-83638-1k6b9nh.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=754&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Streetstyle in Iran.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>I traveled to Iran, Indonesia and Turkey for my research on Muslim women’s clothing. The Iranian penal code <a href="http://mehr.org/Islamic_Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf">requires women to wear proper Islamic clothing</a> in public, although what that entails is never defined. The morality police harass and arrest women who they think expose too much hair or skin. Yet even under these conditions of intense regulation and scrutiny, women wear a remarkable range of styles – from edgy ripped jeans and graphic tees to bohemian loose flowy separates. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=900&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243692/original/file-20181102-83632-12u6kxr.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1131&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Local textiles in Indonesian fashion.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Indonesia is the most populous Muslim nation in the world, but Indonesian women <a href="https://www.colorado.edu/anthropology/sites/default/files/attached-files/3fashionandfaith.pdf">did not wear head coverings or modest clothing</a> until about 30 years ago. Today local styles integrate crystal and sequin embellishments. Popular fabric choices include everything from pastel chiffon to bright batik, which is promoted as the national textile.</p>
<p>When it comes to Turkey, for much of the last century authorities discouraged Muslim women from wearing pious fashion, claiming <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/649910?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">these styles were “unmodern”</a> because they were not secular. That changed with the rise of the Islamic middle class, when Muslim women began to demand an education, to work outside the home and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/mew.2010.6.3.118?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">to wear modest clothing and a headscarf as they did so</a>. Today local styles tend to be tailored closely to the body, with high necklines and low hemlines and complete coverage of the hair. </p>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=400&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243702/original/file-20181102-83657-12ke71c.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=502&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Tailored trench from Turkey.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A stunning range of Muslim fashions are found here in the United States as well, reflecting the diversity of its approximately <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-s-muslim-population-continues-to-grow/">3.45 million Muslims</a>. Fifty-eight percent <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/essay/muslims-in-america-immigrants-and-those-born-in-u-s-see-life-differently-in-many-ways/">of Muslim adults in the U.S. are immigrants</a>, <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/05/being-muslim-in-america/?user.testname=lazyloading:1">coming from some 75 countries</a>. And U.S.-born Muslims are diverse as well. For instance, <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/demographic-portrait-of-muslim-americans/">more than half of Muslims</a> whose families have been in the U.S. for at least three generations are black. </p>
<p>This diversity provides the opportunity for hybrid identities, which are displayed through clothing styles. </p>
<h2>2. Muslim women don’t need saving</h2>
<p>Many non-Muslims see Muslim women’s clothing and headscarves as a sign of oppression. It is true that a Muslim woman’s clothing choices are shaped by her community’s ideas about what it means to be a good Muslim. But this situation is not unlike that for non-Muslim women, who likewise have to negotiate expectations concerning their behavior. </p>
<p>In <a href="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674976160&content=bios">my book</a>, I introduce readers to a number of women who use their clothing to express their identity and assert their independence. Tari is an Indonesian college student who covers her head at her parents’ objections. Her parents worry that a headscarf will make it harder for Tari to get a job after graduation. But for Tari, whose friends all cover their hair, her clothing is the primary way she communicates her personal style and her Muslim identity.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=855&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243685/original/file-20181102-83635-n2trlx.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=1075&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Fashion to confront social issues.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Nur, who majored in communications at Istanbul Commerce University, dresses modestly but is highly critical of the pressure she sees the apparel industry putting on Muslim women to buy brand-name clothing. For her, Muslim style does not have to come with a high price tag.</p>
<p>Leila works for the Iranian government and considers her off-duty clothing choices a form of civil disobedience. Monday through Friday she wears dark colors and long baggy overcoats. But on the weekends she pushes the limits of acceptability with tight-fitting outfits and heavy makeup – sartorial choices that might get her in trouble with the morality police. She accepts the legal obligation to wear Islamic clothing in public, but asserts her right to decide what that entails. </p>
<p>Designers have also used clothing to protest issues affecting their communities. The de Young exhibit, for example, includes <a href="https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/01/smallbusiness/slow-factory-celine-semaan/index.html">a scarf</a> by designer Céline Semaan to protest against Trump’s travel ban. The scarf features a NASA satellite image of several of the countries whose citizens are denied entry to the U.S , overlaid with the word “Banned.” </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=311&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/243680/original/file-20181102-83629-1dcz25k.jpeg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=391&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Banned headscarf by Céline Semaan.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://deyoung.famsf.org/exhibitions/contemporary-muslim-fashions">Contemporary Muslim Fashions 22 September 2018 - 6 January 2019 de Young Museum</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>3. Muslims contribute to mainstream society</h2>
<p>A 2017 Pew survey showed that <a href="http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/how-the-u-s-general-public-views-muslims-and-islam/pf_2017-06-26_muslimamericans-07-04/">50 percent of Americans say Islam is not a part of</a> mainstream society. But as Muslim models and Muslim designers are increasingly recognized by the fashion world, the misperception of Muslims as outsiders has the potential to change. </p>
<p>Muslim models are spokespersons for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/fashion/covergirl-beauty-hijab.html">top cosmetic brands</a>, walk the catwalk for <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2018/feb/22/max-maras-milan-show-puts-empowerment-centre-stage">high end designers</a> and are featured in <a href="https://theconversation.com/gap-back-to-school-hijab-ad-ignites-social-media-101760">print ads for major labels</a>. </p>
<p>Today clothing inspired by Islamic aesthetics is marketed to all consumers, not just Muslim ones. Take the most <a href="https://www.uniqlo.com/my/hanatajima/">recent collection</a> of British Muslim designer Hana Tajima for Uniqlo. In its promotional materials, the global casual wear retailer described the garments as <a href="https://www.uniqlo.com/my/hanatajima/">“culturally sensitive and extremely versatile,”</a> clothing for cosmopolitan women of all backgrounds. </p>
<p>To be hip today is to dress in culturally inclusive ways, and this includes modest styles created by Muslim designers and popularized by Muslim consumers. Fashion makes it clear that Muslims are not only part of mainstream society, they are contributors to it.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/104889/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Liz Bucar received funding from the Theology of Character Project at Wake Forest University for this work. For other work she has received funding from the AAUW, the Enhancing Life Project at the University of Chicago, the ACLS, and Henry Luce Foundation.</span></em></p>The de Young Museum of San Francisco recently opened an exhibit devoted to the Islamic fashion scene. Here’s how Muslim women’s fashions challenge popular stereotypes.Liz Bucar, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Northeastern UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/733152017-02-27T07:42:25Z2017-02-27T07:42:25ZSons of Iraq: Mosul will only recover if we heed the lessons of the US invasion<p>After months of fighting, Iraqi Security Forces have finally regained control of the <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/01/18/iraq-military-troops-have-full-control-eastern-mosul/96710782/">eastern half of Mosul</a>, the last urban stronghold of Islamic State in Iraq. They are now <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/24/middleeast/western-mosul-offensive/">advancing on the city’s west</a>. </p>
<p>The recapture of the northern Iraqi city will be a strategic victory for Iraq and its international partners. But did it ever have to come to this?</p>
<p>Violent opposition has gone up like a mushroom cloud in Iraq since the early years of US occupation. The US military believed that buying people’s hearts and minds with cash was an effective tool to counter against the opposition. Things did not always work out that way.</p>
<h2>Bad money after good</h2>
<p>Back in 2003, shortly after taking control of Baghdad, US forces discovered millions of dollars of <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a523853.pdf">loot</a> taken by the Ba’athist Party during its rule. The US government decided to use it as the seed funding for the Commander’s Emergency Response Programme (CERP).</p>
<p>The CERP aims to rebuild the country by funding hundreds of small-scale projects on water and sanitation infrastructure, food production, health care, education, and transport. And <a href="http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/661983">research</a> shows that these small projects have improved the security situation in Iraq in the short term.</p>
<p>But the hearts and minds strategy <a href="http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2017/wp2017-006.pdf">may not be as effective as it appears in the case of Iraq</a>. Aid can <a href="http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/681239">fuel conflict</a> by creating incentives for looting, and providing a fertile ground for criminal activities. It is frequently <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/thecrisiscaravan/lindapolman/9780312610586/">stolen en route</a> and <a href="https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20131001083727/http:/www.sigir.mil/files/lessonslearned/SpecialReportLeadersPerceptions.pdf#view=fit">induces fraud and corruption</a>. </p>
<p>This new resource base can strengthen rebels’ capacity in an armed struggle. And many Iraqis see this foreign assistance as occupation forces simply giving them a tent after burning down their home.</p>
<h2>A missed opportunity</h2>
<p>The relationship between different religious groups is a decisive determinant of aid effectiveness in Iraq, and it was crucial in this case. </p>
<p>After the US invasion, the Shia-led government had the chance to reduce the enmity of the Sunni population towards them. To this end, part of the emergency response funds were used to sponsor the Sons of Iraq programme, which paid Sunnis to become security providers.</p>
<p>Sons of Iraq had two effects in the short term: it rewarded people who chose to stop fighting and, it gave incentives to local people to cooperate with security forces by providing them with local intelligence. After the introduction of the programme, the number of attacks <a href="http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Biddle%25204-2-08%2520Testimony.pdf">in Iraq</a> between 2007 and 2012 decreased.</p>
<p>According to the plan, the Government of Iraq would offer participants, most of them Sunni, a job in the security sector or civilian ministry. But in the end, only a small number of Sunnis were <a href="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100102810">lucky enough to get a government job</a>. Worse still, there were reports that the Shia-led government <a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/07/world/fg-baqubah7">arrested, tortured, and murdered Sunni members</a> of the programme.</p>
<p>Between 2009 and 2013, former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki gradually dismantled the programme, and filled Iraqi security forces with Shias; Sunnis began to be excluded in Iraqi society once more. This stirred up religious tensions between the two groups. The conflict escalated, leading to a <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22261422">massacre in Hawija in 2013</a>, where hundreds of Sunnis were killed in clashes with security forces.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/158393/original/image-20170225-22986-6cpw7e.JPG?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">An Iraqi boy holds a rifle at a Sons of Iraq checkpoint in 2009.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SOI_boy_at_check_point.JPG">US Army</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The case of Mosul</h2>
<p>Mosul has long been a site much-contested between different religious groups. These include Sunni and Shia Arabs, Kurds and Assyrian Christians. The complex tribal structure of the region and its proximity to the Syrian border make governing the area almost impossible.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sons-iraq-and-awakening-forces">Fearing a perception of favoritism</a> towards Sunnis, the US tamed the Sons of Iraq programme in Mosul. But doing so contributed to the rise of insurgency in the region. It has had the unintended consequence of making Mosul a safe haven for members of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who were repelled from Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala.</p>
<p>By now, all the conditions were set for a firestorm. Angry people were gathered in Mosul, willing to fight for whichever group was ready to overthrow the government. </p>
<p>Arguably, if the Shia government took the chance to absorb more Sunnis into the regime according to the original plan, ISIS, which stormed onto world stage in June 2014, taking both <a href="http://time.com/4384000/isis-fallujah-iraq-mosul-campaign/">Fallujah</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/is-sweeps-across-borders-and-takes-grip-of-an-iraq-collapsing-back-into-civil-war-27886">Mosul</a> in the space of a few months, would have found it more difficult to initiate a war that has since become a political crisis at the global level.</p>
<h2>Learning from history</h2>
<p>While there is still a long way to go before a decisive victory in Iraq, it is time to plan ahead.</p>
<p>What can the international society do to prevent ISIS from re-emerging?</p>
<p>Humanitarian assistance is necessary for rebuilding houses and infrastructure destroyed by rockets and car bombs. But as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/battle-for-mosul-maps-visual-guide-fighting-iraq-isis">military advancement of the past few months shows</a>, the key to success is cooperation that transcends religious and ethnic identities.</p>
<p>On one hand, the Shia-dominated security forces and Kurdish Peshmerga need intelligence from local citizens, mainly Sunni Arabs. On the other hand, local people require the help of the security forces to free them from ISIS’s harsh rule.</p>
<p>Behind the major identity fault lines between Sunni and Shia lie numerous <a href="http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521156011">grassroots-level rivalries</a> over land and resources that have led to decades-long enmity. To achieve sustainable peace, different community members have to reach reconciliation. At the minimum, all groups should realise that no one is more righteous than the other.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/div-classtitleethnic-conflict-and-civil-society-india-and-beyonddiv/2F8EEAACC16E9A8366A9914C0301F08D">Studies</a> have found that cross-ethnic interactions in unions, theatres or even playgrounds can explain why Hindu-Muslim riots are less common in some places than others. </p>
<p>In this light, donors should fund social and <a href="http://unhabitat.org/books/unhabitat-country-programme-document-2016-2019-afghanistan/">urban design</a> projects that help to build <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11">more inclusive, safe and resilient cities</a> for all Iraqis. Hopefully, through these small steps, disparate groups can begin to reach a national-level reconciliation.</p>
<p>Even when ISIS is defeated, unless different groups can repair their relationship, violent extremism will remain, and peace in Iraq will stay elusive. Donor funding must be directed to programmes that help bridge divides.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/73315/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Pui Hang Wong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Even when ISIS is defeated, unless different groups can repair their relationship, violent extremism will remain, and peace in Iraq will stay elusive.Pui Hang Wong, PhD Fellow, United Nations UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/550892016-03-01T12:50:56Z2016-03-01T12:50:56ZIran’s cynical pandering to its ethnic minorities will do it no good<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/113386/original/image-20160301-31040-nv4w5r.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption"></span> </figcaption></figure><p>Iran’s parliamentary election has yielded a victory for the so-called <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-idUSKCN0W218K">reformists</a>, an apparent vote of confidence in Hasan Rouhani’s relatively moderate government after the deal to curb Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme. But the campaign was also marked by promises to finally start meeting the demands and hopes of Iran’s ethnic minorities – and now the election’s over, that won’t be forgotten.</p>
<p>Ethnic minorities make up about 40-50% of Iran’s population. The largest five major ethnic groups, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Turkmen, are large, territorially located, and transnational. They all have long histories of political struggle for their ethnic rights. </p>
<p>While Iran is a majority Shia country, 10% of the Iranian population practices Sunni Islam, and the majority of the Kurds, Baluchis, and Turkmen are Sunni. That means the central government needs ethnic votes not only to shore up its legitimacy, but also to strengthen its national security and territorial integrity. </p>
<p>In the absence of ethnic political parties, ethnic activists, elites, and candidates use sharper rhetoric to stir up ethnic grievances and mobilise minority communities during local and national elections. </p>
<p>This was particularly apparent in the 1997 presidential election, when the reformist movement played the ethnic card, promising civil rights for all Iranians and distributing election leaflets in Arabic, Azeri, and Kurdish. President Muhammad Khatami duly gained the largest share of the vote in the ethnic provinces. But even though ethnic groups enjoyed freedom of a sort under Khatami, his failure to keep his reformist promises only added to minorities’ dissatisfaction. </p>
<p>Despite the consequences, this pattern has been followed ever since. Embracing ethnic issues during election campaigns certainly helps raise ethnic minority people’s profile and amplify their demands. But unfulfilled promises only widen the gap between these groups’ expectations and their chances of getting what they want and need – and the wider that gap, the more Iran will struggle with serious ethnic tensions. </p>
<h2>Democracy undermined</h2>
<p>None of this is good for Iran’s democracy. Whereas many states use elections to unify citizens and to solidify a sense of togetherness among people of different socio-cultural and ethnic backgrounds, the ethnicisation of Iran’s local and national elections achieves precisely the opposite. It also drives divisions between the country’s main political factions, namely <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-at-stake-in-irans-parliamentary-elections-55354">reformists and conservatives</a>, who end up advancing diametrically opposed ethnic policies as a way of marking out their differences. </p>
<p>Given that Iran is increasingly entangled in the Middle East’s growing ethno-sectarian strife, it sees its own diversity as a potential threat to its national security. Iran’s ethno-sectarian groups straddle the borders of neighbouring states, meaning Tehran regards them as potential Trojan horses for foreign interference. </p>
<p>This is particularly important given Iran’s highly sectarian rivalry with predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia, which domestic politicians discuss in belligerent nationalist tones. That hardly sits well with Iran’s own Sunni minority, who find themselves implicitly labelled as a risk to the state they call home.</p>
<p>Many of the demands Iran’s ethnic groups make of their country are justified, perfectly legal and recognised by the constitution. But just like other major national security-related decisions, ethnic policies aren’t made by the government or by members of parliament but by the Supreme National Security Council, which is appointed rather than elected. Any electoral promises made by electoral candidates are hollow and opportunistic. </p>
<p>This isn’t to say that Iran’s political elites should stay away from ethnic issues, or avoid acknowledging minority concerns. But pandering to ethnic demands during elections only to leave promises unfulfilled will only widen the gap between minority groups and the state.</p>
<p>If this habit doesn’t change, the consequences might be severe. The long-term damage already done by this electoral opportunism might be irreversible – and the earlier Tehran actually starts to grapple with ethnic disenchantment, the better.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/55089/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alam Saleh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Every time Iran has an election, its minority groups are suddenly the centre of attention – and then they’re quickly forgotten again.Alam Saleh, Lecturer in Middle Eastern Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/518042016-02-18T19:19:57Z2016-02-18T19:19:57ZWhy is Islam so different in different countries?<p><em>The rise of Islamic State has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of the jihadist group?</em></p>
<p><em>In the fourth article of our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>, Aaron Hughes explains the amazing regional variation in Islamic practice to illustrate why Islamic State appeared where it did.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>No religion is unified. How Catholicism, for example, is practised in rural Italy differs from the way this is done, say, in New York city. Language, culture, tradition, the political and social contexts, and even food is different in these two places. </p>
<p>Such geographic differences are certainly important in Islam. But also important are the numerous legal schools and their interpretations. Since Islam is a religion predicated on law (sharia), variations in the interpretation of that law have contributed to regional differences. </p>
<p>Also significant in the modern world is the existence of other religions. Malaysia, for example, has a relatively <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Malaysia">large percentage of religious minorities</a> (up to 40% of the population). Saudi Arabia <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_in_Saudi_Arabia">has virtually none</a>. </p>
<p>This means Malaysia has had to develop a constitution that protects the rights of religious minorities, whereas Saudi Arabia has not. And it’s why Islam is so different in these two countries.</p>
<h2>Schools of thought</h2>
<p>There are historical reasons for this variation. Despite popular opinion, Islam didn’t appear fully formed at the time of Muhammad (570-632). There were huge debates over the nature of religious and political authority, for instance, and who was or was not a Muslim. </p>
<p>It’s similarly misguided to assume that a unified teaching simply spread throughout the Mediterranean region and beyond. </p>
<p>How Muhammad’s message developed into the religion of Islam — complete with legal and doctrinal content — took centuries to develop and cannot concern us here. </p>
<p>What <em>is</em> important to note, however, is that his message spread into various (unbordered) regions. Modern nation states would only arise much later. And each of these areas was already in possession of its own set of religious, legal and cultural traditions.</p>
<p>The result was that Islam had to be articulated in the light of local customs and understandings. This was done, in part, through the creation of legal courts, a class of jurists (ulema; mullas in Shi`ism), a legal code (sharia) and a system of interpretation of that code based on rulings (fatwas).</p>
<p>Many local customs arose based on trying to understand Muhammad’s message. And these customs and understandings gave rise to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_schools_and_branches">distinct legal schools</a>. </p>
<p>Although there were originally many such schools, they gradually reduced to four in Sunni Islam – Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi`i and Hanbali. While these four schools all regard one another as orthodox, they nevertheless have distinct interpretations of Islamic law. Some of their interpretations are more conservative than others. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=725&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/111278/original/image-20160212-29175-9bxy0z.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=912&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>There are also a number of such schools in Shi`i Islam, as you can see from the image above. </p>
<p>The four Sunni schools are associated with distinct regions (as are the Shi`i schools). The Maliki school, for example, is prominent today in Egypt and North Africa. The Hanafi is in western Asia, the Shafi`i in Southeast Asia and the Hanbali (the most conservative) is found primarily in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. </p>
<h2>Fundamental differences</h2>
<p>All this legal and local variation has produced different interpretations of the religion. But despite such regional and legal diversity, many Muslims and non-Muslims insist on referring to Islam and sharia as if they were stable entities.</p>
<p>An example might be illustrative of the extent of the differences within Islam. Many non-Muslims are often surprised to learn of the cult of saints, namely the role Sufi saints (Sufism is Islamic mysticism) have played and continue to play in the daily life of Muslims. </p>
<p>A Sufi saint is someone who is considered holy and who has achieved nearness to God. Praying to these saints and making pilgrimages to their shrines is a way to, among other things, ask for intercession. </p>
<figure class="align-center zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=1000&fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=331&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/110759/original/image-20160209-12831-18iukny.png?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=416&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption"></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Although these practices are not unlike the role and place of saints in Catholicism, in Islam they are much more localised. And this locally varied cult of saints played and continues to play an important role in Islamic religious life from Morocco in the West to Pakistan in the East. </p>
<p>Devotion to the saints is believed to cure the sick, make fertile the barren, bring rain, and so on. Needless to say, such devotion is often frowned upon by more fundamentalist interpretations. </p>
<p>While most legal schools are content – albeit somewhat bothered – by such practices, the conservative Hanbali school forbids cults like this. Its adherents have, among other things, destroyed tombs of saints in both the premodern and modern eras. They have also been responsible for the destruction of shrines associated with Muhammad’s family, such as the shrines and tombs of Muhammad’s wife. </p>
<p>The Hanbali school, backed by the wealth of the Saudi ruling family, has also tried to make inroads into other areas. Those associated with this legal school, for example, have built madrasas (religious seminaries) in regions traditionally influenced by other legal schools of thought. </p>
<p>Most fundamentalist movements in Islam, including Islamic State, have emanated from such ultra-conservative elements. The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, are influenced by the more conservative elements of Hanbali ideology, even though they exist in a predominantly Hanafi legal environment. </p>
<p>The goal of many of these groups, sometimes referred to as Wahhabis or Salafis, is to return to what they imagine to be the pure or pristine version of Islam as practised by Muhammad and his earliest followers. They often have strict interpretations of Islam, strict dress codes and separation of the sexes. </p>
<p>Today, there are more than one and a half billion Muslims worldwide, making Islam the second-largest religion on the planet after Christianity. But it is a rich and variegated religion. And this variation must be taken into account when dealing with it. </p>
<p>Most importantly, the variation cannot be papered over with simplistic slogans or stereotypes. That women are not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia but are in places like Malaysia tells you something about this variation.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This article is the fourth in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/51804/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aaron W. Hughes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Since Islam is predicated on law, variations in the interpretation of that law – along with geography and distinct legal schools – have all contributed to differences in the religion.Aaron W. Hughes, Philip S. Bernstein Professor of Jewish Studies, University of RochesterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/521552016-02-15T19:21:12Z2016-02-15T19:21:12ZUnderstanding Islamic State: where does it come from and what does it want?<p><em>Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.</em> </p>
<p><em>Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State?</em></p>
<p><em>In the article kicking off <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">our series on the genesis of the group</a> below, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History James Gelvin cautions against easy answers. It’s a logical fallacy, he adds, to think that just because one event followed another, it was also caused by it.</em> </p>
<p><em>Far better to look at the interplay of historical and social forces, as well as recognising that outfits such as Islamic State often cherry-pick ideas to justify their ideas and behaviours.</em></p>
<p><em>Our series attempts, in a dispassionate way, to catalogue many of the forces and events that can arguably have played a part in creating the conditions necessary for these jihadists to emerge. We have tried to spread the net wide, but we make no claim to being comprehensive or having the final word on the origins of Islamic State.</em></p>
<p><em>Over the next two weeks, a selection of religious studies scholars and historians – modern and medieval – from around the world will bring their expertise to our discussion of what led to the most notorious jihadist group in recent history.</em></p>
<hr>
<p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State (IS)?</p>
<p>To the <a href="http://vm136.lib.berkeley.edu/BANC/ROHO/projects/debt/oilcrisis.html">oil shock of 1973-74</a>, when Persian Gulf oil producers used the huge surplus of dollars flowing into their coffers to finance the spread of their severe interpretation of Islam?</p>
<p>To the end of the first world war, when the victorious Entente powers sparked resentment throughout the Arab world by <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553">drawing artificial national borders</a> we hear so much about today? </p>
<p>How about 632 AD, the date of the <a href="http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/death.html">death of the Prophet Muhammad</a>, when the early Islamic community split on who should succeed him as its leader — a breach that led to <a href="http://origins.osu.edu/article/tradition-vs-charisma-sunni-shii-divide-muslim-world/page/0/0">the Sunni-Shi'i divide</a> that IS exploits for its own ends?</p>
<p>The possibilities seem endless and would make for an entertaining variation on the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Degrees_of_Kevin_Bacon">Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon</a> parlour game (which suggests any two people on earth are six or fewer acquaintance links apart) were the subject not so macabre. </p>
<p>But to look at any and all historical phenomena through a simple string of causes and effects is to ignore the almost infinite number of possible effects that might follow from any one purported cause. </p>
<p>It also opens the door to one of the most pernicious logical fallacies historians might commit: <em>post hoc, ergo propter hoc</em> (after this, therefore because of this). So rather than tracing the rise of IS to one or more events in the past, I suggest we take a different tack.</p>
<h2>A long line</h2>
<figure class="align-left ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=688&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109578/original/image-20160129-27177-1e6zxr8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=865&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Muhammad Ahmad, one of a long line of self-professed redeemers of the Islamic faith.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Ahmad#/media/File:Muhammad_Ahmad_al-Mahdi.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>IS is an instance of a phenomenon that recurs in most religions, and certainly in all <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/monotheism">monotheistic religions</a>. Every so often militant strains emerge, flourish temporarily, then vanish. They are then replaced by another militant strain whose own beginning is linked to a predecessor by nothing more profound than drawing from the same cultural pool as its predecessor.</p>
<p>In the seventh century, there were <a href="http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0047.xml">the Kharijites</a> (the first sect of Islam), a starkly puritanical group that assassinated two of the early caliphs. Like IS, the Kharajites thought they knew best what and who were truly Islamic, and what and who were not.</p>
<p>In the 18th century, there were the followers of <a href="http://www.britannica.com/biography/Muhammad-ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab">Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab</a>, a central Arabian preacher whose followers included <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_bin_Saud">Muhammad ibn Saud</a>, the founder of the Saudi dynasty. Believing that the worship of saints and the construction of mausoleums were impious acts, ibn Saud’s army destroyed sites holy to both Sunnis and Shi‘is in Arabia and present-day Iraq, much as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/isis-destruction-of-palmyra-syria-heart-been-ripped-out-of-the-city">IS targets sites from antiquity</a> today. </p>
<p>During the 19th century, <a href="http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Muhammad_Ahmad">Muhammad Ahmad</a>, a member of a religious order in what is now Sudan, proclaimed himself mahdi (redeemer of the Islamic faith), just as <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi</a>, inventor and leader of IS, recently proclaimed himself caliph (leader of the Islamic faith) — a more prosaic position. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Khartoum">Ahmad’s army overran Khartoum</a>, where it massacred a British-led garrison and beheaded its commander.</p>
<p>Between Muhammad Ahmad and al-Baghdadi there were many, many others.</p>
<p>While tempting, it would be a mistake to believe that each militant group “gave rise to” the next (although later militants have sometimes drawn from or been inspired by their predecessors). That would be the equivalent of saying that <a href="http://www.britannica.com/topic/Zealot">the ancient Zealots</a> (a Jewish sect that fought the Romans) gave rise to militant Israeli settlers on the West Bank, or that <a href="http://www.history.com/topics/crusades">medieval Crusaders</a> gave rise to abortion-clinic bombers. </p>
<h2>The right stuff</h2>
<p>From time to time (it’s impossible to predict when), some figure emerges in each tradition who puts his own spin on that tradition. To be successful, that spin must capture the imagination of some of that tradition’s adherents, who then try to put it into practice. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=428&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/109589/original/image-20160129-27159-1ewvj2z.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=538&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A newspaper featuring former al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Ali Jasim/Reuters</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Some spins, such as that of contemporary <a href="https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-wahhabism-in-saudi-arabia-36693">Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabis</a>, have sticking power. This is not because they are somehow “truer” than others, but because those who advocate for them are better able to mobilise resources – a core group of committed followers, for instance, military capabilities, or outside support – than others. Most do not.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27801676">Al-Baghdadi</a> is one such figure (as was al-Qaeda founder <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10741005">Osama bin Laden</a>). His spin melds together three ideas that come from the Islamic tradition. </p>
<p>The first is <em>khilafa</em> (caliphate). Al-Baghdadi believes that Islam requires a caliphate — governance in accordance with Islamic law over territory that’s under the authority of a caliph (a righteous and knowledgeable descendant of the prophet). </p>
<p>When <a href="http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/100620153">his forces took over Mosul</a> in the summer of 2014, al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself caliph and burnished his credentials for the job by changing his name to Caliph Ibrahim al-Quraishi al-Hashimi. The last two names signify he’s a member of the tribe of Muhammad and a descendant of the prophet.</p>
<p>The second idea al-Baghdadi brought into the mix is <em>takfir</em> – the act of pronouncing Muslims who disagree with IS’s strict interpretation of Islamic law to be apostates, which makes them punishable by death. This is the reason for IS’s murderous rampages against Shi‘is; rampages that even al-Qaeda central finds counter-productive, if not repugnant.</p>
<p>Resurrecting the concept of <em>takfir</em> was the idea of <a href="http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866">Abu Musab al-Zarqawi</a>, founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq. His strategy was to use the concept to tighten communal ties among Iraq’s Sunnis by mobilising them against its Shi‘is, thus making post-American-invasion Iraq ungovernable. </p>
<p>Al-Baghdadi has gone one step further, finding the concept useful in his effort to purify the territory of the caliphate which, he believes, will soon stretch across the Islamic world.</p>
<p>Finally, there is <em>hijra</em>, the migration of Muslims from <em>dar al-harb</em> (the abode of war, that is, non-Muslim majority countries) to <em>dar al-Islam</em> (the abode of Islam) – just as Muhammad and his early companions migrated from Mecca to Medina, where they established the first permanent Islamic community. </p>
<p>IS wants a great incoming of Muslims into the caliphate. This is both because it needs skilled administrators and fighters and because it considers emigration from “non-Muslim territory” to “Muslim territory” a religious obligation. </p>
<h2>A dangerous distraction</h2>
<p>According to some commentators, al-Baghdadi brought a fourth idea to the table: <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250080905">an apocalyptic vision</a>. They base this on the name of IS’s glossy magazine, Dabiq (the site in northern Syria where, Islamic tradition has it, the Battle of Armageddon will take place), articles in the magazine and propaganda videos.</p>
<p>It’s not too much of a stretch to attribute an apocalyptic vision to IS — after all, just as every monotheism is prone to militant strains, all are prone to apocalyptic visions as well. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced that the concept represents a significant part of IS’s worldview. </p>
<p>Whatever the future may hold, IS, like some <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/06/end-of-world-7-october-ebible-fellowship">apocalyptic Christian groups</a>, has proved itself so tactically and strategically adept that it has obviously kicked any “end of days” can well down the road (roughly the same distance al-Qaeda kicked the re-establishment of the caliphate can).</p>
<p>Further, much of the IS leadership consists of hard-headed <a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/">former Iraqi Ba‘th military officers</a> who, if they think about an apocalypse at all, probably treat it much as Hitler’s generals treated the purported musings of Nazi true believers – with a roll of their eyes. </p>
<p>Foregrounding IS’s apocalyptic worldview enables us to disparage the group as irrational and even medieval – a dangerous thing to do. If the recent past has demonstrated one thing, it’s that IS thrives when its adversaries underestimate it.</p>
<hr>
<p><em>This is the first article in our series on the <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/understanding-islamic-state">historical roots of Islamic State</a>. <a href="http://bit.ly/UnderstandingIS">Download our special report</a> collating the whole the series.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/52155/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>James L. Gelvin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>How far back in history does one have to go to find the roots of the so-called Islamic State? The first article in our series on the genesis of the terrorist outfit considers some fundamentals.James L. Gelvin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History, University of California, Los AngelesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/443832015-07-16T11:09:49Z2015-07-16T11:09:49ZWhy it’s time to give up on the idea of an Iraqi nation<p>The end of Iraq is no longer a matter of if, or a matter of when – it has already happened. The country has been on life support for too long, and no matter how hard external players try to save it, Iraq cannot save itself.</p>
<p>One of the fundamental properties of any nation state is some sense a national consciousness, a sense of belonging; shared values regardless of how abstract they may be and, most importantly, a collective commitment to the perpetuation of the nation itself, which is perceived to be organically connected to the state. Without these ingredients, there never can be a stable nation state. </p>
<p>Of course, one could argue that perhaps Iraq never had a cohesive national consciousness anyway. After all, Iraq was only constructed almost on a whim by the colonial masters of the previous century. Even at the height of “stability” under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a state without a nation. </p>
<p>There was very little effort put into building an Iraqi nation and the obstacles were always huge. The Kurds, who made up about <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28147263">17-20%</a> of the population, hardly subscribed to an Iraqi identity, and the Shia majority felt deeply marginalised by the political elite who were mainly Sunni.</p>
<p>But what’s happening in Iraq today is different from the realities of a classic multi-ethnic or multi-religious society in the Middle East. Similar situations and grievances exist in much of the region, but what makes the situation hopeless in Iraq is that there is no longer any strong state in power – and, more importantly, no prospect of one emerging any time soon. </p>
<h2>Out of the bottle</h2>
<p>Until 2003, Saddam’s Hussein’s repressive state at least put a lid on the chaos, but invasion, disastrous post-war policies and the opportunistic interference of regional states and sub-state actors finally let the genie out of the bottle. </p>
<p>The forces unleashed are now beyond control, and old animosities between ethno-sectarian groups are channelled into armed confrontation. This cycle of violence has effectively burned any grassroots bridges between the divided groups, who were supposed to be part of a nation, and these problems are here to stay even if Iraq cleanses itself of transnational jihadism. </p>
<p>The rise of Islamic State (IS) reflects a history of poor nation-building as much as anything else. The international coalition against IS has so far been ineffective but, in any case, cutting down IS without pulling up its roots would be nothing more than cosmetic surgery. IS is not really a threat to Iraq’s nationhood, rather a sign of its failure. The current hyper-sectarian conflict is not the cause, but the symptom of the failed nation-state model.</p>
<p>The country is divided into three parts, each of which centres around strong identities – Kurdish, Sunni and Shia – which predate the modern borders. For each of these groups, self-interest comes first. </p>
<p>The Kurds’ loyalty is first and foremost to Kurdistan – and they see an opportunity in the current chaos to realise their long-term <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15467672">dream of a Kurdish state</a>. In many aspects, the Kurdish region is already independent, and given what they have gone through over the years spent resisting IS, it would be inconceivable to imagine them embracing the old system.</p>
<p>Southern Iraq, meanwhile, is effectively a country of its own. The majority of Shia live in the south with a very strong sense of Shia identity. The Shia political elite has dominated what is left of the Iraqi state and has shown little appetite for acknowledging the interests of other ethnic and religious groups – which would have been the only way to save Iraq. After all, in this hyper-sectarian climate being attentive to other minorities could have negative implications for a “state” which is effectively dependent on Shia militia for survival.</p>
<p>Many Sunni tribes, on the other hand, are stuck between the likes of IS or a Shia majority government, which has a track record of discrimination against them. In the same week that there was an <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/world/middleeast/coalition-fighting-islamic-state-meets-in-paris.html?_r=0">anti-IS coalition conference</a> in Paris to try to save Iraq, 50 more Sunni tribes <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/sunni-sheiks-pledge-allegiance-isil-iraq-anbar-150604074642668.html">gave their allegiance</a> to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi because they feared the rise of Shia militia with links to Iran.</p>
<h2>Face facts</h2>
<p>So what could be the answer? Democracy? Federalism? Iraq’s hyper-sectarian politics would never allow a democratic system to flourish within either a federal or centrist system. Sectarianism destroys the roots of civic culture and undermines the development of any functioning civil society, which is the backbone of any democratic system. </p>
<p>As has been proven time and time again in Iraq, people vote to empower their sect, meaning the Sunni minority will be perpetually disadvantaged. This inevitably feeds the politics of victimisation and, in turn, leads to endless battles over the distribution of power between the haves and the have-nots. </p>
<p>Although there are uncertainties about the result of this painful disintegration process, there is very little chance that an Iraqi nation state like that we knew before 2003 can ever be resurrected.</p>
<p>It’s about time we faced facts: Iraq is dead.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/44383/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Afshin Shahi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Attempts to build a nation out of Iraq have failed spectacularly. Why is everyone still so intent on keeping it together?Afshin Shahi, Director of the Centre for the Study of Political Islam & Lecturer in International Relations and Middle East Politics, University of BradfordLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/421462015-05-22T10:20:25Z2015-05-22T10:20:25ZThe ISIS takeover of Ramadi means hard choices face the Iraqi and US governments<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82584/original/image-20150521-979-4rvhkl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=496&fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">ISIS take Ramadi; on the move in Iraq</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.shutterstock.com/pic-254517352/stock-photo-islamic-state-isis-or-isil-unrecognized-state-and-sunni-jihadist-group-active-in-iraq-and-syria.html?src=pp-same_artist-237997351-1&ws=1">Steve Allen/Shutterstock </a></span></figcaption></figure><p>Last Friday, the city of Ramadi – provincial capital of Iraq’s Anbar Province, and symbolic seat of its Sunni population – <a href="http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/05/21/Taking-Ramadi-Behind-ISISs-Bloody-Assault">fell</a> to an ISIS assault. </p>
<p>The loss is devastating, and not only because of the city’s size or symbolic value, or because it’s another reminder that ISIS is on the march. The loss is devastating because between Ramadi and Baghdad there is only one major city, Fallujah, which has long since fallen to ISIS and has always been known as a radical hotbed. </p>
<p>Beyond that is the capital itself. On the Baghdad side of the provincial frontier, Iranian-backed, Shiite militias are poised to move across the line to retake Anbar.</p>
<p>Hard choices about halting ISIS now and building a secure, inclusive Iraq confront both the Iraqi government and the US and its allies in the region. </p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=237&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=642&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/82461/original/image-20150520-11422-ve4fnw.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=807&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Iraq.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Pavalena/Shutterstock</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<h2>The experience of working in Anbar</h2>
<p>My work for an <a href="http://www.ird.org">international nonprofit organization</a> first brought me to Anbar in the summer of 2007, not long after the American-led coalition had written the province off as “lost to the insurgency.” The push to retake it by combining the efforts of US forces and tribal militias (the “Sunni Awakening Movement” or <a href="http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-its-rise-and-fall">Sahwa</a>) had begun earlier that year, and by the summer had gained traction. </p>
<p>From that summer through the spring of 2008, I led a locally hired staff in efforts to reduce the involvement of youth in the insurgency in the area of a city called Hit, a few miles west into Anbar from Ramadi; in 2010, I returned to Anbar with a different organization, this time to Ramadi itself, as head of a <a href="http://www.globalcommunities.org">project</a> integrating internally displaced people who had fled to the Ramadi district from elsewhere in Iraq. My leadership role required understanding the politics and society of the area well enough to effect change without also creating unintended consequences.</p>
<p>My observations here are based in large part on my own knowledge of the region. </p>
<h2>How ISIS found a beachhead in Anbar province</h2>
<p>ISIS’ successes in Anbar province do not come out of nowhere; they come from long history of negative interactions between the Sunni and Shia of Iraq and from American and Iranian interventions. </p>
<p>ISIS’ beachhead within Sunni-dominated Anbar – that segment of the population that either didn’t resist the extremist group or that actively facilitated its advance – has its foundations in the way the US pursued the war in Iraq from the 2003 invasion onward. The US strategy prioritized short-term stability over long-term inclusive governance, and ignored the Shiite-dominated government’s pursuit of that stability through the exclusion and repression of the Sunni minority. That was followed by the sense of betrayal among Anbar’s tribal militias and the Sahwa fighters, who had fought alongside US troops to retake Anbar from the insurgency in 2007 and 2008. </p>
<p>Those fighters were subjected to greater-than-average exclusion by the government in Baghdad, ejected from or denied jobs that had been promised during the American tenure, and targeted by Iranian-backed Shia militia violence. Many saw the American withdrawal of forces as abandonment, and some have since joined the ranks of ISIS’ fighters. </p>
<p>That was worsened by the <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11733715">Nouri al-Maliki</a> government’s overtly repressive and exclusionary policies toward the Sunni population, which were in turn worsened by the new <a href="http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/21117">Haider al-Abadi</a> government’s failure to change those policies, and use of Shia paramilitaries – long a battlefield enemy to the Sunni – to bolster the overwhelmed Iraqi army in fighting ISIS. </p>
<p>Anbar’s Sunni population is very much aware of the threat from ISIS; the fighters under the black flag have not met with an unalloyed welcome, but rather by Sunni tribal militias fighting them street by street. </p>
<h2>Who is seen as the greater threat? ISIS or the Shiite government?</h2>
<p>But while <em>some</em> of the Sunni population sees threat from ISIS, <em>all</em> of the population sees threat from the Shiite government and militias. ISIS’ combination of superior force and political beachhead has been amplified by the fact that the group has good administrators as well as good fighters – a contrast to central government failures with regard to basic services, which has served it well throughout the Sunni parts of Iraq and Syria alike.</p>
<h2>So what happens next?</h2>
<p>American and other international actors, seeing one strategy in ruins, argue over what to replace it with, and whether the fall of Ramadi represents a strategic failure or merely a setback. </p>
<p>But this misses a critical point. The real question isn’t about the strategy of the American administration. The real question is about the strategy of the <em>Iraqi</em> administration – not to defeat ISIS, but to build an Iraqi society and politics that’s inclusive of Sunni and Kurd as well as Shiite.</p>
<p>Throughout its years in power, the Maliki government could hardly have done more to convince <a href="http://aina.org/news/20140615144922.htm">Iraqi Sunnis</a> that they faced a real threat. The new government, distracted by ISIS since almost its first day in office, <a href="http://www.npr.org/2014/06/26/325909167/in-new-iraqi-conflict-sunni-awakening-stays-dormant">has done far too little </a>to ameliorate that perception. Instead, it has already used <a href="http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/saddam-hussein-isis-leadership/2015/04/05/id/636539/">paramilitary Shia militias</a> to bolster its flagging regular military – the same militias that fought with Sunni counterparts during recent years of warfare. </p>
<p>The use of those militias, exacerbated by reports that they turned their violence on <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/shia-fighters-accused-killing-civilians-iraq-150127062642331.html">Sunni populations</a> immediately after engaging ISIS’ fighters in <a href="http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/04/07/398004441/after-retaking-tikrit-shiite-militias-accused-of-violence-against-sunnis">Tikrit</a> and elsewhere, has only added to the problem. </p>
<p>The result: All the easy options are long since gone, and any strategy to defeat ISIS will fail if it doesn’t address the underlying drivers of insecurity and/or continues using the same tools that previously fueled violence.</p>
<h2>Facing the hard options in Iraq</h2>
<p>That may sound glib, but it’s also going to be impossible to rouse the will to tackle the hard options until this tough reality is recognized and accepted. Some situations simply do not lend themselves to easy, straightforward solutions. </p>
<p>In the meantime, those Shiite militias massing west of Baghdad on the Anbar frontier are certainly capable of winning the initial fight against ISIS. With more easily defensible supply lines, they can mobilize greater numbers and greater firepower than the ISIS fighters now holding Ramadi. The US, seeking to defeat ISIS as soon as possible, will likely add air power and perhaps even special operations troops to the fight. The Iraqi flag will fly over Ramadi again, however briefly. </p>
<p>But unless an Iraqi-conceived and Iraqi-led plan for a peaceful governance – which includes Sunnis – follows, the victory will be Pyrrhic. Those militias will be seen – for good reason – as a worse threat than ISIS in the long term and at least as bad in the short term by the population of Ramadi. The militias are symbolic of more than a decade’s worth of sectarian violence, and while there may be a temporary alliance against a larger enemy, that alliance will be entirely ephemeral.</p>
<h2>Two key actions, short term and long term, are required</h2>
<p>ISIS cannot, of course, be allowed to continue its expansion or to continue holding the territory it has already taken. But two things are required if Baghdad wants to halt ISIS and also ensure that a civil war between Sunni tribal militias and Shia paramilitaries does not begin the second the fighting with ISIS is done. </p>
<p>For the short term, the Iraqi government should ensure that any troops massing on the Anbar provincial frontier are Sunni, with Sunni leadership and the full and explicit blessing of the national government as such. </p>
<p>For the long term, Baghdad will need to provide guarantees of inclusive, nonrepressive government and power-sharing for the Sunni population. </p>
<p>Iraq’s government will need to lay out its own explicitly Iraqi strategy for socio-political inclusion and power sharing -— something it has yet to do. That strategy cannot be seen as either American or Iranian, if it hopes to induce willing Sunni participation in a shared government. </p>
<p>No American strategy, no matter how tactically decisive, will make a positive difference in the presence of an Iraqi government that continues to do its utmost to marginalize and repress the Sunni population. The US has been reminded that imposed regime change is a losing battle – change needs to be argued out by the Iraqis themselves. </p>
<p>A successful strategy regarding ISIS would aim to produce a peaceful, unified Iraq in which ISIS cannot find common cause. There will, of course, be a need for some tactical action to dislodge the group and protect civilians in the short term. </p>
<p>But the attempt to “defeat ISIS militarily” without also ensuring that change is the same strategy that scattered broken pieces of al-Qaida into the fertile ground of Iraqi exclusion … only to see it grow into this new menace. </p>
<p>As will happen again, if we continue to make the mistake of bringing defeat and forgetting to build peace.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/42146/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Alpher does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>ISIS victories in Iraq do not come out of the blue; the group’s military success results from a long history of tensions between Sunnis and Shia and US policies that fostered such tension.David Alpher, Adjunct Professor at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.